How to Dance to the Music: On the Relationship between Music and Dance
Solveig Aasen (University of Oslo)
Saturday, October 13, 11:15-1:15 (Quebec)

This paper discusses some difficulties with accounting for the match that there can sometimes be between a piece of music and accompanying dance. The main emphasis is on the suggestion that the match can be explained as obtaining between music’s and dance’s respective movement. While this suggestion seems promising, because it identifies one feature that the two art forms have in common, it runs into problems on several scores.

Humour as a Social Practice
Daniel Abrahams (University of Glasgow)
Thursday, October 11, 11:15-1:15 (British Columbia)

Increasingly, conventional accounts of humour put the focus on some process that happens inside the person experiencing humour. There is some distinctive cognitive or biological process, and it is by the triggering of this process that humour is understood. In this paper I will argue that there is good reason to believe not only that these accounts are not correct, but this style of account cannot be true. Against these accounts I advocate for an account of humour that puts the focus on humour as a social practice that has developed over time. To achieve this, I appeal to historical examples of humour practice, and argue that what they have in common is the pursuit of laughter.

Fearing Fearless Girl
Sondra Bacharach (Victoria University of Wellington) & Deborah Tollefsen (University of Memphis)
Saturday, October 13, 9:00-11:00 (Quebec)

On March 7th, 2017 New Yorkers woke to a new girl in town: brave, little Fearless Girl stood, squarely facing off against the famous Charging Bull statue. Created Visbal and commissioned by State Street Global Advisors (SSgA), her arrival prompted a lawsuit by Charging Bull’s creator Arturo Di Modica, arguing Fearless Girl had transformed Charging Bull’s meaning by emasculating him. We argue that Di Modica is wrong: Fearless Girl hasn’t changed Charging Bull’s meaning – it’s much worse than that. Visbal has appropriated Charging Bull and in doing so, vandalized it! To defend our position, we will clarify the boundaries between artworks, appropriation and vandalism.
Artistic and Aesthetic Characterisations
Aleksey Balotskiy (University of British Columbia)
Saturday, October 13, 9:00-11:00 (Algonquin)

In a recent paper, Anthony Cross attempts to revive the view, attributed to Paul Ziff, that art criticism is primarily in the business of practical reasoning. This view is offered as an alternative not only to the view that art criticism is primarily in the business of theoretical reasoning, but also to the view that art criticism is primarily in the business of facilitating aesthetic experience. Although my suspicion is that any attempt to find the primary aim of art criticism is destined to fail, I am sympathetic to Cross’s conclusion that many of the aims of contemporary art criticism can be fruitfully characterized in practical terms. I disagree, however, with Cross’s claim that the plausibility of this conclusion demonstrates the inadequacy of the facilitating model, which I take to be the view that at least one important kind of art criticism is primarily in the business of neither practical nor theoretical reasoning but the business of facilitating aesthetic experiences. I will defend this claim by arguing that Cross fails to recognize a distinction between what I hope to show are in fact two different activities. On the one hand, there is art criticism, much of which I think is fruitfully conceived of in primarily practical rather than theoretical or facilitating terms. On the other hand, there is aesthetic criticism, which I will argue is neither primarily practical nor theoretical but facilitating.

A Fresh Approach to the Meta-Ontology of Art
Elisa Caldarola (University of Padua)
Thursday, October 11, 9:00-11:00 (Algonquin)

There is growing debate about what is the correct methodology for research in the ontology of artworks. Deriving inspiration from Stephen Yablo’s work on the meta-ontology of folk number talk, this paper introduces semantic descriptivism – a semantic approach that has an impact on meta-ontological views and can be linked with a hermeneutic fictionalist proposal on the meta-ontology of artworks.

If it’s all improvised, why does it always have to be funny?
Clément Canonne (CNRS - IRCAM - Sorbonne Université)
Thursday, October 11, 2:45-5:00 (British Columbia)

Improvisational theater is mainly associated with comedy. But why is it so? In order to answer this question, I will examine three main philosophical theories of humor and show how the mechanisms that underlie those theories are constitutive part of the creative process of collective improvisation itself. In other words, I will argue that collective improvisation, through its core properties (polyphony, unpredictability and processuality), can provide the improvisers with many comical resources that can then be more or less actively exploited to create funny situations. As a support for my argumentation, I will discuss several examples taken from a series of shows that took place in Washington D.C. during FIST 2017 – a yearly competition of improvised theater. As such, by engaging with both philosophical theories of humor and concrete examples of live improv shows, this short paper will hopefully lay the ground for an
aesthetic of improv comedy – a genre of growing importance in contemporary theatrical practices that has only received too little attention in philosophical aesthetics.

