The American Philosophical Association
Pacific Division

Eighty-Fourth
Annual Meeting

Host Institution:
San Francisco State University

Westin St. Francis
San Francisco, CA

March 31 - April 3, 2010
Proceedings and Addresses of The American Philosophical Association

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Each annual volume contains the programs for the meetings of the three Divisions; the membership list; Presidential Addresses; news of the Association, its Divisions and Committees, and announcements of interest to philosophers. Other items of interest to the community of philosophers may be included by decision of the Editor or the APA Board of Officers.

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All correspondence should be sent to the APA, 31 Amstel Avenue, University of Delaware, Newark, DE 19716, directed to the appropriate staff member as follows: Erin Shepherd for inquiries and publication copy concerning programs of the Divisional meetings, general issues of the Proceedings, announcements, awards to members, and advertising; Janet Sample for membership information, address changes, and memorial minutes; and the Executive Director for letters to the editor.

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# Table of Contents

- **Letter from the Secretary-Treasurer** .......................................................... 1
- **Pacific Division Committees** ..................................................................... 7
- **Main Program** .......................................................................................... 9
- **Group Program** ....................................................................................... 57
- **Main, Group, and Mini-Conference Program Participants** ..................... 83
- **Graduate Student Travel Stipend Winners** ............................................. 111
- **Group Sessions** ....................................................................................... 115
- **Special Sessions Sponsored by APA Committees** .................................. 119
- **Abstracts of Colloquium, Symposium, and Invited Papers** .................... 121
- **APA Placement Service Information** ..................................................... 175
  - Placement Service Registration Form ....................................................... 183
- **Paper Submission Guidelines** ................................................................ 185
- **Minutes of the 2009 Pacific Division Executive Committee Meeting** .... 189
- **Minutes of the 2009 Pacific Division Business Meeting** ......................... 191
- **Report of the 2009-2010 Nominating Committee** .................................. 195
- **Call for Proposals for Mini-Conferences** ................................................. 197
- **List of Advertisers and Book Exhibitors** ................................................ 199
- **Forms** ...................................................................................................... 211
  - Advance Registration Form ...................................................................... 213
  - Hotel Reservation Form ........................................................................... 215
- **APA Registration Policy** .......................................................................... 217
- **Restaurants and Attractions** .................................................................... 219
- **Hotel Diagrams** ...................................................................................... 233
LETTER FROM THE SECRETARY-TREASURER

To All Members of the Association:

The Executive Committee of the Pacific Division of The American Philosophical Association cordially invites you to attend the 84th annual meeting of The American Philosophical Association Pacific Division. The meeting will be held at the Westin St. Francis in San Francisco from Wednesday, March 31 through Sunday, April 4, 2010.

1. MEETING LOCATION: SPECIAL ATTRACTIONS

The APA Pacific Division will meet at the St. Francis Hotel on Union Square, at the heart of San Francisco. The address is 335 Powell Street, San Francisco, California 94102-1875. The telephone number is 415-397-7000 and the fax number is 415-774-0124.

The convention rate is available until March 1, subject to availability, and members are strongly advised to book early. Visit apa-pacific.org for online reservations or call 415-397-7000 and give the name and dates of the meeting to obtain the convention rate of $179 for a double or single room. Rooms may also be booked by fax or mail using the hotel reservation form in this issue of the Proceedings.

One of the handful of classic and historic deluxe hotels in San Francisco, the Westin St. Francis has its own cable-car stop and a view overlooking Union Square. It is the site of Mina, a Michelin two-star restaurant and also the Wine Spectator’s pick for best San Francisco restaurant. The hotel is also a favorite stop for afternoon tea, and The Onyx lobby bar expands the locations where philosophers can enjoy each other’s conversations.

The hotel is within walking distance of Chinatown, the theater district, Yerba Buena Center, the Museum of Modern Art, and several smaller museums, as well as dozens of San Francisco’s finest restaurants. (See restaurant and attractions list in this Proceedings.) North Beach is a few minutes ride away on the cable car that stops in front of the hotel. A short ride on the bus or a one-station ride on BART brings you to the Civic Center, home of the Symphony, the Ballet, and the Asian Art Museum. Those travelling with children should note the new Disney Family Museum in the Presidio, near the Golden Gate Bridge. The nearby Palace of the Legion of Honor displays an extensive European painting and sculpture collection and a world-famous print collection. The de Young Museum in Golden Gate Park is worth a visit for its architecture by Herzog and de Meuron as well as its collections. In addition to these large museums, San Francisco has many small ones, including at least five within easy walking distance of the hotel.
(See the list of San Francisco museums and galleries in this Proceedings.)
A list of museums, galleries, theaters, concert halls, restaurants, and clubs can be found in this Proceedings. Those interested in taking a day trip to the Wine Country or Monterey, or heading for skiing in Tahoe should call the concierge at the St. Francis for booking advice.

2. TRAVEL INFORMATION

Driving: (Dial 511 for latest traffic information) -
From the South: Take 101 North to 4th Street exit onto Bryant Street. Continue one block and turn left onto 3rd Street, which becomes Kearny Street. Cross the Market Street intersection at Geary and turn left onto Geary. The St. Francis auto entrance is on Geary, just past Union Square on your right.
From the North across the Bay Bridge: Take 101 South to the Fremont Street exit, turn left on Fremont, turn left on Howard, turn right on Third Street, which becomes Kearny Street. Then follow instructions above.
From the North across the Golden Gate Bridge: Exit Lombard Street. Turn right onto Van Ness, and left onto Bush. At Powell (just at the corner or Union Square), turn right, then turn right at Geary to find hotel’s auto entrance.

Parking: Parking in the garage under Union Square costs $25 per day. Drive down Geary, nearly to Van Ness, for garages with a flat $10 fee, but it’s a long walk back.

By Air: From San Francisco Airport, numerous shuttles will take you to the hotel door. Check to find the most competitive price (around $15), but be sure to ask when the van will leave (some wait till they are full) and whether they take you directly downtown to Union Square without many earlier stops. Here is a list of shuttles, with phone numbers: Advanced Airport Shuttle (650-504-6641), Airport Express (415-775-5121), American Airporter Shuttle (800-282-7758 or 415-202-0733), Bay Shuttle (415-564-3400), Lorrie’s Airport Shuttle (415-334-9000), M & M Luxury Shuttle (415-552-3200), Pacific Airport Shuttle (415-681-6318), Peter’s Airport Shuttle (650-577-8858), Quake City Shuttle (415-255-4899 or 415-621-2831), San Francisco City Shuttle (888- 850-7878), and SuperShuttle (415-558-8500). SuperShuttle has wheelchair-accessible vans, but these should be reserved in advance.
Taxis will get you downtown much more quickly, with a fare running around $37. San Francisco has many wheelchair-accessible taxis. At SFO, locate any taxi dispatcher outside the lower (baggage) level and ask for a wheelchair taxi. One will be called from the taxi waiting area and should roll up within five minutes; no pre-arrangement or prior reservation is necessary.

The BART rapid transit system links the airport to downtown as well. The airport BART station is located on the Departures/Ticketing Level (Level 3) of the International Terminal, on the Boarding Area G side of the terminal.
near the Berman Reflection Room. BART is also easily accessed from any terminal by riding SFO’s AirTrain to the Garage G/BART Station stop. There is no charge to board AirTrain. Take BART to the Powell Street Station in San Francisco and walk two short blocks to Union Square. BART also provides a direct connection from SFO to Caltrain at the Millbrae station. BART is wheelchair accessible and all travel information is provided both by loudspeaker announcement and electric billboard.

From Oakland Airport, you also can BART to San Francisco by taking an AirBART shuttle to the Coliseum/Oakland Airport BART station, and then the subway to the Powell Street Station in San Francisco. As at San Francisco Airport, there are numerous shuttles to San Francisco.

In the City: The Powell Street cable car stops in front of the hotel. MUNI Buses 2, 3, 4, and 38 do so as well. Two short blocks away at Powell and Market, BART will take you to various parts of the City and to the East Bay (Oakland and Berkeley). For detailed information about public transportation in San Francisco, including transit maps, see http://www.511.org/. Dial 511 on landline phones and on most cell phones to obtain public transit information.

3. MEETING REGISTRATION

The registration fee is $10 for student members, $60 for regular members, and $90 for non-members who wish to attend more than a single session. Special tickets for $10 will be available to non-members who wish to attend a single session or one of the receptions.

Only those who are registered or have purchased the limited number of extra tickets may attend the scheduled sessions or receptions. Please be sure to wear your convention badge at all times to identify yourself as a registered participant.

A pre-registration form is included in the back of this issue of the Proceedings.

Those who are not now members of the APA may take advantage of the lower registration fee by becoming members. Membership forms are available from the National Office, online at apaonline.org and will also be available at the meeting registration desk.

4. PLACEMENT SERVICE

Only APA members are eligible to use the Placement service. Appointing officers and applicants are urged to make preparations for their part in the placement operation in advance of the meeting.

5. PRESIDENTIAL ADDRESS

The Presidential Address will be delivered by Michael Bratman at 6:00 p.m. on Friday, April 2. President Bratman will be introduced by Vice President Michael Tooley.
6. RECEPTIONS AND SPECIAL EVENTS

There will be a special reception in honor of Anita Silvers, past Secretary-Treasurer of the Division, at 4:00 p.m. on Thursday, April 1, immediately following a session on her work. All are welcome to join in thanking Professor Silvers for her many years of service to the Division.

There will be a reception for Friends of Chinese Philosophy from 5:00 to 6:00 p.m. on Thursday, April 1. All are welcome to attend.

The Annual Reception will be held from 10:00 p.m. to midnight on Thursday, April 1.

John Perry will deliver the Dewey Lecture on Friday, April 2 starting at 4:00 p.m., with a reception to follow. All are invited to attend the lecture and the reception.

The Presidential Reception will be held at 7:00 p.m. on Friday, April 2, following the Presidential Address.

The APA Committee on the Status of Women is hosting a reception at 6:00 p.m. on Saturday, April 3, following its session on Feminism and Humor.

Generally, receptions are for persons registered at the convention. Tickets for guests may be purchased at the door of receptions or the convention registration desk.

Please check the Special Events page of the Pocket Program for information about receptions added to the schedule as the convention date nears. The Pocket Program is distributed with the registration package.

7. BUSINESS MEETING

The annual Business Meeting will be held at noon on Thursday, April 1. According to the Association’s By-Laws, regular membership is given by an act of the Executive Secretary on behalf of the Board of Officers. Each year the list of regular members that appears in the November Proceedings is used as the list of eligible voters for the three subsequent Divisional business meetings.

Nancy Cartwright (Chair), Thomas Christiano, Lisa Shapiro, and Dominic McIver Lopes (ex officio) served as the 2009-10 Nominating Committee. They have nominated the following APA Pacific Division members for terms beginning July 1, 2010: for Vice President: Alison Wylie; for Executive Committee Member: Alastair Norcross.

Pacific Division members may make nominations or volunteer for membership on the Program Committee or the Nomination Committee. Nominations should be sent by email to the Secretary-Treasurer, Dominic Lopes, at dom.lopes@ubc.ca, no later than March 24, 2010.

8. 2010 PROGRAM

This year’s Program Committee, chaired by Rebecca Copenhaver, has organized a diverse and exciting program. Principal papers in Colloquia and Symposia were selected after blind review of all submitted papers.
Participants in Invited Paper, Invited Symposia, and Author-Meets-Critics sessions were invited by the Program Committee. Participants in sessions arranged by APA Committees were selected by those Committees.

9. 2011 MEETING SITE AND PROGRAM

The 2011 Pacific Division Meeting will be held at the Hilton Bayfront Hotel, in San Diego. The Program Committee invites contributions for the 2011 meeting. The deadline for submission is September 1, 2010. Each author may make only one submission. Electronic submissions are strongly encouraged. Paper submissions should indicate prominently that the paper is submitted for the 2011 Pacific Division Meeting. Because the Program Committee will blind-review all submissions, the names and institution of the author may not appear in the paper in any way that defeats the operation of blind-reviewing. Papers that are not prepared for blind review cannot be reviewed. The 2011 Program Committee also welcomes suggestions for topics and/or speakers of invited sessions. Recommendations (including self-nominations) for commentators and session chairs also are welcome. These all should be sent to the 2010 Program Chair, Joseph Keim Campbell at josephc@wsu.edu.

10. ACCOMMODATING MEMBERS WITH MULTIPLE CHEMICAL SENSITIVITIES

To provide a welcoming environment for those with multiple chemical sensitivities, all participants are requested to refrain from wearing scented products.

On behalf of the Executive and Program Committees of the APA Pacific Division, I extend to every member of The American Philosophical Association a warm invitation to take part in our 2010 Annual Meeting.

Cordially,

Dominic McIver Lopes
Secretary-Treasurer
PACIFIC DIVISION COMMITTEES, 2009-2010

EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE

Michael Bratman  Dominic McIver Lopes
Heather Battaly   Ned Markosian
Nancy Cartwright  Michael Tooley
Stuart Cohen      Julie Van Camp
Rebecca Copenhaver

PROGRAM COMMITTEE

Rebecca Copenhaver (Chair)  Keith McPartland
Joseph Keim Campbell       Mark McPherran
Amy Coplan                 Adam Morton
Stephen Finlay             Jay Odenbaugh
Patrick R. Frierson        L. A. Paul
Avram Hiller               Patrick W. Rysiew
David Hills                David Schmidtz
Paul Hovda                 Adam Sennet
Nadeem J. Z. Hussain       Charles Siewert
Eric Hutton                Ori Simchen
Sherri Irvin               Julie Tannenbaum
Robin Jeshion              Iain Thomson
Amy Kind                   Eric Watkins
Janet Levin                Aaron Zimmerman

LOCAL ARRANGEMENTS

Anita Silvers
NOMINATING COMMITTEE

Nancy Cartwright (Chair)
Thomas Christiano
Lisa Shapiro
Dominic McIver Lopes, *ex officio*
THE AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL ASSOCIATION

PACIFIC DIVISION
EIGHTY-FOURTH ANNUAL
MEETING PROGRAM

MARCH 31 - APRIL 4, 2010
WESTIN ST. FRANCIS, SAN FRANCISCO

MAIN PROGRAM

WEDNESDAY, MARCH 31

PLACEMENT INFORMATION
11:00 a.m.-8:00 p.m., Mezzanine

REGISTRATION
11:00 a.m.-8:00 p.m., Mezzanine

EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE MEETING
4:00-7:00 p.m.

WEDNESDAY AFTERNOON, MARCH 31

SESSION I — 1:00-4:00 P.M.

I-A. Author-Meets-Critics: Russell T. Hurlburt and Eric Schwitzgebel,
Describing Inner Experience? Proponent Meets Skeptic
1:00-4:00 p.m.
Chair: Charles Siewert (University of California–Riverside)
Critics: Christopher Hill (Brown University)
Gualtiero Piccinini (University of Missouri–St. Louis)
Mark Timmons (University of Arizona)
Authors: Russell T. Hurlburt (University of Nevada–Las Vegas)
Eric Schwitzgebel (University of California–Riverside)
I-B. Invited Symposium: Existential Phenomenology in Latin America
1:00-4:00 p.m.
Chair: Jesus Ramirez (Ohlone College)
Speakers: Alejandro Vallega (California State University–Stanislaus)
“A Latin American Philosophy Beyond Pernicious Knowledge”
Carlos Sanchez (San Jose State University)
“Resistance and Ressentiment: Max Scheler and Jorge Portilla on Values and Their Fragility”
Commentators: Omar Rivera (University of Wisconsin–La Crosse)
Alejandro Strong (Southern Illinois University–Carbondale)

I-C. Invited Symposium: Metaphysics
1:00-4:00 p.m.
Chair: L. A. Paul (University of North Carolina–Chapel Hill)
Speakers: Daniel Nolan (University of Nottingham)
Achille Varzi (Columbia University)
Ryan Wasserman (Western Washington University)
Commentator: Jason Turner (University of Leeds)

I-D. Invited Symposium: The Concept of Understanding in Epistemology
1:00-4:00 p.m.
Chair: Charles Griswold (Boston University)
Speakers: Jonathan Kvanvig (Baylor University)
“Curiosity and the Response-Dependent Value of Understanding”
Catherine Elgin (Harvard University)
“Understanding and Knowledge”
Michael Strevens (New York University)
“Varieties of Understanding”
Commentator: Brad Armendt (Arizona State University)

I-E. Colloquium: Epistemic Norms
1:00-4:00 p.m.
1:00-2:00 p.m.
Chair: Michael Trestman (University of California–Davis)
Speaker: Gregory Wheeler (New University of Lisbon)
“Character Matching and the Envelope of Belief”
Commentator: Jonathan Weisberg (University of Toronto)
2:00-3:00 p.m.
Chair: Anthony Rudd (St. Olaf College)
Speaker: Jason Kawall (Colgate University)
“Testimony, Epistemic Egoism, and Epistemic Credit”
Commentator: Anne Baril (University of Arizona)

3:00-4:00 p.m.
Chair: Helmut Wautischer (Sonoma State University)
Speaker: Jerry Joseph Steinhofer (Brown University)
“Epistemic Desert and the Value of Knowledge”
Commentator: Sarah A. Wright (University of Georgia)

I-F. Colloquium: Freedom and Determinism
1:00-4:00 p.m.

1:00-2:00 p.m.
Chair: Justin Coates (University of California–Riverside)
Speaker: Kevin L. Timpe (Northwest Nazarene University)
“Revising Revisionism”
Commentator: Benjamin Vilhauer (William Paterson University)

2:00-3:00 p.m.
Chair: David Vander Laan (Westmont College)
Speaker: Garrett Pendergraft (University of California–Riverside)
“No (New) Troubles with Ockhamism”
Commentator: David Hunt (Whittier College)

3:00-4:00 p.m.
Chair: Benj Hellie (University of Toronto)
Speaker: Paul R. Audi (University of Nebraska–Omaha)
“Freedom, Backtrackers, and the Fixity of the Past”
Commentator: Marc Johansen (University of Arizona)

I-G. Colloquium: Mental States
1:00-4:00 p.m.

1:00-2:00 p.m.
Chair: Barbara Montero (City University of New York–Graduate Center)
Speaker: Andreas Elpidorou (Boston University)
“Reasons, Causes, and Neuropsychology: An Essay on Geometrical Gerrymandering”
Commentator: Anne Jacobson (University of Houston)
2:00-3:00 p.m.
Chair: Alexander Klein (California State University–Long Beach)
Speaker: Mitchell Herschbach (University of California–San Diego)
“Mirroring Is Not Always Simulation”
Commentator: Felipe De Brigard (University of North Carolina–Chapel Hill)

3:00-4:00 p.m.
Chair: Ray Rennard (University of the Pacific)
Speaker: Alex Grzankowski (University of Texas–Austin)
“Are All Attitudes Propositional Attitudes?”
Commentator: Ted Parent (Virginia Tech)

I-H. Colloquium: Philosophy of Biology and Physics
1:00-4:00 p.m.

1:00-2:00 p.m.
Chair: Johanna Wolff (Stanford University)
Speaker: Jill North (Yale University)
“The Structure of a Quantum World”
Commentator: Otávio Bueno (University of Miami)

2:00-3:00 p.m.
Chair: Roberta L. Millstein (University of California–Davis)
Speakers: Andrew Margenot (Connecticut College)
         Derek Turner (Connecticut College)
         “Contingency and Relative Significance Debates in Biology”
Commentator: Alan C. Love (University of Minnesota)

3:00-4:00 p.m.
Chair: Scott Brophy (Hobart and William Smith Colleges)
Speaker: Joel Velasco (Stanford University)
“Species, Genes, and the Tree of Life”
Commentator: Angela Potochnik (Oklahoma State University)

I-I. Colloquium: Plato – Mind and Metaphysics
1:00-4:00 p.m.

1:00-2:00 p.m.
Chair: Matthew Darmalingum (Stanford University)
Speaker: Kelly Arenson (University of Memphis)
“The Pleasures of Psychic Harmony in Plato’s Republic”
Commentator: William Prior (Santa Clara University)
2:00-3:00 p.m.
Chair: Anthony Ferrucci (San Francisco State University)
Speaker: Brian Prince (Rice University)
“Plato’s Kinetic Theory”
Commentator: Russell Jones (University of Oklahoma)

3:00-4:00 p.m.
Chair: Ravi Sharma (Clark University)
Speaker: David J. Yount (Mesa Community College)
“Emanation (or Lack Thereof?) in Plato and Plotinus”
Commentator: Nalin Ranasinghe (Assumption College)

I-J. Colloquium: Will, Responsibility, and Belief
1:00-4:00 p.m.

1:00-2:00 p.m.
Chair: Christopher Williams (University of Nevada–Reno)
Speaker: Eric Barnes (Southern Methodist University)
“Autonomy and Creative Responsibility”
Commentator: Neera Badhwar (University of Oklahoma)

2:00-3:00 p.m.
Chair: Julie Tannenbaum (Pomona College)
Speaker: Laura W. Ekstrom (College of William and Mary)
“What Is the Will?”
Commentator: Tamar Schapiro (Stanford University)

3:00-4:00 p.m.
Chair: Dan Ryder (University of British Columbia–Okanagan)
Speaker: Zachary J. Goldberg (Arizona State University)
“Van Inwagen’s Two Failed Arguments for the Belief in Freedom”
Commentator: Oisin Deery (University of British Columbia)

GROUP MEETING, 1:00-4:00 P.M.
(See Group Meeting Program for details)
Hume Society and North American Kant Society
WEDNESDAY EARLY EVENING, MARCH 31

SESSION II — 4:00-6:00 P.M.

II-A. Author-Meets-Critics: Jiyuan Yu, *The Ethics of Confucius and Aristotle: Mirrors of Virtue*

4:00-6:00 p.m.
Chair: Marjolein Oele (University of San Francisco)
Critics: Lisa Raphals (University of California–Riverside)
George Rudebusch (Northern Arizona University)
Yang Xiao (Kenyon College)
Author: Jiyuan Yu (University at Buffalo)

II-B. Invited Paper: Feminism and Capitalism

4:00-6:00 p.m.
Chair: Samantha Brennan (University of Western Ontario)
Speaker: Ann Cudd (University of Kansas)
“A Feminist Defense of Capitalism”
Commentators: Nicole Hassoun (Carnegie Mellon University)
Cynthia Stark (University of Utah)

II-C. Invited Symposium: Aesthetics and Psychology

4:00-6:00 p.m.
Chair: Jeff Dean (Wiley-Blackwell)
Speakers: Stephen Davies (University of Auckland)
Mark Rollins (Washington University in St. Louis)
Commentators: Tobyn De Marco (Bergen Community College)
Dustin Stokes (University of Toronto)

II-D. Invited Symposium: Content

4:00-6:00 p.m.
Chair: Jessica Rett (University of California–Los Angeles)
Speakers: Sam Cumming (University of California–Los Angeles)
Jeffrey C. King (Rutgers University)
Angel Pinillos (Arizona State University)

II-E. Invited Symposium: Nietzsche’s Relevance for Contemporary Ethics

4:00-6:00 p.m.
Chair: Nadeem J. Z. Hussain (Stanford University)
Speakers: Paul Katsafanas (University of New Mexico)
“Grounding Ethics in Philosophical Psychology”
Simon Robertson (University of Southampton)  
“Nietzsche and Moral Obligation”  
Commentator: Reid Blackman (Colgate University)

II-F. Colloquium: Actions, Intentions, and Slips
4:00-6:00 p.m.

4:00-5:00 p.m.
Chair: Marcia Homiak (Occidental College)
Speaker: John Hacker-Wright (University of Guelph)
“Ethical Naturalism as Transcendental Anthropology”
Commentator: Emer O’Hagan (University of Saskatchewan)

5:00-6:00 p.m.
Chair: Louise Antony (University of Massachusetts–Amherst)
Speaker: Santiago Amaya (Washington University in St. Louis)
“Slips and Revealed Preference”
Commentator: Dion Scott-Kakures (Scripps College)

II-G. Colloquium: Modern Mind and Metaphysics
4:00-6:00 p.m.

4:00-5:00 p.m.
Chair: Julian Wuerth (Vanderbilt University)
Speaker: Ludmila Guenova (Harvard University)
“The Problem of Classification: Kant’s Reply to Locke”
Commentator: Clinton Tolley (University of California–San Diego)

5:00-6:00 p.m.
Chair: Brian Glenney (University of Southern California)
Speaker: Shelley Weinberg (University of Illinois)
“Locke’s Internal Externalism”
Commentator: Antonia Lolordo (University of Virginia)

II-H. Colloquium: Perception
4:00-6:00 p.m.

4:00-5:00 p.m.
Chair: James Stazicker (University of California–Berkeley)
Speaker: Robert Briscoe (Ohio University)
“Spatial Content and Motoric Significance”
Commentator: James Genone (Stanford University)
5:00-6:00 p.m.
Chair: Peter Ross (California State Polytechnic University–Pomona)
Speaker: Berit Brogaard (University of Missouri–St. Louis)
“Do We Perceive Natural Kind Properties?”
Commentator: Robert Howell (Southern Methodist University)

II-I. Colloquium: Plato - State and Statecraft
4:00-6:00 p.m.
4:00-5:00 p.m.
Chair: John Myers (University of South Florida)
Speaker: Matthew King (York University)
“The Plane of Republic 587d”
Commentator: Byron Kaldis (University of California–Berkeley)
5:00-6:00 p.m.
Chair: Judy Wubnig (University of Waterloo)
Speaker: Mason Marshall (Pepperdine University)
“The Unity of Plato’s Timaeus-Critias”
Commentator: Michael Griffin (University of British Columbia)

II-J. Symposium: Epistemology of Induction
4:00-6:00 p.m.
Chair: Christopher Kulp (Santa Clara University)
Speakers: Tim Perrine (Calvin College)
Stephen Wykstra (Calvin College)
“Nozickean Sensitivity, Inductive Evidence, and Cornea”
Commentators: Paul Draper (Purdue University)
Glenn Ross (Franklin and Marshall College)

II-K. APA Committee Session: Best Placement Practices: Helpful Information for Graduate Students and Placement Directors
4:00-6:00 p.m.
Arranged by the APA Committee on Academic Career Opportunities and Placement
Chair: Leslie Pickering Francis (University of Utah)
Speakers: Leslie Pickering Francis (University of Utah)
Gualtiero Piccinini (University of Missouri–St. Louis)
GROUP MEETINGS, 6:00-8:00 P.M.
(See Group Meeting Program for details)
International Association for the Philosophy of Sport
International Hobbes Association, Session 1
Society for Asian and Comparative Philosophy, Session 1

GROUP MEETINGS, 6:00-9:00 P.M.
(See Group Meeting Program for details)
Association for Chinese Philosophers in America, Session 1
Bay Area Continental Philosophy Association
Concerned Philosophers for Peace
International Society for Environmental Ethics, Session 1
North American Nietzsche Society
North American Spinoza Society, Session 1
North American Wittgenstein Society, Session 1
Society for German Idealism, Session 1
Society for Realist/Antirealist Discussion, Session 1
Society for the Advancement of American Philosophy, Graduate Student Section
Society for Women in Philosophy, Session 1
Society of Christian Philosophers

GROUP MEETINGS, 8:00-10:00 P.M.
(See Group Meeting Program for details)
American Society for Aesthetics
Sartre Circle
Society for Natural Religion, Session 1

THURSDAY, APRIL 1

PLACEMENT INTERVIEWING
8:30 a.m.-8:00 p.m., Ascott, Bristol, and Derby

PLACEMENT INFORMATION
8:30 a.m.-8:00 p.m., Mezzanine

REGISTRATION
8:30 a.m.-8:00 p.m., Mezzanine
**BOOK DISPLAYS**

11:00 a.m.-5:30 p.m., California Room

**ANNUAL BUSINESS MEETING**

Noon -1:00 p.m., Tower Salon

**RECEPTION IN HONOR OF ANITA SILVERS**

4:00-5:00 p.m.

