The problem of insider spies has bedeviled intelligence services from time immemorial. Over the years, government intelligence agencies have made significant efforts to preemptively screen away prospective traitors. Nevertheless, all the world’s intelligence services have suffered penetrations, including our own. Increasingly stringent security practices, such as more frequent follow-up background investigations, have been used to lessen the threat of insider spies. Americans have particularly favored advanced technology solutions. Nevertheless, these heroic measures seem to fail time and again. Strongly motivated spies have demonstrated the capacity to successfully discern the seams between the most well thought out protective measures—and have insidiously slipped right through.

The intelligence community is no different from other domains in this respect. Firms in the private sector, such as Microsoft, have tried to protect their products from the depredations of hackers, but despite their enormous resources seem to be fighting a losing war. This reminds us that attention needs to be mainly focused on the workings of the mind of the insider spy.

And yet the mind of the insider spy remains obscure. While many studies have focused on trying to understand what makes the mind of the insider spy tick, progress in this understanding has been slow, and making good use of it has not been particularly successful. Efforts at predicting who will turn traitor have turned out to be mostly blind alleys. The dirty little secret of spy detection has been that, almost always, insider spies have been revealed only when someone from the “other side” comes across bearing gifts of information to prove their bona fides. If we were able to develop an improved understanding of insider spy psychology, we would have better chances of devising countermeasures that could succeed. This would represent just good intelligence practice applied to an issue critical to the intelligence community itself.

My work has permitted me to advance further towards what I call the true psychology of the insider spy. A decade of consulting as a clinical psychiatrist to some of our intelligence agencies, and treating employees from all corners of the intelligence community provided my initial immersion in the world of intelligence. Then I was fortunate enough to be engaged as a consultant to the defense of three captured insider spies, including the notorious Robert Hanssen. While at first I had mixed feelings about joining their defense teams, I regarded involvement in these cases as unique opportunities that would enable me to understand the inner workings of the minds of insider spies.

I received cooperation from all three spies because I was working for them on the defense side, and also because of my frequent access: I could visit each for up to 2 hours weekly over an entire year.

The primary basis of my findings derives from my unprecedented close-contact experiences with these three insider spies. In addition, I intensively studied most of the other cases of insider spying in the United States that occurred during the twentieth century and up through the present that were reported upon in open sources. I studied these additional cases from the vantage point of an experienced psychiatrist. I also had the advantage of my familiarity with these kinds of cases based on my intensive exposure to the insider spies I met with personally. Psychological patterns became apparent to me that might have escaped notice by others not similarly trained or experienced.

The ideas presented here spring from these combined sources. I will put forward here a new paradigm for better understanding the minds of insider spies.

For the purposes of this discussion, I will discuss the relevant issues from the perspective of an invented composite insider spy. This will permit clarification of key observations while at the same time avoiding problems related to confidentiality.

The new paradigm will incorporate three key idea clusters: the core psychology of the insider spy; the ten life stages of the insider spy; and the existential
dilemmas of the insider spy.

Of course, the psychology proposed here does not encompass all insider spies without exception. For example, there are a number of insider spies who seem to hark back to the ideological spies of the thirties and forties, and there are still other anomalous cases that come to mind. Even taking into account these exceptional cases, I believe that probing into them more deeply would reveal layers that would roughly correspond to the ideas I will present here.

**THE CORE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE INSIDER SPY**

An intolerable sense of personal failure, as privately defined by that person.

While another observer might appraise the life of the person in question as having been a very tough story indeed—but still not that bad—the observer’s appraisal does not count for anything. Only the opinion of the person in question matters. The only meaningful fact is whether the prospective insider spy feels like a failure to the point of it being intolerable for him. Even so, few in this group will decide to turn traitor. What turns out to be key is how this intolerable sense of personal failure gets managed. Almost always, this is a state of mind based on male psychology. Over 95% of insider spies are males. Injuries to male pride and ego are at the root of most cases of insider spying. Further comments on gender differences will follow.

**THE TEN LIFE STAGES OF THE INSIDER SPY**

The idea of Life Stages takes a dynamic rather than a static view of what makes for insider spying. A dynamic, evolving view gets away from mainstream explanations that insider spies are born bad, or that a fixed personality type will predict for insider spying. Thus, the usual suspects of insider spy motivations, those based on greed, sociopathy, ideology, ego and arrogance, are held as less important than the unfolding of the movie of a person’s life.

