The American Philosophical Association
Central Division

One Hundred Seventh Annual Meeting

meeting jointly with

The Association for Symbolic Logic

Palmer House Hilton Hotel
Chicago, IL

February 17 - 20, 2010
Proceedings and Addresses of The American Philosophical Association

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All correspondence should be sent to the APA, 31 Amstel Avenue, University of Delaware, Newark, DE 19716, directed to the appropriate staff member as follows: Erin Shepherd for inquiries and publication copy concerning programs of the Divisional meetings, general issues of the Proceedings, announcements, awards to members, and advertising; Janet Sample for membership information, address changes, and memorial minutes; and the Executive Director for letters to the editor.

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LETTER FROM THE SECRETARY-TREASURER

To All Members of the Association:

You are cordially invited to attend the one hundred seventh Annual Meeting of the Central Division at the Palmer House Hilton Hotel, Chicago, Illinois, February 17-20, 2010. This year’s program committee has organized an extensive array of thirty-one Colloquia, four submitted Symposia, sixteen invited Symposia, two sessions of Invited Papers, and six Author-Meets-Critics sessions. Our program also includes eleven sessions organized by Committees of the APA and over sixty-five affiliated group sessions. This year’s meeting is a joint meeting with the Association for Symbolic Logic (ASL), and five ASL sessions are included in the program. In addition, the Central Division is host to the Carus Lectures (given by Ernest Sosa), and our John Dewey Lecturer is Alasdair MacIntyre.

This issue of the Proceedings contains a complete convention program, including scheduled group meetings. At the back of this issue, you will find a hotel reservation form, a meeting registration form, a form for reserving tables at the receptions, and maps of the hotel’s meeting rooms. Also included are information forms concerning the 2011 meeting and the 2010-2011 Nominating Committee, for your use if you have suggestions for future meetings or wish to offer your services to the Division.

1. HOTEL INFORMATION

Most Central Division members will already be familiar with the Palmer House Hilton, a frequent location of Central (and Western) Division meetings for many decades. The Palmer House is located in the Chicago Loop, a short walk from Symphony Center and the Chicago Art Institute, among many other local attractions.

Hotel reservations should be made directly with the hotel in one of the following ways:

• **Through the Internet:** Use the following URL: http://www.hilton.com/en/hi/groups/personalized/CHIPHHH-AMP-20100216/index.jhtml *Please note that reservations at the special graduate student rate cannot be made through this online link.* Graduate students must instead call the hotel at +1 877-865-5321 or use the printed form.

• **By mail:** Use the form printed in the back of this issue of the Proceedings.

• **By telephone:** Call the Palmer House reservations department directly at +1 877-865-5321. Explain that you are attending the American Philosophical Association meeting. If you are a graduate student member, please
indicate that you want the graduate student rate (NOTE: the National Office staff will confirm the graduate student status of all those requesting the graduate student rate).

To be assured of a room at the special convention rate, you should act promptly. Our convention block of rooms will be maintained by the hotel only until January 17, 2010. After that time, any unused rooms in the block will be released to other guests, and convention registrants may be unable to obtain the special rates or appropriate rooms.

• **Chicago Airports:** Chicago is served by O’Hare International and Chicago Midway airports. Virtually all airlines fly to O’Hare, and many also fly to Midway, which has the advantages of being closer to the Loop and somewhat less crowded.

• **Ground Transportation from O’Hare and Midway:** The most economical way to reach the hotel is the Chicago Transit Authority’s trains (fare $2.25 as of Oct. 2009). From O’Hare, take the CTA Blue Line from the station between Terminals 2 and 3 (follow the signs for “Trains to City”). Get off at the Monroe/Dearborn station and go east on Monroe to the hotel entrance between State and Wabash. Travel time is about 45 minutes, and trains run every ten minutes (with reduced schedules Sunday and late at night). From Midway, the CTA Orange Line runs every ten minutes and will take you to the Loop in about half an hour (get off at the Adams/Wabash stop). There are hotel entrances on the west side of Wabash and on Monroe. For further information, including a map of the downtown area CTA routes and stations, see the Chicago Transit Authority’s web site at http://www.transitchicago.com/

• **Airport shuttle buses** to the loop are (at this writing) $27 one way/$49 round trip from O’Hare, $22 one way/$39 round trip from Midway for a single fare. Pair and group tickets are substantially cheaper (as low as $14 per passenger from O’Hare or $12 from Midway). Buses go directly to Loop hotels, including the Palmer House. Allow an hour from Midway, an hour and a half from O’Hare (time varies considerably, especially with heavy traffic). Buses leave every 10-15 minutes, and return buses leave the Palmer House every half hour from the Monroe Street side. You can make advance reservations at http://www.airportexpress.com/.

• **Taxi fare** is $35-$40 from O’Hare, $25 from Midway. For two or more passengers, flat-rate ride sharing fares are available. Travel time to/from O’Hare ranges from half an hour in light traffic to an hour or more in heavy traffic (on Friday afternoon, it can exceed two hours). If you’re in a hurry, a taxi is usually the fastest way to go except when traffic is at its worst, when the CTA is probably fastest (provided that you are traveling with one very small suitcase).

• **Accessible transportation:** The CTA stations at both Midway and O’Hare are wheelchair-accessible, but not all stations in the Loop area have elevators. The closest Blue Line stop to the Palmer House with an elevator is Jackson, two long blocks from the Palmer House at Jackson and State Streets. In the Loop area, the Orange Line from Midway is on
elevated tracks. The closest elevator-equipped Orange Line station is Van Buren, another long block south of the Jackson station. Call the Elevator Status Hotline at +1 888-968-7282 and press 5 to check for elevator service problems (TTY +1 888-282-8891). All CTA buses have lifts or ramps. Contact the RTA Travel Information Center at +1 312-836-7000 for updated information. Maps and other information are available at http://www.transitchicago.com/maps/accessible.html, and a brochure on accessibility is available at http://www.transitchicago.com/downloads/brochures/ada.pdf (text version http://www.transitchicago.com/welcome/ada.txt).

• **Driving to Chicago:** See http://www1.hilton.com/en_US/hotel/CHIPHHH-The-Palmer-House-Hilton-Illinois/directions.do for maps and driving directions to the Palmer House. Hotel valet parking is $51 per day for hotel guests.

• **Amtrak:** Amtrak trains arrive at Union Station, which is about ten blocks (some long) west on Canal between Adams and Jackson, across the Chicago River. The 151 bus goes to the hotel area (stop at State and Adams). A taxi to the Palmer House is about $10. Consult http://www.amtrak.com for schedules and fares.

### 2. MEETING REGISTRATION

Rates for registration are as follows:

- APA Members $60
- Non-Members $90
- Student members $10

The Central Division rebates $15 of the Member’s and Non-Member’s fee to the APA National Office to support the general costs of the APA. All remaining registration income is used to support the expenses of the meeting and the operations of the Central Division. You may pre-register for the meeting by using the pre-registration information form found at the back of this issue. The deadline for pre-registration is **January 29, 2010**. Payment is accepted by cash, check, or credit card.

Registration includes admission to the reception on Thursday evening; non-registrants who wish to attend this reception may purchase tickets at the Registration Desk, or at the door of the reception, for $10. **Please note that all persons attending the convention are expected to register (this includes invited participants and participants in Group Meetings).**

Registration fees are vital to the conduct of APA conventions, since convention revenues are the only source of income for the Divisions.

### 3. INFORMATION ON SESSION LOCATIONS

Following the procedure begun in all three Divisions in 2008-09, this printed program does not include the rooms in which individual meeting sessions are to be held. Instead, this information will be made available at the meeting itself, in a program supplement that will be distributed at the Registration Desk. The locations of the Registration Desk, Book Exhibits,
Placement Service, Placement Interview Area, Presidential Address, and Receptions are, however, included in the program.

4. Placement Service

The Placement Center will open for business at 5:00 p.m. on Wednesday, February 18, and continue in operation through Noon, Saturday, February 21 (check the Meeting Registration Desk on the sixth floor for information about the locations of Placement Center operations). Job seekers are urged to pre-register for Placement by submitting the pre-registration form provided at the back of this issue. Since many job interviews are pre-arranged on the basis of advertisements in Jobs for Philosophers (JFP), and since the Placement Center will not post notices of positions that have already been advertised in JFP, job seekers are advised to obtain copies of JFP in advance of the meeting and to bring them to the meeting. (JFP is available to APA members upon request, at no extra charge. Requests should be addressed to the APA National Office, University of Delaware, Newark, DE 19716.)

Policy on Interviews in Sleeping Rooms. At its 1994 meeting the APA Board of Officers adopted the policy of prohibiting job interviews in sleeping rooms at Divisional meetings. We ask your cooperation in implementing this policy. Interviews in the living rooms of suites are, of course, permissible under this policy, and interviewing departments may also make use of the Placement Center interview area.

A Placement Ombudsperson, either the Chair or a member of the APA Committee on Academic Career Opportunities and Placement, will be available at the Meeting Registration Desk for anyone encountering problems with the interviewing process.

5. Book Exhibits

The publishers’ book exhibits will be located in the Adams Ballroom on the sixth floor. Exhibits will be open 9:00 a.m.-5:00 p.m. on Thursday and Friday and 9:00 a.m.-Noon on Saturday.

6. Receptions and Reception Tables

The reception on Thursday, February 19, will begin at 8:30 p.m. in the Red Lacquer Room (fourth floor). Complimentary beer and soft drinks are provided at this reception, which is open only to those who have either registered for the convention or purchased special tickets for the reception (available for $10 both at the registration desk and at the door of the reception). The Presidential Reception on Friday, February 20 will begin at 9:00 p.m. Tickets are not required for admission to the Friday reception, and refreshments are available on a cash-bar basis.

Departments and societies are invited to reserve one of the large round tables at the Receptions. These tables will be numbered, and a chart will be posted and distributed at Registration giving the table locations along with an index showing, for each table, who has reserved it. The fee for reserving a table is $25. If you wish to reserve a table, please fill out and
mail the form included in the back pages of this issue of the Proceedings or call or email Ms. Linda Smallbrook at the APA National Office (phone +1 302-831-1113, fax +1 302-831-3372, email lindas@udel.edu). The deadline for making table reservations is January 29, 2010.

7. BUSINESS MEETING

The annual Business Meeting of the Central Division will be held Friday, February 19, at 12:15 p.m. in the Wabash Parlor (third floor). Regular items of business include reports from Divisional and National officers and committees and the nomination of officers for 2010-2011. The 2010 Nominating Committee will present a slate of nominees for the positions of Vice President, Member of the Executive Committee, and the four members of the 2011 Nominating Committee. The Report of the Nominating Committee will be posted in the registration area 24 hours prior to the Business Meeting and is also printed on page 161 of this issue of the Proceedings. Nominations from the floor are also accepted if proposed by a group of ten members. In accordance with Divisional rules, voting for candidates will be by mail ballot.

Draft Minutes of the 2009 Executive Committee Meeting and the 2009 Business Meeting are published in this issue of the Proceedings, pp. 155-158. Members may offer corrections to the Business Meeting Minutes at this year’s Business Meeting.

Please note that only APA members who are affiliates of the Central Division have voting rights at this meeting. The list of regular members that appears in the November issue of the Proceedings is used to determine the list of eligible voters for the three subsequent Divisional meetings. Certification of persons as voting affiliates of the Central Division will take place at the entrance to the Business Meeting itself, for those wishing to attend and vote.

8. PRESIDENTIAL ADDRESS

President Sally Sedgwick will present the 2010 Presidential Address, “Reason and History: Kant versus Hegel,” at 6:00 p.m. on Friday in the Red Lacquer Room. She will be introduced by Claudia Card, Vice President of the Central Division.

9. JOHN DWEY LECTURE

At its 2004 meeting, the Executive Committee of the Central Division accepted a generous offer from the John Dewey Foundation to fund a John Dewey Lecture at each annual meeting. The John Dewey Lecture is given by a prominent and senior American philosopher who is invited to reflect, broadly and in an autobiographical spirit, on philosophy in America. The Central Division is pleased to announce that the 2010 John Dewey Lecture will be given by Alasdair MacIntyre on Thursday, February 18, at 1:45 p.m. (Session I-A). The lecture will be introduced by Paul Weithman. A reception, hosted by the John Dewey Foundation, will follow in the same room.
10. CARUS LECTURES

Ernest Sosa will deliver the three 2010 Carus Lectures at this year’s meeting, as follows:

“Descartes and Virtue Epistemology” (Thursday 12:15 p.m.)
“Armchair Philosophy, with Moore and Wittgenstein” (Friday 1:15 p.m.)
“How Value Matters in Epistemology” (Saturday 11:45 a.m.)

A reception for Professor Sosa will follow the second Carus Lecture on Friday in the same room. Please note that the Carus Lectures are plenary sessions during which no other program events are scheduled.

11. GRADUATE STUDENT TRAVEL STIPEND RECIPIENTS

As in past years, the Central Division Executive Committee awards stipends of $300 each to help defray the travel expenses of graduate students whose papers are accepted for the program. Starting with the 2006 program, the Executive Committee has decided to provide a stipend for every graduate student whose paper is accepted. The Executive and Program Committees are pleased to announce the names of the 17 recipients of stipends for this year:

Nathan Ballantyne (University of Arizona): “Anti-luck Epistemology, Pragmatic Encroachment and the Value of True Belief.” Paper 3 in Session III-J, ‘Epistemology’ (Friday 2:45 p.m.)

Jacob N. Caton (University of Arizona): “Is ‘Justification’ an Ordinary Term?” Paper 2 in Session II-H, ‘Epistemic Justification’ (Friday 9:00 a.m.)


Christopher Freiman (University of Arizona): “The Paradox of Sufficiency.” Paper 2 in Session IV-L, ‘Justice’ (Saturday 8:30 a.m.)

Daniel M. Johnson (Baylor University): “Skepticism and Circular Arguments.” Paper 2 in Session III-J, ‘Epistemology’ (Friday 2:45 p.m.)

Charles B. Kurth (University of California–San Diego): “Fashion Models and Moral Realists.” Symposium Paper in Session IV-F (Saturday 8:30 a.m.)

Kevin McCain (University of Rochester): “Testimonial Knowledge from Lies.” Paper 2 in Session I-G, ‘Testimony’ (Thursday 1:45 p.m.)

Andrew Moon (University of Missouri–Columbia): “The New Evil Demon Problem for Internalism.” Paper 3 in Session II-H, ‘Epistemic Justification’ (Friday 9:00 a.m.)

Dylan Murray (Georgia State University): “Delusion, Assertion, and Mad Belief.” Paper 3 in Session V-J, ‘Delusion, Anti-Expertise, and Transmission Failure’ (Saturday 3:15 p.m.)
Peter Nichols (University of Wisconsin–Madison): “Rethinking the Branch-Line Case: An Objection to Parfit.” Paper 2 in Session I-L, ‘Personal Identity and Free Will’ (Thursday 1:45 p.m.)

Adam Pelser (Baylor University): “Seeing Is Not Believing: A Case for Modifying Reid’s Theory of Perception.” Paper 2 in Session II-I, ‘Perception and Epistemology’ (Friday 9:00 a.m.)


Bradley Rettler (University of Notre Dame): “No Epistemic Norm of Assertion.” Paper 2 in Session IV-K, ‘Epistemology and Language’ (Saturday 8:30 a.m.)

Eric Stencil (University of Wisconsin–Madison): “Arnauld’s Occasionalism.” Paper 1 in Session III-H, ‘Seventeenth Century Philosophy’ (Friday 2:45 p.m.)

Steven Swartzer (University of Nebraska–Lincoln): “Humeanism and Amoralism.” Paper 2 in Session III-K, ‘Value and Desire’ (Friday 2:45 p.m.)

Julie Walsh (University of Western Ontario): “‘Things For Actions’: Locke’s Mistake in ‘Of Power’.” Paper 2 in Session III-H, ‘Seventeenth Century Philosophy’ (Friday 2:45 p.m.)

Jennifer Wang (Rutgers University): “The Dice Problem.” Paper 1 in Session II-L, ‘Modality and Mind’ (Friday 10:00 a.m.)

12. 2011 PROGRAM COMMITTEE

Vice President Claudia Card has appointed the following Program Committee for the 2011 Meeting:

Bill E. Lawson (University of Memphis), Chair
Rod Bertolet (Purdue University)
Stephan Blatti (University of Memphis)
David K. Chan (University of Wisconsin–Stevens Point)
Howard Curzer (Texas Tech University)
Kristie Dotson (Michigan State University)
Carla Fehr (Iowa State University)
Robert Gooding-Williams (University of Chicago)
Charles Mills (Northwestern University)
Tamar Rudavsky (Ohio State University)
Georgette Sinkler (University of Illinois at Chicago)
Robin Smith (Texas A&M University), ex officio
Peter B. M. Vranas (University of Wisconsin–Madison)
13. Call for Papers, 2011

The Program Committee for 2011 invites APA members to submit papers for presentation at the one hundred and eighth annual meeting, to be held in Minneapolis, Minnesota, at the Hilton Minneapolis Hotel, March 30-April 2, 2011. The deadline for submission for the 2011 meeting is June 1, 2010. For additional details on how and where to submit papers for consideration, please see the section on Paper Submission Guidelines later in this issue of the Proceedings.

14. Participation

APA members who wish to be considered for as commentators or session chairs for the 2011 meeting should use the Program Information Form provided later in this issue of the Proceedings. The following resolution of the Central Division, adopted at the 1980 Business Meeting, will be of interest to prospective participants:

“The APA is the sole professional organization that serves and represents all American philosophers. To give better effect to the foregoing statement, the Executive Committee of the Central Division publicly affirms its desire that the composition of its officers, committees, and programs reflect the diversity of its membership in such respects as methodology, problem area, and type of employment or institutional affiliation.”

15. Nominations

The Central Division Executive Committee also invites suggestions from Central Division affiliates about appropriate candidates for Central Division offices. If you would like to propose anyone for consideration, please see the instructions in this issue of the Proceedings.

16. Program Information

The Program of the meeting, including the main sessions organized by the APA and group sessions organized by affiliated groups, forms part of this issue. Abstracts of invited and contributed papers are also included. A limited number of copies of the Program will also be available at registration. A world-wide-web version of the Program is also available at the APA's web site, http://apaonline.org/ (this site also includes pointers to additional sources of information on the Internet about the Chicago area). The web version may be updated periodically, as necessary, to incorporate late changes in the Program.

17. Special Thanks from the Secretary-Treasurer

I wish to acknowledge with gratitude the generous support of the College of Liberal Arts of Texas A&M University for the Central Division office.
On behalf of the Executive and Program Committees, I extend to every member of the American Philosophical Association an invitation to take part in our One Hundred Seventh Annual Meeting.

Robin Smith
Secretary-Treasurer, APA Central Division
CENTRAL DIVISION OFFICERS AND COMMITTEES, 2009-2010

EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE, 2009-2010

President: Sally Sedgwick
Vice President: Claudia Card
Past President: Peter van Inwagen
Divisional Representative: Julia Driver
Secretary-Treasurer: Robin Smith
Term 2007-2010: Richard Kraut
Term 2008-2011: Russ Shafer-Landau
Term 2009-2012: Lynn Joy

PROGRAM COMMITTEE, 2010

Margaret Atherton, Chair
Harry Brighouse
Ben Caplan
Joshua Dever
Cynthia Freeland
Geoffrey A. Gorham
David Hilbert

Nick Huggett
Gabriel Richardson Lear
Sebastian Luft
Wayne D. Riggs
Phyllis Rooney
Robin Smith
David Sussman

NOMINATING COMMITTEE, 2009-2010

Peter van Inwagen, Chair
Lisa Downing
Gabriel Richardson Lear
Valerie Tiberius
Linda Zagzebski
THE AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL ASSOCIATION

CENTRAL DIVISION
ONE HUNDRED SEVENTH
ANNUAL MEETING PROGRAM

FEBRUARY 17-20, 2010
PALMER HOUSE HILTON HOTEL

WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 17

GROUP SESSIONS, WEDNESDAY AFTERNOON/EVENING
(See Group Meeting Program for details)
Session G0: 6:00-10:00 p.m.
G0-1: Great Lakes Mind and Science Consortium

PLACEMENT INTERVIEW AREA
5:00-10:00 p.m., Spire Room (sixth floor)

PLACEMENT SERVICE
5:00-10:00 p.m., Meeting Registration Desk (sixth floor)

REGISTRATION
5:00-10:00 p.m., Meeting Registration Desk (sixth floor)

EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE
7:00-11:00 p.m., Cresthill Room (third floor)

THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 18

BOOK EXHIBITS
9:00 a.m.-5:00 p.m., Adams Ballroom (sixth floor)
GROUP AND COMMITTEE SESSIONS, THURSDAY MORNING
(See Group Meeting Program for details)

Session GI: 9:00 a.m.-Noon
GI-1: Max Scheler Society
GI-2: Philosophy of Time Society
GI-3: Society for the Study of the History of Analytical Philosophy
GI-4: Society for Asian and Comparative Philosophy
GI-5: Midwest Society for Women in Philosophy
GI-6: Society for the Philosophic Study of the Contemporary Visual Arts
GI-7: Society for the Metaphysics of Science
GI-8: American Society for Value Inquiry
GI-9: APA Committee on Academic Career Opportunities and Placement

PLACEMENT INTERVIEW AREA
8:30 a.m.-7:00 p.m., Spire Room (sixth floor)

PLACEMENT SERVICE
8:30 a.m.-7:00 p.m., Meeting Registration Desk (sixth floor)

REGISTRATION
8:30 a.m.-7:00 p.m., Meeting Registration Desk (sixth floor)

GROUP AND COMMITTEE SESSIONS, THURSDAY AFTERNOON/EVENING
(See Group Meeting Program for details)

Session GII: 5:00-7:00 p.m.
GII-1: International Society for Environmental Ethics
GII-2: Josiah Royce Society
GII-3: North American Nietzsche Society
GII-4: Philosophy of Religion Group
GII-5: Radical Philosophy Association
GII-6: Society of Christian Philosophers
GII-7: Joint Session: APA Committee on Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and Transgender People in the Profession and the Society for Lesbian and Gay Philosophy
GII-8: Society for Asian and Comparative Philosophy
GII-9: Søren Kierkegaard Society
GII-10: Society for Philosophy and Public Affairs
GII-11: Society for Business Ethics
Main Program

**GII-12**: Society for the Philosophic Study of the Contemporary Visual Arts

**GII-13**: Society for Realist-Antirealist Discussion

**GII-14**: Bertrand Russell Society

**GII-15**: Committee on Institutional Cooperation

**GII-16**: Association for Symbolic Logic

**Session GIII: 7:15-10:15 p.m.**

**GIII-1**: Adam Smith Society

**GIII-2**: Indiana Philosophical Association

**GIII-3**: History of Early Analytic Philosophy Society

**GIII-4**: Society for the Philosophy of Creativity

**GIII-5**: Society for Philosophy in the Contemporary World

**GIII-6**: Society for the Philosophical Study of Education

**GIII-7**: International Association for Computing and Philosophy

**GIII-8**: American Society for Value Inquiry

**GIII-9**: Society for the Study of Process Philosophies

**GIII-10**: American Society for Philosophy, Counseling, and Psychotherapy

**GIII-11**: Association of Chinese Philosophers in North America

**GIII-12**: Society for Analytical Feminism

**Carus Lecture I**

*12:15-1:30 p.m.*

Chair: Peter Graham (University of California–Riverside)

Speaker: Ernest Sosa (Rutgers University)

“Descartes and Virtue Epistemology”

**I-A. Invited Session: The John Dewey Lecture**

*1:45-4:45 p.m.*

Chair: Paul Weithman (University of Notre Dame)

Speaker: Alasdair MacIntyre (University of Notre Dame)

“On Not Knowing Where You Are Going”

_A reception for Professor MacIntyre will follow the lecture in the same room._

**I-B. Symposium: Epistemology and Epistemic Justice**

*1:45-4:45 p.m.*

Chair: Phyllis Rooney (Oakland University)

Speakers: Nancy Daukas (Guilford College)

(Title to be announced)
Juli Eflin (Ball State University)  
(Title to be announced)  

Heidi Grasswick (Middlebury College)  
“Liberatory Epistemology, Social Epistemology, and the Many Facets of Epistemic Justice”  

Elizabeth Potter (Mills College)  
(Title to be announced)  

I-C. **Symposium: Early Modern Philosophy of Time**  
1:45-4:45 p.m.  
Chair: Geoffrey A. Gorham (Macalester College)  
Speakers: Richard Arthur (McMaster University)  
(Title to be announced)  
Yitzhak Melamed (Johns Hopkins University)  
(Title to be announced)  
Donald L. M. Baxter (University of Connecticut)  
“Hume’s Account of Duration An Empiricist Successor to Descartes”  

I-D. **Author Meets Critics: Denis Dutton, *The Art Instinct: Beauty, Pleasure, and Human Evolution***  
1:45-4:45 p.m.  
Chair: Cynthia Freeland (University of Houston)  
Critics: Mohan Matthen (University of Toronto)  
Robert Richardson (University of Cincinnati)  
William P. Seeley (Franklin and Marshall College)  
Author: Denis Dutton (University of Canterbury, New Zealand)  

I-E. **Author Meets Critics: Michael Thompson, *Life and Action***  
1:45-4:45 p.m.  
Chair: Douglas Lavin (Harvard University)  
Critics: Paul Hurley (Claremont McKenna College)  
Talbot Brewer (University of Virginia)  
Author: Michael Thompson (University of Pittsburgh)  

I-F. **Colloquium: Mereology and Properties**  
1:45-4:45 p.m.  
1:45-2:45 p.m.  
Chair: Alyssa Ney (University of Rochester)  
Speaker: Kelly Trogdon (Lingnan University)  
“Grounding, Border-Sensitivity, and Intrinsicality”  
Commentator: Alexander Skiles (University of Notre Dame)
2:45-3:45 p.m.
   Chair: David Baker (University of Michigan–Ann Arbor)
   Speaker: Charlie Tanksley (University of Virginia)
   “Masses and Extended Simples”
   Commentator: Joshua Spencer (Syracuse University)

3:45-4:45 p.m.
   Chair: Joongol Kim (Western Illinois University)
   Speaker: Salvatore Florio (The Ohio State University)
   “Is Two a Plural Property?”
   Commentator: Thomas J. McKay (Syracuse University)

I-G. Colloquium: Testimony
1:45-4:45 p.m.
1:45-2:45 p.m.
   Chair: Daniel Z. Korman (University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign)
   Speaker: Aaron R. Champene (University of Arkansas)
   “Reductionism, Non-Reductionism and the Infant/Child Objection: A Reply to Lackey”
   Commentator: Jennifer Lackey (Northwestern University)

2:45-3:45 p.m.
   Chair: Daniel S. Breyer (Illinois State University)
   Speaker: Kevin McCain (University of Rochester)
   “Testimonial Knowledge from Lies”
   Graduate Student Travel Stipend Recipient
   Commentator: Benjamin McMyler (Texas A&M University)

3:45-4:45 p.m.
   Chair: Jared G. Bates (Hanover College)
   Speaker: Ben Almassi (University of Washington)
   “Trust in Testimony—Interpersonal and Evidential”
   Commentator: Sanford Goldberg (Northwestern University)

I-H. Colloquium: Philosophy of Mind
1:45-4:45 p.m.
1:45-2:45 p.m.
   Chair: V. Alan White (University of Wisconsin–Manitowoc)
   Speaker: Benedicte Veillet (University of Maryland–College Park)
   “Belief, Re-identification and Fineness of Grain”
   Commentator: Philippe Chuard (SMU)
2:45-3:45 p.m.
Chair: Jessica Wilson (University of Toronto)
Speaker: Barbara G. Montero (City University of New York)
“Russellian Physicalism”
Commentator: Jong-wang Lee (Yeungnam University)

3:45-4:45 p.m.
Chair: Mariam Thalos (University of Utah)
Speaker: Theodore Bach (University of Connecticut)
“Varieties of Simulation-Theory Hybrids”
Commentator: Christopher Gauker (University of Cincinnati)

I-I. Colloquium: Reasons and Well-Being

1:45-4:45 p.m.

1:45-2:45 p.m.
Chair: Daniel M. Haybron (Saint Louis University)
Speaker: Anna Alexandrova (University of Missouri–St. Louis)
“Doing Well in the Circumstances: A Defense of Wellbeing Variantism”
Commentator: Michael Weber (Bowling Green State University)

2:45-3:45 p.m.
Chair: Sigrún Svavarsdóttir (Ohio State University)
Speaker: Tristram McPherson (University of Minnesota–Duluth)
“Against Scanlon on the Metaphysics of Reasons”
Commentator: Mark van Roojen (University of Nebraska–Lincoln)

3:45-4:45 p.m.
Chair: Jason Hanna (Northern Illinois University)
Speaker: Douglas R. Paletta (University of Pennsylvania)
“Against Darwall’s Foundation for Contractualism”
Commentator: Daniel Groll (Carleton College)

I-J. Colloquium: Social Philosophy

1:45-4:45 p.m.

1:45-2:45 p.m.
Chair: Hallie Rose Liberto (University of Wisconsin–Madison)
Speaker: Peter Brian Barry (Saginaw Valley State University)
“Beyond Neutrality: The Liberal Case Against Same-Sex Marriage Prohibitions”
Commentator: Jacob M. Held (University of Central Arkansas)
2:45-3:45 p.m.
Chair: Megan Halterman Zwart (Saint Mary’s College)
Speaker: Andrew Pierce (Loyola University of Chicago)
   “Oppression as Group Harm”
Commentator: Clair Morrissey (University of North Carolina–Chapel Hill)

3:45-4:45 p.m.
Chair: Duston Moore (Indiana University-Purdue University–Fort Wayne)
Speaker: Peter Fristedt (Hofstra University)
   “Understanding across Contexts: A Gadamerian Approach”
Commentator: Diane Michelfelder (Macalester College)

I-K. Colloquium: Nineteenth-Century Philosophy
1:45-2:45 p.m.
Chair: Mark A. Painter (Misericordia University)
Speaker: James A. Dunson (Morehouse College)
   “Hegel’s Revival of Socratic Ignorance”
Commentator: William F. Bristow (University of Wisconsin–Milwaukee)

2:45-3:45 p.m.
Chair: Claudia Schmidt (Marquette University)
Speaker: Kate Padgett Walsh (Iowa State University)
   “Is Hegel an Unwitting Humean?”
Commentator: Theodore George (Texas A&M University)

3:45-4:45 p.m.
Chair: Dale E. Snow (Loyola University Maryland)
Speaker: Nikolaj Zunic (St. Jerome’s University)
   “Schelling and Schopenhauer on the Knowledge of Freedom”
Commentator: Velimir Stojkovski (Marquette University)

I-L. Colloquium: Personal Identity and Free Will
1:45-2:45 p.m.
Chair: Joy E. Laine (Macalester College)
Speaker: William E. Jaworski (Fordham University)
   “Animalism and Personhood”
Commentator: Paul Snowdon (University College London)
2:45-3:45 p.m.
Chair: Anthony J. Rudd (St. Olaf College)
Speaker: Peter Nichols (University of Wisconsin–Madison)
“Rethinking the Branch-Line Case: An Objection to Parfit”

*Graduate Student Travel Stipend Recipient*
Commentator: Marya Schechtman (University of Illinois at Chicago)

3:45-4:45 p.m.
Chair: Timothy O’Connor (Indiana University–Bloomington)
Speaker: James Cain (Oklahoma State University)
“The Kane-Widerker Objection to Frankfurt Examples”

Commentator: Keith D. Wyma (Whitworth University)

**I-M. Session Sponsored by the APA Committee on Public Philosophy: Lawrence Becker on Justice, Reciprocity, and Eudaimonistic Health**

1:45-4:45 p.m.
Introductions: Elizabeth Minnich (Association of American Colleges and Universities)
David Schrader (The American Philosophical Association)

**Panel I:** Stoicism, Property, and Agency
Chair: Paula Gottlieb (University of Wisconsin–Madison)
Speakers:
Paula Gottlieb (University of Wisconsin–Madison)
“Eudaimonism and Healthy Agency”
Margaret Graver (Dartmouth College)
“Emotional Health in the Stoic Tradition”
Wendy Gordon (Boston University School of Law)
“Justice in Copyright’s ‘Derivative Works’ Doctrine: Implications of Locke’s Proviso”

Commentators: Lawrence Becker (Hollins University)
John Partridge (Wheaton College)

**Panel II:** Justice, Habilitation, and Health Care
Chair: Peter Vallentyne (University of Missouri–Columbia)
Speakers:
“Becker on Justice and Health”
Anita Silvers (San Francisco State University)
“Becker on Reciprocity and the Tough Crowd”
Leslie Pickering Francis (University of Utah)
“Health, Agency, and Disability”
Elizabeth Fenton (Harvard University)  
“Robustly Healthy Agency as Public Policy”

Commentators: Lawrence Becker (Hollins University)  
Michael Gettings (Hollins University)

I-O. Association for Symbolic Logic  
1:45-4:45 p.m.

