

January 2009
Volume 82, Issue 3

Proceedings and Addresses

of The American Philosophical Association



apa

THE AMERICAN
PHILOSOPHICAL ASSOCIATION

Central Division Program

The American Philosophical
Association
Central Division

One Hundred Sixth
Annual Meeting



Palmer House Hilton Hotel
Chicago, IL

February 18 - 21, 2009

Proceedings and Addresses of The American Philosophical Association

Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association (ISSN 0065-972X) is published five times each year and is distributed to members of the APA as a benefit of membership and to libraries, departments, and institutions for \$75 per year. It is published by The American Philosophical Association, 31 Amstel Ave., University of Delaware, Newark, DE 19716. Periodicals Postage Paid at Newark, DE and additional mailing offices. POSTMASTER: Send address changes to *Proceedings and Addresses*, The American Philosophical Association, University of Delaware, Newark, DE 19716.

Editor: David E. Schrader **Phone:** (302) 831-1112
Publications Coordinator: Erin Shepherd **Fax:** (302) 831-8690
Associate Editor: Robin Smith **Web:** www.apaonline.org
Meeting Coordinator: Linda Smallbrook

Proceedings and Addresses of The American Philosophical Association, the major publication of The American Philosophical Association, is published five times each academic year in the months of September, November, January, February, and May.

Each annual volume contains the programs for the meetings of the three Divisions; the membership list; Presidential Addresses; news of the Association, its Divisions and Committees, and announcements of interest to philosophers. Other items of interest to the community of philosophers may be included by decision of the Editor or the APA Board of Officers.

Microfilm copies are available through National Archive Publishing Company, Periodicals/Acquisitions Dept., P.O. Box 998, Ann Arbor, MI 48106-0998 ([HTTP://WWW.NAPUBCO.COM](http://www.napubco.com)). Certain back issues may be obtained from the APA.

All correspondence should be sent to the APA, 31 Amstel Avenue, University of Delaware, Newark, DE 19716, directed to the appropriate staff member as follows: Erin Shepherd for inquiries and publication copy concerning programs of the Divisional meetings, general issues of the *Proceedings*, announcements, awards to members, and advertising; Janet Sample for membership information, address changes, and memorial minutes; and the Executive Director for letters to the editor.

Copyright © 2009 by The American Philosophical Association
ISSN 0065-972X

TABLE OF CONTENTS

LETTER FROM THE SECRETARY-TREASURER.....	1
CENTRAL DIVISION OFFICERS AND COMMITTEES, 2008-2009.....	9
MAIN PROGRAM	11
GROUP PROGRAM.....	37
MAIN AND GROUP MEETING PARTICIPANTS	53
ABSTRACTS OF COLLOQUIUM PAPERS.....	69
ABSTRACTS OF INVITED AND SYMPOSIUM PAPERS	95
SPECIAL SESSIONS SPONSORED BY APA COMMITTEES.....	101
GROUP SESSIONS.....	103
APA PLACEMENT SERVICE INFORMATION.....	105
PLACEMENT SERVICE REGISTRATION FORM.....	113
APA PLACEMENT BROCHURE	115
PAPER SUBMISSION GUIDELINES	127
DRAFT MINUTES OF THE 2008 CENTRAL DIVISION BUSINESS MEETING.....	131
MINUTES OF THE 2008 CENTRAL DIVISION EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE MEETING.....	133
REPORT OF THE 2008-2009 NOMINATING COMMITTEE	137
RESULTS OF THE 2008 CENTRAL DIVISION ELECTIONS.....	139
LIST OF BOOK EXHIBITORS.....	141
LIST OF ADVERTISERS	143
FORMS	157
ADVANCE REGISTRATION FORM.....	159
HOTEL RESERVATION FORM	161
RECEPTION TABLE REQUEST FORM	163
PROGRAM SUGGESTION FORM.....	165
APA REGISTRATION POLICY	167

LETTER FROM THE SECRETARY- TREASURER

To All Members of the Association:

You are cordially invited to attend the one hundred sixth Annual Meeting of the Central Division at the Palmer House Hilton Hotel, Chicago, Illinois, February 18-21, 2009. This year's program committee has organized an extensive array of 27 Colloquium sessions, two submitted Symposia, 12 invited Symposia, and eight Author Meets Critics sessions. Our program also includes 15 special sessions organized by Committees of the APA and over fifty affiliated group sessions.

This issue of the *Proceedings* contains a complete convention program, including scheduled group meetings. At the back of this issue, you will find a hotel reservation form, a meeting registration form, a form for reserving tables at the receptions, and maps of the hotel's location and meeting rooms. Also included are information forms concerning the 2010 meeting and the 2009-2010 Nominating Committee, for your use if you have suggestions for future meetings or wish to offer your services to the Division.

1. HOTEL INFORMATION

Most Central Division members will already be familiar with the Palmer House Hilton, a frequent location of Central (and Western) Division meetings for many decades. The Palmer House is located in the Chicago Loop, a short walk from Symphony Center and the Chicago Art Institute, among many other local attractions.

Hotel reservations should be made directly with the hotel in one of the following ways:

- *By mail:* Use the form printed in this issue of the *Proceedings*.
 - *By telephone:* Call the Palmer House reservations department directly at 1-877-865-5321. Explain that you are attending the American Philosophical Association meeting. If you are a graduate student member, please indicate that you want the graduate student rate (NOTE: the National Office staff will confirm the graduate student status of all those requesting the graduate student rate).
 - *Through the Internet:* Use the following URL: http://www.hilton.com/en/hi/groups/private_groups/chiphhh_amp/index.jhtml. Please note that *reservations at the special graduate student rate cannot be made through this online link*. Graduate students must instead call 1-877-865-5231 or use the printed form.
-

To be assured of a room at the special convention rate, you should **act promptly**. Our convention block of rooms will be maintained by the hotel only until **January 19, 2009**. After that time, any unused rooms in the block will be released to other guests, and convention registrants may be unable to obtain the special rates or appropriate rooms.

•**Chicago Airports:** Chicago is served by O'Hare International and Chicago Midway airports. Virtually all airlines fly to O'Hare, and many also fly to Midway, which has the advantages of being closer to the Loop and somewhat less crowded.

Ground Transportation from O'Hare and Midway: The most economical way to reach the hotel is the **Chicago Transit Authority** trains (fare \$1.75 as of Jan. 1, 2008). From O'Hare, take the **CTA Blue Line** from the station between Terminals 2 and 3 (follow the signs for "Trains to City"). Get off at the Monroe/Dearborn station and go east on Monroe to the hotel entrance between State and Wabash. Travel time is about 45 minutes, and trains run every ten minutes (with reduced schedules Sunday and late at night). From Midway, the **CTA Orange Line** runs every ten minutes and will take you to the Loop in about half an hour (get off at the Adams/Wabash stop). The hotel entrance is on the west side of Wabash. A **map of the downtown area CTA routes and stations** is available at <http://www.transitchicago.com/maps/maps/F2003D.html>.

•**Airport shuttle buses** to the loop are (at this writing) \$17.50 one way from O'Hare, \$17.50 one way from Midway. Buses go directly to Loop hotels, including the Palmer House. Allow an hour from Midway, an hour and a half from O'Hare (time varies considerably, especially with heavy traffic). Buses leave every 10-15 minutes, and return buses leave the Palmer House every half hour from the Monroe Street side. You can make advance reservations (and get a coupon for \$2 off) at <http://www.airportexpress.com/>.

•**Taxi fare** is \$35-\$40 from O'Hare, \$25 from Midway. For two or more passengers, flat-rate ride sharing fares are available (\$22 per passenger from O'Hare, \$17 per passenger from Midway). Travel time to/from O'Hare ranges from half an hour in light traffic to an hour or more in heavy traffic (on Friday afternoon, it can exceed two hours). If you're in a hurry, a taxi is usually the fastest way to go except when traffic is at its worst, when the CTA is probably fastest (provided that you are traveling with one very small suitcase).

•**Accessible transportation:** The CTA stations at both Midway and O'Hare are wheelchair-accessible, but not all stations in the Loop area have elevators. The closest Blue Line stop to the Palmer House with an elevator is Jackson, two long blocks from the Palmer House at Jackson and State Streets. In the Loop area, the Orange Line from Midway is on elevated tracks. The closest elevator-equipped Orange Line station is Van Buren, another long block south of the Jackson station. Call the Elevator Status Hotline at 1-888-968-7282 and press 5 to check for elevator service problems (TTY 1-888-282-8891). All CTA buses have lifts or ramps. Contact the RTA

Travel Information Center at 1-312-836-7000 for updated information. Maps and other information are available at <http://www.transitchicago.com/maps/accessible.html>, and a brochure on accessibility is available at <http://www.transitchicago.com/downloads/brochures/ada.pdf> (text version <http://www.transitchicago.com/welcome/ada.txt>).

• **Driving to Chicago:** See http://www.hilton.com/en/hi/hotels/maps_directions.jhtml?ctyhocn=CHIPHHH for maps and driving directions to the Palmer House. Valet parking is \$45 per day, self-parking \$35 per day for hotel guests.

• **Amtrak:** Amtrak trains arrive at Union Station, which is about ten blocks (some long) west on Canal between Adams and Jackson, across the Chicago River. The 151 bus goes to the hotel area (stop at State and Adams). A taxi to the Palmer House is under \$10. Consult <http://www.amtrak.com> for schedules and fares.

2. MEETING ROOMS IN THE PALMER HOUSE

Members who have attended Central Division meetings at the Palmer House will find that we are using a different arrangement of meeting rooms from past years. Meeting Registration will be on the 6th floor, in an area designed for precisely that purpose, and the book exhibits will be in the Adams Ballroom on the 6th floor (across lobby space from the Registration area). All meeting rooms are on the 3rd and 6th floors, with the exception of the Red Lacquer room (where the Presidential Address and the evening receptions will be held), which is on the 4th floor. All meeting rooms are accessible via the main elevators from the hotel lobby: the complications of previous meetings at the Palmer House involving access to the two levels of the 3rd floor is eliminated with this change.

An additional change is that the hotel has renamed many of the meeting rooms on the 3rd and 6th floors, as well as remodeled some of the 6th floor space. The designations “Private Dining Room 3” (and its cousins, up to PDR 9) have now been replaced with individual room names, as have Parlors A, B, C, etc.

With the completion of remodeling in the Palmer House, entrances to the Palmer House are now open on State, Monroe, and Wabash, and the entrances on Wabash and Monroe are accessible for disabled members. The hotel has completely renovated its lobby space and added a lobby restaurant, Lockwood’s, with full meal service. The former French Quarter, location of the breakfast buffet but unfortunately not accessible for disabled members, has now been restored to its original condition as a ballroom (the breakfast buffet continues in the fully accessible Lockwood’s restaurant). An additional bar with limited meal service is in Potter’s Bar, located off the lobby towards the right as you exit the elevator area.

In accordance with the policy adopted by all three Divisions in 2008, the room locations of sessions are not included in this printed program. A full listing of all session locations, together with a hotel meeting room plan, is included in the materials registrants will receive when they register.

3. MEETING REGISTRATION

Rates for registration are as follows:

APA Members	\$50
Non-Members	\$60
Student members	\$10

The Central Division rebates \$10 of the Member's and Non-Member's fee to the APA national office to support the general costs of the APA. All remaining registration income is used to support the expenses of the meeting and the operations of the Central Division. You may pre-register for the meeting by using the pre-registration information form found at the back of this issue. The deadline for pre-registration is **January 30, 2009**. Payment is accepted by cash, check, or credit card.

Registration includes admission to the reception on Thursday evening; non-registrants who wish to attend this reception may purchase tickets at the Registration Desk, or at the door of the reception, for \$10. ***Please note that all persons attending the convention are expected to register (this includes invited participants and participants in Group Meetings).*** Registration fees are vital to the conduct of APA conventions, since convention revenues are the only source of income for the Divisions.

4. PLACEMENT SERVICE

The Placement Center will open for business at 5:00 p.m. on Wednesday, February 18, and continue in operation through Noon, Saturday, February 21 (see the Program for specific times). For the location of the Placement Center, contact the meeting Registration Desk on the 6th floor. Job seekers are urged to pre-register for Placement by submitting the pre-registration form provided in this issue. Since many job interviews are pre-arranged on the basis advertisements in *Jobs for Philosophers (JFP)*, and since the Placement Center will not post notices of positions that have already been advertised in *JFP*, job seekers are advised to obtain copies of *JFP* in advance of the meeting and to bring them to the meeting. (*JFP* is available to APA members upon request, at no extra charge. Requests should be addressed to the APA National Office, University of Delaware, Newark, DE 19716.)

Policy on Interviews in Sleeping Rooms. At its 1994 meeting the APA Board of Officers adopted the policy of prohibiting job interviews in sleeping rooms at Divisional meetings. We ask your cooperation in implementing this policy. Interviews in the living rooms of suites are, of course, permissible under this policy, and interviewing departments may also make use of the Placement Center interview area.

5. BOOK EXHIBITS

The publishers' book exhibits will be located in the Adams Ballroom on the 6th floor. Exhibits will be open 9:00 a.m.-5:00 p.m. on Thursday and Friday and 9:00 a.m.-Noon on Saturday.

6. RECEPTIONS

The reception on Thursday, February 19, will begin at 8:30 p.m. in the Red Lacquer Room on the 4th floor. Complimentary beer and soft drinks are provided at this reception, which is open only to those who have either registered for the convention or purchased special tickets for the reception (available for \$10 both at the registration desk and at the door of the reception). The Presidential Reception on Friday, February 20, will begin at 9:00 p.m. in the Red Lacquer Room on the 4th floor. Tickets are not required for admission to the Friday reception, and refreshments are available on a cash-bar basis. Departments that wish to reserve a numbered table at the two receptions may do so for a fee of \$25 (see the form at the back of this issue of the *Proceedings*).

7. BUSINESS MEETING

The annual Business Meeting of the Central Division will be held Friday, February 20, at 12:15 p.m. in the Wabash Parlor. Please note that only APA members who are affiliates of the Central Division have voting rights at this meeting. Regular items of business include reports from Divisional and National officers and committees and the nomination of officers for 2009-2010. The 2009 Nominating Committee will present a slate of nominees for the positions of Vice President, Member of the Executive Committee, and the four members of the 2009 Nominating Committee. The Report of the Nominating Committee will be posted in the registration area 24 hours prior to the Business Meeting and is also printed on page 137 of this issue of the *Proceedings*. Nominations from the floor are also accepted if proposed by a group of ten members. In accordance with Divisional rules, voting for candidates will be by mail ballot.

The Minutes of the 2008 Executive Committee Meeting and draft minutes of the 2008 Business Meeting are published in this issue of the *Proceedings*, pp. 131-132.

8. PRESIDENTIAL ADDRESS

President Peter van Inwagen will present the 2009 Presidential Address, "The New Anti-Metaphysicians," at 5:00 p.m. on Friday in the Red Lacquer Room. He will be introduced by Sally Sedgwick, Vice President of the Central Division.

9. JOHN DEWEY LECTURE

At its 2004 meeting, the Executive Committee of the Central Division accepted a generous offer from the John Dewey Foundation to fund a John Dewey Lecture at each annual meeting. The John Dewey Lecture is given by a prominent and senior American philosopher who is invited to reflect, broadly and in an autobiographical spirit, on philosophy in America. The Central Division is pleased to announce that the 2009 John Dewey Lecture will be given by Michael Tooley on Thursday, February 19, at 1:30 p.m. (Session I-B: see the session list distributed at Registration for

the location). The lecture will be introduced by Edwin Curley. A reception, hosted by the John Dewey Foundation, will follow.

10. GRADUATE STUDENT TRAVEL STIPEND RECIPIENTS

As in past years, the Central Division Executive Committee awards stipends of \$300 each to help defray the travel expenses of graduate students whose papers are accepted for the program. Starting with the 2006 program, the Executive Committee has decided to provide a stipend for every graduate student whose paper is accepted. The Executive and Program Committees are pleased to announce the names of the 19 winners of stipends for this year:

Andreas Elpidorou (Boston University): “The Upsurge of Spontaneity: The Role and Place of Merleau-Ponty in the Dreyfus-McDowell Debate.” Paper 2 in Session II-F, ‘Continental Philosophy’ (Friday 9:00 a.m.)

Christopher Hudspeth (University of South Florida): “Trust and the Prisoner’s Dilemma.” Paper 3 in Session III-F, ‘Moral Philosophy’ (Friday 1:45 p.m.)

Sarah Kenehan (University of Tennessee): “Rawls on Intergenerational Justice.” Paper 1 in Session I-I, ‘Issues in Contemporary Political Philosophy’ (Thursday 1:30 p.m.)

James Macpherson (Ohio State University): “Shared Intentions and Deliberative Commitments.” Paper 3 in Session IV-H, ‘Issues of the Self’ (Saturday 9:00 a.m.)

Jesse Butler (University of Florida): “An Entirely Non-Self Referential Yabloesque Paradox.” Paper 3 in Session III-J, ‘Technical Philosophy of Language’ (Friday 1:45 p.m.)

Michael Harbour (Vanderbilt University): “Liberalism and the Problem of Religious Justification.” Paper 1 in Session IV-K, ‘Justification in Practical Philosophy’ (Saturday 9:00 a.m.)

Caroline Arruda (SUNY–Stony Brook): “Are Relations of Recognition Instances of Collective Intentionality?” Paper 1 in Session IV-F, ‘Political Rationality’ (Saturday 9:00 a.m.)

Claire Morrissey (University of North Carolina–Chapel Hill): “The ‘Harm to Humanity’ Argument for Universal Jurisdiction.” Paper 1 in Session II-J, ‘International Justice’ (Friday 9:00 a.m.)

Jeremy Garrett (California State University–Sacramento): “A *Prima Facie* Case Against Civil Marriage.” Paper 2 in Session I-I, ‘Issues in Contemporary Political Philosophy’ (Thursday 1:30 p.m.)

Daniel M. Johnson (Baylor University): “Proper Function and Should-Be-Believed Defeaters.” Paper 2 in Session II-G, ‘Rationality’ (Friday 9:00 a.m.)

Douglas Paletta (University of Pennsylvania): “Scanlon: The ‘New’ Redundancy Objection and Justifiability.” Paper 3 in Session IV-K, ‘Justification in Practical Philosophy’ (Saturday 9:00 a.m.)

Luke Glynn (Oxford University): “Groundwork for a Probabilistic Analysis of Causation: Some Foundational Issues in the Philosophy of Probability.” Paper 1 in Session II-I, ‘Causation’ (Friday 9:00 a.m.)

Kenneth Faber (Vanderbilt University): “Schopenhauer Was an Optimist.” Paper 3 in Session III-H, ‘Late Modern Philosophy’ (Friday 1:45 p.m.)

Emily Austin (Washington University in St. Louis): “Epicurus and the Politics of the Fear of Death.” Paper 3 in Session III-G, ‘Ancient Philosophy’ (Friday 1:45 p.m.)

Felipe De Brigard (University of North Carolina–Chapel Hill): “If You Like It, Does It Matter If It’s Real?” Paper 1 in Session IV-I, ‘Naturalism and Empirically-Oriented Philosophy’ (Saturday 9:00 a.m.)

James Paton (University of Illinois–Urbana-Champaign): “The Varieties of Explosivism.” Paper 2 in Session I-J, ‘Ontology of the Material World’ (Thursday 1:30 p.m.)

Julianne Chung (University of Calgary): “The Assumptions Account of Knowledge Attributions.” Paper 2 in Session III-I, ‘Foundations of Knowledge’ (Friday 1:45 p.m.)

Adam Pelsler (Baylor University): “Emotional Knowledge: Emotion as a Basic Source of Justification.” Paper 1 in Session III-E, ‘Knowledge and Value’ (Friday 1:45 p.m.)

Audrey L. Anton (Ohio State University): “The Earthly Nature of Justice and the State in Plato’s *Republic*.” Paper 3 in Session IV-G, ‘Plato’s *Republic*’ (Saturday 9:00 a.m.)

11. 2010 PROGRAM COMMITTEE

Vice President Sally Sedgwick has appointed the following Program Committee for the 2010 Central Division Meeting:

Margaret Atherton (University of Wisconsin–Milwaukee), *Chair*

Harry Brighouse (University of Wisconsin–Madison)

Ben Caplan (Ohio State University)

Joshua Dever (University of Texas–Austin)

Cynthia Freeland (University of Houston)

Geoffrey A. Gorham (Macalester University)

David Hilbert (University of Illinois–Chicago)

Nick Huggett (University of Illinois–Chicago)

Victoria Wike (Loyola University Chicago)

Sebastian Luft (Marquette University)

Wayne D. Riggs (University of Oklahoma)

Phyllis Rooney (Oakland University)

Robin Smith (Texas A&M University)

David Sussman (University of Illinois–Urbana-Champaign)

12. CALL FOR PAPERS, 2010

The Program Committee for 2010 invites APA members to submit papers for presentation at the one hundred seventh annual meeting, to be held in Chicago, Illinois, at the Palmer House Hilton hotel, February 17-20, 2010. The deadline for submission is **June 1, 2009**. For additional details on how and where to submit papers for consideration, see the section on Paper Submission Guidelines later in this issue of the *Proceedings*.

13. PARTICIPATION

APA members who wish to be considered for as commentators or session chairs for the 2010 meeting should use the Program Information Form provided later in this issue of the *Proceedings*. The following resolution of the Central Division, adopted at the 1980 Business Meeting, will be of interest to prospective participants:

“The APA is the sole professional organization that serves and represents all American philosophers. To give better effect to the foregoing statement, the Executive Committee of the Central Division publicly affirms its desire that the composition of its officers, committees, and programs reflect the diversity of its membership in such respects as methodology, problem area, and type of employment or institutional affiliation.”

14. NOMINATIONS

The Central Division Executive Committee also invites suggestions from Central Division affiliates about appropriate candidates for Central Division offices. If you would like to propose anyone for consideration, please see the Program Suggestion Form in this issue of the *Proceedings*.

15. PROGRAM INFORMATION

The Program of the meeting, including the main sessions organized by the APA and group sessions organized by affiliated groups, forms part of this issue. Abstracts of invited and contributed papers are also included. A limited number of copies of the Program will also be available at registration. A world-wide-web version of the Program is also available at the APA's web site, <http://www.apaonline.org> (this site also includes pointers to additional sources of information on the Internet about the Chicago area). The web version may be updated periodically, as necessary, to incorporate late changes in the Program.

16. SPECIAL THANKS FROM THE SECRETARY-TREASURER

I wish to acknowledge with gratitude the generous support of Texas A&M University for the Central Division office.

On behalf of the Executive and Program Committees, I extend to every member of The American Philosophical Association an invitation to take part in our One Hundred Sixth Annual Meeting.

Robin Smith

Secretary-Treasurer, APA Central Division

CENTRAL DIVISION OFFICERS AND COMMITTEES, 2008-2009

EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE, 2008-2009

President: Peter van Inwagen

Vice President: Sally Sedgwick

Past President: James P. Sterba

Divisional Representative: Marilyn Friedman

Secretary-Treasurer: Robin Smith

Term 2006-2009: Lisa Downing

Term 2007-2010: Richard Kraut

Term 2008-2011: Russ Shafer-Landau

PROGRAM COMMITTEE, 2009

Timothy O'Connor, *Chair*

Carla Bagnoli

Jeffrey E. Brower

E. J. Coffman

Peggy DesAutels

Dan Kaufman

Robert Koons

Edward Minar

Robert Rupert

Sally Sedgwick

Robin Smith, *ex officio*

Christina Van Dyke

Helga Varden

Peter B. M. Vranas

NOMINATING COMMITTEE, 2008-2009

James P. Sterba, *Chair*

Sarah Buss

Ann E. Cudd

David Hilbert

Linda Radzik

THE AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL ASSOCIATION

CENTRAL DIVISION ONE HUNDRED SIXTH ANNUAL MEETING PROGRAM

FEBRUARY 18-21, 2009
PALMER HOUSE HILTON HOTEL

WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 18

PLACEMENT INTERVIEW AREA

5:00-10:00 p.m., Location TBA

PLACEMENT SERVICE

5:00-10:00 p.m., Location TBA

REGISTRATION

5:00-10:00 p.m., 6th Floor

EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE

7:00-11:00 p.m., Cresthill Room (3rd Floor)

THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 19

BOOK EXHIBITS

9:00 a.m.-5:00 p.m., Adams Ballroom (6th Floor)

GROUP AND COMMITTEE SESSIONS, THURSDAY MORNING

(See Group Meeting Program for details)

Session GI: 9:00 a.m.-Noon

GI-1: Karl Jaspers Society of North America

GI-2: Central Division Sartre Circle

GI-3: American Society for Value Inquiry

GI-4: Society for the Philosophical Study of Education

GI-5: Philosophy of Time Society

GI-6: Society for Arab, Persian, and Islamic Philosophy

GI-7: Society for Analytical Feminism

GI-8: Hume Society

GI-9: Society for the Study of Indian and Tibetan Buddhist Philosophy

GI-10: Joint Session: Committee on the Teaching of Philosophy and the American Association of Philosophy Teachers

GI-11: Conference of Philosophical Societies

GI-12: Society for the Philosophic Study of the Contemporary Visual Arts

PLACEMENT INTERVIEW AREA

9:00 a.m.-7:00 p.m., *Location TBA*

PLACEMENT SERVICE

9:00 a.m.-7:00 p.m., *Location TBA*

REGISTRATION

9:00 a.m.-7:00 p.m., *6th Floor*

GROUP AND COMMITTEE SESSIONS, THURSDAY AFTERNOON/EVENING

(See Group Meeting Program for details)

Session GII: 5:15-7:15 p.m.

GII-1: Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy

GII-2: Society of Christian Philosophers

GII-3: International Society for Environmental Ethics

GII-4: Society for Asian and Comparative Philosophy

GII-5: Joint Session: Committee on Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender People in the Profession and the Society for Lesbian and Gay Philosophy

GII-6: North American Division of the Schopenhauer Society

GII-7: International Berkeley Society

GII-8: Society for Student Philosophers

GII-9: Society for the Metaphysics of Science

GII-10: Radical Philosophy Association

GII-11: Joint Session: Bertrand Russell Society and the History of Early Analytic Philosophy Society

GII-12: American Society for Value Inquiry

GII-14: Committee on Institutional Cooperation

Session GIII: 7:30-10:30 p.m.*GIII-1: Society for Realist-Antirealist Discussion**GIII-2: Society for Philosophy in the Contemporary World**GIII-3: Association for the Development of Philosophy Teaching**GIII-4: North American Society for Social Philosophy**GIII-5: International Association for Computing and Philosophy**GIII-6: Josiah Royce Society**GIII-7: Society for the Philosophy of Creativity***I-A. Symposium: Aristotle's Metaphysics***1:30-4:30 p.m.*

Chair: Robert Koons (University of Texas–Austin)

Speakers: Frank Lewis (University of Southern California)

“Predication, Things, and Kinds in Aristotle's
Metaphysics”

Michael Loux (University of Notre Dame)

“The Roots of Aristotle's Constituent Ontology”

David Charles (Oxford University)

I-B. Invited Session: The John Dewey Lecture*1:30-4:30 p.m.*

Chair: Edwin Curley (University of Michigan)

Speaker: Michael Tooley (University of Colorado–Boulder)

*A reception sponsored by the John Dewey Foundation will follow
the lecture.***I-C. Symposium: Kantian Themes in Logic***1:30-4:30 p.m.*

Chair: Daniel Sutherland (University of Illinois–Chicago)

Speakers: Matthew Boyle (Harvard University)

“Kant on Logic and the Laws of Understanding”

Clinton Tolley (University of California–San Diego)

“Judgment and Truth in Kant's Logics”

Commentator: R. Lanier Anderson (Stanford University)

I-D. Symposium: Concept Acquisition in Cognitive Science*1:30-4:30 p.m.*

Chair: Robert Rupert (University of Colorado–Boulder)

Speaker: Paul Churchland (University of California–San
Diego)

Commentators: Eric Margolis (University of British Columbia)

Daniel A. Weiskopf (University of South Florida)

- I-E. Author Meets Critics: Terence Cuneo, *The Normative Web***
1:30-4:30 p.m.
 Chair: Christina Van Dyke (Calvin College)
 Critics: Chris Heathwood (University of Colorado)
 Michael DePaul (University of Notre Dame)
 Author: Terence Cuneo (University of Vermont)
- I-F. Author Meets Critics: Alexander Bird, *Nature's Metaphysics: Laws and Properties***
1:30-4:30 p.m.
 Chair: Neil E. Williams (University at Buffalo (SUNY))
 Critics: Marc B. Lange (University of North Carolina–Chapel Hill)
 Richard Corry (University of Tasmania)
 Author: Alexander Bird (University of Bristol)
- I-G. Colloquium: Action Theory**
1:30-4:30 p.m.
1:30-2:30
 Chair: Howard Nye (University of Michigan–Ann Arbor)
 Speaker: John Brunero (University of Missouri–St. Louis)
 “Consistency in Belief and Intention”
 Commentator: David Hunter (Ryerson University)
2:30-3:30
 Chair: Hugh J. McCann (Texas A&M University)
 Speaker: Chris Ferro (Tulane University)
 “The Philosophy of Action and the So-Called Problem of Causal Deviance”
 Commentator: Andrei A. Buckareff (Marist College)
3:30-4:30
 Chair: Gordon Pettit (Western Illinois University)
 Speaker: Charles M. Hermes (University of Texas–Arlington)
 “Counterfactual Interveners in Frankfurt Cases”
 Commentator: Neal A. Tognazzini (University of California–Riverside)
- I-H. Colloquium: Aesthetics**
1:30-4:30 p.m.
1:30-2:30
 Chair: Rachel E. Zuckert (Northwestern University)

Speaker: Chris Tillman (University of Manitoba)
 “Musical Materialism”

Commentator: Ben Caplan (Ohio State University)

2:30-3:30

Chair: Anne Eaton (University of Illinois–Chicago)

Speaker: John V. Kulvicki (Dartmouth College)
 “Heavenly Sight and the Nature of Seeing-in”

Commentator: Guy Rohrbaugh (Auburn University)

I-I. Colloquium: Issues in Contemporary Political Philosophy

1:30-4:30 p.m.

1:30-2:30 p.m.

Chair: Jacob M. Held (University of Central Arkansas)

Speaker: Sarah Kenehan (University of Tennessee)
 “Rawls on Intergenerational Justice”

Graduate Student Travel Stipend Winner

Commentator: Thomas D. Harter (University of Tennessee)

2:30-3:30 p.m.

Chair: Tracy A. Edwards (Michigan State University)

Speaker: Jeremy Garrett (California State University–
 Sacramento)
 “A *Prima Facie* Case Against Civil Marriage”

Graduate Student Travel Stipend Winner

Commentator: Susanne Sreedhar (Boston University)

3:30-4:30 p.m.

Chair: Robert B. Talisse (Vanderbilt University)

Speaker: Kyla Ebels Duggan (Northwestern University)
 “Childrens’ Interests and the Fathers’ Rights
 Movement”

Commentator: Anita Superson (University of Kentucky)

I-J. Colloquium: Ontology of the Material World

1:30-4:30 p.m.

1:30-2:30 p.m.

Chair: Joseph Mendola (University of Nebraska–Lincoln)

Speaker: Timothy H. Pickavance (Biola University)
 “Trivializing Naturalness”

Commentator: D. Gene Witmer (University of Florida)

2:30-3:30 p.m.

Chair: Scott Haganman (University of Notre Dame)

Speaker: James Paton (University of Illinois–Urbana-Champaign)

“The Varieties of Explosivism”

****Graduate Student Travel Stipend Winner****

Commentator: Crawford L. Elder (University of Connecticut)

3:30-4:30 p.m.

Chair: David Sanson (Ohio State University)

Speaker: Daniel Z. Korman (University of Illinois–Urbana-Champaign)

“Eliminativism and Its Counterexamples”

Commentator: Eli Hirsch (Brandeis University)

I-K. Special Session Sponsored by the APA Committee on Academic Career Opportunities and Placement: Advice to Jobseekers in Philosophy: Roundtable

1:30-4:30 p.m.

Chairs: Julie Klein (Villanova University)

Nancy E. Snow (Marquette University)

I-L. Special Session Sponsored by the APA Committee on Inclusiveness: Racial and Ethnic Group Terms

1:30-4:30 p.m.