As the movie unfolds, things happen to the main character, some good and some bad. Drama gets added when adversities, stresses, challenges and disappointments pile up in excess. Some of these adverse
developments are due to poor personal choices. Perhaps more of them are due to sheer bad luck. Will the main character manage to survive and triumph despite all the threats and pitfalls? Or will he stumble or fall? Thus, I favor the argument: insider spies are not born—they're made. What is crucial is what befalls them during the course and arc of their lives. We will consider each of the ten life stages of insider spies in turn. (Please refer to the accompanying chart, which maps Inner Tension alongside the Ten Life Stages).

Stage One: The Sensitizing Stage
Growing up is not easy for most of us. We all face less than optimal experiences along the way, such as a harsh or absent father, a critical or moody mother, mean siblings, academic troubles, health problems, and love relationships that end hurtfully. While these negative experiences may scar and sensitize us, they do not necessarily damage us forever or predict for certain later failure. In fact, they may plant an abiding drive for surmounting adversity, or an ambition to fix life's inequities and set the world right, or they may light a fire in the belly for proving that we are actually smart, competent, and successful—no matter what others may have thought of us.

If having gone through a tough childhood reliably ruined chances for later achievement in life, and also predicted a likely turn towards insider spying, perhaps the vast majority of the entire intelligence, law enforcement and defense communities would have to be let go. Clearly, this makes no sense. While experiences can be truly hurtful and sensitizing, much more must happen later to tip the scales towards a decision to spy.

Stage Two: The Stress/Spiral Stage
Entering the adult years brings more complex and demanding challenges. Now we tend to compare ourselves to others, while also facing up to our own expectations of ourselves. We all learn that natural gifts and talents alone do not result in sure success. Much of how it goes depends as much on external forces and blind luck. And for some unfortunates, the going can get very tough. The bell-shaped curve of life is merciless. At one end of the curve, the good end, live the fortunate few for whom everything falls into place like ripe fruit, everything they touch turns to gold. At the other end—the bad end—just the opposite happens. Here live the unfortunate few for whom nothing goes right. Given a large enough population, say a government agency, it becomes a statistical likelihood that a small and very unlucky minority will experience the worst calamities of the bad end of the bell-shaped curve.

Adding further injury, the coincidental timing of life’s hard knocks can really pile on, making it even worse, a situation I call a psychological perfect storm. Even the strongest can waver in such a storm. We all like to think we could weather anything that comes our way. But try adding impending financial bankruptcy, severe personal health threats, an IRS audit, teenage son getting arrested, spouse having an affair, teenage daughter getting pregnant—at the same time—and even the strongest person can buckle under the pressures.

Stage Three: The Crisis/Climax/Resolution Stage
When it gets to be just too much to bear, some people descend into meltdown mode, a mindset of panic, desperation, paralyzing anxiety, altered thinking, and impaired judgment. In a word, it’s like drowning. To mentally cope and survive, these people will resort to various extreme defensive strategies. Many will enter into what I call a Personal Bubble Psychology, in which they will view the world in terms that are internally logical, coherent and consistent, but in terms of the real world, also very wrong. Personal Bubble Psychology, a private world unto itself, escapes the constraints of customary logic and judgment and is temporarily impenetrable to outside influence and reason. Within the bubble, everything makes perfect sense, simple
and compelling, and can reach the proportions of an epiphany. Common examples that are less pernicious include falling in love, and getting into a frenzy about buying a car or a house.

Insurmountable problems call for extreme survival measures, so the psychologically drowning person desperately searches for a miraculous solution. Within his Personal Bubble Psychology, new and dangerous ideas beckon, penetrating the mental storm and chaos with the alluring promise of fixing at one fell stroke everything that is wrong.

Alcoholism or even suicide may appear to be the perfect solutions for those who direct their energies in an inwardly dark direction. These choices may stir up trouble on the job (or even result in death), but do not necessarily create serious risk for espionage.

However, there are others who will choose to direct their energies outwardly and take action against others. Returning to the core psychology, an intolerable sense of personal failure, as privately defined by that person, they will need to deny their sense of inner failure and prefer to blame and project all their inner sense of badness outwardly onto others. In effect, they are saying, “It’s not me that’s the failure—it’s them.”