**Topic:** Continuity and Infinitesimals  
Chair: James Joyce (University of Michigan–Ann Arbor)  
Speakers: Kenneth Easwaran (University of Southern California)  
“Regularity and Infinitesimal Credences”  
Philip Ehrlich (Ohio University)  
“The Absolute Arithmetic Continuum and the Unification of All Numbers Great and Small”  
David Ross (University of Hawaii)  
“Nonstandard Probability”

**Reception**  
8:30 p.m.-Midnight, Red Lacquer Room (fourth floor)

**Friday, February 19**

**Book Exhibits**  
9:00 a.m.-5:00 p.m., Adams Ballroom (sixth floor)

**Placement Interview Area**  
8:30 a.m.-5:00 p.m., Spire Room (sixth floor)

**Placement Service**  
8:30 a.m.-5:00 p.m., Meeting Registration Desk (sixth floor)

**Registration**  
8:30 a.m.-5:00 p.m., Meeting Registration Desk (sixth floor)

II-A. Symposium: Notions of Context  
9:00 a.m.-Noon  
Chair: Peter Ludlow (University of Michigan–Ann Arbor)  
Speakers: Robert Stalnaker (Massachusetts Institute of Technology)  
Nathan Salmon (University of California–Santa Barbara)  
Commentator: Stephen Neale (CUNY Graduate Center)
II-B. Symposium: Ethics in German Idealism
9:00 a.m.-Noon
Chair: Sebastian Luft (Marquette University)
Speakers: Frederick Neuhouser (Barnard College, Columbia University)
“The Normative Significance of ‘Nature’ in Rousseau’s Moral Philosophy”
Eric E. Wilson (Loyola College–Maryland)
“Autonomy Is Its Own Reward: Self-Satisfaction in Kant’s Ethics”
Daniel Breazeale (University of Kentucky)
“In Defense of Fichte’s ‘Moral Fanaticism’”

II-C. Symposium: Ontology of Music
9:00 a.m.-Noon
Chair: Lee Brown (Ohio State University)
Speakers: Franklin Bruno (Independent Scholar)
Carl Matheson (University of Manitoba)
Guy Rohrbaugh (Auburn University)

II-D. Symposium: Newtonian Metaphysics
9:00 a.m.-Noon
Chair: Zvi Biener (Western Michigan University)
Speakers: Lisa Downing (Ohio State University)
(Title to be announced)
James McGuire (University of Pittsburgh) and Edward Slowik (Winona State University)
“Newton’s Ontology of Omnipresence and Infinite Space”
Eric Schliesser (Leiden University)
“Newton’s Challenge to Philosophy: A Programmatic Essay”
Commentator: Andrew Janiak (Duke University)

II-E. Invited Session: Stoic Ethics
9:00 a.m.-Noon
Chair: Gabriel Richardson Lear (University of Chicago)
Speaker: Jacob Klein (Colgate University)
“Two Accounts of Stoic Oikeiôsis”
Commentator: Martha Nussbaum (University of Chicago)
Speaker: Brian Johnson (Fordham University)
“An Interpretive Problem in Epictetus’ Role Theory”
Commentator: Gretchen Reydams-Schils (University of Notre Dame)
II-F. **Submitted Symposium: Against Credibility**

9:00 a.m.-Noon

Chair: Edward S. Hinchman (University of Wisconsin–Milwaukee)

Speaker: Joseph H. Shieber (Lafayette College)

Commentators: Peter Graham (University of California–Riverside)  
Elizabeth Fricker (Oxford University)

II-G. **Colloquium: Responsibility and Intention**

9:00 a.m.-Noon

9:00-10:00 a.m.

Chair: Gabriel Mendlow (Yale University)

Speaker: Michael Tiboris (University of California–San Diego)  
“Luck, Wholeheartedness, and Punishing Failed Criminal Attempts”

Commentator: Hanoch Sheinman (Rice University)

10:00-11:00 a.m.

Chair: Diane Jeske (University of Iowa)

Speaker: Howard L. M. Nye (University of Alberta)  
“Quinn’s Interpretation of Double Effect: Problems and Prospects”

Commentator: Anton Ford (University of Chicago)

11:00 a.m.-Noon

Chair: Elizabeth Foreman (Saint Louis University)

Speaker: Kyla Ebels Duggan (Northwestern University)  
“Taking Responsibility”

Commentator: Angela M. Smith (Washington and Lee University)

II-H. **Colloquium: Epistemic Justification**

9:00 a.m.-Noon

9:00-10:00 a.m.

Chair: Janet Kourany (University of Notre Dame)

Speaker: Clayton M. Littlejohn (University of Texas–San Antonio)  
“What Good Is Justification?”

Commentator: Dorit Ganson (Oberlin College)

10:00-11:00 a.m.

Chair: Joshua Alexander (Siena College)

Speaker: Jacob N. Caton (University of Arizona)  
“Is ‘Justification’ an Ordinary Term?”

*Graduate Student Travel Stipend Recipient*

Commentator: Jennifer Nagel (University of Toronto)
11:00 a.m.-Noon
Chair: Catherine Z. Elgin (Harvard Graduate School of Education)
Speaker: Andrew Moon (University of Missouri–Columbia) 
“The New Evil Demon Problem for Internalism”

Graduate Student Travel Stipend Recipient
Commentator: Matthias Steup (Purdue University)

II-I. Colloquium: Perception and Epistemology
9:00 a.m.-Noon

9:00-10:00 a.m.
Chair: G. Michael Watkins (Auburn University)
Speaker: René Jagnow (University of Georgia)
“Why Perspective Is Not an Epistemic Relation”
Commentator: Robert W. Schroer (Arkansas State University)

10:00-11:00 a.m.
Chair: John Whipple (University of Illinois–Chicago)
Speaker: Adam Pelser (Baylor University)
“Seeing Is Not Believing: A Case for Modifying Reid’s Theory of Perception”
Graduate Student Travel Stipend Recipient
Commentator: Seishu Nishimura (Shiga University, Japan)

11:00 a.m.-Noon
Chair: Nathan King (University of Notre Dame)
Speaker: Chris Tucker (University of Notre Dame)
“Is Phenomenal Conservatism Too Permissive?”
Commentator: Gerald Vision (Temple University)

II-J. Colloquium: American Philosophy
9:00 a.m.-Noon

9:00-10:00 a.m.
Chair: Tracy A. Edwards (Independent Scholar)
Speaker: Andrew F. Smith (Illinois State University)
“On the Epistemic Incentive to Deliberate Publicly”
Commentator: Dasha Polzik (University of Chicago)

10:00-11:00 a.m.
Chair: Russell Goodman (University of New Mexico)
Speakers: Robert B. Talisse (Vanderbilt University) and Scott F. Aikin (Vanderbilt University)
“Three Challenges to Jamesian Ethics”
Commentator: Harvey Cormier (SUNY at Stony Brook)
11:00 a.m.-Noon
Chair: Anne Eaton (University of Illinois at Chicago)
Speaker: Joseph Swenson (University of Illinois–Urbana-Champaign)
“Experience in Context: Dewey on Aesthetic Appreciation”
Commentator: Gary Iseminger (Carleton College)

II-K. Colloquium: Political Philosophy
9:00 a.m.-Noon

9:00-10:00 a.m.
Chair: Anthony S. Laden (University of Illinois at Chicago)
Speaker: Jonathan F. Garthoff (Northwestern University)
“The First Virtue and the Realistic Utopia”
Commentator: Jaime Ahlberg (University of Wisconsin–Madison)

10:00-11:00 a.m.
Chair: Grant Sterling (Eastern Illinois University)
Speaker: Keith D. Hyams (University of Exeter)
“Consent, Liberalism, and Multiculturalism”
Commentator: Matt Waldren (University of Wisconsin–Madison)

11:00 a.m.-Noon
Chair: Harry Brighouse (University of Wisconsin–Madison)
Speaker: Margaret A. Watkins (Saint Vincent College)
“Beyond Undistinguishing Judgments: The Positive Resources of Hume’s ‘Of National Characters’”
Commentator: Holly Kantin (University of Wisconsin–Madison)

II-L. Colloquium: Modality and Mind
10:00 a.m.-Noon

10:00-11:00 a.m.
Chair: Stephanie Lewis (Municipal Capital Management, LLC)
Speaker: Jennifer Wang (Rutgers University)
“The Dice Problem”

Graduate Student Travel Stipend Recipient
Commentator: Sam Cowling (University of Massachusetts–Amherst)

11:00 a.m.-Noon
Chair: L. Nathan Oaklander (University of Michigan–Flint)
Speaker: Ryan Byerly (Baylor University)
“Ersatzer Presentism and Modal Sentences about Times”
Commentator: Adam C. Podlaskowski (Fairmont State University)
II-M. Session Sponsored by the APA Committee on the Teaching of Philosophy: Engaging with New Technologies

9:00 a.m.-Noon
Chair: Brian Ribeiro (University of Tennessee–Chattanooga)
Speakers:
- John Immerwahr (Villanova University)
  “Using Audience Response Devices (Clickers) in Philosophy Classes: A Hands-On Demonstration!”
- Christopher P. Long (Pennsylvania State University)
  “Blogging the Philosophical Life”
- Peter Bradley (McDaniel College)
  “Textbooks on Facebook: Social Networking and Information”
- Nancy Slonneger Hancock (Northern Kentucky University)
  “The Wiki Way: Supporting Collaboration and Dialogue through a Wiki Site”

II-N. Session Sponsored by the APA Committee on Philosophy and Computers: The Jon Barwise Prize

9:00 a.m.-Noon
Chair: Michael Byron (Kent State University)
Speaker: Terrell Ward Bynum (Southern Connecticut State University)
  “Philosophy and the Information Revolution”

II-O. Session Sponsored by the APA Committee on Philosophy in Two-Year Colleges: Credentials, Qualifications, and Instruction in Two-Year Colleges

9:00 a.m.-Noon
Chair: Bill Hartmann (St. Louis Community College–Forest Park)
Panelists:
- Thomas Urban (Houston Community College)
- Brian J. Huschle (Northland Community and Technical College)
- Donna Werner (St. Louis Community College–Meramec)

GROUP AND COMMITTEE SESSIONS, FRIDAY AFTERNOON/EVENING

(See Group Meeting Program for details)

GIV-0: Society of Christian Philosophers (2:30-4:30 p.m.)

Session GIV: 7:15-10:15 p.m.

GIV-1: Max Scheler Society
GIV-2: Association for Informal Logic and Critical Thinking
GIV-3: Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy
GIV-4: Society for Philosophy in the Contemporary World
GIV-5: Association for Symbolic Logic
GIV-6: Society for the Philosophical Study of Education
GIV-7: North American Kant Society
GIV-8: American Association of Philosophy Teachers
GIV-9: Association of Chinese Philosophers in North America
GIV-10: Association for the Development of Philosophy Teaching
GIV-11: North American Spinoza Society
GIV-12: North American Society for Social Philosophy

**Business Meeting**

12:15-1:15 p.m., Wabash Parlor (third floor)

**Carus Lecture II**

1:15-2:30 p.m.

Chair: Peter Graham (University of California–Riverside)
Speaker: Ernest Sosa (Rutgers University)
“Armchair Philosophy, with Moore and Wittgenstein”

*There will be a reception following the lecture in the same room.*

**III-A. Symposium: The A Priori in Physical Theory**

2:45-5:45 p.m.

Chair: David Malament (University of California–Irvine)
Speakers: Michael Friedman (Stanford University)
          Gordon Belot (University of Michigan–Ann Arbor)
          Robert DiSalle (University of Western Ontario)

**III-B. Symposium: Bringing Phenomenology into Cognitive Science and Philosophy of Mind**

2:45-5:45 p.m.

Chair: Cristina Lafont (Northwestern University)
Speakers: Alva Noë (University of California–Berkeley)
          Donn Welton (SUNY Stony Brook)
          Sean D. Kelly (Harvard University)

**III-C. Symposium: Justice in the Distribution of Higher Education**

2:45-5:45 p.m.

Chair: Janet Levin (University of Southern California)
Speakers: Richard J. Arneson (University of California–San Diego)  
Michael McPherson (Spencer Foundation)  
Matthew Smith (Spencer Foundation)  
Stuart White (Oxford University)

III-D. Symposium: Self-Trust  
2:45-5:45 p.m.  
Chair: Claudia Card (University of Wisconsin–Madison)  
Speakers: Linda Zagzebski (University of Oklahoma)  
Miranda Fricker (University of London)  
Karen Jones (University of Melbourne)

III-E. Invited Session: Plato and Aristotle on Desire  
2:45-5:45 p.m.  
Chair: David Ebrey (Northwestern University)  
Speaker: Verity Harte (Yale University)  
“Desire and the Soul: Plato, *Philebus* 35cd”  
Commentator: Sean Kelsey (University of Notre Dame)  
Speaker: Hendrik Lorenz (Princeton University)  
“Aristotle’s Analysis of Uncontrolled Action”  
Commentator: Agnes Gellen Callard (University of Chicago)

III-F. Submitted Symposium: Subject Sensitive Invariantism and the Knowledge View of Assertion  
2:45-5:45 p.m.  
Chair: Jason Bridges (University of Chicago)  
Speaker: Mylan Engel (Northern Illinois University)  
Commentators: Matthew McGrath (University of Missouri–Columbia)  
Jonathan L. Kvanvig (Baylor University)

III-G. Colloquium: Propositions  
2:45-5:45 p.m.  
2:45-3:45 p.m.  
Chair: Michael Rea (University of Notre Dame)  
Speakers: Chris Tillman (University of Manitoba) and Gregory Fowler (University of Rochester)  
“Propositions and Parthood: The Universe and Anti-Symmetry”  
Commentator: Cody S. Gilmore (University of California–Davis)  
3:45-4:45 p.m.  
Chair: Gillian Russell (Washington University in St. Louis)
Speaker: Joshua Rasmussen (University of Notre Dame)
“Propositions Are Not on Paper, in Your Brain, or Anywhere Else”
Commentator: Mark Heller (Syracuse University)

4:45-5:45 p.m.
Chair: Peter W. Hanks (University of Minnesota–Twin Cities)
Speaker: Michael W. McGlone (University at Buffalo)
“Propositional Structure and Truth Conditions”
Commentator: Jeffrey Speaks (University of Notre Dame)

### III-H. Colloquium: Seventeenth Century Philosophy

2:45-5:45 p.m.

2:45-3:45 p.m.
Chair: Steven Nadler (University of Wisconsin)
Speaker: Eric Stencil (University of Wisconsin–Madison)
“Arnauld’s Occasionalism”

*Graduate Student Travel Stipend Recipient*
Commentator: Tad M. Schmaltz (Duke University)

3:45-4:45 p.m.
Chair: Shelley E. Weinberg (University of Toronto)
Speaker: Julie Walsh (University of Western Ontario)
“‘Things For Actions’: Locke’s Mistake in ‘Of Power’”

*Graduate Student Travel Stipend Recipient*
Commentator: Matthew Stuart (Bowdoin College)

4:45-5:45 p.m.
Chair: Timothy Crockett (Marquette University)
Speaker: Joel D. Velasco (Stanford University)
“Mathematics and Leibnizian Necessity”
Commentator: Katherine Dunlop (Brown University)

### III-I. Colloquium: Kant’s Moral Philosophy

2:45-5:45 p.m.

2:45-3:45 p.m.
Chair: Andrea Westlund (University of Wisconsin–Milwaukee)
Speaker: Oliver Sensen (Tulane University)
“Kant’s Conception of Inner Value”
Commentator: Mary Clayton Coleman (Illinois Wesleyan University)
3:45-4:45 p.m.
Chair: Helga Varden (University of Illinois–Urbana-Champaign)
Speaker: Melissa Seymour Fahmy (University of Georgia)
“Kant's Duty of Respect for Other Human Beings: Ends in Themselves as Well as Ends for Others”
Commentator: Ernesto Garcia (University of Massachusetts)

4:45-5:45 p.m.
Chair: Lara Denis (Agnes Scott College)
Speaker: Michael Byron (Kent State University)
“Kantian Supererogation”
Commentator: Krista K. Thomason (Lamar University)

III-J. Colloquium: Epistemology
2:45-5:45 p.m.

2:45-3:45 p.m.
Chair: W. Jay Wood (Wheaton College)
Speaker: Scott Hagaman (University of Notre Dame)
“Have Mentalism and Evidentialism Been Refuted?”
Commentator: Earl Conee (University of Rochester)

3:45-4:45 p.m.
Chair: Richard Fumerton (University of Iowa)
Speaker: Daniel M. Johnson (Baylor University)
“Skepticism and Circular Arguments”

Graduate Student Travel Stipend Recipient
Commentator: Baron Reed (Northwestern University)

4:45-5:45 p.m.
Chair: Linda Martín Alcoff (Hunter College/CUNY Graduate Center)
Speaker: Nathan Ballantyne (University of Arizona)
“Anti-luck Epistemology, Pragmatic Encroachment and the Value of True Belief”

Graduate Student Travel Stipend Recipient
Commentator: E. J. Coffman (University of Tennessee)

III-K. Colloquium: Value and Desire
2:45-5:45 p.m.

2:45-3:45 p.m.
Chair: Jeff McMahan (Rutgers University)
Speaker: Stephan Blatti (University of Memphis)
“Death, Priorism, and Deprivation Harm”
Commentator: Steven Luper (Trinity University)
3:45-4:45 p.m.

Graduate Student Travel Stipend Recipient

Chair: Miren Boehm (University of Wisconsin–Milwaukee)
Speaker: Steven Swartzer (University of Nebraska–Lincoln)
“Humeanism and Amoralism”
Commentator: Melissa Barry (Williams College)

4:45-5:45 p.m.
Chair: Patrizia Pedrini (University of Florence)
Speaker: Leonard A. Kahn (U.S. Air Force Academy)
“Conflict, Regret, and Morality”
Commentator: Patricia A. Marino (University of Waterloo)

III-L. Colloquium: Philosophical Traditions

2:45-5:45 p.m.
2:45-3:45 p.m.
Chair: Noel S. Adams (Marquette University)
Speaker: Mark Piper (James Madison University)
“Is a Theism-Friendly Moderate Skeptical Theism Philosophically Defensible?”
Commentator: Charles Taliaferro (Saint Olaf College)
3:45-4:45 p.m.
Chair: Marianne Janack (Hamilton College)
Speaker: Tadeusz Szubka (Szczecin University)
“Rorty on Analytic Philosophy: The Radical Break or Partial Continuity?”
Commentator: Brian Leiter (University of Chicago)
4:45-5:45 p.m.
Chair: Curtis Carter (Marquette University)
Speaker: Stephen D. Snyder (Fatih University, Istanbul)
“Anticipation in Danto’s Narrative Notion of History: The Case of We Got It!”
Commentator: Mark Rollins (Washington University in St. Louis)

III-M. Session Sponsored by the APA Committee on the Status of Women: Current Work in Continental Feminism

2:45-5:45 p.m.
Chair: Nancy J. Holland (Hamline University)
Speakers: Silvia Stoller (University of Vienna/University of Oregon)
Namita Goswami (DePaul University)
“De-Liberating Traditions: The Female Body of Sati and Slavery”
Robin Schott (Danish Institute for International Studies and School of Education, Aarhus University)
“Pain and Abjection in a Narrative of War Rape”

III-N. Association for Symbolic Logic
2:45-5:45 p.m.

Topic: Causality
Chair: Philip Ehrlich (Ohio State University)
Speakers: Christopher Hitchcock (California Institute of Technology)
“Causation and Defaults”
Peter Spirtes (Carnegie Mellon University)
“Causation and Search”
Judea Pearl (University of California–Los Angeles)
“In Defense of Monotheistic Causation”

PRESIDENTIAL ADDRESS
6:00-7:00 p.m., Red Lacquer Room (fourth floor)
Introduction: Claudia Card
Speaker: Sally Sedgwick
“Reason and History: Kant versus Hegel”

PRESIDENTIAL RECEPTION
9:00 p.m.-Midnight, Red Lacquer Room (fourth floor)

SATURDAY, FEBRUARY 20

BOOK EXHIBITS
9:00 a.m.-Noon, Adams Ballroom (sixth floor)

PLACEMENT INTERVIEW AREA
8:30-11:00 a.m., Spire Room (sixth floor)

PLACEMENT SERVICE
8:30 a.m.-Noon, Meeting Registration Desk (sixth floor)

REGISTRATION
8:30 a.m.-Noon, Meeting Registration Desk (sixth floor)

GROUP AND COMMITTEE SESSIONS, SATURDAY MORNING
(See Group Meeting Program for details)
GV-0: Journal of the History of Philosophy (10:00 a.m.-3:00 p.m.)
IV-A. Symposium: Feminist Philosophy and the Tradition  
8:30-11:30 a.m.  
Chair: Candace Vogler (University of Chicago)  
Speakers: Sharon Crasnow (Riverside Community College–Norco Campus)  
          Ann E. Cudd (University of Kansas)  
          Anita Superson (University of Kentucky)  

IV-B. Symposium: Perceptual Constancies  
8:30-11:30 a.m.  
Chair: David Hilbert (University of Illinois at Chicago)  
Speakers: Gary Hatfield (University of Pennsylvania)  
          Alan Gilchrist (Rutgers University–Newark)  
Commentator: Robert Schwartz (University of Wisconsin–Milwaukee)  

IV-C. Symposium: Kant’s Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View  
8:30-11:30 a.m.  
Chair: Tamra Frei (Michigan State University)  
Speakers: Robert B. Louden (University of Southern Maine)  
          “National Character via the Beautiful and Sublime?”  
          Patrick Kain (Purdue University)  
          (Title to be announced)  
Commentator: Jeanine M. Grenberg (St. Olaf College)  

IV-D. Symposium: Mereology  
8:30-11:30 a.m.  
Chair: David Sanson (Ohio State University)  
Speakers: Paul Hovda (Reed College)  
          Gabriel Uzquiano (Oxford University)  
Commentator: Ali Kazmi (University of Calgary)  

IV-E. Author Meets Critics: Paul Woodruff, The Necessity of Theater: The Art of Watching and Being Watched  
8:30-11:30 a.m.  
Chair: James Hamilton (Kansas State University)  
Critics: Angela Curran (Carleton College)  
          Susan L. Feagin (Temple University)  
          David Hills (Stanford University)  
Author: Paul Woodruff (University of Texas–Austin)
IV-F. **Submitted Symposium: Fashion Models and Moral Realists**

8:30-11:30 a.m.

Chair: Daniel Milsky (Northeastern Illinois University)
Speaker: Charles B. Kurth (University of California–San Diego)

Commentators: Paul Bloomfield (University of Connecticut)
Howard L. M. Nye (University of Alberta)

IV-G. **Colloquium: Philosophy of Science**

8:30-11:30 a.m.

8:30-9:30 a.m.

Chair: Nick Huggett (University of Illinois at Chicago)
Speaker: Alan C. Love (University of Minnesota–Twin Cities)
“Sciences without Theories?”

Commentator: Michael Liston (University of Wisconsin–Milwaukee)

9:30-10:30 a.m.

Chair: Laura Ruetsche (University of Michigan)
Speaker: Melinda B. Fagan (Rice University)
“Is There Collective Scientific Knowledge?”

Commentator: Carolyn Brighouse (Occidental College)

10:30-11:30 a.m.

Chair: Walter Edelberg (University of Illinois at Chicago)
Speaker: David W. Harker (East Tennessee State University)

Commentator: Jonathan Weisberg (University of Toronto)

IV-H. **Colloquium: Metaphysics of Causation**

9:30-11:30 a.m.

9:30-10:30 a.m.

Chair: Jonathan D. Jacobs (Saint Louis University)
Speaker: Michael W. Rota (University of St. Thomas)
“Causal Powers and Final Causes”

Commentator: James Harrington (Loyola University Chicago)

10:30-11:30 a.m.

Chair: Katherine Brading (University of Notre Dame)
Speaker: Matthew C. Haug (College of William and Mary)
“Causal Theories of Properties and Contingency Intuitions”

Commentator: Robert Rupert (University of Colorado–Boulder)
IV-I. Colloquium: Plato’s Republic
8:30-11:30 a.m.

8:30-9:30 a.m.
Chair: Franco V. Trivigno (Marquette University)
Speaker: Mason Marshall (Pepperdine University)
“The Straussian Reading of Plato’s Republic”
Commentator: Zena Hitz (University of Maryland, Baltimore County)

9:30-10:30 a.m.
Chair: Joseph Karbowski (University of Notre Dame)
Speaker: Anna M. Greco (University of Toronto at Mississauga)
“Having One’s Own and Distributive Justice in Plato’s Republic”
Commentator: Rachel Singpurwalla (University of Maryland)

10:30-11:30 a.m.
Chair: Constance Meinwald (University of Illinois at Chicago)
Speaker: Elizabeth J. Jelinek (Vanderbilt University)
“Plato and Practical Wisdom”
Commentator: Charles M. Young (Claremont Graduate University)

IV-J. Colloquium: Philosophy of Language
8:30-11:30 a.m.

8:30-9:30 a.m.
Chair: Roy T. Cook (University of Minnesota)
Speaker: Bryan Pickel (University of Texas–Austin)
“Generalizing Soames’s Argument against Rigidified Descriptivism”
Commentator: Michael Nelson (University of California–Riverside)

9:30-10:30 a.m.
Chair: David Sosa (University of Texas–Austin)
Speaker: Yu Izumi (University of Maryland–College Park)
“Rigidity and Proper Names: Descriptivism with World Pronouns”
Commentator: Fabrizio Cariani (Northwestern University)

10:30-11:30 a.m.
Chair: Timothy McCarthy (University of Illinois–Urbana-Champaign)
Speaker: Peter B. M. Vranas (University of Wisconsin–Madison)
“In Defense of Imperative Inference”
Commentator: Mitchell S. Green (University of Virginia)
**IV-K. Colloquium: Epistemology and Language**

*9:30-11:30 a.m.*

*9:30-10:30 a.m.*

Chair: Luca Ferrero (University of Wisconsin–Milwaukee)  
Speaker: Bradley Rettler (University of Notre Dame)  
"No Epistemic Norm of Assertion"  

*Graduate Student Travel Stipend Recipient*  
Commentator: Ishani Maitra (Rutgers University)

*10:30-11:30 a.m.*

Chair: Marian David (University of Notre Dame)  
Speaker: Ted S. Parent (University of North Carolina–Chapel Hill)  
"What the Externalist Cannot Know A Priori"  

Commentator: Derek Ball (St. Andrews University)

**IV-L. Colloquium: Justice**

*8:30-11:30 a.m.*

*8:30-9:30 a.m.*

Chair: Jonathan Trerise (Florida International University)  
Speaker: Chrisoula Andreou (University of Utah)  
"Add to Cart? Environmental ‘Amenities’ and Cost-Benefit Analysis"  

Commentator: Dale Murray (University of Wisconsin–Baraboo/Sauk County, University of Wisconsin–Richland)

*9:30-10:30 a.m.*

Chair: Raja Halwani (School of the Art Institute of Chicago)  
Speaker: Christopher Freiman (University of Arizona)  
"The Paradox of Sufficiency"  

*Graduate Student Travel Stipend Recipient*  
Commentator: Matt Ferkany (Michigan State University)

*10:30-11:30 a.m.*

Chair: Michael Titlebaum (University of Wisconsin–Madison)  
Speaker: Mark C. Navin (Oakland University)  
"Luck, Democracy, and Distributive Justice"  

Commentator: Simon Cushing (University of Michigan–Flint)
IV-M. Session Sponsored by the APA Committee on Philosophy and Computers: Machines, Intentionality, Ethics, and Cognition
8:30-11:30 a.m.
Chair: Piotr Boltuc (University of Illinois–Springfield)
Speakers: David L. Anderson (Illinois State University)
“Why Intentional Machines Must Be Moral Agents (or at Least Moral Patients)”
Keith Miller (University of Illinois–Springfield)
“Truth in Advertising, or Disrespecting Robot Autonomy”
Thomas W. Polger (University of Cincinnati)
“Distributed Computation and Extended Cognition”
Ricardo Sanz (Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona)
“Closing Comments”

IV-N. Session Sponsored by the APA Committee on Philosophy and Medicine: Rethinking the Ethics of Vital Organ Transplantation
8:30-11:30 a.m.
Chair: James Lindeman Nelson (Michigan State University)
Speakers: Franklin Miller (National Institutes of Health)
Robert Truog (Harvard University)
Commentators: Daniel Brudney (University of Chicago)
Joan McGregor (Arizona State University)

IV-O. Session Sponsored by the APA Committee on the Status of Asian and Asian-American Philosophers and Philosophies: Author Meets Critics: Falguni A. Sheth, Toward a Political Philosophy of Race
8:30-11:30 a.m.
Chair: Kyoo Lee (John Jay College and the Graduate Center–City University of New York)
Critics: Charles Mills (Northwestern University)
Namita Goswami (DePaul University)
Author: Falguni A. Sheth (Hampshire College)

Carus Lecture III
11:45 a.m.-12:45 p.m.
Chair: Peter Graham (University of California–Riverside)
Speaker: Ernest Sosa (Rutgers University)
“How Value Matters in Epistemology”
Saturday Afternoon/Evening, February 20

Group and Committee Sessions, Saturday Afternoon/Evening

(See Group Meeting Program for details)

Session GV: 1:00-3:00 p.m.
GV-1: International Association for the Philosophy of Sport
GV-2: North American Nietzsche Society
GV-3: Radical Philosophy Association
GV-4: Society for the Advancement of American Philosophy
GV-5: Society for the Study of Indian and Tibetan Buddhist Philosophy
GV-6: Personalist Discussion Group
GV-7: Concerned Philosophers for Peace
GV-8: Society for the Philosophical Study of Marxism
GV-9: Association for Symbolic Logic
GV-10: Hume Society
GV-11: International Society for Environmental Ethics
GV-12: Association for the Development of Philosophy Teaching

V-A. Symposium: Ideal Theory and Non-Ideal Theory in Political Philosophy
3:15-6:15 p.m.
Chair: James P. Sterba (University of Notre Dame)
Speakers: Charles Mills (Northwestern University)
          Zofia Stemplowska (University of Manchester)
          David Estlund (Brown University)

V-B. Symposium: Ontological Levels
3:15-6:15 p.m.
Chair: Paul Audi (University of Nebraska–Omaha)
Speakers: Carl Gillett (Northern Illinois University)
          “Making Sense of Levels in the Sciences”
          John Heil (Washington University in St. Louis)
          “Levels of Being”
Commentator: Colin Klein (University of Illinois at Chicago)

V-C. Author Meets Critics: Valerie Tiberius, The Reflective Life: Living Wisely within Our Limits
3:15-6:15 p.m.
Chair: Jason R. Kawall (Colgate University)
Critics: Julia Driver (Washington University in St. Louis)
         Peter Railton (University of Michigan)
Jesse J. Prinz (CUNY Graduate Center)
Author: Valerie Tiberius (University of Minnesota)

V-D. **Author Meets Critics: Herman Cappelen, John Hawthorne, Relativism and Monadic Truth**
3:15-6:15 p.m.
Chair: Berit Brogaard (University of Missouri–St. Louis)
Critics: Scott Soames (University of Southern California)
Andrew Egan (University of Michigan–Ann Arbor)
Adam Sennet (University of California–Davis)
Authors: Herman Cappelen (University of St. Andrews)
John Hawthorne (Oxford University)

V-E. **Author Meets Critics: Roy Sorensen, Seeing Dark Things**
3:15-6:15 p.m.
Chair: Margaret Atherton (University of Wisconsin–Milwaukee)
Critics: Casey O’Callaghan (Rice University)
Jonathan Westphal (Idaho State University)
Author: Roy Sorensen (Washington University in St. Louis)

V-F. **Submitted Symposium: Phenomenology and the Problem of Universals**
3:15-6:15 p.m.
Chair: William McNeill (DePaul University)
Speaker: William H. Koch (University of South Florida)
Commentators: David Kasmier (Independent Scholar)
Colin J. Hahn (Marquette University)

V-G. **Colloquium: Moral Epistemology**
3:15-6:15 p.m.
3:15-4:15 p.m.
Chair: Remy Debes (University of Memphis)
Speaker: Jonathan Matheson (University of Rochester)
“The Epistemology of Moral Responsibility”
Commentator: Ariela Tubert (University of Puget Sound)

4:15-5:15 p.m.
Chair: Scott E. Forschler (Independent Scholar)
Speaker: Kurt Liebegott (Purdue University)
“On the Prior Probability of Ethical Positions”
Commentator: Fritz J. McDonald (Oakland University)

5:15-6:15 p.m.
Chair: Cody Cash (University of Arkansas)
Speaker: Jason F. Brennan (Brown University)
“Does Empirical Moral Psychology Vindicate Utilitarianism?”
Commentator: Daniel R. Kelly (Purdue University)

**V-H. Colloquium: Kant: Intuition and Practical Imagination**

3:15-6:15 p.m.

