The American Philosophical Association
Pacific Division

Eighty-Sixth
Annual Meeting

Westin Seattle Hotel
Seattle, WA

April 4 - 7, 2012
Proceedings and Addresses of
The American Philosophical Association

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Each annual volume contains the programs for the meetings of the three Divisions; the membership list; Presidential Addresses; news of the Association, its Divisions and Committees, and announcements of interest to philosophers. Other items of interest to the community of philosophers may be included by decision of the Editor or the APA Board of Officers.

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All correspondence should be sent to the APA, 31 Amstel Avenue, University of Delaware, Newark, DE 19716, directed to the appropriate staff member as follows: Erin Shepherd for inquiries and publication copy concerning programs of the Divisional meetings, general issues of the Proceedings, announcements, awards to members, and advertising; Janet Sample for membership information, address changes, and memorial minutes; and the Executive Director for letters to the editor.

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**IMPORTANT NOTICES FOR MEETING ATTENDEES**

**PROCEEDINGS NO LONGER DISTRIBUTED TO MEMBERS AT REGISTRATION**

APA members no longer receive a duplicate copy of this issue of the *Proceedings* at the Pacific Division conference registration desk. All registrants will receive a Pocket Program with session titles, times, and locations. Only non-members will receive a copy of the *Proceedings* at registration. Therefore, if you plan to attend the meeting and wish to consult the full program, please bring this copy of the *Proceedings* to the meeting or use the on-line program at apa-pacific.org.

**INTERNET ACCESS AT THE CONFERENCE HOTEL**

The Pacific Division has negotiated complimentary internet access for those who book rooms at the Westin Seattle using the APA room rate. The APA room rate can be obtained by booking on-line at apa-pacific.org or by phoning +1 888 627-8513 and asking for the “American Philosophical Association Pacific” room rate. Please note that those who book rooms at the conference hotel through third party suppliers like hotels.com cannot take advantage of this offer. The deadline for bookings is March 3, subject to availability.

**FOLLOW THE ANNUAL MEETING ON TWITTER**

For real time information as events unfold during the Annual Meeting, follow us on twitter at @apa_pacific.
LETTER FROM THE SECRETARY-TREASURER

To All Members of the Association:

On behalf of the Executive Committee of the Pacific Division of the American Philosophical Association, I cordially invite you to attend the Division’s 86th annual meeting in Seattle, Washington from Wednesday, April 4 through Saturday, April 7, 2012.

1. CONFERENCE HOTEL

The 2012 meeting will take place at the Westin Seattle. The address is 1900 5th Avenue, Seattle, Washington 98101. The telephone number is +1 206 728-1000 and the fax number is +1 206 728-2259.

The convention rate is available until March 3, subject to availability, and members are strongly advised to book early. To book, connect to the hotel’s on-line reservation page through apa-pacific.org or call +1 888 627-8513 and give the name and dates of meeting. The convention rate is $149 per night for a double or single room. Rooms may also be booked by fax or mail using the hotel reservation form in this issue of the Proceedings.

Complimentary internet access is available to those who book rooms at the Westin Seattle using the APA room rate. Those who book rooms at the conference hotel through third party suppliers like hotels.com cannot take advantage of this offer.

2. LOCAL ATTRACTIONS

The Westin Seattle is on the northern edge of downtown Seattle, close to Pike Place Market and Belltown, a residential neighbourhood well equipped with restaurants, bars, and cafés. Nearby cultural attractions include the Seattle Art Museum and the Olympic Sculpture Park, the Burke Museum of Natural History and Culture at the University of Washington, and the Frye Art Museum in Capitol Hill. For families, the Experience Music Project, Space Needle, the Seattle Aquarium, the Pacific Science Center, and the Boeing Museum of Flight are recommended. Also recommended is the evening ferry ride to Bainbridge Island and the day trip to Victoria, British Columbia aboard the Victoria Clipper.

3. TRAVEL INFORMATION

Driving north on I-5: take Exit 165 onto Seneca Street, turn right onto 6th Avenue, proceed for six blocks down 6th Avenue and cross Stewart Street to the hotel, on the left. Driving south on I-5: take Exit 166 at Stewart
Street/Denny Way, continue right onto Stewart Street, travel nine blocks and turn right onto 6th Avenue, where the hotel is located on the left.

**Seattle–Tacoma Airport** is thirteen miles from the conference hotel. **Taxis** are around $40. The **Downtown Airporter** is $15 one way and may be booked at www.downtownairporter.com. To use **public transit**, take the Light Rail from SeaTac Station to Westlake Station and walk one block north to the hotel. The fare for the forty-minute trip is $2.75.

### 4. Meeting Registration

Advanced registration is $60 for regular members of the APA, discounted to $10 for student members as well as precollege teachers and students, and $90 for non-members. To register in advance, visit apaonline.org or send in the registration form included in this issue of the *Proceedings*. The deadline for advanced registration is two weeks prior to the meeting.

On-site registration fees are $90 for regular members of the APA, $120 for non-members, and $15 for student members and precollege teachers and students. A limited number of tickets are available to non-members for single sessions or receptions.

Those who are not now members of the APA may take advantage of the lower registration fee by becoming members. Membership forms are available online at apaonline.org and will also be available at the meeting registration desk.

### 5. Program

The 2012 Program Committee, chaired by Amy Kind, has organized a diverse and exciting program. Highlights include a Presidential Address by Alison Wylie, Julia Annas’s Dewey Lecture, and three plenary Carus Lectures by Sally Haslanger. There will also be panels in memory of Philippa Foot, Gareth Matthews, and Mary Anne Warren.

Posters and principal papers in Colloquia, Symposia, and the Poster Session are selected by anonymous review. Participants in Invited Paper, Invited Symposia, and Author-Meets-Critics sessions are selected by the Program Committee. Participants in sessions arranged by APA Committees are selected by those Committees.

The Pacific Division once again welcomes its affiliated groups, who have organized more than sixty evening sessions.

### 6. Poster Sessions

Following a successful pilot of poster sessions in 2011, the Program now includes a poster session. Posters have the potential to significantly increase access to the Annual Meeting. Please help make them a success by visiting the posters and speaking to their authors.

Posters will be on display adjacent to the book tables on Friday, April 6 and presenters will be available to discuss their posters from 11 a.m. to 2 p.m. Coffee and cookies will be provided.
7. RECEPTIONS AND SPECIAL EVENTS

The Annual Reception will be held from 10:00 p.m. to midnight on Thursday, April 5. A reception follows the Dewey Lecture at 5:30 p.m. on Friday, April 6. The Presidential Reception follows the Presidential Address on the same day. All are invited to a reception at 4 p.m. on Saturday, April 7 following the session in memory of Philippa Foot.

Please check the Special Events page of the Pocket Program (distributed at registration) for information about receptions added to the schedule as the convention date nears. Receptions are for those registered at the convention, but tickets for guests may be purchased at the convention desk.

8. BUSINESS MEETING

The annual Business Meeting will be held at noon on Thursday, April 5. The list of regular members that appears in the 2011–12 Proceedings is used as the list of eligible voters for the Divisional Business Meeting.

The Pacific Division Executive Committee is proposing a draft of a Statement on Program Diversity for discussion and possible adoption by the Business Meeting. The text of the draft is printed below.

Also printed below is the list of Pacific Division members who have been nominated to serve on the Executive Committee. Pacific Division members may make nominations or volunteer for membership on the Program Committee or the Nomination Committee. Nominations should be sent by email to the Secretary-Treasurer, Dominic Mclver Lopes, at dom.lopes@ubc.ca, no later than March 1.

9. PLACEMENT SERVICE

Only APA members are eligible to use the placement service. Appointing officers and applicants are urged to make preparations for their part in the placement operation in advance of the meeting.

10. 2013 MEETING SITE AND PROGRAM

The 2013 Pacific Division Meeting will be held at the Westin St Francis, in San Francisco. The Program Committee invites submissions of posters and papers. The deadline for submission is September 1, 2012. Each author may make only one submission. Only electronic submissions are accepted. The name and institution of the author may not appear in any way that defeats the operation of anonymous reviewing and submissions that are not prepared for anonymous review will not be considered. Full Guidelines for those intending to submit papers and posters are available at apa-pacific.org/future.

The Program Committee also welcomes suggestions for topics and/or speakers of invited sessions. Volunteers to comment and chair sessions are invited to out the form at apa-pacific.org.
11. ACCOMMODATING MEMBERS WITH MULTIPLE CHEMICAL SENSITIVITIES

To provide a welcoming environment for those with multiple chemical sensitivities, all participants are requested to refrain from wearing scented products.

On behalf of the Pacific Division, I extend to every member of the American Philosophical Association a warm invitation to take part in our 2012 Annual Meeting.

Cordially,

Dominic McIver Lopes
Secretary-Treasurer
PACIFIC DIVISION COMMITTEES, 2011-12

EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE

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Amy Kind
Dominic McIver Lopes
Alastair Norcross
Jean Roberts
Michael Tooley
Alison Wylie
Manuel Vargas

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NOMINATING COMMITTEE

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Ken Taylor
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Ahmed Alwishah (Pitzer College)
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Paul Hurley (Claremont McKenna College)
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Rivka Weinberg (Scripps College)
THE AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL ASSOCIATION
PACIFIC DIVISION
86TH ANNUAL
MEETING PROGRAM

APRIL 4 - 7, 2012
WESTIN SEATTLE, SEATTLE

MAIN PROGRAM

WEDNESDAY, APRIL 4

PLACEMENT INFORMATION
Noon-8:00 p.m., Grand Foyer

ON-SITE REGISTRATION
Noon-8:00 p.m., Grand Foyer
(Meeting attendees who pre-registered may pick up their registration materials beginning at 8:00 a.m.)

WEDNESDAY MORNING, APRIL 4

SESSION 1 — 9:00 A.M.-NOON

1A Author-Meets-Critics: Samuel Fleischacker, Divine Teaching and the Way of the World
9:00 a.m.-Noon
Chair: Michael Rosenthal (University of Washington)
Critics: Hubert Dreyfus (University of California–Berkeley)
Stephen Evans (Baylor University)
Howard Wettstein (University of California–Riverside)
Author: Samuel Fleischacker (University of Illinois–Chicago)

1B Author-Meets-Critics: Henry E. Allison, Kant’s Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals: A Commentary
9:00 a.m.-Noon
Chair: Anne Margaret Baxley (Washington University in St. Louis)
Critics: Tamar Schapiro (Stanford University)
Dieter Schönecker (Universität Siegen)
Allen Wood (Stanford University)

Author: Henry E. Allison (University of California–San Diego and Boston University)

1C  Author-Meets-Critics: Sanford Goldberg, *Relying on Others: An Essay in Epistemology*

9:00 a.m.-Noon

Chair: Eric Dayton (University of Saskatchewan)

Critics: Jack Lyons (University of Arkansas–Fayetteville)
Sarah A. Wright (University of Georgia)

Author: Sanford Goldberg (Northwestern University)

1D  Invited Symposium: Fictionalism

9:00 a.m.-Noon

Chair: Joseph Ullian (Washington University in St. Louis)

Speakers: Thomas Hofweber (University of North Carolina–Chapel Hill)
Alexis Burgess (Stanford University)
Mark Balaguer (California State University–Los Angeles)

1E  Invited Symposium: Naturalizing Virtue

9:00 a.m.-Noon

Chair: Adam Morton (University of British Columbia)

Speakers: Carlos Montemayor (San Francisco State University)
“A Ramseyan Account of Naturalized Epistemic Virtue and Responsibility”
Ram Neta (University of North Carolina–Chapel Hill)
“Does the Epistemic ‘Ought’ Imply the Cognitive ‘Can?’”
David Copp (University of California–Davis)
“Indirect Epistemic Teleology Explained and Defended”

Commentators: Peter Graham (University of California–Riverside)
Christoph Kelp (Katholieke Universiteit Leuven)
Lauren Olin (Washington University in St. Louis)

1F  Invited Symposium: Synesthesia

9:00 a.m.-Noon

Chair: Rebecca Copenhaver (Lewis & Clark College)

Speakers: Brit Brogaard (University of Missouri–St. Louis)
Casey O’Callaghan (Rice University)
Kathleen Akins (Simon Fraser University)
Jason Padgett (Independent Scholar)

1G Invited Symposium: The Philosophy of Sara Ruddick
9:00 a.m.-Noon
Chair: Claudia Card (University of Wisconsin–Madison)
Speakers: Sarah Miller (University of Memphis)
“Care and Conflict”
Serene Khader (State University of New York–Stony Brook)
“Maternal Thinking, Paternalism, and Participatory Development?”
Bonnie Mann (University of Oregon)
“On Maternal Aggression”
Jean Keller (College of St. Benedict and St. John’s University)
“Pain, Loss, and Harm in Transnational Adoption: Implications for Maternal Practice”

1H Colloquium: Jacobi, Kierkegaard, and Nietzsche
9:00 a.m.-Noon
9:00-10:00
Chair: Agnes Curry (St. Joseph College)
Speaker: Nathan Carson (Baylor University)
“Kierkegaard on Approximation Knowledge and Existential Truth: An Incompatibilist Interpretation”
Commentator: Christopher Latiolais (Kalamazoo College)

10:00-11:00
Chair: David Pratt (St. Martin’s College)
Speaker: Joseph Swenson (University of Illinois–Urbana-Champaign)
“Nietzsche and the Tradition of Minimalist Moral Psychology”
Commentator: Shari Starrett (California State University–Fullerton)

11:00-12:00
Chair: Gary Shapiro (University of Richmond)
Speaker: Jeremy Proulx (Eastern Michigan University)
“Jacobi and the Problem of Nihilism”
Commentator: John McCumber (University of California–Los Angeles)
Colloquium: Love and Partiality
9:00 a.m.-Noon

9:00-10:00
Chair: Clair Morrissey (Occidental College)
Speaker: Nina Brewer-Davis (Auburn University)
“Partiality and the Significance of Shared History”
Commentator: Ariela Tubert (University of Puget Sound)

10:00-11:00
Chair: Patrick Smith (University of Washington)
Speaker: Alexander Jech (University of Virginia)
“Affinity and Reason to Love”
Commentator: Brook Sadler (University of South Florida)

11:00-12:00
Chair: Shelley Wilcox (San Francisco State University)
Speaker: Emily Crookston (Washington University in St. Louis)
“Love and (Polygamous) Marriage? A Liberal Defense of Opposition to Polygamy”
Commentator: Margaret Denike (Dalhousie University)

Colloquium: Ontology and Meta-ontology
9:00 a.m.-Noon

9:00-10:00
Chair: Brad Armour-Garb (State University of New York–Albany)
Speaker: Sara Bernstein (Duke University)
“Omissions as Possibilities”
Commentator: Mark Heller (Syracuse University)

10:00-11:00
Chair: Chelsea Haramia (University of Colorado–Boulder)
Speaker: Katherine Ritchie (University of Texas–Austin)
“What Are Groups?”
Commentator: Kendy Hess (College of the Holy Cross)

11:00-12:00
Chair: Kathryn Lindeman (University of Pittsburgh)
Speaker: Matthew Haug (College of William and Mary)
“Toward a Naturalistic Reformation of Quinean Meta-ontology”
Commentator: Troy Cross (Reed College)
1K Colloquium: Race
9:00 a.m.-Noon

9:00-10:00
Chair: Darrell Moore (DePaul University)
Speaker: Quayshawn Spencer (University of San Francisco)
“How to Be a Biological Racial Realist”
Commentator: Michael Hardimon (University of California–San Diego)

10:00-11:00
Chair: Ormond Smythe (Antioch University Seattle)
Speaker: Jeremy Pierce (Le Moyne College)
“Race and Context-sensitivity”
Commentator: Luvell Anderson (Pennsylvania State University)

11:00-12:00
Chair: Mark Chakoian (Gonzaga University)
Speaker: John Draeger (Buffalo State College)
“Respect for Racists and Homophobes”
Commentator: Desiree Melton (Notre Dame of Maryland University)

1L Colloquium: War, Armies, and Justice
9:00 a.m.-Noon

9:00-10:00
Chair: Aaron S. Edwards (Imperial Valley College)
Speaker: Crystal Allen (University of Missouri)
“Individual Rights and the Restrictive Force of Just Cause: A Response to Jeff McMahan”
Commentator: Daniel A. Dombrowski (Seattle University)

10:00-11:00
Chair: Paul Schollmeier (University of Nevada–Las Vegas)
Speaker: Sean Erwin (Barry University)
“The Metabolism of the State: Machiavelli’s Treatment of the Theme of Auxiliaries at Discorsi II.20”
Commentator: Christiana Olfert (Tufts University)

11:00-12:00
Chair: Steven Scalet (University of Baltimore)
Speaker: Sameer Bajaj (University of Arizona)
“Facts, Principles, and Justice”
Commentator: Amy Berg (University of California–San Diego)
1M APA Committee Session: Credentialing
9:00 a.m.-Noon

Arranged by the APA Committee on Philosophy in Two-Year Colleges
Chair: Bill Hartmann (St. Louis Community College)
Speakers: Anthony E. Thomas (Kishwaukee College)
Marc Bobro (Santa Barbara City College)
Mark Thorsby (Lone Star College)

1N APA Committee Session: Preparing 21st Century Academics: The Importance of Educating Graduate Students about Teaching and Learning
9:00 a.m.-Noon

Arranged by the APA Committee on the Teaching of Philosophy
Chair: Betsy Decyk (California State University–Long Beach)
Speakers: Annie Bezbatchenko (Teagle Foundation)
“Introduction to, and Context for, the Teagle Foundation’s Graduate Student Teaching Initiative”
Rachelle L. Brooks (Northwestern University)
“Northwestern Initiative for Teaching and Learning by Graduate Students”
Daniel Denecke (Council of Graduate Schools)
“Preparing Future Faculty (PFF): Lessons on Effective Integration of Teaching and Learning in Graduate Education”
Linda von Hoene (University of California–Berkeley)
“Teaching Certificate Programs for Graduate Students: Berkeley’s How Students Learn Initiative”

WEDNESDAY AFTERNOON, APRIL 4

SESSION 2 — 1:00-4:00 p.m.

2A Author-Meets-Critics: Mohammad Azadpur, Reason Unbound: On Spiritual Practice in Islamic Peripatetic Philosophy
1:00-4:00 p.m.
Chair: Jeremy Fischer (University of Washington)
Critics: Nader El-Bizri (Institute of Ismaili Studies)
Bo Mou (San Jose State University)
Sarah Pessin (University of Denver)  
Therese Scarpelli Cory (Seattle University)  
Author: Mohammad Azadpur (San Francisco State University)

2B **Author-Meets-Critics: Charlotte Witt, The Metaphysics of Gender**  
1:00-4:00 p.m.  
Chair: Rachel Fredericks (University of Washington)  
Critics: Mari Mikkola (Humboldt-Universität Berlin)  
Natalie Stoljar (McGill University)  
Ásta Sveinsdóttir (San Francisco State University)  
Author: Charlotte Witt (University of New Hampshire)

2C **Author-Meets-Critics: Jonathan Haidt, The Righteous Mind**  
1:00-4:00 p.m.  
Chair: Aaron Zimmerman (University of California–Santa Barbara)  
Critics: Owen Flanagan (Duke University)  
Allan Gibbard (University of Michigan–Ann Arbor)  
Jeanette Kennett (Macquarie University)  
Author: Jonathan Haidt (University of Virginia)

2D **Invited Symposium: Ideas in Kant**  
1:00-4:00 p.m.  
Chair: Pierre Keller (University of California–Riverside)  
Speakers: Houston Smit (University of Arizona)  
“Kant on the Theoretical and Practical Uses of the Idea of a Person”  
Georg Mohr (Universität Bremen)  
“Music as Communication of Aesthetic Ideas”  
Sanford Budick (Hebrew University)  
“John Milton, Ideas, and Kant’s Opus postumum”  
Commentators: Eric Watkins (University of California–San Diego)  
William Bristow (University of Wisconsin–Milwaukee)  
Fred Rush (University of Notre Dame)

2E **Invited Symposium: Reference and Co-reference**  
1:00-4:00 p.m.  
Chair: Anna-Sara Malmgren (Stanford University)  
Speakers: Robert May (University of California–Davis)  
Kit Fine (New York University)  
Krista Lawlor (Stanford University)
2F Invited Symposium: Unconscious Perception
1:00-4:00 p.m.
Chair: Stephan Blatti (University of Memphis)
Speakers: Murat Aydede (University of British Columbia)
Colin Allen (Indiana University–Bloomington)
Diana Raffman (University of Toronto)

2G Colloquium: Decision Theory
1:00-4:00 p.m.
1:00-2:00
Chair: Jason Raibley (California State University–Long Beach)
Speaker: Armin Schulz (London School of Economics)
“Preferences vs. Desires: Debating the Structure of Conative States”
Commentator: Roger Clarke (University of British Columbia)

2:00-3:00
Chair: Scott Hendricks (Clark University)
Speaker: Julia Staffel (University of Southern California)
“Formulating Principles of Reasoning”
Commentator: Glen Nesse (University of Wyoming)

3:00-4:00
Chair: Nikolaj Jang Pedersen (University of California–Los Angeles)
Speaker: Dylan Dodd (University of Aberdeen)
“White on Imprecise Credences”
Commentator: Roger White (Massachusetts Institute of Technology)

2H Colloquium: Democracy
1:00-4:00 p.m.
1:00-2:00
Chair: Ranjoo Herr (Bentley University)
Speaker: Michael Seifried (Columbia University)
“A Deliberative Outlet? Rethinking the Role of Majority Rule in Deliberative Democracy”
Commentator: Ann Levey (University of Calgary)

2:00-3:00
Chair: Michael Howard (University of Maine)
Speaker: Adam Hosein (University of Colorado–Boulder)
“Democracy, Paternalism, and Campaign Finance”
Commentator: Deborah Hellman (University of Maryland–Baltimore)
3:00-4:00
Chair: Paul Hughes (University of Michigan–Dearborn)
Speaker: Jeremy Neill (Houston Baptist University)
“Fact of the Matter: Political Ideals and Democratic Consensus”
Commentator: Lisa Fuller (State University of New York–Albany)

2I Colloquium: Ethics
1:00-4:00 p.m.

1:00-2:00
Chair: Christian Lee (University of Colorado–Boulder)
Speaker: Mark E. Wunderlich (Union College)
“A Value-neutral Defense of Noncomparabilism”
Commentator: Paul Studtmann (Davidson College)

2:00-3:00
Chair: Michelle Switzer (Whittier College)
Speaker: Thomas Metcalf (University of Colorado–Boulder)
“Deontology Monsters, Particularism, and Counterpossible Counterexamples in Normative Ethics”
Commentator: Craig Agule (University of California–San Diego)

3:00-4:00
Chair: Tian Jie (University of British Columbia)
Speaker: Hallie Liberto (University of Connecticut)
“Moral Perpendiculars”
Commentator: Todd Calder (Saint Mary’s University)

2J Colloquium: Philosophy of Mind
1:00-4:00 p.m.

1:00-2:00
Chair: David Sanford (Duke University)
Speaker: Kirk Ludwig (Indiana University–Bloomington)
“The Argument for Subject-body Dualism from Transtemporal-identity”
Commentator: Martine Nida-Rümelin (Université de Fribourg)

2:00-3:00
Chair: Vasilis Tsompanidis (University of California–Santa Barbara)
Speaker: Ty Fagan (University of Illinois–Urbana-Champaign)
“Animal Mindreading and the Principle of Conservatism”
Commentator: Gary Bartlett (Central Washington University)
3:00-4:00
Chair: Keith Hall (University of Southern California)
Speaker: Bernard Molyneux (University of California–Davis)
“On the Infinite Richness of Seeming and Its Relevance to the Hard Problem of Consciousness”
Commentator: Alejandro Perez Carballo (University of Southern California)

2K Colloquium: Time
1:00-4:00 p.m.

1:00-2:00
Chair: Herminia Reyes (San Diego State University)
Speaker: Caleb Perl (University of Southern California)
“An Argument for Temporalism about Propositions”
Commentator: Gillian Russell (Washington University in St. Louis)

2:00-3:00
Chair: John Manchak (University of Washington)
Speaker: Steven Savitt (University of British Columbia)
“How Fast Time Passes”
Commentator: Tarun Menon (University of California–San Diego)

3:00-4:00
Chair: Rebecca Chan (University of Colorado–Boulder)
Speaker: Ulrich Meyer (Colgate University)
“Theories of Presentness”
Commentator: Lyle Crawford (Simon Fraser University)

2L Colloquium: Virtue and Skill
1:00-4:00 p.m.

1:00-2:00
Chair: Marcia Homiak (Occidental College)
Speaker: Jason Swartwood (University of Minnesota–Twin Cities)
“Wisdom as an Expert Skill”
Commentator: Noell Birondo (University of Missouri–St. Louis)

2:00-3:00
Chair: Helmut Wautischer (Sonoma State University)
Speaker: Nathan King (Whitworth University)
“Perseverance as an Intellectual Virtue”
Commentator: Andrew Bailey (University of Notre Dame)

3:00-4:00
Chair: Stephen Brown (Briar Cliff University)
Speaker: Matt Stichter (Washington State University)

“The Skill of Virtue and the Psychology of Expertise”

Commentator: Emily Mcrae (University of Oklahoma)

2M APA Committee Session: The Scholarship of Teaching and Learning in Philosophy
1:00-4:00 p.m.

Arranged by the APA Committee on the Teaching of Philosophy

Chair: Christina Hendricks (University of British Columbia)

Speakers: Mara Harrell (Carnegie Mellon University)

“Argument Diagramming Improves Critical Thinking in Introductory Philosophy”

David Concepcion (Ball State University)

Paul Green (Mount St. Mary’s College)

“The Nature and Value of SoTL”

Ian Schnee (Western Kentucky University)

“Who Is Disadvantaged by Standard Approaches to Teaching Logic?”

Kate Padgett Walsh (Iowa State University)

“Writing Groups and Peer Evaluation in Undergraduate Courses”

WEDNESDAY EARLY EVENING, APRIL 4

SESSION 3 — 4:00-6:00 P.M.

3A Invited Paper: Ontological Dependence
4:00-6:00 p.m.

Chair: Avram Hiller (Portland State University)

Speaker: L. A. Paul (University of North Carolina–Chapel Hill)

“Structure, Dependence, and Composition”

Commentators: Raul Saucedo (Yale University and Australian National University)

Meghan Sullivan (University of Notre Dame)

3B Invited Paper: Skepticism and Phenomenal Content
4:00-6:00 p.m.

Chair: Charles Wallis (California State University–Long Beach)

Speaker: Robert Howell (Southern Methodist University)

“Phenomenal Content and the New Evil Demon”
Commentators: Terry Horgan (University of Arizona)  
Nicoletta Orlandi (Rice University)

3C Invited Symposium: Addressing the Dearth of Women in Philosophy of Religion
4:00-6:00 p.m.
Chair: Kevin L. Timpe (Northwest Nazarene University)
Speakers: Christina VanDyke (Calvin College)
“Don’t Get Your Panties in a Bunch: The Dilemma of Drawing Attention to the Absence of Women”
Victoria Harrison (University of Glasgow)
“Is Philosophy of Religion Relevant to Women?”
Commentator: Kristen Irwin (Biola University)

3D Colloquium: Applied Ethics
4:00-6:00 p.m.
4:00-5:00
Chair: Jeremy Snyder (Simon Fraser University)
Speaker: Richard Dean (California State University–Los Angeles)
“Stigmatization and Denormalization as Public Health Policies: Some Kantian Thoughts”
Commentator: Bruce Landesman (University of Utah)
5:00-6:00
Chair: Alicia Intriago (University of Washington)
Speaker: John Basl (Bowling Green State University)
“Sensitivity Enhancement: The Ethics of Testing Cognitive Enhancements on Non-human Research Subjects”
Commentator: Yvette Pearson (Old Dominion University)

3E Colloquium: Aristotle’s Elements
4:00-6:00 p.m.
4:00-5:00
Chair: Suzanne Obdrzalek (Claremont McKenna College)
Speaker: Richard Tierney (University of Wisconsin–Milwaukee)
“Proper Place, Form, and Natural Elemental Motion in Aristotle”
Commentator: David Ebrey (Northwestern University)
5:00-6:00
Chair: James Butler (Berea College)
Speaker: Mary Krizan (Spring Hill College)
“An Inconsistency Revisited: Change, Unity, and Aristotle’s Elements”
Commentator: John Mouracade (University of Alaska–Anchorage)

3F Colloquium: Causal Explanations
4:00-6:00 p.m.

4:00-5:00
Chair: Bert Baumgaertner (University of California–Davis)
Speaker: Andrew Wayne (University of Guelph)
“On the Scope of Causal Explanation in Physics”
Commentator: Pablo Zavala (University of Wyoming)

5:00-6:00
Chair: Susanna Goodin (University of Wyoming)
Speaker: Melinda Fagan (Rice University)
“Thinking again about Mechanisms”
Commentator: Joseph Ulatowski (University of Mississippi)

3G Colloquium: Higher-order Theories of Consciousness
4:00-6:00 p.m.

4:00-5:00
Chair: Sean Hermanson (Florida International University)
Speaker: David Miguel Gray (Vanderbilt University)
“HOT: Keeping Up Appearances?”
Commentator: Josh Weisberg (University of Houston)

5:00-6:00
Chair: Tamar Weber (University of California–Los Angeles)
Speaker: Adrienne Prettyman (University of Toronto)
“Empty Thoughts: An Explanatory Problem for Higher-order Theories of Consciousness”
Commentator: Richard Brown (City University of New York–LaGuardia)

3H Colloquium: Logic
4:00-6:00 p.m.

4:00-5:00
Chair: Sandra Lapointe (McMaster University)
Speaker: Jamin Asay (University of North Carolina–Chapel Hill)
“Epistemicism and the Liar”
Commentator: Jeff Snapper (University of Notre Dame)
5:00-6:00
Chair: Jonathan Katz (Kwantlen Polytechnic University)
Speaker: Dean Pettit (University of North Carolina–Chapel Hill)
“All You Can Eat:’ More Than Generalized Quantifier Theory Can Chew”
Commentator: Benjamin R. George (Massachusetts Institute of Technology)

3I Colloquium: Psychopathy
4:00-6:00 p.m.
4:00-5:00
Chair: Garrett Pendergraft (Pepperdine University)
Speaker: Erick Ramirez (University of California–San Diego)
“Receptivity, Reactivity, and the Successful Psychopath: How Psychopathy Undermines Three Assumptions about Moderate Reasons Responsiveness”
Commentator: Julie Tannenbaum (Pomona College)
5:00-6:00
Chair: Tanya Rodriguez (City University of New York–City College)
Speaker: Danielle Wylie (University of Wisconsin–Madison)
“Defending Rationalism from Psychopaths”
Commentator: Gwen Bradford (Rice University)

3J Colloquium: Thought
4:00-6:00 p.m.
4:00-5:00
Chair: Dan López de Sa (LOGOS Barcelona)
Speaker: Alex Grzankowski (University of Texas–Austin)
“The Metaphysics of Non-propositional Attitudes”
Commentator: Catherine Wearing (Wellesley College)
5:00-6:00
Chair: Stavroula Glezakos (Wake Forest University)
Speaker: James Genone (Stanford University)
“Cognitive Significance and Singular Thought”
Commentator: Ephraim Glick (University of St. Andrews)

3K Symposium: Berkeley
4:00-6:00 p.m.
Chair: Kenneth Clatterbaugh (University of Washington)
Speaker: Stephen Daniel (Texas A&M University)  
“Berkeley on God’s Creation of Minds and Human Freedom”

Commentators: John Roberts (Florida State University)  
Tom Stoneham (University of York)

### 3L Symposium: Blame

**4:00-6:00 p.m.**

Chair: Bruce Hunter (University of Alberta)

Speaker: Neal Tognazzini (College of William and Mary)  
“Blame as a Volitional Activity”

Commentators: Scott A. Anderson (University of British Columbia)  
Amélie Rorty (National Humanities Center)

### 3M Symposium: Moral Judgment

**4:00-6:00 p.m.**

Chair: Dan Campana (University of La Verne)

Speaker: Victor Kumar (University of Arizona)  
“A Posteriori Reduction of Moral Judgment”

Commentators: Reid Blackman (Colgate University)  
Aaron Mead (University of California–Los Angeles)

### 3N Symposium: Zeno

**4:00-6:00 p.m.**

Chair: Chris Tennberg (Kauai Community College)

Speaker: Pavle Stojanovic (Johns Hopkins University)  
“Zeno’s Definition of the Apprehensive Impression”

Commentators: Henry Dyson (University of Michigan–Ann Arbor)  
Michelle Jenkins (Whitman College)

### Carus Lecture

**6:00-7:00 p.m.**

**Topic:** Doing Justice to the Social

Chair: Cheshire Calhoun (Arizona State University)

Speaker: Sally Haslanger (Massachusetts Institute of Technology)  
“What Are Social Structures?”

### Group Meetings, 7:00-9:00 p.m.

(See Group Meeting Program for details)

Society for Analytical Feminism
GROUP MEETINGS, 7:00-10:00 P.M.
(See Group Meeting Program for details)
International Society for Comparative Studies of Chinese and Western Philosophy, Session 1
North American Wittgenstein Society, Session 1
Philosophy of Time Society
Society for German Idealism, Session 1
Society for Natural Religion, Session 1
Society for Philosophy in the Contemporary World
Society for the Advancement of American Philosophy, Session 1
Society for the History of Political Philosophy
Society for the Philosophy of History, Session 1
Society for the Philosophy of Sex and Love
Society for the Study of Philosophy and the Martial Arts, Session 1
Society for the Study of the History of Analytical Philosophy, Session 1
Society of Indian Philosophy and Religion, Session 1

GROUP MEETINGS, 9:00-11:00 P.M.
(See Group Meeting Program for details)
Society for Asian and Comparative Philosophy, Session 1

THURSDAY, APRIL 5

PLACEMENT INTERVIEWING
8:30 a.m.-5:00 p.m.

PLACEMENT INFORMATION
8:30 a.m.-8:00 p.m., Grand Foyer

REGISTRATION
8:30 a.m.-8:00 p.m., Grand Foyer

BOOK DISPLAYS
11:00 a.m.-5:30 p.m.

ANNUAL BUSINESS MEETING
Noon-1:00 p.m.

ANNUAL RECEPTION
10:00 p.m.-Midnight
THURSDAY MORNING, APRIL 5

SESSION 4 — 9:00 A.M.-NOON

4A Author-Meets-Critics: Carolyn Korsmeyer, Savoring Disgust: The Foul and the Fair in Aesthetics
9:00 a.m.-Noon
Chair: Peg Brand (Indiana University-Purdue University—Indianapolis)
Critics: Mitchell Green (University of Virginia)
        Alex Neill (University of Southampton)
Author: Carolyn Korsmeyer (University at Buffalo)

4B Author-Meets-Critics: Jason Baehr, The Inquiring Mind: On Intellectual Virtues and Virtue Epistemology
9:00 a.m.-Noon
Chair: Dennis Whitcomb (Western Washington University)
Critics: Heather Battaly (California State University—Fullerton)
        Sven Bernecker (University of California—Irvine)
        Wayne Riggs (University of Oklahoma)
Author: Jason Baehr (Loyola Marymount University)

4C Author-Meets-Critics: Eleonore Stump, Wandering in Darkness: Narrative and the Problem of Suffering
9:00 a.m.-Noon
Chair: Rebekah L. H. Rice (Seattle Pacific University)
Critics: John Martin Fischer (University of California—Riverside)
        David McNaughton (Florida State University)
Author: Eleonore Stump (St. Louis University)

4D Special Memorial Session: Mary Anne Warren
9:00 a.m.-Noon
Chair: Dianne Romain (Sonoma State University)
Speakers: Michael Tooley (University of Colorado–Boulder)
          “Mary Anne Warren on Abortion”
          Michael Boylan (Marymount University)
          “Mary Anne Warren and Duties to Animals”
          Wanda Teays (Mount St. Mary’s College)
          “Mary Anne Warren on Replicants, Cyborgs, and Pre-Cogs: Personhood and Feminist Ethics”
4E  **Invited Symposium: Ethics and War**  
*9:00 a.m.-Noon*  
Chair: Darrel Moellendorf (San Diego State University)  
Speakers:  
Helen Frowe (University of Kent)  
“War and Individualism”  
Richard W. Miller (Cornell University)  
“Killing Civilians in the American Way of War: The Fate of Double Effect”  
David Rodin (Oxford University)  
“After Just War Theory”  
Commentator: Richard Schoonhoven (United States Military Academy)

4F  **Invited Symposium: Locke on Mind and Body**  
*9:00 a.m.-Noon*  
Chair: Samuel Rickless (University of California–San Diego)  
Speakers:  
Lisa Downing (Ohio State University)  
“Locke Contra Descartes on Mind, Body, and Dualism”  
Peter Anstey (University of Otago)  
“Locke on the Nature of Mind”  
Commentators: Michael Jacovides (Purdue University)  
Edwin McCann (University of Southern California)

4G  **Invited Symposium: Socrates in Plato**  
*9:00 a.m.-Noon*  
Chair: Brian Copenhaver (University of California–Los Angeles)  
Speakers:  
Lloyd P. Gerson (University of Toronto)  
Mark McPherran (Simon Fraser University)  
Hugh Benson (University of Oklahoma)  
Rachana Kamtekar (University of Arizona)

4H  **Invited Symposium: The Senses: A Survey**  
*9:00 a.m.-Noon*  
Chair: Peter Ross (California State Polytechnic University–Pomona)  
Speakers:  
Mohan Matthen (University of Toronto)  
“Complex Appearances”  
Fiona Macpherson (University of Glasgow)  
“The Senses”
Brian L. Keeley (Pitzer College)
“What Kind of Kind Are the Senses?”
Commentator: Alex Byrne (Massachusetts Institute of Technology)

4I Invited Symposium: Theories of Meaning and Attitude Ascriptions
9:00 a.m.-Noon
Chair: Robert Greenleaf Brice (Loyola University–New Orleans)
Speakers: Octavian Ion (University of Alberta)
Ernest LePore (Rutgers University)
Daniel Morgan (Oxford University)

4J Colloquium: Belief Revision
9:00 a.m.-Noon
9:00-10:00
Chair: Heidi Grasswick (Middlebury College)
Speaker: Peter Thielke (Pomona College)
“What Would It Take to Change Your Mind?”
Commentator: Carrie Ichikawa Jenkins (University of British Columbia)

10:00-11:00
Chair: Richard Greene (Weber State University)
Speaker: Ekaterina Vavova (Amherst College)
“Confidence, Evidence, and Disagreement”
Commentator: Shamik Dasgupta (Princeton University)

11:00-12:00
Chair: Catherine Legg (University of Waikato)
Speakers: Derek Ball (University of St. Andrews)
Bryan Pickel (Universitat de Barcelona)
“One Dogma of Millianism”
Commentator: Ted Parent (Virginia Tech)

4K Colloquium: Harms and Balancing
9:00 a.m.-Noon
9:00-10:00
Chair: Graham Robertson (Simon Fraser University)
Speaker: Jeffrey Watson (Arizona State University)
“Harm and Reasonable Expectations”
Commentator: Ben Bradley (Syracuse University)
10:00-11:00
Chair: Andrea Gammon (University of Montana)
Speaker: Howard Nye (University of Alberta)
“How the Doctrine of Double Effect Can Vindicate the Doctrine of Doing and Allowing”
Commentator: Alison McIntyre (Wellesley College)

11:00-12:00
Chair: Mitchell Kaufman (University of Washington)
Speaker: Ralf Bader (New York University)
“Aggregating vs. Balancing”
Commentator: Ann Davis (Pomona College)

**4L Colloquium: Kant**

*9:00 a.m.-Noon*

**9:00-10:00**
Chair: Lara Ostaric (St. Michael’s College)
Speaker: Samantha Matherne (University of California–Riverside)
“Kant on the Primacy of Schematized Categories”
Commentator: Tim Jankowiak (University of California–San Diego)

**10:00-11:00**
Chair: Brad McHose (University of Washington)
Speaker: Michael Nance (University of Pennsylvania)
“Equality and the Kantian State”
Commentator: Japa Pallikkathayil (New York University)

**11:00-12:00**
Chair: Anthony Rudd (St. Olaf College)
Speaker: E.S. Elizondo (Yale University)
“What Is the Kantian Will?”
Commentator: Lawrence Pasternack (Oklahoma State University)

**4M Colloquium: Metaphysics**

*9:00 a.m.-Noon*

**9:00-10:00**
Chair: Erika Strickland Au (San Francisco State University)
Speaker: Mark Barber (Syracuse University)
“Analyzing Grounding”
Commentator: Jennifer Lamborn (University of Wyoming)

**10:00-11:00**
Chair: Julian Stone-Kronberg (University of Southern California)
Main Program

Speaker: M. Hayden Thornburg (University of Cincinnati)  
“Levels, Layers, and Degrees of Resolution”  
Commentator: Katrina Elliott (New York University)

11:00-12:00
Chair: Greg Antill (University of California–Los Angeles)  
Speaker: Andrew Arlig (Brooklyn College)  
“Twelfth Century Reflections on Mereological Changelessness”  
Commentator: Calvin Normore (University of California–Los Angeles)

4N APA Committee Session: Causation in Law
9:00 a.m.-Noon
Arranged by the APA Committee on Philosophy and Law
Chair: Kevin Toh (San Francisco State University)  
Speakers: Jonathan Schaffer (Rutgers University)  
Carolina Sartorio (University of Arizona)  
Commentators: Sara Bernstein (Duke University)  
Brad Weslake (University of Rochester)

ANNUAL BUSINESS MEETING
12:00-1:00 p.m.

THURSDAY AFTERNOON, APRIL 5

SESSION 5 — 1:00-4:00 P.M.

5A Author-Meets-Critics: Jason Stanley, Know How
1:00-4:00 p.m.
Chair: Tim Sundell (University of Kentucky)  
Critics: Imogen Dickie (University of Toronto)  
Sean D. Kelly (Harvard University)  
Seth Yalcin (University of California–Berkeley)  
Author: Jason Stanley (Rutgers University)

5B Author-Meets-Critics: Mark Schroeder, Noncognitivism in Ethics
1:00-4:00 p.m.
Chair: Douglas Portmore (Arizona State University)  
Critics: Daniel Boisvert (University of North Carolina–Charlotte)  
Michael Ridge (University of Edinburgh)  
Mark van Roojen (University of Nebraska–Lincoln)  
Author: Mark Schroeder (University of Southern California)
5C  Author-Meets-Critics: Bill Fish, *Perception, Hallucination, and Illusion*
1:00-4:00 p.m.
Chair: Janet Levin (University of Southern California)
Critics: Michael Martin (University College London)
        Adam Pautz (University of Texas–Austin)
        Susanna Schellenberg (Rutgers University)
Author: Bill Fish (Massey University)

5D  Invited Symposium: Comparative Perspectives on Virtue and Moral Psychology
1:00-4:00 p.m.
Chair: Lisa Raphals (National University of Singapore)
Speakers: Nicholas D. Smith (Lewis & Clark College)
          Ralph Weber (Universität Zürich)
          Jiyuan Yu (University at Buffalo)

5E  Invited Symposium: Early Modern European Philosophy Encounters the Non-European World
1:00-4:00 p.m.
Chair: David Owen (University of Arizona)
Speakers: Franklin Perkins (DePaul University)
          “Leibniz on Unity and Diversity Across Cultures”
          Patrick Connolly (University of North Carolina–Chapel Hill)
          “Travel Literature, the New World, and Locke’s Philosophy”
Commentators: Ursula Goldenbaum (Emory University)
               Jan-Erik Jones (Southern Virginia University)

5F  Invited Symposium: Justice in Entry and Exit—Territory, Migration, and Membership
1:00-4:00 p.m.
Chair: Cindy Holder (University of Victoria)
Speakers: Gillian Brock (University of Auckland)
          “Emigration, Losses, and Burden-Sharing”
          Christine Straehle (University of Ottawa)
          “Freedom of Movement, Emigration, and Opportunities: Weighing Gains and Cost in Migration”
          Avigail Eisenberg (University of Victoria)
          “Immigrants and the Right to Effective Participation”
Commentator: Michael Blake (University of Washington)
5G Invited Symposium: Kant’s *Doctrine of Right*
1:00-4:00 p.m.
Chair: Pablo Muchnik (Emerson College)
Speakers: Paul Guyer (University of Pennsylvania)
Sarah Holtman (University of Minnesota–Twin Cities)
Alexander Kaufman (University of Georgia)
Commentators: Robert J. Leland (Stanford University)
Frederick Rauscher (Michigan State University)
Andrews Reath (University of California–Riverside)

5H Invited Symposium: Problems for Philosophers: Implicit Bias and the Perception of Merit
1:00-4:00 p.m.
Chair: Patrick Goodin (Howard University)
Speakers: Naomi Zack (University of Oregon)
“Ethical Professionalism Versus Cronyism: How Women and Minorities Are Affected”
Carla Fehr (Iowa State University)
“Implicit Bias, and the Effectiveness of Epistemic Communities”
Edouard Machery (University of Pittsburgh)
“Implicit Biases: Beyond the Hype”
Anne Jacobson (University of Houston)
“Why There Is No Free Lunch: A Neuroscientific Case Study of Implicit Bias”

5I Colloquium: Aesthetics
1:00-4:00 p.m.
1:00-2:00
Chair: S. West Gurley (Sam Houston State University)
Speaker: Renee Conroy (Purdue University–Calumet)
“Dance: The Ephemeral Art?”
Commentator: Aili Bresnahan (Temple University)

2:00-3:00
Chair: Roger Paden (George Mason University)
Speaker: Thomas Hilgers (Freie Universität Berlin)
“Dickie’s False Mythology”
Commentator: Derek Matravers (Open University)

3:00-4:00
Chair: Michelle Saint (Western Washington University)
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Speaker: Michael Falgoust (Tulane University of New Orleans)
“Derivative Works, Original Value”

Commentator: Adam Moore (University of Washington)

5J Colloquium: Aristotle
1:00-4:00 p.m.

1:00-2:00
Chair: William Stephens (Creighton University)
Speaker: Adam Beresford (University of Massachusetts–Boston)
“Aristotle on the Arguments for and Against Slavery”
Commentator: Benjamin Hole (University of Washington)

2:00-3:00
Chair: Jurgis (George) Brakas (Marist College)
Speaker: R. Kathleen Harbin (University of Pennsylvania)
“Metaphysics Θ 6 1048b18-35: A New Take on the Energeia-kinesis Distinction”
Commentator: Ian McCready-Flora (Columbia University)

3:00-4:00
Chair: Yancy Hughes Dominick (Seattle University)
Speaker: Mariana Anagnostopoulos (California State University–Fresno)
“A Defense of Aristotle’s Socratic Solution to the Paradox of Strict Akrasia”
Commentator: Michael Ferejohn (Duke University)

5K Colloquium: Coercion, Compulsion, and Manipulation
1:00-4:00 p.m.

1:00-2:00
Chair: Gerald D. Doppelt (University of California–San Diego)
Speaker: Moti Gorin (Rice University)
“Manipulation and the Rational Capacities”
Commentator: Brian Coffey (University of California–Davis)

2:00-3:00
Chair: Lijun Yuan (Texas State University–San Marcos)
Speaker: Jesse Summers (Rice University)
“Compulsion as Resistance to Reasoning”
Commentator: Justin Coates (University of California–Riverside)
3:00-4:00
Chair: Sandra Woien (Arizona State University)
Speaker: Jeff Sebo (New York University)
“The Just Soul”
Commentator: Scott Howard (University of Toronto)

5L Colloquium: Luck
1:00-4:00 p.m.
1:00-2:00
Chair: David Pitt (California State University–Los Angeles)
Speaker: Stephen Steward (Syracuse University)
“Luck and Control”
Commentator: David Plunkett (University of California–Los Angeles)

2:00-3:00
Chair: Fareed Awan (University of Washington)
Speaker: Brandon Johns (University of Southern California)
“Non-intentional Action”
Commentator: Preston Greene (Rutgers University)

3:00-4:00
Chair: Lorraine Besser-Jones (Middlebury College)
Speaker: Nathan Hanna (Drexel University)
“Moral Luck Defended”
Commentator: Fritz McDonald (Oakland University)

5M Colloquium: Perception
1:00-4:00 p.m.
1:00-2:00
Chair: Chris Tillman (University of Manitoba)
Speaker: David Chavez (University of Nebraska–Lincoln)
“How to Square E=K with Perceptual Knowledge: The Single State View”
Commentator: Damon Crockett (University of California–San Diego)

2:00-3:00
Chair: Jen Liderth (University of Southern California)
Speaker: Jennifer J. Matey (Florida International University)
“Representing the Impossible”
Commentator: Brian Glenney (Gordon College)

3:00-4:00
Chair: Paul Skokowski (Stanford University)
Speaker: David Ivy (University of Texas–Austin)
“A Naive Realist Argument Against Intentionalism”
Commentator: Anya Farennikova (University of North Carolina–Chapel Hill)

5N Colloquium: Truthmakers
1:00-4:00 p.m.
1:00-2:00
Chair: Byeong-Uk Yi (University of Toronto)
Speaker: Brady Bowman (Pennsylvania State University)
“An ‘Armstrongian’ Truthmaker Argument Against Nihilism”
Commentator: Noel Saenz (University of Colorado–Boulder)

2:00-3:00
Chair: Tyrus Fisher (University of California–Davis)
Speaker: Pablo Rychter (Universitat de València)
“Truthmaker Theory Without Truthmakers”
Commentator: Ben Caplan (Ohio State University)

3:00-4:00
Chair: Erica Shumener (New York University)
Speaker: Bradley Rettler (University of Notre Dame)
“A Truthmaker View of Ontological Commitment”
Commentator: Tyler Hildebrand (University of Colorado–Boulder)

Thursday Early Evening, April 5

Session 6 — 4:00-6:00 p.m.