Context becomes important here. The prospective insider spy wants to project all his negative self-appraisal, self-disappointment and self-loathing onto local, handy targets. Perhaps he will beat or otherwise abuse his wife or children. Or if he works for the proverbial Post Office, he could “go postal.” Working within the intelligence community channels the rage and offers an obvious way to get back at the supposed oppressor that did him wrong: he can turn traitor. This usually comes to his mind as an epiphany. The angry insider spy hopes to get back at “them,” eliminate his money worries, relieve pressures of all kinds, and solve everything in one brilliant plan.

And so the typical insider spy is not so much recruited by the skill of a hostile service intelligence officer but is rather self-recruited. Some insider spies have been known to energetically press for recruitment against the active resistance of the hostile intelligence service they chose to work for. Persevering in his efforts to overcome the skepticism of the hostile service—that fears getting suckerized by a controlled dangle—he will make multiple contacts volunteering to spy, until he finally gets picked up.

**Stage Four: The Post-Recruitment Stage**

This is the honeymoon stage for the newly minted insider spy, and can last for one to several months. He feels relief, even euphoria. With his new plan under-way, everything now is coming together and makes such good sense. Money worries are calmed. His new handler seems simpatico, respectful, and also shows the good judgment of genuinely appreciating his great worth. There are plenty of interesting activities to keep the novice insider spy quite busy, such as learning new tradecraft, and classified documents for him to steal and pass along to the other side. There is so much more to his life now than his boring old day job.

**Stage Five: The Remorse–Morning-After Stage**

No crisis lasts forever, by definition. Any crisis and its associated reverberations will eventually settle down. The insider spy now has a chance to pause for reflection. His perspective will change as it becomes clearer what really happened to him during the course of his recent horrible crisis, and a kind of Buyer’s Remorse can set in. His original decision to spy occurred under intense pressure cooker conditions, but his Remorse Stage can linger as a protracted, agonizing struggle. As the old saying goes: Act in haste, repent at leisure.

*Personal Bubble Psychology* abruptly terminates when rude reality punctures the bubble. The defining statement that retrospectively characterizes *Personal Bubble Psychology* will now enter the mind of the insider spy: “What was I thinking?”

The insider spy can see that bad things did unfairly pile up on him back then—but now he wonders if he really did the right thing to turn traitor. Thus, his first doubts.

Furthermore, now there is a dawning appreciation that he is stuck and trapped. With second thoughts about having crossed the line, fantasies crowd his mind about having a conversation with his handler to explain that it was all a terrible mistake. After further thought, he rules out that option. It would be like trying to get out of an arrangement with the Mafia. It would be very foolish, perhaps dangerous even to try.

What about doing the right thing and turning himself in? He could explain that he got overwhelmed and then did something very stupid, and could he please turn the clock back? On further thought, he realizes that option is impossible too. This situation is what I call *Sharks in a Shark Tank*. Sharks can swim nicely together, but if one of them gets nicked and starts to bleed, all the others will instantly turn to attack, predators going after prey. Given attitudes
within the intelligence community, this course is also not a viable option, in fact, it’s exceedingly dangerous: His career will be over for sure and jail time might be added too, constituting a total disaster not only for him but also for his innocent family. Bad as things are, better to leave things alone, keep spying, and hope for the best.

Now, he is dealing with two failures. His first failure was being unable to manage his life during the time of crisis before he turned traitor. Now, being stuck and trapped, an existential black hole, what is he to make of being no longer in full charge of his own life? Is that not a second failure added to his first?

This appreciation of stuckness leads to the convergence of psychologies that unites most insider spies. While the individual psychologies of insider spies and the specifics of their unique life stories may have varied up to this point, these details no longer matter. All insider spies now come to realize they are all in the same boat: stuck and trapped. Feeling stuck and trapped feels terrible, like being a bug pinned to a mat in a display case, robbing them of basic dignity and pride. They no longer are the captains of their own lives.