**RECEPTION FOR FRIENDS OF CHINESE PHILOSOPHY**

5:00-6:00 p.m.

**ANNUAL RECEPTION**

10:00 p.m.-Midnight

**THURSDAY MORNING, APRIL 1**

**SESSION III — 9:00 A.M.-NOON**


9:00 a.m.-Noon

**Chair:** Manuel Vargas (University of San Francisco)

**Critics:** Ben Bradley (Syracuse University)
Derk Pereboom (Cornell University)
David Velleman (New York University)

**Author:** John Martin Fischer (University of California–Riverside)


9:00 a.m.-Noon

**Chair:** Amy Kind (Claremont McKenna College)

**Critics:** Brie Gertler (University of Virginia)
Joseph Levine (University of Massachusetts–Amherst)
Robert Van Gulick (Syracuse University)

**Author:** Uriah Kriegel (University of Arizona)

**III-C. Invited Symposium: Discourse Relations**

9:00 a.m.-Noon

**Chair:** Robert May (University of California–Davis)

**Speakers:** Nicholas Asher (Centre Nationale de la Recherche Scientifique)
Jerry Hobbs (University of Southern California)
Andrew Kehler (University of California–San Diego)
Commentator: Sonia Memetea (University of British Columbia)

III-D. Invited Symposium: Nonideal Theory
9:00 a.m.-Noon
Chair: Michael Pendlebury (North Carolina State University)
Speakers: Holly M. Smith (Rutgers University)
“The Moral Clout of Reasonable Beliefs”
Christopher Freiman (University of Arizona)
“Nonideal Theory”
Robert Hanna (University of Colorado–Boulder)
“Kantian Ethics and Nonideal Theory”

III-E. Invited Symposium: Word and Object at 50
9:00 a.m.-Noon
Chair: Janet Levin (University of Southern California)
Speakers: Gary Ebbs (Indiana University–Bloomington)
Michael Friedman (Stanford University)
James Higginbotham (University of Southern California)
Thomas Ricketts (University of Pittsburgh)

III-F. Colloquium: Agents, Events, and Motives
9:00 a.m.-Noon
9:00-10:00 a.m.
Chair: Paul Hughes (University of Michigan–Dearborn)
Speaker: Carlo Filice (State University of New York–Geneseo)
“Libertarian Autonomy and Intrinsic Motives”
Commentator: Robert Gressis (California State University–Northridge)

10:00-11:00 a.m.
Chair: John Maier (Australian National University)
Speaker: Rebekah L. H. Rice (Seattle Pacific University)
“Agent Causation and Acting for Reasons”
Commentator: Timothy O’Connor (Indiana University–Bloomington)

11:00 a.m.-Noon
Chair: Luis Cheng-Guajardo (Stanford University)
Speaker: Christopher Evan Franklin (University of California–Riverside)
“The Problem of Enhanced Control”
Commentator: Scott Sehon (Bowdoin College)
III-G.  Colloquium: Kant

9:00 a.m.-Noon

9:00-10:00 a.m.
Chair: Kory Schaff (Occidental College)
Speaker: Michael Cholbi (California State Polytechnic University–Pomona)
“Kant on Moral Dilemmas”
Commentator: J. Jeremy Wisnewski (Hartwick College)

10:00-11:00 a.m.
Chair: Andrews Reath (University of California–Riverside)
Speaker: Scott E. Forschler (Independent Scholar)
“Willing Universal Law vs. Universally Lawful Willing: What Kant’s Supreme Principle of Ethics Should Have Been”
Commentator: Laura Papish (Northwestern University)

11:00 a.m.-Noon
Chair: Elizabeth Brake (University of Calgary)
Speaker: Aaron Bunch (Washington State University)
“The Body as Instrument and as ‘Person’ in Kant’s Moral Philosophy”
Commentator: Jennifer K. Uleman (Purchase College, State University of New York)

III-H.  Colloquium: Plato – Philosophical Methods

9:00 a.m.-Noon

9:00-10:00 a.m.
Chair: Antonio Chu (Metropolitan State College of Denver)
Speaker: J. Clerk Shaw (University of Tennessee)
“Wisdom, Courage, and Natural Virtue at Protagoras 349d-351a”
Commentator: Charles Young (Claremont Graduate University)

10:00-11:00 a.m.
Chair: Lewis Pearson (Baylor University)
Speaker: Chad E. Wiener (Portland State University)
“Plato’s Methodology in Republic I-IV”
Commentator: Blake Hestir (Texas Christian University)

11:00 a.m.-Noon
Chair: Daniel Schwartz (University of California–San Diego)
Speaker: Brian Keady (University of Denver)
“Practical Dialectic in Plato’s Philebus”
Commentator: Nils Rauhut (Coastal Carolina University)
III-I. Colloquium: Probability Theory and Game Theory
9:00 a.m.-Noon

9:00-10:00 a.m.
Chair: Kenny Easwaran (Australian National University)
Speakers: Graciela Kuechle (Universität Witten/Herdecke)
Diego Rios (Universität Witten/Herdecke)
“The Baldwin Effect Reconsidered: A Game-Theoretic Analysis”
Commentator: Steve Downes (University of Utah)

10:00-11:00 a.m.
Chair: J. D. Trout (Loyola University Chicago)
Speaker: Johannes Schmitt (University of Southern California)
“The Can One Bet on One’s Own Ignorance?”
Commentator: Geoff Pynn (Northern Illinois University)

11:00 a.m.-Noon
Chair: Giacomo Sillari (University of Pennsylvania)
Speaker: Darrell P. Rowbottom (University of Oxford)
“The Indispensability of Intersubjective Probability”
Commentator: Robert Rupert (University of Colorado–Boulder)

III-J. APA Committee Session: Beyond Blackboard: Teaching Philosophy with Technology
9:00 a.m.-Noon

Arranged by the APA Committee on Philosophy and Computers
Chair: Renee Smith (Coastal Carolina University)
Speakers: Renee Smith (Coastal Carolina University)
“Camtasia: Using Screen Capture to Teach Philosophy”
Gregory R. Mayes (California State University–Sacramento)
“Clickers: Restoring Purpose, Focus, and Intensity in the Traditional Classroom”
Garrett Pendergraft (University of California–Riverside)
“Teaching with Twitter”
H. E. Baber (University of San Diego)
“Textbook Free: Taking Back Your Course”
Mark Alfino (Gonzaga University)
“Using Wikis in Philosophy”
III-K. APA Committee Session: Environmental Justice and Indigenous Peoples

9:00 a.m.-Noon

Arranged by the APA Committee on the Status of Indigenous Philosophers

Chair: Thomas Norton-Smith (Kent State University)
Speakers: Kyle Powys Whyte (Michigan State University)
            “Environmental Justice and American Indian Communities: Political Not Traditional”
Brian Yazzie Burkhart (Indiana University—Bloomington)
            “On The Killing of Navajo Sheep in the 1930s: A Case Study in Environmental Justice”
Robert Melchior Figueroa (University of North Texas)
            “Risking Recognition: New Assessment Strategies for Environmental Justice and American Indian Communities”

ANNUAL BUSINESS MEETING

Noon-1:00 p.m.

THURSDAY AFTERNOON, APRIL 1

SESSION IV — 1:00-4:00 P.M.

IV-A. Author-Meets-Critics: Kathrin Koslicki, The Structure of Objects

1:00-4:00 p.m.

Chair: Gregory Janssen (University of Nevada–Las Vegas)
Critics: Karen Bennett (Cornell University)
          Ned Markosian (Western Washington University)
          Andrew McGonigal (University of Leeds and Cornell University)
Author: Kathrin Koslicki (University of Colorado–Boulder)

IV-B. Invited Symposium: Epistemic Expressivism

1:00-4:00 p.m.

Chair: Susan Vineberg (Wayne State University)
Speakers: Klemens Kappel (Københavns Universitet)
          “Epistemic Expressivism: An Evaluation”
          Michael Ridge (University of Edinburgh)
          “Expressivism in Epistemology”
Matthew Chrisman (University of Edinburgh)
“Is Epistemic Expressivism Compatible with Inquiry?”

Commentators: Terence Cuneo (University of Vermont)
Allan Gibbard (University of Michigan–Ann Arbor)

IV-C. Invited Symposium: Recent Work of Anita Silvers: A New Theory of Justice for Difference
1:00-4:00 p.m.
Chair: Christie Hartley (Georgia State University)
“Response”
Speakers: Lawrence C. Becker (Hollins University)
Nancy Tuana (Pennsylvania State University)
Jonathan Wolff (University College London)
Commentators: Leslie Pickering Francis (University of Utah)
Anita Silvers (San Francisco State University)

RECEPTION IN HONOR OF ANITA SILVERS
All are cordially invited to this reception and to join in thanking Anita Silvers for her service to the Pacific Division.

IV-D. Invited Symposium: What Is Attention?
1:00-4:00 p.m.
Chair: Declan Smithies (Ohio State University)
Speakers: Christopher Mole (University of British Columbia)
Michael Tye (University of Texas–Austin)
Wayne Wu (Ohio State University)

IV-E. Colloquium: Moral Knowledge and Action
1:00-4:00 p.m.

1:00-2:00 p.m.
Chair: Ann Davis (Pomona College)
Speaker: Sarah Paul (Bowdoin College)
“Double Effect, Single Explanation”
Commentator: Daniel Guevara (University of California–Santa Cruz)

2:00-3:00 p.m.
Chair: Ali Niedbalski (University of California–Berkeley)
Speaker: Lewis Powell (University of Southern California)
“Toward a Less Confident Cognitivism”
Commentator: Josh Earlenbaugh (University of California–Davis)
3:00-4:00 p.m.
Chair: Kirk Ludwig (University of Florida)
Speaker: Giovanni Mion (Southern Methodist University)
“Knowledge and the Action-Guiding Role of Assertions”
Commentator: Joshua Schechter (Brown University)

IV-F. Colloquium: Names, Negative Existentials, and Quotation
1:00-4:00 p.m.

1:00-2:00 p.m.
Chair: Derrick Abdulhakim (San Francisco State University)
Speaker: Joe Hedger (Arizona State University)
Commentator: Peter Alward (University of Lethbridge)

2:00-3:00 p.m.
Chair: Daniel Krasner (Metropolitan State College of Denver)
Speaker: Greg Ray (University of Florida)
“The Problem of Negative Existentials Inadvertently Solved”
Commentator: Nicole Wyatt (University of Calgary)

3:00-4:00 p.m.
Chair: Melissa Fusco (University of California–Berkeley)
Speaker: Paul Saka (University of Texas–Pan American)
“Quotation and Compositionality”
Commentator: John Collins (East Carolina University)

IV-G. Colloquium: Skepticism
1:00-4:00 p.m.

1:00-2:00 p.m.
Chair: Don Sievert (University of Missouri)
Speaker: Jeremy Kirby (Albion College)
“G.E. Moore’s Epistemological Legacy”
Commentator: Nathaniel Goldberg (Washington and Lee University)

2:00-3:00 p.m.
Chair: Kenneth Lucey (University of Nevada–Reno)
Speaker: Clayton Littlejohn (University of Texas–San Antonio)
“Fallibilism and Concessive Knowledge Attributions”
Commentator: Dylan Sabo (Auburn University)
3:00-4:00 p.m.

Chair: Sarah Jones (Northern Michigan University)
Speaker: Eric Thompson (University of Tennessee)
“Pragmatic Invariantism and External World Skepticism”
Commentator: Tim Black (California State University–Northridge)

IV-H. APA Committee Session: California Dreaming: How Race Alerts and Alters the State, Now and Then

1:00-4:00 p.m.
Arranged by the APA Committee on the Status of Asian and Asian-American Philosophers and Philosophies
Chair: Kyoo Lee (City University of New York–John Jay College and Graduate Center)
Speakers: Tommy Lott (San Jose State University)
Gary Mar (State University of New York–Stony Brook)
Eduardo Mendieta (State University of New York–Stony Brook)
John Pittman (City University of New York–John Jay College)
Helena Sooisan (State University of New York–Stony Brook)
Eddie Wong (Independent Scholar)
Helen Zia (Independent Scholar)

IV-I. APA Committee Session: Experimental Philosophy in the Classroom

1:00-4:00 p.m.
Arranged by the APA Committee on the Teaching of Philosophy
Chair: Alexandra Bradner (Denison University)
Speakers: Emily Esch (College of St. Benedict and St. John’s University)
Chris Weigel (Utah Valley University)
“Experimental Philosophy in Introduction to Philosophy: Opportunities and Challenges”
Joshua May (University of California–Santa Barbara)
“Philosophy 101 and Experimental Philosophy”
Kevin L. Timpe (Northwest Nazarene University)
“Polling as Pedagogy: Experimental Philosophy in a Metaphysics Course”
Richard Kamber (The College of New Jersey)
“Teaching Aesthetics with Experimental Philosophy”
Commentator: Eddy Nahmias (Georgia State University)
**Thursday Early Evening, April 1**

**Session V — 4:00-6:00 p.m.**

**V-A. Author-Meets-Critics: Iain Morrisson, *Kant and the Role of Pleasure in Moral Motivation***

4:00-6:00 p.m.
- **Chair:** Erica Holberg (University of Chicago)
- **Critics:** Jeanine Grenberg (St. Olaf College), Holly Wilson (University of Louisiana–Monroe)
- **Author:** Iain Morrisson (University of Houston)

**V-B. Special Memorial Session: Myles Brand: In Memory of a Philosopher of Action***

4:00-6:00 p.m.
- **Chair:** Keith Lehrer (University of Arizona)
- **Speakers:** Peg Brand (Indiana University-Purdue University–Indianapolis), Robert M. Harnish (University of Arizona), Bence Nanay (Syracuse University and University of British Columbia), Christian Plunze (Goethe-Universität Frankfurt)

**V-C. Invited Paper: Knowing How**

4:00-6:00 p.m.
- **Chair:** Amanda Greene (Stanford University)
- **Speaker:** Jason Stanley (Rutgers University)
- **“Knowing How”**
- **Commentators:** Michael Devitt (City University of New York–Graduate Center), Yuri Cath (University of St. Andrews)

**V-D. Invited Symposium: Absent Desires, Present Reasons**

4:00-6:00 p.m.
- **Chair:** Anne Barnhill (Johns Hopkins University)
- **Speakers:** Caspar Hare (Massachusetts Institute of Technology), Elizabeth Harman (Princeton University)
- **Commentator:** Lara Buchak (University of California–Berkeley)

**V-E. Invited Symposium: Connecting Ethical Theory and Environmental Ethics**

4:00-6:00 p.m.
- **Chair:** Jeff Sebo (New York University)
- **Speakers:** Alan Carter (University of Glasgow)
Julia Driver (Washington University in St. Louis)
Commentator: Robert Elliot (University of the Sunshine Coast)

V-F. Colloquium: Hegel
4:00-6:00 p.m.
4:00-5:00 p.m.
Chair: Jason Wilby (University of New Mexico)
Speaker: J. C. Berendzen (Loyola University New Orleans)
“The Proto-Morality of Life: Primary Recognition in Axel Honneth’s Reading of Phenomenology of Spirit”
Commentator: Phillip Williamson (University of New Mexico)
5:00-6:00 p.m.
Chair: S. West Gurley (Sam Houston State University)
Speaker: Jeff Gauthier (University of Portland)
“Hege’s Project of Reconciliation and Radical Political Criticism”
Commentator: Gino Signoracci (University of New Mexico)

V-G. Colloquium: Meaning
4:00-6:00 p.m.
4:00-5:00 p.m.
Chair: Erik Johnson (University of California–Davis)
Speaker: Mark Phelan (Yale University)
“Linguistic Contextualism and Figurative Language”
Commentator: Karen Lewis (Rutgers University)
5:00-6:00 p.m.
Chair: William Taschek (Ohio State University)
Speaker: Claudine Verheggen (York University)
“Semantic Normativity and Naturalism”
Commentator: Matti Eklund (Cornell University)

V-H. Colloquium: Properties and Possibilities
4:00-6:00 p.m.
4:00-5:00 p.m.
Chair: Dustin Locke (Claremont McKenna College)
Speaker: Ralf Bader (University of St. Andrews)
“Being F Intrinsically and Extrinsically”
Commentator: Lauren Ashwell (Bates College)
5:00-6:00 p.m.
Chair: Edward N. Zalta (Stanford University)
Speaker: Daniel Rabinoff (University of Manitoba)
   “Object Theory and AR”
Commentator: Raul Saucedo (Yale University and Australian National University)

V-I. Symposium: Berkeley on Commonsense
4:00-6:00 p.m.
Chair: Rebecca Copenhaver (Lewis and Clark College)
Speaker: Seth Bordner (University of North Carolina–Chapel Hill)
   “Berkeley’s ‘Defense’ of ‘Commonsense’”
Commentators: Lex Newman (University of Utah)
               John Roberts (Florida State University)

V-J. Symposium: Contextualism and Normative Disagreement
4:00-6:00 p.m.
Chair: Jason Raibley (California State University–Long Beach)
Speaker: Janice Dowell (University of Nebraska–Lincoln)
   “Flexible Contextualism about ‘Ought’ and Attitude-attributions”
Commentators: Gunnar Björnsson (Linköpings Universitet)
               Andy Egan (Rutgers University)

V-K. APA Committee Session: From the University to the K-12 Classroom: Introducing Philosophy to Young People
4:00-6:00 p.m.
Arranged by the APA Committee on Pre-College Instruction in Philosophy
Chair: Jana Mohr Lone (University of Washington)
Speakers: Joshua Cottrell (Westview High School)
          Riley Keating (Westview High School)
          “Bringing Philosophy to the Public High School Classroom”
          Susan Gardner (Capilano University)
          “Ethics with Young People”
          Michael Burroughs (University of Memphis)
          “Philosophy with Children and the Academy: Benefits and Challenges”
V-L. APA Committee Session: The Israeli-Palestinian Conflict and the Possibility of Dialogue

4:00-6:00 p.m.
Arranged by the APA Committee on International Cooperation
Chair: Anat Biletzki (Tel Aviv University)
Speakers: Mohammed Abed (California State University–Los Angeles)
          Ovadia Ezra (Tel Aviv University)
          Joseph Levine (University of Massachusetts–Amherst)

Annual Reception

10:00 p.m.-Midnight

Group Meetings, 6:00-8:00 p.m.
(See Group Meeting Program for details)
International Society for Comparative Studies of Chinese and Western Philosophy, Session 1
Radical Philosophy Association, Session 1
Society for Empirical Ethics
Society for the Philosophic Study of the Contemporary Visual Arts, Session 1
Society for the Study of Process Philosophy
Society for Women in Philosophy, Session 2

Group Meetings, 6:00-9:00 p.m.
(See Group Meeting Program for details)
History of Early Analytic Philosophy Society and Bertrand Russell Society
International Hobbes Association, Session 2
International Society for Chinese Philosophy, Session 1
North American Kant Society, Session 1
Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy
Society for Realist/Antirealist Discussion, Session 2
Society for the Metaphysics of Science, Session 1
Society for the Philosophy of History, Session 1
Society for the Study of Philosophy and the Martial Arts
Society of Indian Philosophy and Religion
GROUP MEETINGS, 8:00-10:00 P.M.
(See Group Meeting Program for details)
Association for Informal Logic and Critical Thinking
David Kellogg Lewis Society
Society for Natural Religion, Session 2
Society for Student Philosophers, Session 1
Society for the Advancement of American Philosophy, Session 1
Society for the Philosophical Study of Marxism

FRIDAY, APRIL 2

PROGRAM COMMITTEE BREAKFAST
7:30 a.m.-9:00 a.m.

PLACEMENT INFORMATION
8:30 a.m.-5:00 p.m., Mezzanine

PLACEMENT INTERVIEWING
8:30 a.m.-5:00 p.m., Ascott, Bristol, and Derby

REGISTRATION
8:30 a.m.-5:00 p.m., Mezzanine

BOOK DISPLAYS
11:00 a.m.-6:00 p.m., California Room

LUNCHEON MEETING, APA COMMITTEE ON THE TEACHING OF PHILOSOPHY
Noon-2:00 p.m.

DEWEY LECTURE
4:00-5:30 p.m.

DEWEY LECTURE RECEPTION
5:30-6:00 p.m.

PRESIDENTIAL ADDRESS
6:00-7:00 p.m.

PRESIDENTIAL RECEPTION
7:00-8:00 p.m.
Friday Morning, April 2

Session VI — 9:00 a.m.-Noon

VI-A. Author-Meets-Critics: Judith Jarvis Thomson, Normativity

9:00 a.m.-Noon
Chair: Niko Kolodny (University of California–Berkeley)
Critics: Gilbert Harman (Princeton University)
Thomas Scanlon (Harvard University)
R. Jay Wallace (University of California–Berkeley)
Author: Judith Jarvis Thomson (Massachusetts Institute of Technology)

VI-B. Author-Meets-Critics: Galen Strawson, Selves: An Essay in Revisionary Metaphysics

9:00 a.m.-Noon
Chair: Raymond Martin (Union College)
Critics: Barry Dainton (University of Liverpool)
Beatrice Longuenesse (New York University)
John Perry (University of California–Riverside and Stanford University)
Author: Galen Strawson (University of Reading)

VI-C. Invited Symposium: Experimental Philosophy

9:00 a.m.-Noon
Chair: Ryan Nichols (California State University–Fullerton)
Speakers: Bertram F. Malle (Brown University)
Ron Mallon (University of Utah)
Commentators: Anand Vaidya (San Jose State University)
Jen Cole Wright (College of Charleston)

VI-D. Invited Symposium: Political Authority and Human Nature in Historical Perspective

9:00 a.m.-Noon
Chair: Eirik Harris (Santa Clara University)
Speakers: Michael Green (Pomona College)
“Rights and Political Authority in Hobbes”
Al Martinich (University of Texas–Austin)
“The Sovereign in the Political Thought of Hanfeizi and Thomas Hobbes”
Kinch Hoekstra (University of California–Berkeley)
“Hobbesian Naturalism”
Owen Flanagan (Duke University)
“What Are Humans Like When Resources Are Scarce? European and Chinese Views”

Commentators: Sharon A. Lloyd (University of Southern California)
Justin Tiwald (San Francisco State University)
Susanne Sreedhar (Boston University)
Philip J. Ivanhoe (City University of Hong Kong)

VI-E. Colloquium: Consent, Coercion, and Paternalism
9:00 a.m.-Noon

9:00-10:00 a.m.
Chair: Deirdre Golash (American University)
Speaker: William Glod (Institute for Humane Studies)
“Two Conceptions of Personal Responsibility”
Commentator: Danny Scoccia (New Mexico State University)

10:00-11:00 a.m.
Chair: Daniel Campana (University of La Verne)
Speaker: Xiaofei Liu (University of Missouri–Columbia)
“A Hybrid View of the Ontology of Consent”
Commentator: Joan McGregor (Arizona State University)

11:00 a.m.-Noon
Chair: Marina Oshana (University of California–Davis)
Speaker: Scott A. Anderson (University of British Columbia)
“Coercion, States, and the Practical Function of Principles of Responsibility”
Commentator: Remy Debes (University of Memphis)

VI-F. Colloquium: Counterfactuals and Causal Explanation
9:00 a.m.-Noon

9:00-10:00 a.m.
Chair: Sharon Crasnow (Riverside Community College)
Speaker: Jonathan A. Waskan (University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign)
“In Search of a Non-Counterfactual Foundation for Mechanistic Explanation”
Commentator: James Woodward (California Institute of Technology)

10:00-11:00 a.m.
Chair: Christian Loew (University of North Carolina–Chapel Hill)
Speaker: Michael Dean Hartsock (University of Missouri)
“Explaining Absences”
Commentator: Sara Bernstein (University of Arizona)

11:00 a.m.-Noon
Chair: Donovan Wishon (Stanford University)
Speaker: Amy Karofsky (Hofstra University)
“A Necessitarian Account of Counterfactual Conditionals”
Commentator: Dana Lynne Goswick (University of California–Davis)

VI-G. Colloquium: Epistemic Virtue and Moral Knowledge
9:00 a.m.-Noon
9:00-10:00 a.m.
Chair: Fred Schueler (University of Delaware)
Speaker: Patricia Marino (University of Waterloo)
“Moral Coherence, Value Fragmentation, and Epistemic Justification”
Commentator: Heather Battaly (California State University–Fullerton)

10:00-11:00 a.m.
Chair: John Greco (St. Louis University)
Speaker: Victor Kumar (University of Arizona)
“Virtue Epistemology Naturalized”
Commentator: Joshue Orozco (Whitworth University)

11:00 a.m.-Noon
Chair: Micah Lewin (Stanford University)
Speaker: Erik J. Wielenberg (DePauw University)
“On the Evolutionary Debunking of Morality”
Commentator: Knut Skarsaune (New York University)

VI-H. Colloquium: Justification and Understanding
9:00 a.m.-Noon
9:00-10:00 a.m.
Chair: Charles Wallis (California State University–Long Beach)
Speaker: Christopher Lepock (University of Toronto)
“Reflection and Social Metacognition”
Commentator: Don Fallis (University of Arizona)

10:00-11:00 a.m.
Chair: Stephan Johnson (City College of San Francisco)
Speaker: Adam Pelser (Baylor University)
“Emotion and the Value of Understanding”
Commentator: Matthew Benton (Rutgers University)

11:00 a.m.-Noon
Chair: Candice Shelby (University of Colorado–Denver)
Speaker: Steven Reynolds (Arizona State University)
“Justification as the Appearance of Knowledge”
Commentator: Joel Pust (University of Delaware)

VI-I. Colloquium: Time
9:00 a.m.-Noon
9:00-10:00 a.m.
Chair: Anjan Chakravartty (University of Toronto)
Speaker: Bradford Skow (Massachusetts Institute of Technology)
“The Rate of Time’s Passage in the Moving Spotlight Theory”
Commentator: Ulrich Meyer (Colgate University)

10:00-11:00 a.m.
Chair: Linda Wetzel (Georgetown University)
Speaker: Alex Baia (University of Texas–Austin)
“Presentism, Eternalism, and Existence Simpliciter”
Commentator: Steven Savitt (University of British Columbia)

11:00 a.m.-Noon
Chair: Satish Kumar Singh (Banaras Hindu University)
Speaker: David McElhoes (University of Maryland–College Park)
“No Time Like the Present”
Commentator: Douglas Cannon (University of Puget Sound)

VI-J. Colloquium: Weakness of Will and Moral Maturity
9:00 a.m.-Noon
9:00-10:00 a.m.
Chair: J. M. Fritzman (Lewis and Clark College)
Speaker: Svetlana Beggs (University of California–Riverside)
“Tolstoy and Nussbaum on Innocence”
Commentator: Matthew Noah Smith (Yale University)

10:00-11:00 a.m.
Chair: Benjamin Mitchell-Yellin (University of California–Riverside)
Speaker: Philip Swenson (University of California–Riverside)
“In Defense of Nonsocratic Skepticism”
Commentator: Tiffany Teeman Blase (University of California–Los Angeles)
11:00 a.m.-Noon
Chair: Richard Nunan (College of Charleston)
Speaker: Joshua May (University of California–Santa Barbara)
“What in the World Is Weakness of Will?”
Commentator: Jesse Summers (University of California–Los Angeles)

VI-K. APA Committee Session: Practicing Public Philosophy: Reflection and Dialogue I
9:00 a.m.-Noon
Arranged by the APA Committee on Public Philosophy
Chair: Sharon M. Meagher (University of Scranton)
Speakers: John Lachs (Vanderbilt University)
Noelle McAfee (George Mason University)
Sharon M. Meagher (University of Scranton)
Eduardo Mendieta (State University of New York–Stony Brook)
Elizabeth Minnich (Association of American Colleges and Universities)

Friday Afternoon, April 2

Session VII — 1:00-4:00 p.m.

