The American Philosophical Association
Pacific Division

Eighty-Seventh Annual Meeting

Westin St. Francis
San Francisco, California

March 27–30, 2013
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IMPORTANT NOTICES FOR MEETING ATTENDEES

PROCEEDINGS NO LONGER DISTRIBUTED TO MEMBERS AT REGISTRATION

APA members no longer receive a duplicate copy of this issue of the Proceedings at the Pacific Division conference registration desk. All registrants will receive a Pocket Program with session titles, times, and locations. Only non-members will receive a copy of the Proceedings at registration. Therefore, if you plan to attend the meeting and wish to consult the full program, please bring this copy of the Proceedings to the meeting or use the online program at apa-pacific.org.

INTERNET ACCESS AT THE CONFERENCE HOTEL

The Pacific Division has negotiated complimentary in-room Internet access for those who book rooms at the Westin St. Francis using the APA room rate. The APA room rate can be obtained by booking online at http://apa-pacific.org or by phoning (415) 397-7000 and asking for the “American Philosophical Association Pacific” room rate. Please note that those who book rooms at the conference hotel through third-party suppliers cannot take advantage of this offer. The deadline for bookings is February 23, subject to availability.

FOLLOW THE ANNUAL MEETING ON TWITTER OR FACEBOOK

For real time information as events unfold during the annual meeting, follow us on Twitter at @apa_pacific or Facebook at facebook.com/apapacific.
LETTER FROM THE SECRETARY-TREASURER

To All Members of the Association:

The executive committee of the Pacific Division of the American Philosophical Association cordially invites you to attend the 2013 annual meeting of the American Philosophical Association Pacific Division. The meeting will be held at the Westin St. Francis in San Francisco from Wednesday, March 27 through Saturday, March 30.

1. CONFERENCE HOTEL

The APA Pacific Division will meet at the Westin St. Francis Hotel in Union Square, at the heart of San Francisco. The Pacific Division's hotel contracts now include a clause requiring the hotel to confirm a year before our meeting that a collective agreement will be in place with the labor unions at the time of our meeting. The current collective agreement between the conference hotel and Unite Here Local 2 extends beyond our spring 2013 meeting date. The union asks us to patronize the hotel.

Here are three more reasons to book into the conference hotel at the APA rate. First, the Pacific Division obtains free meeting space in exchange for guaranteeing a block of room sales. Second, six percent of your room charge will be rebated by the hotel to the Pacific Division. These funds have been earmarked for graduate student stipends. Finally, free in-room Internet access has been negotiated for anyone booked into the hotel at the APA rate.

The convention rate is available until February 23, and members are strongly advised to book early. Visit http://apa-pacific.org for online reservations, or call (415) 397-7000 and give the name and dates of the meeting to obtain the convention rate of $179 for a double or single room.

2. LOCAL ATTRACTIONS

One of the handful of classic and historic deluxe hotels in San Francisco, the Westin St. Francis has its own cable-car stop and a view overlooking Union Square. The hotel is also a favorite stop for afternoon tea, and the Onyx Lobby Bar expands the locations where philosophers can enjoy each other’s conversations. The hotel is within walking distance of Chinatown, the theater district, Yerba Buena Center, the Museum of Modern Art, and several smaller museums, as well as dozens of San Francisco’s finest restaurants. North Beach is a few minutes’ ride away on the cable car that stops in front of the hotel. A short ride on the bus or a one-station ride on BART brings you to the Civic Center, home of the symphony, the ballet, and the Asian Art Museum. Those traveling with children should note the new Disney Family Museum in the Presidio, near the Golden Gate Bridge.
The nearby Palace of the Legion of Honor displays an extensive European painting and sculpture collection and a world-famous print collection. The de Young Museum in Golden Gate Park is worth a visit for its architecture by Herzog and de Meuron as well as its collections. In addition to these large museums, San Francisco has many small ones, including at least five within easy walking distance of the hotel.

3. Travel Information

Parking: There is parking in the garage under Union Square. Less expensive garages are down Geary, nearly to Van Ness, but it’s a long walk back.

By Air: From San Francisco Airport (SFO), numerous shuttles will take you to the hotel door. SuperShuttle has wheelchair-accessible vans, but these should be reserved in advance.

Taxis will get you downtown much more quickly. San Francisco has many wheelchair-accessible taxis, which can be obtained through the any taxi dispatcher outside baggage claims; no prior reservation is necessary.

The BART rapid transit system links the airport to downtown as well. The airport BART station is located on the Departures/Ticketing Level (Level 3) of the International Terminal or from any other terminal by riding SFO’s free AirTrain. Take BART to the Powell Street Station in San Francisco and walk two short blocks to Union Square. BART also provides a direct connection from SFO to Caltrain at the Millbrae station. BART is wheelchair accessible and all travel information is provided both by loudspeaker announcement and electric billboard.

From Oakland Airport, you can ride BART to San Francisco via an AirBART shuttle to the Coliseum/Oakland Airport BART station. Alight at the Powell Street Station in San Francisco. As at San Francisco Airport, there are numerous shuttles to San Francisco.

In the City: The Powell Street cable car stops in front of the hotel. MUNI Buses 2, 3, 4, and 38 do so as well. Two short blocks away at Powell and Market, BART will take you to various parts of the city and to the East Bay (Oakland and Berkeley). For detailed information about public transportation in San Francisco, including transit maps, see http://www.511.org/. Dial 511 on landline phones and on most cell phones to obtain public transit information.

4. Meeting Registration

All speakers (including invited speakers), commentators, chairs, and other meeting participants are required to pay the conference registration fee. The only exception is for scholars who reside in an area on UNESCO’s list of Least Developed Countries. Scholars who qualify for this exception must email the secretary-treasurer of the division at least two weeks prior to the meeting with a request for a fee waiver.

The registration fee is $80 for APA members and $25 for APA student members when paid in advance through the APA website. The non-member rate is $120. On-site registrants pay a surcharge of $40, which
covers the cost of travel from Delaware to the west coast for additional APA staff to handle on-site registrations. Advanced registration is strongly encouraged. The deadline for advanced registration is noon Pacific time on March 25.

Undergraduate and K–12 students who are accompanied by a teacher or professor may register on-site for $25.

Only those who are registered may attend the scheduled sessions. Registration includes admission to the receptions; non-registrants, such as spouses, partners, or family members, who wish to attend the receptions may purchase tickets at the door of the reception for $10. Please be sure to wear your convention badge at all times to identify yourself as a registered participant. Those not wearing their convention badges may be instructed to display them or be shown out.

Those who are not now members of the APA may take advantage of the lower registration fee by becoming members. Membership information, applications, and renewals are available online at http://www.apaonline.org.

5. 2013 Program

This year’s program committee, chaired by Patrick Rysiew, has organized a diverse and exciting program.

Posters and principal papers in colloquia, symposia, and the poster session are selected by anonymous review. Participants in invited paper, invited symposia, and author-meets-critics sessions are selected by the program committee. Participants in sessions arranged by APA committees are selected by those committees.

This year’s presidential address is given by John Fischer and is entitled “The Path of Life.” Bert Dreyfus is giving a Dewey Lecture on “Standing up to Analytic Philosophy and AI at MIT in the Sixties.”

The Pacific Division once again welcomes its affiliated groups, who have organized more than sixty evening sessions.

6. Poster Sessions

Following a successful pilot of poster sessions in 2011, the program now includes a poster session. Posters have the potential to significantly increase access to the annual meeting. Please help make them a success by visiting the posters and speaking to their authors.

Posters will be on display adjacent to the book tables on Friday, March 29, and presenters will be available to discuss their posters from 11:00 a.m. to 2:00 p.m. on that day.

7. Receptions and Special Events

The annual reception will be held from 10:00 p.m. to midnight on Thursday, April 5. This year the reception will be held in two adjoining rooms, with a live blues performance to be held in one room.

A reception follows the Dewey Lecture at 5:30 p.m. on Friday, April 6. The
presidential reception follows the presidential address on the same day. All are invited.

Please check the special events page of the pocket program (distributed at registration) for information about receptions added to the schedule as the convention date nears. Receptions are for those registered at the convention, but tickets for spouses, partners, or family members may be purchased at the door.

8. BUSINESS MEETING

The annual business meeting will be held at noon on Thursday, March 28. According to the association’s bylaws, regular membership is given by an act of the executive director on behalf of the board of officers. Each year, the list of regular members that appears in the November Proceedings is used as the list of eligible voters for the three subsequent divisional business meetings.

Information about the business meeting agenda is provided following the program below. This includes the report of the nominating committee and notice of amendments to the APA bylaws proposed by the board of officers.

Pacific Division members may make nominations or volunteer for membership on the program committee or the nominating committee. Nominations should be sent by email to the secretary-treasurer, Dominic Lopes, at dom.lopes@ubc.ca, no later than March 1, 2013.

9. PLACEMENT SERVICE

Only APA members are eligible to use the placement service. Appointing officers and applicants are urged to make preparations for their part in the placement operation in advance of the meeting.

Job seekers may pre-register for placement when registering for the meeting online, or by indicating candidacy on the pre-registration form provided at the back of this issue. Since many job interviews are pre-arranged on the basis of advertisements in Jobs for Philosophers (JFP), and since the placement service will not post notices of positions that have already been advertised in JFP, job seekers are advised to consult JFP in advance of the meeting. (JFP is available to APA members through the APA’s website.)

Whether interviewing in a suite or at a table, all interviewers must be registered for the meeting. In addition, each interviewing department must register for the placement service. If registering for the meeting online, one interviewer per department should select the option to register for the placement service. If registering by mail or fax, please submit an “Advance Registration” form for each interviewer, and one “Placement Service Registration for Interviewing Departments” form for each interviewing department (these forms are located at the end of this issue of the Proceedings).
10. 2014 Meeting Site and Program

The 2014 Pacific Division meeting will be held at the Westin Gaslamp Quarter Hotel, San Diego. The program committee invites contributions for the 2014 meeting. The deadline for submissions of papers and posters is September 1, 2013. Detailed instructions for submitting papers and posters are published on the Pacific Division website, http://apa-pacific.org. The program committee also welcomes suggestions for topics and/or speakers of invited sessions. These should be sent to the 2014 program chair, Kevin Timpe, at chair@apa-pacific.org.

11. Access

The Pacific Division subsidizes childcare for meeting participants. Please inform the secretary-treasurer, by email, of any childcare needs no later than February 1, 2013.

The division also provides accommodations under the Americans with Disabilities Act. A form for accommodations requests is available on the division’s website, http://apa-pacific.org. The deadline for requests is also February 1.

To provide a welcoming environment for those with multiple chemical sensitivities, all participants are requested to refrain from wearing scented products.

On behalf of the executive and program committees of the APA Pacific Division, I extend to every member of the American Philosophical Association a warm invitation to take part in our 2013 annual meeting.

Cordially,
Dominic McIver Lopes
Secretary-Treasurer
## Pacific Division Committees, 2012–2013

### Executive Committee

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<tr>
<th>Member</th>
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<tr>
<td>Rebecca Copenhaver</td>
<td>Manuel Vargas</td>
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<td>John M. Fischer</td>
<td>Alastair Norcross</td>
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<td>Terence Parsons</td>
<td>Jean Roberts</td>
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<td>Alison Wylie</td>
<td>Patrick Rysiew</td>
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<td>Dominic McIver Lopes</td>
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### Program Committee

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<tr>
<td>Patrick Rysiew (chair)</td>
<td>Graham Oddie</td>
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<td>Chrisoula Andreou</td>
<td>Marina Oshana</td>
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<td>Neera Badhwar</td>
<td>David Pitt</td>
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<td>Tim Black</td>
<td>Lisa Raphals</td>
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<td>Elizabeth Brake</td>
<td>Samuel Rickless</td>
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<td>Juan Comesaña</td>
<td>Peter Ross</td>
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<td>Philip Corkum</td>
<td>Nancy E. Snow</td>
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<td>Angela Coventry</td>
<td>Janet Stemwedel</td>
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<td>Sharon Crasnow</td>
<td>Brad Elliott Stone</td>
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<td>Jeremy Fantl</td>
<td>Asta Sveinsdottir</td>
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<td>Patrick R. Frierson</td>
<td>Jan Szaif</td>
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<td>Jeff Gauthier</td>
<td>Kenneth Taylor</td>
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<td>Franz-Peter Griesmaier</td>
<td>Kevin Timpe</td>
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<td>Cindy Holder</td>
<td>Shelley Wilcox</td>
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<td>Carrie Ichikawa Jenkins</td>
<td>Robert A. Wilson</td>
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<td>Pierre Keller</td>
<td>Audrey Yap</td>
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<td>Krista Lawlor</td>
<td>Richard Zach</td>
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<td>Darrell Moellendorf</td>
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### Nominating Committee

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<tr>
<td>Alison Wylie, chair</td>
<td>Dominic McIver Lopes, <em>ex officio</em></td>
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<td>Leslie Francis</td>
<td>Donald Rutherford</td>
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**THE AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL ASSOCIATION**
**PACIFIC DIVISION**
**87TH ANNUAL MEETING**
**MAIN PROGRAM**

**WEDNESDAY, MARCH 27**

**REGISTRATION**
8:30 a.m.–8:00 p.m., mezzanine

**PLACEMENT INFORMATION**
8:30 a.m.–8:00 p.m., mezzanine

**PLACEMENT INTERVIEWING**
8:30 a.m.–5:00 p.m., location TBA

**EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE MEETING**
3:00–7:00 p.m.

**WEDNESDAY MORNING, MARCH 27**

**SESSION 1 — 9:00 A.M.—NOON**

1A  **Author-Meets-Critics: Wayne Sumner, Assisted Death: A Study in Ethics and Law**
9:00 a.m.–noon
Chair: Neera Badhwar (University of Oklahoma and George Mason University)
Critics: Margaret Battin (University of Utah)
S. Matthew Liao (New York University)
Don Marquis (University of Kansas)
Author: Wayne Sumner (University of Toronto)

1B  **Author-Meets-Critics: Kate Moran, Community and Progress in Kant’s Moral Philosophy**
9:00 a.m.–noon
Chair: Alan McLuckie (Stanford University)
Critics: Lara Denis (Agnes Scott College)
Jeanine Grenberg (St. Olaf College)
David Sussman (University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign)

Author: Kate Moran (Brandeis University)

1C Author-Meets-Critics: James P. Sterba, *From Rationality to Equality*

9:00 a.m.–noon
Chair: Susanne Sreedhar (Boston University)
Critics: Richard W. Miller (Cornell University)
William J. Talbott (University of Washington)
Author: James P. Sterba (University of Notre Dame)

1D Invited Symposium: A Fresh Look at Aristotle’s *Metaphysics*, Book Iota

9:00 a.m.–noon
Chair: Josh Hayes (Santa Clara University)
Speakers: Henry Mendell (California State University, Los Angeles)
“The Measure of Iota and Some Other Things”
Klaus Corcilius (University of California, Berkeley)
“Opposites and Conceptual priority in *Metaphysics* Iota 7”
John Bowin (University of California, Santa Cruz)
“What Light Can Book Iota Shed on Aristotle’s Metaphysics of Change?”
Commentator: Adam Crager (Princeton University)

1E Colloquium: Causation

9:00 a.m.–noon

9:00–10:00
Chair: Daniel Krasner (Metropolitan State College of Denver)
Speaker: Sarah Roe (University of California, Davis)
“The New Mechanists and the Myth of Negative Causation”
Commentator: Daniel Pearlberg (Ohio State University)

10:00–11:00
Chair: Ceth Lightfield (University of California, Davis)
Speaker: Nathanael Stein (Florida State University)
“Causation: Ontology and A Priority”
Commentator: Charles Hermes (University of Texas at Arlington)
Wednesday Morning, 1E to 1I

11:00–noon
Chair: Jacqueline Taylor (University of San Francisco)
Speaker: Jennifer S. Marusic (Brandeis University)
“Hume on the Misuse of Causal Language”
Commentator: Graciela De Pierris (Stanford University)

1F Colloquium: Compositionality, Externalism, Supervaluationism
9:00 a.m.–noon
9:00–10:00
Chair: Juan J. Colomina (University of Texas at Austin)
Speaker: Carl Ehrett (Furman University)
“Supervaluating at Higher Orders: How to Incorporate Intransitive Admissibility”
Commentator: Dan Lopez De Sa (LOGOS Barcelona)

10:00–11:00
Chair: Wendy Salkin (Harvard University and Stanford University)
Speaker: Leo Yan (Brown University)
“Externalist Accounts of Racial Epithets”
Commentator: Rachel McKinney (The Graduate Center, CUNY)

11:00–noon
Chair: Daniel Harris (The Graduate Center, CUNY)
Speaker: Lorraine Juliano Keller (University of Notre Dame and Niagara University)
“Compositionality and Structured Propositions”
Commentator: Curtis Kehler (University of British Columbia)

1G Colloquium: Contextualism
9:00 a.m.–noon
9:00–10:00
Chair: Rodrigo Borges (Rutgers University)
Speaker: Benjamin Lennertz (University of Southern California)
“Against Some Group Readings of the Epistemic ‘Might’”
Commentator: Janice Dowell (University of Nebraska, Lincoln)

10:00–11:00
Chair: Richard Greene (Weber State University)
Speaker: Joanna Odrowaz-Sypniewska (Uniwersytet Warszawski)
“Contextualism and the Content of Vague Assertions”
Commentator: Kirk Ludwig (Indiana University, Bloomington)
11:00–noon
Chair: Noel Martin (University of California, San Diego)
Speaker: Logan Gage (Baylor University)
“Against Contextualism: Belief, Evidence, and the Bank Cases”
Commentator: Christoph Kelp (Katholieke Universiteit Leuven)

1H Colloquium: Free Will
9:00 a.m.–noon
9:00–10:00
Chair: Oisín Deery (University of British Columbia)
Speaker: Joseph Campbell (Washington State University)
“Problems for Classical Incompatibilism”
Commentator: Michael Robinson (Grand Valley State University)

10:00–11:00
Chair: Hannah Tierney (University of Arizona)
Speaker: Christopher Franklin (Marymount University)
“If Anyone Should Be an Agent-causalist, Then Everyone Should Be an Agent-causalist”
Commentator: Rebekah L. H. Rice (Seattle Pacific University)

11:00–noon
Chair: Byeong-Uk Yi (University of Toronto)
Speaker: Alex Grzankowski (University of Texas at Austin)
“’Can’ and the Consequence Argument”
Commentator: Mark Balaguer (California State University, Los Angeles)

II Colloquium: Moral Realism
9:00 a.m.–noon
9:00–10:00
Chair: Joseph Wilson (University of Colorado, Boulder)
Speaker: William A. Rottschaefer (Lewis & Clark College)
“Convergence on Divergence: How to Be a Relativistic Moral Realist”
Commentator: Dan Dimetriou (University of Minnesota, Morris)

10:00–11:00
Chair: Benjamin Kultgen (University of Colorado, Boulder)
Speaker: Joshua Rasmussen (Azusa Pacific University)
“Moral Antirealism and the Problem of Self-defeat”
Commentator: Russ Shafer-Landau (University of Wisconsin, Madison)
11:00–noon
Chair: Amanda Brockman (University of Colorado, Boulder)
Speaker: Melis Erdur (New York University)
“How to Distinguish a Quasi-realist from a Realist”
Commentator: Matthew Bedke (University of British Columbia)

1J Colloquium: Reasons to Act
9:00 a.m.–noon
9:00–10:00
Chair: Talbot Brewer (University of Virginia)
Speaker: Nathaniel Sharadin (University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill)
“How Reasons Wrong and Right”
Commentator: Fred Schueler (University of Delaware)

10:00–11:00
Chair: Chris Howard (University of Arizona)
Speaker: Andrew McAninch (Illinois Wesleyan University)
“Acting for a Reason and Following a Principle: A Dilemma for Korsgaard’s Constitutivism”
Commentator: Charles Lang (University of California, Davis)

11:00–noon
Chair: Russell DiSilvestro (California State University, Sacramento)
Speaker: Mary Clayton Coleman (Illinois Wesleyan University and Tulane University)
“Exploring Metanormative Constitutivism”
Commentator: Johnnie Pedersen (University of California, Davis)

1K Colloquium: Reproduction and Bioethics
9:00 a.m.–noon
9:00–10:00
Chair: Leslie Pickering Francis (University of Utah)
Speaker: Russell Powell (Boston University)
“In Genes We Trust: The Evolutionary and Ethical Implications of Human Germline Modification”
Commentator: Anita Ho (University of British Columbia)

10:00–11:00
Chair: Lijun Yuan (Texas State University, San Marcos)
Speaker: Louis-Philippe Hodgson (York University)
“Cosmopolitanism and Reproductive Choices”
Commentator: Katherine Wayne (Queen’s University)
11:00–noon
Chair: Danielle Fundora (Arizona State University)
Speaker: Tomasz Zuradzki (Jagiellonian University)
“The Role of Normative Uncertainty in Bioethical Argumentation: The New Understanding of the ‘Pro-life’ View on Human Embryo Research”
Commentator: Dan Moller (University of Maryland)

1L Colloquium: War and Global Justice
9:00 a.m.–noon
9:00–10:00
Chair: Per-Erik Milam (University of California, San Diego)
Speaker: Daniel Pilchman (University of California, Irvine)
“Global Justice and the State System”
Commentator: Adam Hosein (University of Colorado, Boulder)

10:00–11:00
Chair: James Anderson (University of San Diego)
Speaker: Saba Bazargan (University of California, San Diego)
“Evaluating Wars with Just and Unjust Aims”
Commentator: Bradley J. Strawser (Naval Postgraduate School)

11:00–noon
Chair: Sarah Jones (Northern Michigan University)
Speaker: Stephen Palmquist (Hong Kong Baptist University)
“Kantian Conditions for the Possibility of Justified Resistance to Authority”
Commentator: Marilea Bramer (Minnesota State University, Moorhead)

WEDNESDAY AFTERNOON, MARCH 27

SESSION 2 — 1:00–4:00 P.M.

2A Author-Meets-Critics: Paul Patton, Deleuzian Concepts: Philosophy, Colonization, Politics
1:00–4:00 p.m.
Chair: Daniel W. Smith (Purdue University)
Critics: Jeffrey A. Bell (Southeastern Louisiana University)
Nicholas Tampio (Fordham University)
Author: Paul Patton (University of New South Wales)

2B Author-Meets-Critics: John Tomasi, Free Market Fairness
1:00–4:00 p.m.
Chair: Guido Pincione (University of Arizona)
Critics:  Jason Brennan (Georgetown University)
         Paul Gowder (University of Iowa)
         Steven Wall (University of Arizona)
Author:  John Tomasi (Brown University)

1:00–4:00 p.m.
Chair: Pierre Keller (University of California, Riverside)
Critics: Michael Hardimon (University of California, San Diego)
         Michelle Kosch (Cornell University)
Author:  Terry Pinkard (Georgetown University)

2D  Author-Meets-Critics: Tim Bayne, *The Unity of Consciousness*
1:00–4:00 p.m.
Chair: Robert Rupert (University of Colorado, Boulder)
Critics: Christopher Hill (Brown University)
         Farid Masrour (Harvard University)
         Robert Van Gulick (Syracuse University)
Author:  Tim Bayne (University of Manchester)

2E  Invited Symposium: Accuracy, Coherence, and Evidence
1:00–4:00 p.m.
Chair: Graham Oddie (University of Colorado, Boulder)
Speakers: Branden Fitelson (University of California, Berkeley)
         Kenny Easwaran (University of Southern California)
         James Joyce (University of Michigan)
Commentator: Wayne Myrvold (University of Western Ontario)

2F  Invited Symposium: The Problem of Animal Pain
1:00–4:00 p.m.
Chair: Christina Dietz (Chapman University)
Speakers: Gary Varner (Texas A&M University)
         Trent Dougherty (Baylor University)
         Beth Seacord (University of Colorado, Boulder)
Commentators: Colin Allen (Indiana University, Bloomington)
              Marilyn McCord Adams (University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill)
              Adam Shriver (Washington University in St. Louis)
2G Colloquium: Agency and Responsibility
1:00–4:00 p.m.

1:00–2:00
Chair: Rima Basu (University of Southern California)
Speaker: Mark Rosner (Queen’s University)
“The Rational Relations View Wide and Narrow”
Commentator: Kyle Fritz (Florida State University)

2:00–3:00
Chair: Pamela Hood (San Francisco State University)
Speaker: Andrew Eshleman (University of Portland)
“Praiseworthiness and Phronesis-enhanced Freedom”
Commentator: Greg Damico (University of California, Davis)

3:00–4:00
Chair: Blain Neufeld (University of Wisconsin, Milwaukee)
Speaker: Benjamin Mitchell-Yellin (University of California, Riverside)
“Two Interpretations of Contractualist Moral Agency”
Commentator: Adam Swenson (California State University, Northridge)

2H Colloquium: Ethics
1:00–4:00 p.m.

1:00–2:00
Chair: Clair Morrissey (Occidental College)
Speaker: Daniel Koltonski (Amherst College)
“Professional Norms and Institutional Exploitation”
Commentator: Rita Manning (San Jose State University)

2:00–3:00
Chair: Chad Bogosian (Arkansas Northeastern College)
Speaker: Ornaith O’Dowd (College of Charleston)
“Kantian Ethics and Privilege-buttressing Ignorance”
Commentator: Kate Abramson (Indiana University, Bloomington)

3:00–4:00
Chair: Brian Berkey (University of California, Berkeley)
Speaker: David K. Chan (University of Wisconsin, Stevens Point)
“The Moral Risk in Self-defense”
Commentator: Rebecca Lynn Stangl (University of Virginia)
2I Colloquium: Justification and Knowledge

1:00–4:00 p.m.

1:00–2:00
Chair: Greg Antill (University of California, Los Angeles)
Speaker: Andrew D. Spear (Grand Valley State University)
“Conditions of Cognitive Sanity and the Internalist Credo”
Commentator: Joseph Shieber (Lafayette College)

2:00–3:00
Chair: Charles Wallis (California State University, Long Beach)
Speaker: Philip Osborne (Purdue University)
“On What There Seems to Be: Reflections on Phenomenal Conservatism and Common Sense”
Commentator: Justin Dallmann (University of Southern California)

3:00–4:00
Chair: Dan Campana (University of La Verne)
Speaker: Martin Montminy (University of Oklahoma)
“Knowledge Despite Falsehood”
Commentator: Alexander Arnold (University of Notre Dame)

2J Colloquium: Logic and Semantics

1:00–4:00 p.m.

1:00–2:00
Chair: Chris Tillman (University of Manitoba)
Speaker: Jeff Snapper (University of Notre Dame)
“Trivalent Expressivism”
Commentator: Paolo Santorio (University of Leeds)

2:00–3:00
Chair: Grant A. Marler (Claremont Graduate University)
Speaker: Geoff Georgi (West Virginia University)
“A Propositional Semantics for Substitutional Quantification”
Commentator: Ben Caplan (Ohio State University)

3:00–4:00
Chair: Russell Marcus (Hamilton College)
Speaker: Megan Wallace (University of Kentucky)
“Rearming the Slingshot”
Commentator: Gemma Celestino (LOGOS Barcelona)
2K  Colloquium: Philosophy of Science
1:00–4:00 p.m.
1:00–2:00
Chair:  Michael Hunter (University of California, Davis)
Speaker:  Casey Helgeson (University of Wisconsin, Madison)
“Modus Darwin Reconsidered”
Commentator:  Jill McIntosh (Simon Fraser University)
2:00–3:00
Chair:  Elaine Landry (University of California, Davis)
Speaker:  Reuben Stern (University of Wisconsin, Madison)
“Consilient Generalizations as Laws of Nature”
Commentator:  William Harper (University of Western Ontario)
3:00–4:00
Chair:  Jonathan Kaplan (Oregon State University)
Speakers:  Christopher Hitchcock (California Institute of Technology)
            Joel Velasco (California Institute of Technology)
“Newtonian and Evolutionary Forces”
Commentator:  Christopher Stephens (University of British Columbia)

2L  APA Committee Session: Academic Service-Learning in Philosophy Courses
1:00–4:00 p.m.
Arranged by the APA Committee on the Teaching of Philosophy
Chair:  Matthew C. Altman (Central Washington University)
Speakers:  Dan Hicks (University of Notre Dame)
“A Class on Philosophy and Food: Groping Towards Academic Service-Learning for Philosophy of Science”
Julinna Oxley (Coastal Carolina University)
“Experiential Learning in the Feminist Philosophy Classroom”
Christopher N. Gandy (Wake Technical Community College)
“On the Nature of Shoes: The Ethics Project as Service Learning”
Krista Thomason (Swarthmore College)
“Philosophy and Human Rights: Scholarship and Activism”
Matthew C. Altman (Central Washington University)
“The Value of Service-Learning for Philosophy”
**2M  APA Committee Session: Credentialing**

1:00–4:00 p.m.

Arranged by the APA Committee on Philosophy in Two-Year Colleges

Chair: Anthony E. Thomas (Kishwaukee College)

Speakers:
- Mark Thorsby (Lone Star College)
- Basil Smith (Saddleback College)
- Marc Bobro (Santa Barbara City College)

**WEDNESDAY EARLY EVENING, MARCH 27**

**SESSION 3 — 4:00–6:00 P.M.**

**3A  Invited Paper: From Passion to Action**

4:00–6:00 p.m.

Chair: Julie Tannenbaum (Pomona College)

Speaker: Tamar Schapiro (Stanford University)

“From Passion to Action”

Commentators:
- Doug Lavin (Harvard University)
- Andrews Reath (University of California, Riverside)

**3B  Invited Paper: The Epistemology of Logic**

4:00–6:00 p.m.

Chair: Nicole Wyatt (University of Calgary)

Speaker: Gillian Russell (Washington University in St. Louis)

“Metaphysical Analyticity and the Epistemology of Logic”

Commentators:
- Roberta Ballarin (University of British Columbia)
- Sinan Dogramaci (University of Texas at Austin)

**3C  Invited Paper: What Imagination Teaches**

4:00–6:00 p.m.

Chair: Heidi Maibom (Carleton University)

Speaker: Amy Kind (Claremont McKenna College)

“Imagining under Constraints”

Commentators:
- Jennifer Church (Vassar College)
- Tyler Doggett (University of Vermont)

**3D  Colloquium: Absolutes and Ideals**

4:00–6:00 p.m.

4:00–5:00

Chair: John Harris (Texas Christian University)
Speaker: Piers Norris Turner (Ohio State University)  
“The Absolutism Problem in On Liberty”  
Commentator: Grant J. Silva (Marquette University)  

5:00–6:00  
Chair: Aaron Elliott (University of Nebraska, Lincoln)  
Speaker: Collin Anthony (University of Pennsylvania)  
“Justice, Facts, and Ideals”  
Commentator: James Gledhill (Goethe-Universität Frankfurt)  

3E Colloquium: Belief Reports  
4:00–6:00 p.m.  
4:00–5:00  
Chair: Lewis Powell (University at Buffalo)  
Speaker: Joseph A. Hedger (Syracuse University)  
“Frege’s Puzzle Left Unsolved: A Reply to Sainsbury and Tye”  
Commentator: Ted Parent (Virginia Tech)  

5:00–6:00  
Chair: Scott Clifton (University of Washington)  
Speaker: Miheea Capraru (Syracuse University)  
“A Solution to the Problem of Access for Russellian Theories of Belief”  
Commentator: Robert Stainton (University of Western Ontario)  

3F Colloquium: Lives and Value  
4:00–6:00 p.m.  
4:00–5:00  
Chair: Joyce Havstad (University of California, San Diego)  
Speaker: Howard Nye (University of Alberta)  
“Responsibility for Vulnerability and Non-identity”  
Commentator: Melinda A. Roberts (The College of New Jersey)  

5:00–6:00  
Chair: Franco V. Trivigno (Marquette University)  
Speaker: Stephen Campbell (Coe College)  
“When the Shape of a Life Matters”  
Commentator: Anne Baril (University of New Mexico)  

3G Colloquium: Mindreading  
4:00–6:00 p.m.  
4:00–5:00  
Chair: Anne Jacobsen (University of Houston)
Speaker: Anastasia Panagopoulos (Minnesota State University, Mankato)
“The Independence Approach to Mindreading: Knowing What It’s Like to Be Someone Else, Low-level Simulation, and Theorizing”
Commentator: Kristin Andrews (York University)

5:00–6:00
Chair: Hsiang-Yun Chen (University of Texas at Austin)
Speaker: Joshua Johnson (Saint Louis University)
“The Private Language Argument and a Second-person Approach to Mindreading”
Commentator: Bernard Molyneux (University of California, Davis)

3H Colloquium: Realism and Substantiveness
4:00–6:00 p.m.

4:00–5:00
Chair: Nikolaj Jang Pedersen (Yonsei University)
Speaker: Jeremy Wyatt (University of Connecticut)
“Deflationism Deflated”
Commentator: Douglas Edwards (University of Aberdeen)

5:00–6:00
Chair: Neil Williams (University at Buffalo)
Speaker: Matt Leonard (University of California, Davis)
“Mirror Realism”
Commentator: Alexander Zambrano (University of Colorado, Boulder)

3I Colloquium: The Surprise Exam Paradox and Beyond
4:00–6:00 p.m.

4:00–5:00
Chair: David Burris (Arizona Western College)
Speaker: Daniel Immerman (University of Notre Dame)
“A New Solution to the Surprise Test Paradox”
Commentator: Marc Moffett (University of Wyoming)

5:00–6:00
Chair: Ted Shear (University of California, Davis)
Speaker: Dylan Dodd (Pacific University)
“Cookies and Surprise Exams”
Commentator: Jeremy Troy (University of Wyoming)
3J  Symposium: Compatibilism  
4:00–6:00 p.m.  
Chair: Zachary Bachman (University of California, Riverside)  
Speaker: Yael Loewenstein (University of Arizona)  
“On the Direct Argument and the Burden of Proof: A Response to Schnall and Widerker”  
Commentators: Seth Shabo (University of Delaware)  
David Widerker (Bar-Ilan University)

3K  Symposium: Indicatives  
4:00–6:00 p.m.  
Chair: Ulrich Meyer (Colgate University)  
Speaker: Caleb Perl (University of Southern California)  
“How to Outfox Sly Pete: Semantics for Indicatives”  
Commentators: Alexis Burgess (Stanford University)  
John MacFarlane (University of California, Berkeley)

3L  Symposium: Methodology, Values, and Statistics in Science  
4:00–6:00 p.m.  
Chair: Sharon Crasnow (Norco College)  
Speaker: Irina Meketa (Boston University)  
“Constructing the Null Hypothesis: Epistemic and Non-epistemic Values in Statistical Methods”  
Commentators: Simon Fitzpatrick (John Carroll University)  
Kent Staley (Saint Louis University)

3M  APA Committee Session: Different Dimensions of Buddhism  
4:00–6:00 p.m.  
Arranged by the APA Committee on the Status of Asian and Asian-American Philosophers and Philosophies  
Chair: Prasanta S. Bandyopadhyay (Montana State University)  
Speakers: Sara Waller (Montana State University)  
“Animal Consciousness, Non-propositional Thought, and Zen Buddhism”  
William Deal (Case Western Reserve University)  
“Buddha as Bundle Theorist: The Problem of the Conscious Not-self”  
Prasanta S. Bandyopadhyay (Montana State University)  
“Theseus’s Ship, Buddhist’s Vehicles, and Our Identity Crisis”
GROUP MEETINGS, 6:00–8:00 P.M.
(See Group Meeting Program for details)
Radical Philosophy Association, Session 1
Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy
Society for Applied Philosophy, Session 1

GROUP MEETINGS, 6:00–9:00 P.M.
(See Group Meeting Program for details)
Concerned Philosophers for Peace
Experimental Philosophy Society
International Society for Chinese Philosophy, Session 1
International Society for Environmental Ethics, Session 1
Molinari Society
North American Nietzsche Society
Society for German Idealism, Session 1
Society for the Advancement of American Philosophy, Session 1
Society for the Philosophic Study of the Contemporary Visual Arts, Session 1
Society for the Study of Philosophy and the Martial Arts, Session 1
Society for the Study of the History of Analytical Philosophy
Society for Women in Philosophy, Session 1

GROUP MEETINGS, 8:00–10:00 P.M.
(See Group Meeting Program for details)
Society for Natural Religion
Society of Christian Philosophers

THURSDAY, MARCH 28

REGISTRATION
8:30 a.m.–8:00 p.m., mezzanine

PLACEMENT INFORMATION
8:30 a.m.–8:00 p.m., mezzanine

PLACEMENT INTERVIEWING
8:30 a.m.–5:00 p.m., location TBA
**BOOK DISPLAYS**
11:00 a.m.–5:30 p.m., California Ballroom

**ANNUAL BUSINESS MEETING**
Noon–1:00 p.m.

**ANNUAL RECEPTION**
10:00 p.m.–midnight

**THURSDAY MORNING, MARCH 28**

**SESSION 4 — 9:00 A.M.–NOON**

**4A Author-Meets-Critics: Christopher Yeomans, Freedom and Reflection: Hegel and the Logic of Agency**

9:00 a.m.–noon
Chair:  J. M. Fritzman (Lewis & Clark College)
Critics:  James Kreines (Claremont McKenna College)
  Michael Quante (Westfälische Wilhelms-Universität Münster)
Author:  Christopher Yeomans (Purdue University)

**4B Author-Meets-Critics: Pauline Kleingeld, Kant and Cosmopolitanism: The Philosophical Ideal of World Citizenship**

9:00 a.m.–noon
Chair:  Marc Bobro (Santa Barbara City College)
Critics:  Alyssa Bernstein (Ohio University)
  Helga Varden (University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign)
Author:  Pauline Kleingeld (Rijksuniversiteit Groningen)

**4C Author-Meets-Critics: Sarah Broadie, Nature and Divinity in Plato’s Timaeus**

9:00 a.m.–noon
Chair:  Suzanne Obdrzalek (Claremont McKenna College)
Critics:  Rachel Barney (University of Toronto)
  Charles Kahn (University of Pennsylvania)
  Barbara M. Sattler (Yale University)
Author:  Sarah Broadie (University of St. Andrews)

**4D Invited Symposium: Berkeley’s Puzzle**

9:00 a.m.–noon
Chair:  James Genone (Franklin & Marshall College)
Speakers: John Campbell (University of California, Berkeley)  
Quassim Cassam (Warwick University)  
Barry Stroud (University of California, Berkeley)

4E Invited Symposium: The Epistemology of Modality  
9:00 a.m.–noon  
Chair: Anand Vaidya (San Jose State University)  
Speakers: Robert Fischer (Texas State University, San Marcos)  
“A Meta-epistemology of Modality”  
Stephen Biggs (Iowa State University)  
“Abductive Two-Dimensionalism: A New Route to the A Priori Identification of Necessary Truths”  
Felipe Leon (University of California, Riverside)  
“From Modal Skepticism to Modal Empiricism”

4F Invited Symposium: Theories of Innate Cognition  
9:00 a.m.–noon  
Chair: Timothy Crockett (University of California, Berkeley)  
Speakers: Martin Pickavé (University of Toronto)  
“Innate Cognition in Later Medieval Philosophy”  
Raffaella De Rosa (Rutgers University)  
“Descartes’ Nativism: the Curious Case of Sensations”  
Nicholas Jolley (University of California, Irvine)  
“Leibniz, Plato, and Two Theories of Innate Ideas”

4G Invited Symposium: Where Virtues Meet: Virtue Ethics and Virtue Epistemology  
9:00 a.m.–noon  
Chair: Heather Battaly (California State University, Fullerton)  
Speakers: Guy Axtell (Radford University)  
“Belief, Ethics, and the Ethics of Belief”  
Howard J. Curzer (Texas Tech University)  
“Good People with Bad Principles”  
Jason Baehr (Loyola Marymount University)  
“Loving the Epistemic Good”  
Christine Swanton (University of Auckland)  
“The Notion of the ‘Moral’: The Relation between Virtue Ethics and Virtue Epistemology”
4H  Colloquium: Facts, Relations, Substance

9:00 a.m.–noon

9:00–10:00
Chair: Cody Gilmore (University of California, Davis)
Speaker: Noel Saenz (University of Colorado, Boulder)
“Composition and Facts”
Commentator: David Liebesman (Boston University)

10:00–11:00
Chair: Roger Florka (Ursinus College)
Speaker: Alison Peterman (University of Rochester)
“Spinoza on Extension”
Commentator: Daniel Schneider (University of Wisconsin, Madison)

11:00–noon
Chair: Pablo Rychter (Universitat de València)
Speaker: Fatema Amijee (University of Texas at Austin)
“A Return to Neutral Relations: A Puzzle about Symmetry”
Commentator: Andrew Bailey (University of Notre Dame)

4I  Colloquium: Perception and Perceptual Content

9:00 a.m.–noon

9:00–10:00
Chair: Troy Jollimore (California State University, Chico)
Speaker: Matthew Frise (University of Rochester)
“Discontent with Rich Contents”
Commentator: Adam Pautz (University of Texas at Austin)

10:00–11:00
Chair: Emma Esmaili (University of British Columbia)
Speaker: David Bourget (University of London)
“A General Reply to the Arguments from Blur, Double Vision, Perspective, and Other Kinds of Perceptual Distortion Against Representationalism”
Commentator: Robert Howell (Southern Methodist University)

11:00–noon
Chair: Isabelle Peschard (San Francisco State University)
Speaker: Grace Helton (New York University)
“Veridicality Judgments and High-level Perception”
Commentator: Robert Schroer (University of Minnesota, Duluth)
4J Colloquium: The Self
9:00 a.m.–noon
9:00–10:00
Chair: Christian Miller (Wake Forest University)
Speaker: Roman Altshuler (Stony Brook University and Marymount Manhattan College)
“Free Will, Narrative, and Retroactive Self-constitution”
Commentator: Tina Talsma (Florida State University)

10:00–11:00
Chair: Margaret Bowman (University of Toronto)
Speaker: David Mark Kovacs (Cornell University)
“You Are What You Think You Are”
Commentator: Mohammad Azadpur (San Francisco State University)

11:00–noon
Chair: Simona Capisani (San Francisco State University)
Speaker: Tom O’Shea (University of Essex)
“Against Radical Self-legislation”
Commentator: E.S. Elizondo (Yale University)

4K Colloquium: Well-being and Others
9:00 a.m.–noon
9:00–10:00
Chair: Sarah Goff (Goethe-Universität Frankfurt)
Speaker: Robert (R.J.) Leland (Stanford University)
“An Institutionalized Concern with Promoting Egalitarianism? Defending Dworkin’s Proposal Against G. A. Cohen’s Incoherence Charge”
Commentator: Sean Aas (Goethe-Universität Frankfurt)

10:00–11:00
Chair: Herminia Reyes (San Diego State University)
Speaker: Nina Brewer-Davis (Auburn University)
“Roles and Relationships: Why Social Roles Cannot Ground Associative Obligations”
Commentator: Luis Cheng-Guajardo (Stanford University)

11:00–noon
Chair: Christina Chuang (Nanyang Technological University)
Speaker: Donald Wilson (Kansas State University)
“Balancing Commitments: Herman on Own-happiness and Beneficence”
Commentator: Idil Boran (York University)
APA Committee Session: Health Care for Prisoners
9:00 a.m.–noon

Arranged by the APA Committee on Philosophy and Medicine
Chair: Nancy S. Jecker (University of Washington)
Speakers:
  John Kleinig (John Jay College of Criminal Justice)
    “Correctional Health Care: Further Reflections”
  Anita Silvers (San Francisco State University)
    “Forced Dependence and Custodial Responsibility”
  Nada Gligorov (Mount Sinai School of Medicine)
    “Free Will, Punishment, and Healthcare”
  Kenneth Kipnis (University of Hawaii at Manoa)
    “Social Justice and Correctional Health Services”

APA Committee Session: The Philosophy of Yijing and Its Contemporary Significances
9:00 a.m.–noon

Arranged by the APA Committee on the Status of Asian and Asian-American Philosophers and Philosophies
Chair: Chung-Ying Cheng (University of Hawaii at Manoa)
Speakers:
  Halla Kim (University of Nebraska at Omaha)
    “Confucianism before Confucius: The Rectification of Names in the Yijing”
  Tze-ki Hon (SUNY Geneseo)
    “Hexagrams as Moral Philosophy: The Creation of the Genealogy of the Sages of the Yijing”
  Chung-Ying Cheng (University of Hawaii at Manoa)
    “Philosophy of Yijing as Cosmic Ecology and Onto-ethics”
  Eric S. Nelson (University of Massachusetts, Lowell)
    “The Yijing as Divination, Hermeneutics, and Ethics”

Annual Business Meeting
Noon–1:00 p.m.

Thursday Afternoon, March 28

Session 5 — 1:00–4:00 p.m.

Author-Meets-Critics: Antonia LoLordo, Locke’s Moral Man
1:00–4:00 p.m.
Chair: Samuel Rickless (University of California, San Diego)
Critics: Margaret Atherton (University of Wisconsin, Milwaukee)
Kenneth Winkler (Yale University)

Author: Antonia LoLordo (University of Virginia)

5B Author-Meets-Critics: Christopher Pincock, *Mathematics and Scientific Representation*

1:00–4:00 p.m.
Chair: Richard Zach (University of Calgary)
Critics: Robert Batterman (University of Pittsburgh)
Otávio Bueno (University of Miami)
Thomas Ryckman (Stanford University)
Author: Christopher Pincock (Ohio State University)

5C Author-Meets-Critics: Sally Haslanger, *Resisting Reality: Social Construction and Social Critique*

1:00–4:00 p.m.
Chair: Asta Sveinsdottir (San Francisco State University)
Critics: Karen Jones (University of Melbourne)
Charles Mills (Northwestern University)
Author: Sally Haslanger (Massachusetts Institute of Technology)

5D Author-Meets-Critics: Mark Sainsbury and Michael Tye, *Seven Puzzles of Thought (and How to Solve Them): An Originalist Theory of Concepts*

1:00–4:00 p.m.
Chair: Kent Bach (San Francisco State University)
Critics: Paul Boghossian (New York University)
Agustin Rayo (Massachusetts Institute of Technology)
Mark Richard (Harvard University)
Authors: Mark Sainsbury (University of Texas at Austin)
Michael Tye (University of Texas at Austin)

5E Invited Symposium: Aristotle and Alexander of Aphrodisias on Mental States

1:00–4:00 p.m.
Chair: Timothy Clarke (University of California, Berkeley)
Speakers: Victor Caston (University of Michigan)
“Alexander of Aphrodisias on Representation”
Mark Johnstone (McMaster University)
“Aristotle and Alexander on the Possibility of Perceptual Error”
Michael Griffin (University of British Columbia)
“Alexander’s Nous and Intentionality”

Commentator:  Jakub Deuretzbacher (Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin)

5F Invited Symposium: Crossroads: Philosophy and the Blues
1:00–4:00 p.m.
Chair: Abrol Fairweather (University of San Francisco and San Francisco State University)
Speakers: Robert Stolorow (University of California, Los Angeles)
Ben Stolorow (Independent Scholar)
“Blues, Trauma, and the Finitude of Human Existence”
Lewis R. Gordon (Temple University)
“Is Philosophy Blue?”
Robert Kraut (Ohio State University)
“Cause Versus Content: Semantic Considerations on the Blues”

Commentator: Robert Johnson (University of Missouri)

5G Invited Symposium: Epistemic Trust
1:00–4:00 p.m.
Chair: Nicholas Treanor (University of Edinburgh)
Speakers: Paul Faulkner (University of Sheffield)
“A Virtue Theory of Testimony”
Linda Zagzebski (University of Oklahoma)
“Trust and the Intellectual Virtues”

Commentator: Guy Longworth (Warwick University)

5H Invited Symposium: Mass Incarceration
1:00–4:00 p.m.
Chair: Rebecca Copenhaver (Lewis & Clark College)
Speakers: Natalie Cisneros (Allegheny College)
“Confining Brown Bodies: Latinos, Citizenship, and Mass Incarceration”
Sarah Tyson (University of Colorado, Denver)
“Mass Incarceration and the Construction of Femininity”
Brady Heiner (California State University, Fullerton)
Commentator: Chris Sturr (Harvard University)

5I Invited Symposium: Semantics and Pragmatics of Pejoratives
1:00–4:00 p.m.
Chair: Adam Simon (Stanford University)
Speakers: Christopher Hom (Texas Tech University)
Christopher Potts (Stanford University)
Geoff Nunberg (University of California, Berkeley)

5J Invited Symposium: Temptation
1:00–4:00 p.m.
Chair: Kim Johnston (University of Utah)
Speakers: Gideon Yaffe (Yale University)
“Disinhibition, Temptation, and Criminal Responsibility”
Richard Holton (Massachusetts Institute of Technology)
“Temptation and Moral Resolution”
Commentator: Sarah Stroud (McGill University)

5K Colloquium: Ontology I
1:00–4:00 p.m.
1:00–2:00
Chair: Michael Hicks (University of California, Santa Cruz)
Speaker: Bradley Rettler (University of Notre Dame)
“The Fundamental Quantifier Is Restricted”
Commentator: Dirk Kindermann (Rutgers University)

2:00–3:00
Chair: Thomas Icard (Stanford University)
Speaker: Louis H. deRosset (University of Vermont)
“Analyticity and Ontology”
Commentator: Wesley Holliday (University of California, Berkeley)

3:00–4:00
Chair: Jeffrey Roland (Louisiana State University)
Speaker: John Keller (Niagara University)
“On What There Is, Too”
Commentator: Aldo Antonelli (University of California, Davis)
5L  Colloquium: Sociality and Mind  
1:00–4:00 p.m.

1:00–2:00  
Chair: Reid Blackman (University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill)  
Speaker: Angelica Kaufmann (Universiteit Antwerpen)  
“Collective Intentionality: A Human—Not a Monkey—Business”  
Commentator: Bernard W. Kobes (Arizona State University)

2:00–3:00  
Chair: John Baldari (University of Nevada, Reno)  
Speaker: Siwing Tsoi (University of Texas at Austin)  
“The Concept of a Composite Agent”  
Commentator: Bana Bashour (American University of Beirut)

3:00–4:00  
Chair: Megan Hyska (University of Texas at Austin)  
Speaker: Mark Phelan (Lawrence University)  
“Believing qua Member”  
Commentator: Kurt Sylvan (Rutgers University)

5M  APA Committee Session: Funding for Philosophy: John Templeton Foundation  
1:00–4:00 p.m.  
Arranged by the APA Committee on Lectures, Publications, and Research  
Chair: John Martin Fischer (University of California, Riverside)  
Speakers: Jason Baehr (Loyola Marymount University)  
John Martin Fischer (University of California, Riverside)  
Michael Murray (The John Templeton Foundation)  
John Churchill (The John Templeton Foundation)  
Alexander Arnold (The John Templeton Foundation)

Thursday Early Evening, March 28  
Session 6 — 4:00–6:00 p.m.  