**Stage Six: The Active Spy Career Stage**

Resigned to trying to survive his messy existence, occasionally punctuated by moments of excitement, challenge, and attempts at professionalism in the conduct of his “moonlighting job,” the insider spy tries to just get on with it. Savoring to some degree his delicious secret life, at times feeling superior for it, he is mostly on the road to a life of dreary drudgery. Not only must he fulfill the requirements of his “day job,” now he must also add on the rigors of his insider spy “moonlighting job.”

And the insider spy must daily put up with the mental condition that all humans most dread: uncertainty. He never knows if and when he may be caught. He must always look over his shoulder and can never rest easy. He comes to realize that no matter how well he perfects his tradecraft, his ultimate survival depends more on luck than on skill. He cannot avoid thinking about how other insider spies were blown. Almost always it was because someone from “the other side,” the side he secretly works for, decided to cross over to “our side”—with the damning information that disclosed the identities of the insider spies. He comes to understand that there is really no protection from this eventuality. It’s like a time bomb forever ticking in his ears.

Thus, life becomes an endless nervous wait for the other shoe to drop. This grinding uncertainty is ceaseless and remorseless. Many a criminal subconsciously chooses to get caught, just to get it over with. So much for the glamour of the life of an insider spy.

**Stage Seven: The Dormancy Stage(s)**

From time to time, the insider spy just stops spying. He goes to ground, lies fallow, and quits producing. How perplexing for those who subscribe to the idea that insider spies are simply maliciously driven, robotically single-minded villains. But how logical for Dormancy Stages to occur if the true psychology of the insider spy incorporates the conflicted dynamics described above. Life is nasty and brutish for the insider spy who has been at it for a few years. He feels burned out. The supposed solution to his original sense of failure and drowning years ago has transformed into a larger problem than ever before. Like the Sorcerer’s Apprentice, his vaunted brilliant solution for his problems has mutated into a daily nightmare. Fantasies of escape from this daily dilemma abound. He thinks: “Maybe if I just dial down my productivity, perhaps they will forget about me? If I just keep quiet, I’ll go off their radar screen—and then I’ll resume my normal everyday life and pretend this never happened.”

Then, either his handler tugs on his leash, or other stresses pile up again. Like an alcoholic, he goes back to the sauce. Many insider spies, such as Robert Hanssen and Earl Pitts, cycled through several Dormancy Stages.

**Stage Eight: The Pre-Arrest Stage**

This is where unmistakable signs of surveillance get noticed. Finally, the drama may be coming to its bad end. As mentioned, this development is almost always because of information carried over from “the other side.” Later, counterintelligence officers will belittle the sloppy tradecraft exhibited by insider spies at this juncture. However, their observations are probably off the mark, for at this point, the insider spy is simply exhausted by the futility of the game. He has ceased to care about maintaining his tradecraft, and seeing his bad end clearly in sight, he just wants to get it over with. He will play out this drama to its bitter end. As unwelcome as getting caught will be, he will welcome relief from his grinding daily uncertainty.
Stage Nine: The Arrest and Post-Arrest Stage

Now the trap is sprung. The insider spy gets caught red-handed at the drop site. And out of his mouth come surly, arrogant remarks and teenager-like bravado and insolence. These are the comments and attitudes that commonly form the basis for making sense of insider spy motivation. For example, immediately upon getting caught, Robert Hanssen said, “What took you so long?” These comments engender fury and outrage from within the intelligence and law enforcement communities, as well as from the general public. The insider spy’s seeming lack of remorse and annoying nasty superiority actually covers over something entirely different.

The insider spy is now facing his third failure, added to his first two. He could not even succeed as a spy. He is now revealed to the entire world as a failure in this aspect of his life as well. It’s like a flashback to his bad old days when he first felt like he was drowning. So he spits and fulminates like a teenage rebel without a cause, attempting to preserve his reputation, at least with himself, as a world-class desperado.

Stage Ten: The Brooding in Jail Stage

Years go by, at least two or three. His fifteen minutes of notorious fame have long since passed. Incarcerated for all this time, the insider spy now broods, and forced by a lack of diversions, he must face himself for the first time. Gone are his insolence and his in-your-face comments, now replaced by more realistic, sadder but wiser self-observations about the way his life has gone wrong and the consequences of his poor choices. For example, interviews in print with Aldrich Ames conveyed such thoughts, and Robert Hanssen expressed similar thoughts of remorse and self-reproach directly to me.