VII-A. Author-Meets-Critics: Charles Parsons, Mathematical Thought and Its Objects
1:00-4:00 p.m.
Chair: Robin Jeshion (University of California–Riverside)
Critics: John Burgess (Princeton University)
Erich Reck (University of California–Riverside)
Richard Tieszen (San Jose State University)
Author: Charles Parsons (Harvard University)

VII-B. Author-Meets-Critics: Jack Lyons, Perception and Basic Beliefs: Zombies, Modules, and the Problem of the External World
1:00-4:00 p.m.
Chair: Scott Hendrick (Clark University)
Critics: Alvin Goldman (Rutgers University)
Peter Graham (University of California–Riverside)
Terry Horgan (University of Arizona)
Author: Jack Lyons (University of Arkansas–Fayetteville)
VII-C. Invited Symposium: Aristotle and Existence
1:00-4:00 p.m.
Chair: Gareth Matthews (University of Massachusetts–Amherst)
Speaker: Alan Code (Rutgers University)
Commentators: S. Marc Cohen (University of Washington)
Frank Lewis (University of Southern California)
Marko Malink (Humboldt-Universität Berlin)

VII-D. Invited Symposium: Classical Compatibilism
1:00-4:00 p.m.
Chair: Joseph Keim Campbell (Washington State University)
Speakers: Bernard Berofsky (Columbia University)
Alfred Mele (Florida State University)
Kadri Vihvelin (University of Southern California)
Randolph Clarke (Florida State University)

VII-E. Invited Symposium: The Use of Intuitions in Philosophy
1:00-4:00 p.m.
Chair: Krista Lawlor (Stanford University)
Speakers: George Bealer (Yale University)
Brian Talbot (University of Colorado–Boulder)
Jonathan M. Weinberg (Indiana University–Bloomington)
Commentator: Thomas Nadelhoffer (Dickinson College)

VII-F. Colloquium: Epistemic Hope and Safety
1:00-4:00 p.m.
1:00-2:00 p.m.
Chair: Leonard Kahn (United States Air Force Academy)
Speaker: Adrienne Martin (University of Pennsylvania)
“Hoping Against Hope”
Commentator: Christopher Hudspeth (United States Coast Guard Academy)

2:00-3:00 p.m.
Chair: Avram Hiller (Portland State University)
Speaker: Mark Makin (Yale Divinity School)
“Safety and Lotteries”
Commentator: Wai-hung Wong (California State University–Chico)

3:00-4:00 p.m.
Chair: Diana Palmieri (University of Western Ontario)
Speaker: Matthew J. Kennedy (University of Nottingham)  
“Safety Drills”  
Commentator: Peter Kung (Pomona College)

**VII-G. Colloquium: Intervention, Obligation, and Sovereignty**

*1:00-4:00 p.m.*

*1:00-2:00 p.m.*
Chair: Clair Morrissey (University of North Carolina–Chapel Hill)  
Speaker: David Lefkowitz (University of Richmond)  
“On a Humanitarian Duty of Intervention”  
Commentator: Richard Vernon (University of Western Ontario)

*2:00-3:00 p.m.*  
Chair: Peter W Milne (Santa Clara University)  
Speaker: Bas van der Vossen (Independent Scholar)  
“Can There Be Associative Political Obligations?”  
Commentator: Lori Watson (University of San Diego)

*3:00-4:00 p.m.*  
Chair: Gerald D. Doppelt (University of California–San Diego)  
Speaker: Matt Whitt (Vanderbilt University)  
“Territory, Authority, and the People: Rethinking Modern Sovereignty Today”  
Commentator: Jeanne Morefield (Whitman College)

**VII-H. Colloquium: Liberalism**

*1:00-4:00 p.m.*

*1:00-2:00 p.m.*
Chair: Julie C. Van Camp (California State University–Long Beach)  
Speaker: Douglas Paletta (University of Pennsylvania)  
“Rawls’ Problem with Assumptions”  
Commentator: Jonathan Kaplan (Oregon State University)

*2:00-3:00 p.m.*  
Chair: Christina M. Bellon (California State University–Sacramento)  
Speaker: Paul Gomberg (Chicago State University)  
“The Impossibility of Distributive Justice”  
Commentator: Alastair Norcross (University of Colorado–Boulder)

*3:00-4:00 p.m.*  
Chair: Ann Garry (California State University–Los Angeles)
Speaker: Carol Hay (University of Massachusetts–Lowell)
“A Reconciliation Between Radical and Liberal Feminism”

Commentator: Amy Baehr (Hofstra University)

VII-I. Colloquium: Phenomenal Concepts and Phenomenal Character
1:00-4:00 p.m.
1:00-2:00 p.m.
Chair: Brian L. Keeley (Pitzer College)
Speaker: Bence Nanay (Syracuse University and University of British Columbia)
“Attention and Perceptual Content”
Commentator: Bernard W. Kobes (Arizona State University)

2:00-3:00 p.m.
Chair: David Pitt (California State University–Los Angeles)
Speaker: Emmett L. Holman (George Mason University)
“Phenomenal Concepts and the Mode of Presentation Problem”
Commentator: D. Gene Witmer (University of Florida)

3:00-4:00 p.m.
Chair: Barry Maguire (Princeton University)
Speaker: Vincent Picciuto (University of Maryland–College Park)
“Phenomenal Concepts and the Nature of Phenomenal Consciousness”
Commentator: Michael Bruno (Lewis and Clark College)

VII-J. Colloquium: The Ethics of Numbers and Consciousness
1:00-4:00 p.m.
1:00-2:00 p.m.
Chair: Howard Nye (University of Alberta)
Speaker: Tyler Doggett (University of Vermont)
“Saving the Few”
Commentator: Veronique Munoz-Darde (University College London and University of California–Berkeley)

2:00-3:00 p.m.
Chair: Emily Parker (Santa Clara University)
Speaker: S. Matthew Liao (Oxford University)
“Saving the Neutrality Intuition from Broome”
Commentator: Kent Hurtig (University of Stirling)
3:00-4:00 p.m.
Chair: Piper Brinshurst (University of Arizona)
Speaker: Thomas White (Loyola Marymount University)
“What Can We Know about What It Is Like to Be a Dolphin, and Why It Matters: Dolphin Consciousness and the Ethical Implications”
Commentator: Kristen Andrews (York University)

VII-K. Colloquium: The Status of Value
1:00-4:00 p.m.
1:00-2:00 p.m.
Chair: Joseph Lee (University of California–Santa Barbara)
Speaker: Rebecca Lynn Stangl (University of Virginia)
“Asymmetrical Virtue Particularism”
Commentator: Margaret Watkins (St. Vincent College)
2:00-3:00 p.m.
Chair: Constantine Sandis (Oxford Brookes University)
Speaker: Justin Jeffrey (University of Idaho)
“Contextualism about Intrinsic Value”
Commentator: Dale Dorsey (University of Kansas)
3:00-4:00 p.m.
Chair: Joshua Glasgow (Victoria University of Wellington)
Speakers: John Park (Duke University)
Hagop Sarkissian (City University of New York–Baruch College)
“Are the Folk Objectivists about Morality?”
Commentator: Jonas Olson (Stockholms Universitet)

VII-L. APA Committee Session: Practicing Public Philosophy: Reflection and Dialogue II
1:00-4:00 p.m.
Arranged by the APA Committee on Public Philosophy
Chair: Ellen Feder (American University)
Speakers: Linda Martín Alcoff (City University of New York–Hunter College)
Ellen Feder (American University)
Andrew Light (George Mason University)
William Sullivan (Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching)
Nancy Tuana (Pennsylvania State University)
FRIDAY EARLY EVENING, APRIL 2

SESSION VIII — 4:00-6:00 P.M.

VIII-A. Author-Meets-Critics: Peter Godfrey-Smith, Darwinian Populations and Natural Selection
4:00-6:00 p.m.
Chair: Jay Odenbaugh (Lewis and Clark College)
Critics: James Griesemer (University of California–Davis)
                      Matt Haber (University of Utah)
Author: Peter Godfrey-Smith (Harvard University)

VIII-B. Special Memorial Session: Marjorie Grene
4:00-6:00 p.m.
Chair: Mary V. Rorty (Stanford University)
Commentators: Roger Ariew (University of South Florida)
                      Richard Burian (Virginia Tech)
                      David Depew (University of Iowa)
                      George Gale (University of Missouri–Kansas City)
                      Jocelyn Hoy (University of California–Santa Cruz)

VIII-C. Invited Paper: Kant’s Ethics
4:00-6:00 p.m.
Chair: Karl Ameriks (University of Notre Dame)
Speaker: Ernesto V. Garcia (University of Massachusetts–Amherst)
          “Kant on Supererogation: Four Views”
Commentators: Jens Timmermann (University of St. Andrews)
                      Samuel Kahn (Stanford University)

VIII-D. Invited Symposium: The Experience of Agency
4:00-6:00 p.m.
Chair: Brian McLaughlin (Rutgers University)
Speakers: Tim Bayne (Oxford University)
                      Eddy Nahmias (Georgia State University)
                      Matthew Soteriou (Warwick University)

VIII-E. Invited Symposium: The State and Prospects of Philosophical Research
4:00-6:00 p.m.
Chair: Bojana Mladenovic (Williams College)
Speakers: Jaakko Hintikka (Boston University)
                      Dale Jacquette (Universität Bern)
                      Dermot Moran (University College, Dublin)
VIII-F. Colloquium: Continental Philosophy
4:00-6:00 p.m.

4:00-5:00 p.m.
Chair: Jennifer Gammage (University of New Mexico)
Speaker: B. Scot Rousse (Northwestern University)
“Love of Living or Being-Towards-Death? Heidegger Contra Frankfurt”
Commentator: Vernon Smith (University of New Mexico)

5:00-6:00 p.m.
Chair: Bill Hutchison (University of New Mexico)
Speaker: Joseph Swenson (University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign)
“Overcoming Opposites: Nietzsche’s Minimal Method of Revaluation”
Commentator: Tyler Innis (University of New Mexico)

VIII-G. Colloquium: Governments, Agents, and Property
4:00-6:00 p.m.

4:00-5:00 p.m.
Chair: Suze Berkhout (University of British Columbia)
Speaker: Helga Varden (University of Illinois–Urbana-Champaign)
“The Lockean ‘Enough-and-as-Good’ Proviso: An Internal Critique”
Commentator: Daniel Silvermint (University of Arizona)

5:00-6:00 p.m.
Chair: Rex Martin (University of Kansas)
Speaker: Justin Weinberg (University of South Carolina)
“Is Government Supererogation Possible?”
Commentator: Japa Pallikkathayil (New York University)

VIII-H. Colloquium: Vagueness
4:00-6:00 p.m.

4:00-5:00 p.m.
Chair: David Ian Spencer (University of California–Davis)
Speaker: Daniel Z. Korman (University of Illinois–Urbana-Champaign)
“Universalism, Vagueness, and the Argument from Borderline Hammers”
Commentator: Megan Wallace (Oberlin College)
5:00-6:00 p.m.
Chair: Kelly Glover (University of California–Berkeley)
Speaker: David B. Barnett (University of Colorado–Boulder)
“Vague Entailment”
Commentator: Bert Baumgaertner (University of California–Davis)

VIII-I. Symposium: Externalism and the Knowledge Argument
4:00-6:00 p.m.
Chair: Michelle Montague (University of Bristol)
Speaker: Torin Alter (University of Alabama–Tuscaloosa)
“Social Externalism and the Knowledge Argument”
Commentators: Derek Ball (University of St. Andrews)
Martin Hahn (Simon Fraser University)

VIII-J. Symposium: Spinoza on Causation
4:00-6:00 p.m.
Chair: Julie Klein (Villanova University)
Speaker: Yitzhak Melamed (Johns Hopkins University)
“Inherence-Causation-Conceivability in Spinoza or On Spinoza’s Well-Grounded Bifurcations”
Commentators: Steve Barbone (San Diego State University)
Samuel Newlands (University of Notre Dame)

VIII-K. APA Committee Session: Experiments in Teaching Introduction to Philosophy
4:00-6:00 p.m.
Arranged by the APA Committee on Philosophy in Two-Year Colleges
Chair: Marc Bobro (Santa Barbara City College)
Speaker: Ken Burak (Northampton Community College)
“InTEGRATING YOGA INTO AN INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY CLASS: EXPERIMENTS IN EXPERIENTIAL PEDAGOGY”

VIII-L. Dewey Lecture
4:00-5:30 p.m.
Chair: Kenneth Taylor (Stanford University)
Speaker: John Perry (University of California–Riverside and Stanford University)
“Wretched Subterfuge”

DEWEY LECTURE RECEPTION
5:30-6:00 p.m.
Convention attendees are cordially invited to a reception sponsored by the Dewey Foundation in honor of the Dewey Lecturer.
PRESIDENTIAL ADDRESS
6:00-7:00 p.m.
Introduction: Michael Tooley (University of Colorado–Boulder)
Speaker: Michael E. Bratman (Stanford University)
“Agency, Time, and Sociality”

Presidential Reception
7:00-8:00 p.m.

GROUP MEETINGS, 7:00-9:00 P.M.
(See Group Meeting Program for details)
Society for the Philosophic Study of the Contemporary Visual Arts, Session 2

GROUP MEETINGS, 7:00-10:00 P.M.
(See Group Meeting Program for details)
Association for Chinese Philosophers in America, Session 2
International Association for Computing and Philosophy
International Society for Chinese Philosophy, Session 2
International Society for Environmental Ethics, Session 2
Karl Jaspers Society, Session 1
North American Kant Society, Session 2
North American Spinoza Society, Session 2
Society for Phenomenology and Analytic Philosophy
Society for Philosophy and Public Affairs
Society for Philosophy in the Contemporary World, Session 1
Society for the Advancement of American Philosophy, Session 2
Society for the Metaphysics of Science, Session 2
Society for the Philosophy of History, Session 2
Society for the Philosophy of Sex and Love

SATURDAY, APRIL 3

PLACEMENT INFORMATION
8:30 p.m.-1:00 p.m., Mezzanine

PLACEMENT INTERVIEWING
8:30 a.m.-1:00 p.m., Ascott, Bristol, and Derby
REGISTRATION
8:30 a.m.-1:00 p.m., Mezzanine

BOOK DISPLAYS
9:00 a.m.-1:00 p.m., California Room

BUSINESS MEETING, APA COMMITTEE ON THE STATUS OF INDIGENOUS PHILOSOPHERS
Noon-2:00 p.m.

SATURDAY MORNING, APRIL 3

SESSION IX — 9:00 A.M.-NOON
IX-A. Author-Meets-Critics: Sven Bernecker, Memory: A Philosophical Study
9:00 a.m.-Noon
Chair: David Hunter (Ryerson University)
Critics: Fred Adams (University of Delaware)
Sanford Goldberg (Northwestern University)
Marya Schechtman (University of Illinois–Chicago)
Author: Sven Bernecker (University of California–Irvine)

IX-B. Author-Meets-Critics: Ernest Sosa, Reflective Knowledge: Apt Belief and Reflective Knowledge, Volume II
9:00 a.m.-Noon
Chair: Juan Comesaña (University of Arizona)
Critics: Ram Neta (University of North Carolina–Chapel Hill)
James Van Cleve (University of Southern California)
Crispin Wright (New York University and University of Aberdeen)
Author: Ernest Sosa (Rutgers University)

IX-C. Author-Meets-Critics: Mark Schroeder, Slaves of the Passions
9:00 a.m.-Noon
Chair: David Copp (University of California–Davis)
Critics: Jonathan Dancy (University of Texas–Austin and University of Reading)
Tristram McPherson (University of Minnesota–Duluth)
Russ Shafer-Landau (University of Wisconsin–Madison)
Author: Mark Schroeder (University of Southern California)
IX-D. Invited Symposium: Exploitation

9:00 a.m.-Noon

Chair: Talbot Brewer (University of Virginia)
Speakers: Allen Wood (Stanford University)
“Exploitation”
Matt Zwolinski (University of San Diego)
“Exploitation and Neglect”
Commentator: Andrew Jason Cohen (Georgia State University)

IX-E. Invited Symposium: Non-visual Perception

9:00 a.m.-Noon

Chair: Geoffrey Lee (University of California–Berkeley)
Speakers: Fiona Macpherson (University of Glasgow)
“Individuating the Senses”
Casey O’Callaghan (Rice University)
“Lessons from Beyond Vision (Sounds and Audition)”
Clare Batty (University of Kentucky)
“Smelling Lessons”
Commentator: Austen Clark (University of Connecticut)

IX-F. Invited Symposium: Virtue and Moral Character Across Traditions

9:00 a.m.-Noon

Chair: Christina Chuang (University of California–Irvine)
Speakers: Andrew Terjesen (Rhodes College)
“Joint Attention and Moral Charisma”
James Harold (Mount Holyoke College)
“On the Idea that Music Shapes Character”
Marion Hourdequin (Colorado College)
“The Limits of Empathy”
Commentators: Christine Swanton (University of Auckland)
Jan Szaif (University of California–Davis)

IX-G. Colloquium: Ethical Constructivism

9:00 a.m.-Noon

9:00-10:00 a.m.
Chair: Tamra Frei (Michigan State University)
Speaker: Lee Shepski (University of Tennessee)
“What Constructivism Cannot Accomplish”
Commentator: Carla Bagnoli (University of Wisconsin–Milwaukee)
10:00-11:00 a.m.
Chair: Noell Birondo (Claremont McKenna College)
Speaker: Dylan W. Murray (Georgia State University)
   “Performative Constructivism”
Commentator: Mark LeBar (Ohio University)

11:00 a.m.-Noon
Chair: Amy Coplan (California State University–Fullerton)
Speaker: Jeffrey Brand-Ballard (George Washington University)
   “Moral Constructivism and Evolutionary Psychology”
Commentator: Fritz Allhoff (Western Michigan University)

IX-H. Colloquium: Justification and Skepticism
9:00 a.m.-Noon

9:00-10:00 a.m.
Chair: Jeremy Fantl (University of Calgary)
Speaker: Yuval Avnur (Scripps College)
   “Closure Reconsidered”
Commentator: Anthony Brueckner (University of California–Santa Barbara)

10:00-11:00 a.m.
Chair: Alexei Angelides (Stanford University)
Speaker: Ali Hasan (University of Iowa)
   “Escaping Bergmann’s Dilemma for Internalism”
Commentator: Ian Schnee (University of California–Berkeley)

11:00 a.m.-Noon
Chair: Joseph Barnes (University of California–Berkeley)
Speaker: Mark E. Wunderlich (Union College)
   “A Defense of Epistemological Monism”
Commentator: Allen Coates (East Tennessee State University)

IX-I. Colloquium: Moral Motives and Nativism
9:00 a.m.-Noon

9:00-10:00 a.m.
Chair: Eugene Chislenko (University of California–Berkeley)
Speaker: Danielle Bromwich (National Institutes of Health)
   “Back to Stalemate: The Motivational Internalism/Externalism Debate”
Commentator: Christian Miller (Wake Forest University)
10:00-11:00 a.m.
Chair: Nancy E. Snow (Marquette University)
Speaker: Ellie Hua Wang (Indiana University–Bloomington)
“Virtues as Robust Traits—An Analysis of Doris’s
Situationist Challenge”
Commentator: Gopal Sreenivasan (Duke University)

11:00 a.m.-Noon
Chair: Margaret Bowman (University of Utah)
Speaker: Theresa Lopez (University of Arizona)
“Statistical Learning in Language Acquisition:
Implications for Moral Psychology and the
‘Linguistic Analogy’”
Commentator: Bradford Cokelet (University of Miami)

IX-J. Colloquium: Plato – Textual Interpretations
9:00 a.m.-Noon

9:00-10:00 a.m.
Chair: Mark McPherran (Simon Fraser University)
Speaker: Dan Werner (State University of New York–New Paltz)
“Plato’s Cicadas”
Commentator: John Ferrari (University of California–Berkeley)

10:00-11:00 a.m.
Chair: Richard Galvin (Texas Christian University)
Speaker: Yancy Hughes Dominick (Seattle University)
“Images for the Sake of the Truth in Plato’s
Symposium”
Commentator: Chris Tennberg (University of California–Santa Barbara)

11:00 a.m.-Noon
Chair: Marcus Arvan (University of Tampa)
Speaker: Jerry Green (Texas Tech University)
“Protagoras Was Not a Relativist to Me”
Commentator: Nathan Colaner (University of Kansas)

IX-K. APA Committee Session: Author-Meets-Critics: Laurelyn Whitt, Science, Colonialism, and Indigenous Peoples
9:00 a.m.-Noon
Arranged by the APA Committee on the Status of Indigenous Philosophers
Chair: Lorraine Mayer (Brandon University)
Speakers: Thomas Norton-Smith (Kent State University)
Saturday Afternoon, April 3

Session X — 1:00-4:00 P.M.

X-A. Author-Meets-Critics: John Carriero, *Between Two Worlds: A Reading of Descartes’s Meditations*

1:00-4:00 p.m.

Chair: Lynn S. Joy (University of Notre Dame)

Critics: Dennis Des Chene (Washington University in St. Louis)
          Alan Nelson (University of North Carolina–Chapel Hill)

Author: John Carriero (University of California–Los Angeles)

X-B. Author-Meets-Critics: Michael Thompson, *Life and Action: Elementary Structures of Practice and Practical Thought*

1:00-4:00 p.m.

Chair: Andrew Hsu (University of California–Los Angeles)

Critics: Philip Clark (University of Toronto)
          Anselm Winfried Mueller (Keimyung University)
          Candace Vogler (University of Chicago)

Author: Michael Thompson (University of Pittsburgh)

X-C. Invited Symposium: Interpreting and Assessing the Critique of the Power of Judgment

1:00-4:00 p.m.

Chair: R. Lanier Anderson (Stanford University)

Speakers: Brent Kalar (University of New Mexico)
          Jennifer McMahon (University of Adelaide)
          Kristi Sweet (Texas A&M University)

Commentators: Andrew Chignell (Cornell University)
               Pierre Keller (University of California–Riverside)
               Randall Amano (University of California–Berkeley)

X-D. Invited Symposium: On Words

1:00-4:00 p.m.

Chair: Ori Simchen (University of British Columbia)

Speakers: John Hawthorne (Oxford University)
X-E. Invited Symposium: Plato’s Semantic Theory

1:00-4:00 p.m.

Chair: Nicholas D. Smith (Lewis and Clark College)
Speakers: Christine Thomas (Dartmouth College)
          “Plato on the Unity of Logos”
          Deborah Modrak (University of Rochester)
          “Plato on Words, Parts of Words, and Meaning”

Commentators: Rachel Barney (University of Toronto)
               Michael Ferejohn (Duke University)
               Suzanne Obdrzalek (Claremont McKenna College)
               Mark Wheeler (San Diego State University)

X-F. Colloquium: Aristotle

1:00-4:00 p.m.

1:00-2:00 p.m.

Chair: David DeMoss (Pacific University)
Speaker: Candice Delmas (Boston University)
          “Conflict in the Aristotelian City: Desire for Equality
          and Competition for Power”

Commentator: Gale Justin (California State University–Sacramento)

2:00-3:00 p.m.

Chair: Richard Mohr (University of Illinois–Urbana-Champaign)
Speaker: Ian Flora (University of Michigan–Ann Arbor)
          “Aristotle on Belief and Rationality: Fiction,
          Response, Restraint”

Commentator: Travis Butler (Iowa State University)

3:00-4:00 p.m.

Chair: Phillip Horky (Stanford University)
Speaker: Philip Corkum (University of Alberta)
          “Aristotle on Reference and Generality”

Commentator: Scott O’Connor (Cornell University)
X-G. **Colloquium: Ethical Blame and Forgiveness**

1:00-4:00 p.m.

1:00-2:00 p.m.
Chair: Robert Miner (Baylor University)
Speaker: Kate Moran (Brandeis University)
“Moving on for Community’s Sake: A (Self-Respecting) Kantian Account of Forgiveness”

Commentator: William Peck (Reed College)

2:00-3:00 p.m.
Chair: Brian Berkey (University of California–Berkeley)
Speaker: Andrew Peter Ross (Queen’s University)
“Blame and the Moral Relationship”

Commentator: Coleen McNamara (University of California–Riverside)

3:00-4:00 p.m.
Chair: Joel Martinez (Lewis and Clark College)
Speaker: Arash Farzam-Kia (Queen’s University)
“Is the Capacity to Understand Moral Norms a Precondition of Blameworthiness?”

Commentator: Zac Cogley (Ohio State University)

X-H. **Colloquium: Mereology**

1:00-4:00 p.m.

1:00-2:00 p.m.
Chair: Emily Esch (College of St. Benedict and St. John’s University)
Speakers: Ben Caplan (Ohio State University)
Pat Reeder (Ohio State University)
Chris Tillman (University of Manitoba)
“Parts of Singletons”

Commentator: Monika Piotrowska (University of Utah)

2:00-3:00 p.m.
Chair: Michael Rieppel (University of California–Berkeley)
Speaker: Sean Drysdale Walsh (University of Minnesota–Duluth)
“Modal Supervenience and Modal Mereology”

Commentator: Alexander Skiles (University of Notre Dame)

3:00-4:00 p.m.
Chair: Mélanie Walton (Duquesne University)
Speaker: Aladdin Yaqub (Lehigh University)
“Al-Ghazali on the Oneness and Simplicity of the
Necessary Existent”
Commentator: Ahmed Alwishah (Pitzer College)

X-I. Colloquium: Properties and Relations
1:00-4:00 p.m.

1:00-2:00 p.m.
Chair: Keith McPartland (Williams College)
Speaker: Eric Hiddleston (Wayne State University)
Commentator: Jessica Wilson (University of Toronto)

2:00-3:00 p.m.
Chair: Xianduan Shi (University of Utah)
Speaker: Daniel Giberman (Stanford University)
“Emergent Consciousness and Ontological Fundamentality”
Commentator: Elanor Taylor (University of North Carolina–Chapel Hill)

3:00-4:00 p.m.
Chair: Paul Hovda (Reed College)
Speaker: Cody Gilmore (University of California–Davis)
“Slots in Universals”
Commentator: Chad Carmichael (University of Illinois–Urbana-Champaign)

X-J. APA Committee Session: Ethics and the Nature of ‘Other’: Analyzing European Philosophers in Comparison with Chinese Perspectives
1:00-4:00 p.m.