Chair: Marilyn Frye (Michigan State University)

Speakers: Anna Stubblefield (Rutgers University)

“Conceptual Confusions about Race and Ethnicity”

Jorge Gracia (University at Buffalo)

“Racial and Ethnic Terms”

Susana Nuccetelli (St. Cloud State University) and
Roderick M. Stewart (Austin College)

“Ethnic-Group Terms”

RECEPTION

8:30 p.m.-Midnight, Red Lacquer Room (4th Floor)

FRIDAY, FEBRUARY 20

BOOK EXHIBITS

9:00 a.m.-5:00 p.m., Adams Ballroom (6th Floor)

PLACEMENT INTERVIEW AREA

9:00 a.m.-5:00 p.m., Location TBA

PLACEMENT SERVICE*9:00 a.m.-5:00 p.m., Location TBA***REGISTRATION***9:00 a.m.-5:00 p.m., 6th Floor***II-A. Symposium: Theories of Consciousness: Ancient, Medieval, Modern***9:00 a.m.-Noon*

Chair: Martin Pickavé (University of Toronto)

Speakers: Victor Caston (University of Michigan–Ann Arbor)

Susan Brower-Toland (Saint Louis University)

Alison Simmons (Harvard University)

II-B. Symposium: Empirical Approaches to Moral Philosophy*9:00 a.m.-Noon*

Chair: Peggy DesAutels (University of Dayton)

Speakers: Joshua Knobe (University of North Carolina–Chapel Hill)

Shaun Nichols (University of Arizona)

John M. Doris (Washington University in St. Louis)

II-C. Author Meets Critics: Penelope Mackie, *How Things Might Have Been**9:00 a.m.-Noon*

Chair: Graeme Forbes (University of Colorado)

Critics: Teresa Robertson (University of Kansas)

John Divers (University of Leeds)

Author: Penelope Mackie (University of Nottingham)

II-D. Author Meets Critics: Jonathan Sutton, *Without Justification**9:00 a.m.-Noon*

Chair: E. J. Coffman (University of Tennessee)

Critics: Earl Conee (University of Rochester)

Jennifer Lackey (Northwestern University)

Matthew McGrath (University of Missouri–Columbia)

Author: Jonathan Sutton (Auburn University)

II-E. Symposium: Necessity and Artifacts in Aristotle*9:00 a.m.-Noon*

Chair: Robin Smith (Texas A&M University)

Speaker: Errol Katayama (Ohio Northern University)

“Necessity and Artifacts in Aristotle”

Commentators: Margaret E. Scharle (Reed College)
Charlotte Witt (University of New Hampshire)

II-F. Colloquium: Continental Philosophy

9:00 a.m.-Noon

9:00-10:00 a.m.

Chair: Edward Minar (University of Arkansas)

Speaker: Megan Halteman Zwart (University of Notre Dame)
"Revisiting Heidegger's Plato: Recovering a More
'Phenomenological' Plato from the Sophist
Lectures"

Commentator: Randall Havas (Willamette University)

10:00-11:00 a.m.

Chair: Nancy J. Holland (Hamline University)

Speaker: Andreas Elpidorou (Boston University)
"The Upsurge of Spontaneity: The Role and Place
of Merleau-Ponty in the Dreyfus-McDowell
Debate"

Graduate Student Travel Stipend Winner

Commentator: Steven Levine (University of Massachusetts–
Boston)

11:00 a.m.-Noon

Chair: Mark A. Painter (Misericordia University)

Speaker: Leslie MacAvoy (East Tennessee State University)
"Categorical Intuition and the Problem of the
Categories"

Commentator: David R. Cerbone (West Virginia University)

II-G. Colloquium: Rationality

9:00 a.m.-Noon

9:00-10:00 a.m.

Chair: Baron Reed (Northwestern University)

Speaker: Berislav Marusic (Brandeis University)
"Epistemic Evasion"

Commentator: Brian Boeninger (University of Notre Dame)

10:00-11:00 a.m.

Chair: Chris Waterhouse (University of St. Andrews)

Speaker: Daniel M. Johnson (Baylor University)
"Proper Function and Should-Be-Believed
Defeaters"

Graduate Student Travel Stipend Winner

Commentator: Warren E. Shrader (Indiana University–South Bend)

11:00 a.m.-Noon

Chair: Matthew Mullins (Northwestern University)

Speaker: Paul Weirich (University of Missouri)
“Calibration”

Commentator: Arthur Paul Pedersen (Carnegie Mellon University)

II-H. Colloquium: Concepts and Analytic Truth

9:00 a.m.-Noon

9:00-10:00 a.m.

Chair: Jason Bridges (University of Chicago)

Speaker: Jacob Beck (Texas Tech University)
“The Mixed View of Concepts: A Defense”

Commentator: Nicoletta Orlandi (Rice University)

10:00-11:00 a.m.

Chair: William Wimsatt (University of Chicago)

Speaker: Glen A. Hoffmann (Ryerson University)
“Nativism: In Defense of the Representational Interpretation”

Commentator: Richard Samuels (Ohio State University)

11:00 a.m.-Noon

Chair: Matthew Davidson (California State University–San Bernardino)

Speaker: Bradley Rives (Indiana University of Pennsylvania)
“Can the Analytic Data Be Explained Away?”

Commentator: Jay M. Newhard (East Carolina University)

II-I. Colloquium: Causation

9:00 a.m.-Noon

9:00-10:00 a.m.

Chair: Joseph Moore (Amherst College)

Speaker: Luke Glynn (Oxford University)
“Groundwork for a Probabilistic Analysis of Causation: Some Foundational Issues in the Philosophy of Probability”

Graduate Student Travel Stipend Winner

Commentator: Marion Ledwig (University of Nevada–Las Vegas)

10:00-11:00 a.m.

Chair: Oliver Pooley (Oxford University)

Speaker: Jonathan D. Jacobs (Saint Louis University)
“A Powers Theory of Causation”

Commentator: Joshua Rasmussen (University of Notre Dame)

11:00 a.m.-Noon

Chair: Sungsu Kim (Texas Tech University)

Speaker: Michael W. Rota (University of St. Thomas)
 “An Anti-Reductionist Account of Causation”

Commentator: Justin T. Tiehen (University of Puget Sound)

II-J. Colloquium: International Justice

9:00 a.m.-Noon

9:00-10:00 a.m.

Chair: Jon Mandle (University at Albany–SUNY)

Speaker: Claire Morrissey (University of North Carolina–
 Chapel Hill)

“The ‘Harm to Humanity’ Argument for Universal
 Jurisdiction”

****Graduate Student Travel Stipend Winner****

Commentator: Larry May (Washington University in St. Louis)

10:00-11:00 a.m.

Chair: Derrick Darby (University of Kansas)

Speaker: David Reidy (University of Tennessee)

“Nickel and Rawls on Human Rights and
 Toleration”

Commentator: James W. Nickel (Arizona State University)

II-K. Colloquium: Philosophy of Religion

9:00 a.m.-Noon

9:00-10:00 a.m.

Chair: Michael Rea (University of Notre Dame)

Speaker: Michael J. Almeida (University of Texas–San
 Antonio)

“Sider, Hell, and Supervaluation”

Commentator: Gerhard Nuffer (Reed College)

10:00-11:00 a.m.

Chair: Daniel S. Breyer (Illinois State University)

Speaker: Jonathan Scott Miller (Bowling Green State
 University)

“The Relation between *Anatta* and the *Atman* of
 the *Upanishads*: A Reply to Miri Albahari’s Advaita
 Vedantist Interpretation of Buddhist Doctrine of
 Anatta”

Commentator: Joy E. Laine (Macalester College)

11:00 a.m.-Noon

Chair: Patrick Kain (Purdue University)

Speaker: R. Zachary Manis (Southwest Baptist University)
 “A Molinist Solution to the Problem of Divine Freedom”

Commentator: Wesley Morriston (University of Colorado–Boulder)

II-L. Special Session Sponsored by the APA Committee on Black Philosophers: Virtue Ethics and Racism

9:00 a.m.-Noon

Chair: Robert Gooding-Williams (University of Chicago)

Speakers: Macalester C. Bell (Columbia University)
 “Racial Vices”

Jorge L. A. Garcia (Boston College)
 “Racism and Moral Vice”

Michael Slote (University of Miami)
 “Caring, Empathy, and Racism”

II-M. Special Session Sponsored by the APA Committee on Philosophy and Computers: Online Courseware

9:00 a.m.-Noon

Chair: Michael Byron (Kent State University)

Speakers: Patrick Hurley (University of San Diego)
 Wilfrid Sieg (Carnegie Mellon University)
 Daniel White (CEO, Aplia Inc.)

Harriet Baber (University of San Diego)

II-N. Special Session Sponsored by the APA Committee on Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and Transgender People in the Profession

9:00 a.m.-Noon

GROUP AND COMMITTEE SESSIONS, FRIDAY AFTERNOON/EVENING

(See Group Meeting Program for details)

Session GIV: 7:00-10:00 p.m.

GIV-1: Association for the Development of Philosophy Teaching

GIV-2: Society for the Advancement of American Philosophy

GIV-4: Society for the Philosophical Study of Education

GIV-5: Association of Chinese Philosophers in North America

GIV-6: Association for Informal Logic and Critical Thinking

GIV-7: Society for Student Philosophers

GIV-8: Society for the Study of Process Philosophies

GIV-9: Society for Philosophy and Public Affairs

GIV-10: Society for the Metaphysics of Science

GIV-11: North American Kant Society

BUSINESS MEETING

12:15-1:30 p.m., Wabash Parlor (3rd Floor)

III-A. Symposium: Human Freedom and the Brain and Behavioral Sciences

1:45-4:45 p.m.

Chair: Timothy O'Connor (Indiana University–Bloomington)

Speakers: Alfred R. Mele (Florida State University)
“Free Will and Science: Readiness Potentials, Decisions, and Awareness”

Eddy Nahmias (Georgia State University)

Commentator: Saul Smilansky (University of Haifa)

III-B. Symposium: Global Justice

1:45-4:45 p.m.

Chair: David Sussman (University of Illinois–Urbana-Champaign)

Speakers: Thomas Pogge (Yale University/University of Oslo)
Michael Blake (University of Washington)
Deen Chatterjee (University of Utah)
“Global Justice and the Liberal Conundrum”

III-C. Symposium: Practical Reasoning

1:45-4:45 p.m.

Chair: Candace Vogler (University of Chicago)

Speakers: Kieran Setiya (University of Pittsburgh)
“Reasons and Causes”

Luca Ferrero (University of Wisconsin–Milwaukee)
“Errors, Defects, and Practical Reason”

Mark LeBar (Ohio University)
“Reasons to Be and to Do”

III-D. Author Meets Critics: Peter Hylton, *Quine*

1:45-4:45 p.m.

Chair: Warren Goldfarb (Harvard University)

Critics: Gary Ebbs (Indiana University)
Thomas Ricketts (University of Pittsburgh)

Author: Peter Hylton (University of Illinois–Chicago)

III-E. Colloquium: Knowledge and Value*1:45-4:45 p.m.**1:45-2:45 p.m.*

Chair: Remy Debes (University of Memphis)

Speaker: Adam Pelser (Baylor University)

"Emotional Knowledge: Emotion as a Basic Source of Justification"

Graduate Student Travel Stipend Winner

Commentator: Jay Wood (Wheaton College)

2:45-3:45 p.m.

Chair: Evan Fales (University of Iowa)

Speaker: Allan J. Hazlett (Fordham University)

"Is Knowledge Something Everyone Wants?"

Commentator: Daniel Howard-Snyder (Western Washington University)

3:45-4:45 p.m.

Chair: Mylan Engel, Jr. (Northern Illinois University)

Speaker: Sarah Wright (University of Georgia)

"Virtue Epistemology and Contextualism"

Commentator: Noah Lemos (College of William and Mary)

III-F. Colloquium: Moral Philosophy*1:45-4:45 p.m.**1:45-2:45 p.m.*

Chair: James L. Nelson (Michigan State University)

Speaker: Kelly Sorensen (Ursinus College)

"The Actual and the Expected"

Commentator: Frances Howard-Snyder (Western Washington University)

2:45-3:45 p.m.

Chair: Hilde Lindemann (Michigan State University)

Speaker: Matthew Talbert (West Virginia University)

"Moral Competence and Moral Blame"

Commentator: Paul H. Benson (University of Dayton)

3:45-4:45 p.m.

Chair: David Schweickart (Loyola University Chicago)

Speaker: Christopher Hudspeth (University of South Florida)

"Trust and the Prisoner's Dilemma"

Graduate Student Travel Stipend Winner

Commentator: Michael Byron (Kent State University)

III-G. Colloquium: Ancient Philosophy*1:45-4:45 p.m.**1:45-2:45 p.m.*

Chair: Constance Meinwald (University of Illinois–Chicago)

Speaker: Tim Connolly (East Stroudsburg University)
“The Trouble with Becoming in Plato’s *Republic*”

Commentator: Russell M. Dancy (Florida State University)

2:45-3:45 p.m.

Chair: David Ebrey (University of California–Berkeley)

Speaker: John M. Armstrong (Southern Virginia University)
“Plato’s Eudaimonism”

Commentator: George Rudebusch (Northern Arizona University)

3:45-4:45 p.m.

Chair: Julie Ward (Loyola University Chicago)

Speaker: Emily Austin (Washington University in St. Louis)
“Epicurus and the Politics of the Fear of Death”

****Graduate Student Travel Stipend Winner****

Commentator: Kirk Sanders (University of Illinois–Urbana-Champaign)

III-H. Colloquium: Late Modern Philosophy*1:45-4:45 p.m.**1:45-2:45 p.m.*

Chair: Annemarie Peil Butler (Iowa State University)

Speaker: Emil Badici (East Carolina University)
“On the Compatibility Between Classical Geometry and Hume’s Denial”

Commentator: Samuel Levey (Dartmouth College)

2:45-3:45 p.m.

Chair: Sebastian Luft (Marquette University)

Speaker: Andrew Roche (Wheaton College)
“Kant and Naive Realism”

Commentator: Dai Heide (Ohio State University)

3:45-4:45 p.m.

Chair: Karl Ameriks (University of Notre Dame)

Speaker: Kenneth Faber (Vanderbilt University)
“Schopenhauer Was an Optimist”

****Graduate Student Travel Stipend Winner****

Commentator: Ivan Soll (University of Wisconsin–Madison)

III-I. Colloquium: Foundations of Knowledge*1:45-4:45 p.m.**1:45-2:45 p.m.*

Chair: Jeffrey E. Brower (Purdue University)

Speaker: Todd Long (California Polytechnic State University)
"A Bone for Traditional Foundationalism"

Commentator: Mark Heller (Syracuse University)

2:45-3:45 p.m.

Chair: Giovanni Mion (Southern Methodist University)

Speaker: Julianne Chung (University of Calgary)
"The Assumptions Account of Knowledge
Attributions"****Graduate Student Travel Stipend Winner****

Commentator: Kelly M. Becker (University of New Mexico)

3:45-4:45 p.m.

Chair: Aloysius P. Martinich (University of Texas–Austin)

Speaker: Robert Bass (Coastal Carolina University)
"Knowledge Without Truth?"

Commentator: Gerald Vision (Temple University)

III-J. Colloquium: Technical Philosophy of Language*1:45-4:45 p.m.**1:45-2:45 p.m.*

Chair: David Alexander (Iowa State University)

Speaker: Joongol Kim (Western Illinois University)
"Numerical Predication"

Commentator: Thomas McKay (Syracuse University)

2:45-3:45 p.m.

Chair: Heimir Geirsson (Iowa State University)

Speaker: Paul Saka (Rice University)
"The Act of Quotation"

Commentator: Roger Wertheimer (Agnes Scott College)

3:45-4:45 p.m.

Chair: Roy Sorensen (Washington University in St. Louis)

Speaker: Jesse Butler (University of Florida)
"An Entirely Non-Self Referential Yabloesque
Paradox"****Graduate Student Travel Stipend Winner****

Commentator: Roy T. Cook (University of Minnesota)

III-K. Special Session Sponsored by the APA Committee on Philosophy in Two-Year Colleges: Job Applications and Academic Life at Two-Year Colleges

1:45-4:45 p.m.

- Chair: Gerald Mozur (Lewis and Clark Community College)
 Speakers: Brian J. Huschle (Northland College)
 Bill Hartmann (St. Louis Community College–Forest Park)
 Tom Urban (Houston Community College)
 Donna Werner (St. Louis Community College–Meramec)

PRESIDENTIAL ADDRESS

5:00-6:00 p.m., Red Lacquer Room (4th Floor)

- Introduction: Sally Sedgwick
 Speaker: Peter van Inwagen
 “The New Anti-Metaphysicians”

PRESIDENTIAL RECEPTION

9:00 p.m.-Midnight, Red Lacquer Room (4th Floor)

SATURDAY, FEBRUARY 21

BOOK EXHIBITS

9:00 a.m.-Noon, Adams Ballroom (6th Floor)

PLACEMENT INTERVIEW AREA

9:00 a.m.-3:00 p.m., Location TBA

PLACEMENT SERVICE

9:00 a.m.-Noon, Location TBA

REGISTRATION

9:00 a.m.-Noon, 6th Floor

IV-A. Symposium: Ontological Emergence

9:00 a.m.-Noon

- Chair: Larry Shapiro (University of Wisconsin–Madison)
 Speakers: Karen Bennett (Cornell University) and Carl Gillett (Northern Illinois University)
 “A Whole Lot More from ‘Nothing But’: Scientific Composition and the Possibility of Strong Emergence”
 Commentator: Jordi Cat (Indiana University)

IV-B. Symposium: Responsibility and Omissions*9:00 a.m.-Noon*

Chair: Marina Oshana (University of Florida)

Speakers: Michael Murray (Franklin and Marshall College)
"Without a Trace"

Angela M. Smith (University of Washington)

"Unconscious Omissions, Reasonable
Expectations, and Responsibility"Commentator: Carolina Sartorio (University of Wisconsin-
Madison)**IV-C. Author Meets Critics: Michael Bergmann, *Justification without Awareness****9:00 a.m.-Noon*

Chair: Matthias Steup (Purdue University)

Critics: Richard Fumerton (University of Iowa)

John Greco (Saint Louis University)

Joel Pust (University of Delaware)

Authors: Michael Bergmann (Purdue University)

IV-D. Author Meets Critics: Tad M. Schmaltz, *Descartes on Causation**9:00 a.m.-Noon*

Chair: Dan Kaufman (University of Colorado)

Critics: Michael Della Rocca (Yale University)

Sukjae Lee (Ohio State University)

Author: Tad M. Schmaltz (Duke University)

IV-E. Symposium: Modest Constructivism*9:00 a.m.-Noon*

Chair: Anthony S. Laden (University of Illinois–Chicago)

Speaker: Mary Clayton Coleman (Bard College)

"Modest Constructivism"

Commentators: David Sussman (University of Illinois–Urbana-
Champaign)

Jeffrey Edwards (SUNY–Stony Brook)

IV-F. Colloquium: Political Rationality*9:00 a.m.-Noon**9:00-10:00 a.m.*

Chair: Dasha Polzik (University of Chicago)

Speaker: Caroline Arruda (SUNY–Stony Brook)
 “Are Relations of Recognition Instances of
 Collective Intentionality?”

****Graduate Student Travel Stipend Winner****

Commentator: Facundo Alonso (Georgetown University)

10:00-11:00 a.m.

Chair: Matthew C. Simpson (Luther College)

Speaker: Mark N. Jensen (Hope College)
 “Rational Unity and the Discursive Dilemma”

Commentator: Lara Buchak (University of California–Berkeley)

11:00 a.m.-Noon

Chair: Heidi Malm (Loyola University Chicago)

Speaker: Christopher Freiman (University of Arizona)
 “Prioritarian Justice and Positional Goods”

Commentator: Bekka Williams (University of Wisconsin–Madison)

IV-G. Colloquium: Plato’s *Republic*

9:00 a.m.-Noon

9:00-10:00 a.m.

Chair: To be announced

Speaker: Anna M. Greco (University of Guelph)
 “Natural Inclinations and the Normative Force of
 the Principle of Specialization in Plato’s *Republic*”

Commentator: Naomi Reshotko (University of Denver)

10:00-11:00 a.m.

Chair: Frank Grabowski (Rogers State University)

Speaker: Robyn R. Gaier (Saint Louis University)
 “On the Continuation of the Craft Analogy in
Republic II”

Commentator: Sandra Peterson (University of Minnesota–Twin Cities)

11:00 a.m.-Noon

Chair: To be announced

Speaker: Audrey L. Anton (Ohio State University)
 “The Earthly Nature of Justice and the State in
 Plato’s *Republic*”

****Graduate Student Travel Stipend Winner****

Commentator: Haewon Jeon (Northwestern University)

IV-H. Colloquium: Issues of the Self*9:00 a.m.-Noon**9:00-10:00 a.m.*

Chair: Kate Padgett Walsh (Iowa State University)

Speaker: Brian Ribeiro (University of Tennessee–
Chattanooga)

“I Don’t Want to Go to Heaven (Or Hell)”

Commentator: William D. Glod (Tulane University)

10:00-11:00 a.m.

Chair: Patrizia Pedrini (University of Florence)

Speaker: Maura E. Tumulty (Colgate University)

“Neural Luck”

Commentator: Miren Boehm (University of Wisconsin–Milwaukee)

11:00 a.m.-Noon

Chair: Matt Waldren (University of Wisconsin–Madison)

Speaker: James Macpherson (Ohio State University)

“Shared Intentions and Deliberative Commitments”

****Graduate Student Travel Stipend Winner****

Commentator: Eric Wiland (University of Missouri–St. Louis)

**IV-I. Colloquium: Naturalism and Empirically-Oriented
Philosophy***9:00 a.m.-Noon**9:00-10:00 a.m.*

Chair: Jared G. Bates (Hanover College)

Speaker: Felipe De Brigard (University of North Carolina–
Chapel Hill)

“If You Like It, Does It Matter If It’s Real?”

****Graduate Student Travel Stipend Winner****

Commentator: Basil Smith (John Tyler Community College)

10:00-11:00 a.m.

Chair: A. Minh Nguyen (Eastern Kentucky University)

Speaker: Stephen Biggs (University of Toronto)

“Traditional Versus Experimental Philosophy: A
Case Study”

Commentator: Jonathan Ichikawa (University of St. Andrews)

11:00 a.m.-Noon

Chair: Harold I. Brown (Northern Illinois University)

Speaker: Stephen C. Dille (St. Edward’s University)

“Naturalism in Science: A House Divided?”

Commentator: James Harrington (Loyola University Chicago)

IV-J. Colloquium: Private Objects and Phenomenal Properties*9:00 a.m.-Noon**9:00-10:00 a.m.*

Chair: William Dylan Sabo (Western Michigan University)

Speaker: Robert W. Schroer (Arkansas State University)

"Mental Paint and the Forgivable Introspective Mistake"

Commentator: Brie Gertler (University of Virginia)

10:00-11:00 a.m.

Chair: Aleks Zarnitsyn (University of Illinois–Chicago)

Speaker: William Koch (University of South Florida)

"Late Wittgenstein, the Mental, and Taylor"

Commentator: Roxana Baiasu (University of Oxford)

IV-K. Colloquium: Justification in Practical Philosophy*9:00 a.m.-Noon**9:00-10:00 a.m.*

Chair: Jason Wyckoff (University of Colorado–Boulder)

Speaker: Michael Harbour (Vanderbilt University)

"Liberalism and the Problem of Religious Justification"

Graduate Student Travel Stipend Winner

Commentator: Nicole J. Hassoun (Carnegie Mellon University)

10:00-11:00 a.m.

Chair: Blain Neufeld (University of Wisconsin–Milwaukee)

Speaker: Kevin Vallier (University of Arizona)

"Liberalism Without Privatization"

Commentator: Rex Martin (University of Kansas)

11:00 a.m.-Noon

Chair: Melissa Yates (St. John's University)

Speaker: Douglas Paletta (University of Pennsylvania)

"Scanlon: The 'New' Redundancy Objection and Justifiability"

Graduate Student Travel Stipend Winner

Commentator: Jonathan F. Garthoff (Northwestern University)

IV-L. Special Session Sponsored by the APA Committee on the Status of Women: Mid-Career Issues*9:00 a.m.-Noon*

Speakers: Debra Bergoffen (George Mason University)

"You've Paid Your Dues—Now What?"

Peggy DesAutels (University of Dayton)
 “Advancing Women Faculty”

Martha Nussbaum (University of Chicago)
 “Philosophers in Law Schools”

Blanche Radford-Curry (Fayetteville State University)
 “Unraveling Mid-Career Issues for Women: As
 Persons and Women”

**IV-M. Special Session Sponsored by the APA Committee on
 the Status of American Indians in Philosophy: Thomas
 Michael Norton-Smith, *The Dance of Person and Place:
 One Interpretation of American Indian Philosophy***

9:00 a.m.-Noon

Chair: Kyle White (Allegheny College)

Critics: Agnes Curry (Saint Joseph College)

Thurman Lee Hester (University of Science and
 Arts of Oklahoma)

Scott Pratt (University of Oregon)

Sandra Tomsons (University of Winnipeg)

Author: Thomas Michael Norton-Smith (Kent State
 University, Stark Campus)

**IV-N. Special Session Sponsored by the APA Committee on
 Philosophy in Two-Year Colleges: Promises and Perils in
 Teaching Online**

9:00 a.m.-Noon

Chair: Brian J. Huschle (Northland College)

Speakers: Geoffrey Frasz (Community College of Southern
 Nevada)

Bill Hartmann (St. Louis Community College–
 Forest Park)

**IV-O. Special Session Sponsored by the APA Committee on the
 Status of Asian and Asian-American Philosophers and
 Philosophies: Feminism and Asian Philosophy**

9:00 a.m.-Noon

Speaker: Li-Hsiang Rosenlee (University of Hawai'i–West Oahu)
 “Feminism, Care Ethics, and Confucianism”

Commentator: Amy Olberding (University of Oklahoma)

Speaker: Ashby Lynne Butnor (Metropolitan State College of
 Denver)

“Embodying Morality: Buddhism, Feminism, and
 Ethical Skill”

Commentator: Kathryn J. Norlock (St. Mary's College of Maryland)

Speaker: Melanie Johnson-Moxley (University of Missouri–Columbia)

“‘Our Jane’ and Gitayoga: Non-Gender Exclusiveness and the Bhagavad Gita”

Commentator: Keya Maitra (University of North Carolina–Asheville)

SATURDAY AFTERNOON/EVENING, FEBRUARY 21

GROUP AND COMMITTEE SESSIONS, SATURDAY AFTERNOON/EVENING

(See Group Meeting Program for details)

Session GV: 12:15-2:15 p.m.

GV-1: International Society for Environmental Ethics

GV-2: Society for Realist-Antirealist Discussion

GV-3: International Association for the Philosophy of Sport

GV-4: Committee on the Status of American Indians in Philosophy

GV-5: Concerned Philosophers for Peace

GV-6: Society for Business Ethics

GV-7: Personalist Discussion Group

GV-8: Committee on Philosophy and Medicine

GV-9: Joint Session: Committee on Black Philosophers and the Committee on the Status of Asian and Asian-American Philosophers and Philosophies

GV-10: Radical Philosophy Association

GV-11: North American Nietzsche Society

V-A. Symposium: Collective Intentionality

2:30-5:30 p.m.

Chair: Marya Schechtman (University of Illinois–Chicago)

Speakers: Abe Roth (Ohio State University)

Kirk Ludwig (University of Florida)

Sara Rachel Chant (University of Missouri–Columbia)

V-B. Symposium: Time Travel

2:30-5:30 p.m.

Chair: Peter B. M. Vranas (University of Wisconsin–Madison)

Speakers: Kadri Vihvelin (University of Southern California)
“Killing Time Again”

Steven F. Savitt (University of British Columbia)
“The Possibility of Time Travel”

Phil Dowe (University of Queensland)
 “If I Hadn’t Pressed That Button: Lewis on Time
 Travel and Counterfactuals”

V-C. Author Meets Critics: William Bristow, *Hegel and the Transformation of Philosophical Critique*

2:30-5:30 p.m.

Chair: Sally Sedgwick (University of Illinois at Chicago)

Critics: Allegra de Laurentiis (State University of New
 York–Stony Brook)

Peter Thielke (Pomona College)

Author: William Bristow (University of Wisconsin–
 Milwaukee)

V-D. Invited Session: Are Science and Religion Compatible?

2:30-4:00 p.m.

Chair: William Ramsey (University of Nevada–Las Vegas)

Speaker: Alvin Plantinga (University of Notre Dame)
 “Religion and Science: Where the Real Conflict Lies”

Commentator: Daniel C. Dennett (Tufts University)

V-E. Colloquium: Metaethics

2:30-5:30 p.m.

2:30-3:30 p.m.

Chair: Julia Driver (Washington University in St. Louis)

Speaker: Scott E. Forschler (Northland Community and
 Technical College)

“On Practical Reason, Theoretical Reason, and
 Some Recent Criticisms of Ethical Rationalism”

Commentator: David Enoch (Hebrew University of Jerusalem)

3:30-4:30 p.m.

Chair: Paula L. Gottlieb (University of Wisconsin–
 Madison)

Speaker: Mark Decker (University of Nebraska–Lincoln)
 “Disintegrating Moral Pluralism”

Commentator: Philip Stratton-Lake (University of Reading)

4:30-5:30 p.m.

Chair: Daw-Nay Evans (DePaul University/School of the
 Art Institute, Chicago)

Speaker: Fritz J. McDonald (Oakland University)
 “Prolegomena to a Deflationary Metaphysics of
 Morality”

Commentator: James Dreier (Brown University)

V-F. Colloquium: Modern Political Philosophy*2:30-5:30 p.m.**2:30-3:30 p.m.*

Chair: Anton Ford (University of Chicago)

Speaker: Emily M. Crookston (Washington University in St. Louis)

"Locke's Theory of Political Obligation: A Reinterpretation"

Commentator: Daniel M. Farrell (Ohio State University)

3:30-4:30 p.m.

Chair: Lara Denis (Agnes Scott College)

Speaker: Kate Moran (Brandeis University)

"Kant on Public Participation and Moral Virtue"

Commentator: Jennifer Uleman (Purchase College-SUNY)

4:30-5:30 p.m.

Chair: John Whipple (University of Illinois-Chicago)

"Two Conceptions of Power: Leibniz and Hobbes on Right and Obligation"

Speaker: Christopher Johns (Saint Xavier University (Chicago))

Commentator: Jeremy Anderson (DePauw University)

V-G. Colloquium: Reliabilism*2:30-5:30 p.m.**2:30-3:30 p.m.*

Chair: Alexander Arnold (University of Notre Dame)

Speaker: Victor Kumar (University of Arizona)

"Kinds of Reliability"

Commentator: Nathan Ballantyne (University of Arizona)

3:30-4:30 p.m.

Chair: Andrew Bailey (University of Notre Dame)

Speaker: Chris Tucker (Stonehill College)

"Greco's Reliability Requirement"

Commentator: Thomas D. Senior (University of Arkansas)

4:30-5:30 p.m.

Chair: Ryan Doran (Northwestern University)

Speaker: Mark E. Wunderlich (Union College)

"Avoiding the Generality Problem for Process Reliabilism"

Commentator: John Shoemaker (University of Rochester)

V-H. Colloquium: Aristotle*2:30-5:30 p.m.**2:30-3:30 p.m.*

Chair: Fred D. Miller, Jr. (Bowling Green State University)

Speaker: Steven C. Skultety (University of Mississippi)

"Delimiting Aristotle's Conception of Stasis"

Commentator: Ronald Polansky (Duquesne University)

3:30-4:30 p.m.

Chair: Octavian Gabor (Purdue University)

Speaker: Martin J. Henn (University of Wisconsin–Whitewater)

"An Aristotelian Solution to the Paradox of Moral Luck"

Commentator: Alexander Jech (University of Notre Dame)

4:30-5:30 p.m.

Chair: Mary Krizan (University of Colorado–Boulder)

Speaker: S. Evan Kreider (University of Wisconsin–Fox Valley)

"Aristotle on Justice as a Virtue"

Commentator: Jeremy Kirby (Albion College)

V-I. Colloquium: Colors*2:30-5:30 p.m.**2:30-3:30 p.m.*

Chair: Colin Klein (University of Illinois–Chicago)

Speaker: Dimitria Electra Gatzia (University of Akron)

"Martian Colors"

Commentator: Peter W. Ross (California State Polytechnic University–Pomona)

3:30-4:30 p.m.

Chair: Walter Edelberg (University of Illinois–Chicago)

Speaker: Derek H. Brown (Brandon University)

"Learning That We See the Light: Colour Constancy and Illumination-Dependent Colour"

Commentator: Michael Watkins (Auburn University)

4:30-5:30 p.m.

Chair: Robert Schwartz (University of Wisconsin–Milwaukee)

Speaker: Wayne T. Wright (University of California–Irvine)

"Canonical Approximations and Hue Magnitudes: Still No Grounds for Color Physicalism"

Commentator: Edward Averill (Texas Tech University)

V-J. Special Session Sponsored by the APA Committee on the Status of American Indians in Philosophy: On Indigenous Apologies

2:30-5:30 p.m.