6A Invited Symposium: Evaluative Language and Reality
4:00-6:00 p.m.
Chair: Janice Dowell (University of Nebraska–Lincoln)
Speakers: Pekka Vayrynen (University of Leeds)
Daniel Nolan (Australian National University)

6B Invited Symposium: Philosophy and Science Fiction
4:00-6:00 p.m.
Chair: Amy Coplan (California State University–Fullerton)
Speakers: Ryan Nichols (California State University–Fullerton)
Richard Hanley (University of Delaware)
Nolan Belk (University of North Carolina–Greensboro)
6C  **Colloquium: Buddhism and Confucianism**

*4:00-6:00 p.m.*

4:00-5:00

Chair: Sor-Hoon Tan (National University of Singapore)
Speaker: Chenyang Li (Nanyang Technological University)
“The Confucian Conception of Freedom from a Feminist Perspective”
Commentator: Robin Wang (Loyola Marymount University)

5:00-6:00

Chair: Margaret Cameron (University of Victoria)
Speaker: Nicolas Bommarito (Brown University)
“Patience and Perspective”
Commentator: Brian Bruya (Eastern Michigan University)

6D  **Colloquium: Feminism and the History of Philosophy**

*4:00-6:00 p.m.*

4:00-5:00

Chair: Kristie Dotson (Michigan State University)
Speaker: Sarah Tyson (Vanderbilt University)
“How Should We Claim They Were Philosophers? Reclamation Reconsidered”
Commentator: Christine Overall (Queen’s University)

5:00-6:00

Chair: Marc Bobro (Santa Barbara City College)
Speaker: Jill Graper Hernandez (University of Texas–San Antonio)
“This Present Suffering: An Early Feminist Revision to Leibnizian Theodicy”
Commentator: Jennifer K. Uleman (Purchase College, State University of New York)

6E  **Colloquium: Heidegger**

*4:00-6:00 p.m.*

4:00-5:00

Chair: Clinton Tolley (University of California–San Diego)
Speaker: Matthew Shockey (Indiana University–South Bend)
“Heidegger’s Kantian Cartesianism”
Commentator: Martin Schwab (University of California–Irvine)

5:00-6:00

Chair: Mark Okrent (Bates College)
Speaker: Joshua Tepley (University of Notre Dame)  
“Heidegger and the Properties of Being”

Commentator: Catriona Hanley (Loyola College in Maryland)

6F Colloquium: Indexicals

4:00-6:00 p.m.

4:00-5:00
Chair: John Camacho (University of Missouri–St. Louis)  
Speaker: Brett Sherman (Brandeis University)
“Indexical Guarantees”

Commentator: Karen Lewis (University of Southern California)

5:00-6:00
Chair: David Taylor (Stanford University)  
Speaker: Alex Radulescu (University of California–Los Angeles)
“The Difference Between Indexicals and Demonstratives: A Case Study”

Commentator: Isidora Stojanovic (Institut Jean Nicod)

6G Colloquium: Inference to the Best Explanation

4:00-6:00 p.m.

4:00-5:00
Chair: Jack Woods (Princeton University)  
Speaker: Ted Poston (University of South Alabama)
“Explanationism”

Commentator: Yuval Avnur (Scripps College)

5:00-6:00
Chair: Lee Elkin (University of Calgary)  
Speaker: Robert Fischer (Texas State University–San Marcos)
“Why It Doesn’t Matter Whether Simplicity Is Truth-conducive”

Commentator: William Devlin (Bridgewater State University)

6H Colloquium: Scientific Modeling

4:00-6:00 p.m.

4:00-5:00
Chair: Evelyn Brister (Rochester Institute of Technology)  
Speaker: Collin Rice (University of Missouri)
“Using Optimality Models to Explain Evolutionary Phenomena”

Commentator: Roberta L. Millstein (University of California–Davis)
5:00-6:00
Chair: John Marmysz (College of Marin)
Speaker: Alistair Isaac (University of Pennsylvania)
“Modeling Without Representation”
Commentator: David Stump (University of San Francisco)

6I Symposium: Agency
4:00-6:00 p.m.
Chair: Paul Russell (University of British Columbia)
Speaker: Caroline Arruda (University of Texas–El Paso)
“Ideal Agency and Minimum Agency”
Commentators: Mary Clayton Coleman (Illinois Wesleyan University)
Dion Scott-Kakures (Scripps College)

6J Symposium: Mereology
4:00-6:00 p.m.
Chair: Nick Stang (University of Miami)
Speaker: Ned Markosian (Western Washington University)
“A New Answer to the Special Composition Question”
Commentators: Cody Gilmore (University of California–Davis)
David Sanson (Ohio State University)

6K Symposium: Moral Education
4:00-6:00 p.m.
Chair: Antonio Chu (Metropolitan State College of Denver)
Speaker: Joseph Cannon (Marquette University)
“Is Moral Education a Condition of the Possibility for Moral Obligation?”
Commentators: David Landy (San Francisco State University)
Sean McAleer (University of Wisconsin–Eau Claire)

6L Symposium: Perception
4:00-6:00 p.m.
Chair: Gerald Vision (Temple University)
Speaker: Jonathan Cohen (University of California–San Diego)
“Perception, Feature Perception, and Object Perception”
Commentators: Robert Briscoe (Ohio University)
Christopher Hill (Brown University)
6M  Symposium: Plato’s Aesthetics

4:00-6:00 p.m.
Chair: Ron Jackson (Clayton State University)
Speaker: Sarah Jansen (University of California–Los Angeles)
“Plato and Movie Violence”
Commentators: James Harold (Mount Holyoke College)
Aimee L. Koeplin (Mount St. Mary’s College)

6N  APA Committee Session: Access to Investigational Drugs Outside Clinical Trials

4:00-6:00 p.m.
Arranged by the APA Committee on Philosophy and Medicine
Chair: Inmaculada de Melo-Martin (Cornell University)
Speakers: Heidi Malm (Loyola University Chicago)
David M. Adams (California State Polytechnic University–Pomona)
Ana Iltis (Wake Forest University)

Carus Lecture

6:00-7:00 p.m.
Topic: Doing Justice to the Social
Chair: Michael E. Bratman (Stanford University)
Speaker: Sally Haslanger (Massachusetts Institute of Technology)
“Ideology Is a Moral Issue”

Annual Reception

10:00 p.m.-Midnight

Group Meetings, 7:00-9:00 p.m.
(See Group Meeting Program for details)
Charles S. Peirce Society
Josiah Royce Society
North American Kant Society, Session 1
Society for Asian and Comparative Philosophy, Session 2
Society for Business Ethics

Group Meetings, 7:00-10:00 p.m.
(See Group Meeting Program for details)
Experimental Philosophy Society
Hegel Society of America
International Society for Comparative Studies of Chinese and Western Philosophy, Session 2
Karl Jaspers Society of North America, Session 1
North American Nietzsche Society
Society for Natural Religion, Session 2
Society for the Study of the History of Analytical Philosophy, Session 2
Society for Women in Philosophy

**GROUP MEETINGS, 9:00-11:00 P.M.**
(See Group Meeting Program for details)
American Association of Philosophy Teachers
Ayn Rand Society
Concerned Philosophers for Peace
International Society for Chinese Philosophy, Session 1
Society for Empirical Ethics
Society of Christian Philosophers

**FRIDAY, APRIL 6**

**PROGRAM COMMITTEE BREAKFAST**
7:30-9:00 a.m.

**PLACEMENT INFORMATION**
8:30 a.m.-5:00 p.m., Grand Foyer

**PLACEMENT INTERVIEWING**
8:30 a.m.-5:00 p.m.

**REGISTRATION**
8:30 a.m.-5:00 p.m., Grand Foyer

**BOOK DISPLAYS**
10:00 a.m.-6:00 p.m.

**POSTER SESSION**
11:00 a.m.-2:00 p.m.

**DEWEY LECTURE**
4:00-5:30 p.m.
DEWEY LECTURE RECEPTION
5:30-6:00 p.m.

PRESIDENTIAL ADDRESS
6:00-7:00 p.m.

PRESIDENTIAL RECEPTION
7:00-8:00 p.m.

FRIDAY MORNING, APRIL 6

SESSION 7 — 9:00 A.M.-NOON

7A Author-Meets-Critics: Julia Annas, *Intelligent Virtue*
9:00 a.m.-Noon
Chair: Neera Badhwar (University of Oklahoma and George Mason University)
Critics: Robert Merrihew Adams (University of North Carolina–Chapel Hill)
        Nancy E. Snow (Marquette University)
        Christine Swanton (University of Auckland)
Author: Julia Annas (University of Arizona)

7B Author-Meets-Critics: Janet Kourany, *Philosophy of Science after Feminism*
9:00 a.m.-Noon
Chair: Ann Garry (California State University–Los Angeles)
Critics: Matthew J. Brown (University of Texas–Dallas)
          Hugh Lacey (Swarthmore College)
          Elizabeth Potter (Mills College)
Author: Janet Kourany (University of Notre Dame)

7C Author-Meets-Critics: Peter Ludlow, *The Philosophy of Generative Linguistics*
9:00 a.m.-Noon
Chair: Ori Simchen (University of British Columbia)
Critics: Susan Dwyer (University of Maryland–College Park)
          Paul Pietroski (University of Maryland–College Park)
          Barry C. Smith (University of London)
Author: Peter Ludlow (Northwestern University)
7D  Author-Meets-Critics: Robert Almeder, *Truth and Skepticism*

9:00 a.m.-Noon

Chair: Sarah Jones (Northern Michigan University)
Critics: John Capps (Rochester Institute of Technology)  
Catherine Elgin (Harvard University)  
Michael Lynch (University of Connecticut)
Author: Robert Almeder (Georgia State University)

7E  Invited Symposium: Art and Evolution

9:00 a.m.-Noon

Chair: Ronald Moore (University of Washington)
Speakers: Stephen Davies (University of Auckland)  
Noël Carroll (City University of New York–Graduate School)  
Ronald De Sousa (University of Toronto)  
Tobyn De Marco (Bergen Community College)

7F  Invited Symposium: Philosophers on Parenting

9:00 a.m.-Noon

Chair: Russell Askren (University of Utah)
Speakers: Harry Brighouse (University of Wisconsin–Madison)  
“Is Concerted Cultivation Good Parenting?”  
Johanna Meehan (Grinnell College)  
“When Critical Theory Meets the Lifeworld”  
Laurie Shrage (Florida International University)  
“Is Marriage Bad for Children?”
Commentator: Randall Curren (University of Rochester)

7G  Invited Symposium: Philosophy and Animal Activism

9:00 a.m.-Noon

Chair: Brian Steverson (Gonzaga University)
Speakers: Robert Jones (California State University–Chico)  
“Animal Ethics in Practice: Conversations with a Vivisector”  
Vasile Stanescu (Stanford University)  
“Critical Animal Studies: Connecting Philosophy and Activism”  
Ramona Ilea (Pacific University)  
“Philosophy and Animal Activism: Compatible or in Tension?”
7H  Invited Symposium: Rational Agency and the Emotions
9:00 a.m.-Noon
Chair: Marina Oshana (University of California–Davis)
Speakers: R. Jay Wallace (University of California–Berkeley)
“A Modest Defense of Regret”
Christine Tappolet (Université de Montréal)
“Autonomy and the Ties of Cares”
Justin D’Arms (Ohio State University)
“Value and the Regulation of the Sentiments”
Commentators: Karen Jones (University of Melbourne)
Gary Watson (University of Southern California)

7I  Invited Symposium: The Prospects for Physicalism
9:00 a.m.-Noon
Chair: Amy Kind (Claremont McKenna College)
Speakers: Stephen L. White (Tufts University)
“Can Physicalism Accommodate the Agential Perspective?”
Barbara Gail Montero (City University of New York–Graduate Center)
“Must Physicalism Imply the Supervenience of the Mental on the Physical?”
Thomas W. Polger (University of Cincinnati)
“Naturalistic Physicalism”
Torin Alter (University of Alabama–Tuscaloosa)
“Open Possibility and the Knowledge Argument”
Commentator: David Chalmers (Australian National University)

7J  Colloquium: Kant’s Critique of Judgment
9:00 a.m.-Noon
9:00-10:00
Chair: Uygar Abaci (University of British Columbia)
Speaker: Bryan Hall (Indiana University–Southeast)
“Kant on Newton, Genius, and Scientific Discovery”
Commentator: George E. Smith (Tufts University)

10:00-11:00
Chair: Robert Clewis (Gwynedd-Mercy College)
Speaker: Linda Palmer (University of California–Irvine)
“Two ‘Oughts’ of Kant’s Common Sense”
Commentator: Melissa Zinkin (State University of New York–Binghamton)
11:00-12:00  
Chair: Jeanine Grenberg (St. Olaf College)  
Speaker: Brian Watkins (Duke University)  
“A Kantian Account of How Following Examples Sharpens Judgment”  
Commentator: Samuel Kahn (Stanford University)

**7K Colloquium: Moral Responsibility**  
9:00 a.m.-Noon  

9:00-10:00  
Chair: Sven Arvidson (Seattle University)  
Speaker: Matthew Talbert (West Virginia University)  
“Accountability, Aliens, and Psychopaths: A Reply to Shoemaker”  
Commentator: Jared Poon (University of California–Davis)  

10:00-11:00  
Chair: David DeMoss (Pacific University)  
Speaker: Erik Krag (University of Tennessee)  
“A New Timing Objection to Frankfurt Cases”  
Commentator: Laurel Scotland-Stewart (Reed College)  

11:00-12:00  
Chair: Nancy S. Jecker (University of Washington)  
Speaker: Philip Robichaud (Rice University)  
“Moral Responsibility, Ignorance, and Akrasia”  
Commentator: William FitzPatrick (University of Rochester)

**7L Colloquium: Philosophy of Religion**  
9:00 a.m.-Noon  

9:00-10:00  
Chair: Diana Palmieri (University of Western Ontario)  
Speaker: Scot Yoder (Michigan State University)  
“Three Concepts of Agnosticism”  
Commentator: Andrew Eshleman (University of Portland)  

10:00-11:00  
Chair: Marcy Lascano (California State University–Long Beach)  
Speaker: Majid Amini (Virginia State University)  
“Paradox Lost and Gained: The Coherence of Maximal God”  
Commentator: Colin Ruloff (Kwantlen Polytechnic University)
11:00-12:00
Chair: Scott MacDonald (Cornell University)
Speaker: Daniel Bader (University of Toronto)
“Perfectior”: Reconciling Heaven and Resurrection
in Aquinas [Treatise on Happiness]
Commentator: Eileen Nutting (University of California–Los Angeles)

7M Colloquium: Political Philosophy
9:00 a.m.-Noon

9:00-10:00
Chair: Rodney Peffer (University of San Diego)
Speaker: Alexander Guerrero (New York University)
“Against Representation: Accountability, Information, and Ignorance”
Commentator: Piers Norris Turner (Ohio State University)

10:00-11:00
Chair: Robert Talisse (Vanderbilt University)
Speaker: Daniel Halliday (University of Melbourne)
“Rock Stars, Fine Wine, and Healthcare: Questions about Living by One’s Political Beliefs”
Commentator: Colin Macleod (University of Victoria)

11:00-12:00
Chair: Judith Wagner DeCew (Clark University)
Speaker: Samuel Huang (Rice University)
“Reasonableness, Respect, and the Response to Civil Disobedience”
Commentator: Andrew Jason Cohen (Georgia State University)

7N APA Committee Session: Much Ado about Nothing:
Conceptions of Nothingness in Asian Philosophy
9:00 a.m.-Noon

Arranged by the APA Committee on the Status of Asian and
Asian-American Philosophers and Philosophies
Chair: Douglas Berger (Southern Illinois University–Carbondale)
Speakers: Jay Garfield (Smith College, University of Melbourne,
and Central University of Tibetan Studies)
“Empty of What? Nāgārjuna and Candrakīrti as
Realists, Not Nihilists”
Curtis Rigsby (University of Guam)
“The Kyoto School on Nothingness: Japan’s Philosophical Response to the West”
Bo Wang (Peking University)
“The Way to Nothingness: From Laozi to Zhuangzi”

JeeLoo Liu (California State University–Fullerton)
“Was There Something in Nothingness? The Debate on the Primordial State Between Neo-Daoism and Neo-Confucianism”

Commentator: Roy Sorensen (Washington University in St. Louis)

**POSTER SESSION**

11:00 a.m.-2:00 p.m.

Presenters:
Mark Shumelda (University of Toronto)
“A New Role for Thought Experiments in Quantum Gravity”

Julia Haas (Emory University)
“A Physics of Mental Life: Spinoza’s Scientific Theory of the Emotions”

Rachel McKinney (City University of New York–Graduate Center)
“Convention, Variation, and Force-Marking”

Ben Almassi (College of Lake County)
“E-Prints and the Social Epistemology of Peer Review”

Daniel Harris (City University of New York–Graduate Center)
“Foundational Theories of Linguistic Meaning and the Heterogeneity of Speech Communities”

Matt Haber (University of Utah)
“Positively Misleading Errors”

Sarah Robins (Washington University in St. Louis)
“Remembering the Dinosaur: The Role of Memory Traces in an Account of Constructive Memory”

Tom Cook (Rollins College)
“Spinoza and the Young Leibniz on Chimaeras and Other Unthinkable Things”

Bryce Dalbey (Lewis & Clark College)
“Superstrong Multimodality: A New Approach to Perception”

Kengo Miyazono (University of Tokyo)
“The Role of Imagination in Delusion: Two Hypotheses”
FRIDAY AFTERNOON, APRIL 6

SESSION 8 — 1:00-4:00 P.M.

8A Author-Meets-Critics: Susanna Siegel, The Contents of Visual Experience
1:00-4:00 p.m.
   Chair: Walter Hopp (Boston University)
   Critics: Ned Block (New York University)
            John Campbell (University of California–Berkeley)
            Fred Dretske (Duke University)
   Author: Susanna Siegel (Harvard University)

8B Special Memorial Session: Gareth Matthews
1:00-4:00 p.m.
   Chair: Thomas Blackson (Arizona State University)
   Speakers: Scott MacDonald (Cornell University)
             S. Marc Cohen (University of Washington)
             Sara Goering (University of Washington)

8C Invited Symposium: Choice Over Time
1:00-4:00 p.m.
   Chair: Matthew Mosdell (University of Utah)
   Speakers: Sergio Tenenbaum (University of Toronto)
             “Reconsidering Intentions”
             Michael E. Bratman (Stanford University)
             “Self-Governance, Time, and Rationality”
             Luca Ferrero (University of Wisconsin–Milwaukee)
             “The Stability of Intentions”
   Commentator: Sarah Paul (University of Wisconsin–Madison)

8D Invited Symposium: J. L. Schellenberg’s Philosophy of Religion
1:00-4:00 p.m.
   Chair: Kenneth Himma (Seattle Pacific University)
   Speakers: Thomas M. Crisp (Biola University)
             Jeanine Diller (University of Toledo)
             Daniel Howard-Snyder (Western Washington University)
   Commentator: John Schellenberg (Mount St. Vincent University)

8E Invited Symposium: Perspectives on the Zhuangzi
1:00-4:00 p.m.
   Chair: Lisa Raphals (National University of Singapore)
Speakers: Romain Graziani (École Normale Supérieure)
Mark Csikszentmihalyi (University of California-Berkeley)
Albert Galvany (Universitat Pompeu Fabra)

8F Invited Symposium: Poetry and Philosophy
1:00-4:00 p.m.
Chair: David Hills (Stanford University)
Speakers: John Koethe (University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee)
Matthew Stone (Rutgers University)
Eileen John (Warwick University)
Commentators: Troy Jollimore (California State University-Chico)
Joshua Landy (Stanford University)
Anna Christina Ribeiro (Texas Tech University)

8G Invited Symposium: The Fitting Attitudes Analysis of Value
1:00-4:00 p.m.
Chair: Graham Oddie (University of Colorado-Boulder)
Speakers: Joshua Gert (College of William and Mary)
“Parity and Puzzlement”
Wlodek Rabinowicz (Uppsala Universitet)
“Value Relations Revisited”
Kirster Bykvist (Oxford University)
“They Smiled at the Good and Frowned at the Bad. A Reexamination of the Fitting Attitude Analysis of Goodness”
Commentator: Michael Zimmerman (University of North Carolina-Greensboro)

8H Colloquium: Ethics
1:00-4:00 p.m.

1:00-2:00
Chair: Leonard Kahn (United States Air Force Academy)
Speaker: Brian Kierland (Boise State University)
“Beyond Actualism and Possibilism”
Commentator: Frances Howard-Snyder (Western Washington University)

2:00-3:00
Chair: Janet Giddings (San Jose State University)
Speaker: Ryan Kemp (University of Notre Dame)
“Is Foot an Immoralist?”
Commentator: Ingrid V. Albrecht (University of Illinois-Urbana-Champaign)
3:00-4:00
Chair: Holly M. Smith (Rutgers University)
Speaker: Ryan Millsap (University of Maryland–College Park)
“The Balancing Theory of Ought and Reasons Transmission”
Commentator: S. Andrew Schroeder (Claremont McKenna College)

8I Colloquium: Justice
1:00-4:00 p.m.
1:00-2:00
Chair: Walter E. Schaller (Texas Tech University)
Speaker: Sean Aas (Brown University)
“Understanding the Conceptual Interdependence of Justice and Injustice”
Commentator: Kok-chor Tan (University of Pennsylvania)
2:00-3:00
Chair: Edward H.K. Song (Louisiana State University)
Speaker: Pin-Fei Lu (Taipei Medical University)
“Meeting the Demand of Family Justice: Arguing for Rawls’s Consistency”
Commentator: Daniel Silvermint (University of Arizona)
3:00-4:00
Chair: Nicole Hassoun (Carnegie Mellon University)
Speaker: Brian Berkey (University of California–Berkeley)
“Distributive Justice, Relative Disadvantage, and Individual Obligations”
Commentator: Cynthia Stark (University of Utah)

8J Colloquium: Justification
1:00-4:00 p.m.
1:00-2:00
Chair: Brad Armendt (Arizona State University)
Speaker: Mark Alfano (University of Notre Dame)
“Expanding the Situationist Challenge to Reliabilist Virtue Epistemology”
Commentator: Abrol Fairweather (San Francisco State University)
2:00-3:00
Chair: Sharyn Clough (Oregon State University)
Speaker: Andrew Moon (University of Missouri)
“Epistemic Justification and the Epistemic Ought”
Commentator: Mark Nelson (Westmont College)
3:00-4:00
Chair: Mark Kaplan (Indiana University–Bloomington)
Speaker: Elijah Chudnoff (University of Miami)
“Is Intuition Based on Understanding?”
Commentator: George Bealer (Yale University)

8K Colloquium: Kantian Ethics
1:00-4:00 p.m.
1:00-2:00
Chair: Lara Denis (Agnes Scott College)
Speaker: Aaron Bunch (Washington State University)
“Kant on the Uses and Abuses of Contempt”
Commentator: Kate Moran (Brandeis University)
2:00-3:00
Chair: Patrick McDonald (Seattle Pacific University)
Speaker: Margaret Bowman (University of Utah)
“Can the Categorical Imperative Test Final Ends?”
Commentator: Robert Gressis (California State University–Northridge)
3:00-4:00
Chair: Albert Spencer (Portland State University)
Speaker: Paul Katsafanas (Boston University)
“Kant and the Problem of Relevant Descriptions”
Commentator: Kory Schaff (Occidental College)

8L Colloquium: Philosophy of Biology
1:00-4:00 p.m.
1:00-2:00
Chair: Olin Robus (University of Washington)
Speakers: Patrick Forber (Tufts University)
Rory Smead (University of California–Irvine)
“The Evolution of Spite”
Commentator: Richard N Manning (University of South Florida)
2:00-3:00
Chair: Andrea Sullivan (University of Washington)
Speakers: Simon Huttegger (University of California–Irvine)
Kevin Zollman (Carnegie Mellon University)
“Methodology in Biological Game Theory”
Commentator: Jonathan Kaplan (Oregon State University)
3:00-4:00
Chair: Weimin Sun (California State University–Northridge)
Speaker: Adrian Kwek (Harvard University)
“The Malfunction Problem and the Functional Individuation of Biological Traits”
Commentator: Shawn Miller (University of California–Davis)

8M Colloquium: Powers, Abilities, and Free Will
1:00-4:00 p.m.
1:00-2:00
Chair: Gemma Celestino (University of British Columbia)
Speaker: Andrei Buckareff (Marist College)
“Agent-causal Power”
Commentator: Jonathan Jacobs (St. Louis University)
2:00-3:00
Chair: Shelley Hulbert (Simon Fraser University)
Speaker: Michael Robinson (Grand Valley State University)
“The Limits of ‘Limited Blockage’ Frankfurt-style Cases”
Commentator: Benjamin Mitchell-Yellin (University of California–Riverside)
3:00-4:00
Chair: Scott Sehon (Bowdoin College)
Speaker: Christopher Evan Franklin (Biola University)
“Masks, Abilities, and Opportunities: Why the New Dispositionalism Cannot Succeed”
Commentator: Michael Brent (Columbia University)

8N APA Committee Session: Starting a Philosophy High School?
1:00-4:00 p.m.
Arranged by the APA Committee on Pre-College Instruction in Philosophy
Chair: David A. Shapiro (Cascadia Community College)
Speakers: Terrance McKittrick (The Nova Project)
“Consciousness and Community as Activism”
Jessica Davis (San Diego State University)
“How Important and Feasible Is It to Create Entirely New, Philosophically-based High Schools?”
Jana Mohr Lone (University of Washington)
“Thinking and Learning: Does the Concept of a Philosophy High School Entail Particular Principles of Education?”

Mitchell Green (University of Virginia)
“What Roles Should Philosophers, Graduate Students and Pre-College Teachers Have in the Movement to Create Philosophy High Schools?”

**FRIDAY EARLY EVENING, APRIL 6**

**SESSION 9 — 4:00-6:00 P.M.**

**9A Author-Meets-Critics: Justin E. H. Smith, Divine Machines: Leibniz and the Sciences of Life**
4:00-6:00 p.m.
Chair: Donald Rutherford (University of California–San Diego)
Critics: Karen Detlefsen (University of Pennsylvania)
Jeffrey McDonough (Harvard University)
Author: Justin E. H. Smith (Concordia University)

**9B Invited Paper: Early Modern Ethics**
4:00-6:00 p.m.
Chair: David Cummiskey (Bates College)
Speaker: James P. Sterba (University of Notre Dame)
“Completing the Hobbesian and Kantian Project in Ethics”
Commentators: Carla Bagnoli (Università degli Studi di Modena e Reggio Emilia)
Bernard Gert (Dartmouth College and University of North Carolina–Chapel Hill)

**9C Invited Paper: Ethics and Climate Change**
4:00-6:00 p.m.
Chair: Allen Thompson (Oregon State University)
Speaker: Dale Jamieson (New York University)
“Climate Change at the Frontiers of Ethics”
Commentators: Marion Hourdequin (Colorado College)
Aaron James (University of California–Irvine)

**9D Invited Symposium: Aristotle and Ontological Priority**
4:00-6:00 p.m.
Chair: Matthew Walker (Rutgers University)
Speakers: Philip Corkum (University of Alberta)
          Michail Peramatzis (Oxford University)
Commentator: Alan Code (Stanford University)

9E  Colloquium: Causal Exclusion
   4:00-6:00 p.m.
   4:00-5:00
   Chair: Aness Webster (University of Southern California)
   Speaker: Douglas Keaton (University of Arkansas–Little Rock)
          “Exclusion, Yet Again”
   Commentator: D. Gene Witmer (University of Florida)
   5:00-6:00
   Chair: Douglas Cannon (University of Puget Sound)
   Speaker: David McElhoes (University of Maryland–College Park)
          “Difference-making, Reduction, and Multi-grade Causation”
   Commentator: Alyssa Ney (University of Rochester)

9F  Colloquium: Conditionals
   4:00-6:00 p.m.
   4:00-5:00
   Chair: John K. O’Connor (Colorado State University–Pueblo)
   Speaker: Malte Willer (University of Chicago)
          “Nonmonotonic Thoughts on Conditional Oughts”
   Commentator: Robert Hirsch (Princeton University)
   5:00-6:00
   Chair: Jeff Johnson (St. Catherine University)
   Speaker: Roy Sorensen (Washington University in St. Louis)
          “Lying with Conditionals”
   Commentator: Don Fallis (University of Arizona)

9G  Colloquium: Epistemology
   4:00-6:00 p.m.
   4:00-5:00
   Chair: Maura Priest (University of California–Irvine)
   Speaker: Allan Hazlett (University of Edinburgh)
          “Limning Structure as an Epistemic Goal”
   Commentator: Kelly Becker (University of New Mexico)
5:00-6:00
Chair: Janice Moskalik (University of Washington)
Speaker: Justin Snedegar (University of Southern California)
“Reason Claims and Contrastive Reasons”
Commentator: Evan Tiffany (Simon Fraser University)

9H  Colloquium: Philosophy of Language
4:00-6:00 p.m.

4:00-5:00
Chair: J. M. Fritzman (Lewis & Clark College)
Speaker: H. Benjamin Shaeffer (Humboldt State University)
“Wittgenstein and Linguistic Idealism”
Commentator: Marc Joseph (Mills College)

5:00-6:00
Chair: Jay Garfield (Smith College, University of Melbourne, and Central University of Tibetan Studies)
Speaker: Johannes Schmitt (University of Southern California)
“‘Because’ and Constitutive Explanations”
Commentator: Eliot Michaelson (University of California–Los Angeles)

9I  Colloquium: Philosophy of Science
4:00-6:00 p.m.

4:00-5:00
Chair: Tista Bagchi (CSIR-NISTADS and University of Delhi)
Speaker: Kenneth Boyce (University of Notre Dame)
“On Believing in Neutrons but Not Numbers”
Commentator: Susan Vineberg (Wayne State University)

5:00-6:00
Chair: Jonathan Tallant (University of Nottingham)
Speaker: Johanna Wolff (University of Puget Sound)
“Metaphysics as Foundations of Science”
Commentator: Jonathan Rosenberg (University of Washington)

9J  Symposium: Attention and Perception
4:00-6:00 p.m.
Chair: Roger Florka (Ursinus College)
Speaker: Carolyn Dicey Jennings (Boston University)
“The Standard Theory of Conscious Perception”
Commentators: Brian McLaughlin (Rutgers University)
William P. Seeley (Bates College)
9K  Symposium: Fichte’s Ethics
4:00-6:00 p.m.
Chair: Susan Shell (Boston College)
Speaker: Michelle Kosch (Cornell University)
“Agency and Self-sufficiency in Fichte’s Ethics”
Commentators: Christopher Yeomans (Purdue University)
Guenter Zoeller (Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München and McGill University)

9L  Symposium: Self-Defense
4:00-6:00 p.m.
Chair: James Anderson (San Diego State University)
Speaker: Tyler Doggett (University of Vermont)
“Self-defense, Bystanders, and Human Projectiles”
Commentators: Richard Arneson (University of California–San Diego)
Saba Bazargan (University of California–San Diego)

9M  APA Committee Session: Contemporary Philosophical Development in East Asia
4:00-6:00 p.m.
Arranged by the APA Committee on the Status of Asian and Asian-American Philosophers and Philosophies
Chair: Halla Kim (University of Nebraska–Omaha)
Speakers: Zhen Han (Beijing Normal University)
“Modern Chinese Philosophy and Its Challenges in Society”
Yukio Irie (Osaka University)
“Philosophy in Japan after World War II”
Suksoo Kim (Kyungpook National University)
“Some Main Issues in Philosophy in Korea since 1945”

9N  APA Committee Session: Philosophy Beyond the Academy: Graduate Students and Teaching Pre-College Philosophy
4:00-6:00 p.m.
Arranged by the APA Committee on Pre-College Instruction in Philosophy
Chair: Jana Mohr Lone (University of Washington)
Speakers: Michael Burroughs (University of Memphis)
“Creating Philosophical Horizons in Memphis”
Amy Reed-Sandoval (University of Washington)
“Cross-cultural Exploration: Pre-college Philosophy Classes with Triqui Children in Oaxaca”

Jasmin Weaver (City of Seattle Office of Intergovernmental Relations)
“My College Experiences with Philosophy for Children”

David A. Shapiro (Cascadia Community College)
“Philosophy for Children for Adults: How Doing P4C Helped Me Survive Grad School”

Arik Ben-Avi (Yale University)
“Why Philosophy?”

9O Dewey Lecture
1:00-2:30 p.m.
Chair: Michelle Jenkins (Whitman College)
Speaker: Julia Annas (University of Arizona)
“The Philosopher’s Path”

Dewey Lecture Reception
5:30-6:00 p.m.
Convention attendees are cordially invited to a reception sponsored by the Dewey Foundation in honor of the Dewey Lecturer.

Presidential Address
6:00-7:00 p.m.
Speaker: Alison Wylie (University of Washington)
“Feminist Philosophy of Science: Standpoint Matters”

Presidential Reception
7:00-8:00 p.m.

Group Meetings, 7:00-10:00 p.m.
(See Group Meeting Program for details)
Association for Chinese Philosophers in America, Session 1
Association for Informal Logic and Critical Thinking
International Society for Chinese Philosophy, Session 2
International Society for Environmental Ethics, Session 1
North American Kant Society, Session 2
North American Wittgenstein Society, Session 2
Radical Philosophy Association, Session 1
Society for German Idealism, Session 2
Society for the Philosphic Study of the Contemporary Visual Arts
Society for the Philosophy of Agency
Society for the Philosophy of History, Session 2
Society for the Study of Philosophy and the Martial Arts, Session 2
Society of Indian Philosophy and Religion, Session 2

SATURDAY, APRIL 7

PLACEMENT INFORMATION
8:30 a.m.-1:00 p.m., Grand Foyer

PLACEMENT INTERVIEWING
8:30 a.m.-1:00 p.m.

REGISTRATION
8:30 a.m.-1:00 p.m., Grand Foyer

BOOK DISPLAYS
9:00 a.m.-1:00 p.m.

RECEPTION IN MEMORY OF PHILIPPA FOOT
4:00-5:00 p.m.

SATURDAY MORNING, APRIL 7

SESSION 10 — 9:00 A.M.-NOON

10A AUTHOR-MEETS-CRITICS: Dana Kay Nelkin, Making Sense of Freedom and Responsibility
9:00 a.m.-Noon
Chair: Jason Benchimol (University of Washington)
Critics: Randolph Clarke (Florida State University)
Michael McKenna (University of Arizona)
Daniel Speak (Loyola Marymount University)
Author: Dana Kay Nelkin (University of California–San Diego)

10B AUTHOR-MEETS-CRITICS: Eric Schwitzgebel, Perplexities of Consciousness
9:00 a.m.-Noon
Chair: Janet Stemwedel (San Jose State University)
Critics: Uriah Kriegel (University of Arizona)
Declan Smithies (Ohio State University)
Maja Spener (Oxford University)
Author: Eric Schwitzgebel (University of California–Riverside)

10C Invited Symposium: Cultivating Virtue
9:00 a.m.-Noon
Chair: Margaret Crouch (Eastern Michigan University)
Speakers: Edward Slingerland (University of British Columbia)
“Confucian Virtue Ethics in Light of Contemporary Cognitive Science”
Gopal Sreenivasan (Duke University)
“Should Virtue Be Taught?”
Darcia Narvaez (University of Notre Dame)
“The Cultivation of Different Moral Mindsets”
Michael Slote (University of Miami)
“Why We Need Sentimentalist Moral Education”

10D Invited Symposium: Foucault and Kant
9:00 a.m.-Noon
Chair: Julia Ireland (Whitman College)
Speakers: Robert B. Louden (University of Southern Maine)
“Foucault’s Kant”
Beatrice Han-Pile (University of Essex)
“Normativity and Critique”
Commentators: Thomas Flynn (Emory University)
Holly Wilson (Kantian School of Practical Judgment)

10E Invited Symposium: Reasons and the Will
9:00 a.m.-Noon
Chair: Jack LLoyd Anderson (University of Utah)
Speakers: Ruth Chang (Rutgers University)
“Normativity and the Will”
Stephen Darwall (Yale University)
“The ‘Hard’ Problem of Moral Normativity Made Easier”
Kieran Setiya (University of Pittsburgh)
“How to Be an Ethical Rationalist”
Commentator: Julia Markovits (Massachusetts Institute of Technology)
10F  **Invited Symposium: The Shaky Game: 25 Years Later**

*9:00 a.m.-Noon*

**Chair:** Monica Aufrecht (Linfield College)

**Speakers:**
- Paul Horwich (New York University)
- Laura Ruetsche (University of Michigan–Ann Arbor)
- Thomas Ryckman (Stanford University)

**Commentator:** Arthur Fine (University of Washington)

10G  **Colloquium: Ancient Philosophy**

*9:00 a.m.-Noon*

**9:00-10:00**

**Chair:** Charles Young (Claremont Graduate University)

**Speaker:** Robert Scharff (University of New Hampshire)

“Socrates: Being an Athenian by Loving Wisdom”

**Commentator:** Christopher Kirby (Eastern Washington University)

**10:00-11:00**

**Chair:** Angie Harris (University of Utah)

**Speaker:** Rebecca Bensen Cain (Oklahoma State University)

“Plato on Mimesis and Mirrors”

**Commentator:** James Doyle (Institute for Advanced Study)

**11:00-12:00**

**Chair:** Nils Rauhut (Coastal Carolina University)

**Speaker:** Daniel Farnham (St. John’s University)

“Substantive and Formal Goods in Aristotle: Contemplation and Friendship”

**Commentator:** Maria Paleologou (California State University–Bakersfield)

10H  **Colloquium: Ethics**

*9:00 a.m.-Noon*

**9:00-10:00**

**Chair:** Steven M. Duncan (Bellevue College)

**Speaker:** Ian Blaustein (Boston University)

“Conscience and What We Care About”

**Commentator:** Michael Tiboris (University of California–San Diego)

**10:00-11:00**

**Chair:** Madeleine Ransom (University of British Columbia)

**Speaker:** William A. Rottschaefer (Lewis & Clark College)

“Moral Emotions: Detectors or Projectors of Moral Values?”

**Commentator:** Dan Kelly (Purdue University)
11:00-12:00  
**Chair:** Asia Ferrin (University of Washington)  
**Speaker:** Krista Thomason (Swarthmore College)  
“Get Over It: Praising Fairness Over Forgiveness”  
**Commentator:** Kristina Biniek (University of Western Ontario)

**10I Colloquium: Metaethics**

*9:00 a.m.-Noon*

**9:00-10:00**  
**Chair:** Danielle Bromwich (University of Massachusetts–Boston)  
**Speaker:** Robert A. Mabrito (North Carolina State University)  
“A Friendly Amendment to Schroeder’s Expressivist Semantics”  
**Commentator:** Shyam Nair (University of Southern California)

**10:00-11:00**  
**Chair:** Ryan Walsh (University of Southern California)  
**Speaker:** Rachel Schneebaum (University of Arizona)  
“Slote’s Metaphorical Moral Phenomenology”  
**Commentator:** Andrew Cullison (State University of New York–Fredonia)

**11:00-12:00**  
**Chair:** Rima Basu (University of Southern California)  
**Speaker:** Vladimir Vlaovic (Brown University)  
“Negation and Normative Belief”  
**Commentator:** Neil Sinclair (University of Nottingham)

**10J Colloquium: Philosophy of Law**

*9:00 a.m.-Noon*

**9:00-10:00**  
**Chair:** David Boersema (Pacific University)  
**Speaker:** Richard Greenstein (Temple University)  
“The Rule-standard Continuum”  
**Commentator:** Lori Watson (University of San Diego)

**10:00-11:00**  
**Chair:** Thill Raghunath (Community College of Southern Nevada)  
**Speaker:** John Kwak (University of Southern California)  
“Marmor, Putnamian Externalism, and the Semantics of ‘Law’”  
**Commentator:** Steven James (University of Texas–Austin)
11:00-12:00
Chair: Jeremy Anderson (DePauw University)
Speaker: Nicholas Sars (University of Washington)
“Answerability and Criminal Responsibility”
Commentator: Travis Hreno (University of Akron)

10K Colloquium: Rationality
9:00 a.m.-Noon

9:00-10:00
Chair: Steven Luper (Trinity University)
Speaker: Dustin Locke (Claremont McKenna College)
“It’s Still Not What You Know that Counts”
Commentator: Alex Bundy (University of California–Santa Barbara)

10:00-11:00
Chair: Melinda Hogan (Kwantlen Polytechnic University)
Speaker: Matthew Parrott (University of Puget Sound)
“Self-blindness and Rationality”
Commentator: Anthony Brueckner (University of California–Santa Barbara)

11:00-12:00
Chair: Barak Krakauer (University of Massachusetts–Amherst)
Speaker: Miriam Schoenfield (Massachusetts Institute of Technology)
“Expecting Too Much of Epistemic Rationality: Why We Need Two Notions Instead of One”
Commentator: Jonathan Ichikawa (University of British Columbia)

10L Colloquium: Truth
9:00 a.m.-Noon

9:00-10:00
Chair: Cherilyn Keall (Ryerson University)
Speaker: Anthony Fisher (Syracuse University)
“Against Primitivism about Truth”
Commentator: Matt Leonard (University of California–Davis)

10:00-11:00
Chair: Don Sievert (University of Missouri)
Speakers: Christopher Horn (Texas Tech University)
Jeremy Schwartz (Texas Tech University)
“Unity and the Frege-Geach Problem”
Commentator: Kris McDaniel (Syracuse University)
11:00-12:00
Chair: Vijay Mascarenhas (Metropolitan State College of Denver)
Speaker: Jay Newhard (East Carolina University)
“Alethic Functionalism, Manifestation, and Truth”
Commentator: Luca Struble (University of California–Los Angeles)

10M APA Committee Session: Obtaining a Job at the Community College
9:00 a.m.-Noon
Arranged by the APA Committee on Philosophy in Two-Year Colleges
Chair: Bill Hartmann (St. Louis Community College)
Speakers: Anthony E. Thomas (Kishwaukee College)
Marc Bobro (Santa Barbara City College)
Mark Thorsby (Lone Star College)

10N APA Committee Session: Queer and Trans: Issues in Ethics, Politics, and Representation
9:00 a.m.-Noon
Arranged by the APA Committee on Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and Transgender People in the Profession and the Society for Lesbian and Gay Philosophy
Chair: Cheshire Calhoun (Arizona State University)
Speakers: Carol Quinn (Metropolitan State College of Denver)
“Queer Ethics”
Alexis Shotwell (Laurentian University)
“The Queer Work of Remembering for the Future: Affect, Memory, and Bioethics”
Christine Pierce (North Carolina State University)
“Why Gay and Feminist Scholars Should Stop Opposing Same-Sex Marriage”
Richard Nunan (College of Charleston)
“The Crying Game: Deceptive Transsexuals in Film Criticism”

SATURDAY AFTERNOON, APRIL 7

SESSION 11 — 1:00-4:00 P.M.

11A Author-Meets-Critics: Colleen Murphy, A Moral Theory of Political Reconciliation
1:00-4:00 p.m.
Chair: Rahul Kumar (Queen’s University)
Critics: Tracy Isaacs (University of Western Ontario)  
Alice MacLachlan (York University)  
Val Napoleon (University of Alberta)  

Author: Colleen Murphy (University of Illinois–Urbana-Champaign)

**11B Author-Meets-Critics: Peter Carruthers, *The Opacity of Mind: An Integrative Theory of Self Knowledge***

1:00-4:00 p.m.

Chair: David Shier (Washington State University)

Critics: Brie Gertler (University of Virginia)  
Alvin Goldman (Rutgers University)  
Alex Byrne (Massachusetts Institute of Technology)  

Author: Peter Carruthers (University of Maryland–College Park)

**11C Special Memorial Session: Philippa Foot***

1:00-4:00 p.m.

Chair: John Campbell (University of California–Berkeley)

Speakers: Matthew Hanser (University of California–Santa Barbara)  
“Acting Badly by Trying”  
Gavin Lawrence (University of California–Los Angeles)  
“The Deep and the Shallow”  
Michael Thompson (University of Pittsburgh)  
“The Human Is Nothing Alien to Me”

**Reception in Memory of Philippa Foot***

4:00-5:00 p.m.

Attendees are cordially invited to a reception following this session

**11D Invited Symposium: Aesthetics and the Science of Disgust***

1:00-4:00 p.m.

Chair: Antony Aumann (Northern Michigan University)

Speakers: Jenefer Robinson (University of Cincinnati)  
Jonathan Weinberg (University of Arizona)

Commentator: Nina Strohminger (University of Michigan–Ann Arbor)

**11E Invited Symposium: Akrasia***

1:00-4:00 p.m.

Chair: Nishi Shah (Amherst College)
Speakers: Nomy Arpaly (Brown University)
John Brunero (University of Missouri–St. Louis)
Sam Shpall (University of Southern California)
Commentator: Andrew Reisner (McGill University)

11F Invited Symposium: Cassirer and Neo-Kantianism  
1:00-4:00 p.m.
Chair: Erich Reck (University of California–Riverside)
Speakers: Scott Edgar (Yale University)
“Cohen and Cassirer on the Constitution of Objects”
Jeremy Heis (University of California–Irvine)
“Substance, Function, and the A Priori”
Donald Verene (Emory University)
“Cassirer’s Phenomenology of Culture”
Commentators: Alan Kim (Dartmouth College)
Audrey Yap (University of Victoria)
Thora Bayer (Xavier University of Louisiana)

11G Colloquium: Early Modern Philosophy  
1:00-4:00 p.m.
1:00-2:00
Chair: Russell Wahl (Idaho State University)
Speaker: Monte Cook (University of Oklahoma)
“Body-body Occasionalism and the Conservation of Motion”
Commentator: Patricia Easton (Claremont Graduate University)

2:00-3:00
Chair: Nathan Rockwood (University of California–San Diego)
Speaker: Shelley Weinberg (University of Illinois)
“Locke’s Reply to the Skeptic”
Commentator: Lex Newman (University of Utah)

3:00-4:00
Chair: Jacqueline Taylor (University of San Francisco)
Speaker: Joshua Anderson (St. Louis University)
“Hume, Counterfactuals, and Causation”
Commentator: William Edward Morris (Illinois Wesleyan University)
11H Colloquium: Experimental Philosophy
1:00-4:00 p.m.

1:00-2:00
Chair: Kathleen Creel (Simon Fraser University)
Speaker: Susana Nuccetelli (St. Cloud State University)
“Reflective Equilibrium and Cognitive Diversity”
Commentator: Christopher Stephens (University of British Columbia)

2:00-3:00
Chair: Michael Hodges (Vanderbilt University)
Speakers: Jonathan Livengood (University of Pittsburgh)
Dylan Murray (University of California–Berkeley)
Justin M. Sytsma (East Tennessee State University)
“God Knows (But Does God Believe?)”
Commentator: Jacob Beck (Texas Tech University)

3:00-4:00
Chair: Michael Schmitz (University of California–Berkeley)
Speaker: Genoveva Marti (ICREA and Universitat de Barcelona)
“Use, Reference, and Experimental Data”
Commentator: Justin Fisher (Southern Methodist University)

11I Colloquium: Knowledge
1:00-4:00 p.m.

1:00-2:00
Chair: Joshue Orozco (Whitworth University)
Speaker: Chris Tweedt (Baylor University)
“An Obvious Account of Epistemic Possibility”
Commentator: Peter Kung (Pomona College)

2:00-3:00
Chair: Kenneth Lucey (University of Nevada–Reno)
Speaker: John Waterman (Johns Hopkins University)
“Questioning Contextualist Error Theory”
Commentator: Jeffrey Roland (Louisiana State University)

3:00-4:00
Chair: Dai Heide (Simon Fraser University)
Speaker: Charity Anderson (St. Louis University)
“Putting Fallibilism to Work”
Commentator: John Collins (East Carolina University)
11J Colloquium: Moral Reasons and Moral Beliefs
1:00-4:00 p.m.

1:00-2:00
Chair: John Harris (Texas Christian University)
Speakers: Nathan Ballantyne (Fordham University)
Joshua Thurow (Mount Marty College)
“Moral Intuitionism Defeated?”
Commentator: Brian T. Talbot (University of Colorado–Boulder)

2:00-3:00
Chair: Casie Dunleavy (University of Montana)
Speaker: Erich Matthes (University of California–Berkeley)
“Value and Reasons for Preservation”
Commentator: Steven Arkonovich (Reed College)

3:00-4:00
Chair: Alexandra Perry (Bergen Community College)
Speaker: Luis Cheng-Guajardo (Stanford University)
“A New-Razian Account of the Normative Requirement of Means-end Rationality”
Commentator: Paul Hurley (Claremont McKenna College)

11K Colloquium: Revisionism and Tracing
1:00-4:00 p.m.

1:00-2:00
Chair: Kelly McCormick (Syracuse University)
Speaker: Stephen Morris (City University of New York–College of Staten Island)
“Vargas-style Revisionism and the Problem of Desert”
Commentator: Joseph Keim Campbell (Washington State University)

2:00-3:00
Chair: Tamler Sommers (University of Houston)
Speaker: Chris Weigel (Utah Valley University)
“Revisionism’s Experimental Evidence”
Commentator: David Palmer (University of Tennessee)

3:00-4:00
Chair: Joshua Spencer (Syracuse University)
Speaker: Roman Altshuler (State University of New York–Stony Brook and Marymount Manhattan College)
“Undermining Tracing Globally”
Commentator: Adam Gingera (University of Manitoba)
11L  APA Committee Session: Applications for Philosophy
Grants and Fellowships: Some Advice
1:00-4:00 p.m.

Arranged by the APA Committee on Lectures, Publications
and Research

Chair: Janna Thompson (La Trobe University)
Speakers: R. Jay Wallace (University of California–Berkeley)
Nicole A. Stahlmann (American Council of
 Learned Societies)
Michael A. Rescorla (University of California–Santa
 Barbara)
William J. Talbott (University of Washington)

11M  APA Committee Session: Virtue Epistemology and Chinese
Philosophy
1:00-4:00 p.m.