3:15-4:15 p.m.
Chair: Rachel E. Zuckert (Northwestern University)
Speaker: Jennifer A. Mensch (Pennsylvania State University)
“Kant’s Theory of Intuition in the *Inagural Dissertation* of 1770”
Commentator: Clinton Tolley (University of California–San Diego)

4:15-5:15 p.m.
Chair: Anja Jauernig (University of Notre Dame)
Speaker: Stefan E. Bird-Pollan (Harvard University)
“Kant and the Practical Implications of Genius”
Commentator: Arata Hamawaki (Auburn University)

5:15-6:15 p.m.
Chair: Daniel Sutherland (University of Illinois at Chicago)
Speaker: Peter Brickey LeQuire (University of Chicago)
“Duty *Sui Generis* and the Individual in Kant’s *Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason*”
Commentator: Frederick Rauscher (Michigan State University)

**V-I. Colloquium: Constitution**

3:15-6:15 p.m.

3:15-4:15 p.m.
Chair: Jean-Pierre Marquis (University of Montreal)
Speaker: Andrew M. Bailey (University of Notre Dame)
“You Needn’t Be Simple”
Commentator: David Barnett (University of Colorado–Boulder)

4:15-5:15 p.m.
Chair: C. Wesley Morriston (University of Colorado–Boulder)
Speaker: Andrei A. Buckareff (Marist College)
“Omniscience, Ways of Knowing, and Knowledge De Se”
Commentator: Yujin Nagasawa (University of Birmingham)

5:15-6:15 p.m.
Chair: Peter van Inwagen (University of Notre Dame)
Speaker: Matthew J. Barker (University of Wisconsin–Madison)  
“Constitution, Coincidence and Derivative Properties”

Commentator: Robert Garcia (Texas A&M University)

**V-J. Colloquium: Delusion, Anti-Expertise, and Transmission Failure**

3:15-6:15 p.m.

3:15-4:15 p.m.

Chair: Nicholas L. Silins (Cornell University)
Speaker: Geoffrey Pynn (Northern Illinois University)  
“The Bayesian Explanation of Transmission Failure”

Commentator: Kelly M. Becker (University of New Mexico)

4:15-5:15 p.m.

Chair: David Manley (University of Michigan–Ann Arbor)
Speaker: Nicolas Bommarito (Brown University)  
“Rationally Self-Ascribed Anti-Expertise”

Commentator: Kate Manne (Massachusetts Institute of Technology)

5:15-6:15 p.m.

Chair: G. Lynn Stephens (University of Alabama–Birmingham)
Speaker: Dylan Murray (Georgia State University)  
“Delusion, Assertion, and Mad Belief”

*Graduate Student Travel Stipend Recipient*

Commentator: Anna-Sara Malmgren (University of Texas–Austin)

**V-K. Colloquium: Philosophy of Action**

3:15-6:15 p.m.

3:15-4:15 p.m.

Chair: Donald Hubin (Ohio State University)
Speaker: John Brunero (University of Missouri–St. Louis)  
“Means-Ends Coherence and Unmodifiable Intentions”

Commentator: Sergio Tenenbaum (University of Toronto)

4:15-5:15 p.m.

Chair: Clotilde Calabi (University of Milan)
Speaker: Berislav Marusic (Brandeis University)  
“The Desires of Others”

Commentator: Carla Bagnoli (University of Wisconsin–Milwaukee)
5:15-6:15 p.m.
Chair: Timothy Schroeder (Ohio State University)
Speaker: Andrew Choi (Ohio University)
“On Arpaly and Best Judgment”
Commentator: Nomy Arpaly (Brown University)

V-L. Colloquium: Ancient Philosophy
3:15-6:15 p.m.
3:15-4:15 p.m.
Chair: Naomi Reshotko (University of Denver)
Speaker: Brian D. Prince (Rice University)
“A Metaphysical Monstrosity: the Form of Soul”
Commentator: Allan Silverman (Ohio State University)

4:15-5:15 p.m.
Chair: Robin Smith (Texas A&M University)
Speaker: Noell Birondo (Claremont McKenna College)
“Exercising Our Senses in Aristotle”
Commentator: Deborah Modrak (University of Rochester)

5:15-6:15 p.m.
Chair: Fred D. Miller, Jr. (Bowling Green State University)
Speaker: Ian C. Flora (University of Michigan–Ann Arbor)
“Human Reason as Persuasion: Aristotle on Belief and Rationality”
Commentator: Jeremy Kirby (Albion College)

V-M. Session Sponsored by the APA Committee on Pre-College Instruction in Philosophy: Approaches to Philosophy in the High School Classroom
3:15-6:15 p.m.
Chair: Steven Goldberg (Oak Park and River Forest High School)
Speakers: Kevin Barry (Evanston Township High School)
“Challenges in Developing a High School Philosophy Curriculum”
Clayton Duba (Adlai Stevenson High School)
“Teaching Texts and Using Blogs in High School Philosophy”
Christopher Freiler (Hinsdale Central High School)
“Using Thought Experiments to Teach High School Philosophy”
Commentator: David Hilbert (University of Illinois at Chicago)
   “Suggestions for Training High School Students to Think Philosophically”

V-N. Session Sponsored by the APA Committee on the Status of Asian and Asian-American Philosophers and Philosophies: Confucius and Dewey on Experiential Education

3:15-6:15 p.m.
Chair: Thomas Jackson (University of Hawaii–Manoa)
Speaker: Thomas Jackson (University of Hawaii–Manoa)
   “Dewey on Students’ Interest”
Commentator: Yong Huang (Kutztown University)
Speaker: Yong Huang (Kutztown University)
   “Confucius on the Paradoxicality of Education”
Commentator: Thomas Jackson (University of Hawaii at Manoa)
Speaker: Andrew Colvin (Slippery Rock University)
   “Socialization and Individualization in Education: A Confucian Response to Rorty (and Dewey)”
Commentator: Jinmei Yuan (Creighton University)
Speaker: Jinmei Yuan (Creighton University)
   “The Role of Wonder in Seeking for Certainty through Uncertainty in Dewey’s Experiential Education”
GROUP MEETING PROGRAM

GROUP SESSION G0: WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 17, 5:00-10:00 P.M.

G0-1. Great Lakes Mind and Science Consortium
5:00-10:00 p.m.

GROUP SESSION GI: THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 18, 9:00 A.M.-NOON

GI-1. Max Scheler Society
9:00 a.m.-Noon
Speakers: Christina Gould (Southern Illinois University–Carbondale)
“On the Interpenetration of Nature and Spirit: The Philosophical Anthropologies of Max Scheler and Edmund Husserl”
Michael Gabel (Universität Erfuhr)
“The Transcendence and Corporeality of Human Being”
Daniil Dorofeev (Saint Petersburg University of Telecommunication)
“Interrelations between the Philosophical Anthropology of Max Scheler and Michael Bachtin”
Joachim Fischer (Technische Universität Dresden)
“The Operation called Philosophical Anthropology. Scheler and Plessner: Affinity and Rivalry”
Eric Mohr (Duquesne University)
“Contributions to a Phenomenological Sociology of Knowledge”

GI-2. Philosophy of Time Society
9:00 a.m.-Noon
Chair: Aderemi Artis (University of Michigan–Flint)
Speaker: Erwin Tegtmeier (University of Mannheim)
“The Advancement of the World”
Commentator: L. Nathan Oaklander (University of Michigan–Flint)
Speaker: Alan Rhoda (University of Notre Dame)
“Five Roads to Fatalism and the Openness of the Future”
Commentator: V. Alan White (University of Wisconsin–Manitowoc)
Speaker: Kenneth Faber (Vanderbilt University)
   “The Impermanence and Immutability of Reality”
Commentator: Michael Brodrick (Vanderbilt University)

**GI-3. Society for the Study of the History of Analytical Philosophy**
9:00 a.m.-Noon

**Topic:** Aspects of Analysis

Chair: Sandra Lapointe (Kansas State University)

 Speakers: Peter Hylton (University of Illinois at Chicago)
   “Ideas of a Logically Perfect Language in Analytic Philosophy”
Mark Textor (King’s College, University of London)
   “Reinach and Co. on Rejection and Negative Judgement”
Michael Detlefsen (University of Notre Dame)
   “Freedom and Analysis”

**GI-4. Society for Asian and Comparative Philosophy**
9:00 a.m.-Noon

**Topic:** Reflections on Buddhism, Confucianism, and Daoism

Chair: Eric S. Nelson (University of Massachusetts–Lowell)

 Speakers: Larry D. Harwood (Viterbo University)
   “Confucian Political Philosophy—The Law or the Man?”
Emily McRae (University of Wisconsin–Madison)
   “Integrating Emotions and Morality: The Role of Equanimity in Moral Life”
Bongrae Seok (Alvernia College)
   “One and the Others, The Other-Regarding Orientation of Confucian Moral Philosophy”
Eric S. Nelson (University of Massachusetts–Lowell)
   “Is the Dào Inhuman? Reconsidering Humanity and Nature in Early Daoism”

**GI-5. Midwest Society for Women in Philosophy: Author Meets Critics:** Miranda Fricker, *Epistemic Injustice*
9:00 a.m.-Noon

Chair: Gaile Pohlhaus (Miami University of Ohio)

 Critics: Linda Martín Alcoff (Hunter College/CUNY Graduate Center)
GI-6. Society for the Philosophic Study of the Contemporary Visual Arts

9:00 a.m.-Noon

Topic: Film as Philosophy

Chair: Stephen D. Snyder (Fatih University, Istanbul)

Speakers: Craig Fox (California University of Pennsylvania)
“Mamet’s Oleanna, Wittgenstein, and Film as Philosophy”
Phillip Seng (University of Maryland–Baltimore County)
“Depictions of Soldiers’ Experience in Some Iraq War Movies”
Kian Bergstrom (University of Chicago)
“Beauty and Justice: A Jigsaw Puzzle?”
Dan Flory (Montana State University)
“Evil, Mood, and Philosophical Reflection in No Country for Old Men”

GI-7. Society for the Metaphysics of Science

9:00 a.m.-Noon

Topic: Degrees of Freedom and Inter-theoretic Relations

Chair: Carl Gillett (Northern Illinois University)

Speakers: Jessica Wilson (University of Toronto)
“The Metaphysical Basis of Emergent Non-linear Phenomena”
Jeffrey Yoshimi (University of California–Merced)
“The Geometry of Inter-theoretic Relations”
Mariam Thalos (University of Utah)
“Nonreductive Materialism without Hierarchies”

GI-8. American Society for Value Inquiry

9:00 a.m.-Noon

Topic: History and Value

Chair: G. John M. Abbarno (D’Youville College)

Speakers: Lydia L. Moland (Colby College)
“A Consolatory Result: Hegel on Agency in History”
Jack Russell Weinstein (University of North Dakota)
“The Normative Value of History: A Smithian Hypothesis”
GI-9. Session Sponsored by the APA Committee on Academic Career Opportunities and Placement: Roundtable: Best Placement Practices for Graduate Students and Placement Directors

9:00 a.m.-Noon
Chair: Leslie Pickering Francis (University of Utah)
Panelists: Leslie Pickering Francis (University of Utah)
Debra Nails (Michigan State University)

GROUP SESSION GII: THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 18, 5:00-7:00 P.M.


9:00 a.m.-Noon
Critics: Chris Diehm (University of Wisconsin–Stevens Point)
Chaone Mallory (Villanova University)
Adrian Parr (University of Cincinnati)
Author: Marti Kheel (University of California–Berkeley)

GII-2. Josiah Royce Society

5:00-7:00 p.m.
Topic: Does Royce Have Anything Worthwhile to Contribute to Aesthetics, Political Philosophy, and Race Theory?
Chair: Dwayne A. Tunstall (Grand Valley State University)
Speakers: Judith M. Green (Fordham University)
“Public Reasons, Private Tastes, and Personal Opinions in Deliberative Democratic Politics”
Kaitlin O’Donnell (Temple University)
“Within Plain Sight: Royce, Public Monuments, and the Ethic of Atonement”
Tommy J. Curry (Texas A&M University)
“On the Dark Arts: Problematizing Royce’s Assimilative Assimilative Arts as a Response to LeConte’s ‘Southern Problems’”

GII-3. North American Nietzsche Society

5:00-7:00 p.m.
Topic: Moral Psychology and Nietzsche’s Critique of Morality
Chair: Robert B. Pippin (University of Chicago)
Speakers: William M. Beals (Stanford University)
“Internalization and Its Consequences”
Group Program

Ian Dunkle (Georgia State University)
“Morality Makes Me Sick: A Criticism of Brian Leiter’s Treatment of Health in Nietzsche”

GII-4. Philosophy of Religion Group
5:00-7:00 p.m.
Topic: The Hiddenness of Spiritual Realities
Chair: Michael Murray (Franklin and Marshall College)
Speakers: Klaas Kraay (Ryerson University)
“The Greatest Trick the Devil Ever Played”
Michael Rea (University of Notre Dame)
“Divine Hiddenness”
Commentator: David Taylor (Stanford University)

GII-5. Radical Philosophy Association
5:00-7:00 p.m.
Topic: War and Education
Chair: Jeffrey Jackson (University of Houston–Downtown)
Speakers: Jeff Edmonds (Vanderbilt University)
“Education as War: Deleuze, James, and the Appropriation of the War Machine”
Doug Morris (Eastern New Mexico University)
“Cinematic Militarism as Public Pedagogy”
Jordy Rocheleau (Austin Peay State University)
“Between Critical Advocacy and Deference to Practitioner Experience: Teaching Just War Theory to Soldiers, Veterans, and Military Historians”

GII-6. Society of Christian Philosophers
5:00-7:00 p.m.
Topic: Theism and Libertarian Free Will: A Debate
Chair: Janine Marie Idziak (Loras College)
Speakers: Timothy O’Connor (Indiana University–Bloomington)
Derk Pereboom (Cornell University)

GII-7. Joint Session Sponsored by the Society for Lesbian and Gay Philosophy and the APA Committee on Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and Transgender People in the Profession
5:00-7:00 p.m.
Chair: Andy Wible (Muskegon Community College)
Speakers: Dennis R. Cooley (North Dakota State University)
“Is Outing Oneself a Moral Responsibility? Revisited”
Carol Viola Ann Quinn (Metropolitan State College of Denver)
“What Makes a Dance Queer?”

Commentator: Raja Halwani (School of the Art Institute of Chicago)

GII-8. Society for Asian and Comparative Philosophy
5:00-7:00 p.m.

Topic: Issues in Indian Philosophy
Chair: Bina Gupta (University of Missouri–Columbia)
Speakers: Bina Gupta (University of Missouri–Columbia)
“Anubhava (Experience) in Indian Philosophy”
Douglas L. Berger (Southern Illinois University–Carbondale)
“Consciousness in Action: Classical Nyaya Philosophy of Mind”
Donna Giancola (Suffolk University)
“Women, Religion, and Sacred Space”

GII-9. Søren Kierkegaard Society
5:00-7:00 p.m.
Chair: George Connell (Concordia College)
Speakers: John Davenport (Fordham University)
“Earnestness, Loyalty, and Purity of Heart: Narrative Unity through Infinite Pathos”
Grant Julin (St. Francis University)
“Kierkegaard’s Ethics of Repetition”
Nathan Carson (Baylor University)
“Artistic Representation and Inner-Historical Time: Kierkegaard on the Temporal Limitations of Art and the Task of the Literary Artist”

Commentator: Jason Mahn (Augustana College)

GII-10. Society for Philosophy and Public Affairs
5:00-7:00 p.m.

Topic: Challenges Facing Deliberative Democracy
Chair: Cristina Lafont (Northwestern University)
Speakers: Andrew F. Smith (Illinois State University)
“Public Deliberation and the Challenge of Bounded Rationality”
Robert Erlewine (Illinois Wesleyan University)
“Theocratism and Reciprocity: The Ambivalence of Secularism”
Noelle McAfee (George Mason University)
“Deliberation, Choice, and the Work of Mourning”

Commentator: Paul Weithman (University of Notre Dame)

GII-11. Society for Business Ethics
5:00-7:00 p.m.
Chair: Jeffrey Moriarty (Bentley University)
Speaker: John Boatright (Loyola University Chicago)
“From Hired Hands to Co-Owners: Compensation, Team Production, and the Role of the CEO”

Commentators: Kevin W. Gibson (Marquette University)
Waheed Hussain (The Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania)

GII-12. Society for the Philosophic Study of the Contemporary Visual Arts
5:00-7:00 p.m.

Topic: Woody Allen and Murder
Chair: Dan Flory (Montana State University)
Speakers: Sander H. Lee (Keene State College)
“Woody Allen Gets Away with Murder, or Does He?”
William C. Parmerleau (University of Pittsburgh at Greensburg)
“Philosophizing About Woody Allen: Do Author Intentions Matter?”

5:00-7:00 p.m.
Chair: Henry Jackman (York University)
Critics: Stewart Shapiro (Ohio State University and University of St. Andrews)
Claire S. Horisk (University of Missouri)
Author: Michael P. Lynch (University of Connecticut)

GII-14. Bertrand Russell Society
5:00-7:00 p.m.
Chair: Rosalind Carey (Lehman College–CUNY)
Speakers: Jolen Galagher (McMaster University)
“Russell’s ‘Logical Approach to Analysis’”
Richard Schmitt (Independent Scholar)
“Russell’s Understanding and Reception of Tractatus 5.5-6.0”
Dustin Olson (McMaster University)
“Russell’s ‘The Limits of Empiricism’”

GII-15. Committee on Institutional Cooperation
5:00-7:00 p.m.
Topic: Business Meeting

GII-16. Association for Symbolic Logic
5:00-7:00 p.m.
Reception

GROUP SESSION GIII: THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 18, 7:15-10:15 P.M.

GIII-1. Adam Smith Society
7:15-10:15 p.m.
Topic: Adam Smith’s Original Theory of Imitation
Chair: Remy Debes (University of Memphis)
Speaker: Paul Guyer (University of Pennsylvania)
Commentator: James A. Harris (University of St. Andrews)

GIII-2. Indiana Philosophical Association
7:15-10:15 p.m.
Topic: Contributed Papers

GIII-3. History of Early Analytic Philosophy Society
7:15-10:15 p.m.
Topic: Bernard Bolzano, the New Anti-Kant
Chair: Sandra Lapointe (Kansas State University)
Speakers: Clinton Tolley (University of California–San Diego)
“From the Ontological to the Semantical an sich”
Timothy Rosenkoetter (New York University)
“Bolzano and Kant on the Distinction between Intuition and Concepts”
Nicholas F. Stang (University of Miami)
“Kant and Bolzano on the Syntheticity of Arithmetic”
Waldeomar Rohloff (University of Missouri–St. Louis)
“The Linguistic Divide between Kant and Bolzano”
GIII-4. Society for the Philosophy of Creativity
7:15-10:15 p.m.
Chair: Raymond Boisvert (Siena College)
Speakers: Sharon M. Kaye (John Carroll University)
“Deep Fun”
Pete A. Y. Gunter (University of North Texas)
“The Novel and Academic Philosophy: An Uneasy Alliance”
Dan Lloyd (Trinity College)
“Fiction, Phenomenology, and Reality”

GIII-5. Society for Philosophy in the Contemporary World
7:15-10:15 p.m.
Topic: Moral Reasoning
Chair: David K. Chan (University of Wisconsin–Stevens Point)
Speakers: Philip Clark (University of Toronto)
“Aspects, Guises, Species and Knowing Something to Be Good”
Amanda Marshall (Western Michigan University)
“The Particularist Challenge to Norm Expressivism”
Matt K. Stichter (Washington State University)
“Solving the Dilemma of the Unity of the Virtues”
Melanie Johnson-Moxley (University of Missouri–Columbia)
“Sometimes, the Way to the Soul Is Through the Gut: Confucius, Aristotle, and the Role of Empathy in Moral Comprehension”

GIII-6. Society for the Philosophical Study of Education
7:15-10:15 p.m.
Topic: European Contributions to the Philosophy of Education (through the Enlightenment)
Chair: Alexander Makedon (Chicago State University)
Speakers: Anja-Silvia Goeing (Pädagogisches Institut, Universität Zürich)
“Visual Perception and Academic Learning Strategies: Early Continental European Approaches”
Joseph S. Freedman (Alabama State University)
“Disciplinarity vs. Interdisciplinarity in Education: Johann Amos Comenius (1592-1650) and His Contemporaries”
Emery J. Hyslop-Margison (University of New Brunswick)
“The Legacy of Cartesian Dualism in Educational Thought”

Guillemette Johnston (DePaul University)
“Rousseau’s *Emile* and the Development of the Self: Has the Message of *Emile* Been Misappropriated by Psychology or Education?”

James E. Roper (Michigan State University)
“Kant’s ‘Cosmopolitanism’ Versus Rawls’s ‘Liberalism’ in Education”

Sam Rocha (Ohio State University)
“Reading Like a Cow: Nietzsche on Reading and Constitution”

**GIII-7. International Association for Computing and Philosophy**

*7:15-10:15 p.m.*

**Topic:** Mind in AI

**Chair:** Marvin Croy (University of North Carolina–Charlotte)

**Speakers:** Ricardo Sanz (Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona)
“The Need for a Mind in Control Systems Engineering”

Piotr Boltuc (University of Illinois–Springfield)
“Non-Reductive Machine Consciousness?”

Matthias Scheutz (Indiana University)
“Architectural Steps Towards Self-Aware Robots”

**Commentators:** Thomas W. Polger (University of Cincinnati)

John Barker (University of Illinois–Springfield)

**GIII-8. American Society for Value Inquiry**

*7:15-10:15 p.m.*

**Chair:** Thomas Magnell (Drew University)

**Speakers:** Sander H. Lee (Keene State College)
“The Red Sox and Philosophy”

Michael Macom (New School for Social Research)
“The Redemption of Ron Santo and Jim Rice: On the Value of Retired Numbers in Major League Baseball”
7:15-10:15 p.m.

**Topic:** Introducing Process Philosophy/Theology

Chair: Scott W. Sinclair (Saint Louis University)

Speakers:
- Arlette Poland (University of California–Riverside)
  “Successful Introductions to Process: Context and Commitment”
- Robert Mesle (Graceland University)
  “Connecting with Lived Experience in the World: A Teaching Sample”
- Adam C. Scarfe (Brandon University)

GIII-10. American Society for Philosophy, Counseling, and Psychotherapy
7:15-10:15 p.m.

**Topic:** Theoretical and Applied Issues in Philosophical Practice

Chair: Samuel Zinaich (The Institute for Critical Thinking)

Speakers:
- Nan-Nan Lee (St. Xavier University–Chicago)
  “Sublimated or Castrated Psychoanalysis? Adorno’s Critique of Revisionist Psychoanalysis”
- James Stacey Taylor (College of New Jersey)
  “From Theory to Practice”

GIII-11. Association of Chinese Philosophers in North America
7:15-10:15 p.m.

**Topic:** Confucian Moral Concepts in Contemporary Context

Chair: Steven F. Geisz (University of Tampa)

Speakers:
- Linghao Wang (University of Illinois, College of Law) and Lawrence B. Solum (University of Illinois, College of Law)
  “Names as Thick Ethical Concepts”
- Yanxia Zhao (University of Wales, Lampeter)
  “On the Modernization of Confucian Concept of Harmony”

Commentator: Steven F. Geisz (University of Tampa)
Speaker: Sean P. Walsh (University of Minnesota–Duluth)
  “The Happy Fortune of Aristotle’s Torture on the Rack and Confucius’ Yan Hui: Moral Luck in Classical Greece and China”

Commentator: Stephen Walker (University of Chicago)
Yitian Zhai (DePaul University)
“Trouble with Gender Trouble—A Critique of Butler’s Critique of Identity Politics”

**GIII-12. Society for Analytical Feminism**

7:15-10:15 p.m.

Chair: Robin Dillon (Lehigh University)
Speaker: Barrett Emerick (University of Colorado–Boulder)
“Privileging the Experience of Victims”
Commentator: Deborah K. Heikes (University of Alabama–Huntsville)
Speaker: Sally Markowitz (Willamette University)
“Thinking About Intersectionality, Or What Intersects with What?”
Commentator: Anna Carastathis (California State University–Los Angeles)
Speaker: Lisa H. Schwartzman (Michigan State University)
“Rational Choice Theory and Feminist Critique”
Commentator: Ann E. Cudd (University of Kansas)

**GROUP SESSION GIV: FRIDAY, FEBRUARY 19, 7:15-10:15 P.M.**

**GIV-0. Society of Christian Philosophers**

2:30-4:30 p.m.

**Topic:** Executive Committee Meeting

**GIV-1. Max Scheler Society**

7:15-10:15 p.m.

Speakers: Karin Frings
“In Remembrance of the Life and Work of Manfred S. Frings”
Kenneth Stikkers (Southern Illinois University–Carbondale)
“‘Time’ in and Memories of Manfred S. Frings”
Suzan Gottlöber (National University of Ireland Maynooth)
“War as Katharsis? – Scheler’s Phenomenological Analysis in the Light of His *Ordo Amoris* and the Broader Context of the ‘Ideas of 1914’”
John White (Franciscan University)
“Vital Sympathy and the Cognitive Foundations of Environmental Ethics”
GIV-2. Association for Informal Logic and Critical Thinking
7:15-10:15 p.m.
\[\text{Chair: } \text{Kevin Possin (Winona State University)}\]
\[\text{Speakers: } \text{Hans V. Hansen (University of Windsor)}\]
\[\text{Thomas Keyes (Our Lady of the Lake University)}\]
\[\text{Eric Parkinson (Syracuse University)}\]
\[\text{Lawrence Pasternak (Oklahoma State University)}\]
\[\text{“Picturing Conductive Arguments”}\]
\[\text{“Dewey, Pulp Fiction, and Reinforcing Critical Thinking Concepts”}\]
\[\text{“Teaching Critical Thinking Online”}\]

GIV-3. Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy
7:15-10:15 p.m.
\[\text{Chair: } \text{Fred D. Miller, Jr. (Bowling Green State University)}\]
\[\text{Speakers: } \text{J. Clerk Shaw (University of Tennessee)}\]
\[\text{May Sim (College of the Holy Cross)}\]
\[\text{Octavian Gabor (Purdue University)}\]
\[\text{“On Some Hedonist Interpretations of Plato’s Protagoras”}\]
\[\text{“What Aristotle Should Have Said about Megalopsychia”}\]
\[\text{“Species Souls and Particular Souls”}\]

GIV-4. Society for Philosophy in the Contemporary World
7:15-10:15 p.m.
\[\text{Topic: } \text{War and Killings in War: Are They Necessary?}\]
\[\text{Chair: } \text{David K. Chan (University of Wisconsin-Stevens Point)}\]
\[\text{Speakers: } \text{Cheyney Ryan (University of Oregon)}\]
\[\text{Jeff McMahan (Rutgers University)}\]
\[\text{Andrew Fiala (California State University–Fresno)}\]
\[\text{“A Pacifist Looks at Just War Theory”}\]
\[\text{“Pacifism, Terrorism, and Moral Theory”}\]
\[\text{“Right to Kill; Wrong to Be Killed”}\]

GIV-5. Association for Symbolic Logic
7:15-9:15 p.m.
\[\text{Topic: } \text{Contributed Papers}\]
\[\text{Chair: } \text{Roy T. Cook (University of Minnesota)}\]
Speakers: John G. Mersch (Xavier University of Loyola)
“Pretabular Varieties of Boolean DeMorgan Monoids”
Fred Seymour Michael (Brooklyn College–CUNY)
“Curry and Paraconsistency”
Grigori Mints (Stanford University)
“Category Theory and Structural Proof Theory”

GIV-6. Society for the Philosophical Study of Education
7:15-10:15 p.m.

Topic: European Contributions to the Philosophy of Education (Post-Enlightenment)

Chair: Jason Helfer (Knox College)

Speakers: Allan Johnston (Columbia College and DePaul University)
“The Marxist Legacy in Philosophy of Education”
David L. Mosley (Bellarmine University)
“Nietzsche’s Acoustic Philosophy of Education and the Designation of Genius”
Philip L. Smith (Ohio State University)
“Does Nietzsche Make Sense as a Philosopher of Education?”
Josh Shepperd (University of Wisconsin–Madison)
“De-Distancing and the Sphere of Relevant Context in Heidegger’s Theory of Spatiality”
Jon Fennell (Hillsdale College)
“The Character and Ground of Polanyi’s ‘Educated Mind’ In Personal Knowledge”
Antonina Lukenchuk (National-Lewis University)
“Semiotic Approaches to Meaning Construction of Kristeva’s Female Subject”
Charles Howell (Northern Illinois University)
“Does Contemporary Psychological Research Support Progressive Pedagogy?”

GIV-7. North American Kant Society
7:15-10:15 p.m.

Chair: Robert B. Louden (University of Southern Maine)
Speaker: Georg Mohr (University of Bremen)
The Mary Gregor Lecture: “Kant on Music as Beautiful Art”
Commentator: Richard Eldridge (Swarthmore College)
GIV-8. American Association of Philosophy Teachers

7:15-10:15 p.m.

**Topic:** Teaching Modern Philosophy Survey Courses

Chair: Nils Rauhut (Coastal Carolina University)

Speakers: Andrew Terjesen (Rhodes College)

“The Importance (and Challenge) of Teaching Moral Philosophy in Early Modern Survey Courses”

Bryan Hall (Indiana University Southeast)

“Covering Kant in a History of Modern Philosophy Survey Course”

Brady Bowman (Pennsylvania State University)

“Evaluating Student Performance in Modern Survey Courses”

Matthew Hallgarth (Tarleton State University)

“Depth vs. Breadth in Modern Philosophy Survey Courses”

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7:15-10:15 p.m.

**Topic:** Issues in Daoism

Chair: Yong Huang (Kutztown University)

Speakers: Jennifer Lundin Ritchie (University of British Columbia)

“Cultural Implications in the Interpretation and Classification of the Guodian Laozi and Taiyi Sheng Shui”

Stephen Walker (University of Chicago)

“What Technique Could I, an Artisan, Possess? Unraveling Skillful Attainment in Zhuangzi”

Commentator: Dan Robins (Stockton College)

Speaker: Sean Winkler (Loyola Marymount University)

“The Possibility of Daoist Inner Alchemy in Martin Heidegger’s ‘What Calls for Thinking’”

Commentator: Yitian Zhai (DePaul University)

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GIV-10. Association for the Development of Philosophy Teaching

7:15-10:15 p.m.

**Topic:** Art Criticism

Chair: Robert Lichtenbert (Editor, *The Meaning of Life*)

*For Program Details, see the Program Supplement.*
GIV-11. North American Spinoza Society

7:15-10:15 p.m.

Chair: Joe Van Zandt (Independent Scholar)
Speaker: Syliane Malinowski-Charles (Bishop’s University)
“Rationalism versus Subjective Experience”
Commentator: Melissa M. Shew (Marquette University)


7:15-10:15 p.m.

Topic: Knowledge and Method in Social Theory

Chair: Lisa H. Schwartzman (Michigan State University)
Speakers: Kristie Dotson (Michigan State University)
“Knowing in Space: Lessons from Reading Black Feminist Social Theory”
Phyllis Rooney (Oakland University)
“On Method in Epistemology for Social Progress”
Alison M. Jaggar (University of Colorado) and Theresa W. Tobin (Marquette University)
“Morality, Authority, and Power: A Proposal for Naturalizing Methodology in Moral Philosophy”

GROUP SESSION GV: SATURDAY, FEBRUARY 20, 1:00-3:00 P.M.

GV-0. Journal of the History of Philosophy

10:00 a.m.-3:00 p.m.

Topic: Board Meeting

GV-1. International Association for the Philosophy of Sport

1:00-3:00 p.m.

Chair: Michael W. Austin (Eastern Kentucky University)
Speakers: John White (Franciscan University)
“A Transcendent Approach to Sports: Bonhoeffer’s Ultimate and Penultimate Distinction”
Tait Szabo (University of Wisconsin–Washington County)
“In Defense of Enhancement: Health and Excellence in Elite Competitive Sport”
Rebecca Goldner (Villanova University)
“Running Like a Girl, Or, How Merleau-Ponty Made Me Faster and Stronger”
Jeffrey P. Fry (Ball State University)
“How to Lose at Sport”

1:00-3:00 p.m.

Topic: Consequences of Nietzsche's Naturalism

Chair: Richard Schacht (University of Illinois–Urbana-Champaign)

Speakers: Mark Alfano (CUNY Graduate Center)
- “Nietzsche, Naturalism, and the Tenacity of the Intentional”
- Joshua Andresen (American University of Beirut)
  - “Nietzsche, Naturalism, and Falsification”

GV-3. Radical Philosophy Association

1:00-3:00 p.m.

Topic: Political Science: Gardens, Weapons, and Critical Theory

Chair: Forrest Perry (Saint Xavier University)

Speakers: Mary Butterfield (Vanderbilt University)
- “Urban Agriculture and the Science of Production”
  - Curtis Forbes (University of Toronto)
    - “The Ethics of Scientific Subversion”
  - Patrick Gamez (University of Notre Dame)
    - “Science, Rationality, and Critical Theory”

GV-4. Society for the Advancement of American Philosophy

1:00-3:00 p.m.