Chair: Kyle White (Allegheny College)

Speakers: Andrew D. Christie (University of New Hampshire)
“Indigenous Apologies”

Audra Simpson (Cornell University)

“Liberalism, Residential Schools, and Formal Apologies”

Dale Turner (Dartmouth College)

“Indigenous Apologies and Reconciliation”

GROUP MEETING PROGRAM

GROUP SESSION GI: THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 19, 9:00 A.M.-NOON

GI-1. Karl Jaspers Society of North America

9:00 a.m.-Noon

Topic: Cross-Cultural Hermeneutics and World Philosophy

Chair: Alan M. Olson (Boston University)

Speakers: David Nichols (Michigan State University)
"Heidegger and Jaspers on the Tragic"

Alina Feld (Hofstra University)

"Post-Modernity and Weltphilosophie"

Commentators: Mark Gedney (Gordon College)

Kevin Stoehr (Boston University)

GI-2. Central Division Sartre Circle

9:00 a.m.-Noon

Chair: Constance Mui (Loyola University New Orleans)

Speakers: Matthew C. Eshleman (University of North Carolina–
Wilmington)

Ronald E. Santoni (Denison University and Clare Hall,
Cambridge)

Commentator: David Detmer (Purdue University–Calumet)

GI-3. American Society for Value Inquiry

9:00 a.m.-Noon

Topic: The Vice of Greed

Chair: Thomas Magnell (Drew University)

Speakers: R. Paul Churchill (George Washington University)
"The Shock Doctrine: The Greed and Terrorism of
Global Capitalism"

Jonathan Schonsheck (LeMoyne College)

"Tsunami and Subprimes: Human Vices Not Natural
Disasters"

Raymond Pfeiffer (Delta College)

"Allowing Greed in Work"

GI-4. Society for the Philosophical Study of Education*9:00 a.m.-Noon***GI-5. Philosophy of Time Society***9:00 a.m.-Noon*

Speaker: Oliver Pooley (Oxford University)

"Less Than Becoming"

Commentator: Steven F. Savitt (University of British Columbia)

Speakers: Alan Rhoda (University of Notre Dame)

"Starting, Stopping, and the Continuity of Time"

Andrei A. Buckareff (Marist College)

"Eternalists Cannot Be Humean Compatibilists"

Commentator: V. Alan White (University of Wisconsin–Manitowoc)

GI-6. Society for Arab, Persian, and Islamic Philosophy*9:00 a.m.-Noon***GI-7. Society for Analytical Feminism***9:00 a.m.-Noon*

Chair: Anita Superson (University of Kentucky)

Speaker: Maura E. Tumulty (Colgate University)

"Illocution and Expectations of Being Heard"

Commentator: Anne Barnhill (New York University)

Speaker: Esa Diaz-Leon (University of Manitoba)

"Social Kinds and Conceptual Change: A Reply to Haslanger"

Commentator: Charlotte Witt (University of New Hampshire)

Speaker: Julinna Oxley (Coastal Carolina University)

"Care Ethics, Empathy, and Moral Theory: Do Women Do It Better?"

Commentator: Asha Bhandary (University of Connecticut)

GI-8. Hume Society: Angela Coventry, *Hume's Theory of Causation: A Quasi-Realist Interpretation**9:00 a.m.-Noon*

Chair: Karánn Durland (Austin College)

Critic: Livia Guimaraes (Universidade Federal de Minas Gerais)

Author: Angela Coventry (Portland State University)

GI-9. Society for the Study of Indian and Tibetan Buddhist Philosophy

9:00 a.m.-Noon

- Speakers: Marie Friquegnon (William Paterson University)
 “Santaraksita and Rongzompa: Enlightenment, Appearances and Sensation”
- Douglas Duckworth (Florida State University)
 “Substance and Quality: Contours of a Buddhist ‘Absolute’”
- Toy Tung (John Jay College–CUNY)
 “Further Considerations: Longchenpa and Cittamatra”
- Philip Richman (Independent Scholar)
 “Revaluation of the Concept of Karma for Buddhism in the West”
- Philippe Turenne (McGill University)
 “Philosophy as Hermeneutics: Tibetan Interpretations of the Five Treatises of Maitreya”
- Owen Flanagan (Duke University)
 “Buddhism and Consequentialism: Reflections of Charles Goodman’s Rendering of Buddhist Ethics”

GI-10. Joint Session Sponsored by American Association of Philosophy Teachers and the APA Committee on the Teaching of Philosophy

9:00 a.m.-Noon

Topic: How to Improve Student Learning: Pedagogical Lessons from the Field

- Speakers: David W. Concepción (Ball State University)
 Elizabeth O’Connor Chandler (Director, Center for Teaching and Learning, University of Chicago)
 Jodi Cressman (DePaul University)
 David H. Krause (Dominican University)
 Greg Light (Northwestern University)

GI-11. Conference of Philosophical Societies

9:00 a.m.-Noon

Topic: Business Meeting

- Chair: G. John M. Abbarno (D’Youville College)
- Speakers: G. John M. Abbarno (D’Youville College)
 David Schrader (Executive Director, APA)
 Thomas Magnell (Drew University)

GI-12. Society for the Philosophic Study of the Contemporary Visual Arts

9:00 a.m.-Noon

Topic: Destabilization, Race, and Contemporary Visual Media

Chair: Dan Flory (Montana State University)

Speakers: Ryan Johnson (Kent State University)

“Zips: Experimental Lines of Flight”

Dehlia Hannah (Columbia University)

“Shadows, Wallpaper, and Background

Assumptions: Genetics and the Aesthetics of Race in Contemporary Art”

Dan Flory (Montana State University)

“Race and Cinematic Background Assumptions”

GROUP SESSION GII: THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 19, 5:15-7:15 P.M.

GII-1. Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy

5:15-7:15 p.m.

Chair: Fred D. Miller, Jr. (Bowling Green State University)

Speakers: Elliot C. Welch (University of Maine–Farmington)

“On the Property Identity Requirement in Socratic Definitions”

Anna M. Greco (University of Guelph)

“The Principle of Specialization and the Philosopher-Rulers in Plato’s *Republic*”

Edward Halper (University of Georgia)

“Aristotle’s Generic Being”

GII-2. Society of Christian Philosophers

5:15-7:15 p.m.

Chair: Michael Murray (Franklin and Marshall College)

Speaker: Alvin Plantinga (University of Notre Dame)

“Naturalism, Theism, Morality, and Supervenience”

Commentator: David A. Merli (Franklin and Marshall College)

Everyone is cordially invited to the reception which follows this session.

GII-3. International Society for Environmental Ethics

5:15-7:15 p.m.

Topic: Flourishing in a Changing World

Chair: Jason R. Kawall (Colgate University)

- Speaker: Allen Thompson (Clemson University)
 “Radical Hope for Living Well in a New and Warmer World”
- Commentator: Kathryn J. Norlock (St. Mary’s College of Maryland)
- Speaker: Baylor Johnson (St. Lawrence University)
 “Reduced Consumption and a Theory of Needs”
- Commentator: Keith Bustos (University of Bern)

GII-4. Society for Asian and Comparative Philosophy

5:15-7:15 p.m.

Topic: Reflections on Reality Theory

- Chair: Bina Gupta (University of Missouri–Columbia)
- Speakers: Donna Giancola (Suffolk University)
 “Parmenides and the Buddha: Towards the Light”
- Bina Gupta (University of Missouri–Columbia)
 “Can an Advaitin Pray? The Role of Upasana in Advaita Vedanta”
- Kenneth Faber (Vanderbilt University)
 “Seng-Chao on the Immutability of Reality”

GII-5. Joint Session Sponsored by Society for Lesbian and Gay Philosophy and the APA Committee on Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and Transgender People in the Profession

5:15-7:15 p.m.

Topic: GLBT Issues in Applied Ethics

- Chair: Julie Klein (Villanova University)
- Speakers: Bassam Romaya (Temple University)
 “From Persecution to Propaganda: Iraq and the Question of Sexual Cleansing”
- Dennis R. Cooley (North Dakota State University)
 “Genetic Engineering, Non-Heterosexuality, and Lives Worth Living”
- Commentator: Rachel Heller (Independent Scholar)

GII-6. North American Division of the Schopenhauer Society

5:15-7:15 p.m.

- Chair: David E. Cartwright (University of Wisconsin–Whitewater)
- Speakers: G. Steven Neeley, Esq. (Saint Francis College)
 “The Consistency of Schopenhauer’s Philosophy”
- Sandra L. Shapshay (Indiana University/Indiana University Center for Bioethics)
 “Schopenhauer and the Problem of Tragedy”

Alex Neill (University of Southampton)
 “Schopenhauer on Tragedy and the Sublime”

GII-7. International Berkeley Society

5:15-7:15 p.m.

- Chair: Lisa Downing (Ohio State University)
 Speaker: Peter Baumann (Aberdeen University)
 “Molyneux’s Question and the Berkeleian Answer”
 Commentator: Robert Schwartz (University of Wisconsin–
 Milwaukee)
 Speaker: Keota Fields (University of Massachusetts–
 Dartmouth)
 “The Role of Predication in Berkeley’s
 Immaterialism”
 Commentator: Larry Nolan (California State University–Long
 Beach)

GII-8. Society for Student Philosophers

5:15-7:15 p.m.

- Speakers: Tyler Stephen Paytas (University of Missouri–St.
 Louis)
 “An Irreplaceable Delusion: How Richard Dawkins
 Fails to Refute the Consolation Argument”
 William Reckner (University of Wisconsin–
 Milwaukee)
 “The Value of Reason”
 Greg Lusk (Ohio University)
 “Idealization and Fictionalization in Model
 Explanation”

GII-9. Society for the Metaphysics of Science

5:15-7:15 p.m.

- Chair: Carl Gillett (Northern Illinois University)
 Speakers: Colin Klein (University of Illinois–Chicago)
 “Abstraction and the Shape of Reduction”
 Robert Bishop (Wheaton College)
 “Reductionism Meets Complexity”

GII-10. Radical Philosophy Association

5:15-7:15 p.m.

- Topic: Race and Gender in American Political Discourse**
 Speakers: Natalie Cisneros (Vanderbilt University)
 “Legislative Discourse and the Birth of the Illegal
 Alien”

Kristin McCartney (DePaul University)
 “Whither the State?: An Argument against
 Minoritized Participation in Electoral Politics”

Erin Tarver (Vanderbilt University)
 “Hillary, Michelle, Sarah and Me: Feminism,
 Resignification and Co-Optation”

**GII-11. Joint Session Sponsored by Bertrand Russell Society,
 History of Early Analytic Philosophy Society**

5:15-7:15 p.m.

Chair: Rosalind Carey (Lehman College–CUNY)

Speaker: Samuel Lebens (University of London)
 “A Neglected Theory of Judgment”

Commentator: Craig Fox (California University of Pennsylvania)

Speaker: Michael Garral (Baruch College–CUNY)
 “On What Withholding Is: Russell and
 Agnosticism”

GII-12. American Society for Value Inquiry

5:15-7:15 p.m.

Topic: Values in Business

Chair: G. John M. Abbarno (D’Youville College)

Speaker: Kendall D’Andrade (Retired)
 “A Philosopher King and a Nietzschean Superman
 Arm Wrestle in the Board Room”

Commentators: Ned McClennen (Syracuse University)
 Patricia Werhane (University of Virginia)

GII-13. Committee on Institutional Cooperation

5:15-7:15 p.m.

GROUP SESSION GIII: THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 19, 7:30-10:30 P.M.

GIII-1. Society for Realist-Antirealist Discussion

7:30-10:30 p.m.

Topic: Idealization in Science

Speakers: Robert Batterman (University of Western Ontario)
 “Explanatorily Essential Idealizations”

Otávio A. Bueno (University of Miami)
 “Idealization in Science: An Inferential
 Conception”

Christopher Pincock (Purdue University)
 “Idealization and Mathematical Tractability”

Michael Weisberg (University of Pennsylvania)
 “Deploying Highly Idealized Models”

GIII-2. Society for Philosophy in the Contemporary World

7:30-10:30 p.m.

Topic: Vengeance and Punishment in War

Speakers: Nancy Sherman (Georgetown University)
 “Payback”

Larry May (Washington University in St. Louis)
 “Equity, Collective Detention, and Habeas Corpus”

David K. Chan (University of Wisconsin–Stevens
 Point)
 “Co-Existing with Enemies”

GIII-3. Association for the Development of Philosophy Teaching

7:30-10:30 p.m.

Topic: Teaching an Ethical Norm for Premarital Sex

Speakers: James Gould (McHenry County College)
 “Pre-Marital Sex and Virtue: A Neo-Aristotelean
 Approach”

Michael M. Kazanjian (Triton College)
 Robert Lichtenbert (Editor, *The Meaning of Life*)

GIII-4. North American Society for Social Philosophy

7:30-10:30 p.m.

Topic: Virtue Ethics

Chair: Nancy E. Snow (Marquette University)

Speakers: Joseph Kupfer (Iowa State University)
 “Why the Badness of Vice Sometimes Outweighs
 the Goodness of Virtue”

Lawrence Blum (University of Massachusetts–
 Boston)
 “Race-Related Virtues”

Joan Woolfrey (West Chester University of
 Pennsylvania)

“A Virtue for the Discipline: Thomas’s ‘Textured
 Affirmation’”

Selin Gürsözlü (Binghamton University)
 “On the Possibility of Flourishing Under
 Oppression”

GIII-5. International Association for Computing and Philosophy*7:30-10:30 p.m.***Topic: Can Computationalism Be Salvaged?**

Chair: James Moor (Dartmouth College)

Speakers: James H. Fetzer (University of Minnesota–Duluth)

James Moor (Dartmouth College)

Selmer Bringsjord (Rensselaer Polytechnic
Institute)

Speaker: William Rapaport (University at Buffalo)

GIII-6. Josiah Royce Society*7:30-10:30 p.m.***Topic: Roycean Egoism and Social Hope**

Chair: Dwayne Tunstall (Grand Valley State University)

Speakers: Greg Aldin (Fordham University)

“Royce and Social Hope”

Bonnie Meyer (Indiana University/Purdue
University–Indianapolis)

“Royce’s Theory of Self: A New Face for Egoism”

Jason Bell (Vanderbilt University)

“Royce’s War Ethics”

GIII-7. Society for the Philosophy of Creativity*7:30-10:30 p.m.***Topic: Philosophical Creativity and the Series, “Popular Culture and Philosophy”**Chair: Larry R. Cobb (Executive Director, Foundation for
Philosophy of Creativity)

Speakers: Stephen H. Bickham (Mansfield University)

George Reisch (Open Court Publishing)

Randall E. Auxier (Southern Illinois University–
Carbondale)

Luke Dick (Independent Scholar and Song Writer)

Phillip Seng (University of Maryland–Baltimore
County)

GROUP SESSION GIV: FRIDAY, FEBRUARY 20, 7:00-10:00 P.M.

GIV-1. Association for the Development of Philosophy Teaching

7:00-10:00 p.m.

Topic: Science and the Philosophy of God

Speakers: Pat Flynn (Benedictine University)

“Neo-Darwinian Human Ascent v. Human Ascent?:
A Case for Both”

David Singer (Independent Scholar)

Bernard Toussaint (Benedictine University)

“Flew and the Question of God”

GIV-2. Society for the Advancement of American Philosophy

7:00-10:00 p.m.

Chair: Roger Ward (Georgetown College)

Speakers: Lucio Angelo Privitello (Villanova University)

“George Herbert Palmer: Forgotten Pedagogue of
American Philosophy”

Shane J. Ralston (University of Montreal)

“Reconsidering Philosophy’s Function: Novack,
Hickman and Dewey’s ‘Liaison Officer’ Claim”

Glenn Kuehn (University of Wisconsin Marshfield/
Wood)

“‘Lie to Me, I Like It.’ Malleable Morality and
Cheffing”

GIV-4. Society for the Philosophical Study of Education

7:00-10:00 p.m.

GIV-5. Association of Chinese Philosophers in North America

7:00-10:00 p.m.

Topic: Engaging with Early Chinese Philosophy

Chair: Steven F. Geisz (University of Tampa)

Speaker: Aloysius P. Martinich (University of Texas–Austin)

“Ideal Reader Interpretation: the Case of the Yijing”

Commentator: Steven F. Geisz (University of Tampa)

Speaker: Stephen Walker (University of Chicago)

“‘They Elevate One Thing and Leave Aside a
Hundred Others’—Disentangling Motivation,
Knowledge, and Justification In Mengzi’s Ethics”

Commentator: Franklin T. Perkins (DePaul University)

GIV-6. Association for Informal Logic and Critical Thinking*7:00-10:00 p.m.*

- Chair: Kevin Possin (Winona State University)
- Speakers: Susana Nuccetelli (St. Cloud State University) and Gary Seay (City University of New York)
 “Critical Thinking as an Autonomous Discipline”
 Richard Trowbridge (Independent Scholar)
 “Critical Thinking and Wisdom”
 Jerry Kapus (University of Wisconsin–Stout), Frank Fair (Sam Houston State University), and Jan Sobocan (University of Western Ontario)
 “Critical Thinking: General or Domain-Specific Skills”

GIV-7. Society for Student Philosophers*7:00-10:00 p.m.*

- Speakers: Grant Rozenboom (University of Iowa)
 “Alston’s Misfire: Two Wittgensteinian Analyses of The Reliability of Sense-Perception”
 Kyle Ferguson (Graduate Center, City University of New York)
 “You Know What I Mean: Grice and Epistemic Asymmetry”
 Seth Vannatta (Southern Illinois University)
 “Philosophical Foundations of Legal Pragmatism: The External Standard in the Common Law”
 Chrysoula Gitsoulis (City University of New York)
 “Kripke’s Finitude Argument against the Dispositional Theory of Meaning”
 Michael De Silva (University of King’s College)
 “Schopenhauer’s Musical Aesthetics and Its Application to the Case of Wagner”

GIV-8. Society for the Study of Process Philosophies*7:00-10:00 p.m.*

- Speakers: Duston Moore (Indiana University–Purdue University–Fort Wayne)
 “Unconscious and Non-Conscious Experience in Whitehead, Freud, and Marx”
 Keith A. Robinson (University of South Dakota)
 “Whitehead’s Speculative Philosophy and Radical Empiricism”

GIV-9. Society for Philosophy and Public Affairs*7:00-10:00 p.m.***Topic: Global Justice**

Chair: Carol Gould (Temple University)

Speakers: Thomas Christiano (University of Arizona)

David Reidy (University of Tennessee)

Helga Varden (University of Illinois–Urbana-Champaign)

Carol Gould (Temple University)

GIV-10. Society for the Metaphysics of Science: Don Ross, *Every Thing Must Go**7:00-10:00 p.m.*

Critics: Andrew Melnyk (University of Missouri–Columbia)

D. Gene Witmer (University of Florida)

Author: Don Ross (University of Alabama–Birmingham)

GIV-11. North American Kant Society: Graham Bird, *The Revolutionary Kant**7:00-10:00 p.m.*

Chair: Kenneth R. Westphal (University of Kent)

Critics: Adrian Moore (Oxford University)

Gary Banham (Manchester Metropolitan University)

Manfred Kuehn (Boston University)

Jill Buroker (California State University–San Bernardino)

Author: Graham Bird (University of Manchester)

GROUP SESSION GV: SATURDAY, FEBRUARY 21, 12:15-2:15 P.M.**GV-1. International Society for Environmental Ethics***12:15-2:15 p.m.*

Speakers: Derek D. Turner (Connecticut College) and Simon Feldman (Connecticut College)

“Why Not NIMBY?”

Commentator: Brett Werner (University of Minnesota)

Speaker: Sarah Wright (University of Georgia)

“The Value of Beta Diversity”

Commentator: Daniel Milsky (Northeastern Illinois University)

GV-2. Society for Realist-Antirealist Discussion: Mitchell S. Green, *Self Expression**12:15-2:15 p.m.*

Chair: Sanford Goldberg (Northwestern University)

Critics: Dorit Bar-On (University of North Carolina–Chapel Hill)

Michael Martin (University College)

Author: Mitchell S. Green (University of Virginia)

GV-3. International Association for the Philosophy of Sport

12:15-2:15 p.m.

Topic: Philosophy of Sport

Chair: Michael W. Austin (Eastern Kentucky University)

“Limitations of the Comparison between Sport and Law as Legal Systems”

Speakers: J. S. Russell (Langana College)

Mark A. Holowchak (Muehlenberg College)

Michael W. Austin (Eastern Kentucky University)

“Sportspersonship in Context: Recreational vs. Competitive Sport”

Jeffrey P. Fry (Ball State University)

“Gluttons for Sport”

GV-4. Special Session Sponsored by the APA Committee on the Status of American Indians in Philosophy: Business Meeting

12:15-2:15 p.m.

GV-5. Concerned Philosophers for Peace

12:15-2:15 p.m.

Chair: Danielle Poe (University of Dayton)

Speakers: Tracy Nicholls (Lewis University)

“Turning Swords Into Ploughshares: The Transformative Possibilities of Winter Soldier Movements”

Scott C. Davidson (Oklahoma City University) and Maria D. Davidson (University of Oklahoma)

“Ethics as First Philosophy: King, Levinas, and the Praxis of Peace”

Fuat Gürsözlü (Binghamton University)

“Agonism and Violence: Critique of an ‘Ethos of Democracy’”

Carlo Filice (State University of New York–Geneseo)

“Does Extreme Pacifism Need an After-Life Metaphysics?”

GV-6. Society for Business Ethics*12:15-2:15 p.m.*

Chair: Jeffrey Moriarty (Bowling Green State University)

Speaker: Thomas L. Carson (Loyola University Chicago)
"Side Constraints and the Levels of Moral
Discourse: A Modified Shareholder Theory"Commentators: Ian Maitland (University of Minnesota–Twin Cities)
Robert Phillips (University of Richmond)**GV-7. Personalist Discussion Group***12:15-2:15 p.m.*

Topic: Persons and Self-Organizational Mind Theory

Chair: Randall E. Auxier (Southern Illinois University-
Carbondale)Speaker: Ralph D. Ellis (Clark Atlanta University)
"Self-organization and the Many Senses of
'Person'"Speaker: Natika Newton (Nassau Community College)
"Understanding Persons from the Standpoint of
Action Theory of Intentionality"**GV-8. Special Session Sponsored by the APA Committee on
Philosophy and Medicine: To Code or not to Code: The
American Medical Association's Code of Ethics and Its
Proposed Revision***12:15-2:15 p.m.***GV-9. Joint Session Sponsored by Committee on Black
Philosophers and the Committee on the Status of Asian
and Asian-American Philosophers and Philosophies:
Race, Immigration, and Social Justice***12:15-2:15 p.m.*Chair: Eddy Souffrant (University of North Carolina-
Charlotte)Speakers: Ronald R. Sundstrom (University of San Francisco)
"The Browning of America and the Evasion of
Social Justice"

Erika Lee (University of Minnesota)

"Angel Island: Immigrant Gateway to America"

Commentator: Gary Y. Okihiro (Columbia University)

GV-10. Radical Philosophy Association*12:15-2:15 p.m.***Topic: Left Behind: Interrogating the Relevance of Marxian Social Theory**

- Speakers: Graham Cassano (Oakland University)
“Pragmatism and the Relativity of Marxian Class Formation”
- Peter Hudis (Oakton Community College)
“Philosophic Implications of Marx’s Critique of Value Production”
- George Sanders (Oakland University)
“Situationism, or, Marxian Bodies”

GV-11. North American Nietzsche Society*12:15-2:15 p.m.***Topic: Nietzsche and Lamarckism**

- Chair: R. Lanier Anderson (Stanford University)
- Speakers: Richard Schacht (University of Illinois–Urbana-Champaign)
Maudemarie Clark (University of California–Riverside)

MAIN AND GROUP MEETING PARTICIPANTS

A

ABBARNO, G. John M. (D'Youville College) ... GI-11 Thu AM, GII-12 Thu PM
ALDIN, Greg (Fordham University) GIII-6 Thu PM
ALEXANDER, David (Iowa State University) III-J Fri PM
ALMEIDA, Michael J. (University of Texas–San Antonio) II-K Fri AM
ALONSO, Facundo (Georgetown University) IV-F Sat AM
AMERIKS, Karl (University of Notre Dame) III-H Fri PM
ANDERSON, Jeremy (DePauw University) V-F Sat PM
ANDERSON, R. Lanier (Stanford University) I-C Thu PM, GV-11 Sat PM
ANTON, Audrey L. (Ohio State University) IV-G Sat AM
ARMSTRONG, John M. (Southern Virginia University) III-G Fri PM
ARNOLD, Alexander (University of Notre Dame) V-G Sat PM
ARRUDA, Caroline (SUNY–Stony Brook) IV-F Sat AM
AUSTIN, Emily (Washington University in St. Louis) III-G Fri PM
AUSTIN, Michael W. (Eastern Kentucky University) GV-3 Sat PM
AUXIER, Randall E. (Southern Illinois University–Carbondale)
..... GIII-7 Thu PM, GV-7 Sat PM
AVERILL, Edward (Texas Tech University) V-I Sat PM

B

BABER, Harriet (University of San Diego) II-M Fri AM
BADICI, Emil (East Carolina University) III-H Fri PM
BAIASU, Roxana (University of Oxford) IV-J Sat AM
BAILEY, Andrew (University of Notre Dame) V-G Sat PM
BALLANTYNE, Nathan (University of Arizona) V-G Sat PM
BANHAM, Gary (Manchester Metropolitan University) GIV-11 Fri PM
BAR-ON, Dorit (University of North Carolina–Chapel Hill) GV-2 Sat PM
BARNHILL, Anne (New York University) GI-7 Thu AM
BASS, Robert (Coastal Carolina University) III-I Fri PM
BATES, Jared G. (Hanover College) IV-I Sat AM
BATTERMAN, Robert (University of Western Ontario) GIII-1 Thu PM
BAUMANN, Peter (Aberdeen University) GII-7 Thu PM
BECK, Jacob (Texas Tech University) II-H Fri AM
BECKER, Kelly M. (University of New Mexico) III-I Fri PM

BELL, Jason (Vanderbilt University).....	GIII-6 Thu PM
BELL, Macalester C. (Columbia University).....	II-L Fri AM
BENNETT, Karen (Cornell University)	IV-A Sat AM
BENSON, Paul H. (University of Dayton)	III-F Fri PM
BERGMANN, Michael (Purdue University)	IV-C Sat AM
BERGOFFEN, Debra (George Mason University)	IV-L Sat AM
BHANDARY, Asha (University of Connecticut).....	GI-7 Thu AM
BICKHAM, Stephen H. (Mansfield University)	GIII-7 Thu PM
BIGGS, Stephen (University of Toronto)	IV-I Sat AM
BIRD, Alexander (University of Bristol)	I-F Thu PM
BIRD, Graham (University of Manchester).....	GIV-11 Fri PM
BISHOP, Robert (Wheaton College)	GII-9 Thu PM
BLAKE, Michael (University of Washington).....	III-B Fri PM
BLUM, Lawrence (University of Massachusetts–Boston).....	GIII-4 Thu PM
BOEHM, Miren (University of Wisconsin–Milwaukee)	IV-H Sat AM
BOENINGER, Brian (University of Notre Dame).....	II-G Fri AM
BOYLE, Matthew (Harvard University)	I-C Thu PM
BREYER, Daniel S. (Illinois State University).....	II-K Fri AM
BRIDGES, Jason (University of Chicago).....	II-H Fri AM
BRINGSJORD, Selmer (Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute)	GIII-5 Thu PM
BRISTOW, William (University of Wisconsin–Milwaukee)	V-C Sat PM
BROWER, Jeffrey E. (Purdue University)	III-I Fri PM
BROWER-TOLAND, Susan (Saint Louis University).....	II-A Fri AM
BROWN, Derek H. (Brandon University)	V-I Sat PM
BROWN, Harold I. (Northern Illinois University).....	IV-I Sat AM
BRUNERO, John (University of Missouri–St. Louis)	I-G Thu PM
BUCHAK, Lara (University of California–Berkeley).....	IV-F Sat AM
BUCKAREFF, Andrei A. (Marist College)	I-G Thu PM, GI-5 Thu AM
BUENO, Otávio A. (University of Miami)	GIII-1 Thu PM
BUROKER, Jill (California State University–San Bernardino)	GIV-11 Fri PM
BUSTOS, Keith (University of Bern).....	GII-3 Thu PM
BUTLER, Annemarie Peil (Iowa State University)	III-H Fri PM
BUTLER, Jesse (University of Florida)	III-J Fri PM
BUTNOR, Ashby Lynne (Metropolitan State College of Denver)	IV-O Sat AM
BYRON, Michael (Kent State University)	II-M Fri AM, III-F Fri PM
C	
CAPLAN, Ben (Ohio State University)	I-H Thu PM
CAREY, Rosalind (Lehman College–CUNY).....	GII-11 Thu PM
CARSON, Thomas L. (Loyola University Chicago).....	GV-6 Sat PM

CARTWRIGHT, David E. (University of Wisconsin–Whitewater)	GII-6 Thu PM
CASSANO, Graham (Oakland University)	GV-10 Sat PM
CASTON, Victor (University of Michigan–Ann Arbor)	II-A Fri AM
CAT, Jordi (Indiana University)	IV-A Sat AM
CERBONE, David R. (West Virginia University)	II-F Fri AM
CHAN, David K. (University of Wisconsin–Stevens Point)	GIII-2 Thu PM
CHANDLER, Elizabeth O'Connor (Director, Center for Teaching and Learning, University of Chicago)	GI-10 Thu AM
CHANT, Sara Rachel (University of Missouri–Columbia)	V-A Sat PM
CHARLES, David (Oxford University)	I-A Thu PM
CHATTERJEE, Deen (University of Utah)	III-B Fri PM
CHRISTIANO, Thomas (University of Arizona)	GIV-9 Fri PM
CHRISTIE, Andrew D. (University of New Hampshire)	V-J Sat PM
CHUNG, Julianne (University of Calgary)	III-I Fri PM
CHURCHILL, R. Paul (George Washington University)	GI-3 Thu AM
CHURCHLAND, Paul (University of California–San Diego)	I-D Thu PM
CISNEROS, Natalie (Vanderbilt University)	GII-10 Thu PM
CLARK, Maudemarie (University of California–Riverside)	GV-11 Sat PM
COBB, Larry R. (Executive Director, Foundation for Philosophy of Creativity)	GIII-7 Thu PM
COFFMAN, E. J. (University of Tennessee)	II-D Fri AM
COLEMAN, Mary Clayton (Bard College)	IV-E Sat AM
CONCEPCIÓN, David W. (Ball State University)	GI-10 Thu AM
CONEE, Earl (University of Rochester)	II-D Fri AM
CONNOLLY, Tim (East Stroudsburg University)	III-G Fri PM
COOK, Roy T. (University of Minnesota)	III-J Fri PM
COOLEY, Dennis R. (North Dakota State University)	GII-5 Thu PM
CORRY, Richard (University of Tasmania)	I-F Thu PM
COVENTRY, Angela (Portland State University)	GI-8 Thu AM
CRESSMAN, Jodi (DePaul University)	GI-10 Thu AM
CROOKSTON, Emily M. (Washington University in St. Louis)	V-F Sat PM
CUNEO, Terence (University of Vermont)	I-E Thu PM
CURLEY, Edwin (University of Michigan)	I-B Thu PM
CURRY, Agnes (Saint Joseph College)	IV-M Sat AM

D

D'ANDRADE, Kendall (Retired)	GII-12 Thu PM
DANCY, Russell M. (Florida State University)	III-G Fri PM
DARBY, Derrick (University of Kansas)	II-J Fri AM
DAVIDSON, Maria D. (University of Oklahoma)	GV-5 Sat PM

DAVIDSON, Matthew (California State University–San Bernardino)	II-H Fri AM
DAVIDSON, Scott C. (Oklahoma City University)	GV-5 Sat PM
DE BRIGARD, Felipe (University of North Carolina–Chapel Hill)	IV-I Sat AM
DE LAURENTIIS, Allegra (State University of New York–Stony Brook)	V-C Sat PM
DE SILVA, Michael (University of King’s College)	GIV-7 Fri PM
DEBES, Remy (University of Memphis)	III-E Fri PM
DECKER, Mark (University of Nebraska–Lincoln)	V-E Sat PM
DELLA ROCCA, Michael (Yale University)	IV-D Sat AM
DENIS, Lara (Agnes Scott College)	V-F Sat PM
DENNETT, Daniel C. (Tufts University)	V-D Sat PM
DEPAUL, Michael (University of Notre Dame)	I-E Thu PM
DESAUTELS, Peggy (University of Dayton)	II-B Fri AM, IV-L Sat AM
DETMER, David (Purdue University–Calumet)	GI-2 Thu AM
DIAZ-LEON, Esa (University of Manitoba)	GI-7 Thu AM
DICK, Luke (Independent Scholar and Song Writer)	GIII-7 Thu PM
DILLEY, Stephen C. (St. Edward’s University)	IV-I Sat AM
DIVERS, John (University of Leeds)	II-C Fri AM
DORAN, Ryan (Northwestern University)	V-G Sat PM
DORIS, John M. (Washington University in St. Louis)	II-B Fri AM
DOWE, Phil (University of Queensland)	V-B Sat PM
DOWNING, Lisa (Ohio State University)	GII-7 Thu PM
DREIER, James (Brown University)	V-E Sat PM
DRIVER, Julia (Washington University in St. Louis)	V-E Sat PM
DUCKWORTH, Douglas (Florida State University)	GI-9 Thu AM
DURLAND, Karánn (Austin College)	GI-8 Thu AM

E

EATON, Anne (University of Illinois–Chicago)	I-H Thu PM
EBBS, Gary (Indiana University)	III-D Fri PM
EBELS DUGGAN, Kyla (Northwestern University)	I-I Thu PM
EBREY, David (University of California–Berkeley)	III-G Fri PM
EDELBERG, Walter (University of Illinois–Chicago)	V-I Sat PM
EDWARDS, Jeffrey (SUNY–Stony Brook)	IV-E Sat AM
EDWARDS, Tracy A. (Michigan State University)	I-I Thu PM
ELDER, Crawford L. (University of Connecticut)	I-J Thu PM
ELLIS, Ralph D. (Clark Atlanta University)	GV-7 Sat PM
ELPIDOROU, Andreas (Boston University)	II-F Fri AM
ENGEL, JR., Mylan (Northern Illinois University)	III-E Fri PM
ENOCH, David (Hebrew University of Jerusalem)	V-E Sat PM