**Art by Fiat? Copyright, Ontology, and Metalinguistic Negotiation**
Elizabeth Cantalamessa (University of Miami)
Winner of the Outstanding Student Paper Award
*Thursday, October 11, 11:15-1:15 (Algonquin)*

Appropriation art (AA) involves the use of pre-existing works of art with little to no transformation applied to them. It is necessary for a work of AA that it is not regarded as a copy of the original work. Due to the intimate relationship between the concept COPY and legal conventions, AA is also an artkind essentially connected to legal practices. In legal cases regarding AA and fair use, judges lack a general principle whereby they can decide whether or not an author has sufficiently transformed the original work in order to qualify as creating a new work. Further, it is not the case that there is some descriptive fact that could determine the outcome one way or another. I then diagnose legal debates surrounding transformative use as cases of “metalinguistic negotiation” over the concept COPY. The judge in making the decision that some AA object is fair use determines that the work should not be treated or regarded as a copy. Thus, which receptive features the work has are not fully “up to the artist” because the creative mental processes that determine the essential aesthetic features include the decisions of legal agents. Consequently, judicial decisions play a role in fixing the receptive features that delineate the ontological nature of the work and, in some broad sense, partially constitute the work itself.

**Which City? Whose Streets?**
Tony Chackal (Missouri State University)
*Thursday, October 11, 9:00-11:00 (Manitoba)*

Street art scholars discuss various meanings of the “street” in street art. Two meanings are spatial/logistical and socio-cultural. I discuss two approaches employing them, which prioritize the street as spatial rather than place-based. A spatial approach aims for a universal, totalizing definition and cannot accommodate place-relative aspects and cultural diversity across global street art. Alternatively, a pace-based approach accommodates both material and immaterial aspects of the street and culturally variant and place-relative values, knowledge, and histories. Place must be seen in conjunction with community – a body of interdependent beings dwelling in an environment. I posit community as a third sense of the street. One view holds that “the street decides” which works succumb to ephemerality, suggesting collective action. Yet, a diffuse street art community’s decisions are merely descriptive summative results of individual actions. An organized street art community’s decisions may be collective and normative when it aggregates individual beliefs and decisions into collective ones through a procedure.
What counts as bodily decoration or adornment?
Stephen Davies (University of Auckland)
Saturday, October 13, 11:15-1:15 (Manitoba)

Adornment involves a successfully enacted intention to produce a noticeable aesthetic improvement through adding to or subtracting from an independently identifiable whole. The aesthetic improvement achieved is usually secondary to the whole's primary (artifactual or biological) function. Where the whole is a human person, adornment needs to be distinguished from bodily maintenance and bodily reconstruction, though these distinctions are not always easy to draw and differ from place to place and time to time according to custom.

There Are No Aesthetic Obligations
John Dyck (City University of New York)
Thursday, October 11, 2:45-5:00 (Algonquin)

Do we ever have a duty to aesthetically appreciate certain artworks or objects? If so, there are distinctively aesthetic obligations. Several accounts of, and/or arguments for, aesthetic obligations have been proposed, most recently from Archer and Ware (2018), Eaton (2008), and Kubala (2016). I consider these accounts and the arguments upon which they rest. I sketch a positive argument that there are no aesthetic obligations. Perhaps we have reasons to appreciate aesthetic objects, but these reasons never amount to duties. Using a familiar meta-normative framework from Dancy, I argue that aesthetic considerations only entice us—they never compel us. Furthermore, I argue, the idea that there are implicit aesthetic obligations is a harmful notion itself. I close by arguing that, to the extent that there are aesthetic obligations, their force comes from precisely beyond the aesthetic. The aesthetic realm is so powerful not because the aesthetic realm places duties on us, but precisely because of its connection to cultural, social, and political realms—realms which place duties on us.

Pictures and Persuasion
A.W. Eaton (University of Illinois-Chicago)
Thursday, October 11, 2:45-5:00 (Quebec)

This paper concerns the pragmatics of pictures; in particular, how pictures shape viewers’ sentiments (affect-laden object-directed mental states). I discuss how pictures persuade viewers that certain sentiments are appropriate to depicted objects and argue that pictures persuade not so much by expressing propositions as they do by conjuring perspectives. A perspective is a first-person view of some depicted object that is presented as warranting certain sentimental responses. Pictorial rhetoric is the means by which pictures prescribe these responses. By way of analysis of pictures from advertising, high art, and propaganda, I detail the various mechanisms of pictorial rhetoric.
The Social Life of (Platonic) Beauty
Jonathan Fine (Yale University)
Friday, October 12, 11:15-1:15 (Algonquin)

The ancient Greek concept of the kalon (beautiful, admirable, noble) connects beauty to shame and honor at the heart of a good life. This paper investigates this connection to retrieve the distinctly social dimension of beauty. Examining how, for Plato, the kalon regulates ethical motivations to appear beautiful before and be admired by others helps us to come to terms with the complex dynamics of beauty in social modes of self-presentation and its fundamental yet ambivalent place in contemporary ethical life.