Arranged by the APA Committee on International Cooperation
Chair: Lijun Yuan (Texas State University–San Marcos)
Speakers: Lijun Yuan (Texas State University–San Marcos)
“On the Confucian Golden Rule, Kant’s Categorical Imperative, and Beauvoir’s Reciprocal Claim”
Jiang Yi (Beijing Academy of Social Sciences)
“The Expansion of ‘Other than Being’: A Perspective of Political Philosophy on Levinas’s Ethics”
Zhang Weiwei (Tsinghua University)
“The Thoughts of the Unity of the Universe and the Human in Chinese Confucianism and the Catholic Human Person and the Right to Life: A Comparative Study”
X-K. APA Committee Session: Neuromaging Techniques and Human Nature
1:00-4:00 p.m.
Arranged by the APA Committee on Philosophy and Medicine and the Society for Philosophy and Technology
Chair: Inmaculada de Melo-Martin (Cornell University)
Speakers: Patricia Churchland (University of California–San Diego)
Mark Cohen (University of California–Los Angeles)
Fabrice Jotterand (University of Texas–Southwestern)
Robert Rosenberger (Georgia Institute of Technology)

Saturday Early Evening, April 3

Session XI — 4:00-6:00 p.m.

XI-A. Author-Meets-Critics: Mark Richard, When Truth Gives Out
4:00-6:00 p.m.
Chair: Michael Caie (University of California–Berkeley)
Critics: John MacFarlane (University of California–Berkeley)
Michael A. Rescorla (University of California–Santa Barbara)
Author: Mark Richard (Tufts University)

XI-B. Invited Paper: Emotion
4:00-6:00 p.m.
Chair: Troy Jollimore (California State University–Chico)
Speaker: Jenefer Robinson (University of Cincinnati)
“Music, Mood, and Misattribution”
Commentators: Ronald De Sousa (University of Toronto)
Derek Matravers (Open University)

XI-C. Invited Paper: Ethics and Climate Change
4:00-6:00 p.m.
Chair: Geoffrey Frasz (College of Southern Nevada)
Speaker: Stephen M. Gardiner (University of Washington)
“Jane Austen, Moral Corruption, and Climate Change”
Commentators: Dale Jamieson (New York University)
Ronald Sandler (Northeastern University)
XI-D. Invited Symposium: Heidegger and Plato
4:00-6:00 p.m.

Chair: Susanne Claxton (Green Mountain College)
Speakers: Mark Ralkowski (University of New Mexico)  
“Heidegger’s Platonism”
Francisco Gonzalez (University of Ottawa)
“Why Heidegger Needed to Reread Plato, and Couldn’t”
Commentators: John Bussanich (University of New Mexico)  
Catherine Zuckert (University of Notre Dame)

XI-E. Colloquium: Continental Philosophy
4:00-6:00 p.m.

4:00-5:00 p.m.
Chair: Jaime Denison (University of New Mexico)
Speaker: Nathan Ross (Oklahoma City University)
“On the Debt of Gadamerian Hermeneutics to Schiller’s Letters on Aesthetic Education”
Commentator: Babette Babich (Fordham University)

5:00-6:00 p.m.
Chair: Dan Briggs (University of New Mexico)
Speaker: Matthew S. Haar Farris (Graduate Theological Union)
“Faith and Knowledge Fight and Make Up: Jacques Derrida’s Philosophical Proposal for the ‘Sources’ of Religion”
Commentator: Tristram Dammin (University of New Mexico)

XI-F. Colloquium: Epistemic Disagreement
4:00-6:00 p.m.

4:00-5:00 p.m.
Chair: Edward Cushman (Lewis and Clark College)
Speaker: Matthew C. Kopec (University of Wisconsin–Madison)
“A Defense of Epistemic Permissivism”
Commentator: Roger White (Massachusetts Institute of Technology)

5:00-6:00 p.m.
Chair: Alex Bundy (University of California–Santa Barbara)
Speaker: Michael G. Thune (Joliet Junior College)
“Does Disagreement Lead to Skepticism?”
Commentator: Nathan King (University of Notre Dame)
XI-G. Colloquium: Modern Mind and Metaphysics  
4:00-6:00 p.m.

4:00-5:00 p.m.
Chair: Lindsay Crawford (University of California–Berkeley)  
Speaker: Jennifer S. Marusic (Brandeis University)  
“A Question Unthought of by Philosophers”  
Commentator: Angela Coventry (Portland State University)

5:00-6:00 p.m.
Chair: Patricia Easton (Claremont Graduate University)  
Speaker: Joseph W. Hwang (California State University–Chico)  
“Sensations and Mind-Body Union in Descartes’s Philosophy of Mind”  
Commentator: Kurt Smith (Bloomsburg University of Pennsylvania)

XI-H. Symposium: Kant on Referential Thought  
4:00-6:00 p.m.

Chair: Michelle Grier (University of San Diego)  
Speaker: Lucy Allais (University of the Witwatersrand)  
“A Priori Concepts and ‘Relation to an Object’”  
Commentators: James Hebbeler (St. Joseph’s University)  
Alexandra Newton (University of Pittsburgh)

XI-I. Symposium: Metaphysics of Mereology  
4:00-6:00 p.m.

Chair: Byeong-Uk Yi (University of Toronto)  
Speaker: Patrick Monaghan (University of Iowa)  
“The Largest Proper Parts of a Whole: A Mereological Reason Why the Thesis of Composition as Identity Is False”  
Commentators: Roberta Ballarin (University of British Columbia)  
Theodore Sider (New York University)

XI-J. APA Committee Session: Feminism and Humour  
4:00-6:00 p.m.

Arranged by the APA Committee on the Status of Women  
Chair: Sharyn Clough (Oregon State University)  
Speakers: Ingra Schellenberg (University of Washington)  
“Killing Humour Dead”
Cynthia Willett (Emory University)
Julie Willett (Texas Tech University)
“Ridicule Against Morality”
Commentator: Sharyn Clough (Oregon State University)

RECEPTION SPONSORED BY THE APA COMMITTEE ON THE STATUS OF WOMEN

All are conference participants are cordially invited to attend this reception.

XI-K. APA Committee Session: Romanell Lecture

4:00-6:00 p.m.

Arranged by the APA Committee on Lectures, Publications and Research

Chair: Peter Graham (University of California–Riverside)
Speaker: Alvin Goldman (Rutgers University)
“Philosophical Naturalism and Intuitional Methodology”
GROUP PROGRAM

TUESDAY MORNING, MARCH 30

GROUP SESSION GI — 9:00 A.M.-NOON

GI-A. American Association of Mexican Philosophers, Session 1

9:00 a.m.-Noon, Location: Oxford Room
Chair: Agustin Rayo (Massachusetts Institute of Technology)
Speakers: Carla Merino (Princeton University)
“Challenges of the Self”
Teresa Bruno (University of Kansas)
“Moral Responsibility and the Notion of Control”
Gustavo Ortiz-Millán (Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México)
“Needs and Practical Reason”
Eduardo Garcia-Ramirez (University of Michigan–Ann Arbor)
Moisés Vaca (University College London)
“The Open Question Mistake”

TUESDAY AFTERNOON, MARCH 30

GROUP SESSION GII — 1:00-4:00 P.M.

GII-A. American Association of Mexican Philosophers, Session 2

1:00-4:00 p.m., Location: Oxford Room
Chair: Carlos Montemayor (San Francisco State University)
Speakers: Ricardo Mena (Rutgers University)
Raul Saucedo (Yale University and Australian National University)
“Intrinsicality and Other Things”
Roberto Parra-Dorantes (University of Arizona)
“Self Deception as Second-Order Wishful Thinking”

WEDNESDAY AFTERNOON, MARCH 31

GROUP SESSION GIII — 1:00-4:00 P.M.

GIII-A. Hume Society and North American Kant Society

1:00-4:00 p.m.
**Topic:** Author-Meets-Critics: Henry Allison, *Custom and Reason in Hume: A Kantian Reading of the First Book of the Treatise*

**Chair:** Jacqueline Taylor (University of San Francisco)

**Author:** Henry E. Allison (University of California–San Diego and Boston University)

**Critics:** Lorne Falkenstein (University of Western Ontario)  
Manfred Keuhn (Boston University)

**WEDNESDAY EVENING, MARCH 31**

**GROUP SESSION GIV — 6:00-8:00 P.M.**

**GIV-A. International Association for the Philosophy of Sport**

6:00-8:00 p.m.

**Speakers:** Joan Grassbaugh Forry (Vanderbilt University)  
“Environmental Ethics and the ‘Greening’ of Intercollegiate Sport”

Douglas McLaughlin (California State University–Northridge)  
“Sweet Tension: The Significance of Games to the Good Life”

**GIV-B. International Hobbes Association, Session 1**

6:00-8:00 p.m.

**Topic:** Author-Meets-Critics: Sharon Lloyd, *Morality in the Philosophy of Thomas Hobbes*

**Chair:** Martin Bertman (Hobbes Studies)

**Author:** Sharon A. Lloyd (University of Southern California)

**Critics:** Al Martinich (University of Texas–Austin)  
Rosamond Rhodes (Mount Sinai School of Medicine and City University of New York–Graduate Center)  
Susanne Sreedhar (Boston University)

**GIV-C. Society for Asian and Comparative Philosophy, Session 1**

6:00-8:00 p.m.

**Chair:** Peter S. Groff (Bucknell University)

**Speakers:** Emily McRae (University of Wisconsin–Madison)  
“Emotions and Moral Self-Development in Tibetan Buddhism”

Peter S. Groff (Bucknell University)  
“The Divine and the Inhuman: Apophasic Approaches to God and Nature in al-Sijistani and Nietzsche”
Matthew LoPresti (Hawaii Pacific University)
“The Philosophy of Religious Diversity in the Bhagavadgita and Its Commentaries”

GROUP SESSION GV — 6:00-9:00 P.M.

GV-A. Association for Chinese Philosophers in America, Session 1
6:00-9:00 p.m.
Topic: A Close Examination of Wang Yangming’s Liangzhi Theory
Chair: Philip J. Ivanhoe (City University of Hong Kong)
Speaker: David Tien (National University of Singapore)
“‘Like a Cat Catching Mice’: Neo-Confucian Cognitive Therapy as a Method for Freeing and Extending the Liangzhi”
Commentator: JeeLoo Liu (California State University–Fullerton)
Speaker: Tzu-Li Chang (National Zhengzhi University)
“Reflections on Wang Yangming’s Theory of Liangzhi in Light of Moral Practice and Moral Judgment”
Commentator: Robin Wang (Loyola Marymount University)
Speaker: Rina Marie F. Camus (National Chengchi University)
“Epistemological Observations about Wang Yangming’s Liangzhi”
Commentator: Weimin Sun (California State University–Northridge)

GV-B. Bay Area Continental Philosophy Association
6:00-9:00 p.m.
Topic: The Beautiful
Chair: Gerard Kuperus (University of San Francisco)
Speaker: Thaddeus Taylor-O’Neil (State University of New York–Stony Brook)
“Kant and the Dynamically Sublime in Surfing: Sublimity Engaged Dynamically”
Commentator: Jason Burke Murphy (St. Louis University)
Speaker: David Won Johnson (Pennsylvania State University)
“The ‘Deadliness’ and Fragility of Action: An Oakeshottian View of Beauty”
Commentator: Marjolein Oele (University of San Francisco)

GV-C. Concerned Philosophers for Peace
6:00-9:00 p.m.
Topic: Perspectives on Warfare: Myth and Reality
Speakers:  
Ovadia Ezra (Tel Aviv University)  
“An Unheroic Perspective on Military Service”  
Mavis Biss (University of Wisconsin–Madison)  
“Moral Imagination and Violent Conflict Resolution”  
Ron Hirschbein (California State University–Chico)  
“The Evil of Banality”  
Andrew Fiala (California State University–Fresno)  
“The Just War Myth”

GV-D. **International Society for Environmental Ethics, Session 1**  
6:00-9:00 p.m.  
**Topic:** Environmental Metaphysics  
Chair: Geoffrey Frasz (College of Southern Nevada)  
Speaker: Nathan Kowalsky (University of Alberta)  
“The Metaphysics of Crisis: Maintaining Moral Contingency in Environmental Philosophy”  
Commentator: John Basl (University of Wisconsin–Madison)  
Speaker: Bob Sandmeyer (University of Kentucky)  
“An Existential Interpretation of Aldo Leopold’s Concept of Land”  
Commentator: Dylan Trigg (University of Sussex)  
Speaker: Tim Christion (University of North Texas)  
“Nature’s Agency or Nature’s Response? What It Is for the Natural World to Relate to Us?”  
Commentator: Avram Hiller (Portland State University)

GV-E. **North American Nietzsche Society**  
6:00-9:00 p.m.  
**Topic:** Nietzsche and Antiquity  
Chair: R. Lanier Anderson (Stanford University)  
Speakers: Nickolas Pappas (City College of New York and City University of New York–Graduate Center)  
Joel E. Mann (St. Norbert College)  
Wilson H. Shearin (Stanford University)

GV-F. **North American Spinoza Society, Session 1**  
6:00-9:00 p.m.  
Chair: Steve Barbone (San Diego State University)  
Speaker: Forrest Williams (University of Colorado–Boulder)  
“Urgent Recommendations on How Not to Read Spinoza”  
Commentator: Brandon Look (University of Kentucky)
Speaker: Eugene Garver (College of St. Benedict and St. John’s University)  

Commentator: Steve Barbone (San Diego State University)

**GV-G. North American Wittgenstein Society, Session 1**

*6:00-9:00 p.m.*

Chair: Jeff Johnson (St. Catherine University)

Speaker: Paul Livingston (University of New Mexico)  
“Wittgenstein and Turing”

Commentator: Jack Woods (Princeton University)

Speaker: Simo Säätelä (Universitet i Bergen)  
“Wittgenstein on Aesthetics, Mathematics, and Philosophical Method”

Commentator: John W. Powell (Humboldt State University)

Speaker: George Wrisley (George Washington University)  
“Truth, Nonsense, and the Meaningfulness of Ostensive Gestures”

Commentator: Joshua Kortbein (Luther College)

**GV-H. Society for German Idealism, Session 1**

*6:00-9:00 p.m.*

Chair: J. M. Fritzman (Lewis and Clark College)

Speaker: John McCumber (University of California–Los Angeles)  
“Hegel and the History of ‘Idealism’”

Commentator: Victoria I. Burke (University of Toronto)

Speaker: Tatiana Patrone (Ithaca College)  
“Making Sense of Hegel’s Preface to the *Phenomenology of Spirit*”

Commentator: Brady Bowman (Pennsylvania State University)

Speaker: Martin Donougho (University of South Carolina)  
“Performing Hegel”

Commentator: Daniel Kirchner (Centre College)

**GV-I. Society for Realist/Antirealist Discussion, Session 1**

*6:00-9:00 p.m.*

Speakers: Otávio Bueno (University of Miami)  
“Scientific Modeling and Scientific Representation: The Peculiar Case of Applied Mathematics”

Robert Batterman (University of Western Ontario)  
“Singularities and Explanation”
Jody Azzouni (Tufts University)
“The Role of Mathematics in Scientific Modeling”

GV-J. Society for the Advancement of American Philosophy, Graduate Student Section
6:00-9:00 p.m.
Topic: Pragmatic Methodology, Self-cultivation, and Social Transformation
Chair: Jessica Soester (Southern Illinois University–Carbondale)
Speakers: Carl Dull (Southern Illinois University–Carbondale)
“A Pragmatic Confucian Apprehension of Norms: Virtue, Imagination, and Social Flourishing”
Clancy Smith (Duquesne University)
“Critical Pragmatism: C.S. Peirce and Herbert Marcuse on the Artificial Stagnation of Human Development in Advanced Industrial Societies”
Aaron Rodriguez (University of Oregon)
“Hanging by a Narrative Thread: Dewey and Rorty on Aesthetic Self-Creation”
Commentators: Benjamin Craig (Southern Illinois University–Carbondale)
Ravi Doshi (Southern Illinois University–Carbondale)
Aisha Raees (Southern Illinois University–Carbondale)

GV-K. Society for Women in Philosophy, Session 1
6:00-9:00 p.m.
Topic: Author-Meets-Critics: Falguni Sheth, Towards a Political Philosophy of Race
Chair: Christina M. Bellon (California State University–Sacramento)
Author: Falguni A. Sheth (Hampshire College)
Critics: David Kim (University of San Francisco)
Eduardo Mendieta (State University of New York–Stony Brook)
Mickaella Perina (University of Massachusetts–Boston)

GV-L. Society of Christian Philosophers
6:00-9:00 p.m.
Chair: Daniel Speak (Loyola Marymount University)
Speakers: Jonathan D. Jacobs (St. Louis University)
Group Program

Timothy O'Connor (Indiana University–Bloomington)
“Emergence and the Resurrection”

Commentator: Rebekah L. H. Rice (Seattle Pacific University)
Speaker: Michael Pace (Chapman University)
“Faith and Intellectual Virtue”
Commentator: Daniel Speak (Loyola Marymount University)

GROUP SESSION GVI — 8:00-10:00 P.M.

GVI-A. American Society for Aesthetics

8:00-10:00 p.m.
Chair: Christopher Williams (University of Nevada–Reno)
Speakers: John Brown (University of Maryland–College Park)
         Glenn Parsons (Ryerson University)

GVI-B. Sartre Circle

8:00-10:00 p.m.
Topic: Sartre, Althusser, and the Humanism Debate Revisited
Chair: Ronald E. Santoni (Denison University)
Speaker: Bill Martin (DePaul University)
Commentator: Tom Jeannot (Gonzaga University)

GVI-C. Society for Natural Religion, Session 1

8:00-10:00 p.m.
Topic: Natural Religion after Hume
Chair: Owen Anderson (Arizona State University)
Speakers: David M. Holley (University of Southern Mississippi)
         “A Different Form of Natural Religion”
         Kristen Irwin (Biola University)
         “Epistemic Authority and Certainty in Bayle’s Conception of Religious Belief”
         Lee Hardy (Calvin College)
         “Hume’s Defense of True Religion”
         Surrendra Gangadean (Paradise Valley Community College)
         “On the Necessity for Natural Religion”
THURSDAY EVENING, APRIL 1

GROUP SESSION GVII — 6:00-8:00 P.M.

GVII-A. International Society for Comparative Studies of Chinese and Western Philosophy, Session 1
6:00-8:00 p.m.

Topic: ‘The Moral Fool’: A Debate on Negative Ethics
Chair: Robin Wang (Loyola Marymount University)
Speakers: Eric Schwitzgebel (University of California–Riverside)
“Fooling Oneself?”
Ellen Zhang (Hong Kong Baptist University)
“How to Avoid Speaking Morality: Denials”
Jennifer Lundin Ritchie (University of British Columbia)
“The Morality of Amorality: Did the Daoists Have It Right?”
Commentator: Hans-Georg Moeller (University College, Cork)

GVII-B. Radical Philosophy Association, Session 1
6:00-8:00 p.m.

Chair: Jose Jorge Mendoza (University of Oregon)
Author: Cheyney Ryan (University of Oregon)
Critics: Anatole Anton (San Francisco State University)
Michael Philip Brown (Michigan State University)
Harry van der Linden (Butler University)

GVII-C. Society for Empirical Ethics
6:00-8:00 p.m.

Topic: Disadvantage
Chair: William A. Rottschaefer (Lewis and Clark College)
Speakers: Gillian Brock (University of Auckland)
“Disadvantage”
Jonathan Wolff (University College London)
Polly Vizard (London School of Economics)
“Multidimensional Deprivation and the Capability Approach: A Framework for Selecting Domains”
GVII-D. Society for the Philosophic Study of the Contemporary Visual Arts, Session 1
6:00-8:00 p.m.

Topic: Film, Video, and Philosophy
Chair: Julie C. Van Camp (California State University–Long Beach)
Speakers: Dan Shaw (Lock Haven University of Pennsylvania)
“Nietzschean Themes in the Films of Charlie Kaufmann”
Dylan Trigg (University of Sussex)
“The Return of the New Flesh: David Cronenberg and Body Memory”
Fay Zika (Athens School of Fine Arts)
“Video Art Time”

GVII-E. Society for the Study of Process Philosophy
6:00-8:00 p.m.

Topic: Climate Change and Philosophy
Chair: Daniel A. Dombrowski (Seattle University)
Speakers: Susan Armstrong (Humboldt State University)
Brian G. Henning (Gonzaga University)

GVII-F. Society for Women in Philosophy, Session 2
6:00-8:00 p.m.

Topic: A History of Women in Philosophy
Chair: Alice Sowaal (San Francisco State University)
Speakers: Jessica Davis (San Diego State University)
“Ann Conway Beyond You and Me”
Lysane F. A. Fauvel (State University of New York–Stony Brook)
“Edith Stein’s Legacy: The Phenomenology of Empathy”
Steve Barbone (San Diego State University)
“Gabrielle Suchon (1631-1703): A Third Way Beyond Gender: A Play in Three Acts”

GROUP SESSION GVIII — 6:00-9:00 P.M.

GVIII-A. History of Early Analytic Philosophy Society and Bertrand Russell Society
6:00-9:00 p.m.
Chair: Rosalind Carey (City University of New York–Lehman College)
Speakers: Russell Wahl (Idaho State University)
“Analysis and Acquaintance”
Reshef Agam-Segal (Auburn University)
“Anscombe’s Criticism of Kantian Self-Legislation”
Peter Baumann (Swarthmore College)
“Fulfillment or Satisfaction? Russell and Wittgenstein on the Content of Desires”
Peter Stone (Stanford University)
“Russell on Mathematical Education”

GVIII-B. International Hobbes Association, Session 2
6:00-9:00 p.m.
Chair: Martin Bertman (Hobbes Studies)
Speakers: Peter Vanderschraaf (University of California–Merced)
“Hobbes’ Scientific Natural Law”
Marcus Adams (University of Pittsburgh)
“Hobbes, Definitions, and Simple Conceptions”
James Martel (San Francisco State University)
“Reading Hobbes and Spinoza: Scriptural Interpretation and Political Authority in Early Modern Thought”
Gordon Schochet (Rutgers University)

GVIII-C. International Society for Chinese Philosophy, Session 1
6:00-9:00 p.m.
Topic: Roles and Responsibilities of the Superior in the Analects
Chair: Chung-Ying Cheng (University of Hawaii–Manoa)
Speakers: Stephen C. Walker (University of Chicago)
“‘Though I Exhaust My Capacities, Still Something Looms Up Before Me’—Effort, Emulation, and Enquiry in the Analects”
Alexus McLeod (University of Dayton)
“Ambivalence Toward Children and the Ethics of Fatherhood in the Analects”
Manyul Im (Fairfield University)
“Gentlemen Prefer Bronze: Aesthetic Sensibility as Moral Sense in the Analects”
Nhat Long Vu (University of Connecticut)
“Is It Possible to Know Who Is the Superior Man?”

Commentator: Chung-Ying Cheng (University of Hawaii–Manoa)

**GVIII-D. North American Kant Society, Session 1**

6:00-9:00 p.m.

**Topic:** Kant’s Political Philosophy

**Chair:** Pablo Muchnik (Siena College)

**Speakers:**
- Susan Shell (Boston College)
  “Nachschrift eines Freundes: Kant on Language, Friendship, and the Concept of People”
- Pauline Kleingeld (Universiteit Leiden)
  “Kant on Political Cosmopolitanism and Moral Dispositions”
- Werner Stark (Philipps-Universität Marburg)

**GVIII-E. Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy**

6:00-9:00 p.m.

**Chair:** Mark Wheeler (San Diego State University)

**Speakers:**
- John Bowin (University of California–Santa Cruz)
  “Aristotle on Learning in De Anima II 5”
- Joel E. Mann (St. Norbert College)
  “Causation, Agency, and Law in Antiphon: On Some Subtleties in the Second Tetralogy”
- John Thorp (University of Western Ontario)
  “Intelligible Matter in Aristotle”

**GVIII-F. Society for Realist/Antirealist Discussion, Session 2**

6:00-9:00 p.m.

**Speakers:**
- Henry Jackman (York University)
  “‘Truth’ and Objectivity”
- Patrick Greenough (University of St. Andrews and University of Sydney)
  “Indeterminacy, Truth, and Reality”
- Kevin Scharp (Ohio State University)
  “Truth, Objectivity, and Realism”

**GVIII-G. Society for the Metaphysics of Science, Session 1**

6:00-9:00 p.m.

**Topic:** Decomposing the Mind: From Functional Analysis to Mechanistic Explanation

**Chair:** Cory Wright (California State University–Long Beach)
Speakers: David M. Kaplan (Washington University in St. Louis)
“Decomposition, Description, and Explanation in Visual Neuroscience”
Gualtiero Piccinini (University of Missouri–St. Louis)
“Functional Analyses as Mechanism Sketches”
Mark B. Couch (Seton Hall University)
“Mechanisms and Explanatory Relevance”
Daniel Weiskopf (Georgia State University)
“Mechanisms and Models in Psychological Explanation”
Carrie Figdor (University of Iowa)
“What Is a Piece of Mind?”

GVIII-H. Society for the Philosophy of History, Session 1
6:00-9:00 p.m.
Topic: Meaning in History
Chair: Naomi Choi (University of California–Berkeley)
Speakers: Robert Lamb (University of Exeter)
“Beliefs, Desires, and Weak Intentionality”
Johannis Bin Abdul Aziz (University of California–Berkeley)
“History, Holism, and Wittgenstein”
Petri Koikkalainen (University of Lapland)
“Should the History of Political Theory Be Written as a History of Concepts or as a History of Beliefs?”

GVIII-I. Society for the Study of Philosophy and the Martial Arts
6:00-9:00 p.m.
Chair: Joseph J. Lynch (California Polytechnic State University)
Speakers: Matthew Pike (University of Colorado–Boulder)
“Aikido and the Role of the New Warrior”
Tonya Warren (San Diego State University)
“Bear and Sparrow: Using the Diamond Sutra to Cut Through Duality in the Martial Arts”
Richard Schubert (Cosumnes River College)
“On the Alleged Uniqueness of the Martial Arts”
Alan Bäck (Kutztown University of Pennsylvania)
“Strength and Qi”
Group Program

Commentators: Craig K. Ihara (California State University–Fullerton)
Joseph J. Lynch (California Polytechnic State University)

GVIII-J. Society of Indian Philosophy and Religion
6:00-9:00 p.m.

Topic: Introspection and Consciousness: East and West
Chair: David Lawrence (University of North Dakota)
Speakers:
- Kisor Kumar Chakrabarti (Davis and Elkins College)
  “Introspection”
- Chandana Chakrabarti (Davis and Elkins College)
  “Pure Experience: East and West”
- Matt Mackenzie (Colorado State University)
  “Reflexive Awareness: Luminosity, Temporality, and the Living Present”
- Sthaneshwar Timaisina (San Diego State University)
  “Self Awareness in Advaita”
- David Lawrence (University of North Dakota)
  “The Pratyabhijna Theory of Self-luminosity (svapraksatva)”

GROUP SESSION GIX — 8:00-10:00 P.M.

GIX-A. Association for Informal Logic and Critical Thinking
8:00-10:00 p.m.

Topic: The Epistemic Significance of Disagreement
Chair: Wanda Teays (Mount St. Mary’s College)
Speaker: Dale Turner (California State Polytechnic University–Pomona)
  “You’re Not an Idiot or Evil, But You Are Wrong: Some Reflections on the Epistemic Significance of Disagreement”
Commentators: Jerry Cederblom (University of Nebraska–Omaha)
- Zenon Culverhouse (Stanford University)
- Michael Scriven (Claremont Graduate University)

GIX-B. David Kellogg Lewis Society
8:00-10:00 p.m.