ESHLEMAN, Matthew C. (University of North Carolina–Wilmington) GI-2 Thu AM
 EVANS, Daw-Nay (DePaul University/School of the Art Institute–Chicago) V-E Sat PM

F

FABER, Kenneth (Vanderbilt University) III-H Fri PM, GII-4 Thu PM
 FAIR, Frank (Sam Houston State University) GIV-6 Fri PM
 FALES, Evan (University of Iowa) III-E Fri PM
 FARRELL, Daniel M. (Ohio State University) V-F Sat PM
 FELD, Alina (Hofstra University) GI-1 Thu AM
 FELDMAN, Simon (Connecticut College) GV-1 Sat PM
 FERGUSON, Kyle (Graduate Center, City University of New York) GIV-7 Fri PM
 FERRERO, Luca (University of Wisconsin–Milwaukee) III-C Fri PM
 FERRO, Chris (Tulane University) I-G Thu PM
 FETZER, James H. (University of Minnesota–Duluth) GIII-5 Thu PM
 FIELDS, Keota (University of Massachusetts–Dartmouth) GII-7 Thu PM
 FILICE, Carlo (State University of New York–Geneseo) GV-5 Sat PM
 FLANAGAN, Owen (Duke University) GI-9 Thu AM
 FLORY, Dan (Montana State University) GI-12 Thu AM
 FLYNN, Pat (Benedictine University) GIV-1 Fri PM
 FORBES, Graeme (University of Colorado) II-C Fri AM
 FORD, Anton (University of Chicago) V-F Sat PM
 FORSCHLER, Scott E. (Northland Community and Technical College) V-E Sat PM
 FOX, Craig (California University of Pennsylvania) GII-11 Thu PM
 FRASZ, Geoffrey (Community College of Southern Nevada) ... IV-N Sat AM
 FREIMAN, Christopher (University of Arizona) IV-F Sat AM
 FRIQUEGNON, Marie (William Paterson University) GI-9 Thu AM
 FRY, Jeffrey P. (Ball State University) GV-3 Sat PM
 FRYE, Marilyn (Michigan State University) I-L Thu PM
 FUMERTON, Richard (University of Iowa) IV-C Sat AM

G

GABOR, Octavian (Purdue University) V-H Sat PM
 GAIER, Robyn R. (Saint Louis University) IV-G Sat AM
 GARCIA, Jorge L. A. (Boston College) II-L Fri AM
 GARRAL, Michael (Baruch College–CUNY) GII-11 Thu PM
 GARRETT, Jeremy (California State University–Sacramento) I-I Thu PM
 GARTHOFF, Jonathan F. (Northwestern University) IV-K Sat AM
 GATZIA, Dimitria Electra (University of Akron) V-I Sat PM

GEDNEY, Mark (Gordon College).....	GI-1 Thu AM
GEIRSSON, Heimir (Iowa State University).....	III-J Fri PM
GEISZ, Steven F. (University of Tampa)	GIV-5 Fri PM
GERTLER, Brie (University of Virginia)	IV-J Sat AM
GIANCOLA, Donna (Suffolk University)	GII-4 Thu PM
GILLETT, Carl (Northern Illinois University).....	IV-A Sat AM, GII-9 Thu PM
GITSOULIS, Chrysoula (City University of New York).....	GIV-7 Fri PM
GLOD, William D. (Tulane University).....	IV-H Sat AM
GLYNN, Luke (Oxford University)	II-I Fri AM
GOLDBERG, Sanford (Northwestern University)	GV-2 Sat PM
GOLDFARB, Warren (Harvard University).....	III-D Fri PM
GOODING-WILLIAMS, Robert (University of Chicago).....	II-L Fri AM
GOTTLIEB, Paula L. (University of Wisconsin–Madison).....	V-E Sat PM
GOULD, Carol (Temple University).....	GIV-9 Fri PM
GOULD, James (McHenry County College).....	GIII-3 Thu PM
GRABOWSKI, Frank (Rogers State University)	IV-G Sat AM
GRACIA, Jorge (University at Buffalo)	I-L Thu PM
GRECO, Anna M. (University of Guelph).....	IV-G Sat AM, GII-1 Thu PM
GRECO, John (Saint Louis University).....	IV-C Sat AM
GREEN, Mitchell S. (University of Virginia)	GV-2 Sat PM
GUIMARAES, Livia (Universidade Federal de Minas Gerais) ...	GI-8 Thu AM
GUPTA, Bina (University of Missouri–Columbia)	GII-4 Thu PM
GÜRSÖZLÜ, Fuat (Binghamton University)	GV-5 Sat PM
GÜRSÖZLÜ, Selin (Binghamton University)	GIII-4 Thu PM

H

HAGAMAN, Scott (University of Notre Dame)	I-J Thu PM
HALPER, Edward (University of Georgia)	GII-1 Thu PM
HANNAH, Dehlia (Columbia University)	GI-12 Thu AM
HARBOUR, Michael (Vanderbilt University).....	IV-K Sat AM
HARRINGTON, James (Loyola University Chicago).....	IV-I Sat AM
HARTER, Thomas D. (University of Tennessee)	I-I Thu PM
HARTMANN, Bill (St. Louis Community College–Forest Park)	III-K Fri PM, IV-N Sat AM
HASSOUN, Nicole J. (Carnegie Mellon University)	IV-K Sat AM
HAVAS, Randall (Willamette University)	II-F Fri AM
HAZLETT, Allan J. (Fordham University)	III-E Fri PM
HEATHWOOD, Chris (University of Colorado)	I-E Thu PM
HEIDE, Dai (Ohio State University)	III-H Fri PM
HELD, Jacob M. (University of Central Arkansas)	I-I Thu PM
HELLER, Mark (Syracuse University).....	III-I Fri PM

HELLER, Rachel (Independent Scholar).....	GII-5 Thu PM
HENN, Martin J. (University of Wisconsin–Whitewater)	V-H Sat PM
HERMES, Charles M. (University of Texas–Arlington)	I-G Thu PM
HESTER, Thurman Lee (University of Science and Arts of Oklahoma)	
.....	IV-M Sat AM
HIRSCH, Eli (Brandeis University).....	I-J Thu PM
HOFFMANN, Glen A. (Ryerson University)	II-H Fri AM
HOLLAND, Nancy J. (Hamline University).....	II-F Fri AM
HOLLOWCHAK, Mark A. (Muehlenberg College).....	GV-3 Sat PM
HOWARD-SNYDER, Daniel (Western Washington University) ...	III-E Fri PM
HOWARD-SNYDER, Frances (Western Washington University)...	III-F Fri PM
HUDIS, Peter (Oakton Community College).....	GV-10 Sat PM
HUDSPETH, Christopher (University of South Florida).....	III-F Fri PM
HUNTER, David (Ryerson University)	I-G Thu PM
HURLEY, Patrick (University of San Diego)	II-M Fri AM
HUSCHLE, Brian J. (Northland College).....	III-K Fri PM, IV-N Sat AM
HYLTON, Peter (University of Illinois–Chicago).....	III-D Fri PM

I

ICHIKAWA, Jonathan (University of St Andrews)	IV-I Sat AM
---	-------------

J

JACOBS, Jonathan D. (Saint Louis University).....	II-I Fri AM
JECH, Alexander (University of Notre Dame).....	V-H Sat PM
JENSEN, Mark N. (Hope College).....	IV-F Sat AM
JEON, Haewon (Northwestern University)	IV-G Sat AM
JOHNS, Christopher (Saint Xavier University (Chicago)).....	V-F Sat PM
JOHNSON, Baylor (St. Lawrence University).....	GII-3 Thu PM
JOHNSON, Daniel M. (Baylor University)	II-G Fri AM
JOHNSON, Ryan (Kent State University)	GI-12 Thu AM
JOHNSON-MOXLEY, Melanie (University of Missouri–Columbia)	
.....	IV-O Sat AM

K

KAIN, Patrick (Purdue University)	II-K Fri AM
KAPUS, Jerry (University of Wisconsin–Stout)	GIV-6 Fri PM
KATAYAMA, Errol (Ohio Northern University).....	II-E Fri AM
KAUFMAN, Dan (University of Colorado).....	IV-D Sat AM
KAWALL, Jason R. (Colgate University)	GII-3 Thu PM
KAZANJIAN, Michael M. (Triton College)	GIII-3 Thu PM
KENEHAN, Sarah (University of Tennessee).....	I-I Thu PM
KIM, Joongol (Western Illinois University)	III-J Fri PM
KIM, Sungsu (Texas Tech University).....	II-I Fri AM

KIRBY, Jeremy (Albion College)	V-H Sat PM
KLEIN, Colin (University of Illinois–Chicago).....	V-I Sat PM, GII-9 Thu PM
KLEIN, Julie (Villanova University).....	I-K Thu PM, GII-5 Thu PM
KNOBE, Joshua (University of North Carolina–Chapel Hill)	II-B Fri AM
KOCH, William (University of South Florida)	IV-J Sat AM
KOONS, Robert (University of Texas–Austin).....	I-A Thu PM
KORMAN, Daniel Z. (University of Illinois–Urbana-Champaign) ...	I-J Thu PM
KRAUSE, David H. (Dominican University)	GI-10 Thu AM
KREIDER, S. Evan (University of Wisconsin–Fox Valley)	V-H Sat PM
KRIZAN, Mary (University of Colorado–Boulder)	V-H Sat PM
KUEHN, Glenn (University of Wisconsin Marshfield/Wood)....	GIV-2 Fri PM
KUEHN, Manfred (Boston University).....	GIV-11 Fri PM
KULVICKI, John V. (Dartmouth College)	I-H Thu PM
KUMAR, Victor (University of Arizona)	V-G Sat PM
KUPFER, Joseph (Iowa State University)	GIII-4 Thu PM

L

LACKEY, Jennifer (Northwestern University).....	II-D Fri AM
LADEN, Anthony S. (University of Illinois–Chicago)	IV-E Sat AM
LAINE, Joy E. (Macalester College).....	II-K Fri AM
LANGE, Marc B. (University of North Carolina–Chapel Hill)	I-F Thu PM
LEBAR, Mark (Ohio University)	III-C Fri PM
LEBENS, Samuel (University of London)	GII-11 Thu PM
LEDWIG, Marion (University of Nevada–Las Vegas)	II-I Fri AM
LEE, Erika (University of Minnesota)	GV-9 Sat PM
LEE, Sukjae (Ohio State University).....	IV-D Sat AM
LEMONS, Noah (College of William and Mary)	III-E Fri PM
LEVEY, Samuel (Dartmouth College)	III-H Fri PM
LEVINE, Steven (University of Massachusetts–Boston)	II-F Fri AM
LEWIS, Frank (University of Southern California).....	I-A Thu PM
LICHTENBERT, Robert (Editor, <i>The Meaning of Life</i>)	GIII-3 Thu PM
LIGHT, Greg (Northwestern University)	GI-10 Thu AM
LINDEMANN, Hilde (Michigan State University).....	III-F Fri PM
LONG, Todd (California Polytechnic State University).....	III-I Fri PM
LOUX, Michael (University of Notre Dame).....	I-A Thu PM
LUDWIG, Kirk (University of Florida).....	V-A Sat PM
LUFT, Sebastian (Marquette University).....	III-H Fri PM
LUSK, Greg (Ohio University)	GII-8 Thu PM

M

MACAVOY, Leslie (East Tennessee State University)	II-F Fri AM
MACKIE, Penelope (University of Nottingham)	II-C Fri AM

MACPHERSON, James (Ohio State University)	IV-H Sat AM
MAGNELL, Thomas (Drew University)	GI-11 Thu AM, GI-3 Thu AM
MAITLAND, Ian (University of Minnesota–Twin Cities)	GV-6 Sat PM
MAITRA, Keya (University of North Carolina–Asheville).....	IV-O Sat AM
MALM, Heidi (Loyola University Chicago)	IV-F Sat AM
MANDLE, Jon (University at Albany–SUNY)	II-J Fri AM
MANIS, R. Zachary (Southwest Baptist University)	II-K Fri AM
MARGOLIS, Eric (University of British Columbia)	I-D Thu PM
MARTIN, Michael (University College)	GV-2 Sat PM
MARTIN, Rex (University of Kansas).....	IV-K Sat AM
MARTINICH, Aloysius P. (University of Texas–Austin)	
.....	III-I Fri PM, GIV-5 Fri PM
MARUSIC, Berislav (Brandeis University).....	II-G Fri AM
MAY, Larry (Washington University in St. Louis)	II-J Fri AM, GIII-2 Thu PM
MCCANN, Hugh J. (Texas A&M University)	I-G Thu PM
MCCARTNEY, Kristin (DePaul University)	GII-10 Thu PM
MCCLENNEN, Ned (Syracuse University)	GII-12 Thu PM
MCDONALD, Fritz J. (Oakland University)	V-E Sat PM
MCGRATH, Matthew (University of Missouri–Columbia)	II-D Fri AM
MCKAY, Thomas (Syracuse University)	III-J Fri PM
MEINWALD, Constance (University of Illinois–Chicago).....	III-G Fri PM
MELE, Alfred R. (Florida State University).....	III-A Fri PM
MELNYK, Andrew (University of Missouri–Columbia).....	GIV-10 Fri PM
MENDOLA, Joseph (University of Nebraska–Lincoln).....	I-J Thu PM
MERLI, David A. (Franklin and Marshall College)	GII-2 Thu PM
MEYER, Bonnie (Indiana University/Purdue University–Indianapolis)	
.....	GIII-6 Thu PM
MILLER, Jonathan Scott (Bowling Green State University).....	II-K Fri AM
MILLER, JR., Fred D. (Bowling Green State University)	
.....	V-H Sat PM, GII-1 Thu PM
MILSKY, Daniel (Northeastern Illinois University)	GV-1 Sat PM
MINAR, Edward (University of Arkansas).....	II-F Fri AM
MION, Giovanni (Southern Methodist University)	III-I Fri PM
MOOR, James (Dartmouth College).....	GIII-5 Thu PM
MOORE, Adrian (Oxford University)	GIV-11 Fri PM
MOORE, Duston (Indiana University-Purdue University–Fort Wayne)	
.....	GIV-8 Fri PM
MOORE, Joseph (Amherst College).....	II-I Fri AM
MORAN, Kate (Brandeis University)	V-F Sat PM
MORIARTY, Jeffrey (Bowling Green State University).....	GV-6 Sat PM
MORRISSEY, Claire (University of North Carolina–Chapel Hill)	II-J Fri AM

MORRISTON, Wesley (University of Colorado–Boulder)	II-K Fri AM
MOZUR, Gerald (Lewis and Clark Community College)	III-K Fri PM
MUI, Constance (Loyola University New Orleans).....	GI-2 Thu AM
MULLINS, Matthew (Northwestern University)	II-G Fri AM
MURRAY, Michael (Franklin and Marshall College)	
.....	IV-B Sat AM, GII-2 Thu PM

N

NAHMIAS, Eddy (Georgia State University).....	III-A Fri PM
NEELEY, ESQ., G. Steven (Saint Francis College)	GII-6 Thu PM
NEILL, Alex (University of Southampton)	GII-6 Thu PM
NELSON, James L. (Michigan State University).....	III-F Fri PM
NEUFELD, Blain (University of Wisconsin–Milwaukee).....	IV-K Sat AM
NEWHARD, Jay M. (East Carolina University).....	II-H Fri AM
NEWTON, Natika (Nassau Community College)	GV-7 Sat PM
NGUYEN, A. Minh (Eastern Kentucky University)	IV-I Sat AM
NICHOLLS, Tracy (Lewis University)	GV-5 Sat PM
NICHOLS, David (Michigan State University).....	GI-1 Thu AM
NICHOLS, Shaun (University of Arizona)	II-B Fri AM
NICKEL, James W. (Arizona State University)	II-J Fri AM
NOLAN, Larry (California State University–Long Beach).....	GII-7 Thu PM
NORLOCK, Kathryn J. (St. Mary’s College of Maryland)	
.....	IV-O Sat AM, GII-3 Thu PM
NORTON-SMITH, Thomas Michael (Kent State University, Stark Campus)	
.....	IV-M Sat AM
NUCCETELLI, Susana (St. Cloud State University)...	I-L Thu PM, GIV-6 Fri PM
NUFFER, Gerhard (Reed College)	II-K Fri AM
NUSSBAUM, Martha (University of Chicago)	IV-L Sat AM
NYE, Howard (University of Michigan–Ann Arbor)	I-G Thu PM

O

O’CONNOR, Timothy (Indiana University–Bloomington)	III-A Fri PM
OKIHIRO, Gary Y. (Columbia University)	GV-9 Sat PM
OLBERDING, Amy (University of Oklahoma)	IV-O Sat AM
OLSON, Alan M. (Boston University)	GI-1 Thu AM
ORLANDI, Nicoletta (Rice University)	II-H Fri AM
OSHANA, Marina (University of Florida)	IV-B Sat AM
OXLEY, Julinna (Coastal Carolina University).....	GI-7 Thu AM

P

PADGETT WALSH, Kate (Iowa State University)	IV-H Sat AM
PAINTER, Mark A. (Misericordia University)	II-F Fri AM
PALETTA, Douglas (University of Pennsylvania).....	IV-K Sat AM

PATON, James (University of Illinois–Urbana-Champaign) I-J Thu PM
 PAYTAS, Tyler Stephen (University of Missouri–St. Louis) GII-8 Thu PM
 PEDERSEN, Arthur Paul (Carnegie Mellon University).....II-G Fri AM
 PEDRINI, Patrizia (University of Florence) IV-H Sat AM
 PELSER, Adam (Baylor University) III-E Fri PM
 PERKINS, Franklin T. (DePaul University)..... GIV-5 Fri PM
 PETERSON, Sandra (University of Minnesota–Twin Cities) IV-G Sat AM
 PETTIT, Gordon (Western Illinois University) I-G Thu PM
 PFEIFFER, Raymond (Delta College) GI-3 Thu AM
 PHILLIPS, Robert (University of Richmond)..... GV-6 Sat PM
 PICKAVANCE, Timothy H. (Biola University) I-J Thu PM
 PICKAVÉ, Martin (University of Toronto) II-A Fri AM
 PINCOCK, Christopher (Purdue University)..... GIII-1 Thu PM
 PLANTINGA, Alvin (University of Notre Dame)... V-D Sat PM, GII-2 Thu PM
 POE, Danielle (University of Dayton)..... GV-5 Sat PM
 POGGE, Thomas (Yale University/University of Oslo) III-B Fri PM
 POLANSKY, Ronald (Duquesne University) V-H Sat PM
 POLZIK, Dasha (University of Chicago)..... IV-F Sat AM
 POOLEY, Oliver (Oxford University).....II-I Fri AM, GI-5 Thu AM
 POSSIN, Kevin (Winona State University)..... GIV-6 Fri PM
 PRATT, Scott (University of Oregon) IV-M Sat AM
 PRIVITELLO, Lucio Angelo (Villanova University) GIV-2 Fri PM
 PUST, Joel (University of Delaware) IV-C Sat AM

E

RADFORD-CURRY, Blanche (Fayetteville State University)IV-L Sat AM
 RALSTON, Shane J. (University of Montreal) GIV-2 Fri PM
 RAMSEY, William (University of Nevada–Las Vegas)..... V-D Sat PM
 RAPAPORT, William (University at Buffalo) GIII-5 Thu PM
 RASMUSSEN, Joshua (University of Notre Dame) II-I Fri AM
 REA, Michael (University of Notre Dame).....II-K Fri AM
 RECKNER, William (University of Wisconsin–Milwaukee)..... GII-8 Thu PM
 REED, Baron (Northwestern University)II-G Fri AM
 REIDY, David (University of Tennessee) II-J Fri AM, GIV-9 Fri PM
 REISCH, George (Open Court Publishing) GIII-7 Thu PM
 RESHOTKO, Naomi (University of Denver)..... IV-G Sat AM
 RHODA, Alan (University of Notre Dame)..... GI-5 Thu AM
 RIBEIRO, Brian (University of Tennessee–Chattanooga) IV-H Sat AM
 RICHMAN, Philip (Independent Scholar)..... GI-9 Thu AM
 RICKETTS, Thomas (University of Pittsburgh).....III-D Fri PM
 RIVES, Bradley (Indiana University of Pennsylvania).....II-H Fri AM

ROBERTSON, Teresa (University of Kansas)	II-C Fri AM
ROBINSON, Keith A. (University of South Dakota)	GIV-8 Fri PM
ROCHE, Andrew (Wheaton College)	III-H Fri PM
ROHRBAUGH, Guy (Auburn University).....	I-H Thu PM
ROMAYA, Bassam (Temple University)	GII-5 Thu PM
ROSENLEE, Li-Hsiang (University of Hawai'i–West Oahu)	IV-O Sat AM
ROSS, Don (University of Alabama, Birmingham).....	GIV-10 Fri PM
ROSS, Peter W. (California State Polytechnic University–Pomona)	V-I Sat PM
ROTA, Michael W. (University of St. Thomas)	II-I Fri AM
ROTH, Abe (Ohio State University)	V-A Sat PM
ROZENBOOM, Grant (University of Iowa)	GIV-7 Fri PM
RUDEBUSCH, George (Northern Arizona University)	III-G Fri PM
RUPERT, Robert (University of Colorado–Boulder)	I-D Thu PM
RUSSELL, J. S. (Langana College)	GV-3 Sat PM

S

SABO, William Dylan (Western Michigan University).....	IV-J Sat AM
SAKA, Paul (Rice University).....	III-J Fri PM
SAMUELS, Richard (Ohio State University).....	II-H Fri AM
SANDERS, George (Oakland University)	GV-10 Sat PM
SANDERS, Kirk (University of Illinois–Urbana-Champaign)	III-G Fri PM
SANSON, David (Ohio State University)	I-J Thu PM
SANTONI, Ronald E. (Denison University and Clare Hall–Cambridge)	GI-2 Thu AM
SARTORIO, Carolina (University of Wisconsin–Madison).....	IV-B Sat AM
SAVITT, Steven F. (University of British Columbia)	V-B Sat PM, GI-5 Thu AM
SCHACHT, Richard (University of Illinois–Urbana-Champaign)	GV-11 Sat PM
SCHARLE, Margaret E. (Reed College).....	II-E Fri AM
SCHECHTMAN, Marya (University of Illinois–Chicago)	V-A Sat PM
SCHMALTZ, Tad M. (Duke University)	IV-D Sat AM
SCHONSHECK, Jonathan (LeMoyne College).....	GI-3 Thu AM
SCHRADER, David (Executive Director, APA)	GI-11 Thu AM
SCHROER, Robert W. (Arkansas State University)	IV-J Sat AM
SCHWARTZ, Robert (University of Wisconsin–Milwaukee)	V-I Sat PM, GII-7 Thu PM
SCHWEICKART, David (Loyola University Chicago).....	III-F Fri PM
SEAY, Gary (City University of New York)	GIV-6 Fri PM
SEDGWICK, Sally (University of Illinois–Chicago)	Presidential Address Introduction, V-C Sat PM

SENG, Phillip (University of Maryland–Baltimore County).....	GIII-7 Thu PM
SENR, Thomas D. (University of Arkansas).....	V-G Sat PM
SETIYA, Kieran (University of Pittsburgh).....	III-C Fri PM
SHAPIRO, Larry (University of Wisconsin–Madison).....	IV-A Sat AM
SHAPSHAY, Sandra L. (Indiana University/Indiana University Center for Bioethics).....	GII-6 Thu PM
SHERMAN, Nancy (Georgetown University).....	GIII-2 Thu PM
SHOEMAKER, John (University of Rochester).....	V-G Sat PM
SHRADER, Warren E. (Indiana University–South Bend).....	II-G Fri AM
SIEG, Wilfrid (Carnegie Mellon University).....	II-M Fri AM
SIMMONS, Alison (Harvard University).....	II-A Fri AM
SIMPSON, Audra (Cornell University).....	V-J Sat PM
SIMPSON, Matthew C. (Luther College).....	IV-F Sat AM
SINGER, David (Independent Scholar).....	GIV-1 Fri PM
SKULTETY, Steven C. (University of Mississippi).....	V-H Sat PM
SLOTE, Michael (University of Miami).....	II-L Fri AM
SMLANSKY, Saul (University of Haifa).....	III-A Fri PM
SMITH, Angela M. (University of Washington).....	IV-B Sat AM
SMITH, Basil (John Tyler Community College).....	IV-I Sat AM
SMITH, Robin (Texas A&M University).....	II-E Fri AM
SNOW, Nancy E. (Marquette University).....	I-K Thu PM, GIII-4 Thu PM
SOBOCAN, Jan (University of Western Ontario).....	GIV-6 Fri PM
SOLL, Ivan (University of Wisconsin–Madison).....	III-H Fri PM
SORENSEN, Kelly (Ursinus College).....	III-F Fri PM
SORENSEN, Roy (Washington University in St. Louis).....	III-J Fri PM
SOUFFRANT, Eddy (University of North Carolina–Charlotte)...	GV-9 Sat PM
SREEDHAR, Susanne (Boston University).....	I-I Thu PM
STEUP, Matthias (Purdue University).....	IV-C Sat AM
STEWART, Roderick M. (Austin College).....	I-L Thu PM
STOEHR, Kevin (Boston University).....	GI-1 Thu AM
STRATTON-LAKE, Philip (University of Reading).....	V-E Sat PM
STUBBLEFIELD, Anna (Rutgers University).....	I-L Thu PM
SUNDSTROM, Ronald R. (University of San Francisco).....	GV-9 Sat PM
SUPERSON, Anita (University of Kentucky).....	I-I Thu PM, GI-7 Thu AM
SUSSMAN, David (University of Illinois–Urbana-Champaign)	III-B Fri PM, IV-E Sat AM
SUTHERLAND, Daniel (University of Illinois–Chicago).....	I-C Thu PM
SUTTON, Jonathan (Auburn University).....	II-D Fri AM

T

TALBERT, Matthew (West Virginia University).....	III-F Fri PM
TALISSE, Robert B. (Vanderbilt University).....	I-I Thu PM

TARVER, Erin (Vanderbilt University).....	GII-10 Thu PM
THIELKE, Peter (Pomona College).....	V-C Sat PM
THOMPSON, Allen (Clemson University).....	GII-3 Thu PM
TIEHEN, Justin T. (University of Puget Sound).....	II-1 Fri AM
TILLMAN, Chris (University of Manitoba).....	I-H Thu PM
TOGNAZZINI, Neal A. (University of California–Riverside).....	I-G Thu PM
TOLLEY, Clinton (University of California–San Diego).....	I-C Thu PM
TOMSONS, Sandra (University of Winnipeg).....	IV-M Sat AM
TOOLEY, Michael (University of Colorado–Boulder).....	I-B Thu PM
TOUSSAINT, Bernard (Benedictine University).....	GIV-1 Fri PM
TROWBRIDGE, Richard (Independent Scholar).....	GIV-6 Fri PM
TUCKER, Chris (Stonehill College).....	V-G Sat PM
TUMULTY, Maura E. (Colgate University).....	IV-H Sat AM, GI-7 Thu AM
TUNG, Toy (John Jay College–CUNY).....	GI-9 Thu AM
TUNSTALL, Dwayne (Grand Valley State University).....	GIII-6 Thu PM
TURENNE, Philippe (McGill University).....	GI-9 Thu AM
TURNER, Dale (Dartmouth College).....	V-J Sat PM
TURNER, Derek D. (Connecticut College).....	GV-1 Sat PM

U

ULEMAN, Jennifer (Purchase College–SUNY).....	V-F Sat PM
URBAN, Tom (Houston Community College).....	III-K Fri PM

V

VALLIER, Kevin (University of Arizona).....	IV-K Sat AM
VAN DYKE, Christina (Calvin College).....	I-E Thu PM
VAN INWAGEN, Peter (University of Notre Dame) Presidential Address Fri PM
VANNATTA, Seth (Southern Illinois University).....	GIV-7 Fri PM
VARDEN, Helga (University of Illinois–Urbana-Champaign)....	GIV-9 Fri PM
VIHVELIN, Kadri (University of Southern California).....	V-B Sat PM
VISION, Gerald (Temple University).....	III-1 Fri PM
VOGLER, Candace (University of Chicago).....	III-C Fri PM
VRANAS, Peter B. M. (University of Wisconsin–Madison).....	V-B Sat PM

W

WALDREN, Matt (University of Wisconsin–Madison).....	IV-H Sat AM
WALKER, Stephen (University of Chicago).....	GIV-5 Fri PM
WARD, Julie (Loyola University Chicago).....	III-G Fri PM
WARD, Roger (Georgetown College).....	GIV-2 Fri PM
WATERHOUSE, Chris (University of St. Andrews).....	II-G Fri AM
WATKINS, Michael (Auburn University).....	V-1 Sat PM

WEIRICH, Paul (University of Missouri)	II-G Fri AM
WEISBERG, Michael (University of Pennsylvania)	GIII-1 Thu PM
WEISKOPF, Daniel A. (University of South Florida)	I-D Thu PM
WELCH, Elliot C. (University of Maine–Farmington).....	GII-1 Thu PM
WERHANE, Patricia (University of Virginia)	GII-12 Thu PM
WERNER, Brett (University of Minnesota)	GV-1 Sat PM
WERNER, Donna (St. Louis Community College–Meramec).....	III-K Fri PM
WERTHEIMER, Roger (Agnes Scott College)	III-J Fri PM
WESTPHAL, Kenneth R. (University of Kent)	GIV-11 Fri PM
WHIPPLE, John (University of Illinois–Chicago)	V-F Sat PM
WHITE, Daniel (CEO, Apla Inc.)	II-M Fri AM
WHITE, Kyle (Allegheny College)	IV-M Sat AM, V-J Sat PM
WHITE, V. Alan (University of Wisconsin–Manitowoc)	GI-5 Thu AM
WILAND, Eric (University of Missouri–St. Louis).....	IV-H Sat AM
WILLIAMS, Bekka (University of Wisconsin–Madison).....	IV-F Sat AM
WILLIAMS, Neil E. (University at Buffalo (SUNY))	I-F Thu PM
WIMSATT, William (University of Chicago).....	II-H Fri AM
WITMER, D. Gene (University of Florida).....	I-J Thu PM, GIV-10 Fri PM
WITT, Charlotte (University of New Hampshire) ...	II-E Fri AM, GI-7 Thu AM
WOOD, Jay (Wheaton College)	III-E Fri PM
WOOLFREY, Joan (West Chester University of Pennsylvania)	
.....	GIII-4 Thu PM
WRIGHT, Sarah (University of Georgia)	III-E Fri PM, GV-1 Sat PM
WRIGHT, Wayne T. (University of California–Irvine).....	V-I Sat PM
WUNDERLICH, Mark E. (Union College)	V-G Sat PM
WYCKOFF, Jason (University of Colorado–Boulder)	IV-K Sat AM
Y	
YATES, Melissa (St. John’s University)	IV-K Sat AM
Z	
ZARNITSYN, Aleks (University of Illinois–Chicago).....	IV-J Sat AM
ZUCKERT, Rachel E. (Northwestern University).....	I-H Thu PM
ZWART, Megan Halteman (University of Notre Dame)	II-F Fri AM

ABSTRACTS OF COLLOQUIUM PAPERS

SIDER, HELL, AND SUPERVALUATION (II-K)

MICHAEL J. ALMEIDA (UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS–SAN ANTONIO)

Ted Sider's Proportionality of Justice condition requires that any two moral agents instantiating nearly the same moral state be treated in nearly the same way. I provide a countermodel in supervaluation semantics to the proportionality of justice condition. It is possible that moral agents S and S' are in nearly the same moral state, S' is beyond redemption and S is not. It is consistent with perfect justice then that moral agents that are not beyond redemption go determinately to heaven and moral agents that are beyond all redemption go determinately to hell. I conclude that moral agents that are in nearly the same moral state may be treated in very unequal ways.

THE EARTHLY NATURE OF JUSTICE AND THE STATE IN PLATO'S *REPUBLIC* (IV-G)

AUDREY L. ANTON (OHIO STATE UNIVERSITY)

In this paper, I suggest that, for Plato, there is a class of things in the sensible world that lack forms, but nonetheless exist because they arise from the imperfections of those things that do participate in forms. When such entities are examined in Platonic dialogues, they are rendered "intelligible" by relating them to the forms that predicate the particulars that relate to them. In order to illustrate this thesis, I shall turn to Plato's most practical dialogue, *Republic*. I examine the possibility of the state and justice having corresponding forms in the intelligible realm. After a careful examination of the state, I conclude that there is no such form. Once I have offered reasons for the exclusion of the state among the forms, I reevaluate justice, finding it too to be fundamentally Earthly.