Three Kinds of Racialized Disgust in Film
Dan Flory (Montana State University)
Friday, October 12, 9:00-11:00 (Algonquin)

This essay provides an argument for different kinds of racialized disgust in response to narrative fiction film. Recent research in cognitive psychology and the philosophy of emotions has suggested that disgust is entangled with Western conceptions of race. We know, too, from other areas of research (as well, perhaps, from personal experience) that visceral repulsion can be so powerful that it can become difficult or even impossible to imagine the stories that evoke such feelings. A question thus arises, how does disgust shape our cinematic responses regarding race? I argue that the cinematic intersection of race and disgust may be preliminarily categorized into at least three major types: (i) white racialized disgust, (ii) moral disgust at racism, and (iii) a form of aesthetic disgust that encourages reflection about race. This three-part categorization of racialized cinematic disgust is offered as a preliminary way to distinguish between its different varieties. No doubt it will require subsequent revision, refinement, and supplementation. However, the reason that these three forms of racialized disgust seem worth exploring is they tell us a great deal about race as well as our affective attitudes toward film, particularly because they seem to be nonconscious. Moreover, not only have movies historically elicited such affects, but there continue to exist underappreciated peculiarities in many filmgoers’ knee-jerk resistances or refusals to imagine race, and those peculiarities indicate that our understanding of the intersection between race, cinematic imagining, and forms of embodied affect like disgust remains inadequate and in need of further research.

Platonism about Stories: Creativity without Creation
Patrick Grafton-Cardwell (University of Massachusetts-Amherst)
Friday, October 12, 11:15-1:15 (Algonquin)

In this paper, I take up a question about the metaphysics of fiction, specifically about stories and whether they are created or not. In §1 I pose my Main Question, which is whether stories are created or discovered. In §2 I articulate my preferred answer to the Main Question. The view I espouse is that stories are discovered, not created. I spend some time in that section saying just what sort of ontological categories I take discovered stories to fall under. In §3 I
offer three arguments for my view of stories. The arguments provide a cumulative case for my view over and against the view that stories are created.

“Loving a lovely sight” and expressivism in aesthetics
James Harold (Mount Holyoke College)
Friday, October 12, 2:45-5:00 (Quebec)

In A Record for Practice, Wang Yangming compares knowing what is right to loving a lovely sight, and knowing what is wrong to hating a hateful smell. The first part of the paper offers a close reading and defense of Wang’s argument. The second part shows that the conclusion of Wang’s argument offers support to expressivism.

First, Wang claims that awareness of the aesthetic qualities of the object immediately brings with it an emotional response. In support of this, he notes that there is no inference from or any other kind of intermediate step in between becoming aware of the object’s aesthetic qualities to loving (or hating) the object. Third, he claims that one who is not able to sense the object’s aesthetic qualities properly will not emotionally respond to it. From this he concludes that knowing the aesthetic qualities of the object is the same as loving or hating it.

According to expressivists, aesthetic claims are first and foremost motivational in nature. Wang’s argument shows that aesthetic judgments, like seeing a lovely sight, necessarily motivate the viewer – they involve the viewer’s actually loving the sight. So the state that the viewer is in must be one that is motivational. The unity of seeing a lovely sight with loving that sight is best explained by expressivism: we come to love what we see, which simultaneously involves both feeling love and expressing that love in seeing the object as lovely, that is, as meriting our love.

Feeling Pirouettes? A Paradox of Automatic Accounts of Kinesthesis
Ian Heckman (University of British Columbia)
Saturday, October 13, 11:15-1:15 (Quebec)

Kinesthesis, the ability to perceive in one’s own body what it would be like to perform movement we see, has been posited as an important capacity to be used in the appreciation of dance. Contemporary philosophical views of kinesthesis present it as an automatic human capacity. Kinesthesis occurs whenever someone watches movement and occurs independently of our will. However, an unnoticed paradox arises from this view about kinesthesis. When combined with a few uncontroversial empirical assumptions and that kinesthesis provides us with internal, sensible qualia, the automaticity of kinesthesis runs into contradiction. This paper argues that we must therefore reject automaticity and instead replace it with a view of kinesthesis as a more active human ability.
Materials and Meaning in Contemporary Sculpture
Sherri Irvin (University of Oklahoma)
Saturday, October 13, 9:00-11:00 (Quebec)

This paper addresses a neglected question about sculpture: how does the nature of the sculptural material contribute to the content of the work? I argue that the inclusion in contemporary sculpture of non-standard materials like chocolate, soap, shoes, sugar, and blood makes a distinct contribution to artwork content. Artists, audiences and critics clearly recognize this contribution, but philosophers have scarcely acknowledged it. I offer a taxonomy of three types of case in which non-standard materials are included, and argue that this inclusion can contribute to artwork content both by influencing sculptural representation (what a sculpture represents through the form or configuration of its materials) and through mechanisms independent of sculptural representation. Through examination of specific cases, such as Willi Cole’s *Shine* (2007) and Kara Walker’s monumental *A Subtlety* (2014), I demonstrate the role of sculptural materials in artwork meaning. I discuss the role of the artist’s intention in activating particular resonances of the included material and argue that actual inclusion of material plays a crucial role that is not reducible to the material’s mere appearance.

Fittingness and Value: A Two-Level Theory of (Some) Aesthetic Normativity
Robbie Kubala (Columbia University)
Thursday, October 11, 2:45-5:00 (Algonquin)

Much recent work in aesthetic normativity takes for granted an axiological model, on which value is the principal normative concept. But certain paradigmatic aesthetic practices—such as interpretation, appreciation, and presentation—seem to encompass judgments of fittingness as well as judgments of value. In this paper, I argue for three claims: (i) concepts of fittingness and value must both be deployed to account for the normativity of these practices, (ii) fittingness cannot be reduced to value, and (iii) the relation between them is best captured by a two-level theory, inspired by John Rawls, on which the practices as a whole are justified by considerations of value, but particular actions falling under the practices are justified by considerations of fittingness.

Referential uses of pictures
John Kulvicki (Dartmouth College)
Thursday, October 11, 2:45-5:00 (Quebec)

Even if they are not without detractors, the following two claims about pictorial content seem reasonable. First, pictorial content is richly descriptive. Pictures can represent, for example, a very fine-grained spatial distribution of highly determinate shades of color. Second, sometimes pictures refer in virtue of these richly descriptive contents. We might say, for example, that a picture refers to Obama because it captures his appearance, and no one else’s. In that sense, Obama can be the content of a picture.

This paper asks whether there is another sense in which individuals like Obama, Niagara Falls, your mom, and so on, might be the contents of pictures. Specifically, I want to suggest
that in some cases individuals are, constitutively, the contents of pictures. They are not contents merely in virtue of pictures picking them our descriptively, as a definite or indefinite description might. In these cases, pictures are used referentially.

**Margaret Atwood and a Feminist Aesthetics of the Small Screen**
Kathryn Lawson (Queen’s University)
*Saturday, October 13, 9:00-11:00 (Manitoba)*

The 2017 adaptation of Margaret Atwood’s *The Handmaid’s Tale* to the small screen marks a distinct shift in the medium of television: it offers the possibility of a fully formulated feminist aesthetics of the small screen. This essay distinguishes the key features of such an aesthetics as the merger of the public and private realms, the fallacious distinction between low and high art, the contextual nature of truth, and the importance of alternative narratives. The defining characteristic of this feminist aesthetics is its political impact.

**Cultural Appropriation as Scorekeeping in an Oppression Game**
Shen-yi Liao (University of Puget Sound)
*Friday, October 12, 2:45-5:00 (British Columbia)*

This paper aims to redefine the parameters of debates about cultural appropriation: such debates can only proceed productively if cultural appropriation is conceptualized as *structural* and *dynamic*, rather than *individualistic* and *static*. In particular, it develops an alternative conception of cultural appropriation with attention to artistic cases, such as subaltern artifact, literary yellowface, and indigenous artist Brian Jungen’s artworks.

**The Nature of Perceptual Expertise and the Rationality of Criticism**
Errol Lord (University of Pennsylvania)
*Saturday, October 13, 9:00-11:00 (Algonquin)*

It borders on truistic that (rational) aesthetic judgments must be based on perceptual experience with the object that is judged. It is also plausible—although perhaps not truistic—that criticism is a rational enterprise. Indeed, criticism appears to wear this on its sleeve. Critics appear to provide arguments for their critical conclusions. These two claims are famously in tension with each other. We can see this most clearly by noting that if rational aesthetic judgments must be based on perceptual experiences, then we cannot get rational aesthetic judgments via inference. If this is right, though, then it seems dubious that criticism is an ordinary argumentative activity. This is because ordinary argumentative activities present arguments that are inferential in structure. Given the essential role of perception to the justification of aesthetic judgment, this sort of thinking doesn’t seem to give us legitimate access to the aesthetic facts. Thus, it looks like criticism is rationally dubious. Frank Sibley infamously resolves the tension by holding that while critics aim to guide perception, the considerations they cite do not provide justification for their judgments. On the other end of the spectrum, Fabian Dorsch resolves the tension by denying that noninferential perceptual justification is central to the justification of aesthetic judgment. Instead, Dorsch suggests that
justified aesthetic judgments are inferentially justified. This paper provides a middle path between these two extremes. It does this via what I take to be the best account of the metaphysics of aesthetic perception and perceptual expertise. According to this account, we perceive aesthetic features only after we gain capacities that allow for aesthetic enrichment of the contents of our experiences. The structure and etiology of aesthetic perceptions have important epistemic consequences. Most importantly, their unique structure and etiology makes it plausible that they provide a sort of non-foundational direct access to the aesthetic features of things. This allows us to dissolve our tension. Perceptual experience of aesthetic features can play an essential role in justified aesthetic judgment and criticism can be a rational activity. Critics really do elucidate the structure of their justification (at least the successful ones). This is because they elucidate the features that their justification epistemically depends upon.

The Artist’s Word: Artistic Intentions and Emotional Understanding
Irene Martínez Marin (Uppsala University)
Friday, October 12, 11:15-1:15 (British Columbia)

Even in an intentionalist context, the artist’s direct statements about her own artistic intentions is a largely divisive form of artistic interpretative evidence. Here I defend moderate actual intentionalism, the view of artistic interpretation that takes into consideration this category of evidence. I propose that if we turn from a narrow debate over semantic content to a more general debate about emotional response and appreciation, there are new reasons to be given in support of moderate actual intentionalism and against hypothetical intentionalism. My argumentation will reveal that the reasons that sustain the rejection of the artist’s statement have to do with three notions that are problematic or ill-formed when clarified them from an ‘emotional’ perspective. Firstly, the belief that public avowals are semantic facts as opposed to evidence of meaning, secondly, the claim that artistic intentions are private, and lastly, the assumption that a monist position limits freedom of interpretation. The artworks that will help me to develop my argument are from contemporary autobiographical visual art, such as Ghada Amer, Tracey Emin, and Louis Bourgeois. The declarations from these artists about their intentions will reveal that their statement not only allows the interpreter to grasp the meaning of a confessional work, but also, contributes to a richer emotional understanding of it.

The Kids Are Not Al’ght: Net.Artist Jon Rafman’s Ethnography of Virtual World Reality
Darla Migan (Vanderbilt University)
Friday, October 12, 11:15-1:15 (Quebec)

The title and content of my paper is inspired by the track “The Kids Aren’t Alright” on the 1998 album Americana by the skate punk band The Offspring. In the paper I wish to highlight one representative of a subset of suburban kids who came of age in the 1990s, had access to the first home personal computers, and became what is now recognized as the first wave of commercially successful net artists today. Net.artist Jon Rafman explores the role of virtual worlds in building our contemporary reality. I discuss Rafman’s latest public installation titled Dream Journal May 2016–February 2017. Originally gaining attention in the artworld for his ongoing photo project, “The Nine
Eyes of Google Street View” (started in 2008) and popular among many artists on the contemporary global art scene today, in his latest work Rafman explores the deep net to create a fictional portrayal of the reality of a particular subculture that first emerged online. I offer a phenomenological description of the work to situate the means of production that the work stands in (organized by elements of the real, the virtual, and the simulated) to clarify the urgency of the political realities it reflects. I conclude that for Rafman, despite the vast possibilities for building deeply subversive online worlds, the Internet should not be understood as an escape from alienated reality but as, instead, manifesting alienation in new forms.

On the Structure of Improv-Artistry as a Skillful Action
Tyler Olsson (University of California, Santa Cruz)
*Thursday, October 11, 2:45-5:00 (British Columbia)*

Skillful improv-artistry is philosophically puzzling in that it seems to involve both an anti-intellectual dimension as well as an intellectual dimension. On the one hand, artistic improvisation occurs through an automatic response disposition, requiring little to no thought (anti-intellectual). This consideration problematizes the way in which the improv artist is responsible for what she does. On the other hand, next to being automatic and spontaneous, it transpires that improvisation is prima facie subject to normative appraisal—when the artist does what she does well, her actions are said to be appropriate as if they were in accord with some rule, namely the rule of improvisation. This would suggest that improvisation involves a reflective, attentive intellectual dimension that in fact ties the action to responsibility and which vindicates our inclination toward appraising the improviser normatively. In this paper I wish to unpack in more detail the structure of improvisation so considered, and I argue that we can use the attention-control account of skillful action expounded by Bermudez in his recent work to understand better the way in which improv-artistry is a paradigmatic example of skillful action that is both automatic and reflective. One’s attention when improvising is oriented toward an overarching goal to be open to one’s environment, and this attention is structured by a higher-order, performance-related intention which puts lower-order, habitual motor processes into action. I liken this structure to a Wittgensteinian sense of rule following, and I apply the account to the example of lyric poetry.

Transformative Torture
Emmanuel Ordóñez Angulo (University College-London)
*Saturday, October 13, 11:15-1:15 (Manitoba)*
Winner of an Irene H. Chayes New Voices Award

One long-standing aim of film has been to acquaint viewers with extreme suffering. This aim has important extra-aesthetic, epistemological and normative dimensions. Here I show why and how only first-person Virtual Reality experience can meet them. To support this, I draw on recent developments in the philosophy of mind (Paul 2014, 2015, forthcoming; Camp forthcoming) and on established insights on the necessarily self-involving nature of suffering. Though prompted by an issue in aesthetics, the essay aims to advertise the philosophical study of Virtual Reality and to bring out the normative significance of the notion of transformative
One major motivation for developing theories of artwork completion is to inform our appreciative practices. Current theories, however, are deficient in how they guide judgments we make about completion status. In section one, I rely on a central intuition – concerning the primary importance of the artist’s relation to the work – to argue for the plausibility of the Disposition View (DV) of artwork completion over its three main competitors. In section two, I highlight the difficulties in applying DV. In section three, I suggest a standard for applying DV which aids its ability to inform our judgments.

According to immoralists, some artworks can be better aesthetically in virtue of their immorality. A.W. Eaton recently offered a novel defence of this view, seeking to overcome shortcomings in previous accounts (notably those of Daniel Jacobson and Matthew Kieran), and thereby occasioning a reconsideration of immoralism. Yet, I will argue in this paper that not only is Eaton’s defence of immoralism unsuccessful, but that her most promising argument for it rests on covert moralist assumptions that are, eo ipso, incompatible with immoralism.

Philosophical discussions of musical performance have focused on instrumental Western art music from the common-practice period, understood in terms of the classical paradigm (David Davies 2011). According to the classical paradigm, most performances are performances of pre-existing works and performing a pre-existing work involves intending to follow the score. Most opera productions cannot be described by the classical paradigm, due to the frequency with which opera directors intentionally depart from the libretto and score. This paper argues that there are two dominant paradigms of opera performance today, drawing on recent productions by Toronto-based companies. Some performances are produced with the aim of affording audiences perceptual experiences of pre-existing works. In identifying operatic work-performances, I argue that fidelity to the score and libretto is insufficient. Building on Davies’s account of the classical paradigm for spoken theatre, I argue that operatic work-performances must be faithful to the work’s point and convey that point through a moderately faithful performance of the work’s plot and score. Productions that resist description under this rubric can be explained by James Hamilton’s (2007) ingredients model. Examples include productions
that revise or add to the work’s score and libretto and those that contain faithful performances of these texts but use these performances to articulate a substantially different point or plot from the ones these texts were intended to convey. Understanding such productions under the ingredients model will make much needed distinctions between the aims of directors like Peter Sellars and those guiding more historically informed productions.

**Learning to See Beauty: a novel account of aesthetic perception**  
Madeleine Ransom (University of British Columbia)  
*Friday, October 12, 11:15-1:15 (British Columbia)*

Do we perceive the beauty of sunsets, faces and sculptures, or are our judgments of beauty non-perceptual? One problem for the perceptual view is that training is often involved in our coming to make aesthetic judgments, unlike our perception of shapes, colors and the like. This disanalogy has motivated would-be perceptualists to retreat to the view that our aesthetic abilities are not genuinely perceptual, but only perception-like in some broad sense. In this paper propose a novel view of how we come to perceive beauty that explains how aesthetic properties can be both learned and genuinely perceptual. On the perceptual expertise account, perceptual learning explains how we come to represent new categories of objects in perception, the fluency hypothesis explains how perceiving these categories leads to perceptual experiences of beauty, and a philosophical analysis of what it is to be a perceptual expert allows us to say when those experiences are veridical. The emerging picture of beauty is one where it is an objective property of an object that requires detection by an expert observer. This account also has the virtue of being able to explain how beauty ideals change over time, how they differ between cultures, and how some perceptions of beauty don’t seem to require training.

**New Media, Old Theory, and Critical Self-Encounter on the Internet**  
Summer Renault-Steele (George Washington University),  
*Friday, October 12, 11:15-1:15 (Quebec)*

The recent vote to abandon Internet neutrality laws at the American Federal Communications Commission (FCC) gives new life to critical theorists Max Horkheimer and Theodor W. Adorno’s somber analysis of the “culture industry,” and pessimistic predictions about the consolidation of perspective online. Other developments in new media however, suggest the promising possibility of what film and media scholar Miriam Bratu Hansen called a “critical self-encounter” for the mass audience. Analyzing graphics interchange formatting (GIF) by way of Siegfried Kracauer’s Weimar-era cultural critique, I argue the GIF may trigger a critical self-encounter of the kind highlighted by Hansen.

**Poe, Collingwood, and The Art/Craft Distinction**  
Anna Christina Ribeiro (Texas Tech University)  
*Friday, October 12, 9:00-11:00 (Quebec)*

In *The Philosophy of Composition*, Edgar Allen Poe gave us the logic behind the composition of
his famous poem, The Raven, claiming that ‘the work proceeded, step by step, to its completion with the precision and rigid consequence of a mathematical problem’. Some ninety years later, Roger Collingwood argued, in *The Principles of Art*, that there can be no logic behind the making of art properly so called, distinguishing art from craft on the basis of pre-existing rules and a pre-existing goal to be achieved. Part of Collingwood’s reason for this claim lies in his conception of art not as the arousing of emotion by preconceived means, which would involve technique or craft, plus a knowledge of which emotion one wishes to produce in her audience, but rather as the expression of emotion, a process of discovery, insofar as ‘until a man has expressed his emotion, he does not yet know what emotion it is.’ The aim of this paper is to challenge the art-craft distinction argued for by Collingwood and predominant today, on the basis of approaches to poetry such as Poe’s, approaches evinced also throughout the history of poetry.

**Toward a Cosmopolitan Aesthetic Conception of Race and Nation: William Pope.L’s Whispering Campaign**

Monique Roelofs (Hampshire College)

*Friday, October 12, 2:45-5:00 (British Columbia)*

Against the backdrop of recent work on the aesthetics-race connection, this essay examines the power of aesthetic address to develop newly aestheticized conceptions of race and nation. Critics Barbara Johnson and Stuart Hall influentially use address in social constructionist accounts of aesthetic interpretation and meaning. Picking up where their accounts leave off, this essay sketches a basic model for analyzing address, and puts this model to work in an interpretation of Pope.L’s sound and performance installation *Whispering Campaign* (2016–17) to bring out the capacity of strategies of address to yield alternatively aestheticized, cosmopolitan constructions of race and nation.

**Locating Art**

William Seeley (Bates College)

*Thursday, October 11, 9:00-11:00 (Algonquin)*

Alva Noe argues that neurophysiological approaches to art haven’t found a way to *bring art into focus* in the lab. We can call this difficulty the *problem of locating art*. The short version of the problem can be articulated as follows. Artworks are communicative devices, they are a means by which artists express themselves in a range of different media. The productive strategies that artists develop to generate artworks should, as a result, become fine-tuned over time to the affective, perceptual, and cognitive processes that underwrite the understanding and appreciation of artworks. Neuroaesthetics traffics in these kinds of correlations between artists’ formal strategies and the neurophysiology of early visual processing (see Livingstone 2002). The trouble is that the sorts of perceptual constraints on artistic production that drive research in neuroaesthetics are operative because they are constraints on all perceptual experience. So, short some further story to mark out the context of art from other perceptual contexts, this methodological strategy fails to locate art. This difficulty generalizes to research in cognitive science on art more broadly. I argue that this problem can be resolved by focusing attention on
the structure of categories of art and the role that categorization processing plays in perception.

**Against Poetic Opacity**  
Robert Boyd Skipper (St. Mary’s University)  
*Friday, October 12, 9:00-11:00 (Quebec)*

Jesse Prinz and Eric Mandelbaum in a recent book chapter have argued that one specific feature of texts makes them poetic texts. They call that feature “poetic opacity.” A text is poetically opaque if it forces the readers to attend the words rather than the meanings of those words. I argue their effort falls short of their goal. In part, I suggest that many poems fail to function properly when their readers are distracted by the technical details. First I present the gist of their thesis, then I criticize it, and finally I hint at an alternative account of poetry.

**Danto on Censorship and Subsidy of the Arts**  
Brian Soucek (University of California, Davis)  
*Thursday, October 11, 11:15-1:15 (Algonquin)*

In an important series of essays published in his early years as an art critic, Arthur Danto seemingly claimed: 1) that art should be subsidized but not censored; 2) that refusing to subsidize art constitutes censorship; 3) that public art is subsidized, not least by its placement in public spaces; and 4) that public art can be removed from those spaces when the public doesn’t like it. Yet these claims seem inconsistent. This paper tries to solve this puzzle, addressing along the way important questions about the relationship of non-subsidy and censorship and the distinct nature of public art as opposed to art in public spaces.

**Is Aesthetic Immoralism Obviously True?**  
Nils-Hennes Stear (University of Southampton)  
*Thursday, October 11, 9:00-11:00 (Quebec)*

Three theories explain how ethical properties determine aesthetic ones in artworks. Autonomism denies any relatin. Moralism affirms one according to the valence constraint: ethical merits only ground aesthetic merits, ethical flaws only ground aesthetic flaws. Immoralism affirms one too, but denies the valence constraint. The question these theories answer, I argue, is ambiguous. Each reading requires a different kind of answer: a ‘counterfactual’ or an ‘as-such’ theory. I argue that if one accepts the so-called *qua* problem, as-such theories run into a dilemma. This leaves the counterfactual reading, to which I show immoralism is the obvious answer.

**The Puzzle of Good Bad Movies**  
Uku Tooming (Harvard University)  
*Saturday, October 13, 9:00-11:00 (Manitoba)*
There are bad movies and there are movies that are so bad that they are good. So-called ‘good bad movies’ like “The Room” and “Troll 2” have received a lot of attention from critics and moviegoers in recent years. Many people, including those with excellent taste, are willing to invest their time and resources in watching and discussing them. In this paper, I will argue that the fact that competent consumers of cinema are engaging with good bad movies challenges an intuitive assumption according to which a movie (or an artwork more generally) is a proper object of aesthetic appreciation only if it manifests artistic excellence. I will argue that we should weaken this assumption.

The paper is structured as follows. First, I will look more closely at what makes a good bad movie and argue that what is required is that a film-maker has a sincere intention to depict a familiar world by following genre-specific standards but that she fails at executing this intention due to incompetence. Second, I will articulate the puzzle by introducing and motivating the assumption that incompetence doesn’t have aesthetic merit, and by arguing that this assumption is incompatible with the fact that competent consumers appreciate good bad movies. Third, I will propose my solution to the puzzle by claiming that the assumption about aesthetic merit should be weakened and that good bad movies should be considered as a limiting case of aesthetically valuable cinema.

**Imaginative Resistance and Disgust**
Emine Hande Tuna (Brown University)
*Friday, October 12, 9:00-11:00 (Algonquin)*

In this paper, I have two goals. First, I will criticize some of the recent positions on imaginative resistance (Shen-yi Liao, Nina Strohminger, and Chandra Sekhar Sripada (2014) and Shen-yi Liao (2016)), which I believe are contributing to the trend of straying away from the original promise of imaginative resistance research. But also, I want to acknowledge some of their strengths as well, particularly a compelling diagnosis they make (i.e. genre makes a difference). Second, I am going to provide my own interpretation of the phenomenon and show that my interpretation also provides the theoretical framework to account for this compelling diagnosis. I will argue that the reason why we find it *almost impossible* to engage in the imaginative activity prompted by a fictional work is grounded not only in moral disapprobation it creates but also in the emotion of disgust that mingles with and amplifies the disapprobation.

**Performance Art and the Importance of Being Serious**
Rossen Ventzislavov (Woodbury University)
*Saturday, October 13, 11:15-1:15 (Algonquin)*

Performance art is often recognized for the seriousness of its affect, intent, and political impact. To a certain extent this has to do with historical contingency—the state of the world and the state of the arts across a century of creative exploration. But a closer look at the notion of seriousness shows that its application to performance art is just as much a matter of a conceptual predicament. My study attempts to take stock of this predicament by attending to some philosophical approaches to seriousness and their implications for our understanding of performance art.
On the Role of Trust in Aesthetic Testimony
Rebecca Wallbank (Uppsala University)

Saturday, October 13, 11:15-1:15 (Algonquin)

This paper analyses a recent publication by C. Thi Nguyen in which he postulates that the concept of aesthetic trust can play important role in many cases of testimonial justification. The term ‘trust’ is striking, yet in his paper it is given very little explication or justification. In this paper, I aim to use Nguyen’s work as a prompt in which we can put pressure on this concept and assess its implications for testimonial justification. To do so, I will also appeal to wider epistemic debate, particularly the work of Paul Faulkner, for whom the term ‘trust’ explicitly connotes a move away from evidence-based forms of testimonial justification, captured by positions of reductionism and non-reductionism. There are four key issues which my paper aims to incite: ‘What, if any, kind of trust is in play, within aesthetic testimony?'; ‘What might justify this kind of trust, and would it be appropriate in certain cases and not others?’; ‘In the cases of ‘trust’ that Nguyen offers, do we really, as is claimed, form a new aesthetic judgement?’; and finally, ‘If we do form a new aesthetic judgement based on trust, what kind of judgement is this exactly?’.

Kant’s Two Approaches to the Connection between Beauty and Morality
Weijia Wang (Katholieke Universiteit te Leuven)

Thursday, October 11, 11:15-1:15 (Quebec)

In this paper, I distinguish between two approaches in Kant’s Critique of the Power of Judgment concerning the relationship between the aesthetic and the practical. The first is a formalistic account of an intellectual interest in the beautiful. Against the prevalent reading, I argue that beauty itself does not exhibit nature’s specifically moral purposiveness. The second is Kant’s semi-substantive approach to the mediation between the domains of nature and freedom. In judging the beautiful, through a practical necessity, we conceive of nature as cooperative with practical ends and, thereby, reinforce our hope in realizing them.

Individuating Phonographic Works
Zachary Weinstein (University of Toronto)

Friday, October 12, 2:45-5:00 (Algonquin)

First, I introduce the phonographic view about the ontology of recorded music, which holds that specific sonic qualities of recordings are essential objects of aesthetic attention, and are thus relevant to the work’s identity. I then raise a reductio objection to the view: if specific specific sonic qualities are essential to the identity of works, then no two token recordings will instantiate the same work, because no two token recordings will sound exactly alike. I consider Theodore Gracyk’s response to this objection, and argue that his response cheapens the phonographic view. Finally, I put forward a refinement to the phonographic view, a view according to which works of phonography are individuated by versions. This allows for a
satisfactory response to the *reductio* objection while maintaining the commitments that motivate the phonographic view.

**Urban Aesthetics and Augmented Reality**
Mary Beth Willard (Weber State University)
*Thursday, October 11, 9:00-11:00 (Manitoba)*

In early October 2017, artist Jeff Koons partnered with social media app Snapchat to produce a novel artistic installation that made use of augmented reality. Users who wandered within one thousand feet of the designated, geo-tagged locations found that digital images of Koons’s famous balloon sculptures would be superimposed into their cameras, as if they had naturally come upon the sculptures.

Within two days of the launch of the installation, however, the sculptures were vandalized. Artist Sebastian Errazuriz created his own digital intrinsic duplicate of Koons’ balloon dog that had been tagged, iconic graffiti painted over its golden skin, and geo-tagged it to the Central Park location that had been chosen as one of Koons’ sites.

In this paper, I argue that the aesthetic significance of augmented reality lies in its ability to change public spaces by infusing arbitrary locations with private reasons for valuing them. Augmented reality has the potential to remove from the public space some of the value that comes of genuinely sharing spaces with others, and this has implications for the aesthetics of urban spaces, which depend greatly on the possibility of spontaneous interaction between strangers. Those who seek out Koons’ balloon sculptures do so, at the expense of ignoring the broader public sphere. Those who do not have access to the technology will pass by the location of the installation in ignorance. It’s hard to imagine that they would successfully ignore a real giant shiny metal balloon dog.

**Wehi and the Sublime**
Daniel Wilson (University of Auckland)
*Thursday, October 11, 11:15-1:15 (Quebec)*
Winner of an Irene H. Chayes New Voices Award

The Māori (indigenous people of New Zealand) term *wehi* may be used in an aesthetic sense in a way comparable to the sublime. I examine *wehi* and argue that comparing it with Immanuel Kant’s theory of the sublime highlights shortcomings regarding the kinds of actions that Kant’s account of the sublime emotion might motivate. I will show the important respects in which *wehi* may be differentiated from the sublime—particularly in response to the natural environment—and I suggest that attempts to bridge these differences might have a positive impact on human flourishing.

*September 14, 2018*