Spent Fuel Security

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Protection Strategy

• Immediately detect attempts to sabotage Spent Nuclear Fuel (SNF) and notify local law enforcement agencies
General Performance Requirements

• Defense in depth
• Redundancy and diversity
• Analyze site specific conditions
• Insider mitigation
• Problem identification and resolution method

Security Plan

• Physical Security Plan
• Training and Qualification Plan
• Safeguards Contingency Plan
• Security Implementing Procedures
Security Organization

- Management system
- At least one member on site to direct activities

Physical Barriers

- Protected area
- Isolation zone with intrusion detection
- Openings must be secured and monitored to prevent exploitation
- CAS, SAS
- OCA barriers
- Stand-off vehicle barriers
Access Authorization/Controls

- Trustworthy and reliable based on background investigation
- Psychological assessment
- Access control portals
- Limit routine unescorted access
- Exercise control over vehicles

Search Programs

- Contraband search
- Sentry search into PA
- Search vehicles, packages and personnel leaving the CAA or PA
Detection and Assessment

- Intrusion detection and assessment systems
- Tamper indicating and self checking alarm systems
- Uninterruptable power supply
- CAS/SAS
- CAS/SAS not subject to single act failure
- Continuous surveillance
- Exterior areas checked by armed patrols
- Duress alarms

Communication

- Continuous communication capability with onsite and offsite resources
- Two-way voice communication with LLEA from CAS/SAS
- Security personnel must be able to communicate with CAS/SAS
Response

- Deter adversary vs interrupt
- Respond to alarms and notify LLEA
- Agreements with LLEA
- Annual LLEA familiarization visits
- Threat warning system

Others

- Physical protection program review
- Maintenance, testing and calibration
Questions?