PLATO'S EUDAIMONISM (III-G)

JOHN M. ARMSTRONG (SOUTHERN VIRGINIA UNIVERSITY)

Eudaimonism is the view that happiness (*eudaimonia*) is the human being's end (*telos*). Some take this to mean that happiness is the final good, the ultimate justifying reason for all one's rational desires and pursuits. While this interpretation suits some ancient philosophers, I argue that it does not fit Plato. Rather than take the end to be the ultimate reason for action, Plato understands it to be a state of mature and proper functioning of the rational soul. Achieving this end is good, but it is not the final good nor the ultimate reason for action. For Plato, that role belongs to the normative order that the Demiurge seeks to bring about in the world as a whole. Plato thinks that the human end is indeed happiness, but he

does not think that achieving happiness is the highest good or what the virtuous most seek after.

ARE RELATIONS OF RECOGNITION INSTANCES OF COLLECTIVE INTENTIONALITY? (IV-F)

CAROLINE ARRUDA (SUNY-STONY BROOK)

The concept of recognition plays an integral role in contemporary political philosophy, often serving to secure the socio-political community's unity or remedy injustice. These accounts have ignored the more basic condition that recognition must be an intentional action for it to be genuinely social. I argue that recognition is better described as an intentional action. As an intentional action, recognition's realizability depends upon agents understanding their intentions as dependent on others for their satisfaction. As a result of this interdependence, recognition can be characterized as an instance of collective intentionality.

EPICURUS AND THE POLITICS OF THE FEAR OF DEATH (III-G)

EMILY AUSTIN (WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY IN ST. LOUIS)

According to the standard interpretation, Epicurus believes the fear of death is irrational and wholly eliminable in light of sound arguments. In this paper, I argue otherwise. For Epicurus, one variety of the fear of death is irrational in the sense that it is altogether beyond the reach of rational persuasion. The desire for security from violent death at the hands of others is a natural and necessary desire that cannot be jettisoned. Thus, Epicurus recommends ways to ameliorate the fear of violent death rather than to extirpate it, and I argue his strategies are primarily political in nature. His best advice for coping with this irrational fear of death is a situation, not an argument.

ON THE COMPATIBILITY BETWEEN CLASSICAL GEOMETRY AND HUME'S DENIAL (III-H)

EMIL BADICI (EAST CAROLINA UNIVERSITY)

It has been argued that Hume's denial of infinite divisibility entails that most of the theorems of classical geometry, including central results such as the Pythagorean theorem and the bipartition and bisection theorems, are false. I argue that Hume's thesis that there are indivisibles is not incompatible with the Pythagorean theorem and other central theorems of classical geometry, but only with those theorems that deal with matters of minuteness. The key to understanding Hume's view of geometry is the distinction he draws between a precise and an imprecise standard of equality in extension. Hume's project is different from the attempt made by Berkeley in some of his later writings to save classical geometry. Unlike Berkeley, who interprets the theorems of classical geometry as false albeit useful approximations of the relations that hold between geometrical figures, Hume is able to save most of those theorems as true.

KNOWLEDGE WITHOUT TRUTH? (III-I)

ROBERT BASS (COASTAL CAROLINA UNIVERSITY)

It is generally assumed that, whatever else is necessary for knowledge, at least truth is necessary. That is, there are no cases in which a claim is known but not true. This paper challenges that assumption. It is shown that, given three plausible theses, fallibilism about knowledge, irreducible chance in physics, and failures of bivalence in logic, there can be constructed plausible cases in which something is known but not true. Then, objections are considered and found not to be adequate. The conclusion is that we may have to admit that there can be knowledge without truth.

THE MIXED VIEW OF CONCEPTS: A DEFENSE (II-H)

JACOB BECK (TEXAS TECH UNIVERSITY)

Philosophers are divided on the ontological status of concepts. Fregeans hold that concepts are senses, abstract objects that exist in neither time nor space. Fodorians, by contrast, maintain that concepts are tokens of Mentalese, concrete mental representations located in the head. Margolis and Laurence (2007) entertain the possibility of reconciliation: a “Mixed View” according to which concepts are abstract and concrete. However, they go on to criticize this view, raising objections to the idea that concepts could be abstract, even in part. In this paper, I defend the Mixed View, arguing that there is a way of developing it that is immune to Margolis and Laurence’s objections. The key to this defense is to view Fregean senses as ability types that have Mentalese tokens as their categorical bases.

TRADITIONAL VERSUS EXPERIMENTAL PHILOSOPHY: A CASE STUDY (IV-I)

STEPHEN BIGGS (UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO)

According to a growing trend, empirical findings threaten traditional a prioristic philosophizing. That tradition uses intuitions as evidence. In caricature, one offers her intuition as evidence for some philosophically interesting proposition P and then, provided that her audience largely shares her intuition, all conclude that P is true. The contrary trend suggests that philosophers should discover an intuition’s prevalence before using it as evidence. Since experiments, not a priori reasoning, establish prevalence, the trend would have philosophers move from armchairs to laboratories. Once in the lab, however, one allegedly discovers that intuitions are too unruly to suggest much about knowledge, language, or metaphysics. The trend suggests, therefore, that traditional a prioristic philosophizing is doomed. This paper explores an instance of this trend, Machery et al.’s (2004) “Semantics, Cross-Cultural Style,” arguing that, contrary to Machery et al.’s contentions, their findings do not threaten traditional a prioristic philosophizing.

LEARNING THAT WE SEE THE LIGHT: COLOUR CONSTANCY AND ILLUMINATION-DEPENDENT COLOUR (V-I)

DEREK H. BROWN (BRANDON UNIVERSITY)

Colour objectivists routinely appeal to colour constancy to support their thesis that colours are illumination-independent. I argue that the plausibility of this claim rests on a superficial and inaccurate conception of colour constancy. In particular, constancy cases routinely involve perceived variations in illumination, variations that themselves are described as involving changes in colour. In such cases an illumination-dependent colour is reported in addition to a constant, illumination-independent one. The inference from colour constancy to the illumination-independence of colour is invalid, constancy instead supports a dual-referent approach to colour theory. Objections from the computational approach to colour constancy and recent work by David Hilbert are considered.

CONSISTENCY IN BELIEF AND INTENTION (I-G)

JOHN BRUNERO (UNIVERSITY OF MISSOURI-ST. LOUIS)

Cognitivists about Practical Rationality argue that we can explain some of the requirements of practical rationality by appealing to the requirements of theoretical rationality. In general, they argue, first, that intentions involve beliefs, and, second, that the theoretical requirements governing those involved beliefs can explain the practical requirements governing those intentions. For instance, some Cognitivists argue that intending to x involves believing that one will x , and the rational requirement to have consistent beliefs (about what one will do) can explain the rational requirement to have consistent intentions. In this paper, I argue that this explanation is unsuccessful (even if we grant that intending to x involves believing that one will x). My argument involves an extended discussion of Anscombe's example of St. Peter.

AN ENTIRELY NON-SELF REFERENTIAL YABLOESQUE PARADOX (III-J)

JESSE BUTLER (UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA)

We investigate the truth of a general claim about paradoxes and self-reference: "Is self-reference required for paradox?" We will investigate this claim by focusing on a specific issue raised by Priest in his 1997 "Yablo's Paradox" in response to Yablo's 1993 "Paradox without Self Reference." I claim that even if we grant Priest's assertion that YP ("Yablo's Paradox") is self-referential, then there is another list of sentences that is (1) paradoxical, (2) not self-referential in the same way the liar sentence is, and (3) not self-referential in the way that Priest claims that YP is. We shall notice a limitation on our ability to provide a general framework (such as Priest's "Inclosure Schema") for characterizing paradoxical behavior: we cannot say much more about liar-like paradoxes by way of an abstract, yet materially correct characterization than that such sentences or sets of sentences do form paradoxes.

 THE ASSUMPTIONS ACCOUNT OF KNOWLEDGE ATTRIBUTIONS (III-I)

JULIANNE CHUNG (UNIVERSITY OF CALGARY)

Infallibilist skepticism remains a highly influential philosophical position that is perhaps as irksome as it is compelling; for though it has endured, it is not easy, or perhaps even possible, to fully endorse. However, those who have attempted to refute it have continually met with difficulty. The purpose of this paper is to explain the lure of skepticism while at the same time elucidating how and why knowledge claims can be considered true. In this paper, I advance what I will call the assumptions account of knowledge attributions. It will be important to keep in mind that it is a defining feature of this account that it is infallibilist; which is to say that it endorses the view that there cannot be knowledge without certainty. This account is intended to rival a number of other accounts that have surfaced in recent years; most notably, contextualism and subject-sensitive invariantism.

 THE TROUBLE WITH BECOMING IN PLATO'S *REPUBLIC* (III-G)

TIM CONNOLLY (EAST STROUDSBURG UNIVERSITY)

Plato claims in Books VI-VII of the *Republic* that philosophical training involves turning one's soul away from the realm of becoming and toward the realm of being. There is much disagreement, however, about what Plato means by "becoming" (genesis) and why he thinks the realm of becoming is deficient. This paper begins by specifying one kind of becoming with which Plato takes issue in the dialogue, namely, ordinary change over time. To figure out his trouble with this sort of change, I examine a much neglected passage from Book II in which Plato associates change in ordinary objects with the qualitative inferiority of those objects. Finally, I show the connection between this intuition about change and his notion in VI-VII that the philosopher-king must imitate what is orderly and changeless in founding the best possible city.

LOCKE'S THEORY OF POLITICAL OBLIGATION: A REINTERPRETATION (V-F)

EMILY M. CROOKSTON (WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY IN ST. LOUIS)

In this paper, I challenge the standard interpretation of Locke's theory of political obligation. On this view, Locke is a consent theorist who thinks it is reasonable for one to obey government only if one benefits from exchanging some of the liberties of the state of nature for the conveniences of civil society. I argue that Locke's defense of consent theory runs deeper than exchanging liberties for conveniences. Instead, Locke recognizes consent as the vehicle through which human beings apply the natural law. Because most people within the state of nature are incapable of satisfying their moral duties, Locke argues that individuals have a moral duty to politically obligate themselves—a moral duty to consent. Therefore, society increases equality and justice when civil law reflects the natural law and guides those who lack key resources for fulfilling the moral law.

IF YOU LIKE IT, DOES IT MATTER IF IT'S REAL? (IV-I)

FELIPE DE BRIGARD (UNIVERSITY OF NORTH CAROLINA—CHAPEL HILL)

Nozick's experience machine thought-experiment was intended to mobilize our intuitions toward a negative claim: that hedonism is false because in addition to pleasurable experiences people care about their reality. On the basis of some experimental evidence, I argue that the experience machine thought-experiment may not isolate the intuition Nozick wants to isolate. In addition, I present an explanatory model, derived from what behavioral economists and psychologists call the status quo bias, in order to account for these experimental results.

DISINTEGRATING MORAL PLURALISM (V-E)

MARK DECKER (UNIVERSITY OF NEBRASKA—LINCOLN)

One common objection to pluralist theories of moral rightness is that such views fail to unify the multiplicity of fundamental moral principles. In the absence of a unifying explanation, moral pluralism seems to leave us with an arbitrary list of right-making features, thereby failing to justify moral pluralism. One novel strategy in attempting to answer the disunity objection is to try integrating moral pluralism with versions of moral monism. This strategy is pursued (independently) by Robert Audi and Philip Stratton-Lake, who attempt to integrate moral pluralism with Kantian deontology. I argue that moral pluralism cannot be integrated with moral monism. After explicating the core tenets of moral pluralism, I present and criticize the Kantian nonconsequentialist integration projects of Audi and Stratton-Lake. I show that the criticisms of their attempts at integration extend to any such project, not just the Kantian ones.

NATURALISM IN SCIENCE: A HOUSE DIVIDED? (IV-I)

STEPHEN C. DILLEY (ST. EDWARD'S UNIVERSITY)

This essay argues that philosophical naturalists ought to set aside methodological naturalism in science. When linked to methodological naturalism, philosophical naturalism opens itself to several problems. Specifically, when joined with methodological naturalism, philosophical naturalism can never be scientifically disconfirmed but will always be confirmed, no matter what the empirical evidence. Theistic-friendly "God hypotheses," on the other hand, can never be scientifically confirmed—again, no matter what the evidence—but are routinely said to be disconfirmed. Instead of this questionable dynamic, this essay recommends that philosophical naturalists set aside methodological naturalism and adopt a two-tier model of science, which allows their worldview to enjoy genuine scientific confirmation, pursue a robust research program, and meaningfully engage theism.

CHILDRENS' INTERESTS AND THE FATHERS' RIGHTS MOVEMENT (I-I)

KYLA EBELS DUGGAN (NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY)

Child custody cases in the United States are usually settled by appeal to what is taken to be in the children's best interests. A growing movement for fathers' rights asserts that an explicit recognition of parental rights should replace this practice, and further that this should lead us to favor split custody arrangements. I argue that fundamental commitments of political liberalism demand that we take parental rights rather than children's interests to provide our custodial standard. But I oppose the fathers' claim that this should lead us to embrace a 50/50 split as our default custody arrangement.

THE UPSURGE OF SPONTANEITY: THE ROLE AND PLACE OF MERLEAU-PONTY IN THE DREYFUS-McDOWELL DEBATE (II-F)

ANDREAS ELPIDOROU (BOSTON UNIVERSITY)

In a multifaceted debate between Dreyfus and McDowell, Merleau-Ponty has been unambiguously placed on the side of the former. In line with Dreyfus, Merleau-Ponty holds that conceptual activity is founded upon a pre-thematic and unreflective engagement with the world. Spontaneity, they both agree, is the result of the transformation of the nonconceptual to the conceptual. In what follows, I argue that Dreyfus's account of this transformation is only partially in agreement with the one advanced by Merleau-Ponty. More explicitly, I demonstrate that whereas Dreyfus holds that the difference between the nonconceptual and the conceptual is a difference in kind, Merleau-Ponty puts forth a more nuanced explanation of the relationship between the two: Namely, by arguing that the two differ both in degree and in kind, Merleau-Ponty does away with the exclusive dualism that Dreyfus inherits by maintaining a difference in kind, which is a radical or categorical difference.

SCHOPENHAUER WAS AN OPTIMIST (III-H)

KENNETH FABER (VANDERBILT UNIVERSITY)

In our attempt to come to terms with the nature of the universe and our place within it, we may wonder whether it is reasonable to be optimistic concerning our situation. Schopenhauer is generally considered extremely pessimistic, and, in certain respects, this is undoubtedly a fitting assessment. In the final analysis, however, Schopenhauer is a decided optimist. Our central aim in this essay is to explain why this is true. According to Schopenhauer, the most important of all truths is that it would be better for us not to exist. Schopenhauer believes that, despite the evil character of the world, salvation is possible. According to Schopenhauer, the complete denial of the will-to-live results in the end of the world, and it is in this that salvation consists. The path to salvation is difficult, but not impossible, to traverse. Hence, in the ultimate sense, Schopenhauer was an optimist.

THE PHILOSOPHY OF ACTION AND THE SO-CALLED PROBLEM OF CAUSAL DEVIANCE (I-G)

CHRIS FERRO (TULANE UNIVERSITY)

Much philosophical work on the nature of action has focused on the problem of causal deviance. The basic problem is to explain—in a non-question-begging way—how the sort of mental causation that is definitive of intentional action differs from the “deviant” mental causation of involuntary movements. This paper argues (1) that the “sensitivity strategy” that John Bishop and others deploy in order to solve this problem does not succeed in doing so; (2) that the manner in which Bishop’s account fails suggests that there is just no way to solve the problem on its own terms; and (3) that we therefore have to rethink the assumptions that give rise to the problem to begin with. Specifically, I recommend that we give up the assumption that actions are not *sui generis* with respect to other sorts of human bodily movements.

ON PRACTICAL REASON, THEORETICAL REASON, AND SOME RECENT CRITICISMS OF ETHICAL RATIONALISM (V-E)

SCOTT E. FORSCHLER (NORTHLAND COMMUNITY AND TECHNICAL COLLEGE)

David Enoch, Harry Frankfurt, and Lionel McPherson have recently criticized versions of ethical rationalism, or the need for them. All three make the radical mistake of confusing practical reason with theoretical reason. They suppose that ethical rationalism attempts to derive ethics from the latter, and hence inevitably fail in this impossible task; but standard versions of ethical rationalism are based on practical reason, not theoretical reason. Diagnosing this common mistake requires us to distinguish between theoretical acceptance and practical acceptance of an ethical claim. Since both are possible for all such claims, the long history of meta-ethical dispute over whether such claims are statements (which can be believed, be true, etc.) or expressions, prescriptions, etc. which can only be felt or acted upon, may rest upon a mistake which has tremendously confused the issue, and made it difficult to understand ethical rationalism in particular.

PRIORITARIAN JUSTICE AND POSITIONAL GOODS (IV-F)

CHRISTOPHER FREIMAN (UNIVERSITY OF ARIZONA)

Positional goods are goods whose relative amount determines their absolute value. Harry Brighouse and Adam Swift argue that prioritarianism recommends “leveling down” positional goods including education, health, and wealth because the value of the shares of individuals with less of such goods can be increased simply—and only—by decreasing the shares of individuals with more. I argue that Brighouse and Swift restrict their analysis to the immediate and local negative externalities of the pursuit of positional goods and ignore its dispersal of global benefits over time. The most effective strategy for improving the worth of the positional goods held by those individuals with less of such goods is to improve the

individuals' absolute socioeconomic condition, which will likely disallow Pareto inefficient distributions of resources like education, health care, and wealth. Thus, prioritarianism does not recommend leveling down with respect to these goods and may actually forbid it.

ON THE CONTINUATION OF THE CRAFT ANALOGY IN *REPUBLIC II* (IV-G)

ROBYN R. GAIER (SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY)

Terence Irwin argues that Plato ultimately rejects the craft analogy presented by Socrates, or the idea that the practice of virtue resembles the practice of a craft, such as medicine. In this paper, I employ Gregory Vlastos's response to Irwin to help show that Plato does not abandon the craft analogy. However, my response to Irwin's interpretation diverges from Vlastos's. I do not wish to claim that the craft analogy is the same, or remains unmodified between its appearance in the early dialogues and the later dialogues. Rather, I extend Vlastos's critique of Irwin and suggest that Plato ultimately develops the craft analogy in *Republic II*, a critical middle dialogue.

A *PRIMA FACIE* CASE AGAINST CIVIL MARRIAGE (I-I)

JEREMY GARRETT (CALIFORNIA STATE UNIVERSITY—SACRAMENTO)

Contemporary debates over civil marriage increasingly have polarized into what appear to be two starkly opposed positions: one defending "traditional" marriage and the other pushing for an expansion of the civil franchise to include same-sex marriages. Despite their considerable differences, however, these two positions share a significant common assumption—namely, that some form of civil marriage is justifiable in the first place. In this paper, I challenge this assumption and defend an alternative I call marital contractualism (MC). This view holds that marriage ought primarily to be a private affair worked out between partners, with the state's involvement limited to the enforcement of (1) general laws and (2) particular contracts. After describing MC's primary features, I offer a tripartite *prima facie* case in its favor and against civil marriage, arguing that MC is default-justified, has many attractive virtues, and avoids some important moral and social costs of civil marriage.

MARTIAN COLORS (V-I)

DIMITRIA ELECTRA GATZIA (UNIVERSITY OF AKRON)

Developmental synesthesia typically involves either the stimulation of one sensory modality giving rise to an experience in a different modality (when a sound, for example, evokes a color) or the stimulation of a single sensory modality giving rise to different qualitative aspects of experience (when the sight of a number, for example, evokes a color). These occurrences seem to support Grice's (1989) argument that considerations pertaining to the individualization of various sense modalities provide a basis for accepting qualia. The existence of qualia, however, threatens intentionalism, viz., the view that phenomenal content is reducible to

the representational content. In defense of intentionalism, Ross (2001) attempts to defuse Grice's argument by proposing necessary conditions for distinguishing sense modalities that do not appeal to qualia. I shall argue that his argument fails.

GROUNDWORK FOR A PROBABILISTIC ANALYSIS OF CAUSATION: SOME FOUNDATIONAL ISSUES IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF PROBABILITY (II-I)

LUKE GLYNN (OXFORD UNIVERSITY)

The major foundational obstacle to the development of a probabilistic analysis of causation is that, according to the standard axiomatization of the probability calculus, the probability that event *e* occurs conditional upon the non-occurrence of event *c* is undefined where *c* has a probability of 1. But the (otherwise) most attractive sort of probabilistic analysis requires that this probability be well-defined if *c* is to be a cause of *e*. So it seems that such an analysis has the unpalatable consequence that probability 1 events cannot act as causes.

The paper distinguishes two problem cases: undetermined probability 1 causes and determined probability 1 causes. It is shown that recognition of the fundamental relativity of probability allows both problems to be solved. A corollary is that there are non-trivial objective probabilities in deterministic worlds.

NATURAL INCLINATIONS AND THE NORMATIVE FORCE OF THE PRINCIPLE OF SPECIALIZATION IN PLATO'S *REPUBLIC* (IV-G)

ANNA M. GRECO (UNIVERSITY OF GUELPH)

The Principle of Specialization is often taken to imply that people have fine-grained "natural inclinations" that uniquely predispose them to given jobs. I propose instead a different interpretation of what it is for Plato to have a "natural inclination" for a job. Once one has acquired a *techne* with high levels of proficiency in it, then that *techne* can be seen as one for which the individual has a natural aptitude. But this is because one's natural general abilities and dispositions would then support and facilitate both the acquisition and the application of the *techne*, not because they would predispose the individual to that *techne* only. In line with this interpretation, I discuss the Principle of Specialization—as it applies to productive activities for the satisfaction of social demands—in a way that highlights the work ethics underpinning Plato's conception of social justice.

LIBERALISM AND THE PROBLEM OF RELIGIOUS JUSTIFICATION (IV-K)

MICHAEL HARBOUR (VANDERBILT UNIVERSITY)

In this paper, I argue against Christopher Eberle's contention that religious convictions can serve as a legitimate basis for policy making in liberal democratic regimes, and that the attempt to exclude them itself constitutes a violation of liberalism. In response to Eberle, I contend that citizens who want to pursue such policies are ultimately forced into a bind: either they

are committed to the epistemic superiority of their religious beliefs, in which case they have no reason to be committed to liberalism, or they are committed to a kind of epistemic relativism which is deeply at odds with their strong religious convictions.

IS KNOWLEDGE SOMETHING EVERYONE WANTS? (III-E)

ALLAN J. HAZLETT (FORDHAM UNIVERSITY)

I consider the thesis that “truth is the aim of belief” and argue that this thesis is threatened by social psychological work on “self-promoting” false beliefs.

AN ARISTOTELIAN SOLUTION TO THE PARADOX OF MORAL LUCK (V-H)

MARTIN J. HENN (UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN–WHITEWATER)

The paradox of moral luck as developed by Bernard Williams (1976) and Thomas Nagel (1979) arises whenever a rational agent is held responsible for some action done voluntarily and uncoerced, even though a significant aspect of what the agent has done depends on factors that fall well outside his control. I propose here an Aristotelian solution to the paradox based on a distinction drawn at *Nicomachean Ethics* 1136b25-31 between two compelling different senses of the Greek verb *poiein* as on the one hand “to do,” on the other “to make, to produce.” For Aristotle, the object of *poiein* as “doing” is action (*praxis*) while the object of *poiein* as “producing” is some resultant state-of-affairs, for instance, the unjust state-of-affairs (*ta adika*) produced inadvertently by the man who receives an unjust distribution of some good. The paradox ultimately relies upon our confusing the antecedent circumstances for the proximate causes of action.

COUNTERFACTUAL INTERVENERS IN FRANKFURT CASES (I-G)

CHARLES M. HERMES (UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS–ARLINGTON)

Frankfurt cases supposedly show that alternative possibilities are not necessary for moral responsibility. Yet, it also seems that one ought not be blamed for doing the best that she could. These opposing intuitions are created when we ignore the modally complex nature of Frankfurt cases. In Frankfurt cases, Black must ensure that an event occurs. Yet, Black is usually seen as merely being part of a preempted causal chain. In standard preemption cases the preempted causal chain ensures that, had the cause not occurred, the effect still would have occurred. So, preempted causal chains ensure that a certain counterfactual is true. Ensuring that a counterfactual is true is not the same as ensuring that the consequent of that counterfactual is true. Frankfurt cases seem compelling because we employ reasoning that is only appropriate in standard preemption cases to scenarios where the consequent must be ensured.

NATIVISM: IN DEFENSE OF THE REPRESENTATIONAL INTERPRETATION (II-H)

GLEN A. HOFFMAN (RYERSON UNIVERSITY)

Linguistic competence, in general terms, involves the ability to learn, understand, and speak a language. Nativism holds that linguistic competence is explained primarily by an innate faculty of linguistic cognition. In this paper, close scrutiny is given to nativism's fundamental commitments in the area of metaphysics. In the course of this exploration it is argued that any minimally defensible variety of nativism is, for better or worse, married to two theses: linguistic competence is grounded in a faculty of linguistic cognition that is (i) embodied and (ii) whose rules are represented in the brains of human language users.

TRUST AND THE PRISONER'S DILEMMA (III-F)

CHRISTOPHER HUDSPETH (UNIVERSITY OF SOUTH FLORIDA)

For more than 30 years the Prisoner's Dilemma has been used as a way to investigate trust; it is the foundation for nearly all contemporary discussions of trust. But the Prisoner's Dilemma, unlike most instances of trust, is a special: in it a single action is simultaneously trusting and trustworthy. The act of cooperating, however, may be motivated by either trusting or trustworthiness but need not be motivated both. Further, the act of cooperating, or defecting, in the Prisoner's Dilemma might be strategic and not connected to trust at all. The Prisoner's Dilemma then does not do what it is purported to do: give us special insight into the nature of trust. In this paper I show that the Prisoner's Dilemma confuses the various motivations for acting into a single, simplified, explanatory motivation and I conclude that, as a model, it is insufficient for explaining and understanding trust.

A POWERS THEORY OF CAUSATION (II-I)

JONATHAN D. JACOBS (SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY)

In this paper, my central aim is to defend the Powers Theory of causation, according to which causation is the exercise of a power (or manifestation of a disposition). I will do so by, first, presenting a recent version of the Powers Theory, that of Mumford (Forthcoming). Second, I will raise an objection to Mumford's account. Third, I will offer a revised version that avoids the objection. And, fourth, I will end by briefly comparing the proposed Powers Theory with the Neo-Humean, counterfactual theory.

RATIONAL UNITY AND THE DISCURSIVE DILEMMA (IV-F)

MARK N. JENSEN (HOPE COLLEGE)

Philip Pettit has recently argued that democratic groups face a discursive dilemma: when deciding an issue that connects to prior issues decided by the group, it is possible for the position consistent with prior decisions to diverge from the position the group might make if it simply voted on the issue. Pettit favors a decision inferred on the basis of prior considerations, arguing that it best preserves the rational unity of the group, an important

condition for group success. In this paper, I argue that this approach overly restricts the liberty of group members. First, I argue that groups become unresponsive to individuals on this model. Second, I challenge the account of priority that Pettit uses to distinguish between which issues count as premises and which count as conclusions. Ultimately, I argue that rational unity should not be a necessary condition for group success.

TWO CONCEPTIONS OF POWER: LEIBNIZ AND HOBBS ON RIGHT AND OBLIGATION (V-F)

CHRISTOPHER JOHNS (SAINT XAVIER UNIVERSITY (CHICAGO))

In this paper I draw from two 17th century natural law theorists, Leibniz and Hobbes, in order to shed some light on three metaethical questions: what are rights and obligations; what grounds them; and what is the relationship between them? Both philosophers conceive of right as the “subjective” power that an individual has to act. But they differ strikingly on the nature of this power. For Leibniz right is a moral power entailing certain obligations. This moral power is grounded in the capacity of a person act “freely,” i.e., in accord with actions defined as objectively just. For Hobbes right is a natural power entailing freedom, but no obligations and no objectively determined justice. Obligations arise only when everyone has renounced their natural power and transferred it to a sovereign possessing coercive power. I show how these different conceptions of power entail different conceptions of right, freedom and obligation.

PROPER FUNCTION AND SHOULD-BE-BELIEVED DEFEATERS (II-G)

DANIEL M. JOHNSON (BAYLOR UNIVERSITY)

Jonathan Kvanvig has argued that what he terms “doxastic” theories of epistemic justification fail to account for certain epistemic features having to do with evidence. I’m going to give an argument roughly along these lines, but I’m going to focus specifically on proper function theories of justification or warrant. In particular, I’ll focus on Michael Bergmann’s recent proper function account of justification. The epistemic features I’m concerned about are experiences that should generate a believed defeater but don’t. I’ll argue that proper functionalism as it stands cannot account for the epistemic effects of these “should-be-believed” defeaters. I’ll conclude by arguing that the only plausible option Bergmann has for modifying his theory undercuts the consideration that motivates proper functionalism in the first place.

RAWLS ON INTERGENERATIONAL JUSTICE (I-I)

SARAH KENEHAN (UNIVERSITY OF TENNESSEE)

In this paper, I consider whether the framework that John Rawls develops (as detailed in *A Theory of Justice*, *Political Liberalism*, *Justice as Fairness*, and *The Law of Peoples*) offers a viable way in which to rethink some of the problems that are often associated with questions of intergenerational justice. Specifically, I examine whether Rawls’s framework provides a

possible way out of some of the most problematic features of questions of intergenerational justice; namely, the problem of incentivizing the earliest generations to cooperate and the problem of time-indexed benefits. I conclude that not only does Rawls's theory adequately dissolve these problems, but his theory also offers a strong foundation for minimum obligations owed towards future generations.

NUMERICAL PREDICATION (III-J)

JOONGOL KIM (WESTERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY)

Numerical predication, as in 'Socrates and Hippias are two (in number)', has been cited as a chief example of non-distributive predication that shows the need for a logic of plural terms (as opposed to the standard logic that only admits singular terms). I argue that numerical predicates like 'to be two (in number)' are not genuine non-distributive predicates and should be eliminated in favor of singular numerical quantifiers like 'there are exactly two things such that they ...'.

LATE WITTGENSTEIN, THE MENTAL, AND TAYLOR (IV-J)

WILLIAM KOCH (UNIVERSITY OF SOUTH FLORIDA)

This paper seeks to clarify what conception of sensation and emotion arises from Wittgenstein's private language argument, his treatment of the inner and outer picture, and his conception of the role played by language and society in structuring human life. In attempting to say what Wittgenstein has shown us, I will turn to Charles Taylor as an ally. We will come to see that Charles Taylor and Wittgenstein are presenting very similar views of supposedly "inner" mental life, but are coming at it from opposite directions. In combining and comparing their views we will be able to supplement and clarify the work of both. Taylor's depiction of complex emotional life can flesh out what Wittgenstein says about emotions, and Wittgenstein's depiction of sensations can provide what Taylor's concept would look like extended to the basic and less articulate elements of mental life.

ELIMINATIVISM AND ITS COUNTEREXAMPLES (I-J)

DANIEL Z. KORMAN (UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS-URBANA-CHAMPAIGN)

Eliminativism (as I will understand it) is the thesis that there can be no inanimate composite objects. It follows that atoms arranged tablewise do not compose anything. Intuitively, however, atoms arranged tablewise do compose something. Can we now conclude that eliminativism is false on the grounds that it is open to counterexamples? I examine whether there is any reason to take such apparent counterexamples to be any less effective against their targets than those wielded by Gettier, Kripke, Putnam, and Burge were against theirs. I examine various eliminativist strategies for accounting for the apparent counterexamples (including adaptations of their paraphrases of folk discourse) and find that they all are either psychologically implausible or else lead to dialectical instability. The results generalize to many other revisionary metaphysical theses.

ARISTOTLE ON JUSTICE AS A VIRTUE (V-H)

S. EVAN KREIDER (UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN–FOX VALLEY)

In this paper, I will discuss several difficulties raised by Aristotle's notion of justice as a character virtue. Specifically, I will focus on the issue of whether justice as a character virtue is consistent of Aristotle's account of the other character virtues and the doctrine of the mean, and the various *prima facie* difficulties raised by treating justice as such a virtue. I will then examine solutions to these difficulties as proposed by David Bostock, Bernard Williams, and Howard J. Curzer. I will conclude by arguing for my own solution, which is an attempt to improve upon Aristotle's doctrines by synthesizing and expanding upon the best aspects of the solutions put forward by the aforementioned scholars, and showing that justice can be treated as a character virtue in a way that is consistent with the other character virtues and the doctrine of the mean.

HEAVENLY SIGHT AND THE NATURE OF SEEING-IN (I-H)

JOHN V. KULVICKI (DARTMOUTH COLLEGE)

Richard Wollheim famously understood pictures to be distinct from other kinds of representation in virtue of eliciting a special kind of experience: seeing-in. Many agree that pictures often evoke experiences of seeing something in a marked surface, even if they do not assign seeing-in such a central place in their theories of depiction or characterize it in exactly the way Wollheim does. This paper proposes a new way to understand seeing-in that is motivated by a renaissance discussion of vision after death: heavenly sight (Baxandall 1988). The first section introduces seeing-in as Wollheim understands it, while the second introduces heavenly sight. Section three argues that experiences akin to heavenly sight are indeed possible despite appearances to the contrary. And section four concludes by showing that this proposal does an excellent job accounting for seeing-in.