Arranged by the APA Committee on International
Cooperation

Chair: Chienkuo Mi (Soochow University)
Speakers: Wang Zhi-Hue (Soochow University)
“Action as Performance”
Kai Marchal (Soochow University)
“The Epistemic Function of Virtuous Emotions: The
Neo-Confucian View”
Chienkuo Mi (Soochow University)
“Virtue and Skill: Virtue Epistemology and Chinese
Philosophy”
Cheng-Hung Tsai (Soochow University)
“Xunzi (荀子) and Virtue Epistemology”
Shen Hsiang-Min (Soochow University)
“Zhu Xi on ‘Intellectual Virtue:’ A Perspective from
Virtue Epistemology”

Commentators: Stephen C. Angle (Wesleyan University)
Ernest Sosa (Rutgers University)

Saturday Early Evening, April 7

Session 12 — 4:00-6:00 p.m.

12A  Invited Paper: Fundamentality and Degrees of Reality
4:00-6:00 p.m.
Chair: Rex Welshon (University of Colorado–Colorado
Springs)
Speaker: Christopher Shields (Oxford University)  
“The Great Chain of Being Inversion”

Commentators: Elizabeth Barnes (University of Leeds)  
David Robb (Davidson College)

12B Invited Paper: Hume, Nietzsche, and Naturalism  
4:00-6:00 p.m.
  Chair: Charlie Huenemann (Utah State University)  
  Speaker: Peter Kail (Oxford University)  
  “Nietzsche, Hume and Naturalism”
  Commentators: Jessica N. Berry (Georgia State University)  
                     Dario Perinetti (Université du Québec–Montréal)

12C Colloquium: Cardinals  
4:00-6:00 p.m.
  4:00-5:00
  Chair: Bob Dumas (University of Washington)  
  Speaker: Eric Snyder (Ohio State University)  
  “Type Pluralism and the Semantics of Cardinals”
  Commentator: Otávio Bueno (University of Miami)

  5:00-6:00
  Chair: Paul Hovda (Reed College)  
  Speaker: Joongol Kim (Seoul National University)  
  “The Sortal Resemblance Problem”
  Commentator: Benjamin Levinstein (Rutgers University)

12D Colloquium: Counterfactuals and Dispositions  
4:00-6:00 p.m.
  4:00-5:00
  Chair: Patrick Findler (Kwantlen Polytechnic University)  
  Speaker: Sean Drysdale Walsh (University of Minnesota–Duluth)  
  “What Can/Ought I Do? Vagueness in Abilities, Options, and Utilities”
  Commentator: Jennifer McKitrick (University of Nebraska–Lincoln)

  5:00-6:00
  Chair: Carla Merino-Rajme (Princeton University)  
  Speaker: Cody Cash (University of Arkansas)  
  “An Alternate Approach to the Conditional Analysis of Dispositions”
  Commentator: Ron Wilburn (University of Nevada–Las Vegas)
12E  Colloquium: Definite Descriptions
4:00-6:00 p.m.

4:00-5:00
Chair: Daniel Krasner (Metropolitan State College of Denver)
Speaker: Allan Bäck (Kutztown University of Pennsylvania)
"An Attractive Theory of Definite Descriptions"
Commentator: Grant Marler (Claremont Graduate University)

5:00-6:00
Chair: Adam Simon (Stanford University)
Speaker: Brian Rabern (Australian National University)
"Descriptions which Have Grown Capital Letters"
Commentator: James R. Shaw (University of Pittsburgh)

12F  Colloquium: Feminist Philosophy
4:00-6:00 p.m.

4:00-5:00
Chair: Lauren Ashwell (Bates College)
Speaker: Jessica Wolfendale (West Virginia University)
"Provocation, Sex, and Fashion"
Commentator: Katherine Logan (University of Oregon)

5:00-6:00
Chair: Elizabeth Brake (University of Calgary and Arizona State University)
Speaker: Jennifer Warriner (University of Utah)
"Feminism and Political Liberalism: A Return to Comprehensive Liberalism?"
Commentator: Abigail Levin (Niagara University)

12G  Colloquium: Function in Neuroscience and Biology
4:00-6:00 p.m.

4:00-5:00
Chair: Franz-Peter Griesmaier (University of Wyoming)
Speaker: Charles Rathkopf (University of Virginia)
"Localizing Intrinsic Function"
Commentator: Charles Hermes (University of Texas–Arlington)

5:00-6:00
Chair: Jeffrey Lockwood (University of Wyoming)
Speaker: Justin Garson (City University of New York–Hunter College)
“Biological Function and Biological Normalcy: Breaking the Link”
Commentator: Joyce Havstad (University of California–San Diego)

12H Colloquium: Philosophy and Psychiatry
4:00-6:00 p.m.

4:00-5:00
Chair: Michael Koch (State University of New York–Oneonta)
Speaker: Matthew Drabek (University of Iowa)
“Feedback Bias in the Social Sciences: The Case of Paraphilia”
Commentator: Esa Diaz-Leon (University of Manitoba)

5:00-6:00
Chair: Scott Clifton (University of Washington)
Speakers: Gary Gala (University of North Carolina–Chapel Hill)
Daniel Moseley (University of North Carolina–Chapel Hill)
“The Role of Internal Reasons in Psychiatry”
Commentator: Julie Ponesse (State University of New York–Brockport)

12I Colloquium: Plato
4:00-6:00 p.m.

4:00-5:00
Chair: Joshua Wilburn (University of Victoria)
Speaker: George Harvey (Indiana University Southeast)
“Virtues and Pre-political Life in Plato’s Laws III and IV”
Commentator: Catherine McKeen (Skidmore College)

5:00-6:00
Chair: Blake Hestir (Texas Christian University)
Speaker: Matt Duncan (University of Virginia)
“Infallibilism and Contradiction in Plato’s Theaetetus”
Commentator: Travis Butler (Iowa State University)
**12J  Colloquium: Testimony and Assertion**

*4:00-6:00 p.m.*

**4:00-5:00**

Chair: Ken Rogerson (Florida International University)  
Speaker: Kenneth Boyd (University of Toronto)  
“Commonality in Assertion and Practical Reasoning”  
Commentator: Sonia Memetea (University of British Columbia)

**5:00-6:00**

Chair: Dylan Sabo (Occidental College)  
Speaker: Michael J. Raven (University of Victoria)  
“Vindicating Testimonial Acquaintance”  
Commentator: Anastasia Panagopoulos (University of Minnesota–Twin Cities)

**12K  Symposium: Altruism**

*4:00-6:00 p.m.*

Chair: Justin Caouette (University of Calgary)  
Speaker: Elizabeth Harman (Princeton University)  
“Understanding Some Cases of Altruism as Permissible Mistakes”  
Commentators: Jennifer Morton (City University of New York–City College)  
Alastair Norcross (University of Colorado–Boulder)

**12L  Symposium: Interactionism**

*4:00-6:00 p.m.*

Chair: Justin Tiehen (University of Puget Sound)  
Speaker: Peter Bokulich (Boston University)  
“How Interactionist Dualism Runs Afoul of Physics”  
Commentators: Robert Bishop (Wheaton College)  
Bernard Keating (West Virginia Wesleyan College)

**12M  Symposium: Moral Personhood**

*4:00-6:00 p.m.*

Chair: John Bailar (University of Idaho)  
Speaker: C. D. Meyers (University of Southern Mississippi)  
“Respect for Autopilots: Defending Person-based Ethics from Empirically Grounded Skepticism”  
Commentators: George Backen (Adams State College)  
Rebecca Lynn Stangl (University of Virginia)
12N  Symposium: Scientific Impartiality
4:00-6:00 p.m.
   Chair: Sharon Crasnow (Norco College)
   Speakers: Inmaculada de Melo-Martin (Cornell University)
             Kristen Intemann (Montana State University)
             “Profit-driven Research and Conflicts of Interest: Is Impartiality the Solution?”
   Commentators: Moira Howes (Trent University)
                  Carole Lee (University of Washington)

Carus Lecture
6:00-7:00 p.m.
   Topic: Doing Justice to the Social
   Chair: Alison Wylie (University of Washington)
   Speaker: Sally Haslanger (Massachusetts Institute of Technology)
            “Epistemic Wrongdoing”

Group Meetings, 7:00-9:00 p.m.
(See Group Meeting Program for details)
   International Association for the Philosophy of Sport
   North American Society for Social Philosophy
   Society for Skeptical Studies

Group Meetings, 7:00-10:00 p.m.
(See Group Meeting Program for details)
   American Society for Aesthetics
   Association for Chinese Philosophers in America, Session 2
   Hume Society
   International Society for Environmental Ethics
   Karl Jaspers Society of North America, Session 2
   Marxism and Philosophy Association
   Molinari Society
   Radical Philosophy Association, Session 2
   Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy
   Society for the Advancement of American Philosophy, Session 2

Group Meetings, 9:00-11:00 p.m.
(See Group Meeting Program for details)
   David Kellogg Lewis Society
GROUP PROGRAM

WEDNESDAY EVENING, APRIL 4

GROUP SESSION G1 — 7:00-9:00 P.M.

G1A Society for Analytical Feminism

7:00-9:00 p.m.

Topic: Feminist Metaphysics

Chair: Charlotte Witt (University of New Hampshire)
Speakers: Mari Mikkola (Humboldt-Universität Berlin)
Asta Sveinsdottir (San Francisco State University)
Brit Brogaard (University of Missouri–St. Louis)

GROUP SESSION G2 — 7:00-10:00 P.M.

G2A International Society for Comparative Studies of Chinese and
Western Philosophy, Session 1

7:00-10:00 p.m.

Topic: ISCWP Tenth Anniversary Chinese-Western Constructive
Engagements: Metaphysics, Naturalism, and Science

Chair: Yang Xiao (Kenyon College)
Speakers: Stephen C. Angle (Wesleyan University)
“Moral Metaphysics: East and West”
Bo Mou (San Jose State University)
“Quine’s Naturalized Epistemology, Liberal Naturalism,
and Daoist Naturalism: How It Is Possible for Them to
Constructively Engage Each Other?”
Sor-Hoon Tan (National University of Singapore)
“Science and Metaphysics in China’s Encounter with
Pragmatism”

Commentators: Xiaofei Tu (Appalachian State University)
Ralph Weber (Universität Zürich)
Guo Yi (Chinese Academy of Social Sciences)

G2B North American Wittgenstein Society, Session 1

7:00-10:00 p.m.

Chair: Jeff Johnson (St. Catherine University)
Speakers: Edward Crowell (Santa Rosa Junior College)
“Bouwsma, Religious Language, and Its Limits”
Craig Fox (California University of Pennsylvania)
“Making Sense of Wittgenstein’s ‘Lecture on Ethics’”

Robert Greenleaf Brice (Loyola University–New Orleans)
“Mistakes and Mental Disturbances: Wittgenstein, Action, and Moral Certainty”

G2C  Philosophy of Time Society
7:00-10:00 p.m.
Chair: Richard Gawne (Duke University)
Speaker: Ulrich Meyer (Colgate University)
“What Is Absolute Time?”
Commentator: Jonathan Tallant (University of Nottingham)
Speaker: Michael Sigrist (George Washington University)
“Objections to a Naive Theory of Temporal Perception”
Commentator: Joseph Keim Campbell (Washington State University)
Speaker: Curtis Kehler (University of British Columbia)
“Against the Argument from Experience to Presentism”
Commentator: Richard Gawne (Duke University)

G2D  Society for German Idealism, Session 1
7:00-10:00 p.m.
Topic: Author-Meets-Critic: Katerina Deligiorgi, The Scope of Autonomy
Chair: Aaron Bunch (Washington State University)
Author: Katerina Deligiorgi (University of Sussex)
Critics: Carla Bagnoli (Università degli Studi di Modena e Reggio Emilia)
Michael Morris (University of South Florida)
Susan Shell (Boston College)

G2E  Society for Natural Religion, Session 1
7:00-10:00 p.m.
Speakers: Gregory Goodrich (Arizona State University)
“Clarity of Mind’s Existence and Nature”
Matt Nolen (Arizona State University)
“Contemporary Solutions to the Problem of Evil: Nothing New Under the Sun”
Owen Anderson (Arizona State University)
“Kierkegaard and Natural Religion: Must We Assume God’s Existence?”
G2F  Society for Philosophy in the Contemporary World  
7:00-10:00 p.m.  
Topic: Aesthetics and Ethics in the Contemporary World  
Chair: William Stephens (Creighton University)  
Speakers: Roger Padén (George Mason University)  
“Biological Paradigms and the Ethics and Aesthetics of Nature”  
Travis T. Anderson (Brigham Young University)  
Tim W. Christie (University of British Columbia)  
“Eugenics, Teleology, and Oppression: Past and Present”  
Hannah Love (Pacific Lutheran University)  
“Sex Selection and the Limits of Patient Autonomy”

G2G  Society for the Advancement of American Philosophy, Session 1  
7:00-10:00 p.m.  
Topic: Insurrectionist Philosophy  
Chair: Scott L. Pratt (University of Oregon)  
Presenters: John Kaag (University of Massachusetts–Lowell)  
“From Hobomok to Chocorua: Lydia Maria Child as Insurrectionist”  
Lee A. McBride III (College of Wooster)  
“Insurrectionist Ethics and Pathos”  
Kristie Dotson (Michigan State University)  
“Towards Identifying a Proto-Black Feminist Insurrectionist Ethics”  
Commentator: Leonard Harris (Purdue University)

G2H  Society for the History of Political Philosophy  
7:00-10:00 p.m.  
Topic: History, Law, and the Divine  
Chair: Steven Berg (Bellarmine University)  
Speakers: Shawn Welnak (Long Island University)  
“Alfarabi’s Book of Religion”  
Paul Wilford (Tulane University of New Orleans)  
“History as Theodicy”  
Seth Appelbaum (Tulane University of New Orleans)  
“Maimonides’ Prophetology”
Steven Berg (Bellarmine University)
“Poetry and Philosophy on Trial Before the Court of Revelation”

G2I  Society for the Philosophy of History, Session 1
7:00-10:00 p.m.
Topic: Historicism and Social Science
Chair: Paul Roth (University of California–Santa Cruz)
Speakers:
Jason Blakely (University of California–Berkeley)
“Alasdair MacIntyre’s Narrative Social Science”
Serge Grigoriev (Ithaca College)
“History and Philosophy in Hume”
Jens Olesen (Oxford University)
“New Historicisms: Contextualizing Author and Reader”

G2J  Society for the Philosophy of Sex and Love
7:00-10:00 p.m.
Topic: Author-Meets-Critics: Elizabeth Emens, Monogamy’s Law: Compulsory Monogamy and Polyamorous Existence
Chair: Patricia Marino (University of Waterloo)
Author: Elizabeth Emens (Columbia University)
Discussants:
Elizabeth Brake (University of Calgary and Arizona State University)
Jacob Hale (California State University–Northridge)
Laurie Shrage (Florida International University)

G2K  Society for the Study of Philosophy and the Martial Arts, Session 1
7:00-10:00 p.m.
Chair: Joseph J. Lynch (California Polytechnic State University)
Speaker: Todd Jones (University of Nevada–Las Vegas)
“Martial Competitiveness – Hating Losing or Loving Uncertainty”
Commentator: Joseph J. Lynch (California Polytechnic State University)
Speaker: Johnathan Flowers (Southern Illinois University–Carbondale)
“Martial Arts in the Current Era; Budo, Bugei, and Combat Sports: A Discussion of Teleological, Ontological, and Metaphysical Differences Between Modern Conceptions of the ‘Martial Arts’”
Commentator: Todd Jones (University of Nevada–Las Vegas)
Speaker: Paul A. Swift (Bryant University)
    “Karate-Dough: The Purpose of Teaching in the Marketplace”
Commentator: Tonya Warren (Florida State University)
Speaker: R. Shannon Duval (Mount Mary College)
    “What If Blanche DuBois Had Been a Martial Artist?: Empowering Women in Their Homes and Communities Through Martial Arts Principles”
Commentator: Miroslav Imbrisevic (University of London)

G2L  **Society for the Study of the History of Analytical Philosophy, Session 1**
7:00-10:00 p.m.
**Topic:** Pragmatism and Early Analytic Philosophy
**Chair:** Sandra Lapointe (McMaster University)
**Speakers:**
    Eric Dayton (University of Saskatchewan)
    “C.I. Lewis, the Pragmatic a Priori and the American Assimilation of Logical Positivism”
    Henry Jackman (York University)
    “James vs. Russell on the Nature of Acquaintance”
    Alexander Klein (California State University–Long Beach)
    “What (Use) Did Russell Make of Functionalist Psychology?”

G2M  **Society of Indian Philosophy and Religion, Session 1**
7:00-10:00 p.m.
**Chair:** Kisor Chakrabarti (Davis and Elkins College)
**Speakers:**
    Clint Jones (University of Kentucky)
    “A Zen Master and a Capitalist Walk into a Bar ... How Integrating Interconnectivity Is Necessary for a Future Environmental Ethic”
    Glen Pettigrove (University of Auckland)
    “Anger and Moral Judgment”
    Koji Tanaka (University of Auckland)
    Joshua Anderson (St. Louis University)
    “Character Consequentialism: Confucianism, Buddhism, and Mill”
    Tista Bagchi (CSIR-NISTADS and University of Delhi)
    “Ethical Principles Behind Policy on Reproductive Technologies in India”
Audrey L. Anton (Western Kentucky University)
“Flexible and Fixed Character States: Aristotle on the Permanence and Mutability of Distinct Types of Character”

Ervin Castle (Brock University)
“Losing the Wager: Desire and Duty in the Bhagavad Gita”

Marisol Brito (University of Minnesota–Twin Cities)
“Releasing Arendtian Forgiveness: An Interfaith Approach”

Jonathan Miller (Bowling Green State University)
“The Role of Wu-Wei in Virtuous Activity”

Gordon Haist (University of South Carolina–Beaufort)
“Value Conflicts in Ethical Reasoning”

**GROUP SESSION G3 — 9:00-11:00 P.M.**

**G3A  Society for Asian and Comparative Philosophy, Session 1**

9:00-11:00 p.m.

**Topic:** Topics in Classical Chinese Philosophy

Chair: Henrique Schneider (Universität Wien)

Speakers: Sumner B. Twiss (Florida State University)
Jonathan Chan (Hong Kong Baptist University)
“Classical Confucianism, Punitive Expeditions, and Humanitarian Intervention”

Presenters: Henrique Schneider (Universität Wien)
“Hanfeizi and Welfare?”
Carl Dull (University of North Carolina–Greensboro)
“The Wandering Heart: Moral Psychology in the Inner Chapters of the Zhuangzi”
Bongrae Seok (Alvernia University)
“What Is Qing? A Situationist Interpretation”

**THURSDAY EVENING, APRIL 5**

**GROUP SESSION G4 — 7:00-9:00 P.M.**

**G4A  Charles S. Peirce Society**

7:00-9:00 p.m.

Chair: Robert Lane (University of West Georgia)
Speaker: Risto Hilpinen (University of Miami)
“Types, Tokens, and Words”
G4B  Josiah Royce Society  
7:00-9:00 p.m.  
**Topic:** The Implications of Royce for Contemporary Philosophy  
Chair: Scott L. Pratt (University of Oregon)  
Speakers: Matthew Jacobs (University of Oregon)  
“Royce and Brandom on Inference: Will-Acts and Propositions”  
Amrita Banerjee (Oregon State University)  
“Royce and Contemporary Feminism”  
Vincent Colapietro (Pennsylvania State University)  
“Self, Other, World: Royce’s Anticipation of Davidson’s ‘Argument’”  

G4C  North American Kant Society, Session 1  
7:00-9:00 p.m.  
**Topic:** Author-Meets-Critics: Robert Clewis, *The Kantian Sublime and the Revelation of Freedom*  
Chair: Guenter Zoeller (Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München and McGill University)  
Author: Robert Clewis (Gwynedd-Mercy College)  
Commentators: Paul Guyer (University of Pennsylvania)  
Melissa Zinkin (State University of New York–Binghamton)  

G4D  Society for Asian and Comparative Philosophy, Session 2  
7:00-9:00 p.m.  
**Topic:** Topics in Indian and Tibetan Philosophy  
Chair: Adrienne C. Cochran (Green River Community College)  
Presenters: Malcolm Keating (University of Texas–Austin)  
“Lakṣaṇā and Sort-Shifting in Mukula Bhaṭṭa’s *Abhidhāvṛttimāṭkā*”  
Adrienne C. Cochran (Green River Community College)  
“Tibetan Buddhism in the West: The Next Generation”  
Donna Dorsey (Grant MacEwan University)  
“Transference of Merit and the Transformation of Karma”
G4E  **Society for Business Ethics**

7:00-9:00 p.m.

**Topic:** Rethinking Ethics in Business: Trust, Service, and the Social Contract

Chair: Jeffery Smith (University of Redlands)

Speakers:
- David Silver (University of British Columbia)
  “A Contractualist Approach to Business Ethics”
- Sareh Pouryousefi (University of Toronto)
  “Business as a Profession: Professional Ethics and the Ethics of Service”
- Marc A. Cohen (Seattle University)
  “Moral and Amoral Conceptions of Trust”

**GROUP SESSION G5 — 7:00-10:00 P.M.**

**G5A  Experimental Philosophy Society**

7:00-10:00 p.m.

Chair: Galen Baril (University of Scranton)

Speaker: Alfred Mele (Florida State University)
  “Free Will, Science, and Substance Dualism”

Commentator: Kevin L. Timpe (Northwest Nazarene University)

Speaker: Tamler Sommers (University of Houston)
  “Free Will and Experimental Philosophy: A Match Made in Purgatory”

Commentator: Christopher Evan Franklin (Biola University)

Speaker: Jonathan Phillips (Yale University)
  “Manipulating Morality: Connecting Causation, Intention, and Moral Responsibility”

Commentator: Eddy Nahmias (Georgia State University)

Speaker: Chris Weigel (Utah Valley University)
  “Further Implications of Variance in Free Will Intuitions”

Commentator: Thomas Nadelhoffer (Dickinson College)

**G5B  Hegel Society of America**

7:00-10:00 p.m.

**Topic:** Hegel and the Conditions of Agency

Chair: Christopher Yeomans (Purdue University)

Speakers:
- Shannon Hoff (Institute for Christian Studies)
  “Hegel and the Legal Conditions of Action”
- Christopher Yeomans (Purdue University)
  “Hegel's Dual Theory of Free Will”
David Ciavatta (Ryerson University)
“The World of Action: Hegel on Agency and Its Living Context”

G5C  International Society for Comparative Studies of Chinese and Western Philosophy, Session 2
7:00-10:00 p.m.
Topic:  Moral Psychology in Early Chinese Philosophy
Chair:  Sor-Hoon Tan (National University of Singapore)
Speakers:  Carl Dull (University of North Carolina–Greensboro)
“Language, Speech Acts, and Moral Psychology in the Zhuangzi”
Tim Connolly (East Stroudsburg University)
“Sagehood and Supererogation in Confucius’ Analects”
Ryan Nichols (California State University–Fullerton)
“The Origins and Effects of Shame in Early Confucianism”
Deborah Mower (Youngstown State University)
“Understanding Rituals as Scripts: Confucianism Meets Western Psychology”
Commentators:  Stephen C. Angle (Wesleyan University)
Henrique Schneider (Universität Wien)
Sor-Hoon Tan (National University of Singapore)
Lijun Yuan (Texas State University–San Marcos)

G5D  Karl Jaspers Society of North America, Session 1
7:00-10:00 p.m.
Chair:  Alan M. Olson (Boston University)
Author:  Tomoko Iwasawa (Reitaku University)
Critics:  Purushottama Bilimoria (University of California–Berkeley)
Michael Palencia-Roth (University of Illinois–Urbana-Champaign)
Fabio Rambelli (University of California–Santa Barbara)
Helmut Wautischer (Sonoma State University)
G5E  North American Nietzsche Society
7:00-10:00 p.m.
Topic: Nietzsche as a Figure in the History of Philosophy
Chair: Jessica N. Berry (Georgia State University)
Speakers: Keith Ansell-Pearson (Warwick University)
Michael Steven Green (College of William and Mary)
Gary Shapiro (University of Richmond)

G5F  Society for Natural Religion, Session 2
7:00-10:00 p.m.
Speakers: Adam Omelianchuk (Biola University)
“Ethical Contextualism”
Owen Anderson (Arizona State University)
Greg Malloy (Arizona State University)
“When Is Disagreement Rational?”
Horace Fairlamb (University of Houston–Victoria)
“When Particulars Are Scandalous: Thoughts on General and Special Revelation”

G5G  Society for the Study of the History of Analytical Philosophy, Session 2
7:00-10:00 p.m.
Topic: Kant, Frege, and the Science of Logic
Chair: Jeremy Heis (University of California–Irvine)
Speaker: Clinton Tolley (University of California–San Diego)
“The Necessity of Receptivity in Logic: Frege’s Criticism of Kant”
Commentator: Danielle Macbeth (Haverford College)
Speaker: Erich Reck (University of California–Riverside)
“From Kant to Frege and Beyond: On the Objects of Modern Logic”
Commentator: Joan Weiner (Indiana University–Bloomington)

G5H  Society for Women in Philosophy
7:00-10:00 p.m.
Topic: Author-Meets-Critics: Alexis Shotwell, Knowing Otherwise: Race, Gender, and Implicit Understanding
Chair: Heather Battaly (California State University–Fullerton)
Author: Alexis Shotwell (Laurentian University)
Critics: Ann Garry (California State University–Los Angeles)
José Jorge Mendoza (University of Oregon)
Darrell Moore (DePaul University)

**GROUP SESSION G6 — 9:00-11:00 P.M.**

**G6A American Association of Philosophy Teachers**

*9:00-11:00 p.m.*

**Topic:** The Craft of Structuring Writing Assignments: Progression, Feedback, and Groups

- **Chair:** Nils Rauhut (Coastal Carolina University)
- **Speakers:**
  - Ronald Robles Sundstrom (University of San Francisco)
  - Bill Anelli (Modesto Junior College)
  - Ian Schnee (Western Kentucky University)

- “Democratic Disagreement as a Model for Collaborative Learning”
- “Managing Writing Feedback in the Large Class: From Annotations to Paraphrasings to Critiques”

**G6B Ayn Rand Society**

*9:00-11:00 p.m.*

**Topic:** Concepts and the Growth of Scientific Knowledge: The Case of “Temperature”

- **Chair:** Allan Gotthelf (University of Pittsburgh)
- **Speaker:** Travis Norsen (Smith College)
- **Commentators:**
  - Hasok Chang (University of Cambridge)
  - James G. Lennox (University of Pittsburgh)

**G6C Concerned Philosophers for Peace**

*9:00-11:00 p.m.*

**Topic:** Arab Spring/Western Autumn

- **Chair:** James P. Sterba (University of Notre Dame)
- **Speakers:**
  - Ovadia Ezra (Tel Aviv University)
  - Ron Hirschbein (Walden University)

- “Sanctions, Boycotts, and Embargoes: Means for Political Change”
- “Three Generals: Three Generalizations”

**G6D International Society for Chinese Philosophy, Session 1**

*9:00-11:00 p.m.*

**Topic:** Author-Meets-Critics: Ruiping Fan, Reconstructionist Confucianism: Rethinking Morality after the West

- **Chair:** Chenyang Li (Nanyang Technological University)
G6E  Society for Empirical Ethics
9:00-11:00 p.m.

Topic:  Dan Kelly, Yuck! The Nature and Moral Significance of Disgust

Chair: William A. Rottschaefer (Lewis & Clark College)
Author: Dan Kelly (Purdue University)
Commentators: Joel Martinez (Lewis & Clark College)
Jen Cole Wright (College of Charleston)

G6F  Society of Christian Philosophers
9:00-11:00 p.m.

Chair: Daniel Speak (Loyola Marymount University)
Speaker: Rebekah L. H. Rice (Seattle Pacific University)
“Robust Christian Materialism”
Commentator: Jason Baehr (Loyola Marymount University)

FRIDAY EVENING, APRIL 6

GROUP SESSION G7 — 7:00-10:00 P.M.

G7A  Association for Chinese Philosophers in America, Session 1
7:00-10:00 p.m.

Topic: Ancient Chinese Values in the Context of Cognitive Science and Evolutionary Psychology

Chair: Owen Flanagan (Duke University)
Speaker: Kelly James Clark (Calvin College)
“The Evolutionary Psychology of Chinese Religion: Pre-Qin High Gods as Punishers and Rewarders”
Commentator: Steven Geisz (University of Tampa)
Speaker: Mingran Tan (University of Toronto)
“A Comparative Study of Confucian Benevolence/ren and Darwinian Sympathy”
Commentator: Weimin Sun (California State University–Northridge)
Speaker: Jennifer Lundin Ritchie (University of British Columbia)
“Cognitive Science vs. Xunzi on Status and Authority”
Commentator: JeeLoo Liu (California State University–Fullerton)
G7B  Association for Informal Logic and Critical Thinking
7:00-10:00 p.m.

Topic:  Critical Reflection on Teaching Critical Thinking: Learning Outcomes, Course Content, and Assessment

Chair:  Wanda Teays (Mount St. Mary’s College)

Speakers:
- Donald L. Hatcher (Baker University)
- Jerry Cederblom (University of Nebraska–Omaha)
  “Problems with Teaching How to Reconstruct a Common Kind of Argument”
- Paul Green (Mount St. Mary’s College)
  “What Are the Learning Outcomes for a Critical Thinking Course?”
- Dale Turner (California State Polytechnic University–Pomona)
  “What Are We Assessing When We Assess Critical Thinking?”

G7C  International Society for Chinese Philosophy, Session 2
7:00-10:00 p.m.

Topic:  World Philosophy and Hermeneutics: Chinese and German Perspectives

Chairs:  Chung-Ying Cheng (University of Hawaii–Manoa)
         Robin Wang (Loyola Marymount University)

Speakers:
- Eric S. Nelson (University of Massachusetts–Lowell)
  “Interpretive Conflict and World-Formation: Dilthey, Heidegger, and Intercultural Hermeneutics”
- Franklin Perkins (DePaul University)
  “Leibniz and Intercultural Hermeneutics”
- Martin Schonfeld (University of South Florida)
  “World Philosophy and Climate Change: The German-Chinese Pathway to Civil Evolution”
- Chung-Ying Cheng (University of Hawaii–Manoa)
  “World Philosophy and Hermeneutics: A Chinese Philosophical Perspective”
G7D  International Society for Environmental Ethics, Session 1
7:00-10:00 p.m.


Chair: Mark Woods (University of San Diego)
Speakers: David Concepcion (Ball State University)
“Grieving in the Classroom”
Jen Rowland (University of North Texas)
“Leopold’s Challenge to Environmental Philosophy: Politicizing the Issues”
Joan McGregor (Arizona State University)
“Was Leopold a Feminist?”
Kyle Powys Whyte (Michigan State University)
“What Reading Leopold Tells Us about Sustainability Ethics and Indigenous Peoples”

G7E  North American Kant Society, Session 2
7:00-10:00 p.m.

Topic: Kant on Well-being and Happiness

Chair: Pablo Muchnik (Emerson College)
Speakers: Oliver Sensen (Massachusetts Institute of Technology and Tulane University of New Orleans)
“Kant on Happiness and Moral Obligation”
Jeanine Grenberg (St. Olaf College)
“Kant’s Understanding of Love Within Human Limits”
Anne Margaret Baxley (Washington University in St. Louis)
“The Conditional Value of Happiness in Kant’s Ethics”

G7F  North American Wittgenstein Society, Session 2
7:00-10:00 p.m.

Chair: John W. Powell (Humboldt State University)
Speakers: Hao Tang (Wuhan University)
“A Meeting of the Conceptual and the Natural: Wittgenstein on Learning a Sensation-language”
Thomas Raleigh (Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México)
“The Private Language Argument and ‘Burke’s Assumption’”
William Child (Oxford University)
“Wittgenstein and Phenomenal Concepts”

G7G  **Radical Philosophy Association, Session 1**
7:00-10:00 p.m.

**Topic:**  Author-Meets-Critics: Naomi Zack, *The Ethics and Mores of Race: Equality after the History of Philosophy*

**Chair:**  Rhea Muchalla (University of Oregon)
**Author:**  Naomi Zack (University of Oregon)
**Critics:**  Kristie Dotson (Michigan State University)
Lewis R. Gordon (Temple University)
José Jorge Mendoza (University of Oregon)
Lucius T. Outlaw, Jr. (Vanderbilt University)

G7H  **Society for German Idealism, Session 2**
7:00-10:00 p.m.

**Topic:**  Hegel’s *Science of Logic*

**Chair:**  J. M. Fritzman (Lewis & Clark College)
**Speaker:**  Victoria I. Burke (University of Guelph)
“Hegel and the Normativity of the Concept”

**Commentator:**  John McCumber (University of California–Los Angeles)

**Speaker:**  Adam Moeller (Emory University)
“Dialectic and Method: Rejections and Affirmations of the Organon Theory of Knowledge in Hegel’s *Science of Logic*”

**Commentator:**  Jeff Gauthier (University of Portland)

**Speaker:**  Christina Rawls (Duquesne University)
“Presupposing/Positing Notions of Reverse Causality in Hegel’s *Science of Logic*”

**Commentator:**  Marcos Bisticas-Cocoves (Morgan State University)

G7I  **Society for the Philosophic Study of the Contemporary Visual Arts**
7:00-10:00 p.m.

**Topic:**  Reflections on Still Photography and Cinematic Art

**Chair:**  Richard Nunan (College of Charleston)
**Speakers:**  James B. South (Marquette University)
“Veronica Mars – She’s a Marshmallow”

Edward Winters (Independent Scholar)
“What Moves at the Movies? The Priority of the Recognitional Fold”
Topic: Aesthetic Tensions as Modes of Evaluating Films and Video Games
Chair: Richard Nunan (College of Charleston)
Speakers: Tad Bratkowski (Southern Illinois University–Carbondale)
“Bullough’s Psychical Distance and the Aesthetic Experience of Grand Theft Auto IV”
Scott Clifton (University of Washington)
“Structural and Aesthetic Narrative Tension in Films”

G7J  Society for the Philosophy of Agency
7:00-10:00 p.m.
Topic: The Current State and Future of Philosophical Research on Action and Agency
Chair: Joseph Keim Campbell (Washington State University)
Panelists: Jeanette Kennett (Macquarie University)
Alfred Mele (Florida State University)
Thomas Nadelhoffer (Dickinson College)
Eddy Nahmias (Georgia State University)
Manuel Vargas (University of San Francisco)

G7K  Society for the Philosophy of History, Session 2
7:00-10:00 p.m.
Topic: The Function of General Laws in History at 70
Chair: Paul Roth (University of California–Santa Cruz)
Speakers: Daniel Little (University of Michigan–Dearborn)
“Disaggregating Historical Explanation: The Move to Social Mechanisms”
James Woodward (University of Pittsburgh)
“Hempel: Then and Now”
Noël Carroll (City University of New York–Graduate School)
“Narrative Explanation”

G7L  Society for the Study of Philosophy and the Martial Arts, Session 2
7:00-10:00 p.m.
Chair: Joseph J. Lynch (California Polytechnic State University)
Speaker: Miroslav Imbrisevic (University of London)
“Sartrean Existentialism and the Martial Arts Teacher”
Commentator: Paul A. Swift (Bryant University)
Speaker: Richard Schubert (Cosumnes River College)
“On Being a Martial Artist: A Zhuangzian Account”
Commentator: Carl Dull (University of North Carolina–Greensboro)
Speaker: Dennis Stevens (Randolph College)
“Plato on the Morality of Self-defense”
Commentator: R. Shannon Duval (Mount Mary College)
Speaker: Charles W. Wright (College of St. Benedict and St. John’s University)
“Preserving Recognition in the Face of Aggression: Aikido as a Practice of Physical Intersubjectivity”
Commentator: Michael J. Monahan (Marquette University)
Speaker: Koji Tanaka (University of Auckland)
“Who’s There: On Self-awareness and Self”
Commentator: Allan Bäck (Kutztown University of Pennsylvania)

G7M Society of Indian Philosophy and Religion, Session 2
7:00-10:00 p.m.
Chair: Chandana Chakrabarti (Davis and Elkins College)
Speaker: Kisor Chakrabarti (Davis and Elkins College)
“Major Ethical Theories (East and West): A Retrospect and Review”
Commentators: Joshua Anderson (St. Louis University)
Ervin Castle (Brock University)
Gordon Haist (University of South Carolina–Beaufort)
Jonathan Miller (Bowling Green State University)
Glen Pettigrove (University of Auckland)
Nancy E. Snow (Marquette University)
Speakers: Ilana Maymind (Ohio State University)
“Convergences and Divergences in East/West Ethics: A Case Study”
Joshua Horn (University of Kentucky)
**SATURDAY EVENING, APRIL 7**

**GROUP SESSION G8 — 7:00-9:00 P.M.**

**G8A International Association for the Philosophy of Sport**  
7:00-9:00 p.m.

Chair: Douglas McLaughlin (California State University–Northridge)

Speakers: John Gleaves (California State University–Fullerton)
          Tim Lehrbach (University of San Francisco)
          “A Series of Footnotes to Suits: Beyond an Analytic Definition of Games”
          John S. Russell (Langara College)
          “Does Metaethics Make a Difference in Philosophy of Sport?”
          Daniel A. Dombrowski (Seattle University)
          “Homer, Competition, and Sport”

**G8B North American Society for Social Philosophy**  
7:00-9:00 p.m.

**Topic:** Pornography, Liberalism, and Rights

Chair: Cindy Holder (University of Victoria)

Presenters: Abigail Levin (Niagara University)
            Rebecca Whisnant (University of Dayton)
            “What (If Anything) Is Feminist Pornography?”
            Lori Watson (University of San Diego)
            “What Does It Mean to Say That Pornography Is a Form of Prostitution?”

**G8C Society for Skeptical Studies**  
7:00-9:00 p.m.

Chair: Rachel Robison (University of Massachusetts–Amherst)

Speakers: Otávio Bueno (University of Miami)
          “Disagreeing with the Pyrrhonist?”
          Richard Greene (Weber State University)
          “Proposition Sensitive Variantism”
Group Program

Group Session G9 — 7:00-10:00 p.m.

G9A  American Society for Aesthetics
7:00-10:00 p.m.

Topic:  Everyday Aesthetics
Chair:  Elizabeth Scarbrough (University of Washington)
Speaker:  Thomas Leddy (San Jose State University)
“Are ‘Pretty’ and ‘Nice’ Aesthetic Qualities or Something Else?”
Commentator:  Sally Markowitz (Willamette University)
Speaker:  Yuriko Saito (Rhode Island School of Design)
“Everyday Aesthetics and World-Making”
Commentator:  Thomas Heyd (University of Victoria)

G9B  Association for Chinese Philosophers in America, Session 2
7:00-10:00 p.m.

Topic:  Issues in Traditional Chinese Political Philosophy: Moral Cosmology and Theories of Just War
Chair:  JeeLoo Liu (California State University–Fullerton)
Speaker:  Liang Cai (University of Arkansas–Fayetteville)
“Political Application of Moral Cosmology and Its Bankruptcy in Western Han China (206BCE—8CE)”
Commentator:  Robin Wang (Loyola Marymount University)
Speaker:  Weigang Chen (University of Macau)
“Confucian Humanism and Theodicy”
Commentator:  Ronnie Littlejohn (Belmont University)
Speaker:  Ellen Zhang (Hong Kong Baptist University)
“A Challenge to Just War Thinking: Why Laozi Would Say ‘No’ to Punitive Expeditions?”
Commentator:  Xiaofei Tu (Appalachian State University)
Speaker:  Ping-cheung Lo (Hong Kong Baptist University)
“Warfare Ethics in Sunzi’s Art of War? Historical Controversies and Contemporary Perspectives”
Commentator:  Sumner B. Twiss (Florida State University)

G9C  Hume Society
7:00-10:00 p.m.

Topic:  Early Criticisms of Hume
Chair:  Lisa Shapiro (Simon Fraser University)
Speakers:  Antonia LoLordo (University of Virginia)
Rebecca Copenhaver (Lewis & Clark College)
Sean Greenberg (University of California—Irvine)
G9D  International Society for Environmental Ethics, Session 2
7:00-10:00 p.m.

Topic: Managing Nature?
Chair: Geoffrey Frasz (College of Southern Nevada)
Speakers:
Alexa Forrester (Franklin and Marshall College)  “A Sensible Ecocentrism”
Joel MacClellan (University of Tennessee)  “Recreating Eden? Natural Evil and Environmental Ethics”
Thomas White (Loyola Marymount University)  “The Declaration of Rights for Cetaceans: Cetacean Culture and Harm”
Allen Thompson (Oregon State University)  “The Human Influence: Ecosystem Intervention, Design, and Novelty”

G9E  Karl Jaspers Society of North America, Session 2
7:00-10:00 p.m.

Topic: The Hermeneutics of Jaspers, Sartre, and Heidegger
Chair: Helmut Wautischer (Sonoma State University)
Presenters:
Kile Jones (Claremont Lincoln University)  “All the Consequences of This: Why Atheistic Existentialism Is More Consistent Than Religious Existentialism”
David P. Nichols (Saginaw Valley State University)  “The God of the Existentialist Philosophers: Fate, Freedom, and Mystery”
Discussants:
Purushottama Bilimoria (University of California–Berkeley)
Chung-Ying Cheng (University of Hawaii–Manoa)
Eric Michael Dale (Emerson College)
Catharina Stenqvist (Lunds Universitet)

G9F  Marxism and Philosophy Association
7:00-10:00 p.m.

Topic: Marxist-Humanism in Dialogue with Contemporary Continental Philosophy
Speakers:
Joe Anderson (Independent Scholar)  “Badiou’s Militant Subject”
Tom Jeannot (Gonzaga University)  “Badiou, Dunayevskaya, and Marx”
Bruce Beerman (Gonzaga University)
“Foucault, Marx, and the Idea of Critique”
Craig Vander Hart (Wenatchee Valley College)
“Heidegger and Marxist-Humanism”

G9G  Molinari Society
7:00-10:00 p.m.

Topic: Explorations in Philosophical Anarchy
Chair: Roderick Long (Auburn University)
Speakers: David M. Hart (Liberty Fund)
“Bastiat’s Distinction Between Legal and Illegal Plunder”
Kurt Gerry (Independent Scholar)
“On Political Obligation and the Nature of Law”
Commentators: Charles Johnson (Molinari Institute)
Jennifer McKitrick (University of Nebraska–Lincoln)

G9H  Radical Philosophy Association, Session 2
7:00-10:00 p.m.

Topic: Solidarity with Those Most Vulnerable: Ethical and Political Responses to Immigration
Chair: Michelle Switzer (Whittier College)
Speakers: Dana Rognlie (University of Oregon)
“A Response to José Jorge Mendoza’s ‘Neither a State of Nature Nor a State of Exception’”
Shelley Wilcox (San Francisco State University)
“Borders and Economic Vulnerability: A Relational Egalitarian Approach to Immigration”
Rhea Muchalla (University of Oregon)
“Brutality, Bodies, and Borders: Untangling Immigration, Illegality, and the Global Sex Trade”
Rita Manning (San Jose State University)
“Criminalizing Immigration”
Amelia Wirts (Boston College)
“The Duty of Restitution: Immigration and National Borders”

G9I  Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy
7:00-10:00 p.m.

Chair: Mark Wheeler (San Diego State University)
Speakers: Keith McPartland (Williams College)
“Aristotle on Negation and Falsity”
David Ebrey (Northwestern University)
“Making Room for Matter”

Christopher Buckels (University of California–Davis)
“The Republic’s Reluctant Rulers”

G9J  Society for the Advancement of American Philosophy, Session 2
7:00-10:00 p.m.
Topic: John Dewey and the Anthropological
Chair: Charles A. Hobbs (Gonzaga University)
Presenters: Mike Jostedt (Southern Illinois University–Carbondale)
“Challenging Feminine Natures: Reconstructing Ideals of Woman with Dewey”
Shane Ralston (Pennsylvania State University)
“Dewey’s Political Technology from an Anthropological Perspective”
Cherilyn Keall (Ryerson University)
“The Paradox of Freedom: Dewey on Human Nature, Culture, and Education”
Commentator: Terrance MacMullan (Eastern Washington University)

GROUP SESSION G10 — 9:00-11:00 P.M.
G10A  David Kellogg Lewis Society
9:00-11:00 p.m.
Chair: Richard Hanley (University of Delaware)
Speakers: Daniel Nolan (Australian National University)
“It’s a Kind of Magic: Lewis, Magic, and Abstract Objects”
Andrea Brewer (Princeton University)
“Supervaluational Tricks: Can Lewisians Turn Many Objects into One?”
GROUP SESSIONS

A
American Association of Philosophy Teachers, Thursday, April 5, 9:00-11:00 p.m.
American Society for Aesthetics, Saturday, April 7, 7:00-10:00 p.m.
Association for Chinese Philosophers in America, Session 1, Friday, April 6, 7:00-10:00 p.m.
Association for Chinese Philosophers in America, Session 2, Saturday, April 7, 7:00-10:00 p.m.
Association for Informal Logic and Critical Thinking, Friday, April 6, 7:00-10:00 p.m.
Ayn Rand Society, Thursday, April 5, 9:00-11:00 p.m.

C
Charles S. Peirce Society, Thursday, April 5, 7:00-9:00 p.m.
Concerned Philosophers for Peace, Thursday, April 5, 9:00-11:00 p.m.

D
David Kellogg Lewis Society, Saturday, April 7, 9:00-11:00 p.m.

E
Experimental Philosophy Society, Thursday, April 5, 7:00-10:00 p.m.

H
Hegel Society of America, Thursday, April 5, 7:00-10:00 p.m.
Hume Society, Saturday, April 7, 7:00-10:00 p.m.

I
International Association for the Philosophy of Sport, Saturday, April 7, 7:00-9:00 p.m.
International Society for Chinese Philosophy, Session 1, Thursday, April 5, 9:00-11:00 p.m.
International Society for Chinese Philosophy, Session 2, Friday, April 6, 7:00-10:00 p.m.
International Society for Comparative Studies of Chinese and Western Philosophy, Session 1, Wednesday, April 4, 7:00-10:00 p.m.
International Society for Comparative Studies of Chinese and Western Philosophy, Session 2, Thursday, April 5, 7:00-10:00 p.m.
International Society for Environmental Ethics, Session 1, Friday, April 6, 7:00-10:00 p.m.
International Society for Environmental Ethics, Session 2, *Saturday, April 7, 7:00-10:00 p.m.*

**J**
Josiah Royce Society, *Thursday, April 5, 7:00-9:00 p.m.*

**K**
Karl Jaspers Society of North America, Session 1, *Thursday, April 5, 7:00-10:00 p.m.*
Karl Jaspers Society of North America, Session 2, *Saturday, April 7, 7:00-10:00 p.m.*

**M**
Marxism and Philosophy Association, *Saturday, April 7, 7:00-10:00 p.m.*
Molinari Society, *Saturday, April 7, 7:00-10:00 p.m.*

**N**
North American Kant Society, Session 1, *Thursday, April 5, 7:00-9:00 p.m.*
North American Kant Society, Session 2, *Friday, April 6, 7:00-10:00 p.m.*
North American Nietzsche Society, *Thursday, April 5, 7:00-10:00 p.m.*
North American Society for Social Philosophy, *Saturday, April 7, 7:00-9:00 p.m.*
North American Wittgenstein Society, Session 1, *Wednesday, April 4, 7:00-10:00 p.m.*
North American Wittgenstein Society, Session 2, *Friday, April 6, 7:00-10:00 p.m.*

**P**
Philosophy of Time Society, *Wednesday, April 4, 7:00-10:00 p.m.*

**R**
Radical Philosophy Association, Session 1, *Friday, April 6, 7:00-10:00 p.m.*
Radical Philosophy Association, Session 2, *Saturday, April 7, 7:00-10:00 p.m.*

**S**
Society for Analytical Feminism, *Wednesday, April 4, 7:00-9:00 p.m.*
Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy, *Saturday, April 7, 7:00-10:00 p.m.*
Society for Asian and Comparative Philosophy, Session 1, *Wednesday, April 4, 9:00-11:00 p.m.*
Society for Asian and Comparative Philosophy, Session 2, *Thursday, April 5, 7:00-9:00 p.m.*
Society for Business Ethics, *Thursday, April 5, 7:00-9:00 p.m.*
Society for Empirical Ethics, *Thursday, April 5, 9:00-11:00 p.m.*
Society for German Idealism, Session 1, *Wednesday, April 4, 7:00-10:00 p.m.*
Society for German Idealism, Session 2, *Friday, April 6, 7:00-10:00 p.m.*
Society for Natural Religion, Session 1, *Wednesday, April 4, 7:00-10:00 p.m.*
Society for Natural Religion, Session 2, *Thursday, April 5, 7:00-10:00 p.m.*
Society for Philosophy in the Contemporary World, *Wednesday, April 4, 7:00-10:00 p.m.*
Society for Skeptical Studies, *Saturday, April 7, 7:00-9:00 p.m.*
Society for Women in Philosophy, *Thursday, April 5, 7:00-10:00 p.m.*
Society for the Advancement of American Philosophy, Session 1, *Wednesday, April 4, 7:00-10:00 p.m.*
Society for the Advancement of American Philosophy, Session 2, *Saturday, April 7, 7:00-10:00 p.m.*
Society for the History of Political Philosophy, *Wednesday, April 4, 7:00-10:00 p.m.*
Society for the Philosophic Study of the Contemporary Visual Arts, *Friday, April 6, 7:00-10:00 p.m.*
Society for the Philosophy of Agency, *Friday, April 6, 7:00-10:00 p.m.*
Society for the Philosophy of History, Session 1, *Wednesday, April 4, 7:00-10:00 p.m.*
Society for the Philosophy of History, Session 2, *Friday, April 6, 7:00-10:00 p.m.*
Society for the Philosophy of Sex and Love, *Wednesday, April 4, 7:00-10:00 p.m.*
Society for the Study of Philosophy and the Martial Arts, Session 1, *Wednesday, April 4, 7:00-10:00 p.m.*
Society for the Study of Philosophy and the Martial Arts, Session 2, *Friday, April 6, 7:00-10:00 p.m.*
Society for the Study of the History of Analytical Philosophy, Session 1, *Wednesday, April 4, 7:00-10:00 p.m.*
Society for the Study of the History of Analytical Philosophy, Session 2, *Thursday, April 5, 7:00-10:00 p.m.*
Society of Christian Philosophers, *Thursday, April 5, 9:00-11:00 p.m.*
Society of Indian Philosophy and Religion, Session 1, *Wednesday, April 4, 7:00-10:00 p.m.*
Society of Indian Philosophy and Religion, Session 2, *Friday, April 6, 7:00-10:00 p.m.*
MAIN AND GROUP PROGRAM PARTICIPANTS

(Group sessions begin with “G.” All others are main sessions.)