6A Invited Paper: Knowledge and Experiments  
4:00–6:00 p.m.  
Chair: Jason Kawall (Colgate University)
Speaker: Angel Pinillos (Arizona State University)  
“Knowledge and Experiments”

Commentators: Wesley Buckwalter (The Graduate Center, CUNY)  
Jonathan Ichikawa (University of British Columbia)

6B Invited Paper: Phenomenal Intentionality  
4:00–6:00 p.m.

Chair: Michael Shim (California State University, Los Angeles)  
Speaker: Angela Mendelovici (University of Western Ontario)  
“Mental Representation Is Not a Relation”

Commentators: Tim Crane (University of Cambridge)  
Brad Thompson (Southern Methodist University)

6C Invited Paper: Slurs  
4:00–6:00 p.m.

Chair: Aaron Bentley (San Francisco State University)  
Speaker: Ishani Maitra (University of Michigan)  
“On the Plurality of Pejoratives”

Commentators: Luvell Anderson (University of Memphis)  
Stavroula Glezakos (Wake Forest University)

6D Colloquium: Actions and Rule-following  
4:00–6:00 p.m.

4:00–5:00  
Chair: David Merli (Franklin & Marshall College)  
Speaker: Nathaniel Bulthuis (Cornell University)  
“Rescuing Rule-following: How Dispositionalism Can Help with Rule-following Primitivism”

Commentator: Jonathan Simon (Australian National University)

5:00–6:00  
Chair: Luca Ferrero (University of Wisconsin, Milwaukee)  
Speaker: Santiago Amaya (Washington University in St. Louis)  
“Slip-proof Actions”

Commentator: Andrei Buckareff (Marist College)

6E Colloquium: Aristotle  
4:00–6:00 p.m.

4:00–5:00  
Chair: Blake Hestir (Texas Christian University)  
Speaker: Joseph Karbowski (University of Notre Dame)  
“Human Nature in Aristotle’s Politics”

Commentator: Catherine McKeen (Williams College)
5:00–6:00
Chair: Sean McAleer (University of Wisconsin, Eau Claire)
Speaker: Matthew Walker (Yale-NUS College)
“A Pluralist Objection to Aristotle’s Account of the Happiest Life: A Response”
Commentator: George Garcia (Independent Scholar)

6F Colloquium: Assent and Freedom, Judgment and Morality
4:00–6:00 p.m.
4:00–5:00
Chair: Gwen Bradford (Rice University)
Speaker: Yujia Song (University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill)
“What’s Wrong with Judgmentalism?”
Commentator: Amy Berg (University of California, San Diego)
5:00–6:00
Chair: Marie Jayasekera (Colgate University)
Speaker: Georges Dicker (College at Brockport, SUNY)
“The Coherence of Cartesian Freedom”
Commentator: Scott Ragland (Saint Louis University)

6G Colloquium: Distributive Justice
4:00–6:00 p.m.
4:00–5:00
Chair: Russell Askren (Utah Valley University)
Speaker: Steven P. Lee (Hobart and William Smith Colleges)
“Is Justice Possible Under Welfare State Capitalism?”
Commentator: Christian Schemmel (Goethe-Universität Frankfurt)
5:00–6:00
Chair: John Gotti (San Francisco State University)
Speaker: Philip Shadd (Queen’s University)
Commentator: Govind Persad (Stanford University)

6H Colloquium: Forgiveness
4:00–6:00 p.m.
4:00–5:00
Chair: Dan Shahar (University of Arizona)
Speaker: Jeffrey Helmreich (University of California, Irvine)
“The Metaphysics of Reconciliation: How Forgiveness Relieves Moral Debt”
Colloquium: Foucault

4:00–6:00 p.m.

4:00–5:00

Chair: Tim Christie (Fraser International College)
Speaker: Colin Koopman (University of Oregon)
“Infopolitics and Biopolitics: Notes Toward a Foucaultian Genealogy”

Commentator: Corey McCall (Elmira College)

5:00–6:00

Chair: Shannon Winnubst (Ohio State University)
Speaker: David Vessey (Grand Valley State University)
“The Telling Absence of Moderation in Foucault’s Discussion of Parrhesia”

Commentator: S. West Gurley (Sam Houston State University)

Colloquium: Lying

4:00–6:00 p.m.

4:00–5:00

Chair: Nick Nash (University of Wisconsin, Milwaukee)
Speaker: Matthew Homan (Kennesaw State University)
“Spinoza on a Supposed Right to Lie”

Commentator: Diane Steinberg (Cleveland State University)

5:00–6:00

Chair: Gerardo Viera (University of British Columbia)
Speaker: Don Fallis (University of Arizona)
“Kant Versus Skyrms on Universal Deception”

Commentator: Gregory McWhirter (University of California, Irvine)

Symposium: Structural Realism

4:00–6:00 p.m.

Chair: Bryan W. Roberts (University of Southern California)
Speaker: Gerald D. Doppelt (University of California, San Diego)
“Does Structural Realism Provide the Best Explanation of the Predictive Success of
Science: Or Is Any Version of Scientific Realism Defensible?”

Commentators: Nora Berenstain (University of Tennessee)
Pablo Ruiz de Olano (University of Notre Dame)

6L APA Committee Session: Author-Meets-Critics: Mel Chen, *Animacies: Biopolitics, Racial Mattering, and Queer Affect*

4:00–6:00 p.m.

Arranged by the APA Committee on Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender People in the Profession

Chair: Alastair Norcross (University of Colorado, Boulder)
Speaker: Mel Chen (University of California, Berkeley)
Commentators: Richard Nunan (College of Charleston)
Alexis Shotwell (Carleton University)

6M APA Committee Session: Broadening Philosophy’s Reach: Partnerships with Colleges of Education

4:00–6:00 p.m.

Arranged by the APA Committee on Pre-College Instruction in Philosophy

Chair: Jana Mohr Lone (University of Washington)
Speakers: Michael Burroughs (University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill)
“Bringing Pre-college Philosophy Online at UNC–Chapel Hill”
Brian Wood (Harvard University)
“Open Minds: Using Partnerships between Philosophers, Harvard University, and Local Schools to Rediscover the Purpose of Education”
Jean Hanson (Independent Scholar)
“Opening Teacher and Student Minds: Thinking and Connecting with Middle School Students Through Philosophical Inquiry”
Sarah Cashmore (University of Toronto)
Trevor Norris (University of Toronto)
“Teaching How to Teach Philosophy: Aims, Challenges, and Insights”

Annual Reception

10:00 p.m.–midnight
**GROUP MEETINGS, 6:00–8:00 P.M.**

(See Group Meeting Program for details)
Association for Informal Logic and Critical Thinking
Society for Lesbian and Gay Philosophy
Society for the Study of Process Philosophies, Session 1

**GROUP MEETINGS, 6:00–9:00 P.M.**

(See Group Meeting Program for details)
International Hobbes Association, Session 1
International Society for Comparative Studies of Chinese and Western Philosophy, Session 1
Josiah Royce Society
Kierkegaard Society
North American Kant Society, Session 1
Society for Asian and Comparative Philosophy, Session 1
Society for Realist/Antirealist Discussion
Society for the History of Political Philosophy
Society for the Philosophy of Agency
Society for the Philosophy of History, Session 1
Society for the Philosophy of Sex and Love, Session 1
Society for the Study of Ethics and Animals

**GROUP MEETINGS, 8:00–10:00 P.M.**

(See Group Meeting Program for details)
Association for Chinese Philosophers in America, Session 1
Society for Philosophy in the Contemporary World
Wilfrid Sellars Society

**FRIDAY, MARCH 29**

**PROGRAM COMMITTEE BREAKFAST**

7:30–9:00 a.m.

**REGISTRATION**

8:30 a.m.–5:00 p.m., mezzanine

**PLACEMENT INFORMATION**

8:30 a.m.–5:00 p.m., mezzanine
**Placement Interviewing**
8:30 a.m.–5:00 p.m., location TBA

**Book Displays**
10:00 a.m.–6:00 p.m., California Ballroom

**Dewey Lecture**
4:00–5:30 p.m.

**Dewey Lecture Reception**
5:30–6:00 p.m.

**Presidential Address**
6:00–7:00 p.m.

**Presidential Reception**
7:00–8:00 p.m.

**Friday Morning, March 29**

**Session 7 — 9:00 a.m.–noon**

**7A** Author-Meets-Critics: Douglas Portmore, *Commonsense Consequentialism: Wherein Morality Meets Rationality*
9:00 a.m.–noon
Chair: Daniel Star (Boston University)
Critics: Joshua Gert (College of William and Mary)
        Paul Hurley (Claremont McKenna College)
        Sergio Tenenbaum (University of Toronto)
Author: Douglas Portmore (Arizona State University)

**7B** Author-Meets-Critics: Michael McKenna, *Conversation and Responsibility*
9:00 a.m.–noon
Chair: Kevin L. Timpe (Northwest Nazarene University)
Critics: Dana Kay Nelkin (University of California, San Diego)
        George Sher (Rice University)
        Holly M. Smith (Rutgers University)
Author: Michael McKenna (University of Arizona)

**7C** Author-Meets-Critics: Robert Pasnau, *Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671*
9:00 a.m.–noon
Chair: Philip Corkum (University of Alberta)
Critics:  Kris McDaniel (Syracuse University)
          Calvin Normore (University of California, Los Angeles)
          Marleen Rozemond (University of Toronto)
Author:    Robert Pasnau (University of Colorado, Boulder)

7D  Author-Meets-Critics: Howard Wettstein, The Significance of Religious Experience
9:00 a.m.–noon
Chair:    Rega Wood (Stanford University)
Critics:  William Abraham (Southern Methodist University)
          Jack Miles (University of California, Irvine)
Author:   Howard Wettstein (University of California, Riverside)

7E  Invited Symposium: Agency and Commitment
9:00 a.m.–noon
Chair:    Matthew Berk (University of Utah)
Speakers: Michael Smith (Princeton University)
          “Constitutive Commitments”
          Philip Pettit (Princeton University and Australian National University)
          “The Self-representing Agent”
Commentator: Sarah Buss (University of Michigan)

7F  Invited Symposium: The Epistemic Significance of Consciousness
9:00 a.m.–noon
Chair:    David Pitt (California State University, Los Angeles)
Speakers: Katalin Farkas (Central European University)
          “Knowledge Without Belief?”
          Declan Smithies (Ohio State University)
          “The Phenomenal Basis of Epistemic Justification”
          Charles Siewert (Rice University)
          “Warrant for Perceptual and Introspective Judgments: The Role of Phenomenal Character”
Commentator: Elijah Chudnoff (University of Miami)

7G  Invited Symposium: Towards a Feminist Philosophy of Logic
9:00 a.m.–noon
Chair:    Audrey Yap (University of Victoria)
Speakers: Judy Pelham (York University)
          Catherine Hundleby (University of Windsor)
          Sharyn Clough (Oregon State University)
Commentators: Catarina Dutilh Novaes (Rijksuniversiteit Groningen)
Tim Kenyon (University of Waterloo)

7H Colloquium: Emotion, Morality, and the Second-person Standpoint
9:00 a.m.–noon

9:00–10:00
Chair: John Berteaux (California State University, Monterey Bay)
Speaker: Andrew Peter Ross (Queen’s University)
“Is the Second-person Standpoint Non-consequentialist?”
Commentator: Thomas M. Powers (University of Delaware)

10:00–11:00
Chair: Alireza Sayadmansour (Independent Scholar)
Speaker: Emily McRae (University of Oklahoma)
“Transforming Anger: Three Approaches to the Morality of Anger”
Commentator: David DeMoss (Pacific University)

11:00–noon
Chair: Stephen Brown (Briar Cliff University)
Speaker: Meghan Masto (Lafayette College)
“Why Empathy Is Necessary for Morality”
Commentator: Ryan Indy Rhodes (University of Oklahoma)

7I Colloquium: Environmental Philosophy
9:00 a.m.–noon

9:00–10:00
Chair: Edward Maine (California State University, Fullerton)
Speaker: Sarah Kenehan (Marywood University)
“In Defense of the Duty to Assist: A Response to Critics on the Viability of a Rawlsian Approach to Climate Change”
Commentator: Paul Voice (Bennington College)

10:00–11:00
Chair: Michael Wagner (University of San Diego)
Speaker: Daniel Steel (Michigan State University)
“The Precautionary Principle and the Dilemma Objection”
Commentator: Marion Hourdequin (Colorado College)
11:00–noon
Chair: Joseph J. Lynch (California Polytechnic State University)
Speaker: Martin Benjamin (Michigan State University)
“Responding to Marx (Groucho, Not Karl) on Obligations to Posterity”
Commentator: Trevor Hedberg (University of Tennessee)

**7J Colloquium: Evaluative Judgments**

9:00 a.m.–noon

9:00–10:00
Chair: Albert Shin (University of California, Santa Barbara)
Speaker: Susan Hahn (Massachusetts Institute of Technology)
“How Can a Skeptic Have a Standard of Taste?”
Commentator: Eva Dadlez (University of Central Oklahoma)

10:00–11:00
Chair: Alida Liberman (University of Southern California)
Speaker: Ayca Boylu (University of Tennessee)
“The Relationship Between Intrinsic Goodness Attributions and Thick Evaluative Judgments: Reversing the Direction of Analysis”
Commentator: Luke Elson (University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill)

11:00–noon
Chair: John Camacho (University of Missouri, St. Louis)
Speaker: Gregory Nirshberg (University of Texas at El Paso)
“Does the Judgment Internalist’s Claim Depend on a Particular View of Motivation?”
Commentator: Cinzia Smothers (Bowling Green State University)

**7K Colloquium: Kantian Ethics**

9:00 a.m.–noon

9:00–10:00
Chair: Cecilea Mun (Clemson University)
Speaker: David Forman (University of Nevada, Las Vegas and University of British Columbia)
“Kant on the Happiness in Virtue”
Commentator: Anne Margaret Baxley (Washington University in St. Louis)
10:00–11:00
Chair: Tracy de Boer (University of Victoria)
Speaker: Benjamin Chan (Lawrence University)
“Kant, Cannibalism, and Enjoying Others”
Commentator: Jordan Pascoe (Manhattan College)

11:00–noon
Chair: Keren Gorodeisky (Auburn University)
Speaker: Erica Holberg (Utah State University)
“Kant on the Pleasures of Virtue”
Commentator: Richard Galvin (Texas Christian University)

7L Colloquium: Objectivity and Rationality
9:00 a.m.–noon
9:00–10:00
Chair: Michael Hodges (Vanderbilt University)
Speaker: Joshua Houston (Vanderbilt University)
“Meadian Pragmatism and Scientific Objectivity”
Commentator: Manuela Fernandez Pinto (University of Notre Dame)

10:00–11:00
Chair: John Woods (University of Minnesota)
Speaker: Brian Talbot (University of Colorado, Boulder)
“Truth Promoting Non-evidential Reasons for Belief”
Commentator: Richard Fumerton (University of Iowa)

11:00–noon
Chair: Alex Wilson (Athabasca University)
Speaker: Zac Irving (University of Toronto)
“The Epistemic Rationality of Mind-wandering”
Commentator: John Poland (University of Wyoming)

7M APA Committee Session: Berger Prize
9:00 a.m.–noon
Arranged by the APA Committee on Lectures, Publications, and Research
Chair: Melinda A. Roberts (The College of New Jersey)
Speaker: Kimberly Kessler Ferzan (Rutgers University, Camden)
“Beyond Crime and Commitment: Justifying Liberty Deprivations of the Dangerous and Responsible”
Commentators: Louis-Philippe Hodgson (York University)
Douglas Husak (Rutgers University)
Gideon Yaffe (Yale University)
POSTER SESSION

11:00 a.m.–2:00 p.m.

Presenters: 
Aaron Flaster (Lewis & Clark College)
“Consequentialism, Eudaimonism, and Alienation”

Asia Ferrin (University of Washington)
“It Just Feels Right: Exploring Ethical Automaticity as a Theory of Moral Judgment”

Timothy Nailer (University of Adelaide)
“Moral Responsibility Without Moral Considerability”

Thomas Cunningham (University of Pittsburgh)
“The Principle of Charity and Non-inferential Coding in Interdisciplinary Behavioral Research”

Meghan Dupree (University of Pittsburgh)
“Valuable But Not Viable: Collaborations as Knowledge Producing Communities”

FRIDAY AFTERNOON, MARCH 29

SESSION 8 — 1:00–4:00 P.M.

8A Author-Meets-Critics: David Chalmers, Constructing the World
1:00–4:00 p.m.

Chair: Sara Bernstein (Duke University)
Critics: Ram Neta (University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill)
Laura Schroeter (University of Melbourne)
Jason Stanley (Rutgers University)
Author: David Chalmers (Australian National University and New York University)

8B Author-Meets-Critics: Sahotra Sarkar, Environmental Philosophy: From Theory to Practice
1:00–4:00 p.m.

Chair: Stephen Roberts (San Francisco State University)
Critics: David Frank (New York University)
Justin Garson (Hunter College)
Jay Odenbaugh (Lewis & Clark College)
Author: Sahotra Sarkar (University of Texas at Austin)

8C Author-Meets-Critics: Stephen Davies, The Artful Species: Aesthetics, Art, and Evolution
1:00–4:00 p.m.

Chair: Joanne Waugh (University of South Florida)
Critics: Noël Carroll (The Graduate Center, CUNY)
Peter Godfrey-Smith (The Graduate Center, CUNY)
Author: Stephen Davies (University of Auckland)

8D  Invited Symposium: Rationalist Responses to Reliability Challenges
1:00–4:00 p.m.
Chair: Erika Au (San Francisco State University)
Speakers: Daniel Z. Korman (University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign)
"Debunking Perceptual Beliefs about Ordinary Objects"
John Bengson (University of Wisconsin, Madison)
"Intuitive Knowledge and the Benacerraf Problem"
Commentators: Dana Lynne Goswick (University of Melbourne)
Anna-Sara Malmgren (Stanford University)

8E  Invited Symposium: Reliance
1:00–4:00 p.m.
Chair: Samuel Asarnow (Stanford University)
Speakers: Peter Railton (University of Michigan)
Berislav Marušić (Brandeis University)
Facundo Alonso (Yale University)
Commentator: Han van Wietmarschen (Stanford University)

8F  Invited Symposium: The Influence of Norms and Values on Science
1:00–4:00 p.m.
Chair: Marc Workman (University of Alberta)
Speakers: Anita Silvers (San Francisco State University)
"Pathologizing and Predicting Risk"
Roberta L. Millstein (University of California, Davis)
"Stability, Interdependence, and Leopold’s Land Ethic"
Matthew H. Slater (Bucknell University)
"The Norm-Ladenness of Biological Classification"

8G  Colloquium: Compatibilism
1:00–4:00 p.m.
1:00–2:00
Chair: Kenneth Lucey (University of Nevada, Reno)
Speaker: P. Roger Turner (University of Tennessee)
"Haji on the Direct Argument"
Commentator: Daniel Speak (Loyola Marymount University)
2:00–3:00
Chair: Chad Bogosn (Azusa Pacific University)
Speaker: Taylor Cyr (Florida State University)
“Moral Responsibility, Luck, and Compatibilism”
Commentator: Jordan Wolf (University of California, Los Angeles)

3:00–4:00
Chair: Carmen Zinn (University of California, Santa Barbara)
Speaker: Justin Coates (University of Chicago)
“Manipulation and the Reactive Emotions”
Commentator: Katherine Rickus (Marquette University)

8H Colloquium: Language and Semantics
1:00–4:00 p.m.
1:00–2:00
Chair: Henry Jackman (York University)
Speaker: Megan Henricks Stotts (University of California, Riverside)
“Conventions, Precedents, and Beliefs: A Lesson from Lewis and Millikan”
Commentator: Ruth Garrett Millikan (University of Connecticut)

2:00–3:00
Chair: Carlos Montemayor (San Francisco State University)
Speaker: Adam Auch (Dalhousie University)
Commentator: Heidi Savage (SUNY Geneseo)

3:00–4:00
Chair: Eliot Michaelson (University of California, Los Angeles)
Speaker: Fabrizio Cariani (Northwestern University)
“One Theory to Rule Them All”
Commentator: Shyam Nair (University of Southern California)

8I Colloquium: Medical Ethics
1:00–4:00 p.m.
1:00–2:00
Chair: Diana Buccafurni (Sam Houston State University)
Speaker: Paul Menzel (Pacific Lutheran University)
“Can Cost-effectiveness Analysis Accommodate the Equal Value of Life?”
Commentator: Alastair Norcross (University of Colorado, Boulder)
2:00–3:00
Chair: Mark Migotti (University of Calgary)
Speaker: Robert C. Hughes (University of California, Los Angeles)
“Strict Egalitarianism about Medical Treatment”
Commentator: Sarah Holtman (University of Minnesota)

3:00–4:00
Chair: John Davis (California State University, Fullerton)
Speaker: Eric Vogelstein (Jefferson College of Health Sciences)
“Precedent Autonomy and the Authority of Advance Directives”
Commentator: Amy Reed-Sandoval (University of Washington)

8J Colloquium: Philosophy of Religion
1:00–4:00 p.m.

1:00–2:00
Chair: Paul Pistone (Talbot School of Theology)
Speaker: Philip Swenson (University of California, Riverside)
“Ability, Foreknowledge, and Explanatory Dependence”
Commentator: Benjamin H. Arbour (University of Bristol)

2:00–3:00
Chair: Christopher Callaway (St. Joseph’s College of Maine)
Speaker: Cameron Domenico Kirk-Giannini (Oxford University)
“Mushy Skeptical Theism and the Evidential Argument from Evil”
Commentator: Brandon Carey (University of Rochester)

3:00–4:00
Chair: Christina VanDyke (Calvin College)
Speaker: Joseph Anderson (University of South Florida)
“Scotus on Omnipotence and the Disunity of the Sciences”
Commentator: Ashley Dressel (University of California, Irvine)

8K Colloquium: Plato
1:00–4:00 p.m.

1:00–2:00
Chair: Keith McPartland (Williams College)
Speaker: Melissa Lane (Princeton University)
“Archein and Archai (Rule and Offices) in Plato’s Statesman”
Commentator: Charles Young (Claremont Graduate University)
2:00–3:00  
Chair: Christopher Buckels (University of California, Davis)  
Speaker: Michelle Jenkins (Whitman College)  
“A Puzzle about Dialectic at Republic 533a1-5”  
Commentator: Lloyd P. Gerson (University of Toronto)  

3:00–4:00  
Chair: Anthony Boese (University of St. Andrews)  
Speaker: S. Seth Bordner (University of Alabama)  
“...And Justice for All?: Rethinking the Reciprocity of the Virtues in the Republic”  
Commentator: Riin Sirkel (University of Alberta)  

8L APA Committee Session: Gregory Kavka/UC Irvine Prize in Political Philosophy  
1:00–4:00 p.m.  
Arranged by the APA Committee on Lectures, Publications, and Research  
Chair: Gillian Brock (University of Auckland)  
Speaker: Thomas Pogge (Yale University)  
“Are We Violating the Human Rights of the World’s Poor?”  
Commentators: Richard Arneson (University of California, San Diego)  
Ann Cudd (University of Kansas)  
Alistair M. Macleod (Queen’s University)  
Rob Reich (Stanford University)  

8M APA Committee Session: How to Obtain a Position at the Community College  
1:00–4:00 p.m.  
Arranged by the APA Committee on Philosophy in Two-Year Colleges  
Chair: Mark Thorsby (Lone Star College)  
Speakers: Anthony E. Thomas (Kishwaukee College)  
Basil Smith (Saddleback College)  
Marc Bobro (Santa Barbara City College)  

Friday Early Evening, March 29  
Session 9 — 4:00–6:00 p.m.  
9A Invited Paper: Blame  
4:00–6:00 p.m.  
Chair: Lorraine Code (York University)
Speaker: Miranda Fricker (University of Sheffield)
“What’s the Point of Blame?”

Commentators: Rahul Kumar (Queen’s University)
Paul Russell (University of British Columbia)

9B Invited Paper: Dogmatism
4:00–6:00 p.m.
Chair: Lisa Wareski (City College of New York)
Speaker: Dorit Ganson (Oberlin College)
“The Bayesian Critique of Dogmatist and Evidentialist Anti-skeptical Strategies”

Commentators: Matthew McGrath (University of Missouri)
Susan Vineberg (Wayne State University)

9C Invited Paper: Foucault’s Aesthetics: Place, Space, and Ecology
4:00–6:00 p.m.
Chair: Daniel Wagnon (San Jose State University)
Speaker: Dan Williamson (San Jose State University)
“Foucault’s Aesthetics: Place, Space, and Ecology”

Commentators: Kyle Yrigoyen (San Jose State University)

9D Invited Paper: Multiple Realization and Idealization
4:00–6:00 p.m.
Chair: David Stump (University of San Francisco)
Speaker: Angela Potochnik (University of Cincinnati)
“Increasing Realism Without Getting Real”

Commentators: Alisa Bokulich (Boston University)
Quayshawn Spencer (University of San Francisco)

9E Colloquium: Amoralism and Evil
4:00–6:00 p.m.

4:00–5:00
Chair: Daniela Dover (New York University)
Speaker: Todd Calder (Saint Mary’s University)
“Evil and Its Opposite”

Commentator: Charlotte Brown (Illinois Wesleyan University)

5:00–6:00
Chair: Van Tu (University of Colorado, Boulder)
Speaker: Alexandra King (Brown University)
“The Amoralist and the Anaesthetic”

Commentator: Dale Dorsey (University of Kansas)
**9F Colloquium: Consciousness**  
4:00–6:00 p.m.

4:00–5:00  
Chair: Enrico Grube (University of Texas at Austin)  
Speaker: Richard Brown (LaGuardia Community College)  
“The Phenomenology of HOT, or What Is It Like to Think That You Think That p?”  
Commentator: Josh Weisberg (University of Houston)

5:00–6:00  
Chair: Peter S. Fosl (Transylvania University)  
Speaker: Joshua Shepherd (Florida State University)  
“Consciousness, Control, and Zombie Action”  
Commentator: Wayne Wu (Carnegie Mellon University)

**9G Colloquium: Contents**  
4:00–6:00 p.m.

4:00–5:00  
Chair: Octavian Ion (University of Alberta)  
Speaker: Eric Saidel (George Washington University)  
“Compositionality and Conceptual Role”  
Commentator: Gurpreet Rattan (University of Toronto)

5:00–6:00  
Chair: Jennifer J. Matey (Florida International University)  
Speakers: Murat Aydede (University of British Columbia)  
Matthew Fulkerson (University of California, San Diego)  
“Affective Qualities”  
Commentator: Brendan O’Sullivan (Stonehill College)

**9H Colloquium: Thomas Reid**  
4:00–6:00 p.m.

4:00–5:00  
Chair: Shoshana Brassfield (Frostburg State University)  
Speaker: Marina Folescu (University of Southern California)  
“The Role of Sympathy in Reid’s Action Theory”  
Commentator: Terence Cuneo (University of Vermont)

5:00–6:00  
Chair: Patrick Rysiew (University of Victoria)  
Speaker: Gregory S. Poore (Baylor University)  
“Thomas Reid on Arguing for First Principles”  
Commentator: James Van Cleve (University of Southern California)
9I  Symposium: Feminism and Disability
4:00–6:00 p.m.
Chair: Pin-Fei Lu (Taipei Medical University)
Speaker: Shelley Tremain (Independent Scholar)
“Educating Jouy: A Case Study of Ableism in Feminist Philosophy”
Commentators: Linda Martín Alcoff (Hunter College)
Jana Sawicki (Williams College)

9J  Symposium: Mental Causation
4:00–6:00 p.m.
Chair: Glenn Ross (Franklin & Marshall College)
Speakers: Douglas Keaton (Flagler College)
Thomas W. Polger (University of Cincinnati)
“Exclusion, Still Not Tracted”
Commentators: Lenny Clapp (Northern Illinois University)
Brian McLaughlin (Rutgers University)

9K  Symposium: Psychopathy
4:00–6:00 p.m.
Chair: Marina Oshana (University of California, Davis)
Speaker: Matthew Talbert (West Virginia University)
“The Significance of Psychopathic Wrongdoing”
Commentators: Kyle Adams (University of California, Davis)
Gary Watson (University of Southern California)

9L  Symposium: The Stoics
4:00–6:00 p.m.
Chair: Charles M. Urban (University of Arkansas)
Speaker: Pavle Stojanovic (Johns Hopkins University)
“The Stoics on Clarity and Distinctness of Impressions”
Commentators: Maria Paleologou (California State University, Bakersfield)
Justin Vlasits (University of California, Berkeley)

9M  Symposium: Vision
4:00–6:00 p.m.
Chair: Todd Ganson (Oberlin College)
Speaker: Chris Smith (Wake Forest University)
“Seeing, Noticing, and Noteworthiness”
Commentators: Philippe Chuard (Southern Methodist University)
David Sanford (Duke University)
9N  Dewey Lecture
4:00–5:30 p.m.
Introduction: Mark Wrathall (University of California, Riverside)
Speaker: Hubert Dreyfus (University of California, Berkeley)
“Standing up to Analytic Philosophy and AI at MIT
in the Sixties”

Dewey Lecture Reception
5:30–6:00 p.m.
Convention attendees are cordially invited to a reception sponsored
by the Dewey Foundation in honor of the Dewey Lecturer.

Presidential Address
6:00–7:00 p.m.
Introduction: Terence Parsons (University of California, Los Angeles)
Speaker: John Martin Fischer (University of California, Riverside)
“The Path of Life”

Presidential Reception
7:00–8:00 p.m.

Group Meetings, 7:00–10:00 p.m.
(See Group Meeting Program for details)
Hume Society
International Association for the Philosophy of Sport
International Society for Comparative Studies of Chinese and Western
Philosophy, Session 2
Karl Jaspers Society of North America, Session 1
North American Kant Society, Session 2
North American Wittgenstein Society
Philosophy of Time Society
Society for Applied Philosophy, Session 2
Society for Asian and Comparative Philosophy, Session 2
Society for the Philosophic Study of the Contemporary Visual Arts,
Session 2
Society for the Philosophy of Sex and Love, Session 2
Society for the Study of Philosophy and the Martial Arts, Session 2
Society for the Study of Process Philosophies, Session 2
Society for Women in Philosophy, Session 2
Western Phenomenology Conference
Saturday, March 30

Registration
8:30 a.m.–1:00 p.m., mezzanine

Placement Information
8:30 a.m.–1:00 p.m., mezzanine

Placement Interviewing
8:30 a.m.–1:00 p.m., location TBA

Book Displays
9:00 a.m.–1:00 p.m., California Ballroom

Saturday Morning, March 30

Session 10 — 9:00 a.m.–noon

10A Author-Meets-Critics: Aaron James, Fairness in Practice: A Social Contract for a Global Economy
9:00 a.m.–noon
Chair: Debra Satz (Stanford University)
Critics: Christian Barry (Australian National University)
A. J. Julius (University of California, Los Angeles)
Gabriel Wollner (London School of Economics)
Author: Aaron James (University of California, Irvine)

10B Author-Meets-Critics: Clayton Littlejohn, Justification and the Truth-connection
9:00 a.m.–noon
Chair: Tim Black (California State University, Northridge)
Critics: Anthony Brueckner (University of California, Santa Barbara)
Sanford Goldberg (Northwestern University)
David Sosa (University of Texas at Austin)
Author: Clayton Littlejohn (King’s College London)

10C Author-Meets-Critics: Owen Flanagan, The Bodhisattva’s Brain
9:00 a.m.–noon
Chair: Margaret Crouch (Eastern Michigan University)
Critics: Christian Corseru (College of Charleston)
Bronwyn Finnigan (Marquette University)
Charles Goodman (Binghamton University)
Author: Owen Flanagan (Duke University)
10D  Author-Meets-Critics: Sue Donaldson and Will Kymlicka, *Zoopolis: A Political Theory of Animal Rights*

9:00 a.m.–noon

Chair: Nick Alvarez (San Francisco State University)
Critics: Jennifer Everett (DePauw University)
Lori Gruen (Wesleyan University)
Mark Rowlands (University of Miami)
Authors: Sue Donaldson (Independent Scholar)
Will Kymlicka (Queen’s University)

10E  Invited Symposium: 21st Century Metaphysics

9:00 a.m.–noon

Chair: Carrie Ichikawa Jenkins (University of British Columbia)
Speakers: Daniel Nolan (Australian National University)
“Hyperintensional Metaphysics”
Elizabeth Barnes (University of Leeds)
“Symmetric Dependence”
Ross Cameron (University of Leeds)
“The Moving Spotlight View Isn’t As Bad As You Think”

10F  Invited Symposium: Immigration and Globalization

9:00 a.m.–noon

Chair: Richard Boswell (University of California, Hastings College of the Law)
Speakers: Mathias Risse (Harvard University)
Patti Lenard (University of Ottawa)
Arash Abizadeh (McGill University)
Commentator: Alex Sager (Portland State University)

10G  Invited Symposium: Promises and Interpersonal Obligations

9:00 a.m.–noon

Chair: Grant J. Rozeboom (Stanford University)
Speakers: Jorah Dannenberg (Stanford University)
Mitchell Green (University of Virginia)
R. Jay Wallace (University of California, Berkeley)

10H  Invited Symposium: Spinoza’s Theory of the Affects

9:00 a.m.–noon

Chair: Michael Rosenthal (University of Washington)
Speakers: Donald Rutherford (University of California, San Diego)
“Deciding What to Do: The Relation of Affect and Reason”
Karolina Huebner (University of Toronto)
“Human Affects, Animal Affects”
Michael LeBuffe (Texas A&M University)
“Wonder and Reason”
Lisa Shapiro (Simon Fraser University)

10I Colloquium: Ground and Essence
9:00 a.m.–noon
9:00–10:00
Chair: W. Russ Payne (Bellevue College)
Speaker: Amy Karofsky (Hofstra University)
“Dispositional Essentialism and Contingency”
Commentator: Anna Marmodoro (Oxford University)

10:00–11:00
Chair: Laura Landen (Providence College)
Speaker: Michael J. Raven (University of Victoria)
“Is Ground a Strict Partial Order?”
Commentator: Alexander Skiles (Université de Genève)

11:00–noon
Chair: Melinda Campbell (National University)
Speaker: Mark Makin (University of California, Irvine)
“Ontological Dependence Grounds Grounding”
Commentator: H. E. Baber (University of San Diego)

10J Colloquium: Kant on Mind and Metaphysics
9:00 a.m.–noon
9:00–10:00
Chair: Willem deVries (University of New Hampshire)
Speaker: Paul Redding (University of Sydney)
“Kant’s ‘Judgments of Perception’ and the Ambiguity of His Concept of Intuition”
Commentator: Huaping Lu-Adler (Georgetown University)

10:00–11:00
Chair: Paul Guyer (University of Pennsylvania)
Speaker: Uygar Abaci (University of British Columbia)
“Kant’s Modal Theory and the Schemata of Modal Categories”
Commentator: Ralf Bader (New York University)

11:00–noon
Chair: Karl Ameriks (University of Notre Dame)
Speaker: Alex Rueger (University of Alberta)
"Kant on Feelings and Sensations"
Commentator: Iain Morrisson (University of Houston)

10K Colloquium: Moral Responsibility, Bias
9:00 a.m.–noon

9:00–10:00
Chair: Kay Mathiesen (University of Arizona)
Speaker: Michael S. Brownstein (New Jersey Institute of Technology)
"Responsibility and Implicit Bias"
Commentator: John Koolage (Eastern Michigan University)

10:00–11:00
Chair: Jerry Miller (Haverford College)
Speaker: William Smith (University of Notre Dame and Emory University)
"The Trouble for Strawsonians: Nazis In, Psychopaths Out"
Commentator: Bruce Landesman (University of Utah)

11:00–noon
Chair: Jean Roberts (University of Washington)
Speaker: Alex Madva (University of California, Berkeley)
"Implicit Bias, Moods, and Moral Responsibility"
Commentator: Manuel Vargas (University of San Francisco)

10L Colloquium: Philosophy of Art
9:00 a.m.–noon

9:00–10:00
Chair: Jennifer Judkins (University of California, Los Angeles)
Speaker: Brandon Polite (Knox College)
"Prelude to a Theory of Music Representation"
Commentator: Erum Naqvi (Temple University)

10:00–11:00
Chair: Margaret Moore (University of Tennessee)
Speaker: William P. Seeley (Bates College)
"Mammals and Music among Others: Crossmodal Perception and Musical Expressiveness"
Commentator: Jenefer Robinson (University of Cincinnati)

11:00–noon
Chair: John McCumber (University of California, Los Angeles)
Speaker: Emine Hande Tuna (University of Alberta)
“Artistic Beauty as Free Beauty”
Commentator: Melissa Zinkin (Binghamton University)

10M Colloquium: Rights and Justice
9:00 a.m.–noon

9:00–10:00
Chair: Nancy E. Snow (Marquette University)
Speaker: Aness Webster (University of Southern California)
“Corrective Justice Supplemented”
Commentator: Randall Morris (William Jewell College)

10:00–11:00
Chair: Michael Merry (Universiteit van Amsterdam)
Speaker: Krista Thomason (Swarthmore College)
“A Kantian Argument for the Sovereignty Rights of Indigenous Peoples”
Commentator: Alexander Guerrero (University of Pennsylvania)

11:00–noon
Chair: Michael Weber (Bowling Green State University)
Speakers: Matthew Braham (Universität Bayreuth)
Martin van Hees (Rijksuniversiteit Groningen)
“The Inconsistency of Pure Libertarianism”
Commentator: Michael Huemer (University of Colorado, Boulder)

Saturday Afternoon, March 30

Session 11 — 1:00–4:00 p.m.

11A Author-Meets-Critics: Robert Audi, Democratic Authority and the Separation of Church and State

1:00–4:00 p.m.
Chair: Cindy Holder (University of Victoria)
Critics: Simone Chambers (University of Toronto)
Sarah Song (University of California, Berkeley)
Robert Talisse (Vanderbilt University)
Author: Robert Audi (University of Notre Dame)
11B Author-Meets-Critics: Nicole Hassoun, *Globalization and Global Justice: Shrinking Distance, Expanding Obligations*

*1:00–4:00 p.m.*

Chair: Michael Tiboris (University of California, San Diego)
Critics: Gillian Brock (University of Auckland)
         Miriam Ronzoni (Technische Universität Darmstadt)
         Fernando Teson (Florida State University)
Author: Nicole Hassoun (Binghamton University)

11C Author-Meets-Critics: David K. Henderson and Terry Horgan, *The Epistemological Spectrum*

*1:00–4:00 p.m.*

Chair: Mark Alfano (Princeton University)
Critics: Albert Casullo (University of Nebraska, Lincoln)
         Peter Graham (University of California, Riverside)
         Jack Lyons (University of Arkansas)
Authors: David K. Henderson (University of Nebraska, Lincoln)
         Terry Horgan (University of Arizona)


*1:00–4:00 p.m.*

Chair: Carrie Figdor (University of Iowa)
Critics: Josh Dever (University of Texas at Austin)
         John Hawthorne (Oxford University)
         Peter Ludlow (Northwestern University)
Author: Brit Brogaard (University of Missouri, St. Louis)

11E Invited Symposium: Agency and Pathologies of the Self

*1:00–4:00 p.m.*

Chair: Sarah Robins (University of Texas at El Paso)
Speakers: Alfred Mele (Florida State University)
         “Delusions and Self-deception”
         Walter Sinnott-Armstrong (Duke University)
         Jesse Summers (Duke University)
         “Scrupulous Agents”
Commentator: David Shoemaker (Tulane University of New Orleans)

11F Invited Symposium: Eugenics, Disability, and Technology

*1:00–4:00 p.m.*

Chair: Robert A. Wilson (University of Alberta)
Speakers: Adrienne Asch (Yeshiva University)
“The Full Extent of the Disability Critique of Prenatal Testing”

John Dupre (University of Exeter)
“Has Genomics Changed our Concept of Disability?”

Rob Sparrow (Monash University)
“Gender Eugenics? The Ethics of PGD for Intersex Conditions”

11G Invited Symposium: Reasoning and Rationality in Early China
1:00–4:00 p.m.
Chair: Lisa Raphals (National University of Singapore)
Speakers: Dan Robins (University of Hong Kong)
Hui-Chieh Loy (National University of Singapore)
Stephen C. Walker (University of Chicago)

11H Invited Symposium: Vulnerability and Children
1:00–4:00 p.m.
Chair: Shelley Hulbert (University of Calgary)
Speakers: Colin Macleod (University of Victoria)
“Agency, Authority, and the Vulnerability of Children”
Christine Straehle (University of Ottawa)
“Children, Vulnerability, and Autonomy”
Christina M. Bellon (California State University, Sacramento)
“The Vulnerability of the Least Advantaged Group: Using Rawls to Establish Justice for Children”
Commentator: Anca Gheaus (University of Sheffield)

11I Invited Symposium: What’s in a Name?
1:00–4:00 p.m.
Chair: Isidora Stojanovic (Universitat Pompeu Fabra)
Speakers: Robin Jeshion (University of Southern California)
David Manley (University of Michigan)
Commentator: Karen Lewis (Barnard College)

11J Colloquium: Harm and Fault
1:00–4:00 p.m.
1:00–2:00
Chair: Alexandra Perry (Bergen Community College)
Saturday Afternoon/Early Evening, 11J to 12B

Speaker: Duncan Purves (University of Colorado, Boulder)  
“Death and Disability: Two Problems for the Event-based Account of Harm”

Commentator: Elizabeth Harman (Princeton University)

2:00–3:00

Chair: Cory Davia (University of California, San Diego)
Speaker: Jason Raibley (California State University, Long Beach)  
“Three Concepts of Harm”

Commentator: Matthew Hanser (University of California, Santa Barbara)

3:00–4:00

Chair: Michael Reed (Eastern Michigan University)
Speaker: Richard Arneson (University of California, San Diego)  
“Self-defense and Culpability: Fault Forfeits First”

Commentator: Elizabeth Sperry (William Jewell College)

11K Colloquium: Nietzsche, Heidegger, Husserl

1:00–4:00 p.m.

1:00–2:00

Chair: John Marmysz (College of Marin)
Speaker: Scott Jenkins (University of Kansas)  
“What Does Eternal Recurrence Weigh On?”

Commentator: Babette Babich (Fordham University)

2:00–3:00

Chair: Michael Koch (SUNY Oneonta)
Speaker: Jacob Rump (Emory University)  
“The Problem of Origin in Derrida’s Early Reading of Husserl”

Commentator: David Wood (Vanderbilt University)

3:00–4:00

Chair: Alex Shalom Kohav (Independent Scholar)
Speaker: James Hebbeler (St. Joseph’s University)  
“Heidegger’s Transcendental Idealism”

Commentator: Ingvild Torsen (Marquette University)

11L Colloquium: Ontology II

1:00–4:00 p.m.

1:00–2:00

Chair: Gerald Vision (Temple University)
Main Program

Speaker: Mark Moyer (University of Vermont)
“Common Sense Ontology”

Commentator: Ned Markosian (Western Washington University)

2:00–3:00

Chair: Gregory Janssen (University of Nevada, Las Vegas)
Speaker: Thomas Metcalf (University of Colorado, Boulder)
“Ontological Parsimony and Erosion”

Commentator: Daniel Giberman (Stanford University)

3:00–4:00

Chair: Scott Dixon (University of California, Davis)
Speaker: Luke Manning (Independent Scholar)
“What Is the Problem of Negative Existentials?”

Commentator: Nola Semczyszyn (Franklin & Marshall College)

11M APA Committee Session: Patrick Romanell Lecture
1:00–4:00 p.m.

Arranged by the APA Committee on Lectures, Publications, and Research

Chair: Allen Wood (Indiana University, Bloomington)
Speaker: Hilary Kornblith (University of Massachusetts, Amherst)
“Naturalism vs. the First-person Perspective”

Saturday Early Evening, March 30

Session 12 — 4:00–6:00 p.m.

12A Invited Paper: Racism and Aesthetics
4:00–6:00 p.m.

Chair: Shelley Wilcox (San Francisco State University)
Speaker: Paul C. Taylor (Pennsylvania State University)
“Dark Am I, But/And Lovely? Philosophical Aesthetics and Black Beauty”

Commentators: Anne Eaton (University of Illinois at Chicago)
Devonya N. Havis (Canisius College)

12B Invited Paper: The Metaphysics of Subjectivity
4:00–6:00 p.m.

Chair: Victor Ma (San Francisco State University)
Speaker: Benj Hellie (University of Toronto)
“Out of This World”

Commentators: Brie Gertler (University of Virginia)
Geoffrey Lee (University of California, Berkeley)
12C Invited Symposium: Heidegger
4:00–6:00 p.m.
Chair: Brad Elliott Stone (Loyola Marymount University)
Speakers: Mark Wrathall (University of California, Riverside)
          Dana Belu (California State University, Dominguez Hills)

12D Colloquium: Assertion and Know-how
4:00–6:00 p.m.
4:00–5:00
Chair: Roger Clarke (University of British Columbia)
Speaker: Geoff Pynn (Northern Illinois University)
        “Assertibility in Context”
Commentator: Rachel McKinnon (University of Waterloo)
5:00–6:00
Chair: Anthony Rudd (St. Olaf College)
Speaker: Marija Jankovic (Indiana University, Bloomington)
        “Varieties of Obligatory Control and Ascriptions of Know-how”
Commentator: James Higginbotham (University of Southern California)

12E Colloquium: Beliefs
4:00–6:00 p.m.
4:00–5:00
Chair: Derek Malone-France (George Washington University)
Speaker: Chris Jenson (University of Utah)
        “The Fragility of Beliefs: A New Eliminativist Argument”
Commentator: Brett Sherman (University of Rochester)
5:00–6:00
Chair: Rafael Martins (University of Kansas)
Speaker: Allen Coates (East Tennessee State University)
        “What Are Directions of Fit?”
Commentator: Greg Scherkoske (Dalhousie University)

12F Colloquium: Moore, Russell, Wittgenstein
4:00–6:00 p.m.
4:00–5:00
Chair: Michael Goodman (Humboldt State University)
Speaker: Garrett Bredeson (Vanderbilt University)
“G. E. Moore, Analysis, and the Rejection of Idealism”
Commentator: David Shier (Washington State University)

5:00–6:00
Chair: Hao Tang (Wuhan University)
Speaker: Dominic Alford-Duguid (University of Toronto)
“Russell Versus Wittgenstein on Nonsense”
Commentator: Adam Bobella (San Francisco State University)

12G Colloquium: Philosophy of Physics
4:00–6:00 p.m.

4:00–5:00
Chair: Christoph Durt (University of California, Santa Cruz)
Speaker: John Manchak (University of Washington)
“On Gödel and the Ideality of Time”
Commentator: Steven Savitt (University of British Columbia)

5:00–6:00
Chair: Alexandre V. Korolev (University of British Columbia)
Speaker: David Glick (University of Arizona)
“Minimal Structural Essentialism”
Commentator: Paul Teller (University of California, Davis)

12H Colloquium: Punishment
4:00–6:00 p.m.

4:00–5:00
Chair: Basil Smith (Saddleback College)
Speaker: Craig Agule (University of California, San Diego)
“Abandonment, Mitigation, and the Principle of Underlying Censure”
Commentator: David Boersema (Pacific University)

5:00–6:00
Chair: Stanislaus Husi (University of Wisconsin, Milwaukee)
Speaker: Annette Dufner (Westfälische Wilhelms-Universität)
“Releasing Prisoners with Dementia: Could There Be a Recollection Requirement for Expressivist and Communicative Justifications of Punishment?”
Commentator: Kathleen Poorman Dougherty (Notre Dame of Maryland University)
12I Colloquium: Self and Society
4:00–6:00 p.m.

4:00–5:00
Chair: Elizabeth Hamilton (West Virginia University)
Speaker: Todd Hedrick (Michigan State University)
   “Hegel’s Estates Reconsidered: The Mediation and Reconciliation of Group Interests”
Commentator: Harrison Fluss (Stony Brook University)

5:00–6:00
Chair: Owen Anderson (Arizona State University)
Speaker: Mark Gedney (Gordon College)
   “Politics and the Nature of Violence: Ricoeur’s Negotiation with Arendt and Levinas”
Commentator: Rosalie Siemon (Loyola Marymount University)

12J Colloquium: Social Kinds
4:00–6:00 p.m.

4:00–5:00
Chair: Clare LaFrance (University of Nebraska, Lincoln)
Speaker: Adam Bowen (University of Illinois)
   “Intention-dependent Artifacts and an Argument from Arbitrariness”
Commentator: Eyja M. Brynjarsdóttir (University of Iceland)

5:00–6:00
Chair: Jamie Lindsay (The Graduate Center, CUNY)
Speaker: Muhammad Ali Khalidi (York University)
   “Three Kinds of Social Kinds”
Commentator: Esa Diaz-Leon (University of Manitoba)

12K Symposium: Bayesianism
4:00–6:00 p.m.
Chair: Weimin Sun (California State University, Northridge)
Speaker: Julia Staffel (University of Southern California)
   “Degrees of Incoherence and Dutch Books”
Commentators: Brad Armendt (Arizona State University)
              Lyle Zynda (Indiana University, South Bend)
12L  Symposium: Seeing Colors
      4:00–6:00 p.m.
      Chair: Peter Ross (California State Polytechnic University, Pomona)
      Speaker: David Papineau (King’s College London)
              “Can We Really See a Million Colors?”
      Commentators: David Hilbert (University of Illinois at Chicago)
                     Robert Schwartz (University of Wisconsin, Milwaukee)

12M  Symposium: Socrates and Gorgias
      4:00–6:00 p.m.
      Chair: Joseph Barnes (University of California, Berkeley)
      Speaker: Tushar Irani (Wesleyan University)
              “Socrates and Gorgias on the Aims of Argument”
      Commentators: James Butler (Berea College)
                     Nicholas D. Smith (Lewis & Clark College)
GROUP PROGRAM

WEDNESDAY EVENING, MARCH 27

GROUP SESSION G1 — 6:00–8:00 P.M.