Topic: Inaugural Meeting
Speakers: Richard Hanley (University of Delaware)
  “Counterfactuals, Back-tracking, and Time Travel”
Terry Horgan (University of Arizona)
“Quantification with Crossed Fingers”

**GIX-C. Society for Natural Religion, Session 2**

*8:00-10:00 p.m.*

**Topic:** Natural Religion and Special Revelation

**Chair:** Owen Anderson (Arizona State University)

**Speakers:**
- Aaron Rizieri (City University of New York–LaGuardia)
  “High Stakes Miracles and Knowledge”
- David Hunt (Whittier College)
  “Hume, Theological Minimalism, and the Problem of Evil”
- Majid Amini (Virginia State University)
  “Philo Revisiting Revelation”

**GIX-D. Society for Student Philosophers, Session 1**

*8:00-10:00 p.m.*

**Topic:** Ethics and Action

**Speakers:**
- Tara Rhoades (University of Delaware)
  “A New Solution to the Ducking Problem”
- Kory DeClark (University of Southern California)
  “Reasons of the Obligation Sort”
- Grant J. Rozeboom (Stanford University)
  “Thinking and the Unforgivable”
- Jesse Summers (University of California–Los Angeles)
  “What Happens When J. David Velleman Acts?”

**GIX-E. Society for the Advancement of American Philosophy, Session 1**

*8:00-10:00 p.m.*

**Topic:** Author-Meets-Critics: Judith Green, Pragmatism and Social Hope: Deepening Democracy in Global Contexts

**Chair:** Brendan Hogan (New York University)

**Author:** Judith Green (Fordham University)

**Critics:**
- Mark Van Hollebeke (Pacific Lutheran University)
- Noelle McAfee (George Mason University)
- Scott L. Pratt (University of Oregon)

**GIX-F. Society for the Philosophical Study of Marxism**

*8:00-10:00 p.m.*
FRIDAY EVENING, APRIL 2

GROUP SESSION GX — 7:00-9:00 P.M.

GX-A. Society for the Philosophic Study of the Contemporary Visual Arts, Session 2

7:00-9:00 p.m.

Topic: Art, Architecture, and Value

Chair: Dan Shaw (Lock Haven University of Pennsylvania)

Speakers: Edward Winters (Independent Scholar)
          “Art and Value: Civilisation and the Altermodern”
          Jennifer McMahon (University of Adelaide)
          “Before Art Ended: Reuniting Art with Metaethics”
          Timothy Dzimiri (National University of Sciences and Technology)
          “The Relationship of Architecture and Music”

GROUP SESSION GXI — 7:00-10:00 P.M.

GXI-A. Association for Chinese Philosophers in America, Session 2

7:00-10:00 p.m.

Topic: Political Realism Chinese and Western (Han Fei Zi, Machiavelli, and Hobbes)

Chair: Tongdong Bai (Xavier University)

Speaker: Philip J. Ivanhoe (City University of Hong Kong)
          “Hanfeizi and Moral Self-Cultivation”

Commentator: Henrique Schneider (Universität Wien)

Speaker: Markus Fischer (California State University–Fullerton)
          “The Book of Lord Shang Compared to Machiavelli and Hobbes”

Commentator: Eirik Harris (Santa Clara University)
Speaker: Wei Liu (Chinese University of Hong Kong)  
“Advising the Tyrant and Advising the Prince: Aristotle and Machiavelli on Political Manipulation”

Commentator: Owen Flanagan (Duke University)  
Speaker: Eirik Harris (Santa Clara University)  
“Han Fei on Morality in Politics”

Commentator: Michael Green (Pomona College)

GXI-B. International Association for Computing and Philosophy  
7:00-10:00 p.m.

**Topic:** Authors-Meet-Critics: Wendell Wallach and Colin Allen, *Moral Machines*  
Chair: John P. Sullins (Sonoma State University)  
Authors: Colin Allen (Indiana University–Bloomington)  
Wendell Wallach (Yale University)  
Commentators: Mark Coeckelbergh (Universiteit Twente)  
James H. Moor (Dartmouth College)  
Thomas M. Powers (University of Delaware)  
Carson Reynolds (University of Tokyo)  
Robin Zebrowski (Beloit College)

GXI-C. International Society for Chinese Philosophy, Session 2  
7:00-10:00 p.m.

**Topic:** Comparative Philosophical Methodology  
Chair: Chung-Ying Cheng (University of Hawaii–Manoa)  
Speakers: Wai Wai Chiu (University of New South Wales)  
“A Critique of ‘Neutral’ Knowledge in Zhuangzi”  
Karyn Lai (University of New South Wales)  
“Knowing and Thinking in the Confucian Analects”  
Li-Hsiang Lisa Rosenlee (University of Hawaii–West Oahu)  
“Political Authority and Care-giving in Confucianism”  
Ranie Villaver (University of New South Wales)  
“Zhuangzi’s Skeptical Method in Light of Yangism”  
Sandra A. Wawrytko (San Diego State University)  
“Prajna Wisdom in Buddhist Philosophy: Transcending Human Nature and Human Reason”

GXI-D. International Society for Environmental Ethics, Session 2  
7:00-10:00 p.m.
**Group Program**

**Topic:** Moral Responsibilities to Nature  
Chair: Christina M. Bellon (California State University–Sacramento)  
Speaker: Toby Svoboda (Pennsylvania State University)  
“Natural Goods and the Moral Considerability of Non-humans”  
Commentator: Lisa Kretz (Dalhousie University)  
Speaker: David Wood (Vanderbilt University)  
“In the Face of Anthropogenic Climate Change, How Strong Is the Case for Voluntary Human Extinction?”  
Commentator: Jeff Sebo (New York University)  
Speaker: Jennifer Welchman (University of Alberta)  
“A Defense of Environmental Stewardship”  
Commentator: Chris Cuomo (University of Georgia)

**GXI-E. Karl Jaspers Society, Session 1**  
7:00-10:00 p.m.  
**Topic:** Author-Meets-Critics: Suzanne Kirkbright, *Karl Jaspers: A Biography—Navigations in Truth*  
Chair: Alan M. Olson (Boston University)  
Author: Suzanne Kirkbright (University of London)  
Critics: Elena Bezzubova (University of California–Irvine)  
Stephen Erickson (Pomona College)  
Gregory Walters (Saint Paul University)

**GXI-F. North American Kant Society, Session 2**  
7:00-10:00 p.m.  
**Topic:** Kant’s Philosophy of Mathematics  
Chair: Charles Parsons (Harvard University)  
Speakers: Daniel Sutherland (University of Illinois–Chicago)  
“Cardinality and Ordinality in Kant’s Philosophy of Arithmetic”  
Ofra Rechter (Tel Aviv University)  
“Intuition and the Formality of Arithmetic in Kant”  
Daniel Warren (University of California–Berkeley)  
“The Role of Infinitesimals in Mathematics and in the Metaphysics of Corporeal Nature”

**GXI-G. North American Spinoza Society, Session 2**  
7:00-10:00 p.m.  
**Topic:** Adequacy in Spinoza  
Chair: Steve Barbone (San Diego State University)
Speakers: Tad Robinson (Muhlenberg College)
“Recognizing Adequacy”
Christopher Martin (University of Wisconsin–Green Bay)
“Spinoza’s Clunky Clumps”
Julie Klein (Villanova University)
“Truth and Adequacy in Spinoza”

GXI-H. Society for Phenomenology and Analytic Philosophy
7:00-10:00 p.m.
Topic: Cognitive Phenomenology
Chair: David Woodruff Smith (University of California–Irvine)
Speakers: Michelle Montague (University of Bristol)
David Pitt (California State University–Los Angeles)
Charles Siewert (University of California–Riverside)
Galen Strawson (University of Reading)
Dallas Willard (University of Southern California)

GXI-I. Society for Philosophy and Public Affairs
7:00-10:00 p.m.
Topic: Global justice and Equality: Three Views
Chair: Shelley Wilcox (San Francisco State University)
Speakers: Gillian Brock (University of Auckland)
“How Should Equality Matter?”
Darrel Moellendorf (San Diego State University)
“Human Dignity and Global Equality”
Richard W. Miller (Cornell University)
“What Global Inequalities Are Too Much?”

GXI-J. Society for Philosophy in the Contemporary World,
Session 1
7:00-10:00 p.m.
Topic: Philosophy of Art and Film in the Contemporary World
Chair: Travis T. Anderson (Brigham Young University)
Speakers: Bryan Benham (University of Utah)
“Aesthetics for Philosophizing: Inhabiting Bio-social Futures in Code 46”
Stephen Brown (Briar Cliff College)
“Choosing Goodness: The Many Moralities of A Clockwork Orange”
Leonard Kahn (United States Air Force Academy)
“The Valence of Aesthetic Reasons”
Scott Woodcock (University of Victoria)
“Why Some Horror Films Are Immoral”

GXI-K. Society for the Advancement of American Philosophy, Session 2
7:00-10:00 p.m.
Topic: Dewey and Foucault
Chair: Giles Gunn (University of California–Santa Barbara)
Speakers: Paul Rabinow (University of California–Berkeley)
“Dewey and Foucault: What’s the Problem?”
Colin Koopman (University of Oregon)
“Problematization and Reconstruction: Reciprocities and Tensions”
Brad Elliott Stone (Loyola Marymount University)
“The Praise and Critique of Experience in Dewey and Foucault”

GXI-L. Society for the Metaphysics of Science, Session 2
7:00-10:00 p.m.
Topic: The Role of Abstraction in Causal-Mechanical Explanation
Chair: Gualtiero Piccinini (University of Missouri–St. Louis)
Speakers: Stuart Glennan (Butler University)
“Building and Explaining Mechanisms: Some Lessons on the Role of Abstraction”
James Tabery (University of Utah)
“Mechanisms and Difference Mechanisms”
Cory Wright (California State University–Long Beach)
“The Role of Abstraction in Generalizations about Mechanistic Phenomena”
Michael Strevens (New York University)
“Toward a Quantitative Theory of Idealization”

GXI-M. Society for the Philosophy of History, Session 2
7:00-10:00 p.m.
Topic: Empathy, Rationality, and Explanation
Chair: Mark Bevir (University of California–Berkeley)
Speakers: Constantine Sandis (Oxford Brookes University)
“Empathy and Detachment in Historical Understanding”
Stephen Turner (University of South Florida)
“Narrative or Verstehen Plus Cause? Weber and Collingwood vs. Mink”

Karsten Stueber (College of the Holy Cross)
“On a Supposed Difference between the Human and the Natural Sciences: Rethinking the Distinction between Understanding and Explanation.”

GXII-N. Society for the Philosophy of Sex and Love
7:00-10:00 p.m.

Topic: Intersex: Bodies, Norms, and Identities
Chair: Patricia Marino (University of Waterloo)
Speakers: Sharon Sytsma (Northern Illinois University)
“Being True to Oneself: Intersexuality and the Quest for Authenticity”
David Ozar (Loyola University Chicago)
“Intersex and the Inadequacy of Stable Binary Norms”
Ellen Feder (American University)
“Normalizing Medicine: Between ‘Intersexuals’ and Individuals with ‘Disorders of Sex Development’”

Intersex performer Hida Viloria will give a reading entitled “Intersex, Unplugged”

SATURDAY EVENING, APRIL 3

GROUP SESSION GXII — 6:00-8:00 P.M.

GXII-A. North American Society for Social Philosophy
6:00-8:00 p.m.

Topic: Sexuality and Justice
Chair: Jeff Gauthier (University of Portland)
Speakers: Susan Brison (Dartmouth College)
“Justice and Gender-Based Violence”
Robin L. West (Georgetown University)
“Religious Rights as Protected Wrongs: The Case of Homeschooling”
Elizabeth Brake (University of Calgary)
“Special Treatment for Lovers: Law, Sexual Orientation, and ‘Amato-normativity’”
GXII-B. Radical Philosophy Association, Session 2
6:00-8:00 p.m.

Topic: Economic Crisis: Philosophical Investigations into Its Root Causes, Consequences, and What Can Be Done

Chair: Jose Jorge Mendoza (University of Oregon)
Speakers: Naomi Zack (University of Oregon)
“The Value of Disadvantage”
Miles Hentrup (University of Oregon)
“What Thinking Through the Crisis: Late Capitalism and the Logic of Indemnification”
David Schweickart (Loyola University Chicago)
“What Why Is This Happening? What Is to Be Done? A Marxian-Keynesian Reflection on the Economic Crisis”

GXII-C. Society for Philosophy in the Contemporary World, Session 2
6:00-8:00 p.m.

Topic: Philosophy of Literature in the Contemporary World

Chair: Leonard Kahn (United States Air Force Academy)
Speakers: Katherine Hazzard (Independent Scholar)
“Bidart’s Pragmatism: A Prosody of Processes in Ellen West and The War of Vaslav Nijinsky”
Travis T. Anderson (Brigham Young University)
“What Levinas and McCarthy: Paternity and Justice in The Road”
Michael Koch (State University of New York–Oneonta)
“What Saving Alcibiades: Chaos and Delight in A. S. Byatt’s Babel Tower”

GXII-D. Society for Student Philosophers, Session 2
6:00-8:00 p.m.

Topic: Mind, Language, and Epistemology

Speakers: Sarah McCulley (Ohio University)
“What Davidson’s Semantical Primitives and Why They Cannot Work”
Jeff Dauer (University of Missouri–St. Louis)
“What Relativism, Epistemic Modals, and Contextual Projection”
Said Saillant (Rutgers University)
“What The Logic of Mentalistic and Physicalistic Language”
Jonathan Spelman (University of Missouri–St. Louis)
“Virtue Epistemology and the Problem of Environmental Luck”

**GROUP SESSION GXIII — 6:00-9:00 P.M.**

GXIII-A. Ayn Rand Society

6:00-9:00 p.m.

**Topic:** Authors-Meet-Critics: *Essays on Ayn Rand’s Atlas Shrugged*

Chair: Fred D. Jr. Miller (Bowling Green State University)
Speakers: Robert Mayhew (Seton Hall University)
“From the Editor: Aims and Structure of the Volume”
Christine Swanton (University of Auckland)
Lester Hunt (University of Wisconsin–Madison)
William Glod (Institute for Humane Studies)
Commentators: Onkar Ghate (Ayn Rand Institute)
Allan Gotthelf (University of Pittsburgh)
Gregory Salmieri (University of North Carolina–Chapel Hill)

GXIII-B. International Society for Comparative Studies of Chinese and Western Philosophy, Session 2

6:00-9:00 p.m.

**Topic:** Political Realism in Chinese and Western Philosophy (Han Fei Zi, Machiavelli, and Hobbes)

Chair: Andrew Dell'Olio (Hope College)
Speaker: Alexus McLeod (University of Dayton)
“A Reconstruction of Wang Chong’s Argument against Han Feizi’s Legalism in His Essay Fei Han”
Commentator: Gordy Mower (Brigham Young University)
Speaker: Henrique Schneider (Universität Wien)
“Han Fei and Constitutionalism”
Commentator: Chris Naticchia (California State University–San Bernardino)
Speaker: Gordy Mower (Brigham Young University)
“Realism and Virtue: Han Feizi, Machiavelli, and Confucianism”
Commentator: Markus Fischer (California State University–Fullerton)
Speaker: Martin Bertman (Hobbes Studies)
“Freedom in a Hobbesian State”
Commentator: Alexus McLeod (University of Dayton)
GXIII-C. Karl Jaspers Society, Session 2
6:00-9:00 p.m.

**Topic:** World Philosophy and the Axial Age Thesis

Chair: Helmut Wautischer (Sonoma State University)
Speakers: Joanne Miyang Cho (William Paterson University)
  “Karl Jaspers on Rudolf Bultmann and Paradigmatic Individuals in Asia”
Tomoko Iwasawa (Reitaku University)
  “Philosophical Faith as the Will to Communicate: The Case of Helen Mears and Japan as Mirror for Americans (1948)”
Lydia Voronina (Independent Scholar)
  “Philosophy of History in the Age of Globalization: Karl Jaspers, Walter Benjamin, and Taoist Metaphysics”

Commentator: Alan M. Olson (Boston University)

**BUSINESS MEETING**

GXIII-D. North American Wittgenstein Society, Session 2
6:00-9:00 p.m.

**Topic:** Ordinary Language Philosophy

Speaker: Avner Baz (Tufts University)
  “Must Philosophers Rely on Intuitions?”
Commentator: Jeff Johnson (St. Catherine University)

**ROUND TABLE DISCUSSION ON WITTGENSTEINIAN PEDAGOGY**

GXIII-E. Philosophy of Religion Group
6:00-9:00 p.m.

**Topic:** Religious Toleration

Chair: Michael Murray (Franklin and Marshall College)
Speakers: Edwin Curley (University of Michigan–Ann Arbor)
  Robert Audi (University of Notre Dame)
  Kristen Irwin (Biola University)
Commentator: James Bruce (John Brown University)

GXIII-F. Society for Asian and Comparative Philosophy, Session 2
6:00-9:00 p.m.

**Topic:** Topics in Chinese Philosophy

Chair: Edward Slingerland (University of British Columbia)
Speakers: Edward Slingerland (University of British Columbia)
  “Body and Mind in Early China”
Bongrae Seok (Alvernia University)
“Character or Situation? A Confucian Response to Situational Social Psychology”

Daniel Coyle (Birmingham–Southern College and Our Lady of the Lake University)
“Early Yinyang Cosmology as a Praxiology of Efficacy”

Valerie Oved (Loyola Marymount University)
“The Problem of Naming: A Case for Philosophy of Language in the Daodejing”

GXIII-G. Society for German Idealism, Session 2
6:00-9:00 p.m.
Chair: Aaron Bunch (Washington State University)
Author: Stephen Engstrom (University of Pittsburgh)
Critics: William Bristow (University of Wisconsin–Milwaukee)
Richard Dean (California State University–Los Angeles)
Jeanine Grenberg (St. Olaf College)

GXIII-H. Society for Skeptical Studies
6:00-9:00 p.m.
Chair: Richard Greene (Weber State University)
Speakers: Otávio Bueno (University of Miami)
“Is the Pyrrhonist an Internalist?”
Gavin Enck (University of Tennessee)
“Live Skepticism and Genius Testimony”
Eric Thompson (University of Tennessee)
“Pragmatic Invariantism and External World Skepticism”
Joel Buenting (University of Alberta)
“Some Epistemics of Skeptical Questions”

GXIII-I. Society for the Philosophy of History, Session 3
6:00-9:00 p.m.
Topic: Empathy, Rationality, and Explanation
Chair: Mark Bevir (University of California–Berkeley)
Speakers: Karim Dharamsi (Mount Royal University)
“Collingwood and the Second Person”
David K. Henderson (University of Nebraska–Lincoln)
“Silly Me”

Axel Seemann (Bentley University)
“Why I Did It: Narratives, Selves, and Action Explanation”

GXIII-J. Society for the Study of the History of Analytical Philosophy
6:00-9:00 p.m.

**Topic:** Bolzano’s New Anti-Kant

**Chair:** Sandra Lapointe (Kansas State University)

**Speakers:**
Timothy Rosenkoetter (Dartmouth College)
“Intuitions and Concepts in Kant and Bolzano”

Nick Stang (University of Miami)
“Kant, Bolzano, and the Nature of Arithmetic”

Waldemar Rohloff (University of Missouri–St. Louis)
“Ordinary Language in Bolzano and Kant”

Clinton Tolley (University of California–San Diego)
“The Place of Subjectivity in a Wissenschaftslehre”

GXIII-K. Western Phenomenology Conference
6:00-9:00 p.m.

**Topic:** Articulating the Imperceptible

**Chair:** Jason Winfree (California State University–Stanislaus)

**Speakers:**
James Risser (Seattle University)
“On the Imperceptible”

Daniela Vallega-Neu (California State University–Stanislaus)
“The Fabric of Machination”

**Critics:**
David Kangas (Santa Clara University)
Ben Pryor (University of Toledo)

GROUP SESSION GXIV — 8:00-10:00 P.M.

GXIV-A. Josiah Royce Society
8:00-10:00 p.m.

**Topic:** Feminism and Idealism

**Chair:** Scott L. Pratt (University of Oregon)

**Speakers:**
Amrita Banerjee (University of Oregon)
Kimberly Garchar (Kent State University)
John Kaag (University of Massachusetts–Lowell)
GXIV-B. Philosophy of Time Society
8:00-10:00 p.m.
Chair: Ned Markosian (Western Washington University)
Speaker: Dean Zimmerman (Rutgers University)
“Presentism and the Structure of the Space-Time Manifold”
Commentator: Joseph Keim Campbell (Washington State University)
Speaker: Joshua Mozersky (Queen’s University)
“Three-dimensionalism”
Commentator: Michael Tooley (University of Colorado–Boulder)

GXIV-C. Society for Business Ethics
8:00-10:00 p.m.
Topic: Author-Meets-Critics: Marvin Brown, *Civilizing the Economy: A New Economics of Provision*
Chair: Carlo Carrascoso (University of Redlands)
Author: Marvin Brown (University of San Francisco)
Critics: Andrew Gustafson (Creighton University)
Jessica Ludescher (Seattle University)
James O’Toole (University of Denver)

GXIV-D. Society for Lesbian and Gay Philosophy and the APA Committee on the Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender People in the Profession
8:00-10:00 p.m.
Chair: Cheshire Calhoun (Arizona State University)
Speakers: Richard Nunan (College of Charleston)
“Same-Sex Marriage in California: Direct Democracy vs. Constitutional Integrity”
Raja Halwani (School of the Art Institute of Chicago)
“Some Thoughts on the Ethics of Racial Desires”
Annika Thiem (Villanova University)
“What Does the Breast Want from Me? Transerotics Queering Heterosexuality”
MAIN AND GROUP PROGRAM
PARTICIPANTS

(Group sessions begin with “G.” All others are main sessions.)

A
Abdulhakim, Derrick (San Francisco State University) ..........IV-F Thu PM
Abed, Mohammed (California State University–Los Angeles) ....V-L Thu PM
Adams, Fred (University of Delaware) ................................................IX-A Sat AM
Adams, Marcus (University of Pittsburgh) ..................GVIII-B Thu PM
Agam-Segal, Reshef (Auburn University) .........................GVIII-A Thu PM
Alcoff, Linda Martín (City University of New York–Hunter College) ...........VII-L Fri PM
Alfino, Mark (Gonzaga University) .........................................III-J Thu AM
Allais, Lucy (University of the Witwatersrand) ......................XI-H Sat PM
Allen, Colin (Indiana University–Bloomington) ...............GXI-A Sat AM
Alhoff, Fritz (Western Michigan University) .....................IX-G Sat AM
Allison, Henry E. (University of California–San Diego and Boston University) .........GIII-A Wed PM
Alter, Torin (University of Alabama–Tuscaloosa) ...............VIII-I Fri PM
Alward, Peter (University of Lethbridge) ..................IV-F Thu PM
Alwishah, Ahmed (Pitzer College) ..................X-H Sat PM
Amano, Randall (University of California–Berkeley) ...........X-C Sat PM
Amaya, Santiago (Washington University in St. Louis) .........II-F Wed PM
Ameriks, Karl (University of Notre Dame) ..................VIII-C Fri PM
Amini, Majid (Virginia State University) ..................GIX-C Thu PM
Anderson, Owen (Arizona State University) ..............GVIII-C Thu PM
Anderson, R. Lanier (Stanford University) ...........GV-E Wed PM, X-C Sat PM
Anderson, Scott A. (University of British Columbia) ..........VI-E Fri AM
Anderson, Travis T. (Brigham Young University) ..........GXI-J Fri PM, GXII-C Sat PM
Andrews, Kristen (York University) ...............................VII-J Fri PM
Angelides, Alexei (Stanford University) ..................IX-H Sat AM
Anton, Anatole (San Francisco State University) ..........GVII-B Thu PM
Antony, Louise (University of Massachusetts–Amherst) ..........II-F Wed PM
Arenson, Kelly (University of Memphis) ..................I-I Wed PM
Proceedings and Addresses of the APA 83:

Ariew, Roger (University of South Florida) ........................................ VIII-B Fri PM
Armendt, Brad (Arizona State University) ...................................... I-D Wed PM
Armstrong, Susan (Humboldt State University) ........................... GVII-E Thu PM
Arvan, Marcus (University of Tampa) ........................................ IX-J Sat AM
Asher, Nicholas (Centre Nationale de la Recherche Scientifique) ........................................................ III-C Thu AM
Ashwell, Lauren (Bates College) ............................................... V-H Thu PM
Audi, Paul R. (University of Nebraska–Omaha) .......................... I-F Wed PM
Audi, Robert (University of Notre Dame) .................................. GXIII-E Sat PM
Avnur, Yuval (Scripps College) ............................................... IX-H Sat AM
Azzouni, Jody (Tufts University) ............................................. GV-I Wed PM