A

Aas, Sean (Brown University) ............................................................. 8I Fri PM
Abaci, Uygar (University of British Columbia) ................................. 7J Fri AM
Adams, David M. (California State Polytechnic University–Pomona)  .............................................................................................................. 6N Thu PM
Adams, Robert Merrihew (University of North Carolina–Chapel Hill) .............................................................................................. 7A Fri AM
Agule, Craig (University of California–San Diego) ............................. 2I Wed PM
Akins, Kathleen (Simon Fraser University) ....................................... 1F Wed AM
Albrecht, Ingrid V. (University of Illinois–Urbana-Champaign) .... 8H Fri PM
Alfano, Mark (University of Notre Dame).......................................... 8J Fri PM
Allen, Colin (Indiana University–Bloomington) ............................... 2F Wed PM
Allen, Crystal (University of Missouri) ............................................. 1L Wed AM
Allison, Henry E. (University of California–San Diego and Boston University) .......................................................... 1B Wed AM
Almassi, Ben (College of Lake County) ............................................ Posters Fri
Almeder, Robert (Georgia State University) ..................................... 7D Fri AM
Alter, Torin (University of Alabama–Tuscaloosa) ............................ 7I Fri AM
Altshuler, Roman (State University of New York–Stony Brook and Marymount Manhattan College) .................................................... 11K Sat PM
Amini, Majid (Virginia State University) ........................................... 7L Fri AM
Anagnostopoulos, Mariana (California State University–Fresno) ... 5J Thu PM
Anderson, Charity (St. Louis University) ......................................... 11I Sat PM
Anderson, Jack LLOYD (University of Utah) .................................. 10E Sat AM
Anderson, James (San Diego State University) ............................ 9L Fri PM
Anderson, Jeremy (DePauw University) ........................................... 10J Sat AM
Anderson, Joe (Independent Scholar) ............................................ G9F Sat PM
Anderson, Joshua (St. Louis University) .......................................... G2M Wed PM, G7M Fri PM, 11G Sat PM
Anderson, Luvell (Pennsylvania State University) .......................... 1K Wed AM
Anderson, Owen (Arizona State University) .................. G2E Wed PM, G5F Thu PM
Anderson, Scott A. (University of British Columbia) .............. 3L Wed PM
Anderson, Travis T. (Brigham Young University) ...................... G2F Wed PM
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<tr>
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<tr>
<td>Anelli, Bill</td>
<td>Modesto Junior College</td>
<td>G6A Thu PM</td>
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<td>Angle, Stephen C.</td>
<td>Wesleyan University</td>
<td>G2A Wed PM, G5C Thu PM, 11M Sat PM</td>
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<td>Annas, Julia</td>
<td>University of Arizona</td>
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<td>Ansell-Pearson, Keith</td>
<td>Warwick University</td>
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<td>University of Otago</td>
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<td>Antill, Greg</td>
<td>University of California–Los Angeles</td>
<td>4M Thu AM</td>
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<td>Anton, Audrey L.</td>
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<td>Badhwar, Neera</td>
<td>University of Oklahoma and George Mason University</td>
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<td>Baehr, Jason</td>
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<td>Bishop, Robert</td>
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Blackman, Reid (Colgate University) ........................................... 3M Wed PM
Blackson, Thomas (Arizona State University) ......................... 8B Fri PM
Blake, Michael (University of Washington) .............................. 5F Thu PM
Blakely, Jason (University of California–Berkeley) .................. G2I Wed PM
Blatti, Stephan (University of Memphis) ................................. 2F Wed PM
Blaustein, Ian (Boston University) ......................................... 10H Sat AM
Block, Ned (New York University) ....................................... 8A Fri PM
Bobro, Marc (Santa Barbara City College) .............................. 1M Wed AM, 6D Thu PM, 10M Sat AM
Boersema, David (Pacific University) ..................................... 10J Sat AM
Boisvert, Daniel (University of North Carolina–Charlotte) ....... 5B Thu PM
Bokulich, Peter (Boston University) ....................................... 12L Sat PM
Bommarito, Nicolas (Brown University) .................................. 6C Thu PM
Bowman, Brady (Pennsylvania State University) ..................... 5N Thu PM
Bowman, Margaret (University of Utah) ................................. 8K Fri PM
Boyce, Kenneth (University of Notre Dame) ............................ 9I Fri PM
Boylan, Michael (University of Toronto) ............................... 12J Sat PM
Boyce, Kenneth (University of Notre Dame) ............................ 9I Fri PM
Bradford, Gwen (Rice University) ........................................ 3I Wed PM
Bradford, Gwen (Rice University) ........................................ 3I Wed PM
Braak, Elizabeth (University of Calgary and Arizona State University) ........................................... G2J Wed PM, 12F Sat PM
Brand, Peg (Indiana University-Purdue University–Indianapolis) .. 4A Thu AM
Bratko, Tad (Southern Illinois University–Carbondale) ............ G7I Wed PM
Bratman, Michael E. (Stanford University) ......................... Thu PM, 8C Fri PM
Brent, Michael (Columbia University) .................................... 8M Fri PM
Bresnahan, Aili (Temple University) ..................................... 5I Thu PM
Brewer, Andrea (Princeton University) .................................. G10A Sat PM
Brewer-Davis, Nina (Auburn University) ................................ 11 Wed AM
Brice, Robert Greenleaf (Loyola University–New Orleans) ....... G2B Wed PM, 4I Thu AM
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Brito, Marisol (University of Minnesota–Twin Cities) ............. G2M Wed PM
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Brogaard, Brit (University of Missouri–St. Louis) .................. 1F Wed AM, 6F Wed PM
Bromwich, Danielle (University of Massachusetts–Boston) .... 10I Sat AM
Brooks, Rachelle L. (Northwestern University) ...................... 1N Wed AM
Brown, Matthew J. (University of Texas–Dallas) ....................... 7B Fri AM
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Brown, Stephen (Briar Cliff University) ............................... 2L Wed PM
Brueckner, Anthony (University of California–Santa Barbara) ......10K Sat AM
Bruno, John (University of Missouri–St. Louis) ....................... 11E Sat PM
Brunya, Brian (Eastern Michigan University) ........................... 6C Thu PM
Buckareff, Andrei (Marist College) ....................................... 8M Fri PM
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Bueno, Otávio (University of Miami) ................................. 12C Sat PM, G8C Sat PM
Bunch, Aaron (Washington State University) ................... G2D Wed PM, 8K Fri PM
Bundy, Alex (University of California–Santa Barbara) .............. 10K Sat AM
Burgess, Alexis (Stanford University) .................................. 1D Wed AM
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Cameron, Margaret (University of Victoria) .......................... 6C Thu PM
Campana, Dan (University of La Verne) .............................. 3M Wed PM
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Campbell, Joseph Keim (Washington State University) ............. G2C Wed PM, G7J Fri PM, 11K Sat PM
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Cannon, Joseph (Marquette University) .............................. 6K Thu PM
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Capps, John (Rochester Institute of Technology) ..................... 7D Fri AM
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Chakrabarti, Chandana (Davis and Elkins College) ................. G7M Fri PM
Chakrabarti, Kisor (Davis and Elkins College) ...................... G2M Wed PM, G7M Fri PM
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Chan, Rebecca (University of Colorado–Boulder) .................. 2K Wed PM
Chang, Hasok (University of Cambridge) ................................. G6B Thu PM
Chang, Ruth (Rutgers University) ............................................. 10E Sat AM
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Dyson, Henry (University of Michigan–Ann Arbor) .................. 3N Wed PM

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Ebrey, David (Northwestern University) ................................. 3E Wed PM, G9I Sat PM
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Eisenberg, Avigail (University of Victoria) ............................. 5F Thu PM
El-Bizri, Nader (Institute of Ismaili Studies) ............................ 2A Wed PM
Elgin, Catherine (Harvard University) ....................................... 7D Fri AM
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<td>Elizondo, E.S.</td>
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<td>Universitat Pompeu Fabra</td>
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<td>Smith College, University of Melbourne, and</td>
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<td>Howard University</td>
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McHose, Brad (University of Washington) ..............................4L Thu AM
McIntyre, Alison (Wellesley College) .......................................4K Thu AM
McKeen, Catherine (Skidmore College) ...................................12I Sat PM
McKenna, Michael (University of Arizona) .............................10A Sat AM
McKinney, Rachel (City University of New York–Graduate Center)

McKittrick, Jennifer (University of Nebraska–Lincoln)

McKittrick, Terrance (The Nova Project)

McLaughlin, Brian (Rutgers University)

McLaughlin, Douglas (California State University–Northridge)

McNaughton, David (Florida State University)

McPartland, Keith (Williams College)

McPherran, Mark (Simon Fraser University)

Mcrae, Emily (University of Oklahoma)

Mead, Aaron (University of California–Los Angeles)

Meehan, Johanna (Grinnell College)

Mele, Alfred (Florida State University)

Melton, Desiree (Notre Dame of Maryland University)

Mendoza, José Jorge (University of Oregon)

Menon, Tarun (University of California–San Diego)

Merino-Rajme, Carla (Princeton University)

Metcalf, Thomas (University of Colorado–Boulder)

Meyer, Ulrich (Colgate University)

Meyers, C. D. (University of Southern Mississippi)

Mi, Chienkuo (Soochow University)

Michaelson, Eliot (University of California–Los Angeles)

Mikkola, Mari (Humboldt-Universität Berlin)

Miller, Jonathan (Bowling Green State University)

Miller, Richard W. (Cornell University)

Miller, Sarah (University of Memphis)

Miller, Shawn (University of California–Davis)

Millsap, Ryan (University of Maryland–College Park)

Millstein, Roberta L. (University of California–Davis)

Mitchell-Yellin, Benjamin (University of California–Riverside)

Miyazono, Kengo (University of Tokyo)

Moellendorf, Darrel (San Diego State University)

Moeller, Adam (Emory University)

Mohr, Georg (Universität Bremen)

Molyneux, Bernard (University of California–Davis)

Monahan, Michael J. (Marquette University)

Montermayor, Carlos (San Francisco State University)

Montero, Barbara Gail (City University of New York–Graduate Center)
Moon, Andrew (University of Missouri) ............................................ 8J Fri PM
Moore, Adam (University of Washington) ........................................ 5I Thu PM
Moore, Darrell (DePaul University) ..........................1K Wed AM, G5H Thu PM
Moore, Ronald (University of Washington) ........................................ 7E Fri AM
Moran, Kate (Brandeis University) ................................................... 8K Fri PM
Morgan, Daniel (Oxford University) ................................................ 4I Thu AM
Morris, Michael (University of South Florida) .................................. G2D Wed PM
Morris, Stephen (City University of New York–College of Staten Island) .......................................................... 11K Sat PM
Morris, William Edward (Illinois Wesleyan University) ............... 11G Sat PM
Morrissey, Clair (Occidental College) ............................................. 11I Wed AM
Morton, Adam (University of British Columbia) ............................ 1E Wed AM
Morton, Jennifer (City University of New York–City College) ......... 12K Sat PM
Mosdell, Matthew (University of Utah) ............................................. 8C Fri PM
Moseley, Daniel (University of North Carolina–Chapel Hill) ...... 12H Sat PM
Moskalik, Janice (University of Washington) .................................... 9G Fri PM
Mou, Bo (San Jose State University) .............................................. 2A Wed PM, G2A Wed PM
Mouracade, John (University of Alaska–Anchorage) ...............3E Wed PM
Mower, Deborah (Youngstown State University) ............................ G5C Thu PM
Muchalla, Rhea (University of Oregon) .......................................... G7G Fri PM, G9H Sat PM
Muchnik, Pablo (Emerson College) .............................................5G Thu PM, G7E Fri PM
Murphy, Colleen (University of Illinois–Urbana-Champaign) ......... 11A Sat PM
Murray, Dylan (University of California–Berkeley) .................... 11H Sat PM

N
Nadelhoffer, Thomas (Dickinson College) ........................... G5A Thu PM, G7J Fri PM
Nahmias, Eddy (Georgia State University) .................................. G5A Thu PM, G7J Fri PM
Nair, Shyam (University of Southern California) ......................... 10I Sat AM
Nance, Michael (University of Pennsylvania) ................................ 4L Thu AM
Napoleon, Val (University of Alberta) ........................................... 11A Sat PM
Narvaez, Darcia (University of Notre Dame) .............................. 10C Sat AM
Neill, Alex (University of Southampton) ...................................... 4A Thu AM
Neill, Jeremy (Houston Baptist University) ............................... 2H Wed PM
Nelkin, Dana Kay (University of California–San Diego) ............ 10A Sat AM
Nelson, Eric S. (University of Massachusetts–Lowell) ............... G7C Fri PM
Nelson, Mark (Westmont College) ................................................ 8J Fri PM
Nesse, Glen (University of Wyoming) ......................................... 2G Wed PM
Neta, Ram (University of North Carolina–Chapel Hill) ............... 1E Wed AM
Newhard, Jay (East Carolina University) ................................... 10L Sat AM
Newman, Lex (University of Utah) .............................................. 11G Sat PM
Ney, Alyssa (University of Rochester) ............................................. 9E Fri PM
Nichols, David P. (Saginaw Valley State University) ....................G9E Sat PM
Nichols, Ryan (California State University–Fullerton) ..................6B Thu PM, G5C Thu PM
Nida-Rumelin, Martine (Université de Fribourg) ......................2J Wed PM
Nolan, Daniel (Australian National University) .....................6A Thu PM, G10A Sat PM
Nolen, Matt (Arizona State University) ..................................G2E Wed PM
Norcross, Alastair (University of Colorado–Boulder) ............12K Sat PM
Normore, Calvin (University of California–Los Angeles) ......4M Thu AM
Norsen, Travis (Smith College) .............................................G6B Thu PM
Nuccetelli, Susana (St. Cloud State University) .....................11H Sat PM
Nunan, Richard (College of Charleston) ..................................G7I Fri PM, 10N Sat AM
Nutting, Eileen (University of California–Los Angeles) .........7L Fri AM
Nye, Howard (University of Alberta) .....................................4K Thu AM

O

O’Callaghan, Casey (Rice University) ..................................1F Wed AM
O’Connor, John K. (Colorado State University–Pueblo) ..........9F Fri PM
Obdrazalek, Suzanne (Claremont McKenna College) ..........3E Wed PM
Oddie, Graham (University of Colorado–Boulder) ............8G Fri PM
Olkrent, Mark (Bates College) .............................................6E Thu PM
Olesen, Jens (Oxford University) ..........................................G2I Wed PM
Olfert, Christiana (Tufts University) ...................................1L Wed AM
Olin, Lauren (Washington University in St. Louis) .............1E Wed AM
Olson, Alan M. (Boston University) ....................................G5D Thu PM
Omelianchuk, Adam (Biola University) ..............................G5F Thu PM
Orlandi, Nicoletta (Rice University) ..................................3B Wed PM
Orozco, Joshua (Whitworth University) ..............................11I Sat PM
Oshana, Marina (University of California–Davis) .................7H Fri AM
Ostoric, Lara (St. Michael’s College) ..................................4L Thu AM
Outlaw, Jr., Lucius T. (Vanderbilt University) .................G7G Fri PM
Overall, Christine (Queen’s University) ...........................6D Thu PM
Owen, David (University of Arizona) .............................5E Thu PM

P

Paden, Roger (George Mason University) ......................G2F Wed PM, 5I Thu PM
Padgett Walsh, Kate (Iowa State University) .........................2M Wed PM
Padgett, Jason (Independent Scholar) ..................................1F Wed AM
Palencia-Roth, Michael (University of Illinois–Urbana-Champaign)
..................................................................................G5D Thu PM
Paleologou, Maria (California State University–Bakersfield) ....10G Sat AM
Pallikkathayil, Japa (New York University) ............................4L Thu AM
Palmer, David (University of Tennessee) ..........................11K Sat PM
Palmer, Linda (University of California–Irvine) .................................... 7J Fri AM
Palmieri, Diana (University of Western Ontario) .................................... 7L Fri AM
Panagopoulos, Anastasia (University of Minnesota–Twin Cities) .... 12J Sat PM
Parent, Ted (Virginia Tech) .................................................................. 4J Thu AM
Parrott, Matthew (University of Puget Sound) ................................... 10K Sat AM
Pasternack, Lawrence (Oklahoma State University) ....................... 4L Thu AM
Paul, L. A. (University of North Carolina–Chapel Hill) ................. 3A Wed PM
Paul, Sarah (University of Wisconsin–Madison) ............................ 8C Fri PM
Pautz, Adam (University of Texas–Austin) ....................................... 5C Thu PM
Pearson, Yvette (Old Dominion University) ...................................... 3D Wed PM
Pedersen, Nikolaj Jang (University of California–Los Angeles) ....... 2G Wed PM
Peffer, Rodney (University of San Diego) ......................................... 7M Fri AM
Pendergraft, Garrett (Pepperdine University) ................................. 3I Wed PM
Peramatzis, Michail (Oxford University) ........................................... 9D Fri PM
Perez Carballo, Alejandro (University of Southern California) ...... 5C Thu PM
Perinetti, Dario (Université du Québec–Montréal) ......................... 12B Sat PM
Perkins, Franklin (DePaul University) ............................................. 5E Thu PM, G7C Fri PM
Perl, Caleb (University of Southern California) .............................. 2K Wed PM
Perry, Alexandra (Bergen Community College) .............................. 11J Sat PM
Pessin, Sarah (University of Denver) ............................................... 2A Wed PM
Pettigrove, Glen (University of Auckland) ................................. G2M Wed PM, G7M Fri PM
Pettit, Dean (University of North Carolina–Chapel Hill) ............... 3H Wed PM
Pfister, Lauren (Hong Kong Baptist University) ............................... G6D Thu PM
Phillips, Jonathan (Yale University) .............................................. G5A Thu PM
Pickel, Bryan (Universitat de Barcelona) ....................................... 4J Thu AM
Pierce, Christine (North Carolina State University) ....................... 10N Sat AM
Pierce, Jeremy (Le Moyne College) .................................................. 1K Wed AM
Pietroski, Paul (University of Maryland–College Park) ............... 7C Fri AM
Pitt, David (California State University–Los Angeles) .................... 5L Thu PM
Plunkett, David (University of California–Los Angeles) ............... 5L Thu PM
Polger, Thomas W. (University of Cincinnati) ................................. 7I Fri AM
Ponesse, Julie (State University of New York–Brockport) ............. 12H Sat PM
Poon, Jared (University of California–Davis) ................................. 7K Fri AM
Portmore, Douglas (Arizona State University) ............................... 5B Thu PM
Poston, Ted (University of South Alabama) ................................. 6G Thu PM
Potter, Elizabeth (Mills College) ..................................................... 7B Fri AM
Pouryousefi, Sareh (University of Toronto) ................................. G4E Thu PM
Powell, John W. (Humboldt State University) ............................... G7F Fri PM
Pratt, David (St. Martin’s College) ................................................... 1H Wed AM
Pratt, Scott L. (University of Oregon) ............................................. G2G Wed PM, G4B Thu PM
Prettyman, Adrienne (University of Toronto) ............................... 3G Wed PM
Main and Group Program Participants

Priest, Maura (University of California–Irvine) ............................. 9G Fri PM
Proulx, Jeremy (Eastern Michigan University) ............................. 1H Wed AM

Q
Quinn, Carol (Metropolitan State College of Denver) ................. 10N Sat AM

R
Rabern, Brian (Australian National University) ......................... 12E Sat PM
Rabinowicz, Włodek (Uppsala Universitet) ............................ 8G Fri PM
Radulescu, Alex (University of California–Los Angeles) ............. 6F Thu PM
Raffman, Diana (University of Toronto) ................................. 2F Wed PM
Ragunath, Thill (Community College of Southern Nevada) .... 10J Sat AM
Raibley, Jason (California State University–Long Beach) ......... 2G Wed PM
Raleigh, Thomas (Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México) .... 7F Fri PM
Ralston, Shane (Pennsylvania State University) ......................... 6GJ Sat PM
Rambelli, Fabio (University of California–Santa Barbara) ....... 5GD Thu PM
Ramirez, Erick (University of California–San Diego) ............. 3I Wed PM
Ransom, Madeleine (University of British Columbia) .............. 10H Sat AM
Raphals, Lisa (National University of Singapore) .............. 5D Thu PM, 8E Fri PM
Rathkopf, Charles (University of Virginia) ............................ 12G Sat PM
Rauhut, Nils (Coastal Carolina University) ........................... 6A Thu PM, 10G Sat AM
Rauscher, Frederick (Michigan State University) ................. 5G Thu PM
Raven, Michael J. (University of Victoria) ......................... 12J Sat PM
Rawls, Christina (Duquesne University) ............................... 7H Fri PM
Reath, Andrews (University of California–Riverside) ........... 5G Thu PM
Reck, Erich (University of California–Riverside) .................. G5G Thu PM, 11F Sat PM
Reed-Sandoval, Amy (University of Washington) .................... 9N Fri PM
Reisner, Andrew (McGill University) ................................. 11E Sat PM
Rescorla, Michael A. (University of California–Santa Barbara) ... 11L Sat PM
Rettler, Bradley (University of Notre Dame) ......................... 5N Thu PM
Reyes, Herminia (San Diego State University) .................... 2K Wed PM
Ribeiro, Anna Christina (Texas Tech University) .............. 8F Fri PM
Rice, Collin (University of Missouri) ................................. 6H Thu PM
Rice, Rebekah L. H. (Seattle Pacific University) .................. 4C Thu AM, G6F Thu PM
Rickless, Samuel (University of California–San Diego) ........... 4F Thu AM
Ridge, Michael (University of Edinburgh) ............................. 5B Thu PM
Riggs, Wayne (University of Oklahoma) .............................. 4B Thu AM
Rigsby, Curtis (University of Guam) ................................. 7N Fri AM
Ritchie, Jennifer Lundin (University of British Columbia) .... 5G Thu PM
Ritchie, Katherine (University of Texas–Austin) .................... 1J Wed AM
Robb, David (Davidson College) ................................. 12A Sat PM
Roberts, John (Florida State University) ......................... 3K Wed PM
Robertson, Graham (Simon Fraser University) .......................4K Thu AM
Robichaud, Philip (Rice University) ......................................7K Fri AM
Robins, Sarah (Washington University in St. Louis) .................Posters Fri
Robinson, Jenefer (University of Cincinnati) .........................11D Sat PM
Robinson, Michael (Grand Valley State University) ...................8M Fri PM
Robison, Rachel (University of Massachusetts–Amherst) ..........G8C Sat PM
Robus, Olin (University of Washington) ..................................8L Fri PM
Rockwood, Nathan (University of California–San Diego) .........11G Sat PM
Rodin, David (Oxford University) ..........................................4E Thu AM
Rodriguez, Tanya (City University of New York–City College) .....3I Wed PM
Rogerson, Ken (Florida International University) ......................12J Sat PM
Rognlie, Dana (University of Oregon) ......................................G9H Sat PM
Roland, Jeffrey (Louisiana State University) ............................11l Sat PM
Romain, Dianne (Sonoma State University) ...........................4D Thu AM
Rorty, Amélie (National Humanities Center) ..........................3L Wed PM
Rosenberg, Jonathan (University of Washington) .....................9l Fri PM
Rosenthal, Michael (University of Washington) .......................1A Wed AM
Ross, Peter (California State Polytechnic University–Pomona) ....4H Thu AM
Roth, Paul (University of California–Santa Cruz) .................G2I Wed PM, G7K Fri PM
Rottschaefer, William A. (Lewis & Clark College) ................G6E Thu PM, 10H Sat AM
Rowland, Jen (University of North Texas) ..............................G7D Fri PM
Rudd, Anthony (St. Olaf College) .........................................4L Thu AM
Ruetsche, Laura (University of Michigan–Ann Arbor) ..............10F Sat AM
Ruloff, Colin (Kwantlen Polytechnic University) .......................7L Fri AM
Rush, Fred (University of Notre Dame) ..................................2D Wed PM
Russell, Gillian (Washington University in St. Louis) .............2K Wed PM
Russell, John S. (Langara College) .......................................G8A Sat PM
Russell, Paul (University of British Columbia) .......................6I Thu PM
Rutherford, Donald (University of California–San Diego) ...........9A Fri PM
Rychter, Pablo (Universitat de València) ...............................5N Thu PM
Ryckman, Thomas (Stanford University) ...............................10F Sat AM

S
Sabo, Dylan (Occidental College) .........................................12J Sat PM
Sadler, Brook (University of South Florida) ..........................1I Wed AM
Saenz, Noel (University of Colorado–Boulder) .......................5N Thu PM
Saint, Michelle (Western Washington University) ....................5I Thu PM
Saito, Yuriko (Rhode Island School of Design) .......................G9A Sat PM
Sanford, David (Duke University) ....................................2J Wed PM
Sanson, David (Ohio State University) ..................................6J Thu PM
Sars, Nicholas (University of Washington) ............................10J Sat AM
Main and Group Program Participants

Sartorio, Carolina (University of Arizona) ..........................................4N Thu AM
Saucedo, Raul (Yale University and Australian National University) .........................................................3A Wed PM
Savitt, Steven (University of British Columbia) ........................................2K Wed PM
Scabel, Steven (University of Baltimore) ..................................................1L Wed AM
Scarborough, Elizabeth (University of Washington) ...........................................G9A Sat PM
Scarpelli Cory, Therese (Seattle University) ........................................2A Wed PM
Schaff, Kory (Occidental College) .............................................................8K Fri PM
Schaffer, Jonathan (Rutgers University) .................................................4N Thu AM
Schaller, Walter E. (Texas Tech University) ..............................................8I Fri PM
Schapiro, Tamar (Stanford University) .......................................................1B Wed AM
Schaffer, Robert (University of New Hampshire) .....................................10G Sat AM
Schellenberg, John (Mount St. Vincent University) ......................................8D Fri PM
Schellenberg, Susanna (Rutgers University) .............................................5C Thu PM
Schmitt, Johannes (University of Southern California) ................................9H Fri PM
Schmitz, Michael (University of California–Berkeley) ................................11H Sat PM
Schnee, Ian (Western Kentucky University) ..........................................2M Wed PM, G6A Thu PM
Schneebaum, Rachel (University of Arizona) ........................................10I Sat AM
Schneider, Henrique (Universität Wien) .............................................G3A Wed PM, G5C Thu PM
Schoenfield, Miriam (Massachusetts Institute of Technology) ..................10K Sat AM
Schollmeier, Paul (University of Nevada–Las Vegas) ................................1L Wed AM
Schoenfeld, Martin (University of South Florida) ......................................G7C Fri PM
Schoonhoven, Richard (United States Military Academy) .....................4E Thu AM
Schroeder, Mark (University of Southern California) ................................5B Thu PM
Schroeder, S. Andrew (Claremont McKenna College) ...............................8H Fri PM
Schubert, Richard (Cosumnes River College) .........................................G7L Fri PM
Schulz, Armin (London School of Economics) ......................................2G Wed PM
Schwab, Martin (University of California–Irvine) ......................................6E Thu PM
Schwartz, Jeremy (Texas Tech University) ..............................................10L Sat AM
Schwitzgebel, Eric (University of California–Riverside) .........................10B Sat AM
Schönecker, Dieter (Universität Siegen) ..................................................1B Wed AM
Scotland-Stewart, Laurel (Reed College) ..............................................7K Fri AM
Scott-Kakures, Dion (Scripps College) ....................................................6I Thu PM
Sebo, Jeff (New York University) .............................................................5K Thu PM
Seeley, William P. (Bates College) .........................................................9J Fri PM
Sehon, Scott (Bowdoin College) ..............................................................8M Fri PM
Seifried, Michael (Columbia University) .................................................2H Wed PM
Sensen, Oliver (Massachusetts Institute of Technology and Tulane University of New Orleans) ..................G7E Fri PM
Seok, Bongrae (Alvernia University) .........................................................G3A Wed PM
Setiya, Kieran (University of Pittsburgh) ................................................10E Sat AM
Shaeffer, H. Benjamin (Humboldt State University) ...................... 9H Fri PM
Shah, Nishi (Amherst College) ...................................................... 11E Sat PM
Shapiro, David A. (Cascadia Community College) ...... 8N Fri PM, 9N Fri PM
Shapiro, Gary (University of Richmond)............... 1H Wed AM, 5G E Thu PM
Shapiro, Lisa (Simon Fraser University) .................................. G9C Sat PM
Shaw, James R. (University of Pittsburgh) .................................. 12E Sat PM
Shell, Susan (Boston College) ............................................. G2D Wed PM, 9K Fri PM
Sherman, Brett (Brandeis University) ................................. 6F Thu PM
Shields, Christopher (Oxford University) ............................... 12A Sat PM
Shier, David (Washington State University) ....................... 11B Sat PM
Shotwell, Alexis (Laurentian University) .................. G5H Thu PM, 10N Sat AM
Shpall, Sam (University of Southern California) ......... 11E Sat PM
Shrage, Laurie (Florida International University) .... G2J Wed PM, 7F Fri AM
Shumelda, Mark (University of Toronto) .............................. Posters Fri
Shumener, Erica (New York University) .......... 5N Thu PM
Siegel, Susanna (Harvard University) ................................. 8A Fri PM
Sievert, Don (University of Missouri) ................................. 10L Sat AM
Sigrist, Michael (George Washington University) .......... G2C Wed PM
Silver, David (University of British Columbia) ................. G4E Thu PM
Silvermint, Daniel (University of Arizona) ......................... 8I Fri PM
Simchen, Ori (University of British Columbia) ............... 7C Fri AM
Simon, Adam (Stanford University) ........................................ 12E Sat PM
Sinclair, Neil (University of Nottingham) ......................... 10I Sat AM
Skokowski, Paul (Stanford University) ...................... 5M Thu PM
Slingerland, Edward (University of British Columbia) ....... 10C Sat AM
Smead, Rory (University of California–Irvine) ............... 8L Fri PM
Smith, Houston (University of Arizona) ............................. 2D Wed PM
Smith, Barry C. (University of London) ......................... 7C Fri AM
Smith, George E. (Tufts University) ................................. 7J Fri AM
Smith, Holly M. (Rutgers University) ................................. 8H Fri PM
Smith, Jeffery (University of Redlands) ......................... 9H Fri PM
Smith, Justin E. H. (Concordia University) ....................... 9A Fri PM
Smith, Nicholas D. (Lewis & Clark College) ..................... 5D Thu PM
Smith, Patrick (University of Washington) ............... 1I Wed AM
Smithies, Declan (Ohio State University) ..................... 10B Sat AM
Smythe, Ormond (Antioch University Seattle) ................. 1K Wed AM
Snapper, Jeff (University of Notre Dame) .......................... 3H Wed PM
Snedegar, Justin (University of Southern California) .... 9G Fri PM
Snow, Nancy E. (Marquette University) ....................... 7A Fri AM, 7B Fri PM
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Affiliation</th>
<th>Time</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Snyder, Eric</td>
<td>(Ohio State University)</td>
<td>12C Sat PM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Snyder, Jeremy</td>
<td>(Simon Fraser University)</td>
<td>3D Wed PM</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sommers, Tamler</td>
<td>(University of Houston)</td>
<td>G5A Thu PM, 11K Sat PM</td>
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<td>Song, Edward H.K.</td>
<td>(Louisiana State University)</td>
<td>8I Fri PM</td>
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<td>Sorensen, Roy</td>
<td>(Washington University in St. Louis)</td>
<td>7N Fri AM, 9F Fri PM</td>
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<td>Sosa, Ernest</td>
<td>(Rutgers University)</td>
<td>11M Sat PM</td>
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<td>South, James B.</td>
<td>(Marquette University)</td>
<td>G7I Fri PM</td>
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<td>Speak, Daniel</td>
<td>(Loyola Marymount University)</td>
<td>G6F Thu PM, 10A Sat AM</td>
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<td>Spencer, Albert</td>
<td>(Portland State University)</td>
<td>8K Fri PM</td>
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<td>Spencer, Joshua</td>
<td>(Syracuse University)</td>
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<td>Spence, Quayshawn</td>
<td>(University of San Francisco)</td>
<td>1K Wed AM</td>
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<td>Spener, Maja</td>
<td>(Oxford University)</td>
<td>10B Sat AM</td>
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<td>Sreenivasan, Gopal</td>
<td>(Duke University)</td>
<td>10C Sat AM</td>
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<td>Staffel, Julia</td>
<td>(University of Southern California)</td>
<td>2G Wed PM</td>
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<td>Stahlmann, Nicole A.</td>
<td>(American Council of Learned Societies)</td>
<td>11L Sat PM</td>
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<td>Stanescu, Vasile</td>
<td>(Stanford University)</td>
<td>7G Fri AM</td>
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<td>Stang, Nick</td>
<td>(University of Miami)</td>
<td>6J Thu PM</td>
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<td>Stangl, Rebecca Lynn</td>
<td>(University of Virginia)</td>
<td>12M Sat PM</td>
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<td>Stanley, Jason</td>
<td>(Rutgers University)</td>
<td>5A Thu PM</td>
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<td>Starrett, Shari</td>
<td>(California State University–Fullerton)</td>
<td>1H Wed AM</td>
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<td>Stenwedel, Janet</td>
<td>(San Jose State University)</td>
<td>10B Sat AM</td>
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<td>Stenqvist, Catharina</td>
<td>(Lunds Universitet)</td>
<td>G9E Sat PM</td>
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<td>Stephens, Christopher</td>
<td>(University of British Columbia)</td>
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<td>(Creighton University)</td>
<td>G2F Wed PM, 5J Thu PM</td>
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<td>(University of Notre Dame)</td>
<td>G6C Thu PM, 9B Fri PM</td>
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<td>(Randolph College)</td>
<td>G7L Fri PM</td>
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<td>(Gonzaga University)</td>
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<td>(Washington State University)</td>
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<td>Stojanovic, Isidora</td>
<td>(Institut Jean Nicod)</td>
<td>6F Thu PM</td>
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<td>(Johns Hopkins University)</td>
<td>3N Wed PM</td>
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<td>Stoljar, Natalie</td>
<td>(McGill University)</td>
<td>2B Wed PM</td>
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Sullivan, Meghan (University of Notre Dame) ..................... 3A Wed PM
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Sun, Weimin (California State University–Northridge) .... 8L Fri PM, G7A Fri PM
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Sveinsdottir, Asta (San Francisco State University) .............. 2B Wed PM, G1A Wed PM
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Switzer, Michelle (Whittier College) ................................. 2I Wed PM, G9H Sat PM
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Tan, Mingran (University of Toronto) ............................... G7A Fri PM
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Ullian, Joseph (Washington University in St. Louis) .............. 1D Wed AM

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Vargas, Manuel (University of San Francisco) ...................... G7J Fri PM
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Weaver, Jasmin (City of Seattle Office of Intergovernmental Relations) 

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Zollman, Kevin (Carnegie Mellon University) .................................. 8L Fri PM
Abstracts

A Defense of Aristotle’s Socratic Solution to the Paradox of Strict Akrasia

Mariana Anagnostopoulos, California State University–Fresno

Aristotle’s solution to the paradox posed by Socrates’ denial that knowledge can be overcome by desire concedes a critical point to Socrates. Concluding that akratic action is itself reason-based, Aristotle acknowledges that it does not involve what he calls, “knowledge in the primary sense” (NE 1147b15-16). I argue that this result is reasonable: descriptions of “strict” akrasia construe the phenomenon as too irrational, effectively closing off all avenues of explanation for the relevant phenomena. This outcome is duplicated in 20th century models of practical reason and action, yet their proponents resist Aristotle’s line, instead insisting that strict akrasia is possible. I defend Aristotle’s approach, which illuminates the error of the akrates while affirming the skeptical position, that conceptual constraints render plainly incoherent the idea of intentional action contrary to one’s sincere best judgment, when such judgment constitutes a flawless integration of one’s own convictions and motivations.

A Deliberative Outlet? Rethinking the Role of Majority Rule in Deliberative Democracy

Michael Seifried, Columbia University

Several deliberative democrats have observed a tension between the primacy of majority rule mechanisms in real politics and their peripheral role in their theoretical models. In this paper, I argue that this tension can be overcome. After outlining the basics of deliberative democracy, I consider two observations regarding this tension before briefly assessing their accuracy within a number of works by deliberative democrats. I then turn to Elizabeth Anderson’s proposal for integrating these procedures more centrally. Her proposal, I contend, does not go far enough. Instead, I suggest expanding our view of majority rule procedures to include the role of their anticipation, not just their actual use. Accordingly, such procedures are central to deliberative democracy because they are the primary catalysts—or deliberative outlets—of democratic deliberation, as evidenced by the way campaign season deliberation arises in anticipation of an upcoming election, not just on election day.
A FRIENDLY AMENDMENT TO SCHROEDER’S EXPRESSIVIST SEMANTICS
ROBERT A. MABRITO, NORTH CAROLINA STATE UNIVERSITY

In *Being For: Evaluating the Semantic Program of Expressivism*, Mark Schroeder provides a detailed expressivist semantics for a language having the resources of the predicate calculus and containing both moral and non-moral predicates. However, due to the difficulties of extending his semantics to certain natural language constructions, Schroeder concludes that, ultimately, the prospects for expressivism are not good. In this paper, I offer an alternative way of developing Schroeder’s semantics that I believe can overcome these difficulties. If my proposal is successful, then the prospects for expressivism may be much brighter than Schroeder and many others believe.

A KANTIAN ACCOUNT OF HOW FOLLOWING EXAMPLES SHARPENS JUDGMENT
BRIAN WATKINS, DUKE UNIVERSITY

Kant distinguishes two ways of sharpening the power of judgment: by imitating examples and by following examples. Kant thinks we must follow examples to develop the judgment required to strive toward an ideal, whether we are students of morality aiming to act with perfect virtue or artists struggling to represent supersensible topics, such as God’s power at the moment of creation. I draw on Kant’s remarks in the *Critique of Judgment* regarding how we contemplate and make sense of beautiful objects in order to provide an account of what makes an example worth following and how following an example sharpens the power of judgment. I argue that in contrast with imitation, where we learn to mediate between some determinate concept and its sensible instances, following an example teaches us to strive toward an ideal by inspiring us to organize or regulate our power of judgment in general.

“All You Can Eat”: More Than Generalized Quantifier Theory Can Chew
DEAN PETTIT, UNIVERSITY OF NORTH CAROLINA–CHAPEL HILL

Generalized Quantifier Theory (GQT) treats quantifiers as second-order predicates that apply to the extensions of first-order predicates, that is, sets of objects. The idea that quantifiers are second-order predicates goes back to Frege, but the general framework of GQT was outlined in Barwise and Cooper (1981). What I will argue in the present paper is that, contra GQT, “all” cannot be understood to express a property or relation between the extensions of first-order predicates. In certain linguistic contexts the relata of quantification cannot be understood to be sets. Instead, “all” seems to express a more abstract quantitative relationship that in some contexts amounts to a relationship between sets, but cannot be thus understood in other contexts.
A NAIVE REALIST ARGUMENT AGAINST INTENTIONALISM

DAVID IVY, UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS–AUSTIN

Intentionalism contends that, necessarily, a perceptual experience’s phenomenology is wholly determined by what the experience represents. Typical objections to the theory take the form of counterexamples. However, in this paper, I explore an alternative type of objection. To begin, I explain intentionalism and draw attention to a cost: if intentionalism is true, what it is like for a subject, S, to see a tomato’s redness is wholly determined by a relation S bears to something that is neither a tomato nor red. This is counterintuitive and, hence, constitutes prima facie reason for rejecting intentionalism. But this should concern intentionalists only if there is another viable theory without this counterintuitive consequence. There is such a theory: naive realism. After explaining the theory, I argue on intuitive grounds that, all else being equal, we should reject intentionalism and accept naive realism. I then respond to an intentionalist objection advanced by Adam Pautz.

A NEW ANSWER TO THE SPECIAL COMPOSITION QUESTION

NED MARKOSIAN, WESTERN WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY

The aim of this paper is to offer a novel, commonsense answer to Peter van Inwagen’s Special Composition Question. The approach I offer begins by considering a different mereological question. I try to show that the road to mereological sanity begins with giving the most straightforward and commonsensical answer to this other question, and then extending that answer to further questions about the mereology of physical objects, including the Special Composition Question. On the approach I am recommending, it turns out that all of the mereological properties and relations of physical objects are determined by their spatial properties and relations.

A NEW ROLE FOR THOUGHT EXPERIMENTS IN QUANTUM GRAVITY

MARK SHUMELDA, UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO

In 1977 Kenneth Eppley and Eric Hannah devised an elegant thought experiment that, for decades, many have touted as “proof” that the gravitational field must be quantized. Despite its popular appeal amongst physicists, Eppley and Hannah’s thought experiment has recently been criticized as being both unphysical and subject to serious problems of interpretation. I defend the thought experiment against these challenges and argue that Eppley and Hannah’s thought experiment succeeds by limiting the space of logical alternatives to a quantum theory of gravity. This result is especially relevant given the current lack of empirical data within this field of physics.
A NEW TIMING OBJECTION TO FRANKFURT CASES

Erik Krag, University of Tennessee

Carl Ginet’s “timing objection” to Pereboom’s Frankfurt-style counterexample to the principle of alternative possibilities (PAP) argues that if we take a time-indexed view of moral responsibility whereby the moral blameworthiness of an action is evaluated in relation to the time that the action takes place, the thrust of these sorts of cases can be defused. Ginet’s objection has been criticized on the grounds that it is unintuitive: we typically say that an agent who commits an immoral act is morally responsible for that act simpliciter, not just at a time. I offer a new version of the timing objection which does not rely on time-indexed ascriptions of responsibility. This new timing objection allows the PAP advocate to maintain that Pereboom’s agent remains morally responsible for his action in a way that is consistent with our everyday judgments about moral responsibility.

A NEW-RAZIAN ACCOUNT OF THE NORMATIVE REQUIREMENT OF MEANS-END RATIONALITY

Luis Cheng-Guijardo, Stanford University

I argue that, in order to explain why the person who takes means to his end is more rational than the person who does not, we do not need to appeal to coherence as such to avoid the conclusion that persons ought to take the means to whatever ends they happen to intend. This is a welcome result because the “Myth theorists” thesis is true. Rather, I show that a narrow-scope version of the normative requirement of means-end rationality under a Razian framework of reasons can still meet John Broome’s strict demand criterion and provide a better explanation of a person’s normative failure whenever she is means-end irrational.

A PHYSICS OF MENTAL LIFE: SPINOZA’S SCIENTIFIC THEORY OF THE EMOTIONS

Julia Haas, Emory University

Researchers in the affective neurosciences are working to understand the nature of the emotions, and an important number of them are turning to Spinoza’s Ethics for possible answers (Damasio 2003, Panksepp 2005). Problematically, the contemporary philosophical literature has focused on Spinoza’s treatment of the mind-body problem in Part II of the Ethics, to the neglect of the seemingly less-orderly discussion of the emotions in Part III. In my poster, I argue that Part III of the Ethics is instrumental for bridging these philosophical and neuroscientific theories of the emotions, and aim to 1) draw attention to the explicitly scientific nature of Spinoza’s theory of the emotions, and 2) show that the theory does not present a descriptive “anatomy” of the emotions, but instead provides a causal account of them. I then outline a strategy for integrating Spinoza’s causal theory into a paradigm for future scientific research.
A POSTERIORI REDUCTION OF MORAL JUDGMENT

VICTOR KUMAR, UNIVERSITY OF ARIZONA

An a posteriori reduction of moral judgment is warranted insofar as it supports the causal-explanatory roles assigned to moral judgment in empirical models of moral thought and action. Hybrid theories of moral judgment in general do well by this criterion. A hybrid theory on which moral judgment is an integrated state of belief and emotion also dovetails with a dual process model of moral cognition. An upshot is that the theory captures seemingly conflicting intuitions about the relationship between moral judgment and motivation.

A TRUTHMAKER VIEW OF ONTOLOGICAL COMMITMENT

BRADLEY RETTLER, UNIVERSITY OF NOTRE DAME

According to Quinean meta-ontology (hereafter “the orthodoxy”), if one affirms the sentence “Fs exist,” then one is ontologically committed to Fs. In this paper, I offer an alternative to the orthodoxy: if one affirms the sentence “Fs exist,” one is ontologically committed to there being some thing or some things that make true the sentence “Fs exist.” I clarify the alternative using the notion of a fundamental quantifier, and then give three motivations for it.

A VALUE-NEUTRAL DEFENSE OF NONCOMPARABILISM

MARK E. WUNDERLICH, UNION COLLEGE

Many discussions of incommensurability and incomparability focus on comparisons of value. Focusing instead on value-neutral comparatives, I defend the view that some objects that fall under some comparative concepts fail to compare. I claim that there is a clear example of a comparative for which not all of its objects compare: a particular understanding of extensiveness. I then show how this example can be put to use in addressing an argument against noncomparabilism for value-laden comparatives.

ACCOUNTABILITY, ALIENS, AND PSYCHOPATHS: A REPLY TO SHOEMAKER

MATTHEW TALBERT, WEST VIRGINIA UNIVERSITY

In “Attributability, Answerability, and Accountability: Toward a Wider Theory of Moral Responsibility,” David Shoemaker argues that a complete theory of moral responsibility will make room for three distinct conceptions of responsibility: attributability, answerability, and accountability. Shoemaker argues that “Scanlonian” theories of blame ignore the importance of accountability insofar as these theories do not require that wrongdoers possess the capacity to respond appropriately to the moral considerations that count against their behavior. In this reply, I defend the Scanlonian perspective against Shoemaker’s criticism.
Affinity and Reason to Love

Alexander Jech, University of Virginia

What is the nature of our reasons for loving something? When someone wonders why one person or activity stimulates his imagination and hopes more deeply than others, he or she is tempted to ask whether the difference is in him, or in his beloved. Much of our discussion about reasons for love revolves around the dichotomy between subjective and objective reasons for loving, but neither way of conceiving the matter appears satisfactory, and so in this paper I will instead propose that we adopt a view of reasons for love according to which our reasons are primarily relational and based in the concept of affinity. Affinity, defined in terms of fitness between two parties, allows us to successfully analyze someone’s loving activity in terms of a practical inference concerned with spending one’s life engaged in activities and relationships that are worthwhile and suitable to oneself.

Against Primitivism about Truth

Anthony Fisher, Syracuse University

I argue that Trenton Merricks’s (2007) argument for primitivism about truth fails.

Against Representation: Accountability, Information, and Ignorance

Alexander Guerrero, New York University

This paper presents an argument against systems of political representation on the grounds that those systems will tend to do poorly along two important outcome-related dimensions of political evaluation: responsiveness and good governance. This argument is part of a larger project in which I argue that representative democracy is inferior to an alternative system—a lottocratic system—the three distinctive features of which are (1) the legislative function is fulfilled by many different single-issue legislatures, rather than by a single, generalist legislature; (2) members of these single-issue legislatures are chosen by lottery; and (3) members of the single-issue legislatures hear from relevant experts at the beginning of the legislative process. Central to the argument of this paper and the larger project is the idea that modern political problems are information intensive, and that we need political systems that can create responsive and good policy even, and especially, under those circumstances.

Agency and Self-Sufficiency in Fichte’s Ethics

Michelle Kosch, Cornell University

J.G. Fichte was Kant’s most prominent intellectual heir, in ethics as well as in theoretical philosophy, and it is puzzling that the resurgence in interest in Kant’s ethics has not brought more attention to Fichte’s ethical thought. While recognizably Kantian in spirit, Fichte’s ethics differs radically from Kant’s own in some of its important details. These differences should interest contemporary Kantians in ethics, many of whom depart from Kant
in Fichtean directions. This paper gives an overview of Fichte’s ethics, with the aim of introducing Fichte to a broader Kantian audience.

**AGENT-CAUSAL POWER**

**ANDREI BUCKAREFF, MARIST COLLEGE**

Agent-causalism is the thesis that agents qua objects/substances cause at least some of their actions (either mental actions or overt actions). In this paper, I examine the tenability of agent-causalism as an account of the springs of action. I argue that even if we accept the irreducibility of the concept of agent-causation, the agent-causal relation is ontologically reducible. So even if discourse about agent-causation is true, the truth-makers for such discourse will not include agents qua substances as the direct causes of decisions. Against the backdrop of recent work on causal powers in ontology, I argue that on at least one plausible account of agent-causal power the defender of agent-causalism faces an exclusion problem that renders the theory untenable.

**AGGREGATING VS. BALANCING**

**RALF BADER, NEW YORK UNIVERSITY**

Should one save five rather than one? Intuitively, the answer is a clear “yes.” Yet, justifying this answer requires overcoming a number of difficulties. This paper will address one such difficulty by arguing that there is an overlooked distinction between two different aggregative procedures, namely (i) balancing gains and losses, and (ii) determining aggregate quantities. This distinction is important in that the aggregative procedure of balancing is not subject to some of the objections that have been raised by critics of “aggregation” yet suffices for justifying saving five rather than one as far as axiological considerations are concerned.