Topic: Pragmatism, Justice, and Environment

Chair: David L. O’Hara (Augustana College)

Speakers: Anthony L. Cashio (Southern Illinois University–Carbondale)
- “What Would It Mean to Understand the Environment as a Social Institution? A Framework for Contemporary Environmental Issues from the Philosophy of G. H. Mead”
  - Jacob Lynn Goodson (College of William and Mary)
    - “The Problem of Humanism in Environmental Ethics”
  - Stacey Ake (Drexel University)
    - “Nature as Other/Nature as Self: What Does It Mean to Be a Gainstand”
  - Shane J. Ralston (Pennsylvania State University–Hazleton)
    - “Leopold and Dewey on the Limits of Environmental Justice”
GV-5. Society for the Study of Indian and Tibetan Buddhist Philosophy  
1:00-3:00 p.m.  
Speakers: Henry Shiu (University of Toronto)  
“Using the Four Reasonings to Understand the Realm of Enlightenment”  
Kenneth Faber (Vanderbilt University)  
“Time, Eternity, and the Meaning of the Fourth Time in Tibetan Buddhism”  
Emily McRae (University of Wisconsin–Madison)  
“Reasons for Love: The Role of Purifying Emotions in Cultivating Insight”  
Marie Friquegnon (William Paterson University)  
“Santaraksita and Rongzom: Their Paths to Enlightenment”  
Philippe Turenne (McGill University)  
“Using or Transcending Reason for Enlightenment: The Three Wisdoms as Model of Practice and Interpretation in Tibetan Buddhism”

GV-6. Personalist Discussion Group  
1:00-3:00 p.m.  
Topic: The Recent Work of Rufus Burrow, Jr., on the Personalism of Martin Luther King, Jr., and the Theology of David Walker  
Chair: Randall E. Auxier (Southern Illinois University–Carbondale)  
Speakers: Lewis V. Baldwin (Vanderbilt University)  
“The Unfolding of the Moral Order: Rufus Burrow, Jr., Ethical Personalism, and the Life and Thought of Martin Luther King, Jr.”  
Dwayne A. Tunstall (Grand Valley State University)  
“There Are Prophets, and There Are Ethical Prophets: David Walker’s and Rufus Burrow, Jr.’s Contributions to Religious Ethics”  
Commentator: Rufus Burrow, Jr. (Christian Theological Seminary (Indianapolis))

GV-7. Concerned Philosophers for Peace  
1:00-3:00 p.m.  
Speakers: Nikki Lawson (DePaul University)  
“The Pin Up: Social Warrior or Sexual Slave?”
Phyllis Kaminski (St. Mary’s College)  
“Creating a Path for Justice: Luce Irigaray and Transformative Dialogue”
Danielle Poe (University of Dayton)  
“Donut Shops and Peace”

GV-8. Society for the Philosophical Study of Marxism  
1:00-3:00 p.m.
Topic: Marx, Capital, and Utility  
Chair: Peter Amato (Drexel University)
Speakers: Patrick Murray (Creighton University) and Jeanne Schuler (Creighton University)  
“Capital, the Truth of Utility”

GV-9. Association for Symbolic Logic  
1:00-3:00 p.m.
Topic: Pluralism  
Chair: Stewart Shapiro (Ohio State University)
Speakers: Roy T. Cook (University of Minnesota)  
“The Problem(s) with Pluralism”
Jean-Pierre Marquis (University of Montreal)  
“Logic and Invariance”

GV-10. Hume Society: Author Meets Critics: Peter Kail, Projection and Realism in Hume’s Philosophy  
1:00-3:00 p.m.
Chair: Dorothy Coleman (Northern Illinois University)
Critics: Don Garrett (New York University)  
Eric Schliesser (Leiden University)  
Jacqueline Taylor (University of San Francisco)
Author: Peter Kail (Oxford University)

5:00-7:00 p.m.
Critic: Eric Katz (New Jersey Institute of Technology)
Author: Anthony Weston (Elon University)

GV-12. Association for the Development of Philosophy Teaching  
1:00-3:00 p.m.
Topic: Does the Future of the Philosophy Profession Reside in Increasing Adjuncts, On-line Courses, and Vocationalism?
MAIN AND GROUP MEETING PARTICIPANTS

A

ABBARNO, G. John M. (D’Youville College) ........................................... GI-8 Thu AM
ADAMS, Noel S. (Marquette University) .............................................. III-L Fri PM
AHLBERG, Jaime (University of Wisconsin–Madison) ..................... II-K Fri AM
AIKIN, Scott F. (Vanderbilt University) ............................................. II-J Fri AM
AKE, Stacey (Drexel University) ...................................................... GV-4 Sat PM
ALCOFF, Linda Martín (Hunter College/CUNY Graduate Center) ................................................ III-J Fri PM, GI-5 Thu AM
ALEXANDER, Joshua (Siena College) ............................................ II-H Fri AM
ALEXANDROVA, Anna (University of Missouri–St. Louis) .............. I-I Thu PM
ALFANO, Mark (CUNY Graduate Center) ....................................... GV-2 Sat PM
ALMASSI, Ben (University of Washington) ..................................... I-G Thu PM
AMATO, Peter (Drexel University) .................................................. GV-8 Sat PM
ANDERSON, David L. (Illinois State University) ............................ IV-M Sat AM
ANDREOU, Chrisoula (University of Utah) ..................................... IV-L Sat AM
ANDRESEN, Joshua (American University of Beirut) ..................... GV-2 Sat PM
APARICIO, Michael (Santa Rosa Junior College) ......................... GIV-2 Fri PM
ARNESON, Richard J. (University of California–San Diego) .......... III-C Fri PM
ARPALY, Nomy (Brown University) ............................................. V-K Sat PM
ARTHUR, Richard (McMaster University) .................................... I-C Thu PM
ARTIS, Aderemi (University of Michigan–Flint) ............................. GI-2 Thu AM
ATHERTON, Margaret (University of Wisconsin–Milwaukee) .......... V-E Sat PM
AUDI, Paul (University of Nebraska, Omaha) .............................. V-B Sat PM
AUSTIN, Michael W. (Eastern Kentucky University) ...................... GV-1 Sat PM
AUXIER, Randall E. (Southern Illinois University–Carbondale) .... GV-6 Sat PM

B

BACH, Theodore (University of Connecticut) ................................. I-H Thu PM
BAGNOLI, Carla (University of Wisconsin–Milwaukee) ............... V-K Sat PM
BAILEY, Andrew M. (University of Notre Dame) ........................... V-I Sat PM
BAKER, David (University of Michigan–Ann Arbor) ..................... I-F Thu PM
BALDWIN, Lewis V. (Vanderbilt University) ................................. GV-6 Sat PM
BALL, Derek (St. Andrews University) .......................................... IV-K Sat AM
BALLANTYNE, Nathan (University of Arizona) ...................................... III-J Fri PM
BARKER, John (University of Illinois–Springfield) ............................ GIII-7 Thu PM
BARKER, Matthew J. (University of Wisconsin–Madison) .............. V-I Sat PM
BARNETT, David (University of Colorado–Boulder) ....................... V-I Sat PM
BARON, Marcia (Indiana University–Bloomington) ....................... I-M Thu PM
BARRY, Kevin (Evanston Township High School) ......................... V-M Sat PM
BARRY, Melissa (Williams College) ............................................. III-K Fri PM
BARRY, Peter Brian (Saginaw Valley State University) .................. I-J Fri PM
BATES, Jared G. (Hanover College) ........................................... I-G Thu PM
BAXTER, Donald L. M. (University of Connecticut) ....................... I-C Thu PM
BEALS, William M. (Stanford University) .................................. GII-3 Thu PM
BECKER, Kelly M. (University of New Mexico) .............................. V-J Sat PM
BECKER, Lawrence (Hollins University) ...................................... I-M Thu PM
BELOT, Gordon (University of Michigan–Ann Arbor) .................... III-A Fri PM
BERGER, Douglas L. (Southern Illinois University–Carbondale) .... GII-8 Thu PM
BERGSTROM, Kian (University of Chicago) .................................. GI-6 Thu AM
BIENER, Zvi (Western Michigan University) ................................ II-D Fri AM
BIRD-POLLAN, Stefan E. (Harvard University) ............................ V-H Sat PM
BIRONDO, Noell (Claremont McKenna College) .......................... V-L Sat PM
BLATTI, Stephan (University of Memphis) .................................. III-K Fri PM
BLOOMFIELD, Paul (University of Connecticut) .......................... IV-F Sat PM
BOATRIGHT, John (Loyola University Chicago) .......................... GII-11 Thu PM
BOEHM, Miren (University of Wisconsin–Milwaukee) .................... III-K Fri PM
BOISVERT, Raymond (Siena College) ........................................ GIII-4 Thu PM
BOLTUC, Piotr (University of Illinois–Springfield) ...................... IV-M Sat AM, GIII-7 Thu PM
BOMMARITO, Nicolas (Brown University) .................................. V-J Sat PM
BOWMAN, Brady (Pennsylvania State University) ......................... GIV-8 Fri PM
BRADING, Katherine (University of Notre Dame) ........................ IV-H Sat AM
BRADLEY, Peter (McDaniel College) ........................................... II-M Fri AM
BREAZEALE, Daniel (University of Kentucky) .............................. II-B Fri AM
BRENNAN, Jason F. (Brown University) .................................... V-G Sat PM
BREWER, Talbot (University of Virginia) ................................. I-E Thu PM
BREYER, Daniel S. (Illinois State University) .............................. I-G Thu PM
BRIDGES, Jason (University of Chicago) .................................... III-F Fri PM
BRIGHOUSE, Carolyn (Occidental College) ................................. IV-G Sat AM
BRIGHOUSE, Harry (University of Wisconsin–Madison) ............... II-K Fri AM
BRISTOW, William F. (University of Wisconsin–Milwaukee) ....... I-K Thu PM
BRODRICK, Michael (Vanderbilt University) .............................. GI-2 Thu AM
BROGAARD, Berit (University of Missouri–St. Louis) .................. V-D Sat PM
BROWN, Lee (Ohio State University) ........................................... II-C Fri AM
BRUDNEY, Daniel (University of Chicago) ............................... IV-N Sat AM
BRUNERO, John (University of Missouri–St. Louis) ................. V-K Sat PM
BRUNO, Franklin (Independent Scholar) .................................. II-C Fri AM
BUCKAREFF, Andrei A. (Marist College) ................................ V-I Sat PM
BURROW, JR., Rufus (Christian Theological Seminary (Indianapolis))

................................................................................................ GV-6 Sat PM
BUTTERFIELD, Mary (Vanderbilt University) ......................... GV-3 Sat PM
BYERLY, Ryan (Baylor University) .......................................... II-L Fri AM
BYNUM, Terrell Ward (Southern Connecticut State University) III-N Fri AM
BYRON, Michael (Kent State University) ................................ II-N Fri AM, III-I Fri PM

C
CAIN, James (Oklahoma State University) ............................... I-L Thu PM
CALABI, Clotilde (University of Milan) ................................. V-K Sat PM
CALLARD, Agnes Gellen (University of Chicago) ................ III-E Fri PM
CAPPELEN, Herman (University of St. Andrews) ................. V-D Sat PM
CARASTATHIS, Anna (California State University–Los Angeles)
.................................................................................... GIII-12 Thu PM
CARD, Claudia (University of Wisconsin–Madison)
.................................................................................... III-D Fri PM, Presidential Address Introduction
CAREY, Rosalind (Lehman College–CUNY) ......................... GII-14 Thu PM
CARIANI, Fabrizio (Northwestern University) ..................... IV-J Sat AM
CARSON, Nathan (Baylor University) ................................. GII-9 Thu PM
CARTER, Curtis (Marquette University) ................................. III-L Fri PM
CASH, Cody (University of Arkansas) .............................. V-G Sat PM
CASHIO, Anthony L. (Southern Illinois University–Carbondale)
................................................................................... GV-4 Sat PM
CATON, Jacob N. (University of Arizona) ......................... II-H Fri AM
CHAMPENE, Aaron R. (University of Arkansas) ................... I-G Thu PM
CHAN, David K. (University of Wisconsin–Stevens Point)
.................................................................................... GIII-5 Thu PM, GIV-4 Fri PM
CHOI, Andrew (Ohio University) ........................................ V-K Sat PM
CHUARD, Philippe (SMU) ..................................................... I-H Thu PM
CLARK, Philip (University of Toronto) ................................. GIII-5 Thu PM
COFFMAN, E. J. (University of Tennessee) ......................... III-J Fri PM
COLEMAN, Dorothy (Northern Illinois University) .......... GV-10 Sat PM
COLEMAN, Mary Clayton (Illinois Wesleyan University) .... III-I Fri PM
COLVIN, Andrew (Slippery Rock University) ..................... V-N Sat PM
CONEE, Earl (University of Rochester) ............................. III-J Fri PM
CONNELL, George (Concordia College) ......................... GII-9 Thu PM
COOK, Roy T. (University of Minnesota) .................................................. IV-J Sat AM, GII-16 Thu PM, GV-9 Sat PM
COOLEY, Dennis R. (North Dakota State University) ............ GII-7 Thu PM
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EATON, Anne (University of Illinois at Chicago) ............. II-J Fri AM
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<td>EDWARDS, Tracy A.</td>
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<td>I-J Fri AM</td>
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<td>EFLIN, Juli</td>
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<td>I-B Thu PM</td>
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<td>EGAN, Andrew</td>
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<td>I-O Thu PM, III-N Fri PM</td>
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THREE CHALLENGES TO JAMESIAN ETHICS (II-J)

ROBERT B. TALISSE (VANDERBILT UNIVERSITY)
SCOTT F. AIKIN (VANDERBILT UNIVERSITY)

William James formulated a unique moral theory rooted in commitments to meliorism and pluralism. The authors pose three pragmatic challenges to Jamesian ethics.

DOING WELL IN THE CIRCUMSTANCES: A DEFENSE OF WELLBEING VARIANTISM (I-I)

ANNA ALEXANDROVA (UNIVERSITY OF MISSOURI-ST. LOUIS)

Verdicts about a person’s wellbeing depend on the situation in which they are made. In some situations the threshold that separates wellbeing from illbeing is higher than in others; and some contexts call for different notions of wellbeing than others. It is common to the existing views that the wellbeing of a person depends only on features of her life and/or her inner states—an assumption that does not sit comfortably with the context-sensitivities of our judgments.

I propose Wellbeing Variantism, a view according to which there is no such thing as wellbeing simpliciter, only wellbeing given a practical context. Since this context varies from situation to situation, two persons with the same features of life and relevant inner states might still count as faring differently. This is because wellbeing expressions have context-sensitive semantic content, where context is fixed by the objective features of the practical environment of the subject.

TRUST IN TESTIMONY—INTERPERSONAL AND EVIDENTIAL (I-G)

BEN ALMASSI (UNIVERSITY OF WASHINGTON)

The view that testimony cannot be evidential has been defended recently by Moran, and, before him, Ross and Grice. Against these authors I argue that one can appreciate a speaker’s role in testimony and recognize testimony as capable of providing the hearer with evidence, and to this end I offer accounts of epistemic trust and trustworthiness as interpersonal and evidential.
**Add to Card? Environmental “Amenities” and Cost-Benefit Analysis (IV-L)**

**Chrisoula Andreou (University of Utah)**

My paper focuses on the use of cost benefit analysis in decision-making, particularly environmental decision-making, which is used to illustrate my reasoning. The sort of cost-benefit analysis I am interested in incorporates two very controversial features: the assumption of comparability; and the willingness-to-pay measure. My aim is to show how debates about such cost-benefit analysis can be illuminated by recognizing a well-motivated holistic decision-making strategy that is often neglected in the interpretation of our actual and projected choices. I end with some remarks about interpreting some of what goes by the name of cost-benefit analysis as *cost-preparedness analysis*.

**Varieties of Simulation-Theory Hybrids (I-H)**

**Theodore Bach (University of Connecticut)**

The theory of mind debate has reached a “hybrid consensus” concerning the status of theory-theory and simulation-theory. Extant hybrid models either specify co-dependency and implementation relations, or distribute mentalizing tasks according to folk-psychological categories. By relying on a non-developmental framework these models fail to capture the central connection between simulation and theory. In contrast, I propose a “developmental” simulation-theory hybrid. This type of hybrid does not presuppose that adult mentalizing consists in normal, default, or inflexible mind-reading skills. Rather, various forms of mentalizing—belief attribution, desire attribution, inference prediction, etc.—are “multiply realized” by both simulation and theory, and which heuristic is preferred is largely a function of the individual’s developmental status. I conclude by showing how this developmental approach opens up new directions for empirical research.

**You Needn’t Be Simple (V-I)**

**Andrew M. Bailey (University of Notre Dame)**

We humans are among the more interesting things that populate the world. And one of the more interesting questions about us is: *what are we?* David Barnett has claimed that reflection on consciousness suggests an answer to that question: *we are simple*. Barnett argues that the mereological simplicity of conscious beings (Simplicity) best explains the Datum: that no pair of persons can itself be conscious. In this paper, I offer two alternative explanations of the Datum. If either is correct, Barnett’s argument fails. First, there aren’t any such things as pairs of persons. Second, consciousness is maximal; no conscious thing is a proper part of another conscious thing.
ANTI-LUCK EPISTEMOLOGY, PRAGMATIC ENCROACHMENT AND THE VALUE OF TRUE BELIEF (III-J)

NATHAN BALLANTYNE (UNIVERSITY OF ARIZONA)

I argue that anti-luck epistemologists should either embrace pragmatic encroachment or accept a strong thesis about the value of true belief.

CONSTITUTION, COINCIDENCE, AND DERIVATIVE PROPERTIES (V-I)

MATTHEW J. BARKER (UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN–MADISON)

Constitution, the view that some continuants are numerically and sortally distinct from the matter constituting them, implies Coincidence, the view that some numerically and sortally distinct objects occupy the same spatiotemporal region. Lynn Rudder Baker holds versions of these views and I argue that Michael Burke’s grounding problem for Coincidence confronts her in a particular and underappreciated form: how is it that a marble lump that constitutes a statue such that the lump has all the statue’s properties, is not also sortally a statue? Baker’s explanation is that essences for statues are had only derivatively, not essentially, by lumps constituting them. I examine this appeal to derivative properties and show it merely restates that, rather than explains how, the lump isn’t sortally a statue. So Baker doesn’t solve the Burkean problem. But curiously, I end by suggesting she may not need to solve such problems.

BEYOND NEUTRALITY: THE LIBERAL CASE AGAINST SAME-SEX MARRIAGE PROHIBITIONS (I-J)

PETER BRIAN BARRY (SAGINAW VALLEY STATE UNIVERSITY)

Experience suggests that most legal philosophers and ethicists are not surprised when told that liberal states cannot permissibly prohibit same-sex marriage (henceforth: SSM). It is less clear what the appropriate liberal strategy in defense of SSM should be. However, at least some arguments for SSM prohibitions ostensibly proceed on liberal grounds and liberals who maintain that recognizing SSM neither harms nor seriously burdens anyone have to determine how to dismiss any alleged burdens as less than serious without abandoning their commitment to neutrality. I am skeptical that a bare appeal to liberal neutrality will show either that forbidding or recognizing SSM is illiberal. In any event, liberalism’s constitutive commitment is arguably not to neutrality, but liberty. I argue that this constitutive commitment to liberty suffices to show that SSM prohibitions are illiberal. Effectively, I argue that SSM prohibitions fail to survive a liberal version of rational basis review.

KANT AND THE PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS OF GENIUS (V-H)

STEFAN E. BIRD-POLLAN (HARVARD UNIVERSITY)

Basing myself on Kant’s theory of reflective judgment and aesthetic judgment of beauty, I make some suggestions about how reflective judgment might be used to produce political change. I argue that by
rerearranging the materials of the world, the artistic genius actually alters the empirical concepts of the understanding. While beauty does not provide us with a concept, the artwork provides us with a different composition of the conceptual schema, drawing attention to certain features of reality which we have not noticed before and which can become part of our understanding. I argue that this refiguring also has implications for the moral sphere, since maxims are necessarily formulated in terms of our empirical understanding of the world. Thus the artwork might draw our attention to certain features of the world which have hitherto been neglected as domains of the moral. I link this to Kant’s conception of the enlightenment.

**Exercising Our Senses in Aristotle (V-L)**

*N. Birondo (Claremont McKenna College)*

In his most extensive discussion of perception, Aristotle separates paradigmatic cases of perception from divergent quasi-perceptual cases that nevertheless resemble genuine cases of perception: misperceiving, imagining, dreaming, remembering, hallucinating. All of these phenomena are taken, somewhat surprisingly, to be the result of “imagination” (*phantasia*), a capacity that Aristotle insists is not the same as the perceptual faculty, *aisthêsis*. In this paper I consider a problematic remark that Aristotle makes, at *De Anima* 428a11-15, regarding the difference between *phantasia* and *aisthêsis*. On one extremely natural way of taking the remark, Aristotle’s claim appears to commit him to maintaining that certain straightforward cases of veridical perception are not genuine cases of perception at all. The resulting account of perception appears to preclude unmediated epistemological contact with ordinary material objects; and the resulting account therefore invites the distinctively modern epistemological skepticism to which some commentators have thought Aristotle to be (even especially) immune.

**Death, Priorism, and Deprivation Harm (III-K)**

*S. Blatti (University of Memphis)*

Epicurus notoriously denied that death harms the one who dies. While many have tried to locate the subject of death’s harm (*contra* Epicurus), the “priorist” alternative has received little attention. According to priorism, since death ensures of the antemortem subject that her interests will be undermined, death’s harm is rightly attributed to the living subject. Whilst sympathetic to the claim that the living subject suffers death’s harm, I argue that the character of the harm is inadequately captured by the deprivation theory on which priorism relies. Rather than as depriving the living subject of a welfare she would have enjoyed had she not died, death’s harm is better understood as a constraint on the living subject’s autonomy. This alternative account is shown to be both at home within a priorist framework and more successful at capturing the commitments that motivated us to reject the Epicurean view in the first place.
RATIONALLY SELF-ASCRIBED ANTI-EXPERTISE (V-J)

NICHOLAS BOMMARITO (BROWN UNIVERSITY)

In their paper, “I Can’t Believe I’m Stupid,” Adam Elga and Andy Egan argue that it is never rational to believe oneself to be an anti-expert. I wish to deny the claim that it is never rational for us to ascribe anti-expertise to ourselves and suggest ways that even Perfectly Rational Agents must do so as well.

DOES EMPIRICAL MORAL PSYCHOLOGY VIDICATE UTILITARIANISM? (V-G)

JASON F. BRENNAN (BROWN UNIVERSITY)

Peter Singer and Joshua Greene argue that recent results in empirical moral psychology give us reason to reject commonsense deontology in favor of utilitarianism. They have proposed an empirical test of the acceptability of moral intuitions. I argue that we do not have good grounds for accepting that this is a good test. I argue that they have to admit that some proposed moral theories are unacceptable regardless of the results of their test, but once they admit this, it gives deontologists grounds for accepting deontology regardless of the results of their test.

MEANS-ENDS COHERENCE AND UNMODIFIABLE INTENTIONS (V-K)

JOHN BRUNERO (UNIVERSITY OF MISSOURI–ST. LOUIS)

Some philosophers have argued that the requirements of rationality are normative in that if you are rationally required to \( X \), then you ought to \( X \). However, there is a supposed problem for this view, introduced by Kieran Setiya, having to do with the rational requirement of means-ends coherence. If someone ought to be means-ends coherent, but he cannot modify his ends, then the only way he can do what he ought to do is by intending the means, and, so, he ought to intend the means. But it could be that the means are immoral or imprudent, and thus not the case that he ought to intend the means. So, we must reject the view that means-ends coherence is normative. In this paper, I consider Michael Bratman’s recent proposed solution to this problem, present two objections to it, and present my own solution, which improves on Bratman’s proposal.

OMNISCIENCE, WAYS OF KNOWING, AND KNOWLEDGE DE SE (V-I)

ANDREI A. BUCKAREFF (MARIST COLLEGE)

A knowledge argument against one version of omniGod theism is offered (the view of God on which God exemplifies all of the so-called “omni-properties”). It is argued that God’s epistemic powers are partially fixed by the relationship God bears to the universe in a given world. In those worlds populated by other persons where God is incorporeal and, hence, is neither identical to the universe nor constituted by the universe, God cannot have knowledge \( \text{de se} \) of another person. But in worlds where God is either identical to the universe or constituted by the universe, God can have knowledge \( \text{de se} \) of another person. If this is the case, then God’s epistemic powers are not fixed across possible worlds. The upshot is that
if God exists and can bear a variety of different types of relations to the universe, then God cannot be omniGod.

ERSATZER PRESENTISM AND MODAL SENTENCES ABOUT TIMES (II-L)

RYAN BYERLY (BAYLOR UNIVERSITY)

Presentists claim that for any x, x is present. One major objection which Presentists face is called the grounding objection. In response to this objection, a number of Presentists have moved to a version of Presentism called Ersatzer Presentism. In this paper, I will challenge this move to Ersatzer Presentism as it is fleshed out by two leading Presentists—Thomas Crisp and Craig Bourne. I argue that both of their versions of Ersatzer Presentism face a severe challenge in accounting for the truth of modal sentences like “Yesterday might have been sunny.” Neither Crisp nor Bourne can allow that these sentences are about the particular actual times they seem to be about. Further, the two most obvious translation strategies available to the Ersatzer Presentist for treating sentences of this type fail to track the truth-values of all sentences of the type in question and are subject to independent difficulties.

KANTIAN SUPEREROGATION (III-I)

MICHAEL BYRON (KENT STATE UNIVERSITY)

This paper examines Thomas Hill’s account of supererogation. I will argue that Hill’s account succeeds on its own terms: he shows that it is in fact possible to accommodate a concept of supererogation within a recognizably Kantian deontological moral theory. Doing so, however, reshapes both the concept and the theory in certain ways, and it is mainly this reshaping to which his critics take exception. Marcia Baron argues that Kant’s axiology and anthropology entail rigorism, which in turn entails that supererogation is impossible. Hill retools Kantian axiology in a way that leaves room for supererogation, and he thereby disrupts this argument.

THE KANE-WIDERKER OBJECTION TO FRANKFURT EXAMPLES (I-L)

JAMES CAIN (OKLAHOMA STATE UNIVERSITY)

Among the many objections that have been raised against Frankfurt examples it seems to be generally accepted that the most pressing difficulty—at least for what are termed “prior-sign” examples—is the Kane-Widerker objection. Though I hold that Frankfurt examples are highly problematic, I will argue that the Kane-Widerker objection is much weaker than is generally recognized.

IS “JUSTIFICATION” AN ORDINARY TERM? (II-H)

JACOB N. CATON (UNIVERSITY OF ARIZONA)

The use of intuitions in epistemic theorizing has been criticized in the recent decade, beginning with Weinberg et al. (2001). However, there is an older criticism of certain kinds of epistemic intuition that has been overlooked. Along similar lines to Cohen (1995), I argue that we shouldn’t ask for or use
intuitions about the term ‘justified’ (in the epistemic sense) in theories of knowledge or justification because ‘justified’ is not an ordinary language term. The ordinary status of a term is a good probabilistic indicator of the community’s semantic competence with respect to the term. Data from corpus linguistics shows that ‘justified’ is not an ordinary term, so intuitions about epistemic justification should carry little theoretical value. Epistemic theories of justification should not claim to capture the commonsense view by appeal to widespread intuition because there cannot be any meaningful widespread intuition.

**REDUCTIONISM, NON-REDUCTIONISM, AND THE INFANT/CHILD OBJECTION: A REPLY TO LACKEY (I-G)**

*Aaron R. Champene (University of Arkansas)*

One prominent objection to reductionism in the epistemology of testimony is that it prohibits infants and young children from having justified testimonial beliefs since they seem incapable of obtaining the non-testiminally based reasons required by the view. However, Jennifer Lackey has argued that if infants/children are unable to satisfy this requirement, then they are also unable to non-trivially satisfy the non-reductionist’s no-defeater condition. Consequently, non-reductionism holds no advantage over reductionism in this respect. I argue, first, that Lackey has failed to substantiate her main claim. I then argue that even if she had, there is a reply available to non-reductionists. Specifically, non-reductionists may argue that infants/children can substantively satisfy a no-defeater condition and concede that they can acquire non-testiminally based reasons, but deny that they can have the sort of non-testiminally based reasons that reductionists regard as necessary for testimonial justification. Thus, non-reductionism holds an advantage over reductionism here.

**ON ARPALY AND BEST JUDGMENT (V-K)**

*Andrew Choi (Ohio University)*

In “On Acting Rationally Against One’s Best Judgment,” Nomy Arpaly argues against the view that rational action is action that accords with one’s best judgment—a view I will call the “standard account” of rational action. One of her most convincing arguments relies on our intuitions about Sam, a man who seemingly acts against his best judgment, but who nevertheless seems to be rational in so acting. While Arpaly’s argument is certainly powerful, I don’t think we are thereby required to reject the standard account. In fact, I think one can persuasively argue that Sam acts in accordance with his best judgment after all—in particular, a competing unconscious best judgment that he does not reach through his initial deliberation. This proposal may initially seem problematic, but if we are careful in how we characterize best judgment, I think the proposal can be shown to be a promising one.
HEGEL’S REVIVAL OF SOCRATIC IGNORANCE (I-K)

James A. Dunson (Morehouse College)

G. W. F. Hegel is stuck between a rock and a hard place in the history of moral philosophy. On one hand, he is frequently regarded as an infamous critic of Kantian moral individualism. From the standpoint of Kierkegaard’s Socratic revival, Hegel is seen as ignoring or even suppressing the individual in favor of a “systematic” form of philosophy. This paper addresses both criticisms by reconstructing Hegel’s unique contribution to the history of moral philosophy. Refusing to reduce Hegel to a foil for either Kant or Kierkegaard reveals his own inheritance of a Socratic ethic. I argue that Hegel revives a long-suppressed form of moral and practical philosophy: the Bildung of one’s self-understanding that involves both self-knowledge and self-transformation. Understanding the way in which Hegel resurrects and reinterprets this conception of moral philosophy requires that one pay attention to the close connection between his systematic method and his unique version of skepticism.

TAKING RESPONSIBILITY (II-G)

Kyla Ebels Duggan (Northwestern University)

How can we acknowledge that we all bear the marks of others’ influences while preserving a sense of individual responsibility for our actions? I argue that our practices of holding others responsible are tied to judgments about how they should conduct their deliberations. When we hold someone responsible for wrong-doing, we should consider how the choice looked to her. Though she cannot take unfortunate aspects of her past as reasons to mistreat others, her history might affect her deliberations by making some incentives more salient or some considerations that are not reasons appear to be. Understanding this can lead us to revise our interpretation of the attitude behind her actions and this may alter their moral significance without eliminating it.

SUBJECT SENSITIVE INVARIANTISM AND THE KNOWLEDGE VIEW OF ASSERTION (III-F)

Mylan Engel (Northern Illinois University)

The knowledge view of assertion holds that knowledge is the norm governing assertion. According to this norm, one should flat-out assert that \( p \) only if one knows that \( p \). John Hawthorne embraces the knowledge view of assertion and contends that it supports subject sensitive invariantism better than any competing account of the semantics of knowledge ascriptions. I argue that the knowledge view of assertion harmonizes rather poorly with subject sensitive invariantism. I show that subject sensitive invariantism gives rise to the problem of semantic ignorance vis-à-vis our third-person knowledge ascriptions, because on an subject sensitive invariantist semantics knowledge ascribers will often fail to know what propositions are expressed by their third-person knowledge-ascribing sentences. This semantic ignorance, in turn, creates a serious problem for advocates of the knowledge view of assertion, at least with respect to making third-
person knowledge ascriptions. The latter problem can only be avoided by abandoning the knowledge view of assertion or abandoning subject sensitive invariantism. Either way, contra Hawthorne, the knowledge view of assertion fails to support subject sensitive invariantism.

IS THERE COLLECTIVE SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE? (IV-G)

**MELINDA B. FAGAN (RICE UNIVERSITY)**

Contemporary scientific research is highly collaborative. Yet it is widely held that scientific knowledge is had solely or primarily by individuals. This individualistic assumption is rejected in recent work based on Gilbert’s plural subjects theory (Gilbert 2000, Wray 2007, Rolin 2008). This paper examines an important defense of collective scientific knowledge: accounts of science including this concept better explain important features of inquiry than accounts that do not. I present three objections to this explanatory argument. First, the phenomena to be explained (rate and dynamics of scientific progress) are not empirically confirmed. Second, they do not follow from assumption of collective knowledge alone, but require assumptions which are not independently plausible. Third, if these assumptions are in fact correct, then explanatory motivation for positing collective belief is undermined. So this defense of collective scientific belief fails. I conclude by sketching ways these objections could be avoided.