B

Baber, H. E. (University of San Diego) .................................... III-J Thu AM
Babich, Babette (Fordham University) .................................. XI-E Sat PM
Bader, Ralf (University of St Andrews) .................................. V-H Thu PM
Badhwar, Neera (University of Oklahoma) ............................... I-J Wed PM
Baehr, Amy (Hofstra University) ........................................ VII-H Fri PM
Bagnoli, Carla (University of Wisconsin–Milwaukee) ............... IX-G Sat AM
Bai, Tongdong (Xavier University) ......................................... GXI-A Fri PM
Baia, Alex (University of Texas–Austin) ................................ VIII-I Fri PM
Ball, Derek (University of St. Andrews) .................................. VII-I Fri PM
Ballarini, Roberta (University of British Columbia) ................ XI-I Sat PM
Banerjee, Arnita (University of Oregon) ................................. GXIV-A Sat PM
Barbone, Steve (San Diego State University) ......................... GV-F Wed PM, GVII-F Thu PM, VIII-J Fri PM, GXI-G Fri PM
Baril, Anne (University of Arizona) ........................................ I-E Wed PM
Barnes, Eric (Southern Methodist University) ......................... I-J Wed PM
Barnes, Joseph (University of California–Berkeley) ............... IX-H Sat AM
Barnett, David B. (University of Colorado, Boulder) .......... VIII-H Fri PM
Barney, Rachel (University of Toronto) .................................. X-E Sat PM
Barnhill, Anne (Johns Hopkins University) ............................... V-D Thu PM
Basl, John (University of Wisconsin–Madison) ....................... GV-D Wed PM
Battaly, Heather (California State University–Fullerton) ........ VI-G Fri AM
Batterman, Robert (University of Western Ontario) ............ GV-I Wed PM
Batty, Clare (University of Kentucky) ...................................IX-E Sat AM
Baumann, Peter (Swarthmore College) ................................. GVIII-A Thu PM
Baumgaertner, Bert (University of California–Davis) .......... VIII-H Fri PM
Bayne, Tim (Oxford University) ........................................... VIII-D Fri PM
Baz, Avner (Tufts University) ........................................... GXIII-D Sat PM
Bealer, George (Yale University) ........................................ VII-E Fri PM
Becker, Lawrence C. (Hollins University) ............................ IV-C Thu PM
Beggs, Svetlana (University of California–Riverside) ................... VI-J Fri AM
Bellon, Christina M. (California State University–Sacramento) ..................................................... GV-K Wed PM, VII-H Fri PM, GXI-D Fri PM
Benham, Bryan (University of Utah) ........................................... GXI-J Fri PM
Bennett, Karen (Cornell University) ........................................... IV-A Thu PM
Benton, Matthew (Rutgers University) ........................................... VI-H Fri AM
Berendzen, J. C. (Loyola University New Orleans) ....................... V-F Thu PM
Berkey, Brian (University of California–Berkeley) ....................... X-G Sat PM
Berkhout, Suze (University of British Columbia) ........................ VIII-G Fri PM
Bernecker, Sven (University of California–Irvine) ....................... IX-A Sat AM
Bernstein, Sara (University of Arizona) ....................................... VI-F Fri AM
Berofsky, Bernard (Columbia University) .................................. VII-D Fri PM
Bertman, Martin (Hobbes Studies) .................................................. GIV-B Wed PM, GVIII-B Thu PM, GXIII-B Sat PM
Bevir, Mark (University of California–Berkeley) ....................... GXI-M Fri PM, GXIII-I Sat PM
Bezzubova, Elena (University of California–Irvine) .................... GXI-E Fri PM
Biletzki, Anat (Tel Aviv University) ............................................. V-L Thu PM
Bin Abdul Aziz, Johannis (University of California–Berkeley) ........ GIV-H Thu PM
Birondo, Noell (Claremont McKenna College) ......................... IX-G Sat AM
Biss, Mavis (University of Wisconsin–Madison) ....................... GV-C Wed PM
Björnsson, Gunnar (Linköpings Universitet) ............................... V-J Thu PM
Black, Tim (California State University–Northridge) .................. IV-G Thu PM
Blackman, Reid (Colgate University) ........................................... II-E Wed PM
Bobro, Marc (Santa Barbara City College) ................................. VIII-K Fri PM
Bordner, Seth (University of North Carolina–Chapel Hill) ......... V-I Thu PM
Bowin, John (University of California–Santa Cruz) ................. GVIII-E Thu PM
Bowman, Brady (Pennsylvania State University) ......................... GV-H Wed PM
Bowman, Margaret (University of Utah) ................................. IX-I Sat AM
Bradley, Ben (Syracuse University) ........................................... III-A Thu AM
Bradner, Alexandra (Denison University) ................................... IV-I Thu PM
Brake, Elizabeth (University of Calgary) ............................... III-G Thu AM, GXII-A Sat PM
Brand, Peg (Indiana University-Purdue University–Indianapolis) .................................................. V-B Thu PM
Brand-Ballard, Jeffrey (George Washington University) ........... IX-G Sat AM
Bratman, Michael E. (Stanford University) ................................. Fri PM
Brennan, Samantha (University of Western Ontario) .................. II-B Wed PM
Brewer, Talbot (University of Virginia) ....................................... IX-D Sat AM
Briggs, Dan (University of New Mexico) .................................. XI-E Sat PM
Bringhurst, Piper (University of Arizona) .................................. VII-J Fri PM
Briscoe, Robert (Ohio University) ............................................. II-H Wed PM
Brison, Susan (Dartmouth College) ...........................................GXII-A Sat PM
Bristow, William (University of Wisconsin–Milwaukee) ...... GXIII-G Sat PM
Brock, Gillian (University of Auckland) .....................GVII-C Thu PM, GXI-I Fri PM
Broggaard, Berit (University of Missouri–St. Louis) ............II-H Wed PM
Bromberger, Sylvain (Massachusetts Institute of Technology) ...X-D Sat PM
Bromwich, Danielle (National Institutes of Health) ...............IX-I Sat AM
Brophy, Scott (Hobart and William Smith Colleges) ............I-H Wed PM
Brown, John (University of Maryland–College Park) ..........GVI-A Wed PM
Brown, Marvin (University of San Francisco) .......................GXIV-C Sat PM
Brown, Michael Philip (Michigan State University) ..........GVII-B Thu PM
Brown, Stephen (Briar Cliff College) ....................................GXI-J Fri PM
Bruce, James (John Brown University) .................................GXIII-E Sat PM
Brueckner, Anthony (University of California–Santa Barbara) ...IX-H Sat AM
Bruno, Teresa (University of Kansas) .................................GI-A, Tue AM
Bruno, Michael (Lewis and Clark College) .......................VII-I Fri PM
Buchak, Lara (University of California–Berkeley) .................V-D Thu PM
Bueno, Otávio (University of Miami) ......................................I-H Wed PM, GV-I Wed PM, GXIII-H Sat PM
Buenting, Joel (University of Alberta) .................................GXIII-H Sat PM
Bunch, Aaron (Washington State University) ....III-G Thu AM, GXIII-G Sat PM
Bundy, Alex (University of California–Santa Barbara) ..........XI-F Sat PM
Burak, Ken (Northampton Community College) ....................VIII-K Fri PM
Burgess, John (Princeton University) ....................................VII-A Fri PM
Burian, Richard (Virginia Tech) ...........................................VII-B Fri PM
Burke, Victoria I. (University of Toronto) .............................GV-H Wed PM
Burkhart, Brian Yazzie (Indiana University–Bloomington) ....III-K Thu AM
Burroughs, Michael (University of Memphis) ......................V-K Thu PM
Bussanich, John (University of New Mexico) .....................XI-D Sat PM
Butler, Travis (Iowa State University) .................................X-F Sat PM
Bäck, Alan (Kutztown University of Pennsylvania) ...............GVIII-I Thu PM

C
Caie, Michael (University of California–Berkeley) ..................XI-A Sat PM
Calhoun, Cheshire (Arizona State University) .......................GXIV-D Sat PM
Campagna, Daniel (University of La Verne) ........................VI-E Fri AM
Campbell, Joseph Keim (Washington State University) .............VII-D Fri PM, GXIV-B Sat PM
Camus, Rina Marie F. (National Chengchi University) ..........GV-A Wed PM
Cannon, Douglas (University of Puget Sound) .....................VI-I Fri AM
Caplan, Ben (Ohio State University) .................................X-H Sat PM
Carey, Rosalind (City University of New York–Lehman College) ...........................................GVIII-A Thu PM
Carmichael, Chad (University of Illinois–Urbana-Champaign) .......... X-I Sat PM
Carrascoso, Carlo (University of Redlands) ................................ GXIV-C Sat PM
Carriero, John (University of California–Los Angeles) .......... X-A Sat PM
Carter, Alan (University of Glasgow) ............................................. V-E Thu PM
Cath, Yuri (University of St. Andrews) ................................... V-C Thu PM
Cederblom, Jerry (University of Nebraska–Omaha) ........... GIX-A Thu PM
Chakrabarti, Chandana (Davis and Elkins College) .......... GVIII-A Thu PM
Chakrabarti, Kisor Kumar (Davis and Elkins College) ....... GVIII-J Thu PM
Chakravarty, Anjan (University of Toronto) ...................... VI-I Fri AM
Chang, Tzu-Li (National Zhengzhi University) ............... GV-A Wed PM
Cheng, Chung-Ying (University of Hawaii–Manoa) ....... GVIII-C Thu PM, GXI-C Fri PM
Cheng-Guajardo, Luis (Stanford University) ......................... III-F Thu AM
Chignell, Andrew (Cornell University) ................................. X-C Sat PM
Chislenko, Eugene (University of California–Berkeley) ....... IX-I Sat AM
Chiu, Wai Wai (University of New South Wales) ............... GXI-C Fri PM
Cho, Joanne Miyang (William Paterson University) .......... GXIII-C Sat PM
Choi, Naomi (University of California–Berkeley) ............. GVIII-H Thu PM
Cholbi, Michael (California State Polytechnic University–Pomona) ........................................ III-G Thu AM
Chrisman, Matthew (University of Edinburgh) .................... IV-B Thu PM
Christion, Tim (University of North Texas) ......................... GV-D Wed PM
Chu, Antonio (Metropolitan State College of Denver) ........ III-H Thu AM
Chuang, Christina (University of California–Irvine) .......... IX-F Sat AM
Churchland, Patricia (University of California–San Diego) .... X-K Sat PM
Clark, Austen (University of Connecticut) ........................... IX-E Sat AM
Clark, Philip (University of Toronto) ........................................ X-B Sat PM
Clarke, Randolph (Florida State University) ...................... VII-D Fri PM
Claxton, Susanne (Green Mountain College) .................... XI-D Sat PM
Clough, Sharyn (Oregon State University) ........................ XI-J Sat PM
Coates, Allen (East Tennessee State University) ............... IX-H Sat AM
Coates, Justin (University of California–Riverside) .......... I-F Wed PM
Code, Alan (Rutgers University) .............................................. VII-C Fri PM
Coeckelbergh, Mark (Universiteit Twente) ...................... GXI-B Fri PM
Cogley, Zac (Ohio State University) .............................................. X-G Sat PM
Cohen, Andrew Jason (Georgia State University) .......... IX-D Sat AM
Cohen, Mark (University of California–Los Angeles) .......... X-K Sat PM
Cohen, S. Marc (University of Washington) ...................... VII-C Fri PM
Cokelet, Bradford (University of Miami) .......................... IX-I Sat AM
Colaner, Nathan (University of Kansas) .............................. IX-J Sat AM
Collins, John (East Carolina University) ............................ IV-F Thu PM
Comesaña, Juan (University of Arizona) ................................................ IX-B Sat AM
Copenhaver, Rebecca (Lewis and Clark College) .............................. V-I Thu PM
Coplan, Amy (California State University–Fullerton) ....................... IX-G Sat AM
Copp, David (University of California–Davis) ................................... IX-C Sat AM
Corkum, Philip (University of Alberta) ............................................. X-F Sat PM
Cottrell, Joshua (Westview High School) ......................................... V-K Thu PM
Couch, Mark B. (Seton Hall University) ............................................. GVIII-G Thu PM
Coventry, Angela (Portland State University) ................................... XI-G Sat PM
Coyle, Daniel (Birmingham–Southern College and Our Lady of the Lake University) ...................................................... GXIII-F Sat PM
Craig, Benjamin (Southern Illinois University–Carbondale) ....... GV-J Wed PM
Crasnow, Sharon (Riverside Community College) ............................. VI-F Wed PM
Crawford, Lindsay (University of California–Berkeley) .................... XI-G Sat PM
Cudd, Ann (University of Kansas) ...................................................... II-B Wed PM
Culverhouse, Zenon (Stanford University) ........................................... GIX-A Thu PM
Cumming, Sam (University of California–Los Angeles) ..................... II-D Wed PM
Cuneo, Terence (University of Vermont) ............................................ IV-B Thu PM
Cuomo, Chris (University of Georgia) ............................................. GXI-D Fri PM
Curley, Edwin (University of Michigan–Ann Arbor) ................. GXIII-E Sat PM
Cushman, Edward (Lewis and Clark College) ................................... XI-F Sat PM

D

Dainton, Barry (University of Liverpool) ........................................... VI-B Fri AM
Dammin, Tristram (University of New Mexico) ................................ XI-E Sat PM
Dancy, Jonathan (University of Texas–Austin and University of Reading) ............................................. IX-C Sat AM
Darmalingum, Matthew (Stanford University) .................................. I-I Wed PM
Dauer, Jeff (University of Missouri–St. Louis) .............................. GXII-D Sat PM
Davies, Stephen (University of Auckland) ........................................ II-C Wed PM
Davis, Ann (Pomona College) ............................................................ IV-E Thu PM
Davis, Jessica (San Diego State University) ...................................... GVII-F Thu PM
De Brigard, Felipe (University of North Carolina–Chapel Hill) .... I-G Wed PM
De Marco, Tobyn (Bergen Community College) ............................... II-C Wed PM
de Melo-Martin, Inmaculada (Cornell University) ............................ X-K Sat PM
De Sousa, Ronald (University of Toronto) ........................................ XI-B Sat PM
Dean, Jeff (Wiley-Blackwell) ......................................................... II-C Wed PM
Dean, Richard (California State University–Los Angeles) .......... GXIII-G Sat PM
Debes, Remy (University of Memphis) ............................................. VI-E Fri AM
DeClark, Kory (University of Southern California) ....................... GIX-D Thu PM
Deery, Oisin (University of British Columbia) ............................... I-J Wed PM
Dell’Olio, Andrew (Hope College) ................................................. GXIII-B Sat PM
Delmas, Candice (Boston University) .............................................. X-F Sat PM
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>University</th>
<th>Time</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DeMoss, David</td>
<td>Pacific University</td>
<td>X-F Sat PM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denison, Jaime</td>
<td>University of New Mexico</td>
<td>XI-E Sat PM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Depew, David</td>
<td>University of Iowa</td>
<td>VIII-B Fri PM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Des Chene, Dennis</td>
<td>Washington University in St. Louis</td>
<td>X-A Sat PM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Devitt, Michael</td>
<td>City University of New York–Graduate Center</td>
<td>V-C Thu PM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dharamsi, Karim</td>
<td>Mount Royal University</td>
<td>GXIII-I Sat PM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Doggett, Tyler</td>
<td>University of Vermont</td>
<td>VII-J Fri PM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dombrowski, Daniel A.</td>
<td>Seattle University</td>
<td>GVII-E Thu PM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Donougho, Martin</td>
<td>University of South Carolina</td>
<td>GV-H Wed PM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Doppelt, Gerald D.</td>
<td>University of California–San Diego</td>
<td>VII-G Fri PM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dorsey, Dale</td>
<td>University of Kansas</td>
<td>VII-K Fri PM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Doshi, Ravi</td>
<td>Southern Illinois University–Carbondale</td>
<td>GV-J Wed PM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dowell, Janice</td>
<td>University of Nebraska–Lincoln</td>
<td>V-J Thu PM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Downes, Steve</td>
<td>University of Utah</td>
<td>III-I Thu AM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Draper, Paul</td>
<td>Purdue University</td>
<td>II-J Wed PM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Driver, Julia</td>
<td>Washington University in St. Louis</td>
<td>V-E Thu PM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dull, Carl</td>
<td>Southern Illinois University–Carbondale</td>
<td>GV-J Wed PM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elpidorou, Andreas</td>
<td>Boston University</td>
<td>I-G Wed PM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enck, Gavin</td>
<td>University of Tennessee</td>
<td>GXIII-H Sat PM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Engstrom, Stephen</td>
<td>University of Pittsburgh</td>
<td>GXIII-G Sat PM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Erickson, Stephen</td>
<td>Pomona College</td>
<td>GXI-E Fri PM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Esch, Emily</td>
<td>College of St. Benedict and St. John’s University</td>
<td>IV-I Thu PM, X-H Sat PM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ezra, Ovadia</td>
<td>Tel Aviv University</td>
<td>GV-C Wed PM, V-L Thu PM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Falkenstein, Lorne</td>
<td>University of Western Ontario</td>
<td>GIII-A Wed PM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fallis, Don</td>
<td>University of Arizona</td>
<td>VI-H Fri AM</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Fantl, Jeremy (University of Calgary) ........................................... IX-H Sat AM
Farzam-Kia, Arash (Queen’s University) ....................................... X-G Sat PM
Fauvel, Lysane F. A. (State University of New York–Stony Brook)
.......................................................... GVII-F Thu PM
Feder, Ellen (American University) ............................. VII-L Fri PM, GXI-N Fri PM
Ferejohn, Michael (Duke University) ........................................ X-E Sat PM
Ferrari, John (University of California–Berkeley) .................. IX-J Sat AM
Ferrucci, Anthony (San Francisco State University) .......... I-I Wed PM
Fiala, Andrew (California State University–Fresno) ........... GV-C Wed PM
Figdor, Carrie (University of Iowa) ........................................... GVIII-G Thu PM
Figueroa, Robert Melchior (University of North Texas) .... III-K Thu AM
Filice, Carlo (State University of New York–Geneseo) .......... III-F Thu AM
Fischer, John Martin (University of California–Riverside) .... III-A Thu AM
Fischer, Markus (California State University–Fullerton)
......................................................................................................... GXI-A Fri PM, GXIII-B Sat PM
Flanagan, Owen (Duke University) ....................... VI-D Fri AM, GXI-A Fri PM
Flora, Ian (University of Michigan–Ann Arbor) ................... X-F Sat PM
Forschler, Scott E. (Independent Scholar) ............................ III-G Thu AM
Francis, Leslie Pickering (University of Utah) .... II-K Wed PM, IV-C Thu PM
Franklin, Christopher Evan (University of California–Riverside)
......................................................................................................... III-F Thu AM
Frasz, Geoffrey (College of Southern Nevada) ... GV-D Wed PM, XI-C Sat PM
Frei, Tamra (Michigan State University) ............................ IX-G Sat AM
Freiman, Christopher (University of Arizona) ............ III-D Thu AM
Friedman, Michael (Stanford University) .......................... III-E Thu AM
Fritzman, J. M. (Lewis and Clark College) ...... GV-H Wed PM, VI-J Fri AM
Fusco, Melissa (University of California–Berkeley) ............... IV-F Thu PM

G

Gale, George (University of Missouri–Kansas City) .......... VIII-B Fri PM
Galvin, Richard (Texas Christian University) ....................... IX-J Sat AM
Gammage, Jennifer (University of New Mexico) ............... VIII-F Fri PM
Gangadean, Surenndra (Paradise Valley Community College)
..................................................................................... GVI-C Wed PM
Garchar, Kimberly (Kent State University) ........................... GXIV-A Sat PM
Garcia, Ernesto V. (University of Massachusetts–Amherst) ... VIII-C Fri PM
Garcia-Ramirez, Eduardo (University of Michigan–Ann Arbor)
.......................................................................................... GI-A, Tue AM
Gardiner, Stephen M. (University of Washington) ....... XI-C Sat PM
Gardner, Susan (Capilano University) ...................... V-K Thu PM
Garry, Ann (California State University–Los Angeles) .... VII-H Fri PM
Garver, Eugene (College of St. Benedict and St. John’s University) .......................................................GV-F Wed PM
Gauthier, Jeff (University of Portland) ............V-F Thu PM, GXII-A Sat PM
Genone, James (Stanford University) .........................II-H Wed PM
Gertler, Brie (University of Virginia) .......................III-B Thu AM
Ghate, Onkar (Ayn Rand Institute) .........................GXIII-A Sat PM
Gibbard, Allan (University of Michigan–Ann Arbor) ..........IV-B Thu PM
Giberman, Daniel (Stanford University) ............X-I Sat PM
Gilgower, Cody (University of California–Davis) ..........X-I Sat PM
Glasgow, Joshua (Victoria University of Wellington) ......VII-K Fri PM
Glennan, Stuart (Butler University) ......................GXI-L Fri PM
Glenney, Brian (University of Southern California) ........II-G Wed PM
Glover, Kelly (University of California–Berkeley) ..........VIII-H Fri PM
Golash, Deirdre (American University) .....................VI-E Fri AM
Goldberg, Nathaniel (Washington and Lee University) ....IV-G Thu PM
Goldberg, Sanford (Northwestern University) .............IX-A Sat AM
Goldberg, Zachary J. (Arizona State University) ...........I-J Wed PM
Goldman, Alvin (Rutgers University) ......................VII-B Fri PM, XI-K Sat PM
Gomberg, Paul (Chicago State University) ..................VII-H Fri PM
Gonzalez, Francisco (University of Ottawa) ...............XI-D Sat PM
Goswick, Dana Lynne (University of California–Davis) ....VI-F Fri AM
Gotthelf, Allan (University of Pittsburgh) .................GXIII-A Sat PM
Graham, Peter (University of California–Riverside) ........VI-B Fri PM, XI-K Sat PM
Grassbaugh Forry, Joan (Vanderbilt University) ..........GIV-A Wed PM
Greco, John (St. Louis University) .........................VI-G Fri AM
Green, Jerry (Texas Tech University) .......................IX-J Sat AM
Green, Judith (Fordham University) .......................GIX-E Thu PM
Green, Michael (Pomona College) .......................VI-D Fri AM, GXI-A Fri PM
Greene, Amanda (Stanford University) ....................V-C Thu PM
Greene, Richard (Weber State University) ................GXIII-H Sat PM
Greenough, Patrick (University of St. Andrews and University of Sydney) ..............................................GVIII-F Thu PM
Grenberg, Jeanine (St. Olaf College) ...........V-A Thu PM, GXIII-G Sat PM
Gressis, Robert (California State University–Northridge) ....III-F Thu AM
Grier, Michelle (University of San Diego) .............. XI-H Sat PM
Griesemer, James (University of California–Davis) ..........VIII-A Fri PM
Griffin, Michael (University of British Columbia) ..........II-I Wed PM
Griswold, Charles (Boston University) .................I-D Wed PM
Groff, Peter S. (Bucknell University) ........................................... GIV-C Wed PM
Grzankowski, Alex (University of Texas–Austin) ........................... I-G Wed PM
Guenova, Ludmila (Harvard University) ...................................... II-G Wed PM
Guevara, Daniel (University of California–Santa Cruz) ............... IV-E Thu PM
Gunn, Giles (University of California–Santa Barbara) ............... GXI-K Fri PM
Gurley, S. West (Sam Houston State University) ....................... V-F Thu PM
Gustafson, Andrew (Creighton University) .............................. GXIV-C Sat PM

H
Haar Farris, Matthew S. (Graduate Theological Union) ............... XI-E Sat PM
Haber, Matt (University of Utah) ................................................ VIII-A Fri PM
Hacker-Wright, John (University of Guelph) ............................ II-F Wed PM
Hahn, Martin (Simon Fraser University) ..................................... VIII-I Fri PM
Halwani, Raja (School of the Art Institute of Chicago) ............. GXIV-D Sat PM
Hanley, Richard (University of Delaware) ......................... GIX-B Thu PM
Hanna, Robert (University of Colorado–Boulder) ..................... III-D Thu AM
Hardy, Lee (Calvin College) .................................................... GVI-C Wed PM
Hare, Caspar (Massachusetts Institute of Technology) ............. V-D Thu PM
Harman, Elizabeth (Princeton University) .............................. V-D Thu PM
Harman, Gilbert (Princeton University) ................................ VI-A Fri AM
Harnish, Robert M. (University of Arizona) ......................... V-B Thu PM
Harold, James (Mount Holyoke College) ............................... IX-F Sat AM
Harris, Eirik (Santa Clara University) .................................. VI-D Fri AM, GXI-A Fri PM
Hartley, Christie (Georgia State University) ......................... IV-C Thu PM
Hartsock, Michael Dean (University of Missouri) ................... VI-F Fri AM
Hasan, Ali (University of Iowa) ........................................ IX-H Sat AM
Hassoun, Nicole (Carnegie Mellon University) ..................... II-B Wed PM
Hawthorne, John (Oxford University) ...................................... X-D Sat PM
Hay, Carol (University of Massachusetts–Lowell) ............. VII-H Fri PM
Hazzard, Katherine (Independent Scholar) .......................... GXII-C Sat PM
Hebbeler, James (St. Joseph’s University) ............................ XI-H Sat PM
Hedger, Joe (Arizona State University) ................................. V-F Thu PM
Hellie, Benj (University of Toronto) .................................... I-F Wed PM
Henderson, David K (University of Nebraska–Lincoln) .......... GXIII-I Sat PM
Hendricks, Scott (Clark University) ....................................... VII-B Fri PM
Henning, Brian G. (Gonzaga University) .............................. GVII-E Thu PM
Hentrup, Miles (University of Oregon) .................................. GXII-B Sat PM
Herschbach, Mitchell (University of California–San Diego) .... I-G Wed PM
Hestir, Blake (Texas Christian University) .......................... III-H Thu AM
Hiddleston, Eric (Wayne State University) .......................... X-I Sat PM
Higginbotham, James (University of Southern California) ....... III-E Thu AM
Hill, Christopher (Brown University) ............................................ I-A Wed PM
Hiller, Avram (Portland State University) ............ GV-D Wed PM, VII-F Fri PM
Hintikka, Jaakko (Boston University) ........................................... VIII-E Fri PM
Hirschbein, Ron (California State University–Chico) ............ GV-C Wed PM
Hobbs, Jerry (University of Southern California) ..................... III-C Thu AM
Hokstra, Kinch (University of California–Berkeley) .................. VI-D Fri AM
Hogan, Brendan (New York University) ...................... GIX-E Thu PM
Holberg, Erica (University of Chicago) ................................. V-A Thu PM
Hollebeke, Mark Van (Pacific Lutheran University) .............. GIX-E Thu PM
Holley, David M. (University of Southern Mississippi) ........... GVI-C Wed PM
Holman, Emmett L. (George Mason University) ....................... VII-I Fri PM
Homiak, Marcia (Occidental College) .............................. II-F Wed PM
Horgan, Terry (University of Arizona) ................... GIX-B Thu PM, VII-B Fri PM
Horky, Phillip (Stanford University) ................................. X-F Sat PM
Hourdequin, Marion (Colorado College) ............................. IX-F Sat AM
Hovda, Paul (Reed College) .................................................... X-I Sat PM
Howell, Robert (Southern Methodist University) ............ II-H Wed PM
Hoy, Jocelyn (University of California–Santa Cruz) .............. VIII-B Fri PM
Hsu, Andrew (University of California–Los Angeles) ............ X-B Sat PM
Hudspeth, Christopher (United States Coast Guard Academy) ... VII-F Fri PM
Hughes Dominick, Yancy (Seattle University) ........................ IX-J Sat AM
Hughes, Paul (University of Michigan–Dearborn) .............. III-F Thu AM
Hunt, David (Whittier College) ............................................. I-F Wed PM, GIX-C Thu PM
Hunt, Lester (University of Wisconsin–Madison) ................... GXIII-A Sat PM
Hunter, David (Ryerson University) ................................... IX-A Sat AM
Hurlburt, Russell T. (University of Nevada–Las Vegas) ........... I-A Wed PM
Hurtig, Kent (University of Stirling) ...................................... VII-J Fri PM
Hussain, Nadeem J. Z. (Stanford University) ..................... II-E Wed PM
Hutchison, Bill (University of New Mexico) ....................... VIII-F Fri PM
Hwang, Joseph W. (California State University–Chico) ........... XI-G Sat PM

I

Ihara, Craig K. (California State University–Fullerton) .......... GVIII-I Thu PM
Im, Manyul (Fairfield University) .......................................... GVIII-C Thu PM
Innis, Tyler (University of New Mexico) ............................... VIII-F Fri PM
Irwin, Kristen (Biola University) ................................. GVI-C Wed PM, GXIII-E Sat PM
Ivanhoe, Philip J. (City University of Hong Kong) ........... GV-A Wed PM, VI-D Fri AM, GXI-A Fri PM
Iwasawa, Tomoko (Reitaku University) ............................. GXIII-C Sat PM

J

Jackman, Henry (York University) ........................................... GVIII-F Thu PM
Jacobs, Jonathan D. (St. Louis University) .......... GV-L Wed PM
Jacobson, Anne (University of Houston) ............... I-G Wed PM
Jacquette, Dale (Universität Bern) ........ VIII-E Fri PM
Jamieson, Dale (New York University) ............... XI-C Sat PM
Janssen, Gregory (University of Nevada–Las Vegas) ... IV-A Thu PM
Jeannot, Tom (Gonzaga University) ............. GVI-B Wed PM, GIX-F Thu PM
Jeffrey, Justin (University of Idaho) ............. VII-K Fri PM
Jeshion, Robin (University of California–Riverside) ... VII-A Fri PM
Johansen, Marc (University of Arizona) ............. I-F Wed PM
Johnson, David Won (Pennsylvania State University) .. GV-B Wed PM
Johnson, Erik (University of California–Davis) ...... V-G Thu PM
Johnson, Jeff (St. Catherine University) .......... GV-G Wed PM, GXII-D Sat PM
Johnson, Stephan (City College of San Francisco) ... VI-H Fri AM
Jollimore, Troy (California State University–Chico) ... XI-B Sat PM
Jones, Russell (University of Oklahoma) .......... I-I Wed PM
Jones, Sarah (Northern Michigan University) ....... IV-G Thu PM
Jotterand, Fabrice (University of Texas–Southwestern) . X-K Sat PM
Joy, Lynn S. (University of Notre Dame) .......... X-A Sat PM
Justin, Gale (California State University–Sacramento) . X-F Sat PM