G1A Radical Philosophy Association, Session 1
6:00–8:00 p.m.

Topic: The Ethics and Politics of Permanent War
Chair: José Jorge Mendoza (Worcester State College)
Speakers: Bassam Romaya (University of Massachusetts, Lowell)
“Permanent War and the Problem of Cyberwarfare”
Harry van der Linden (Butler University)
“The Condition of Permanent War: Is There a Way Out?”
John Kaag (University of Massachusetts, Lowell)
“Weapons of Choice: An Argument Against Drone Warfare on the Basis of Prudence?”

G1B Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy
6:00–8:00 p.m.
Chair: Alexander P. D. Mourelatos (University of Texas at Austin)
Speakers: Franco V. Trivigno (Marquette University)
“Ideal and Ordinary Language in Plato’s Cratylus”
Philip Corkum (University of Alberta)
“Snub”
Christopher Buckels (University of California, Davis)
“We Should Always Call the Receptacle the Same Thing: Timaeus 50b6-51b6”

G1C Society for Applied Philosophy, Session 1
6:00–8:00 p.m.

Chair: Hugh LaFollette (University of South Florida St. Petersburg)
Author: Ruth Abbey (University of Notre Dame)
Critics: Christie Hartley (Georgia State University)
Charles Mills (Northwestern University)
Lori Watson (University of San Diego)
GROUP SESSION G2 — 6:00–9:00 P.M.

G2A Concerned Philosophers for Peace

6:00–9:00 p.m.

Topic: Nuclear Weapons and the Iran Problem

Chair: David Boersema (Pacific University)
Speakers: Ovadia Ezra (Tel Aviv University)
“A Nuclear Iran: A Critical Israeli Perspective”
Ron Hirschbein (Walden University)
“Prolegomenon to Any Future Nuclear Metaphysics”
David K. Chan (University of Wisconsin, Stevens Point)
“War and the Problem of Nuclear Proliferation”
Andrew Fiala (California State University, Fresno)
“Whatever Happened to Containment and Deterrence?”

G2B Experimental Philosophy Society

6:00–9:00 p.m.

Topic: New Work in Experimental Philosophy

Speakers: Wesley Buckwalter (The Graduate Center, CUNY)
Jonathan Schaffer (Rutgers University)
“Knowledge, Stakes, and Mistakes”
Commentators: Jeremy Fantl (University of Calgary)
Matthew McGrath (University of Missouri)
Speakers: Matthew Bedke (University of British Columbia)
Oisin Deery (University of British Columbia)
Shaun Nichols (University of Arizona)
“Phenomenal Abilities: Incompatibilism and the Experience of Agency”
Commentator: Jonathan Phillips (Yale University)
Speakers: Tania Lombrozo (University of California, Berkeley)
Dylan Murray (University of California, Berkeley)
“He Made Me Do It: The Effect of Manipulation on Attributions of Causation, Free Will, and Moral Responsibility”
Commentator: Derk Pereboom (Cornell University)

G2C International Society for Chinese Philosophy, Session 1

6:00–9:00 p.m.

Topic: Action in Chinese Philosophy

Chairs: Chung-Ying Cheng (University of Hawaii at Manoa)
Tim Connolly (East Stroudsburg University)
Speakers: Tim Connolly (East Stroudsburg University)  
“Commitment and Desire in the Analects”

Manyul Im (Fairfield University)  
“Confucian Spontaneity”

Susan Blake (Indiana University Bloomington)  
“Knowledge and Non-action in the Laozi”

Samuel Cocks (University of Wisconsin, La Crosse)  
“Wang Yangming, Spontaneity, and Moral Imagination”

G2D International Society for Environmental Ethics, Session 1  
6:00–9:00 p.m.

Topic: Environmental Ethics
Speakers: Nathan Draluck (University of South Florida)  
“An Ecophenomenological Approach to Climate Change”

Lorraine Code (York University)  
“Ecological Responsibility, Advocacy, and Care”

Kathryn Ross Wayne (Western Washington University)  
“Freire, Bateson, Basso, and the Nature of Place”

Jack Isherwood (University of Western Sydney)  
“Public Reason and Environmental Claim-making”

William Edelglass (Marlboro College)  
“Seasonal Change: Understanding the Importance of Time in Places”

G2E Molinari Society  
6:00–9:00 p.m.

Topic: Author-Meets-Critics: Gary Chartier, Anarchy and Legal Order: Law and Politics for a Stateless Society
Chair: Roderick Long (Auburn University)
Author: Gary Chartier (La Sierra University)
Critics: Eric Roark (Millikin University)
Kevin Vallier (Bowling Green State University)

G2F North American Nietzsche Society  
6:00–9:00 p.m.

Topic: Robert Solomon’s Living with Nietzsche: A Ten Year Retrospective
Chair: R. Lanier Anderson (Stanford University)
Speakers: Ivan Soll (University of Wisconsin, Madison)
Ariela Tubert (University of Puget Sound)
G2G  Society for German Idealism, Session 1
6:00–9:00 p.m.
Chair:  Daniel Kirchner (Centre College)
Author:  Katrin Pahl (Johns Hopkins University)
Critics:  Jason J. Howard (Viterbo University)
John McCumber (University of California, Los Angeles)
Donald J. Morse (Webster University)

G2H  Society for the Advancement of American Philosophy, Session 1
6:00–9:00 p.m.
Topic:  The Lost Book: John Dewey’s *Unmodern Philosophy and Modern Philosophy*
Chair:  Colin Koopman (University of Oregon)
Speakers:  Albert Spencer III (Portland State University)
“Assessing Dewey’s Ethnocentrism in *Unmodern Philosophy and Modern Philosophy*”
Jady Hsin (Johns Hopkins University)
“Qualifying Actions: Dewey on the Origins of Meaning”
Larry Hickman (Southern Illinois University, Carbondale)
“Unpacking *Unmodern Philosophy and Modern Philosophy*”

G2I  Society for the Philosphic Study of the Contemporary Visual Arts, Session 1
6:00–9:00 p.m.
Topic:  Silent Films and the Nature of Cinematic Narrative
Chair:  Richard Nunan (College of Charleston)
Speakers:  Alessandra Stradella (SUNY Oneonta)
“Let’s Go Silent: The Puzzling Case of Hazanavicious’ *The Artist*”
Shai Biderman (Tel Aviv University)
“Philosophical Blindness, Cinematic Vision (Or: Why Chaplin Matters)”

Topic:  Object to Photograph to Film: Worlds Viewed and Cinematic Perception
Chair:  Richard Nunan (College of Charleston)
Speakers:  David Caldwell (University of Northern Colorado)
“Bachelard and the Cinematic Space of Berlin”
John Carvalho (Villanova University)
“The World Achieved: Enacting the World and Ourselves Through Film”

**G2J  Society for the Study of Philosophy and the Martial Arts, Session 1**

*6:00–9:00 p.m.*

**Chair:** Joseph J. Lynch (California Polytechnic State University)

**Speaker:** Joshua D. Stein (New York University)
“Legacy and Legitimacy: A Critical Account of Change in Identity of Martial Arts, Styles, and Systems”

**Commentator:** Richard Schubert (Cosumnes River College)

**Speaker:** Niels Hermannsson (University of Edinburgh)
“The Nature of *Uke-tori* Relationship and the *Aporetic*—Dialogue”

**Speaker:** Johnathan Flowers (Southern Illinois University, Carbondale)
“Mixed Martial Arts: Combat Sport or Martial Arts and/or Martial Self-cultivation as Character Development in American film and/or Martial Arts as the Expression of Character in Film”

**Commentator:** Niels Hermannsson (University of Edinburgh)

**Speaker:** Judy Salzman (California Polytechnic State University)
“The Spiritual Warrior: The Martial Arts and Courage”

**Commentator:** Paul A. Swift (Bryant University)

**Speaker:** Charles Klayman (Southern Illinois University, Carbondale)
“Mixed Martial Arts: Submitting the Art”

**Commentator:** Joshua D. Stein (New York University)

**G2K  Society for the Study of the History of Analytical Philosophy**

*6:00–9:00 p.m.*

**Topic:** Paul Grice’s Philosophy of Language

**Chair:** Sandra Lapointe (McMaster University)

**Speakers:** Kent Bach (San Francisco State University)
“Getting Grice Straight and Straightening Out Grice”

Daniel Harris (The Graduate Center, CUNY)
“Grice on the Composition of Timeless Meaning”

Stephen Neale (The Graduate Center, CUNY)
“What Is Said”
G2L  **Society for Women in Philosophy, Session 1**  
*6:00–9:00 p.m.*  
**Topic:** Author-Meets-Critics: Michael Slote, *The Impossibility of Perfection: Aristotle, Feminism, and the Complexities of Ethics*  
Chair: Lorraine Besser-Jones (Middlebury College)  
Author: Michael Slote (University of Miami)  
Critics: Sarah Conly (Bowdoin College)  
         Erin Frykholm (University of Kansas)  
         Eva Kittay (Stony Brook University)  

**Group Session G3 — 8:00–10:00 p.m.**  
G3A  **Society for Natural Religion**  
*8:00–10:00 p.m.*  
**Topic:** Author-Meets-Critics: Owen Anderson, *The Natural Moral Law: The Good after Modernity*  
Critics: David Burris (Arizona Western College)  
         Horace Fairlamb (University of Houston, Victoria)  
         Scott Rae (Biola University)  
Respondent: Owen Anderson (Arizona State University)  

G3B  **Society of Christian Philosophers**  
*8:00–10:00 p.m.*  
Chair: Jason Baehr (Loyola Marymount University)  
Speaker: Nathan King (Whitworth University)  
“Religious Skepticism: A Cumulative Argument from Higher-order Evidence”  
Commentator: Joshue Orozco (Whitworth University)  

**THURSDAY EVENING, MARCH 28**  

**Group Session G4 — 6:00–8:00 p.m.**  
G4A  **Association for Informal Logic and Critical Thinking**  
*6:00–8:00 p.m.*  
**Topic:** Teaching Critical Thinking to Diverse Populations  
Chair: Wanda Teays (Mount St. Mary’s College)  
Speakers: Jana Mohr Lone (University of Washington)  
         Peter Tan (Mount St. Mary’s College)  
“Critical Thinking and Reasoning—It’s Never Too Early”  
“Don’t Categorize—Measure: Diversity and the Process of Critical Thinking”
James Davis (Boston University)
“Teaching Critical Thinking to Diverse Populations: Advanced High School Students”

Musho Kwon (Long Beach City College)
“Teaching Critical Thinking to Diverse Populations: Community College Students”

G4B  **Society for Lesbian and Gay Philosophy**

6:00–8:00 p.m.

Chair: Julie Klein (Villanova University)
Speakers: Bassam Romaya (University of Massachusetts, Lowell)
“Queer Pacifism”
Andy Wible (Muskegon Community College)
“The Love of Bacha Bazi Boys and Gay Identity”
John Corvino (Wayne State University)
“What Bigotry Is”

G4C  **Society for the Study of Process Philosophies, Session 1**

6:00–8:00 p.m.

**Topic:**  Philosophy of Religion

Chair: Randy Ramal (Claremont Graduate University)
Speakers: Kyra Kaufman (Independent Scholar)
“A Defense of Freedom in A. N. Whitehead’s Metaphysics”
Lenny Gibson (Burlington College)
“From Religion to Philosophy and Back”
Olav Smith (Empirical Magazine)
“On the Phenomenon of Being Spiritual But Not Religious?”
John Quiring (Victor Valley College)
“Overlap-autonomy-dialogue-fusion: Science, Philosophy, Religion, Education”

**GROUP SESSION G5 — 6:00–9:00 P.M.**

G5A  **International Hobbes Association, Session 1**

6:00–9:00 p.m.

**Topic:**  Author-Meets-Critics: Philip Petit, *Made with Words: Hobbes on Mind, Society, and Politics*

Moderator: Juhana Lemetti (University of Helsinki)
Critics: Jeremy Anderson (DePauw University)
Rosamond Rhodes (Mount Sinai School of Medicine and The Graduate Center, CUNY)
Robert Talisse (Vanderbilt University)
Respondent: Philip Pettit (Princeton University and Australian National University)

Topic: Submitted Paper
Speaker: Sarah Meier (Emory University)

G5B International Society for Comparative Studies of Chinese and Western Philosophy, Session 1
6:00–9:00 p.m.

Topic: The Idea of Justice: Dialogues Across Traditions
Chair: Yang Xiao (Kenyon College)
Speakers: Dorothy Oluwagbemi-Jacob (University of Calabar)
“Communalism as a Theory of Justice and the Human Person in African Culture”
Henrique Schneider (Karl-Franzens-Universität Graz)
“Justice in Hanfeizi and Western Legal Philosophy: A Non-comparative Approach”
May Sim (College of the Holy Cross)
“The Relevance of Aristotle’s ‘Justice’ for Confucian Politics”

Commentators: Hui-chieh Loy (National University of Singapore)
Anh Tuan Nuyen (National University of Singapore)
Jennifer White (San Francisco State University)

G5C Josiah Royce Society
6:00–9:00 p.m.

Topic: Royce in Relation: Loyalty and History
Chair: Scott L. Pratt (University of Oregon)
Speakers: Robert McDermott (California Institute of Integral Studies)
“Royce’s Philosophy of Loyalty, Sorrow, and Atonement in Response to Ecological Devastation”
Francesco Poggiani (Pennsylvania State University)
“Royce’s Analysis of Nietzsche and J. M. Guyau’s Approach to the Ethical Problem”
Kipton Jensen (Morehouse College)
“The Growing Edges of the Beloved Community: From Royce (and James) to Thurman (and King)”
David Vessey (Grand Valley State University)
“What We Can Learn from Reading Royce’s Interpretations of Fichte”
G5D  Kierkegaard Society
6:00–9:00 p.m.

Topic:  Celebrating Søren at 200!

Chair:  Shannon Nason (Loyola Marymount University)
Speakers:  Manuel ‘Mandel’ Cabrera, Jr. (University of California, Los Angeles)
“Aesthetic Authenticity: Kierkegaard and Social Media”
Mark McCreary (Kirkwood Community College)
“Hidden Love: Kierkegaard on Love and Love’s Suffering”
Melissa Fitzpatrick (Loyola Marymount University)
“The Recollection of Anxiety: Kierkegaard as Our Socratic Occasion to Transcend Unfreedom”

Commentator:  Shannon Nason (Loyola Marymount University)

G5E  North American Kant Society, Session 1
6:00–9:00 p.m.

Topic:  The Public Use of Reason

Chair:  Eric Watkins (University of California, San Diego)
Speakers:  Philip J. Rossi (Marquette University)
“Cosmopolitan Religion and the Moral Imperative for Perpetual Peace”
Lawrence Pasternack (Oklahoma State University)
“Kant’s Touchstone of Communicability and the Public Use of Reason”
Rudolf Makkreel (Emory University)
“Two Senses of ‘Public’ in Kant and the Idea of a Universal Voice”

G5F  Society for Asian and Comparative Philosophy, Session 1
6:00–9:00 p.m.

Chair:  Kim Skoog (University of Guam)
Speakers:  Kim Skoog (University of Guam)
“Assessing Martyrdom: A Comparative and Critical Study of Self-inflicted Death”
Rafal Banka (Uniwersytet Jagielloński)
“Contemporary Interpretations of Aesthetics According to Li Zehou and Wolfgang Welsch”
Johnathan Flowers (Southern Illinois University, Carbondale)
“Japanese Self-cultivation Praxis and Women’s Bodies: A Solution to Iris Marion Young’s Problem”
Jinli He (Trinity University)
“Wang Guowei and Nietzsche: The Idea of Tragedy”

**G5G  Society for Realist/Antirealist Discussion**
6:00–9:00 p.m.

**Topic:** Proofs in Mathematics

Speakers:
Jody Azzouni (Tufts University)
“Regimentation, Logic, and Mathematical Proof”
Kenny Easwaran (University of Southern California)
“Testimony and the Knowledge of the Mathematical Community”
Catarina Dutilh Novaes (Rijksuniversiteit Groningen)
“The Roots of Deduction: Every Proof Is and Is Not a Dialogue”
Otávio Bueno (University of Miami)
“What Does a Mathematical Proof Really Prove?”

**G5H  Society for the History of Political Philosophy**
6:00–9:00 p.m.

**Topic:** Philosophy, Theology, and the Law

Chair: Matthew Davis (St. John’s College)

Speakers:
Matthew Oberrieder (Rogers State University)
“Machiavelli’s Three Brains: The Paradox of Reading The Prince”
Steven Berg (Bellarmine University)
“Matelda, Dante, and Beatrice in the Earthly Paradise: Poetry and Philosophy on Trial in the Court of Biblical Theology”
Seth Appelbaum (Tulane University of New Orleans)
“Rule of Law as a Rule of Thumb in Aristotle’s Ethics V.7, Plato’s Crito, and Xenophon’s Memorabilia IV.4”
Alex Limanowski (Tulane University of New Orleans)
“The Education of God in Lessing’s Education of the Human Race”

**G5I  Society for the Philosophy of Agency**
6:00–9:00 p.m.

**Topic:** Davidsonian Causalism: Themes from Davidson’s “Actions, Reasons, and Causes”

Chair: Michael Brent (Carthage College)
Speaker: Sarah Paul (University of Wisconsin, Madison)
“The Force of the ‘Because’”

Commentator: George Wilson (University of Southern California)

Speakers: Guido Löhrer (Universität Erfurt)
Scott Sehon (Bowdoin College)
“Davidson’s Challenge to the Non-causalist”

Commentator: Alfred Mele (Florida State University)

G5J Society for the Philosophy of History, Session 1
6:00–9:00 p.m.

Topic: **Anglophone Historicisms 1**

Chair: Paul A. Roth (University of California, Santa Cruz)

Speakers: Hans Sluga (University of California, Berkeley)
“What Has History to Do with Me?” Wittgenstein’s Discovery of the Historical World”

Karsten Stueber (College of the Holy Cross)
“Historicism and the Explanatory Power of Narratives”

Constantine Sandis (Oxford Brookes University)
“Historicism in the ‘Small Red Books’ of the ’50s and ’60s”

G5K Society for the Philosophy of Sex and Love, Session 1
6:00–9:00 p.m.

Topic: **Thinking about Pornography**

Speakers: Talia Bettcher (California State University, Los Angeles)

“Chicks with Dicks’: A Plea for Persons”

Mireille Miller-Young (University of California, Santa Barbara)

“Make Your Booty Clap: Ho Theory and Corporeal Craftwork in Black Pornographies”

Kory Schaff (Occidental College)

“Pornography and Paternalism”

Raja Halwani (School of the Art Institute of Chicago)

“Pornography and Polysemy”

G5L Society for the Study of Ethics and Animals
6:00–9:00 p.m.

Topic: **Book Session: Jeremy Garrett, ed., The Ethics of Animal Research**

Chair: Jeremy Garrett (Children’s Mercy Bioethics Center and University of Missouri, Kansas City)
Speakers: Alastair Norcross (University of Colorado, Boulder)  
“Animal Experimentation, Marginal Cases, and the Significance of Suffering”

Christina M. Bellon (California State University, Sacramento)  
“Created Dependencies: A Feminist Approach to Our Obligations to Non-human Animal Research Subjects”

Mylan Engel, Jr. (Northern Illinois University)  
“The Commonsense Case Against Animal Experimentation”

Jeremy Garrett (Children’s Mercy Bioethics Center and University of Missouri, Kansas City)  
“The Ethics of Animal Research: An Overview”

Commentator: Kathie Jenni (University of Redlands)

**GROUP SESSION G6 — 8:00–10:00 p.m.**

**G6A  Association for Chinese Philosophers in America, Session 1**

8:00–10:00 p.m.

**Topic:** Mencius, Xunzi, Empirical Psychology, and Virtue Ethics

Chair: Chung-Ying Cheng (University of Hawaii at Manoa)

Speaker: Ellie Hua Wang (National Chengchi University)  
“The New Situationist Challenge and a Potential Xunzian Reply”

Commentator: Bongrae Seok (Alvernia University)

Speaker: Kai Wang (Beijing Normal University)  
“Confucian Ethics as Virtue Ethics—A Case Study Based on Xunzi”

Commentator: Winnie Sung (University College London)

Speaker: Wenqing Zhao (City University of Hong Kong)  
“Is Contemporary Chinese Society Inhumane? What Mencius and Empirical Psychology Have to Say”

Commentator: Tze-ki Hon (SUNY Geneseo)

**G6B  Society for Philosophy in the Contemporary World**

8:00–10:00 p.m.

**Topic:** Religion and Oppression

Speakers: Robert Metcalf (University of Colorado, Denver)  
“Religion as Ligature: A Theory of What Makes for Oppression”

Tim Christie (Fraser International College)  
“Religious Education, Children, and Oppression”
Andrew Fiala (California State University, Fresno)
“Religious Illiteracy and the Oppression of Ignorance”

**G6C  Wilfrid Sellars Society**

8:00–10:00 p.m.

**Topic:** Sellars and Kant

**Speakers:**
- Aaron Schiller (Santa Clara University)
  “Situating the Conceptual Order in the Real Order”
- Willem deVries (University of New Hampshire)
  “Some Remarks on Sellars’s Theory of Experience”
- David Landy (San Francisco State University)
  “The Transcendental Unity of Apperception Is Constituted by the Paralogisms’ Three Analytic Propositions”

**FRIDAY EVENING, MARCH 29**

**GROUP SESSION G7 — 7:00–10:00 P.M.**

**G7A  Hume Society**

7:00–10:00 p.m.

**Topic:** Hume’s Theory of Mental Representation

**Chair:** David Landy (San Francisco State University)

**Speakers:**
- Karl Schafer (University of Pittsburgh)
  “Cognition in Hume and Kant”
- Lewis Powell (University at Buffalo)
  “Hume’s Rejection of the Mirror Thesis”
- Jonathan Cottrell (New York University)
  “Perceptions of Unity and Number”

**G7B  International Association for the Philosophy of Sport**

7:00–10:00 p.m.

**Chair:** Douglas McLaughlin (California State University, Northridge)

**Speakers:**
- Joan Grassbaugh Forry (Linfield College)
  “Against Animals as Sports Team Mascots”
- Sarah Teetzel (University of Manitoba)
  “Drug Testing Child Athletes”
- Jesús Ilundain-Agurrutz (Linfield College)
  “Effortless Proficiency: Pragmatic Features in Eastern and American Philosophies of Sport”
Tim Elcombe (Wilfrid Laurier University)
“The Ethics of Sporting Technologies: Thickening the Theory”

**G7C  International Society for Comparative Studies of Chinese and Western Philosophy, Session 2**

*7:00–10:00 p.m.*

**Topic:** Virtue, Social Propriety, and the Family: East and West

**Chair:** May Sim (College of the Holy Cross)

**Speakers:**
- Sean McAleer (University of Wisconsin, Eau Claire)
  “Confucian and Aristotelian Social Propriety”
- Gordan B. Mower (Brigham Young University)
  “Mengzi and Hume on Extending Virtue”
- Anh Tuan Nuyen (National University of Singapore)
  “The Role of the Family in Ames’s Role Ethics”

**Commentators:**
- Tim Connolly (East Stroudsburg University)
- Hui-chieh Loy (National University of Singapore)
- Lijun Yuan (Texas State University, San Marcos)

**G7D  Karl Jaspers Society of North America, Session 1**

*7:00–10:00 p.m.*

**Topic:** Book Session: Philosophical Faith and the Future of Humanity

**Chair:** Stephen Erickson (Pomona College)

**Speaker:** Purushottama Bilimoria (University of California, Berkeley)

  “Philosophical Humanity and the Future of Faith”

**Respondents:**
- Ties Nijssen (Springer Verlag)
- Alan M. Olson (Boston University)
- Reinhard Schulz (Carl von Ossietzky Universität Oldenburg)
- Gregory J. Walters (Saint Paul University)
- Helmut Wautischer (Sonoma State University)

**G7E  North American Kant Society, Session 2**

*7:00–10:00 p.m.*

**Topic:** Purposiveness in Kant’s Critiques

**Chair:** Pablo Muchnik (Emerson College)

**Speakers:**
- Jane Kneller (Colorado State University)
  “A Sense of Purpose: The Relation of the Faculties in the Critique of Aesthetic Judgment”
- Pierre Keller (University of California, Riverside)
  “Cognitive Significance and Ends in the First Critique”
Allen Wood (Indiana University, Bloomington)
“Purposiveness in Kant’s Practical Philosophy”

G7F North American Wittgenstein Society
7:00–10:00 p.m.
Chair: John W. Powell (Humboldt State University)
Speakers:
- James Connelly (Trent University)
  “On Private Diarists and Modal Solitaires: A Response to Wrisley”
- Timothy Jussaume (Villanova University)
  “The Paradox of a Transcendental Tractarian Ethics”
- Ronald Hustwit (College of Wooster)
  “Wittgenstein and Ordinary Language Philosophy”
- Hao Tang (Wuhan University)
  “Wittgenstein and the Dualism of the Inner and the Outer”

G7G Philosophy of Time Society
7:00–10:00 p.m.
Chair: Noa Latham (University of Calgary)
Speaker: Yuri Balashov (University of Georgia)
  “The Puzzle of the Present”
Commentator: Bradford Skow (Massachusetts Institute of Technology)
Speaker: Oliver Pooley (Oxford University)
  “Three Types of Gauge Redundancy and the Problem of Time”
Commentator: Christian Wüthrich (University of California, San Diego)
Speaker: Noa Latham (University of Calgary)
  “The Passage of Time”
Commentator: Ben Caplan (Ohio State University)

G7H Society for Applied Philosophy, Session 2
7:00–10:00 p.m.
Topic: Ethics in a Climate Emergency
Chair: Hugh LaFollette (University of South Florida, St. Petersburg)
Speakers:
- Dale Jamieson (New York University)
  “Ethics in a Climate Emergency”
- Stephen M. Gardiner (University of Washington)
  “Geoengineering and Moral Schizophrenia: What’s the Question?”
Clare Heyward (Oxford University)
“What Is a Climate Emergency—And Is Geoengineering a Solution?”

**G7I  Society for Asian and Comparative Philosophy, Session 2**
7:00–10:00 p.m.
Chair: William Edelglass (Marlboro College)
Speakers: William Edelglass (Marlboro College)
“Buddhist Ethics and Western Moral Philosophy”
Gail M. Presbey (University of Detroit, Mercy)
“Gandhi on Vows, Pledges, and Promises to Self and Community”
Lin Qian (University of Washington)
“Making Sense of Mind in Early Buddhist Abhidharma”
Sam Mickey (University of San Francisco)
“On Plants: Contributions to a Philosophical Botany”

**G7J  Society for the Philosophic Study of the Contemporary Visual Arts, Session 2**
7:00–10:00 p.m.
**Topic:** Moral and Political Content in Art / as Art
Chair: Richard Nunan (College of Charleston)
Speakers: James Mollison (Loyola Marymount University)
“Bacon and Bataille: Toward an Ethic of Self Sacrifice”
Laura Specker Sullivan (University of Hawaii at Manoa)
“Photography and Moral Interest: Bridging the Gap Between Nature and Art”
Vid Simoniti (Oxford University)
“Political and Site-specific Art: What’s the Point of It Being Art?”

**Topic:** Bollywood—Defining a Genre
Chair: Richard Nunan (College of Charleston)
Speaker: Shad Bauer (Ohio University)
“Throwing Down the Gauntlet: The Bollywood Aesthetic and Western Cinematic Dominance”

**G7K  Society for the Philosophy of Sex and Love, Session 2**
7:00–10:00 p.m.
Speakers: Mark Migotti (University of Calgary)
Nicole Wyatt (University of Calgary)
“On the Very Idea of Having Sex”

Tracy de Boer (University of Victoria)
“Sex, Rights, and Patriarchy: A Case for the Right to Sex and a Feminist Assessment”

Rachel McKinnon (University of Waterloo)
“Stereotype Threat for Trans Women”

G7L  Society for the Study of Philosophy and the Martial Arts, Session 2
7:00–10:00 p.m.
Chair: Joseph J. Lynch (California Polytechnic State University)
Speaker: Mark Rowlands (University of Miami)
“The Value of the Martial Arts”
Commentator: Craig K. Ihara (California State University, Fullerton)
Speaker: Allan Bäck (Kutztown University of Pennsylvania)
“The Art of Forms”
Commentator: LeRon Harrison (Stanford University)
Speaker: R. Shannon Duval (Mount Mary College)
“When Tengu Speak: Lessons on Ontology and Consciousness in Issai Chozanshi’s The Demon’s Sermon on Martial Arts”
Commentator: Ervin Castle (Independent Scholar)
Speaker: Richard Schubert (Cosumnes River College)
“Violence, Nonviolence, and the Martial Arts”
Commentator: Steve Bein (SUNY Geneseo)
Speaker: Steve Bein (SUNY Geneseo)
“Can There Be High-quality Suffering? Rational Agents, Martial Artists, and Utilitarianism”
Commentator: Joseph J. Lynch (California Polytechnic State University)
Speaker: Paul A. Swift (Bryant University)
“Habits, Virtue, and Fear in Karatate Training for War and Peace”
Commentator: R. Shannon Duval (Mount Mary College)

G7M  Society for the Study of Process Philosophies, Session 2
7:00–10:00 p.m.
Topic: Philosophy of Religion
Chair: John Quiring (Victor Valley College)
Speakers: Derek Malone-France (George Washington University)
“A Process Perspective on Religion and the Public Sphere”
Group Program

Spyridon Koutroufinis (University of California, Berkeley)
“Bergson’s Idea of ‘Living Eternity’ and Whitehead’s Concept of the ‘Consequent Nature of God’”

Daniel R. Siakel (University of California, Irvine)
“God, Becoming, and Dependence: Whitehead Ramified”

Jea Sophia Oh (Brooklyn College)
“Hanul, an Eco-God: The Triune Reverence of Life”

Dong-Sik Park (Claremont Graduate University)
“Self-limiting God (Kenosis of Christ) and the Hope for the Eschaton”

Randy Ramal (Claremont Graduate University)
“Why Metaphysical Realism Is an Obstacle to True Faith”

G7N  Society for Women in Philosophy, Session 2
7:00–10:00 p.m.

Topic:  Author-Meets-Critics: Ann V. Murphy, Violence and the Philosophical Imaginary
Author:  Ann V. Murphy (University of New Mexico)
Critics:  Samir Haddad (Fordham University)
          Gayle Salamon (Princeton University)
          Shannon Winnubst (Ohio State University)

G7O  Western Phenomenology Conference
7:00–10:00 p.m.

Topic:  Jean-Luc Nancy and Phenomenology
Moderator:  Jason Winfree (California State University, Stanislaus)
Speakers:  Francois Raffoul (Louisiana State University)
          “Deconstruction as Self-Deconstruction: Nancy with Heidegger and Derrida”
          Marie-Eve Morin (University of Alberta)
          “Jean-Luc Nancy’s Thinking of the Body: A Phenomenology?”
          Hakhamanesh Zangeneh (California State University, Stanislaus)
          “Struction and Distension”
SATURDAY EVENING, MARCH 30

GROUP SESSION G8 — 6:00–8:00 P.M.

G8A American Association of Philosophy Teachers

6:00–8:00 p.m.

Topic: Philosophy Discussions Online: How to Make them Productive, Effective, and Efficient

Chair: Andrew Carpenter (Ellis University)
Speakers: Jessica Katz (Bowling Green State University)
“Class Discussions 2.0: Using Online Lectures and Video Chats to Optimize Class Discussions”

Dennis Earl (Coastal Carolina University)
“Effective Use of Blogs in Philosophy Courses”

Justin Kalef (Rutgers University)
“Imparting Philosophical Values Through Online Discussions”

Scott Clifton (University of Washington)
“Restoring the Natural Order: Online Discussions and Learning Philosophy”

G8B American Society for Aesthetics

6:00–8:00 p.m.

Topic: Words and Music

Chair: Ronald Moore (University of Washington)
Speaker: Peter Kivy (Rutgers University)
“Speaking in Song and Singing in Speech: Another Paradox for the Paradoxical Art”

Commentator: Jeanette Bicknell (Independent Scholar)
Speaker: Jenefer Robinson (University of Cincinnati)
“Is There a Grand Canyon or a Gentle Valley Between ‘Absolute’ and ‘Program’ Music?”

Commentator: Jennifer Judkins (University of California, Los Angeles)

GROUP SESSION G9 — 6:00–9:00 P.M.

G9A Ayn Rand Society

6:00–9:00 p.m.

Topic: Capitalism, Limited Government, and Morality

Chair: Allan Gotthelf (Rutgers University)
Speaker: Michael Huemer (University of Colorado, Boulder)

Commentator: Harry Binswanger (Ayn Rand Institute)
G9B  International Hobbes Association, Session 2  
6:00–9:00 p.m.
Moderator: Chris Naticchia (California State University, San Bernardino)
Speakers: Anne Davenport (Boston College)  
“Hobbes Modestly Accosted”
Helen Hattab (University of Houston)  
“Hobbes’s Analyses and Syntheses in Relation to Civil Science”
Geoffrey Gorham (Macalester College)  
“Hobbes’s Stoic Metaphysics: Space, Time, and God”
Miguel Saralegui (Universidad de La Sabana)  
“Hobbes’s Theory of Punishment in the Appendix to Leviathan”
Andrew Forcehimes (Vanderbilt University)  
“The War Amongst Artificial Persons”

G9C  International Society for Chinese Philosophy, Session 2  
6:00–9:00 p.m.
Topic: Korean Confucianism in a Comparative Perspective
Chair: Philip J. Ivanhoe (City University of Hong Kong)
Speakers: Sungmoon Kim (City University of Hong Kong)  
“Cultivating Sage-hood for Social Justice: A Lesson from Two Korean Female Neo-Confucian Philosophers”
Philip J. Ivanhoe (City University of Hong Kong)  
“Dai Zhen (戴震) (1722–1776), Jeong Yak-yong (丁若鏞) (1762–1836), and Itō Jinsai (伊藤 仁斎) (1627–1705): The Naturalization of East Asian Ethical Philosophy”
Youngmin Kim (Seoul National University)  
“Sallim as Political Actor”
Hyoungchan Kim (Korea University)  
“Yi Hwang (李滉) (1501–1570) and Yi I (李珥) (1536–1584)’s Building ‘Korean Confucianism’ and the Reinterpretation of Confucianism as a State Ideology”
G9D  International Society for Environmental Ethics, Session 2
6:00–9:00 p.m.

**Topic:** Environmental Ethics

**Speakers:**
- Jeffrey Lockwood (University of Wyoming)
- Don Maeir (Independent Scholar)
  - “Conservation as Picking up Trash in Nature: A Debate”
- Kenneth Shockley (University at Buffalo)
  - “The Environmental Moral Problem and What to Do About It”
- Anthony Chackal (University of Georgia)
  - “Toward a Critical Aesthetics of Nature”
- Benjamin Hale (University of Colorado, Boulder)
- Adam Pérou Hermans (University of Colorado, Boulder)
- Alex Lee (University of Colorado, Boulder)
  - “Wildness Without Naturalness: Expanding Environmental Focus in the Anthropocene”

G9E  Karl Jaspers Society of North America, Session 2
6:00–9:00 p.m.

**Topic:** Humanity and Post-humanity

**Chair:** Gregory J. Walters (Saint Paul University)

**Speakers:**
- Natasha Vita-More (University of Plymouth)
  - “Contested Culture: The Plausibility of Transhumanism”
- Dale Carrico (University of California, Berkeley)
  - “Futurological Discourse and Posthuman Terrains”
- Stephen Erickson (Pomona College)
  - “Post-Humanism, Technology, and Education”
- Francesca Ferrando (Università degli Studi di Roma Tre)
  - “Post/Trans/Meta/Anti-Humanism: Relations and Differences”
- James Carroll (Los Alamos National Laboratory)
  - “The Pace of Technological Progress, Linear or Exponential, and Its Implications for the Future of Humanity”
- John P. Sullins (Sonoma State University)
  - “Transhuman Express: Are We Ethically Required to Be Transhumanists?”
G9F  **Radical Philosophy Association, Session 2**  
6:00–9:00 p.m.  
**Topic:** Immigrants, Refugees, and Liberation: Latino/a Philosophy at and from the Border  
Chair: José Jorge Mendoza (Worcester State College)  
Speakers:  
- Grant J. Silva (Marquette University)  
  “An Argument for Economic Refugees: War, Drugs, and Gray Moral Areas”  
- Natalie Cisneros (Allegheny College)  
  “Death and the ‘Illegal Alien’: Normalizing Racism and Immigrant Detainment”  
- José-Antonio Orosco (Oregon State University)  
  “Overcoming a Certain Blindness: Latin Thought as American Liberation Philosophy”  
- Carlos Alberto Sánchez (San Jose State University)  
  “Philosophical Interventions: Centeotl and Post-NAFTA Mexican Immigration”

G9G  **Society for Analytical Feminism**  
6:00–9:00 p.m.  
**Topic:** The Metaphysics of Sex (Differences) and Sexual Orientation: In or out of the Social Change Recipe?  
Chair: Saray Ayala (Universidad Carlos III de Madrid)  
Speakers:  
- Nadya Vasilyeva (Brandeis University)  
  “Explanations and Beliefs”  
- Sally Haslanger (Massachusetts Institute of Technology)  
  “Gender Justice: Social Not Metaphysical (or Physical)”  
- Esa Diaz-Leon (University of Manitoba)  
  “The Semantics and Metaphysics of Sexual Orientations and Their Significance for LGBT Rights”  
- Talia Bettcher (California State University, Los Angeles)  
  “Transsexualism and the Concept of Brain Sex”

G9H  **Society for German Idealism, Session 2**  
6:00–9:00 p.m.  
Chair: Karen Ng (Siena College)  
Speaker: Gabriel Gottlieb (Xavier University)  
  “Fichte’s Deduction of the External World”  
Commentator: Nicholas Mowad (Independent Scholar)
Speaker: Rafeeq Hasan (University of Chicago)
“Politics, Property, Personhood: Kant’s Rousseauian Return”

Commentator: Andreja Novakovic (College of William and Mary)

Speaker: Lydia Moland (Colby College)
“Taking Hegel’s Humor Seriously”

Commentator: Marcos Bisticas-Cocoves (Morgan State University)

G9I  Society for Phenomenology and Analytic Philosophy
6:00–9:00 p.m.

Topic: Genetic Phenomenology
Chair: David Woodruff Smith (University of California, Irvine)
Speakers: Roma Hernández (Rice University)
Christopher Lay (University of California, Irvine)
Michael Shim (California State University, Los Angeles)
Jeffrey Yoshimi (University of California, Merced)

G9J  Society for the Advancement of American Philosophy, Session 2
6:00–9:00 p.m.

Topic: Author-Meets-Critics: Colin Koopman, Pragmatism as Transition and Genealogy as Critique
Chair: Albert Spencer III (Portland State University)
Critics: Noëlle McAfee (Emory University)
Paul Rabinow (University of California, Berkeley)
Brad Elliott Stone (Loyola Marymount University)
Respondent: Colin Koopman (University of Oregon)

G9K  Society for the Metaphysics of Science
6:00–9:00 p.m.

Topic: Causation and Causal Accounts of Explanation
Speakers: Sara Bernstein (Duke University)
“Actual and Counterfactual Redundancy”
Marco J. Nathan (University of Denver)
“Causation and Causal Explanation: Which Is More Fundamental?”
Cory Wright (California State University, Long Beach)
“Causes in Causal Explanations: The Problem of Abstract Relata”
Holly Andersen (Simon Fraser University)
“Patterns, Information, and Causation”
G9L  Society for the Philosophy of History, Session 2  
6:00–9:00 p.m.  

**Topic:** Anglophone Historicisms 2  
Chair: Admir Skodo (University of California, Berkeley)  
Speakers: Petri Koikkalainen (University of Lapland)  
“Contextualism Politicised: The ‘Normative Turn’ of the Revisionist History of Political Thought”  
Giuseppina D’Oro (Keele University)  
“Is Collingwood a Historicist?”  
Loren Goldman (University of California, Berkeley)  
“Rorty’s ‘Post-Kantian’ Philosophy of History”

G9M  William James Society  
6:00–9:00 p.m.  

**Topic:** James Versus Peirce on Affective Belief and Rationality  
Presenters: Cheryl Misak (University of Toronto)  
Kyle Bromhall (University of Guelph)  
Aaron Massecar (University of Western Ontario)

GROUP SESSION G10 — 8:00–10:00 P.M.  

G10A  Association for Chinese Philosophers in America, Session 2  
8:00–10:00 p.m.  

**Topic:** Chinese Philosophy and the European Tradition  
Chair: Weimin Sun (California State University, Northridge)  
Speaker: May Sim (College of the Holy Cross)  
“Traveling with Laozi and Plato”  
Commentator: Chung-Ying Cheng (University of Hawaii at Manoa)  
Speaker: Weigang Chen (University of Macau)  
“Confucian Marxism—a Reflection on Religion and Global Justice”  
Commentator: Elizabeth Woo Li (Peking University)  
Speaker: Yitian Zhai (University at Buffalo)  
“Forgottenness of Being vis-à-vis Forgetting of Text—An Exploration of Derrida’s Critique of Heidegger Through a Chinese Philosophical Perspective”  
Commentator: Ellen Zhang (Hong Kong Baptist University)
MAIN AND GROUP PROGRAM PARTICIPANTS

(Group sessions begin with “G.” All others are main sessions.)

A

Aas, Sean (Goethe-Universität Frankfurt) ........................................ 4K Thu AM
Abaci, Uygar (University of British Columbia) .................................. 10J Sat AM
Abbey, Ruth (University of Notre Dame) ........................................ G1C Wed PM
Abizadeh, Arash (McGill University) .............................................. 10F Sat AM
Abraham, William (Southern Methodist University) ....................... 7D Fri AM
Abramson, Kate (Indiana University, Bloomington) ..................... 2H Wed PM
Adams, Kyle (University of California, Davis) ............................. 9K Fri PM
Agule, Craig (University of California, San Diego) ....................... 12H Sat PM
Alcoff, Linda Martin (Hunter College) ........................................... 9I Fri PM
Alfano, Mark (Princeton University) ............................................ 11C Sat PM
Alford-Duguid, Dominic (University of Toronto) ......................... 12F Sat PM
Allen, Colin (Indiana University, Bloomington) ........................... 2F Wed PM
Alonso, Facundo (Yale University) ............................................... 8E Fri PM
Altman, Matthew C. (Central Washington University) ............... 2L Wed PM
Altshuler, Roman (Stony Brook University and Marymount Manhattan College) ........................................ 4J Thu AM
Alvarez, Nick (San Francisco State University) ......................... 10D Sat AM
Amaya, Santiago (Washington University in St. Louis) .............. 6D Thu PM
Amerikas, Karl (University of Notre Dame) ................................. 10J Sat AM
Amijee, Fatema (University of Texas at Austin) ......................... 4H Thu AM
Andersen, Holly (Simon Fraser University) ................................. G9K Sat PM
Anderson, James (University of San Diego) .............................. 1L Wed AM
Anderson, Jeremy (DePauw University) ....................................... G5A Thu PM
Anderson, Joseph (University of South Florida) ......................... 8J Fri PM
Anderson, Luvell (University of Memphis) .................................. 6C Thu PM
Anderson, Owen (Arizona State University) ......................... G3A Wed PM, 12I Sat PM
Anderson, R. Lanier (Stanford University) ................................. G2F Wed PM
Andrews, Kristin (York University) ........................................... 3G Wed PM
Anthony, Collin (University of Pennsylvania) ........................... 3D Wed PM
Antill, Greg (University of California, Los Angeles) ............... 2I Wed PM
Antonelli, Aldo (University of California, Davis) ....................... 5K Thu PM
Appelbaum, Seth (Tulane University of New Orleans) ..................G5H Thu PM
Arbour, Benjamin H. (University of Bristol) ............................... 8J Fri PM
Armendt, Brad (Arizona State University) ..............................12K Sat PM
Arneson, Richard (University of California, San Diego) .........8L Fri PM, 11J Sat PM
Arnold, Alexander (The John Templeton Foundation) ............5M Thu PM
Arnold, Alexander (University of Notre Dame) ......................2I Wed PM
Asarnow, Samuel (Stanford University) ................................. 8E Fri PM
Asch, Adrienne (Yeshiva University) .................................11F Sat PM
Askren, Russell (Utah Valley University) ...............................6G Thu PM
Atherton, Margaret (University of Wisconsin, Milwaukee) ....5A Thu PM
Au, Erika (San Francisco State University) ............................8D Fri PM
Auch, Adam (Dalhousie University) ................................. 8H Fri PM
Audi, Robert (University of Notre Dame) .........................11A Sat PM
Axtell, Guy (Radford University) .................................4G Thu AM
Ayala, Saray (Universidad Carlos III de Madrid) ..................G9G Sat PM
Aydede, Murat (University of British Columbia) ..................9G Fri PM
Azadpur, Mohammad (San Francisco State University) .......4J Thu AM
Azzouni, Jody (Tufts University) ................................. G5G Thu PM

B

Baber, H. E. (University of San Diego) ..............................10I Sat AM
Babich, Babette (Fordham University) ..............................11K Sat PM
Bach, Kent (San Francisco State University) ..................G2K Wed PM, 5D Thu PM
Bachman, Zachary (University of California, Riverside) ....... 3J Wed PM
Bader, Ralf (New York University) .................................10J Sat AM
Badhwar, Neera (University of Oklahoma and George Mason University) ...............................1A Wed AM
Baehr, Jason (Loyola Marymount University) .........................G3B Wed PM, 4G Thu AM, 5M Thu PM
Bailey, Andrew (University of Notre Dame) ..........................4H Thu AM
Balaguer, Mark (California State University, Los Angeles) .... 1H Wed AM
Balashov, Yuri (University of Georgia) ...............................G7G Fri PM
Baldari, John (University of Nevada, Reno) ......................... 5L Thu PM
Ballarin, Roberta (University of British Columbia) ...............3B Wed PM
Bandopadhyay, Prasanta S. (Montana State University) ........3M Wed PM
Banka, Rafal (Uniwersytet Jagielloński) ..............................G5F Thu PM
Baril, Anne (University of New Mexico) ..............................3F Wed PM
Barnes, Elizabeth (University of Leeds) .............................10E Sat AM
Barnes, Joseph (University of California, Berkeley) ..........12M Sat PM
Barney, Rachel (University of Toronto) ............................4C Thu AM
Barry, Christian (Australian National University) ...............10A Sat AM
Bashour, Bana (American University of Beirut) ....................... 5L Thu PM
Basu, Rima (University of Southern California) .................... 2G Wed PM
Battaly, Heather (California State University, Fullerton) ......... 4G Thu AM
Batterman, Robert (University of Pittsburgh) ....................... 5B Thu PM
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Bauer, Shad (Ohio University) ............................................. G7J Fri PM
Baxley, Anne Margaret (Washington University in St. Louis) .... 7K Fri AM
Bayne, Tim (University of Manchester) .................................. 2D Wed PM
Bazargan, Saba (University of California, San Diego) .......... 1L Wed AM
Bedke, Matthew (University of British Columbia) ................. 11 Wed AM, G2B Wed PM
Bein, Steve (SUNY Geneseo) .............................................. G7L Fri PM
Bell, Jeffrey A. (Southeastern Louisiana University) ............ 2A Wed PM
Bellon, Christina M. (California State University, Sacramento) .. G5L Thu PM, 11H Sat PM
Belu, Dana (California State University, Dominguez Hills) ...... 12C Sat PM
Bengson, John (University of Wisconsin, Madison) ............... 8D Fri PM
Benjamin, Martin (Michigan State University) ...................... 7I Fri AM
Bentley, Aaron (San Francisco State University) .................... 6C Thu PM
Berenstain, Nora (University of Tennessee) ......................... 6K Thu PM
Berg, Amy (University of California, San Diego) ................... 6F Thu PM
Berg, Steven (Bellarmine University) ................................... G5H Thu PM
Berk, Matthew (University of Utah) ..................................... 7E Fri AM
Berkey, Brian (University of California, Berkeley) ............... 2H Wed PM
Bernstein, Alyssa (Ohio University) ................................. 4B Thu AM
Bernstein, Sara (Duke University) ...................................... 8A Fri PM, G9K Sat PM
Berteaux, John (California State University, Monterey Bay) .... 7H Fri AM
Besser-Jones, Lorraine (Middlebury College) ....................... G2L Wed PM
Bettcher, Talia (California State University, Los Angeles) ..... G5K Thu PM, G9G Sat PM
Bicknell, Jeanette (Independent Scholar) ............................ G8B Sat PM
Biderman, Shai (Tel Aviv University) .................................. G2I Wed PM
Biggs, Stephen (Iowa State University) ............................... 4E Thu AM
Bilimoria, Purushottama (University of California, Berkeley) ... G7D Fri PM
Binswanger, Harry (Ayn Rand Institute) .............................. G9A Sat PM
Bisticas-Cocoves, Marcos (Morgan State University) ............. G9H Sat PM
Black, Tim (California State University, Northridge) ............ 10B Sat AM
Blackman, Reid (University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill) .... 5L Thu PM
Blake, Susan (Indiana University, Bloomington) .................... G2C Wed PM
Bobella, Adam (San Francisco State University) .................. 12F Sat PM
Bobro, Marc (Santa Barbara City College) .......................... 2M Wed PM, 4B Thu AM, 8M Fri PM
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Bueno, Otávio (University of Miami) ..................... 5B Thu PM, G5G Thu PM
Bulthuis, Nathaniel (Cornell University) ............................. 6D Thu PM
Burgess, Alexis (Stanford University) ..................................... 3K Wed PM
Burris, David (Arizona Western College) ............. 3I Wed PM, G3A Wed PM
Burroughs, Michael (University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill) ........................................ 6M Thu PM
Buss, Sarah (University of Michigan) ........................................... 7E Fri AM
Butler, James (Berea College) .................................................. 12M Sat PM
Bäck, Allan (Kutztown University of Pennsylvania) ......... G7L Fri PM

C
Cabrera Jr., Manuel ‘Mandel’ (University of California, Los Angeles) ................................................................. G57 Thu PM
Calder, Todd (Saint Mary’s University) ...................................... 9E Fri PM
Caldwell, David (University of Northern Colorado) .......... G2I Wed PM
Callaway, Christopher (St. Joseph’s College of Maine) ........ 8J Fri PM
Camacho, John (University of Missouri, St. Louis) ............. 7J Fri AM
Cameron, Ross (University of Leeds) ................................. 10E Sat AM
Campana, Dan (University of La Verne) ............................. 2I Wed PM
Campbell, John (University of California, Berkeley) .......... 4D Thu AM
Campbell, Joseph (Washington State University) ............. 1H Wed AM
Campbell, Melinda (National University) ......................... 10I Sat AM
Campbell, Stephen (Coe College) ...................................... 3F Wed PM
Capisani, Simona (San Francisco State University) ............ 4J Thu AM
Caplan, Ben (Ohio State University) .............................. 2J Wed PM, G7G Fri PM
Capraru, Mihnea (Syracuse University) .............................. 3E Wed PM
Carey, Brandon (University of Rochester) ...................... 8J Fri PM
Cariani, Fabrizio (Northwestern University) ..................... 8H Fri PM
Carpenter, Andrew (Ellis University) ............................... G8A Sat PM
Carrico, Dale (University of California, Berkeley) .......... G9E Sat PM
Carroll, James (Los Alamos National Laboratory) ............ G9E Sat PM
Carroll, Noël (The Graduate Center, CUNY) ..................... 8C Fri PM
Carvalho, John (Villanova University) ............................. G2I Wed PM
Cashmore, Sarah (University of Toronto) ..................... 6M Thu PM
Cassam, Quassim (Warwick University) ......................... 4D Thu AM
Castle, Ervin (Independent Scholar) ............................. G7L Fri PM
Caston, Victor (University of Michigan) .......................... 5E Thu PM
Casullo, Albert (University of Nebraska, Lincoln) .......... 11C Sat PM
Celestino, Gemma (LOGOS Barcelona) ......................... 2J Wed PM
Chackal, Anthony (University of Georgia) .................................. G9D Sat PM
Chalmers, David (Australian National University and New York University) .................................................. 8A Fri PM
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<td>Chambers, Simone</td>
<td>University of Toronto</td>
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<td>Illinois Wesleyan University and Tulane University</td>
<td>1J Wed AM</td>
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Crasnow, Sharon (Norco College) ................................................3L Wed PM
Crockett, Timothy (University of California, Berkeley) .................. 4F Thu AM
Crouch, Margaret (Eastern Michigan University) ........................ 10C Sat AM
Cudd, Ann (University of Kansas) ................................................... 8L Fri PM
Cuneo, Terence (University of Vermont) ........................................ 9H Fri PM
Cunningham, Thomas (University of Pittsburgh)...................... Posters Fri
Curzer, Howard J. (Texas Tech University) .............................. 4G Thu AM
Cyr, Taylor (Florida State University) ........................................... 8G Fri PM

D

D’Oro, Giuseppina (Keele University) .................................... G9L Sat PM
Dadlez, Eva (University of Central Oklahoma) ......................... 7J Fri AM
Dallmann, Justin (University of Southern California) ............. 2I Wed PM
Darnico, Greg (University of California, Davis) ...................... 2G Wed PM
Dannenberg, Jorah (Stanford University) ............................... 10G Sat AM
Davenport, Anne (Boston College) .................................. G9B Sat PM
Davia, Cory (University of California, San Diego) ................... 11J Sat PM
Davies, Stephen (University of Auckland) .............................. 8C Fri PM
Davis, James (Boston University) ........................................ G4A Thu PM
Davis, John (California State University, Fullerton) .............. 8I Fri PM
Davis, Matthew (St. John’s College) ...................................... G5H Thu PM
de Boer, Tracy (University of Victoria) ................................. 7K Fri AM, G7K Fri PM
De Pierris, Graciela (Stanford University) .............................. 1E Wed AM
De Rosa, Raffaella (Rutgers University) ................................ 4F Thu AM
Deal, William (Case Western Reserve University) ................. 3M Wed PM
Deery, Oisín (University of British Columbia) .... 1H Wed AM, G2B Wed PM
DeMoss, David (Pacific University) ........................................ 7H Fri AM
Denis, Lara (Agnes Scott College) ........................................ 1B Wed AM
deRosset, Louis H. (University of Vermont) .............................. 5K Thu PM
Deuretzbacher, Jakub (Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin) ...... 5E Thu PM
Dever, Josh (University of Texas at Austin) ......................... 11D Sat PM
deVries, Willem (University of New Hampshire) .... G6C Thu PM, 10J Sat AM
Diaz-Leon, Esa (University of Manitoba) ............................... 12J Sat PM, G9G Sat PM
Dicker, Georges (College at Brockport, SUNY) ......................... 6F Thu PM
Dietz, Christina (Chapman University) .................................. 2F Wed PM
Dimetriou, Dan (University of Minnesota, Morris) .............. 11I Wed AM
DiSilvestro, Russell (California State University, Sacramento) .... 1J Wed AM
Dixon, Scott (University of California, Davis) ....................... 11L Sat PM
Dodd, Dylan (Pacific University) ........................................... 3I Wed PM
Doggett, Tyler (University of Vermont) .................................. 3C Wed PM
Dogramaci, Sinan (University of Texas at Austin) .................... 3B Wed PM
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Farkas, Katalin (Central European University) ................................. 7F Fri AM
Faulkner, Paul (University of Sheffield) .......................................... 5G Thu PM
Fernandez Pinto, Manuela (University of Notre Dame) ................. 7L Fri AM
Ferrando, Francesca (Università degli Studi di Roma Tre) ............ G9E Sat PM
Ferrero, Luca (University of Wisconsin, Milwaukee) ..................... 6D Thu PM
Ferrin, Asia (University of Washington) ........................................... Posters Fri
Ferzan, Kimberly Kessler (Rutgers University, Camden) ................. 7M Fri AM
Fiala, Andrew (California State University, Fresno) .......................... G2A Wed PM, G6B Thu PM
Figdor, Carrie (University of Iowa) .............................................. 11D Sat PM
Finnigan, Bronwyn (Marquette University) .................................. 10C Sat AM
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Fluss, Harrison (Stony Brook University) ..................................... 12I Sat PM
Florka, Roger (Ursinus College) .................................................. 4H Thu AM
Flowers, Johnathan (Southern Illinois University, Carbondale) ....... G2J Wed PM, G5F Thu PM
Folescu, Marina (University of Southern California) ................. 9H Fri PM
Forcehimes, Andrew (Vanderbilt University) ............................. G9B Sat PM
Forman, David (University of Nevada, Las Vegas and University of British Columbia) ........................................... 7K Fri AM
Forry, Joan Grassbaugh (Linfield College) ...................................... G7B Fri PM
Fosl, Peter S. (Transylvania University) ......................................... 9F Fri PM
Francis, Leslie Pickering (University of Utah) .............................. 1K Wed AM
Frank, David (New York University) ........................................... 8B Fri PM
Franklin, Christopher (Marymount University) ........................... 1H Wed AM
Fricker, Miranda (University of Sheffield) ................................... 9A Fri PM
Frise, Matthew (University of Rochester) .................................... 4I Thu AM
Fritz, Kyle (Florida State University) ........................................... 2G Wed PM
Fritzman, J. M. (Lewis & Clark College) ..................................... 4A Thu AM
Frykholm, Erin (University of Kansas) ........................................ G2L Wed PM
Fulkerson, Matthew (University of California, San Diego) ........... 9G Fri PM
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Graham, Peter (University of California, Riverside) .................. 11C Sat PM
Green, Mitchell (University of Virginia) .............................. 10G Sat AM
Greene, Richard (Weber State University) ............................. 1G Wed AM
Grenberg, Jeanine (St. Olaf College) ..................................... 1B Wed AM
Griffin, Michael (University of British Columbia) ................. 5E Thu PM
Grube, Enrico (University of Texas at Austin) .............. 9F Fri PM
Gruen, Lori (Wesleyan University) ........................................ 10D Sat AM
Grzankowski, Alex (University of Texas at Austin) ............ 1H Wed AM
Guerrero, Alexander (University of Pennsylvania) ......... 10M Sat AM
Gurley, S. West (Sam Houston State University) .............. 6I Thu PM
Guyer, Paul (University of Pennsylvania) .......................... 10J Sat AM

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Haddad, Samir (Fordham University) .................................. G7N Fri PM
Hahn, Susan (Massachusetts Institute of Technology) .......... 7J Fri AM
Hale, Benjamin (University of Colorado, Boulder) ............. G9D Sat PM
Halvani, Raja (School of the Art Institute of Chicago) ....... G5K Thu PM
Hamilton, Elizabeth (West Virginia University) ................. 12I Sat PM
Hanser, Matthew (University of California, Santa Barbara) ... 11J Sat PM
Hanson, Jean (Independent Scholar) ................................. 6M Thu PM
Hardimon, Michael (University of California, San Diego) ... 2C Wed PM
Harman, Elizabeth (Princeton University) ....................... 11J Sat PM
Harper, William (University of Western Ontario) .............. 2K Wed PM
Harris, Daniel (The Graduate Center, CUNY) ............................ 1F Wed AM, G2K Wed PM
Harris, John (Texas Christian University) ............................ 3D Wed PM
Harrison, LeRon (Stanford University) ......................... 4G7L Fri PM
Hartley, Christie (Georgia State University) .................... G1C Wed PM
Hasan, Rafeeq (University of Chicago) ........................... G9H Sat PM
Haslanger, Sally (Massachusetts Institute of Technology) .... 5C Thu PM, G9G Sat PM
Hassoun, Nicole (Binghamton University) ...................... 11B Sat PM
Hattab, Helen (University of Houston) ............................... G9B Sat PM
Havis, Devonya N. (Canisius College) ...................... 12A Sat PM
Havstad, Joyce (University of California, San Diego) .... 3F Wed PM
Hawthorne, John (Oxford University) ............................. 11D Sat PM
Hayes, Josh (Santa Clara University) .......................... 1D Wed AM
He, Jinli (Trinity University) ........................................ G5F Thu PM
Hebbeler, James (St. Joseph’s University) ..................... 11K Sat PM
Hedberg, Trevor (University of Tennessee) .................... 7J Fri AM
Hedger, Joseph A. (Syracuse University) ..................... 3E Wed PM
### Main and Group Meeting Participants

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Huemer, Michael (University of Colorado, Boulder) ................................................................. 10M Sat AM, G9A Sat PM
Hughes, Robert C. (University of California, Los Angeles) ................. 8I Fri PM
Hulbert, Shelley (University of Calgary) ........................................ 11H Sat PM
Hundleby, Catherine (University of Windsor) .............................................. 7G Fri AM
Hunter, Michael (University of California, Davis) ......................... 2K Wed PM
Hurley, Paul (Claremont McKenna College) ...................................... 7A Fri AM
Husak, Douglas (Rutgers University) ...................................................... 7M Fri AM
Husi, Stanislaus (University of Wisconsin, Milwaukee) ....................... 12H Sat PM
Hustwit, Ronald (College of Wooster) .................................................. G7F Fri PM
Hyska, Megan (University of Texas at Austin) ..................................... 5L Thu PM

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Ichikawa Jenkins, Carrie (University of British Columbia) ............... 10E Sat AM
Ichikawa, Jonathan (University of British Columbia) ..................... 6A Thu PM
Ihara, Craig K. (California State University, Fullerton) ............... G7L Fri PM
Ilundain-Agurruza, Jesús (Linfield College) ............................................ G7B Fri PM
Im, Manyul (Fairfield University) ................................................ G2C Wed PM
Immerman, Daniel (University of Notre Dame) ........................................ 3I Wed PM
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Irani, Tushar (Wesleyan University) .............................................. 12M Sat PM
Irving, Zac (University of Toronto) ................................................ 7L Fri AM
Isherwood, Jack (University of Western Sydney) ............................. G2D Wed PM
Ivanhoe, Philip J. (City University of Hong Kong) .......................... G9C Sat PM

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Jackman, Henry (York University) .................................................. 8H Fri PM
Jacobsen, Anne (University of Houston) ........................................ 3G Wed PM
James, Aaron (University of California, Irvine) .................................... 10A Sat AM
Jamieson, Dale (New York University) ........................................... G7H Fri PM
Jankovic, Marija (Indiana University, Bloomington) ....................... 12D Sat PM
Janssen, Gregory (University of Nevada, Las Vegas) .................... 11L Sat PM
Jayasekera, Marie (Colgate University) .............................................. 6F Thu PM
Jecker, Nancy S. (University of Washington) .................................. 4L Thu AM
Jenkins, Michelle (Whitman College) ............................................... 8K Fri PM
Jenkins, Scott (University of Kansas) .............................................. 11K Sat PM
Jenni, Kathie (University of Redlands) .......................................... G5L Thu PM
Jensen, Kipton (Morehouse College) ............................................. G5C Thu PM
Jenson, Chris (University of Utah) ............................................... 12E Sat PM
Jeshion, Robin (University of Southern California) ......................... 11I Sat PM
Johnson, Joshua (Saint Louis University) ................................... 3G Wed PM
Johnson, Robert (University of Missouri) ................................... 5F Thu PM
Johnston, Kim (University of Utah) ........................................... 5J Thu PM
Johnstone, Mark (McMaster University) ..................................... 5E Thu PM
Jolley, Nicholas (University of California, Irvine) ...................... 4F Thu AM
Jollimore, Troy (California State University, Chico) ................... 4I Thu AM
Jones, Karen (University of Melbourne) ..................................... 5C Thu PM
Jones, Sarah (Northern Michigan University) ............................ 1L Wed AM
Joyce, James (University of Michigan) ...................................... 2E Wed PM
Judkins, Jennifer (University of California, Los Angeles) ............. 10L Sat AM, G8B Sat PM
Julius, A. J. (University of California, Los Angeles) .................... 10A Sat AM
Jussaume, Timothy (Villanova University) ................................. G7F Fri PM

K

Kaag, John (University of Massachusetts, Lowell) ..................... G1A Wed PM
Kahn, Charles (University of Pennsylvania) ............................... 4C Thu AM
Kalef, Justin (Rutgers University) ........................................... G8A Sat PM
Kaplan, Jonathan (Oregon State University) ............................... 2K Wed PM
Karbowiski, Joseph (University of Notre Dame) ......................... 6E Thu PM
Karofsky, Amy (Hofstra University) ......................................... 10I Sat AM
Katz, Jessica (Bowling Green State University) ......................... G8A Sat PM
Kaufman, Kyra (Independent Scholar) ....................................... G4C Thu PM
Kaufmann, Angelica (Universiteit Antwerpen) ............................ 5L Thu PM
Kawall, Jason (Colgate University) .......................................... 6A Thu PM
Keaton, Douglas (Flagler College) ........................................... 9J Fri PM
Kehler, Curtis (University of British Columbia) ......................... 1F Wed AM
Keller, John (Niagara University) ............................................. 5K Thu PM
Keller, Lorraine Juliano (University of Notre Dame and Niagara University) ........................................ 1F Wed AM
Keller, Pierre (University of California, Riverside) ....................... 2C Wed PM, G7E Fri PM
Kelp, Christoph (Katholieke Universiteit Leuven) ....................... 1G Wed AM
Kenahan, Sarah (Marywood University) .................................... 71 Fri AM
Kenyon, Tim (University of Waterloo) ...................................... 7G Fri AM
Khalidi, Muhammad Ali (York University) ................................ 12J Sat PM
Kim, Hallya (University of Nebraska at Omaha) ......................... 4M Thu AM
Kim, Hyoungchan (Korea University) ....................................... G9C Sat PM
Kim, Sungmoon (City University of Hong Kong) ......................... G9C Sat PM
Kim, Youngmin (Seoul National University) .............................. G9C Sat PM
Kind, Amy (Claremont McKenna College) .................................. 3C Wed PM
Kindermann, Dirk (Rutgers University) .................................... 5K Thu PM
King, Alexandra (Brown University) .................................................9E Fri PM
King, Nathan (Whitworth University) ...........................................G3B Wed PM
Kipnis, Kenneth (University of Hawaii at Manoa) ..........................4L Thu AM
Kirchner, Daniel (Centre College) ..............................................G2G Wed PM
Kirk-Giannini, Cameron Domenico (Oxford University) .................8J Fri PM
Kittay, Eva (Stony Brook University) ...........................................G2L Wed PM
Kivy, Peter (Rutgers University) ..................................................G8B Thu PM
Klayman, Charles (Southern Illinois University, Carbondale) .......G2J Wed PM
Klein, Julie (Villanova University) ................................................G4B Wed PM
Kleingeld, Pauline (Rijksuniversiteit Groningen) .........................4B Thu AM
Kleingeld, David (John Jay College of Criminal Justice) ..............4L Thu AM
Kneller, Jane (Colorado State University) .....................................G7E Fri PM
Kobes, Bernard W. (Arizona State University) .............................5L Thu PM
Koch, Michael (SUNY Oneonta) ..................................................11K Sat PM
Kohav, Alex Shalom (Independent Scholar) .................................11K Sat PM
Koikkalainen, Petri (University of Lapland) .................................G9L Sat PM
Koltonski, Daniel (Amherst College) .........................................2H Wed PM
Koolage, John (Eastern Michigan University) ..............................10K Sat AM
Koopman, Colin (University of Oregon) .......................................G2H Wed PM, 6I Thu PM, G9J Sat PM
Korman, Daniel Z. (University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign) ...8D Fri PM
Kornblith, Hilary (University of Massachusetts, Amherst) ...........11M Thu AM
Korolev, Alexandre V. (University of British Columbia) ...............12G Sat PM
Kosch, Michelle (Cornell University) .........................................2C Wed PM
Koutroufinis, Spyridon (University of California, Berkeley) .......G7M Fri PM
Kovacs, David Mark (Cornell University) ....................................4J Thu AM
Krasner, Daniel (Metropolitan State College of Denver) ..............1E Wed AM
Kraut, Robert (Ohio State University) .........................................5F Thu PM
Kreines, James (Claremont McKenna College) ...............................4A Thu AM
Kultgen, Benjamin (University of Colorado, Boulder) .................1I Wed AM
Kumar, Rahul (Queen’s University) .............................................9A Fri PM
Kwon, Musho (Long Beach City College) ..................................G4A Thu PM
Kymlicka, Will (Queen’s University) .........................................10D Sat AM

LaFollette, Hugh (University of South Florida, St. Petersburg) ......G1C Wed PM, G7H Fri PM
LaFrance, Clare (University of Nebraska, Lincoln) ......................12J Sat PM
Landen, Laura (Providence College) ............................................10I Sat AM
Landesman, Bruce (University of Utah) ......................................10K Sat AM
Landry, Elaine (University of California, Davis) .........................2K Wed PM
Landy, David (San Francisco State University) ..........................G6C Thu PM, G7A Fri PM
Main and Group Meeting Participants

Lane, Melissa (Princeton University) ............................................... 8K Fri PM
Lang, Charles (University of California, Davis) ............................ 1J Wed AM
Lapointe, Sandra (McMaster University) ....................................... G2K Wed PM
Latham, Noa (University of Calgary) ........................................... G7G Fri PM
Lavin, Doug (Harvard University) .................................................. 3A Wed PM
Lay, Christopher (University of California, Irvine) ......................... G9I Sat PM
LeBuffe, Michael (Texas A&M University) .................................... 10H Sat AM
Lee, Alex (University of Colorado, Boulder) ................................ G9D Sat PM
Lee, Geoffrey (University of California, Berkeley) ....................... 12B Sat PM
Lee, Steven P. (Hobart and William Smith Colleges) ....................... 6G Thu PM
Leland, Robert (R.I.) (Stanford University) .................................. 4K Thu AM
Lemetti, Juhana (University of Helsinki) .................................... G5A Thu PM
Lenard, Patti (University of Ottawa) .......................................... 10F Sat AM
Lennertz, Benjamin (University of Southern California) ........... 1G Wed AM
Leon, Felipe (University of California, Riverside) ....................... 4E Thu AM
Leonard, Matt (University of California, Davis) ......................... 3H Wed PM
Lewis, Karen (Barnard College) ..................................................... 11I Sat PM
Li, Elizabeth Woo (Peking University) ......................................... G10A Sat PM
Liao, S. Matthew (New York University) ...................................... 1A Wed AM
Liberman, Alida (University of Southern California) .................. 7J Fri AM
Liebesman, David (Boston University) .......................................... 4H Thu AM
Lightfield, Ceth (University of California, Davis) ....................... 1E Wed AM
Limanowski, Alex (Tulane University of New Orleans) ............... G5H Thu PM
Lindsey, Harry van der (Butler University) ................................. 1A Wed PM
Lindsay, Jamie (The Graduate Center, CUNY) .............................. 12J Sat PM
Littlejohn, Clayton (King’s College London) ............................... 10B Sat AM
Lockwood, Jeffrey (University of Wyoming) .............................. G9D Sat PM
Loewenstein, Yael (University of Arizona) .................................... 3J Wed PM
LoLordo, Antonia (University of Virginia) ................................... 5A Thu PM
Lombrozo, Tania (University of California, Berkeley) ............... G2B Wed PM
Long, Roderick (Auburn University) .......................................... G2E Wed PM
Longworth, Guy (Warwick University) ........................................ 5G Thu PM
Lopez De Sa, Dan (LOGOS Barcelona) ........................................... 1F Wed AM
Loy, Hui-Chieh (National University of Singapore) ...................... 11G Sat PM, G5B Thu PM, G7C Fri PM
Lu, Pin-Fei (Taipei Medical University) ..................................... 9I Fri PM
Lu-Adler, Huaping (Georgetown University) ............................... 10J Sat AM
Lucey, Kenneth (University of Nevada, Reno) ............................. 8G Fri PM
Ludlow, Peter (Northwestern University) ................................. 11D Sat PM
Ludwig, Kirk (Indiana University, Bloomington) ......................... 1G Wed AM
Lynch, Joseph J. (California Polytechnic State University) .................................................G2J Wed PM, 7I Fri AM, G7L Fri PM
Lyons, Jack (University of Arkansas) ..................................................11C Sat PM
Löhner, Guido (Universität Erfurt) ..................................................G5I Thu PM

M
Ma, Victor (San Francisco State University) ..................12B Sat PM
MacFarlane, John (University of California, Berkeley) ........3K Wed PM
Macleod, Alistair M. (Queen’s University) ..................8L Fri PM
Macleod, Colin (University of Victoria) ..................11H Sat PM
Madva, Alex (University of California, Berkeley) ..........10K Sat AM
Maeir, Don (Independent Scholar) ..................................G9D Sat PM
Maibom, Heidi (Carleton University) ..........................3C Wed PM
Maine, Edward (California State University, Fullerton) ....7I Fri AM
Maitra, Ishani (University of Michigan) ..................6C Thu PM
Makin, Mark (University of California, Irvine) ..........10I Sat AM
Makkreel, Rudolf (Emory University) ..................G5E Thu PM
Malngren, Anna-Sara (Stanford University) ..................8D Fri PM
Malone-France, Derek (George Washington University) .................................................G7M Fri PM, 12E Sat PM

Manchak, John (University of Washington) ..................12G Sat PM
Manley, David (University of Michigan) ..................11I Sat PM
Manning, Luke (Independent Scholar) ..................11L Sat PM
Manning, Rita (San Jose State University) ..................2H Wed PM
Marcus, Russell (Hamilton College) ..................2J Wed PM
Markosian, Ned (Western Washington University) ...11L Sat PM
Marler, Grant A. (Claremont Graduate University) ....2J Wed PM
Marmodoro, Anna (Oxford University) ..................10I Sat AM
Marmysz, John (College of Marin) ..................11K Sat PM
Marquis, Don (University of Kansas) ..................1A Wed AM
Martin, Noel (University of California, San Diego) ....1G Wed AM
Martins, Rafael (University of Kansas) ..................12E Sat PM
Marusic, Jennifer S. (Brandeis University) ..............1E Wed AM
Marušić, Berislav (Brandeis University) ..................8E Fri PM
Masrour, Farid (Harvard University) ..................2D Wed PM
Massescar, Aaron (University of Western Ontario) .......G9M Sat PM
Masto, Meghan (Lafayette College) ..................7H Fri AM
Matey, Jennifer J. (Florida International University) ......9G Fri PM
Mathiesen, Kay (University of Arizona) ..................10K Sat AM
McAfee, Noëlle (Emory University) ..................G9J Sat PM
McAleer, Sean (University of Wisconsin, Eau Claire) ..........................6E Thu PM, G7C Fri PM
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Affiliation and University</th>
<th>Meeting Dates</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>McAninch, Andrew</td>
<td>Illinois Wesleyan University</td>
<td>1JWed AM</td>
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<tr>
<td>McCall, Corey</td>
<td>Elmira College</td>
<td>6IThu PM</td>
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<tr>
<td>McCord Adams, Marilyn</td>
<td>University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill</td>
<td>2FWed PM</td>
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<td>McCreary, Mark</td>
<td>Kirkwood Community College</td>
<td>G5DThu PM</td>
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<td>McCumber, John</td>
<td>University of California, Los Angeles</td>
<td>G2GWed PM, 10L Sat AM</td>
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<td>McDaniel, Kris</td>
<td>Syracuse University</td>
<td>7CFri AM</td>
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<td>McDermott, Robert</td>
<td>California Institute of Integral Studies</td>
<td>G5CThu PM</td>
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<td>McGrath, Matthew</td>
<td>University of Missouri</td>
<td>G2BWed PM, 9BFri PM</td>
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<td>McEntosh, Jill</td>
<td>Simon Fraser University</td>
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<td>McKeen, Catherine</td>
<td>Williams College</td>
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<td>McKenna, Michael</td>
<td>University of Arizona</td>
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<td>McKinney, Rachel</td>
<td>The Graduate Center, CUNY</td>
<td>1FWed AM</td>
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<td>McKinnon, Rachel</td>
<td>University of Waterloo</td>
<td>G7FRI PM, 12DSat PM</td>
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<td>McLaughlin, Brian</td>
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<td>California State University, Northridge</td>
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<td>McPartland, Keith</td>
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<td>McRae, Emily</td>
<td>University of Oklahoma</td>
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<td>McWhirter, Gregory</td>
<td>University of California, Irvine</td>
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<td>Meier, Sarah</td>
<td>Emory University</td>
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<td>Meketa, Irina</td>
<td>Boston University</td>
<td>3LWed PM</td>
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<td>Mele, Alfred</td>
<td>Florida State University</td>
<td>G5IThu PM, 11ESat PM</td>
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<td>Mendell, Henry</td>
<td>California State University, Los Angeles</td>
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<td>Mendelovici, Angela</td>
<td>University of Western Ontario</td>
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<td>Mendoza, Jose Jorge</td>
<td>Worcester State College</td>
<td>G5AThu PM, 9FGSat PM</td>
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<td>Menzel, Paul</td>
<td>Pacific Lutheran University</td>
<td>8IFri PM</td>
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<td>Merli, David</td>
<td>Franklin &amp; Marshall College</td>
<td>6DThu PM</td>
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<tr>
<td>Merry, Michael</td>
<td>Universiteit van Amsterdam</td>
<td>10MSat AM</td>
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<tr>
<td>Metcalf, Robert</td>
<td>University of Colorado, Denver</td>
<td>G6BThu PM</td>
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<td>Metcalf, Thomas</td>
<td>University of Colorado, Boulder</td>
<td>11LSat PM</td>
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<td>Meyer, Ulrich</td>
<td>Colgate University</td>
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<td>Michaelson, Eliot</td>
<td>University of California, Los Angeles</td>
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<td>Mickey, Sam</td>
<td>University of San Francisco</td>
<td>G7IFri PM</td>
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<td>Migotti, Mark</td>
<td>University of Calgary</td>
<td>8IFri PM, G7IFri PM</td>
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<tr>
<td>Milam, Per-Erik</td>
<td>University of California, San Diego</td>
<td>1LWed AM</td>
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<td>Miles, Jack</td>
<td>University of California, Irvine</td>
<td>7DFri AM</td>
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<tr>
<td>Miller, Christian</td>
<td>Wake Forest University</td>
<td>4JThu AM</td>
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<tr>
<td>Miller, Jerry</td>
<td>Haverford College</td>
<td>10K Sat AM</td>
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Miller, Richard W. (Cornell University) .............................. 1C Wed AM
Miller-Young, Mireille (University of California, Santa Barbara)
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Millikan, Ruth Garrett (University of Connecticut) .............. G1C Wed PM, 5C Thu PM
Mills, Charles (Northwestern University) ......................... G1C Wed PM, 5C Thu PM
Millstein, Roberta L. (University of California, Davis) ....... 8F Fri PM
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Mitchell-Yellin, Benjamin (University of California, Riverside).... 2G Wed PM
Moffett, Marc (University of Wyoming) ............................ 3I Wed PM
Mohr Lone, Jana (University of Washington) ...... 6M Thu PM, G4A Thu PM
Moland, Lydia (Colby College) ........................................ G9H Sat PM
Mollison, James (Loyola Marymount University) .................... G7J Fri PM
Molyneux, Bernard (University of California, Davis) ........... 3G Wed PM
Montemayor, Carlos (San Francisco State University) .......... 8H Fri PM
Montgomery, Jen (San Francisco State University) .............. 6H Thu PM
Montminy, Martin (University of Oklahoma) ....................... 2I Wed PM
Moore, Margaret (University of Tennessee) ......................... 10L Sat AM
Moore, Ronald (University of Washington) ................. G8B Sat PM
Moran, Kate (Brandeis University) .................................. 1B Wed AM
Morin, Marie-Eve (University of Alberta) .......................... G7O Fri PM
Morris, Randall (William Jewell College) ......................... 10M Sat AM
Morrissey, Clair (Occidental College) ............................. 2H Wed PM
Morrisson, Iain (University of Houston) ....................... 10J Sat AM
Morse, Donald J. (Webster University) ............................... G2G Wed PM
Mourelatos, Alexander P. D. (University of Texas at Austin) .... G1B Wed PM
Mowad, Nicholas (Independent Scholar) ......................... G9H Sat PM
Mower, Gordon B. (Brigham Young University) ................. G7C Fri PM
Moyer, Mark (University of Vermont) ................................ 11L Sat PM
Muchnik, Pablo (Emerson College) ................................. G7E Fri PM
Mun, Cecilea (Clemson University) ................................. 7K Fri AM
Murphy, Ann V. (University of New Mexico) ....................... G7N Fri PM
Murray, Dylan (University of California, Berkeley) ............ G2B Wed PM
Murray, Michael (The John Templeton Foundation) .......... 5M Thu PM
Myrvold, Wayne (University of Western Ontario) ............... 2E Wed PM

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Nailer, Timothy (University of Adelaide) ......................... Posters Fri
Nair, Shyam (University of Southern California) ................. 8H Fri PM
Naqvi, Erum (Temple University) .................................. 10L Sat AM
Nash, Nick (University of Wisconsin, Milwaukee) ............. 6J Thu PM
Nason, Shannon (Loyola Marymount University) ..................... G5D Thu PM
Nathan, Marco J. (University of Denver) ........................................ G9K Sat PM
Naticchia, Chris (California State University, San Bernardino) ...... G9B Sat PM
Neale, Stephen (The Graduate Center, CUNY) ......................... G2K Wed PM
Nelkin, Dana Kay (University of California, San Diego) .............. 7B Fri AM
Nelson, Eric S. (University of Massachusetts, Lowell) ............. 4M Thu AM
Neta, Ram (University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill) .......... 8A Fri PM
Neufeld, Blain (University of Wisconsin, Milwaukee) .............. 2G Wed PM
Ng, Karen (Siena College) ............................................................ G9H Sat PM
Nichols, Shaun (University of Arizona) ................................. G2B Wed PM
Nijssen, Ties (Springer Verlag) ...................................................... G7D Fri PM
Nirshberg, Gregory (University of Texas at El Paso) ................. 7J Fri AM
Nolan, Daniel (Australian National University) ....................... 10E Sat AM
Norcross, Alastair (University of Colorado, Boulder) .............. 6L Thu PM, G5L Thu PM, 8I Fri PM
Normore, Calvin (University of California, Los Angeles) ........... 7C Fri AM
Norris, Trevor (University of Toronto) ........................................ 6M Thu PM
Novakovic, Andreja (College of William and Mary) .................. G9H Sat PM
Nunan, Richard (College of Charleston) ...................................... G2I Wed PM, 6L Thu PM, G7J Fri PM
Nunberg, Geoff (University of California, Berkeley) ................. 5I Thu PM
Nuyen, Anh Tuan (National University of Singapore) ............... G5B Thu PM, G7C Fri PM
Nye, Howard (University of Alberta) ......................................... 3F Wed PM

O

O'Dowd, Ornaith (College of Charleston) .................................. 2H Wed PM
O'Shea, Tom (University of Essex) ............................................. 4J Thu AM
O'Sullivan, Brendan (Stonehill College) ..................................... 9G Fri PM
Obdrzalek, Suzanne (Claremont McKenna College) ................. 4C Thu AM
Oberrieder, Matthew (Rogers State University) ....................... G5H Thu PM
Oddie, Graham (University of Colorado, Boulder) .................... 2E Wed PM
Odenbaugh, Jay (Lewis & Clark College) ................................... 8B Fri PM
Odwowaz-Sypniewska, Joanna (Uniwersytet Warszawski) .......... 1G Wed AM
Oh, Jea Sophia (Brooklyn College) ........................................... G7M Fri PM
Olson, Alan M. (Boston University) .......................................... G7D Fri PM
Oluwagbemi-Jacob, Dorothy (University of Calabar) ............... G5B Thu PM
Orosco, José-Antonio (Oregon State University) ...................... G9F Sat PM
Orozco, Joshue (Whitworth University) .................................... G3B Wed PM
Osborne, Philip (Purdue University) ........................................ 2I Wed PM
Oshana, Marina (University of California, Davis) ................... 9K Fri PM
Oxley, Julina (Coastal Carolina University) .............................. 2L Wed PM
Pahl, Katrin (Johns Hopkins University) .................................................. G2G Wed PM
Paleologou, Maria (California State University, Bakersfield) ....... 9L Fri PM
Palmquist, Stephen (Hong Kong Baptist University) ................. 1L Wed AM
Panagopoulos, Anastasia (Minnesota State University, Mankato)
........................................................................................................ 3G Wed PM
Papineau, David (King’s College London) ....................................... 12L Sat PM
Parent, Ted (Virginia Tech) ................................................................. 3E Wed PM
Park, Dong-Sik (Claremont Graduate University) ....................... G7M Fri PM
Parsons, Terence (University of California, Los Angeles) .......... Fri PM
Pascoe, Jordan (Manhattan College) ............................................... 7K Fri AM
Pasnau, Robert (University of Colorado, Boulder) ................. 7C Fri AM
Pasternack, Lawrence (Oklahoma State University) ............... G5E Wed PM
Patton, Paul (University of New South Wales) ......................... 2A Wed PM
Paul, Sarah (University of Wisconsin, Madison) ....................... 1G5I Thu PM
Pautz, Adam (University of Texas at Austin) .............................. 4I Thu AM
Payne, W. Russ (Bellevue College) ............................................... 10I Sat AM
Pearlberg, Daniel (Ohio State University) ................................. 1E Wed AM
Pedersen, Johnnie (University of California, Davis) ............... 1J Wed AM
Pedersen, Nikolaj Jang (Yonsei University) ......................... 3H Wed PM
Pelham, Judy (York University) ...................................................... 7G Fri AM
Pereboom, Derk (Cornell University) .......................... G2B Wed PM
Perl, Caleb (University of Southern California) ................. 3K Wed PM
Perry, Alexandra (Bergen Community College) .................. 11J Sat PM
Persad, Govind (Stanford University) ........................................ 6G Thu PM
Peschard, Isabelle (San Francisco State University) .......... 4I Thu AM
Peterman, Alison (University of Rochester) ..................... 4H Thu AM
Pettit, Philip (Princeton University and Australian National University)
........................................................................................................ 5A Thu PM, 7E Fri AM
Phelan, Mark (Lawrence University) ........................................ 5L Thu PM
Phillips, Jonathan (Yale University) ........................................... G2B Wed PM
Pickavé, Martin (University of Toronto) ...................................... 4F Thu AM
Pilchman, Daniel (University of California, Irvine) .......... 1L Wed AM
Pincione, Guido (University of Arizona) ................................. 2B Wed PM
Pincock, Christopher (Ohio State University) .................................. 5B Thu PM
Pinillos, Angel (Arizona State University) .............................. 6A Thu PM
Pinkard, Terry (Georgetown University) ..................................... 2C Wed PM
Pistone, Paul (Talbot School of Theology) ..................... 8J Fri PM
Pitt, David (California State University, Los Angeles) .......... 7F Fri AM
Pogge, Thomas (Yale University) ................................................ 8L Fri PM
Poggiani, Francesco (Pennsylvania State University) ........... G5C Thu PM
Poland, John (University of Wyoming) ............................................. 7L Fri AM
Polger, Thomas W. (University of Cincinnati) .................................. 9J Fri PM
Polite, Brandon (Knox College) ...................................................... 10L Sat AM
Pooley, Oliver (Oxford University) ................................................. G7G Fri PM
Poore, Gregory S. (Baylor University) .............................................. 9H Fri PM
Portmore, Douglas (Arizona State University) ................................. 7A Fri AM
Potochnik, Angela (University of Cincinnati) .................................. 9D Fri PM
Potts, Christopher (Stanford University) .......................................... 5I Thu PM
Powell, John W. (Humboldt State University) ................................... G7F Fri PM
Powell, Lewis (University at Buffalo) .............................................. 3E Wed PM, G7A Fri PM
Powell, Russell (Boston University) .................................................. 1K Wed AM
Powers, Thomas M. (University of Delaware) ................................... 7H Fri AM
Pratt, Scott L. (University of Oregon) ............................................. G5C Thu PM
Presbey, Gail M. (University of Detroit, Mercy) ................................ G7I Fri PM
Purves, Duncan (University of Colorado, Boulder) ......................... 11J Sat PM
Pynn, Geoff (Northern Illinois University) ....................................... 12D Sat PM

Q
Qian, Lin (University of Washington) .............................................. G7I Fri PM
Quante, Michael (Westfälische Wilhelms-Universität Münster) ....... 4A Thu AM
Quiring, John (Victor Valley College) .............................................. G4C Thu PM, G7M Fri PM

R
Rabinow, Paul (University of California, Berkeley) ......................... G9J Sat PM
Rae, Scott (Biola University) ....................................................... G3A Wed PM
Raffoul, Francois (Louisiana State University) ................................. G7O Fri PM
Ragland, Scott (Saint Louis University) ........................................... 6F Thu PM
Raibley, Jason (California State University, Long Beach) ............ 11J Sat PM
Railton, Peter (University of Michigan) .......................................... 8E Fri PM
Ramal, Randy (Claremont Graduate University) ... G4C Thu PM, G7M Fri PM
Raphals, Lisa (National University of Singapore) .......................... 11G Sat PM
Rasmussen, Joshua (Azusa Pacific University) ............................... 11 Wed AM
Rattan, Gurpreet (University of Toronto) ....................................... 9G Fri PM
Raven, Michael J. (University of Victoria) ..................................... 10I Sat AM
Rayo, Agustin (Massachusetts Institute of Technology) .................. 5D Thu PM
Reath, Andrews (University of California, Riverside) .................... 3A Wed PM
Redding, Paul (University of Sydney) ............................................. 10J Sat AM
Reed, Michael (Eastern Michigan University) ................................. 11J Sat PM
Reed-Sandoval, Amy (University of Washington) ......................... 8I Fri PM
Reich, Rob (Stanford University) .................................................. 8L Fri PM
Rettler, Bradley (University of Notre Dame) ................................. 5K Thu PM
Reyes, Herminia (San Diego State University) ........................................... 4K Thu AM
Rhodes, Rosamond (Mount Sinai School of Medicine and
The Graduate Center, CUNY) ............................................................... G5A Thu PM
Rhodes, Ryan Indy (University of Oklahoma) ...................................... 7H Fri AM
Rice, Rebekah L. H. (Seattle Pacific University) ............................... 1H Wed AM
Richard, Mark (Harvard University) .................................................... 5D Thu PM
Rickless, Samuel (University of California, San Diego) ................... 5A Thu PM
Rickus, Katherine (Marquette University) .......................................... 8G Fri PM
Risse, Mathias (Harvard University) ................................................... 10F Sat AM
Roark, Eric (Millikin University) ..................................................... G2E Wed PM
Roberts, Bryan W. (University of Southern California) .................... 6K Thu PM
Roberts, Jean (University of Washington) ........................................ 10K Sat AM
Roberts, Melinda A. (The College of New Jersey) .......................... 3F Wed PM, 7M Fri AM
Roberts, Stephen (San Francisco State University) .......................... 8B Fri PM
Robins, Dan (University of Hong Kong) ........................................... 11G Sat PM
Robins, Sarah (University of Texas at El Paso) ............................... 11E Sat PM
Robinson, Jenefer (University of Cincinnati) ................................. 10L Sat AM, G8B Sat PM
Robinson, Michael (Grand Valley State University) ....................... 1H Wed AM
Roe, Sarah (University of California, Davis) .................................... 1E Wed AM
Roland, Jeffrey (Louisiana State University) ..................................... 5K Thu PM
Romaya, Bassam (University of Massachusetts, Lowell) ...................... G1A Wed PM, G4B Thu PM
Ronzoni, Miriam (Technische Universität Darmstadt) ........................ 11B Sat PM
Rosenthal, Michael (University of Washington) ............................. 10H Sat AM
Rosner, Mark (Queen’s University) ................................................... 2G Wed PM
Ross, Andrew Peter (Queen’s University) ....................................... 7H Fri AM
Ross, Glenn (Franklin & Marshall College) ....................................... 9J Fri PM
Ross, Peter (California State Polytechnic University, Pomona) .......... 12L Sat PM
Rossi, Philip J. (Marquette University) ............................................. 1G5E Thu PM
Roth, Paul A. (University of California, Santa Cruz) ....................... G5J Thu PM
Rottschaefel, William A. (Lewis & Clark College) .......................... 11 Wed AM
Rowlands, Mark (University of Miami) .......................................... G7L Fri PM, 10D Sat AM
Rozeboom, Grant J. (Stanford University) ....................................... 10G Sat AM
Rozemond, Marleen (University of Toronto) .................................... 7C Fri AM
Rudd, Anthony (St. Olaf College) ................................................. 12D Sat PM
Rueger, Alex (University of Alberta) .............................................. 10J Sat AM
Ruiz de Olano, Pablo (University of Notre Dame) ............................ 6K Thu PM
Rump, Jacob (Emory University) .................................................... 11K Sat PM
Rupert, Robert (University of Colorado, Boulder) ......................... 2D Wed PM
Russell, Gillian (Washington University in St. Louis) ..................... 3B Wed PM
Russell, Paul (University of British Columbia) ............................... 9A Fri PM
Main and Group Meeting Participants

Rutherford, Donald (University of California, San Diego) .......... 10H Sat AM
Rychter, Pablo (Universitat de València) .......................................4H Thu AM
Ryckman, Thomas (Stanford University) ......................................5B Thu PM
Rysiew, Patrick (University of Victoria)............................................ 9H Fri PM
Sadler, Brook (University of South Florida)............................. 6H Thu PM
Saenz, Noel (University of Colorado, Boulder) .4H Thu AM
Sager, Alex (Portland State University) .......................................10F Sat AM
Saidel, Eric (George Washington University)............................ 9G Fri PM
Sainsbury, Mark (University of Texas at Austin).......................... 5D Thu PM
Salamon, Gayle (Princeton University) ..................................G7N Fri PM
Salkin, Wendy (Harvard University and Stanford University) ....1F Wed AM
Salzman, Judy (California Polytechnic State University) ....G2J Wed PM
Sandis, Constantine (Oxford Brookes University)....................G5J Thu PM
Sanford, David (Duke University) .............................................9M Fri PM
Santorio, Paolo (University of Leeds) ......................................... 2J Wed PM
Saralegui, Miguel (Universidad de La Sabana) .........................G9B Sat PM
Sarkar, Sahotra (University of Texas at Austin) ......................... 8B Fri PM
Sattler, Barbara M. (Yale University) ...........................................4C Thu AM
Satz, Debra (Stanford University) ...........................................10A Sat AM
Savage, Heidi (SUNY Geneseo) ...................................................8H Fri PM
Savitt, Steven (University of British Columbia) .........................12G Sat PM
Sawicki, Jana (Williams College) ...............................................9I Fri PM
Sayadmansour, Alireza (Independent Scholar) .........................7H Fri AM
Schafer, Karl (University of Pittsburgh) ..................................G7A Fri PM
Schaff, Kory (Occidental College) ..........................................G5K Thu PM
Schaffer, Jonathan (Rutgers University) ................................G2B Wed PM
Schapiro, Tamar (Stanford University) .......................................3A Wed PM
Schemmel, Christian (Goethe-Universität Frankfurt) ...............6G Thu PM
Scherkoske, Greg (Dalhousie University) ..................................12E Sat PM
Schiller, Aaron (Santa Clara University) .................................G6C Thu PM
Schneider, Daniel (University of Wisconsin, Madison) ..........4H Thu AM
Schneider, Henrique (Karl-Franzens-Universität Graz)...........G5B Thu PM
Schroer, Robert (University of Minnesota, Duluth) .................4I Thu AM
Schroeter, Laura (University of Melbourne) .....................................8A Fri PM
Schubert, Richard (Cosumnes River College) ......G2J Wed PM, G7L Fri PM
Schueler, Fred (University of Delaware) ..................................1J Wed AM
Schulz, Reinhard (Carl von Ossietzky Universität Oldenburg)..... G7D Fri PM
Schwartz, Robert (University of Wisconsin, Milwaukee) ............12L Sat PM
Seacord, Beth (University of Colorado, Boulder) .........................2F Wed PM
Seeley, William P. (Bates College) .................................................10L Sat AM
Sehon, Scott (Bowdoin College) ......................................................G5I Thu PM
Semenyizyn, Nola (Franklin & Marshall College) .........................11L Sat PM
Seok, Bongrae (Alvernia University) ..............................................G6A Thu PM
Shabo, Seth (University of Delaware) ............................................3J Wed PM
Shadd, Philip (Queen’s University) ...............................................6G Thu PM
Shafer-Landau, Russ (University of Wisconsin, Madison).............11 Wed AM
Shahar, Dan (University of Arizona) ..............................................6H Thu PM
Shapiro, Lisa (Simon Fraser University) .....................................10H Sat AM
Sharadin, Nathaniel (University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill) .................................................................1J Wed AM
Shear, Ted (University of California, Davis) ..................................3I Wed PM
Shepherd, Joshua (Florida State University) ..................................9F Fri PM
Sher, George (Rice University) ......................................................7B Fri AM
Sherman, Brett (University of Rochester) .....................................12E Sat PM
Shieber, Joseph (Lafayette College) ..............................................2I Wed PM
Shier, David (Washington State University) ..................................12F Sat PM
Shim, Michael (California State University, Los Angeles) .............6B Thu PM, G9I Sat PM
Shin, Albert (University of California, Santa Barbara) ..................7J Fri AM
Shockley, Kenneth (University at Buffalo) ....................................G9D Sat PM
Shoemaker, David (Tulane University of New Orleans) .................11E Sat PM
Shotwell, Alexis (Carleton University) .........................................6L Thu PM
Shriver, Adam (Washington University in St. Louis) .................2F Wed PM
Siakel, Daniel R. (University of California, Irvine) ......................G7M Fri PM
Siemon, Rosalie (Loyola Marymount University) .........................12I Sat PM
Siewert, Charles (Rice University) ..............................................7F Fri AM
Silva, Grant J. (Marquette University) ..........................................3D Wed PM, G9F Sat PM
Silvers, Anita (San Francisco State University) .........................4L Thu AM, 8F Fri PM
Sim, May (College of the Holy Cross) ...........................................G5B Thu PM, G7C Fri PM, G10A Sat PM
Simon, Adam (Stanford University) ..............................................5I Thu PM
Simon, Jonathan (Australian National University) .......................6D Thu PM
Simoniti, Vid (Oxford University) ...............................................G7J Fri PM
Sinnott-Armstrong, Walter (Duke University) ...............................11E Sat PM
Sirkel, Riin (University of Alberta) ...............................................8K Fri PM
Skiles, Alexander (Université de Genève) .....................................10I Sat AM
Skodo, Admir (University of California, Berkeley) .................G9L Sat PM
Skoog, Kim (University of Guam) .................................................G5F Thu PM
Skow, Bradford (Massachusetts Institute of Technology) ...........G7G Fri PM
Slater, Matthew H. (Bucknell University) .....................................8F Fri PM
Slote, Michael (University of Miami)................................. G2L Wed PM
Sluga, Hans (University of California, Berkeley).........................G5J Thu PM
Smith, Basil (Saddleback College)...... 2M Wed PM, 8M Fri PM, 12H Sat PM
Smith, Chris (Wake Forest University)........................................9M Fri PM
Smith, Daniel W. (Purdue University)........................................2A Wed PM
Smith, David Woodruff (University of California, Irvine)...........G9I Sat PM
Smith, Holly M. (Rutgers University)........................................7B Fri AM
Smith, Michael (Princeton University)......................................7E Fri AM
Smith, Nicholas D. (Lewis & Clark College)............................12M Sat PM
Smith, Olav (Empirical Magazine) ...........................................G4C Thu PM
Smith, William (University of Notre Dame and Emory University)
..........................................................................................10K Sat AM
Smithies, Declan (Ohio State University)....................................7F Fri AM
Smothers, Cinzia (Bowling Green State University)......................7J Fri AM
Snapper, Jeff (University of Notre Dame)..................................2J Wed PM
Snow, Nancy E. (Marquette University)......................................10M Sat AM
Soll, Ivan (University of Wisconsin, Madison)..........................G2F Wed PM
Song, Sarah (University of California, Berkeley)......................11A Sat PM
Song, Yu-jia (University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill)......... 6F Thu PM
Sosa, David (University of Texas at Austin).............................10B Sat AM
Sparrow, Rob (Monash University)...........................................11F Sat PM
Speak, Daniel (Loyola Marymount University).............................8G Fri PM
Spear, Andrew D. (Grand Valley State University)......................2I Wed PM
Specker Sullivan, Laura (University of Hawaii at Manoa).........G7J Fri PM
Spencer III, Albert (Portland State University).........................G2H Wed PM, G9J Sat PM
Spencer, Quayshawn (University of San Francisco)....................9D Fri PM
Sperry, Elizabeth (William Jewell College)..............................11J Sat PM
Sreedhar, Susanne (Boston University).................................1C Wed AM
Staffel, Julia (University of Southern California).....................12K Sat PM
Stainton, Robert (University of Western Ontario).....................3E Wed PM
Staley, Kent (Saint Louis University).......................................3L Wed PM
Stangl, Rebecca Lynn (University of Virginia).........................2H Wed PM
Stanley, Jason (Rutgers University).........................................8A Fri PM
Star, Daniel (Boston University)..............................................7A Fri AM
Steel, Daniel (Michigan State University).................................7I Fri AM
Stein, Joshua D. (New York University)..................................G2J Wed PM
Stein, Nathanael (Florida State University)................................1E Wed AM
Steinberg, Diane (Cleveland State University).........................6J Thu PM
Stephens, Christopher (University of British Columbia).............2K Wed PM
Sterba, James P. (University of Notre Dame)............................1C Wed AM
Stern, Reuben (University of Wisconsin, Madison)....................2K Wed PM
<table>
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<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Institution</th>
<th>Day</th>
<th>Time</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Stojanovic, Isidora</td>
<td>Universitat Pompeu Fabra</td>
<td>11I</td>
<td>Sat PM</td>
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<td>Stojanovic, Pavle</td>
<td>Johns Hopkins University</td>
<td>9L</td>
<td>Fri PM</td>
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<td>Stolorow, Ben</td>
<td>Independent Scholar</td>
<td>5F</td>
<td>Thu PM</td>
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<td>Stolorow, Robert</td>
<td>University of California, Los Angeles</td>
<td>5F</td>
<td>Thu PM</td>
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<td>Stone, Brad Elliott</td>
<td>Loyola Marymount University</td>
<td>12C</td>
<td>Sat PM, G9J Sat PM</td>
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<td>Stotts, Megan Henricks</td>
<td>University of California, Riverside</td>
<td>8H</td>
<td>Fri PM</td>
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<td>Stradella, Alessandra</td>
<td>SUNY Oneonta</td>
<td>G2I</td>
<td>Wed PM</td>
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<td>Stráehle, Christine</td>
<td>University of Ottawa</td>
<td>11H</td>
<td>Sat PM</td>
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<td>Strawser, Bradley J</td>
<td>Naval Postgraduate School</td>
<td>1L</td>
<td>Wed AM</td>
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<td>Stroud, Barry</td>
<td>University of California, Berkeley</td>
<td>4D</td>
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<td>Stroud, Sarah</td>
<td>McGill University</td>
<td>5J</td>
<td>Thu PM</td>
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<td>Stueber, Karsten</td>
<td>College of the Holy Cross</td>
<td>G5J</td>
<td>Thu PM</td>
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<td>Stump, David</td>
<td>University of San Francisco</td>
<td>9D</td>
<td>Fri PM</td>
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<td>Sturr, Chris</td>
<td>Harvard University</td>
<td>5H</td>
<td>Thu PM</td>
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<td>Sullins, John P.</td>
<td>Sonoma State University</td>
<td>G9E</td>
<td>Sat PM</td>
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<td>Summers, Jesse</td>
<td>Duke University</td>
<td>11E</td>
<td>Sat PM</td>
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<td>Sumner, Wayne</td>
<td>University of Toronto</td>
<td>1A</td>
<td>Wed AM</td>
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<td>Sun, Weimin</td>
<td>California State University, Northridge</td>
<td>12K</td>
<td>Sat PM, G10A Sat PM</td>
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<td>Sung, Winnie</td>
<td>University College London</td>
<td>G6A</td>
<td>Thu PM</td>
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<td>Sussman, David</td>
<td>University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign</td>
<td>1B</td>
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<td>Sveinsdottir, Asta</td>
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<td>5C</td>
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<td>Swanton, Christine</td>
<td>University of Auckland</td>
<td>4G</td>
<td>Thu AM</td>
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<td>Swenson, Adam</td>
<td>California State University, Northridge</td>
<td>2G</td>
<td>Wed PM</td>
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<td>Swift, Paul A.</td>
<td>Bryant University</td>
<td>G2J</td>
<td>Wed PM, G7L Fri PM</td>
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<td>Sylvan, Kurt</td>
<td>Rutgers University</td>
<td>5L</td>
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<td>Sánchez, Carlos Alberto</td>
<td>San Jose State University</td>
<td>G9F</td>
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<td>Talbert, Matthew</td>
<td>West Virginia University</td>
<td>9K</td>
<td>Fri PM</td>
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<td>Talbot, Brian</td>
<td>University of Colorado, Boulder</td>
<td>7L</td>
<td>Fri AM</td>
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<td>Talbott, William J.</td>
<td>University of Washington</td>
<td>1C</td>
<td>Wed AM</td>
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<td>Talisse, Robert</td>
<td>Vanderbilt University</td>
<td>G5A</td>
<td>Thu PM, 11A Sat PM</td>
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<td>Talsma, Tina</td>
<td>Florida State University</td>
<td>4J</td>
<td>Thu AM</td>
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<td>Tampio, Nicholas</td>
<td>Fordham University</td>
<td>2A</td>
<td>Wed PM</td>
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<tr>
<td>Tan, Peter</td>
<td>Mount St. Mary’s College</td>
<td>G4A</td>
<td>Thu PM</td>
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<td>Tang, Hao</td>
<td>Wuhan University</td>
<td>G7F</td>
<td>Fri PM, 12F Sat PM</td>
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<td>Tannenbaum, Julie</td>
<td>Pomona College</td>
<td>3A</td>
<td>Wed PM</td>
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<tr>
<td>Taylor, Jacqueline</td>
<td>University of San Francisco</td>
<td>1E</td>
<td>Wed AM</td>
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<tr>
<td>Taylor, Paul C.</td>
<td>Pennsylvania State University</td>
<td>12A</td>
<td>Sat PM</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Main and Group Meeting Participants

Teays, Wanda (Mount St. Mary’s College) .................................. G4A Thu PM
Teetzl, Sarah (University of Manitoba) .................................. G7B Fri PM
Teller, Paul (University of California, Davis) .............................. 12G Sat PM
Tenenbaum, Sergio (University of Toronto) .............................. 7A Fri AM
Tesn, Fernando (Florida State University) ................................. 11B Sat PM
Thomas, Anthony E. (Kishwaukee College) .............................. 2M Wed PM, 8M Fri PM
Thomason, Krista (Swarthmore College) ................................. 2L Wed PM, 10M Sat AM
Thompson, Brad (Southern Methodist University) ...................... 6B Thu PM
Thorsby, Mark (Lone Star College) .......................................... 2M Wed PM, 8M Fri PM
Tiboris, Michael (University of California, San Diego) .............. 11B Sat PM
Tierney, Hannah (University of Arizona) .................................. 1H Wed AM
Tillman, Chris (University of Manitoba) .................................... 2J Wed PM
Timpe, Kevin L. (Northwest Nazarene University) ...................... 7B Fri AM
Tomasi, John (Brown University) ........................................... 2B Wed PM
Torsen, Ingvild (Marquette University) ..................................... 11K Sat PM
Treonor, Nicholas (University of Edinburgh) ............................. 5G Thu PM
Tremain, Shelley (Independent Scholar) ................................... 9I Fri PM
Trivigno, Franco V. (Marquette University) .............................. 3F Wed PM, G1B Wed PM
Troy, Jeremy (University of Wyoming) ..................................... 3I Wed PM
Tu, Siwing (University of Texas at Austin) ................................ 5L Thu PM
Tu, Van (University of Colorado, Boulder) ................................ 9E Fri PM
Tubert, Ariela (University of Puget Sound) ................................ G2F Wed PM
Tuna, Emine Hande (University of Alberta) .............................. 10L Sat AM
Turner, P. Roger (University of Tennessee) ............................... 8G Fri PM
Turner, Piers Norris (Ohio State University) ............................. 3D Wed PM
Tye, Michael (University of Texas at Austin) ............................. 5D Thu PM
Tyson, Sarah (University of Colorado, Denver) ......................... 5H Thu PM

U

Urban, Charles M. (University of Arkansas) ............................. 9L Fri PM

V

Vaidya, Anand (San Jose State University) ............................... 4E Thu AM
Vallier, Kevin (Bowling Green State University) ....................... G2E Wed PM
Van Cleve, James (University of Southern California) .............. 9H Fri PM
Van Gulick, Robert (Syracuse University) ............................... 2D Wed PM
van Hees, Martin (Rijksuniversiteit Groningen) ......................... 10M Sat AM
van Wietmarschen, Han (Stanford University) ......................... 8E Fri PM
VandYke, Christina (Calvin College) ...................................... 8J Fri PM
Varden, Helga (University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign) ....... 4B Thu AM
Vargas, Manuel (University of San Francisco) ......................... 10K Sat AM
Varner, Gary (Texas A&M University) ............................ 2F Wed PM
Vasilyeva, Nadya (Brandeis University) ........................................ G9G Sat PM
Velasco, Joel (California Institute of Technology) ......................... 2K Wed PM
Vessey, David (Grand Valley State University) ........................... 6I Thu PM, G5C Thu PM
Viera, Gerardo (University of British Columbia) .......................... 6J Thu PM
Vineberg, Susan (Wayne State University) ................................. 9B Fri PM
Vision, Gerald (Temple University) ............................................ 11L Sat PM
Vita-More, Natasha (University of Plymouth) ............................. G9E Sat PM
Vlasits, Justin (University of California, Berkeley) ...................... 9L Fri PM
Vogelstein, Eric (Jefferson College of Health Sciences) ............... 8I Fri PM
Voice, Paul (Bennington College) ............................................. 7I Fri AM

W
Wagner, Michael (University of San Diego) .............................. 7I Fri AM
Wagnon, Daniel (San Jose State University) .............................. 9C Fri PM
Walker, Matthew (Yale-NUS College) ...................................... 6E Thu PM
Walker, Stephen C. (University of Chicago) ............................... 11G Sat PM
Wall, Steven (University of Arizona) ........................................ 2B Wed PM
Wallace, Megan (University of Kentucky) .................................. 2J Wed PM
Wallace, R. Jay (University of California, Berkeley) ................... 10G Sat AM
Waller, Sara (Montana State University) .................................... 3M Wed PM
Wallis, Charles (California State University, Long Beach) .......... 2I Wed PM
Walters, Gregory J. (Saint Paul University) ............................. G7D Fri PM, G9E Sat PM
Wang, Ellie Hua (National Chengchi University) ....................... G6A Thu PM
Wang, Kai (Beijing Normal University) .................................... G6A Thu PM
Warenski, Lisa (City College of New York) ............................... 9B Fri PM
Warmke, Brandon (University of Arizona) ............................... 6H Thu PM
Watkins, Eric (University of California, San Diego) ................. G5E Thu PM
Watson, Gary (University of Southern California) .................... 9K Fri PM
Watson, Lori (University of San Diego) .................................. G1C Wed PM
Waugh, Joanne (University of South Florida) ......................... 8C Fri PM
Wautischer, Helmut (Sonoma State University) ......................... G7D Fri PM
Wayne, Katherine (Queen’s University) .................................. 1K Wed AM
Wayne, Kathryn Ross (Western Washington University) .......... G2D Wed PM
Weber, Michael (Bowling Green State University) ................. 10M Sat AM
Webster, Aness (University of Southern California) ............... 10M Sat AM
Weisberg, Josh (University of Houston) .................................. 9F Fri PM
Wettstein, Howard (University of California, Riverside) ......... 7D Fri AM
White, Jennifer (San Francisco State University) .................... G5B Thu PM
Wible, Andy (Muskegon Community College) ......................... G4B Thu PM
Widerker, David (Bar-Ilan University) ................................... 3J Wed PM
Wilcox, Shelley (San Francisco State University) .................... 12A Sat PM
Williams, Neil (University at Buffalo)................................. 3H Wed PM
Williamson, Dan (San Jose State University).......................... 9C Fri PM
Wilson, Alex (Athabasca University) ....................................... 7L Fri AM
Wilson, Donald (Kansas State University) .................................. 4K Thu AM
Wilson, George (University of Southern California) ............. G5I Thu PM
Wilson, Joseph (University of Colorado, Boulder)............... 1I Wed AM
Wilson, Robert A. (University of Alberta) ................................. 11F Sat PM
Wilson, Yolonda (Duke University) ........................................ 6H Thu PM
Winfree, Jason (California State University, Stanislaus) ....... G7O Fri PM
Winkler, Kenneth (Yale University) ........................................ 5A Thu PM
Winnubst, Shannon (Ohio State University) .......................... 6I Thu PM, G7N Fri PM
Wolf, Jordan (University of California, Los Angeles) ........... 8G Fri PM
Wollner, Gabriel (London School of Economics) .................... 10A Sat AM
Wood, Allen (Indiana University, Bloomington) ... G7E Fri PM, 11M Sat PM
Wood, Brian (Harvard University) ........................................... 6M Thu PM
Wood, David (Vanderbilt University) ......................................... 11K Sat PM
Wood, Rega (Stanford University) ........................................... 7D Fri AM
Woods, John (University of Minnesota) ................................. 7L Fri AM
Workman, Marc (University of Alberta) ................................. 8F Fri PM
Wrathall, Mark (University of California, Riverside) ... 9N Fri PM, 12C Sat PM
Wright, Cory (California State University, Long Beach) ...... G9K Sat PM
Wu, Wayne (Carnegie Mellon University) .............................. 9F Fri PM
Wyatt, Jeremy (University of Connecticut) ............................ 3H Wed PM
Wyatt, Nicole (University of Calgary) ................................. 3B Wed PM, G7K Fri PM
Wüthrich, Christian (University of California, San Diego) .... G7G Fri PM

X
Xiao, Yang (Kenyon College) ................................................ G5B Thu PM

Y
Yaffe, Gideon (Yale University) ............................................ 5J Thu PM, 7M Fri AM
Yan, Leo (Brown University) ............................................... 1F Wed AM
Yap, Audrey (University of Victoria) ...................................... 7G Fri AM
Yeomans, Christopher (Purdue University) ......................... 4A Thu AM
Yi, Byeong-Uk (University of Toronto) ................................. 1H Wed AM
Yoshimi, Jeffrey (University of California, Merced) .......... G9I Sat PM
Young, Charles (Claremont Graduate University) ................... 8K Fri PM
Yrigoyen, Kyle (San Jose State University) ...................... 9C Fri PM
Yuan, Lijun (Texas State University, San Marcos) .... 1K Wed AM, G7C Fri PM

Z
Zach, Richard (University of Calgary) ................................. 5B Thu PM
Zagzebski, Linda (University of Oklahoma) ......................... 5G Thu PM
Zambrano, Alexander (University of Colorado, Boulder) ........ 3H Wed PM
Zangeneh, Hakhamanesh (California State University, Stanislaus)
...................................................................................................... G7O Fri PM
Zhai, Yitian (University at Buffalo) .................................... G10A Sat PM
Zhang, Ellen (Hong Kong Baptist University) ....................... G10A Sat PM
Zhao, Wenqing (City University of Hong Kong) ................. G6A Thu PM
Zinkin, Melissa (Binghamton University) ......................... 10L Sat AM
Zinn, Carmen (University of California, Santa Barbara) ........ 8G Fri PM
Zuradzki, Tomasz (Jagiellonian University) ....................... 1K Wed AM
Zynda, Lyle (Indiana University, South Bend) ..................... 12K Sat PM
ABSTRACTS

“CAN” AND THE CONSEQUENCE ARGUMENT
ALEX GRZANKOWSKI, UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS AT AUSTIN

In the free will debate, the consequence argument is a powerful incompatibilist argument for the conclusion that, under the assumption that determinism is true, what one does is what one must do. A major point of controversy between classical compatibilists and incompatibilists has been over the use of “can” in the argument. Many classical compatibilists have held that “can” should be analyzed as a conditional. But the debate reached a dialectical impasse. The present paper offers a new dialectical point of entry. By making use of Kratzer’s (1977) influential semantic work on “can” and “must,” it is argued that incompatibilists are in a position to offer a plausible, positive treatment of ‘can’ that, if adopted, validates the consequence argument.

...AND JUSTICE FOR ALL? RETHINKING THE RECIPROCITY OF THE VIRTUES IN THE REPUBLIC
S. SETH BORDNER, UNIVERSITY OF ALABAMA

Most scholars think that Plato holds the view in Republic that one is just (or brave, or temperate) if and only if one is also wise. Call this the Reciprocity Thesis (RT). Because Plato holds that only philosophers can be wise, he would seem to be committed to the view that only philosophers can be just. But then the perfectly just city is composed mostly of unjust persons. For several reasons, I will argue, this is an undesirable interpretation, but one that can be avoided. In this paper I push back against this interpretation of justice in Republic and the RT that supports.

A CLASS ON PHILOSOPHY AND FOOD: GROPPING TOWARDS ACADEMIC SERVICE-LEARNING FOR PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE
DAN HICKS, UNIVERSITY OF NOTRE DAME

While service learning might seem best suited to applied ethics, I believe that it is also appropriate for such areas as philosophy of science. A philosophy and food class that I developed and have taught at the University of Notre Dame, “Are We Eating Good Food?” is a first attempt to develop a model for service learning in philosophy of science. I explain the structure and content of my class and my students’ service projects. The class is not exclusively devoted to philosophy of science, and deals with complexity and the role of values in science rather than such “classical” issues as explanation or scientific realism. Reflecting on the gap that thus exists
between “classical” philosophy of science and the content of my course, I conclude that I do not yet have a general model for service learning in philosophy of science, but I have made some progress.

A GENERAL REPLY TO THE ARGUMENTS FROM BLUR, DOUBLE VISION, PERSPECTIVE, AND OTHER KINDS OF PERCEPTUAL DISTORTION AGAINST REPRESENTATIONALISM

DAVID BOURGET, UNIVERSITY OF LONDON

This paper offers a general reply to arguments from perceptual distortion (e.g., blur, perspective, double vision) against the representationalist thesis that the phenomenal characters of experiences supervene on their intentional contents. It has been argued that distorted and undistorted experiences are counterexamples to this thesis because they can share contents without sharing phenomenal characters. In reply, I suggest that cases of perceptual distortion do not constitute counterexamples to the representationalist thesis because the contents of distorted experiences are always impoverished in some way compared to those of normal experiences. This can be shown by considering limit cases of perceptual distortion, for example, maximally blurry experiences, which manifestly lack detailed content. Since there is no reasonable way to draw the line between distorted experiences that have degraded content and distorted experiences that don’t, we should allow that an increase in distortion is always accompanied by a degradation in content.

A KANTIAN ARGUMENT FOR THE SOVEREIGNTY RIGHTS OF INDIGENOUS PEOPLES

KRISTA THOMASON, SWARTHMORE COLLEGE

Some recent scholarship suggests that Kant’s critique of colonialism provides a prima facie argument in favor of self-government rights for indigenous peoples. Here, I argue for a stronger conclusion: Kantian political theory not only can but must include sovereignty for indigenous peoples. Normally these rights are considered redress for historic injustice. On a Kantian view, however, I argue that they are not remedial. Sovereignty rights are a necessary part of establishing perpetual peace. By failing to acknowledge the sovereignty of native groups, states once guilty of imperialism leave open the in principle possibility for future violence, even though no current conflict exists. Only in recognizing self-government rights can states truly commit to the cosmopolitan ideal.

A NEW SOLUTION TO THE SURPRISE TEST PARADOX

DANIEL IMMERMAN, UNIVERSITY OF NOTRE DAME

In this paper I offer a new solution to the Surprise Test Paradox. The paradox arises thanks to an ingenious argument that seems to show that surprise tests are impossible. I identify a flaw in the argument, namely, a reliance on an instance of a false closure principle. I then show how my solution to the paradox is better than extant solutions. The reason it is better is that it can handle variants of the paradox that extant solutions cannot.
A PLURALIST OBJECTION TO ARISTOTLE’S ACCOUNT OF THE HAPPIEST LIFE: A RESPONSE
MATTHEW WALKER, RUTGERS UNIVERSITY

In *Nicomachean Ethics* X.7-8, Aristotle defends a striking view, which I call the supremacy thesis. This is the claim that the happiest way of life for human beings is a contemplative life. Contemporary philosophers are apt to find the supremacy thesis seriously blinkered, however. According to what I call the pluralist worry, it is implausible to think that a single determinate life—especially the contemplative life—could be happiest for all people. Aristotle’s view might seem to overlook, or fail to show proper appreciation for, the full range of talents, abilities, and inclinations that human beings possess. In this paper, I argue that Aristotle has resources for responding to the pluralist worry.

A PROPOSITIONAL SEMANTICS FOR SUBSTITUTIONAL QUANTIFICATION
GEOFF GEORGI, WEST VIRGINIA UNIVERSITY

The standard truth-conditional semantics for substitutional quantification, due to Saul Kripke, gets the modal profile of simple sentences containing substitutional quantifiers wrong. In this paper, I propose an alternative semantic theory for substitutional quantification that specifies what proposition is expressed by a sentence containing the particular substitutional quantifier, and show how it gets the modal profile of such sentences right. The key to this semantic theory is identifying the appropriate propositional function to serve as the content of an occurrence of a formula containing a free substitutional variable.

A PUZZLE ABOUT DIALECTIC AT REPUBLIC 533A1-5
MICHELLE JENKINS, WHITMAN COLLEGE

This paper is a close examination of *Republic* 533a1-5. Glaucon has asked Socrates to describe dialectic and Socrates appears to rebuff this request, telling Glaucon that he would not be able to follow the account that Socrates would offer. Scholars have traditionally taken this passage to refer to the method of dialectic—Socrates is telling Glaucon that he will not be able to understand the account of dialectic that Socrates were to give. I offer considerations against this interpretation and argue that Socrates is in fact talking of the Form of the Good in this passage. I end with some thoughts about why Socrates would warn Glaucon about the Form of the Good given Glaucon’s request for information about dialectic.

A RETURN TO NEUTRAL RELATIONS: A PUZZLE ABOUT SYMMETRY
FATEMA AMJEE, UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS AT AUSTIN

In “Neutral Relations,” Kit Fine argues against the standard view of relations on which a relation holds of its objects in a given order, in favor of a view on which a relation does not hold of its objects in any given order but is unbiased with respect to ordering, or neutral. On the standard view the
ordering of the relata serves to distinguish the various exemplifications of a relation (i.e., it distinguishes aRb from bRa). This ability to explain differential application constitutes a criterion of adequacy on any theory of relations. A view on which relations are neutral must explain differential application without appeal to an ordering of the relata. My goal is to defend one such account—a view Fine calls “positionism.” In §1, I briefly sketch Fine’s arguments against the standard view. In §2 I introduce Fine’s “symmetry objection” to positionalism. I defend positionalism in §3.

A Solution to the Problem of Access for Russellian Theories of Belief

Mihnea Capraru, Syracuse University

Russellian theories of belief identify the contents of our beliefs with Russellian propositions. To address the ensuing Fregean puzzles, most contemporary Russellians maintain that two belief reports can attribute belief in one and the same Russellian proposition, yet concern different ways of believing it. If so, then the speakers of belief reports can talk about other people’s ways of believing. How they can do so is a problem: let us call this the problem of access. In this paper, I propose a simple solution to complement the “theory” theory and the simulation theory: in the simplest cases, speakers can talk about other people’s ways of believing by talking about ways of believing that they themselves share with the others.

Abandonment, Mitigation, and the Principle of Underlying Censure

Craig Aguile, University of California, San Diego

In his Attempts, Gideon Yaffe provided a theory of sentencing mitigation in cases of criminal abandonment which turns on the disincentive effect of punishment. That theory properly grants mitigation in cases where a defendant abandons after realizing she was doing wrong, and it properly withholds mitigation in cases where a defendant abandons after realizing her prospects for criminal success are not as good as she had thought. However, Yaffe’s theory struggles with cases where the defendant abandons after realizing that her behavior is illegal. After examining two sorts of these cases of belated legal realization, I conclude that Yaffe’s theory falls short and that the true theory of abandonment-based mitigation should be more closely tied to the failure to properly recognize reasons that led to the original culpability.

Abductive Two-Dimensionalism: A New Route to the A Priori Identification of Necessary Truths

Stephen Biggs, Iowa State University

Chalmers and Jackson (Chalmers 2006; Jackson 1998), among others, advocate epistemic two-dimensional semantics (E2D) as a way of reforging the necessity-a priority link seemingly broken by the identification of necessary a posteriori truths (Kripke 1972/1980). The E2D strategy requires that we can have a priori knowledge of semantic intensions constitutively connected to necessity, but many have argued
that we cannot have such knowledge. We argue that such access-based objections turn not on features of E2D per se, but rather on features of the conceiving-based epistemology of intensions (CEI) that extant versions of E2D uniformly presuppose. We introduce an alternative epistemology, based in abduction (i.e., inference to the best explanation), argue that the results of idealized abduction are reasonably taken to be a priori, and show that this epistemology of intensions blocks the access-based objections to E2D. We thereby provide a new route to the a priori identification of necessary truths.

ABILITY, FOREKNOWLEDGE, AND EXPLANATORY DEPENDENCE

PHILIP SWENSON, UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, RIVERSIDE

Many philosophers wish to maintain that the ability to do otherwise is compatible with comprehensive divine foreknowledge but incompatible with the truth of causal determinism. One problem with this view is that the Fixity of the Past principle which underlies the rejection of compatibilism about the ability to do otherwise and determinism appears to generate an argument for the incompatibility of the ability to do otherwise and divine foreknowledge as well. By developing an account of ability which appeals to the notion of explanatory dependence, we can replace the Fixity of the Past with a new principle which does not generate this difficulty.

ACTING FOR A REASON AND FOLLOWING A PRINCIPLE: A DILEMMA FOR KORSGAARD’S CONSTITUTIVISM

ANDREW MCANINCH, ILLINOIS WESLEYAN UNIVERSITY

Christine M. Korsgaard argues that a person acts for a reason only if she recognizes some consideration to be a reason, where this recognition motivates her to act. Some contend that this requirement, which I call the guidance condition on acting for a reason, generates a vicious regress. Korsgaard herself is sensitive to this worry. Indeed, her appeal in recent work to the constitutive principles of rational activity can be seen, in part, as a response to this regress worry. I will argue, however, if she is to appeal to the constitutive principles of rational activity to resolve the regress, Korsgaard must determine whether acting on such principles is also subject to the guidance condition. If following constitutive principles is subject to the guidance condition, then the regress remains unresolved. But if not, then the rationale for applying it to acting for a reason vanishes as well.

AFFECTIONAL QUALITIES

MURAT AYDEDE, UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA
MATTHEW FULKERSON, UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, SAN DIEGO

We distinguish between affect-presenting and affect-causing perceptual experiences and focus on the former. We note that we attribute positive or negative affectional qualities (e.g., pleasantness and unpleasantness) both to perceptual experiences and to their objects. We offer a psychofunctionalist
account of affective qualities when they are attributed to experiences and a dispositional (Lockean) account when they are attributed to their objects. We show how these two accounts are naturally united—indeed each almost follows from the other. Along the way we note some of the advantages of our approach.

AGAINST CONTEXTUALISM: BELIEF, EVIDENCE, AND THE BANK CASES

LOGAN GAGE, BAYLOR UNIVERSITY

Contextualism (the view that “knowledge” and its variants are context-sensitive) has been supported in large part through appeal to intuitions about Keith DeRose’s Bank Cases. Recently, however, the contextualist construal of these cases has come under fire from Kent Bach and Jennifer Nagel who question whether the Bank Case subject’s confidence can remain constant in both low- and high-stakes cases. Having explained the Bank Cases and this challenge to them, I argue that DeRose has given a reasonable reply to this initial challenge. However, I proceed to argue that the current stalemate can be broken. Seeking to extend the Bach-Nagel critique, I offer a novel interpretation of the Bank Cases according to which the subject’s evidence changes between low- and high-stakes cases. If I am correct, then, given the amount of support the Bank Cases have been thought to lend contextualism, the case for contextualism is seriously weakened.

AGAINST RADICAL SELF-LEgISLATIoN

TOM O’SHEA, UNIVERSITY OF ESSEX

Radical constructivists claim that all normative authority in practical deliberation originates in self-legislation. Critics object that this position is beset by paradox: either self-legislation is governed by antecedent norms, and so is not the ultimate ground of normativity, or else it is not governed by such norms, and so legislation is too arbitrary to genuinely bind us or express our freedom. This paper outlines Onora O’Neill’s sophisticated defense of radical constructivism against these objections but argues that she ultimately succumbs to them. In particular, O’Neill transgresses her own necessarily strict requirement that self-legislation be independent of conditioned forms of reasoning. A possible reply—relying on the existence of practically necessary standards of reason to guide legislation—is considered but found wanting.

AGAINST SOME GROUP READINGS OF THE EPISTEMIC “MIGHT”

BENJAMIN LENNERTZ, UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA

There is a debate over whether contextualists about the epistemic modal, “might,” can explain how hearers can disagree with utterances of “might”-sentences. Some contextualists have responded with what I call The Group Reading Strategy—that in uttering a “might”-sentence, speakers assert something about the information of the conversational group and that hearers appropriately respond by disagreeing with the
proposition asserted. In this paper, I give two arguments to show that The Group Reading Strategy is unsuccessful. Each shows that “might” does not get a group reading in all of the situations where we have disagreement. First, I amend von Fintel’s and Gillies’s (2011) argument from warrant in a way that gets around the objections of Dowell (2011). Second, I offer an independent argument based on conversational data in which it is clear that “might” doesn’t get a group reading (though the disagreement phenomena persist).

AN INSTITUTIONALIZED CONCERN WITH PROMOTING Egalitarianism? DEFENDING DWORKIN’S PROPOSAL AGAINST G. A. COHEN’S INCOHERENCE CHARGE

ROBERT (R.J.) LELAND, STANFORD UNIVERSITY

I begin by presenting a proposal attributed by G. A. Cohen to Ronald Dworkin: the difference principle could require regulating the basic structure so as to promote an egalitarian ethos, without directly requiring individuals to take up that ethos. I present some cases to spell out what such a principle would require. Then I discuss Cohen’s argument that Dworkin’s proposal commits its proponents to an incoherent triad. I argue that the argument as stated by Cohen fails. Then I present an improved version of the argument (which may be what Cohen had in mind). I show that advocates of Dworkin’s proposal can escape the improved argument, via one of two plausible routes, which philosophers ought to explore more fully. The result of my argument is that Cohen fails to establish that Dworkin’s proposal leads to an incoherence.

ANALYTICITY AND ONTOLOGY

LOUIS H. DEROSSET, UNIVERSITY OF VERMONT

Analyticity theorists, as I will call them, endorse the doctrine of analyticity in ontology: if some truth P analytically entails the existence of certain things, then a theory that contains P but does not claim that those things exist is no more ontologically parsimonious than a theory that also claims that they exist. Suppose, for instance, that the existence of a table in a certain location is analytically entailed by the existence and features of certain particles in that location. The doctrine implies that the table’s existence requires nothing more of the world than that those particles exist and bear the features in question. Here I argue that the doctrine faces counterexamples, and so analytic entailment does not have the significance for ontology that analyticity theorists have claimed.

ANIMAL CONSCIOUSNESS, NON-PROPOSITIONAL THOUGHT, AND ZEN BUDDHISM

SARA WALLER, MONTANA STATE UNIVERSITY

Mental states that are free of beliefs and desires are intrinsic to the illuminated trance prescribed by Zen Buddhist practice. Meditators strive to minimize thoughts, expectations, and emotions, and attachment to them. Koans serve to end analytic thought by presenting unsolvable puzzles. Experimental evidence that (many) non-human animals
experience beliefs and desires that are non-propositional. Are these animals technically closer to satori than humans because they are free of the tangles of language, or are their desires even more pressing? This paper explores the role of language in chaining us to, or freeing us from, attachment to beliefs and desires.

**Archein and Archai (Rule and Offices) in Plato’s Statesman**

**Melissa Lane, Princeton University**

The Statesman has been powerfully characterized as an abstract analysis of architectonic political knowledge or expertise. Yet in its very abstraction, it has been described as impoverished, by comparison with the Republic and the Laws, in treating the concrete question of how a constitution should organize the distribution of offices. I contend that the dialogue is less absolutely impoverished on this point than this statement implies. I show that the Statesman addresses the most important political offices (archai) and political roles which characterized Greek constitutions, and that its account of the rule (archein) of the ideal statesman is developed in relation to a corresponding reconceptualization of these political roles and offices. The Statesman is an exercise in constitutional analysis as well as an abstract analysis of political expertise: to reconfigure the political authority of statesmanship, it must reconfigure the political authority of the subordinate offices.

**Are We Violating the Human Rights of the World’s Poor?**

**Thomas Pogge, Yale University**

Human rights violations involve unfulfilled human rights and a specific active and intentional causal relation of human agents to such non-fulfillment. This causal relation may be interactional—or institutional, as when agents collaborate in designing and imposing institutional arrangements that foreseeably and avoidably cause human rights deficits. Readily available evidence suggests that the design of supranational institutional arrangements plays a major role in shrinking the already small (3 percent) share of global household income going to humanity’s poorer half, whose social and economic human rights consequently remain unfulfilled. A strong case can be made, then, that people like myself—affluent citizens of influential states—collaboratively violate the human rights of the global poor. Most of us find this judgment incredible—but only because they fail to investigate the institutional causes of the non-fulfillment of human rights or relevant institutional reform possibilities.

**Artistic Beauty as Free Beauty**

**Emine Tuna, University of Alberta**

The apparent inconsistency between the third moment of the Analytic in the Critique of Judgment and the section on fine arts and genius creates problems that make the status of artistic beauty questionable. Already problematic distinction between adherent and free beauty, which makes commentators
question whether or not adherent beauty is a beauty, resurfaces in the issue of artistic beauty. In order to overcome this problem I suggest that even though we can judge artistic beauty as adherent beauty similar to the way in which we do for natural beauty, we also judge it as free beauty.

**Assertibility in Context**

*Geoff Pynn, Northern Illinois University*

The knowledge account of assertibility says that a speaker is in an epistemic position to assert that \( p \) if and only if she knows that \( p \). Keith DeRose has shown that the knowledge account is incompatible with purist invariantism about knowledge. So purist invariantists need an alternative account of assertibility. An adequate account should explain why assertibility varies with context, and should underwrite an explanation for the tight link between knowledge and assertibility that makes the knowledge account so attractive. I argue for such an account by starting with a suggestion from Robert Stalnaker about the “essential effect” of assertion. I show how the account predicts the context-sensitivity of assertibility, explains some common data, and implies that knowledge is typically required for warranted assertion.

**Balancing Commitments: Herman on Own-Happiness and Beneficence**

*Donald Wilson, Kansas State University*

In her most recent book, Barbara Herman offers a distinctive approach to an old problem related to the practical scope of moral requirements. Herman argues that we can avoid the kind of troubling balancing of commitments that seems to leave personal relationships and projects hostage to an open-ended and extensive commitment to helping others that threatens to reduce us to lives spent in the unrelenting service of others. I argue that the structural changes that Herman proposes and the room she makes for circumstance specific individual judgment do not obviate the need for this kind of balancing and that the basic problem cannot be solved without embracing it.

**Belief, Ethics, and the Ethics of Belief**

*Guy Axtell, Radford University*

Several ongoing philosophical debates indicate a need to look closer at the relationship between ethical and intellectual virtues. One is the challenge coming from situationist psychology, a challenge that bears differently on different domains and conceptions of character traits. Another is the debate over a proper understanding of the ethics of belief, and of the differences between moral and epistemic versions of it. This paper will primarily address contrasting basic conceptions of the relationship between facts and values, and how that issue informs and constrains the kind of norms that a proposed ethics of belief can properly appeal to. It also tries to show that a “responsibilist” ethics of belief is superior, both philosophically and pragmatically, to the better-known “evidentialist” ethics of belief.
BELIEVING QUA MEMBER

MARK PHELAN, LAWRENCE UNIVERSITY

Casual reflection on the daily news reminds us that we often talk as though groups have intentional states, such as beliefs and desires. But what is the status of such verbal ascriptions? Are these to be given a realist interpretation and understood as attributions of mental states to groups, over and above the individuals that constitute them? Or should they be understood individualistically, as involving shorthand references to the mental states of the individual persons that comprise groups? As I will argue, neither approach conforms entirely to our practice of mental state attribution. Careful reflection on an array of mental state ascriptions favors a third approach. People generally interpret group mental state ascriptions distributively, as attributions of mental states to group members, whose mental states constitute a subset of the mental states of individual persons.

BLUES, TRAUMA, AND THE FINITUDE OF HUMAN EXISTENCE

BEN STOLOROW, INDEPENDENT SCHOLAR

ROBERT STOLOROW, UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, LOS ANGELES

Emotional trauma brings us face-to-face with our vulnerability to suffering, death, and loss—possibilities that are constitutive of finite human existing. We elucidate the vital role played by the process of bringing the bodily aspect of emotional experience into language in the working through of painful emotional states. Such visceral-linguistic unities are achieved in a dialogue of emotional understanding, and it is in such dialogue that experiences of emotional trauma can be transformed into endurable and namable painful feelings. The blues is a wonderful example of such dialogue. The lyrics provide the words that name the particular experience of trauma, while the more formal aspects of the music evoke the visceral dimension of emotional pain. In the unifying experience of the blues, songwriter, performers, and listeners are joined in a visceral-linguistic conversation in which universally traumatizing aspects of finite human existing can be communally held and borne.

CAN COST-EFFECTIVENESS ANALYSIS ACCOMMODATE THE EQUAL VALUE OF LIFE?

PAUL MENZEL, PACIFIC LUTHERAN UNIVERSITY

Cost-effectiveness analysis of health care (CEA) has been criticized for unfair discrimination against the disabled and chronically ill because it attributes less value to extending their lives than to the lives of those who would be in full health. One prominent response has been to modify CEA by distinguishing different roles in its structure for individual utility and social value. On this view, the equal value of life is a claim about social value, not individual utility, and CEA can therefore accommodate it. I argue that this defense of CEA fails because the claim of the equal value of life is compelling as a claim about individual utility as well as social value. As a result, the equal value of life continues to pose a severe challenge to CEA's
CAN WE REALLY SEE A MILLION COLORS?

DAVID PAPINEAU, KING’S COLLEGE LONDON

It is widely assumed that humans are capable of over a million different conscious visual responses to colored surfaces. This paper argues that the empirical data are better explained by positing far fewer such responses, alongside a gestalt ability to register directly that adjacently presented surfaces are different-in-color.

CAUSATION: ONTOLOGY AND A PRIORITY

NATHANIEL STEIN, FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY

Philosophers discussing causation must specify an ontology of causation. The standard account of that ontology is that causation is a relation between events, though some alternative candidates have been proposed. All of these accounts make two assumptions: that the ontological category of causal relata admits of a unique specification Uniqueness, and that cause and effect are of the same ontological type Uniformity. There are good reasons for rejecting both assumptions, derived from considerations of plausible cases, standard usage, and theoretical motivations. Reasons which might be or have been given in favor of Uniqueness and Uniformity are unconvincing. Thus, the standard ontologies of causation, including those framed in terms of events should be rejected in favor of an ontological pluralism. That pluralism is only provisional, however, since giving a non-provisional account of the relata of causation is far more complex than normally supposed.

COLLECTIVE INTENTIONALITY: A HUMAN—NOT A MONKEY—BUSINESS

ANGELICA KAUFMANN, UNIVERSITEIT ANTWERPEN

In Making the Social World Searle makes the same claim he made in 1995: that “Human beings along with a lot of other social animals, have the capacity for collective intentionality” (Searle 2010, 43). In this paper I aim to show that Searle’s “overattribution” of collective intentionality to non-human animals is unjustified. Firstly, I briefly reconstruct and augment Tomasello and Rakoczy’s (2007) criticism that Searle overemphasises the primitiveness of the notion of collective intentionality. Secondly, I will outline a cross-species analysis for the emergence of cooperative behavior. Such an approach suggests that we resist Searle’s overattribution. Thirdly, I argue that Searle’s six conditions of adequacy for any account of collective intentionality are incompatible with his attribution of collective intentionality to non-human animals. Finally, I conclude by noting that Searle’s overattribution has important consequences for his system, as it implicates that human uniqueness begins with institutional reality rather than with collective intentionality and social ontology.
COMMON SENSE ONTOLOGY

MARK MOYER, UNIVERSITY OF VERMONT

A radical view of what exists bears a burden of explaining away the contrary views of common sense. But what does common sense say exists? According to most philosophers, common sense holds that chairs and countries exist but not arbitrary quantities of matter or arbitrary sums of objects. I argue otherwise. Although people would deny that anything exactly occupies the combined space of the Eiffel Tower and my nose, they would also say that there is a quantity of matter constituting the two of them and that the collection of the tower and my nose weighs more than the tower itself. This shows such things are accepted by the common folk. Common sense thinking, it turns out, countenances much that is quite uncommon.

COMPOSITION AND FACTS

NOEL SAENZ, UNIVERSITY OF COLORADO, BOULDER

Facts, when taken to have particulars and parts, are thought to succumb to a number of mereological objections. For example, facts so understood are thought to violate the following very plausible principle: If y is a proper part of x, then there’s something, z, such that (1) z is a proper part of x, and (2) z is not identical with y. In this paper (which is a proper part of a much larger paper) I argue that, for example, facts do violate this principles but that the proper response to make is to deny the principle and not the facts. Though this may, at first, strike us as philosophically revisionary, I will show that rejecting it is not as revisionary as it may at first seem.

COMPOSITIONALITY AND CONCEPTUAL ROLE

ERIC SAIDEL, GEORGE WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY

Fodor and Lepore (among others) argue that Conceptual Role Semantics (CRS) cannot handle an important cognitive phenomenon: compositionality. As a consequence, CRS is not a viable theory of mental semantics. This paper argues that Fodor and Lepore’s challenge is based on taking compositionality to be stronger than the evidence warrants. A weaker compositionality that is consistent with CRS is a better fit for the phenomena it is supposed to explain (the productivity and systematicity of language and thought), and it coheres better with ordinary usage. Thus compositionality does not present a challenge to CRS.

COMPOSITIONALITY AND STRUCTURED PROPOSITIONS

LORRAINE JULIANO KELLER, UNIVERSITY OF NOTRE DAME AND NIAGARA UNIVERSITY

In this paper, I evaluate one of the central arguments for a popular thesis in the philosophy of language that I call “Structured Propositionalism,” according to which propositions are complex entities composed of the semantic values of the meaningful parts of the sentences that express them. According to what I call the “Compositionality Argument,” semantic compositionality entails complexity in semantic values: if the assignment
of semantic values to sentences obeys the widely accepted principle of compositionality, then sentential semantic values (viz., propositions) must be complex. This paper subjects this hitherto inadequately explored argument to scrutiny. I present an objection to the Compositionality Argument that is potentially devastating for Russellians, but to which Fregeans have a satisfactory response. Since Russellianism is by far the most popular version of Structured Propositionalism, this challenge to one of the central arguments supporting the view is not to be taken lightly.

CONDITIONS OF COGNITIVE SANITY AND THE INTERNALIST CREDO

ANDREW D. SPEAR, GRAND VALLEY STATE UNIVERSITY

Laurence BonJour has proposed background conditions on internalist justification. Hilary Kornblith argues that such conditions are inconsistent with a core internalist commitment, that subjects internally alike are justificationally alike, resulting in a position indistinguishable from standard externalisms and so signaling the “death” of internalism. I think the funeral arrangements are premature, though a more systematic consideration of background conditions is needed. I explain how BonJour-style internalism is consistent with certain kinds of background conditions: conditions the failure of which either affect what a subject has access to or undermine the subject’s epistemic agency. Four of BonJour’s five conditions are of this type and so not susceptible to Kornblith’s objections, while a fifth should be rejected in its current form. The result is that certain background conditions are motivated by commitments of internalism, are consistent with internalism, and result in a view distinct from standard externalisms.

CONFUCIANISM BEFORE CONFUCIUS: THE RECTIFICATION OF NAMES IN THE YI JING

HALLA KIM, UNIVERSITY OF NEBRASKA AT OMAHA

The Yi Jing is full of names and symbols, broadly conceived, and they stand in semantic/semiotic relations to the world, sometimes in the natural way and sometimes in the normative way. I argue that this is part of the underlying implications of the well-known Confucian doctrine of the rectification of names. In the end, I conclude, though, that, in the actual presentation of his doctrine, Confucius not only played the role of a mere “transmitter” of the Xianjin ideals, as he famously claimed, but also developed them in a new, creative way, in particular, with a strong implication for political reforms in the human society.

CONSCIOUSNESS, CONTROL, AND ZOMBIE ACTION

JOSHUA SHEPHERD, FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY

According to a strong intuition, persistent in both philosophy and cognitive science, consciousness is intimately involved in control’s exercise. Recently, however, some have suggested that consciousness is functionally unimportant for the control of at least some overt action— that these overt actions are controlled by “the zombie within” (Koch and Crick 2001). In this paper I examine arguments in favor of zombie action. I note that
these arguments suffer from an attenuated view of control, and I highlight important but thus far overlooked empirical possibilities concerning the role of consciousness for action control.

**Consequentialism, Eudaimonism, and Alienation**

*Aaron Flaster, Lewis & Clark College*

Eudaimonism shows how consequentialism can avoid the problem of alienation. The problem of alienation reduces to three objections: consequentialists cannot act for the sake of others, consequentialists cannot accommodate the loyalty that exists between friends, and consequentialists cannot develop the intimacy between friends. Each objection tries to show that consequentialism cannot accommodate friendship. This threatens consequentialism because people need friends, and not just acquaintances, to live well. Unlike acquaintances, friends have an intimate relationship—they spend time together, share similar interests, and discuss how to live well. This intimacy allows friends to improve each other’s characters more effectively than acquaintances could. Consequentialism can assuage these objections by appealing to eudaimonism. Eudaimonism faces three similar critiques and the eudaimonist responses serve as useful parallels for consequentialism.

**Consilient Generalizations as Laws of Nature**

*Reuben Stern, University of Wisconsin, Madison*

In this paper, I propose a novel way for Humeans to explain scientists’ search for laws of nature. Though Humeans are often sympathetic to David Lewis’s Best System Account of lawhood, problems arise from its reference to our standards of simplicity and strength. I argue that Humeans can avoid these problems by regarding laws as the maximally consilient generalizations. A generalization is consilient if and only if it necessitates the agreement of independent measurements in two or more generalizations. A set of generalizations is maximally consilient at some world if and only if it consiliates all of the generalizations that can be consiliated at that world. My proposal is inspired by William Whewell’s account of confirmation.

**Constructing the Null Hypothesis: Epistemic and Non-Epistemic Values in Statistical Methods**

*Irina Meketa, Boston University*

Philosophical treatments of bias in comparative psychology’s statistical models have left out a crucial feature: the choice of null hypothesis (H0). Earlier accounts of bias largely focus on error-rate asymmetry in the Neyman-Pearson Method (NPM). I argue that the asymmetry is less important than the value assigned to the H0. I propose a reformulation of the NPM that controls for bias by (a) replacing problematic metaphysical assumptions about parsimony with relevant empirical and theoretical considerations in determining the H0 and (b), establishing a role for
appropriate value judgments in the determination of the error rate asymmetry.

CONTEXTUALISM AND THE CONTENT OF VAGUE ASSERTIONS

JOANNA ODROWAZ-SYPNIEWSKA, UNIWERSYTET WARSZAWSKI

The problem with contextualism concerning vague assertions is that it seems that while content-contextualism makes impossible any genuine disagreement concerning ascriptions of vague properties to objects, truth-contextualism either precludes permissible disagreement concerning borderline cases or else it leads to content-contextualism. I suggest a way out for contextualists. I offer a new account of the usage of personal taste predicates and suggest that we model the usage of all vague predicates on it. The idea is that in clear cases “a is F” means “a is F simpliciter,” whereas in borderline cases it means “a is F-to-me.” Since the boundary between borderline and non-borderline cases depends on context, my solution weds content-contextualism with truth-contextualism.

CONVENTIONS, PRECEDENTS, AND BELIEFS: A LESSON FROM LEWIS AND MILLIKAN

MEGAN STOTTS, UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, RIVERSIDE

David Lewis and Ruth Millikan provide strikingly different analyses of convention. Lewis requires mutual knowledge of regular conformity that relies on a process of reasoning about others’ beliefs, whereas Millikan champions a simpler view of conventions as behavior reproduced due to weight of precedent, with no requirement of mutual knowledge. I argue that despite these major differences, their accounts suffer from complementary tensions. Lewis overemphasizes beliefs and tries to exclude the causal power of precedents from his account, but he runs into trouble when precedents sneak back in. Millikan tries to exclude beliefs in favor of causal connections to precedents, but beliefs eventually make a problematic appearance. These complementary tensions reveal that the correct account of convention will have to include both beliefs and causal connections to precedents, but perhaps as sufficient rather than necessary conditions.

CONVERGENCE ON DIVERGENCE: HOW TO BE A RELATIVISTIC MORAL REALIST

WILLIAM A. ROTTSCAEFER, LEWIS & CLARK COLLEGE

Urging the scientifically minded moral realist to meet her own methodological standards, Doris and Plakias have challenged her to address the long-standing problem of moral disagreement. I use a gene-culture co-evolutionary account of one of their showcase problem cases, the difference between honor and non-honor cultures, to argue not only that significant moral disagreement—and the moral relativism it seems to imply—pose no awkwardness for moral realism, but also that a properly scientifically based naturalistic moral realism explains it, indeed, provides tools for justifying it. In doing so, I show how to be a relativistic moral realist.
COOKIES AND SURPRISE EXAMS

DYLAN DODD, PACIFIC UNIVERSITY

I introduce a new paradox, the Cookie Paradox. I compare it to the more familiar Surprise Exam Paradox, and argue that the two paradoxes have analogous solutions.

CORRECTIVE JUSTICE SUPPLEMENTED

ANESS WEBSTER, UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA

Jules Coleman, in *The Practice of Principle*, defends a theory of tort law based on the principle of corrective justice which posits a duty to repair when a right has been breached. In the course of this defense, he considers an objection that the principle of corrective justice is inadequate because a complete theory of tort law ought to provide an adequate account of the first-order rights/duties as well as the second-order right to redress or duty to repair. I argue that Coleman’s responses are inadequate and that we should supplement the principle of corrective justice with an adequate account of first-order rights that tort law protects. I also argue that an account of first-order rights is not sufficient for a complete theory of tort law; it must be supplemented by the principle of corrective justice. Tort law, I suggest, is an institution which protects particular sorts of first-order rights in a particular way, namely, by forcing those who have violated these rights to compensate for the breach of these rights (and the resulting harm). This view has the virtue of being able to distinguish tort law from both criminal law and a publicly funded compensation scheme.

COSMOPOLITANISM AND REPRODUCTIVE CHOICES

LOUIS-PHILIPPE HODGSON, YORK UNIVERSITY

I articulate a problem that cosmopolitans face regarding reproductive choices, and I argue that it can only be solved by leaving cosmopolitanism behind. I start with the obvious observation that children are born as a result of somebody’s choices. Since cosmopolitans hold that justice demands that the prospects of children everywhere be equalized, this seems to commit them to the claim that a person in one country can unilaterally create an enforceable duty for those in another country just by choosing to have a child. I maintain that this is problematic. I then argue that the problem requires political institutions for its solution. This creates serious trouble for cosmopolitanism, since a central tenet of the view is that the content of our duties of justice doesn’t depend on what institutions are present (except insofar as that influences what is feasible).

DEATH AND DISABILITY: TWO PROBLEMS FOR THE EVENT-BASED ACCOUNT OF HARM

DUNCAN PURVES, UNIVERSITY OF COLORADO, BOULDER

State-based and event-based accounts of harm offer competing answers to the question, what is it to suffer a harm? According to state-based accounts someone suffers a harm just in case she is worse off (either in a respect or all things considered) than she otherwise would have...
been. On event-based accounts, someone suffers a harm just in case she undergoes an event of losing a basic good. I suggest that the event-based account is undermined by two overlooked but troubling aspects of the view. First (and surprisingly) the event-based account offers a much less adequate treatment of the harmfulness of death than a properly amended version of the state-based account. Second, the event-based account has troubling implications for the harmfulness of what I call “non-regrettable disabilities,” conditions that would normally be considered debilitating but that, due to peculiar circumstances, make no difference to the quality of one’s life.

**DEBUNKING PERCEPTUAL BELIEFS ABOUT ORDINARY OBJECTS**

_DANIél Z. KORMAN, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign_

Debunking arguments purport to undermine some range of beliefs by showing that there is no appropriate explanatory connection between those beliefs and the facts that they purport to be about. Such arguments have been wielded against beliefs about morality, mathematics, logic, colors, and the existence of God. Perceptual beliefs about ordinary objects, however, are widely thought to be invulnerable to such arguments. I will show that this is a mistake. I articulate a debunking argument that purports to undermine our most basic perceptual beliefs. I challenge two natural responses to the argument: (i) that there is a causal explanation of the accuracy of such beliefs, and (ii) that there are a plenitude of objects before us, virtually guaranteeing the accuracy of such beliefs. I then defend a rationalist response, according to which our beliefs are accurate on account of our apprehension of facts about composition and kind membership.

**DEFlationIsm DEFlated**

_JEREMY WYATT, University of Connecticut_

The substantiveness of properties is a central notion in many deflationist theories. I investigate what it is for a property to be substantive, arguing that every existing view of substantiveness is problematic and that a deflationist view of substantiveness is more promising. But, as it happens, deflationism about substantiveness ushers in the deflation of deflationism itself.

**DEGREES OF INCOHERENCE AND DUTCH BOOKS**

_JULIA STAFFEL, University of Southern California_

Many philosophers hold that the probability axioms constitute the norms of rationality governing degrees of belief. This view is widely known as subjective Bayesianism. While this view is the foundation of a broad research program, it is also widely criticized for being too idealized. My goal in this paper is to extend the framework of subjective Bayesianism in such a way that we can capture differences between incoherent credence functions. Being able to measure to what degree a credence function is
incoherent will help us model the degrees of belief of non-ideal agents. This will give us the resources to explain how the ideal norms of Bayesianism can be approximated by non-ideal agents, and thus exert normative force over their credence functions.

**Discontent with Rich Contents**

*Matthew Frise, University of Rochester*

There is recent debate about whether the rich content view—the view that properties about kinds, natural kinds, causal relations, dispositions, or moral statuses can be represented in the contents of visual experience—is true. Participants in this debate have claimed that its outcome informs various important issues in philosophy of mind, epistemology, metaphysics, psychology, and neuroscience, and such claims have gone unchallenged. I argue that, other than its intrinsic interest, the outcome of the rich contents debate doesn’t matter. I consider four claims in the recent literature, each of which purportedly suffices to show that the outcome matters, and I show that each claim is either false or insufficient. If correct, I have undermined key motivations for an entire debate.

**Dispositional Essentialism and Contingency**

*Amy Karofsky, Hofstra University*

Many recent metaphysicians have successfully shown that any theory on which natural laws are anything less than absolutely necessary will ultimately collapse into Humeanism. However, a world that operates according to metaphysically necessary natural laws seems to be one where everything happens as a matter of absolute necessity. Since most philosophers reject Humeanism, at one extreme, and strong necessitarianism at the other, the challenge is to secure a position somewhere in between the two positions by positing an ultimate basis for nature’s metaphysics that can ground the absolute necessity of natural laws while still allowing for some genuine contingency. Dispositional essentialists maintain that fundamental, dispositional properties constitute basis and can ground both necessity and contingency. The necessary natural laws are ultimately rooted in the essential nature of the dispositions, while contingent manifestations of properties are rooted in the dispositional character of dispositions. In this paper, I argue that dispositional essentialism fails to provide for genuine contingency and cannot avoid collapsing into strong necessitarianism. I then suggest that there is nothing wrong with that.

**Does Structural Realism Provide the Best Explanation of the Predictive Success of Science: Or Is Any Version of Scientific Realism Defensible?**

*Gerald D. Doppelt, University of California, San Diego*

I examine Carrier’s and Ladyman’s structural realist (SR) explanation of the predictive success of phlogiston chemistry. On their account, it succeeds because phlogiston chemists grasped that there is some common unobservable structure of relations underlying combustion,
calcification, and respiration. I argue that this SR account depends on assuming the truth of current chemical theory of oxidation and reduction, which provides a better explanation of the success of phlogiston theory than SR provides. I defend an alternative version of inference-to-the-best-explanation scientific realism which I call “Best Current Theory Realism” (BCTR) and argue that it can answer the pessimistic meta-induction.

**Does the Judgment Internalist’s Claim Depend on a Particular View of Motivation?**

**Gregory Nirshberg, University of Texas at El Paso**

The debate between judgment internalists and judgment externalists is fought over whether moral judgments are necessarily motivating, or only contingently so. I argue that formulations of the judgment internalist position have never clearly defined what it means to be motivated. As a result of this, the “practically irrational” defeater (and others like it) included in conditional forms of judgment internalism do too much work for the judgment internalist’s claim. Using a partial working definition of motivation, I explore a few unusual cases for the judgment internalist, and examine what kind of impact this definition has on their claim. I argue that the judgment internalist should accept this view of motivation, and, once this is done, also defend judgment internalism in its strong form sans conditionals. I then examine one particular critique of the strong form on empirical, rather than a priori, grounds, and determine the consequences for the judgment internalist.

**Educating Jouy: A Case Study of Ableism in Feminist Philosophy**

**Shelley Tremain, Independent Scholar**

The feminist charge that Michel Foucault’s theoretical approach in general and his history of sexuality in particular are masculinist, sexist, and reflect male biases vexes feminist philosophers who believe his claims imbue their analyses of disability and ableism with complexity and richness. No aspect of Foucault’s corpus has been more consistently subjected to the charge of masculinism and male bias than his example of the nineteenth-century farmhand Charles Jouy who, at about forty years old, engaged in sexual activity with a young girl, Sophie Adam, was apprehended by authorities, and was subsequently incarcerated for the rest of his days. In this paper, my central aim is to interrupt the momentum of the accepted feminist interpretation of the incidents involving Jouy and Adam by advancing a perspective on Jouy’s identity and the incidents that takes seriously insights derived from philosophy of disability and critical disability theory and history.

**Evaluating Wars with Just and Unjust Aims**

**Saba Bazargan, University of California, San Diego**

How do we evaluate a war which has both just and unjust ultimate aims? The assumption that it’s possible to reach a verdict on whether such
a war satisfies *jus ad bellum* is basic to the just war tradition. But this assumption, I will argue, is deeply problematic. There is no satisfactory way to aggregate the individual, morally heterogeneous evaluations of war’s disparate ultimate aims into an all-things-considered evaluation of the war *en toto*. Attempts to do so either rob just war theory of its action-guiding character, or unnecessarily obfuscate the moral status of a war’s constituent aims. Instead, I argue, we ought to limit the object of evaluation to the ultimate aims composing that war.

**Evil and Its Opposite**

*Todd Calder, Saint Mary’s University*

Several theorists writing about the nature of evil believe that the best way to begin is to think about evil’s opposite. According to this approach, evil just is the opposite of some familiar moral concept such as virtue, supererogation, or goodness. The first part of this paper questions the wisdom of this approach. The second part develops a plausible theory of evil that does not begin with the thought that evil is the opposite of some familiar moral concept. At the end of the paper, once a plausible theory of evil has been established, I return to the question of evil’s opposite.

**Exclusion, Still Not Tracted**

*Douglas Keaton, Flagler College*

*Thomas W. Polger, University of Cincinnati*

Karen Bennett has recently articulated and defended a “compatibilist” solution to the causal exclusion problem. Bennett’s solution works by rejecting the Exclusion principle on the grounds that even though physical realizers are distinct from the mental states or properties that they realize, they necessarily co-occur such that they fail to satisfy standard accounts of causal over-determination. This is the case, Bennett argues, because the causal background conditions for core realizers being sufficient causes of their effects are identical to the “surround” conditions with which the core realizers are metaphysically sufficient for the states or properties that they realize. Here we demonstrate that the background conditions for the causal sufficiency of core realizers for their effects are not identical to the core realizer’s surrounds, nor do backgrounds necessitate such surround conditions. If compatibilist solutions to exclusion can be defended, a different argument will be needed.

**Experiential Learning in the Feminist Philosophy Classroom**

*Julinna Oxley, Coastal Carolina University*

This presentation will describe how I adapted the methodology, goals, and activities used in Women’s Studies Service Learning courses into my Philosophical Issues in Feminism course. First, I articulate the pedagogy used called “Experiential Learning” (EL), which is a type of Service Learning. EL is distinctive in that it emphasizes personal transformation along with service to the community; the student’s beliefs or mental models should
change as a result of the service experience. Next, I describe the various Experiential Learning elements of the course: (1) Student dialogue with guest speakers from the community; (2) Student reflection on how class discussion affects the student and contributes to their learning process; and (3) An “Activism Project” where students collectively research, design, and implement a project that addresses a course-related social problem in the university or community. These activities enable students to see the relevance of philosophy to the world around them.

EXPLORING METANORMATIVE CONSTITUTIVISM

MARY CLAYTON COLEMAN, ILLINOIS WESLEYAN UNIVERSITY AND TULANE UNIVERSITY

Constitutivism faces two kinds of serious challenges. First, the constitutivist strategy may seem incoherent. How could truths about what it is to act possibly entail anything about which actions we ought to perform? Second, even if the constitutivist strategy is coherent, it may not look at all promising. It may seem as if there are no normative truths about action that follow from whatever minimal premises we can squeeze out of the nature of action. In this paper I focus on the second challenge. I begin by offering an account of what it is for a principle to be constitutive of action, and I use this account to make what I call the basic constitutivist argument. Next, I make a proposal about the nature of action, and I use this proposal to argue that anyone who acts ought to comply with both an instrumental principle and a prudential principle.

EXTERNALIST ACCOUNTS OF RACIAL EPIPHETS

LEO YAN, BROWN UNIVERSITY

Christopher Hom has recently argued that his account of racial epithets, Combinatorial Externalism, is superior to alternative accounts precisely because only his account can satisfy a series of adequacy conditions, most of which describe various characteristics of racial epithets. In particular, Hom’s account explains the unique derogatory nature of racial epithets as due to the epithet’s semantic content, which is determined externally from the speaker. I here analyze Hom’s account and argue that while it indeed satisfies his adequacy conditions, it does so by virtue of its externalist nature rather than its particular semantic conception of racial epithets. I also argue that an alternative externalist account of racial epithets can likewise satisfy Hom’s adequacy conditions. If this is correct, then Hom has not shown that his account is the best explanation of racial epithets simply because it is able to satisfy his adequacy conditions.

FOUCAULT’S AESTHETICS: PLACE, SPACE, AND ECOLOGY

DAN WILLIAMSON, SAN JOSE STATE UNIVERSITY

The question of the environment is a paramount social and political concern. These concerns are addressed here by using Foucault’s later ideas of ethics, aesthetics, and bio-politics applied to an aesthetics of place and space that coincide with long-standing American environmental/
ecological discourses. The approach here is not limited to the natural environment alone but to the possibilities of urban “heterotopias” that might be constructed. Arendt’s ideas are deployed to further articulate the idea of a space for power to be structured to embody not only an aesthetics but also a public space for speech and action, a place for *parrhesia*. What emerges from this is a concept of an environmentally centered community that is aesthetically realized within a political, social, and public space committed to plurality and diversity, an ecologically centered bio politics.

**FREE WILL, NARRATIVE, AND RETROACTIVE SELF-CONSTITUTION**

*Roman Altshuler, Stony Brook University and Marymount Manhattan College*

John Fischer has recently argued that the value of acting freely is the value of self-expression. Fischer holds that the value of a life is a narrative value. Free will is valuable insofar as it allows us to shape the narrative structure of our lives. This account rests on Fischer’s distinction between regulative control and guidance control. While we lack the former kind of control, on Fischer’s view, the latter is all that is needed for self-expression. I first develop Fischer’s narrative account, focusing on his reliance on temporal loops as giving us control over the value of our lives. Second, I argue that the narrative account grants us greater power over the past than Fischer would allow—it allows for a kind of retroactive self-constitution. Finally, I suggest that this modification of the narrative view opens the possibility of a conception of freedom far stronger than guidance control.

**FREGE’S PUZZLE LEFT UNSOLVED: A REPLY TO SAINSBURY AND TYE**

*Joseph A. Hedger, Syracuse University*

In *Seven Puzzles of Thought and How to Solve Them*, Sainsbury and Tye argue for their Originalist theory of concepts on the basis that it solves seven well-known puzzles. These puzzles are traditionally seen as puzzles about language, and in particular puzzles concerning semantic content. Sainsbury and Tye argue that they have analogues as applied to the content of thoughts. In this paper I argue that their solution of Frege’s Identity Puzzle (from “On Sense and Reference”) is implausible, because Originalism fails to explain the difference in cognitive significance which Frege took to be the puzzling explanandum.

**G. E. MOORE, ANALYSIS, AND THE REJECTION OF IDEALISM**

*Garrett Bredeson, Vanderbilt University*

In this paper I seek to clarify the stakes of Moore’s encounter with idealism by drawing out the methodological commitments implicit in his program of philosophical analysis, a program which in his mature thought is rooted in his defense of common sense. The sharp wedge he drives between ordinary understanding and philosophical analysis in the course of his defense of common sense leads to difficulties in his own view of analysis, but these very difficulties, I will argue, are ones he should embrace as faithful reflections of the starkness of his rejection of idealism. While
the idealists have allowed philosophical considerations to infect their understanding of everyday life, Moore argues that everyday life can serve as a proper object of philosophical analysis only if it is granted its own, distinctive kind of integrity and secured against the inroads of philosophical investigation.

GLOBAL JUSTICE AND THE STATE SYSTEM

Daniel Pilchman, University of California, Irvine

This essay answers the question “Are there binding principles of global justice?” in the affirmative. According to this interpretive theory, principles of global justice have binding moral authority when they correct for the evident internal pathologies of a global practice. The state system is a global practice for which we can identify a number of internal pathologies. In light of these harms, I propose a number of corrective norms. Unless and until alternative principles are proposed that better correct for the systematic harms caused by the state system, these principles have binding moral authority. Even if my proposed principles are replaced by more effective alternatives, it remains the case that there are binding principles of global justice.

GOOD PEOPLE WITH BAD PRINCIPLES

Howard J. Curzer, Texas Tech University

Right now the USA seems quite divided about justice. Since the two sides hold incompatible principles, at least one side must be holding the wrong principles. To have bad principles, and to feel and act upon them reliably without regret or reconsideration, is vice. Yet we all know people on both sides of the political divide whom we consider virtuous. This poses a challenge for virtue ethics. How can people with bad principles of justice seem virtuous? In this paper, I reject several potential solutions. Although some people don’t really believe what they say, others are confused about the facts of economics, yet others misapply the correct general principles, and some virtuous-seeming people are actually unjust, these explanations do not account for all of the seemingly virtuous, but wrongheaded people. I propose a different solution based upon the distinction between personal and role virtue.

HAIJ ON THE DIRECT ARGUMENT

P. Roger Turner, University of Tennessee

In his “On the Direct Argument for the Incompatibility of Determinism and Moral Responsibility,” Ishtiyaque Haji challenges the so-called Direct Argument for the incompatibility of determinism and moral responsibility. His challenge comes in the form of a counterexample to Rule B, a principle about the transfer of non-responsibility over the material conditional whose truth no one is responsible for. What is important about Haji’s alleged counterexample is that, if it is successful, then it’ll follow not only that Rule B is false, but also that the Direct Argument—which rests upon
Rule B—fails. But I don’t think Rule B is false, and neither do I think that the Direct Argument fails. So, in the paper, I defend Rule B from Haji’s alleged counterexample. I conclude that my defense of Rule B is successful; from which it follows that Haji’s alleged counterexample fails to undermine the Direct Argument more generally.

**Hegel’s Estates Reconsidered: The Mediation and Reconciliation of Group Interests**

*Todd Hedrick, Michigan State University*

This paper argues that Hegel’s political thought has not been properly appreciated as a version of liberalism that incorporates agonistic group differences, which critics often contend liberal politics is unable to do. This is because Hegel makes this point in the context of his account of the estates and corporations, which are usually seen as dated and paternalistic institutions that Hegel was unwise to retain in his account of ethical life. However, I argue that although many criticisms of Hegel’s estates are valid, it is worth attending to his reasons for including institutions of their type: they follow from Hegel’s critique of “abstract” citizenship in Rousseau and Kant, and the need for persons (a) to see how their particular activities contribute to broad types of social labor essential for the reproduction of society, and (b) how their group interests are represented in the state and related to other groups.

**Heidegger’s Transcendental Idealism**

*James Hebbeler, St. Joseph’s University*

In this paper I pursue a deeper comparison than has been offered so far in the literature between parallel features that can be found in Heidegger’s theory of Dasein in *Being and Time* and Kant’s theory of human reason in the *Critique of Pure Reason*. Given the strikingly similar structural features of the two accounts, I argue against other broadly Kantian readings of Heidegger’s position that Heidegger is best read as a transcendental idealist. While Heidegger certainly rejects Kant’s transcendental idealism, his ultimate departure from Kant is to be found in a subtle reversal of priorities within a shared general transcendental framework.

**How Can a Skeptic Have a Standard of Taste?**

*Susan Hahn, Massachusetts Institute of Technology*

Why wasn’t Hume a skeptic about matters of taste? He was a thoroughgoing skeptic about fundamental matters in traditional metaphysics, such as cause, causal necessitation, inductive inferences, the self, even external objects. Yet, without exception, Hume’s aesthetics is read as abruptly reversing his skeptical position and promoting a timeless and objective standard for judging beauty. I reject the dominant approach for displacing the gains of his skepticism. To impute to Hume knowledge of a standard that depends essentially on a relation to certain persons makes him sound more like an idealist than an empiricist philosopher with naturalistic
leanings. Instead, I read his aesthetic naturalism against the background of his skeptical commitment, by reconstructing his dilemma of taste along the lines of his general skepticism about cause. I argue that he deduces “that” an unknown standard is operative, but in a qualified sense not ruled out by his skepticism.

**How to Distinguish a Quasi-Realist from a Realist**  
*MELIS ERDUR, NEW YORK UNIVERSITY*

The debate between moral realism and anti-realism suffered a peculiar setback recently: expressivists, who had been leading the anti-realist camp with their emphatic denial of moral facts, have begun professing belief in “moral facts that obtain independently of our opinions,” while insisting that they are not realists—but quasi-realists. However, articulating what is “quasi” about quasi-realism has proved difficult. The official expressivist line is that what is distinctive of quasi-realism is not the conclusions that expressivists have reached but the modest metaphysics they have relied on to get there. I argue that this roundabout way of contrasting quasi-realism with realism, favored by expressivists and non-expressivists alike, is extremely misguided. Whatever special route expressivists may have followed, they have certainly not ended up saying anything close to traditional realism, and to see that we must pay attention to the first-order moral content of quasi-realism.

**How to Outfox Sly Pete: Semantics for Indicatives**  
*CALEB PERL, UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA*

I focus on a problem about the semantics of indicative conditionals. This problem is interestingly difficult, in a way that suggests a turn to exotic semantics: expressivism or relativism. I’ll show how to modify Stalnaker’s and Kratzer’s semantics to avoid these problems. (I’m hopeful that my account will extend to bare epistemic modals, too. But I’ll focus on getting my proposal off the ground, before seeing how far it generalizes.) So I’m pushing a technical proposal that, if viable, dissolves some otherwise puzzling philosophical problems. I begin with a challenge to canonical expressivist views. This challenge imposes constraints on semantics for indicatives that my account is well-placed to satisfy. The same resources that answer that challenge dissolve McGee’s putative counterexamples to *modus ponens*.

**Human Nature in Aristotle’s Politics**  
*JOSEPH KARBOWSKI, UNIVERSITY OF NOTRE DAME*

The claim that human beings are naturally political is one of the most fundamental of Aristotle’s *Politics*, and, understandably, it has received a lot of scholarly attention. However, I will argue that one very important implication of that doctrine has been overlooked by scholars. It has been well documented that within the teleological framework of the *Politics* that thesis implies that humans will have a natural impulse to form
poleis and a natural potential for civic virtue. However, it has not been adequately appreciated that this doctrine additionally entails that human nature itself will have to exhibit a functional complexity akin to that of the bee. This proposal has implications for the place that natural slaves and women have in Aristotle’s political anthropology. So, after elaborating and defending this interpretation I conclude by explaining those implications.

HUME ON THE MISUSE OF CAUSAL LANGUAGE

JENNIFER S. MARUSIC, BRANDEIS UNIVERSITY

In the Treatise, Hume repeatedly suggests that we misuse causal terms when we use them to try to pick out features of a cause in virtue of which it is necessarily connected with its effect. Hume thinks that this mistake results from our using an idea of necessity that is copied from our impression of necessity to give content to causal terms. Yet it is far from clear what the content of this idea of necessity is, nor therefore why we misuse causal terms. The key to understanding these mistakes lies in taking seriously Hume’s identifying the impression of necessary connection with the determination of the mind in forming a belief. I argue, contrary to a number of commentators, that Hume’s identification is not a category mistake, nor does it presuppose that there is genuine necessity in the mind.

HYPERINTENSIONAL METAPHYSICS

DANIEL NOLAN, AUSTRALIAN NATIONAL UNIVERSITY

In the last few decades of the twentieth century there was a revolution in metaphysics: the intensional revolution. Many metaphysicians rejected the doctrine, associated with Quine and Davidson, that extensional analyses and theoretical resources were the only acceptable ones. Metaphysicians helped themselves to modal analyses, counterfactual analyses, and supervenience claims, and committed themselves to resources such as possible worlds, intensionally individuated properties and relations, and connections of modal and counterfactual dependence. The twenty-first century is seeing a hyperintensional revolution. Theoretical tools in common use carve more finely than by necessary equivalence: two pieces of language can apply to the same entities across all possible worlds but not be equivalent; thoughts can be necessarily equivalent in truth value but not synonymous. This paper argues that hyperintensional resources are valuable in metaphysics outside theories of representation, and discusses some promising areas of hyperintensional metaphysics.

IF ANYONE SHOULD BE AN AGENT-CAUSALIST, THEN EVERYONE SHOULD BE AN AGENT-CAUSALIST

CHRISTOPHER FRANKLIN, MARYMOUNT UNIVERSITY

Almost all defenses of the agent-causal theory of free will portray the reasons for endorsing the theory as belonging uniquely to libertarians. According to what I call “the standard argument for the agent-causal theory
of free will,” in order for libertarians to solve the problem of enhanced control, they must afford agents with the agent-causal power. Thus, it is assumed that there is only reason to accept the agent causal theory if there is reason to accept libertarianism. I aim to refute this claim, arguing that the reasons we have for endorsing the agent-causal theory of free will are non-partisan. The real reason for going agent-causal has nothing to do with determinism or indeterminism, but rather with anti-reductionism about the self and the self’s role in free action. It is in this sense that I contend that if anyone should be an agent-causalist, then everyone should be an agent-causalist.

Imagining under Constraints

Amy Kind, Claremont McKenna College

As Hume has famously claimed, we are nowhere more free than in our imagination. While this feature of the imagination suggests that the imagination has a crucial role to play in modal epistemology, it also suggests that imagining cannot provide us with any non-modal knowledge about the world in which we live. In this talk, I reject this latter suggestion. Offering an account of imagining that I call “imagining under constraints,” I provide a framework for showing when and how an imaginative project can play a justificatory role with respect to our beliefs about the world. That we can be free in our imaginings does not show that they must proceed unfettered; as I argue, our ability to constrain our imaginings in light of facts about the world enables us to learn from them. The important upshot is that the imagination has considerably more epistemic significance than previously thought.

Implicit Bias, Moods, and Moral Responsibility

Alex Madva, University of California, Berkeley

Implicit social biases can influence our behavior in harmful and unjust ways, but they seem to operate outside of consciousness and control. Are individuals morally responsible for their implicitly biased behavior, or are they merely non-culpably implicated in a broader systematic injustice? One reason some philosophers have denied that individuals are responsible for their biases is that they are not sufficiently aware of them. They fail the necessary “awareness condition” for moral responsibility. However, recent empirical evidence suggests that individuals are often aware of their biases in some senses but not others. To argue that this state of partial awareness satisfies the awareness condition, I offer an argument by analogy to a close relative of implicit bias: moods. The degree of awareness individuals have of their moods meets the awareness condition, and the type of awareness individuals have of their implicitly biased behavior is importantly similar.
IN DEFENSE OF THE DUTY TO ASSIST: A RESPONSE TO CRITICS ON THE VIABILITY OF A RAWLSIAN APPROACH TO CLIMATE CHANGE

SARAH KENEHAN, MARYWOOD UNIVERSITY

Many theorists dismiss the Rawlsian framework as a viable approach to thinking through the problems of global climate change (GCC), arguing, among other things, that it demands too little, too late. In this essay, I hope to show that these critics may have overlooked or underestimated at least one key feature of Rawls’s theory: the duty to assist. I begin by exploring what Rawls says about this duty and also how he envisions it being implemented, and then I offer an interpretation of this duty as a principle of sufficientarian justice. I then move to advocate for the usefulness of this principle with regard to the issue of climate change by directly responding to concerns raised by critics. I conclude that this cursory examination of Rawls’s theory indicates that this framework will likely be helpful in thinking through our response to GCC, and so critics and Rawlsians alike should give it a second look.

IN GENES WE TRUST: THE EVOLUTIONARY AND ETHICAL IMPLICATIONS OF HUMAN GERMLINE MODIFICATION

RUSSELL POWELL, BOSTON UNIVERSITY

Bioliberals maintain that human germline modification is morally desirable because it will result in a net improvement in human health and well-being. Their conservative opponents, meanwhile, appeal to the value of the biological status quo as a reason for restraining the development and use of human genetic modification technologies. I argue that germline intervention will be necessary merely to sustain the levels of genetic health and well-being that humans presently enjoy for future generations, an ethical goal that should appeal to bioliberals and bioconservatives alike. This is due to the population-genetic consequences of relaxed selection in human populations caused by the increasing efficacy and availability of conventional medicine. This heterodox conclusion has been overlooked in medicine and bioethics due to misconceptions about human evolution, which I attempt to rectify, as well as the sordid history of Darwinian approaches to medicine and social policy, which I distinguish from the present argument.

INCREASING REALISM WITHOUT GETTING REAL

ANGELA POTOCHNIK, UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI

Incorporating lower-level details into a model is supposed to provide information about the supervenience bases, or realizers, of a higher-level property, functional description, or black box. Yet in my view, what the incorporation of such information actually accomplishes is routinely misunderstood. Including lower-level information in a model often does not eliminate idealization, for this information is itself idealized. I thus propose a different understanding of what is gained by filling in such details. In my view, the added details improve the representation...
of a causal process, yet often fail to represent it with full accuracy. This suggests that the relationships of supervenience and multiple realization are less significant for science than commonly thought, and it grounds a revised conception of the role of idealization.

**INFOPOLITICS AND BIOPOLITICS: NOTES TOWARD A FOUCALTIAN GENEALOGY**

*Colin Koopman, University of Oregon*

Michel Foucault's genealogical method can (and should) be put to use to study the historical emergence of conceptual formations that Foucault himself did not write about. One model of the productive re-use of genealogy is Ian Hacking's histories of statistics. Following Foucault and Hacking, I offer a genealogy of the intersection of modern politics and what might be called modern “informationalization.” I show how “infopolitics” is a historical extension of the intersection of political and biological formations conceptualized by Foucault as “biopolitics.” This paper summarizes a wider research project on the past, present, and future of the emergence of infopolitics.

**INTENTION-DEPENDENT ARTIFACTS AND AN ARGUMENT FROM ARBITRARINESS**

*Adam Bowen, University of Illinois*

Lynne Rudder Baker (2007) argues for an account of artifacts according to which an artifact’s proper function depends on the intentions of its designer(s), and the execution of such intentions is a necessary and sufficient condition for something to be an artifact. I challenge Baker’s view and argue that the existence of artifacts does not depend on design intentions. I proceed by presenting two types of counter-example to Baker’s account, both of which demonstrate that there can be an artifact of kind K in the absence of the appropriate design intentions. I conclude that my cases expose the vulnerability of Baker’s view to the charge of objectionable arbitrariness. Furthermore, my objections generalize to other intention-dependent accounts of artifacts.

**IS GROUND A STRICT PARTIAL ORDER?**

*Michael J. Raven, University of Victoria*

Interest surges in a distinctively metaphysical notion of a fact being grounded in other facts. But a schism has emerged between orthodoxy’s view of ground as a strict partial order on the facts and heresy’s rejection of this view. What’s at stake is the structure of the facts (for friends of ground), or even ground itself (for those who think this schism casts doubt upon its coherence). I defend orthodoxy against heresy: ground is a strict partial order.

**IS JUSTICE POSSIBLE UNDER WELFARE STATE CAPITALISM?**

*Steven P. Lee, Hobart and William Smith Colleges*

According to John Rawls, our current political-economic regime, welfare state capitalism (WSC), makes his principles of justice unachievable. WSC
is a system in which productive property (capital) is largely controlled by a relatively small number of individuals. One alternative he proposes that could realize justice is property owning democracy (POD), where productive property would be much more equally distributed among citizens. Rawls argues that WSC will allow neither fair value of political liberties nor fair equality of opportunity, and he argues that WSC cannot provide the social bases of self respect. In this paper, I take issue with his claims that these important aspects of social justice cannot be realized under WSC.

**IS THE SECOND-PERSON STANDPOINT NON-CONSEQUENTIALIST?**

**ANDREW PETER ROSS, QUEEN’S UNIVERSITY**

In *The Second-Person Standpoint* (2006), Stephen Darwall argues that the second-person standpoint serves as the foundation for non-consequentialism. Despite its non-consequentialist appearances, however, it remains to be shown that the second-person standpoint actually illuminates non-consequentialist reasoning. In this respect, deontic constraints serve as the non-consequentialist benchmark for evaluating non-consequentialist credentials. If the second-person standpoint is actually non-consequentialist, then it certainly ought to produce deontic constraints. I argue that the second-person standpoint fails to yield an account of constraints that can be labeled non-consequentialist. In particular, I argue that the conceptual structure of second-personal reasons cannot demarcate legitimate from illegitimate demands. The problem, for Darwall, is that neither the conceptual structure of second-personal reasons nor the idea of address can accomplish this latter task. Without a method of arbitration, I argue, there is nothing inherently non-consequentialist about the second-person standpoint.

**IT JUST FEELS RIGHT: EXPLORING ETHICAL AUTOMATICITY AS A THEORY OF MORAL JUDGMENT**

**ASIA FERRIN, UNIVERSITY OF WASHINGTON**

Recent empirical research in moral psychology has challenged moral rationalism, the view that good moral judgments require conscious reflection and reliance on general principles. One sort of response to such research insists that our moral judgments are arbitrary and incoherent, and in large part motivated by unconscious biases and prejudices, thus rendering the moral rationalist ideal unattainable. A second sort of response insists that reasoning and principles are involved in our moral judgments, though differently than traditionally understood, thus requiring revision rather than rejection of moral rationalism. Here I explore a third, alternative response, such that good moral judgment does not utilize reasoning and principles, yet nor does it succumb to arbitrariness and incoherence. Drawing on work by Brownstein and Madva on ethical automaticity of action, I offer an account of ethical automaticity of judgment. I discuss challenges facing Brownstein and Madva, and in turn suggest how an ethical automaticity account of judgment might handle these challenges.
JUSTICE, FACTS, AND IDEALS

COLLIN ANTHONY, UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA

It is often claimed by theorists that normative principles, particularly principles of justice, should be informed by a set of facts about human nature, society, and the world. For constructivists, these facts are required if principles are to retain their practical significance for us in providing us with determinate guidance for what to do. G. A. Cohen has recently challenged this view, arguing that fundamental normative principles must be “fact-free” in that they cannot be grounded in facts about society or humans as such. I defend constructivism against Cohen’s arguments and argue for the need to separate our idea of justice from our various ideals which underlie Cohen’s fundamental normative principles. I argue that these ideals do not have final authority in determining what principles should guide our institutions, and that it is only through a constructivist procedure do we obtain suitable fundamental principles of justice.

KANT ON FEELINGS AND SENSATIONS

ALEX RUEGER, UNIVERSITY OF ALBERTA

In the Critique of Judgment Kant insists that feelings and sensations have to be carefully distinguished. Two years earlier, in the Critique of Practical Reason, he seemed to have held that all feelings are (nothing but) sensations. It is tempting to dismiss the claim from the third Critique (because the supporting argument is obscure) and take the second Critique to represent Kant’s position. Alternatively, one can accept the distinction of feelings and sensations and claim that Kant has changed his view on the nature of feelings in a fundamental way between the two works. I argue that both interpretations are mistaken, propose a different reading of the texts, and sketch some of its consequences.

KANT ON THE HAPPINESS IN VIRTUE

DAVID FORMAN, UNIVERSITY OF NEVADA, LAS VEGAS AND UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA

Kant’s strict distinction between happiness and morality has led many readers to think that Kantian moral demands are positively hostile to our human nature as happiness-seekers. To counter this charge, it is not enough to show that we are permitted to pursue happiness as long as it is subordinated to morality. We would have to show that subordinating happiness to morality does not, in fact, require the systematic sacrifice of one’s own happiness. In this paper, I show that Kant has an account of the harmony between virtue and happiness that fits this bill.

KANT ON THE PLEASURES OF VIRTUE

ERICA HOLBERG, UTAH STATE UNIVERSITY

When we compare Aristotle’s and Kant’s theorizations of virtue, important differences are evident. For Aristotle, virtue is conceptually connected to pleasure: the virtuous agent necessarily takes pleasure in his virtuous action, and the virtuous life is the key to living a pleasant, flourishing life.
But for Kant, virtuous action is not any more intrinsically pleasant than any other sort of action, suggesting that pleasure and virtue are only contingently coupled in human life. I argue that even though virtuous action is not necessarily pleasant action within Kant’s ethics, in fact, Kant argues for important structural connections between a life of virtue and experiences of pleasure. For Kant, virtue is non-accidentally productive of pleasure in the moral, pleasure in aesthetic judgment, and even pleasure in the agreeable.

**KANT VERSUS SKYRMS ON UNIVERSAL DECEPTION**

*Don Fallis, University of Arizona*

Immanuel Kant famously argued that it would be self-defeating for everyone to follow a maxim of lying whenever it is to her advantage. In his recent book *Signals*, Brian Skyrms claims that Kant was wrong. First, he argues that there are Lewisian signaling games in which, whenever it would be beneficial to deceive the receiver, the sender sends a signal that deceives. Second, Skyrms argues that there are even signaling games in which the sender always sends a signal that deceives. I argue here that, while Skyrms is right on the first count, he is wrong on the second. While it is not always self-defeating for everyone to follow a maxim of lying whenever it is to her advantage, this is only because it is not always beneficial to mislead. If it were, then universal deception would be futile. Thus, there is a sense in which Kant was right after all.

**KANT’S “JUDGMENTS OF PERCEPTION” AND THE AMBIGUITY OF HIS CONCEPT OF INTUITION**

*Paul Redding, University of Sydney*

In the *Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics*, Kant controversially distinguishes subjective “judgments of perception” from objective “judgments of experience.” Like Longuenesse, I treat judgments of perception as genuine judgments and not mere Humean associations, and see the key to their understanding as lying in Kant’s conception of a judgment’s logical form. But Kant’s distinction, I suggest, rests on an ambiguity, noted by Sellars and others, in his account of intuition. In judgments of experience, intuitions play a role analogous to logical singular terms, while in judgments of perception they play a role analogous to Aristotelian “this-such”es. It is only this ambiguity that allows Kant to translate Aristotelian categorical judgments into a Leibnizian form in which the subject terms of those judgments are understood as predicates, predicated of some underlying “x.” This suggests that the distinction between the two judgment forms may be more basic than that between concepts and intuitions.

**KANT’S MODAL THEORY AND THE SCHEMATA OF MODAL CATEGORIES**

*Uygar Abaci, University of British Columbia*

For any attempt to reconstruct Kant’s discussion of modal categories in different sections of the *Critique of Pure Reason* as a coherent theory of
modality, one interpretive challenge is to reconcile the “schemata of modal categories” (A145/B184), where Kant presents the temporal definitions of modal categories, with the “postulates of empirical thinking in general” (B266), where he presents the complete empirical definitions of modal categories. As a number of commentators have pointed out, it is especially difficult to make sense of the schema of necessity, “existence at all times,” given that the third postulate defines necessity as existence determined by a cause. I offer a reading of Kant’s schemata of modal categories that can account for their consistency not only with the postulates but also with the rest of Kant’s modal theory as it is laid out in the Critique.

KANT, CANNIBALISM, AND ENJOYING OTHERS

BENJAMIN CHAN, LAWRENCE UNIVERSITY

Kant suggests that enjoying human beings (rather than their works) is distinctively problematic. I think Kant errs in taking sex to be the paradigm of this problematic enjoyment of others. Instead, I suggest we take cannibalism as our starting point. I attempt to illuminate what might be distinctively problematic about the enjoyment of others by considering whether there is a degrading valuation implicit in even the most conscientiously satisfied cannibalistic desires. I conclude that there are two separate ways in which the enjoyment of others can be inherently degrading: first, when what one enjoys about another fails to reflect her distinctive value as a human being; second, when how one desires another fails to reflect her intrinsic value. This latter problem is especially important, as it may affect our most intimate desires.

KANTIAN CONDITIONS FOR THE POSSIBILITY OF JUSTIFIED RESISTANCE TO AUTHORITY

STEPHEN PALMQQUIST, HONG KONG BAPTIST UNIVERSITY

Kant’s theory of justifiable resistance to authority appears to conflict with his practice and/or with itself. Authority is either “public” or “private”: resistance to public (e.g., contract-based) authority is forbidden; resistance to private (e.g., morally based or philosophically grounded) authority is sometimes required. In “Perpetual Peace” Kant foresees a political situation wherein no political resistance (e.g., war) would be necessary. Yet in Metaphysics of Morals, he argues that a citizen never has the right to revolt against one’s government: we must cooperate even with war. Moreover, Kant openly praised the American and the French revolutions; yet when the king’s censor challenged his religious writings, Kant failed to resist the (arguably unjust) authority. The key to resolving these tensions lies in the principle that universities must promote a healthy “conflict” between philosophers and all “public” employments of reason. The only ground for disallowing public resistance is the underlying presence of genuine philosophical resistance.
KANTIAN ETHICS AND PRIVILEGE-BUTTRESSING IGNORANCE

ORNATH O’DOWD, COLLEGE OF CHARLESTON

Recent work in psychology and philosophy on various kinds of privilege-buttressing ignorance raises questions about moral responsibility and may raise particularly sharp questions for Kantian ethics. In this paper, I outline a Kantian account of privilege-buttressing ignorance and our moral duties with respect to it.

KNOWLEDGE AND EXPERIMENTS

ANGEL PINILLOS, ARIZONA STATE UNIVERSITY

Recently, there have been a lot of interesting discussions (both experimental and armchair) on Gettier cases (Turri, Cappelen, Buckwalter, Nagel, Williamson, Jenkins Ichikawa, Friedman, Starmans, etc.). A lot of this research pertains not only to epistemology but also to broader methodological issues in philosophy. In this paper, I engage in a critical review of some of this work. The perspective I take is that of pragmatic encroachment, where knowledge is importantly connected to action and practical deliberation (Fantl, McGrath, Stanley, Hawthorne, Weatherson, etc.). I think that one issue which arises for typical Gettier cases is that we are often not told how the protagonist is going to use the belief in question. I argue (backed, in part, by experimental data) that if you fill this information in, then the typical “Gettier” judgment that the protagonist has no knowledge can be reversed. I think this bodes well for pragmatic encroachment theories.

KNOWLEDGE DESPITE FALSEHOOD

MARTIN MONTMINY, UNIVERSITY OF OKLAHOMA

Some authors contend that we sometimes acquire knowledge from falsehood. I examine one representative case invoked in support of this contention. I argue that in this case either the subject does not have knowledge, or she has knowledge but that knowledge is not based on her false belief.

KNOWLEDGE WITHOUT BELIEF?

KATALIN FARKAS, CENTRAL EUROPEAN UNIVERSITY

It is standard to assume in epistemological discussions that the belief that $p$ is a necessary condition for knowing that $p$. This paper presents some considerations that may put this view into doubt. More precisely, I will argue that there are cases where there are certain objections to attributing beliefs to someone, but the same objections don’t apply to attributing knowledge to the same person. The kind of cases I have in mind are familiar from arguments for the so-called “extended mind” hypothesis.
Leibniz, Plato, and Two Theories of Innate Ideas
Nicholas Jolley, University of California, Irvine

In the New Essays and other writings Leibniz supplements his dispositional theory of innate ideas with an account in terms of the mind’s reflection on its own nature. The reflection account has puzzled readers and it has been harshly criticized. In this paper I argue that this account avoids certain problems posed by the dispositional theory; in particular, it allows Leibniz to remain more faithful to his Platonic doctrine that the human mind mirrors the divine perfections. I also defend the reflection account against the objection that it is limited in scope to explaining our possession of metaphysical concepts. Finally, I reply to the objection that, far from offering a competing theory, the reflection account should be seen as a strand in a single, overarching theory of innate ideas that includes a dispositional component. I argue that, despite its attractions, this interpretation is subject to several damaging criticisms.

Mammals and Music Among Others: Crossmodal Perception and Musical Expressiveness
William P. Seeley, Bates College

The paradox of musical expressiveness can be interpreted as a question about the nature of artistic communication in music. We express an emotion when we publicly display it in our behavior. Behavioral expressiveness is thereby one side of a communicative exchange whose function is, at least in part, to help integrate and coordinate the activities of individuals in social contexts—it is a subconscious means to reveal emotions indicative of our current beliefs, desires, and action tendencies. Musical works are inanimate artifacts. Therefore, the exchange between music and a listener is not adequately structured to support an expressive communicative event. Yet, nonetheless, we regularly recognize music as expressive of emotions and are sometimes even aroused to experience those emotions. In this paper I propose an integrated crossmodal model for our engagement with expressive music and sketch its potential impact on the discussion of this issue.

Manipulation and the Reactive Emotions
Justin Coates, University of Chicago

In this paper I argue that the manipulation argument against compatibilism is unsound. Specifically, I claim that the reactive emotions of resentment and indignation can be fitting responses to actions performed by manipulated agents. To motivate this claim, I first provide an analysis of the reactive emotions that specifies the conditions under which they are appropriate. Because resentment and indignation are mental attitudes that represent others’ actions as disrespectful, they are fitting just in case the agent’s action is in fact disrespectful. I proceed to argue on the basis of three independently motivated arguments that manipulated agents like Professor Plum (a creation of Derk Pereboom) act in disrespectful ways.
Consequently, manipulated agents like Plum can be fitting targets of the reactive emotions. And because being responsible should be understood in terms of being an apt target of the reactive emotions, I conclude that manipulation doesn’t undermine responsibility.

Meadian Pragmatism and Scientific Objectivity

Joshua Houston, Vanderbilt University

In this paper I argue that George Herbert Mead’s account of sociality provides a framework from which we can articulate objectivity as an epistemic norm (or cluster of norms) that emerges from the intersubjective, communicative dimension of sociality. Drawing on resources from Mead’s work, I follow Helen E. Longino in articulating a social account of the norm of procedural objectivity, according to which a process of inquiry is evaluated as objective insofar as it allows for criticism from diverse perspectives. I construe this general requirement, of the subjection of knowledge claims to legitimation via the input and negotiation of various perspectives, as the inherently social core of the epistemic ideal of objectivity. I go beyond Longino, however, in arguing that the normative force of the ideal of procedural objectivity requires a regulative ideal from which it gains its normative force.

Metaphysical Analyticity and the Epistemology of Logic

Gillian Russell, Washington University in St. Louis

On one traditional approach to the epistemology of logic, logic is analytic and our knowledge of it is based on our knowledge of meaning. On another, beliefs about logic are just one part of the interconnected web of our beliefs about the world, a web that can be revised as a whole in response to new data of any kind. This paper argues for a third view, on which logical truths are true in virtue of meaning, though their epistemology is more holist (and perhaps even a posteriori).

Minimal Structural Essentialism

David Glick, University of Arizona

John Stachel has proposed that quantum mechanics and general relativity share an interesting trait: both fail to distinguish “which is which” when it comes to objects and their properties. This paper is concerned with the metaphysical implications of this feature, which Stachel calls “general permutability” (GP). It has been argued that GP provides support for scientific structuralism, but extant proposals are problematic. My own view, “Minimal Structural Essentialism,” aims to provide a clear structuralist metaphysics motivated by GP. Roughly, my view is that points and particles have their structural properties essentially. This compels us to view representations related by permutation as equivalent, thus supporting GP. It also serves as an explication of the structuralist image of fundamental objects as principally elements of structure.
MIRROR REALISM

MATT LEONARD, UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, DAVIS

This paper concerns how the mereotopological structure of material objects is related to the mereotopological structure of those objects’ locations in spacetime. If an object $x$ is a part of an object $y$, does it follow that $x$’s location is a part of $y$’s location? If $x$’s location is connected to $y$’s location, does it follow that $x$ is connected to $y$? Mirror realism is the view that, for any objects, they are mereotopologically related in a given way iff their locations are mereotopologically related in that way. In this paper, I do a few things. I provide some reasons to think that mirror realism is true. I then provide some natural principles which capture the view. I then show how the introduction of these principles leads to two undesirable results: the “expansions” of objects and the exclusion of some views people often defend: namely, one version of endurantism, one view regarding time-travel, and the view defending coincident objects. Lastly, I discuss how mirror realism relates to the big picture. In particular, I discuss how the view and its consequences relate to the debate between (dualist) substantivalists and supersubstantivalists.

MODUS DARWIN RECONSIDERED

CASEY HELGESON, UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN, MADISON

Modus Darwin is the name given by Elliott Sober to a form of argument that Sober attributes to Darwin in the *Origin of Species*, and to subsequent evolutionary biologists who have reasoned in the same way. In short, the argument form goes: Similarity, ergo common ancestry. In the present paper I review and critique Sober’s analysis of Darwin’s reasoning. I argue that modus Darwin has serious limitations that make the argument form unsuited for supporting Darwin’s conclusions. Thus, either Darwin argued badly, or he didn’t use modus Darwin.

MORAL ANTIREALISM AND THE PROBLEM OF SELF-DEFEAT

JOSHUA RASMUSSEN, AZUSA PACIFIC UNIVERSITY

I argue that, given certain commonly held assumptions, certain moral antirealist theories are ultimately self-defeating. Here is the barebones outline: (i) if moral antirealism is true, then any evaluative judgment could be “true” relative to certain people; (ii) but the judgment to disobey all moral judgments cannot be true relative to anyone; (iii) therefore, moral antirealism is not true. I spell out the details and discuss potential objections.

MORAL RESPONSIBILITY WITHOUT MORAL CONSIDERABILITY

TIMOTHY NAILER, UNIVERSITY OF ADELAIDE

Applied ethicists distinguish between moral agents, who can legitimately be held morally responsible, and moral patients, to whom we owe direct moral consideration. Recent explorations into the moral responsibility of groups and artificial intelligences, entities that do not obviously seem to be
owed direct moral consideration, highlight the question of whether moral agency requires moral considerability. Whether one accepts the possibility of non-patient moral agents depends on the theories of moral responsibility and moral considerability that one accepts. Specifically, it requires that no condition necessary for moral responsibility is also sufficient for moral considerability. I analyze reactive attitude, hierarchical, and valuational theories of moral responsibility, and Kantian, preference-satisfaction, and hedonistic theories of moral considerability, which I cross-reference to argue that certain pairs of theories allow for the possibility of such agents, others do not, and others require further clarification or development before we can make a clear determination.

**MORAL RESPONSIBILITY, LUCK, AND COMPATIBILISM**

*TAYLOR CYR, FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY*

Libertarians about free will, those who believe that at least some human beings have free will despite free will’s incompatibility with determinism, have been criticized for their view’s failure to show how agents’ actions are not subject to present (or cross-world) luck. Recently, some have argued that compatibilists about free will and determinism likewise encounter the problem of luck. The aim of this paper is to develop a history-sensitive compatibilist strategy for dealing with luck of both stripes. Although officially agnostic concerning whether or not free will and moral responsibility are historical concepts, I suggest that the history-sensitive compatibilist’s best strategy for dealing with luck leads to a nonhistorical compatibilism. One implication of this paper, if it succeeds, is that at least one version of event-causal libertarianism (modest libertarianism) can avoid the problem of present luck just as compatibilism can.

**MUSHY SKEPTICAL THEISM AND THE EVIDENTIAL ARGUMENT FROM EVIL**

*CAMERON DOMENICO KIRK-GIANNNINI, OXFORD UNIVERSITY*

Bergmann and Rea (2005) hope to defend skeptical theism against the charge that it entails moral skepticism by offering a credible hypothesis about the conditions under which a rational skeptical-theistic agent ought to act to prevent the occurrence of a *prima facie* horrific evil. I show that the hypothesis in question is not credible; skeptical theism and rational obligation to prevent *prima facie* horrific evils are inconsistent according to standard decision theory, even when credence functions are allowed to “go mushy.” In the absence of a compelling alternative theory of decision, I conclude that the moral challenge remains an important problem for skeptical-theistic responses to the evidential argument from evil.

**NATURALISM VERSUS THE FIRST-PERSON PERSPECTIVE**

*HILARY KORNBLYTH, UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS, AMHERST*

Many philosophers have discussed features of the first-person perspective that seem to create problems for naturalism. Qualitative character, consciousness itself, and our ability to think of ourselves from a first-person
point of view have each been alleged to create problems for naturalism. These suggestions have been much discussed. But I will not be discussing any of these problems. I am not interested here in the ways in which the first-person perspective might create problems for naturalism. I am interested, instead, in how it is that naturalism creates problems for the first-person perspective. In my view, the first-person perspective gets far more respect than it deserves. There are serious problems with the view which the first-person perspective affords, and naturalism nicely brings these out. The first-person perspective needs to be taken down a notch, and naturalism is well-placed to do the job. Or so I will argue.

NEWTONIAN AND EVOLUTIONARY FORCES

CHRISTOPHER HITCHCOCK, CALIFORNIA INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY
JOEL VELASCO, CALIFORNIA INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY

A number of recent papers have criticized what they call the “dynamical interpretation” of evolutionary theory found in Elliott Sober’s The Nature of Selection. Sober argues that we can think of evolutionary theory as a theory of forces analogous to Newtonian mechanics. These critics argue that there are several important disanalogies between evolutionary and Newtonian forces such as that unlike evolutionary forces, Newtonian forces can be considered in isolation, they have source laws, they compose causally in a straightforward way, and they are tertium quid in a causal chain. Here we defend and extend the forces analogy by arguing that each of these criticisms are based on a misunderstanding of Newtonian forces. Our discussion also has the interesting consequence that natural selection turns out to be more similar to forces such as friction and elastic forces rather than the more “canonical” gravitation.

ON CORRECTLY APPLYING “aubergine”: DEFENDING SEMANTIC NORMATIVITY

ADAM AUCH, DALHOUSIE UNIVERSITY

In recent years, a number of philosophers, most notably Wikforss (2001), Boghossian (2003), and Hattiangadi (2006, 2007), have argued that linguistic meaning cannot be genuinely normative because the correctness conditions for words and phrases imply only hypothetical, and not categorical imperatives. Only categorical normativity, they argue, has the intrinsic action-guiding property required to pose problems for naturalist and realist accounts of meaning. In this paper, I attempt to defend the semantic normativity hypothesis against these arguments. In particular, I present reasons to resist the notion that only categorical semantic correctness conditions should be considered to be genuinely normative. While meanings may be distinguished by non-normative means, the significance of this distinction is a normative matter. In other words, though there are facts about the proper application of words like “aubergine” and “courgette,” it is a normative matter that these facts (and not others) are taken to be decisive.
ON GÖDEL AND THE IDEALITY OF TIME

JOHN MANCHAK, UNIVERSITY OF WASHINGTON

Gödel’s (1949a) remarks concerning the ideality of time are examined. In the literature, some of these remarks have been somewhat neglected while others have been heavily criticized. In this note, we propose a clear and defensible sense in which Gödel’s work bears on the question of whether there is an objective lapse of time in our world.

ON THE DIRECT ARGUMENT AND THE BURDEN OF PROOF: A RESPONSE TO SCHNALL AND WIDERKER

YAEEL LOEWENSTEIN, UNIVERSITY OF ARIZONA

Peter van Inwagen’s Direct Argument (DA) makes use of a rule of inference he calls “Rule (B).” Michael McKenna has argued that van Inwagen’s defense of this rule is dialectically inappropriate because it is based entirely on alleged “confirming cases” of the rule which are not in fact the type of cases at the heart of the compatibilism/incompatibilism dispute and can thus do no work in justifying van Inwagen’s use of Rule (B) in DA. Recently, however, Ira M. Schnall and David Widerker have put forth a powerful two-pronged attack against McKenna’s objection to DA. My aim is to demonstrate that neither prong of their attack is successful: first, Schnall and Widerker fail to construct a legitimate confirming instance of Rule (B); and, second, they are wrong in thinking that it is not dialectically inappropriate to mount a defense of Rule (B) that relies on van Inwagen’s own cases.

ON WHAT THERE IS, TOO

JOHN KELLER, NIAGARA UNIVERSITY

A growing number of philosophers have come to doubt that we should follow Quine’s Commandment: thou shalt not deny the entailments of thy best theories. This paper argues that rejecting Quine’s Commandment commits one to irrationality or skepticism. This consequence of rejecting Quine’s Commandment has gone undetected in part due to misconceptions about the role of paraphrase in Quinean meta-ontology. In the final section of the paper, I point out the worst of these misconceptions.

ON WHAT THERE SEEMS TO BE: REFLECTIONS ON PHENOMENAL CONSERVATISM AND COMMON SENSE

PHILIP OSBORNE, PURDUE UNIVERSITY

Phenomenal Conservatism (or “PC”) is a foundationalist epistemological theory according to which non-inferential justification arises from mental states known as “seemings.” PC is standardly thought of as being well within the common sense tradition in epistemology, according to which subjects need not have access to sophisticated anti-skeptical arguments in order to have knowledge of themselves and the world around them. This short paper calls PC’s common sense credentials into question. I identify
the following assumption as key to PC’s status as a common sense view: Necessarily, a belief’s degree of non-inferential justification co-varies with the strength of the associated seemings. I then argue that because this assumption has normatively implausible consequences, the proponent of PC must surrender the assumption, leaving PC’s point of contact with the common sense tradition unclear.

ONE THEORY TO RULE THEM ALL

FABRIZIO CARIANI, NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY

In recent literature in natural language semantics, there has been a lot of interest in how to derive some broadly decision theoretic verdicts concerning deontic modalities (specifically “ought” and “should”) and their interactions with conditionals and probability operators. It is easy to argue that a traditional Kratzer-style premise-semantics needs some revisions in order to get these facts right. The difficulty is how to develop a semantic theory that gets those facts while remaining, as much as possible, “ethically neutral”—without, for example, building facts about rational decision-theory into the semantics of “should.” This paper answers this challenge by providing a probabilistic (but not decision-theoretic) semantics for deontic modals.

ONTLOGICAL DEPENDENCE GROUNDS GROUNDING

MARK MAKIN, UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, IRVINE

I propose a novel account of what grounds grounding that involves a connection between grounding and ontological dependence that has heretofore been overlooked. Particular grounding facts, I argue, are grounded in facts about ontological dependence, where ontological dependence is defined in terms of essence. The paper is divided into two sections: in the first section I present my ontological dependence account of what grounds grounding, and in the second I illustrate how it applies to putative cases of grounding. The ontological dependence account possesses multiple virtues, including its coherence with a plausible theory of the nature of explanation and its versatility in accommodating the full range of putative grounding facts.

ONTLOGICAL PARSIMONY AND EROSION

THOMAS METCALF, UNIVERSITY OF COLORADO, BOULDER

I present a novel argument against the widely employed principle that we should ceteris paribus prefer smaller ontologies to larger ontologies. I argue that this preference commits one to an implausible epistemological thesis, according to which evidence for the existence of some entity is at least prima facie evidence against the existence of all other entities. Therefore, philosophers have good reason to cease appealing to one very common principle of ontological parsimony.
OUT OF THIS WORLD

**Benj Hellie, University of Toronto**

The crown jewel of analytic philosophy, “classical modal semantics,” treats meaning as content. True enough when meaning is “purely objective.” But that leaves out almost everything of philosophical interest. In particular, our attempts to understand consciousness have been extraordinarily procrustean. Fortunately, we can look for a panacea to “mindset semantics,” an enrichment of the classical approach according to which meaning is a relation between content and mindset. On the resulting picture, discourse about consciousness does not concern the constituency of objective reality—we are out of this world.

POLITICS AND THE NATURE OF VIOLENCE: RICOEUR’S NEGOTIATION WITH ARENDT AND LEVINAS

**Mark Gedney, Gordon College**

The crisis of European liberal democracy after the horrific violence of two world wars led many to speculate that violence is lodged at the core of political power itself. In this paper, I develop an account of the work of Arendt, Levinas, and Ricoeur that puts their accounts of violence and politics into a productive tension. I begin by examining Arendt’s claim that politics, rather than being the source of violence, is in fact the realm in which violence is overcome. Arendt, however, seems to consign much of social life to violence, and so I turn to Levinas’s claim that a proper understanding of violence requires a more radical account of human desire that renews suspicions about political action. In my conclusion, I sketch an account of Ricoeur’s work as a productive negotiation of these two thinkers that defends Arendt’s fundamental insights, modified, however, by his close reading of Levinas.

PRAISEWORTHINESS AND PHRONESIS-ENHANCED FREEDOM

**Andrew Eshlemen, University of Portland**

Much recent work on moral responsibility has focused on responsibility as accountability—a particular type of responsibility associated primarily with the blame-oriented attitudes of resentment, indignation, and guilt, as well as with their accompanying practices. Though certainly important, near exclusive attention to responsibility as accountability fosters a truncated portrait of our moral lives by largely ignoring responsibility for actions that merit praise and emulation. Making sense of praiseworthy action requires that we raise the profile of another type of responsibility—what Gary Watson has identified as its attributability, or “aretaic” face. I argue that when we do so, some important distinctive features of virtuous agency are thereby highlighted, including a sense in which such agency may exhibit an oft-overlooked and distinctive type of freedom.
PREDICENT AUTONOMY AND THE AUTHORITY OF ADVANCE DIRECTIVES
ERIC VOGELSTEIN, JEFFERSON COLLEGE OF HEALTH SCIENCES

Advance directives are commonly praised as an important way to safeguard the autonomy of incompetent medical patients; nevertheless, important questions remain about their moral authority. The main philosophical concern with advance directives involves cases in which the incompetent patient no longer possesses the desires on which the advance directive was based (for example, in cases of severe dementia). The question is, does that entail that prior expressions of medical choices are no longer morally binding? I believe that the answer is “yes.” I argue that a patient’s autonomy is not respected by honoring the preferences she used to have but no longer does. If this is correct, then advance directives in the kind of case at issue are not morally binding, and it may even be morally required to act contrary to a patient’s explicit advance directive.

PRELUDE TO A THEORY OF MUSIC REPRESENTATION
BRANDON POLITE, KNOX COLLEGE

This paper offers the beginnings of a resemblance theory of musical representation. I start by examining how Peter Kivy and Roger Scruton, two prominent philosophers of music, conceive of artistic representation. Each model’s artistic representation (in part) on a Gricean conception of linguistic communication on which the audience’s ability to grasp an artwork’s intended subject is necessary for it to count as a representation. This model, I claim, confuses problems surrounding musical representation. I offer in its place a model of representation that philosophers have productively applied across a number of domains: structural resemblance. This model not only accommodates examples that the linguistic model cannot, but, by divorcing a piece of music’s representational status from our grasping its subject, also clarifies how a composer’s intention to represent a given subject can be realized musically, how the audience grasps the subject in the music, and how linguistic conventions facilitate both processes.

PROBLEMS FOR CLASSICAL INCOMPATIBILISM
JOSEPH CAMPBELL, WASHINGTON STATE UNIVERSITY

Classical views of free will hold that S freely does a only if S is or was able to do otherwise. Classical incompatibilism holds that if determinism is true, no one is or was able to do otherwise. This paper explores two problems for classical incompatibilism. In section 2 it is shown that the best arguments for classical incompatibilism do not really prove the thesis. Several recent responses to this criticism are considered and rebutted. Section 3 establishes that there is no adequate classical incompatibilist analysis of “ability to do otherwise.” There is a very clear necessary condition: S is able to do otherwise only if that S does otherwise is consistent with propositions about the past and the laws of nature. Yet there is no single underlying classical incompatibilist analysis and all the analyses that spring to mind are subject to compelling criticisms.
PROFESSIONAL NORMS AND INSTITUTIONAL EXPLOITATION

DANIEL KOLTONSKI, AMHERST COLLEGE

In a market economy, members of professions are vulnerable to a distinctive kind of exploitation—the exploitation of their vocational commitment—and this exploitation, particularly in the “caring” professions, is morally wrong. The fact that professionals are vulnerable to this kind of exploitation is not a contingent one, as it seems a structural feature of a market economy that includes professions. This is important to note, say, in cases concerning nurses (or members of other caring professions), because, when such exploitation is allowed to occur, it becomes difficult for the nurse to live both as a person of integrity—as someone who is able to live up to the demands of her own reasonable personal projects and relationships outside of work—and as a morally conscientious agent, for she finds herself in situations where she feels morally compelled to allow herself to be exploited.

REARMING THE SLINGSHOT

MEGAN WALLACE, UNIVERSITY OF KENTUCKY

Slingshot arguments aim to show that an allegedly non-extensional sentential connective—such as “necessarily (☐)” or “the statement that \( \Phi \)” is, to the contrary, an extensional sentential connective. Neale (1995, 2001) argues that a reformulation of Gödel’s slingshot shows that (certain) theories of facts are forced to adopt a Russelian or non-referential theory of descriptions, on pain of metaphysical collapse. I will present a revised version of the slingshot argument—one that piggy-backs on Neal’s formulation that relies on Kaplan’s notion of “dthat”—in order to show that whatever our treatment of descriptions, the slingshot is either (i) still threatening or (ii) was never a threat to begin with.

REASONS WRONG AND RIGHT

NATHANIEL SHARADIN, UNIVERSITY OF NORTH CAROLINA AT CHAPEL HILL

The fact that I just put my children to bed is a reason for me to believe my children are safely asleep in their beds; the fact that you’ve offered me a great deal of money to believe my children are safely asleep in their beds is also a reason—a different kind of reason—for me to believe they’re asleep in their beds. Philosophers mark the difference between these two kinds of reasons by saying the first is the right, whereas the second is the wrong, kind of reason for an action or attitude. The thought is that the wrong kind of reasons are somehow defective in a way the right kind of reasons are not. The philosophical task is making sense of this intuitive thought. I argue that three recent attempts to do so are mistaken. I then present an alternative view and argue that it makes good on the promise of the failed accounts while avoiding the difficulties plaguing them.
RELEASING PRISONERS WITH DEMENTIA: COULD THERE BE A RECOLLECTION REQUIREMENT FOR EXPRESSIVIST AND COMMUNICATIVE JUSTIFICATIONS OF PUNISHMENT?

ANNETTE DUFNER, WESTFÄLISCHE WILHELM-UNIVERSITÄT

This paper is based on the assumption that a prison is not the right place for criminals in the late stages of dementia. More specifically, I will argue that applicable theories of punishment, especially theories with an appropriate expressivist or communicative element, fail to justify the imprisonment of the late-stage demented, because this would require a capacity for comprehension on the part of the punished, and, under certain narrowly specified conditions, even a capacity to be at least in principle capable of recalling the crime.

RESCUING RULE-FOLLOWING: HOW DISPOSITIONALISM CAN HELP WITH RULE-FOLLOWING PRIMITIVISM

NATHANIEL BULTHUIS, CORNELL UNIVERSITY

A feature typical of standard models of rule-following is that the analyses they offer break down at some fundamental level. Recently, Paul Boghossian has provided a diagnosis of why these breakdowns occur. He locates the problem in an assumption, common to standard models of rule-following, that rule-following necessarily involves drawing a deductive inference. This assumption, he argues, leads to a vicious regress upon which typical analyses founder. But, having diagnosed the problem, Boghossian is at a loss as to how to rescue rule-following. I argue that one possible source of rescue which Boghossian rejects—rule-following primitivism—holds much promise. Furthermore, I argue that rule-following primitivism need not make rule-following mysterious. For, while we ought not to identify one’s acceptance of a rule with one’s dispositions to act, we can—and should—appeal to dispositionalism as an account of what determines the rules we follow.

RESPONDING TO MARX (GROUCHO, NOT KARL) ON OBLIGATIONS TO POSTERITY

MARTIN BENJAMIN, MICHIGAN STATE UNIVERSITY

Anthropogenic climate change poses a serious threat to the well-being, if not the lives, of distant future generations. Averting the most serious effects is likely to require significant reductions in consumption, comfort, and convenience. Do we have an obligation to make such reductions? If so, what is its basis? A quip attributed to comedian Groucho Marx implies there is no such obligation. “Why should I care about posterity?” Groucho asks. “What’s posterity ever done for me?” This is a compressed argument based on reciprocity. Distant future generations can do nothing for us, Groucho assumes, because we will be gone before they exist. Therefore, we have no obligations to them. Is there a plausible response? I argue there is. The prospective existence and well-being of distant future generations give shape and meaning here and now to our finite lives.
RESPONSIBILITY AND IMPLICIT BIAS

MICHAEL S. BROWNSTEIN, NEW JERSEY INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY

“Implicit biases” are typically unconscious, negative evaluative attitudes about individuals based on their membership in stigmatized social groups. Such biases have been shown to impact social behavior in many unsettling ways. It is a difficult question whether, and in what way, individuals are responsible for behaviors affected by implicit biases. I argue that such behaviors are attributable to agents, in Watson’s (1996) sense. Attributability tells us that an agent is an appropriate subject for judgments of responsibility for a particular behavior. Determining that behavior is attributable to an agent, however, does not settle questions about the responsibilities an agent bears to others or to the expectations and demands others might have of responsible agents. This sort of responsibility is what Watson calls accountability. I analyze accountability for behaviors affected by implicit biases.

RESPONSIBILITY FOR VULNERABILITY AND NON-IDENTITY

HOWARD NYE, UNIVERSITY OF ALBERTA

It can seem wrong to cause individuals to exist, even when their lives are worth continuing, if we could have caused different, better-off individuals to exist instead. The non-identity problem is that causing the existence of the individuals who are less well-off does not seem to make anyone worse off, and it is difficult to explain why else it would be wrong. In response to this problem, several authors have suggested that we have special obligations to create better-off individuals. But reflection on the non-identity problem itself seems to undermine the plausibility of these obligations. In this paper I argue that special obligations to create better-off individuals can be supported by a plausible understanding of obligations to prevent others from suffering harms to which we have made them vulnerable in cases where their levels of well-being after we create the vulnerability are neither higher, lower, nor equally as high as before.

ROLES AND RELATIONSHIPS: WHY SOCIAL ROLES CANNOT GROUND ASSOCIATIVE OBLIGATIONS

NINA BREWER-DAVIS, AUBURN UNIVERSITY

Associative reasons, which attach to interpersonal relationships and hold by virtue of the relationships, have received some attention recently, but basic features of these reasons, including what grounds or justifies them, remain underdeveloped. One common theory of such reasons is that they attach to a special kind of status, position, or social role, and when an individual identifies with that role or status (such as “mother,” or “member of this political community”), she acquires associative reasons. However, I will argue that social role, or identification, views provide reasons that are different in kind from associative reasons, assuming that they provide any reasons at all. Social roles depend on the individual inhabiting the role, and the way she does that, rather than features of her relationship
with another person. They also cannot account for the wide and deep variations between particular relationships of the same type.

**Russell Versus Wittgenstein on Nonsense**  
*Dominic Alford-Duguid, University of Toronto*

In *Theory of Knowledge* Bertrand Russell developed a sophisticated multiple relation theory of judgment. Russell later abandoned this theory in response to an objection from Wittgenstein. Wittgenstein claimed that Russell’s theory fails a basic constraint on any right account of judgment, viz. that such a theory should entail that it is impossible to judge nonsense. In this paper I argue that Russell’s theory can resist Wittgenstein’s attack. The paper has three parts: §1 sketches the Theory of Knowledge view, while §2 develops Wittgenstein’s criticism; §3 contains my case in favor of Russell.

**Scotus on Omnipotence and the Disunity of the Sciences**  
*Joseph Anderson, University of South Florida*

In John Duns Scotus’s *Reportatio*, he considers two questions: whether omnipotence can be proved by natural reasoning, and whether God can, through omnipotence, directly produce anything that is possible. Scotus offers a negative answer to the first and a positive answer to the second. One would think, then, that omnipotence is neither proved true nor proved false by natural reasoning, but this is not the case. Scotus’s arguments for the negative answer to the first question are arguments that omnipotence is inconsistent with those things that are known by natural reasoning. If Scotus were able to overcome these difficulties, his arguments for the negative answer to the first question would be undermined. I conclude (with evidence from other passages from the *Reportatio*) that Scotus held that the sciences that employ natural reasoning are independent from theology. These disciplines are able to come to contradictory conclusions.

**Scrupulous Agents**  
*Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, Duke University*  
*Jesse Summers, Duke University*

Scrupulosity (a form of OCD involving obsession with morality) raises fascinating issues about the nature of moral judgment, about what is morally permitted in therapy, and about moral responsibility. After defining scrupulosity, describing its common features, and discussing concrete cases studies, we will focus on some peculiar aspects of moral judgments made by scrupulous patients (such as thought-action fusion) and on the issue of whether these patients are reasons-responsive in the ways required for control and moral responsibility.

**Seeing, Noticing, and Noteworthiness**  
*Chris Smith, Wake Forest University*

I develop and defend a theory about the nature of seeing called the noteworthiness view. According to this view, seeing something requires
noticing it if it is noteworthy. More specifically, seeing something requires noticing it if the information that it is present at an egocentric location is noteworthy. This view implies that seeing is referentially opaque, i.e., that it’s possible for “S sees x” and “S sees y” to differ in truth value even though \( x = y \). The main motivation for the view is its ability to resolve a paradox about camouflage recently articulated by Fred Dretske: we see something in the spaces occupied by perfectly camouflaged objects, so it seems that, contrary to what we ordinarily say, we see perfectly camouflaged objects. I argue that the referential opacity of seeing allows us to say we see the occupants of the spaces without seeing the perfectly camouflaged objects.

**SELF-DEFENSE AND CULPABILITY: FAULT FORFEITS FIRST**

*Richard Arneson, University of California, San Diego*

When one person’s behavior or bodily movement threatens to cause serious harm to another, under what circumstances is it morally permissible to use violent force, even lethal force, to save one’s life (or the life of a threatened victim)? Recent authors on self-defense disparage the idea that culpability or blameworthiness has an important role to play in answering this question. This essay resists this consensus. I propose Fault Forfeits First: In a situation in which the bodily movements of some place others under threat of suffering physical harm, resulting in a predicament in which someone must die, if one person is significantly morally at fault (culpable) with respect to this situation, and at fault (culpable) to a significantly greater extent than others with respect to this situation, then it is morally preferable that this culpable agent should be the one who dies.

**SLIP-PROOF ACTIONS**

*Santiago Amaya, Washington University in St. Louis*

Most human actions are complex, but some of them are basic. Which are these? In this paper, I seek to answer this question by invoking slips, a common kind of mistake. The proposal is this: an action is basic if and only if it is not possible to slip in performing it. The argument discusses some well-established results from the psychology of language production in the context of a philosophical theory of action. In the end, the proposed criterion is applied to show why basic actions should not be identified with bodily movements.

**SOCRATES AND GORGIAS ON THE AIDS OF ARGUMENT**

*Tushar Irani, Wesleyan University*

Most studies of the Gorgias that consider Socrates’ exchanges with its eponymous character focus on the well-known refutation passage at 460a-e. This paper argues that Socrates’ questioning of Gorgias in the early stages of the dialogue sets the pattern of inquiry he pursues in his subsequent exchanges with Polus and Callicles. His purpose here is to reorient his interlocutors’ attitudes towards argument—to get them to reconceive what it means to use argument well and what the role of argument should
be in civic life. This calls for Socrates to offer an alternative to Gorgias’s view of argument as a purely competitive skill, an approach to discourse that requires not just a commitment to truth, but also a commitment to the good of others, and by focusing in this way on what I call the social dimension of argument, he meets the rhetorician on his own terms.

SPINOZA ON A SUPPOSED RIGHT TO LIE

MATTHEW HOMAN, KENNESAW STATE UNIVERSITY

According to Ethics 4p72, a free man always acts honestly, never deceptively, even in the face of death. According to Spinoza’s principle of self-preservation, however, an individual has an absolute right to do whatever is to his advantage, including, it would seem, to lie. The conflict between 4p72 and the principle of self-preservation presents a difficult problem. I argue against a solution which turns on reading the free man of 4p72 as an ideal limit concept. Since the ideal free man cannot actually die, this solution renders 4p72 senseless. The only way of making sense of 4p72 is to understand how death can be the lesser of two evils for actual finite human beings. I show how death qua lesser evil fits with the principle of self-preservation, for Spinoza, by (i) distinguishing between kinds of “self” in “self-preservation,” and (ii) pointing to certain rare cases where duty prevails over life.

SPINOZA ON EXTENSION

ALISON PETERMAN, UNIVERSITY OF ROCHESTER

In this paper, I argue that when Spinoza talks about the attribute of Extension he does not mean the three-dimensional extension, and that by “an extended thing” he does not mean a volume. The argument proceeds in two parts: First, I present Spinoza’s argument that corporeal substance is not extended in length, breadth and depth. Second, I make the more controversial case that Spinoza does not believe that extension understood this way emerges from certain modifications of Extended substance in any way, and that our perception of physical things as volumes is a function of the imagination, and hence inadequate.

STRICT EGAListarianism about Medical Treatment

ROBERT C. HUGHES, UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, LOS ANGELES

If Kant’s argument for public support of the poor is sound, then the state is required to ensure that citizens’ finances do not affect their access to life-saving medical treatment. It must ensure this even if doing so involves leveling down and even if a less egalitarian health care system would offer better care to the poor.
SUPERVERVALUATING AT HIGHER ORDERS: HOW TO INCORPORATE INTRANSITIVE ADMISSIBILITY

CARL EHRETT, FURMAN UNIVERSITY

Two types of problems afflict supervaluationist attempts to avoid sharp semantic boundaries for vague expressions. Firstly: how can it be indeterminate whether \( o \) is absolutely determinately \( F \), given that \( o \) is absolutely determinately \( F \) iff \( o \) is determinately \( F \) at all levels of vagueness? Secondly are arguments found in Wright (1987), (1992) and (2010), and Fara (2003) and (2011). Call these the structural problems: under seemingly innocuous assumptions about determinacy, paradox results. Wright also diagnoses supervaluationism as unhappily committed to the “Buffering View,” that the extension and anti-extension of a vague term are buffered by another category, as purple buffers red and blue. A strategy for absolute determinacy has been suggested by Williamson (1994, 156-61), and modified by Keefe (2000, 202-10). Keefe’s suggestion is purely formal; an explanation is needed to integrate it into a supervaluationist framework. I offer one which resolves not just the problem of absolute determinacy, but also the structural problems.

TEACHING HOW TO TEACH PHILOSOPHY: AIMS, CHALLENGES, AND INSIGHTS

SARAH CASHMORE, UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO
TREVOR NORRIS, UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO

In this paper we describe how we have begun training teachers how to teach secondary philosophy. Since the late 1990s philosophy has been offered in the province of Ontario. Currently some 30,000 students per year are enrolled in grade 11 and 12 philosophy in some 300 schools by some 700 teachers. In this presentation we describe the design and development of this teacher education course. We explore the conceptual underpinnings, larger pedagogical objectives, and political implications of preparing candidates to teach philosophy. Perhaps the most significant guiding principle was that this course wasn’t designed or intended to help advance students’ content knowledge, familiarity with philosophy, or fill gaps in their knowledge. It was necessary to emphasize the intense and demanding dynamics of a high school classroom, the challenges of working within a school structure, and the centrality of relationships with students to the daily life of a high school teacher.

TELEPTION AND MORAL RESOLUTION

RICHARD HOLTON, MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY

Resolutions enable us to resist temptation by committing us to a course of action decided in advance. Moral resolutions likewise enable us to resist the temptation brought by morally challenging situations. I discuss this with reference to recent U.S. policy on torture. I suggest further that this explains why morally effective action can require agents to look not just out to the world, but also inwards towards their own resolutions; and that this in turn can provide a justification for something like the doctrine of double effect.
THE ABSOLUTISM PROBLEM IN ON LIBERTY
PIERS NORRIS TURNER, OHIO STATE UNIVERSITY

In On Liberty, Mill’s liberty principle restricts absolutely paternalistic social interference with any basically rational adult. Yet, in his ethical writings Mill argues that, apart from the principle of utility itself, his utilitarianism is incompatible with absolutes. Making sense of the absolute character of the liberty principle in the context of his utilitarianism—what I will call the “absolutism problem”—is an instance of the general problem of reconciling Mill’s liberal and utilitarian commitments. I argue that four main solutions to the absolutism problem—the vital-interest view, the infinite-value view, the institutional-scope view, and the rule-utilitarian view—fail on their own terms, or are not supported by the text of On Liberty. I then defend a fifth solution—the competence view—that turns on Mill’s focus on expertise in decision-making structures.

THE AMORALIST AND THE ANAESTHETIC
ALEXANDRA KING, BROWN UNIVERSITY

The amoralist debate in metaethics has come to a kind of stalemate. While I don’t want to rehash the entire debate surrounding the possibility or plausibility of amoralists, I want to reopen the debate with a slightly different approach. I will draw on intuitions other than those directly surrounding the amoralist and her ability to make sincere ethical judgments. Instead, by looking at parallels in another normative domain, aesthetics, we might be able to revive our exhausted amoralist intuitions. I will argue that an aesthetic analog of the amoralist exists, the anaesthetic, and that such a person makes sincere aesthetic judgments, but is not motivated to act accordingly. Thus, the sincere avowal of robustly normative concepts does not seem to have a necessary connection to motivation, and so we have less reason to deny the existence of amoralists.

THE BAYESIAN CRITIQUE OF DOGMATIST AND EVIDENTIALIST ANTI-SKEPTICAL STRATEGIES
DORIT GANSON, OBERLIN COLLEGE

Dogmatism is a substantive, formidable epistemological program with considerable intuitive appeal, yet a simple set of Bayesian considerations seems to destroy its viability, at least as a Moorean anti-skeptical strategy. A similar case can be made against evidentialist and explanationist responses to skepticism. Drawing from work in the defense of scientific realism against charges of probabilistic incoherence, I explore a number of ways of trying to make considerations of explanatoriness compatible with Bayesian constraints, and suggest that some of these proposals may be relevant to answering the Bayesian worries concerning dogmatist and evidentialist anti-skeptical strategies.
THE COHERENCE OF CARTESIAN FREEDOM

**GEORGES DICKER, COLLEGE AT BROCKPORT, SUNY**

Descartes holds that clear and distinct perceptions are “assent-compelling,” that is, that during the time that one clearly and distinctly perceives some proposition $p$, one cannot but assent to $p$. Yet he insists that when we assent to a clear and distinct perception, we do so freely; indeed, he thinks that freely assenting to such perceptions is the “best” kind of freedom that we can have. In Descartes’s day, following the dictates of one’s reason was neither the favored method of fixing belief nor conducive to one’s personal safety, so his position may well strike us as a salutary celebration of intellectual freedom. But it also raises what looks like a radical problem: how can it be true that we are free when we assent to a clear and distinct perception if we cannot do otherwise than assent to it? I argue that Descartes could have resolved this apparent inconsistency.

THE CONCEPT OF A COMPOSITE AGENT

**SIWING TSOI, UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS AT AUSTIN**

An agent is the subject that acts, and a composite agent is an agent constituted by multiple agents. However, a set of several agents do not always constitute a composite agent. In other words, there is a concept of a composite agent such that it only applies to some sets of agents but not others. Taking how people ordinarily think of actions and agents as a starting point, I will argue that the concept of a composite agent is disjunctive, i.e., there is no essential feature shared by all composite agents. That means there are at least two distinct sufficient conditions of being a composite agent.

THE ECONOMIC MODEL OF FORGIVENESS

**BRANDON WARMKE, UNIVERSITY OF ARIZONA**

It is sometimes claimed that forgiveness involves the cancellation of a moral debt. This way of speaking about forgiveness exploits an analogy between moral forgiveness and economic debt-cancellation. We can call the view that moral forgiveness is like (in a way to be explained) economic debt-cancellation the Economic Model of Forgiveness. In this paper I articulate the model, motivate some of its theoretical and practical advantages, and defend it against some recent objections.

THE EPISTEMIC RATIONALITY OF MIND-WANDERING

**ZAC IRVING, UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO**

Cognitive neuroscientists have recently begun to debate the anatomical basis and functional role of mind-wandering. Yet there has been no sustained philosophical discussion of whether, as suggested by cases I discuss, mind-wandering has a rational role in epistemic inquiry. I argue that it does, focusing on how mind-wandering facilitates what I call “consideration receptivity,” which occurs when we think about a proposition other than the one we chose or planned to. In turn, I argue that
consideration receptivity can be epistemically valuable because it allows us to consider propositions that we initially deemed to be irrelevant, but turn out to be relevant. My argument for these theses draws on cognitive neuroscience, phenomenological data, and a brief sketch of epistemic value that I develop elsewhere.

THE FRAGILITY OF BELIEFS: A NEW ELIMINATIVIST ARGUMENT

CHRIS JENSON, UNIVERSITY OF UTAH

I offer a new argument for the elimination of “beliefs” from scientific psychology based on Wimsatt’s (1981) concept of robustness and its inverse, fragility. A theoretical entity is robust if multiple independent means of detection show invariant results in measuring the posited entity. A theoretical entity is fragile when multiple independent and reliable means of detecting it produce variant results. Recent work in social psychology shows radical variance between what people sincerely report their “beliefs” are and what their nonverbal behavior indicates about their “beliefs.” This variance between self-report and nonverbal behavior, two independent means of detection, is evidence that “belief” is a fragile theoretical posit and thus a strong candidate for elimination.

THE FUNDAMENTAL QUANTIFIER IS RESTRICTED

BRADLEY RETTLER, UNIVERSITY OF NOTRE DAME

There is a growing movement towards construing some classic debates in ontology as meaningless, either because the answers seem obvious or the debates seem intractable. In this paper, I give some ammunition to the ontologist. The ontologist should say that there is a quantifier more fundamental than the English quantifier, and that it is this quantifier that one should use when doing ontology. The reason some debates seem intractable is because some people are using this quantifier (or at least trying to), and others are not. Thankfully, the two quantifiers are not wholly unrelated; the austere ontologist’s quantifier is simply a restriction of her opponent’s quantifier—a restriction to the fundamental things. I define three senses of quantifier restriction and argue that in every sense, the fundamental quantifier is a restriction of the ordinary English quantifier.

THE INCONSISTENCY OF PURE LIBERTARIANISM

MATTHEW Braham, UNIVERSITÄT BAYREUTH

MARTIN VAN HEESE, RIJKSUNIVERSITEIT GRONINGEN

Libertarianism, whether in its “left” or “right” variety, is about the allocation of individual rights. We argue that there are four requirements that any rights structure should meet in order to be called purely libertarian: completeness, conclusiveness, non-imposition, and symmetry. Completeness means that we cannot add extra rights to individuals without yielding inconsistencies; conclusiveness states that agents can always ensure that all issues are decided through the exercise of rights; non-imposition ensures minimal richness of the options about which individuals have to make a decision;
and symmetry implies that all agents have the same rights. We show that no rights structure exists that satisfies all four of these conditions: pure libertarianism is an inconsistent political theory.

**The Independence Approach to Mindreading: Knowing What It’s Like to Be Someone Else, Low-level Simulation, and Theorizing**

*Anastasia Panagopoulou, Minnesota State University, Mankato*

I begin by linking my notion of shared experiential-knowledge to Alvin Goldman’s low-level simulational mindreading. We will see that sharing experiential-knowledge is necessary for the ability to low-level simulate. An important consequence follows: when experiential-knowledge is not present (hence, not shared nor sharable), low-level simulation is not possible, yet successful low-level mindreading still occurs. Why? I propose that low-level mindreading in the absence of low-level simulation is the result of theorizing. My defense of independence in low-level simulational mindreading rests on empirical evidence in Goldman (2006) with respect to selective impairment patterns for several emotions which show that since “there is a deficit both in experiencing a given emotion and a selective deficit in recognizing that very emotion” (p. 115), there is a consequent deficit in mindreading for the impaired emotion using low-level simulation, but not for mindreading for it using theorizing.

**The Metaphysics of Reconciliation: How Forgiveness Relieves Moral Debt**

*Jeffrey Helmreich, University of California, Irvine*

Philosophical treatment of forgiveness has focused on the attitudes or commitments of victims of wrongdoing. But forgiveness is also a formal speech act, associated with absolution (“I hereby forgive you”), which has powerful, but largely under-explored, moral consequences. Specifically, the formal act can relieve wrongdoers of significant duties of moral repair, including apology and restitution. Even when there are sound moral reasons to apologize and compensate a victim for harms wrongfully inflicted on them, victims can render these reparatory steps unnecessary, and their absence blameless, by forgiving their offenders. Here I seek to explain this unique power of the formal act of forgiveness. The account draws on two basic theses: first, restitution requires respecting the victim’s right to do what she wishes with any restitutionary benefits, including having them remain with the offender. Second, the formal speech act of forgiveness requires uptake of a kind that involves respecting the victim in all the essential ways apology does.

**The Moral Risk in Self-defense**

*David K. Chan, University of Wisconsin, Stevens Point*

Self-defense carries the risk that someone who is perceived as a threat is killed unjustifiably. This risk has been recognized in Lazar’s discussion of the agency view of the liability to be killed in self-defense. In this paper, I show that the risk in self-defense applies also to the unjustified-threat
and culpability views. There is usually uncertainty in real life concerning culpability and the existence of a threat. The moral risk in self-defense arises because the defender’s choice to kill involves a gamble that the person killed is morally liable to be killed. I argue that whether the criterion for the right to kill in self-defense is interpreted subjectively or objectively, the results are unsatisfactory. Thus, killing in self-defense is, contrary to common intuition, morally problematic in a way not fully recognized in any account of the right to kill in self-defense. I suggest an alternative approach derived from virtue ethics.

THE MOVING SPOTLIGHT VIEW ISN’T AS BAD AS YOU THINK

ROSS CAMERON, UNIVERSITY OF LEEDS

The moving spotlight view gets a hard time amongst A-theories. It is often thought that, in comparison to presentism, it faces both a metaphysical problem (in the face of McTaggart’s paradox) and an epistemic problem (how can we know we’re present?), whereas in comparison to the growing block view, it lacks the resources to account for the distinction between the closed past and open future. I think these claims are all wrong and that the moving spotlight view is at least as good as its A-theoretic rivals. In this talk I will argue for some subset of these claims.

THE NEW MECHANISTS AND THE MYTH OF NEGATIVE CAUSATION

SARAH ROE, UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, DAVIS

Currently, the philosophical literature is peppered with purported cases of negative causation. Here, I outline the new mechanists’ approaches, and argue that none of the approaches can handle purported cases of negative causation. I further argue that Philip Dowe’s approach regarding negative causation is flawed. As a result, I offer an enhanced version of Wesley Salmon’s account. By combining my view with those of the new mechanists, I argue that even those alleged cases that are deemed negative causation in fact are not upon further examination. Simply, the new mechanists’ accounts can explain alleged cases of negative causation when coupled with my account.

THE PHENOMENOLOGY OF HOT, OR WHAT IS IT LIKE TO THINK THAT YOU THINK THAT p?

RICHARD BROWN, LA GUARDIA COMMUNITY COLLEGE

In this paper I argue that a surprising consequence of the higher-order thought theory of consciousness as developed by David Rosenthal (2005; 2011) is that it is committed to the existence of cognitive phenomenology. The basic argument can be stated rather simply. Once one comes to accept that a suitable higher-order state is necessary and sufficient for there to be something that it is like for one to have a conscious mental state, there is no way to deny cognitive phenomenology. A conscious thought and a conscious pain both involve a higher-order state deploying concepts and result in one being aware of oneself as being in the mental state in
question. If it is only thoughts about oneself as being in qualitative states that results in phenomenology, then there must be something special, hence unexplained, about qualitative properties or concepts.

**The Precautionary Principle and the Dilemma Objection**  
**Daniel Steel, Michigan State University**

The dilemma objection charges that “weak” versions of PP are vacuous while “strong” ones are incoherent. I argue that the “weak” versus “strong” distinction should be replaced with a contrast between PP as a meta rule and PP proper. Meta versions of PP insist that environmental decision-making procedures not be susceptible to paralysis by scientific uncertainty. Such claims are substantive because they often recommend against cost-benefit analysis as a basis for environmental policy. I argue that the second horn of the dilemma fails as a result of disregarding the role of proportionality in applications of PP.

**The Principle of Charity and Non-inferential Coding in Interdisciplinary Behavioral Research**  
**Thomas Cunningham, University of Pittsburgh**

Because philosophers are increasingly evaluating their theses empirically, we must adopt rigorous methods for data measurement and analysis. This poster describes a methodological issue that arose during a non-inferential coding analysis of seventy-three transcripts of physician-family conferences about end-of-life decisions in intensive care units. An interdisciplinary team of behavioral researchers, including a philosopher, developed and employed a coding framework to identify how physicians and families incorporate patients’ values into medical decisions. Training revealed systematic differences in coding, which we hypothesized were caused by team members’ differing assumptions about the non-propositional context of conversations. To improve the transparency and reliability of our analysis, we appealed to Quine’s “principle of charity.” Adopting the principle led to subjects’ verbal behaviors being coded in ways that were more consistent with unstated norms for medical decision-making than were warranted, *prima facie*, which increased inter-rater reliability while maintaining consistency with other methodological commitments.

**The Private Language Argument and a Second-person Approach to Mindreading**  
**Joshua Johnson, Saint Louis University**

Until recently, the debate over how we are able to know the mental states of others has largely been restricted to Theory-Theory (TT) and Simulation Theory (ST). However, both TT and ST share common assumptions about the nature of how we come to understand mental terms that render both theories implausible in light of Wittgenstein’s Private Language Argument (PLA). In this paper I defend the claim that, if the PLA is correct, both TT and ST fail as adequate theories of mindreading. Further, I argue for a
“Second-Person Approach” to mindreading that both avoids the objections of the PLA and provides a much more intuitive account of how we come to know what others are thinking.

THE PROBLEM OF ORIGIN IN DERRIDA’S EARLY READING OF HUSSERL

JACOB RUMP, EMMORY UNIVERSITY

It is commonly held among interpreters of Derrida that his early readings of Husserl uncovered internal inconsistencies in the transcendental phenomenological project and led to the development of his own conception of *différance*. This paper examines Derrida’s earliest published critique of Husserl, *Le Problème de la genèse dans la philosophie de Husserl*, arguing that the inconsistency discussed in that work is not internal to Husserl’s thought, but arises from existential commitments that Derrida brings to his reading of phenomenology which preclude the complete undertaking of the phenomenological reduction, thus betraying a fundamental principle of Husserl’s method. Derrida takes phenomenology’s concern with meaning to hold existential commitments and attempts to look beyond the constituting role of transcendental subjectivity, which must be understood as an absolute limit from the Husserlian standpoint. This shows that *différance* is already presupposed in Derrida’s early reading of phenomenology, not a result of inconsistencies internal to it.

THE RATIONAL RELATIONS VIEW WIDE AND NARROW

MARK ROSNER, QUEEN’S UNIVERSITY

The rational relations view of moral responsibility holds that it is not the connection with choice that is the mark of responsible agency; rather, it is the connection of an attitude or action with an agent’s evaluative capacities that determines when an agent is responsible. In this paper I defend the rational relations view of moral responsibility against two criticisms—first, that it cannot make good sense of our responsibility for practical irrationalities such as akrasia, and second, that it cannot account for our responsibility for what we notice and neglect, forget and omit. I distinguish a wide and narrow version of the rational relations view and in each case claim that the criticisms are convincing only on the narrow, but not on the wide, reading.

THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN INTRINSIC GOODNESS ATTRIBUTIONS AND THICK EVALUATIVE JUDGMENTS: REVERSING THE DIRECTION OF ANALYSIS

AYCA BOYLU, UNIVERSITY OF TENNESSEE

There is a growing interest in what Bernard Williams has dubbed “thick evaluative concepts” such as kindness and greediness. What lies behind this interest isn’t just the fact that the revival of virtue ethics seems to require their invocation. There is also a well-placed concern about the compatibility of judgments involving thick concepts with the fact-value divide—a divide that many contemporary ethical theories have taken for granted, following their modern predecessors. “Compatibilists” argue that
the meaning of a thick evaluative judgment can be captured by appealing to two components: one purely descriptive component and some pure evaluation. By contrast, “incompatibilists” hold that a successful analysis of thick judgments is incompatible with a division of fact and value. I argue that in the case of intrinsic goodness attributions, the direction of analysis that compatibilists work with is reversed: attributions of intrinsic goodness are explained by thick evaluative judgments.

THE ROLE OF NORMATIVE UNCERTAINTY IN BIOETHICAL ARGUMENTATION: THE NEW UNDERSTANDING OF THE “PRO-LIFE” VIEW ON HUMAN EMBRYO RESEARCH

TOMASZ ZURADZKI, JAGIELLONIAN UNIVERSITY

In this paper I present a new interpretation of the “pro-life” view on the status of human embryos. In my understanding this position is not based on presumptions about the ontological status of embryos and their developmental capabilities but on the specific criteria of rational decisions under uncertainty and on a cautious response to the ambiguous status of embryos. This view, which in my interpretation uses the decision theory model of moral reasoning in situations of normative uncertainty, promises to reconcile the uncertainty about the ontological status of embryos with the certainty about normative obligations. I will demonstrate that my interpretation of the “pro-life” view, although seeming to be stronger than the standard one, has limited scope and cannot be used to limit research, e.g., on human embryonic stem cells.

THE ROLE OF SYMPATHY IN REID’S ACTION THEORY

MARINA FOLESCU, UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA

Thomas Reid’s views on sympathy and its role in human action are less known than his views on the principles of common sense or human cognition. He argues that sympathy is both a principle of action, and a moral virtue connected with a rational principle of action. The present paper argues that Reid should have construed sympathy only as an animal principle of action, and not also as a moral virtue, based mainly on the following reason. To be sympathetic in a virtuous way requires one to determine one’s will to act according to the Golden Rule, whenever there is opportunity. The problem is that some actions that would be sympathetic, when sympathy is understood to be an animal principle of action, would not count as sympathetic, when sympathy is understood to be a moral virtue. This type of divergence is unacceptable, on Reid’s theory of action.

THE SAVIOUR OF JL? THE REDISTRIBUTION PROBLEM AND THE REFRAMING STRATEGY

PHILIP SHADD, QUEEN’S UNIVERSITY

A major challenge faced by Justificatory Liberalism (JL) is that it jeopardizes redistributive policies. In response, Andrew Lister has recently proposed what I call the “reframing strategy.” According to this strategy, we need to distinguish between two ways in which JL can be framed. The right frame applies JL’s unanimity condition to reasons, with a default of exclusion;
the wrong frame applies it to decisions, with a default of state inaction. I point out three problems faced by this strategy. First, it is premised upon a detachment of decisions from reasons, but normally the two are attached. Second, the strategy mischaracterizes the nature of JL's default position when the unanimity condition is applied to reasons. Third, the strategy is unfaithful to the liberal ideal of public justification which emphasizes justifiability to affected persons. Consequently, the reframing strategy’s prospects for success in saving JL from libertarian implications are quite limited.

THE SIGNIFICANCE OF PSYCHOPATHIC WRONGDOING

MATTHEW TALBERT, WEST VIRGINIA UNIVERSITY

I respond to Neil Levy’s and Gary Watson’s recent arguments that psychopaths are not open to central aspects of moral blame. In particular, on these authors’ views, psychopaths are not proper targets for negative reactive attitudes like resentment. On the approach I pursue, blame is a response to the significance that other agents’ actions have for us. I argue that despite their moral impairments, psychopaths possess rational and agential capacities that endow their behavior with a significance that makes blaming responses like resentment appropriate. However, on Levy’s view, psychopaths’ impairments entail that their actions cannot convey ill will. Watson, on the other hand, grants that psychopaths express morally significant ill will (or at least malice) through their behavior, but he argues that their moral impairments still render them unfit for resentment.

THE STOICS ON CLARITY AND DISTINCTNESS OF IMPRESSIONS

PAVLE STOJANOVIC, JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY

In this paper, I offer an analysis of the two properties the Stoics assigned to impressions, clarity and distinctness. I argue that clarity of an impression is its phenomenal property that the Stoics thought is necessarily cognitively accessible to the subject entertaining the impression. On the other hand, an impression’s distinctness is a property of the impression that need not be cognitively open to the subject, and that it is a property of a special kind of impression, the apprehensive impression (phantasia kataleptikē). This analysis further reveals that, since the Stoics thought that one could achieve apprehension (katalēpsis) by assenting to an impression without being aware of its distinctness, their epistemology was essentially a form of access externalism that shares some basic features with contemporary reliabilism.

THE TELLING ABSENCE OF MODERATION IN FOUCAULT’S DISCUSSION OF PARRHESIA

DAVID VESSEY, GRAND VALLEY STATE UNIVERSITY

In this paper I consider Foucault’s discussion of parrhesia, frank or candid speech, in his very last writings. I use many of his own examples, especially his brief discussion of Euripides’ Hyppolytus, to show that a proper account of parrhesia needs to be connected with an account of the virtue of
moderation, *sophrosyne*. Speaking frankly needs to be understood within the broader context of speaking appropriately and the virtues that guide that activity. Talking about courage but not moderation opens himself up again to some common criticisms of his overall project.

**The Trouble for Strawsonians: Nazis In, Psychopaths Out**

*William Smith, University of Notre Dame and Emory University*

A number of theorists argue that psychopaths should not be held morally responsible. Generally, they believe that, to properly be held morally responsible, one must be a moral agent—that is, one must (at least) have access to moral reasons. “The trouble with psychopaths” is that they are thought to be agents, but precisely non-moral agents; and so, on this view, they should not be held morally responsible. I believe that many of the best accounts of the exemption of psychopaths from moral responsibility are indebted to Peter Strawson. While these accounts have an intuitively plausible account of the exemption of psychopaths, they cannot account for another widely held intuition—that many of the most repulsive agents can properly be held morally accountable—or so I will argue. The “trouble for Strawsonians” is that they cannot both claim to exempt psychopaths and to hold other “incorrigibles” responsible.

**The Value of Service-Learning for Philosophy**

*Matthew Altmann, Central Washington University*

Academic service-learning allows students to develop skills that are needed to apply their philosophy education outside of academia. This is especially important given the limited number of academic positions in philosophy. In this presentation, I will define service-learning, explain its academic and professional benefits for students, and show how it can help to bridge the town-gown divide. More concretely, I will show how service-learning can make students more employable and can give chairs a rationale for maintaining funding for philosophy programs. I will use my own medical ethics course as an example to demonstrate how academic service-learning can benefit philosophy students and faculty, the university, and the community.

**Theseus’s Ship, Buddhist’s Vehicles, and Our Identity Crisis**

*Prasanta S. Bandyopadhyay, Montana State University*

The ship of Theseus problem is a problem about personal identity taken from Greek philosophy. Distinguishing between two versions of this problem, I argue that the first version shows the inability to define what makes the ship, and the second version raises the question, when does the original ship cease to exist? Buddha regarded such metaphysical questions as useless in alleviating human sufferings, and consequently became silent when such questions were posed. To understand Buddha’s silence and teachings, two major schools (Hinayana and Mahayana) have emerged with varying and often incompatible interpretations of his
teachings. Among their radical differences, they share a common thread of ideas. One is the theory of momentariness, which states that every event, physical or otherwise, exists only for a moment. Based on an insight from the theory of momentariness, I argue that a Buddhist is able to address the ship of Theseus problem.

THOMAS REID ON ARGUING FOR FIRST PRINCIPLES

GREGORY S. POORE, BAYLOR UNIVERSITY

According to Thomas Reid, the foundation of knowledge consists of first principles that are justified on externalist grounds, and therefore do not require reasoning for their justification. But there is a difference between not requiring reasoning for justification and not admitting of justification from reasoning. According to Reid scholars such as Peter Baumann, Philip de Bary, John Greco, James Harris, Dennis Holt, Douglas McDermid, Patrick Rysiew, and Paul Vernier, Reid’s first principles not only do not require reasoning for their justification, but they do not admit of justification from reasoning. These scholars accept the No-Inference Thesis: In Reid’s epistemology, it is impossible to infer (deductively or inductively) the truth of a first principle. I argue that this thesis is false. Its philosophical and textual grounds are unsatisfactory, and there are strong philosophical and textual reasons to reject it. Reid does, however, see some epistemic dangers in arguing for first principles.

THREE CONCEPTS OF HARM

JASON RABLEY, CALIFORNIA STATE UNIVERSITY, LONG BEACH

In his forthcoming paper, “Doing Away with Harm,” Ben Bradley recommends that we jettison the concept of harm when doing serious moral philosophy. This paper argues that we can affirm the moral importance of traditional injunctions against doing harm by distinguishing between absolute harms, temporal harms, and preventive harms, and providing separate analyses of these three concepts. While there is strong moral reason to avoid harms of the first two kinds, preventive harms are a mixed bag. This paper first critiques the counterfactual comparative account of harm, traditional absolutist accounts of harm, and temporal comparative accounts of harm. It builds on the work done by Matthew Hanser in “The Metaphysics of Harm” and the work done by Elizabeth Harman in “Harming as Causing Harm,” conjoining the best parts of these approaches. It answers the objection that Hanser mistakenly analyzes harm in terms of the loss and prevention of extrinsic goods by supplying a holistic, agency-based theory of welfare that shows that Hanser’s basic goods are not extrinsic but intrinsic goods. It simultaneously answers the objection that Harman’s approach to absolute harm is disunified.

THREE KINDS OF SOCIAL KINDS

MUHAMMAD ALI KHALIDI, YORK UNIVERSITY

In this paper, I argue that there are three kinds of social kinds: (1) social kinds
whose existence does not depend on human beings having any attitudes towards them (e.g., recession, racism); (2) social kinds whose existence depends in part on specific attitudes that human beings have towards them, though attitudes need not be manifested towards their particular instances (e.g., money, war); (3) social kinds whose existence and that of their instances depend in part on specific attitudes that human beings have towards them (e.g., permanent resident, prime minister). Although all three kinds of social kinds are mind-dependent, this does not make them ontologically subjective or preclude them from being natural kinds. Rather, what prevents the third kind of social kinds from being natural kinds is that their properties are conventionally rather than causally linked.

**TRANSFORMING ANGER: THREE APPROACHES TO THE MORALITY OF ANGER**

*EMILY MCRAE, UNIVERSITY OF OKLAHOMA*

In this paper I compare three approaches to understanding the role of anger in moral life. I begin by arguing that neither the Stoic view nor the Aristotelian view can capture the moral complexity of anger since neither can preserve our moral obligation to cultivate humanity and still account for the moral efficacy of anger. I will present and defend a third view on anger, one that I argue can encourage the cultivation of humanity while still recognizing a robust role for anger, especially in the public moral order. I call this third approach the Tantric view: the rightness or wrongness of anger depends primarily on the emotional capacities of the agent. On this view, moral development requires increasing and refining one’s emotional capacities; moral excellence involves a sophisticated facility with complex emotional states. In my presentation of the Tantric view, I turn to two tenth-century Buddhist texts by Dharmarakṣita.

**TRIVALENT EXPRESSIVISM**

*JEFF SNAPPER, UNIVERSITY OF NOTRE DAME*

An expressivist semantics for moral sentences must explain why certain patterns of reasoning using moral sentences are valid. According to the Frege-Geach objection, expressivist semantics have trouble doing this. But, I argue here, expressivism plus a trivalent logic allows for a clean, logical answer to the Frege-Geach objection: all such reasoning is trivially valid and the conclusions of such arguments logically follow from the premises by way of trivalent valid rules of inference.

**TRUTH PROMOTING NON-EVIDENTIAL REASONS FOR BELIEF**

*BRIAN TALBOT, UNIVERSITY OF COLORADO, BOULDER*

Sometimes a belief that \( p \) promotes having true beliefs, whether or not \( p \) is true. This gives reasons to believe that \( p \), but most epistemologists would deny that it gives epistemic reasons, or that these reasons can epistemically justify the belief that \( p \). Call these reasons to believe “truth promoting non-evidential reasons for belief.” This paper argues that three common views in epistemology, taken together, entail that reasons of this
sort can epistemically justify beliefs. These three views are: epistemic oughts are normative, epistemic oughts have a source, and the source of epistemic oughts is an end that has true belief as a necessary component. The paper considers a range of accounts that endorse these views but might seem to avoid the consequence that truth promoting non-evidence reasons generate real epistemic oughts; it shows that none do avoid this.

**Two Interpretations of Contractualist Moral Agency**

_Benjamin Mitchell-Yellin, University of California, Riverside_

T. M. Scanlon holds that agents who cannot understand the force of moral reasons may be morally blameworthy for what they do. This claim is controversial. I show how one can excise it from Scanlon’s contractualist moral theory. On Scanlon’s view, the ability to reason about what could be justified to others is a prerequisite for morally responsible agency. But this ability is subject to a weaker and a stronger interpretation. Scanlon appears to assume the weaker interpretation, as evidenced by his reasoning in support of the controversial claim. But the stronger interpretation is compatible with the core elements of his moral theory and supports an account of morally responsible agency that exempts those who cannot understand the force of moral reasons.

**Valuable But Not Viable: Collaborations as Knowledge Producing Communities**

_Meghan Dupree, University of Pittsburgh_

This paper explores the relationship between collaborative research projects and scientific knowledge within the framework of Helen Longino’s feminist contextual empiricism. I suggest a potential problem for Longino’s view with respect to collaborations: it appears that individual members of a collaborative research project can know their findings, but independent researchers cannot know their findings. However, collaborative research projects are often given the same weight by the scientific community as individual research projects. I argue that feminist contextual empiricism can be revised to accommodate this fact by introducing a constraint on communities that produce scientific knowledge called viability. Only viable communities are capable of having knowledge, and individuals can only derive knowledge through membership in a viable community. I argue that because collaborations are not viable, the members of collaborations do not know the findings of their research until the scientific community at large absorbs the research results.

**Varieties of Obligatory Control and Ascriptions of Know-how**

_Maria Jankovic, Indiana University, Bloomington_

Sentences (1) are examples of obligatory control (OC). (1a) Pete wants [to play with John]. (1b) Pete ordered his sister [to play with John]. Each contains an infinitival complement with an understood subject whose referent is determined (“controlled”) by one of the arguments of
the main verb. The understood subject is usually represented as PRO, and in obligatory control contexts, its referent is uniquely determined grammatically. Thus, in (1a) the subject of the matrix verb, and in (1b) the object, obligatorily controls the understood subject of the complement. In this paper, I discuss some issues regarding the interpretation of OC complements that are relevant for the arguments in favor of intellectualism about practical knowledge. In particular, I address the cross-linguistic variation of attributions of practical knowledge. I show that Stanley’s optimism that the full range of these attributions can be captured by the propositional paradigm is unfounded.

**Veridicality Judgments and High-Level Perception**

*Grace Helton, New York University*

In this paper, I make three primary points: First, I suggest that high-level perceptual disputes, i.e., disputes over whether properties other than shape and color can be perceptually represented, have important implications for both philosophy and psychology. Second, I criticize Tye’s veridicality argument for singularity perception, on the grounds that the argument establishes, at most, that singularity is represented by some attitude or other but does nothing to establish that singularity is represented by perception in particular. Third, I claim that the shortcoming of Tye’s argument is shared with veridicality arguments in general, which suggests an important constraint on how high-level perceptual claims can be defended.

**What Are Directions of Fit?**

*Allen Coates, East Tennessee State University*

We might unpack the notion of direction of fit to explain the fact that we adjust the world (specifically our actions) to fit our intentions and we adjust our beliefs to fit the world. Or we might unpack it to explain the fact that we adjust our intentions to fit the good and our beliefs to fit the true. But it is not obvious that we can unpack it in a way that explains both of these facts. I will offer an account of directions of fit that can explain both.

**What Does Eternal Recurrence Weigh On?**

*Scott Jenkins, University of Kansas*

Nietzsche clearly takes his theory of eternal recurrence to have practical significance. In *Thus Spoke Zarathustra* he suggests that the thought of recurrence can weigh on us in our practical lives, and in *The Gay Science* he claims that belief in recurrence generates “the heaviest weight.” Most commentators have focused on the question of why the eternal recurrence of all existence, including one’s own life, should generate any sort of practical weight. I consider the more fundamental question of what eternal recurrence weighs on. Contrary to the received view that eternal recurrence weighs on the process of deliberation, I argue that in
Gay Science 341 eternal recurrence actually plays no role in deliberation. Instead, eternal recurrence undermines our capacity to deliberate and act. Since no interpretation of eternal recurrence can explain why this would be so, I conclude that we still have no adequate interpretation of this central Nietzschean idea.

**WHAT IS THE PROBLEM OF NEGATIVE EXISTENTIALS?**

**LUKE MANNING, INDEPENDENT SCHOLAR**

Consider the sentence “Dorothy does not exist,” said to correct someone’s misunderstanding that a discussion about The Wonderful Wizard of Oz was about a real person. The sentence is problematic, but I argue that common characterizations of the problem are wrong. It is not problematic because it denies something exists, or merely because the name “Dorothy” may fail to refer, thus preventing the sentence from expressing a proposition. Instead, the general problem is that it both carries ontological commitment to Dorothy and, inconsistently, denies such commitment. This problem also arises in cases without names, such as “There are ten gods that she worships, but really those gods don’t exist.” My goal is to give a precise characterization of the problem, and thereby to establish some common ground on a very confusing topic.

**WHAT’S THE POINT OF BLAME?**

**Miranda Fricker, University of Sheffield**

Both remorse and blame are clearly negative moral emotions. But while few have considered remorse to be an unhelpfully negative moral sentiment, the idea that blame is pointlessly negative, even cruel, is frequently expressed, with the implication that moral life would be better without it. While there are undoubtedly certain pathologies of blame, which should be avoided, I argue that the purely negative view of blame is mistaken. As an antidote, I try to present a more positive, because transformative, style of blame: Communicative Blame. I propose it as an essential moral emotion, and as the second-personal counterpart to remorse. This pair of mirror emotions structure our most basic moral “reactive attitudes,” and together they work both to bring the different parties’ moral understanding into greater alignment; and also to align their moral reasons. In so doing, they serve to continuously (re-)generate our shared moral life.

**WHAT’S WRONG WITH JUDGMENTALISM?**

**Yuji Song, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill**

An exclusive focus on problems with the content of one’s judgments misses an important respect in which judgmentalism is objectionable. I will argue that having a tendency to judge may constitute a kind of moral failure regardless of whether it comes with a disproportionately large number of poor judgments. This is so because the tendency to judge others is at odds with what I call “the receptive attitude” towards them, an attitude that is deeply valuable.
When the Shape of a Life Matters

Stephen Campbell, Coe College

There is a puzzle about well-being and time. It seems plausible that something is good or bad for us only if it is so at some particular time. Yet, certain things, such as death, seem good or bad for us, though not at any particular time. An increasingly popular response to this puzzle embraces the idea of non-synchronic benefits and costs—that is, things that are good or bad for an individual, though not at any particular time. One motivation for this view is an influential line of argument that implies that the “shape” of a life (roughly, the pattern of benefits and costs over the course of the life) can be a non-synchronic benefit or cost. In this essay, I critique a well-known version of this argument from David Velleman and offer a positive proposal as to when the shape of a life can matter prudentially.

Why Empathy Is Necessary for Morality

Meghan Masto, Lafayette College

In this paper I argue that empathy is necessary for morality. In particular, I argue that empathy is necessary for being a competent, genuinely moral agent. I begin by briefly discussing some arguments that have been offered for the conclusion that empathy is not necessary for morality and I explain why the general argument strategy is unsuccessful. I go on to argue that empathy is necessary for morality because facts about people’s affective states often determine whether an act is morally right. If an agent wants to be able to act on the morally relevant reasons—wants to do the right thing for the right reasons—then the agent needs access to the facts about others’ mental states. If an agent wants reasonably reliable access to these facts, he or she needs to develop the empathy to get things right.

You Are What You Think You Are

David Mark Kovacs, Cornell University

According to non-substantivism about persons, the answers to certain (apparently metaphysical) questions about people will not, at the end of the day, be revealed by metaphysics. The most popular brand of non-substantivism is weak conventionalism, the view that which things are picked out by the term “person” or the personal pronoun “I” are a matter of social convention. This paper offers an alternative: persons are self-made, rather than simply conventional things. That is, within certain constraints it is in my power to decide which thing is picked out by the personal pronoun “I.” On the basis of a plausible principle about how personhood is tied up with rationality, I offer an argument to the effect that people are in part self-made and then discuss an interesting consequence of the view. Eventually I conclude that we should at least take seriously the idea that persons are to a certain extent self-made.
PLACEMENT SERVICE INFORMATION

Questions concerning the service should be directed to Mike Morris at the American Philosophical Association, University of Delaware, 31 Amstel Avenue, Newark, DE 19716, telephone: (302) 831-2012, fax: (302) 831-8690.

APA PLACEMENT SERVICE GENERAL HOURS OF OPERATION:

- **Wednesday, March 27:** Placement Information, 8:30 a.m.–8:00 p.m., meeting registration desk, mezzanine
  Placement Interview Tables, location TBA
- **Thursday, March 28:** Placement Information, 8:30 a.m.–8:00 p.m., meeting registration desk, mezzanine
  Placement Interview Tables, location TBA
- **Friday, March 29:** Placement Information, 8:30 a.m.–5:00 p.m., meeting registration desk, mezzanine
  Placement Interview Tables, location TBA
- **Saturday, March 30:** Placement Information, 8:30 a.m.–1:00 p.m., meeting registration desk, mezzanine
  Placement Interview Tables, location TBA

APA PLACEMENT SERVICE LOCATIONS

The placement desk will be located in the meeting registration area (mezzanine). Information concerning the location of the interviewing area will be available at the registration desk.

JOB CANDIDATES – MEETING REGISTRATION DESK (MEZZANINE)

1. Candidate numbers will be assigned when you register for the placement service.
2. The location of a job interview will be available from the placement staff, or posted on the bulletin board at the information desk.
3. If there are interviewing institutions accepting on-site interview requests, additional “Request for Interview” forms will be available at the placement desk.
4. APA membership applications will be available at the APA meeting registration desk.
5. Information and instructions for using the service will be available at the placement desk (also see following pages), and posted on the information bulletin board.
6. Only candidates who are requesting interviews will receive a folder. Candidates who opt in can also receive notification via text message (SMS) when a response is received.

7. A complete set of job postings will be available at the placement desk.

8. A message for the APA placement ombudsperson can be left at the placement desk.

**INTERVIEWERS – MEETING REGISTRATION DESK (MEZZANINE)**

1. **Interviewers check in here**—as soon as possible upon arrival.

2. Payments for **on-site interviewing departments** will be received here.

3. Opportunity will be provided here for interviewers to check their files.

4. “Request for Interview” forms received from job candidates that have been reviewed by interviewers **should be returned** here.

5. A list of interviewing table assignments will be posted on the placement information bulletin board.

**INTERVIEWING AREA – TBA**

1. APA interviewing tables will be located here.

2. In the event that additional space for interviewing is needed, we will post the additional location on the placement information bulletin board.

**INFORMATION AND INSTRUCTIONS FOR JOB CANDIDATES**

**REQUIREMENTS FOR USING THE PLACEMENT SERVICE**

1. You **must** **be an APA member** in order to use the service. Placement is a benefit of membership for candidates, and there is no additional charge to use this service. Membership applications are available on the APA website (www.apaonline.org) or by contacting the APA national office at (302) 831-1112, or at the membership/registration desk at the meeting.

2. You **MUST REGISTER** for the **MEETING** in order to use the service.

   • If you **register in advance** for the meeting and indicate that you will be a candidate (we recommend that you register online at www.apaonline.org; an advance registration form is also located at the back of this issue), a candidate number will be assigned by the national office and will appear on the back of your badge. You **must** pick up your badge from the APA registration staff prior to using the placement service.

   • If you register on-site for the meeting, your placement number will be assigned when you register and will appear on the back of your badge.

**WHAT TO BRING WITH YOU**

1. Your laptop or smartphone with Internet access (Wi-Fi will not be provided in the hotel meeting area), or printouts of key *JFP* listings from the website.
2. Several copies of your *curriculum vitae*. If you run out of CVs at the meeting, the hotel has a copy center located in the Business Center.

**HOW TO USE THE PLACEMENT SERVICE**

After you have picked up your registration materials from the APA registration staff, you are ready to use the service. If you do not yet have a candidate number on the back of your badge, please go to the placement desk at the meeting registration desk (mezzanine) to receive one.

**JOB CANDIDATES’ AREA – MEETING REGISTRATION DESK (MEZZANINE)**

“Request for Interview” forms will be available from the placement staff. Be sure that your placement number appears at the top of all forms.

**JOB POSTINGS**

New jobs (not having appeared on the *Jobs for Philosophers* website) will be posted on a bulletin board in the placement service area. You should check this board regularly for new postings. Each ad will contain instructions on how to apply.

**INSTITUTIONS THAT HAVE CHECKED IN WITH PLACEMENT**

The names of institutions that have registered to use the service will be posted on the bulletin board (updated periodically) in alphabetical order. Each listing will indicate the following:

1. If the listing institution has checked in with placement.
2. If the institution is accepting interview requests at the meeting.
3. Where the institution plans on interviewing (table with number assignment).
4. Miscellaneous notes deemed appropriate by the placement staff or the institution.

**SUBMITTING AN INTERVIEW REQUEST FORM**

Complete the top portion of the “Request for Interview” form and attach a copy of your CV. Be sure that your candidate number appears at the top of all forms. Include your cell phone number and check the box if you wish to be notified via text when a response is received. *Note: Normal text messaging fees from your service provider will apply.* After you have completed the necessary information, place your request form and CV in the box marked *Requests for Interviews*, which will be prominently displayed on the placement service desk. Your request will be forwarded to the institution by a staff member.

**INTERVIEWS**

After your request has been reviewed by a representative from the institution, the form will be returned to your file folder with the institution’s response appearing on the bottom of the form. By 1:00 p.m. on March
30, all requests that you have submitted should have been answered. Occasionally, an institution may retain applications to review at a later date. If you applied for a job that had been posted and the institution did not check in with the service during the meeting, we suggest that you contact the institution after the conference.

**Interviewing Locations**

Some departments will be conducting interviews at tables (location TBA). Other interviewing table locations will be posted if additional space is required. Each institution using a table for interviewing will be assigned a table number. The table numbers assigned to institutions will be posted on the bulletin board in the placement service area.

**Advice for Job Applicants**

The APA Committee on Career Opportunities offers the following advice for job applicants: The schedule for those seeking jobs and those departments offering positions is difficult for all concerned. From the point of view of departments, any *JFP* ad publication date is a compromise between the competing demands imposed by the need to get funding for positions, so the later the better, and by the need to have time to process applications, so the sooner the better. From the point of view of job applicants, there are also competing demands: the sooner it is published, the more time to apply, but the later it is published, the more opportunities will be available. There is no easy solution to this problem, but you can ease your difficulties somewhat by being prepared. You should have your *curriculum vitae* ready to put in an envelope, a generic draft of a letter of application ready to be fine-tuned for particular job opportunities, and the rest of your file ready for mailing. This means talking to those who are to write letters of recommendation well in advance, preparing material about your teaching capacities, and selecting a writing sample for those departments that request it. Applications should be complete, as well as clearly organized. It is to your advantage to send in your application as soon as possible after an ad appears.

**Information and Instructions for Interviewers**

**Requirements for Using the Placement Service**

1. **All individual interviewers MUST register for the meeting** online at www.apaonline.org, by using the registration form found at the back of this issue, or by stopping at the APA registration desk (mezzanine) to register on-site prior to using the placement service.

2. **All departments (not individuals)** planning to interview at the meeting must register for the placement service on our website (www.apaonline.org) or complete the form at the end of this issue. Upon receipt of an advance placement service registration form, additional information pertaining to the placement service will be sent to the attention of the contact person listed on the form. If you are completing a form and sending it by either mail or fax, please be sure to do so at your earliest
opportunity. Otherwise, your materials may arrive after the staff has left the office to travel to the meeting. In this case, you must fill out the forms again on site. If time does not allow you to send them in advance, please bring them with you and turn them in at the placement desk.

CHECKING IN WITH THE SERVICE

Before you begin to interview candidates, you must check in with the placement staff (meeting registration desk, mezzanine). We will need to know that you have arrived on site so that we can communicate that to candidates inquiring about your institution. At this time we will also request or confirm additional information as needed.

Some institutions accept interview requests at the meeting; some of these job notices may have appeared in Jobs for Philosophers while others are unpublished positions. A new, unpublished position will be posted on the bulletin board in the placement service area. If you are bringing such a job notice with you to the meeting, please provide the placement staff with four copies of the notice for the position you are advertising. Such a position announcement should be printed on one side only in a good size and easy to read font, and be as brief as possible. Only positions that have not appeared in Jobs for Philosophers will be posted.

Some institutions interview by prearrangement after placing an advertisement in Jobs for Philosophers and then contacting candidates prior to the meeting. When you arrange an interview with candidates, please inform them that they must be APA members in order to use the service and they must register for the meeting in order to use the service.

If you plan to conduct job interviews anywhere other than at the interviewing tables/suites provided, please let the placement service know your plans. Candidates often ask questions about the location and time of their interviews, and the staff need to have complete, up-to-date information in order to help them (and you). Departments using a suite for interviewing must provide an interview schedule form at the time they check in with the placement service. Doing so enables the service to notify the candidates you wish to interview of your interviewing location. Be assured that only those candidates listed on your interview schedule will be told the location of your hotel room, unless you have directed staff to give this information to all candidates who ask. Departments interviewing at tables DO NOT need to complete this form.

Note: If you are conducting interviews in a hotel room, please be aware of the following policy statement adopted by the APA Board of Officers at its November 2004 meeting: “Departments should not conduct job interviews in non-suite hotel rooms. Candidates who are subject to such interviews can appeal to the APA and are guaranteed anonymity.” (Originally published in Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association, Vol. 78, No. 5, pp. 23, 119.)
APA INTERVIEWING TABLES

The placement service provides numbered tables for interviewing purposes; you will receive your table number assignment when you check in. These table number assignments will also be posted on the placement service bulletin board. Should additional space for interviewing tables be necessary, this location will be posted as well.

INSTITUTION FILE FOLDER (MAILBOX)

There will be a file folder bearing the name of your institution located at the meeting registration desk (mezzanine). Requests for interviews from candidates will be placed in this file folder.

REVIEWING INTERVIEW REQUESTS

When a candidate requests an interview with your institution, you should receive her/his curriculum vitae attached to a “Request for Interview” form. The bottom of this form is to be completed by you and returned to placement staff. If an interview is granted, space is provided on this form to list the time, date, and location of the interview. If you are unable to interview a candidate, space for this response is also provided on the form.

Any request you receive in an envelope contains confidential material and should be destroyed rather than returned to the candidate. As a matter of professional courtesy, all requests should receive a response. When a candidate receives a request form back without a response, he or she is likely to assume that the material has not been reviewed and might return this to you via our service or contact your institution following the meeting.

Materials that you wish to transmit to a registered candidate should be handed in to the placement service staff located at the meeting registration desk (mezzanine), and will be delivered to the candidate by our staff.

APA STATEMENT ON PLACEMENT PRACTICES

The APA Committee on the Status and Future of the Profession reminds you of its Statement on Placement Practices: The APA discourages the nomination by graduate departments of job seekers for positions in philosophy, and the submission of their dossiers in response to announcements of positions, without their knowledge or interest. This may seriously mislead those who are conducting searches, and may have unfortunate consequences both for them and for genuinely interested applicants. Graduate departments using a nomination procedure or submitting dossiers on behalf of job seekers should either attest explicitly that the candidate wishes to be considered for the positions in question, or (preferably) ensure that the job seekers themselves submit personal letters of application for these positions. Departments conducting searches are encouraged to recommend or require explicitly (in their position announcements) that each candidate, to be assessed of full
consideration, should submit a personal letter of application for and interest in the announced position. A *placement ombudsperson will be available at the meeting.*
*Paper Submission Guidelines*

**Anonymous Review:** Papers in any area are welcome. All papers are anonymously reviewed. Author’s name, institution, or references pertaining to the identity of the author must be removed from the paper, abstract, notes, and bibliography. Papers containing such identifying references may be rejected. Submitted papers are not returned to authors. Papers not accepted by one division may be re-submitted for consideration to another division. In submitting papers, authors warrant that those papers are entirely their own work or the joint work of the authors identified in the cover letter, and that, where appropriate, acknowledgement of the contributions of others has been made.

**Graduate Student Travel Stipends and Awards:** Verification of graduate student status must be submitted according to the divisional guidelines.

**Submission via the online paper submission system is preferred. The Pacific Division only accepts submissions via the online system.** Mailed submissions for Eastern and Central divisions may be sent to the following address:

Mike Morris  
ATTN: [Eastern or Central] Division Papers  
The American Philosophical Association  
University of Delaware  
Newark, DE 19716  
(302) 831-2012

**NOTE:** Authors of *accepted* papers will be asked to submit a copy of their abstract by email to the national office.

**Central Division:**

Meeting is usually held in February or March.
Selections are announced in September, or before when possible.
Papers exceeding 3,000 words will not be considered as colloquium papers. Abstracts for colloquium papers must not exceed a length of 150 words.
Submissions for consideration as symposium papers must not exceed a length of 5,000 words. Abstracts for symposium papers must not exceed a length of 300 words. Authors should be aware that only a few papers are selected for presentation as symposium papers. If authors wish to have a shortened version of their paper considered as a colloquium paper, they should submit the appropriately shortened version, along with a shortened abstract, simultaneously with the submission of the symposium paper.
The Central Division will not include a paper on its meeting program if that paper (1) has already been presented or is scheduled for presentation on the main program of another APA divisional meeting or (2) has been accepted for publication and will have actually been published prior to the Central Division meeting in question. If a paper is accepted for presentation and the program committee subsequently learns that it will have been published prior to the meeting, then that paper will be withdrawn from the meeting program.

**Eastern Division:**

Meeting has generally been held December 27–30; will change to January beginning in 2015.

Selections are announced in May or June.

Papers accepted by either the Central Division or the Pacific Division may not be presented at any subsequent meeting of the Eastern Division. Any paper which is under consideration for publication elsewhere will be considered, provided that it will not appear in print until after the divisional meeting is held. If this is the case, indicate when and where the paper is expected to be published.

Papers exceeding 3,000 words will not be considered as colloquium papers. Abstracts for colloquium papers must not exceed 150 words.

Submissions for consideration as symposium papers must not exceed a length of 5,000 words. Abstracts for symposium papers must not exceed a length of 300 words. Authors should be aware that only a few papers are selected for presentation as symposium papers. If authors wish to have a shortened version of their paper considered as a colloquium paper, they should submit the appropriately shortened version, along with a shortened abstract, simultaneously with the submission of the symposium paper.

Any paper submitted without an abstract will not be considered. Any paper whose abstract is deemed unacceptable by the program committee will not be accepted. No revised abstract submitted after the paper’s acceptance will be published in the *Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association* without the approval of the program committee.

**Pacific Division:**

Papers and posters in any area are welcome. All papers and posters are reviewed anonymously.

**Important Notices**

The Pacific Division only accepts online submissions made through the APA submission website. *Submissions by post and by email are not accepted.*

The Pacific Division now invites submissions for poster presentations.
Important Dates
Deadline for membership dues and new applications (dues payments from members who still owe dues for the current fiscal year and membership applications from new applicants who are joining the APA for the first time): August 13
Deadline for submissions: September 1
Deadline for receipt of proof of graduate student status (for travel stipends): September 1

Submission Eligibility
1. Authors (and all co-authors) must be members in good standing of the APA at the time of submission.
2. Each member may be the author (or co-author) of one paper or poster. (If Jones and Smith co-author a paper, neither is eligible to submit a second item.)
3. Any paper or poster which is under consideration for publication elsewhere will be considered, provided that it will not appear in print until after the divisional meeting is held. If this is the case, indicate when and where the paper or poster is expected to be published.
4. A paper or poster that has been on the main program at a past APA meeting (any division), or will be on the main program at a future Central or Eastern Division meeting, cannot be presented as a main program colloquium or symposium paper or poster at the Pacific Division meeting. However, papers not accepted by another division may be submitted for consideration by the Pacific Division.
5. No one who is scheduled to appear in an invited session on the Main Program of a meeting may also present a submitted paper or poster as part of that same Main Program. Members who have already agreed to participate in invited sessions on the Main Program of a meeting are asked not to submit papers or posters for that same meeting. Please note that this does not apply to sessions organized by APA committees or by affiliated groups.

Preparation for Anonymous Review
6. Submissions must be prepared for anonymous review. The author’s (and any co-author’s) name, institution, and references pertaining to the identity of the author must be removed from the paper, abstract(s), notes, and bibliography. Papers containing identifying references may be rejected.

Submission Process
7. All submissions must include an abstract of not more than 150 words. Those submitting posters also provide a long abstract of not more than 750 words (the poster itself is not submitted). Colloquium papers must not exceed 3,000 words. Symposium papers must not exceed 5,000 words. Authors should be aware that only a few papers are selected for presentation as symposium papers. If authors wish to have a shortened version of their paper considered as a colloquium paper, they should
submit the appropriately shortened version simultaneously with the submission of the symposium paper. (This will be considered a single submission.)

8. The Pacific Division only considers submissions made through the APA website. Postal submissions are not longer accepted. Submissions are not accepted by email.

Graduate Student Travel Stipends

9. A stipend of $300 will be awarded to any graduate student whose paper or poster is accepted by the program committee in its normal, anonymous review process.

10. Eligibility is restricted to APA members or associate members who are graduate students in residence and in good standing at a M.A. or Ph.D. program in philosophy. It is the author’s responsibility to ensure that a letter verifying that the author of the paper or poster is a student in residence is provided to the APA. The letter must be formatted on departmental stationery and signed by the department chair or graduate advisor. It must be uploaded at the time of submission. If appropriate verification documentation is not supplied by the deadline, the submission will not be considered for a Travel Stipend.

11. Co-authored papers and posters are not eligible for Graduate Student Travel Stipends unless all authors are graduate students.

Authors’ Warrants and Permissions

12. In submitting papers or posters, authors warrant that their submissions are entirely their own work or the joint work of the named co-authors, and that, where appropriate, acknowledgement of the contributions of others has been made.

13. In submitting a paper or poster, its authors grant to the American Philosophical Association the nonexclusive worldwide right to publish the abstract of the paper or poster in the Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association and on the APA and Pacific Division websites, in the event that the paper is accepted. Its authors also grant to the American Philosophical Association the nonexclusive worldwide right to post a preprint of the paper, in the form in which it was submitted, on the Pacific Division website, for up to four months prior to the meeting for which the paper is accepted. (The division will not publish a preprint provided that the authors so notify the Pacific Division in writing at the time the paper is accepted.)

14. Authors agree to provide accurate email addresses as part of their contact information and must notify the Pacific Division of any address changes that may occur between the time of submission and the meeting.
MINUTES OF THE 2012 PACIFIC DIVISION EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE MEETING

WESTIN SEATTLE HOTEL, SEATTLE, WASHINGTON
WEDNESDAY, APRIL 4, 2012

Present: Julie Van Camp, Chair, John Fisher, Amy Kind, Dominic McIver Lopes, Alastair Norcross, Jean Roberts, Michael Tooley, Alison Wylie

CALL TO ORDER: The meeting came to order at 2:00 p.m.

ADOPTION OF AGENDA: The agenda was adopted.

APPROVAL OF MINUTES: The minutes were approved as printed.

MATTERS ARISING FROM THE MINUTES: There was no business arising from the minutes.

REPORT OF ACTIONS BY EMAIL: The executive committee takes decisions by email when immediate action is required. Since its last meeting, the committee took the following actions. Having reviewed the results of a survey of APA members with Pacific Division affiliation and recent program participants, who were asked about their preferences for potential meeting sites in the southwest and dates on and off Easter weekend, the committee directed the secretary-treasurer to consider possible properties in San Diego and Los Angeles for the 2014 annual meeting and not to agree to dates that will require significant increases in room rates. The committee also agreed that the division’s tradition of meeting at unionized properties allows that a non-union hotel might sometimes be contracted for secondary meeting space and sleeping rooms, provided that the primary site for a meeting is unionized. This will permit the division to meet at the newly unionized Westin Gaslamp Quarter in San Diego in 2014 and to use a small amount of additional meeting space and sleeping rooms at the nearby Ulysses S. Grant Hotel. The U. S. Grant Hotel is not unionized but it is owned and operated by the Sycuan Tribe of the Kumeyaay Nation. Finally, the committee agreed that a room revenue rebate from the Westin Seattle in 2012 will be used to fund graduate student travel stipends. More than forty stipends are being awarded this year—almost twice as many as in recent years.

SECRETARY-TREASURER’S REPORT: The secretary-treasurer reported that the division is in sound condition. Registrations for the 2011 annual meeting in San Diego were the second highest in recent years and set a record for meetings outside San Francisco. A study of the registration rolls shows that 95 percent of the 148 non-members who registered in 2011 are philosophers, who should be encouraged to join the association. The
2012 annual meeting set the record for number of participants, though registration numbers are expected to dip because of the difficulty of using the APA's registration system. The long-term trend of decreasing sales of tables for book exhibits has flattened out for two years and is likely to remain stable unless some publishers decide to forego the meeting. Future meeting sites are: San Francisco in 2013, San Diego in 2014, Vancouver in 2015, and back to San Francisco in 2016. Turning to treasurer’s business, the division continues to maintain assets sufficient to cushion unexpected expenses. The executive committee approved a budget for the 2012–13 fiscal year, projecting expenses of $122,000 and revenues of $123,000, assuming an increase in registration fees.

ANNUAL MEETING FEES: At its 2011 meeting, the executive committee agreed in principle to increase registration fees for the annual meeting so that the meeting realizes a modest surplus for the APA as a whole and for the national office in particular. A complete and accurate picture of the costs incurred by the national office in running the annual meeting is not yet available, but a modest increase in registration fees seems to be warranted. The committee therefore authorized an increase in advance registration fees to a maximum of $80 for members and $25 for student members. These amounts match new fees set by the Eastern Division and they remain substantially below fees for meetings of our peer learned societies. In addition, maximum increases were approved for registration fees for non-members and for on-site registrations. However, fees may not be raised or may not be raised to the approved maxima unless the APA enables members to pay their membership dues and registration fees online through a user-friendly and efficient website. A final decision on fees for the 2012 meeting will be taken in December.

DEMOGRAPHIC SURVEY RESULTS: The executive committee reviewed the results of a demographic survey of those participating in 2012 annual meeting. A summary of the results will be published on the division’s website, the complete (anonymous) data set will be made available to APA committees, and a further analysis of the data may be commissioned.

REVIEW OF THE SECRETARY-TREASURER: At the suggestion of the secretary-treasurer, a committee was charged in 2011 first with drafting procedures for a cyclical review of the performance of the secretary-treasurer and then for conducting such a review and reporting the results to the executive committee and the nominating committee. The executive committee adopted the procedure proposed by the ad hoc committee. This procedure will be published on the division’s website. In addition, it reviewed and adopted the ad hoc committee’s assessment of Professor Lopes’s performance as secretary-treasurer, singling out his efforts to improve technology and sustainability, to support program diversity, and to negotiate favorable hotel contracts. The executive committee thanked Heather Battaly, Joseph Keim Campbell, and Calvin Normore for serving on the ad doc committee.

APPOINTMENT OF THE NOMINATING COMMITTEE: Leslie Francis, Donald Rutherford, and Alison Wylie were appointed to the nominating
committee, with Professor Wylie serving as chair.

REPORT OF THE PROGRAM CHAIR: The program chair reported that 2012 saw a record-breaking number of paper submissions, presenting the program committee with an unusually high refereeing workload. This was exacerbated by numerous bugs in the new electronic submission system adopted by the national office. In view of the large number of submissions, it was decided that the meeting would begin on Wednesday morning rather than Wednesday afternoon. The acceptance rate for colloquia was 30 percent. The main program includes 291 sessions and almost one thousand participants. This year all scheduling requests citing religious reasons were accommodated. It was agreed that a prize be offered for best poster in 2013. Professor Kind was thanked for her bold and efficient leadership of the program committee.

APPOINTMENTS TO THE PROGRAM COMMITTEE: A list of candidates for appointment to the program committee was approved.

PROGRAM CHAIR APPOINTMENTS: A list of candidates for appointment to chair of the program committee was approved.

SCHEDULING MAIN PROGRAM SESSIONS: The executive committee took no action on a request to give defeasible priority for time slots to sessions sponsored by APA committees. The committee was concerned about the logistical burden imposed on program chairs, who already schedule sessions to avoid splitting audiences, to distribute different types of sessions evenly across the program, to accommodate religious observances, and to accommodate special requests from participants with conflicting commitments. Beyond this, the committee is wary of setting any precedent that may risk the perception that some types of sessions are marginalized.

REPORT OF THE REPRESENTATIVE TO THE BOARD: The division’s representative to the board reported on the 2011 meeting of the APA board of officers (see the May 2012 Proceedings). The executive committee continues to be concerned about the impact of the implementation of the APA’s new IT system on the division’s operations. The committee therefore directed the secretary-treasurer to take all reasonable measures to ensure that paper submissions and meeting registrations meet the highest expectations. At the same time, the committee continues to wish to support the association in its efforts to build a preeminent learned society that serves all its members and functions with distinction.

AGENDA OF THE BUSINESS MEETING: A business meeting agenda was approved.

MINI-CONFERENCE PROPOSALS: Two mini-conference proposals were discussed; neither was funded.

SITE VISIT PROGRAM PROPOSAL: The executive committee agreed to contribute funding up to $10,000 to enable the APA Committee on the Status of Women to develop a site visit program which will advise philosophy departments on how to improve their climates for women.
An additional amount of $1,000 is available to a department in the Pacific region to defray travel costs in arranging for a site visit, and the CSW will sponsor a session at the division’s annual meeting to share best practices for improving the climate for women in departments. However, the division does not support publishing “climate rankings” or climate data about individual departments.

ANY OTHER BUSINESS: There was no other business.

ADJOURNMENT: The meeting adjourned at 5:50 p.m.
CALL TO ORDER: The meeting came to order at 12:05 p.m.

ADOPTION OF AGENDA: The agenda was adopted.

APPROVAL OF MINUTES: The minutes were approved as printed in the February 2012 Proceedings.

MATTERS ARISING FROM THE MINUTES: The secretary-treasurer announced that the bylaws have been amended to provide for electronic voting.

ANNOUNCEMENTS: The names of APA members who had passed away since the last meeting were read and a moment of silence was observed.

REPORT OF THE NOMINATING COMMITTEE: The nominating committee presented Terence Parsons as candidate for vice president, Dominic McIver Lopes as candidate for secretary-treasurer, and Rebecca Copenhaver as candidate for member at large. There were no nominations by petition. A motion to elect the candidates for terms beginning July 1, 2012 was put and carried.

SECRETARY-TREASURER’S REPORT: The secretary-treasurer summarized his report to the executive committee (see the executive committee minutes). He also explained that long registration lines on Wednesday were due to a slow computer system in the national office and this problem was solved by opening up a cash-only registration line starting Thursday morning. Lopes then thanked Amy Kind and her program committee for mounting an outstanding program in exceptionally trying circumstances. Amy Coplan, Stephen Finlay, Avram Hiller, David Hills, Paul Hovda, Janet Levin, Keith McPartland, Adam Morton, Adam Sennet, and Aaron Zimmerman have completed terms on the program committee, and Michael Tooley, Amy Kind, and Julie van Camp are stepping off the executive committee. The generosity of all those who volunteer their time to the Pacific Division was acknowledged by a round of applause.

REPORT OF THE PACIFIC DIVISION EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE: The chair of the executive committee summarized the actions of the committee (see the executive committee minutes). It was moved that the executive committee should raise graduate student stipends to $400, budget permitting. The motion carried.
REPORT OF THE APA BOARD OF OFFICERS: The executive director of the association summarized the actions of the board of officers at its November meeting (see the May 2012 Proceedings). He acknowledged the Pacific Division for having taken leadership on a number of initiatives concerning the association as a whole and, taking advantage of the occasion of his final address to a business meeting of a division, he thanked the Pacific Division and its leadership for the kindness shown to him over the past six years, and more generally he thanked those in the APA with whom he has worked and wished the association well. It was moved that the division thank David Schrader for his service as executive director of the association. The motion carried with applause.

STATEMENT ON PROGRAM DIVERSITY: A statement on program diversity, published in the February 2012 Proceedings and the Pacific Division website, was moved by the executive committee. The motion carried and the statement was adopted.

ANY OTHER BUSINESS: There was no other business.

ADJOURNMENT: The meeting adjourned at 12:58 p.m.
AGENDA ITEMS FOR THE 2013 BUSINESS MEETING

REPORT OF THE 2012–13 NOMINATING COMMITTEE

Alison Wylie (chair), Leslie Francis, Donald Rutherford, and Dominic McIver Lopes (ex officio) served as the 2012–13 nominating committee. They have nominated the following APA Pacific Division members for terms beginning July 1, 2013: for vice president: David Copp, and for member at large: Ken Taylor.

Respectfully submitted,
Alison Wylie, Chair

APA BYLAW AMENDMENTS

Six amendments to the bylaws of the APA have been proposed by the association’s board of officers. Each proposal will be presented at the business meeting for discussion and amendment before being put to a vote of APA members with Pacific Division affiliation.

The text of the proposed amendments has been posted on the APA website at http://www.apaonline.org/APAOnline/About_The_APA/Governance/Proposed_APA_Bylaws_Amendments.aspx.
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ADVANCE REGISTRATION FORM

HOTEL RESERVATION INFORMATION

PLACEMENT SERVICE REGISTRATION FORM

Please note: Advance registration and placement service registration can also be performed online at http://www.apaonline.org.
2013 PACIFIC DIVISION MEETING
March 27-31, The Westin St. Francis
San Francisco, CA

ADVANCE REGISTRATION FORM
Please read this form carefully, as the registration process has changed.

To register online, please go to our website: www.apaonline.org
To register by fax, please send this form with your credit card payment to (302) 831-3372. No cover sheet is needed.
To register by mail, please mail this form to Melissa Milburn, 31 Amstel Avenue, Newark, DE 19716-4797.

The deadline for advance online registration is March 26, 2013, at noon Pacific (3 p.m. Eastern).
The deadline for advance registrations mailed or faxed to the APA National Office is March 1, 2013.
After these deadlines, you will need to either register on site at the Pacific Division Meeting or at www.apaonline.org at the higher rate of $65 for students, $120 for members, and $160 for non-members.

WE CANNOT ACCEPT REGISTRATION FORMS BY EMAIL.

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>REGISTRATION INFORMATION</th>
<th>Please print legibly. This information is used for your meeting name badge.</th>
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<td>Name:</td>
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<td>Date of birth: / / /</td>
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<th>ADVANCE REGISTRATION RATES</th>
<th>This form must be received by March 1, 2013 to receive advance rates.</th>
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<tr>
<td>$25 — APA Student Members</td>
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<td>$80 — APA Regular, International, and Emeritus Members</td>
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<td>$120 — Non-members</td>
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<tr>
<th>PLACEMENT REGISTRATION</th>
<th>Placement is available to APA members only.</th>
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<td>Check this box if you will be a job candidate and wish to register for the placement service.</td>
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Do you anticipate needing childcare at the meeting?  Yes  No

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<th>PAYMENT METHOD</th>
<th>The APA can only accept checks drawn on a U.S. bank, in U.S. dollars.</th>
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<td>Check (payable to APA)</td>
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Last 3 digits on back of card  Exp. Date  

Name as it appears on card:  

Signature of Authorization:  

Email address (for receipt):  

Please print legibly
2013 PACIFIC DIVISION MEETING
March 27-31, The Westin St. Francis
San Francisco, CA

HOTEL RESERVATION INFORMATION

The American Philosophical Association Pacific Division Meeting will be held March 27–31, 2013, in San Francisco, CA. The meeting location is as follows:

The Westin St. Francis
335 Powell Street
San Francisco, CA 94102
Phone Number: (415) 397-7000

The room rate for regular members, nonmembers and student members is $179.00 per night. Rooms are available on a first-come, first-served basis and subject to availability. **Reservations must be made by February 23 to be assured the APA rate.**

The tax rate for The Westin St. Francis is 14.08%. Check-in time is 3:00 PM and check-out time is 12 noon.

Please be sure to let the hotel know if you are physically challenged and will need special accommodations.

The Westin St. Francis prefers reservations be made online at the following URL:


If you are unable to reserve online, please call the hotel at (415) 397-7000.
2013 PACIFIC DIVISION MEETING  
March 27-30, The Westin St. Francis  
San Francisco, California  

Placement Service Registration  
For Interviewing Departments  
If registered as an interviewer online, do not submit this form.

We cannot accept registration forms by email. Submit completed form by fax to (302) 831-8690  
or by mail to Mike Morris, American Philosophical Association, 31 Amstel Avenue, Newark, DE 19716.

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<th>Registration Information</th>
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<td>Institution:</td>
<td>Department:</td>
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<td>Contact Person:</td>
<td>Phone:</td>
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<td>Address:</td>
<td>Email:</td>
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<td>City:</td>
<td>State: Zip Code:</td>
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<tr>
<td>Names of those conducting interviews:</td>
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Note: Placement registration cannot be processed until all interviewers are registered for the Pacific Division Meeting.

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<th>Position Information</th>
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<td>Title(s) of open position(s):</td>
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<td>Advertised in: JFP PhilJobs CHE Other:</td>
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<th>Interview Information</th>
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<tr>
<td>Interviewing Table(s): Please reserve ___ table(s) for our department.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Hotel Suite: Contact Linda Smallbrook at <a href="mailto:lindas@udel.edu">lindas@udel.edu</a> to reserve a suite.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Placement staff may provide our suite number to anyone who requests it.</td>
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<td>If not checked, list of candidates must be provided to placement staff upon check-in.</td>
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<td>Our department will accept interview requests on site. Attach the job description/posting for each position.</td>
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<th>Placement Registration Rates</th>
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<td>To receive pre-registration rate, payment must be received by March 1.</td>
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<td>$50 — Pre-registration</td>
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<td>$75 — Regular/on-site registration</td>
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<td>Signature of Authorization:</td>
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<td>Email address (for receipt):</td>
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Please print legibly.
It is the policy of the APA that all persons attending sessions, including those who are participating as speakers, commentators or session chairs, are required to register for each meeting they attend. In addition, we have always recommended that all participants wear their APA badges during session hours to identify themselves as registered participants. In an effort better to enforce this policy we have begun a system of checking meeting attendees, both at random and if we suspect an attendee may not be registered, for proof of registration. If you are asked to provide proof of registration and are unable to do so, you will be asked to register immediately in order to attend sessions. Registration fees help subsidize every divisional meeting. Without that income we will be unable to ensure the quality and excellence of our meetings which you have come to expect. We thank you for your continued cooperation.