KANT’S DUTY OF RESPECT FOR OTHER HUMAN BEINGS: ENDS IN THEMSELVES AS WELL AS ENDS FOR OTHERS (III-I)

**MELISSA SEYMOUR FAHMY (UNIVERSITY OF GEORGIA)**

In the *Doctrine of Virtue* Kant labels the duty of respect for other human beings as a *duty of virtue*. If “only an end that is also a duty can be called a duty of virtue” (MS 6:383), it follows that there must be some obligatory end which corresponds to the duty of respect for others. What is this end? The two obligatory ends that Kant explicitly identifies—one’s own perfection and the happiness of others—do not appear to be plausible candidates. I suggest that an answer to this taxonomical puzzle may be found in Kant’s claim that “it is in itself [a] duty to make man as such his end” (MS 6:395). I demonstrate that this moral prescription is not equivalent to the *Groundwork*’s Formula of Humanity and offer an account of what it means to make man as such one’s end.

HUMAN REASON AS PERSUASION: ARISTOTLE ON BELIEF AND RATIONALITY (V-L)

**IAN C. FLORA (UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN—ANN ARBOR)**

Aristotle’s view of rational cognition has been obscured by overemphasis demonstrative knowledge and intellect. This has lead to the assumption that Aristotle’s conception of reason concerns only necessary connections, unshakeable certainty, and strictly demonstrative reasoning. Rationality, however, also grounds and shapes his theory of belief, a mental state that concerns contingent events and falls short of the rigorous demands of high-level epistemic states.
I analyze a well-known argument about belief from *De Anima* 3.3 and reconstruct a picture of Aristotelian rationality that captures the wide range of cognition that deserves the name. Beliefs arise from fine-grained states of confidence. To have such states, a creature must be able to discern the often probabilistic evidential connections between events and states of affairs. To be a rational agent just is, in part, to exercise this capacity to discern, even though such cognition often involves neither necessity, certainty nor demonstration.

**IS TWO A PLURAL PROPERTY? (I-F)**

**Salvatore Florio (The Ohio State University)**

It has been argued that collective plural predicates such as “being two” or “being a couple” signify plural properties, namely, properties taking pluralities as arguments. Plural properties differ from traditional, singular properties that take objects as arguments. This view results primarily from the thesis that plural terms denote pluralities rather than objects. Alternatively, one might take plural terms to denote singular properties and take collective plural predicates to signify singular second-order properties—properties whose arguments are singular properties. Thus, one can eschew pluralities and their properties from one’s semantics. In this paper I examine both views and argue that the second is a viable alternative to the first. If “being two” signifies a property, it does not have to be a plural one.

**PROPOSITIONS AND PARthood: THE Universe AND Anti-Symmetry (III-G)**

**Chris Tillman (University of Manitoba)**

**Gregory Fowler (University of Rochester)**

It is plausible that the world exists: a thing such that absolutely everything is a part of it. It is also plausible that singular, structured propositions exist: propositions that literally have individuals as parts. It is also plausible that for each thing, there is a singular, structured proposition that has it as a part. Finally, it is plausible that parthood is a partial ordering: reflexive, transitive, and anti-symmetric. All of these plausible claims cannot be correct. We canvass some costs of denying each plausible claim and tentatively conclude that parthood is not a partial ordering. Provided that the relevant entities exist, parthood is not anti-symmetric and proper parthood is neither asymmetric nor transitive.

**THE PARADOX OF SUFFICIENCY (IV-L)**

**Christopher Freiman (University of Arizona)**

This paper locates a tension between two claims in political philosophy that are widely regarded as complementary. First, distributive justice requires political institutions to be arranged to secure economic sufficiency for all citizens. Second, political regimes should include institutional procedures that directly aim at securing economic sufficiency for all citizens. Refashioning arguments traditionally affiliated with indirect
consequentialism, I argue that direct institutional means for achieving sufficiency are especially susceptible to self-defeat: the features that make some threshold a satisfactory specification of sufficiency will also make that threshold an unsuitable target for institutional procedures designed to ensure sufficiency.

Understanding across Contexts: A Gadamerian Approach (I-J)

Peter Fristedt (Hofstra University)

How is it possible for two people from very different cultural, social, or political contexts to understand each other? This paper considers the challenge to intercontextual understanding that comes from the view that language is, in Cristina Lafont’s phrase, “world disclosing”—i.e., that different speakers understand from out of different holistically structured worldviews, and hence that there can be no mutual understanding unless there is near total overlap between “worlds.” Gadamer’s hermeneutics, I claim, blocks this consequence by holding that language is a medium in which the distinction between interpretation and object of interpretation is paradoxically both maintained and overcome. This view gives us a way of thinking of the objects of individual interpretations as not simply dependent on their relation to the rest of the speaker’s worldview. Mutual understanding becomes a matter of mutual access to such worldview (but not language) transcendent objects.

The First Virtue and the Realistic Utopia (II-K)

Jonathan F. Garthoff (Northwestern University)

In this essay I explore a tension between two ways that John Rawls characterizes his conception of distributive justice: as the first virtue of social institutions, where principles of justice are moral prohibitions, and as a realistic utopia, where principles of justice are regulative ideals. I argue that it is problematic to advance an optimizing conception of justice (like justice as fairness) with the normative force of moral prohibition, and that doing so stands in tension with Rawls’s understanding of distributive justice as purely procedural. I suggest that the best response to this tension is to withdraw the claim that justice as fairness as a whole is the first virtue of social institutions. An appealing view emerges when we assert basic justice with the force of the first virtue and assert Rawls’s second principle of justice only as a realistic utopia.

Having One’s Own and Distributive Justice in Plato’s Republic (IV-I)

Anna M. Greco (University of Toronto at Mississauga)

Although Plato did not explicitly propose any principle of distributive justice, he indicated that justice involves both the doing and the having of one’s own. On the interpretation I’m proposing, (i) “having one’s own” refers directly to the compensation one receives for doing one’s own; (ii) the principle of distribution of benefits that is actually operative in Plato’s system is that any form of compensation must be such that the worker
(whether ruler, soldier, or producer) has his needs satisfied. I also highlight how Plato’s account does not quite fit any contemporary conceptual framework—either utilitarian or desert-based. But it encourages us to reflect on the moral aspects of economic interactions of exchange, resulting from a fundamental collective choice to associate in order to satisfy individual needs, broadly understood as what human beings need to flourish in their social life.

**HAVE MENTALISM AND EVIDENTIALISM BEEN REFUTED? (III-J)**

*Scott Hagaman (University of Notre Dame)*

Mentalism is the doctrine that subjects cannot be justificationally different without also being mentally different. Michael Bergmann has recently argued that both mentalism and evidentialism succumb to a distinctive type of counterexample. A Bergmann-style counterexample to mentalism and evidentialism is a case which purports to show that it is a contingent property of a subject’s evidence or mental state that it justifies one of her beliefs. If it is a contingent property of some evidence or mental state that it justifies a belief, subjects can be mentally or evidentially identical but differ justificationally. I show that Bergmann’s argument for this claim reduces to a mere request for an intuitional report that it is a contingent property of a perceptual experience that it justifies some subject’s belief. Since this is precisely the intuition that mentalists and evidentialists lack, Bergmann has failed to give either any reasons for abandoning their positions.

**A LIKELY EXPLANATION: IBE AS A GUIDE TO BETTER (BUT NOT MORE PROBABLE) HYPOTHESES (IV-G)**

*David W. Harker (East Tennessee State University)*

Lipton’s (2004) analysis of inference to best explanation (IBE) distinguishes lovely explanations from likely explanations and argues IBE should be understood as promoting inferences to the loveliest explanations. Loveliness is associated with explanatory virtues, such as consilience and simplicity. Lipton defines likeliness in terms of probabilities: the most likely hypothesis has the highest probability of being true. The distinction between lovely and likely explanations is well-motivated. Lipton’s conclusions that IBE should be interpreted as an inference to the loveliest explanation, and that loveliness should be offered as a guide to likeliness, each seem correct. His appeal to probabilities to ground the concept of likeliness is unsurprising, but strikes me as unbefitting of an IBE defence. In this paper I argue against defining likely explanations probabilistically, offer an alternative interpretation, and defend the revision in part by showing that it accommodates two important objections that have been levelled against IBE.
CAUSAL THEORIES OF PROPERTIES AND CONTINGENCY INTUITIONS (IV-H)

Matthew C. Haug (College of William and Mary)

In this paper, I sketch a modified version of the causal theory of properties that is designed to accommodate the powerful and prevalent intuition that the relation between causal powers and properties is contingent in some cases. This proposal relies on the fact that properties can be reliably sorted into different kinds based on what I call the “aspects” that characterize properties of that kind. If it is only causal powers grounded in aspects of a certain kind that individuate and are essential to a given property, then one can accommodate the relevant contingency intuitions while respecting the naturalistic principles that motivate causal theories of properties.

CONSENT, LIBERALISM, AND MULTICULTURALISM (II-K)

Keith D. Hyams (University of Exeter)

This paper examines the claim, made by Robert Nozick and Michael Otsuka, that provided the rules of a community are consented to by their members, it does not matter how liberal or illiberal those rules are. Against this claim Rod Long has argued that liberals should be concerned to ensure that their commitment to freedom and consent is expressed within the rules of communities as well as to the rules of those communities. I examine arguments for and against each claim and conclude in favor of the Nozick-Otsuka position.

RIGIDITY AND PROPER NAMES: DESCRIPTIVISM WITH WORLD PRONOUNS (IV-J)

Yu Izumi (University of Maryland–College Park)

This article offers a descriptivist analysis of proper names under two empirical assumptions. First, some occurrences of proper names have the syntactic form of “the $\Phi$.” Second, the object language quantifies over possible worlds. If these assumptions are empirically correct, a certain form of descriptivism becomes attractive, according to which proper names are rigidified definite descriptions. Linguistic semanticists argue for the existence of variables in natural language that range over possible worlds (“world pronouns”). The meaning of every predicate shifts relative to a world pronoun that the predicate takes as its argument. I demonstrate how definite descriptions can be rigidified by means of world pronouns together with the mechanism of domain restriction. The descriptivist analysis of proper names based on the notion of world pronouns avoids the modal argument against descriptivism.

WHY PERSPECTIVE IS NOT AN EPISTEMIC RELATION (II-I)

René Jagnow (University of Georgia)

In a recent paper, Susanna Schellenberg has argued that we can understand the perspectival character of perceptual experience in terms of the epistemic dependence of representations of intrinsic properties on representations of situation-dependent properties. I consider shape
properties, in order to argue that Schellenberg’s proposal encounters serious problems.

**ANIMALISM AND PERSONHOOD (I-L)**

*William E. Jaworski (Fordham University)*

Animalism claims that we are essentially animals. Philosophers such as Lynne Rudder Baker and E. J. Lowe have sometimes argued that if we are essentially animals we cannot be essentially persons. I defend animalism in conjunction with an account of personhood similar to David Wiggins’s. It claims that being a person amounts to being the member of a natural kind, such as an animal species, whose members normally develop psychological capacities. What distinguishes this account from Wiggins’s is that it appeals to a notion of clinical normality as opposed to mere statistical normality. I argue that this difference insulates it from the criticisms that have been leveled against Wiggins’s account, most notably by Paul Snowdon. The result is a view according to which we are both essentially animals and essentially persons.

**PLATO AND PRACTICAL WISDOM (IV-I)**

*Elizabeth J. Jelinek (Vanderbilt University)*

I argue for a view that departs radically from the long-held assumption that “to know the good is to do the good.” On the view I shall defend, the role of the Form of the Good in the *Republic* is greatly demoted: I argue that Plato thinks that knowledge of the Form of the Good is in fact insufficient for the Philosopher-King to rule. Instead, I attribute to Plato a view that might seem quite un-Platonic: I claim that Plato thinks that knowledge of the Forms must be complemented with a type of “practical wisdom.” I define “practical wisdom” as the ability to discern information about a particular circumstance and the capacity to choose the best actions that will bring about ideal ends for that circumstance. Contrary to traditional interpretations, I argue that Plato recognizes that Formal knowledge is insufficient, and that this type of “practical wisdom” is necessary.

**SKEPTICISM AND CIRCULAR ARGUMENTS (III-J)**

*Daniel M. Johnson (Baylor University)*

Perhaps the most popular and historically important way of responding to skepticism is by an appeal to non-inferential justification. A problem with this sort of response is that while it may constitute a response to skepticism, it does not constitute a response to the skeptic. At some point, the anti-skeptic must simply fall silent, resigned to the fact that her non-inferential justification for the belief challenged by the skeptic is not communicable. I want to point out a possible solution to this problem. I will argue that, in certain circumstances, it is possible to adduce circular arguments which are nevertheless rationally persuasive, and that the anti-skeptic may employ these arguments in lieu of simply falling silent when a non-inferentially justified belief is challenged. The almost universal
assumption among philosophers that epistemically circular arguments are rationally useless is mistaken, and this fact can be utilized by the clever anti-skeptic.

CONFlict, Regret, AND Morality (III-K)

Leonard A. Kahn (U.S. Air Force Academy)

Bernard Williams argued that many mainstream ethical theories—Kantianism in particular—presuppose a notion of moral obligation that renders them unable to make sense of moral conflict and rational moral regret. One line of response is to argue that Kantianism can invoke other normative notions—such as reasons—which are weaker than moral obligations and then explain conflict and regret in terms of them. However, Jonathan Dancy has recently raised doubts about this line of reply and suggested that such notions are no more helpful to Kantians than moral obligation is. I answer these doubts by arguing that the structure of their ethical theory provides Kantians with resources which Dancy does not fully appreciate: Kantians can employ both moral obligations and contributory reasons when explaining tensions in our moral lives. As a result, Kantians can make sense of moral conflict and rational moral regret, contra both Williams and Dancy.

Phenomenology AND THE Problem oF Universals (V-F)

William H. Koch (University of South Florida)

The idea for this paper began with the question of what status the universal could possibly have within the scope of Heidegger’s phenomenology. It seems to me that the implications of Heidegger’s reformulation of the nature of the conceptual has not been fully brought to bear on the question of what we mean by the universal. This is, perhaps, not surprising insofar as these same implications seem, at moments, to also have been overlooked by Heidegger himself. Particularly connected to this issue is the status of transcendental arguments in Heidegger and, indeed, his entire relation to the question of the a priori. Ultimately my own presentation of Heidegger’s thought is likely to swim against the stream of the powerful interpretation of the transcendental Heidegger. In preparation for my discussion of Heidegger I will suggest why it is that Husserl believes we have access to universals and how we might problematize this confidence.

1 It may also be that Heidegger purposefully employs both a traditional and renovated sense of universality in his work.

2 See, for example, Crowell, Steven, Husserl, Heidegger and the Space of Meaning.

Fashion Models AND MorAL REALISTS (IV-F)

Charles B. Kurth (University of California—San Diego)

This essay demonstrates that thinking about the nature of our fashion discourse reveals serious problems for a prominent form of argument for naturalistic moral realism. The argument—call it the analogy argument—
can be found in the work of Richard Boyd, David Brink, Peter Railton, and others. It claims that we have reason to endorse a realist account of moral properties in virtue of the similarities that our moral discourse has with the sciences and other intuitively realist discourses. While many have questioned the extent to which our moral discourse is analogous with that of the sciences, my case against these realists is significant because it demonstrates that their strategy of seeking parallels with the sciences fails to support a claim to moral realism even if we grant that moral discourse is analogous to science in that ways that the realists maintain. More specifically, I argue that because paradigmatically constructivist discourses like fashion evince the same parallels with science, there’s no reason to take the analogy between morals and science as evidence for moral realism. In fact, looking closely at our fashion discourse suggests that moral properties are better understood on a constructivist model.

**Duty Sui Generis and the Individual in Kant’s Religion Within the Boundaries of Mere Reason (V-H)**

**Peter Brickey Lequire (University of Chicago)**

In this paper I examine Kant’s argument that human beings are morally obligated to join or establish a religious “ethical community” as a therapy for “radical evil.” Kant regards this as a duty *sui generis*, because the human propensity to evil cannot be eradicated. This requirement seems to conflict with the fundamental axiom of Kant’s moral philosophy that “ought” implies “can”—i.e., that we are only morally responsible for what is within our power. Although, on Kant’s account, evil has no cause outside the individual’s free decision to deviate from the moral law, Kant’s religious writings would require us to regard it precisely as though it had a phenomenal cause. I seek to show how this duty *sui generis* in Kant’s Religion essay can be made compatible with Kant’s ethical writings, arguing that this constitutes an intriguing, pragmatic moment in Kant’s practical philosophy.

**On the Prior Probability of Ethical Positions (V-G)**

**Kurt Liebegott (Purdue University)**

There is a general assumption in ethical debates that each position is equally likely to be true before we assess the arguments. This paper will argue that this assumption is false, and that instead the position that any action is morally permissible has a higher prior probability than the position that the same action is morally wrong. There are three main reasons for thinking this. First, there must be a specific reason why an action is morally wrong. Second, the overwhelming majority of actions appear to be morally permissible. Third and most importantly, the higher prior probability of the position that any action is morally permissible appears to be a practical requirement for any ethical reasoning to take place. It is concluded that the position that any given action is morally wrong can be rationally held if and only if the evidence and arguments for it are quite strong.
WHAT GOOD IS JUSTIFICATION? (II-H)
CLAYTON M. LITTLEJOHN (UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS–SAN ANTONIO)

It seems from the epistemic point of view that epistemic justification is the sort of thing that is always good to have. It also seems that it is always better from the epistemic point of view to have justified beliefs than unjustified beliefs. Here I’ll discuss an attempt to derive evidentialism from intuitions about epistemic value. I shall argue that evidentialism faces a serious objection in that it classifies beliefs we shouldn’t act on as justified. I shall then explain that even if this objection can be overcome, it shows that an assumption in the argument for evidentialism about epistemic value may well be true but may well fail to support the evidentialist view of epistemic justification.

SCIENCES WITHOUT THEORIES? (IV-G)
ALAN C. LOVE (UNIVERSITY OF MINNESOTA–TWIN CITIES)

Can some sciences be understood apart from theories? This paper offers an affirmative answer by reviewing earlier literature on scientific problems and isolating three overlooked characteristics: hierarchical structure, interdisciplinary location, and diversity of kind. By explicating problem structure as analogous to anatomical structure, these three characteristics are encompassed and a picture emerges of how scientific knowledge can be organized apart from theories. The solution outlined provides an epistemological perspective that is applicable to experimental biology and yields other philosophical assets, such as a novel interpretation of incommensurability.

THE STRAUSSIAN READING OF PLATO’S REPUBLIC (IV-I)
MASON MARSHALL (PEPPERDINE UNIVERSITY)

On an interpretation commonly associated with Leo Strauss, the Republic is supposed to teach us that the just city is impossible, so as ultimately to purge us of the ambition to make our polis into all that a city should be. Most scholars have either ignored this interpretation or roundly criticized it. But Plato studies has shifted enough in recent years that the Straussian reading deserves to be reconsidered, and the objections to it that have been raised so far may no longer carry the day. Offering a new objection, I argue that this interpretation should still be rejected. The heart of my objection is that in order to demonstrate the impossibility of the just city, the Republic would need to show [1] what the just city is and [2] that this city is impossible, yet the Republic cannot demonstrate both of those things.

THE DESIRES OF OTHERS (V-K)
BERISLAV MARUSIC (BRANDEIS UNIVERSITY)

According to T. M. Scanlon’s influential view, desires are almost never normative reasons. I argue that Scanlon’s view is wrong and that desires are almost always pro tanto normative reasons. My argument proceeds in
two steps. First, the desires of others are normative reasons for us even when we don’t believe that satisfying their desires would bring about the good they desire. Second, if the desires of others are normative reasons for us and if, as Scanlon also holds, normative reasons are universal, they are equally normative reasons for them. I conclude by pointing out that the thesis that desires are almost always pro tanto normative reasons does not entail that a desire-based account of reasons is correct.

THE EPISTEMOLOGY OF MORAL RESPONSIBILITY (V-G)

JONATHAN MATHESON (UNIVERSITY OF ROCHESTER)

When an agent performs an act which is objectively wrong, that agent is morally blameworthy for performing that act unless she had an excuse. An agent has an excuse when she fails to meet one or more of the necessary conditions for moral responsibility. Tracing back to Aristotle, two such requirements for moral responsibility have been identified: a control requirement and an epistemic requirement. In this paper I will examine the epistemic requirement for moral blameworthiness: both what epistemic relation one must have toward the relevant propositions as well as what the relevant propositions are. I object to Carl Ginet’s (2000) account of both the requisite epistemic relation and the relevant propositions, offering and defending replacements of my own.

TESTIMONIAL KNOWLEDGE FROM LIES (I-G)

KEVIN MCCAIN (UNIVERSITY OF ROCHESTER)

Recently, Dan O’Brien has argued that there are situations in which a hearer can gain testimonial knowledge from a speaker who is lying. In order to make his case, O’Brien presents two examples where a speaker lies to a hearer, but supposedly the hearer comes to have testimonial knowledge on the basis of the lying speaker’s testimony. O’Brien claims that his examples demonstrate that lies can be used to pass on knowledge in a non-inferential fashion. I argue that O’Brien is mistaken. More specifically, I argue that the hearer’s belief in the second example that O’Brien depicts fails to meet two plausible conditions for knowledge. First, the hearer’s belief fails to satisfy the requirements of the epistemic basing relation. Second, the hearer’s belief is not safe.

PROPOSITIONAL STRUCTURE AND TRUTH CONDITIONS (III-G)

MICHAEL W. McGLONE (UNIVERSITY AT BUFFALO)

This paper presents an account of the manner in which a proposition’s structural features are related to its core truth conditional features. The leading idea underlying this account is that for a proposition to have a certain structure is just for certain entities to play certain roles in the correct theory of the brute facts regarding that proposition’s truth conditions. The paper explains how this account addresses certain worries and questions recently raised by Scott Soames.
AGAINST SCANLON ON THE METAPHYSICS OF REASONS (I-I)

TRISTRAM MCPHERSON (UNIVERSITY OF MINNESOTA–DULUTH)

Recently, some philosophers have suggested that a form of robust realism about ethics, or normativity more generally, does not face a significant explanatory burden in metaphysics. I call this view *metaphysically quietist normative realism*. This paper examines T. M. Scanlon’s defense of this suggestion. Scanlon’s argument rests on two central claims. The first is that if we conceive of normative reasons as propositions, they raise no distinct metaphysical questions. The second is that remaining apparent doubts about reasons are best understood as substantive normative concerns. I argue that, rather than silencing metaphysical questions about reasons, Scanlon’s strategy at best succeeds only in shifting the focus of metaphysical enquiry. I then set aside the details of Scanlon’s view, and argue on general grounds that the quietist realist cannot finesse a crucial metanormative task: to explain the contrast between the correct normative system and alternative putatively normative standards.

KANT’S THEORY OF INTUITION IN THE INAUGURAL DISSERTATION OF 1770 (V-H)

JENNIFER A. MENSCH (PENNSYLVANIA STATE UNIVERSITY)

From 1770 on Kant consistently rejected anything other than a sensible intuition for human beings. By the mid-1790s, however, for the majority of Kant’s successors either intellectual intuition or the practices of an intuitive intellect were understood to be key to solving the problem of relating freedom and nature. How are we to understand Kant’s particular attitude toward intellectual intuition and what are we to make of an apparent reversal in the fortunes of this concept? In addressing the first part of this question I will focus on the earliest moments in Kant’s account of intuition in order to understand how “sensible intuition” becomes the first step in his development of transcendental idealism and how this in turn requires him to reject the possibility of an “intellectual intuition” for human cognition if skepticism is to be overcome.

RUSSELLIAN PHYSICALISM (I-H)

BARBARA G. MONTERO (CITY UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK)

According to David Chalmers, the conceivability of worlds that duplicate our physics yet lack consciousness refutes physicalism. Or rather, it almost refutes it. This qualification arises because “Russellian monism,” characterized roughly as the view that consciousness is determined by the intrinsic properties of fundamental physical entities, escapes this sort of antiphysicalist conceivability arguments. One might think this is good news for the physicalist, but not Chalmers. Although he takes Russellian monism to be a highly appealing view, he claims that many physicalists will reject it as it “shares the spirit of antimaterialism.” I think that the gap in the conceivability argument is more significant than Chalmers has made it out to be, for, as I shall argue, Chalmers fails to take into account a version of Russellian monism, what I refer to as “Russellian physicalism,” that escapes the conceivability argument yet is fully physicalistic.
THE NEW EVIL DEMON PROBLEM FOR INTERNALISM (II-H)

Andrew Moon (University of Missouri–Columbia)

The new evil demon problem is considered to be a serious problem for reliabilism. In this paper, I will show two things. First, I will show that the new evil demon problem afflicts two important versions of internalism: accessibilist internalism, the view that internalism is true and some unaccessed, accessible internal properties are directly relevant to a belief’s justificational status; and historical internalism, the view that internalism is true and some nonpresent internal properties are directly relevant to a belief’s justificational status. Secondly, I will present a dilemma for internalists. The only remaining version of internalism is strong internalism, the view that justificational properties supervene on presently accessed internal properties. So internalists must either accept strong internalism or reject the force of the new evil demon problem. The first option has a counterintuitive implication, and the second option gives up an argument against reliabilism. Either option is unattractive for internalists.

DELUSION, ASSERTION, AND MAD BELIEF (V-J)

Dylan Murray (Georgia State University)

Evidence suggests that delusions often do not occupy the causal roles functionalism claims are characteristic of, and necessary for, beliefs. On this basis several authors have concluded that delusions are not beliefs. These non-doxastic accounts of delusions, though, cannot explain their irrationality because non-beliefs cannot be truth-functionally inconsistent with beliefs. Given that a theory of delusions should, at the very least, account for their irrationality, we might salvage the non-doxastic accounts’ insights but derive a very different conclusion. Namely, if delusions are, but do not play the characteristic causal roles of, belief, then the roles are unnecessary for a state to be a belief and functionalism is false. Delusions also lend support to independent challenges to functionalism, as well, as they can be used to construct cases of “mad beliefs,” the doxastic analogue to David Lewis’s “mad pain.”

LUCK, DEMOCRACY, AND DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE (IV-L)

Mark C. Navin (Oakland University)

Luck egalitarianism claims that inequalities are unjust when they arise from circumstances of luck, but are not unjust when they arise from persons’ choices. One prominent objection to luck egalitarianism is that it cannot ground concern for inequalities that undermine democratic social relations, whenever such inequalities are the result of persons’ choices. I defend luck egalitarianism against this objection. On my view, luck egalitarianism can embrace a conception of choice according to which genuine choice presupposes the possession of a wide range of options. I argue that anti-democratic social relations arise from inequalities that also minimize the options available to those who have less. Therefore, since luck egalitarianism ought to be committed to preserving the conditions
under which genuine choice is possible, luck egalitarianism can ground concern for inequalities that also undermine democratic social relations.

**Rethinking the Branch-Line Case: An Objection to Parfit (I-L)**

*Peter Nichols (University of Wisconsin–Madison)*

In Derek Parfit’s famous Branch-Line Case, we are asked to imagine that a scanner creates a duplicate of him but leaves behind the original person—call him the “branch-line person”—who will soon die. Parfit argues that the branch-line person should regard his impending death as almost as good as ordinary survival. Call this normative claim the “Branch-Line Claim.” I argue that the Branch-Line Claim engenders an intolerable consequence: it would not be wrong of someone to kill the branch-line person shortly after duplication, even in a case where the branch-line person would otherwise live a full life. Moreover, I argue that the reasoning Parfit gives in favor of the Branch-Line Claim is deeply flawed. Nevertheless, since the Branch-Line Claim is not integral to Parfit’s theory of survival, I contend that he and like-minded psychological continuity theorists can dispense with this claim at little cost to their preferred theory.

**Quinn’s Interpretation of Double Effect: Problems and Prospects (II-G)**

*Howard L. M. Nye (University of Alberta)*

The Doctrine of Double Effect states roughly that it is harder to justify causing harm as a means to an end than causing harm as a byproduct. The Doctrine is invoked to explain why it is permissible to do things like divert a trolley from hitting five people to hitting one, but wrong to do things like push someone into the trolley’s path to stop it from hitting five others. However, the actual harms one causes play no role in bringing about the good in either kind of case. To solve this problem, Warren Quinn proposed a version of the Doctrine according to which it is particularly hard to justify affecting someone as a means when this causes her harm. I present several counter-examples to Quinn’s account. I examine some alterations of the account, but find it doubtful that any can capture our intuitions about cases and morally relevant factors.

**Is Hegel an Unwitting Humean? (I-K)**

*Kate Padgett Walsh (Iowa State University)*

Hegel is famously critical of Kant’s claim that pure reason can legislate for the will; more specifically, he is critical of the claim that moral deliberation requires radically stepping back from everything empirical about ourselves. The question I take up in this paper is whether this criticism places Hegel in familiar territory occupied by Humeans. If deliberation does not involve radically stepping back from everything that is particular about ourselves, then must normative claims, specifically reasons for action, have their source in desires? This question is of vital importance not only for Kantian and Humean ethics, but also for any attempt to develop a distinctively Hegelian approach in ethics. I sketch a Hegelian response to two distinct
Humean claims about reasons and desires. This response rejects normative Humeanism but advances an amended version of motivational Humeanism.

**AGAINST DARWALL’S FOUNDATION FOR CONTRACTUALISM (I-I)**

**DOUGLAS R. PALETTA (UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA)**

In *The Second-Person Standpoint*, Darwall proposes a new and interesting foundation for contractualism. Rather than begin with an ideal or value, like fairness, Darwall attempts to ground contractualism in the way we practically engage with others. He focuses on the requirements, or “felicity conditions,” for the family of relational interactions we have with one another, such as blaming, demanding, and holding accountable. Successfully grounding contractualism in these requirements provides a firmer and more general foundation than approaches that depend on our (possibly contingent) values. Despite its promise, Darwall’s novel approach sacrifices important elements of traditional contractualist ideals like justifiability to each and substantive equality. I argue a value-oriented foundation that appeals to the ideal of justifiability both overcomes Darwall’s challenges based on Strawson’s Point and better secures familiar versions of traditional contractualist ideals.

**WHAT THE EXTERNALIST CANNOT KNOW A PRIORI (IV-K)**

**TED S. PARENT (UNIVERSITY OF NORTH CAROLINA–CHAPEL HILL)**

According to Paul Boghossian, semantic externalism implies that given *a priori* knowledge of our own thought-contents, we could know *a priori* contingent facts about the empirical world. After presenting the argument, I shall respond by resisting Boghossian’s claim that an externalist can know *a priori*: If s/he has the concept WATER, then water exists. I do this by defending externalism about empty concepts from Boghossian’s criticisms.

**SEEING IS NOT BELIEVING: A CASE FOR MODIFYING REID’S THEORY OF PERCEPTION (II-I)**

**ADAM PELSER (BAYLOR UNIVERSITY)**

Thomas Reid famously defended a nonreductive (or, dualcomponent) theory of perception, according to which the primary cognitive component of perception is belief. Despite the strength of his conviction that belief is an essential ingredient in perception, Reid’s own reflections on dim and infant perceptions suggest a couple of possible exceptions to his theory. In addition to dim and infant perceptions, oasis-type cases, in which one perceives while believing oneself to be hallucinating, support the plausibility of perception without belief. I thus propose a modification of Reid’s theory of perception according to which the cognitive component is construal, rather than belief. Had Reid adopted this modification, he could have avoided the counterexamples to doxastic analyses of perception examined herein, while nevertheless enjoying the antiskeptical benefits of his dualcomponent theory as exemplified in his *experimentum crucis*. 
GENERALIZING SOAMES’S ARGUMENT AGAINST RIGIDIFIED DESCRIPTIVISM (IV-J)

BRYAN PIECKEL (UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS–AUSTIN)

In a number of publications, Scott Soames has argued that Rigidified Descriptivism is false, because it predicts that one cannot believe, say, that Joe Strummer was born in 1952, without having a belief about the actual world. Soames suggests that agents in other possible worlds may have this belief, but may lack any beliefs about the actual world which they do not occupy and have no contact with. I argue that Soames’s argument extends to other actuality-involving analyses which have been popular in semantics. I argue that in order for Soames to hold on to his argument against Rigidified Descriptivism, he must provide alternatives to these analyses. I then argue that there is reason to think that these analyses are not forthcoming, so Soames should surrender his argument against Rigidified Descriptivism.

OPPRESSION AS GROUP HARM (I-J)

ANDREW PIERCE (LOYOLA UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO)

Oppression is a powerful concept for political theory. Yet it is often used in such a way that its meaning escapes precise definition, a way that scarcely differentiates it from exploitation, domination, discrimination, and other kinds of abuse. In what follows, I will attempt to provide a more precise definition of oppression, one that makes clear that the concept, as it is most often employed in contemporary political thought, differs significantly from its employment by classical liberals. I argue that while for classical liberalism oppression named a kind of individual harm, oppression as it is most often used today points to a kind of group harm. Therefore, the strategies for ameliorating oppression now will differ significantly from those that classical liberalism advocated, and even from contemporary “multicultural” liberalism, which suffers, I will argue, from an imprecise and even mistaken understanding of oppression.