**ALETHIC FUNCTIONALISM, MANIFESTATION, AND TRUTH**

**JAY NEWHARD, EAST CAROLINA UNIVERSITY**

According to alethic functionalism, there are numerous lower level truth properties, had by some but not all true propositions, depending on their subject matter properties; and truth per se is a generic truth property had by all true propositions. Each lower level truth property is supposed to be a way of being truth per se. In this paper, I examine the key components of alethic functionalism, specifically, the manifestation relation holding between a truth-manifesting property and truth per se, and the nature of truth per se. I argue that the manifestation relation is not a relation through which the lower level truth-manifesting properties really are ways of being true, and suggest a replacement relation. Examining the nature of truth per se as characterized by alethic functionalism reveals that alethic functionalism does not justify the claim that truth per se exists, or that truth is a functional property.
AN "ARMSTRONGIAN" TRUTHMAKER ARGUMENT AGAINST NIHILISM

BRADY BOWMAN, PENNSYLVANIA STATE UNIVERSITY

This paper presents an argument against nihilism, i.e., against the possibility of an empty world, based on David Armstrong’s theory of truthmakers. Drawing on his Possibility Principle for providing modal truths with truthmakers, Armstrong himself has argued that it is true that there could have been nothing. I argue that, by Armstrong’s own principles, the proposition “There could have been nothing” is true only if the proposition “There is nothing” is false: \( p \rightarrow \neg \Box p \), thus violating a basic axiom of modal logic. While this consequence may be interpreted in several ways, some of which cast doubt on Armstrong’s principles, I suggest we understand it as a reductio ad absurdum of nihilism. In the conclusion, I show how the character of the empty world as an essentially unrealizable true possibility can be explained with reference to the conception of “totality states of affairs” Armstrong has introduced to provide truthmakers for negative propositions.

AN ALTERNATE APPROACH TO THE CONDITIONAL ANALYSIS OF DISPOSITIONS

CODY CASH, UNIVERSITY OF ARKANSAS

The conditional analysis of dispositions has gone through several versions, all of which have proven to be fallible, in one way or another, to instances where the stimulus of the disposition is present yet the manifestation fails to occur. In light of this, some have suggested the conditional analysis is fatally flawed and should be abandoned altogether. In this paper I argue that the conditional analysis can be saved, but only if the objects commonly referenced in the conditional analysis as possessing the dispositional property are replaced by paradigmatic situations, and the disposition is understood as an extrinsic relation between the intrinsic properties of the objects comprising the paradigmatic situation.

AN ARGUMENT FOR TEMPORALISM ABOUT PROPOSITIONS

CALEB PERL, UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA

This paper argues that propositions are true relative to both times and worlds, by detailing the unacceptable consequences of supposing otherwise. If you suppose otherwise, each proposition must be specific with respect to time or world. I argue for two claims: (A) If propositions are specific with respect to world, someone in the actual world can’t grasp some propositions that she would believe in a counterfactual world. (B) Similarly, if propositions are specific with respect to time, someone at the present time can’t grasp some propositions that she will believe. But the relevant propositions are graspable in the actual world and at the present time. The cost of supposing otherwise is too high—for one thing, it destroys our ability to make some inferences we can actually make. So propositions must be true relative to both times and worlds.
**AN ATTRACTIVE THEORY OF DEFINITE DESCRIPTIONS**  
*ALLAN BÄCK, KUTZTOWN UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA*

Definite descriptions are often introduced syntactically and grammatically, as having the form of “the \( \phi \).” However their standard logical analysis works only if we ignore or exclude various uses of various sentences containing phrases having that grammatical form, and instead focus only on the ones that work. Russell admits this and advises us to ignore the variant uses, especially those found in ordinary language. I opt instead not to exclude any of the grammatical phenomena for which the logical analysis is to provide the theory. I offer an alternative theory, based upon thinking of language use as a dynamic system that ends to form relatively stable attractor basins, especially when the linguistic community is closed. Russell’s theory becomes one of the attractors.

**AN INCONSISTENCY REVISITED: CHANGE, UNITY, AND ARISTOTLE’S ELEMENTS**  
*MARY KRIZAN, SPRING HILL COLLEGE*

Aristotle’s general theory of change generates an inconsistency when applied to the specific case of the elemental transformations, as readers of Aristotle have long recognized; attempts to resolve the inconsistency have generated volumes of literature surrounding the so-called prime matter debate. The prime matter debate ends in a stalemate because the problems that generate the inconsistency in Aristotle’s thought can only be resolved by taking a closer look at Aristotle’s complete account of the elements in *On Generation and Corruption*. Before turning to the solution, we need to be completely clear on what the problem is. In this paper, I argue that three mainstream attempts to save Aristotle from his inconsistency fail because they inadvertently commit Aristotle to denying the ability for elements to undergo substantial changes or they threaten the ontological status of elements as unified substances.

**AN OBVIOUS ACCOUNT OF EPISTEMIC POSSIBILITY**  
*CHRIS TWEEDT, BAYLOR UNIVERSITY*

Concesive knowledge attributions (CKAs) are statements of the form: I know that \( p \), but possibly \( q \), where \( q \) obviously entails not-\( p \). “Possibly” here expresses epistemic possibility. But what is epistemic possibility? Stanley argues that on the standard version of epistemic possibility—a version based on knowledge—CKAs are contradictory. Dougherty and Rysiew propose two non-standard accounts of epistemic possibility—each of which is based on evidence—to argue that CKAs are not contradictory. I will give some problems for Dougherty and Rysiew’s non-standard accounts. Then I’ll propose an account—an account based on obviousness—that parallels Stanley’s account but overcomes the problems with Dougherty and Rysiew’s account, and I’ll show that this account, unlike Stanley’s account but like Dougherty and Rysiew’s account, allows some CKAs to be true.
ANALYZING GROUNDING

MARK BARBER, SYRACUSE UNIVERSITY

Grounding has an important role to play in metaphysics. There is a rapidly growing literature on what grounding is like and this paper is a contribution to that debate. Specifically, this paper presents an analysis of grounding in terms of two relations, more fundamental than and intimacy. Some philosophers have tried to account for relative fundamentality in terms of grounding, but I argue first that this is unacceptable and then show how we can use relative fundamentality and intimacy, an introduced, but familiar relation, to analyze grounding.

ANIMAL MINDREADING AND THE PRINCIPLE OF CONSERVATISM

TY FAGAN, UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS–URBANA-CHAMPAIGN

In the debate over whether animal mindreaders exist—that is, whether any animals can represent and reason about the mental states of others—each side draws quite different conclusions from the same scientific data. Where some see evidence of mindreading, others see evidence only of behavior-reading. To discredit their opponents’ purported empirical evidence, these latter often employ an inferential rule of thumb known as the principle of conservatism: all other things equal, we should prefer the hypothesis that invokes lower-order intentionality. Using a test case drawn from research with chimpanzees, I show that the principle of conservatism is best understood as an appeal to parsimony—and that no matter how one conceives of parsimony, the principle is unwarranted. Discarding the principle of conservatism means that the prospects for animal mindreading are better than most have thought.

ANSWERABILITY AND CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY

NICHOLAS SARS, UNIVERSITY OF WASHINGTON

Antony Duff has recently attempted to better understand the notorious issue of strict criminal liability by reframing it in terms of strict responsibility. Duff focuses on the concept of answerability in order to help illuminate this claim. In this paper I argue that this move proves problematic. I show both that Duff blurs the line between two senses of answerability and that this undercuts his arguments based on an analogy between moral and criminal responsibility. Despite these errors, Duff’s focus on answerability does prove illuminating, and I conclude by proposing one way to keep his insights even though his arguments for them prove inadequate.

ARGUMENT DIAGRAMMING IMPROVES CRITICAL THINKING IN INTRODUCTORY PHILOSOPHY

MARA HARRELL, CARNEGIE MELLON UNIVERSITY

I have developed a curriculum for our introductory philosophy course that is aimed specifically at developing students’ critical thinking skills by focusing on argument diagramming as a way to understand, evaluate and
create arguments. Here I report on two studies of this curriculum in which we administered pre-tests at the beginning of the semester, and a post-test at the end. Students who took this curriculum in their introductory class improved certain critical thinking skills more than the students who did not. In addition, this curriculum had the greatest impact on the students who had the fewest skills at the beginning of the course. The students who did the poorest on the pre-test gained the most, as a percentage of what they could have gained, than the students who had average or high scores on the pre-test.

**Aristotle on the Arguments For and Against Slavery**

*Adam Beresford, University of Massachusetts–Boston*

In *Politics* 1.6 Aristotle reports the argument of certain philosophical opponents of slavery. This is the only place where anti-slavery arguments are discussed in any detail in antiquity. But the passage is obscure and probably corrupt, and has baffled interpreters and generated several incompatible interpretations. I set out the main readings and issues and try to show that none of the standard proposals can be right, and offer a new reading that makes much better sense of what the opponents of slavery were saying. I also argue that previous readings have been hampered first by political prejudices, then by the imposition of misguided theories about the meaning of areté, in this passage and beyond. My reading proposes that, according to Aristotle, the central claim of the opponents of slavery was simple: human beings are intellectually and morally equal, and slavery results purely from brute force used against moral equals.

**“Because” and Constitutive Explanations**

*Johannes Schmitt, University of Southern California*

Sentences like “The proposition that John is tall is true because John is tall” are acceptable whereas sentences of the form “John is tall because the proposition that John is tall is true” are odd. In this paper, I explain this difference by assuming an account of the acceptability of “because”—statements according to which “p because q” is true if and only if q gives at least a partial explanation for p. In the class of examples that I investigate the inference from p to q is explanatory and the inference from q to p fails to be explanatory even though p and q are a priori equivalent. I then go on to argue that the truth of a constituent proposition may in certain circumstances count as a constitutive explanation of a proposition that predicates truth of its constituent and defend this claim against one major objection.

**Berkeley on God’s Creation of Minds and Human Freedom**

*Stephen Daniel, Texas A&M University*

Like other theists, Berkeley believes that God is the creator of all sensible objects and minds. That seems to imply that God causes our volitions and we are not free. Recent descriptions of Berkeley’s position as a form of
concurrentism or occasionalism have attempted to show how we can still be free as long as either our volitions are not determined in God’s creation of our minds or our volitions result in actual effects only if they are consistent with the laws of nature. But these accounts ignore how God creates minds precisely in willing that ideas are perceived or willed in specific ways. I argue that freedom, for Berkeley, does not consist in being able to will other than we do, for our volitions are specified by their actual effects in the world. Rather, it consists in willing that what we do be in harmony with God’s will.

**Beyond Actualism and Possibilism**

*Brian Kierland, Boise State University*

The moral value of an action often depends upon later actions of the same agent. For example, the moral value of your writing a check for Oxfam depends on your putting it in the mail sometime later. In such cases, how does the normative status of the action in question depend on these later actions? The debate in the literature has largely been framed around two views. Actualism claims that what an agent ought to do depends on what he would do in the future, while possibilism claims that it depends on what he could do in the future. I argue, however, that there are true ought-judgments corresponding to both actualism and possibilism. I explore three accounts which can explain this fact, the last of which I defend.

**Biological Function and Biological Normalcy: Breaking the Link**

*Justin Garson, City University of New York–Hunter College*

In his “Against Normal Function,” Amundson (2000; also see 2011) criticizes Boorse’s Biostatistical Theory of function (BST) for presupposing a conception of biological normalcy which is biologically inaccurate and which has been used to justify discriminatory policies and attitudes against people with disabilities. Biological normalcy is the view that species (or subsets thereof) exhibit a “uniform functional design” based on the typical contribution of their parts to survival and reproduction, and that various disabilities represent abnormal and fitness-reducing departures from this design. In the following, I argue that a suitably-refined and rigorously defensible version of BST need not presuppose biological normalcy. An “abnormal” variant has a function if it contributes to survival or inclusive fitness. As a consequence, one can accept naturalistic accounts of biological function without endorsing the problematic notion of biological normalcy with which they have been associated and which have cast them in a negative light.

**Blame as a Volitional Activity**

*Neal Tognazzini, College of William and Mary*

Blame is fascinating yet elusive, and it is both of these things because it is so complex. It seems to have a cognitive aspect (the belief that someone has done wrong, perhaps), but it also seems to have an emotional aspect
resentment at being disrespected, perhaps). And then of course there is the outside-of-the-head aspect of blame, which manifests itself in rebukes and reprimands, accusations and distrust, cold shoulders and estrangement. Still, accounts of blame that identify it with beliefs or emotions seem inadequate. In this paper I draw on the work of Harry Frankfurt to suggest an alternative account, according to which blame most centrally involves changes in the structure of the will.

**Body-body Occasionalism and the Conservation of Motion**

*Monte Cook, University of Oklahoma*

I criticize the assumption that if Cartesians believed that only God could cause motion, then they believed that bodies could not causally affect one another. Daniel Garber, Steven Nadler, Tad Schmaltz, and Michael Della Rocca all make this assumption in arguing that Descartes, Antoine Arnauld, Louis de la Forge, Géraud de Cordemoy, or Robert Desgabets were or were not body-body occasionalists. I show that this assumption, though natural, is wrong. First I discuss how various Cartesians use a distinction between causing motion and causally affecting the direction of motion to show that mind to body causation is consistent with the conservation of motion in the physical world. Then I show how they make this same distinction for body-body causation. Arguing that for the Cartesians bodies cannot cause motion, then, is insufficient to establish that they believe that bodies cannot causally affect one another.

**Can the Categorical Imperative Test Final Ends?**

*Margaret Bowman, University of Utah*

The “New Kantians,” for example, Christine Korsgaard, Onora O’Neill, and Barbara Herman offer a “practical interpretation” of the Kantian “Categorical Imperative.” Their approach grounds the moral assessment of actions and ends on practical rationality. Both contradictions in conception and the will are to be found in our intentions, rather than our beliefs. Problems arise whenever a proposed course of action undermines the goals one has as an agent under universalization. I argue against the underlying account of intention, particularly with respect to long term goals. While our actions work toward final ends, it is implausible to assume that we always expect or fully commit to achieving them. Without these assumptions, the practical interpretation of the “Categorical Imperative” no longer generates contradictions. I conclude that we must reject this approach to Kantian moral philosophy and recommend reexamining accounts of intention in the light of a more plausible understanding of practical commitment.

**Cassirer’s Phenomenology of Culture**

*Donald Verene, Emory University*

Cassirer claims that in his philosophy of symbolic forms the transcendental analysis of science, ethical freedom, and aesthetic and organic natural
forms of Kant’s three critiques is extended to other forms of culture, such as language, myth, and art. Thus, the “critique of reason becomes the critique of culture.” This claim tends to place Cassirer within the tradition of Neo-Kantianism. This view is offset by Cassirer’s further claim that his phenomenology of knowledge is “established and systematically grounded by Hegel.” To achieve his philosophy of symbolic forms, Cassirer joins Kantian transcendental method with Hegelian phenomenology. In so doing, Cassirer replaces the idea of system with a conception of “systematic overview,” which he connects to a theory of “basis phenomena,” especially the basis phenomenon of the work. This phenomenon allows him finally to conceive his philosophy as a fulfillment of the Socratic pursuit of self-knowledge.

COGNITIVE SIGNIFICANCE AND SINGULAR THOUGHT
JAMES GENONE, STANFORD UNIVERSITY

In this essay, I criticize Robin Jeshion’s recent proposal of a constraint of cognitive significance on singular thought (Jeshion 2010). I argue that reflection on a number of examples she discusses suggests that significance is neither necessary nor sufficient for thoughts that refer directly to a particular object. Although I agree with Jeshion that acquaintance is not required for all cases of singular thought, I argue that her account doesn’t go far enough in rejecting semantic instrumentalism, the view that we can generate singular thoughts simply by manipulating the mechanisms of direct reference.

COMMONALITY IN ASSERTION AND PRACTICAL REASONING
KENNETH BOYD, UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO

Call “commonality” the view that the epistemic states that figure in the norms of assertion are the same as those that figure in the norms of practical reasoning. Here I defend what I take to be the most plausible principled explanation for commonality, what Jessica Brown calls the “instance argument”: since assertions are kinds of actions, they therefore share a common epistemic norm. I consider a number of arguments against the instance argument from Brown, but argue that they ultimately fail because Brown mischaracterizes the way in which assertion and other illocutionary acts are related to our epistemic states.

COMPLETING THE HOBBESIAN AND KANTIAN PROJECT IN ETHICS
JAMES P. STERBA, UNIVERSITY OF NOTRE DAME

Both Hobbes and Kant both wanted to provide a foundation for ethics that didn’t already presuppose a commitment to ethics. Hobbes attempted to do this by appealing to self-interest; Kant by appealing to rationality. The general consensus among contemporary philosophers is that neither Hobbes nor Kant successfully completed this foundational project. I propose to offer a way completing the project by appealing to the principle of non-question-beggingness. As it turns out, my way of completing the project
ends up justifying a much more demanding and much more egalitarian ethics than either Hobbes or Kant wanted to defend. Nevertheless, I claim, that is just the unavoidable consequence of providing ethics with the type of foundation that both Hobbes and Kant wanted to provide.

**COMPULSION AS RESISTANCE TO REASONING**

*Jesse Summers, Rice University*

I propose an account of compulsion. I question initially whether Gary Watson’s account of compulsion can distinguish compulsion from normal desires. I then consider whether compulsion is motivation that did not originate in one’s decision. I reject this view because decisions, and consequent motivations, may be compelled. I then consider whether compulsion is motivation that one cannot change. I reject this view because even compulsive motivation can be changed. I then propose that motivation is resistance to reasoning, which captures the insights of the previous two proposals. So understood, and perhaps surprisingly, compulsion is both ubiquitous and not as obviously objectionable as we may have supposed.

**CONFIDENCE, EVIDENCE, AND DISAGREEMENT**

*Ekaterina Vavova, Amherst College*

Should learning that we disagree about p lead you to revise your opinion about p? Even those who think that it often should want to make a *prima facie* plausible exception for beliefs in which you are rationally highly confident. The Intuitive Thought is that if you are really sure of what you believe, and you’re right in being so sure, learning that we disagree should not affect your opinion. I argue that the Intuitive Thought is false, and so we should reject recent accounts that crucially rely on it. I then show that, contra the Intuitive Thought, having a low confidence in p can make disagreement about p less significant. Understanding this surprising result can help us toward a better way of thinking about evidence and disagreement.

**CONSCIENCE AND WHAT WE CARE ABOUT**

*Ian Blaustein, Boston University*

What is it to have a conscience? What is it to act conscientiously? My proposal is that to have a conscience is to have a standing desire to do the morally right thing, where “the morally right thing” is read de dicto. That conception of conscience provides my answer to the second question: to act conscientiously is to act on a desire to do the morally right thing, where “the morally right thing,” again, is read de dicto. In other words, to act conscientiously is to do something because you believe it’s the morally right thing to do. That’s a very minimal conception of conscience, but I think it’s an adequate one. I’ll say why by discussing some supposed facts about conscience, and how my conception explains them. Then I’ll discuss, too briefly, a couple of other supposed facts about conscience that
appear to conflict with my conception. I’ll end by discussing why we might think that, even if it is on the right track, my conception is inadequate, and say why I think it really does work. My proposal is that having a conscience is part of what it is to care about morality.

CONVENTION, VARIATION, AND FORCE-MARKING

Rachel McKinney, City University of New York—Graduate Center

In this paper I discuss a set of linguistic data underdeveloped in the philosophical literature on linguistic convention. I explore an example of a cluster of linguistic conventions—force-marking—and argue that knowledge of conventions governing lexical, syntactic, and compositional form is insufficient for knowledge of conventions governing force. A misalignment of conventions governing force negatively impacts communicative uptake. I then look at sociolinguistic variation and propose a picture for how speakers are able to communicate outside of their most local speech communities. On my view, communicatively competent agents have at their disposal multiple different convention models that they employ in different contexts and with different speakers. Such models allow for agents to converge on common conventions and communicate.

DANCE: THE EPHEMERAL ART?

Renee Conroy, Purdue University—Calumet

Ask any dancer what she thinks is special about her art, and she is likely to respond without pause: dance is an art of the moment. Dancers and choreographers often declare that artworks created in the medium of dance are more evanescent than are those created in the artistic traditions of music and drama. But what does the claim that dance is an “ephemeral” art really mean? In this paper, I argue that dancers’ claims about the fleeting character of their art form are best understood as the expression of a set of deep-seated danceworld values rather than as purely factual statements or as the articulation of an ontological theory. I also consider several elements of dance art practice that plausibly give rise to this nest of values, and suggest how these features of “dance life” contribute to the regnant belief that the art form trades in the ineluctably temporary.

DEFENDING RATIONALISM FROM PSYCHOPATHS

Danielle Wylie, University of Wisconsin—Madison

Michael Smith’s defense of rationalism (the claim that our concept of moral requirements is a concept of requirements of rationality, which entails that judgments are intrinsically motivating) has been objected to by David Brink and Shaun Nichols through the use of amoralists and data on psychopaths. I will use Smith’s view of conceptual analysis and findings in moral psychology to propose elements which seem to be included in our ordinary moral concepts. Given the resulting concepts, I will then argue that psychopaths do not share these concepts, and that this lack of moral concepts (for a reason other than lack of motivation) serves to
support Smith’s response to the amoralist challenge. Finally, I will explain and respond to Nichols’s version of the challenge. With these objections dismissed, Smith’s position is safe from the existence of psychopaths, at least as they have been most prominently used against him thus far.

**DEMOCRACY, PATERNALISM, AND CAMPAIGN FINANCE**

*Adam Hosein, University of Colorado–Boulder*

Democracy, Paternalism and Campaign Finance In this paper I defend limits on corporate expenditures of the kind that were enacted by the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act (BCRA) and struck down by the Supreme Court in Citizens United. I argue that limits are justified by the need to ensure that the government is representative of the people rather than wealthy corporations who can gain influence through campaign spending. I then present the objection that this argument makes paternalistic assumptions about the abilities of citizens to evaluate speech, assumptions that are themselves undemocratic because they reflect a lack of trust in citizens. Finally, I respond to this objection by showing that the assumptions needed to defend BCRA are compatible with democratic principles.

**DEONTOLOGY MONSTERS, PARTICULARISM, AND COUNTERPOSSIBLE COUNTEREXAMPLES IN NORMATIVE ETHICS**

*Thomas Metcalf, University of Colorado–Boulder*

Ethicists commonly employ hypothetical but possible counterexamples to various normative theories or applied ethics principles. But must hypothetical counterexamples describe possible scenarios? Here I argue that they need not, and that this conclusion actually has far-reaching implications in normative ethics, among other areas. In the first section of this paper, I explain how one might employ counterpossible counterexamples in general, and why we should sometimes trust them. The later sections of this paper motivate one major implication of allowing impossible counterexamples: Now there is a new and powerful argument for particularism in normative ethics, from the premise that some actions are clearly morally impermissible.

**DERIVATIVE WORKS, ORIGINAL VALUE**

*Micahel Falgoust, Tulane University of New Orleans*

Creative works allow individuals to explore beliefs, cultural biases and prejudices, or simply the author’s own point of view. Derivative works allow the same kind of discourse, but they also make possible a critical mode that is especially valuable for questioning mainstream or widely-accepted ideas. Free expression, particularly expressions that criticize mainstream ideas, is chilled by the arbitrary control exercised by copyright holders. Without the ability to prepare derivative works, creators are unable to express their own views about cultural biases and prejudices, and the liberating critical mode is lost.
DESCRIPTIONS WHICH HAVE GROWN CAPITAL LETTERS

BRIAN RABERN, AUSTRALIAN NATIONAL UNIVERSITY

Definite descriptions “which have grown capital letters” have periodically been noted for their unique syntactic and semantic properties yet they have never been given a proper linguistic analysis. My aim here is to begin this process. I will argue that the standard suggestion that “descriptions with grown capitals” should be regarded not as definite descriptions, but as proper names, is untenable. I will then suggest a new treatment that avoids these problems. My view is that they should be assimilated to definite descriptions, where the nouns that constitute the definite noun phrase are predicates of metalinguistic kinds. The discussion, aside from its intrinsic value, provides further support for the thesis that the expressions that are commonly called “proper names” are, in fact, predicates (i.e., common nouns).

DICKIE’S FALSE MYTHOLOGY

THOMAS HILGERS, FREIE UNIVERSITÄT BERLIN

In this paper, I seek to clear the way for a re-evaluation of the claim that our aesthetic experiences typically include the adoption of a disinterested attitude by showing that none of George Dickie’s famous objections against the notion of a disinterested attitude is successful. I show that the notion is not the result of a conceptual confusion, and that it stands for more than a perceptual state in which one is free from distraction. Moreover, I show that the adoption of a disinterested attitude may be an important part of our typical aesthetic experience even if the adoption of such an attitude is hardly ever a conscious act or an explicit decision.

DIFFERENCE-MAKING, REDUCTION, AND MULTI-GRADE CAUSATION

DAVID McELHOES, UNIVERSITY OF MARYLAND–COLLEGE PARK

The causal exclusion argument remains one of the most well-known and most persistent challenges to non-reductive physicalism. In this paper, I show that by shifting the discourse from talk of causation to talk of difference-making, there is a straightforward argument, the contrastive argument, which gives us an interesting and unexpected way out of the causal exclusion problem. The shift from causal relations to difference-making relations provides only eight possible ways to model the space of inter-level relations; and the contrastive argument allows us to eliminate seven of them. What we are left with, paradoxically, is a reductive model of the relationship between higher and lower-level explanatory theories that nevertheless preserves the central feature of non-reductive physicalism.

DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE, RELATIVE DISADVANTAGE, AND INDIVIDUAL OBLIGATIONS

BRIAN BERKEY, UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA–BERKELEY

In this paper I consider the claim that the beneficiaries of prevailing distributive injustice are not obligated to voluntarily sacrifice their unjust advantages because by doing so they would face the prospect of
disadvantage relative to others who will not make similar sacrifices. I examine some remarks made by G.A. Cohen that are sympathetic to this relative disadvantage-based defense of the refusal to sacrifice voluntarily, and raise some doubts about the support that they provide to that defense. Specifically, I argue that thinking about certain examples in which a beneficiary of non-distributive injustice can sacrifice her advantages, at the cost of relative disadvantage, in order to benefit the victims of the relevant injustice, suggest that the relative disadvantage defense cannot be accepted. I conclude that we should take seriously the view that our obligations, insofar as we are beneficiaries of distributive injustice, are more extensive than we tend to think.

**E-PRINTS AND THE SOCIAL EPISTEMOLOGY OF PEER REVIEW**

*Ben Almassi, College of Lake County*

The growth of arXiv.org and other “e-print” archives presents a great opportunity for epistemologists to examine the social-evidential value of peer review. Traditionally framed as a cornerstone of scientific objectivity, peer reviewed publication is often presumed to be good evidence of rigor and reliability, and anonymous review can be a powerful if imperfect mechanism to mitigate explicit and implicit social bias. Given these epistemic and ethical functions, what’s lost as epistemic communities move from reliance on journals to unreviewed platforms like arXiv.org? Absent the corroboration of peer review, how can we gauge reliability and mitigate bias? Here I engage founder Paul Ginsparg’s defense of arXiv and critique of traditional scholarly publication. I argue that while the development of arXiv has been responsive to other issues, problems of gender and other social biases remain neglected. I suggest how these problems might be addressed given an arXiv that takes both open access and implicit bias seriously.

**EMIGRATION, LOSSES, AND BURDEN-SHARING**

*Gillian Brock, University of Auckland*

This paper focuses on issues of justice in emigration from developing countries. I discuss why there may be important harms that frequently follow emigrants’ departure from developing countries. My concern is with the normative case for there being important responsibilities to address these and fair ways to distribute the burdens associated with tackling these losses. I argue (inter alia) that it may be defensible to specify certain conditions (such as taxation or service requirements) that must be met when emigrants choose to live outside source countries, and that it may be fair to impose costs on emigrants and residents of developed countries who will benefit from these movements. I canvas a variety of arguments to show why such burden-sharing arrangements are fair ones, and defend the view against some key anticipated objections concerning inappropriate interference with freedom.
EMPTY OF WHAT? NĀGĀRJUNA AND CANDRAKĪRTI AS REALISTS, NOT NIHILISTS

Jay Garfield, Smith College, University of Melbourne, and Central University of Tibetan Studies

The assertion of Mādhyamikas such as Nāgārjuna and Candrakīrti that all phenomena are empty has been read as a kind of nihilism, denying the reality of the world. In fact, however, when properly understood, it is the assertion that phenomena are empty of intrinsic existence. Since emptiness itself is empty, this amounts to the claim that the everyday world is as real as anything ever could be. Mādhyamika is hence realism.

EMPTY THOUGHTS: AN EXPLANATORY PROBLEM FOR HIGHER-ORDER THEORIES OF CONSCIOUSNESS

Adrienne Prettyman, University of Toronto

Block (2011) has recently argued that empty higher-order representations raise a problem for higher-order theories of consciousness. In response, Rosenthal, Lau, and Brown have defended the higher-order theory on empirical grounds. In this paper, I show that this empirically motivated defense is inadequate. In support of Block, I argue that if empty thoughts are possible, then the higher-order view cannot explain what makes some mental states conscious. I conclude that the higher-order view fails to deliver on its prime motivation: a naturalistic explanation of consciousness.

EPISTEMIC JUSTIFICATION AND THE EPISTEMIC OUGHT

Andrew Moon, University of Missouri

I present a counterexample to Mark Nelson’s (2010) thesis that there are no propositions that we epistemically ought to believe. I then show how Nelson’s paper and mine open up further discussion and research by making clear possible differences between epistemic justification and the epistemic ought.

EPISTEMICISM AND THE LIAR

Jamin Asay, University of North Carolina—Chapel Hill

Recently Paul Horwich has defended an epistemicist approach to the liar paradox. While granting that the liar proposition has a truth value, Horwich denies that we can deduce a contradiction from that fact because we lack the liar proposition’s corresponding T-biconditional. Although this approach may be thought to offer a uniform solution both to the liar paradox and the paradoxes associated with vagueness, I argue that epistemicism is of no help in solving the liar paradox. Even without the liar proposition’s corresponding T-biconditional, we can still derive a contradiction. I conclude by showing how, contrary to what has previously been argued, the epistemicist approach to the liar paradox does not encounter an obvious revenge problem. But this fact is of little comfort, given that the approach offers no solution to the original paradox.
EQUALITY AND THE KANTIAN STATE

MICHAEL NANCE, UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA

Commentators have pursued two main strategies for extracting an account of distributive justice from Kant’s *Rechtslehre*. The first strategy, pursued by Paul Guyer, involves a re-interpretation of the theory of property Kant develops in Private Right. Guyer argues that Kant’s account of what a right to property is implies a substantial egalitarian commitment. Guyer is correct to say that Kant’s RL is compatible with an egalitarian account of distributive justice, but I suggest some problems with his argument that Kant’s property theory requires property egalitarianism. The second strategy for showing that Kant’s theory has distributive implications, pursued by Arthur Ripstein, focuses on Kant’s remarks about poverty and the state in Public Right. Ripstein is correct that the Kantian state must provide welfare programs for the poor. But Ripstein suggests that the Kantian state may not pursue more robustly egalitarian economic policies. I stake out a middle ground between Guyer’s argument that the *Rechtslehre* requires robust egalitarianism and Ripstein’s argument that the *Rechtslehre* is incompatible with robust egalitarianism.

ETHICAL PROFESSIONALISM VERSUS CRONYISM: HOW WOMEN AND MINORITIES ARE AFFECTED

NAOMI ZACK, UNIVERSITY OF OREGON

Ethical professionalism today is based on assumed standards of excellence in research and pedagogy, transparent decision processes, and non-discrimination; it is formally protected by non-discrimination laws and policies. Diversity is not mere inclusion: Women and racial/ethnic minorities are demographically new to academic philosophy departments and should expect ethical professionalism after admission or hire. When women or minorities do not participate in professionally powerful subgroups in a department, they may individually experience their exclusion as sexist or racist. When white males form affective and instrumental small groups that control power across a larger demographically diverse group, they are participating in a structure of cronyism. White male cronyism is the other side of institutional sexism and racism—it does not require avowed or explicit white supremacy or misogyny to impair ethical professionalism for women and minorities.

EXCLUSION, YET AGAIN

DOUGLAS KEATON, UNIVERSITY OF ARKANSAS–LITTLE ROCK

In recent work Karen Bennett has offered a clear defense of non-reductive physicalism against the charge that mental properties, if efficacious, overdetermine their effects. Her defense is compatibilist, and operates on standard assumptions about the functionalist picture of the base physical (neurological) properties that necessitate mental properties. I argue that one of these standard assumptions is false, rendering Bennett’s argument for compatibilism unsound. I argue that Bennett’s argument relies on the
assumption that the causal background conditions that fix the effects of the core realizer of a mental property are the same conditions as the conditions that guarantee that the core realizer realizes an instance of the mental property. I show that this is not true. The result, while bad for Bennett’s specific argument, is probably good for the non-reductive physicalism that she and many others wish to defend.

EXPANDING THE SITUATIONIST CHALLENGE TO RELIABILIST VIRTUE EPISTEMOLOGY

Mark Alfano, University of Notre Dame

The last few decades have witnessed the birth and growth of both virtue epistemology and the situationist challenge to virtue ethics. It seems only natural that eventually we would see the situationist challenge to virtue epistemology. This article articulates one aspect of that new challenge by spelling out an argument against the reliabilist brand of virtue epistemology. The trouble can be framed as an inconsistent triad: (non-skepticism) many people know quite a bit; (reliabilism) knowledge is true belief acquired and retained through the exercise of intellectual virtue; (epistemic situationism) most people do not possess the intellectual virtues countenanced by reliabilism. Non-skepticism is a Moorean platitude we should aim to preserve at most if not all costs. I muster evidence from cognitive psychology to argue for epistemic situationism. If my argument is correct, then reliabilism must be rejected.

EXPECTING TOO MUCH OF EPISTEMIC RATIONALITY: WHY WE NEED TWO NOTIONS INSTEAD OF ONE

Miriam Schoenfield, Massachusetts Institute of Technology

In this paper I argue that we need two notions of epistemic rationality. We need one notion to help us deliberate and another to help us evaluate. In section one I introduce the two notions. In second two I supply the central idea for why these notions must be distinct: the notion we use for deliberation should respect a principle about higher order evidence which I call epistemic modesty, and the principle we use for evaluation should not. In sections three and four I provide two arguments for the importance of this distinction: the first shows why need the distinction to make sense of principles of deference to others, and the second shows why need the distinction to avoid violations of the reflection principle. I sum up with some thoughts about why notions that are relative to agents’ capacities are not good notions to use for evaluation.

EXPLANATIONISM

Ted Poston, University of South Alabama

I advocate explanationism in epistemology. Explanationism is the view that inference to the best explanation is a central, if not the central part of normative epistemology. The goal of normative epistemology is to specify the conditions under which a subject has good reasons for believing some propositions. My aim in this paper is to clearly layout the explanationist
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position. First, I formulate a set of necessary and sufficient conditions for a belief’s justification. Second, I discuss the nature of explanation. Finally, I offer four cases to distinguish explanationism from rival views in normative epistemology.

FACT OF THE MATTER: POLITICAL IDEALS AND DEMOCRATIC CONSENSUS

JEREMY NEILL, HOUSTON BAPTIST UNIVERSITY

The consensus among critics has so far been that the deficiencies of ideal theory are serious enough to merit our more concentrated attention. Their criticisms could perhaps be answered to some extent if ideal theorists were willing to pay greater attention to their modeling of empirical circumstances. Three of the most prominent of the roles of ideal theories are edification, inspiration, and general-purpose guidance. A fourth role, practical prescription, is sometimes also capable of being played by ideal theories and is usually even more empirically demanding than the other three roles. It usually is not a very good idea for ideal theorists to be attempting to lay out wide-ranging political prescriptions in situations in which their assumptions are not being regularly and rigorously tested against real-world circumstances.

FACTS, PRINCIPLES, AND JUSTICE

SAMEER BAJAJ, UNIVERSITY OF ARIZONA

G. A. Cohen argues that normative principles justified by facts cannot be fundamental principles. According to Cohen, facts only justify normative principles in light of further principles that play a more foundational justificatory role. Cohen relies on this conclusion to argue that any constructivist selection procedure incorporating facts among its justificatory considerations cannot produce fundamental ethical principles. In this essay, I contend that Cohen’s argument does not undermine constructivist approaches to social justice and morality. Focusing on John Rawls’s “Original Position,” I argue that constructivist procedures can produce principles that are fundamental as substantive ethical principles, even though they are justified by other normative principles. I further argue that the disagreement between Rawls and Cohen over whether fundamental principles of justice can be justified by facts arises from their differing views of the conceptual nature of justice.

FEEDBACK BIAS IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES: THE CASE OF PARAPHILIA

MATTHEW DRABEK, UNIVERSITY OF IOWA

In this paper I discuss problematic interactions between social scientific work and the public. I do this by examining a form of bias embodied in some of the classificatory work done by the scientists who study and classify human beings. I call this form of bias “feedback bias,” a form of bias where negative social portrayals and marginalization of specific groups come to be reinforced by the study and classification of the group in question. I explore a case study in psychiatry, the classification of the
various paraphilias in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual (DSM) of the American Psychiatric Association (APA). I point out some of the problems with the DSM and suggest a few positive moves grounded in positive steps the APA has taken in the past.

**Feminism and Political Liberalism: A Return to Comprehensive Liberalism?**

*Jennifer Warriner, University of Utah*

Is liberalism compatible with the feminist aim of ending gender oppression? Some feminist thinkers argue that only comprehensive liberalism provides a suitable normative framework to advance feminist aims. However, in her 2007 paper, “Pornography and Public Reason,” Lori Watson argues that feminist thinkers ought to appeal to political liberalism to fight gender injustice. According to Watson, political liberalism not only has the resources to address gender injustice, political liberalism requires that gender injustice be addressed. This is because gender injustice in the private or social world interferes with the legitimacy of political deliberations between citizens in the political world, which in turn threatens the legitimacy of the exercise of political power. In this paper, I argue that if Watson’s interpretation is correct, this pushes political liberalism in the direction of comprehensive liberalism. I argue that Watson’s account of political liberalism is comprehensive liberalism in disguise: one that purports to describe a general theory for political justice and social relations and which commands citizens’ allegiance over and above any other “private” beliefs they might hold. If I am right, my argument presents a consideration in favour of comprehensive liberalism, for it turns out that feminist critics were right—only comprehensive liberalism can deal with gender oppression.

**Formulating Principles of Reasoning**

*Julia Staffel, University of Southern California*

It has been recognized in recent years that logic, probability, and decision theory are ill-suited for directly providing norms of good reasoning. In a nutshell, these systems either contain rules that would constitute bad reasoning, or they contain rules that are too difficult for humans to follow. In response to these problems, there have been multiple attempts to formulate principles of reasoning that rely upon, but are distinct from rules of logic, probability and decision theory. In this paper, I will present two different approaches that may be called the “criterial approach” and the “tradeoff approach.” The attempts we find in the literature turn out to be all versions of the criterial approach. I will argue that the criterial approach is problematic, and that we should instead focus on developing versions of the tradeoff approach.
FOUCAULT’S KANT  
ROBERT B. LOUDEN, UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN MAINE

Foucault issued many statements about Kant’s philosophy, both pro and con, throughout his writing career. But it was not until 2008 (nearly twenty-five years after his death), when his Introduction to Kant’s Anthropology (originally submitted to the University of Paris, Sorbonne in 1961 as part of his complementary doctoral thesis) was finally published that readers were presented with a book of Foucault’s that focused directly on Kant. How does Foucault understand Kant’s anthropology in this text, and in what ways does this understanding influence his subsequent writings? How does Foucault’s interpretation of Kant’s anthropology compare to those of contemporary German and anglophone Kant scholars, and how plausible is his interpretation? In my presentation I will try to answer these questions.

FOUNDATIONAL THEORIES OF LINGUISTIC MEANING AND THE HETEROGENEITY OF SPEECH COMMUNITIES  
DANIEL HARRIS, CITY UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK–GRADUATE CENTER

In virtue of what does a sentence have meaning for a community of speakers? According to Lewis and Schiffer, the meaning relation is mediated by conventions to use public languages. I offer a variety of criticisms of this theory, the common theme being that it cannot be reconciled with the large degree of linguistic variation found within actual speech communities. According to the Grice-inspired theory I offer, a sentence is meaningful in a community just in case the community members are disposed both interpretively and performatively to pair the sentence with a certain type of speech act. The theory is not committed to public languages, conventions, mutual knowledge, or any particular psycholinguistic theses. I show how it obviates several prominent dilemmas in the philosophy of linguistics and how it can accommodate widespread linguistic variation.

GET OVER IT: Praising Fairness over Forgiveness  
KRISTA THOMASON, SWARThMORE COLLEGE

Forgiveness is widely considered a virtue in moral philosophy. Forgiving people are praised for having compassion and humility, and unforgiving people are criticized for being resentful. In this paper, I argue that those who praise the forgiving person for her compassion are committed to an untenable conception of wrongdoing. I argue further that the unforgiving person is not necessarily vicious. Finally, I raise a puzzle about the inconsistency with which we urge others to forgive. In order to solve this puzzle, I suggest the trait we actually praise is fair-mindedness rather than forgiveness.
GOD KNOWS (BUT DOES GOD BELIEVE?)

Jonathan Livengood, University of Pittsburgh

Dylan Murray, University of California–Berkeley

Justin M. Sytsma, East Tennessee State University

It is standardly held in epistemology that propositional knowledge entails belief. While potential counterexamples have been proposed (e.g., Radford, 1966), they have generally been dismissed as unconvincing. Recently, however, Myers-Schulz and Schwitzgebel (forthcoming) have provided empirical evidence that a non-trivial percentage of English speakers do not treat propositional knowledge as entailing belief in some cases. Based on this evidence, they argue that the claim cannot simply be taken for granted, and propose an alternative account of knowledge that better accords with their data (the capacity-tendency account). Here, we provide further fuel for the fire, presenting the results of four new studies that use rather different examples from those given by Myers-Schulz and Schwitzgebel. These new examples are not well explained by the capacity-tendency account, however, and we conclude by suggesting a different account: that the responses at issue are better explained by a conviction account of belief.

HARM AND REASONABLE EXPECTATIONS

Jeffrey Watson, Arizona State University

A counterfactual account of harm defines an event as harmful to a person if and only if that a person’s well-being is lower compared to the nearest possible world in which the event does not occur. I propose an improvement to existing counterfactual accounts of harm. I suggest that the relevantly “nearest” world for comparison is that which would be most reasonable to expect, had the event not occurred, given the set of evidence available beforehand from the relevant perspective. This account avoids many of the typical objections to counterfactual accounts of harm, and is more informative than current contextualist accounts.

HEIDEGGER AND THE PROPERTIES OF BEING

Joshua Tepley, University of Notre Dame

It is well known that the early Heidegger distinguishes between different kinds of being, most notably between the kind of being possessed by human beings and those he calls “presence-at-hand” and “readiness-to-hand.” Nevertheless, there has been very little discussion in the literature about what exactly these kinds of being are. In this paper I provide an answer to this question: I argue that the various “thick” kinds of being countenanced by the early Heidegger are properties of the entities which have those kinds of being. One result of this position is a new opportunity for dialogue between Heideggerians and analytic philosophers. If what Heidegger refers to as “kinds of being” just are properties, then analytic philosophers should have no trouble understanding a large part of what
the early Heidegger is doing, namely offering a novel account of what different kinds of entities, especially human beings, are like.

HEIDEGGER’S KANTIAN CARTESIANISM

MATTHEW SHOCKEY, INDIANA UNIVERSITY–SOUTH BEND

In a pair of easily overlooked remarks in Being and Time, Heidegger claims that two key ideas in Kant’s theoretical philosophy—his view that existence is not a real predicate and his understanding of the subjectivity of space—develop central aspects of Descartes’ theory of substance. While not an implausible view, it raises an interesting question about Heidegger himself: given that his own project of “fundamental ontology” develops just those aspects of Kant’s thought that he links to Descartes’, does that mean there is also a positive link between fundamental ontology and Descartes’ metaphysics? I argue that there is: Heidegger’s account of the understanding of being aims to complete the separation Kant had begun of Descartes’ views of the a priori intelligibility of being from his commitment to a substance ontology.

HOT: KEEPING UP APPEARANCES?

DAVID MIGUEL GRAY, VANDERBILT UNIVERSITY

David Rosenthal and Josh Weisberg have recently provided a counter argument to Ned Block’s argument that a Higher Order Thought (HOT) theory of consciousness cannot accommodate the existence of hallucinatory conscious states (i.e., a conscious episode consisting of a HOT without the presence of a relevant lower order thought). Their counter argument invokes the idea of mental appearances: a non-existent intentional object which is to aid in an account of subjective conscious awareness. I argue that if mental appearances are to do the work they are supposed to, we cannot draw a mental appearance/reality distinction. I provide an alternative story that a HOT theorist can invoke to account for cases of conscious misrepresentation. Such a story will require denying the existence of HCS while still accounting for conscious misrepresentation. This is a cost I believe the HOT theorist should be willing to pay.

HOW FAST TIME PASSES

STEVEN SAVITT, UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA

Many have argued that it is not possible for time to pass because it is impossible to specify meaningfully a rate at which it passes. The natural suggestion, one second per second, is not a rate (it is argued) because (a) it collapses into a pure number when the dimensions cancel or (b) because there is no other possible alternative rate. After reviewing some of the main arguments for (a) and (b) and finding them inconclusive, I show that in Minkowski spacetime it is possible to specify a variable rate for the passing of proper time in terms of coordinate time, and also vice versa. Therefore, even if a no-rate-of-passage argument succeeds pre-relativistically, it fails in special relativity. One might think that my argument
could be parodied to produce a rate of passage for space. Interestingly, that’s not so.

**HOW INTERACTIONIST DUALISM RUNS AFOUL OF PHYSICS**

*Peter Bokulich, Boston University*

There is a recurring argument in philosophy of mind (presented in various forms by, e.g., Lycan, Montero, Bishop, Averill, and Keating) which denies that current physics rules out interactionist dualism. Physics only tells us how physical things behave in the absence of non-physical causes (the argument claims), it tells us nothing about whether or not there actually are any non-physical causes. Here I argue that this objection rests on a mistake. The existence of physical causes does rule out non-physical causes (setting aside worries about overdetermination), and physical research does provide us with good evidence for the claim that all causal processes in our brains are physical. I argue that scientific knowledge of the domains of applicability of physical theories is sufficient to rule out interactionist dualism.

**HOW SHOULD WE CLAIM THEY WERE PHILOSOPHERS? RECLAMATION RECONSIDERED**

*Sarah Tyson, Vanderbilt University*

In the mid-1980s, feminist philosophers began to turn their critical effort toward reclaiming women in the history of philosophy who had been neglected by traditional histories and canons. There are now scores of resources treating historical women philosophers and reclaiming them for philosophical history. This paper explores the four major argumentative strategies that have been used within those reclamation projects. I argue that three of the strategies unwittingly work against the reclamationist end of having women engaged as philosophers. The fourth type, the one that seeks to transform philosophical practice and reconstruct its history, is the only strategy that will result in that engagement. I argue that is because it is the only strategy that pays sufficient attention to the mechanisms by which women have been excluded from philosophy and its history. Further, I suggest that to bring about engagement with historical women’s writing reclamation must be undertaken as transformation.

**HOW THE DOCTRINE OF DOUBLE EFFECT CAN VINDICATE THE DOCTRINE OF DOING AND ALLOWING**

*Howard Nye, University of Alberta*

The Doctrine of Doing and Allowing states that it’s harder to justify inflicting harm than allowing harm. This is directly plausible, but it faces the objections that it focuses on personal purity, permitting us to let others do our dirty work, and it invests the course of nature with moral significance. Drawing on the Doctrine of Double Effect (DDE), I offer an explanation of why, in paradigm cases, doing harm is worse than allowing harm, which avoids these objections. I argue that we should interpret the DDE as saying
that it’s hard to justify benefiting some at the expense of others, which is a matter of benefiting them by means of events that cause others to be harmed. Typically, doing harm benefits some at the expense of others while allowing harm doesn’t, but the DDE explains the wrongness in action and the permissibility of interference when this is not the case.

HOW TO BE A BIOLOGICAL RACIAL REALIST

Quayshawn Spencer, University of San Francisco

This paper shows that the case for biological racial realism is more formidable than philosophers have thought, provided that one adopts the right semantic and biological assumptions. Specifically, I will argue that given a referentialist account for the meaning of “race,” and the landmark results from Rosenberg et al. (2002; 2005), one can fashion a respectable population genetic definition of “race” in much the way that Neil Risch et al. (2002) first proposed. However, after developing this position and defending it against salient criticisms, I show that it lacks adequate empirical support due to a systematic error in genetic cluster analysis research. Nevertheless, I leave it as an open empirical question as to whether adherents to this population genetic view of race can overcome my objection.

HOW TO SQUARE E=K WITH PERCEPTUAL KNOWLEDGE: THE SINGLE STATE VIEW

David Chavez, University of Nebraska–Lincoln

Timothy Williamson’s account of perceptual knowledge remains puzzling. The combination of a strictly propositional theory of epistemic support with a nonpropositional view of perception leaves it inexplicable how perceptions function epistemically. Despite Anthony Brueckner’s arguments to the contrary, adopting the Propositional View (PV) of perceptual content can rectify the account while still supplying the preferred answer to skepticism. For Williamson, PV requires embracing what I call the Single State View (SSV). On SSV, one’s favorable perception that p and one’s corresponding knowledge of p are the same mental state. On E=K, such a state would count as evidence and be poised to justify, and the epistemic function of perception would be clarified. This option warrants consideration because it coheres better with key remarks from Williamson on such factive mental states as seeing A. According to those remarks, seeing that A is a state of knowing—just as SSV says.

HUME, COUNTERFACTUALS, AND CAUSATION

Joshua Anderson, St. Louis University

David Hume famously argues against the then current rationalist conceptions of causation. Hume believes that since there is no impression of a power causal influence or necessary connection, rationalist understandings of causation cannot be correct. Instead, Hume argues, what one does have is the constant conjunction of cause c and effect e and the expectation that e will follow c. In this paper, I argue that the
considerations that Hume brings against rationalist and powers theories of causation can be applied to present-day counterfactual theories of causation. That is not to say that Hume is right. Rather, if his arguments are effective against the rationalist and powers theories, then they are effective against counterfactual theories. Now, counterfactuals, possible worlds and modality—despite the influence of Leibniz—were not ideas that would have been overly familiar to Hume. Thus, some reconstruction of Hume’s arguments will be necessary.

IDEAL AGENCY AND MINIMUM AGENCY

CAROLINE ARRUDA, UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS–EL PASO

I consider whether standard accounts of agency must include the possibility that individuals who meet the criteria for agency must also be able to fail to be agents, such as in cases of weakness of will. I show that the standard view of agency is unable to account coherently for this possibility because it equates agency with ideal rational agency. In place of the standard view, I propose a minimum conception of agency that individuals must meet to count as agents. On the latter view, it follows that individuals ought not be characterized as agents solely in terms of whether they meet the conditions for ideal agency. This view is thus better able to account for the possibility of failure. Since this view is a minimum conception, the possibility of failure is built into the very definition of what it means to be an agent. Modifying the definition in this way is significant, but not simply because it suggests that individuals who intermittently fail to be ideal agents, as in cases of weakness of will or temporary incapacitation, are still agents. There is a more controversial claim that, I will show, follows from this modified definition of agency. Namely, perennially deficient agents, various non-human primates, seriously cognitively disabled individuals, among others, are nonetheless agents on this view. I argue that this is the case because the minimum conception of agency in conjunction with its allowance for failure entails a sliding scale, from less to more ideal, of the kinds of agents that exist.

IMPLICIT BIASES: BEYOND THE HYPE

EDOUARD MACHERY, UNIVERSITY OF PITTSBURGH

Philosophers have recently shown a lot of interest in implicit biases. Their discovery is sometimes viewed as calling for a new taxonomy of mental states, their existence is said to have important epistemological consequences, and they are often mentioned to explain the striking gender disparities in philosophy. In this talk, I will look critically at the science behind these claims.

INDEXICAL GUARANTEES

BRETT SHERMAN, BRANDEIS UNIVERSITY

I argue that, insofar as there is a pre-theoretical guarantee associated with “I am here now,” we can explain it without restricting the kind of object
to which we relativize the contents of indexicals. Specifically, I argue that the tools needed to explain the guarantee associated with an utterance of “You're watching NBC” when broadcast on NBC as a station-identification are also available to explain the guarantee associated with “I am here now.”

**Indirect Epistemic Teleology Explained and Defended**

David Copp, University of California–Davis

The standards of normative epistemology determine what we ought epistemically to believe. I contend that these are the standards, a disposition to conform with which in the ordinary circumstances of human life equips human beings to deal as well as can be with what I call “the epistemic problem.” The problem is that our untutored processes of belief formation are not in general reliable in all the circumstances where we need them to be, given the kind of things we value and aim to achieve. J. L. Mackie proposed that morality as a “device” needed to solve a “problem” faced by humans because of “certain contingent features of the human condition.” I propose that the standards of normative epistemology have a similar status. The paper aims to develop the view and to answer at least some of the more important objections.

**Individual Rights and the Restrictive Force of Just Cause: A Response to Jeff McMahan**

Crystal Allen, University of Missouri

Jeff McMahan gives an account of just cause for war in terms of individual liability, making considerations of individual responsibility, narrow proportionality, and necessity internal to this traditional constraint. I argue that this pulls much more strongly in the direction of pacifism than McMahan himself recognizes, and will rule out many of the paradigmatic just causes for war, including ones McMahan himself endorses. However, I think McMahan is correct to bring considerations of individual rights into just cause, and that we should adopt the implications of this view.

**Infallibilism and Contradiction in Plato’s Theaetetus**

Matt Duncan, University of Virginia

In Plato’s *Theaetetus*, Socrates attempts to refute Protagoras’ Measure doctrine (M). There is much debate about how to interpret M. Some argue that M is an expression of relativism and others argue that M is an expression of infallibilism. Gail Fine claims that we should prefer an infallibilist interpretation of M to a relativist interpretation of M because, if M is an expression of relativism, Socrates’ refutation of M does not succeed. In this paper I argue that Socrates’ refutation of M also fails if M is an expression of infallibilism. So if Fine is right that we should favor interpretations of M that render Socrates’ arguments against M successful, then Fine’s own interpretation of M (i.e., as an infallibilist thesis) should not be favored. Furthermore, I argue that the way in which Socrates’
arguments fail to refute infallibilism casts special doubt on the infallibilist reading of M.

**IS FOOT AN IMMORALIST?**

*Ryan Kemp, University of Notre Dame*

In this paper I argue that Philippa Foot’s account of natural goodness commits her to the following theses: (1) the human species is such that we cannot formulate a generalized account of goodness for all its members, and (2) some people, by their very nature, are rationally required to perform actions that Foot is inclined to call categorically bad. Though it’s not clear that either thesis poses a problem for natural goodness accounts per se, Foot claims that each is a hallmark of Nietzschean immoralism, a position she goes to great lengths to attack. If this is right, my contention that each thesis can just as easily be attributed to her account should be worrisome.

**IS INTUITION BASED ON UNDERSTANDING?**

*Elijah Chudnoff, University of Miami*

According to the most popular non-skeptical views about intuition, intuitions justify beliefs because they are based on understanding. More precisely: if intuiting that p justifies you in believing that p it does so because your intuition is based on your understanding of p. The aim of this paper is to raise some challenges for accounts of intuitive justification along these lines. I pursue this project from a non-skeptical perspective: I argue that there are cases in which intuiting that p justifies you in believing that p but not because your intuition is based on your understanding of p.

**IS MORAL EDUCATION A CONDITION OF THE POSSIBILITY FOR MORAL OBLIGATION?**

*Joseph Cannon, Marquette University*

Kant’s account of moral education raises questions about his apparent claim that human beings universally recognize the moral law, that “what duty is, is plain of itself to everyone.” Namely, Kant’s account of education often paints it as a precondition for recognizing the “ought” of the moral law, for what in the second *Critique* he calls the “subjective practicality” of the law. I ask whether for Kant it is possible for a person who has received no moral education to be a moral agent, that is, to be objectively obligated by the moral law. Kant’s account of education and moral development partially answers this question, and shows him to be committed to a social conception of the achievement of the minimal capacity for practical reasoning that is a precondition for moral obligation.

**IT’S STILL NOT WHAT YOU KNOW THAT COUNTS**

*Dustin Locke, Claremont McKenna College*

In his classic “It’s Not What You Know that Counts” (1985), Mark Kaplan argued that knowledge is not required for rationality. Focusing primarily on practical rationality, several authors have recently challenged Kaplan’s
thesis. One of the most well-known challenges is offered by John Hawthorne and Jason Stanley (2008), who argue that it is appropriate to act on one’s belief that P only if one knows that P. When combined with an implicit assumption connecting rationality to appropriately acting on one’s beliefs, Hawthorne and Stanley’s principle poses a direct threat to Kaplan’s thesis. In this paper I defend Kaplan’s thesis by arguing against Hawthorne and Stanley’s principle. I argue that the latter ought to be replaced by a principle that requires sufficiently high justified credence to appropriately act on one’s belief, where “sufficiently high” is determined by the nature of the choice one faces.

**JACOBI AND THE PROBLEM OF NIHILISM**

*Jeremy Proulx, Eastern Michigan University*

To the classical German philosopher Friedrich Heinrich Jacobi, we are indebted for the philosophical use of the concept of nihilism. In this paper I argue that 1) Jacobi articulated the main problem of modern rationalist philosophy as the problem of nihilism, and that 2) he offered a solution that articulated a compelling theory about the structure of consciousness that accounts for the constitution of the world as meaningful.

**JOHN MILTON, IDEAS, AND KANT’S OPUS POSTUMUM**

*Sanford Budick, Hebrew University*

Kant recognized the incompleteness of his first *Critique* account of how ideas of “reciprocity” and “community of reciprocity” construct experience. I here explore his efforts to complete that account in his repeated levying upon Milton’s integrated representation of ideas of reciprocity in community of reciprocity. Kant turned to products of “poetic art,” especially Milton’s poetry of the sublime, to encounter aesthetic ideas. In the case of Milton’s representation of an aesthetic idea of reciprocity, Kant first follows its “transfer” from empirical objects to a priori ideas of reciprocity within community of reciprocity. In his second engagement with the very same representation, now in the *Opus postumum*, he follows the “transition” from a priori ideas of reciprocity and community of reciprocity (including sexual reciprocity) to experience of a whole of empirical objects. The “swing” (“Schwung”) between this transfer and this transition is the full reciprocity that constructs “subjectively actual” experience.

**KANT AND THE PROBLEM OF RELEVANT DESCRIPTIONS**

*Paul Katsafanas, Boston University*

Kant argues that we can assess the permissibility of actions by asking whether their maxims are in accordance with the “Categorical Imperative.” Critics of Kantian ethics argue that an insuperable difficulty arises at this point: whether a particular action is deemed permissible by the “Categorical Imperative” depends on the way in which the action is described. Accordingly, in order to generate consistent results Kantian
ethics needs some way of specifying how particular actions should be described. Defenders of Kantian ethics, including Onora O’Neill, Allen Wood, Mark Timmons, and Barbara Herman have proposed solutions to this problem. In this paper, I investigate these proposed solutions and argue that they fail. We lack a convincing solution to the problem relevant descriptions.

KANT ON NEWTON, GENIUS, AND SCIENTIFIC DISCOVERY

BRYAN HALL, INDIANA UNIVERSITY–SOUTHEAST

In the *Critique of Judgment*, Kant defines genius by distinguishing it from science and uses Newton as his paradigmatic example of a “great mind” who was nevertheless not a genius. Kant believes that Newton possesses what today would be called a “logic of discovery,” i.e., a rule-governed procedure where the discovery is the logical consequence of certain well-established premises. Since Newton possesses a logic of discovery, there is no gap that the creativity of genius could occupy between what the rule-governed procedure dictates and the discovery itself. Although I will argue (pace Kant) that Newton does possess a logic of discovery for establishing his law of universal gravitation, nevertheless, he does not possess a rule-governed procedure for generating the logic of discovery he uses to establish the law of universal gravitation. As I hope to show, this second-order discovery makes Newton count as a scientific genius by Kant’s own lights.

KANT ON THE PRIMACY OF SCHEMATIZED CATEGORIES

SAMANTHA MATHERNE, UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA–RIVERSIDE

Kant’s seemingly contradictory claims about categories and schemata have given rise to two competing views of their relationship: the external view, according to which schemata are sensible conditions external to the categories; and, (in the minority) the internal view, according to which schemata are an internal constitutive moment of the categories. In this paper, I argue that a new defense of the internal view is needed, which explains the tension in Kant’s account without resorting to either positing two sets of categories, unschematized and schematized, or charging him with confusion about the relationship between the logical functions and categories (Aquila). I show that it is Kant’s clarity about the distinction between categories and functions that gives us reason to reject the external view, and this paves the way for a new interpretation of his conflicting claims, as reflecting either methodological constraints or an abstract characterization of the fundamentally schematized categories.

KANT ON THE USES AND ABUSES OF CONTEMPT

AARON BUNCH, WASHINGTON STATE UNIVERSITY

Though it is common to think that the unconditional respect for persons demanded by Kant’s ethics rules out all contemptuous treatment, I argue that Kant thinks there are in fact edifying expressions of contempt that are
not only morally permissible, but even morally obligatory. The universal proscription of contempt at MS 6:463 should be understood to refer only to the malicious forms discussed in that section (arrogance, defamation and ridicule), and not to the edifying forms of contempt Kant condones elsewhere. In particular, Kant says we have a moral obligation to avoid “giving scandal,” which requires that we express contempt for public instances of morally degrading behavior.

**Kierkegaard on Approximation Knowledge and Existential Truth: An Incomptabilist Interpretation**

*Nathan Carson, Baylor University*

Kierkegaard (through Johannes Climacus) argues that if human thought always translates actuality into possibility, empirical reality and human knowers themselves are in flux, and empirical knowledge is perspectively shaped by the data choice and will of the knower, then all human knowledge of empirical reality is at best, an unfinished and uncertain approximation. With Climacus’s addition that it is the non-cognitive passion of belief that nullifies this uncertainty, many scholars have declared Kierkegaard the irrationalist Christian skeptic, par excellence. Against this view, I argue that Kierkegaard is a mitigated skeptic, for he countenances fallibilist approximative knowledge that corresponds to reality. However, I will also argue that, for Kierkegaard, pursuing such knowledge severely undermines the “essential knowing” of subjectivity that he wants to commend. For Kierkegaard, the approximative project should be eschewed in favor of the “essential truth” for an existing being, that is, the task of becoming a self.

**Levels, Layers, and Degrees of Resolution**

*M. Hayden Thornburg, University of Cincinnati*

Kim (2010) identifies both an ontological and epistemic motivation for the “layered model” of nature, according to which the world divides into levels of natural organization. First, he argues that it is necessary to formulate emergentism. Emergentists commit to the layered model, he argues, because higher-level emergents supervene on lower-level non-emergents. Though skeptical about the ontological import of emergence, Kim suggests that salvaging higher-level explanation may require levels of description. Kim (1998) argues that reductive and non-reductive explanations can compete to explain the same event. Understanding this competition requires countenancing levels of explanation. I challenge the ontological motivation for the layered model by endorsing an alternative proposed by Ryan (2007), on which emergence is tied to scope, not level. I also challenge the epistemic motivation for the layered model by suggesting the notion of resolution provides a more comprehensive framework for understanding how “different level” explanations compete.
**Limning Structure as an Epistemic Goal**

**Allan Hazlett, University of Edinburgh**

In this paper I define a property of beliefs—that of being “structure-limning,” or of “carving nature at the joints”—and propose two epistemological applications: (i) that limning structure has pro tanto epistemic value, (ii) that a species of understanding can be defined by appeal to this notion.

**Localizing Intrinsic Function**

**Charles Rathkopf, University of Virginia**

This paper describes one style of functional analysis commonly used in the neurosciences called task-bound functional analysis. The concept of function implicitly invoked by this style of analysis is distinctive in virtue of the complex dependence relations it bears to transient environmental properties. It is argued that task-bound functional analysis cannot explain the presence of structural properties in nervous systems. In addition, an alternative concept of neural function is introduced—one that has been invoked in the contemporary theoretical neuroscience literature. An argument is given to show that this alternative concept of functional analysis may help to overcome the explanatory limitations of task-bound functional analysis.

**Locke’s Reply to the Skeptic**

**Shelley Weinberg, University of Illinois**

Locke has been chastised for what has been called his “insouciant attitude” toward the skeptical problem. Along with a representational theory of perception and the ensuing veil of ideas, Locke, without much explanation, claims that we have knowledge of the external world, albeit in a less certain form. I argue that although Locke does not offer a full-fledged solution to skepticism, in his theory of the three degrees of certainty of knowledge (intuitive, demonstrative, and sensitive), and in the reasons for the different degrees of certainty, is an interesting, consistent, and philosophically satisfactory reply to the skeptic.

**Love and (Polygamous) Marriage? A Liberal Defense of Opposition to Polygamy**

**Emily Crookston, Washington University in St. Louis**

The issue of legalizing polygamy arises in relationship to the US debate concerning legalization of gay marriage. Opponents of gay marriage raise the threat of a slippery slope: allowing gay marriage would require allowing other non-traditional domestic partnerships, including polygamy, which we think should remain impermissible. This creates a dilemma for political liberal thinkers: (a) allow the slide and explain why we shouldn’t worry about polygamy or (b) stop the slide and explain why polygamy is intrinsically anti-liberal. In this paper, I argue, that political liberals ought to oppose legalization of polygamy on the grounds that it is intrinsically a
structurally inegalitarian practice. While legalization would be permissible within an ideally just democratic political system, I argue that legalization within non-ideally just democratic political systems would increase the risk of exploitation of members of disadvantaged groups in society.

LUCK AND CONTROL

**Stephen Steward, Syracuse University**

I discuss the popular view that luck excludes control. Coffman (2009) and Levy (2009) defend this view against objections from Lackey (2008). I argue that Coffman’s formulation of the view is incomplete without a temporal index. I discuss four different options for time-indexing, and give counterexamples to all of them. Then I propose that luck excludes a different kind of control: guidance control. The resulting account avoids the problems with Coffman’s view.

LYING WITH CONDITIONALS

**Roy Sorensen, Washington University in St. Louis**

If you read this abstract, then you will understand what my essay is about. Under what conditions would the preceding assertion be a lie? Traditional definitions of lying are always applied to straight declaratives such as “The dog ate my homework.” This one sided diet of examples leaves us unprepared for sentences in which conditional probability governs assertibility. The truth-value of conditionals does not play a significant role in the sincere assertion of conditionals. Lying is insincere assertion. So the connection between lying and falsehood is broken when lying with conditionals. Drawing on Frank Jackson’s account of indicative conditionals, I argue that it is possible to lie with true conditionals by virtue of their false conventional implicatures. False conversational implicatures only guarantee misleading assertions, not lies. Lying remains a semantic rather than a pragmatic affair.

MANIPULATION AND THE RATIONAL CAPACITIES

**Moti Gorin, Rice University**

Despite its ubiquity, its conceptual richness, and the subtlety of the ethical problems it raises, interpersonal manipulation has received relatively little attention from philosophers. In this paper I take one modest step toward developing a full account of interpersonal manipulation by examining a claim I have encountered occasionally both in the literature and in conversation. This is the plausible claim that manipulation is, or at least always involves, the bypassing or subversion of the manipulated agent’s rational capacities. If this were true, it likely would be an ethically salient fact about manipulation. I explore various interpretations of what it means to bypass or subvert an agent’s rational capacities and I argue that none of them captures a phenomenon that is always inconsistent with manipulation. Manipulation is sometimes consistent with treating others as rational beings.
MARMOR, PUTNAMIAN EXTERNALISM, AND THE SEMANTICS OF “LAW”

JOHN KWAK, UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA

In chapter five of his *Interpretation and Legal Theory*, Marmor argues that the natural language word “law” is not possibly semantically externalistic, in the sense of Putnam (1975), on the ground that the concept expressed by “law” is a “purely cultural product” and hence incompatible with externalism. The aim of this paper is to present and critically evaluate Marmor’s argument, judging it to be unsound on the ground that it rests on a key equivocation.

MARY ANNE WARREN AND DUTIES TO ANIMALS

MICHAEL BOYLAN, MARYMOUNT UNIVERSITY

This presentation will support Mary Anne Warren’s “weak animal rights” position. In particular the following positions will be discussed: the flaws in the “strong animal rights position” and a critical examination of the weak animal rights position including (1) any creature whose natural mode of life includes the pursuit of certain satisfactions has the right not to be forced to exist without the opportunity to pursue those satisfactions, (2) that any creature which is capable of pain, suffering, or frustration has the right that such experiences not be deliberately inflicted upon it without some compelling reason, (3) that no sentient being should be killed without good reason. In the practice of implementing these principles, it is understood that there needs to be an overarching tie-breaking system that will apply to all non-human organisms.

MARY ANNE WARREN ON REPLICANTS, CYBORGS, AND PRE-COGS: PERSONHOOD AND FEMINIST ETHICS

WANDA TEAYS, MOUNT ST. MARY’S COLLEGE

Early in her career, Mary Anne Warren examined the issues of personhood and membership in the moral community. Her criteria included consciousness, reasoning ability, ability to communicate, among others. (Genetic) humanity was not on the list. Someone could reason, communicate, feel pain and yet not be human. This opened the potential-person door for such entities as vampires, cyborgs, androids, avatars, humanoids, extraterrestrials, and dolphins. In addition, Warren thought it unwise to rest moral agency on one criterion, such as rationality or sentience. In her book *Moral Status* she suggested a few principles to help guide us. The result was a wider view of moral agency and the role of relational properties in moral reasoning—thereby reinforcing the work of Feminist Ethicists. Warren’s discussion merits our attention and helps us better appreciate her legacy.
MASKS, ABILITIES, AND OPPORTUNITIES: WHY THE NEW DISPOSITIONALISM CANNOT SUCCEED

CHRISTOPHER EVAN FRANKLIN, BIOLA UNIVERSITY

Conditional analyses of ability have been nearly entirely abandoned by philosophers of action as woefully inadequate attempts of analyzing the concept of ability. Recently, however, Kadri Vihvelin (2004) and Michael Fara (2008) have appealed to the similarity between dispositions and abilities, as well as recent advances in the metaphysics of dispositions in order to construct superior conditional analyses of ability. Vihvelin and Fara claim that their revised conditional analyses of ability enable them to show that Frankfurt-style cases fail to sever the connection between freedom and responsibility and that compatibilism about free will and determinism is true. I show, however, that even granting the truth of their dispositional analyses, they cannot achieve these aims. Vihvelin and Fara’s fundamental error lies in failing to appreciate the complex nature of free will and moral responsibility, specifically that agents’ freedom and responsibility depend not only on their abilities, but also their opportunities.

MEETING THE DEMAND OF FAMILY JUSTICE: ARGUING FOR RAWLS’S CONSISTENCY

PIN-FEI LU, TAIPEI MEDICAL UNIVERSITY

How should justice be applied to the family? Susan Okin challenges John Rawls for his inconsistently applying the principles of justice to the basic structure of society and the family. In this paper, I defend for Rawls against Okin’s charge of inconsistency. Rawls’s view is not contradictory, for his way of application implies a space for different kinds of duty for people who are near and dear and who are not; moreover, his account of political justice offers a reasonable protection for justice within the family. In other words, Rawlsian way is a dualist arrangement of justice, which is supported by the fact that citizens’ multiple identities and standpoints necessitate different duties and affections. Eventually, Rawlsian family justice could serve as political philosophy for what many of us believe public policy should be in accordance with women’s equality.

METAPHYSICS Θ 6 1048b18-35: A NEW TAKE ON THE ENERGEIA-KINESIS DISTINCTION

R. KATHLEEN HARBIN, UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA

I argue that despite claims that the distinction Aristotle makes in the much disputed passage at Metaphysics Θ 1048b18-35 is primarily linguistic and suggestions that it is somehow confused, it presents a genuinely interesting metaphysical distinction that sheds light on the nature of energeia. I claim the passage shows that in the case of energeia, the present and perfect tenses entail one another, as the “mutual entailment reading” of Makin and Burnyeat claims. But further, this linguistic marker indicates an important metaphysical difference between energeia and kinesis, marking kinesis as a kind of activity that is incomplete, and energeia as a kind of activity more complete than any kinesis and, contrary to some readings, more
complete than any hexis. At the same time, in a way that Burnyeat and Makin do not recognize, the mutual entailment reading shows that kinesis and energeia are both capable of development over time.

METAPHYSICS AS FOUNDATIONS OF SCIENCE

JOHANNA WOLFF, UNIVERSITY OF PUGET SOUND

The question of how much metaphysics is involved in doing science and/or doing philosophy of science is a pressing one. Some philosophers of science consider themselves “anti-metaphysicians” and aim to avoid metaphysics altogether. Others, by contrast, propose that philosophers of science should do metaphysics, but a scientifically grounded metaphysics. These opposing views about the role of philosophers of science vis-à-vis metaphysics indicate a need for clarification: When we look for metaphysics in science, what are we even looking for? In this paper I distinguish two different ways in which metaphysics might be thought to be involved in science, and suggest three conditions for telling whether elements of scientific theories are metaphysics.

METHODOLOGY IN BIOLOGICAL GAME THEORY

SIMON HUTTEGGER, UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA–IRVINE
KEVIN ZOLLMAN, CARNEGIE MELLON UNIVERSITY

Game theory has a prominent role in evolutionary biology, in particular in the ecological study of various phenomena ranging from conflict behavior to altruism to signaling and beyond. The two central methodological tools in biological game theory are the concepts of Nash equilibrium and Evolutionarily Stable Strategy (ESS). While both were inspired by a dynamic conception of evolution, these concepts are essentially static—they only show that a population is uninvadable, but not that a population is likely to evolve. In this paper we argue that a static methodology can lead to misleading views about dynamic evolutionary processes. Instead, we advocate a more pluralistic methodology, which includes both static and dynamic game theoretic tools. Such an approach provides a more complete picture of the evolution of strategic behavior.

MODELING WITHOUT REPRESENTATION

ALISTAIR ISAAC, UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA

Recent analysis of the scientific practice of modeling has puzzled over how to understand the use of models that appear to represent the causal structure of the world incompletely or incorrectly. I argue that this puzzle is an artifact of the realist emphasis on representation that has worked so well in analyzing other areas of scientific practice. I offer an alternative, pragmatic methodology of modeling, inspired by classic papers by modelers themselves. I conclude by arguing that there is no inconsistency between realism about theories and pragmatism about models. Furthermore, apparent inconsistencies between the assumptions
of a successful model and a successful theory should not be treated as a puzzle about the model, but as a clue for better understanding the theory.

**MORAL EMOTIONS: DETECTORS OR PROJECTORS OF MORAL VALUES?**

*William A. Rottschafer, Lewis & Clark College*

I sketch a scientifically based moral realism that has cognitive and motivational roles for moral emotions as detectors of moral properties and motivators of moral action rather than as projectors of moral properties onto a valueless world. To do so, I outline an ontology of objective moral values as relational entities, a theory of moral agency derived from Bandura’s social cognitive theory of agency and a psychological theory of moral affordances. Applying a modified version of Jesse Prinz’s account of emotions, I argue that moral emotions are perceptual detectors of objective moral values and motivators of actions to achieve them.

**MORAL INTUITIONISM DEFEATED?**

*Nathan Ballantyne, Fordham University

Joshua Thurow, Mount Marty College*

Walter Sinnott-Armstrong has developed and progressively refined an argument against moral intuitionism—the view on which some moral beliefs enjoy noninferential justification. To start with, Sinnott-Armstrong highlights a set of facts relevant to the truth of moral beliefs: such beliefs are sometimes biased, influenced by various irrelevant factors, and often subject to disagreement. Given these facts, Sinnott-Armstrong infers that many moral beliefs are false. Once we realize this, he argues, then either our moral beliefs are unjustified or we produce some special reason for thinking that some of them are reliably produced. Either way, our moral beliefs will then no longer be noninferentially justified. This paper argues that Sinnott-Armstrong’s argument employs a dubious epistemological assumption about how defeaters can be defeated.

**MORAL LUCK DEFENDED**

*Nathan Hanna, Drexel University*

Moral luck occurs when someone’s moral standing is affected by factors beyond her control, i.e., “luck.” Many philosophers reject moral luck, but I don’t. I think there’s lots of it. Here, I defend a particular kind of it: circumstantial luck. Circumstantial luck is luck in one’s circumstances that affects one’s moral standing, say luck involving the choices and opportunities one has. I’ll criticize the standard argument against circumstantial luck. The argument claims that counterfactuals about what one would do in different circumstances affect one’s moral standing just as much as what one actually does.
MORAL PERPENDICULARS

HALLIE LIBERTO, UNIVERSITY OF CONNECTICUT

Certain morally evaluative terms do not occupy a clear sub-section on the traditional scale of moral rightness and wrongness. In this paper I will argue that certain such terms, “supererogation” and “evil,” require axes perpendicular to the traditional scale in order for us to comprehensively assess a variety of actions. Luke Russell has argued that no philosopher has produced a plausible account of evil that has successfully arrived at a qualitatively distinct set of characteristics to demarcate evil actions from mere wrong-doing. I will argue that there is a type of distinctness by which two action-types can be identified by the same set of qualities, but measured on different scales. Since an account of evil that Russell deems plausible can be measured on just such a perpendicular axis, Russell is incorrect in his assessment of evil as a ‘wrong intensifier.’

MORAL RESPONSIBILITY, IGNORANCE, AND AKRASIA

PHILIP ROBICHAUD, RICE UNIVERSITY

In this paper I critique an influential account of the epistemic condition of moral responsibility. Any account of the epistemic condition should explain the difference between culpably ignorant agents and blamelessly ignorant ones in a way that illuminates why it is fair or reasonable to blame the former but not the latter. Volitionists maintain that ignorance is culpable only if the ignorance is the product of an agent’s witting violation an epistemic requirement or norm. The relevant norms are understood as requirements to act in certain belief-producing ways. The witting violation of a requirement of this kind is a paradigm instance of akrasia. Volitionists have a powerful argument against any account of the epistemic condition that does not ground culpable ignorance in akrasia. In the most developed version of this strategy, Neil Levy, argues that it is unreasonable to expect agents to take measures to modify their beliefs in cases where agents did not form their beliefs akratically. There are two central claims in his argument. First, he claims that it is unfair to expect agents to modify their beliefs in accordance with an epistemic standard so long as the agent lacks the capacity to do so. Second, he claims that agents possess this capacity only if they can conform to the epistemic standard in a rational way. In this paper, I raise several challenges to this argument. First, I argue that even on the sense of rationality Levy presupposes, agents do have the capacity to modify their beliefs in accordance with epistemic requirements. Second, I argue that Levy’s conception of rationality is far too stringent. On a less stringent and indeed more plausible conception of rationality, Levy’s case against the non-volitionist breaks down. This is a significant result, since much intuitively culpable ignorance is not traceable to akratic actions.
MUSIC AS COMMUNICATION OF AESTHETIC IDEAS

GEORG MOHR, UNIVERSITÄT BREMEN

One crucial and complex claim in Kant’s philosophy of music (Critique of the Power of Judgment, sect. 53) can be unpacked as follows: As beautiful art, music is the expression of “aesthetic ideas.” Aesthetic ideas are expressed by “proportionate dispositions” of sensations with a “mathematical form.” “Composition” with this form leads in music to the “unity of an affect.” This “dominant affect of the piece” is related to a “theme” that is in turn characterized by an “unutterable fullness of thoughts.” This paper attempts to determine what aesthetic ideas in music might be. It attempts to articulate what music might have to do with “fullness of thoughts.” Finally, it attempts to determine what musical theory of “dominant affect” might allow Kant to conceive of music as communication of aesthetic ideas.

MUST PHYSICALISM IMPLY THE SUPERVENIENCE OF THE MENTAL ON THE PHYSICAL?

BARI GAIL MONTERO, CITY UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK–GRADUATE CENTER

The standard arguments against physicalism purport to establish that certain mental properties do not supervene on the fundamental properties of physics, where supervenience is supposed to capture the idea that one set of properties determines, or suffices for, another set of properties. The supervenience of mental properties on fundamental physical properties is taken as a necessary condition for physicalism because the failure of such supervenience is thought to render mental properties nonphysical; and if there is something nonphysical, physicalism, which holds that everything is physical, is false. Many have objected to various aspects of the standard antiphysicalist arguments, but most, if not all, agree that if physicalism is true, then mental properties supervene on the fundamental physical properties. I aim to question this widely, perhaps even universally, held view: Why should the supervenience of the mental on the physical be a necessary condition for physicalism?

NEGATION AND NORMATIVE BELIEF

VLADIMIR VLAOVIC, BROWN UNIVERSITY

Expressivists have not given a convincing account of inconsistency. An agent’s accepting a normative sentence and its negation is a serious mistake. If this is construed by expressivists as an agent’s having logically distinct types of non-cognitive attitudes directed toward the same bit of content, it is unclear what the mistake is. And if this is construed by expressivists as an agent’s having an incompatible (inconsistent) pair of instances of a single type of attitude, the mistake seems to be that these instances of this attitude cannot be jointly realized. The problem with this is that incompatible pairs of wishes seem to be inconsistent in virtue of the fact that they cannot be jointly realized. But there is no rational pressure on an agent with such wishes to abandon or revise his or her wishes, which suggests that the property of being jointly unrealizable does not explain rationally vicious inconsistency relations, such as those involved in an
agent’s accepting a normative sentence and its negation. But an individual belief that is untrue is in some sense incorrect, and this is more serious than being unrealized. So a pair of beliefs both of which cannot be true is more seriously at fault than a pair of instances of any non-cognitive attitude which cannot be realized. This is a point in favor of construing normative judgment cognitively, though perhaps not a decisive one.

Nietzsche and the Tradition of Minimalist Moral Psychology

Joseph Swenson, University of Illinois–Urbana-Champaign

This paper argues that Nietzsche’s enigmatic claims to originality as a psychologist are best understood in terms of two distinct senses of psychological originality operative within his writing. Drawing on Bernard Williams, I argue that the first sense of originality is discovered through Nietzsche’s identification with a minority “minimalist” tradition of moral psychology whose membership stands in opposition to the dominant moralizing tendencies of the Western tradition. But I will argue that Nietzsche also presents us with a second sense of his originality as a psychologist through his claim to inaugurate a radically new evaluative project—the “Revaluation of all Values”—that reveals why he is not only the greatest exemplar of the minimalist moral tradition but also its “opposite.” The novelty of this claim, I will argue, not only serves to significantly qualify Nietzsche’s broadly naturalistic commitments to the tradition of minimalist moral psychology but also serves to justify his otherwise odd claim that psychology did not exist before him.

Non-intentional Action

Brandon Johns, University of Southern California

The existence of intentional and unintentional action is relatively uncontroversial. The question of whether there exists a third type of action—non-intentional action—is the controversial subject of this paper. I present an argument that non-intentional action exists in the form of lucky and side-effect action.

Nonmonotonic Thoughts on Conditional Oughts

Malte Willer, University of Chicago

Every adequate semantics for conditionals and deontic modals must solve a number of paradoxes involving deontic conditionals. Puzzles involving deontic conditionals that articulate contrary-to-duty obligations—obligations that hold in deontically non-ideal circumstances—have received a lot of attention in philosophy and linguistics. I present a semantics for “ifs” and “oughts” that combines insights from dynamic semantics with recent work on informational modal operators. The resulting nonmonotonic logic preserves intuitive rules of inference for iffy oughts (including modus ponens) while offering a plausible treatment of deontic conditionals that articulate contrary-to-duty obligations.
NORMATIVITY AND CRITIQUE

BEATRICE HAN-PILE, UNIVERSITY OF ESSEX

This paper distinguishes two main critical questions: the “how possible,” which looks for enabling conditions (empirical or transcendental) and raises issues of epistemic normativity, and the “whether permissible,” relating to ethical conditions and normativity. It considers the interplay of both questions in Foucault’s work and the various demands for justification which were put to him. It argues that as a consequence of such interplay Foucault is faced with the three sides of the Agrippan trilemma (regression, circularity, and dogmatism), exemplified in various commentators’ attacks about the issue of crypto-normativity, and charts the complex conceptual space available for a defence. After examining several possible replies and their difficulties, it concludes that the best strategy is to refuse the demand for normative justification as self-defeating and to cultivate the development of an appropriate ethical sensibility through an emphasis on critique as a practice of the self.

NORMATIVITY AND THE WILL

RUTH CHANG, RUTGERS UNIVERSITY

What is the role of the will in practical normativity? I offer an answer.

OMISSIONS AS POSSIBILITIES

SARA BERNSTEIN, DUKE UNIVERSITY

What are omissions? Suppose that an airplane technician eats lunch rather than perform a safety check, and the airplane crashes due to a malfunction. Intuitively, the technician’s failure to check the plane causes the plane to crash. What, exactly, is the failure to check the plane? Omissions are metaphysically puzzling. On the one hand, they seem to be nothing: they are events that do not occur. On the other hand, we intuitively reify omissions and grant them causal efficacy. I present and develop the view that omissions are de re possibilities: they are possibilities of actual events. They do not literally fail to occur; rather, they possibly occur. Once we have an ontology of omissions, we can better understand their role in causation and in attributions of moral responsibility.

ON BELIEVING IN NEUTRONS BUT NOT NUMBERS

KENNETH BOYCE, UNIVERSITY OF NOTRE DAME

Scientific realists who do not want to be mathematical realists face a challenge. It seems that our justification for believing in unobservable entities like quarks and neutrons primarily stems from the fact that their existence is entailed by our best, most well-confirmed scientific theories. But our best scientific theories are shot through with mathematics and thereby also entail the existence of mathematical entities. Doesn't epistemological consistency demand, if one believes in concrete unobservables, that one believe in mathematical entities as well? Elliot Sober has suggested a line of response to this challenge of which scientific
realists who are not mathematical realists might want to avail themselves. But (as I argue) it is not obvious that the suggested line of response succeeds. I then show how to extend this line of response so that it does meet the above challenge.

ON THE INFINITE RICHNESS OF SEEMING AND ITS RELEVANCE TO THE HARD PROBLEM OF CONSCIOUSNESS

BERNARD MOLYNEUX, UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA–DAVIS

I show how a previously ignored a priori principle explains the existence of the hard problem of consciousness.

ON THE SCOPE OF CAUSAL EXPLANATION IN PHYSICS

ANDREW WAYNE, UNIVERSITY OF GUELPH

Many philosophers now regard causal approaches to explanation as highly promising, even in physics. Preeminent among these approaches is James Woodward’s influential argument that a wide range of explanations in physics are causal explanations, based on his interventionist approach to causation (Woodward 2003; Woodward 2007). The present paper argues that Woodward’s account of causal explanation is inconsistent with one significant kind of explanation in physics, namely explanations involving highly idealized models. These explanations are not causal, yet they do not fall under any of the types of non-causal explanation Woodward describes. This constitutes a significant limitation on the scope of causal explanation in physics. Causal explanation is simply not as widespread or important in physics as Woodward and other proponents have claimed.

ONE DOGMA OF MILLIANISM

DEREK BALL, UNIVERSITY OF ST. ANDREWS

BRYAN PICKEL, UNIVERSITAT DE BARCELONA

We argue that standard epistemic arguments for Millianism can be generalized to show that every judgment is revisable in light of empirical information, and, therefore, knowable only a posteriori. We argue that Millians are ill-suited to resist this generalization of their arguments, and that they would be better served by a Quinean empiricism.

OPEN POSSIBILITY AND THE KNOWLEDGE ARGUMENT

TORIN ALTER, UNIVERSITY OF ALABAMA–TUSCALOOSA

In his recent book, Consciousness and the Prospects of Physicalism, Derk Pereboom presents an intriguing challenge to the knowledge argument against physicalism. The challenge is based on what he calls the open possibility of introspective inaccuracy: the claim that, given what we now rationally believe, it is epistemically possible that phenomenal properties are not as they are introspectively represented to be. That claim can be understood in different ways, depending on how the relevant notions of possibility and inaccuracy are explicated. I will argue on no
plausible interpretation does it undermine the knowledge argument. Time permitting, I will also briefly explain why similar problems arise for other physicalist strategies, such as the meta-modal objection to the conceivable argument.

**Paradox Lost and Gained: The Coherence of Maximal God**

*Majid Amini, Virginia State University*

The classical monotheistic concept of God has been bedevilled by a plethora of logical and metaphysical paradoxes. Recently there have been a number of attempts claiming that by reforming the traditional concept of God as an omniscient, omnipotent, and omnibenevolent being to a concept of God as the being with maximal consistent set of knowledge, power and benevolence, the monotheistic concept of God can be rescued from contradictions and thereby reinstating a viable version of Anselmian theism. By focusing on omnipotence specifically, the purpose of this paper is therefore twofold: (1) to show the logical impossibility of maintaining an absolute or infinite conception of divine attributes, and (2) to show that even a maximal conception of divine attributes is plagued with the problem of uniqueness of God and a variant of the paradox of omnipotence thus indicating that such reformulations are still beset with dilemmas and paradoxes.

**Partiality and the Significance of Shared History**

*Nina Brewer-Davis, Auburn University*

We have reasons to act differently toward some people than we do toward others, just in virtue of our relationships with them. What can explain the difference between relationships that give rise to partiality and those that do not? Niko Kolodny has recently tried to explain the difference by appeal to shared history, but his account leaves important questions unanswered. These gaps leave him unable to defend his claims about which relationships call for partiality. I argue that shared history between two people is important because of the psychological connectedness that forms between them, which fills in the gaps left by Kolodny’s account. People affect each other’s values and beliefs, and this reciprocal influence grounds special reasons. This account gives us a fuller understanding of the significance of particular relationships, and in some cases, calls for revisions to Kolodny’s conclusions about what reasons those relationships give rise to.

**Patience and Perspective**

*Nicolas Bommarito, Brown University*

In Western philosophy, patience has largely been overlooked. When it is discussed, it is often described as being non-moral and valuable only instrumentally. This is in stark contrast with its central role in Buddhist ethics. I suggest an account of patience, inspired by Buddhist ethics, that analyzes patience in terms of having perspective on our desires and
values. This account explains what sort of patience has intrinsic moral value and why.

**PERCEPTION, FEATURE PERCEPTION, AND OBJECT PERCEPTION**

*Jonathan Cohen, University of California–San Diego*

There is a long and distinguished tradition in philosophy and psychology according to which the mind’s fundamental, foundational connection to the world is made by connecting perceptually to features of objects. On this picture, which we’ll call feature prioritarianism, minds like ours first make contact with the colors, shapes, and sizes of distal items, and then, only on the basis of the representations so obtained, build up representations of the objects that bear these features. The feature priority view maintains, then, that our perception/knowledge of objects asymmetrically depends on our perception/knowledge of simple features. This paper has two aims. First, we will present evidence, drawn from a variety of perceptual effects, that feature prioritarianism cannot be true, since there are cases that speak against the priority of feature representations in perceptual processing. Instead, we claim that the evidence supports an alternative—and more complex—no-priority view. Second, we will offer a framework for a no-priority view that both captures the cases we cite and provides a more sensible architecture in which to understand a variety of productive projects in perceptual science, and show how the framework cross-cuts some recent discussions in philosophy of perception.

**“PERFECTION”: RECONCILING HEAVEN AND RESURRECTION IN AQUINAS’ “TREATISE ON HAPPINESS”**

*Daniel Bader, University of Toronto*

Aquinas must reconcile two aspects of Christian doctrine: that the disembodied souls of saints in heaven are happy, and that the resurrection is a desirable thing. Denial of the first appears to deny the reward of heaven for the holy, and denial of the second would deny the importance of a central doctrine of Christianity. In order to reconcile these positions, Aquinas claims that the disembodied soul has its perfect good, but that the incarnate soul is more perfect still. However, Aquinas appears to be using a comparative degree of an inherently superlative concept: the perfect good. His reconciliation rests in considering perfection under two different aspects: under a psychological aspect as desires needing to be satisfied, and under a metaphysical aspect as being which is interchangeable with goodness. Under the former, no levels of perfection are possible. However, under the latter, they are.

**PERSEVERANCE AS AN INTELLECTUAL VIRTUE**

*Nathan King, Whitworth University*

Much recent work in virtue epistemology has focused on the analysis of cognitive character traits. These traits comprise an important kind of intellectual virtue. Among the intellectual virtues that have received
extended treatment in the literature are responsibility, conscientiousness, honesty, courage, open-mindedness, firmness, humility, charity, and wisdom. To my knowledge, no philosopher has undertaken an extended treatment of perseverance as an intellectual virtue. In the present paper, I take up this task. In section 1, I locate perseverance as a specifically intellectual virtue. In section 2, I adopt an oft-borrowed Aristotelian structure in locating intellectual perseverance in relation to its vice-counterparts, intransigence and irresolution. In section 3, I consider some important relations between perseverance and other intellectual virtues. In particular, I argue that intellectual courage is a species of perseverance—an important result, given the prominence of courage in the present literature.

Philosophy in Japan after World War II

Yukio Irie, Osaka University

After World War II, philosophical research in Japan addressed Marxist and Existentialist philosophies. Research into Marxism moved from a focus on the theory of alienation to a focus on the theory of reification, and Wataru Hiromatu was a distinguished philosopher in this area. Research on Existentialism shifted to research on Phenomenology, Structuralism, Poststructuralism, and Postmodernism. However, the popularity of Marxism declined after the end of Cold War, and that of Postmodernism eroded after the economic bubble burst in 1991. Subsequently, the primary focus of philosophical research shifted gradually to analytic philosophy. Research on applied philosophy and on Japanese philosophy after the Meiji Restoration is currently attracting substantial attention, and these theoretical perspectives are developing into new movements. It is difficult to place the development of philosophy in Japan after World War II into a linear framework. However, an understanding of developments in this domain may reflect the development of theories of personhood or selfhood.

Plato and Movie Violence

Sarah Jansen, University of California–Los Angeles

I shall argue that Plato proposes a plausible model of how popular drama negatively impacts adults, one which ought to shake our collective confidence that the adult psyche is somehow “immune” to the adverse effects of movie violence. First, I shall explore the differences between Greek drama and modern movies. Second, I shall interpret Plato’s analysis of how tragedy corrupts the adult psyche and conclude that Plato’s model is transferrable to modern film, despite differences between Greek and modern theater. In section III I will apply Plato’s model to violent movies, suggesting that contemporary theorizing about the effects of violent movies supports Plato’s model, even though Plato’s model is more comprehensive in that it considers and links the immediate effects of drama inside of the theater (i.e., the evocation of emotion) to the effects of drama outside of the theater. In section IV I consider “pretense theories” of how film evokes
emotion and argue that Plato’s non-pretense model is a formidable rival, insofar as it is better able to explain the after-effects of violent movies on the adult psyche, while remaining sensitive to the fact that adults are less impressionable than youths.

PLATO ON MIMESIS AND MIRRORS

REBECCA BENSEN CAIN, OKLAHOMA STATE UNIVERSITY

I examine how the “mirror passage” in Republic Book X (596c-e) helps Socrates formulate the conception of mimesis used in his arguments against painting and poetry. The focus of my discussion is the metaphysical argument which contains the mirror passage (596a-598b). I show that the mirror analogy gives Socrates a dialectical advantage that he would not otherwise achieve. Socrates builds a framework of Form, artifact, and image which relies heavily upon the appearance-reality distinction which in turn relies upon the metaphorical imagery of the mirror passage. When the argument is examined closely as a dialectical argument, it is quite inadequate. If Socrates succeeds at all with Glaucon in his attempt to show that painters and poets are both imitators, his success is due primarily to the mirror analogy and its metaphorical force.

POSITIVELY MISLEADING ERRORS

MATT HABER, UNIVERSITY OF UTAH

Positively Misleading Errors (PMEs) are cases of scientific reasoning in which adding data to an analysis systematically strengthens support for an erroneous hypothesis over a correct one. PMEs bear resemblance to false positives and statistical inconsistency, but warrant distinction. Notably, PMEs are not a function of poor or insufficient data. Once diagnosed, the very same data may be used to accurately discern features of the system of study. PMEs are also not simply a failure to satisfy statistical consistency, but something logically stronger. PMEs may play both a confounding and constructive role in scientific reasoning, demonstrated by cases drawn from phylogenetics and medicine. The presence of PMEs challenges the notion that accumulation of and simple conditionalization on good data will produce good reasoning. The real story, as is so often the case, is more complex.

PREFERENCES VS. DESIRES: DEBATING THE STRUCTURE OF CONATIVE STATES

ARMIN SCHULZ, LONDON SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS

In this paper, I argue that the question of whether our conative states are monistic (desire-like) or comparative (preference-like) is, despite appearances to the contrary, still very much in need of resolution. In particular, I try to show that, on the one hand, none of the major decision theories can be used to answer this question (as they remain mute on precisely this point), and on the other, the only explicit attempt at settling this debate to date—that of John Pollock—is unsuccessful as well (as it is unjustifiably biased towards desires). In this, way, I hope to show that the
structure of conative states is a widely overlooked issue that still needs to be further investigated.

**Profit-driven Research and Conflicts of Interest: Is Impartiality the Solution?**

_Inmaculada de Melo-Martin, Cornell University_

_Kristen Intemann, Montana State University_

Increased private funding of research has raised two related concerns: a fear that commercial interests may bias the direction of research toward profitable aims, regardless of its social value; and a worry that researchers’ financial conflicts can lead to biases in scientific reasoning. In attempting to address these problems, some have argued for a renewed commitment to a norm of scientific impartiality. Presumably, if scientists are impartial, this will minimize the undue influence of commercial interests. Moreover, several philosophers of science have provided more sophisticated accounts of objectivity that promote impartiality of scientific communities. We argue that problems related to commercialized science cannot be successfully addressed by scientific impartiality, understood as a norm for governing either individual researchers or scientific communities. Instead such worries require reframing the debate from one focusing mainly on epistemic concerns to one attentive to the best way to promote socially responsive research.

**Proper Place, Form, and Natural Elemental Motion in Aristotle**

_Richard Tierney, University of Wisconsin–Milwaukee_

In *Physics* VIII 4, Aristotle articulates a problem that directly relates to the natural motions of the elements (although he actually frames it in the more general terms of “light and heavy things”). The problem is that, in the case of their natural motions, “it is no longer evident, as it is when the motion is unnatural, whence their motion is derived.” This is a problem because of Aristotle’s conviction, of which he also wants to convince his audience, that “all things that are in motion must be moved by something”; a central premise in his argument for the unmoved mover. He purports to solve the problem by appealing to a distinction between two levels of potentiality. In this paper, I argue that in making this appeal, Aristotle implicitly draws upon a particular conception of natural motion, which enables us to understand that the elements must indeed be moved by something.

**Provocation, Sex, and Fashion**

_Jessica Wolfendale, West Virginia University_

The belief that women’s outfits can provoke sexual assault is resilient. Variants of the phrase “dressing provocatively” are used without question in academia and in popular culture, and studies show that many ordinary people believe that a provocatively dressed woman is more likely to be assaulted and bears some responsibility if she is attacked, despite no correlation between wearing revealing clothing and the likelihood of
being sexually assaulted. Yet men’s clothing is never described as sexually provocative. Why? I argue that the concept of provocative dress reflects problematic attitudes about women’s responsibility for men’s sexual behavior and women’s relationship to their bodies. These attitudes are based on the depersonalization and objectification of women’s bodies that alienates women from their bodies and undermines women’s autonomy by creating the threat of sexual attack. The use the phrase masks the seriousness of this harm to women’s autonomy and women’s relationship to their bodies.

PUTTING FALLIBILISM TO WORK

Charity Anderson, St. Louis University

Jeremy Fantl and Matthew McGrath defend the following thesis: (KJ) If you know that p, then p is warranted enough to justify you in f-ing, for any f. In this paper, I discuss their argument for this principle. First, I undermine their argument for KJ and argue that KJ is false: sometimes reasons—even known reasons—are insufficiently warranted to justify action. Second, I argue that a weaker principle can account for an intimate connection between knowledge and action, without the cost of rejecting purism or fallibilism. Finally, I argue that the trilemma they advance is misconceived. KJ, purism, and fallibilism do not form an inconsistent trio. Instead, the trilemma depends on a specific kind of fallibilism. I clarify what kind of fallibilism is needed for the trilemma, and argue that despite a fallibilist position that can maintain both KJ and purism, we nevertheless have sufficient reason to reject KJ.