KINDS OF RELIABILITY (V-G)

VICTOR KUMAR (UNIVERSITY OF ARIZONA)

There is more than one kind of reliability. Therefore, a reliabilist theory of justification or knowledge must index its conception of reliability to one or another reference class and must do so on a principled basis. I present and defend a subject-sensitive, reliabilist theory of justification on which reliability is indexed to the "home-range" of the subject. The subject-sensitivity of justification is best accounted for by a naturalistic account of epistemology as empirical investigation into epistemic-cum-natural kinds (rather than as a priori inquiry in the content of epistemic concepts). If "being justification-conferring" is a natural kind property, then it is not surprising that it can be realized by different kinds of reliability since it is common for the aptness of natural kind properties of biological organisms to depend on the range of circumstances the organism is fitted to operate in.

A BONE FOR TRADITIONAL FOUNDATIONALISM (III-I)

TODD LONG (CALIFORNIA POLYTECHNIC STATE UNIVERSITY)

I argue for a version of modest foundationalism (“Strong Modest Foundationalism”) that upholds something of value to traditional foundationalists but avoids common objections to traditional foundationalist theories. Modest Foundationalists tend to hold that an external world proposition such as that a hand can be both basic and justified. The key principle of Strong Modest Foundationalism, applied to an external world belief, is as follows: if S justifiably believes MB (that is a hand), then S is justified in believing TB (it seems to me that that is a hand). The coherence of Strong Modest Foundationalism depends on an epistemic inferential relation between MB and TB, but not on a psychological inference from TB to MB. I point out some theoretical advantages of the view, and I defend it against the objection that young children cannot satisfy the key principle.

CATEGORIAL INTUITION AND THE PROBLEM OF THE CATEGORIES (II-F)

LESLIE MACAVOY (EAST TENNESSEE STATE UNIVERSITY)

As others have noted, categorial intuition is important in the development of Heidegger’s thought, but its philosophical significance can be more fully appreciated by considering how the notion is addressed to certain issues surrounding the problem of the categories. This aspect of categorial intuition is important in both Husserl’s development of the notion and Heidegger’s appropriation of it. My aim in this paper is to show how categorial intuition responds to the problem of the categories. I will first discuss this problem and some of the issues that it raises in order to indicate its significance in broad philosophical terms. Second, I will discuss Husserl’s presentation of the notion of categorial intuition and Heidegger’s more limited treatment of it in order to show how it addresses the category problem. Finally, I will suggest how Heidegger’s philosophical interest in this area guides his thinking during the first half of his career.

SHARED INTENTIONS AND DELIBERATIVE COMMITMENTS (IV-H)

JAMES MACPHERSON (OHIO STATE UNIVERSITY)

This paper presents a new way to approach how it is that people come to share an intention. This approach stems from the claim that intentions—whether shared or had by individuals—involve a characteristic kind of commitment. To understand how an intention can be shared it is necessary to understand how this commitment can be shared. Michael Bratman’s approach to shared intentions suggests one way in which the commitment could be shared, but I argue that Bratman’s approach faces two problems: (1) in some cases, it violates a commonly recognized limitation on the content of intentions; and (2) it implies a psychologically unrealistic account of the attitudes of those who share in the intention. Working from the observation that something is shared when a number of people each have a part in it, I present an alternative way for the commitment to be shared that avoids these problems.

A MOLINIST SOLUTION TO THE PROBLEM OF DIVINE FREEDOM (II-K)

R. ZACHARY MANIS (SOUTHWEST BAPTIST UNIVERSITY)

One important version of the problem of divine freedom is that, if God is essentially good, and if freedom logically requires being able to do otherwise, then God is not free with respect to willing the good, and thus He is not morally praiseworthy for His goodness. I develop and defend a broadly Molinist solution to this problem, which, I argue, provides the best way out of the difficulty for orthodox theists who are unwilling to relinquish the Principle of Alternate Possibilities. The solution is that the divine essence includes the property of transworld goodness: i.e., for any possible morally significant choice that God could have faced, if God had actually faced it, God would have chosen to will the good. This view makes coherent the otherwise paradoxical theological intuition that it is within God's power to do something evil, but He would not ever do such a thing.

EPISTEMIC EVASION (II-G)

BERISLAV MARUSIC (BRANDEIS UNIVERSITY)

The following reasoning is an example of evasion: "I have decided to quit smoking. However, statistics in *JAMA* show that I only have a 10-15 percent chance of upholding this decision. Hence I will quite likely smoke again." This reasoning is normatively deficient. However it is difficult to say what is wrong with it, if the statistics from *JAMA* are correct. In this paper I first define the phenomenon of epistemic evasion: S's belief in $\sim p$ is evasive if and only if S believes $\sim p$ for reason R, and R is partly constituted by the fact that S believes p. I then argue that even if we have good reasons for an evasive belief, we ought not to avail ourselves of those reasons, at pains of undermining our authority. If we undermine our authority, we ultimately cripple our epistemic agency.

PROLEGOMENA TO A DEFLATIONARY METAPHYSICS OF MORALITY (V-E)

FRITZ J. McDONALD (OAKLAND UNIVERSITY)

The metaphysical dispute between moral realists and antirealists is cast in terms of properties: the realist holds that moral properties exist, the antirealist denies this claim. There is a longstanding philosophical dispute over the nature of properties, and the obscurity of properties may make the realist/antirealist dispute even more obscure. In the spirit of deflationary theories of truth, we can turn to a deflationary theory of properties in order to clarify this issue. One might reasonably worry that such an account of properties would not be capable of properly characterizing disputes regarding the existence or nonexistence of genuine moral properties. In this paper, I will show that, within this framework, the traditional disputes over the existence of moral properties can be characterized in a far clearer fashion than is usually the case. A deflationary account of properties, along with an explanatory hierarchy of properties, makes the dispute in ontology clear.

THE RELATION BETWEEN ANATTA AND THE ATMAN OF THE UPANISHADS: A REPLY TO MIRI ALBAHARI'S ADVAITA VEDANTIST INTERPRETATION OF BUDDHIST DOCTRINE OF ANATTA (II-K)

JONATHAN SCOTT MILLER (BOWLING GREEN STATE UNIVERSITY)

Miri Albahari has argued that the Buddhist view of anatta should not be interpreted as denying the *Atman* of the *Upanishads*. According to Albahari, *anatta* is a strategy of not identifying the self with conditioned existence, rather than a metaphysical position. On this view, Buddhism's ego-less *Nibbana* is ultimately conformable to Sankara's ego-less *Atman*, and the Buddha's differences with Sankara have to do with method, not metaphysics. Albahari succeeds in uncovering parallels between Buddhism's unconditioned reality and Sankara's unconditioned reality, but she overlooks the Buddhist claim that all *dhammas* (including *Nibbana*) are not-self, and she unjustifiably privileges Sankara's *Advaita Vedanta* over other schools of Hindu philosophy in her discussion of the nature of *Atman*.

KANT ON PUBLIC PARTICIPATION AND MORAL VIRTUE (V-F)

KATE MORAN (BRANDEIS UNIVERSITY)

Often, Kant's political philosophy is interpreted as distinct from and secondary to his moral philosophy. On such an account, Kant's political theory is a kind of stopgap measure to ensure that individuals can live together in relative harmony even if they are less than perfectly moral. In this paper, I argue that Kant's account of public participation is actually more closely related to his moral philosophy than typically acknowledged. I examine Kant's account of a republican constitution and argue that the requirements of participation in such a government encourage citizens to practice important skills of practical reasoning—specifically, thinking for oneself and thinking from the standpoint of others. Mastering these skills of practical reasoning is an essential component in developing a more virtuous moral character.

THE 'HARM TO HUMANITY' ARGUMENT FOR UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION (II-J)

CLAIRE MORRISSEY (UNIVERSITY OF NORTH CAROLINA—CHAPEL HILL)

Arguments for universal jurisdiction to prosecute crimes against humanity often strive to show how the evils in question "cross borders" in order to rebut the strong presumption that the sovereignty of states disallows international criminal prosecutions. One way theorists attempt to establish that crimes against humanity do in fact cross borders, and thus that there is no presumption against international criminal prosecutions, is to show that the crimes in question harm humanity, itself. Larry May's analysis of crimes against humanity is just such an account. I argue that his analysis is insufficient for establishing universal jurisdiction, because it does not provide a story that explains the move from "harm" to "jurisdiction," nor is it consistent with the most plausible candidate. I then touch briefly on some general challenges for "harm to humanity" approaches drawn from the discussion of May's analysis.

 SCANLON: THE 'NEW' REDUNDANCY OBJECTION AND JUSTIFIABILITY (IV-K)

DOUGLAS PALETTA (UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA)

Several critics attack Scanlon's account of wrongness on grounds that it is redundant. The old redundancy objection alleges that the wrongness of an act adds nothing over and above the reasons that make the act wrong. Scanlon can avoid this objection by clarifying that he provides an account of what wrongness is rather than a criterion of wrongness. In doing so, he removes the conceptual space necessary to mount the old objection. This response, however, leads to the new version of the objection. According to the new redundancy objection, since wrongness is constituted by the underlying reasons, the wrongness of the act itself cannot provide reasons. I argue that Scanlon can appeal to the status of wrong reasons—that they are unjustifiable—to explain the reason-giving force of wrongness.

THE VARIETIES OF EXPLOSIVISM (I-J)

JAMES PATON (UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS—URBANA—CHAMPAIGN)

Many different formulations have been presented of a view that has been called "explosivism," "absolutism," and "Plenitude." This view posits an explosion of sorts of objects beyond those recognized by our workaday conceptual scheme, objects like incars, outcars, and snowdiscalls. Yet little work has been done to determine the merits each has over the others. In my paper I examine four candidate formulations of explosivism including Sosa's (absolutism) and Hawthorne's (Plenitude). I find that only under Hawthorne's formulation can explosivism do what philosophers tend to think it can do.

EMOTIONAL KNOWLEDGE: EMOTION AS A BASIC SOURCE OF JUSTIFICATION (III-E)

ADAM PELSER (BAYLOR UNIVERSITY)

Recent work on the epistemology of emotions has been generally pessimistic about the ability of emotions to justify beliefs. Contrary to this far-reaching pessimism about the justificatory authority of emotion, considerations of the reliability of emotion as a source of justification together with considerations of the justificatory epistemic value of emotion reveal that emotion is an important source of justification. Moreover, reflection on the fact that emotions are not proper objects of epistemic justification reveals that emotion is a basic source of justification. While it is true that emotional maturity is a rare virtue, emotions nevertheless can and do justify beliefs. Emotional maturity is thus as much an epistemic virtue as it is a moral virtue.

TRIVIALIZING NATURALNESS (I-J)

TIMOTHY H. PICKAVANCE (BIOLA UNIVERSITY)

I worry that the notion of naturalness for properties is in danger of being trivialized. In this paper, I make an argument that threatens to trivialize naturalness, which argument trades on the presence of natural properties

in the “ontological base.” I then consider some ways out; each way has its hurdles.

NICKEL AND RAWLS ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND TOLERATION (II-J)

DAVID REIDY (UNIVERSITY OF TENNESSEE)

In this paper I critically assess Jim Nickel’s recent claim that John Rawls’s conception of human rights is “ultram minimalist” and rooted in an excessive desire to accommodate the self-determination of nonliberal and/or nondemocratic polities and/or a wrongheaded conception of human rights as primarily regulative of coercive international interventions. I show that a) Rawls’s conception is not plausibly characterized as “ultram minimalist” and b) that once we notice key distinctions in Rawls’s view, between ideal and non-ideal theory, and between toleration as respect and begrudging toleration, Nickel’s account of Rawls’s reasoning is rendered implausible. I conclude drawing attention to some of the deeper fault lines that run beneath the surface of contemporary philosophical debates over human rights.

I DON’T WANT TO GO TO HEAVEN (OR HELL) (IV-H)

BRIAN RIBEIRO (UNIVERSITY OF TENNESSEE–CHATTANOOGA)

Any state of being that lasts eternally and preserves a human agent’s earthly personhood would be hellish and therefore not desirable to that human agent; and any state of being that lasts eternally and yet fails to preserve a human agent’s earthly personhood thereby fails to be a state of being that it would be rational for that human agent to desire. Thus, if heaven is a state of being that lasts eternally then— whether or not it preserves the earthly personhood of human agents—it is not a state of being that any human agent could have a rationally compelling reason to desire.

CAN THE ANALYTIC DATA BE EXPLAINED AWAY? (II-H)

BRADLEY RIVES (INDIANA UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA)

Many contemporary proponents of analyticity defend their view on explanatory grounds, arguing that positing analyticities provides the best explanation of our “analytic intuitions.” I argue against the most recent Quinean attempt to undermine this explanatory argument, put forward by Eric Margolis and Stephen Laurence. I suggest that the reason their argument fails is that they fail to recognize an important implication of the explanatory argument, namely, that analyticity must be divorced from truth.

KANT AND NAIVE REALISM (III-H)

ANDREW ROCHE (WHEATON COLLEGE)

What is Kant’s theory of perception? In particular, what is for Kant the nature of the “mind-world relation” unique to the perception of objects? This paper is part of a longer project dedicated to answering this question. Here, my primary aim is negative: to rule out a naïvely realistic reading. In

Part I of this paper, I briefly stake out available readings of Kant's theory of perception. In Part II, I make a case for a naïvely realistic reading, appealing in part to John McDowell's analysis of Kant in his Woodbridge Lectures. In Part III, however, I show why a naïvely realistic reading ultimately proves unsatisfactory.

AN ANTI-REDUCTIONIST ACCOUNT OF CAUSATION (II-I)

MICHAEL W. ROTA (UNIVERSITY OF ST. THOMAS)

When it comes to the conceptual analysis of causation, no one theory enjoys widespread acceptance. It is generally acknowledged that counterfactual and probabilistic accounts of causation are subject to serious objections, at least when they are offered as reductive conceptual analyses. Process or transference accounts—again, if offered as reductive conceptual analyses—also face major difficulties. Given the prolonged failure to uncover a successful reductionist conceptual analysis of causation, anti-reductionist accounts can become attractive. In this paper I articulate one such account, drawing on resources provided by Aquinas, Anscombe, and Suarez.

THE ACT OF QUOTATION (III-J)

PAUL SAKA (RICE UNIVERSITY)

If we are to understand the Tarskian T-schema, and hence truth-theoretic semantics, we must understand quotation. Such understanding, however, is far from trivial, and a vigorous literature on the topic has emerged. In this paper my aim is to focus on the dominant approach to understanding quotation, the Identity Theory; to delineate varieties thereof; and to cite some considerations for favoring a speech-act version. According to one speech-act identity theory, if S uses quotation x then S may refer to one part of x, namely to the interior quoted matter. This differs from the formalist view that if x is a quotation then x denotes one part of x, namely the interior quoted matter. A good part of the paper will be devoted to clarifying the differences between formal semantics and speech-act semantics.

MENTAL PAINT AND THE FORGIVABLE INTROSPECTIVE MISTAKE (IV-J)

ROBERT W. SCHROER (ARKANSAS STATE UNIVERSITY)

The question of whether perceptual experience is “transparent” to the act of introspection has been the focus of much recent debate. Those who deny that perceptual experience is transparent are, in essence, saying that those who embrace this idea are making an introspective mistake—the mistake of thinking that phenomenal features seem like features of external objects when, in fact, they don't really seem that way. The reasonable thing for the defender of non-transparency to say about this mistake is that it is forgivable. But if it is forgivable, then we are owed an explanation of why it's forgivable. In this paper, I examine an attempt to provide this explanation that features an analogy between experiences and paintings and then argue that this analogy fails to deliver the goods.

DELIMITING ARISTOTLE'S CONCEPTION OF STASIS (V-H)

STEVEN C. SKULTETY (UNIVERSITY OF MISSISSIPPI)

Some scholars have claimed that Aristotle uses the word "stasis" to refer to any sort of conflict in the political realm, and that it covers everything from civil-war to social rivalry. After developing an interpretation of *Politics* V.1-4, where Aristotle discusses the topic at length, I argue that Aristotle is in fact carefully delimiting the concept of stasis so that it refers only to civil-war and open sedition, showing how the *Pol.* V.1-4 analysis cannot apply to partisan antipathy, legal disputes, or any sort of competition. I conclude with some reflections on the significance of Aristotle's position: by defining *stasis* narrowly, Aristotle not only distinguishes himself from Plato (who thinks of all intra-polis conflict as civil-war writ large or small), but all political theorists whose univocal conception of conflict leads them into believing that ideal political life is conflict-free.

THE ACTUAL AND THE EXPECTED (III-F)

KELLY SORENSON (URSINUS COLLEGE)

Outcomes count for something in almost all ethical theories, and every such theory must take a stand on whether it is expected or actual outcomes that count. This is obviously true of consequentialism. But any non-consequentialist theory that includes even a weak positive obligation to aid others must also say whether fulfilling that obligation tracks what one reasonably expects to happen or instead what actually happens. With Kurt Gerstein as a historical test case, I argue that both must count, and that morality in fact consists of two (often conflated) subject matters.

MORAL COMPETENCE AND MORAL BLAME (III-F)

MATTHEW TALBERT (WEST VIRGINIA UNIVERSITY)

I argue against the widespread view that wrongdoers are open to blame only if they could have responded appropriately to relevant moral considerations and refrained from wrongdoing. My initial argument notes that there are cases in which a wrongdoer could not have responded to moral reasons, but this incapacity does not explain her action. Instead, the wrong done is explained by the wrongdoer's judgment that something counted in favor of so acting. I argue that this explanation can qualify an agent for blame even if she lacked access to appropriate moral understanding. A second argument is based on the observation that, in some cases, a blameworthy wrongdoer could have grasped moral reasons to which she was insensitive, but this possibility of moral understanding does not contribute to the agent's blameworthiness. Such cases indicate that the capacity for moral understanding is not a necessary condition on blameworthiness.

MUSICAL MATERIALISM (I-H)

CHRIS TILLMAN (UNIVERSITY OF MANITOBA)

The standard objections to the view that multiple artworks are concrete are a “Many-One” objection, a “Destructive Asymmetry” objection, and a Modal objection. This paper aims to show that by appealing to recent work on occupation and existence, concretists avoid the standard objections.

GRECO'S RELIABILITY REQUIREMENT (V-G)

CHRIS TUCKER (STONEHILL COLLEGE)

Reliabilists about inferential justification, such as John Greco, endorse the Reliability Requirement (RR): a body of evidence E can confer justification on a conclusion C only if the truth of E is a reliable indication of the truth of C. Greco provides two arguments for this requirement. In this paper, I argue that both fail.

NEURAL LUCK (IV-H)

MAURA E. TUMULTY (COLGATE UNIVERSITY)

We sometimes gain confidence in the sincerity of others' experiential claims when we acquire neuroscientific information about the structures underlying such experiences. Since a commitment common to many positions in the philosophy of mind makes these increases in confidence appear unwarranted, a person who gains our confidence in this way is benefiting from neural luck. I lay out the problem of neural luck explicitly, and argue that our judgments are shaped by it in two ways. In one, we are simply mired in vehicle/content confusions. In the other, we are using a strategy to preserve others' first-person authority. But the strategy threatens to rob first-person perspectives of their special significance. The threat can be avoided if the significance of the first-person is not simply a matter of informational access. Resolving the problem of neural luck provides new support for accounts of first-person authority that prioritize its connection to moral agency.

LIBERALISM WITHOUT PRIVATIZATION (IV-K)

KEVIN VALLIER (UNIVERSITY OF ARIZONA)

It is widely held that justificatory liberalism and religious belief are somehow in tension. In particular, many have argued that justificatory liberalism impels religious persons to “privatize” their beliefs. Specifically, privatization is thought to require persons of faith to be disloyal to their religious traditions and to “split” their personal commitments into public and private halves. I shall argue that while the dominant interpretation of justificatory liberalism requires the privatization of religious belief, justificatory liberalism per se does not. We can develop a justificatory liberalism that does not require privatization. This paper presents and defends one liberalism of this kind. I argue that the conception of permissible reasons that justificatory liberals appeal to generates most of the conflict. An alternative conception of permissible reasons, what

I call the convergence conception, can not only resolve the conflict but commends itself on independent grounds.

CALIBRATION (II-G)

PAUL WEIRICH (UNIVERSITY OF MISSOURI)

Abner Shimony (1988) argues that degrees of belief satisfy the axioms of probability because their epistemic goal is to match estimates of objective probabilities. Because the estimates obey the axioms of probability, degrees of belief must also obey them to reach their epistemic goal. This calibration argument meets some objections, but with a few revisions it can surmount those objections. It offers a good alternative to the Dutch book argument for compliance with the probability axioms. The defense of Shimony's calibration argument examines rational pursuit of an epistemic goal, introduces strength of evidence and its measurement, and distinguishes epistemic goals and functions.

VIRTUE EPISTEMOLOGY AND CONTEXTUALISM (III-E)

SARAH WRIGHT (UNIVERSITY OF GEORGIA)

Contextualism in epistemology has been endorsed by many as a solution to skepticism. When we turn to contextualism to do this job, we need to make sure that the version of contextualism we endorse is the best suited for this task. In this paper I examine three versions of epistemic contextualism: attributor contextualism, inferential contextualism, and virtue-based context-sensitivity. I argue that inferential contextualism is superior to attributor contextualism. I further show how virtue-based context-sensitivity, in attuning the requirements of virtue to our social roles, can serve as a useful extension of inferential contextualism—one that more fully captures the role that contexts play in our lives.

CANONICAL APPROXIMATIONS AND HUE MAGNITUDES: STILL NO GROUNDS FOR COLOR PHYSICALISM (V-I)

WAYNE T. WRIGHT (UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA—IRVINE)

This talk briefly examines Paul Churchland's (2007) and Alex Byrne & David Hilbert's (2003abc) differing attempts to deal with some of the major problems facing any version of color physicalism. Churchland cannot make good on his claim that there is a property from the inventory of physics that unifies a set of metameric reflectances. Byrne & Hilbert face an evidential shortcoming in trying to motivate their view, one that is particularly acute given their aim to show that the problem of color realism is relevant to empirical research on color vision. I conclude with some methodological considerations that are relevant in the light of the difficulties plaguing various attempts to defend color physicalism.

AVOIDING THE GENERALITY PROBLEM FOR PROCESS RELIABILISM (V-G)

MARK E. WUNDERLICH (UNION COLLEGE)

Feldman and Conee have insisted that the generality problem is a serious difficulty for reliability theories of epistemic justification. The generality problem is the problem of determining the level of generality at which a process token is to be described when picking the relevant process type—and therefore the reliability number—for the process token. Here I argue that while the generality problem cannot be solved, it can be avoided. I assume that there is a canonical order in which one gathers information about belief-forming processes, and I aim for a reliability theory that supplies pairwise comparisons of beliefs rather than degrees of justification. These moves allow me to avoid the generality problem.

REVISITING HEIDEGGER'S PLATO: RECOVERING A MORE 'PHENOMENOLOGICAL' PLATO FROM THE SOPHIST LECTURES (II-F)

MEGAN HALTEMAN ZWART (UNIVERSITY OF NOTRE DAME)

Though Heidegger is commonly taken to be a bad reader of Plato, I argue that Heidegger's strident critiques of Platonism are, in many cases, attacks on the tradition's misappropriation of Plato as a spokesperson, rather than attacks on Plato's own views. I then show that this alternative reading of Heidegger's Plato, as it emerges in the *Sophist* lectures, gives us resources to uncover a more phenomenologically-oriented Plato concealed beneath the tradition's caricature. This emerging Plato is aware that Being is fundamentally about human existence; this Plato has a more original sense of Being; and this Plato's insights give evidence to the ability of language not only to reveal but also to conceal.

ABSTRACTS OF INVITED AND SYMPOSIUM PAPERS

KANTIAN THEMES IN LOGIC (I-C)

MATTHEW BOYLE (HARVARD UNIVERSITY)

There is an irony in our attitude toward Kant's views on logic. On the one hand, we generally take his claims about the nature and significance of logic to be of great interest. But on the other hand, we tend to take a dismissive attitude toward the actual logical system he accepted—Aristotelian syllogistic logic, which he took to “omit no moment of the understanding,” but which we regard as a description of a mere fragment of logic, and an awkward and misleading description of even that fragment. I argue that this division in our attitude is unsustainable: we cannot achieve a genuine appreciation of Kant's claims about the nature of logic unless we understand why he regarded syllogistic logic as satisfactory. I show how various seemingly peculiar features of this system are actually required in a logic that can claim to be what Kant says logic must be, namely, “the science of the necessary laws of the understanding.” My aim is not, of course, to argue for a return to syllogistic logic, but it is to bring out aspects of its attractiveness that contemporary discussions often overlook, and thereby to make us appreciate some important differences between Kant's understanding of logic and the understanding that prevails today.

IF I HADN'T PRESSED THAT BUTTON: LEWIS ON TIME TRAVEL AND COUNTERFACTUALS (V-B)

PHIL DOWE (UNIVERSITY OF QUEENSLAND)

According to David Lewis time travel is possible, and an account of causation and the counterfactuals in terms of which causation ought to be analysed should allow for its possibility. “Careful readers have thought they could make sense of stories of time travel... speculative physicists have given serious consideration to tachyons, advanced potentials, and cosmological models with closed timelike curves. Most or all of these phenomena would involve special exceptions to the normal asymmetry of counterfactual dependence. It will not do to declare them impossible a priori” (Lewis 1979). Here Lewis refers to two kinds of time travel: that involving reverse causation on a background linear time, and that which can occur when there are closed time-like curves. I show that Lewis's counterfactual theory of causation does not allow for standard examples of time travel of both kinds.

ERRORS, DEFECTS, AND PRACTICAL REASON (III-C)

LUCA FERRERO (UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN–MILWAUKEE)

It seems uncontroversial that there is an important connection between practical reason and the possibility of error: An agent can be said to be subject to a norm or principle only if there is some kind of action whose performance would amount to a violation of that principle. A basic desideratum for the plausibility of any theory of practical reason is that it allow for the possibility of genuine practical error—the so-called “error constraint.” It has been argued that the error constraint generates insurmountable problems for constitutivist views of practical reason. In this paper, I will show that there is no single kind of “error constraint” but rather a variety of constraints in correspondence with the different loci of potential practical error and defectiveness. I will then argue that constitutivism is able to satisfy all of these “error constraints” even if it is true that at the heart of constitutivism lies a claim about the impossibility of a specific kind of defectiveness in the agent’s subjection to the authority of norms and principles.

REASONS TO BE AND TO DO (III-C)

MARK LEBAR (OHIO UNIVERSITY)

One of the early, perhaps overenthusiastic, upshots to the advent of virtue ethics as an alternative to other moral theories, was the thought that *here* was a way of thinking about ethics as a matter, not of what to *do*, but of what to *be*. There is a similar contrast in conceptions of practical rationality, and there this contrast has important and unexplored implications. Our ordinary linguistic and reflective practice makes room for reasons both to be and to do, and the relation of these reasons deserves more scrutiny than it has received. Here I explore this relation by considering a recent paper by David Velleman (“Willing the Law”), and suggest a way of thinking about practical rationality which is somewhat alien to much work on the subject. We might ask whether our understanding of the requirements of practical reason should privilege reasons to do over reasons to be, or vice versa. This is an issue about the primary norms or canons which are to be applied in assessing success in practical rationality. In the case of reasons to do, these primary canons are *synchronic*: they consist for the most part in criteria which apply to decision-making in a given moment of time, given the materials (often construed psychologically) available at that moment. By way of contrast, I defend a conception of practical reason which is in the first instance *diachronic*: the relevant norms apply primarily to decision-making across time, as it were, over decision-making at different times. This way of thinking about practical reasons I find in ancient Greek thinking about practical reasons but is absent from much recent work on practical rationality. I argue that it resolves tensions between reasons to be and to do more satisfyingly than does Velleman’s proposal.

THE ROOTS OF ARISTOTLE'S CONSTITUENT ONTOLOGY (I-A)

MICHAEL J. LOUX (UNIVERSITY OF NOTRE DAME)

Aristotle is what has been called a constituent ontologist. He thinks that familiar particulars derive their character from other things—things that are immanent in those particulars, immanent in the sense of being something like their components or constituents. Why does he endorse a constituent account of character rather than a relational account, where a particular has a given form of character in virtue of some nonmereological relation to something that, as Aristotle puts it, exists “apart from” the particular? Aristotle sometimes suggests that he prefers a constituent over a relational account because he thinks that the latter approach has no good explanation for a pair of familiar facts: that we have knowledge of the underived sources of character and that familiar sensible particulars get their character by way of the causal activity of other sensible particulars. But any arguments that hinge on these facts rest on a prior line of reasoning, one that argues that only a constituent approach can accommodate the fact that familiar particulars come to be and pass away. I examine that line of reasoning.

RELIGION AND SCIENCE: WHERE THE REAL CONFLICT LIES (V-D)

ALVIN PLANTINGA (UNIVERSITY OF NOTRE DAME)

Our question: are science and religion compatible? Many points of conflict have been suggested; I'll restrict myself to a cluster of issues having to do with evolution. I'll argue (1) that contemporary evolutionary theory is not incompatible with theistic belief, (2) that the main antitheistic arguments involving evolution together with other premises also fail, (3) that even if current science, evolutionary or otherwise, were incompatible with theistic belief, it wouldn't follow that theistic belief is irrational or unwarranted or in any other kind of trouble, (4) that naturalism, the thought that there is no such thing as the God of theistic religion or anything like him, is an essential element in the naturalistic worldview, which is a sort of quasi-religion in the sense that it plays some of the most important roles of religion; and that the naturalistic worldview is in fact incompatible with evolution. Hence there is a science/religion (or science/quasi-religion) conflict, all right, but it is a conflict between naturalism and science, not theistic religion and science.

ON THE POSSIBILITY OF TIME TRAVEL (V-B)

STEVEN SAVITT (UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA)

The question of time travel is connected in relativistic spacetimes to the existence of closed timelike curves (or CTCs). The existence of CTCs, in turn, has been thought to have profound (profoundly destructive, in fact) implications for time. I will argue to the contrary. The important lesson of the theories of relativity regarding time is that it is local. Closed timelike curves are global features of spacetime, and they are indeed puzzling; but local time suffices, even in a spacetime odd enough to have CTCs.

UNCONSCIOUS OMISSIONS, REASONABLE EXPECTATIONS, AND RESPONSIBILITY (IV-B)

ANGELA M. SMITH (UNIVERSITY OF WASHINGTON)

Unconscious omissions are puzzling. Unlike conscious omissions, where we can tie a person's failure to act to a conscious intentional mental state of some sort, unconscious omissions (by definition) involve failures to act that occur without an agent's awareness. How, then, do we determine when an agent has committed "an unconscious omission? The puzzle is to give an account of how an unconscious failure to act can nevertheless be genuinely reflective of a person's agency, given the apparent absence of any conscious mental state linking the person to her failure. One strategy, which I have rejected elsewhere, is to appeal to a notion of "tracing" to tie a person's unconscious failure to some earlier conscious choice or decision. Another strategy, defended by Patricia Smith, is to argue that unconscious failures involve *violations of or deviations from* reasonable expectations within a context, and that such violations or deviations are, by definition, "doings" on the part of agents (and thus reflective of their agency). My aim in this paper is to critically evaluate Smith's strategy, and to raise some doubts about her pure "reasonable expectation" account of responsibility for unconscious omissions. I argue that, while this is a clear improvement over tracing accounts, an acceptable account of responsibility for unconscious omissions must explain what it is the ties agents mentally to unconscious omissions for which they are appropriately held responsible.

JUDGMENT AND TRUTH IN KANT'S LOGICS (I-C)

CLINTON TOLLEY (UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA—SAN DIEGO)

It is commonly thought that Kant subscribes to a picture according to which what it is to be a judgment is to be something that is, or can be, either true or false. I argue that such a truth-theoretic interpretation of Kant's doctrine of judgment should be resisted. For Kant, some judgments (such as aesthetic judgments) are simply not truth-apt, and so are not appropriately described as either true or false. This implies that Kant takes the essence of judgment ('as such') to lie elsewhere, in something sufficiently generic enough to comprise even non-truth-evaluable acts of understanding. I argue this essence can be found instead in the broader notion of apperceptive unity—a notion which, I suggest, we can interpret as referring to the unity that characterizes all cases of 'making (roughly Fregean) sense,' whether this 'sense' takes the form of truth-claims, moral injunctions, aesthetic creation, or something else altogether. An important consequence of the elimination of truth-evaluability from the essence of Kantian judgment would be that formal ('pure general') logic—insofar as it is the science which is to provide just such a 'general' doctrine of judgment—should not itself be construed as a truth-theoretic discipline (again, despite common assumptions to the contrary by many of Kant's readers). I show that such an implication is, in fact, accepted by Kant himself, a claim which I support by reference to (i) Kant's consistent explication of formal logic on the model of a general grammar, (ii) Kant's identification of transcendental,

and so not formal, logic as the 'logic of truth', (iii) Kant's claim that it is apperceptive unity in general that represents the 'highest point' of logic, and (iv) Kant's willingness to ground his analysis of aesthetic or moral domains upon the very same pure general logical forms.