IS A THEISM-FRIENDLY MODERATE SKEPTICAL THEISM PHILOSOPHICALLY DEFENSIBLE? (III-L)

MARK PIPER (JAMES MADISON UNIVERSITY)

A popular objection to skeptical theism is that it leads to a slippery slope of undesirable skepticism of various kinds. A common response to these objections is to urge that taking other aspects of theism into account serves to nullify such fears by providing grounds for the restriction of skeptical theism to theism-friendly grounds alone. Yet although this position has often been mentioned, not a great deal has been written on ways that theists can defend it. In this paper I consider three ways in which a theism-friendly moderate skeptical theism might be established, and argue that all of them are subject to difficulties. I conclude that the best recourse for skeptical theists is to justify the restriction of their skepticism within theism-friendly borders through faith alone.
A METAPHYSICAL MONSTROSITY: THE FORM OF SOUL (V-L)

BRIAN D. PRINCE (RICE UNIVERSITY)

In this paper I shall describe a puzzle that arises in the Phaedo and suggest a solution. The problem is this: the Phaedo’s two main philosophical topics are the theory of Forms and the immortality of the soul. The intersection of these should be of central importance: is there a Form of Soul that accounts for the being of individual souls and for their immortality, or should we account for individual souls in some other way? Yet there is not a word on this topic in the Phaedo. I shall show that Socrates says enough that we should answer, on his behalf, that there is a Form of Soul. This raises two other questions: if Plato is committed to this theory, why doesn’t he make this clear? And second, what does this theory say about the nature of individual souls? I suggest answers to these questions as well.

THE BAYESIAN EXPLANATION OF TRANSMISSION FAILURE (V-J)

GEOFFREY PYNN (NORTHERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY)

Transmission failure occurs when a subject’s e-based justification for believing \( p \) cannot provide her with justification to believe \( q \), despite the fact that she recognizes that \( p \) entails \( q \). According to the Bayesian explanation, transmission failure occurs because \( P(q|e) < P(q) \). I argue that the Bayesian explanation is extensionally inadequate: the condition it identifies is neither necessary nor sufficient for transmission failure.

PROPOSITIONS ARE NOT ON PAPER, IN YOUR BRAIN, OR ANYWHERE ELSE (III-G)

JOSHUA RASMUSSEN (UNIVERSITY OF NOTRE DAME)

A number of philosophers think that propositions are spatial things, such as sentences, brain states, or sums of such things. I offer a new argument against that view. I also reveal an unforeseen cost of any reply that makes use of the distinction between “truth in” and “truth at.”

NO EPISTEMIC NORM OF ASSERTION (IV-K)

BRADLEY RETTLER (UNIVERSITY OF NOTRE DAME)

The epistemic norm of assertion is the condition or conditions which are necessary for a subject to epistemically properly assert something. Many accounts of the norm have been defended, and counter-examples have been offered to each. In this paper, I lay out the conditions and counter-examples to them, and then discuss the various ways that proponents of each condition respond. All responses are of three basic types. I argue that each type of response is unacceptable. Thus, proponents of each condition need new ways of responding to counter-examples. If there aren’t any, or they fail, we ought to conclude that either the norm of assertion is context-sensitive and thus wildly disjunctive, or there isn’t one.
CAUSAL POWERS AND FINAL CAUSES (IV-H)

MICHAEL W. ROTA (UNIVERSITY OF ST. THOMAS)

A causal power is a property which accounts for the fact that its bearer is disposed to engage in a certain sort of activity. Here I argue that contemporary causal powers theorists need, and already have, a place for final causes in their theory, at least on one historically prominent conception of final causation (that of Thomas Aquinas).

KANT’S CONCEPTION OF INNER VALUE (III-I)

OLIVER SENSEN (TULANE UNIVERSITY)

There is an important movement within the current Kant literature that emphasizes the role of value in Kant’s moral thought. The absolute inner value of human beings is often said to be the reason why one should respect others, and to be the foundation even of the Categorical Imperative itself. However, the literature contains few reflections upon the meta-ethical questions of what this value itself is supposed to be. What does one mean in saying that human beings have an absolute value? What is this value ontologically? How can one discern it, and why should one be motivated to pursue it? In this paper I shall first look at Kant’s arguments for his meta-ethical views (Section 1), and then consider how he conceives of value ontologically (Section 2).

AGAINST CREDIBILITY (II-F)

JOSEPH H. SHIEBER (LAFAYETTE COLLEGE)

How should we characterize the role of testifier credibility in the transmission of testimonial justification? In particular, how does the monitoring of a testifier’s credibility by recipients of testimony bear upon the epistemic license accruing to a recipient’s belief in the testifier’s communications? According to an intuitive and philosophically influential conception, licensed acceptance of testimony requires that recipients of testimony monitor testifiers with respect to their credibility. I argue that this conception, however, proves itself to be untenable when confronted with the wealth of empirical evidence from social psychology bearing on the ways in which testifiers and their interlocutors actually interact.

ON THE EPISTEMIC INCENTIVE TO DELIBERATE PUBLICLY (II-J)

ANDREW F. SMITH (ILLINOIS STATE UNIVERSITY)

Why should citizens regard engagement in public deliberation to be a worthwhile endeavor when they run into opposition in the process of seeking to influence political decisions? Under such circumstances, why should citizens be motivated to engage in free, open, and reasoned dialogue with political opponents? In this essay, I draw primarily on considerations offered by C. S. Peirce to argue that citizens maintain a salient epistemic incentive to deliberate publicly when (a) they pursue the enshrinement of their convictions in laws and public policies and (b) are challenged by others in this pursuit. Engagement in public deliberation provides citizens
with the opportunity to develop beliefs that endure over time—beliefs that do not succumb to doubt—precisely because they stand up effectively to concerted scrutiny.

**ANTICIPATION IN DANTO’S NARRATIVE NOTION OF HISTORY: THE CASE OF *WE GOT IT!* (III-L)**

*Stephen D. Snyder (Fatih University, Istanbul)*

This paper examines *We Got It!*, the contribution of a confectionary union to Chicago’s 1993 exhibition *Culture in Action*, in order to show that though Danto’s essentialist theory of art—art as historically indexed embodied meaning—is very helpful in explaining contemporary art, he was in error in believing that the final narrative interpretation had been made. Thus, he was unable to see the value in those artistic expressions that were furthering the dialogue of art. Habermas, in his discussion of narrative statements, argues that in the right context, some “future historical” statements can serve as a hermeneutical guide for practically oriented action. Applying this theoretical perspective to the creation and interpretation of art, my analysis of the *Culture in Action* exhibition supports the claim that in the pluralistic world of contemporary art, artistic expression is not arbitrary, but is part of a process of cultural self-understanding.

**ARNAULD’S OCCASIONALISM (III-H)**

*Eric Stencil (University of Wisconsin–Madison)*

One of the most overlooked philosophers of the 17th century is the Cartesian philosopher Antoine Arnauld. One question which has received some attention lately is whether Arnauld adopted mind-body interactionism or abandoned interactionism for a limited version of occasionalism. The most notable defense of an occasionalist reading of Arnauld is offered by Steven Nadler. Nadler’s interpretation focuses on Arnauld’s later works. Nadler suggests in a footnote that Arnauld’s account in his later works appears to be at odds with the account Arnauld offered in an earlier work, the Port-Royal *Logic*. I defend a reading of Arnauld as a limited occasionalist and offer an interpretation of the *Logic* which is not only consistent with his later works, but which requires an occasionalist reading. My interpretation is preferable because it best fits the text and avoids attributing a pervasive confusion to Arnauld.

**HUMEANISM AND AMORALISM (III-K)**

*Steven Swartz (University of Nebraska–Lincoln)*

According to the Humean Theory of Motivation (hereafter “HTM”), agents cannot be motivated to act by beliefs alone, but must have a distinct desire. Amoralists are sometimes thought to pose a special problem for those who deny this theory: if moral beliefs are not necessarily connected to motivation, then something extra is needed to pick up the slack and a complete explanation of an agent’s behavior must appeal to this extra element. For, since the presence of moral beliefs does not guarantee that
she will be appropriately motivated, explanations citing only those beliefs would be too shallow. I contend that the possibility of amoralism offers no support for HTM. The direct argument from amoralism to HTM rests on questionable premises about desire. Moreover, the reasons for doubting these premises also give us reason to doubt that Humean explanations are any deeper than the supposedly objectionable anti-Humean alternatives.

**EXPERIENCE IN CONTEXT: DEWEY ON AESTHETIC APPRECIATION (II-J)**

*JOSEPH SWESEN (UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS–URBANA–CHAMPAIGN)*

I argue that John Dewey’s account of aesthetic experience offers a contextual approach to aesthetic appreciation that could benefit contemporary contextual definitions of art. It is well known that many philosophers who employ contextual definitions of art (most notably, George Dickie) also argue that traditional conceptions of aesthetic experience are obsolete because they fail to distinguish art from non-art when confronted with hard cases like Marcel Duchamp’s *Fountain*. While questions of perceptual indiscernibility are a problem for many traditional theories of aesthetic experience, I argue they are not a problem for Dewey. Dewey’s account of experience is not only compatible with Dickie’s “institutional theory” but Dewey’s oft criticized notion of “an experience” additionally brings a needed evaluative component to contextual definitions by showing how appeals to our experience of the theoretical, historical, and institutional contexts of the “artworld” can better explain how something like a urinal could become worthy of aesthetic appreciation.

**RORTY ON ANALYTIC PHILOSOPHY: THE RADICAL BREAK OR PARTIAL CONTINUITY? (III-L)**

*TADEUSZ SZUBKA (SZCZECIN UNIVERSITY)*

It is quite widely assumed that at the beginning of his career Richard Rorty was an orthodox analytic philosopher, working in its then current mainstream, and especially fascinated by the linguistic turn taken by this tradition. Subsequently he supposedly radically and dramatically changed his views, turning himself from a staunch analytic philosophers into a vigorous critic of the analytic tradition and ultimately paradigmatically postmodern and continental thinker. It is argued in the paper that this common picture exaggerates changes in Rorty’s philosophical views. He certainly never became a fully postmodern and continental philosopher, whatever it means. And what seems here more important, he always had a lot of reservations about analytic philosophy and had less hopes of it than one or two passages from his early writings suggest.
THREE CHALLENGES TO JAMESIAN ETHICS (II-J)
Robert B. Talisse (Vanderbilt University)
Scott F. Aikin (Vanderbilt University)

William James formulated a unique moral theory rooted in commitments to meliorism and pluralism. The authors pose three pragmatic challenges to Jamesian ethics.

MASSES AND EXTENDED SIMPLES (I-F)
Charlie Tanksley (University of Virginia)

In this paper I argue extended simples are impossible. I offer a novel variation on a familiar, though controversial, argument: extended simples have a left and a right half; if an object has a left and right half, then it has parts; therefore, extended simples have parts. I argue that if masses exist (masses are the physical objects that are the referents of mass nouns), all extended simples must be constituted by masses. I also argue that those masses must have genuine parts. In light of these facts, I argue that either the extended simple itself must have genuine parts or masses must not have genuine parts. Since neither conclusion is acceptable, I conclude that extended simples are impossible.

LUCK, WHOLEHEARTEDNESS, AND PUNISHING FAILED CRIMINAL ATTEMPTS (II-G)
Michael Tiboris (University of California–San Diego)

As David Lewis suggests, in his widely read article on punishment, wholehearted attempts are open to more punishment than halfhearted ones. I argue that wholeheartedness, if it matters to desert, can’t be cashed out in terms of risk of harm as Lewis suggests. Examples of attempts with extremely low probabilities of success effectively separate wholeheartedness and risk, and suggest that if wholeheartedness matters it must be for other reasons. I think the distinction between attempts and successes does spin on the issue of luck, however. And when properly understood we can see how significant this threat is to theories of punishment which focus on desert in general.

PROPOSITIONS AND PARTHOOD: THE UNIVERSE AND ANTI-SYMMETRY (III-G)
Chris Tillman (University of Manitoba)
Gregory Fowler (University of Rochester)

It is plausible that the world exists: a thing such that absolutely everything is a part of it. It is also plausible that singular, structured propositions exist: propositions that literally have individuals as parts. It is also plausible that for each thing, there is a singular, structured proposition that has it as a part. Finally, it is plausible that parthood is a partial ordering: reflexive, transitive, and anti-symmetric. All of these plausible claims cannot be correct. We canvass some costs of denying each plausible claim and tentatively conclude that parthood is not a partial ordering. Provided that
the relevant entities exist, parthood is not anti-symmetric and proper parthood is neither asymmetric nor transitive.

GROUNDING, BORDER-SENSITIVITY, AND INTRINSICALITY (I-F)

Kelly Trogdon (Lingnan University)

It has become more or less a platitude in the literature on intrinsicality that so-called border-sensitive properties like being a rock are non-intrinsic. In this paper I challenge this idea. First, I argue that we should understand Sider’s [2001, 2003] notion of border-sensitivity in terms of grounding (alternatively, the in virtue of relation) rather than mere metaphysical necessitation. Second, I argue that if there are border-sensitive properties, then the grounding relations that are supposed to render them non-intrinsic are actually orthogonal to intrinsicality. Third, I explain what sorts of grounding relations do make for non-intrinsicality.

IS PHENOMENAL CONSERVATISM TOO PERMISSIVE? (II-I)

Chris Tucker (University of Notre Dame)

Phenomenal Conservatism, sometimes called dogmatism, is the view that, necessarily, if it seems to S that P, then S has prima facie justification. Some philosophers object that this view is too permissive in that it allows seemings to provide prima facie justification no matter how they are caused. This objection—or at least Peter Markie’s version of it—fails to take seriously the new evil demon objection to reliabilism. Phenomenal Conservatism is a very permissive view of (non-inferential) justification, but it is not too permissive.

BELIEF, RE-IDENTIFICATION, AND FINENESS OF GRAIN (I-H)

Benedicte Veillet (University of Maryland–College Park)

The so-called “re-identification condition” (Kelly 2001) plays an important role in the most prominent argument for nonconceptualism, the argument from fineness of grain. The argument goes roughly like this: experience represents very determinate shades of color. But according to the re-identification condition, for a subject’s experience to represent such determinate shades conceptually, she must have the ability to re-identify the shade at different times. Since the empirical data suggests that most subjects are unable to re-identify most fine-grained determinate shades, the nonconceptualist concludes that the constituents of experience that represent these fine-grained shades are not concepts. I argue here that appealing to the re-identification condition in arguments from fineness of grain is self-defeating. Though the condition plays a crucial role in the argument from fineness of grain, it ultimately serves to undermine that argument. The nonconceptualist is better off, I conclude, arguing for nonconceptualism without relying on the re-identification condition.
MATHEMATICS AND LEIBNIZIAN NECESSITY (III-H)

JOEL D. VELASCO (STANFORD UNIVERSITY)

In this paper, it is argued that Leibniz’s view that necessity is grounded in the availability of a demonstration is incorrect. First, we show that modern mathematical logic shows that this “infinite analysis” view of contingency is incorrect. It is then argued that Leibniz’s own examples of incommensurable lines and convergent series undermine rather than bolster his view by providing further examples of necessary truths that are not demonstrable. Finally, it is argued that a more modern view on convergent series would, in certain respects, help support some claims he makes about the necessity of mathematical truths, but would still not yield a viable theory of necessity due to remaining problems with other mathematical and modal claims.

IN DEFENCE OF IMPERATIVE INFERENCE (IV-J)

PETER B. M. VRANAS (UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN–MADISON)

“Surrender; therefore, surrender or fight” is apparently an argument corresponding to an inference from an imperative to an imperative. Several philosophers, however (Williams 1963; Wedeking 1970; Harrison 1991), have denied that imperative inferences exist, arguing that (1) no such inferences occur in everyday life, (2) imperatives cannot be premises or conclusions of inferences because it makes no sense to say, for example, “since surrender” or “it follows that surrender or fight”, and (3) distinct imperatives have conflicting permissive presuppositions (“surrender or fight” permits you to fight without surrendering, but “surrender” does not), so issuing distinct imperatives amounts to changing one’s mind and thus cannot be construed as making an inference. In response I argue inter alia that, on a reasonable understanding of “inference,” some everyday-life inferences do have imperatives as premises and conclusions, and that issuing imperatives with conflicting permissive presuppositions does not amount to changing one’s mind.

“THINGS FOR ACTIONS”: LOCKE’S MISTAKE IN “OF POWER” (III-H)

JULIE WALSH (UNIVERSITY OF WESTERN ONTARIO)

In a letter to William Molyneux John Locke states that in reviewing his chapter “Of Power” for the second edition of An Essay Concerning Human Understanding he noticed that he had made one mistake which, now corrected, has put him “into a new view of things” which will clarify his account of human freedom. Locke says the mistake was putting “things for actions” on p. 123 of the first edition, a page on which the word “things” does not appear.¹ It is the aim of this paper to (1) elucidate where the correction occurs, (2) give an analysis of why the correction is needed, and (3) give an explanation of why Locke believed replacing “things” with “actions” was an important change.

THE DICE PROBLEM (II-L)

Jennifer Wang (Rutgers University)

Actualism faces several well-known problems when it comes to possible world semantics. One of these concerns expressive power: it looks as if actualists of a certain sort must conflate possibilities, as they are unable to distinguish between distinct possibilities. I will argue that this burden should not be placed squarely on the actualist, as it is a problem for possibilism’s main defender, David Lewis. These will be the topics of sections 1 and 2. In section 3, I will argue that the problem stems from a different debate, one about the relation between possibility and possible worlds.

BEYOND UNDISTINGUISHING JUDGMENTS: THE POSITIVE RESOURCES OF HUME’S “OF NATIONAL CHARACTERS” (II-K)

Margaret A. Watkins (Saint Vincent College)

Hume’s “Of National Characters” is infamous for its racist footnote asserting the superiority of “the whites.” While commentators have justly condemned this racism, and some have addressed the complexity of Hume’s position on these kinds of prejudices, the positive resources of this essay for understanding and overcoming cultural conflict remain unexplored. I identify and discuss three insights from the essay that offer such resources. These insights concern (1) the importance of public confrontation of enemies; (2) the significance of common language; and (3) the possibility of change in national or cultural character. Consideration of these insights reveals Hume’s argument against the physical determination of national character to be of continuing relevance for sociological and philosophical discussions of culture.

SCHELLING AND SCHOPENHAUER ON THE KNOWLEDGE OF FREEDOM (I-K)

Nikolaj Zunic (St. Jerome’s University)

This paper offers a succinct explication of Friedrich Schelling’s and Arthur Schopenhauer’s arguments that we can never know that we are free. According to Schelling, human freedom is located in the ground of being, which is a dark and inscrutable will and which is the principle of evil. The fact that the ground is not intelligible militates against any knowledge of freedom. By contrast, Schopenhauer follows a faithful Kantian argument by removing freedom from the domain of phenomena, which are cognizable through the categories, and by placing it in a noumenal sphere, beyond the reaches of the principle of sufficient reason. In conclusion I offer the argument that our ignorance of our freedom can lead to both positive defences of freedom as well as nihilistic repudiations of freedom.
ABSTRACTS OF INVITED AND SYMPOSIUM PAPERS

HUME’S ACCOUNT OF DURATION: AN EMPIRICIST SUCCESSOR TO DESCARTES (I-C)

DONALD L. M. BAXTER (UNIVERSITY OF CONNECTICUT)

Hume holds that all and only successions have duration, and that there are steadfast objects that do not. These are temporally simple things without duration that nonetheless coexist with successions. This strange view can be understood as a natural successor to Descartes’s view that time, conceived as suitable for doing physics, is what Gorham calls “successive duration.” On this Cartesian view, everything that takes up time has duration by being a succession. Such a view, however, goes beyond appearances. There are some things that, even after careful scrutiny, appear not to be successions even if they are not temporally brief. These are things that, to all appearances, are steadfast and unchanging. Because of skeptical considerations, Hume restricts his theorizing to things as they appear, and makes no claims about things as they really are. Therefore, applying the Cartesian view of duration and given this skeptical restriction, there are things that are not temporally brief yet are not successions. Consequently there are two ways of taking up time: by enduring or by being steadfast. Hume’s idiosyncratic view is a Cartesian view qualified by Empiricist restraint.

MAKING SENSE OF LEVELS IN THE SCIENCES (V-B)

CARL GILLETT (NORTHERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY)

Talk of levels is ubiquitous in the sciences and I focus on describing two scientific uses of “level” which are ontological in nature. One usage is a looser heuristic notion of “level” used to group disciplines or their work, but a second usage of “level” is focused on the relations of specific entities under certain background conditions. My goal in the paper is to show that such notions of “level” are built upon scientific notions of composition and to demonstrate that a better understanding of such concepts illuminates the nature of such “levels.” At the heart of my work is the descriptive project of reconstructing the notions of composition between powers, properties, individuals and processes used in the sciences. For the emerging consensus in philosophy of science is that an important kind of mechanistic explanation is basically a compositional explanation which explains entities of higher sciences in terms of the entities of lower sciences that such explanations take to compose them. Using concrete scientific cases, I outline some of the general features of scientific notions of composition before providing precise theory schemas for the particular
compositional relations posited between powers, properties, individuals and processes. Using this framework for scientific composition, I argue that a picture of nature as having compositional levels is a very natural one given the character of mechanistic explanations. Furthermore, I show our framework provides plausible reconstructions of the two scientific usages of “level” we have taken as our focus. Along the way, I also note how scientific concepts of composition provide an intuitive base for a philosophically neglected, and ontological, form of scientific reductionism.

**Levels of Being (V-B)**

*John Heil (Washington University in St. Louis)*

A popular view among philosophers of many different persuasions is that the world comprises levels of being. At the fundamental level are the things of interest to fundamental physics, the quarks, electrons, and fields, and their properties. At higher levels are complex objects and their properties. Complex objects are made up of arrangements of objects at lower levels. But higher-level items are not just arrangements of lower-level things. Higher-level objects and properties might be dependent on those at lower-levels, but this dependence is consistent with a measure of autonomy. Thus higher-level properties are said not to be reducible to—in the sense of identifiable with—lower-level properties. I discuss this hierarchical picture, argue that it is gratuitous and very likely ontologically incoherent.

**Two Accounts of Stoic Oikeiôsis (II-E)**

*Jacob Klein (Colgate University)*

The Stoic theory of oikeiôsis develops a distinctive account of the human good and describes the developmental process by which an understanding of the good is acquired. According to one interpretation of the Stoic theory, all appropriate motivation expresses a dominant impulse to self-preservation that persists throughout this development and constitutes a criterion of rational action in the human case. According to a second interpretation, although humans are born with an impulse to self-preservation, rational maturity is characterized by the abandonment of this motivation altogether. I argue that both views are mistaken in supposing that the Stoics have a particular interest in self-preserving behavior at all. The import of the oikeiôsis theory lies rather in its emphasis on self-perception, the motivational mechanism that controls and explains appropriate action in both the animal and human case. The Stoics hold that the human good depends on a form of perception whose perfection is constitutive of practical rationality and an analogue of the perceptual awareness observable in animals. The motivational mechanism of self-perception, rather than the motive of self-preservation, is the central concern of the oikeiôsis doctrine and illuminates the theory’s role in Stoic ethical argument.
NATIONAL CHARACTER VIA THE BEAUTIFUL AND SUBLIME? (IV-C)

ROBERT B. LOUDEN (UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN MAINE)

In this paper I examine Kant’s treatment of national character in the Fourth Section of his 1764 work, Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and Sublime. After exploring some interconnections between the Observations and Kant’s anthropology lectures (1772-98) and his pre-1764 geography lectures, I try to show why national character is important for Kant. I then proceed to my main goals, which are both negative and positive. Although I point to several inconsistencies and weaknesses in his portrayal of national character, I also try to show, contrary to present scholarly opinion, that there is much that is redeemable in the Fourth Section of the Observations. Knowledge of national character forms an integral dimension of Kant’s pragmatic orientation toward the world and its inhabitants: we cannot achieve world-knowledge (Weltkenntnis) without it. Kant’s teleological assumption within his philosophy of history also includes the core conviction that nature wills progress through diversity and plurality. Nature itself thus seeks to preserve cultural pluralism and national characters, whether human beings aim to or not. The variety of national characters will not be obliterated by the forces of globalization, for “nature wills it otherwise” (Toward Perpetual Peace 8: 367). The best cosmopolitanism is one that recognizes that different states “are not to be fused into a single state” (Toward Perpetual Peace 8: 354).

NEWTON’S CHALLENGE TO PHILOSOPHY: A PROGRAMMATIC ESSAY (II-D)

ERIC SCHLIESSE (LEIDEN UNIVERSITY)

The main point of this paper is to identify a set of arguments that became very influential within philosophy in the wake of Newton’s success. These arguments use the authority of natural philosophy/mechanics to settle debates within philosophy. I label these arguments “Newton’s Challenge.” Newton had some hand in promoting them, but he is not responsible for all of them. The heart of the paper (sections II-III) identifies the core set of arguments that constitute “Newton’s Challenge.” In section IIA, I draw on two eighteenth-century figures (Euler and Musschenbroek) to introduce “Newton’s Challenge” and distinguish four strands within it. In section IIB, I use Berkley as evidence that “Newton’s Challenge” was recognized by philosophical opponents to Newton and I identify in his work five counter-strategies. In section IIC, I identify Newton’s contribution to Newton’s Challenge. In section III, I use the writings by MacLaurin, Gravesande, and Musschenbroek to identify eight arguments that constitute the way “Newton’s Challenge” was articulated in practice. My interest in these arguments is four-fold: first, these arguments may have played some role in creating the conceptual building blocks for a “split” between philosophy and science in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. I hope that tracing the uses and abuses of these arguments in that “split” can be a way in which history and philosophy of science can enrich each other; I do not pursue the line of inquiry in this paper. Second, these arguments give us not merely insight into Newton’s immediate impact on philosophy,
but their existence may help resolve otherwise intractable exegetical problems in history of philosophy. I have started to pursue some of the relevant research elsewhere. Related to this is a third interest: to better understand and contextualize the exemplaric role of Newton in three not entirely overlapping scholarly discourses: i) Newton’s role in the founding of history of science as a discipline in the works of Koyré, I. B. Cohen, Whiteside, Dobbs, Guerlac, and the Halls; ii) the importance of Newton to recent Kantian philosophy of science (see the work by Michael Friedman, especially); iii) Newton’s status in recent philosophy of science (William Harper, Edward McGuire, Howard Stein, George E. Smith), who helped reinvigorate the historical study of philosophy of science in response to Kuhn, Popper, Hanson, and Lakatos. This project should appeal to philosophers, historians, and sociologists. Fourth, these arguments have a curious afterlife in the vigour by which the so-called “scientific philosophers” of the early twentieth century argued for their research agenda. Despite the demise of the Logical Empiricists and the recent relatively neglected standing of Russell within analytic philosophy these have acquired the status of conventional wisdom among Anglophone, analytic philosophers. In the final section (iv) of this paper I provide some evidence for the claims associated with this fourth rationale.

**NEWTON’S ONTOLOGY OF OMNIPRESENCE AND INFINITE SPACE (II-D)**

**JAMES MCGUIRE (UNIVERSITY OF PITTSBURGH)**

**EDWARD SLOWIK (WINONA STATE UNIVERSITY)**

A central topic in the Newtonian metaphysics of space is its ontic status: is it a substance, an attribute of a substance, or an entity whose mode of being falls outside the traditional categories? To clarify Newton’s position it is necessary to consider the intimate connections between his conceptions of Divine omnipresence and infinite space. Although his many contemporaries in England and on the Continent wrote at length on this topic, Newton’s thought in many ways is original, and underwent change over time. Among the “Cambridge Platonists” a doctrine which Henry More called “holenmerism” and a position he called “nullibism” were discussed extensively. According to holenmerism, God’s being is said to be whole in the entirety of space and simultaneously whole in each of its parts. For More, a nullibist believes that incorporeal entities, such as God and minds, can exist without reference to space and time; whereas his favored view, anti-nullibism, states that anything which lacks position or place, or which is unrelated to space, cannot be said to exist. This leaves it open what the scope of being is for the anti-nullibists and whether in their view the existence of every sort of thing needs to bear some relation to what is extended. In his later anti-holenmerist thought, More identifies space with God’s amplitude of presence and articulates a view of incorporeal extension to fit the ontology of Divine being. In what follows we will situate Newton’s thought on this intellectual landscape. Facing many of the same problems, Newton accepted More’s critique of nullibism, but there is no clear evidence that he ever accepted holenmerism. Nor did he articulate, as
did More, a specific doctrine of incorporeal extension with which to explain the ontology of Divine omnipresence and its relation to space. Indeed, as will be demonstrated, Newton’s ontology of space is interestingly different from anything to be found in the work of his contemporaries.
SESSIONS SPONSORED BY APA COMMITTEES

THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 18

Roundtable: Best Placement Practices for Graduate Students and Placement Directors (GI-9)
Sponsored by the Committee on Academic Career Opportunities and Placement
9:00 a.m.-Noon

Lawrence Becker on Justice, Reciprocity, and Eudaimonistic Health (I-M)
Sponsored by the Committee on Public Philosophy
1:45-4:45 p.m.

FRIDAY, FEBRUARY 19

Engaging with New Technologies (II-M)
Sponsored by the Committee on the Teaching of Philosophy
9:00 a.m.-Noon

The Jon Barwise Prize (II-N)
Sponsored by the Committee on Philosophy and Computers
9:00 a.m.-Noon

Credentials, Qualifications, and Instruction in Two-Year Colleges (II-O)
Sponsored by the Committee on Philosophy in Two-Year Colleges
9:00 a.m.-Noon

Current Work in Continental Feminism (III-M)
Sponsored by the Committee on the Status of Women
2:45-5:45 p.m.
SATURDAY, FEBRUARY 20

Machines, Intentionality, Ethics, and Cognition (IV-M)
Sponsored by the Committee on Philosophy and Computers
8:30-11:30 a.m.

Rethinking the Ethics of Vital Organ Transplantation (IV-N)
Sponsored by the Committee on Philosophy and Medicine
8:30-11:30 a.m.

Author Meets Critics: Falguni A. Sheth’s Toward a Political Philosophy of Race (IV-O)
Sponsored by the Committee on the Status of Asian and Asian-American Philosophers and Philosophies
8:30-11:30 a.m.

Approaches to Philosophy in the High School Classroom (V-M)
Sponsored by the Committee on Pre-College Instruction in Philosophy
3:15-6:15 p.m.

Confucius and Dewey on Experiential Education (V-N)
Sponsored by the Committee on the Status of Asian and Asian-American Philosophers and Philosophies
3:15-6:15 p.m.
GROUP SESSIONS

Sessions sponsored by affiliated groups are listed below in alphabetical order of sponsoring group. Sessions sponsored jointly by more than one group are listed once for each sponsor.

A
Adam Smith Society: GIII-1, Thu, 7:15-10:15 p.m.
American Association of Philosophy Teachers: GIV-8, Fri, 7:15-10:15 p.m.
American Society for Philosophy, Counseling, and Psychotherapy: GIII-10, Thu, 7:15-10:15 p.m.
American Society for Value Inquiry: GI-8, Thu, 9:00 a.m.-Noon
American Society for Value Inquiry: GIII-8, Thu, 7:15-10:15 p.m.
Association for Informal Logic and Critical Thinking: GIV-2, Fri, 7:15-10:15 p.m.
Association for Symbolic Logic: I-O, Thu, 1:45-4:45 p.m.
Association for Symbolic Logic: III-N, Fri, 2:45-5:45 p.m.
Association for Symbolic Logic: GII-16, Thu, 5:15-7:15 p.m.
Association for Symbolic Logic: GIV-5, Fri, 7:15-9:15 p.m.
Association for Symbolic Logic: GV-9, Sat, 1:00-3:00 p.m.
Association for the Development of Philosophy Teaching: GIV-10, Fri, 7:15-10:15 p.m.
Association for the Development of Philosophy Teaching: GV-12, Sat, 1:00-3:00 p.m.
Association of Chinese Philosophers in North America: GIII-11, Thu, 7:15-10:15 p.m.
Association of Chinese Philosophers in North America: GIV-9, Fri, 7:15-10:15 p.m.

B
Bertrand Russell Society: GII-14, Thu, 5:00-7:00 p.m.

C
Committee on Institutional Cooperation: GII-15, Thu, 5:00-7:00 p.m.
Concerned Philosophers for Peace: GV-7, Sat, 1:00-3:00 p.m.

G
Great Lakes Mind and Science Consortium: G0-1, Wed, 5:00-10:00 p.m.
H
History of Early Analytic Philosophy Society: GIII-3, Thu, 7:15-10:15 p.m.
Hume Society: GV-10, Sat, 1:00-3:00 p.m.

I
Indiana Philosophical Association: GIII-2, Thu, 7:15-10:15 p.m.
International Association for Computing and Philosophy: GIII-7, Thu, 7:15-10:15 p.m.
International Association for the Philosophy of Sport: GV-1, Sat, 1:00-3:00 p.m.
International Society for Environmental Ethics: GI-1, Thu, 9:00 a.m.-Noon
International Society for Environmental Ethics: GII-1, Thu, 5:00-7:00 p.m.