K
Kaag, John (University of Massachusetts–Lowell) .......... GXIV-A Sat PM
Kahn, Leonard (United States Air Force Academy) ...... VII-F Fri PM, GXI-J Fri PM, GXII-C Sat PM
Kahn, Samuel (Stanford University) ................. VIII-C Fri PM
Kalar, Brent (University of New Mexico) .......... X-C Sat PM
Kaldis, Byron (University of California–Berkeley) .... II-I Wed PM
Kamber, Richard (The College of New Jersey) ........ IV-I Thu PM
Kangas, David (Santa Clara University) .......... GXIII-K Sat PM
Kaplan, David (University of California–Los Angeles) .. X-D Sat PM
Kaplan, David M. (Washington University in St. Louis) .. GVIII-G Thu PM
Kaplan, Jonathan (Oregon State University) ........... VII-I Fri PM
Kappel, Klemens (Københavns Universitet) .......... IV-B Thu PM
Karofsky, Amy (Hofstra University) ............... VI-F Fri AM
Katsafanas, Paul (University of New Mexico) ....... II-E Wed PM
Kawall, Jason (Colgate University) .......... I-E Wed PM
Keady, Brian (University of Denver) .......... III-H Thu AM
Keating, Riley (Westview High School) ............ V-K Thu PM
Keeley, Brian L. (Pitzer College) ............... VII-I Fri PM
Kehler, Andrew (University of California–San Diego) . III-C Thu AM
Keller, Pierre (University of California–Riverside) ... X-C Sat PM
Kennedy, Matthew J. (University of Nottingham) ....................... VII-F Fri PM
Keuhn, Manfred (Boston University) ....................................... GIII-A Wed PM
Kim, David (University of San Francisco) .............................. GV-K Wed PM
Kind, Amy (Claremont McKenna College) ............................... III-B Thu AM
King, Jeffrey C. (Rutgers University) ..................................... II-D Wed PM
King, Matthew (York University) .......................................... II-I Wed PM
King, Nathan (University of Notre Dame) ............................ XI-F Sat PM
Kirby, Jeremy (Albion College) .............................................. IV-G Sat PM
Kirchner, Daniel (Centre College) ....................................... GV-H Wed PM
Kirkbright, Suzanne (University of London) .......................... GXI-E Fri PM
Klein, Alexander (California State University–Long Beach) .... I-G Wed PM
Klein, Julie (Villanova University) ........................................ VIII-J Fri PM, GXI-G Fri PM
Kleingeld, Pauline (Universiteit Leiden) ............................... GVI-III D Thu PM
Kobes, Bernard W. (Arizona State University) ......................... VII-I Fri PM
Koch, Michael (State University of New York–Oneonta) ...... GXII-C Sat PM
Koikkalainen, Petri (University of Lapland) ........................ GVI-H Thu PM
Kolodny, Niko (University of California–Berkeley) ................. VI-A Fri AM
Koopman, Colin (University of Oregon) .............................. GXI-K Fri PM
Kopec, Matthew C. (University of Wisconsin–Madison) ....... XI-F Sat PM
Korman, Daniel Z. (University of Illinois–Urbana-Champaign) .. VIII-H Fri PM
Kortbein, Joshua (Luther College) ..................................... GV-G Wed PM
Koslicki, Kathrin (University of Colorado–Boulder) ............. IV-A Thu PM
Kowalsky, Nathan (University of Alberta) ............................ GV-D Wed PM
Krasner, Daniel (Metropolitan State College of Denver) ....... IV-F Thu PM
Kretz, Lisa (Dalhousie University) ....................................... GXI-D Fri PM
Kriegel, Uriah (University of Arizona) ................................. III-B Thu AM
Kuechle, Graciela (Universität Witten/Herdecke) .................... III-I Thu AM
Kulp, Christopher (Santa Clara University) ........................... II-J Wed PM
Kumar, Victor (University of Arizona) ................................. VI-G Fri AM
Kung, Peter (Pomona College) ............................................ VII-F Fri PM
Kuperus, Gerard (University of San Francisco) ...................... GV-B Wed PM
Kvanvig, Jonathan (Baylor University) ................................. I-D Wed PM

L

Lachs, John (Vanderbilt University) ................................. VI-K Fri AM
Lai, Karyn (University of New South Wales) ....................... GXI-C Fri PM
Lamb, Robert (University of Exeter) ................................. GVI-H Thu PM
Lapointe, Sandra (Kansas State University) ......................... GIXIII-J Sat PM
Lawlor, Krista (Stanford University) ................................. VII-E Fri PM
Lawrence, David (University of North Dakota) ..................... GVIII-J Thu PM
LeBar, Mark (Ohio University) ................................. IX-G Sat AM
Lee, Geoffrey (University of California–Berkeley) ....................... IX-E Sat AM
Lee, Joseph (University of California–Santa Barbara) ............. VII-K Fri PM
Lee, Kyoo (City University of New York–John Jay College and Graduate Center) ................................................................. IV-H Thu PM
Lefkowitz, David (University of Richmond) ......................... VII-G Fri PM
Lehrer, Keith (University of Arizona) ..................................... V-B Thu PM
Lepock, Christopher (University of Toronto) ....................... VI-H Fri AM
LePore, Ernest (Rutgers University) ...................................... X-D Sat PM
Levin, Janet (University of Southern California) .................... III-E Thu AM
Levine, Joseph (University of Massachusetts–Amherst) ....... III-B Thu AM, V-L Thu PM
Lewin, Micah (Stanford University) ...................................... VI-G Fri AM
Lewis, Frank (University of Southern California) ............... VII-C Fri PM
Lewis, Karen (Rutgers University) ....................................... V-G Thu PM
Liao, S. Matthew (Oxford University) ............................... VII-J Fri PM
Light, Andrew (George Mason University) ........................... VII-L Fri PM
Linden, Harry van der (Butler University) ......................... GIVII-B Thu PM
Littlejohn, Clayton (University of Texas–San Antonio) ........ IV-G Thu PM
Liu, JeeLoo (California State University–Fullerton) .............. GV-A Wed PM
Liu, Wei (Chinese University of Hong Kong) ..................... GXI-A Fri PM
Liu, Xiaofei (University of Missouri-Columbia) .................. VI-E Fri AM
Livingston, Paul (University of New Mexico) ..................... GV-G Wed PM
Lloyd, Sharon A. (University of Southern California) .......... GIV-B Wed PM, VI-D Fri AM
Locke, Dustin (Claremont McKenna College) ........................... V-H Thu PM
Loew, Christian (University of North Carolina–Chapel Hill) .... VI-F Fri AM
Lolordo, Antonia (University of Virginia) ............................ II-G Wed PM
Lone, Jana Mohr (University of Washington) ...................... V-K Thu PM
Longuenesse, Beatrice (New York University) ..................... VI-B Fri AM
Look, Brandon (University of Kentucky) ................................. GV-F Wed PM
Lopez, Theresa (University of Arizona) .............................. IX-I Sat AM
LoPresti, Matthew (Hawaii Pacific University) ...................... GIV-C Wed PM
Lott, Tommy (San Jose State University) ............................. IV-H Thu PM
Love, Alan C. (University of Minnesota) ............................. I-H Wed PM
Lucey, Kenneth (University of Nevada–Reno) ....................... IV-G Thu PM
Ludescher, Jessica (Seattle University) ................................ GXIV-C Sat PM
Ludwig, Kirk (University of Florida) .................................... IV-E Thu PM
Lynch, Joseph J. (California Polytechnic State University) ... GVIII-I Thu PM
Lyons, Jack (University of Arkansas–Fayetteville) ............... VII-B Fri PM
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Affiliation</th>
<th>Program</th>
<th>Date</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MacFarlane, John</td>
<td>University of California–Berkeley</td>
<td>XI-A</td>
<td>Sat PM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mackenzie, Matt</td>
<td>Colorado State University</td>
<td>GIVIII-J</td>
<td>Thu PM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Macpherson, Fiona</td>
<td>University of Glasgow</td>
<td>IX-E</td>
<td>Sat AM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maguire, Barry</td>
<td>Princeton University</td>
<td>VII-I</td>
<td>Fri PM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maier, John</td>
<td>Australian National University</td>
<td>III-F</td>
<td>Thu AM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mackenzie, Matt</td>
<td>Colorado State University</td>
<td>GVIII-J</td>
<td>Thu PM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Macpherson, Fiona</td>
<td>University of Glasgow</td>
<td>IX-E</td>
<td>Sat AM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maier, John</td>
<td>Australian National University</td>
<td>III-F</td>
<td>Thu AM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maier, John</td>
<td>Australian National University</td>
<td>III-F</td>
<td>Thu AM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malink, Marko</td>
<td>Humboldt-Universität Berlin</td>
<td>VII-C</td>
<td>Fri PM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mohler, Bertram</td>
<td>Brown University</td>
<td>VI-C</td>
<td>Fri PM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mallon, Ron</td>
<td>University of Utah</td>
<td>VI-C</td>
<td>Fri AM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mann, Joel E.</td>
<td>St. Norbert College</td>
<td>GV-E</td>
<td>Wed PM, GIVIII-E</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mar, Gary</td>
<td>State University of New York–Stony Brook</td>
<td>IV-H</td>
<td>Thu PM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Margenot, Andrew</td>
<td>Connecticut College</td>
<td>I-H</td>
<td>Wed PM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marino, Patricia</td>
<td>University of Waterloo</td>
<td>VI-G</td>
<td>Fri AM, GIXI-N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Markosian, Ned</td>
<td>Western Washington University</td>
<td>IV-A</td>
<td>Thu PM, GXIV-B</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marshall, Mason</td>
<td>Pepperdine University</td>
<td>II-I</td>
<td>Wed PM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Martel, James</td>
<td>San Francisco State University</td>
<td>GVIII-B</td>
<td>Thu PM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Martin, Adrienne</td>
<td>University of Pennsylvania</td>
<td>VII-F</td>
<td>Fri PM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Martin, Bill</td>
<td>DePaul University</td>
<td>GVI-B</td>
<td>Wed PM, GIX-F</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Martin, Christopher</td>
<td>University of Wisconsin–Green Bay</td>
<td>GIX-G</td>
<td>Fri PM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Martin, Raymond</td>
<td>Union College</td>
<td>VI-B</td>
<td>Fri AM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Martin, Rex</td>
<td>University of Kansas</td>
<td>VIII-G</td>
<td>Fri PM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Martinez, Joel</td>
<td>Lewis and Clark College</td>
<td>X-G</td>
<td>Sat PM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Martinich, Ai</td>
<td>University of Texas–Austin</td>
<td>GIV-B</td>
<td>Wed PM, VI-D</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marusic, Jennifer S.</td>
<td>Brandeis University</td>
<td>XI-G</td>
<td>Sat PM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Matravers, Derek</td>
<td>Open University</td>
<td>XI-B</td>
<td>Sat PM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Matthews, Gareth</td>
<td>University of Massachusetts–Amherst</td>
<td>VII-C</td>
<td>Fri PM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May, Joshua</td>
<td>University of California–Santa Barbara</td>
<td>IV-I</td>
<td>Thu PM, VI-J</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May, Robert</td>
<td>University of California–Davis</td>
<td>III-C</td>
<td>Thu AM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mayer, Lorraine</td>
<td>Brandon University</td>
<td>IX-K</td>
<td>Sat AM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mayes, Gregory R.</td>
<td>California State University–Sacramento</td>
<td>III-J</td>
<td>Thu AM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mayhew, Robert</td>
<td>Seton Hall University</td>
<td>GXIX-A</td>
<td>Sat PM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>McAfee, Noelle</td>
<td>George Mason University</td>
<td>GIX-E</td>
<td>Thu PM, VI-K</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>McCullay, Sarah</td>
<td>Ohio University</td>
<td>GIXI-D</td>
<td>Sat PM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>McCumber, John</td>
<td>University of California–Los Angeles</td>
<td>GV-H</td>
<td>Wed PM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>McElhoes, David</td>
<td>University of Maryland–College Park</td>
<td>VI-I</td>
<td>Fri AM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>McGonigal, Andrew</td>
<td>University of Leeds and Cornell University</td>
<td>IV-A</td>
<td>Thu PM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>McGregor, Joan</td>
<td>Arizona State University</td>
<td>VI-E</td>
<td>Fri AM</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
McLaughlin, Brian (Rutgers University) ................. VIII-D Fri PM
McLaughlin, Douglas (California State University–Northridge) ................................................... GIV-A Wed PM
McLeod, Alexus (University of Dayton) ................. GVIII-C Thu PM, GXIII-B Sat PM
McMahon, Jennifer (University of Adelaide) ........... GX-A Fri PM, X-C Sat PM
McNamara, Coleen (University of California–Riverside) ........ X-G Sat PM
McPartland, Keith (Williams College) ......................... X-I Sat PM
McPherran, Mark (Simon Fraser University) ................. IX-J Sat AM
McPherson, Tristram (University of Minnesota–Duluth) ........ IX-C Sat AM
McRae, Emily (University of Wisconsin–Madison) .......... GI-V-C Wed PM
Meagher, Sharon M. (University of Scranton) .......... VI-K Fri AM
Melamed, Yitzhak (Johns Hopkins University) ............ VIII-J Fri PM
Mele, Alfred (Florida State University) ...................... VII-D Fri PM
Memetea, Sonia (University of British Columbia) ........ III-C Thu AM
Mena, Ricardo (Rutgers University) ......................... GII-A Tue PM
Mendieta, Eduardo (State University of New York–Stony Brook) ........................................... GV-K Wed PM, IV-H Thu PM, VI-K Fri AM
Mendoza, Jose Jorge (University of Oregon) ............... GXXI-B Thu PM, GXII-B Sat PM
Merino, Carla (Princeton University) ........................... GI-A, Tue AM
Meyer, Ulrich (Colgate University) ........................... VI-I Fri AM
Miller, Christian (Wake Forest University) ................. IX-I Sat AM
Miller, Fred D. Jr. (Bowling Green State University) ....GXIII-A Sat PM
Miller, Richard W. (Cornell University) ...................... GXI-I Fri PM
Millstein, Roberta L. (University of California–Davis) ....I-H Wed PM
Milne, Peter W (Santa Clara University) ...................... VII-G Fri PM
Miner, Robert (Baylor University) ............................. X-G Sat PM
Minnich, Elizabeth (Association of American Colleges and Universities) ................................. VI-K Fri AM
Mion, Giovanni (Southern Methodist University) ........ IV-E Thu PM
Mitchell-Yellin, Benjamin (University of California–Riverside) .... VI-J Fri AM
Mladenovic, Bojana (Williams College) ...................... VIII-E Fri PM
Modrak, Deborah (University of Rochester) ................. X-E Sat PM
Moellendorf, Darrel (San Diego State University) ........ GXXI-I Fri PM
Moeller, Hans-Georg (University College, Cork) ........... GVII-A Thu PM
Mohr, Richard (University of Illinois–Urbana-Champaign) .......... X-F Sat PM
Mole, Christopher (University of British Columbia) ........ IV-D Thu PM
Monaghan, Patrick (University of Iowa) ........................ XI-I Sat PM
Montague, Michelle (University of Bristol) ............... VIII-I Fri PM, GXI-H Fri PM
Montemayor, Carlos (San Francisco State University) ....... GII-A Tue PM
Montero, Barbara (City University of New York–Graduate Center) ............................................ I-G Wed PM
Moor, James H. (Dartmouth College) ........................................... GXI-B Fri PM
Moran, Dermot (University College, Dublin) ............................. VIII-E Fri PM
Moran, Kate (Brandeis University) ............................................ X-G Sat PM
Morefield, Jeanne (Whitman College) ....................................... VII-G Fri PM
Morrissey, Clair (University of North Carolina–Chapel Hill) ..... VII-G Fri PM
Morrisson, Iain (University of Houston) ................................... V-A Thu PM
Mower, Gordy (Brigham Young University) .............................. GXIII-B Sat PM
Mozersky, Joshua (Queen’s University) ................................. GXIV-B Sat PM
Muchnik, Pablo (Siena College) ............................................. GVIII-D Thu PM
Mueller, Anselm Winfried (Keimyung University) ..................... X-B Sat PM
Munoz-Darde, Veronique (University College London and University of California–Berkeley) .......................................... VII-J Fri PM
Murphy, Jason Burke (St. Louis University) ......................... GV-B Wed PM
Murray, Dylan W. (Georgia State University) ......................... IX-G Sat AM
Murray, Michael (Franklin and Marshall College) ............. GXIII-E Sat PM
Myers, John (University of South Florida) .............................. II-I Wed PM
N
Nadelhoffer, Thomas (Dickinson College) ............................. VII-E Fri PM
Nahmias, Eddy (Georgia State University) ....................... IV-I Thu PM, VIII-D Fri PM
Nanay, Bence (Syracuse University and University of British Columbia) .......................................................... V-B Thu PM, VII-I Fri PM
Naticchia, Chris (California State University–San Bernardino) ................................................................. GXIII-B Sat PM
Nelson, Alan (University of North Carolina–Chapel Hill) ........ X-A Sat PM
Neta, Ram (University of North Carolina–Chapel Hill) ....... IX-B Sat AM
Newlands, Samuel (University of Notre Dame) ...................... VIII-J Fri PM
Newman, Lex (University of Utah) ........................................... V-I Thu PM
Newton, Alexandra (University of Pittsburgh) ........................ XI-H Sat PM
Nichols, Ryan (California State University–Fullerton) ........ VI-C Fri AM
Niedbalski, Ali (University of California–Berkeley) ............. IV-E Thu PM
Nolan, Daniel (University of Nottingham) .......................... I-C Wed PM
Norcross, Alastair (University of Colorado–Boulder) ........... VII-H Fri PM
North, Jill (Yale University) .................................................... I-H Wed PM
Norton-Smith, Thomas (Kent State University) .................... III-K Thu AM, IX-K Sat AM
Nunan, Richard (College of Charleston) ......................... VI-J Fri AM, GXIV-D Sat PM
Nye, Howard (University of Alberta) ..................................... VII-J Fri PM
O
O’Callaghan, Casey (Rice University) ................................ IX-E Sat AM
O’Connor, Scott (Cornell University) .................................. X-F Sat PM
O’Connor, Timothy (Indiana University–Bloomington) ........ GV-L Wed PM, III-F Thu AM
O'Hagan, Emer (University of Saskatchewan) ......................... II-F Wed PM
O'Toole, James (University of Denver) .................................. GXIV-C Sat PM
Obdrzalek, Suzanne (Claremont McKenna College) ................. X-E Sat PM
Odenbaugh, Jay (Lewis and Clark College) ............................ VIII-A Fri PM
Oele, Marjolein (University of San Francisco) ....................... II-A Wed PM, GV-B Wed PM
Olson, Alan M. (Boston University) ................................. GXI-E Fri PM, GXIII-C Sat PM
Olson, Jonas (Stockholms Universitet) ................................. VII-K Fri PM
Orozco, Joshue (Whitworth University) ................................. VI-G Fri AM
Ortiz-Millán, Gustavo (Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México)
...................................................................................... GI-A, Tue AM
Oshana, Marina (University of California–Davis) .................. VI-E Fri AM
Oved, Valerie (Loyola Marymount University) ....................... GXIII-F Sat PM
Ozar, David (Loyola University Chicago) ............................. GXI-N Fri PM

P

Pace, Michael (Chapman University) ................................. GV-L Wed PM
Paletta, Douglas (University of Pennsylvania) ...................... VII-H Fri PM
Pallikkathayil, Japa (New York University) ........................... VIII-G Fri PM
Palmieri, Diana (University of Western Ontario) .................... VII-F Fri PM
Papish, Laura (Northwestern University) ............................... III-G Thu AM
Pappas, Nickolas (City College of New York and City University
of New York–Graduate Center) ............................................ GV-E Wed PM
Parent, Ted (Virginia Tech) .................................................. I-G Wed PM
Park, John (Duke University) ............................................... VII-K Fri PM
Parker, Emily (Santa Clara University) ................................. VII-J Fri PM
Parra-Dorantes, Roberto (University of Arizona) ................. GII-A Tue PM
Parsons, Charles (Harvard University) ................................. VII-A Fri PM, GXI-F Fri PM
Parsons, Glenn (Ryerson University) ................................. GVI-A Wed PM
Patrone, Tatiana (Ithaca College) ........................................... GV-H Wed PM
Paul, L. A. (University of North Carolina–Chapel Hill) ......... I-C Wed PM
Paul, Sarah (Bowdoin College) .............................................. IV-E Thu PM
Pearson, Lewis (Baylor University) ................................. III-H Thu AM
Peck, William (Reed College) .............................................. X-G Sat PM
Pelser, Adam (Baylor University) ............................. VI-H Fri AM
Pendergraft, Garrett (University of California–Riverside)
...................................................................................... I-F Wed PM, III-J Thu AM
Pendlebury, Michael (North Carolina State University) ........ III-D Thu AM
Pereboom, Derk (Cornell University) ..................................... III-A Thu AM
Perina, Mickaella (University of Massachusetts–Boston) ...... GV-K Wed PM
Perrine, Tim (Calvin College) .............................................. II-J Wed PM
Perry, John (University of California–Riverside and Stanford University)
...................................................................................... VI-B Fri AM, VIII-L Fri PM
Phelan, Mark (Yale University) .......................................................... V-G Thu PM
Piccinini, Gualtiero (University of Missouri–St. Louis) ...................... I-A Wed PM, II-K Wed PM, GVIII-G Thu PM, GXI-L Fri PM
Picciuto, Vincent (University of Maryland–College Park) ............... VII-I Fri PM
Pike, Matthew (University of Colorado–Boulder) ......................... G-VIII-I Thu PM
Pinillos, Angel (Arizona State University) ........................................ II-D Wed PM
Piotrowska, Monika (University of Utah) ........................................ X-H Sat PM
Pitt, David (California State University–Los Angeles) ...................... VII-I Fri PM, GXI-H Fri PM
Pittman, John (City University of New York–John Jay College) ....... IV-H Thu PM
Plunze, Christian (Goethe-Universität Frankfurt) ......................... V-B Thu PM
Pomeroy, Anne F. (Richard Stockton College of New Jersey) ......... GI-A, Tue AM
Potochnik, Angela (Oklahoma State University) ......................... I-H Wed PM
Powell, John W. (Humboldt State University) ................................. GV-G Wed PM
Powell, Lewis (University of Southern California) ....................... IV-E Thu PM
Powers, Thomas M. (University of Delaware) ............................... G-VI-H Fri AM
Pratt, Scott L. (University of Oregon) ................................. G-VI-E Thu PM, GX-AVI-A Sat PM
Prince, Brian (Rice University) ...................................................... I-I Wed PM
Prior, William (Santa Clara University) ......................................... I-I Wed PM
Pryor, Ben (University of Toledo) .................................................. GXIII-K Sat PM
Pust, Joel (University of Delaware) ............................................... VI-H Fri AM
Pynn, Geoff (Northern Illinois University) ................................... III-I Thu AM
Rabinoff, Daniel (University of Manitoba) ...................................... V-H Thu PM
Rabinow, Paul (University of California–Berkeley) ...................... GXI-K Fri PM
Raees, Aisha (Southern Illinois University–Carbondale) ............ GV-J Wed PM
Raibley, Jason (California State University–Long Beach) ............. V-J Thu PM
Ralkowski, Mark (University of New Mexico) ............................. XI-D Sat PM
Ramirez, Jesus (Ohlone College) .................................................. I-B Wed PM
Ranasinghe, Nalin (Assumption College) ....................................... I-I Wed PM
Raphals, Lisa (University of California–Riverside) ..................... II-A Wed PM
Rauhut, Nils (Coastal Carolina University) ..................................... III-H Thu AM
Ray, Greg (University of Florida) ............................................... IV-F Thu PM
Rayo, Agustin (Massachusetts Institute of Technology) ............ GI-A, Tue AM
Reath, Andrews (University of California–Riverside) .................. III-G Thu AM
Rechter, Ofra (Tel Aviv University) ............................................. GXI-F Fri PM
Reck, Erich (University of California–Riverside) ......................... VII-A Fri PM
Reeder, Pat (Ohio State University) .............................................. X-H Sat PM
Rennard, Ray (University of the Pacific) ..................................... I-G Wed PM
Proceedings and Addresses of the APA 83:4

Rescorla, Michael A. (University of California–Santa Barbara) .... XI-A Sat PM
Rett, Jessica (University of California–Los Angeles) ............... II-D Wed PM
Reynolds, Carson (University of Tokyo) ............................. GXI-B Fri PM
Reynolds, Steven (Arizona State University) ....................... VI-H Fri AM
Rhoaodes, Tara (University of Delaware) ............................ GI-IX-D Thu PM
Rhodes, Rosamond (Mount Sinai School of Medicine and City University of New York–Graduate Center) .......... GIV-B Wed PM
Rice, Rebekah L. H. (Seattle Pacific University) .............. GV-L Wed PM, III-F Thu AM
Richard, Mark (Tufts University) .................................... XI-A Sat PM
Ricketts, Thomas (University of Pittsburgh) ...................... III-E Thu AM
Ridge, Michael (University of Edinburgh) ........................ IV-B Thu PM
Rieppel, Michael (University of California–Berkeley) ......... X-H Sat PM
Rios, Diego (Universität Witten/Herdecke) ......................... III-I Thu AM
Risser, James (Seattle University) .................................... GXIII-K Sat PM
Ritchie, Jennifer Lundin (University of British Columbia) .... GVII-A Thu PM
Rivera, Omar (University of Wisconsin–La Crosse) ............ I-B Wed PM
Rizzi, Aaron (City University of New York–LaGuardia) .... GIX-C Thu PM
Roberts, John (Florida State University) ............................. V-I Thu PM
Robertson, Simon (University of Southampton) ................. II-E Wed PM
Robinson, Jenefer (University of Cincinnati) ...................... XI-B Sat PM
Rodriguez, Tad (Muhlenberg College) .............................. GIX-G Fri PM
Rodriguez, Aaron (University of Oregon) .......................... GV-J Wed PM
Rohloff, Waldemar (University of Missouri–St. Louis) ....... GXIII-J Sat PM
Rollins, Mark (Washington University in St. Louis) .......... II-C Wed PM
Rorty, Mary V. (Stanford University) ............................... VIII-B Fri PM
Rosenberger, Robert (Georgia Institute of Technology) ....... X-K Sat PM
Rosenkoetter, Timothy (Dartmouth College) ....................... GXIII-J Sat PM
Rosenlee, Li-Hsiang Lisa (University of Hawaii–West Oahu) .... GIX-C Fri PM
Ross, Andrew Peter (Queen’s University) ......................... X-G Sat PM
Ross, Glenn (Franklin and Marshall College) ..................... II-J Wed PM
Ross, Nathan (Oklahoma City University) ......................... XI-E Sat PM
Ross, Peter (California State Polytechnic University–Pomona) ................................................................. II-H Wed PM
Rottschaefner, William A. (Lewis and Clark College) ........ GVII-C Thu PM
Rousse, B. Scot (Northwestern University) ........................ VIII-F Fri PM
Rowbottom, Darrell P. (University of Oxford) ...................... III-I Thu AM
Rozeboom, Grant J. (Stanford University) ......................... GIX-D Thu PM
Rudd, Anthony (St. Olaf College) .................................... I-E Wed PM
Rudebusch, George (Northern Arizona University) .......... II-A Wed PM
Rupert, Robert (University of Colorado–Boulder) .......... III-F Thu AM
Ryan, Cheyney (University of Oregon) ...........................................GVII-B Thu PM
Ryder, Dan (University of British Columbia–Okanagan) ............ I-J Wed PM