QUESTIONING CONTEXTUALIST ERROR THEORY

John Waterman, Johns Hopkins University

Epistemic contextualism’s semantic theory is usually paired with a cognitive failure theory to explain, or explain away, problems like Cartesian skepticism. The semantic theory claims “know” is context sensitive. The failure theory claims that while most people make context-sensitive knowledge attributions, they do not recognize the logical commitments of those attributions. Accordingly, the theory claims (i) we know in low scrutiny contexts that there is an external world; (ii) we do not know in high scrutiny contexts that there is an external world; and, (iii) we fail to recognize this is not a contradiction. While the semantic theory has become the object of intense, largely negative experimental scrutiny, the cognitive failure theory has received none. I present data that suggests (i) contrary to prevailing results there is evidence for contextualism’s semantic thesis, but that (ii) the cognitive failure theory is not robust enough to explain away the problem of Cartesian skepticism. Contextualism is correct, but The Demon abides.
RACE AND CONTEXT-SENSITIVITY

JEREMY PIERCE, LE MOYNE COLLEGE

In philosophical literature on race, contextualist accounts usually involve wholesale meaning-change, such as different racial-classification criteria in different locations or changes in how we have thought about race over time. This paper argues for context-sensitive features of race-language and racial-classification more along the lines of the kind of contextualism in epistemology, namely a meaning-shift that admits of degrees along a continuum, such as with “flat” and “tall.” Especially in mixed-race cases, rules of classification can change from context to context, and shifts in which factors we care about or which facts we pay attention to can determine what race someone might be classified as. These cases are mostly outliers, but they indicate something about how race-terms, race-thinking, and racially-influenced behavior operate, elements that are mostly hidden when changes in context fail to change the factors we use in assigning people racial categories.

REASON CLAIMS AND CONTRASTIVE REASONS

JUSTIN SNEDEGAR, UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA

This paper addresses puzzles about two kinds of reason claims: (i) negative reason existentials like “There’s no reason to cry over spilled milk,” and (ii) reason against ascriptions like “The fact that you’ll make a scene is a reason not to cry over spilled milk.” I argue that by adopting a contrastivist view of reasons, on which all reasons are reasons relative to a set of alternatives (or more naturally but less generally, a reason for x rather than y), we can solve both puzzles. I close by discussing how revisionary this suggestion really is.

REASONABLENESS, RESPECT, AND THE RESPONSE TO CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE

SAMUEL HUANG, RICE UNIVERSITY

In this paper I argue that civil disobedients should be not punished unilaterally with ordinary offenders of the same crime, but that sanctions given in cases of civil disobedience may sometimes be adjusted downwards based on two factors: the plausibility of the reasons for the disobedience, and the respect for other citizens shown in the act of disobedience. I argue that this policy could be assimilated into consequentialist, retributive and communicative theories of punishment, and suggest that disobedients in these cases be allowed to choose from differing levels of legal sanction.

RECEPTIVITY, REACTIVITY, AND THE SUCCESSFUL PSYCHOPATH: HOW PSYCHOPATHY UNDERMINES THREE ASSUMPTIONS ABOUT MODERATE REASONS RESPONSIVENESS

ERICK RAMIREZ, UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA–SAN DIEGO

I argue that research on psychopathy undermines three important claims in support of moderate reasons responsive (MRR) theories of responsibility. I characterize psychopathic agents as having difficulty with feeling empathic
distress, as having problems with understanding the salience of their agency, and as not susceptible to “aversive conditioning.” First I argue that psychopathic agents show that the systems that underlie receptiveness to moral and pragmatic reasons bifurcate. This raises a unique form of mechanism individuation problem. Second, these bifurcations newly challenge the claim that “reactivity is all of a piece.” If moral and pragmatic receptivity and reactivity are distinct then we lack a reason to believe that pragmatic reactivity implies moral reactivity. Thirdly, I argue that attempts to incorporate bifurcation into MRR relies on a notion of “appropriate” receptiveness that implies motivational internalism, a claim Fischer and Ravizza have previously rejected.

**Reflective Equilibrium and Cognitive Diversity**

*Susana Nuccetelli, St. Cloud State University*

This paper challenges the “cognitive-diversity argument” offered by Stephen Stich and his collaborators against the Goodman account of the justification of rules of inference. An early version of the argument (Stich 1988, 1990) invokes the logical possibility of cognitive diversity to raise a relativism problem for that account, but a more recent version (Nichols, Stich, and Weinberg 2001; Weinberg, Nichols and Stich 2003) contends that such diversity is a fact. I first show that experimentalists have gained nothing for their argument by taking cognitive diversity to be a fact. I then offer a line of reply that gets Goodmanians off the hook from the experimentalist attempt to raise a relativism problem for them with the early version of the cognitive-diversity argument.

**Remembering the Dinosaur: The Role of Memory Traces in an Account of Constructive Memory**

*Sarah Robins, Washington University in St. Louis*

When I recall a particular past experience, the representation I retrieve may contain features from multiple experiences and even things I have never experienced. A theory of memory traces must explain the constructive nature of memory. Connectionist accounts explain construction as the result of memory traces that are stored suprapositionally. Remembering, reconstructing, and guessing are the same process of activating a network of features amalgamated from various experiences. I propose an alternative dispositional account of memory traces, which accommodates construction without sacrificing the distinction between remembering and other inferential processes. On my view, retrieval is constructive; memory traces are not. Responses to retrieval cues are manifestations of the disposition to remember a past experience. Constructed at cueing, the features manifested in the representation vary as a function of the cue. I conclude by exploring the advantages of an account that distinguishes memory traces from their manifestations in retrieval.
REPRESENTING THE IMPOSSIBLE
JENNIFER J. MATEY, FLORIDA INTERNATIONAL UNIVERSITY
A theory of perception must be capable of explaining the full range of conscious visual perception, including amodal perception. In amodal perception we perceive the world to contain physical features that are not directly detectable by the visual receptors. According to the active-externalist account of perception, amodal perception draws on a type of knowledge that depends on active engagement with perceptual objects. This paper presents a counterexample to the claim that perception of amodal properties depends on active engagement with perceptual objects. The counterexample involves the experience of so-called “impossible objects,” objects experienced in visual character as having geometrical properties that no physically real object can have. Several potential objections to the counterexample are also considered and rejected.

RESPECT FOR AUTOPILOTS: DEFENDING PERSON-BASED ETHICS FROM EMPIRICALLY GROUNDED SKEPTICISM
C. D. MEYERS, UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN MISSISSIPPI
Recently, skeptical arguments have been raised against the existence of persons as morally responsible, self-governing agents. John Doris appeals to psychological evidence indicating that much of our behavior, including important life decisions, is determined by automatic processes below the level of awareness rather than by conscious reflection. I argue that the moral concept of persons is not threatened by these skeptical considerations. First, even if these automatic processes are pervasive, they might only influence behavior within a range narrow enough not to undermine autonomy. More importantly, if we reject moral realism, then the question is what attitudes we should adopt toward our fellow human beings, not whether persons exist independently of our moralizing. Moral concepts do not aim to explain or predict but to prescribe. Even if we have reason to doubt the existence of persons, we still have reasons to retain the concept of personhood in our moral theory.

RESPECT FOR RACISTS AND HOMOPHOBES
JOHN DRAEGER, BUFFALO STATE COLLEGE
This paper considers some of the complexities surrounding respect for those with morally disagreeable views (e.g., racists and homophobes). Because moral attitudes take a variety of objects, it is possible to respect them as persons and admire them as friends, neighbors, professionals, and fellow citizens. Distinguishing between objects allows us to bracket various disagreements especially when these do not have a direct bearing upon fulfilling our role appropriate expectations (as friends, neighbors, professionals, and fellow citizens). But because living with integrity and self-respect requires standing up to injustice, respect for others as fellow moral works in progress requires holding the accountable for their views.
Thus, respect for persons requires confronting the racist and homophobe in a role appropriate way.

Revisionism’s Experimental Evidence

Chris Weigel, Utah Valley University

A revisionist theory of free will says that what we ought to think about free will conflicts with what we do think about free will. A new result in experimental philosophy gives evidence for the view that we must all be revisionists in at least this sense: what we ought to believe about free will cannot include everything we do believe about free will. The folk find neither incompatibilism nor compatibilism intuitive simpliciter. Rather, intuitions change as a function of whether the question is “Is determinism compatible with free will?” or “Is free will compatible with determinism?” No theory can accommodate both intuitions (unless the view that they are mutually exclusive is revised), so revisionism is justified empirically.

Rock Stars, Fine Wine, and Healthcare: Questions about Living by One’s Political Beliefs

Daniel Halliday, University of Melbourne

People often endorse a certain political principle and yet apparently fail to live by it. Libertarians opposed to the state-provision of certain goods may still consume them when their state in fact provides them. Verbal proponents egalitarian redistribution may fail to transfer their wealth voluntarily when the state fails to impose redistributive policies itself. Both cases have been discussed in the Libertarian and Egalitarian literatures, but not together. This paper develops a framework for doing so. In particular, two strategies are identified. First, Libertarians may exploit the fact that many state-provided resources come as public goods, whereas taxation does not have an analogous character. Second, as suggested by some egalitarian authors, political principles may have a sort of collective character. Rejecting some existing developments of this idea, I advance a proposal guided by the way in which a moral requirement may take wide rather than narrow scope across agents.

Self-Blindness and Rationality

Matthew Parrott, University of Puget Sound

Hume believed that all psychological states were distinct existences; each one could exist without any of the others. Even though this thesis intuitively seems to be correct, many contemporary philosophers reject it. Instead, they believe that, with an individual mind, the existence of a psychological state entails knowledge of its existence. On this view, some psychological states ontologically depend on others. Support for this view is found in a well-known argument presented by Sydney Shoemaker in a number of papers. Shoemaker argues that if a person’s psychological states were ontologically independent from her knowledge of them a condition he calls “self-blindness” would be possible. But, according to Shoemaker, this condition is absurd. In this paper, I will argue against Shoemaker that
the best explanation for this impossibility does not deny Hume’s distinct existence thesis. Rather, it can be fully explained by aspects of our rational cognitive agency.

Self-defense, Bystanders, and Human Projectiles

Tyler Doggett, University of Vermont

I consider a powerful and influential argument that, if sound, severely restricts which things may be killed in self-defense. I argue it is unsound and for reasons that have far-reaching implications for which things may be killed in self-defense. The result is a novel theory of why we may kill in self-defense.

Sensitiveness Enhancement: The Ethics of Testing Cognitive Enhancements on Non-Human Research Subjects

John Basl, Bowling Green State University

Cognitive enhancement technologies are already in use, but the future promises technologies that offer the possibility of truly robust, cognitive enhancement. Robust Enhancement Technologies (RETs) raise novel ethical issues. While some of these issues have been discussed, there has been little discussion of the ethics of testing these technologies on non-humans. Testing RETs on non-human research subjects raises the possibility that these research subjects will have their sensitivity to suffering altered or enhanced. For example, drastically increasing the memory of, say, a mouse changes the amount of time it might suffer from a painful experience. In this paper, I argue that the probability of such enhancements is relatively high and that, given the moral relevance of animal suffering, this raises and ethical concern. After developing these concerns, I propose research oversight practices to mitigate against mistreatment of sensitivity enhanced research subjects.

Slote’s Metaphorical Moral Phenomenology

Rachel Schneebaum, University of Arizona

In Moral Sentimentalism, Michael Slote works to develop a metaethical theory that both grounds moral judgments in contingent human sentiments and allows those judgments to be justifiable a priori. Slote relies on a phenomenological claim about moral experiences to support this account: that we feel warmed or chilled when witnessing others’ right or wrong actions. In this paper, I claim that Slote’s appeal to phenomenology is more problematic than it might immediately appear. I work from the position that phenomenology is too idiosyncratic and too theory-laden to serve as argument for or foundation of a metaethical position, and suggest that the metaphorical nature of Slote’s chosen phenomenology allows him to implicitly build normative care ethical commitments into his metaethical semantic account. Thus, I argue, the phenomenology that grounds Slote’s semantic argument cannot serve as the basis for a non-question-begging sentimentalist semantics.
SOCRATES: BEING AN ATHENIAN BY LOVING WISDOM

ROBERT SCHARFF, UNIVERSITY OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

Historians of philosophy, like historians generally, say that history matters to them. So do men and women of action, who use knowledge of the past to guide decisions. To all of them, history matters because they choose to make it matter. There is, however, another sense in which history simply does matter—in philosophical practice, as elsewhere. Our cultural, social, and political past already belongs to us as an inheritance before it becomes a topic of inquiry or source of practical guidance. Understood this way, history belongs to us unchosen and to some extent eludes our efforts to make it explicit. I offer here a case study of the point: the Socrates of Plato's early dialogues. He may not be “interested in history,” but he is very much aware of how it is to “be” historical, which is why he always connects his examined life with being an Athenian.

SPINOZA AND THE YOUNG LEIBNIZ ON CHIMAERAS AND OTHER UNTHINKABLE THINGS

TOM COOK, ROLLINS COLLEGE

In his early writings Spinoza discusses extensively the problem of impossible things and our ideas thereof. Insofar as we understand that these things are impossible (say, round squares), we cannot think them at all. They are chimaeras, and just as these self-contradictory “essences” cannot be instantiated in the attribute of extension, neither can they be instantiated under the attribute of thought—i.e., there can exist no ideas of them at all. We can’t even feign (fingere) them. They are mere words. Rather surprisingly, this is also true of those things whose essences are not internally contradictory, but whose necessary causal conditions are not fulfilled. Only our ignorance and confusion makes it possible for us even to think about such things (or, better, to think that we are thinking about such things). I argue that Leibniz’s thoughts about the ontological argument, the Christian mysteries, and possible worlds can be better understood when approached with these early writings of Spinoza in mind.

STIGMATIZATION AND DENUMRALIZATION AS PUBLIC HEALTH POLICIES: SOME KANTIAN THOUGHTS

RICHARD DEAN, CALIFORNIA STATE UNIVERSITY–LOS ANGELES

The stigmatization of some groups of people, whether for some characteristic they possess or some behavior they engage in, will initially strike most of us as wrong. For many years, academic work in public health, which focused mainly on the stigmatization of HIV-positive individuals, reinforced this natural reaction to stigmatization, by pointing out the negative health effects of stigmatization. But more recently, the apparent success of anti-smoking campaigns which employ stigmatization of smokers has raised questions about whether stigmatization may sometimes be justified, because of its positive effects on public health. Discussion of the issue so far has focused on consequences, and on some Kantian considerations regarding the status of the stigmatized. In this
paper, I argue that further Kantian considerations, regarding the treatment of the general public (the potential stigmatizers) also count against any public health policy involving stigmatization.

**SUBSTANCE, FUNCTION, AND THE A PRIORI**

*Jeremy Heis, University of California–Irvine*

In his book *Substance and Function* and later writings, Ernst Cassirer articulated a novel two-part theory of the a priori. This theory assigns, I argue, both constitutive and regulative roles for a priori representations. These a priori representations help explain the possibility of scientific objectivity and thus also objective reference. I consider three questions. Can Cassirer’s theory avoid collapsing into conventionalism (as Schlick and Reichenbach alleged)? Are the two parts of the theory in tension with one another (as some more recent commentators have alleged)? Can the theory coexist with the very strong confirmation holism that Cassirer also advocates (as Quineans would suspect)? I argue that Cassirer has resources to answer all three questions.

**SUBSTANTIVE AND FORMAL GOODS IN ARISTOTLE: CONTEMPLATION AND FRIENDSHIP**

*Daniel Farnham, St. John’s University*

There is a large divide in Aristotle scholarship between people who think that the final end of eudaimonia is contemplation (dominant end theorists) and those who hold that it is morally virtuous action (inclusive end theorists). In this paper, I introduce a distinction between substantive and formal goods to show that contemplation and friendship are two distinct kinds of good, and that on Aristotle’s view the latter takes priority. Because friendship is a formal good, though, the end result is an argument for inclusivism.

**SUPERSTRONG MULTIMODALITY: A NEW APPROACH TO PERCEPTION**

*Bryce Dalbey, Lewis & Clark College*

Recently, investigations into the contents of perception have looked at sense modalities other than vision. I present three ways sense-specific contents could be unified and provide an argument for the strongest. Weak multimodality holds that modality specific experiences are co-conscious: they are experienced simultaneously as parts of a conjoined overall experience. Each sense could be enjoyed in isolation from the others without change in sense specific content. Strong multimodality claims that sense specific experiences are unified across multimodal frameworks. A tomato can be both red and smooth. A rumbling sound can come from the same location as a diesel motorcycle. Superstrong multimodality holds that we experience only ordinary objects, in a way irreducible to a stable core of modality-specific experiences. Overall perceptual experience is explanatorily and experientially basic. Superstrong multimodality furthermore solves the many-properties problem of common perceptibles by allowing that only overall phenomenal character supervenes on overall content.
THE ARGUMENT FOR SUBJECT-BODY DUALISM FROM TRANSTEMPORAL-IDENTITY

KIRK LUDWIG, INDIANA UNIVERSITY–BLOOMINGTON

Martine Nida-Rümelin has argued recently for subject-body dualism on the basis of reflections on the possibility of survival in fission cases from the literature on personal identity. The argument focuses on the claim that there is a factual difference between the claims that one or the other of two equally good continuers of a person in a fission case is identical with her. I consider three interpretations of the notion of a factual difference that the argument employs, and I argue that on each of them the argument either begs the question or is unsound.

THE BALANCING THEORY OF OUGHT AND REASONS TRANSMISSION

RYAN MILLSAP, UNIVERSITY OF MARYLAND–COLLEGE PARK

This paper investigates one standard account of how all things considered oughts are determined by reasons, a view I'll refer to as the balancing theory. On the balancing theory of ought, one ought to perform an action just in case the reasons for performing that action outweigh the reasons against doing so. So stated, this is a very generic view, and various questions might arise in an attempt to fill in the details. My primary aim in this paper, though, is to look at what sorts of commitments even this general balancing theory will incur in light of the underlying structure it requires. More specifically, I'll argue that the balancing theory needs to be supplemented with principles that outline the entailment relations that hold between reasons. However, once the principles are in place, new issues appear that threaten to weaken the revised theory's overall plausibility.

THE CONFUCIAN CONCEPTION OF FREEDOM FROM A FEMINIST PERSPECTIVE

CHENYANG LI, NANYANG TECHNOLOGICAL UNIVERSITY

In this essay, I argue that it will be fruitful to utilize contemporary feminist theories of freedom and autonomy, particularly the notion of autonomy competency (Diana Meyers), in understanding Confucian freedom. I articulate the Confucian notion of freedom in terms of choosing (ze), and advance a Confucian conception of freedom as choosing the good (ze shan) in unfolding the human xing as endowed by heaven. Utilizing a Hegelian notion of freedom as recognition of necessity, I resolve an apparent contradiction between human freedom and the necessity of human nature.

THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN INDEXICALS AND DEMONSTRATIVES: A CASE STUDY

ALEX RADULESCU, UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA–LOS ANGELES

This paper discusses Kaplan's claim that one can split indexicals into two: pure indexicals and true demonstratives. Briefly, pure indexicals are words like “today” and “I,” which get their semantic value directly from the context, irrespective of the speaker's referential intentions. True demonstratives are words like “this” and “that,” which can only get
a referent by working off the speaker’s intentions, or some other agent-related feature of the situation. I have a number of goals in this paper. First, I argue that the singular second person pronoun “you” is in some ways like typical pure indexicals, and in some other ways more like typical true demonstratives. Second, I argue that there are good reasons to count “you” as a pure indexical. This will lead me to propose a new criterion for the distinction, which plays down the importance of intentions and focuses instead on the word’s stable meaning.

**THE EPISTEMIC FUNCTION OF VIRTUOUS EMOTIONS: THE NEO-CONFUCIAN VIEW**

*Kai Marchal, Soochow University*

The general issue of emotions is complex in Neo-Confucian thought, in part because emotions are closely linked to the idea of Neo-Confucian subjectivity. As is well known, the Neo-Confucian thinker Zhu Xi (1130-1200) particularly emphasizes the role of emotions in human life: the genuineness of “human nature” (xìng) becomes manifest only in “emotions” (qìng). Furthermore, virtuous or moral emotions seem to have epistemic functions in Zhu’s thinking: they serve crucial roles for perceiving salience and provide the ground for a criterion how to react to a specific situation. This paper examines the issue of virtuous or moral emotions in Zhu Xi. In order to make Zhu’s claim more intelligible, it also analyzes his theory of moral motivation and explains the reason why Zhu Xi has often been perceived as a Kantian avant la lettre.

**THE EVOLUTION OF SPITE**

*Patrick Forber, Tufts University*

*Rory Smead, University of California–Irvine*

Spite is the shady relative of altruism. Biological altruism is social behavior that incurs a cost (in fitness) to confer a benefit on other individuals. If altruism involves paying a cost to benefit another, spite involves paying a cost to inflict a greater cost on another. After W. D. Hamilton showed that correlated interactions among kin can produce the evolution of altruistic behavior, he came to realize that spiteful behavior could evolve by a similar process. Here we analyze a model of spite. Generally, spiteful behavior is unstable, but we show that it can evolve and be maintained under specific conditions. While the model is Hamilton’s, we have a novel extension to cases where population size fluctuates over time. By focusing on a paradigm case of spite, our model helps clarify philosophical puzzles surrounding the concept of spite and its application to animal behavior.

**THE JUST SOUL**

*Jeff Sebo, New York University*

We typically think that we are morally permitted to engage in “self-binding”—i.e., to coerce or physically restrain ourselves—in order to get our future selves to do what our present selves want to do. For example, if you currently want to keep yourself from drinking tonight, then you are
morally permitted to give all your beer and money to a friend to keep until morning, as well as, if you really want to cover your bases, have your friend lock you in your room overnight. I argue, however, that this is a mistake. You have a duty to let everyone live the way they want, including yourself. It follows that self-binding is prima facie morally wrong: you need to have a very good reason to justify binding yourself, just as you do with other people.

THE KYOTO SCHOOL ON NOTHINGNESS: JAPAN’S PHILOSOPHICAL RESPONSE TO THE WEST

CURTIS RIGSBY, UNIVERSITY OF GUAM

For the Kyoto School—modern Japan’s most impressive philosophical response to the West—the ultimate Reality grounding and evaluating all being is “Nothingness” (mu). Kyoto thinkers have synthetically characterized Nothingness in terms of Hegelian dialectic, Kantian noumenon, and Christian Divinity, but also as Buddhist Amida and Emptiness. Although Western commentators of Nothingness have focused on its religious and political dimensions, Kyoto School Nothingness is radically holistic, entailing and informing all being, from abstract math and logic, to physics and biology, to ethics and political philosophy, and finally to maximally concrete and complex religious reality. This paper examines the Kyoto architectonic of Nothingness and the epistemology and praxis of its realization, noting its unique formulations by different Kyoto thinkers. This paper also proposes that the holistic character of Nothingness suggests—as intended by the Kyoto thinkers—a critique of Western thought, especially in its highly compartmentalized and non-life-transformational manifestations.

THE LIMITS OF “LIMITED BLOCKAGE” FRANKFURT-STYLE CASES

MICHAEL ROBINSON, GRAND VALLEY STATE UNIVERSITY

Traditionally, philosophers engaged in employing Frankfurt-style cases to challenge the Principle of Alternative Possibilities have mostly sought to construct scenarios that eliminate all an agent’s alternatives. One of the chief difficulties for this traditional approach is that the closer one gets to eliminating absolutely all alternative possibilities the more it appears that agents’ actions in these cases are causally determined. “Limited blockage” versions of these cases are intended to sidestep this worry by blocking all and only those pathways that constitute robust alternative possibilities while leaving open all other alternatives. I argue that, owing to the fact that omissions (and not just actions) are capable of constituting robust alternative possibilities, limited blockage cases cannot avoid collapsing into the more traditional Frankfurt-style cases to which they are meant to be an alternative, and so are vulnerable to the very same concerns they are meant to avoid.
THE MALFUNCTION PROBLEM AND THE FUNCTIONAL INDIVIDUATION OF BIOLOGICAL TRAITS

ADRIAN KWEEK, HARVARD UNIVERSITY

Systemic theories of biological functions hold that a biological trait token’s function is its causal contribution to the overall capacity of its containing system. Coupled with the common view that biological traits are functionally individuated, systemic theories incur the problem of denying the possibility of malfunctions. Amundson and Lauder offer an influential solution to the malfunction problem by rejecting the claim that all biological traits are functionally individuated. Instead, they argue from the practice of functional ascription in anatomy that many biological traits are anatomically—physically as opposed to functionally—individuated. Their solution, however, is limited and they themselves admit to the existence of many important biological traits that are functionally individuated. I propose a reading of their solution that enables a systemic theorist of biological function to accommodate the twin everyday phenomena of malfunctioning biological trait tokens and biologists’ functional individuation of biological traits.

THE METABOLISM OF THE STATE: MACHIAVELLI’S TREATMENT OF THE THEME OF AUXILIARIES AT DISCORSI II.20

SEAN ERWIN, BARRY UNIVERSITY

For many commentators, Machiavelli’s analyses of kinds of armies are only meant to furnish ‘practical’ solutions to a variety of historical problems and not to be seriously considered beyond their Renaissance context. However, my contention in this paper is that Machiavelli’s criticism of princes and republics that make use of the arms of others (arma alienis) deserves more careful attention than it generally receives. In the paper I show how Machiavelli, in his interpretation of the Capuan episode in Livy’s History of Rome (book VII, chapters 38 to 42), uses the theme of arma alienis in the Discorsi to show how the people, no matter how apparently neutralized by the grandi, can be viewed as outside the projects of the state and, because of that fact, capable of effecting decisive change to its structures of authority and to the “metabolism” of the state overall.

THE METAPHYSICS OF NON-PROPOSITIONAL ATTITUDES

ALEX GRZANKOWSKI, UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS–AUSTIN

Most philosophical discussions of the attitudes start and end with a treatment of the propositional attitudes. This is unfortunate, for there are non-propositional attitudes. I like Sally, my brother fears snakes, everyone loves my grandmother, and Rush Limbaugh hates Obama. Such states feature prominently in our folk-theory of the mind, but their objects seem to be, at least on the face of things, something other than propositions. Without some treatment of these attitudes, a theory of the mind can’t be complete. The present paper offers a positive treatment of the non-
propositional attitudes that avoids especially difficult problems that they pose concerning non-existent entities.

**THE NATURE AND VALUE OF SOTL**

*David Concepcion, Ball State University*

*Paul Green, Mount St. Mary’s College*

In order to teach well, we need to develop content expertise. But we also need to develop pedagogical expertise. Many philosophers interested in maximizing student learning have turned to the Scholarship of Teaching and Learning (SoTL) to develop pedagogical expertise, and some are now making important contributions to the SoTL field. Our presentation is designed to address basic questions regarding the Scholarship of Teaching and Learning: What is SoTL (and how is it different from good teaching; from scholarly teaching)? What is its value to the practitioner? To the profession? And, most importantly, to students? What are the first steps for faculty who wish to newly engage themselves in SoTL? The goods of SoTL are many, and our aim is to help faculty who care about student learning make effective and innovative use of the extant research regarding teaching and learning.

**THE PHILOSOPHER’S PATH**

*Julia Annas, University of Arizona*

The Dewey Lecture offers an opportunity “for personal reflection on a lifetime of work as a teacher and scholar.” I hope to present my thoughts on aspects of my philosophical life which are somewhat unusual in the U.S: my journey from classics to philosophy, from Britain to the United States, from all-women’s schools and university college to teaching in a different and changing intellectual world.

**THE QUEER WORK OF REMEMBERING FOR THE FUTURE: AFFECT, MEMORY, AND BIOETHICS**

*Alexis Shotwell, Laurentian University*

In this paper, I examine the ACT UP Oral History Project’s depiction of medical activism around the HIV/AIDS crisis. I offer an account of how we should think of genealogy and its reclassificatory work as a kind of memory project, using Sue Campbell’s conception of “remembering for the future.” I render this idea—of remembering for the future—in relation to Ladelle McWhorter’s recent work on biopolitics, and on classification and its consequences, and situated memory work in relation to a larger set of questions about disability, genealogy, memory, and queers reclassifying ourselves in relation to medical knowledge and memory practices. I close with an account of why understanding bioethics in terms of biopolitics might help us think about a critical disability politics of time in a mode of queer futurity, and how that work benefits from a Campbellian attention to affect and memory.
THE ROLE OF IMAGINATION IN DELUSION: TWO HYPOTHESES
KENGO MIYAZONO, UNIVERSITY OF TOKYO

In this presentation, I investigate the role of imagination in delusion by examining two hypotheses on the relationship between imagination and delusion in light of recent empirical research. The first hypothesis says that delusion is caused by (perceptual) imagination (McGinn). According to the second hypothesis, on the other hand, delusion is (propositional) imagination (Currie). The first hypothesis posits a misidentification by the patients between perception and perceptual imagination, while the second posits a misidentification between belief and propositional imagination. My main claim in this presentation is that there is some empirical evidence for the perception-perceptual imagination misidentification, and therefore the first hypothesis is more empirically credible than the second, at least, in the present stage of empirical research. The relevant empirical evidence mainly come from recent researches on reality monitoring deficits in anosognosia for hemiplegia, hallucination, and confabulation.

THE ROLE OF INTERNAL REASONS IN PSYCHIATRY
GARY GALA, UNIVERSITY OF NORTH CAROLINA–CHAPEL HILL

DANIEL MOSELEY, UNIVERSITY OF NORTH CAROLINA–CHAPEL HILL

Psychiatric evaluations ought to centrally involve the psychiatrist apprehending the patient’s internal reasons for treatment. By focusing on the patient’s internal reasons, the psychiatrist is well positioned to provide effective and justifiable psychiatric intervention and treatment of the patient’s psychiatric disorder. We focus on cases of self-harm because they are often invoked by civil libertarians that contend that psychiatry is essentially coercive and unduly paternalistic.

THE RULE-STANDARD CONTINUUM
RICHARD GREENSTEIN, TEMPLE UNIVERSITY

As commonly understood, rules and standards are distinct tools available to legislators, judges, and administrators to use in fashioning the law to meet the relevant policy objectives. This paper argues that the reality is far more complicated. First, rules and standards do not represent binary alternative forms that legal provisions can take, but rather poles of a continuum, along which legal provisions display various blends of rule-like and standard-like qualities. Second, the location of a provision of law along this continuum is not fixed at the time the law is promulgated; rather, it emerges out of an ongoing dynamic among lawmakers, the population subject to the law, and those tasked with administering the law—a dynamic that is fueled by social attitudes toward the values underlying the provision. Examining three specific examples of legal provisions, the paper offers an account of what determines their locations along the rule-standard continuum.
THE SENSES

Fiona Macpherson, University of Glasgow

In this paper I elaborate on a suggestion that I made in earlier work that we can arrange the sensory modalities in a space that enables us to see how similar and how different they are from each other. In particular, I respond to worries for such a view recently articulated by Richard Gray who suggests that the dimensions of such a space must be independent and continuous. I outline different ways in which dimensions can be independent and continuous. I argue that they that they need not be independent and that they need only be continuous in one sense. I then illustrate how we can use all four criteria that are standardly taken as competing accounts of individuating the senses to determine (in some cases overlapping) sets of dimensions within which we can order the actual and possible sensory modalities.

THE SKILL OF VIRTUE AND THE PSYCHOLOGY OF EXPERTISE

Matt Stichter, Washington State University

One approach to understanding virtue has been to compare and contrast virtues with practical skills, since both involve learning how to act well. If the thesis that a virtue is a type of skill is correct, then it will have a significant impact on our conceptions of virtue and moral knowledge. Determining whether a skill model of virtue is plausible requires answering two central questions. First, what is the nature of skills and expertise? Second, what characteristics would virtues and the virtuous person have if they are modeled on skills and expertise? This paper delves into both questions, by analyzing some of the current psychological research on expertise and exploring the philosophical implications of that research for virtue theory. Various arguments that have been given both for and against the skill model of virtue will be examined in order to determine which arguments are empirically consistent with the psychology literature.

THE SORAL RESEMBLANCE PROBLEM

Joongol Kim, Seoul National University

This paper presents a new problem for the neo-Fregean interpretation of Hume’s Principle (HP) as an implicit definition of the concept of cardinal number. More specifically, it will be argued that we cannot determine by HP whether cardinal numbers are any more similar to real numbers than to persons, and so, contrary to the neo-Fregean view, HP cannot be viewed as providing an adequate characterization of the sortal essence of cardinal numbers.

THE STANDARD THEORY OF CONSCIOUS PERCEPTION

Carolyn Dicey Jennings, Boston University

In this paper I argue that, assuming the possibility of a natural explanation of conscious perception, the prioritization of sensations brought about by attention is constitutive of and essential to conscious perception. That is,
where “conscious perception” refers to the experience of sensory content arranged within a space-time framework, attention can be shown to be at the heart of any explanation of such content. Put another way, attention is required to solve the neuropsychological problems of division and unity. Thus, attention is necessary for conscious perception as we know it. I present this argument through a theory, which I call the “Standard Theory.”

THEORIES OF PRESENTNESS

ULRICH MEYER, COLGATE UNIVERSITY

I argue that there is no property of presentness that only one time possesses, and whose possession makes it the case that that time is present. In this short version of the paper, I focus on what I call internal theories of presentness, and show that they run into the same difficulties as the property theories of actuality discussed in Robert Merrihew Adams’ 1974 paper “Theories of Actuality.” Examples of internal theories of presentness are the moving spotlight theory and Lynne Rudder Baker’s BA theory of time. The longer version of the paper presents a second argument against external theories, which include presentism and the growing block view.

THINKING AGAIN ABOUT MECHANISMS

MELINDA FAGAN, RICE UNIVERSITY

Many explanations of biological phenomena describe underlying causal processes. Woodward’s manipulability theory offers a satisfying analysis of these causal relations. But if this theory is correct, then mechanistic explanations are not causal explanations. The concept of “jointness,” parts working together to constitute a whole, better explicates mechanistic explanations in biology.

THinking And Learning: Does the Concept of a Philosophy High School Entail Particular Principles of Education?

JANA MOHR LONE, UNIVERSITY OF WASHINGTON

“Philosophy high schools” are schools in which philosophical inquiry on the part of the students is the foundation of everything that goes on in classrooms. This structure demands a commitment to the following four principles of education: collaborative inquiry, independent thinking, epistemological modesty, and the value of questions. Collaborative inquiry is aimed at constructing meaning and acquiring understanding through the examination of questions of interest to the classroom community. Cultivation of students’ ability to think independently is at the heart of this endeavor, which facilitates student reflection about some of the fundamental aspects of human experience and supports the development of strong analytic reasoning skills. Epistemological modesty involves an acknowledgement that all members of the class, including the teacher, are fallible, and therefore hold views that could end up being mistaken. Finally, the ability to construct and ask good questions is understood as an indispensable skill for navigating contemporary life.
THIS PRESENT SUFFERING: AN EARLY FEMINIST REVISION TO LEIBNIZIAN THEODICY

JILL GRAPER HERNANDEZ, UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS–SAN ANTONIO

Contemporary feminists have criticized theodicy for its use of a theoretical concept of moral evil that is disconnected from, especially, concrete atrocious evil. But these feminists were not the first to do so. This paper demonstrates that the philosophical work of Mary Hays grounds evil in particular concrete sufferings of the exploited, but also provides several defenses of the divine that can only be called “theodicy”: God had to create the world as he did, and concrete moral evil is a part of the world that does not impinge upon divine omniscience, omnibenevolence, or omnipotence. This theodicy, I will argue, should be considered as a rich, unique philosophical project that compliments and furthers traditional theodicy while better assuaging the contemporary feminist critique.

THREE CONCEPTS OF AGNOSTICISM

SCOT YODER, MICHIGAN STATE UNIVERSITY

In this paper I will argue that debates regarding religious agnosticism have suffered from a failure to distinguish between three possible conceptions of agnosticism. My hope is that paying attention to these distinctions will make future debates about the justification of agnosticism more productive. In Part One I look at the emergence of the term “agnosticism” in the work of T.H. Huxley. In Part Two I identify and describe three distinct conceptions of agnosticism—agnosticism as not knowing, agnosticism as not believing, and agnosticism as not accepting. In Part Three I examine Richard Dawkins’s argument against agnosticism in *The God Delusion* to illustrate how a failure to recognize these different conceptions can undermine arguments regarding the justification of agnosticism.

TOWARD A NATURALISTIC REFORMATION OF QUINEAN META-O NTOL OGY

MATTHEW HAUG, COLLEGE OF WILLIAM AND MARY

In this paper, I explore the prospects for reforming the standard Quinean approach to answering ontological questions. Drawing on and revising work by Penelope Maddy and Zoltan Szabó, I formulate and defend a schema for determining ontological commitments according to which it is not possible to read off such commitments from the theories one accepts. I argue that Maddy’s critique of confirmational holism and her focus on detection, a novel form of evidence that goes beyond Quinean theoretical virtues, can be used to improve Szabó’s account of ontological commitment, which holds that in some cases it is rational to believe that some entities exist while refusing to believe in such entities (i.e., while refraining from full-blown ontological commitment to those entities). The resulting hybrid account captures the grain of truth in skeptical attitudes toward ontology and has interesting implications for the nature of naturalized metaphysics and its relation to other disciplines.
TRUTHMAKER THEORY WITHOUT TRUTHMAKERS

PABLO RYCHTER, UNIVERSITAT DE VALÈNCIA

The idea that there may be truthmaking without truthmakers is familiar. Several authors have argued that although every true proposition is made true by reality, there need not be particular entities (like facts, states of affairs, or tropes) that make these propositions true. Here I would like to go further and argue that we can also have truthmaker theory without truthmakers: talk about truthmakers within the theory can be understood as metaphoric and as conveying valuable information about something other than the supposed truthmakers (about truthmaking). In section 1, I will outline the debate between truthmaker theorists and their critics. In section 2, I will discuss two arguments for truthmaker theory and show how they can be resisted. This will help me motivate the figuralist approach to truthmaker theory, which I introduce in section 3.

TWELFTH CENTURY REFLECTIONS ON MEREOLOGICAL CHANGELINESS

ANDREW ARLIG, BROOKLYN COLLEGE

The doctrine of Mereological Essentialism states that a whole is necessarily individuated by and depends upon a specific sum of parts. There is a principle entailed by Mereological Essentialism, which Alvin Plantinga once dubbed the Principle of Mereological Changelessness. Plantinga’s principle entails a claim about part-whole dependence, namely, that if something is a part of a whole, then if it ceases to be a part of that whole, the whole ceases to exist. In the Twelfth Century there was much reflection on Mereological Changlessness and the propositions concerning persistence and dependence that are entailed by this principle. In this paper I will examine some of these reflections. I will pay particular attention to a fascinating treatise that takes a hard look at the thesis that a whole existentially depends upon each and every one of its parts.

TWO “OUGHTS” OF KANT’S COMMON SENSE

LINDA PALMER, UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA–IRVINE

In §22 of the Critique of Judgment Kant raises a puzzling question about the “common sense”; here I would like to relate Kant’s question to a normative requirement for the development of both our cognitive and aesthetic capacities, as individuals and in society. This approach draws on a suggestion originally made by Henry Allison regarding the “aesthetic common sense.” I take it that Kant’s new principle of reflective judgment is fundamentally epistemologically normative (in Hannah Ginsborg’s sense), but that this very demand inevitably shades into the morally normative in connection with our use of concepts embedded in society and in the human community.
**Type Pluralism and the Semantics of Cardinals**

**Eric Snyder, Ohio State University**

In this paper I argue for two key claims. First, contrary to certain influential views within the Philosophy of Mathematics, I claim that cardinals are neither exclusively referential nor exclusively quantificational expressions. They also occur as predicative expressions. Secondly, I claim that cardinals can denote all three of those semantic types, i.e., cardinals are type-ambiguous, and certain type-shifting principles serve to relate those various semantic types, similarly to other type-shifting noun phrases. The resulting view, what I call “type pluralism,” is altogether better than its “monist” alternatives in that it respects the linguistic data without having to posit a (potentially) infinite number of lexical ambiguities. I offer a semantics for cardinals consonant with type pluralism, showing how various apparently conflicting but important intuitions can be reconciled and explained once the appropriate domain structure is in place.

**Undermining Tracing Globally**

**Roman Altshuler, State University of New York – Stony Brook and Marymount Manhattan College**

Most accounts of moral responsibility appeal to a tracing condition, on which responsibility for actions that lack the usual responsibility-bestowing features is explained by tracing those actions to prior ones which do have them. Recently, the appeal to tracing has come under assault from Vargas, who argues that in many ordinary cases a tracing analysis can yield no help with establishing responsibility. Thus, tracing fails to explain moral responsibility in a troublingly large number of the sorts of cases it is designed to make sense of. Fischer and Tognazzini have responded that Vargas’s case-based arguments fail to establish either a need for tracing or any reason to doubt its appropriateness. I argue that Vargas’s argument survives if we understand it as focusing on the difficulty involved with tracing responsibility for character. In fact, the argument is even stronger than Vargas takes it to be: it shows that tracing fails globally.

**Understanding Some Cases of Altruism as Permissible Mistakes**

**Elizabeth Harman, Princeton University**

I develop a view on which some supererogatory actions are morally permissible mistakes: while they are morally good things to do, nevertheless, one should not do them, all things considered. I consider the example of gamete donation as a possible instance of something morally good to do but that is nevertheless a mistake. I argue that the view is coherent and plausible, and that it may apply to many supererogatory actions.
Understanding the Conceptual Interdependence of Justice and Injustice

Sean Aas, Brown University

“We do not live in a just world,” says Tom Nagel, “That may be the least controversial claim one can make in political theory.” Our world, taken as a whole, is not just. But this doesn’t mean that it’s unjust. Some things are neither just nor unjust. To understand whether and how the world is unjust, then, we need to get clear on the nature of the justice-injustice relation. But we can’t do this until we get clear on the nature of a third property, the property things have when they are unjust-if-not-just. Questions about this property are closely related to question about what kind of justice (the justice of states of affairs, people, actions, or relationships) is most fundamental. Drawing on this relation, I argue here that there’s some reason to think that things in general are either just or unjust if they are suitably related to distributively significant social relationships.

Unity and the Frege-Geach Problem

Christopher Hom, Texas Tech University

Jeremy Schwartz, Texas Tech University

The problem of the unity of the proposition asks what binds together the constituents of a proposition into a fully formed proposition that provides truth-conditions for the sentence that expresses it, rather than merely a set of objects. Hanks’s solution is to reject the traditional distinction between content and force. According to him, propositions are speech act types, and the attitudes that the speakers take toward propositions are essential for their contents. Although Hanks does not draw the inference, his proposal extends naturally to metaethics as a solution to the Frege-Geach problem, since expressivists believe that the attitude of the speaker is part of the content of a normative term. Unfortunately Hanks’s theory isn’t successful, but it does point to significant connections between expressivism, unity and embedding.

Use, Reference, and Experimental Data

Genoveva Marti, ICREA and Universitat de Barcelona

My purpose is to discuss recent proposals by experimental philosophers based on data that seem to indicate that the semantic intuitions on which philosophers have relied when discussing the theory of reference and, in particular, the semantics of proper names and other singular terms, are not universal, since there appear to be wide differences, both cross-cultural and intra-cultural in intuitive judgments about reference. I contend that the tests conducted by experimentalists do not elicit the kind of data that could have an impact in the theory of reference and that they are thus irrelevant for semantic theorizing. This discussion leads to a reflection on what kind of data constitutes the input of semantics.
Using Optimality Models to Explain Evolutionary Phenomena

Collin Rice, University of Missouri

Recently philosophers of science have begun to pay more attention to the use of idealized mathematical models. An important example of idealized mathematical modeling is the widespread use of optimality models in evolutionary biology. In two recent articles, Angela Potochnik has argued that it is their ability to identify general causal patterns—by focusing on a modular part of a causal process and omitting other causal factors—that secures optimality models a permanent role in the future of evolutionary biology. In this paper, I first argue that Potochnik’s account misleading implies that the explanations of optimality models are necessarily more general than those provided by more inclusive evolutionary models. In addition, I argue that not all optimality explanations can be understood as censored causal explanations in the way required by Potochnik’s view. In response, I suggest an alternative approach that emphasizes optimality models’ reliance on representing tradeoffs, appeal to equilibrium, and use of idealizations.

Value and Reasons for Preservation

Erich Matthes, University of California–Berkeley

Many philosophers (including G.A. Cohen, Samuel Scheffler, T. M. Scanlon, and Joseph Raz) have claimed that reasons for preservation are fundamental to the concept of value. In contrast with these philosophers, I argue that reasons for preservation are subordinate to and dependent on other reasons associated with value, namely, reasons for engagement: the prima facie demand for preservation of a valuable object falls away where it is inconsistent with proper engagement with that value. Nevertheless, I argue that the intuition at the core of the thesis about the fundamentality of reasons for preservation can be accommodated, while providing an alternative that offers a clear explanatory advantage. In addition to this theoretical payoff, the priority of engagement over preservation that I present offers a framework for analyzing and resolving disputes in the applied literature on environmental ethics, bioethics, art restoration, and heritage ethics.

Vargas-style Revisionism and the Problem of Desert

Stephen Morris, City University of New York–College of Staten Island

Manuel Vargas argues that we ought to accept a revised understanding of the terms “free will” and “moral responsibility” that eliminates the libertarian commitments inherent in the commonsense conceptions of these terms. His rationale is that these revised terms are plausibly attributable to human beings and can play virtually all of the important roles that the commonsense terms have been traditionally valued for. In response to Derk Pereboom’s criticism that Vargas’s revisionist position cannot adequately address the question of whether or not people are capable of possessing the basic desert sense of responsibility, Vargas argues
that we are justified in accepting a revised notion of basic desert since this
notion fosters attentiveness to moral reasons. I argue that Vargas’s attempt
to preserve the notion of basic desert within his revisionist account does
not succeed since he does not adequately explain why being attentive to
moral reasons is valuable.

Vindicating Testimonial Acquaintance

**Michael J. Raven, University of Victoria**

Someone is testimonially acquainted with something just in case one’s
ability to think de re about it is grounded in communication with others
who already have that ability. The apparent expensiveness of acquaintance
in general conflicts with the apparent cheapness of acquiring it
testimonially in particular. I explore a sketch of how this conflict dissolves
by distinguishing the cheapness of having a de re thought from the
expensiveness of accessing it.

Virtue and Skill: Virtue Epistemology and Chinese Philosophy

**Chienkuo Mi, Soochow University**

We have been witnessing a “virtue” turn since 1980, not only in ethics
and epistemology in the western philosophy, but also in a new way of
exploring Chinese philosophy. In order to grasp clearly what philosophical
significances it has brought to the interdisciplinary dialogues and the
international collaboration, we must pay attention to what the concept
of “virtue” really connotes. There are at least three different approaches
in which we can accommodate and manipulate the concept of virtue:
virtue as personal traits or character, virtue as faculties or competence,
and virtue as abilities or disposition. However the concept of virtue can
also be understood as “skills” or background expertise. This way of
revealing virtue will more suitably link the theories of “virtue” to Taoism
and Zhuangzi. When “virtue” and “skill” are bound more closely together,
we can make much better sense of “flow” and “flourishing” in Zhuangzi’s
philosophical viewpoints.

Virtues and Pre-political Life in Plato’s Laws III and IV

**George Harvey, Indiana University Southeast**

In his discussion of the origins of political systems (politeias), the Athenian
Stranger finds a great deal to be admired in the ethical characters of the
individuals living in the period prior to the emergence of political life. He
describes their superiority to modern man in terms of the ethical qualities
they possess (679e), but makes clear that pre-political individuals do not
possess complete virtue (678b). In book IV the Athenian presents this
Age of Cronus as the model for what the art of politics, even in the best
possible circumstances, can only imitate (713a-714b). This paper aims at
offering a clearer account of the ethical character the Athenian associates
with pre-political life, and showing that the features the Athenian finds so
admirable are the same as those he identifies as central to his conception
of ethical virtue.
Was There Something in Nothingness? The Debate on the Primordial State Between Neo-Daoism and Neo-Confucianism

JeeLoo Liu, California State University–Fullerton

The notion of nothingness (wu) can be taken as either a cosmological or an ontological concept. As a cosmological concept, it is contrasted with something and the issue is whether there was something or nothing at the beginning of the cosmos. As an ontological notion, it is contrasted with being and is closely associated with such notions as non-being and emptiness. This paper deals with nothingness in the cosmological sense. In Daodejing, “wu” is sometimes used to signify something vague, elusive, formless, shapeless, inaudible, invisible, and nameless. This undifferentiated something, which existed before heaven and earth, is what Laozi calls “Dao.” It can be understood as nothingness since there was no object, no thing, no shape nor form; however, it is not primordial absolute nothingness. Some neo-Daoists as well as neo-Confucians identify this primordial something as “primordial qi” (yuan qi). This paper examines whether there really could be primordial absolute nothingness.

What Are Groups?

Katherine Ritchie, University of Texas–Austin

In this paper I argue for a view of things like teams, committees and courts, which I call groups. I begin by examining the features all groups seem to have in common. I formulate a list of seven criteria that any adequate theory of groups must capture. I then examine three of the most prominent views of groups currently on offer that groups are fusions, aggregates and sets. I argue that each fails to capture one or more of the criteria. Last, I develop the view that groups are realized structures. Such a view has two components. First, groups are entities with structure. Second, groups are concreta, so they exist only when a group structure is realized. I show how the view captures the seven criteria while offering a substantive answer to the question, “What are groups?”