J
Josiah Royce Society: GII-2, Thu, 5:00-7:00 p.m.
Journal of the History of Philosophy: GV-0, Sat, 10:00 a.m.-3:00 p.m.

M
Max Scheler Society: GI-1, Thu, 9:00 a.m.-Noon
Max Scheler Society: GIV-1, Fri, 7:15-10:15 p.m.
Midwest Society for Women in Philosophy: GI-5, Thu, 9:00 a.m.-Noon

N
North American Kant Society: GIV-7, Fri, 7:15-10:15 p.m.
North American Nietzsche Society: GII-3, Thu, 5:00-7:00 p.m.
North American Nietzsche Society: GV-2, Sat, 1:00-3:00 p.m.
North American Society for Social Philosophy: GIV-12, Fri, 7:15-10:15 p.m.
North American Spinoza Society: GIV-11, Fri, 7:15-10:15 p.m.

P
Personalist Discussion Group: GV-6, Sat, 1:00-3:00 p.m.
Philosophy of Religion Group: GII-4, Thu, 5:00-7:00 p.m.
Philosophy of Time Society: GI-2, Thu, 9:00 a.m.-Noon

R
Radical Philosophy Association: GII-5, Thu, 5:00-7:00 p.m.
Radical Philosophy Association: GV-3, Sat, 1:00-3:00 p.m.

S
Society for Analytical Feminism: GIII-12, Thu, 7:15-10:15 p.m.
Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy: GIV-3, Fri, 7:15-10:15 p.m.
Society for Asian and Comparative Philosophy: GI-4, Thu, 9:00 a.m.-Noon
Society for Asian and Comparative Philosophy: GII-8, Thu, 5:00-7:00 p.m.
Society for Business Ethics: GII-11, Thu, 5:00-7:00 p.m.
Society for Lesbian and Gay Philosophy: GII-7, Thu, 5:00-7:00 p.m.
Society for Philosophy and Public Affairs: GII-10, Thu, 5:00-7:00 p.m.
Society for Philosophy in the Contemporary World: GIII-5, Thu, 7:15-10:15 p.m.
Society for Philosophy in the Contemporary World: GIV-4, Fri, 7:15-10:15 p.m.
Society for Realist-Antirealist Discussion: GII-13, Thu, 5:00-7:00 p.m.
Society for the Advancement of American Philosophy: GV-4, Sat, 1:00-3:00 p.m.
Society for the Metaphysics of Science: GI-7, Thu, 9:00 a.m.-Noon
Society for the Philosophic Study of the Contemporary Visual Arts: GI-6, Thu, 9:00 a.m.-Noon
Society for the Philosophic Study of the Contemporary Visual Arts: GII-12, Thu, 5:00-7:00 p.m.
Society for the Philosophical Study of Education: GIII-6, Thu, 7:15-10:15 p.m.
Society for the Philosophical Study of Education: GIV-6, Fri, 7:15-10:15 p.m.
Society for the Philosophical Study of Marxism: GV-8, Sat, 1:00-3:00 p.m.
Society for the Philosophy of Creativity: GIII-4, Thu, 7:15-10:15 p.m.
Society for the Study of Indian and Tibetan Buddhist Philosophy: GV-5, Sat, 1:00-3:00 p.m.
Society for the Study of Process Philosophies: GIII-9, Thu, 7:15-10:15 p.m.
Society for the Study of the History of Analytical Philosophy: GI-3, Thu, 9:00 a.m.-Noon
Society of Christian Philosophers: GII-6, Thu, 5:00-7:00 p.m.
Society of Christian Philosophers: GIV-0, Fri, 2:30-4:30 p.m.
Søren Kierkegaard Society: GII-9, Thu, 5:00-7:00 p.m.
PLACEMENT SERVICE INFORMATION

Evonda Acevedo will be the Coordinator for the APA Placement Service at the 2010 Central Division Meeting. Questions concerning the Service should be directed to Evonda at The American Philosophical Association, University of Delaware, 31 Amstel Avenue, Newark, DE 19716. She can also be reached by telephone at (302) 831-2012, fax: (302) 831-8690, or email: eacevedo@udel.edu.

APA PLACEMENT SERVICE GENERAL HOURS OF OPERATION:

Wednesday, February 17: Placement Information, 5:00 – 10:00 p.m., Meeting Registration Desk (Sixth Floor)
Placement Interviewing, 5:00 – 10:00 p.m., Spire Room (Sixth Floor)

Thursday, February 18: Placement Information, 8:30 a.m. – 7:00 p.m., Meeting Registration Desk (Sixth Floor)
Placement Interviewing, 8:30 a.m. – 7:00 p.m., Spire Room (Sixth Floor)

Friday, February 19: Placement Information, 8:30 a.m. – 5:00 p.m., Meeting Registration Desk (Sixth Floor)
Placement Interviewing, 8:30 a.m. – 5:00 p.m., Spire Room (Sixth Floor)

Saturday, February 20: Placement Information, 8:30 a.m. – Noon, Meeting Registration Desk (Sixth Floor)
Placement Interviewing, 8:30 a.m. – 11:00 a.m., Spire Room (Sixth Floor)

APA PLACEMENT SERVICE LOCATIONS

The Placement Desk will be located at the Meeting Registration Desk (sixth floor), and the Interviewing Area will be in the Spire Room (sixth floor). In the event that additional space is needed for interviewing, the location will be posted near the Meeting Registration Desk.

JOB CANDIDATES – MEETING REGISTRATION DESK (SIXTH FLOOR)

1. Candidate Numbers will be assigned at the Placement Desk.
2. The location of a Job Interview will be available from the Placement staff, or posted on the bulletin board at the information desk.
3. Additional “Request for Interview” forms will be available at the Placement Desk.
4. APA Membership Applications will be available at the APA Meeting Registration Desk.

5. Information and instructions for using the Service will be available at the Placement desk (also see following pages), and posted on the information bulletin board.

6. The mailboxes for Job Candidates will be located at the Placement Desk.

7. A complete set of Job Postings will be available at the Placement Desk.

8. A message for the APA Placement Ombudsperson can be left at the Placement Desk.

**INTERVIEWERS – MEETING REGISTRATION DESK (SIXTH FLOOR)**

1. **Interviewers check in here**—as soon as possible upon arrival.

2. Payments for **On-Site Interviewing Departments** will be received here.

3. Space will be provided here for interviewers to check their files.

4. “Request for Interview” forms received from job candidates that have been reviewed by interviewers **should be returned** here.

5. A list of interviewing table assignments will be posted on the Placement Information Bulletin Board.

**INTERVIEWING AREA – SPIRE ROOM (SIXTH FLOOR)**

1. APA Interviewing Tables will be located here.

2. In the event that additional space for interviewing is needed, we will post the additional location on the Placement Information Bulletin Board.

**INFORMATION AND INSTRUCTIONS FOR JOB CANDIDATES**

**Requirements for Using the Placement Service**

1. **You must be an APA member** in order to use the Service. Placement is a benefit of membership for candidates, and there is no additional charge to use this service. Membership applications are available on the APA web site (www.apaonline.org) or by contacting the APA National Office (302) 831-1112, or at the Membership/Registration desk at the Meeting.

2. **You MUST REGISTER** for the **MEETING** in order to use the Service.

   - If you **register in advance** for the meeting and indicate that you will be a candidate (an advance registration form is located at the back of this issue), a candidate number will be assigned in the National Office and will appear on the back of your badge. You **must** pick up your badge from the APA Registration staff prior to using the Placement service.

   - If you register on-site for the meeting, present your badge to the Placement Staff, who will be available to assign you a candidate number in the “Placement Service” line.
WHAT TO BRING WITH YOU

1. Your copies of recent issues of *Jobs For Philosophers*.
2. Several copies of your curriculum vitae. If you run out of CVs at the meeting, the hotel has a copy center located in the Business Center.

HOW TO USE THE PLACEMENT SERVICE

After you have picked up your registration materials from the APA Registration staff, you are ready to use the Service. If you do not yet have a candidate number on the back of your badge, please go to the job candidates’ area at the Meeting Registration Desk (Sixth Floor) to receive one.

JOB CANDIDATES’ AREA – MEETING REGISTRATION DESK (SIXTH FLOOR)

Here you will find a file folder (mailbox) with your candidate number on it. All communications addressed to you during the meeting will be placed there. Your folder contains:

1. “Request for Interview” forms. Additional forms will be available from the Placement staff. **Be sure that your Placement Number appears at the top of all forms.**
2. A “Locator” form for you to list your name and hotel address. Please do not remove this form from your folder. This is used only in the event that we need to contact you during the meeting.

JOB POSTINGS

New jobs (not having appeared in the *Jobs for Philosophers*) will be posted on a bulletin board in the Placement Service Area. You should check this board regularly for new postings. Each ad should contain instructions on how to apply.

INSTITUTIONS THAT HAVE CHECKED IN WITH PLACEMENT

The names of institutions that have registered to use the Service will be posted on the bulletin board (updated regularly) in alphabetical order. Each listing will indicate the following:

1. If the listing institution has checked in with Placement.
2. If the institution is accepting interview requests at the meeting.
3. The relevant *JFP* for the institution’s opening(s).
4. Where the institution plans on interviewing (Table with number assignment).
5. Miscellaneous notes deemed appropriate by the Placement staff or the institution.

SUBMITTING AN INTERVIEW REQUEST FORM

Complete the *top* portion of the “Request for Interview” form and attach a copy of your CV. **Be sure that your candidate number appears at the**
top of all forms. After you have completed the necessary information, place your request form and CV in the box marked Requests for Interviews which will be prominently displayed on the Placement Service Desk. Your “Request” will be forwarded to the institution by a staff member.

INTERVIEWS

After your “Request” has been reviewed by a representative from the institution, the form will be returned to your file folder with the institution’s response appearing on the bottom of the form. Check your file folder often so that you can be certain to receive your messages promptly.

By Noon on February 20, all “Requests” submitted by you should have been returned to your file folder, and you should remove them at that time. Occasionally, an institution may retain applications to review at a later date. If you applied for a job that had been posted and the institution did not check in with the Service during the meeting, it is suggested that you contact the institution by mail.

INTERVIEWING LOCATIONS

Some departments will be conducting interviews at tables in the Spire Room (Sixth Floor). Other interviewing table locations will be posted if additional space is required. Each institution using a table for interviewing will be assigned a table number. The table numbers assigned to institutions will be posted on the bulletin board in the Placement Service Area.

ADVICE FOR JOB APPLICANTS

The APA Committee on Career Opportunities offers the following advice for job applicants: The schedule for those seeking jobs and those Departments offering positions is difficult for all concerned. From the point of view of Departments, any publication date for Jobs for Philosophers is a compromise between the competing demands imposed by the need to get funding for positions, so the later the better, and by the need to have time to process applications, so the sooner the better. From the point of view of job applicants, there are also competing demands: the sooner it is published, the more time to apply, but the later it is published, the more opportunities will be available. There is no easy solution to this problem, but you can ease your difficulties somewhat by being prepared when the JFP is published. You should have your curriculum vitae ready to put in an envelope, a generic draft of a letter of application ready to be fine-tuned for particular job opportunities, and the rest of your file ready for mailing. This means talking to those who are to write letters of recommendation long before the JFP is due to arrive, preparing material about your teaching capacities, and selecting a writing sample for those Departments that request it. Applications should be complete, as well as clearly organized. It is to your advantage to send in your application as soon as possible after an ad appears.
INFORMATION AND INSTRUCTIONS FOR INTERVIEWERS

REQUIREMENTS FOR USING THE PLACEMENT SERVICE

1. It is expected that all individual interviewers will register for the meeting either by using the registration form found in the back of this issue or by stopping at the APA Meeting Registration Desk (Sixth Floor) to register on-site prior to using the Placement Service.

2. All Departments (not individuals) planning to interview at the meeting should complete the Placement Service advance registration form found on our web site, www.apaonline.org/divisions/central/index.aspx or at the end of this section.

Upon receipt of an advance registration form additional information pertaining to the Placement Service will be sent to the attention of the contact person listed on the form. In the event that we send Placement forms either via email or mail, please be sure to complete these and return them to our office at your earliest opportunity. Not doing so may cause your materials to arrive after the Staff has already left the office to travel to the meeting. In this case, we must have you fill out the forms again on site. If time does not allow sending them to us, please bring them with you and turn them in at the Placement Desk.

CHECKING IN WITH THE SERVICE

Before you begin to interview candidates, please check in with the Placement Staff (Meeting Registration Desk, Sixth Floor). We will need to know that you have arrived on site for candidates inquiring about your institution. Additional information will be requested from you (or confirmed if your department pre-registered) at this time as well.

Some institutions accept interview requests at the meeting; some of these job notices may have appeared in Jobs for Philosophers while others are unpublished positions. A new, unpublished position will be assigned an AD# and posted on the bulletin board in the Placement Service area. If you are bringing such a job notice with you to the meeting, please provide the Placement Staff with four copies of the notice for the position you are advertising. Such a position announcement should be typed on one side only in a good size and easy to read font, and be as brief as possible. Only positions that have not appeared in Jobs for Philosophers will be posted. If you would like a position that has been posted at this meeting to appear on our website immediately following the meeting, or in the issue of Jobs for Philosophers, you need to submit this ad immediately, following the close of the meeting via our website, https://member.apaonline.org/formredirect.aspx?p=JFP. If you need assistance with this, contact the APA National Office.

Some institutions interview by prearrangement after placing an advertisement in Jobs for Philosophers and then contacting candidates prior to the meeting. When you arrange an interview with candidates, please inform them that they must be APA Members in order to use the Service and they must register for the meeting in order to use the Service.
If you plan to conduct job interviews anywhere other than at the interviewing tables/suites we have provided, please let us know your plans because candidates often come to us to ask questions about the location/time (etc.) of their interviews, and we need to have complete, up-to-date information in order to help them (and you).

Departments using a Suite for interviewing will need to complete an interview schedule form at the time they check in with the Service. Doing so enables the Service to notify the candidates you wish to interview of your interviewing location. **Be assured that only those candidates listed on your interview schedule will be told the location of your hotel room, unless you have directed us to give this information to all candidates who ask.** Departments interviewing at tables DO NOT need to complete this form.

N.B.: If you are conducting interviews in a hotel room, please be aware of the following policy statement adopted by the APA Board of Officers at its November 2004 meeting:

“Departments should not conduct Job Interviews in non-suite hotel rooms. Candidates who are subject to such interviews can appeal to the APA and are guaranteed anonymity.” (Originally published in *Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association*, Vol. 78, No. 5, pp. 23, 119.)

**APA INTERVIEWING TABLES**

The Placement Service provides numbered tables for interviewing purposes; you will receive your table number assignment when you check in. These table number assignments will also be posted on the Placement Service Bulletin Board. Should additional space for interviewing tables be necessary, this location will be posted as well.

**INSTITUTION FILE FOLDER (MAILBOX)**

There will be a file folder bearing the name of your institution located at the Meeting Registration Desk (Sixth Floor). Requests for interviews from candidates will be placed in this file folder.

**REVIEWING INTERVIEW REQUESTS**

When a candidate requests an interview with your institution, you should receive her/his curriculum vitae attached to a “Request for Interview” form. The bottom of this form is to be completed by you and returned to Placement staff. If an interview is granted, space is provided on this form to list the time, date, and location of the interview. If you are **unable to interview a candidate**, space for this response is also provided on the form. Any request you receive in an envelope contains confidential material and should be destroyed rather than returned to the candidate. As a matter of professional courtesy, **all requests should receive a response**. When a candidate receives a “Request” form back without a response, he or she is
likely to assume that the material *has not been reviewed* and might return this to you via our service or contact your institution by mail.

Each candidate is assigned a numbered file folder to facilitate prompt communication between interviewers and candidates. Materials that you wish to transmit to a registered candidate should be handed in to the Placement Service staff located at the Registration Desk (Sixth Floor), and will be delivered to the candidate by our staff.

**APA Statement on Placement Practices**

The APA Committee on the Status and Future of the Profession reminds you of its Statement on Placement Practices: The APA discourages the nomination by graduate departments of job seekers for positions in philosophy, and the submission of their dossiers in response to announcements of positions, without their knowledge or interest. This may seriously mislead those who are conducting searches, and may have unfortunate consequences both for them and for genuinely interested applicants. Graduate departments using a nomination procedure or submitting dossiers on behalf of job seekers should either attest explicitly that the candidate wishes to be considered for the positions in question, or (preferably) ensure that the job seekers themselves submit personal letters of application for these positions. Departments conducting searches are encouraged to recommend or require explicitly (in their position announcements) that each candidate, to be assessed of full consideration, should submit a personal letter of application for and interest in the announced position.

*A Placement Ombudsperson will be available at the meeting. Please see the Placement Service Staff if you would like to contact the Ombudsperson.*
Placement Service Registration for Interviewing Departments  
APA 2010 Central Division Meeting  
Palmer House Hilton Hotel, Chicago, IL - February 17-20, 2010

Only one form is required for each interviewing department. Once completed, this can be faxed to (302) 831-8690.

Institution: ___________________________ 
Department: ______________________________ 
Contact: _____________________________ Phone: ___________________________________
Address: ______________________________________________________________________
City, State, Zip Code: _____________________________ Email:_________________________

All persons conducting interviews should be registered** for the Central Division Meeting as well as the department being registered with the Placement Service.

**Registered members of the department who will be conducting interviews:
_____________________________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________________________

Our department will:
____ need interviewing table(s) Quantity of Tables____
–or–
____ conduct interviews in a hotel suite (you must contact Linda Smallbrook to reserve a suite)

Our department will:
____ provide suite # and list of prearranged candidates to whom suite information may be given
–or–
____ bring suite # and allow service to give to anyone who requests it

Our department will:
____ conduct prearranged interviews only
–or–
____ accept interview requests on-site

Please list the JFP issue(s) (if any) in which this job was advertised: ________________________

Registration Fees (Please Check One): ______ Pre-Registration, By February 5: $50.00
______ *Regular Registration, After February 5: $75.00

Credit Card Type: (Circle One) VISA / MASTERCARD

Credit Card #:  [redacted]  
Exp. Date:  [redacted] / [redacted]

Last 3 Digits on back of card:  [redacted]  

Name on Card: _____________________________ Phone #: __________________
Signature: _____________________________ Email: __________________

***Check #: ____________________________ Check Date: ___________________ Check Amount ________

***Payable to: The American Philosophical Association. The APA only accepts checks drawn on U.S. banks in U.S. funds, or Int’l. Money Orders in U.S. funds. There is a $10 charge for all returned checks. **If PAYMENT is not received in our office by February 5, 2010 you MUST pay the on-site fee! Please mail form and payment to: Attn: Evonda Acevedo, Placement, The American Philosophical Association, 31 Amstel Avenue, University of Delaware, Newark, DE 19716.
This brochure offers some advice to those seeking jobs in philosophy. Like all advice it is to be taken with a grain of salt. It is based on the collective wisdom of the APA's Committee on Academic Careers and Placement in Fall 2004 (Larry May [chair], Andrew Light, Frank Ryan, Abby Wilkerson, Melissa Zinkin, Nancy Holland, Rebecca Copenhaver, Mark Timmons, David Tuncellito). Collective wisdom is probably somewhat less controversial than collective punishment, but more controversial than almost everything else. Nonetheless, we hope that some of what we recommend will prove helpful to some of you, some of the time. Job seeking is one of the most difficult things that people can engage in. Anything that reduces that difficulty has value.

1. WHEN TO START THINKING ABOUT JOBS

It is never too early to start thinking about the job market. During your first years in graduate school you should be thinking about which papers your teachers have liked. After the end of term, take the paper back to the professor who liked it and ask two questions:

What can I do to improve this paper and make it marketable for a conference or for publication?

Which conference or journal would be best suited for a paper like mine?

You don’t need to do a lot of this. One or two of your best essays, sent first to a conference and then to a journal, will do nicely. Only send out your very best work to conferences, for that is what you want to be remembered for.

In addition, in these early years in graduate school, you should try to put together a good assortment of courses that you have TAed for or taught independently. You should try to TA for all of the major introductory courses (introduction to philosophy, ethics, logic and critical thinking) as well as some specialized or advanced courses in your areas of specialization and competence. At some universities, such as the large state schools, the trick will be to limit your teaching so that you can get good writing done. At other schools, you may have to be creative to get enough teaching experience (try contacting small colleges and community colleges in your area). Most importantly, keep your teaching evaluations from these courses. Or if course evaluations do not routinely have students evaluate TAs, design your own and administer it during the last week of classes (then have a departmental secretary collect and hold them for you until grades are turned in so students don’t think you will retaliate against them).
A note of caution: Given the current and foreseeable demand for low-paid adjunct courses it can be very tempting to take on a large amount of adjunct teaching. Given the large number of graduate students seeking such teaching it can also be very tempting to take every course that is offered to you in order to ensure your place in the adjunct pool. The result sometimes can be a vicious cycle of taking more and more low-paid adjunct teaching that can impede your ability to finish your dissertation.

All other things being equal, and they hardly ever are, you could also use the early years in graduate school to get a bit (but only a bit) of service or administrative experience. The easiest here is to volunteer for a departmental committee, like the colloquium or admissions committee. If there are opportunities to work with an actual administrator, especially a Dean or higher, on a special project, you should jump at the opportunity since a letter from said administrator will make you look more attractive to administrators who will hire you down the road. Do not (repeat: do not) spend much time at this. Service is clearly a very distant third-place, after research and teaching, for the vast majority of jobs. No one gets hired on the basis of service, standing alone, unless you want to be hired into an administrative job. Remember too that one should be cautious about spending too much time on departmental or campus politics. Indeed, try to stay out of departmental politics altogether, which can come back to bite you. You are a transient in graduate school, and should not treat this as a permanent position.

It is a good idea to join the APA as soon as you can—the rates for student members are very low. And make sure to check the box on the application form saying that you would like to receive the publication called: Jobs for Philosophers (it’s free—but you have to check the box to get it). Once you get this publication, you can scan through it and think to yourself: Do any of these jobs sound interesting to me? What do I need to do to stand the best chance of getting the job I like the most? Note whether there are any such jobs. If not, consider another career. If so, notice what combinations of things employers are looking for (for example, notice that most jobs in philosophy of science or mind also want someone who can teach logic; and most jobs in ethical theory or political philosophy also want someone who can teach applied ethics).

Another good source of experience and professional contacts can be found in the numerous smaller specialized societies organized around particular sub-fields of philosophy, affinity groups, or particular periods or figures, such as the Society for Women in Philosophy, the International Society for Environmental Ethics, or the Society for Realist/Antirealist Discussion. Such organizations can be invaluable for helping to establish you in the field and providing a set of interlocutors who can improve your work. One of the best ways to find such organizations is to survey the Group Meetings listings in the program for each divisional APA conference.

In general, use the early years in graduate school to learn as much philosophy as you can. Also, begin to develop a specialty in philosophy, and perhaps also begin to develop a competence outside of philosophy,
such as political science or computer science (although for certain jobs you might not want to highlight this). Use these early years to figure out if you really want to spend your life in a philosophy department, and to begin to get a sense of what it means to be a “professional” philosopher. While it is very romantic to want to be a philosopher, like being a poet one does not live by thoughts and words alone. The way to support yourself is by getting a job as a member of a profession, and our profession, as odd as it may sound, is teaching and publishing in philosophy, which is not especially romantic, but is better than many other jobs we know.

2. **When to Go into the “Market”**

One of the most important decisions you will make is when to go into the philosophy job market. This is especially important because many graduate students go in too early and waste years of their lives. The job market process is a nearly full-time job. So if you go in early and you don’t have enough of your dissertation done, you can find yourself six months later with no job prospects and no more done on your dissertation than when you started. Do this a couple of years and you nearly place yourself out of the market by being too long in graduate school—taking too long to finish a dissertation is almost always seen as a bad sign of how long it will take you to finish anything else.

So, when is it optimal to go into the job market? While this varies a bit, the best time is when you are nearly done with your dissertation. “Nearly done” is a relative term. If you have a five-chapter dissertation, “nearly done” can mean four chapters drafted and approved by your committee, and the other chapter at least begun. Or it can mean, all five chapters drafted and some fairly minor revisions needed. At bare minimum, you need three of those five chapters done by early September. The main reason for this is that you need your dissertation committee chair to say, in a letter he or she will write in late September, “Yes, Jones will be done and ready to start undistracted in the Fall.” But this is not enough, since everyone’s committee chair will say that, or else your application process is simply a waste of time. In addition, the committee chair must offer evidence to back up this claim, such as, that all five chapters are drafted and only need minor revisions, or some such. Optimally, the letter from your committee chair will say: “We have set December 8th as the defense date.” This is optimal because by the time you get to the Eastern Division meetings in late December, folks will know whether you are really done or not. January defense dates are good as well, because departments will be making hiring decisions by late January or early February, typically.

In normal years there are a lot more applicants for jobs in philosophy than there are jobs. So, employers are looking for reasons to throw out applications. The first cut at most schools is “whether the candidate is done, or will be done by September.” Unless you can make a strong case for this, and your dissertation committee chair can back you up, you are unlikely to make the first cut, and hence likely to have wasted six months or more. Don’t delude yourself. It normally takes two months of relatively
uninterrupted work to draft a good chapter, so it will take six months of very hard work to draft more than half of a dissertation, depending on your other commitments. If you haven’t started seriously writing your dissertation by March, you don’t stand much of a chance of being more than halfway done by September. But also don’t wait too long. While the national average is seven years from BA to completion of the Ph.D., if after completing your coursework you take longer than three years to write the dissertation, potential employers will start to wonder whether this is a sign that you will not be able to write enough in your probationary period to be able to get tenure. So, our best advice is not to go into the market until you are done with the dissertation, or at very least “nearly done.”

3. THE SYSTEM

In America in philosophy, the majority of jobs are advertised in Jobs for Philosophers in October and November and then first interviews (a half hour to an hour in length) are conducted at the APA Eastern Division meetings between Christmas and New Year’s day. If you make it through the convention, then two or three people will be flown to campus for a two-day intensive interview, where you will meet all of the faculty members and present a professional paper, or teach a class, and increasingly both. There are also jobs advertised after New Year’s day, although far fewer than before New Year’s. These jobs will typically have their first interviews at the Pacific or Central Division meetings in late March or late April respectively. But many of these jobs will not be tenure track, but instead they are rather late announcements for temporary positions of one or more years. Some schools will do first interviews by phone, but these are still very rare. If you are seriously on the market, you should plan to go to the APA Eastern Division meetings and apply to jobs out of the October and November JFPs, and then keep applying throughout the year.

Many graduate students go to their first APA meeting when they go on the job market. While certainly understandable due to financial constraints, we strongly advise you to attend a meeting of the APA prior to going on the market. In particular, going to an Eastern APA meeting may help you avoid the “shell shock” of going to one of these meetings only when it “counts.” We would also hope that attending these meetings without the pressure of being on the market will help you see the positive aspects of these conferences, especially the ability to reconnect with friends in the field and make new friends that you otherwise might not see in the academic year. Also, reading a paper or being a commentator might help get you a job in the following years.

4. THE “VITA”

One of the main ways to tell whether you are ready to go on the market is whether you can put together a respectable vita by early September. A vita is simply an academic resume, but it is not really very simple at all. You should show your vita to various faculty members and put it through the kind of drafting process that you would use for a term paper. For most
applicants, the vita should be two to three pages long, with three to four pages for dissertation abstract and summary of teaching evaluations as supplements to the vita.

a) Address – list your departmental and home addresses and phone numbers. Also list where you can be reached right up to the beginning of the Eastern APA convention (December 27).

b) Area of specialization – this is optimally two or three areas of philosophy that you are especially qualified in. The dissertation is the primary, often only, basis for proof of a specialization. To figure out what would be good combinations of specialization, consult back issues of Jobs for Philosophers and then make sure that your dissertation really does cover those areas.

c) Area of competence – this is optimally four or five areas of philosophy that you are ready to offer courses in, different from your specialized areas. The best way to demonstrate this is in terms of what you have taught or TAed.

d) Publications or conference presentations – this could be one area of the vita or several, depending on what you have accomplished. Do not pad your vita with very minor things (or optimally, list them under a separate category for minor publications). Try to list the most significant first—they don’t need to be in chronological order. Make sure to indicate whether something was peer refereed.

e) Teaching experience – list TA experience in a separate category from autonomous teaching. List the dates and places of the experience.

f) Special honors and awards – list whatever seems relevant to a job search in philosophy. Mainly focus on things you earned in graduate school.

g) Recommendation writers – list the names of all of those who will write letters for you and the addresses and phone numbers for them. This list should include all three (or four) members of your primary dissertation committee, as well as someone who will write specifically about your teaching—preferably someone who has good first-hand experience of it. And it is sometimes an especially good thing to be able to have someone write for you who is not a faculty member at your department or school. Those letters are more believable since the reputation of the recommendation writer is not tied up with whether you get a job or not. For example, if you give a conference paper and have a commentator who liked the paper, ask that person to write a letter for you; act similarly for a paper you have written about a prominent philosopher who has read your work and appreciated it, but such letters are limited in scope. It often is a good idea to give to prospective letter writers a letter from you that indicates what things optimally you’d like them to cover in the recommendation, and give them lots of time—ask them by Sept. 1.
h) List of graduate courses taken: list all courses (including those you audited) along with the name of the professor and the semester taken. It is often a good idea to group these by subject areas rather than merely to present them chronologically. DO NOT LIST GRADES—no one cares anymore.

i) Summary of selected course evaluations: on no more than two sheets of paper, list five or six sets of teaching evaluations, displayed in graphic form that is easy to read.

j) Dissertation abstract—on one or two sheets of paper give a detailed description of the arguments of the dissertation. Provide a summary paragraph and long paragraphs on each chapter. [NOTE: if you can’t easily provide this abstract then you are definitely not ready to go on the market.]

It is hard to stress enough how important it is to get the vita just right. The trick is not to pad the vita and yet to list all of the important stuff about your fledgling professional life.

On a more mundane subject, normal white paper and average size typeface work best. This is why you need lots of feedback and redraftings to get it right. If you have any questions about how you “appear” through the vita, ask people you can trust to give you frank advice, and then, with several such pieces of advice, make a decision about how you want to “appear.”

Do not waste your time applying for jobs that list an AOS different from the ones you list on the vita.

5. **The Cover Letter**

The cover letter for each job application should basically be a one-page attempt to demonstrate that you fit the job description. This means that you should highlight aspects of the vita that demonstrate your qualifications for the things mentioned in the job ad. You should have a paragraph on teaching and a paragraph on research, at bare minimum.

The cover letter is sometimes the only thing that members of a hiring committee read, so take your time with it and try to convey as much information as you can in a page or so without being excessively wordy or using terms and expressions that may be esoteric to a particular sub-field of philosophy—keep in mind that most people reading this letter will not be working in the specialty area in which you work. It is not a problem to go over one page in length, but remember that folks may not read the second page.

If at all possible, put the cover letter on departmental stationary. If you already have a job, this is easy. But if you are still in graduate school, most departments will let you use departmental stationary. If your department secretary complains about the cost of letterhead stock, merely ask for one sheet, and then photocopy it and print your covering letter on the photocopied departmental letterhead.
6. **The Writing Sample**

You will need to supply at least one writing sample with each application. It is commonly thought that the writing sample should come from the dissertation. If it does not, people may wonder whether the dissertation is indeed almost done. You should take a chapter from the dissertation and make it a free-standing 25-page paper. If you have a paper that has been accepted for publication, you should include this as well; but especially if it is not from the dissertation, this should be included in addition to, not instead of, the dissertation chapter.

In all cases, the writing sample should be your very best work. After all, someone may actually read it and base the whole interview on it. How embarrassing it will be for you if you really don’t think that thesis is defensible anymore. Writing samples should be very carefully edited for typos and infelicities of style, since this is the only piece of your work members of a hiring committee are likely to see. You should never send out a writing sample that has not been seen, and critiqued, by several people in your field, even if these are only fellow graduate students. Do not assume that even if people have seen earlier drafts of the writing sample, say when it was merely a chapter, that is good enough. As with everything else you send out for the purposes of getting a job, only send things out that others have looked at for you in advance. [Note: Your writing sample should not be the same as the professional paper you deliver on campus, lest folks think that you only have one good idea.]

7. **Which Schools to Apply to**

Our standard advice is that if you are serious about the job market you should be able to apply to 30-80 jobs before Christmas. Of course, it is a waste of everyone’s time to apply to jobs that you are not qualified for, or for which you do not have the right AOS. But so many jobs list open specializations, or merely list courses to be taught, that it shouldn’t be hard to find quite a number of jobs that one is qualified for out of the 300-plus advertised in the October and November issues of *Jobs for Philosophers*.