S
Sabo, Dylan (Auburn University) .............................................. IV-G Thu PM
Saillant, Said (Rutgers University) ........................................... GXII-D Sat PM
Saka, Paul (University of Texas–Pan American) ....................... IV-F Thu PM
Salmieri, Gregory (University of North Carolina–Chapel Hill) ....GXIII-A Sat PM
Sanchez, Carlos (San Jose State University) ............................ I-B Wed PM
Sandis, Constantine (Oxford Brookes University) ....................... VII-K Fri PM, GXI-M Fri PM
Sandler, Ronald (Northeastern University) ............................... XI-C Sat PM
Sandmeyer, Bob (University of Kentucky) ............................... GV-D Wed PM
Santoni, Ronald E. (Denison University) ................................. GVI-B Wed PM
Sarkissian, Hagop (City University of New York–Baruch College) ...VII-K Fri PM
Saucedo, Raul (Yale University and Australian National University) .GII-A Tue PM
Saucedo, Raul (Yale University and Australian National University) .V-H Thu PM
Savitt, Steven (University of British Columbia) ......................... VI-I Fri AM
Scanlon, Thomas (Harvard University) ................................. VI-A Fri AM
Schaff, Kory (Occidental College) ......................................... III-G Thu AM
Schapiro, Tamar (Stanford University) ............................... I-J Wed PM
Scharp, Kevin (Ohio State University) ........................................ GVIII-F Thu PM
Schechter, Joshua (Brown University) ...................................... IV-E Thu PM
Schechtman, Marya (University of Illinois–Chicago) ............... IX-A Sat AM
Schellenberg, Ingra (University of Washington) ....................... XI-J Sat PM
Schmitt, Johannes (University of Southern California) ............ III-I Thu AM
Schnee, Ian (University of California–Berkeley) ....................... IX-H Sat AM
Schneider, Henrique (Universität Wien) ..................GXI-A Fri PM, GXIII-B Sat PM
Schochet, Gordon (Rutgers University) .................................. GVIII-B Thu PM
Schroeder, Mark (University of Southern California) .............. IX-C Sat AM
Schubert, Richard (Cosumnes River College) ......................... GVIII-I Thu PM
Schueler, Fred (University of Delaware) ................................. VI-G Fri AM
Schwartz, Daniel (University of California–San Diego) .......... III-H Thu AM
Schweickart, David (Loyola University Chicago) ....................... GXII-B Sat PM
Schwitzgebel, Eric (University of California–Riverside) ............I-A Wed PM, GVII-A Thu PM
Scoccia, Danny (New Mexico State University) ....................... VI-E Fri AM
Scott-Kakures, Dion (Scripps College) ................................. II-F Wed PM
Scriven, Michael (Claremont Graduate University) ................ GIX-A Thu PM
Sebo, Jeff (New York University) ................................. V-E Thu PM, GXI-D Fri PM
Seemann, Axel (Bentley University) .............................. GXIII-I Sat PM
Sehon, Scott (Bowdoin College) ................................. III-F Thu AM
Seok, Bongrae (Alvernia University) ............................ GXIII-F Sat PM
Shafer-Landau, Russ (University of Wisconsin–Madison) .. IX-C Sat AM
Sharma, Ravi (Clark University) .............................. I-I Wed PM
Shaw, Dan (Lock Haven University of Pennsylvania)
.................................................................................. GVII-D Thu PM, GX-A Fri PM
Shaw, J. Clerk (University of Tennessee) ....................... III-H Thu AM
Shearin, Wilson H. (Stanford University) ...................... GV-E Wed PM
Shelby, Candice (University of Colorado–Denver) ........ VI-H Fri AM
Shell, Susan (Boston College) ............................... GVIII-D Thu PM
Shepski, Lee (University of Tennessee) ......................... IX-G Sat AM
Sheth, Falguni A. (Hampshire College) ......................... GV-K Wed PM
Shi, Xianduan (University of Utah) ............................. X-I Sat PM
Sider, Theodore (New York University) ......................... XI-I Sat PM
Sievert, Don (University of Missouri) ........................ IV-G Thu PM
Siewert, Charles (University of California–Riverside)
.................................................................................. I-A Wed PM, GXI-H Fri PM
Signoracci, Gino (University of New Mexico) ............... V-F Thu PM
Sillari, Giacomo (University of Pennsylvania) ............... III-I Thu AM
Silvermint, Daniel (University of Arizona) ................. VIII-G Fri PM
Silvers, Anita (San Francisco State University) .......... IV-C Thu PM
Simchen, Ori (University of British Columbia) ............. X-D Sat PM
Singh, Satish Kumar (Banaras Hindu University) ........ VI-I Fri AM
Skarsaune, Knut (New York University) ........................ VI-G Fri AM
Skiles, Alexander (University of Notre Dame) .......... X-H Sat PM
Skow, Bradford (Massachusetts Institute of Technology) VI-I Fri AM
Slingerland, Edward (University of British Columbia) .... GXIII-F Sat PM
Smith, Clancy (Duquesne University) ................. GV-J Wed PM
Smith, David Woodruff (University of California–Irvine) GXI-H Fri PM
Smith, Holly M. (Rutgers University) ......................... III-D Thu AM
Smith, Kurt (Bloomsburg University of Pennsylvania) XI-G Sat PM
Smith, Matthew Noah (Yale University) ..................... VI-J Fri AM
Smith, Nicholas D. (Lewis and Clark College) .......... X-E Sat PM
Smith, Renee (Coastal Carolina University) .............. III-J Thu AM
Smith, Vernon (University of New Mexico) .......... VIII-F Fri PM
Smithies, Declan (Ohio State University) ............... IV-D Thu PM
Snow, Nancy E. (Marquette University) .................. IX-I Sat AM
Soester, Jessica (Southern Illinois University–Carbondale)... GV-J Wed PM
Soosan, Helena (State University of New York–Stony Brook) ........................................... IX-B Sat AM
Sosa, Ernest (Rutgers University) ...................................................................................... IX-B Sat AM
Soteriou, Matthew (Warwick University) ........................................................... VIII-D Fri PM
Sowaal, Alice (San Francisco State University) ........................................... GVII-F Thu PM
Speak, Daniel (Loyola Marymount University) ........................................... GV-L Wed PM
Spelman, Jonathan (University of Missouri–St. Louis) ........................................... GXII-D Sat PM
Spencer, David Ian (University of California–Davis) .......................................... VIII-H Fri PM
Sreedhar, Susanne (Boston University) ........................................................... GIV-B Wed PM, VI-D Fri AM
Sreenivasan, Gopal (Duke University) .............................................................. IX-J Sat AM
Stang, Nick (University of Miami) ........................................................................... GXIII-J Sat PM
Stangl, Rebecca Lynn (University of Virginia) .................................................. VII-K Fri PM
Stanley, Jason (Rutgers University) ......................................................................... V-C Thu PM
Stark, Cynthia (University of Utah) ........................................................................... II-B Wed PM
Stark, Werner (Philipps-Universität Marburg) ................................................... GVIII-D Thu PM
Stazicker, James (University of California–Berkeley) ........................................... II-H Wed PM
Steinhofer, Jerry Joseph (Brown University) ........................................................ I-E Wed PM
Stokes, Dustin (University of Toronto) ............................................................... II-C Wed PM
Stone, Brad Elliott (Loyola Marymount University) ........................................... GXI-K Fri PM
Stone, Peter (Stanford University) ........................................................................... GVIII-A Thu PM
Strawson, Galen (University of Reading) ........................................................ VI-B Fri AM, GXI-H Fri PM
Strevens, Michael (New York University) ........................................................ I-D Wed PM, GXI-L Fri PM
Strong, Alejandro (Southern Illinois University–Carbondale) ..................... I-B Wed PM
Stueber, Karsten (College of the Holy Cross) ...................................................... GXI-M Fri PM
Sullins, John P. (Sonoma State University) ........................................................... GXI-B Fri PM
Sullivan, William (Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching) ........................................................................................................ VII-L Fri PM
Summers, Jesse (University of California–Los Angeles) ........................................ GIX-D Thu PM, VI-J Fri AM
Sun, Weimin (California State University–Northridge) ........................................ GV-A Wed PM
Sutherland, Daniel (University of Illinois–Chicago) .................................... GXI-F Fri PM
Svoboda, Toby (Pennsylvania State University) .................................................. GXI-D Fri PM
Swanton, Christine (University of Auckland) .................................................. IX-F Sat AM, GXIII-A Sat PM
Sweet, Kristi (Texas A&M University) ................................................................. X-C Sat PM
Swenson, Joseph (University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign) ......................... VIII-F Fri PM
Swenson, Philip (University of California–Riverside) .......................................... VI-J Fri AM
Sytsma, Sharon (Northern Illinois University) .................................................. GXI-N Fri PM
Szaif, Jan (University of California–Davis) ........................................................ IX-F Sat AM
Säätelä, Simo (Universitetet i Bergen) ................................................................. GV-G Wed PM
Tabery, James (University of Utah) ...................................................................... GXI-L Fri PM
Talbot, Brian (University of Colorado–Boulder) ......................VII-E Fri PM
Tannenbaum, Julie (Pomona College).....................................I-J Wed PM
Taschek, William (Ohio State University) ......................V-G Thu PM
Taylor, Elanor (University of North Carolina–Chapel Hill) ........X-I Sat PM
Taylor, Jacqueline (University of San Francisco) ..................GIII-A Wed PM
Taylor, Kenneth (Stanford University) ......................VIII-L Fri PM
Taylor-O’Neil, Thaddeus (State University of New York–Stony Brook) ..........GV-B Wed PM
Teays, Wanda (Mount St. Mary’s College) .........................IX-A Thu PM
Teeman Blase, Tiffany (University of California–Los Angeles) ....VI-J Fri AM
Tennberg, Chris (University of California–Santa Barbara) ........IX-J Sat AM
Terjesen, Andrew (Rhodes College)..........................IX-F Sat AM
Thiem, Annika (Villanova University).............................GXIV-D Sat PM
Thomas, Christine (Dartmouth College) ...................X-E Sat PM
Thomas, Tommy (Brandon University) ..............................IX-K Sat AM
Thompson, Eric (University of Tennessee) ...................IV-G Thu PM, GXIII-H Sat PM
Thompson, Michael (University of Pittsburgh) ..............X-B Sat PM
Thomson, Judith Jarvis (Massachusetts Institute of Technology) ........VI-A Fri AM
Thorp, John (University of Western Ontario) .............GVIII-E Thu PM
Thune, Michael G. (Joliet Junior College) .......................XI-F Sat PM
Tien, David (National University of Singapore) ..............GV-A Wed PM
Tieszen, Richard (San Jose State University) ...............VII-A Fri PM
Tillman, Chris (University of Manitoba) ......................X-H Sat PM
Timaisina, Sthaneshwar (San Diego State University) ....GVIII-J Thu PM
Timmermann, Jens (University of St. Andrews) ..............VIII-C Fri PM
Timmons, Mark (University of Arizona) ..........................I-A Wed PM
Timpe, Kevin L. (Northwest Nazarene University) ..........I-F Wed PM, IV-I Thu PM
Tiwald, Justin (San Francisco State University) .............VI-D Fri AM
Tolley, Clinton (University of California–San Diego) ..........II-G Wed PM, GXIII-J Sat PM
Tooley, Michael (University of Colorado–Boulder) ............Fri PM, GXIV-B Sat PM
Trestman, Michael (University of California–Davis) ..........I-E Wed PM
Trigg, Dylan (University of Sussex) .....................GV-D Wed PM, GVII-D Thu PM
Trout, J. D. (Loyola University Chicago) ...................III-I Thu AM
Tuana, Nancy (Pennsylvania State University) ............IV-C Thu PM, VII-L Fri PM
Turner, Dale (California State Polytechnic University–Pomona) ..........GIX-A Thu PM
Turner, Derek (Connecticut College) ..............................I-H Wed PM
Turner, Jason (University of Leeds) .................................I-C Wed PM
Turner, Stephen (University of South Florida) ...............GXI-M Fri PM
Tye, Michael (University of Texas–Austin) ..............IV-D Thu PM
U

Uleman, Jennifer K. (Purchase College, State University of New York) ................................................................. III-G Thu AM

V

Vaca, Moisés (University College London) ............................. GI-A, Tue AM
Vaidya, Anand (San Jose State University) ................................ VI-C Fri AM
Vallega, Alejandro (California State University–Stanislaus) .... I-B Wed PM
Vallega-Neu, Daniela (California State University–Stanislaus) .......................................................... GXIII-K Sat PM
Van Camp, Julie C. (California State University–Long Beach) ............................................................................. GVII-D Thu PM, VII-H Fri PM
Van Cleve, James (University of Southern California) ............... IX-B Sat AM
van der Vossen, Bas (Independent Scholar) .......................... VII-G Fri PM
Van Gulick, Robert (Syracuse University) ............................... III-B Thu AM
Vander Laan, David (Westmont College) ............................... I-F Wed PM
Vanderschraaf, Peter (University of California–Merced) ....... GVIII-B Thu PM
Varden, Helga (University of Illinois–Urbana-Champaign) ...... VIII-G Fri PM
Vargas, Manuel (University of San Francisco) ......................... III-A Thu AM
Varzi, Achille (Columbia University) ................................. I-C Wed PM
Velasco, Joel (Stanford University) ....................................... I-H Wed PM
Velleman, David (New York University) ............................... III-A Thu AM
Verheggen, Claudine (York University) ................................. V-G Thu PM
Vernon, Richard (University of Western Ontario) ................. VII-G Fri PM
Vihvelin, Kadri (University of Southern California) ............... VII-D Fri PM
Vilhauer, Benjamin (William Paterson University) ............... I-F Wed PM
Villaver, Ranie (University of New South Wales) ................. GXIII-C Fri PM
Vineberg, Susan (Wayne State University) ............................ IV-B Thu PM
Vizard, Polly (London School of Economics) ........................ GVII-C Thu PM
Vogler, Candace (University of Chicago) .............................. X-B Sat PM
Voronina, Lydia (Independent Scholar) ................................. GXIII-C Sat PM
Vu, Nhat Long (University of Connecticut) .......................... GVIII-C Thu PM

W

Wahl, Russell (Idaho State University) ................................. GVIII-A Thu PM
Walker, Stephen C. (University of Chicago) .......................... GVIII-C Thu PM
Wallace, Megan (Oberlin College) ..................................... VIII-H Fri PM
Wallace, R. Jay (University of California–Berkeley) ............... VI-A Fri AM
Wallach, Wendell (Yale University) .................................. GXI-B Fri PM
Wallis, Charles (California State University–Long Beach) ........ VI-H Fri AM
Walsh, Sean Drysdale (University of Minnesota–Duluth) ....... X-H Sat PM
Walters, Gregory (Saint Paul University) ............................. GXI-E Fri PM
Walton, Mélanie (Duquesne University) .................................................. X-H Sat PM
Wang, Ellie Hua (Indiana University–Bloomington) .................. IX-I Sat AM
Wang, Robin (Loyola Marymount University) .......................................................... GV-A Wed PM, GVII-A Thu PM
Warren, Daniel (University of California–Berkeley) ............... GXI-F Fri PM
Warren, Tonya (San Diego State University) .......................................................... GVIII-I Thu PM
Waskan, Jonathan A. (University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign) .................................................. VI-F Fri AM
Wasserman, Ryan (Western Washington University) ............. I-C Wed PM
Watkins, Margaret (St. Vincent College) ............................... VII-K Fri PM
Watson, Lori (University of San Diego) .......................................................... VII-G Fri PM
Wautischer, Helmut (Sonoma State University) .......................................................... I-E Wed PM, GXIII-C Sat PM
Wawrytko, Sandra A. (San Diego State University) ................. GXI-C Sat PM
Weigel, Chris (Utah Valley University) .................................................. IV-I Thu PM
Weinberg, Jonathan M. (Indiana University–Bloomington) ... VII-E Fri PM
Weinberg, Justin (University of South Carolina) ......................... VIII-G Fri PM
Weinberg, Shelley (University of Illinois) .................................................. II-G Wed PM
Weisberg, Jonathan (University of Toronto) .............................. I-E Wed PM
Weiskopf, Daniel (Georgia State University) ................................. GVIII-G Thu PM
Weiwei, Zhang (Tsinghua University) ............................................ X-J Sat PM
Welchman, Jennifer (University of Alberta) ............................. GXI-D Sat PM
West, Robin L. (Georgetown University) ............................................ GXII-A Sat PM
Wetzel, Linda (Georgetown University) ............................................ VI-I Fri AM
Wheeler, Gregory (New University of Lisbon) .......................... I-E Wed PM
Wheeler, Mark (San Diego State University) ................. GVIII-E Thu PM, X-E Sat PM
White, Roger (Massachusetts Institute of Technology) .............. XI-F Sat PM
White, Thomas (Loyola Marymount University) ....................... VII-J Fri PM
Whitt, Laurelyn (Brandon University) ............................................. IX-K Sat AM
Whitt, Matt (Vanderbilt University) .................................................. VII-G Fri PM
Whyte, Kyle Powys (Michigan State University) ... III-K Thu AM, IX-K Sat AM
Wielenberg, Erik J. (DePauw University) ........................................ VI-G Fri AM
Wiener, Chad E. (Portland State University) ............................... III-H Thu AM
Wilby, Jason (University of New Mexico) ..................................... V-F Thu PM
Wilcox, Shelley (San Francisco State University) .................. GXI-I Fri PM
Willard, Dallas (University of Southern California) .................. GXI-H Fri PM
Willett, Cynthia (Emory University) .................................................. XI-J Sat PM
Willett, Julie (Texas Tech University) .................................................. XI-J Sat PM
Williams, Christopher (University of Nevada–Reno) .................. I-J Wed PM, GVI-A Wed PM
Williams, Forrest (University of Colorado–Boulder) ..................GV-F Wed PM
Williamson, Phillip (University of New Mexico) .......................V-F Thu PM
Wilson, Holly (University of Louisiana–Monroe) ......................V-A Thu PM
Wilson, Jessica (University of Toronto) ..................................X-I Sat PM
Winfree, Jason (California State University–Stanislaus) .......GXIII-K Sat PM
Winters, Edward (Independent Scholar) ...............................GV-A Fri PM
Wisnewski, J. Jeremy (Hartwick College) .................................III-G Thu AM
Witmer, D. Gene (University of Florida) .................................VII-I Fri PM
Wolff, Johanna (Stanford University) ....................................I-H Wed PM
Wolff, Jonathan (University College London) .........................IV-C Thu PM, GVII-C Thu PM
Wong, Eddie (Independent Scholar) ........................................IV-H Thu PM
Wong, Wai-hung (California State University–Chico) ..........VII-F Fri PM
Wood, Allen (Stanford University) .......................................IX-D Sat AM
Wood, David (Vanderbilt University) ..................................GXI-D Fri PM
Woodcock, Scott (University of Victoria) .............................GXI-J Fri PM
Woods, Jack (Princeton University) ...................................GV-G Wed PM
Woodward, James (California Institute of Technology) ..........VI-F Fri AM
Wright, Cory (California State University–Long Beach) .......GVIII-G Thu PM, GXI-L Fri PM
Wright, Crispin (New York University and University of Aberdeen) ......................................IX-B Sat AM
Wright, Jen Cole (College of Charleston) ...............................VI-C Fri AM
Wright, Sarah A. (University of Georgia) ..............................I-E Wed PM
Wrisley, George (George Washington University) ............GV-G Wed PM
Wu, Wayne (Ohio State University) ..................................IV-D Thu PM
Wubnig, Judy (University of Waterloo) .................................II-I Wed PM
Wuerth, Julian (Vanderbilt University) ................................II-G Wed PM
Wunderlich, Mark E. (Union College) ..................................IX-H Sat AM
Wyatt, Nicole (University of Calgary) ..................................IV-F Thu PM
Wykstra, Stephen (Calvin College) ....................................II-J Wed PM

X

Xiao, Yang (Kenyon College) .............................................II-A Wed PM

Y

Yaqub, Aladdin (Lehigh University) .................................X-H Sat PM
Yi, Byeong-Uk (University of Toronto) .................................XI-I Sat PM
Yi, Jiang (Beijing Academy of Social Sciences) ..............X-J Sat PM
Young, Charles (Claremont Graduate University) ..............III-H Thu AM
Yount, David J. (Mesa Community College) .......................I-I Wed PM
Yu, Jiyuan (University at Buffalo) .................................................. II-A Wed PM
Yuan, Lijun (Texas State University–San Marcos) ......................... X-J Sat PM

Z
Zack, Naomi (University of Oregon) ........................................... GXII-B Sat PM
Zalta, Edward N. (Stanford University) ...................................... V-H Thu PM
Zebrowski, Robin (Beloit College) ........................................... GXI-B Fri PM
Zhang, Ellen (Hong Kong Baptist University) ......................... GVII-A Thu PM
Zia, Helen (Independent Scholar) .......................................... IV-H Thu PM
Zika, Fay (Athens School of Fine Arts) ................................ GVII-D Thu PM
Zimmerman, Dean (Rutgers University) ................................. GXIV-B Sat PM
Zuckert, Catherine (University of Notre Dame) ..................... XI-D Sat PM
Zwolinski, Matt (University of San Diego) ............................... IX-D Sat AM
Graduate Student Stipend Winners

Alex Grzankowski (University of Texas–Austin)
“Are All Attitudes Propositional Attitudes?”
I-G Wednesday, March 31, 1:00-4:00 p.m.

Mitchell Herschbach (University of California–San Diego)
“Mirroring Is Not Always Simulation”
I-G Wednesday, March 31, 1:00-4:00 p.m.

Brian Prince (Rice University)
“Plato’s Kinetic Theory”
I-I Wednesday, March 31, 1:00-4:00 p.m.

Santiago Amaya (Washington University in St. Louis)
“Slips and Revealed Preference”
II-F Wednesday, March 31, 4:00-6:00 p.m.

Christopher Evan Franklin (University of California–Riverside)
“The Problem of Enhanced Control”
III-F Thursday, April 1, 9:00 a.m.-Noon

Joe Hedger (Arizona State University)
IV-F Thursday, April 1, 1:00-4:00 p.m.

Ralf Bader (University of St. Andrews)
“Being F Intrinsically and Extrinsically”
V-H Thursday, April 1, 4:00-6:00 p.m.
Seth Bordner (University of North Carolina–Chapel Hill)
“Berkeley’s ‘Defense’ of ‘Commonsense’”
V-I Thursday, April 1, 4:00-6:00 p.m.

Adam Pelser (Baylor University)
“Emotion and the Value of Understanding”
VI-H Friday, April 2, 9:00 a.m.-Noon

Philip Swenson (University of California–Riverside)
“In Defense of Nonsocratic Skepticism”
VI-J Friday, April 2, 9:00 a.m.-Noon

David McElhoes (University of Maryland–College Park)
“No Time Like the Present”
VI-I Friday, April 2, 9:00 a.m.-Noon

Joshua May (University of California–Santa Barbara)
“What in the World Is Weakness of Will?”
VI-J Friday, April 2, 9:00 a.m.-Noon

Douglas Paletta (University of Pennsylvania)
“Rawls’ Problem with Assumptions”
VII-H Friday, April 2, 1:00-4:00 p.m.

Matt Whitt (Vanderbilt University)
“Territory, Authority, and the People: Rethinking Modern Sovereignty Today”
VII-G Friday, April 2, 1:00-4:00 p.m.

Dylan W. Murray (Georgia State University)
“Performative Constructivism”
IX-G Saturday, April 3, 9:00 a.m.-Noon
Theresa Lopez (University of Arizona)
“Statistical Learning in Language Acquisition: Implications for Moral Psychology and the ‘Linguistic Analogy’”
*IX-I Saturday, April 3, 9:00 a.m.-Noon*

Ian Flora (University of Michigan–Ann Arbor)
“Aristotle on Belief and Rationality: Fiction, Response, Restraint”
*X-F Saturday, April 3, 1:00-4:00 p.m.*

Daniel Giberman (Stanford University)
“Emergent Consciousness and Ontological Fundamentality”
*X-I Saturday, April 3, 1:00-4:00 p.m.*

Matthew S. Haar Farris (Graduate Theological Union)
“Faith and Knowledge Fight and Make Up: Jacques Derrida’s Philosophical Proposal for the ‘Sources’ of Religion”
*XI-E Saturday, April 3, 4:00-6:00 p.m.*
GROUP SESSIONS

A
American Society for Aesthetics, Wednesday, March 31, 8:00-10:00 p.m.
Association for Chinese Philosophers in America, Session 1, Wednesday, March 31, 6:00-9:00 p.m.
Association for Chinese Philosophers in America, Session 2, Friday, April 2, 7:00-10:00 p.m.
Association for Informal Logic and Critical Thinking, Thursday, April 1, 8:00-10:00 p.m.
American Association of Mexican Philosophers, Session 1, Tuesday, March 30, 9:00 a.m.-Noon
American Association of Mexican Philosophers, Session 2, Tuesday, March 30, 1:00-4:00 p.m.
Ayn Rand Society, Saturday, April 3, 6:00-9:00 p.m.

B
Bay Area Continental Philosophy Association, Wednesday, March 31, 6:00-9:00 p.m.

C
Concerned Philosophers for Peace, Wednesday, March 31, 6:00-9:00 p.m.

D
David Kellogg Lewis Society, Thursday, April 1, 8:00-10:00 p.m.

H
History of Early Analytic Philosophy Society and Bertrand Russell Society, Thursday, April 1, 6:00-9:00 p.m.
Hume Society and North American Kant Society, Wednesday, March 31, 1:00-4:00 p.m.

I
International Association for Computing and Philosophy, Friday, April 2, 7:00-10:00 p.m.
International Association for the Philosophy of Sport, Wednesday, March 31, 6:00-8:00 p.m.
International Hobbes Association, Session 1, Wednesday, March 31, 6:00-8:00 p.m.
International Hobbes Association, Session 2, Thursday, April 1, 6:00-9:00 p.m.
International Society for Chinese Philosophy, Session 1, Thursday, April 1, 6:00-9:00 p.m.
International Society for Chinese Philosophy, Session 2, Friday, April 2, 7:00-10:00 p.m.
International Society for Comparative Studies of Chinese and Western Philosophy, Session 1, Thursday, April 1, 6:00-8:00 p.m.
International Society for Comparative Studies of Chinese and Western Philosophy, Session 2, Saturday, April 3, 6:00-9:00 p.m.
International Society for Environmental Ethics, Session 1, Wednesday, March 31, 6:00-9:00 p.m.
International Society for Environmental Ethics, Session 2, Friday, April 2, 7:00-10:00 p.m.

J
Josiah Royce Society, Saturday, April 3, 8:00-10:00 p.m.

K
Karl Jaspers Society, Session 1, Friday, April 2, 7:00-10:00 p.m.
Karl Jaspers Society, Session 2, Saturday, April 3, 6:00-9:00 p.m.

N
North American Kant Society, Session 1, