

Chhaochharia, Vidhi, and Yaniv Grinstein, 2009, CEO Compensation and Board Structure, *Journal of Finance* 64, 231-261.

There are two typos in the original paper which are related to the data collection procedure and the definition of variables. Below are the corrections.

- a. In all the regressions the sample was balanced across all variables except for the tenure variable. Therefore, in the article, the number of observations in all the regressions should be 4956 rather than 5190. None of the results change once we collect the missing tenure variables and run the regressions with the 5190 observations.
- b. The correct definition for independent directors in the sample is:
 1. A director that has no family affiliation with the firm (affiliation as defined by IRRC).
 2. A director that has not been employed by the firm in the last three years. Data of last year of employment is from IRRC.

We did not disqualify directors from being independent if they are affiliated with the firm through consulting, legal advice, or other business links, since the NYSE rule allows directors to have such relations and still be independent as long as these relations are not too large.