Many students decide to do a more limited search. In order to accomplish this goal they try to determine which departments are most likely to hire them, and then only apply to those schools. For instance, if someone really wants to teach applied ethics, then one often applies only to jobs that list applied ethics as an AOS, rather than also to jobs that list ethical theory or political philosophy as specializations. In deciding whether to pursue this strategy, you should realize that departments often change their minds about precisely what they want. If you do a limited search, still apply to as many jobs as you can from those that you are qualified for. Remember that you don’t have to take every job that is offered, but unless you get an offer from somewhere you won’t get a job at all.

8. **Preparing for the Interview**

Before going to the APA Eastern convention for the first round of job interviews, everyone should first have a mock interview. If this is not a
regular feature of your graduate program, mock interviews are easy to organize on your own. Merely find two or three faculty members, give them a copy of your vita a few minutes in advance (to make it seem like the real thing) and have them sit in a room with you for an hour and role-play.

The first half of the interview should be about research, and it should begin with someone asking you to describe your dissertation in about ten minutes. The “Spiel” should be memorized and well-rehearsed in front of a mirror. Of course, you will rarely get through ten minutes before questions start flying. And that’s good—since the whole point of an interview is to have a conversation where three things are learned: how good a philosopher you are, what kind of a teacher you are likely to be, and whether you will be a good conversationalist as a colleague. Since you won’t normally be allowed to finish the “Spiel” front-load it with the most interesting ideas.

The second half of the mock interview, like most of the real interviews you will face, should be focused on teaching. You should come prepared to discuss in detail how you would teach courses that would naturally fall out of your areas of specialization and competence. Be prepared to explain what you think students should get out of a given course in order to motivate your teaching approach. Prepare elaborately for these mock interviews, as well as for the real one, and bring sample syllabi for a host of courses you are likely to be asked to teach.

At the mock interview, those mocking you should put on different hats, preferably trying to simulate folks who will indeed interview you. For that reason, wait to do this until early to middle December so it is likely that you will have started to hear from schools. Also, ask the mockers to be brutally frank with you. A lot of what goes wrong in interviews is easy to fix if you know about it in advance. It is easy to redo your “Spiel.” And, if you bite your thumb or scratch your rear end, this can easily be corrected once you know it. If you look distracted, you can sit up straight and then lean forward. If you look too intense or nervous, you can slide down in the chair and slump a little. If you look too buttoned-up, unbutton; if you look too laid-back, button-up, etc.

When you get interviews, go onto the departmental web site and look at the courses that would naturally fall into your specialization and competence. It is also a good idea to try to get a sense of what type of school it is. And if this is a “plum” job for you, you might want to read some things that people in the department, especially those in your area, have written.

At nearly every real interview, you will be asked if you have any questions for them, so make that part of the mock interview as well. If you don’t know this you can be flummoxed by this question—so have one or two questions, ideally based on your knowledge of the department and the curriculum, e.g.: “Are your 400 level courses only upper level undergraduate courses or are there both graduate students and undergraduate students in these courses?” Don’t be too provocative here and generally stay away from salary issues.
Very often you will be asked what your “next” project will be, now that you are nearing the end of your dissertation—you don’t have to have a super-detailed answer to this, but you should have some answer. Don’t try to make something up on the spur of the moment. A good strategy is to work up a project that spins off the dissertation, perhaps writing the chapter you never got to, or that is a natural follow-up to the dissertation. That way you can still talk about stuff you know something about.

9. **What to Wear**

The best advice about what to wear is to wear what will make you comfortable. Men don’t need to wear a suit, nor do women. Jackets are pretty much required though. Don’t wear a loud tie or a loud scarf. You don’t want to be remembered later as that person with the weird thing on—much better to be remembered for what you said—the person who had a really interesting response to Smith’s hard question, for instance. Ties for men are not strictly required; but more men wear them than not, so… Women, as is true for men, can certainly wear pants, as long as they look professional, and indeed you might prefer them. In general, dress comfortably—the placement process will be uncomfortable enough as it is.

10. **General Convention Advice**

If you can afford it, plan to spend two or three nights at the hotel where the convention occurs. And best not to have a roommate, unless it is someone you really trust. Things will be stressful enough without having anywhere to escape to (and watch cartoons, or the weather channel, or whatever relaxes you) between interviews. Also, for two of the evenings there will be receptions (still called “smokers” by most attendees, even though there hasn’t been any smoke or fire for many years) in the evening, often going on till late hours, and it is best not to have to navigate mass transit after midnight.

Generally, drink little if any alcohol during the convention. And try to stay away from folks who have been drinking and have interviewed you. Aside from this advice, though, there is nothing wrong with trying to find folks who interviewed you later in the day at the “smokers.” Many a job has been secured with an extra effort at finding and conversing with folks where you effectively get a second interview to only one for your competitors. Of course, don’t make a pest out of yourself. Look sheepish as you approach them, and ask if it is OK to continue the conversation that was begun earlier. Many departments make finding them at the smoker easy by reserving a table in the large hall where these events occur. When you enter the hall the APA will provide a list of the numbered tables that have been reserved by various departments. When departments have reserved a table they are signaling in part that they are encouraging candidates to stop by for a chat after the interview, so you should plan on coming by.
11. APRES CONVENTION

After the convention go back home and prepare a campus job talk. Better yet, you should have had such a talk already planned out in October. In any event, you should not delay doing this since you might get a call only a few days after the meetings asking you to fly out for a campus visit. Almost everyone wants either a formal or informal paper, and you should get one ready right away just in case. It is also a good idea to go over the convention with your placement director or mentor and see if follow-up e-mails might be warranted. Also try to set up a mock job talk—round up your friends and stray faculty members and make them sit down for an hour with you while you do a dress rehearsal.

If you get a job offer and still haven’t heard from a school you prefer, call them up. Nothing is lost here. If they don’t want you, and they have any manners at all, then they’ll let you down gently. But the worst thing is if they do want you but are merely being slow and you don’t give them enough notice about a deadline for another job.

12. LATE BREAKING JOBS AND PERSISTENCE

Keep yourself open to the possibility that nothing will happen as a result of the first round of job interviews. Keep sending out applications until you are sure you’ll be employed. This is psychologically hard to do, but it is necessary. Many of our students have gotten jobs in the second or third round, after the competition has diminished a bit. Those jobs are no less desirable, often, than those that interview at the Eastern. And always remember, you don’t have to stay in the same position forever.

As was briefly mentioned above, some jobs that are advertised in the Fall, and comparatively more advertised in the Spring, are not tenure-track but limited term appointments for a year or more. These jobs can be important stepping-stones to a good tenure-track job. While many if not most of these limited term positions are for sabbatical replacements and so not renewable, some can become gateways for permanent positions at the same institution. In addition, having letters of reference from members of a department who have gotten to know you as a colleague, rather than as a grad student, can be very valuable in helping you to land a tenure-track job.

It is also increasingly common for departments to advertise full time postdoctoral fellowships of one to three years. You might even consider looking for and taking one of these positions rather than initially seeking a tenure-track job. Most postdocs do not teach full loads and will allow you to build a strong record of publications. Helpful hint: Many postdoctoral positions are not advertised in Jobs for Philosophers when they are part of a college or university’s on-going “society of fellows” program or part of an established research center. Those interested in such positions should consult the job listings in the Chronicle of Higher Education and individual university web-sites.
13. Problems

If problems (of harassment, intimidation, or general annoyance) occur, talk to the APA staff or to the ombudsperson for the meetings, normally a friendly member of the very APA committee that wrote this brochure, and hence someone who cares about you. It is simply unacceptable for any job candidate to be made to feel uncomfortable because of comments about physical appearance, and certainly about sex or race. There is no reason not to complain, and the members of our committee who attend every APA meeting will not treat such complaints lightly.

If you are disabled, your right to full access in every aspect of the placement process ought to be extended without question or repercussion, just as you should be able freely to disclose your disability status. The APA is now beginning to address these problems, as are many institutions. In the meantime, candidates must not hesitate to request necessary accommodations, yet still have to strategize about disclosure or access requests. At the campus visit stage, wheelchair-accessible spaces cannot be assumed, yet are probably one of the simpler accommodations for most institutions, which may not be prepared to provide interpreter services or assume the travel costs of assistants. Candidates should carefully think through how they will negotiate these issues. Currently, the APA will provide a quiet interview room for candidates or interviewers for whom the large common interviewing area is inaccessible for reasons of disability such as, but not limited to, deafness, hearing impairment, cognitive impairments, or speech impairments. Contact the placement service if you need this provision. Additional concerns related to access or ableist bias in the placement process may be taken up with the placement ombudsperson through the APA placement service.
**Paper Submission Guidelines**

**Online Paper Submissions:** Papers may be submitted either electronically or in hard copy by mail. For electronic submissions, follow the instructions on the APA web site. For hard copy submissions, mail to: Evonda Acevedo, ATTN: [Eastern, Pacific, or Central] Division Papers, The American Philosophical Association, University of Delaware, 31 Amstel Avenue, Newark, DE 19716, (302) 831-2012. Papers in any area are welcome. All papers are blind reviewed. Author’s name, institution, or references pertaining to the identity of the author must be removed from the paper, abstract, notes, and bibliography. Papers containing such identifying references may be rejected. Submitted papers are not returned to authors. Papers not accepted by one Division may be re-submitted for consideration to another Division. In submitting papers, authors warrant that those papers are entirely their own work or the joint work of the authors identified in the cover letter, and that, where appropriate, acknowledgement of the contributions of others has been made.

**Graduate Student Travel Stipends and Awards:** Papers to be considered for Graduate Student Travel Stipends/Awards must meet the criteria specified by each Division. For more information, visit the following address: www.apaonline.org/divisions/stipends/travelstipendsandprizesindex.aspx.

**Guidelines for All Three Divisions**

(*Guidelines 6, 7, 9, and 10 only apply to authors who are submitting papers in hard copy.)

1. Authors must be members in good standing of the APA.
2. 1 copy of the paper.
3. 1 copy of the abstract.
4. Colloquium papers are limited to 3,000 words.
5. Abstracts for colloquium papers are limited to 150 words.
6. Title or cover page, which must include: a) title; b) word counts for all papers and abstracts; c) author’s contact information; d) the Division the paper is to be submitted for. **If you are submitting your paper on-line, please exclude this information from your submission.**
7. Papers must be typed on one side of page, double spaced, 1-inch margins on all sides, all pages numbered, 10-12 pt. font.
8. No more than one submission by the same author for the same Division will be considered.
*9. Indicate name of Division on outside lower left side of the envelope containing the paper.

*10. Include a self-addressed stamped envelope to the National Office if you wish the receipt of your paper to be acknowledged.

11. Any paper which is under consideration for publication elsewhere will be considered, provided that it will not appear in print until after the Divisional meeting is held. If this is the case, indicate when and where the paper is expected to be published.

12. Papers are not accepted by e-mail.

13. Authors are advised to provide accurate email addresses as part of their contact information because they may be contacted by email, sometimes under urgent circumstances. Authors who expect to relocate between the date of submission and the date of the meeting should arrange for email forwarding, or else provide both current and new email addresses with their contact information.

14. No one who is scheduled to appear in an invited session on the Main Program of a meeting may also present a submitted paper as part of that same Main Program. Because of this policy, members who have already agreed to participate in invited sessions on the Main Program of a meeting are asked not to submit papers for that same meeting. Please note that this does not concern sessions organized by APA Committees or by affiliated groups.

**EASTERN DIVISION:**

Meeting is held December 27-30.

Selections are announced in May or June.

Papers accepted by either the Central Division or the Pacific Division may not be presented at any subsequent meeting of the Eastern Division.

Papers exceeding 3,000 words will not be considered as colloquium papers.

Submissions for consideration as symposium papers must not exceed a length of 5,000 words. Abstracts for symposium papers must not exceed a length of 300 words. Authors should be aware that only a few papers are selected for presentation as symposium papers. If authors wish to have a shortened version of their paper considered as a colloquium paper, they should submit the appropriately shortened version, along with a shortened abstract, simultaneously with the submission of the symposium paper.

Any paper submitted without an abstract will not be considered. Any paper whose abstract is deemed unacceptable by the Program Committee will not be accepted. No revised abstract submitted after the paper’s acceptance will be published in the *Proceedings and Addresses of The American Philosophical Association* without the approval of the Program Committee.
**PACIFIC DIVISION:**

Meeting is usually held at the end of March, but starting in 2009 moved to April.

Selections are announced in January.

A paper that has been on the Main Program at a past APA meeting (any division), or will be on the Main Program at a future Central or Eastern Division meeting, cannot be presented as a Main Program colloquium/symposium paper at the Pacific Division meeting.

All abstracts are not to exceed 150 words. For dual submissions (colloquium and symposium) only one abstract is required and should not exceed 150 words.

Submissions for consideration as colloquium papers must not exceed 3,000 words.

Submissions for consideration as symposium papers must not exceed a length of 5,000 words. Abstracts for symposium papers must not exceed a length of 300 words. Authors should be aware that only a few papers are selected for presentation as symposium papers. If authors wish to have a shortened version of their paper considered as a colloquium paper, they should submit the appropriately shortened version, along with a shortened abstract, simultaneously with the submission of the symposium paper. (This will be considered a single submission.)

**CENTRAL DIVISION:**

Meeting is usually held at the end of February.

Selections are announced in January, or before when possible.

Papers exceeding 3,000 words will not be considered as colloquium papers.

Submissions for consideration as symposium papers must not exceed a length of 5,000 words. Abstracts for symposium papers must not exceed a length of 300 words. Authors should be aware that only a few papers are selected for presentation as symposium papers. If authors wish to have a shortened version of their paper considered as a colloquium paper, they should submit the appropriately shortened version, along with a shortened abstract, simultaneously with the submission of the symposium paper.

The Central Division will not include a paper on its meeting program if that paper (1) has already been presented or is scheduled for presentation on the Main Program of another APA Divisional meeting or (2) has been accepted for publication and will have actually been published prior to the Central Division meeting in question. If a paper is accepted for presentation and the Program Committee subsequently learns that it will have been published prior to the meeting, then that paper will be withdrawn from the meeting program.
1. CALL TO ORDER. President Peter van Inwagen called the meeting to order at 12:15 p.m. and appointed Stephanie Lewis parliamentarian for the meeting.

2. APPROVAL OF MINUTES. The draft Minutes of the 2008 meeting, as printed in *Proceedings and Addresses of the APA*, Vol. 80 #4 (February 2009), pp. 131-132, were approved without correction.

3. REPORT ON THE 2009 EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE MEETING. Secretary-Treasurer Robin Smith reported on the actions of the 2009 Executive Committee [see the draft Minutes of the 2009 Executive Committee meeting published immediately following these Minutes.]

4. REPORT OF THE NOMINATING COMMITTEE. Past President James P. Sterba presented the Report of the 2008-2009 Nominating Committee, as printed in *Proceedings and Addresses of the APA*, Vol. 80 #4 (February 2009), pp. 137-138. President van Inwagen noted that the Division's Bylaws allow additional nominations to be added from the floor by any group of ten members present and asked if there were such nominations forthcoming. None were proposed. The list of nominees as prepared by the Nominating Committee is therefore to be sent to mail ballot.

5. REPORTS FROM THE BOARD OF OFFICERS, THE NATIONAL OFFICE, AND APA COMMITTEES.

6. RECOGNITION OF GRADUATE STUDENT TRAVEL STIPEND WINNERS. President van Inwagen read the names of those who had received Graduate Student Travel Stipend Awards, as printed on pages 5-6 of the *Proceedings and Addresses of the APA*, Vol. 80 #4 (February 2009).

7. NEW BUSINESS. No items were discussed under New Business.

8. MEMORIAL. President Sterba read the names of those members of the Association who had died since the last meeting of the Central Division:
Kenneth F. Barber
John P. Burke
Arthur Burks (Central Division President, 1972-73)
Thompson Burks
W. Norris Clarke
Michael C. Coburn
Walter A. Coole
John Crean
Laura M. De Schrenk
Julius A. Elias
Joseph A. Grispino
Byron L. Haines
Thomas M. Haynes
Thomas K. Hearn Jr.
Joseph J. Kockelmans (Eastern Division President, 1986-87)
Henry Kyburg
Austin Lewis
Leslie M. Marenchin
Edward P. Mahoney
Lucinda Joy Peach
Robert A. Rethy
Jay F. Rosenberg
Paul F. Schmidt
Benjamin Tel-Vered
H. Stan Thayer

9. **ADJOURNMENT.** The meeting was adjourned at 1:36 p.m.

Respectfully submitted,
Robin Smith, Secretary-Treasurer
APA Central Division
Present: Members Lisa Downing, Marilyn Friedman, Sally Sedgwick, Russ Shafer-Landau, Robin Smith, James P. Sterba, Peter van Inwagen; Absent: Richard Kraut.

1. President Peter van Inwagen called the meeting to order at 7:05 p.m.

2. Draft minutes of the 2008 meeting, as printed on pp. 133-136 of issue 82:3 (February 2008) APA Proceedings, were approved as printed on motion by Friedman, seconded by Sterba.

3. The Agenda for the meeting was approved as proposed on motion by Friedman, seconded by Shafer-Landau.

4. The Executive Committee considered the changes in the Bylaws proposed by the 2008 Board of Officers meeting that would create a new category of membership, Teacher Associate. Smith explained that under the Bylaws of the APA, this motion would go to the Business Meeting for discussion and possible amendment and then be sent to mail ballot among the members of the Division for approval or rejection. Friedman moved that the Executive Committee “endorse this proposal and recommend to the Business Meeting that it be sent in unamended form to the members of the Central Division for approval by mail ballot.” Shafer-Landau seconded. The motion carried.

5. Past President James P. Sterba presented the report of the Nominating Committee, as follows:

For Vice-President and President-Elect:

- Claudia Card (University of Wisconsin–Madison)
- Richard Fumerton (University of Iowa)
- Charles W. Mills (Northwestern University)

For Divisional Representative, term 2009-2012:
Julia Driver (Washington University in St. Louis)
Gary Ebbs (Indiana University)
Anita Superson (University of Kentucky)

For Member-at-Large of the Executive Committee, term 2009-2012:
Jeanine Grenberg (St. Olaf College)
Lynn Joy (University of Notre Dame)
Pat Manfredi (Southern Illinois University–Carbondale)

For the 2009-2010 Nominating Committee (4 to be elected):
J. Baird Callicott (University of North Texas)
Lisa Downing (Ohio State University)
Tomis Kapitan (Northern Illinois University)
Gabriel Richardson Lear (University of Chicago)
Jeffrey Roland (Louisiana State University)
David Sussman (University of Illinois–Urbana/Champaign)
Valerie Tiberius (University of Minnesota–Twin Cities)
Linda Zagzebski (University of Oklahoma)

In discussion, Sterba said that the Committee had done its best to follow the instruction from the 2008 Executive Committee Meeting to ensure that nominees come from geographically diverse institutions. In discussion, members noted that only one nominee was from a four-year college and that all the institutions but two had graduate programs in philosophy. By consensus, the Executive Committee encouraged the 2009-10 Nominating Committee to do its best to foster diversity of institutional type as well as institutional location among its nominees.

Sterba also reported on some difficulties in determining with certainty that all prospective nominees are not only APA members but also Central Division affiliates, as required by our Bylaws, and offered suggestions to the incoming Chair of the Nominating Committee about the best measures for accomplishing this. As the incoming chair of this Committee for 2009-10, van Inwagen took all the above recommendations under advisement.

By consensus, the Executive Committee thanked Sterba for the work done by him and the Committee.

Friedman proposed that the Executive Committee convey as the sense of its meeting to the incoming Chair of the Nominating Committee that the Committee’s attention be called to the issues of institutional and regional diversity in the process of selecting the nominees for offices. This action was taken by consensus.

6. Secretary-Treasurer Robin Smith reported on the activities of the 2009 Program Committee, noting that it had completed preliminary plans for the invited portion of the program and was in the process of securing
commitments from speakers. For the 2010 meeting, the deadline for submitted papers has been advanced to June 1, 2009. The members of the 2010 committee are:

Margaret Atherton (University of Wisconsin–Milwaukee), Chair
Harry Brighouse (University of Wisconsin–Madison)
Ben Caplan (Ohio State University)
Joshua Dever (University of Texas–Austin)
Cynthia Freeland (University of Houston)
Jeffrey A. Gorham (St. Olaf College)
David Hilbert (University of Illinois–Chicago)
Nick Huggett (University of Illinois–Chicago)
Gabriel Richardson Lear (University of Chicago)
Sebastian Luft (Marquette University)
Wayne D. Riggs (University of Oklahoma)
Phyllis Rooney (Oakland University)
Robin Smith (Texas A&M University), *ex officio*
David Sussman (University of Illinois–Urbana-Champaign)

[The members of the 2009 Committee are listed on p. 11 of the meeting program.]

Smith moved that the Executive Committee change the deadline for receipt of submitted papers from July 1 to June 1 to accommodate the change of meeting dates to February. Vice President Peter Van Inwagen seconded. The motion carried.

7. Secretary-Treasurer Smith presented the financial report for 2008-09. He noted that the report is necessarily an estimate since income and expenses for the 2009 meeting will not be known until after the meeting. Tentative projections are for lower registration and lower book exhibit income than budgeted. However, since the contract for this year includes various credits from the hotel totaling approximately $15,000, he projected a small surplus for the year. *(Note: In the event, registration for the 2009 meeting was within 2% of registration at the 2008 meeting.)*

8. Secretary-Treasurer Smith presented a proposed budget for 2009-10, assuming a continued decline in book exhibit income and no net change in registration income. After brief discussion, Friedman moved that the proposed budget be accepted, with second by Downing. The motion carried.

9. Secretary-Treasurer Smith presented a proposal from the Eastern Division Executive Committee

“to raise meeting registration fees to $60 for regular members and $90 for non-members effective in 2010; to waive registration fees for invited speakers from other fields and invited speakers from outside North America; and to review registration fees on a regular basis every five years.”
Smith moved to amend the motion by replacing the second clause with the words “That registration fees for invited speakers from outside philosophy be set at an appropriate lower rate for those speakers who only wish to attend the sessions in which they are participating.” Friedman seconded. The motion to amend failed. Smith then moved to amend the motion by deleting the second clause. Sedgwick seconded. The motion to amend was carried. The main motion was carried.

10. Smith presented a proposal from the Eastern Division Executive Committee to adopt new advertising rates for the APA Proceedings. The proposal was adopted by consensus.

11. The Executive Committee approved the agenda for the Business Meeting on motion by Sedgwick, seconded by Shafer-Landau.

12. Under New Business, Friedman moved that the Executive Committee ask the Secretary-Treasurer to prepare a report including information about the practices of the other two Divisions concerning registration fees for invited speakers outside philosophy, as well as registration policies in other professional associations, and to deliver it to the 2010 Executive Committee meeting; and, to include consideration of this as an item on the agenda for the 2010 meeting. The motion carried.

13. The meeting adjourned at 8:55 p.m.

Respectfully submitted,

Robin Smith
Secretary-Treasurer, APA Central Division
REPORT OF THE 2009-2010 NOMINATING COMMITTEE

The 2009-2010 Central Division Nominating Committee, composed of Peter van Inwagen (Chair), Lisa Downing, Gabriel Richardson Lear, Valerie Tiberius, and Linda Zagzebski, proposes the following nominations for 2010:

FOR VICE-PRESIDENT AND PRESIDENT-ELECT:
Hugh J. McCann (Texas A&M University)
Steven Nadler (University of Wisconsin–Madison)
Peter Railton (University of Michigan–Ann Arbor)

FOR EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE MEMBER-AT-LARGE, TERM 2010-2013:
Carla Bagnoli (University of Wisconsin–Milwaukee)
Marya Schechtman (University of Illinois–Chicago)
Paul Weithman (University of Notre Dame)

FOR SECRETARY-TREASURER, TERM 2010-2013:
Robin Smith (Texas A&M University)

FOR THE 2010-2011 NOMINATING COMMITTEE (FOUR TO BE ELECTED):
Patricia Blanchette (University of Notre Dame)
Eric Brown (Washington University in St. Louis)
Justin D'Arms (Ohio State University)
Todd Ganson (Oberlin College)
Sanford Goldberg (Northwestern University)
Andrew Mills (Otterbein College)
Kieran Setiya (University of Pittsburgh)
Russell Shafer-Landau (University of Wisconsin–Madison)

The By-Laws of the Central Division contain this provision concerning nominations from the floor at the Business Meeting (Article 1.c):

“Upon receipt of the report of the Nominating Committee, additional nominations for the next year’s Nominating Committee, for officers, and members of the Executive Committee, may be made from the floor by any ten members of the Association affiliated with the Central Division. Before ballots are prepared, the individuals nominated shall be invited by
mail to signify their willingness to stand for election. No name shall appear on a ballot unless the individual named has filed a signed statement of willingness to stand for election.”
RESULTS OF THE 2009 CENTRAL DIVISION ELECTIONS

In the May-June 2009 Central Division elections:

- Claudia Card was elected Vice President for 2009-2010 (and thus President for 2010-2011).
- Julia Driver was elected Divisional Representative for 2009-2010.
- Lynn Joy was elected Member at Large of the Executive Committee for the term 2009-2012.
- Lisa Downing, Gabriel Richardson Lear, Valerie Tiberius, and Linda Zagzebski were elected to the 2009-2010 Nominating Committee.
- The proposal to amend the Bylaws of the APA to create a new category of member, Teacher Associate, was approved by a vote of 275 to 17. This proposal had previously been approved by the Eastern Division. It was also subsequently approved by the Pacific Division, and consequently the proposed amendments have been adopted.
Members who need child care during the 2010 Central Division meeting may wish to contact the following:

**American Child Care, Inc.**
http://www.americanchildcare.com/chicago_fun1.html

**Illinois Action for Children**
1340 S. Damen Avenue
3rd Floor
Chicago, IL 60608
childcare@actforchildren.org
Referral 312-823-1100
http://www.actforchildren.org/

**Sittercity**
http://www.sittercity.com/us/chicago-60622/il/
A complete list of book exhibitors will be available online (www.apaonline.org) and at the Central Division Meeting.
LIST OF ADVERTISERS

CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS (A-178)
DUKE UNIVERSITY PRESS (A-172)
HARVARD UNIVERSITY PRESS (A-170)
MARQUETTE UNIVERSITY PRESS (A-173)
PARAGON HOUSE (A-177)
PERSEUS BOOKS GROUP (A-IV)
PENN STATE PRESS (A-171)
PHILOSOPHY DOCUMENTATION CENTER (A-OUTSIDE BACK COVER)
ROUTLEDGE PUBLISHERS (A-174-176)
SUNY PRESS (A-INSIDE FRONT COVER)
WADSWORTH CENGAGE LEARNING (A-INSIDE BACK COVER)
FORMS

ADVANCE REGISTRATION FORM

HOTEL RESERVATION INFORMATION

RECEPTION TABLE REQUEST FORM

PROGRAM SUGGESTION FORM
NAME: ______________________________________________________________

AFFILIATION: ____________________________________________________________

EMAIL: ______________________  PHONE: ______________________

ADVANCE REGISTRATION FEES (Received by January 29, 2010 at the National Office)

$10.00 APA Student Members

$60.00 APA Regular, International & Emeritus Members

$90.00 Nonmembers

We cannot process any advanced registrations at the National Office past the January 29th deadline. After that date you will need to register in Chicago.

Placement Registration

Interviewers should also complete the Placement Registration Form. Candidates should check the space below if planning to use the service. Candidates must be a member of the APA in order to use the Placement Service. Placement is a free service for all current APA members.

I will be a job candidate.

1) Check* (Payable to APA)

*The APA can only accept checks drawn on a U.S. bank, in U.S. Dollars.

2) Visa  MasterCard  Exp. Date

Last 3 digits on back of card

Name as it appears on Card:

Signature of Authorization:

Email: ______________________________  Phone #: __________________________
American Philosophical Association, Central Meeting, February 17-20, 2010
The Palmer House Hilton, 17 East Monroe Street, Chicago, IL 60603
Phone: 312 726 7500; Toll Free 877 865 5321; Fax 312 332 3619

If you prefer to make your reservation online, Please use the following link:
and use the special group code AMP.

Note: Students must call the toll free number listed above for reservations at the student rate. The rate is $129 plus tax and the special group code is AMS.

Name: __________________________________________________________
Address: ______________________________________________________________________________________
City: ___________________ State: _______ Zip: __________
Home Phone: __________________ Office Phone: __________________
E-mail Address: ______________________________________________________
Arrival: ___________________ Departure: ___________________
Sharing Room With: _________________________________________________
Handicapped Accessible Room: _________________________________________

Please check one:  Single ($175) __________ Double ($175)______________
Bed Preference:  King Bed______________Double Beds_________________

Rooms are subject to 15.4% tax per night. Check-in time is 3:00 p.m.; check-out time is 11:00 a.m. Deadline to cancel a guaranteed reservation without penalty is 72 hours prior to arrival. A first night’s deposit is required to confirm your reservation using a credit card or check. Checks should be made payable to the Palmer House Hilton and mailed to the address above.

Please confirm your dates! If you fail to arrive on your confirmed check-in date, your entire reservation will be cancelled and you will be charged one night room & tax. If you are paying by credit card, please complete the information below.

Visa □ MasterCard □ Amex □ Diner’s Club □ Discover □ Exp. Date □

Name as it appears on Card: ___________________________________________
Signature of Authorization: ____________________________________________
Email: _______________________________ Phone #: ________________________

Rooms are available on a first-come, first-served basis and subject to availability.
Reservations must be made by January 17th to be assured of the APA rate.
Fax this form with your credit card payment to Linda Smallbrook (302-831-3372). No cover sheet is needed. Or, if you prefer, mail this form with your payment to Linda Smallbrook, APA, University of Delaware, Newark, DE 19716.

Payment must accompany your registration form.

**IMPORTANT NOTE:** ALL TABLE RESERVATIONS MUST BE PAID FOR AT THE TIME OF PLACING THE RESERVATION. WE WILL BE UNABLE TO PROCESS YOUR FORM WITHOUT THE ACCOMPANYING PAYMENT. THANK YOU FOR YOUR UNDERSTANDING.

Receptions are scheduled to be held in the **Red Lacquer Room** on **February 18th** (8:30 p.m. to midnight) and in the **Red Lacquer Room** on **February 19th** (9:00 p.m. to midnight). The first night reception provides beer and soft drinks at no charge. **Admittance is by registration name badge or ticket only.** The second night reception is a cash bar. The charge for a table at both receptions is $25.00 total. The deadline for receipt of reservations is January 29th. After that time we will still take reservations but your school’s name will not appear in the handout.

To reserve a table, please complete the following and return to Linda Smallbrook, APA, University of Delaware, Newark, DE 19716; or fax the form to 302-831-3372.

Name:________________________________________________________

School/Organization:_____________________________________________

E-mail address: __________________________________________________

Please select an option for payment and fill out the form completely if paying by credit card.

___ 1) Check* (Payable to APA)
   *The APA can only accept checks drawn on a U.S. bank, in U.S. Dollars.

___ 2) Visa  MasterCard  Exp. Date ________________

   Last 3 digits on back of card ____________

   Name as it appears on Card: ____________________________________________

   Signature of Authorization: ____________________________________________

Email: ___________________________ Phone #: ____________________________

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**Table Form:**

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<th>Name:</th>
<th>School/Organization:</th>
<th>E-mail address:</th>
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**Credit Card Payment:**

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**Additional Information:**

- Fax: 302-831-3372
- Mail to: Linda Smallbrook, APA, University of Delaware, Newark, DE 19716
- Credit card payments preferred
- Payment must accompany registration form
- Reservations deadline: January 29th
In order to foster diversity of and participation in the program of the Central
Division, the Executive Committee invites submission of the following
form:

(1) I would like to hear papers at the Divisional Meetings in the following
areas:

(2) I would like to be considered as a Session Chair for papers in one of
the following areas:

(3) I would like to be considered as a Paper Commentator for papers in
one of the following areas:

To be considered as Commentator or Chair for the 2011 meeting, please
submit this form, along with a CV, by August 1, 2010, to:

Bill E. Lawson, Chair
2011 APA Central Program Committee
Department of Philosophy
University of Memphis
327 Clement Hall
Memphis, TN 38152-3530
belawson@memphis.edu

This form may be reproduced, and suggestions under (1) may be sent to
Professor Lawson or to:

Robin Smith, Secretary-Treasurer
APA Central Division
Department of Philosophy
Texas A&M University
College Station, TX 77843-4237
rasmith@tamu.edu

If you would like acknowledgement of receipt of your CV and form, please
enclose a stamped, self-addressed postcard.
APA Registration Policy

It is the policy of the APA that all persons attending sessions, including those who are participating as speakers, commentators or session chairs, are required to register for each meeting they attend. In addition, we have always recommended that all participants wear their APA badges during session hours to identify themselves as registered participants. In an effort better to enforce this policy we have begun a system of checking meeting attendees, randomly and anyone whom we suspect might not be registered, for proof of registration. If you are asked to provide proof of registration and are unable to do so, you will be asked to register immediately in order to enable you to attend sessions. Registration fees help subsidize every divisional meeting. Without that income we will be unable to ensure the quality and excellence of our meetings which you have come to expect. We thank you for your continued cooperation.