KILLING TIME AGAIN (V-B)

KADRI VIHVELIN (UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA)

Could a time traveler travel back in time and kill her baby self? Some years ago, I argued that she could not. More precisely, I argued that no matter how many times a time traveler travels back to the past with the intention of killing her baby self, it will never be true that she could have killed that baby. This does not mean that the time traveler can never do anything that she fails to do nor does it mean that time travel is impossible. A number of philosophers have criticised my argument. Some have objected that my argument is guilty of fatalist confusion or mistaken counterfactual reasoning. Some have objected that my argument succeeds too well; it shows that time travel is impossible or that no time traveler can ever do otherwise. In this paper, I defend my original argument against these and other objections.

SPECIAL SESSIONS SPONSORED BY APA COMMITTEES

THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 19

Advice to Jobseekers in Philosophy: Roundtable (I-K)

Sponsored by the Committee on Academic Career Opportunities and Placement

1:30-4:30 p.m.

Racial and Ethnic Group Terms (I-L)

Sponsored by the Committee on Inclusiveness

1:30-4:30 p.m.

Virtue Ethics and Racism (II-L)

Sponsored by the Committee on Black Philosophers

9:00 a.m.-Noon

FRIDAY, FEBRUARY 20

Online Courseware (II-M)

Sponsored by the Committee on Philosophy and Computers

9:00 a.m.-Noon

Topic TBA (II-N)

Sponsored by the Committee on Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender People in the Profession

9:00 a.m.-Noon

Job Applications and Academic Life at Two-Year Colleges (III-K)

Sponsored by the Committee on Philosophy in Two-Year Colleges

1:45-4:45 p.m.

SATURDAY, FEBRUARY 21

Mid-Career Issues (IV-L)

Sponsored by the Committee on the Status of Women

9:00 a.m.-Noon

Thomas Michael Norton-Smith, *The Dance of Person and Place: One Interpretation of American Indian Philosophy* (IV-M)

Sponsored by the Committee on the Status of American Indians in Philosophy

9:00 a.m.-Noon.

Promises and Perils in Teaching Online (IV-N)

Sponsored by the Committee on Philosophy in Two-Year Colleges

9:00 a.m.-Noon

Feminism and Asian Philosophy (IV-O)

Sponsored by the Committee on the Status of Asian and Asian-American Philosophers and Philosophies

9:00 a.m.-Noon

On Indigenous Apologies (V-J)

Sponsored by the Committee on the Status of American Indians in Philosophy

2:30-5:30 p.m.

GROUP SESSIONS

Sessions sponsored by affiliated groups are listed below in alphabetical order of sponsoring group. Sessions sponsored jointly by more than one group are listed once for each sponsor.

A

American Association of Philosophy Teachers, *Thu, 9:00 a.m.-Noon*

American Society for Value Inquiry, *Thu, 9:00 a.m.-Noon*

American Society for Value Inquiry, *Thu, 5:15-7:15 p.m.*

Association for Informal Logic and Critical Thinking, *Fri, 7:00-10:00 p.m.*

Association for the Development of Philosophy Teaching, *Thu, 7:30-10:30 p.m.*

Association for the Development of Philosophy Teaching, *Fri, 7:00-10:00 p.m.*

Association of Chinese Philosophers in North America, *Fri, 7:00-10:00 p.m.*

B

Bertrand Russell Society, *Thu, 5:15-7:15 p.m.*

C

Central Division Sartre Circle, *Thu, 9:00 a.m.-Noon*

Committee on Institutional Cooperation, *Thu, 5:15-7:15 p.m.*

Concerned Philosophers for Peace, *Sat, 12:15-2:15 p.m.*

Conference of Philosophical Societies, *Thu, 9:00 a.m.-Noon*

H

History of Early Analytic Philosophy Society, *Thu, 5:15-7:15 p.m.*

Hume Society, *Thu, 9:00 a.m.-Noon*

I

International Association for Computing and Philosophy, *Thu, 7:30-10:30 p.m.*

International Association for the Philosophy of Sport, *Sat, 12:15-2:15 p.m.*

International Berkeley Society, *Thu, 5:15-7:15 p.m.*

International Society for Environmental Ethics, *Thu, 5:15-7:15 p.m.*

International Society for Environmental Ethics, *Sat, 12:15-2:15 p.m.*

J

Josiah Royce Society, *Thu, 7:30-10:30 p.m.*

K

Karl Jaspers Society of North America, *Thu, 9:00 a.m.-Noon*

N

North American Division of the Schopenhauer Society, *Thu, 5:15-7:15 p.m.*

North American Kant Society, *Fri, 7:00-10:00 p.m.*

North American Nietzsche Society, *Sat, 12:15-2:15 p.m.*

North American Society for Social Philosophy, *Thu, 7:30-10:30 p.m.*

P

Personalist Discussion Group, *Sat, 12:15-2:15 p.m.*

Philosophy of Time Society, *Thu, 9:00 a.m.-Noon*

R

Radical Philosophy Association, *Thu, 5:15-7:15 p.m.*

Radical Philosophy Association, *Sat, 12:15-2:15 p.m.*

S

Society for Analytical Feminism, *Thu, 9:00 a.m.-Noon*

Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy, *Thu, 5:15-7:15 p.m.*

Society for Arab, Persian, and Islamic Philosophy, *Thu, 9:00 a.m.-Noon*

Society for Asian and Comparative Philosophy, *Thu, 5:15-7:15 p.m.*

Society for Business Ethics, *Sat, 12:15-2:15 p.m.*

Society for Lesbian and Gay Philosophy, *Thu, 5:15-7:15 p.m.*

Society for Philosophy and Public Affairs, *Fri, 7:00-10:00 p.m.*

Society for Philosophy in the Contemporary World, *Thu, 7:30-10:30 p.m.*

Society for Realist-Antirealist Discussion, *Thu, 7:30-10:30 p.m.*

Society for Realist-Antirealist Discussion, *Sat, 12:15-2:15 p.m.*

Society for Student Philosophers, *Thu, 5:15-7:15 p.m.*

Society for Student Philosophers, *Fri, 7:00-10:00 p.m.*

Society for the Advancement of American Philosophy, *Fri, 7:00-10:00 p.m.*

Society for the Metaphysics of Science, *Thu, 5:15-7:15 p.m.*

Society for the Metaphysics of Science, *Fri, 7:00-10:00 p.m.*

Society for the Philosophic Study of the Contemporary Visual Arts, *Thu, 9:00 a.m.-Noon*

Society for the Philosophical Study of Education, *Thu, 9:00 a.m.-Noon*

Society for the Philosophical Study of Education, *Fri, 7:00-10:00 p.m.*

Society for the Philosophy of Creativity, *Thu, 7:30-10:30 p.m.*

Society for the Study of Indian and Tibetan Buddhist Philosophy, *Thu, 9:00 a.m.-Noon*

Society for the Study of Process Philosophies, *Fri, 7:00-10:00 p.m.*

Society of Christian Philosophers, *Thu, 5:15-7:15 p.m.*

PLACEMENT SERVICE INFORMATION

Evonda Acevedo will be the Coordinator for the APA Placement Service at the 2009 Central Division Meeting. Questions concerning the Service should be directed to Evonda at The American Philosophical Association, University of Delaware, 31 Amstel Avenue, Newark, DE 19716. She can also be reached by telephone at (302) 831-2012, fax: (302) 831-8690, or email: eacevedo@udel.edu.

APA PLACEMENT SERVICE GENERAL HOURS OF OPERATION:

Wednesday, February 18:	Placement Information, 5:00 – 10:00 p.m. Placement Interviewing, 5:00 – 10:00 p.m.
Thursday, February 19:	Placement Information, 9:00 a.m. – 7:00 p.m. Placement Interviewing, 9:00 a.m. – 7:00 p.m.
Friday, February 20:	Placement Information, 9:00 a.m. – 5:00 p.m. Placement Interviewing, 9:00 a.m. – 5:00 p.m.
Saturday, February 21:	Placement Information, 9:00 a.m. – Noon Placement Interviewing, 9:00 a.m. – 3:00 p.m.

APA PLACEMENT SERVICE LOCATIONS

The Placement Service locations have not been determined as of this printing. Please stop by the Registration Desk at the meeting to find out where the Placement Services will be located this year.

JOB CANDIDATES

1. Candidate Numbers will be assigned at the Placement Desk.
 2. The location of a Job Interview will be available from the Placement staff, or posted on the bulletin board at the information desk.
 3. Additional “Request for Interview” forms will be available at the Placement Desk.
 4. APA Membership Applications will be available at the APA Meeting Registration Desk.
 5. Information and instructions for using the Service will be available at the Placement desk (also see following pages), and posted on the information bulletin board.
 6. The mailboxes for Job Candidates will be located at the Placement Desk.
 7. A complete set of Job Postings will be available at the Placement Desk.
-

8. A message for the APA Placement Ombudsperson can be left at the Placement Desk.

INTERVIEWERS

1. **Interviewers check in here**—as soon as possible upon arrival.
2. Payments for **On-Site Interviewing Departments** will be received here.
3. Space will be provided here for interviewers to check their files.
4. “Request for Interview” forms received from job candidates that have been reviewed by interviewers **should be returned** here.
5. A list of interviewing table assignments will be posted on the Placement Information Bulletin Board.

INTERVIEWING AREA

1. APA Interviewing Tables will be located here.
2. In the event that additional space for interviewing is needed, we will post the additional location on the Placement Information Bulletin Board.

INFORMATION AND INSTRUCTIONS FOR JOB CANDIDATES

REQUIREMENTS FOR USING THE PLACEMENT SERVICE

1. You **must be an APA member** in order to use the Service. Placement is a benefit of membership for candidates, and there is no additional charge to use this service. Membership applications are available on the APA web site (www.apaonline.org) or by contacting the APA National Office (302) 831-1112, or at the Membership/Registration desk at the Meeting.
2. You **MUST REGISTER** for the **MEETING** in order to use the Service.
 - If you **register in advance** for the meeting and indicate that you will be a candidate (an advance registration form is located at the back of this issue), a candidate number will be assigned in the National Office and will appear on the back of your badge. You **must** pick up your badge from the APA Registration staff prior to using the Placement service.
 - If you register on-site for the meeting, present your badge to the Placement Staff, who will be available to assign you a candidate number in the “Placement Service” line.

WHAT TO BRING WITH YOU

1. Your copies of recent issues of *Jobs For Philosophers*.
 2. Several copies of your curriculum vitae. If you run out of CVs at the meeting, the hotel has a copy center located in the Business Center.
-

HOW TO USE THE PLACEMENT SERVICE

After you have picked up your registration materials from the APA Registration staff, you are ready to use the Service. If you do not yet have a candidate number on the back of your badge, please go to the job candidates' area to receive one.

JOB CANDIDATES' AREA

Here you will find a file folder (mailbox) with your candidate number on it. All communications addressed to you during the meeting will be placed there. Your folder contains:

1. "Request for Interview" forms. Additional forms will be available from the Placement staff. **Be sure that your Placement Number appears at the top of all forms.**
2. A "Locator" form for you to list your name and hotel address. Please do not remove this form from your folder. This is used only in the event that we need to contact you during the meeting.

JOB POSTINGS

New jobs (not having appeared in the *Jobs for Philosophers*) will be posted on a bulletin board in the Placement Service Area. You should check this board regularly for new postings. Each ad should contain instructions on how to apply.

INSTITUTIONS THAT HAVE CHECKED IN WITH PLACEMENT

The names of institutions that have registered to use the Service will be posted on the bulletin board (updated regularly) in *alphabetical order*. Each listing will indicate the following:

1. If the listing institution has checked in with Placement.
2. If the institution is accepting interview requests at the meeting.
3. The relevant *JFP* for the institution's opening(s).
4. Where the institution plans on interviewing (Table with number assignment).
5. Miscellaneous notes deemed appropriate by the Placement staff or the institution.

SUBMITTING AN INTERVIEW REQUEST FORM

Complete the *top* portion of the "Request for Interview" form and attach a copy of your CV. **Be sure that your candidate number appears at the top of all forms.** After you have completed the necessary information, place your request form and CV in the box marked *Requests for Interviews* which will be prominently displayed on the Placement Service Desk. Your "Request" will be forwarded to the institution by a staff member.

INTERVIEWS

After your “Request” has been reviewed by a representative from the institution, the form will be returned to your file folder with the institution’s response appearing on the *bottom* of the form. Check your file folder often so that you can be certain to receive your messages promptly.

By Noon on February 21, all “Requests” submitted by you should have been returned to your file folder, and you should remove them at that time. Occasionally, an institution may retain applications to review at a later date. If you applied for a job that had been posted and the institution did not check in with the Service during the meeting, it is suggested that you contact the institution by mail.

INTERVIEWING LOCATIONS

Some departments will be conducting interviews at tables (the location of the tables will be available at the Registration Desk). Other interviewing table locations will be posted if additional space is required. Each institution using a table for interviewing will be assigned a table number. The table numbers assigned to institutions will be posted on the bulletin board in the Placement Service Area.

ADVICE FOR JOB APPLICANTS

The APA Committee on Career Opportunities offers the following advice for job applicants: The schedule for those seeking jobs and those Departments offering positions is difficult for all concerned. From the point of view of Departments, any publication date for *Jobs for Philosophers* is a compromise between the competing demands imposed by the need to get funding for positions, so the later the better, and by the need to have time to process applications, so the sooner the better. From the point of view of job applicants, there are also competing demands: the sooner it is published, the more time to apply, but the later it is published, the more opportunities will be available. There is no easy solution to this problem, but you can ease your difficulties somewhat by being prepared when the *JFP* is published. You should have your curriculum vitae ready to put in an envelope, a generic draft of a letter of application ready to be fine-tuned for particular job opportunities, and the rest of your file ready for mailing. This means talking to those who are to write letters of recommendation long before the *JFP* is due to arrive, preparing material about your teaching capacities, and selecting a writing sample for those Departments that request it. Applications should be complete, as well as clearly organized. It is to your advantage to send in your application as soon as possible after an ad appears.

INFORMATION AND INSTRUCTIONS FOR INTERVIEWERS

REQUIREMENTS FOR USING THE PLACEMENT SERVICE

1. It is expected that **all individual interviewers will register for the meeting** either by using the registration form found in the back of this issue or by stopping at the APA Registration Desk (6th Floor) to register on-site prior to using the Placement Service.
2. All **Departments (not individuals)** planning to interview at the meeting should complete the Placement Service advance registration form found on our web site, www.apaonline.org/divisions/central/index.aspx or at the end of this section.

Upon receipt of an advance registration form additional information pertaining to the Placement Service will be sent to the attention of the contact person listed on the form. In the event that we send Placement forms either via email or mail, please be sure to complete these and return them to our office **at your earliest opportunity**. Not doing so may cause your materials to arrive after the Staff has already left the office to travel to the meeting. In this case, we **must** have you fill out the forms again on site. If time does not allow sending them to us, please bring them with you and turn them in at the Placement Desk.

CHECKING IN WITH THE SERVICE

Before you begin to interview candidates, please check in with the Placement Staff. We will need to know that you have arrived on site for candidates inquiring about your institution. Additional information will be requested from you (or confirmed if your department pre-registered) at this time as well.

Some institutions accept interview requests at the meeting; some of these job notices may have appeared in *Jobs for Philosophers* while others are unpublished positions. A new, unpublished position will be assigned an AD# and posted on the bulletin board in the Placement Service area. If you are bringing such a job notice with you to the meeting, please provide the Placement Staff with **four** copies of the notice for the position you are advertising. Such a position announcement should be typed on *one side only* in a good size and easy to read font, and be as brief as possible. Only positions that have **not** appeared in *Jobs for Philosophers* will be posted. If you would like a position that has been posted at this meeting to appear on our website immediately following the meeting, or in the issue of *Jobs for Philosophers*, you need to submit this ad immediately, following the close of the meeting via our website, <https://member.apaonline.org/formredirect.aspx?p=JFP>. If you need assistance with this, contact the APA National Office.

Some institutions interview by prearrangement after placing an advertisement in *Jobs for Philosophers* and then contacting candidates prior to the meeting. When you arrange an interview with candidates, please inform them that they **must be APA Members in order to use the Service and they must register for the meeting in order to use the Service**.

If you plan to conduct job interviews anywhere other than at the interviewing tables/suites we have provided, please let us know your plans because candidates often come to us to ask questions about the location/time (etc.) of their interviews, and we need to have complete, up-to-date information in order to help them (and you).

Departments using a **Suite** for interviewing will need to complete an interview schedule form at the time they check in with the Service. Doing so enables the Service to notify the candidates you wish to interview of your interviewing location. **Be assured that only those candidates listed on your interview schedule will be told the location of your hotel room, unless you have directed us to give this information to all candidates who ask.** Departments interviewing at tables **DO NOT** need to complete this form.

N.B.: If you are conducting interviews in a hotel room, please be aware of the following policy statement adopted by the APA Board of Officers at its November 2004 meeting:

“Departments should not conduct Job Interviews in non-suite hotel rooms. Candidates who are subject to such interviews can appeal to the APA and are guaranteed anonymity.” (Originally published in *Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association*, Vol. 78, No. 5, pp. 23, 119.)

APA INTERVIEWING TABLES

The Placement Service provides numbered tables for interviewing purposes; you will receive your table number assignment when you check in. These table number assignments will also be posted on the Placement Service Bulletin Board. Should additional space for interviewing tables be necessary, this location will be posted as well.

INSTITUTION FILE FOLDER (MAILBOX)

There will be a file folder bearing the name of your institution located in the Interviewers' Area. Requests for interviews from candidates will be placed in this file folder.

REVIEWING INTERVIEW REQUESTS

When a candidate requests an interview with your institution, you should receive her/his curriculum vitae attached to a “Request for Interview” form. The bottom of this form is to be completed by you and returned to Placement staff. If an interview is granted, space is provided on this form to list the time, date, and location of the interview. If you are *unable to interview a candidate*, space for this response is also provided on the form. Any request you receive in an envelope contains confidential material and should be destroyed rather than returned to the candidate. As a matter of professional courtesy, *all requests should receive a response*. When a candidate receives a “Request” form back without a response, he or she is likely to assume that the material *has not been reviewed* and might return this to you via our service or contact your institution by mail.

Each candidate is assigned a numbered file folder to facilitate prompt communication between interviewers and candidates. Materials that you wish to transmit to a registered candidate should be handed in to the Placement Service staff, and will be delivered to the candidate by our staff.

APA STATEMENT ON PLACEMENT PRACTICES

The APA Committee on the Status and Future of the Profession reminds you of its Statement on Placement Practices: The APA discourages the nomination by graduate departments of job seekers for positions in philosophy, and the submission of their dossiers in response to announcements of positions, without their knowledge or interest. This may seriously mislead those who are conducting searches, and may have unfortunate consequences both for them and for genuinely interested applicants. Graduate departments using a nomination procedure or submitting dossiers on behalf of job seekers should either attest explicitly that the candidate wishes to be considered for the positions in question, or (preferably) ensure that the job seekers themselves submit personal letters of application for these positions. Departments conducting searches are encouraged to recommend or require explicitly (in their position announcements) that each candidate, to be assessed of full consideration, should submit a personal letter of application for and interest in the announced position.

A Placement Ombudsperson will be available at the meeting. Please see the Placement Service Staff if you would like to contact the Ombudsperson.

**Placement Service Registration for Interviewing Departments
APA 2009 Central Division Meeting
Palmer House Hilton Hotel, February 18-21, 2009**

Only one form is required for each interviewing department. Once completed, this can be faxed to (302) 831-8690.

Institution: _____ Department: _____
Contact: _____ Phone: _____
City, State: _____ Email: _____

All persons conducting interviews should be registered** for the Central Division Meeting as well as the department being registered with the Placement Service.

**Registered members of the department who will be conducting interviews:

Our department will:

_____ need interviewing table(s) Quantity of Tables _____

-or-

_____ conduct interviews in a hotel suite (you must contact Linda Smallbrook to reserve a suite)

Our department will:

_____ provide suite # and list of prearranged candidates to whom suite information may be given

-or-

_____ bring suite # and allow service to give to anyone who requests it

Our department will:

_____ conduct prearranged interviews only

-or-

_____ accept interview requests on-site

Please list the JFP issue(s) (if any) in which this job was advertised: _____

Registration Fees (Please Check One): _____ Pre-Registration, By February 6: \$50.00
_____ *Regular Registration, After February 6: \$75.00

Credit Card Type: (Circle One) VISA / MASTERCARD

Credit Card #:

Exp. Date: /

Last 3 Digits on back of card:

Name on Card: _____ Phone #: _____

Signature: _____ Email: _____

***Check #: _____ Check Date: _____ Check Amount _____

***Payable to: The American Philosophical Association. The APA only accepts checks drawn on U.S. banks in U.S. funds, or Int'l. Money Orders in U.S. funds. There is a \$30 charge for all returned checks. *If PAYMENT is not received in our office by February 6, 2009 you MUST pay the on-site fee! Please mail form and payment to: Attn: Evonda Acevedo, Placement, The American Philosophical Association, 31 Amstel Avenue, University of Delaware, Newark, DE 19716.

PLACEMENT BROCHURE

This brochure offers some advice to those seeking jobs in philosophy. Like all advice it is to be taken with a grain of salt. It is based on the collective wisdom of the APA's Committee on Academic Careers and Placement in Fall 2004 (Larry May [chair], Andrew Light, Frank Ryan, Abby Wilkerson, Melissa Zinkin, Nancy Holland, Rebecca Copenhaver, Mark Timmons, David Tuncellito). Collective wisdom is probably somewhat less controversial than collective punishment, but more controversial than almost everything else. Nonetheless, we hope that some of what we recommend will prove helpful to some of you, some of the time. Job seeking is one of the most difficult things that people can engage in. Anything that reduces that difficulty has value.

1. WHEN TO START THINKING ABOUT JOBS

It is never too early to start thinking about the job market. During your first years in graduate school you should be thinking about which papers your teachers have liked. After the end of term, take the paper back to the professor who liked it and ask two questions:

What can I do to improve this paper and make it marketable for a conference or for publication?

Which conference or journal would be best suited for a paper like mine?

You don't need to do a lot of this. One or two of your best essays, sent first to a conference and then to a journal, will do nicely. Only send out your very best work to conferences, for that is what you want to be remembered for.

In addition, in these early years in graduate school, you should try to put together a good assortment of courses that you have TAed for or taught independently. You should try to TA for all of the major introductory courses (introduction to philosophy, ethics, logic and critical thinking) as well as some specialized or advanced courses in your areas of specialization and competence. At some universities, such as the large state schools, the trick will be to limit your teaching so that you can get good writing done. At other schools, you may have to be creative to get enough teaching experience (try contacting small colleges and community colleges in your area). Most importantly, keep your teaching evaluations from these courses. Or if course evaluations do not routinely have students evaluate TAs, design your own and administer it during the last week of classes (then have a departmental secretary collect and hold them for you until grades are turned in so students don't think you will retaliate against them).

A note of caution: Given the current and foreseeable demand for low-paid adjunct courses it can be very tempting to take on a large amount of adjunct teaching. Given the large number of graduate students seeking such teaching it can also be very tempting to take every course that is offered to you in order to ensure your place in the adjunct pool. The result sometimes can be a vicious cycle of taking more and more low-paid adjunct teaching that can impede your ability to finish your dissertation.

All other things being equal, and they hardly ever are, you could also use the early years in graduate school to get a bit (but only a bit) of service or administrative experience. The easiest here is to volunteer for a departmental committee, like the colloquium or admissions committee. If there are opportunities to work with an actual administrator, especially a Dean or higher, on a special project, you should jump at the opportunity since a letter from said administrator will make you look more attractive to administrators who will hire you down the road. Do not (repeat: do not) spend much time at this. Service is clearly a very distant third-place, after research and teaching, for the vast majority of jobs. No one gets hired on the basis of service, standing alone, unless you want to be hired into an administrative job. Remember too that one should be cautious about spending too much time on departmental or campus politics. Indeed, try to stay out of departmental politics altogether, which can come back to bite you. You are a transient in graduate school, and should not treat this as a permanent position.

It is a good idea to join the APA as soon as you can—the rates for student members are very low. And make sure to check the box on the application form saying that you would like to receive the publication called: *Jobs for Philosophers* (it's free—but you have to check the box to get it). Once you get this publication, you can scan through it and think to yourself: Do any of these jobs sound interesting to me? What do I need to do to stand the best chance of getting the job I like the most? Note whether there are any such jobs. If not, consider another career. If so, notice what combinations of things employers are looking for (for example, notice that most jobs in philosophy of science or mind also want someone who can teach logic; and most jobs in ethical theory or political philosophy also want someone who can teach applied ethics).

Another good source of experience and professional contacts can be found in the numerous smaller specialized societies organized around particular sub-fields of philosophy, affinity groups, or particular periods or figures, such as the Society for Women in Philosophy, the International Society for Environmental Ethics, or the Society for Realist/Antirealist Discussion. Such organizations can be invaluable for helping to establish you in the field and providing a set of interlocutors who can improve your work. One of the best ways to find such organizations is to survey the Group Meetings listings in the program for each divisional APA conference.

In general, use the early years in graduate school to learn as much philosophy as you can. Also, begin to develop a specialty in philosophy, and perhaps also begin to develop a competence outside of philosophy,

such as political science or computer science (although for certain jobs you might not want to highlight this). Use these early years to figure out if you really want to spend your life in a philosophy department, and to begin to get a sense of what it means to be a “professional” philosopher. While it is very romantic to want to be a philosopher, like being a poet one does not live by thoughts and words alone. The way to support yourself is by getting a job as a member of a profession, and our profession, as odd as it may sound, is teaching and publishing in philosophy, which is not especially romantic, but is better than many other jobs we know.

2. WHEN TO GO INTO THE “MARKET”

One of the most important decisions you will make is when to go into the philosophy job market. This is especially important because many graduate students go in too early and waste years of their lives. The job market process is a nearly full-time job. So if you go in early and you don’t have enough of your dissertation done, you can find yourself six months later with no job prospects and no more done on your dissertation than when you started. Do this a couple of years and you nearly place yourself out of the market by being too long in graduate school—taking too long to finish a dissertation is almost always seen as a bad sign of how long it will take you to finish anything else.

So, when is it optimal to go into the job market? While this varies a bit, the best time is when you are nearly done with your dissertation. “Nearly done” is a relative term. If you have a five-chapter dissertation, “nearly done” can mean four chapters drafted and approved by your committee, and the other chapter at least begun. Or it can mean, all five chapters drafted and some fairly minor revisions needed. At bare minimum, you need three of those five chapters done by early September. The main reason for this is that you need your dissertation committee chair to say, in a letter he or she will write in late September, “Yes, Jones will be done and ready to start undistracted in the Fall.” But this is not enough, since everyone’s committee chair will say that, or else your application process is simply a waste of time. In addition, the committee chair must offer evidence to back up this claim, such as, that all five chapters are drafted and only need minor revisions, or some such. Optimally, the letter from your committee chair will say: “We have set December 8th as the defense date.” This is optimal because by the time you get to the Eastern Division meetings in late December, folks will know whether you are really done or not. January defense dates are good as well, because departments will be making hiring decisions by late January or early February, typically.

In normal years there are a lot more applicants for jobs in philosophy than there are jobs. So, employers are looking for reasons to throw out applications. The first cut at most schools is “whether the candidate is done, or will be done by September.” Unless you can make a strong case for this, and your dissertation committee chair can back you up, you are unlikely to make the first cut, and hence likely to have wasted six months or more. Don’t delude yourself. It normally takes two months of relatively

uninterrupted work to draft a good chapter, so it will take six months of very hard work to draft more than half of a dissertation, depending on your other commitments. If you haven't started seriously writing your dissertation by March, you don't stand much of a chance of being more than halfway done by September. But also don't wait too long. While the national average is seven years from BA to completion of the Ph.D., if after completing your coursework you take longer than three years to write the dissertation, potential employers will start to wonder whether this is a sign that you will not be able to write enough in your probationary period to be able to get tenure. So, our best advice is not to go into the market until you are done with the dissertation, or at very least "nearly done."

3. THE SYSTEM

In America in philosophy, the majority of jobs are advertised in *Jobs for Philosophers* in October and November and then first interviews (a half hour to an hour in length) are conducted at the APA Eastern Division meetings between Christmas and New Year's day. If you make it through the convention, then two or three people will be flown to campus for a two-day intensive interview, where you will meet all of the faculty members and present a professional paper, or teach a class, and increasingly both. There are also jobs advertised after New Year's day, although far fewer than before New Year's. These jobs will typically have their first interviews at the Pacific or Central Division meetings in late March or late April respectively. But many of these jobs will not be tenure track, but instead they are rather late announcements for temporary positions of one or more years. Some schools will do first interviews by phone, but these are still very rare. If you are seriously on the market, you should plan to go to the APA Eastern Division meetings and apply to jobs out of the October and November *JFPs*, and then keep applying throughout the year.

Many graduate students go to their first APA meeting when they go on the job market. While certainly understandable due to financial constraints, we strongly advise you to attend a meeting of the APA prior to going on the market. In particular, going to an Eastern APA meeting may help you avoid the "shell shock" of going to one of these meetings only when it "counts." We would also hope that attending these meetings without the pressure of being on the market will help you see the positive aspects of these conferences, especially the ability to reconnect with friends in the field and make new friends that you otherwise might not see in the academic year. Also, reading a paper or being a commentator might help get you a job in the following years.

4. THE "VITA"

One of the main ways to tell whether you are ready to go on the market is whether you can put together a respectable vita by early September. A vita is simply an academic resume, but it is not really very simple at all. You should show your vita to various faculty members and put it through the kind of drafting process that you would use for a term paper. For most

applicants, the vita should be two to three pages long, with three to four pages for dissertation abstract and summary of teaching evaluations as supplements to the vita.

- a) Address – list your departmental and home addresses and phone numbers. Also list where you can be reached right up to the beginning of the Eastern APA convention (December 27).
 - b) Area of specialization – this is optimally two or three areas of philosophy that you are especially qualified in. The dissertation is the primary, often only, basis for proof of a specialization. To figure out what would be good combinations of specialization, consult back issues of *Jobs for Philosophers* and then make sure that your dissertation really does cover those areas.
 - c) Area of competence – this is optimally four or five areas of philosophy that you are ready to offer courses in, different from your specialized areas. The best way to demonstrate this is in terms of what you have taught or TAed.
 - d) Publications or conference presentations – this could be one area of the vita or several, depending on what you have accomplished. Do not pad your vita with very minor things (or optimally, list them under a separate category for minor publications). Try to list the most significant first—they don't need to be in chronological order. Make sure to indicate whether something was peer refereed.
 - e) Teaching experience – list TA experience in a separate category from autonomous teaching. List the dates and places of the experience.
 - f) Special honors and awards – list whatever seems relevant to a job search in philosophy. Mainly focus on things you earned in graduate school.
 - g) Recommendation writers – list the names of all of those who will write letters for you and the addresses and phone numbers for them. This list should include all three (or four) members of your primary dissertation committee, as well as someone who will write specifically about your teaching—preferably someone who has good first-hand experience of it. And it is sometimes an especially good thing to be able to have someone write for you who is not a faculty member at your department or school. Those letters are more believable since the reputation of the recommendation writer is not tied up with whether you get a job or not. For example, if you give a conference paper and have a commentator who liked the paper, ask that person to write a letter for you; act similarly for a paper you have written about a prominent philosopher who has read your work and appreciated it, but such letters are limited in scope. It often is a good idea to give to prospective letter writers a letter from you that indicates what things optimally you'd like them to cover in the recommendation, and give them lots of time—ask them by Sept. 1.
-

- h) List of graduate courses taken: list all courses (including those you audited) along with the name of the professor and the semester taken. It is often a good idea to group these by subject areas rather than merely to present them chronologically. **DO NOT LIST GRADES**—no one cares anymore.
- i) Summary of selected course evaluations: on no more than two sheets of paper, list five or six sets of teaching evaluations, displayed in graphic form that is easy to read
- j) Dissertation abstract—on one or two sheets of paper give a detailed description of the arguments of the dissertation. Provide a summary paragraph and long paragraphs on each chapter. [NOTE: if you can't easily provide this abstract then you are definitely not ready to go on the market.]

It is hard to stress enough how important it is to get the vita just right. The trick is not to pad the vita and yet to list all of the important stuff about your fledgling professional life.

On a more mundane subject, normal white paper and average size typeface work best. This is why you need lots of feedback and redraftings to get it right. If you have any questions about how you “appear” through the vita, ask people you can trust to give you frank advice, and then, with several such pieces of advice, make a decision about how you want to “appear.”

Do not waste your time applying for jobs that list an AOS different from the ones you list on the vita.

5. THE COVER LETTER

The cover letter for each job application should basically be a one-page attempt to demonstrate that you fit the job description. This means that you should highlight aspects of the vita that demonstrate your qualifications for the things mentioned in the job ad. You should have a paragraph on teaching and a paragraph on research, at bare minimum.

The cover letter is sometimes the only thing that members of a hiring committee read, so take your time with it and try to convey as much information as you can in a page or so without being excessively wordy or using terms and expressions that may be esoteric to a particular sub-field of philosophy—keep in mind that most people reading this letter will not be working in the specialty area in which you work. It is not a problem to go over one page in length, but remember that folks may not read the second page.