Surprisingly, the insider spy is rarely truly dedicated to the subversion and destruction of his native land. His beef was always primarily with himself, and with the local people or institutions that were his nearby, handy targets. He may actually harbor attachment and true patriotic feelings towards his country, however paradoxical and unlikely it may seem. He now will offer gratuitous advice about how to protect the country from the likes of himself, and insightful ideas about the state of the world. Many of these ideas would be useful contributions—if only the jailed insider spy enjoyed the standing to be listened to and taken seriously. This is the final stage, which provides the first real chance to get a balanced understanding of the perplexing life decision of someone who has decided to turn traitor.

THE EXISTENTIAL DILEMMAS OF THE INSIDER SPY

Failure upon failure

For a man, maintaining a stable sense of personal worth is key. However, the insider spy experiences three tremendous losses: He suffers two failures before getting caught: His first failure was his inability to successfully navigate his own life; his second failure was discovering that his best attempt to solve his worst life crisis turned out to be a pathetic delusion, as he is now merely a puppet on the string of his handler. His third and very public failure is that he could not even succeed at being an insider spy.

Stuckness

This refers to the insider spy’s condition of being in a state of paralysis, unable to steer the course of his own life. Caught between equally strong forces tugging in opposite directions, the net result is stuckness. This unhappy state of loss of control over his life undermines the insider spy’s most fundamental bedrock of pride as a man.

Convergence of psychology

All insider spies wind up imprisoned by the same psychology: Fear of being caught; constant grinding uncertainty, waiting for the other shoe to drop; yearnings for deliverance and relief; despair and hopelessness about the ultimate direction their lives will take.
OTHER FACTORS

Socio-Economic Pyramid

There are three layers within the pyramid of intelligence community personnel that provide guidance for understanding the nature of the life stresses that overwhelm prospective insider spies.

At the base of the pyramid, this most densely populated layer is composed of enlisted military and blue-collar civilian employees in technical positions. Their troubling life issues are described well by country music lyrics: money woes, mean bosses, women who betray trust, and other basic life stresses. They are less well screened when they enter on duty. While numerous, their access to classified materials is more limited, but collectively they can pass on to adversaries a voluminous amount of classified material, so insider spies from this layer can be very dangerous.

The middle layer, less numerous, is composed of scientific, technical, engineering, white-collar types, from within the military branches as well as the civilian agencies. They enjoy greater accesses to classified materials. They are college graduates and their life problems tend to be the “mid-life crises” more typical of the middle class.

The topmost layer, smallest in number, is composed of the most highly screened professional intelligence officers. They enjoy the highest accesses and are privy to all-source intelligence. They represent the greatest threats if they decide to turn traitor, since they can disclose a great range of high-level strategic secrets. Their individual psychologies are more idiosyncratic and tend to be based on affronts to personal and professional pride.

Gender Differences

Insider spies are mostly males, but there are occasional women, too. The Core Psychology still applies but in a somewhat different way. Nearly all humans value two concerns at the top of the list of what everyone cares about: Career success (including financial), and intimate relationships. On average, which of these two concerns holds the top position varies by gender. For men, career success tends to edge out intimate relationships. For women, the reverse tends to hold true. Of course, this generalization is not etched in stone, and many exceptions do exist. This paper emphasizes male psychology simply because over 95% of insider spies are male. When women slip into becoming insider spies, it’s often because of doubts about their worth as women, attractive to the opposite sex. Hostile intelligence services have traditionally targeted women who seem vulnerable because of their loneliness. East German spy services used male “Ravens” to target female secretaries quite successfully.

CURRENT UNDERSTANDING AND PRACTICES

Conventional approaches to solving the problem of the insider spy have relied on careful screening at the time of first hire, follow up background investigations, stringent security practices, and various high tech monitoring schemes.

Why don’t these current practices work very well? Intelligence community personnel are sophisticated enough to realize that revealing details of serious life stresses, and the distress that results, is not a career-enhancing move. They will conceal as best they can any evidence of this. And they are good at it. Even so, distress can leak out, come to the attention of co-workers or management, and then action can be taken to refer them for appropriate help. These are not the cases of concern. The true cases of concern are those individuals who can preserve a calm outward demeanor while their private life descends into an awful pit. These types will never present themselves for help knowing all too well that their careers would screech to a halt. Out of self-interest and having the talent for it, they are smart enough to dodge questioning that would reveal incriminating matters. Thus, the usual checks are not generally effective.