What Can/Ought I Do? Vagueness in Abilities, Options, and Utilities

Sean Drysdale Walsh, University of Minnesota–Duluth

In this paper, I argue that: 1. Options, but not abilities, satisfy the “Simple Conditional Analysis” of counterfactuals. One has the option to do X if one both (a) has the ability to do X and (b) meets certain other “move forward conditions” (regarding finks, masks, etc.). Having the option to do X implies one has the ability to do X, but not vice versa. It will turn out that having the option to do X implies that certain subtle, complex counterfactuals hold (more complex than David Lewis’s in his “sophisticated dispositionalism”). These subtle counterfactuals will be important to the vagueness of options. 2. Due to this “counterfactual analysis” (and other factors), it is often metaphysically vague what a given agent is able to do, and thus, 3. It is often metaphysically vague what options an agent has, and thus, 4. It is often metaphysically vague for a given option or options whether there
are better options, and thus, 5. It is often metaphysically vague what, on utilitarianism, the rightness status for many options is, since it is vague whether they are indeed the maximal option, and, 6. Epistemological alternatives to metaphysical vagueness lack the proper motivations (e.g., holding Leibniz’s Law) that obtain for other domains, and thus we should accept that there is metaphysical (rather than merely epistemological) vagueness concerning abilities, options, and utilities (e.g., Leibniz’s Law) in this domain.

**What Is the Kantian Will?**

*E.S. Elizondo, Yale University*

Kantian ethics is an ethics of will. But what does Kant take the will to be? In this paper I sketch an answer. I take as my starting point Kant’s identification of the will as a rational faculty of desire. I make three points. First, the will is not merely a faculty of desire, a faculty to bring things about. It is also, insofar as it is rational, a faculty of cognition, a faculty to cognize objects as to be brought about, i.e., as good. Second, as a consequence of this double nature, the will is subject to double success conditions. It is successful both when it brings things about and when it correctly cognizes what is good. Third, it is this cognitive success in which the goodness of the will properly consists. I conclude by reflecting on the significance of these points for Kant’s account of moral motivation.

**What Would It Take to Change Your Mind?**

*Peter Thielke, Pomona College*

Most of us have settled views about various philosophical debates, and much of the activity of philosophers is devoted to giving arguments that are designed to convince opponents to change their minds about a certain issue. But, what might this process require? More pointedly, can you clearly imagine what it would take to make you change your mind about a position you currently hold? I argue that the surprising answer to this question is no; you cannot imagine what would convince you to change your mind, since in doing so you would actually have to find that reason compelling. I then briefly look at some implications of this conclusion.

**White on Imprecise Credences**

*Dylan Dodd, University of Aberdeen*

According to the Imprecise Credence Framework (ICF), a rational believer’s doxastic state should be modeled by a set of probability functions rather than a single probability function, namely the set of probability functions allowed by the evidence (Joyce [3]). Roger White has recently given an arresting argument against the ICF, which has garnered a number of responses. In this paper, I attempt to cast doubt on his argument. First, I point out that it’s not an argument against the ICF per se, but an argument for the Principle of Indifference. Second, I present an argument that’s analogous to White—I argue that if White’s premises
are true, the premises of this argument are too. But the premises of my argument entail something obviously false. Therefore, White’s premises must not all be true.

WHY GAY AND FEMINIST SCHOLARS SHOULD STOP OPPOSING SAME-SEX MARRIAGE

CHRISTINE PIERCE, NORTH CAROLINA STATE UNIVERSITY

The concept of “beyond marriage” as advocated by sociology professor Judith Stacey and law professor Nancy Polikoff, among others, is based on the assertion that a focus on legalizing same-sex marriage is discriminatory against the unmarried and either will or might derail the more important goal of reforming family law for all families. I argue that the Stacey-Polikoff view (1) is wrong-headed from a rights point of view, (2) barely takes account of and certainly gives no serious weight to the argument from respect for marriage equality,(3) is incorrect, at least from the history of U.S. Supreme Court decisions on the definition of “family,” in claiming that same-sex couples must wait for comprehensive family law reform before they can marry;(4) ignores social science evidence that undermines their claims of discrimination,and (5) risks being homophobic in effect, if not in intent.

WHY IT DOESN’T MATTER WHETHER SIMPLICITY IS TRUTH-CONDUCTIVE

ROBERT FISCHER, TEXAS STATE UNIVERSITY–SAN MARCOS

Given a number of competing hypotheses, inference to the best explanation (IBE) recommends believing the one that scores best on the explanatory virtues: conservatism, modesty, simplicity, generality, and predictive power. Whatever IBE’s appeal, many philosophers deny that its epistemic credentials are in good order. One standard objection is that (1) some of the explanatory virtues are not truth-conducive, so (2) IBE is not truth-conducive, and so (3) IBE cannot provide epistemic justification. I argue that the move from (1) to (2) is illegitimate. I argue that the move depends on an implausible model of how IBE works; and, once that model is exposed, it becomes clear that the objection fails. If there is a problem with IBE’s epistemic credentials, this line of reasoning doesn’t identify it.

WISDOM AS AN EXPERT SKILL

JASON SWARTWOOD, UNIVERSITY OF MINNESOTA–TWIN CITIES

Recently, some philosophers have suggested that we can vindicate the claim that wise people intuitively see what ought to be done by modeling virtue and wisdom on expert skills: just as, for example, expert chess players learn through feedback and practice to see what moves are best, a person can learn through feedback and practice to see what virtue requires. Daniel Jacobson (2005) has argued that this expert skill model of wisdom fails to fulfill its promise, since wisdom is “not a plausible human skill.” While it is clear how a chess player can get good feedback on her moves, feedback on the virtue of our conduct comes from objectionably parochial sources such as our own guilt reactions and the dictates of our
culture. I argue that Jacobson’s critique fails to undermine the expert skill model because it overlooks a kind of feedback that can reform objectionably parochial intuitions.

**WITTGENSTEIN AND LINGUISTIC IDEALISM**

*H. BENJAMIN SHAEFFER, HUMBOLDT STATE UNIVERSITY*

I argue, on both textual and philosophical grounds, that, contra GEM Anscombe and David Bloor, it is misleading to characterize the Wittgenstein of the *Philosophical Investigations* as a linguistic idealist. First, such an interpretation conflicts with Wittgenstein’s therapeutic method; second, the textual evidence adduced in favor of this reading is ambiguous at best; and finally, it misses the fact that Wittgenstein rejects the underlying assumption, common to both realism and idealism, that language and reality can be clearly distinguished.

**WRITING GROUPS AND PEER EVALUATION IN UNDERGRADUATE COURSES**

*KATE PADGETT WALSH, IOWA STATE UNIVERSITY*

Written assignments are essential to developing critical thinking skills and encouraging deeper philosophical reflection. Yet, large (and increasing) class sizes make it challenging to provide constructive feedback on student work. To address this challenge, two colleagues (in Sociology) and I are currently developing and studying a writing group model for use in medium and large size courses. The model emphasizes: effective strategies for enhancing writing skills, teaching students to be critical readers, teaching students how to use peer-review feedback to revise their own papers, and using multi-step assignments to improve student writing.

**XUNZI (荀子) AND VIRTUE EPISTEMOLOGY**

*CHENG-HUNG TSAI, SOOCHOW UNIVERSITY*

Ernest Sosa establishes a bi-level virtue epistemology, according to which there are two levels of knowledge, the animal and the reflective. For Sosa, animal knowledge is apt belief, and reflective knowledge is apt belief aptly noted. In this paper, I reconstruct Xunzi’s epistemology in line with the idea of Sosa’s bi-level virtue epistemology. I first highlight the bi-level structure of Xunzi’s epistemology by focusing on his two core notions: “tianguan” (the natural faculties) and “tianjun” (or “xin”; mind-heart). I then discuss Xunzi’s idea about the superior relation of xin over the natural faculties, and his solution to the problem of the blindness of xin (that is, dispelling blindness by emptiness-unity-stillness of xin). After reconstructing Xunzi’s epistemology, I address the significance of such an interpretation of Xunzi’s epistemology, and the possible contribution by Xunzi to contemporary virtue epistemology.
Zeno’s Definition of the Apprehensive Impression

Pavle Stojanovic, Johns Hopkins University

Zeno’s definition of the apprehensive impression is of crucial importance for understanding the epistemology of the Hellenistic period. Although scholars today mostly agree on general intentions Zeno had when he formulated it, showing how exactly its clauses are supposed to bring about the desired result has been a matter of serious controversy. In this paper, I propose an interpretation that, in my opinion, solves all the difficulties. First, I argue that the word huparchon that occurs in all three clauses should be interpreted to mean “actual,” i.e., a corporeal object with its properties. Second, unlike virtually all scholars, I argue that the second clause must be interpreted as formulating a weak requirement if Arcesilaus’ objection is to make sense. Finally, I argue that the purpose of the third clause was to add a new requirement to the definition, and that only then the definition can achieve its purported aim.
Placement Service Information

Mike Morris will be the Coordinator for the APA Placement Service at the 2012 Pacific Division Meeting. Questions concerning the Service should be directed to Mike at The American Philosophical Association, University of Delaware, 31 Amstel Avenue, Newark, DE 19716. He can also be reached by telephone at (302) 831-2012, fax: (302) 831-8690, or email: mpmorris@udel.edu.

APA Placement Service General Hours of Operation:

Wednesday, April 4: Placement Information, Noon – 8:00 p.m., Grand Foyer
Thursday, April 5: Placement Information, 8:30 a.m. – 8:00 p.m., Grand Foyer
Placement Interviewing, 8:30 a.m. – 8:00 p.m., Location TBA

Friday, April 6: Placement Information, 8:30 a.m. – 5:00 p.m., Grand Foyer
Placement Interviewing, 8:30 a.m. – 5:00 p.m., Location TBA

Saturday, April 7: Placement Information, 8:30 a.m. – 1:00 p.m., Grand Foyer
Placement Interviewing, 8:30 a.m. – 1:00 p.m., Location TBA

APA Placement Service Locations

The Placement Services will be located in the Grand Foyer of the Westin Seattle Hotel as outlined below.

Job Candidates – Grand Foyer

1. Candidate Numbers will be assigned at the Placement Desk.
2. The location of a Job Interview will be available from the Placement staff, or posted on the bulletin board at the information desk.
3. Additional “Request for Interview” forms will be available at the Placement Desk.
4. APA Membership Applications will be available at the APA Meeting Registration Desk.
5. Information and instructions for using the Service will be available at the Placement desk (also see following pages), and posted on the information bulletin board.

6. The mailboxes for Job Candidates will be located at the Placement Desk.

7. A complete set of Job Postings will be available at the Placement Desk.

8. A message for the APA Placement Ombudsperson can be left at the Placement Desk.

**INTERVIEWERS – GRAND FOYER**

1. **Interviewers check in here**—as soon as possible upon arrival.

2. Payments for **On-Site Interviewing Departments** will be received here.

3. Space will be provided here for interviewers to check their files.

4. “Request for Interview” forms received from job candidates that have been reviewed by interviewers **should be returned** here.

5. A list of interviewing table assignments will be posted on the Placement Information Bulletin Board.

**INTERVIEWING AREA – LOCATION TBA**

1. APA Interviewing Tables will be located here.

2. In the event that additional space for interviewing is needed, we will post the additional location on the Placement Information Bulletin Board.

**INFORMATION AND INSTRUCTIONS FOR JOB CANDIDATES**

**REQUIREMENTS FOR USING THE PLACEMENT SERVICE**

1. **You must be an APA member** in order to use the Service. Placement is a benefit of membership for candidates, and there is no additional charge to use this service. Membership applications are available on the APA web site (www.apaonline.org) or by contacting the APA National Office (302) 831-1112, or at the Membership/Registration desk at the Meeting.

2. **You MUST REGISTER for the MEETING** in order to use the Service.
   - If you **register in advance** for the meeting and indicate that you will be a candidate (an advance registration form is located at the back of this issue), a candidate number will be assigned in the National Office and will appear on the back of your badge. You **must** pick up your badge from the APA Registration staff prior to using the Placement service.
   - If you register on-site for the meeting, present your badge to the Placement Staff, who will be available to assign you a candidate number in the “Placement Service” line.
**WHAT TO BRING WITH YOU**

1. Your copies of recent issues of *Jobs For Philosophers*.
2. Several copies of your curriculum vitae. If you run out of CVs at the meeting, the hotel has a copy center located in the Business Center.

**HOW TO USE THE PLACEMENT SERVICE**

After you have picked up your registration materials from the APA Registration staff, you are ready to use the Service. If you do not yet have a candidate number on the back of your badge, please go to the job candidates’ area in the Grand Foyer to receive one.

**JOB CANDIDATES’ AREA – GRAND FOYER**

Here you will find a file folder (mailbox) with your candidate number on it. All communications addressed to you during the meeting will be placed there. Your folder contains:

1. “Request for Interview” forms. Additional forms will be available from the Placement staff. **Be sure that your Placement Number appears at the top of all forms.**
2. A “Locator” form for you to list your name and hotel address. Please do not remove this form from your folder. This is used only in the event that we need to contact you during the meeting.

**JOB POSTINGS**

New jobs (not having appeared in the *Jobs for Philosophers*) will be posted on a bulletin board in the Placement Service Area. You should check this board regularly for new postings. Each ad should contain instructions on how to apply.

**INSTITUTIONS THAT HAVE CHECKED IN WITH PLACEMENT**

The names of institutions that have registered to use the Service will be posted on the bulletin board (updated regularly) in alphabetical order. Each listing will indicate the following:

1. If the listing institution has checked in with Placement.
2. If the institution is accepting interview requests at the meeting.
3. The relevant *JFP* for the institution’s opening(s).
4. Where the institution plans on interviewing (Table with number assignment).
5. Miscellaneous notes deemed appropriate by the Placement staff or the institution.

**SUBMITTING AN INTERVIEW REQUEST FORM**

Complete the top portion of the “Request for Interview” form and attach a copy of your CV. **Be sure that your candidate number appears at the top of all forms.** After you have completed the necessary information,
place your request form and CV in the box marked *Requests for Interviews* which will be prominently displayed on the Placement Service Desk. Your “Request” will be forwarded to the institution by a staff member.

**INTERVIEWS**

After your “Request” has been reviewed by a representative from the institution, the form will be returned to your file folder with the institution’s response appearing on the *bottom* of the form. Check your file folder often so that you can be certain to receive your messages promptly.

By **1:00 p.m. on April 7**, all “Requests” submitted by you should have been returned to your file folder, and you should remove them at that time. Occasionally, an institution may retain applications to review at a later date. If you applied for a job that had been posted and the institution did not check in with the Service during the meeting, it is suggested that you contact the institution by mail.

**INTERVIEWING LOCATIONS**

Some departments will be conducting interviews at tables (location TBA). Each institution using a table for interviewing will be assigned a table number. The table numbers assigned to institutions will be posted on the bulletin board in the Placement Service Area.

**ADVICE FOR JOB APPLICANTS**

The APA Committee on Career Opportunities offers the following advice for job applicants: The schedule for those seeking jobs and those Departments offering positions is difficult for all concerned. From the point of view of Departments, any publication date for *Jobs for Philosophers* is a compromise between the competing demands imposed by the need to get funding for positions, so the later the better, and by the need to have time to process applications, so the sooner the better. From the point of view of job applicants, there are also competing demands: the sooner it is published, the more time to apply, but the later it is published, the more opportunities will be available. There is no easy solution to this problem, but you can ease your difficulties somewhat by being prepared when the *JFP* is published. You should have your curriculum vitae ready to put in an envelope, a generic draft of a letter of application ready to be fine-tuned for particular job opportunities, and the rest of your file ready for mailing. This means talking to those who are to write letters of recommendation long before the *JFP* is due to arrive, preparing material about your teaching capacities, and selecting a writing sample for those Departments that request it. Applications should be complete, as well as clearly organized. It is to your advantage to send in your application as soon as possible after an ad appears.
INFORMATION AND INSTRUCTIONS FOR INTERVIEWERS

REQUIREMENTS FOR USING THE PLACEMENT SERVICE

1. It is expected that all individual interviewers will register for the meeting either by using the registration form found in the back of this issue or by stopping at the APA Registration Desk (Grand Foyer) to register on-site prior to using the Placement Service.

2. All Departments (not individuals) planning to interview at the meeting should complete the Placement Service advance registration form found at http://www.apaonline.org or at the end of this section. Upon receipt of an advance registration form additional information pertaining to the Placement Service will be sent to the attention of the contact person listed on the form. In the event that we send Placement forms either via email or mail, please be sure to complete these and return them to our office at your earliest opportunity. Not doing so may cause your materials to arrive after the Staff has already left the office to travel to the meeting. In this case, we must have you fill out the forms again on site. If time does not allow sending them to us, please bring them with you and turn them in at the Placement Desk.

CHECKING IN WITH THE SERVICE

Before you begin to interview candidates, please check in with the Placement Staff (Grand Foyer). We will need to know that you have arrived on site for candidates inquiring about your institution. Additional information will be requested from you (or confirmed if your department pre-registered) at this time as well.

Some institutions accept interview requests at the meeting; some of these job notices may have appeared in Jobs for Philosophers while others are unpublished positions. A new, unpublished position will be assigned an AD# and posted on the bulletin board in the Placement Service area. If you are bringing such a job notice with you to the meeting, please provide the Placement Staff with four copies of the notice for the position you are advertising. Such a position announcement should be typed on one side only in a good size and easy to read font, and be as brief as possible. Only positions that have not appeared in Jobs for Philosophers will be posted. If you would like a position that has been posted at this meeting to appear on our website immediately following the meeting, or in the issue of Jobs for Philosophers, you need to submit this ad immediately, following the close of the meeting. If you need assistance with this, contact the APA National Office.

Some institutions interview by prearrangement after placing an advertisement in Jobs for Philosophers and then contacting candidates prior to the meeting. When you arrange an interview with candidates, please inform them that they must be APA Members in order to use the Service and they must register for the meeting in order to use the Service.
If you plan to conduct job interviews anywhere other than at the interviewing tables/suites we have provided, please let us know your plans because candidates often come to us to ask questions about the location/time (etc.) of their interviews, and we need to have complete, up-to-date information in order to help them (and you).

Departments using a Suite for interviewing will need to complete an interview schedule form at the time they check in with the Service. Doing so enables the Service to notify the candidates you wish to interview of your interviewing location. Be assured that only those candidates listed on your interview schedule will be told the location of your hotel room, unless you have directed us to give this information to all candidates who ask. Departments interviewing at tables DO NOT need to complete this form.

N.B.: If you are conducting interviews in a hotel room, please be aware of the following policy statement adopted by the APA Board of Officers at its November 2004 meeting:

“Departments should not conduct Job Interviews in non-suite hotel rooms. Candidates who are subject to such interviews can appeal to the APA and are guaranteed anonymity.” (Originally published in Proceedings and Addresses of The American Philosophical Association, Vol. 78, No. 5, pp. 23, 119.)

APA INTERVIEWING TABLES

The Placement Service provides numbered tables for interviewing purposes; you will receive your table number assignment when you check in. These table number assignments will also be posted on the Placement Service Bulletin Board. Should additional space for interviewing tables be necessary, this location will be posted as well.

INSTITUTION FILE FOLDER (MAILBOX)

There will be a file folder bearing the name of your institution located in the Candidates’ Area in the Grand Foyer. Requests for interviews from candidates will be placed in this file folder.

REVIEWING INTERVIEW REQUESTS

When a candidate requests an interview with your institution, you should receive her/his curriculum vitae attached to a “Request for Interview” form. The bottom of this form is to be completed by you and returned to Placement staff. If an interview is granted, space is provided on this form to list the time, date, and location of the interview. If you are unable to interview a candidate, space for this response is also provided on the form. Any request you receive in an envelope contains confidential material and should be destroyed rather than returned to the candidate. As a matter of professional courtesy, all requests should receive a response. When a candidate receives a “Request” form back without a response, he or she is likely to assume that the material has not been reviewed and might return this to you via our service or contact your institution by mail.
Each candidate is assigned a numbered file folder to facilitate prompt communication between interviewers and candidates. Materials that you wish to transmit to a registered candidate should be handed in to the Placement Service staff located in the Grand Foyer, and will be delivered to the candidate by our staff.

**APA Statement on Placement Practices**

The APA Committee on the Status and Future of the Profession reminds you of its Statement on Placement Practices: The APA discourages the nomination by graduate departments of job seekers for positions in philosophy, and the submission of their dossiers in response to announcements of positions, without their knowledge or interest. This may seriously mislead those who are conducting searches, and may have unfortunate consequences both for them and for genuinely interested applicants. Graduate departments using a nomination procedure or submitting dossiers on behalf of job seekers should either attest explicitly that the candidate wishes to be considered for the positions in question, or (preferably) ensure that the job seekers themselves submit personal letters of application for these positions. Departments conducting searches are encouraged to recommend or require explicitly (in their position announcements) that each candidate, to be assessed of full consideration, should submit a personal letter of application for and interest in the announced position.

*A Placement Ombudsperson will be available at the meeting. Please see the Placement Service Staff if you would like to contact the Ombudsperson.*
Placement Service Registration for Interviewing Departments  
The APA 2012 Pacific Division Meeting  
The Westin Seattle, Seattle, WA, April 4 - 7, 2012

Only one form is required for each interviewing department. Once completed, this can be faxed to (302) 831-8690.

Institution: ___________________________ Department: ______________________________
Contact: _____________________________ Phone: __________________________________
Address:  _____________________________________________________________________
City, State, Zip: ___________________________ Email: _______________________________

All persons conducting interviews should be registered** for the Pacific Division Meeting as well as the department being registered with the Placement Service.

**Registered members of the department who will be conducting interviews:

_____________________________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________________________

Our department will:

_____ need interviewing table(s) Quantity of Tables_____  
–or–

_____ conduct interviews in a hotel suite (you must contact Linda Smallbrook to reserve a suite)

Our department will:

_____ provide suite # and list of prearranged candidates to whom suite information may be given 
–or–

_____ bring suite # and allow service to give to anyone who requests it

Our department will:

_____ conduct prearranged interviews only  
–or–

_____ accept interview requests on-site

Please list the JFP issue(s) (if any) in which this job was advertised: _________________________

Registration Fees (Please Check One): ______ Pre-Registration, By March 15, 2012: $50.00  
__________________________________________ *Regular Registration, After March 15, 2012: $75.00

Credit Card Type: (Circle One) VISA / MASTERCARD  
Credit Card #:  ______________  ______________  ______________  ______________  
Exp. Date: _____/_____
Last 3 Digits on back of card: ______

Name on Card: ___________________________ Phone #: __________________________
Signature: ____________________________ Email: ____________________________

***Check #: ______________ Check Date: _____________ Check Amount________

***Payable to: The American Philosophical Association. The APA only accepts checks drawn on U.S. banks in U.S. funds, or Int’l. Money Orders in U.S. funds. There is a $30 charge for all returned checks. **If PAYMENT is not received in our office by March 15, 2011 you MUST pay the on-site fee! Please mail form and payment to: Attn: Placement Services, The American Philosophical Association, 31 Amstel Avenue, University of Delaware, Newark, DE 19716.
PAPER SUBMISSION GUIDELINES

Anonymous Review: Papers in any area are welcome. All papers are anonymously reviewed. Author’s name, institution, or references pertaining to the identity of the author must be removed from the paper, abstract, notes, and bibliography. Papers containing such identifying references may be rejected. Submitted papers are not returned to authors. Papers not accepted by one Division may be re-submitted for consideration to another Division. In submitting papers, authors warrant that those papers are entirely their own work or the joint work of the authors identified in the cover letter, and that, where appropriate, acknowledgement of the contributions of others has been made.

Graduate Student Travel Stipends and Awards: To compete for a Travel Stipend/Awards, at the time of submission on-line, the “Apply For Stipend” check-box must be checked. Those papers that are sent directly to the APA National Office must be accompanied by a separate cover page indicating that the paper should be considered for a Stipend/Award. Those papers that are to be considered for a Travel Stipend/Awards must include a letter on departmental stationery and signed by the department chair or graduate advisor verifying that the author of the paper is a student in residence. The letter may be sent by post, courier, or fax. A scan of the letter may be sent as an email attachment. Stipend letters should be sent by fax to (302) 831-8690, or by mail to: The American Philosophical Association, University of Delaware, 31 Amstel Avenue, Newark, DE 19716 PRIOR to the paper submission deadline. If the verification documentation is not received by the institution on the institution’s letterhead by the paper deadline, the paper will NOT be considered for a Travel Stipend/Award. For more information, see http://www.apaonline.org.

Submissions for Eastern, Central, and Pacific Divisions should be sent to:

ATTN: [Eastern, Pacific or Central] Division Papers
The American Philosophical Association
University of Delaware
Newark, DE 19716
(302) 831-1112

NOTE: Authors of accepted papers will be asked to submit a copy of their abstract by e-mail to the National Office.
EASTERN DIVISION:

Meeting is held December 27-30.
Selections are announced in May or June.
Papers accepted by either the Central Division or the Pacific Division may not be presented at any subsequent meeting of the Eastern Division.
Papers exceeding 3,000 words will not be considered as colloquium papers.
Submissions for consideration as symposium papers must not exceed a length of 5,000 words. Abstracts for symposium papers must not exceed a length of 300 words. Authors should be aware that only a few papers are selected for presentation as symposium papers. If authors wish to have a shortened version of their paper considered as a colloquium paper, they should submit the appropriately shortened version, along with a shortened abstract, simultaneously with the submission of the symposium paper.
Any paper submitted without an abstract will not be considered. Any paper whose abstract is deemed unacceptable by the Program Committee will not be accepted. No revised abstract submitted after the paper’s acceptance will be published in the Proceedings and Addresses of The American Philosophical Association without the approval of the Program Committee.

PACIFIC DIVISION:

Papers and posters in any area are welcome. All papers and posters are anonymously reviewed.

Important Notices
The Pacific Division only accepts on-line submissions made through the APA submission web site. Submissions by post and by email are not accepted.
The Pacific Division now invites submissions for poster presentations.

Important Dates
Deadline for membership dues and new applications (in time for submission deadline): August 13
Deadline for submissions: September 1
Deadline for receipt of proof of graduate student status (for travel stipends): September 1

Submission Eligibility
1. Authors (and all co-authors) must be members in good standing of the APA at the time of submission.
2. Each member may submit up to one paper or poster. Co-authorship does not abrogate this rule.
3. Any paper or poster which is under consideration for publication elsewhere will be considered, provided that it will not appear in print until after the Divisional meeting is held. If this is the case, indicate when and where the paper or poster is expected to be published.

4. A paper or poster that has been on the Main Program at a past APA meeting (any division), or will be on the Main Program at a future Central or Eastern Division meeting, cannot be presented as a Main Program colloquium or symposium paper or poster at the Pacific Division meeting. However, papers not accepted by another Division may be submitted for consideration by the Pacific Division.

5. No one who is scheduled to appear in an invited session on the Main Program of a meeting may also present a submitted paper or poster as part of that same Main Program. Members who have already agreed to participate in invited sessions on the Main Program of a meeting are asked not to submit papers or posters for that same meeting. Please note that this does not apply to sessions organized by APA Committees or by affiliated groups.

**Preparation for Anonymous Review**

6. Submissions must be prepared for anonymous review. The author’s (and any co-author’s) name, institution, and references pertaining to the identity of the author must be removed from the paper, abstract(s), notes, and bibliography. Papers containing identifying references may be rejected.

**Submission Process**

7. A complete submission includes an abstract of not more than 150 words. Poster submissions additionally include a long abstract of not more than 750 words. Colloquium papers must not exceed 3,000 words. Symposium papers must not exceed 5,000 words. Authors should be aware that only a few papers are selected for presentation as symposium papers. If authors wish to have a shortened version of their paper considered as a colloquium paper, they should submit the appropriately shortened version simultaneously with the submission of the symposium paper. (This will be considered a single submission.)

8. The Pacific Division only considers submissions made through the APA web site. Postal submissions are no longer accepted. Submissions are not accepted by email.

**Graduate Student Travel Stipends**

9. A stipend of $300 will be awarded to any graduate student whose paper or poster is accepted by the Program Committee in its normal, anonymous-review process.

10. Eligibility is restricted to APA members or associate members who are graduate students in residence and in good standing at a MA or PhD program in philosophy. It is the author’s responsibility to ensure that a letter verifying that author of the paper or poster is a student in residence is sent to the APA. The letter must be printed on departmental stationery and signed by the department chair or
graduate advisor. It may be uploaded at the time of submission or it may be sent separately by post, courier, fax, or a scan attached to an email. The deadline for faxes and email attachments is September 1. The postmark deadline for post or courier is September 1. The letter should be sent to:

Attn: Mike Morris  
The American Philosophical Association  
31 Amstel Avenue  
Newark DE 19716  
phone: (302) 831-1112  
fax: (302) 831-8690

If appropriate verification documentation is not sent by the deadline, the submission will not be considered for a Travel Stipend.

11. Co-authored papers and posters are not eligible for Graduate Student Travel Stipends unless all authors are graduate students.

Authors’ Warrants and Permissions

12. In submitting papers or posters, authors warrant that their submissions are entirely their own work or the joint work of the named co-authors, and that, where appropriate, acknowledgement of the contributions of others has been made.

13. In submitting a paper or poster, its authors grant to The American Philosophical Association the nonexclusive worldwide right to publish the abstract of the paper or poster in the *Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association* and on the APA and Pacific Division web sites, in the event that the paper is accepted. Its authors also grant to The American Philosophical Association the nonexclusive worldwide right to post a preprint of the paper, in the form in which it was submitted, on the Pacific Division web site, for up to four months prior to the meeting for which the paper is accepted. (The Division will not publish a preprint provided that the authors so notify the Pacific Division in writing at the time the paper is accepted.)

14. Authors agree to provide accurate email addresses as part of their contact information and must notify the Pacific Division of any address changes that may occur between the time of submission and the meeting.

Central Division:

Selections are announced in September, or before when possible.

Papers exceeding 3,000 words will not be considered as colloquium papers.

Submissions for consideration as symposium papers must not exceed a length of 5,000 words. Abstracts for symposium papers must not exceed a length of 300 words. Authors should be aware that only a few papers are selected for presentation as symposium papers. If authors wish to have a
shortened version of their paper considered as a colloquium paper, they should submit the appropriately shortened version, along with a shortened abstract, simultaneously with the submission of the symposium paper.

The Central Division will not include a paper on its meeting program if that paper (1) has already been presented or is scheduled for presentation on the Main Program of another APA Divisional meeting or (2) has been accepted for publication and will have actually been published prior to the Central Division meeting in question. If a paper is accepted for presentation and the Program Committee subsequently learns that it will have been published prior to the meeting, then that paper will be withdrawn from the meeting program.
MINUTES OF THE 2011 PACIFIC DIVISION EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE MEETING

HILTON BAYFRONT HOTEL, SAN DIEGO, CALIFORNIA
WEDNESDAY, APRIL 20, 2011

Present: Julie Van Camp, Chair, Heather Battaly, Michael Bratman, Joseph Keim Campbell, Dominic McIver Lopes, Ned Markosian, Alastair Norcross, Michael Tooley, Alison Wylie

Guest: Amy Kind

CALL TO ORDER: The meeting came to order at 2:05 p.m.

ADOPTION OF AGENDA: The agenda was adopted.

APPROVAL OF MINUTES: The minutes were approved as printed.

MATTERS ARISING FROM THE MINUTES: There was no business arising from the minutes.

REPORT OF ACTIONS BY EMAIL: The Executive Committee takes decisions by email to address events that require immediate attention. Since its 2010 meeting, the Committee sent letters in support of endangered philosophy programs at Middlesex University and the University of Nevada Las Vegas. It proposed an amendment to the Bylaws of the Division that would provide for electronic voting. It agreed that graduate student stipend recipients will no longer be listed in the Proceedings since the Division has replaced its prize for the best graduate student papers accepted for presentation on the main program of the Annual Meeting with a stipend for any graduate student whose paper is accepted on the main program.

SECRETARY–TREASURER’S REPORT: The Division’s web site has been revamped and now includes documents related to Divisional governance, including past minutes. In accordance with the decision taken in 2010 to reduce the Division’s carbon footprint, copies of the Proceedings containing the conference program are no longer distributed at conference registration to APA members, who receive the Proceedings in the mail. Registration at the 2010 annual meeting topped one thousand but fell approximately fifteen percent below expectations as a result of a union boycott of the conference hotel. Registration numbers are expected to be healthy this year and the number of advance registrations is three times that of recent years, presumably because advance registration is now a lower cost than on-site registration. An ad hoc committee was charged last year with designing a pilot study of poster sessions at the Division.
Seven refereed posters are on display this year, session visitors are being surveyed for their opinion of the effectiveness of the poster format, the poster presenters are being asked to relay their experience of the process, and the committee will report by June. The Division realized a surplus of just over three thousand dollars in 2010–11 and continues to maintain a sufficient cushion of savings. A budget for fiscal year 2011–12 was reviewed and approved. No proposals for mini-conferences were submitted this year but the Committee authorized a call for proposals for one or more mini-conferences to be held in 2013.

FUTURE MEETING SITES: Annual Meeting sites have been secured for 2012, 2013, 2015, and 2016 in San Francisco, Seattle, and Vancouver. A multiyear contract for these sites provides several benefits, including a room revenue rebate to the Division and free internet in hotel guest rooms for those who book rooms within the APA's room block. In addition, the Division has a new clause in its contracts to protect it from the effect of boycotts by allowing a site to be cancelled a year in advance of an Annual Meeting date if there is no collective agreement in place at that time and extending through to the Annual Meeting date. (Previous contracts provided an option to cancel in case of labour action but the labour action in 2005 and 2010 commenced well after meeting planning was under way.) The Committee discussed Las Vegas, Los Angeles, Phoenix, and San Diego as possible sites in the southwest for 2014. While the Division has controlled meeting costs by booking Easter dates, the burden that this imposes on some potential meeting participants is an ongoing concern. The Secretary–Treasurer was asked to conduct a survey of Pacific Division members and recent Annual Meeting participants to find out their preferences for meeting sites and what kind of surcharges they report they are willing to pay for a meeting that is not held at Easter.

ELECTRONIC SUBMISSIONS: The vast majority of papers are now submitted electronically. The Committee agreed that the Division will no longer accept submissions by post: all submissions must be made electronically via the submissions web site.

ANNUAL MEETING FEES: The APA's Executive-Director reported to the Board of Officers in November that revenues generated by the annual meetings of the three divisions of the Association fall short of meeting expenses (see the May 2011 Proceedings). The Committee agreed that the Annual Meeting budget should realize a surplus for the APA and for the National Office in particular. Since it appears that the National Office is not using the fee sharing formula previously approved by the Committee, this will be rectified immediately to the benefit of the National Office. It was noted that the Division’s budgets only contain information about costs directly incurred by the Secretary–Treasurer plus some meeting costs incurred by the National Office; not all meeting costs incurred by the National Office on behalf of the Division have been reported to or overseen by the Division. The Secretary–Treasurer will work with the National Office to obtain accurate and complete annual reports of total meeting costs incurred by the National Office and will ensure that, in the
future, these costs are authorized by him. A more complete picture of the finances of the Division will enable the Executive Committee to take further appropriate action.

JOURNAL PROPOSAL: The Division will explore possible options for publishing a journal featuring work presented at the Annual Meeting.

REVIEW OF THE SECRETARY–TREASURER: At the suggestion of the Secretary–Treasurer, a committee was charged first with drafting procedures for a cyclical review of the performance of the Secretary–Treasurer and then for conducting such a review and reporting the results to the Executive Committee and the Nominating Committee.

APPOINTMENT OF THE NOMINATING COMMITTEE: Sara Goering, Ken Taylor, and Michael Tooley were appointed to the Nominating Committee, with Professor Tooley serving as chair.

REPORT OF THE PROGRAM CHAIR: The Program Chair reported that session, submission, and acceptance numbers for this year are comparable to those of recent years. This year there were 794 main program participants, higher than any year since 2007, and the number of speakers topped every year since 2006. However, the number of invited symposia was the lowest in six years even as the total number of sessions was slightly higher than any year since 2007. Submissions were down, lower than most years except for 2006 and 2008 and much lower than 2009. With more total sessions yet fewer submissions and invited symposia, the acceptance rate for submissions was higher, at thirty-eight percent, than most recent years.

In response to some concerns raised by the Program Chair, it was moved that when a member of the Program Committee knowingly circumvents a clearly communicated policy of the Program Committee or the Division, it shall be appropriate to request that the member resign from the Committee or to terminate their appointment to the Committee. The motion carried.

APPOINTMENTS TO THE PROGRAM COMMITTEE: A list of candidates for appointment to the Program Committee was approved.

PROGRAM CHAIR APPOINTMENTS: A list of candidates for appointment to chair of the Program Committee was approved.

GENDER REPRESENTATION ON THE ANNUAL MEETING PROGRAM: In the fall of 2010 the Pacific Division conducted a study of the distribution of male and female philosophers on its committees and the portion of the main program of the Annual Meeting that is organized by the Program Committee. This study indicates that women are well represented in the leadership of the Division, including the Program Committee, and that they comprise twenty-one percent of invited speakers, twenty-three percent of refereed paper presenters, and almost one in four commentators. Although this reflects the current representation of women in the profession, the Executive Committee remains unsatisfied with this proportion of women active in philosophy. The Committee encourages program chairs and their committees to strive for programs that reflect the rich diversity of the
profession, not only by gender, but also race, national origin, culture, rank in the profession, and type of institution. The study will be published on the Division’s web site.

PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT STATEMENT AND PROCEDURES: There has been an increase in informal reports of breaches of norms of professional conduct on the part of meeting participants. The following statement is currently sent to all those listed on the main program:

All authors of refereed papers must present their papers as they were refereed, without substantial revisions. All speakers, commentators, and critics in all sessions should ensure that their presentations are sent to other session participants well in advance of the meeting and are not changed substantially thereafter. Such practices as withholding prepared texts and changing papers to undermine commentators’ objections are egregious breaches of norms of professional conduct.

A subcommittee was struck to strengthen this language and to design a mechanism for formal complaints.

REPORT OF THE REPRESENTATIVE TO THE BOARD: The Division’s Representative to the Board reported on the 2010 meeting of the APA Board of Officers (see May 2011 Proceedings). The Secretary–Treasurer added that he is working with the Chairs of the Committees on Hispanics and International Cooperation to explore a possible joint conference with the Inter-American Philosophical Association.

JOURNALS AND PEER REVIEW: The Executive Committee expressed its concern over delays on the part of journals in refereeing and publishing articles, especially as these delays have a disproportionate impact on junior scholars.

AGENDA OF THE BUSINESS MEETING: An agenda for the Business Meeting was approved.

RESEARCH PROPOSAL: A proposal for access to some of the records of the Division for the purpose of research was approved. This information will be provided in a way that conforms to the APA’s policy on privacy.

ANY OTHER BUSINESS: There was no other business.

ADJOURNMENT: The meeting adjourned at 7:25 p.m.
MINUTES OF THE 2011 PACIFIC DIVISION BUSINESS MEETING

HILTON BAYFRONT HOTEL, SAN DIEGO, CALIFORNIA
THURSDAY, APRIL 20, 2011

CALL TO ORDER: The meeting came to order at 12:05 p.m.

ADOPTION OF AGENDA: The agenda was adopted.

APPROVAL OF MINUTES: The minutes were approved as printed in the February 2011 Proceedings.

MATTERS ARISING FROM THE MINUTES: There was no business arising from the minutes.

ANNOUNCEMENTS: The names of APA members who had passed away since the last meeting were read and a moment of silence was observed.

REPORT OF THE NOMINATING COMMITTEE: The Nominating Committee presented John M. Fischer as candidate for Vice President, Manuel Vargas as candidate for Representative to the Board of Officers, and Jean Roberts as Member at Large. There were no nominations by petition. A motion to elect the candidates was put and carried.

SECRETARY–TREASURER’S REPORT: The Secretary–Treasurer summarized his report to the Executive Committee (see the Executive Committee Minutes), commended Joseph Keim Campbell and his Program Committee for putting on an outstanding program, and thanked Patrick Frierson, Nadeem Hussain, Jay Odenbaugh, Laurie Paul, Patrick Rysiew, David Schmidtz, Julie Tanenbaum, and Eric Watkins for their work on the Program Committee. He also thanked Michelle Pham for her tireless assistance throughout the year and observed that Heather Battaly, Michael Bratman, Joseph Keim Campbell, and Ned Markosian are stepping off the Executive Committee and will be missed. The generosity of all those who give their time to serve the Pacific Division were acknowledged by a hearty round of applause.

REPORT OF THE PACIFIC DIVISION EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE: The Chair of the Executive Committee summarized the actions of the Committee (see the Executive Committee Minutes).

REPORT OF THE APA BOARD OF OFFICERS: The Executive Director of the Association summarized the actions of the Board of Officers at its November meeting (see the May 2011 Proceedings). In response to a question about the implementation of the APA’s plans for collecting demographic data on APA members and on philosophers with academic employment in the
United States, he stated that these projects are on schedule to be launched with the National Office’s new management systems. This is expected to occur before the start of the new fiscal year on July 1.

APA BYLAW AMENDMENT: A proposal to amend the Bylaws of the Association to broaden the pool of candidates for Chair of the Board of Officers was presented. There was no discussion or amendment. The proposal will be sent to members of the Division for a vote and will be enacted just in case it is approved by the majority of those voting in each of the APA’s three divisions.

PACIFIC DIVISION BYLAW AMENDMENT: A proposal to amend the Bylaws of the Division was presented for discussion. If enacted, the amendment will provide for electronic as well as postal ballots. The proposal will be sent (by post) to members of the Division for a vote.

FUTURE ANNUAL MEETING DATES: The Secretary–Treasurer summarized the Division’s plans for future meetings and for conducting a survey of preferences of meeting sites and dates (see the Executive Committee Minutes). There was no further discussion.

ENDANGERED PHILOSOPHY DEPARTMENTS: The Chair of the Philosophy Department at the University of Nevada Las Vegas reported that the UNLV administration had withdrawn a proposal to eliminate the Department. A letter writing campaign, which included letters from the Pacific Division Executive Committee and the APA Board of Officers, was effective in helping to secure this result. He also reported that the most compelling argument for preserving the place of philosophy at UNLV stressed the role played by philosophical thought in the history and the political culture of the United States, though philosophy’s contributions to the teaching of ethics and critical thinking were also important. It was pointed out that the strategy that proved effective in making a case in Nevada may be less effective in other contexts, notably California. There was consensus that whereas philosophy departments across the country are vulnerable to be closed in order to balance budgets, the Association should be prepared to respond quickly and with an appreciation of local context.

ANY OTHER BUSINESS: There was no other business.

ADJOURNMENT: The meeting adjourned at 1:05 p.m.
AGENDA ITEMS FOR THE 2012 BUSINESS MEETING

REPORT OF THE 2011-12 NOMINATING COMMITTEE

Michael Tooley (Chair), Sara Goering, Ken Taylor, and Dominic McIver Lopes (ex officio) served as the 2011-12 Nominating Committee. They have nominated the following APA Pacific Division members for terms beginning July 1, 2011: for Vice President: Terence Parsons, for Secretary-Treasurer: Dominic McIver Lopes, and for Member at Large: Rebecca Copenhaver. Lopes recused himself from the discussion of nominees for Secretary-Treasurer.

Respectfully submitted,
Michael Tooley, Chair

DRAFT STATEMENT ON PROGRAM DIVERSITY

The following is a draft of a Statement on Program Diversity that will be presented at the 2012 Business Meeting of the Pacific Division of the American Philosophical Association for discussion and possible adoption. If adopted, the Statement will be a formal policy of the Pacific Division.

APA PACIFIC DIVISION

DRAFT STATEMENT ON PROGRAM DIVERSITY

It is the policy of APA Pacific Division that its programs, and the membership of its committees, reflect the broad diversity of the profession. This diversity includes (but is not limited to) race, color, religion, political conviction, national origin, sex, disability, sexual orientation, gender identification and age. Where representation on the program is concerned we also include seniority within the profession and institutional affiliation. To encourage this diversity, the Pacific Division Executive Committee is undertaking the following initiatives and welcomes suggestions from the membership for continued improvement in achieving these policy goals.

(a) Ongoing documentation of the diversity represented in the main program of the Pacific Division Annual Meeting, beginning with gender representation but with a commitment to broadening the scope of our data collection in the future.
(b) Regular review of the available program data at the Division’s annual Business Meeting, and sharing of these data with the membership and relevant APA Committees.

(c) Active encouragement of the membership to support these efforts by volunteering to chair and comment at sessions, suggesting invited sessions to the program chair, submitting papers and posters for anonymous review, and identifying other ways to ensure that the main program is based on the broadest possible pool of submissions and reflects the membership of the profession.
MINICONFERENCES: CALL FOR PROPOSALS

The Pacific Division invites proposals for one-day miniconferences to be held in conjunction with its annual meeting in 2013. The Division will provide a venue and support of up to $5000 to defray direct expenses of the miniconference.

The purpose of this program is to provide opportunities for collective exploration of important philosophical topics in more depth than is offered by the usual meeting schedule. Past miniconferences are listed at apa-pacific.org/minis.

Proposals should include (1) a list of the organizing committee’s members, (2) a description of the topic of the miniconference that explains its timeliness, significance, and anticipated impact, (3) a list of potential and committed speakers, (4) plans for publicizing the miniconference, and (5) a brief budget indicating what contribution the Pacific Division is asked to make. Proposals that budget expenditures aimed to attract an audience or maximize impact are more likely to be successful. Miniconference organizing committees are expected to include at least one member of the Pacific Division. APA Committees are not eligible to apply.

Proposals should be submitted by email to the Secretary-Treasurer no later than March 14 for adjudication by the Division’s Executive Committee at the next Annual Meeting. A number of considerations enter into the Committee’s decision – these include but are not limited to the availability of resources, the timeliness, significance, and potential impact of the miniconference, the selection of speakers, the experience of the organizers, and the use of the budget to attract an audience. The decision of the Executive Committee is final.

Information about the Pacific Division’s annual meeting, including future meeting sites and dates, is available on the Division’s web site at apa-pacific.org. For more information about the miniconference program, please contact the Secretary-Treasurer, Dominic McIver Lopes at dom.lopes@ubc.ca.
LIST OF ADVERTISERS AND BOOK EXHIBITORS

A complete list of book exhibitors will be available online (www.apaonline.org) and at the Pacific Division Meeting.

CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS (A-238-239)
DUKE UNIVERSITY PRESS (A-236)
INDIANA UNIVERSITY PRESS (A-240)
JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY PRESS (A-244)
McGILL-QUEEN’S UNIVERSITY PRESS (A-245)
PHILOSOPHER’S INFORMATION CENTER (A-INSIDE BACK COVER)
PHILOSOPHY DOCUMENTATION CENTER (A-OUTSIDE BACK COVER)
PRINCETON UNIVERSITY PRESS (A-241)
PROGRAM IN THE HUMANITIES AND HUMAN VALUES AT UNC (A-240)
ROUTLEDGE PUBLISHERS (A-242-243)
SUNY PRESS (A-INSIDE FRONT COVER)
WESTVIEW PRESS (A-237)
FORMS

ADVANCE REGISTRATION FORM

HOTEL RESERVATION INFORMATION
PACIFIC 2012

ADVANCE REGISTRATION FORM
APRIL 4 – 7, 2012, THE WESTIN SEATTLE, 1900 FIFTH AVENUE, SEATTLE, WA 98101

Fax this form with your credit card payment to Linda Smallbrook (302-831-3372). No cover sheet is needed. Or, if you prefer, mail this form with your payment to Linda Smallbrook, APA, University of Delaware, Newark, DE  19716. Payment must accompany your form.

The APA complies with the Americans with Disabilities Act. Registrants requesting reasonable accommodation to participate in the Pacific Division Meeting should contact the Secretary-Treasurer with a request as early as possible, and no later than March 15, 2012.

Please print legibly. This information is used for your name badge.

Name: _______________________________________________________________________
Affiliation: _____________________________________________________________________
Street Address:  _______________________________________________________________
City, State, Zip:  _______________________________________________________________
Email:_____________________________________Phone:_____________________________

Advance Registration Fees (Received by March 20, 2012 at the National Office)

_______  $10.00 APA Student Members
_______  $60.00 APA Regular, International & Emeritus Members
_______  $90.00  Nonmembers

We cannot process any advanced registrations at the National Office past the March 20th deadline. After that date you will need to register in Seattle and at higher rates: $90 for regular/international/emeritus, $120 for nonmembers, and $15 for student members.

Placement Registration
Interviewers should also complete the Placement Registration Form. Candidates should check the space below if planning to use the service. Candidates must be a member of the APA in order to use the Placement Service. Placement is a free service for all current APA members.

_____ I will be a job candidate.

___ 1) Check* (Payable to APA)
   *The APA can only accept checks drawn on a U.S. bank, in U.S. Dollars.

___ 2) Visa [ ] MasterCard [ ] Exp. Date __________
    Last 3 digits on back of card __________

Name as it appears on card: ________________________________________________________

Signature of Authorization: _________________________________________________________

Email: ____________________________ Phone #: __________________________
The room rate for members, nonmembers, and students is $149.00. The tax rate for our meeting is 15.6%. Check-in time is 4 pm and check-out is noon. Please be sure to let the hotel know if you are physically challenged and will need special accommodations. Rooms are available on a first-come, first-served basis and subject to availability. Reservations must be made by March 3 in order to be assured the APA rate.

The hotel prefers that we make our reservations online. Please use the following link:

https://www.starwoodmeeting.com/StarGroupsWeb/booking/reservation?id=1109125748&key=59B74

For those persons who are unable to make reservations online, please call the hotel (206 728 1000 directly or toll free 800 937 8461) to make your reservations.
APA REGISTRATION POLICY

It is the policy of the APA that all persons attending sessions, including those who are participating as speakers, commentators or session chairs, are required to register for each meeting they attend. In addition, we have always recommended that all participants wear their APA badges during session hours to identify themselves as registered participants. In an effort better to enforce this policy we have begun a system of checking meeting attendees, randomly and anyone whom we suspect might not be registered, for proof of registration. If you are asked to provide proof of registration and are unable to do so, you will be asked to register immediately in order to enable you to attend sessions. Registration fees help subsidize every divisional meeting. Without that income we will be unable to ensure the quality and excellence of our meetings which you have come to expect. We thank you for your continued cooperation.