If at all possible, put the cover letter on departmental stationary. If you already have a job, this is easy. But if you are still in graduate school, most departments will let you use departmental stationary. If your department secretary complains about the cost of letterhead stock, merely ask for one sheet, and then photocopy it and print your covering letter on the photocopied departmental letterhead.

6. THE WRITING SAMPLE

You will need to supply at least one writing sample with each application. It is commonly thought that the writing sample should come from the dissertation. If it does not, people may wonder whether the dissertation is indeed almost done. You should take a chapter from the dissertation and make it a free-standing 25-page paper. If you have a paper that has been accepted for publication, you should include this as well; but especially if it is not from the dissertation, this should be included in addition to, not instead of, the dissertation chapter.

In all cases, the writing sample should be your very best work. After all, someone may actually read it and base the whole interview on it. How embarrassing it will be for you if you really don't think that thesis is defensible anymore. Writing samples should be very carefully edited for typos and infelicities of style, since this is the only piece of your work members of a hiring committee are likely to see. You should never send out a writing sample that has not been seen, and critiqued, by several people in your field, even if these are only fellow graduate students. Do not assume that even if people have seen earlier drafts of the writing sample, say when it was merely a chapter, that is good enough. As with everything else you send out for the purposes of getting a job, only send things out that others have looked at for you in advance. [Note: Your writing sample should not be the same as the professional paper you deliver on campus, lest folks think that you only have one good idea.]

7. WHICH SCHOOLS TO APPLY TO

Our standard advice is that if you are serious about the job market you should be able to apply to 30-80 jobs before Christmas. Of course, it is a waste of everyone's time to apply to jobs that you are not qualified for, or for which you do not have the right AOS. But so many jobs list open specializations, or merely list courses to be taught, that it shouldn't be hard to find quite a number of jobs that one is qualified for out of the 300-plus advertised in the October and November issues of *Jobs for Philosophers*.

Many students decide to do a more limited search. In order to accomplish this goal they try to determine which departments are most likely to hire them, and then only apply to those schools. For instance, if someone really wants to teach applied ethics, then one often applies only to jobs that list applied ethics as an AOS, rather than also to jobs that list ethical theory or political philosophy as specializations. In deciding whether to pursue this strategy, you should realize that departments often change their minds about precisely what they want. If you do a limited search, still apply to as many jobs as you can from those that you are qualified for. Remember that you don't have to take every job that is offered, but unless you get an offer from somewhere you won't get a job at all.

8. PREPARING FOR THE INTERVIEW

Before going to the APA Eastern convention for the first round of job interviews, everyone should first have a mock interview. If this is not a

regular feature of your graduate program, mock interviews are easy to organize on your own. Merely find two or three faculty members, give them a copy of your vita a few minutes in advance (to make it seem like the real thing) and have them sit in a room with you for an hour and role-play.

The first half of the interview should be about research, and it should begin with someone asking you to describe your dissertation in about ten minutes. The “Spiel” should be memorized and well-rehearsed in front of a mirror. Of course, you will rarely get through ten minutes before questions start flying. And that’s good—since the whole point of an interview is to have a conversation where three things are learned: how good a philosopher you are, what kind of a teacher you are likely to be, and whether you will be a good conversationalist as a colleague. Since you won’t normally be allowed to finish the “Spiel” front-load it with the most interesting ideas.

The second half of the mock interview, like most of the real interviews you will face, should be focused on teaching. You should come prepared to discuss in detail how you would teach courses that would naturally fall out of your areas of specialization and competence. Be prepared to explain what you think students should get out of a given course in order to motivate your teaching approach. Prepare elaborately for these mock interviews, as well as for the real one, and bring sample syllabi for a host of courses you are likely to be asked to teach.

At the mock interview, those mocking you should put on different hats, preferably trying to simulate folks who will indeed interview you. For that reason, wait to do this until early to middle December so it is likely that you will have started to hear from schools. Also, ask the mockers to be brutally frank with you. A lot of what goes wrong in interviews is easy to fix if you know about it in advance. It is easy to redo your “Spiel.” And, if you bite your thumb or scratch your rear end, this can easily be corrected once you know it. If you look distracted, you can sit up straight and then lean forward. If you look too intense or nervous, you can slide down in the chair and slump a little. If you look too buttoned-up, unbutton; if you look too laid-back, button-up, etc.

When you get interviews, go onto the departmental web site and look at the courses that would naturally fall into your specialization and competence. It is also a good idea to try to get a sense of what type of school it is. And if this is a “plum” job for you, you might want to read some things that people in the department, especially those in your area, have written.

At nearly every real interview, you will be asked if you have any questions for them, so make that part of the mock interview as well. If you don’t know this you can be flummoxed by this question—so have one or two questions, ideally based on your knowledge of the department and the curriculum, e.g.: “Are your 400 level courses only upper level undergraduate courses or are there both graduate students and undergraduate students in these courses?” Don’t be too provocative here and generally stay away from salary issues.

Very often you will be asked what your “next” project will be, now that you are nearing the end of your dissertation—you don’t have to have a super-detailed answer to this, but you should have some answer. Don’t try to make something up on the spur of the moment. A good strategy is to work up a project that spins off the dissertation, perhaps writing the chapter you never got to, or that is a natural follow-up to the dissertation. That way you can still talk about stuff you know something about.

9. WHAT TO WEAR

The best advice about what to wear is to wear what will make you comfortable. Men don’t need to wear a suit, nor do women. Jackets are pretty much required though. Don’t wear a loud tie or a loud scarf. You don’t want to be remembered later as that person with the weird thing on—much better to be remembered for what you said—the person who had a really interesting response to Smith’s hard question, for instance. Ties for men are not strictly required; but more men wear them than not, so... Women, as is true for men, can certainly wear pants, as long as they look professional, and indeed you might prefer them. In general, dress comfortably—the placement process will be uncomfortable enough as it is.

10. GENERAL CONVENTION ADVICE

If you can afford it, plan to spend two or three nights at the hotel where the convention occurs. And best not to have a roommate, unless it is someone you really trust. Things will be stressful enough without having anywhere to escape to (and watch cartoons, or the weather channel, or whatever relaxes you) between interviews. Also, for two of the evenings there will be receptions (still called “smokers” by most attendees, even though there hasn’t been any smoke or fire for many years) in the evening, often going on till late hours, and it is best not to have to navigate mass transit after midnight.

Generally, drink little if any alcohol during the convention. And try to stay away from folks who have been drinking and have interviewed you. Aside from this advice, though, there is nothing wrong with trying to find folks who interviewed you later in the day at the “smokers.” Many a job has been secured with an extra effort at finding and conversing with folks where you effectively get a second interview to only one for your competitors. Of course, don’t make a pest out of yourself. Look sheepish as you approach them, and ask if it is OK to continue the conversation that was begun earlier. Many departments make finding them at the smoker easy by reserving a table in the large hall where these events occur. When you enter the hall the APA will provide a list of the numbered tables that have been reserved by various departments. When departments have reserved a table they are signaling in part that they are encouraging candidates to stop by for a chat after the interview, so you should plan on coming by.

11. APRES CONVENTION

After the convention go back home and prepare a campus job talk. Better yet, you should have had such a talk already planned out in October. In any event, you should not delay doing this since you might get a call only a few days after the meetings asking you to fly out for a campus visit. Almost everyone wants either a formal or informal paper, and you should get one ready right away just in case. It is also a good idea to go over the convention with your placement director or mentor and see if follow-up e-mails might be warranted. Also try to set up a mock job talk—round up your friends and stray faculty members and make them sit down for an hour with you while you do a dress rehearsal.

If you get a job offer and still haven't heard from a school you prefer, call them up. Nothing is lost here. If they don't want you, and they have any manners at all, then they'll let you down gently. But the worst thing is if they do want you but are merely being slow and you don't give them enough notice about a deadline for another job.

12. LATE BREAKING JOBS AND PERSISTENCE

Keep yourself open to the possibility that nothing will happen as a result of the first round of job interviews. Keep sending out applications until you are sure you'll be employed. This is psychologically hard to do, but it is necessary. Many of our students have gotten jobs in the second or third round, after the competition has diminished a bit. Those jobs are no less desirable, often, than those that interview at the Eastern. And always remember, you don't have to stay in the same position forever.

As was briefly mentioned above, some jobs that are advertised in the Fall, and comparatively more advertised in the Spring, are not tenure-track but limited term appointments for a year or more. These jobs can be important stepping-stones to a good tenure-track job. While many if not most of these limited term positions are for sabbatical replacements and so not renewable, some can become gateways for permanent positions at the same institution. In addition, having letters of reference from members of a department who have gotten to know you as a colleague, rather than as a grad student, can be very valuable in helping you to land a tenure-track job.

It is also increasingly common for departments to advertise full time postdoctoral fellowships of one to three years. You might even consider looking for and taking one of these positions rather than initially seeking a tenure-track job. Most postdocs do not teach full loads and will allow you to build a strong record of publications. Helpful hint: Many postdoctoral positions are not advertised in *Jobs for Philosophers* when they are part of a college or university's on-going "society of fellows" program or part of an established research center. Those interested in such positions should consult the job listings in the *Chronicle of Higher Education* and individual university web-sites.

13. PROBLEMS

If problems (of harassment, intimidation, or general annoyance) occur, talk to the APA staff or to the ombudsperson for the meetings, normally a friendly member of the very APA committee that wrote this brochure, and hence someone who cares about you. It is simply unacceptable for any job candidate to be made to feel uncomfortable because of comments about physical appearance, and certainly about sex or race. There is no reason not to complain, and the members of our committee who attend every APA meeting will not treat such complaints lightly.

If you are disabled, your right to full access in every aspect of the placement process *ought* to be extended without question or repercussion, just as you should be able freely to disclose your disability status. The APA is now beginning to address these problems, as are many institutions. In the meantime, candidates must not hesitate to request necessary accommodations, yet still have to strategize about disclosure or access requests. At the campus visit stage, wheelchair-accessible spaces cannot be assumed, yet are probably one of the simpler accommodations for most institutions, which may not be prepared to provide interpreter services or assume the travel costs of assistants. Candidates should carefully think through how they will negotiate these issues. Currently, the APA will provide a quiet interview room for candidates or interviewers for whom the large common interviewing area is inaccessible for reasons of disability such as, but not limited to, deafness, hearing impairment, cognitive impairments, or speech impairments. Contact the placement service if you need this provision. Additional concerns related to access or ableist bias in the placement process may be taken up with the placement ombudsperson through the APA placement service.

PAPER SUBMISSION GUIDELINES

Online Paper Submissions: Papers may be submitted either electronically or in hard copy by mail. For electronic submissions, follow the instructions on the APA web site. For hard copy submissions, mail to: Evonda Acevedo, ATTN: [Eastern, Pacific, or Central] Division Papers, The American Philosophical Association, University of Delaware, 31 Amstel Avenue, Newark, DE 19716, (302) 831-2012. Papers in any area are welcome. All papers are blind reviewed. Author's name, institution, or references pertaining to the identity of the author should be omitted from the paper, abstract, notes, and bibliography. Submitted papers are not returned to authors. Papers not accepted by one Division may be re-submitted for consideration to another Division. In submitting papers, authors warrant that those papers are entirely their own work or the joint work of the authors identified in the cover letter, and that, where appropriate, acknowledgement of the contributions of others has been made.

Graduate Student Travel Stipends and Awards: Papers to be considered for Graduate Student Travel Stipends/Awards must meet the criteria specified by each Division. For more information, visit the following address: www.apaonline.org/divisions/stipends/travelstipendsandprizes/index.aspx.

GUIDELINES FOR ALL THREE DIVISIONS

(*Guidelines 6, 7, 9, and 10 only apply to authors who are submitting papers in hard copy.)

1. Authors must be members in good standing of the APA.
 2. 1 copy of the paper.
 3. 1 copy of the abstract.
 4. Colloquium papers are limited to 3,000 words.
 5. Abstracts for colloquium papers are limited to 150 words.
 - *6. Title or cover page, which must include: a) title; b) word counts for all papers and abstracts; c) author's contact information; d) the Division the paper is to be submitted for.
 - *7. Papers must be typed on one side of page, double spaced, 1-inch margins on all sides, all pages numbered, 10-12 pt. font.
 8. No more than one submission by the same author for the same Division will be considered.
 - *9. Indicate name of Division on outside lower left side of the envelope containing the paper.
-

- *10. Include a self-addressed stamped envelope to the National Office if you wish the receipt of your paper to be acknowledged.
- 11. Any paper which is under consideration for publication elsewhere will be considered, provided that it will not appear in print until after the Divisional meeting is held. If this is the case, indicate when and where the paper is expected to be published.
- 12. Papers are not accepted by e-mail.
- 13. Authors are advised to provide accurate email addresses as part of their contact information because they may be contacted by email, sometimes under urgent circumstances. Authors who expect to relocate between the date of submission and the date of the meeting should arrange for email forwarding, or else provide both current and new email addresses with their contact information.

EASTERN DIVISION:

Meeting is held December 27-30.

Selections are announced in May or June.

Papers accepted by either the Central Division or the Pacific Division may not be presented at any subsequent meeting of the Eastern Division.

Papers exceeding 3,000 words will not be considered as colloquium papers.

Submissions for consideration as symposium papers must not exceed a length of 5,000 words. Abstracts for symposium papers must not exceed a length of 300 words. Authors should be aware that only a few papers are selected for presentation as symposium papers. If authors wish to have a shortened version of their paper considered as a colloquium paper, they should submit the appropriately shortened version, along with a shortened abstract, simultaneously with the submission of the symposium paper.

Any paper submitted without an abstract will not be considered. Any paper whose abstract is deemed unacceptable by the Program Committee will not be accepted. No revised abstract submitted after the paper's acceptance will be published in the *Proceedings and Addresses of The American Philosophical Association* without the approval of the Program Committee.

PACIFIC DIVISION:

Meeting is usually held at the end of March, but starting in 2009 will move to April.

Selections are announced in January.

A paper that has been on the Main Program at a past APA meeting (any division), or will be on the Main Program at a future Central or Eastern Division meeting, cannot be presented as a Main Program colloquium/symposium paper at the Pacific Division meeting.

Submissions for consideration as colloquium papers must not exceed 3,000 words.

Submissions for consideration as symposium papers must not exceed a length of 5,000 words. Abstracts for symposium papers must not exceed a length of 300 words. Authors should be aware that only a few papers are selected for presentation as symposium papers. If authors wish to have a shortened version of their paper considered as a colloquium paper, they should submit the appropriately shortened version, along with a shortened abstract, simultaneously with the submission of the symposium paper. (This will be considered a single submission.)

CENTRAL DIVISION:

Meeting has usually been held at the end of April, but starting in 2009 will be held in February.

Selections are announced in January, or before when possible.

Papers exceeding 3,000 words will not be considered as colloquium papers.

Submissions for consideration as symposium papers must not exceed a length of 5,000 words. Abstracts for symposium papers must not exceed a length of 300 words. Authors should be aware that only a few papers are selected for presentation as symposium papers. If authors wish to have a shortened version of their paper considered as a colloquium paper, they should submit the appropriately shortened version, along with a shortened abstract, simultaneously with the submission of the symposium paper.

The Central Division will not include a paper on its meeting program if that paper has already been presented or is scheduled for presentation on the Main Program of another APA Divisional meeting.

DRAFT MINUTES OF THE 2008 CENTRAL DIVISION BUSINESS MEETING

AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL ASSOCIATION
CENTRAL DIVISION
DRAFT MINUTES: 2008 BUSINESS MEETING

PALMER HOUSE HILTON HOTEL, CHICAGO, ILLINOIS
WABASH PARLOR
FRIDAY, APRIL 18, 2008

1. **CALL TO ORDER.** President James P. Sterba called the meeting to order at 12:15 p.m. and appointed Anita Silvers parliamentarian for the meeting.
 2. **APPROVAL OF MINUTES.** The draft Minutes of the 2007 meeting, as printed in *Proceedings and Addresses of the APA*, Vol. 80 #4 (February 2008), pp. 155-157, were approved without correction.
 3. **REPORT ON THE 2008 EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE MEETING.** Secretary-Treasurer Robin Smith reported on the actions of the 2008 Executive Committee [see the draft Minutes of the 2008 Executive Committee meeting published immediately following these Minutes].
 4. **REPORT OF THE NOMINATING COMMITTEE.** Past President Ted Cohen presented the Report of the 2006-2008 Nominating Committee, as printed in *Proceedings and Addresses of the APA*, Vol. 80 #4 (February 2008), pp. 163-164. President Sterba noted that the Division's Bylaws allow additional nominations to be added from the floor by any group of ten members present and asked if there were such nominations forthcoming. None were proposed. The list of nominees as prepared by the Nominating Committee is therefore to be sent to mail ballot.
 5. **REPORTS FROM THE BOARD OF OFFICERS, THE NATIONAL OFFICE, AND APA COMMITTEES.**
 6. **RECOGNITION OF GRADUATE STUDENT TRAVEL STIPEND WINNERS.** President Sterba read the names of those who had received Graduate Student Travel Stipend Awards, as printed on pages 5-6 of the *Proceedings and Addresses of the APA*, Vol. 80 #4 (February 2008).
 7. **NEW BUSINESS.** No items were discussed under New Business.
 8. **MEMORIAL.** President Sterba read the names of those members of the Association who had died since the last meeting of the Central Division:
-

R. E. Allen
Russell Blackwood
John Brentlinger
Charles Chastain
Lloyd F. Dean
Albert J. Devereaux
Owen W. Dukelow
Abraham Edel
Gregory W. Fitch
Peter H. Hare
Lloyd Hays
Richard G. Henson
Yeager Hudson
Benjamin Kotkov
Marlies Kronegger
Byron C. Lambert*
Peter Lipton
Eugene D. Mayers
Mary Mothersill (President, Eastern Division, 1998-99)
William O'Connor
Robert J. Pargetter
Betsy Postow
Richard Rorty (President, Eastern Division, 1979-80)
Mary Carman Rose
Fay Horton Sawyer
Robert Solomon
Victor Suchar
Craig Walton

**Byron C. Lambert died in 2004. The APA was notified of his death on March 4, 2008.*

9. **ADJOURNMENT.** The meeting was adjourned at 1:36 p.m.

Respectfully submitted,
Robin Smith, Secretary-Treasurer
APA Central Division

MINUTES OF THE 2008 CENTRAL DIVISION EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE MEETING

AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL ASSOCIATION
CENTRAL DIVISION
DRAFT MINUTES OF THE 2008 EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE MEETING

PALMER HOUSE HILTON HOTEL, CHICAGO, ILLINOIS
CRESTHILL ROOM
APRIL 16, 2008

Present: Members Charlotte Brown, Ted Cohen, Lisa Downing, Marilyn Friedman, Peter van Inwagen, Richard Kraut, Robin Smith, James P. Sterba

1. President James P. Sterba called the meeting to order at 7:06 p.m.
2. Draft minutes of the 2007 meeting, as printed on pp. 151-153 of the February 2008 *APA Proceedings*, were approved as printed.
3. The Agenda for the meeting was approved as proposed.
4. Past President Ted Cohen presented the report of the Nominating Committee, as follows:

For Vice-President and President-Elect:

Mark Kaplan (University of Indiana)

Steven Nadler (University of Wisconsin–Madison)

Sally Sedgwick (University of Illinois–Chicago)

For Member-at-Large of the Executive Committee, term 2008-2011:

Janet Folina (Macalester College)

Cynthia Freeland (University of Houston)

Russ Shafer-Landau (University of Wisconsin–Madison)

For the 2008-2009 Nominating Committee (4 to be elected):

Michael Bergmann (Purdue University)

Sarah Buss (University of Michigan–Ann Arbor)

Ann E. Cudd (University of Kansas)

David Hilbert (University of Illinois–Chicago)

Linda Radzik (Texas A&M University)

Abraham Roth (Ohio State University)

Daniel Sutherland (University of Illinois–Chicago)

Jonathan M. Weinberg (Indiana University)

In discussion, Past President Cohen recounted the process whereby he had come to choose a procedure for voting on candidates within the Nominating Committee. He noted in particular that in recent years, members of two types were largely absent from nominees: those from colleges and those from institutions in the south.

Friedman proposed that the Executive Committee convey the sense of its meeting to the incoming Chair of the Nominating Committee that the Committee's attention be called to the issues of institutional and regional diversity in the process of selecting the nominees for offices. This action was taken by consensus.

5. Secretary-Treasurer Robin Smith reported on the activities of the 2009 Program Committee, chaired by Timothy O'Connor (the members of the Committee are listed on p. 9 of the Meeting Program).

Smith moved that the Executive Committee change the deadline for receipt of submitted papers from July 1 to June 1 to accommodate the change of meeting dates to February. Vice President Peter Van Inwagen seconded. The motion carried.

6. Secretary-Treasurer Robin Smith presented the financial report for 2007-08 and the proposed budget for 2008-09. The report for 2007-08, which is necessarily an estimate since income and expenses for the 2008 meeting will not be known until after the meeting, projects higher reg income than budgeted, lower exhibit income, and a significant increase in audiovisual charges; overall, the projection for the current year is for income \$1,000 above the budget, expenses \$4,500 greater than budgeted.

The proposed budget for 2008-09 assumes income at 2007 levels, with an decrease in exhibit income. Budgeted expenses are decreased because of lower anticipated program committee expenses and a lower budget for audiovisual expenses. Smith called attention to two major items of expense: audiovisual charges from the convention, which came to over \$17,000 in 2007 and are projected as \$10,000 for 2008, and the cost of Graduate Student Travel Stipends, which have increased to \$7,200 for 2008 and, based on the trend observed in all three Divisions, may be expected to continue to increase in the near term. However, Smith noted that the 2008-09 proposed budget included no allowance at all for audiovisual expenses because of the provision of the 2009 meeting contract of an allowance of \$13,000 for these. He also noted that book exhibit expenses and projected expenses for receptions at the annual meeting were each reduced by \$1,000 based on further concessions in the hotel contract.

Finally, Smith provided more detail on the issue of increasing Graduate Student Travel Stipends. These have gone from a mere three stipends in 2000 to 24 in the current year. Currently, all three Divisions

have a policy of providing a travel stipend to any verified graduate student whose paper is accepted for their Divisional program. In 2008, there were 38 stipend recipients at the Pacific Division meeting. One reason for the increase is the adoption of this policy; a further is the great increase in the number of graduate students who submit papers, and thus the number who have papers accepted. The Executive Committee discussed a variety of actions that might be relevant. President Sterba asked whether it would be in order to determine which recipients already had support for travel from their institutions. Lisa Downing said that a policy of awarding stipends only to students who were not receiving such support would likely have the unintended consequence of seeing that support reduced. President Sterba then proposed that the Division seek information on the support available to this year's recipients. By consensus, the Executive Committee instructed the Secretary-Treasurer to (1) write this year's recipients asking them how much travel support their institutions provided, and (2) contact the Secretary-Treasurers of the other two divisions to ask what information they might have, or be able to obtain, about this issue.

7. Secretary-Treasurer Smith presented a proposed budget for 2008-09, projecting an overall surplus of \$8,000 despite decreased projections for book exhibit revenue. The main source of the surplus is the concessions built into the 2009 meeting contract. Divisional Representative Marilyn Friedman and President Sterba noted the absence of an item for support of the PIKSI proposal as in the preceding three years. Smith replied that 2007-08 was the final year of that commitment. However, those members who are also Board members recalled that the PIKSI proposal itself had received funding. After discussion, Friedman moved that the Executive Committee include a reserve item of \$3,250 in the 2008-09 budget to cover this expense if needed. Downing seconded. After discussion, the Executive Committee agreed by consensus to defer action on this motion until 12:00 on Friday, April 18, at which time the meeting would be reconvened.
 8. Secretary-Treasurer Smith presented a proposal from the Eastern Division Executive Committee "to raise meeting registration fees to \$60 for regular members and \$90 for non-members effective in 2010; to waive registration fees for invited speakers from other fields and invited speakers from outside North America; and to review registration fees on a regular basis every five years." He said that this proposal had been approved by the Eastern Division Executive Committee at its 2007 meeting and, with some modification, by the Pacific Division Executive Committee at its 2008 meeting. After lengthy discussion, during which questions were raised requiring information not available at the time, the Executive Committee agreed by consensus that this item is to be included on the agenda for its 2009 meeting and instructed the Secretary-Treasurer to collect additional information concerning it in the interim.
-

9. The Executive Committee approved the agenda for the Business Meeting.
10. Under New Business, Secretary-Treasurer Smith presented a problem concerning a student member who had submitted a paper for the 2008 meeting which was later accepted but had not provided the necessary documentation for a Graduate Student Travel Stipend at that time. The Executive Committee reaffirmed its policy that determination of Graduate Student status for purposes of eligibility for a Stipend lies with the National Office and delegated to the Secretary-Treasurer the authority to resolve the specific issue after further investigation.
11. The meeting adjourned at 9:35 p.m. until 12:00 Noon, Friday, April 18.

Respectfully submitted,
Robin Smith, Secretary-Treasurer
APA Central Division

REPORT OF THE 2008-2009 NOMINATING COMMITTEE

The 2008-2009 Central Division Nominating Committee, composed of James P. Sterba (Chair), Sarah Buss, Ann E. Cudd, David Hilbert, and Linda Radzik, proposes the following nominations for 2009:

FOR VICE-PRESIDENT AND PRESIDENT-ELECT:

Claudia Card (University of Wisconsin–Madison)

Richard Fumerton (University of Iowa)

Charles W. Mills (Northwestern University)

FOR DIVISIONAL REPRESENTATIVE, TERM 2009-2012:

Julia Driver (Washington University in St. Louis)

Gary Ebbs (Indiana University)

Anita Superson (University of Kentucky)

FOR EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE MEMBER-AT-LARGE, TERM 2009-2012:

Jeanine Grenberg (St. Olaf College)

Lynn Joy (University of Notre Dame)

Pat Manfredi (Southern Illinois University–Carbondale)

FOR THE 2009-2010 NOMINATING COMMITTEE (4 TO BE ELECTED):

J. Baird Callicott (University of North Texas)

Lisa Downing (Ohio State University)

Tomis Kapitan (Northern Illinois University)

Gabriel Richarson Lear (University of Chicago)

Jeffrey Roland (Louisiana State University)

David Sussman (University of Illinois–Urbana-Champaign)

Valerie Tiberius (University of Minnesota)

Linda Zagzebski (University of Oklahoma)

The *By-Laws of the Central Division* contain this provision concerning nominations from the floor at the Business Meeting (Article 1.c):

“Upon receipt of the report of the Nominating Committee, additional nominations for the next year’s Nominating Committee, for officers, and members of the Executive Committee, may be made from the floor by any ten members of the Association affiliated with the Central Division.

Before ballots are prepared, the individuals nominated shall be invited by mail to signify their willingness to stand for election. No name shall appear on a ballot unless the individual named has filed a signed statement of willingness to stand for election.”

RESULTS OF THE 2008 CENTRAL DIVISION ELECTIONS

In the May-June 2008 Central Division mail ballot, the following Central Division members were elected to Divisional offices:

- Sally Sedgwick was elected Vice President for 2008-2009 (and thus President for 2009-2010).
- Russ Shafer-Landau was elected Member-at-Large of the Executive Committee for the term 2008-2011.
- Sarah Buss, Ann E. Cudd, David Hilbert, and Linda Radzik were elected to the 2008-2009 Nominating Committee).

LIST OF BOOK EXHIBITORS

A complete list of book exhibitors will be available online (www.apaonline.org) and at the Central Division Meeting.

LIST OF ADVERTISERS

DUKE UNIVERSITY PRESS (A-152)

HARVARD UNIVERSITY PRESS (A-146)

OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS (A-154-155)

PARAGON HOUSE (A-156)

PARMENIDES PUBLISHING (A-151)

PENN STATE PRESS (A-147)

PHILOSOPHY DOCUMENTATION CENTER (A-OUTSIDE BACK COVER)

ROUTLEDGE PUBLISHERS (A-148-150)

SPENCER FOUNDATION (A-INSIDE BACK COVER)

SUNY PRESS (A-INSIDE FRONT COVER)

THE MIT PRESS (A-153)

UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO PRESS (A-144-145)

FORMS

ADVANCE REGISTRATION FORM

HOTEL RESERVATION FORM

RECEPTION TABLE REQUEST FORM

PROGRAM SUGGESTION FORM

CENTRAL 2009

ADVANCE REGISTRATION FORM

FEBRUARY 18 – 21, 2009, THE PALMER HOUSE HILTON, CHICAGO, IL

Fax this form with your credit card payment to Linda Smallbrook (302-831-3372). No cover sheet is needed. Or, if you prefer, mail this form with your payment to Linda Smallbrook, APA, University of Delaware, Newark, DE 19716. Payment must accompany your registration form.

Please print legibly. **This information is used for your name badge.**

Name: _____

Affiliation: _____

Email: _____ Phone: _____

Advance Registration Fees (**Received by January 30, 2009** at the National Office)

- _____ \$10.00 APA Student Members
- _____ \$50.00 APA Regular, International & Emeritus Members
- _____ \$60.00 Nonmembers

We cannot process any advanced registrations at the National Office past the January 30th deadline. After that date you will need to register in Chicago.

Placement Registration

Interviewers should also complete the Placement Registration Form. **Candidates** should check the space below if planning to use the service. Candidates **must** be a member of the APA in order to use the Placement Service. Placement is a free service for all current APA members.

_____ I will be a job candidate.

___ 1) Check* (Payable to APA)

*The APA can only accept checks drawn on a U.S. bank, in U.S. Dollars.

___ 2) Visa MasterCard

Exp. Date

Last 3 digits on back of card

- - -

Name as it appears on Card: _____

Signature of Authorization: _____

Email: _____ Phone #: _____

CENTRAL 2009

RECEPTION TABLE FORM

FEBRUARY 18 – 21, 2009, THE PALMER HOUSE HILTON, CHICAGO, IL

Fax this form with your credit card payment to Linda Smallbrook (302-831-3372). No cover sheet is needed. Or, if you prefer, mail this form with your payment to Linda Smallbrook, APA, University of Delaware, Newark, DE 19716. Payment must accompany your registration form.

IMPORTANT NOTE: ALL TABLE RESERVATIONS MUST BE PAID FOR AT THE TIME OF PLACING THE RESERVATION. WE WILL BE UNABLE TO PROCESS YOUR FORM WITHOUT THE ACCOMPANYING PAYMENT. THANK YOU FOR YOUR UNDERSTANDING.

Receptions are scheduled to be held in the **Red Lacquer Room** on **February 19th** (8:30 p.m. to midnight) and in the **Red Lacquer Room** on **February 20th** (9:00 p.m. to midnight). The first night reception provides beer and soft drinks at no charge. **Admittance is by registration name badge or ticket only.** The second night reception is a cash bar. The charge for a table at both receptions is \$25.00 total. The deadline for receipt of reservations is January 30th. After that time we will still take reservations but your school's name will not appear in the handout.

To reserve a table, please complete the following and return to Linda Smallbrook, APA, University of Delaware, Newark, DE 19716; or fax the form to 302-831-3372.

Name: _____

School/Organization: _____

E-mail address: _____

Please select an option for payment and fill out the form completely if paying by credit card.

___ 1) **Check* (Payable to APA)**

***The APA can only accept checks drawn on a U.S. bank, in U.S. Dollars.**

___ 2) Visa MasterCard Exp. Date

Last 3 digits on back of card

- - -

Name as it appears on Card: _____

Signature of Authorization: _____

Email: _____ Phone #: _____

APA CENTRAL DIVISION PROGRAM SUGGESTION FORM

In order to foster diversity of and participation in the program of the Central Division, the Executive Committee invites submission of the following form:

(1) I would like to hear papers at the Divisional Meetings in the following areas:

(2) I would like to be considered as a Session Chair for papers in one of the following areas:

(3) I would like to be considered as a Paper Commentator for papers in one of the following areas:

To be considered as Commentator or Chair for the 2010 meeting, please submit this form, along with a CV, by August 1, 2009, to:

Margaret Atherton, Chair
2010 APA Central Program Committee
Department of Philosophy - Curtin Hall
University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee
3243 N. Downer Avenue
Milwaukee, WI 53211
atherton@uwm.edu

This form may be reproduced, and suggestions under (1) may be sent to Professor Atherton or to:

Robin Smith, Secretary-Treasurer
APA Central Division
Department of Philosophy
Texas A&M University
College Station, TX 77843-4237
rasmith@tamu.edu

If you would like acknowledgement of receipt of your CV and form, please enclose a stamped, self-addressed postcard.

APA REGISTRATION POLICY

It is the policy of the APA that all persons attending sessions, including those who are participating as speakers, commentators, or session chairs, are required to register for each meeting they attend. In addition, we have always recommended that all participants wear their APA badges during session hours to identify themselves as registered participants. In an effort better to enforce this policy we have begun a system of checking meeting attendees, randomly and anyone whom we suspect might not be registered, for proof of registration. If you are asked to provide proof of registration and are unable to do so, you will be asked to register immediately in order to enable you to attend sessions. Registration fees help subsidize every divisional meeting. Without that income we will be unable to ensure the quality and excellence of our meetings which you have come to expect. We thank you for your continued cooperation.