Attempts to study the problem have been frustrating. There is a dearth of formal official and academic studies of insider spy psychology partly because of the lack of easy access to the study material, the spies themselves. They are incarcerated and out of reach to researchers, except for those who work within the intelligence community or for those who work for private companies that have been cleared for such studies. The two main studies whose conclusions have been disseminated in a limited way (much of this work remains classified) are Project Slammer and the PERSEREC studies.

These studies have approached the problem by gathering voluminous demographic data, psychological testing and interviews, to assemble a detailed accounting of the many disparate factors that seem
to stand out as common factors. This has succeeded in painting an impressionistic picture of a group that numbers approximately 150 insider spies, constituting a very useful body of information. But these approaches also have methodological limitations since the formal instruments that were used can only go so far in digging beneath the surface of things to discern deeper psychological roots. Also, the length of study of each subject seems to have been limited, which gets in the way of the chance to develop an in-depth personal relationship over an extended period of time. As a result, more subtle and deeper psychological dynamics do not get surfaced and examined. Furthermore, the information is somewhat undigested. There is little in the way of information that tracks the trajectory of the life of the insider spy from before the spying started until later.

These studies also lack a coherent overarching theory that could provide guidance for novel approaches to halt insider spying. Thus, these studies while correct are also incomplete. They point to conclusions that may be overdrawn or disproportional in weight and importance. For example, money is often emphasized as the chief motivating factor. I have shown that while money and greed may appear to be true motivations on the surface, deeper analysis points to more complex underlying dynamics. These studies can direct better profiling of those likely to commit espionage, or of those already engaged in it, but they primarily support the current exclusive emphasis on improving the detection strategies described above.

New Directions Proposed

My work has suggested that further progress along the lines of better profiling and detection, while useful up to a point, faces limitations due to an iron law: the Law of Diminishing Returns. Each additional increment of effort costs more and more, with very little additional protection to show for it. Every news story detailing the capture of the latest insider spy seems to prove that human ingenuity can trump even the best efforts. Attempts to develop profiles that will predict who will become an insider spy have turned out to be blind alleys.

Because my work highlights the long-term dynamic evolution of the insider spy, it shifts emphasis away from pushing for intensified profiling and detection strategies. Instead, my work suggests strategies that favor new and different policies. These new policies would promote conditions that would make it less likely for someone to turn to spying in the first place, long before there's anything to detect. If already engaged in spying, new policies are suggested that make it more likely that insider spies would voluntarily turn themselves in. A novel way to approach the problem of insider spying would be to build mechanisms that create safe exits for troubled insiders before they start to spy and safe exits for those already engaged in spying. While there would be difficult tradeoffs to calculate and manage, these novel approaches to fixing the problem of insider spies, while currently neglected in the United States, hold great promise for making our nation more secure.

Based upon the material presented here, I will be proposing a new proactive insider spy management paradigm called NOIR, which I believe will help diminish the dangerous threat of insider spying.

Dr. Charney is the Founder and Medical Director of Roundhouse Square Psychiatric Center, in Alexandria, Virginia. He has specialized in Anxiety and Mood Disorders, Couples and Family Therapy, as well as Attention Deficit Disorder in adults.

In addition to his “day job,” he became intimately familiar with the Intelligence Community as a Consultant and Therapist to IC personnel for many years. As a result of being at the right place at the right time, he had the opportunity to join the defense team of his first spy case, Earl Pitts. Building on that foundation, Robert Hanssen’s attorney, Plato Cacheris, invited Dr. Charney to join his defense team, which added a fascinating further dimension to his experience.

With his third spy case, Brian Regan, Dr. Charney’s in-depth knowledge of the psychological nuances of captured spies is unmatched. As a member of their defense teams, Dr. Charney was received by these spies as an understanding and supportive figure, which lowered their defensive mindsets, providing a truer picture of their inner lives. Many common assumptions of spy motivation have been brought into question by Dr. Charney’s work. To further extend his findings, he has been working on a policy White Paper in which he will amplify his psychological findings and also propose new and perhaps controversial initiatives to better protect the country from spying.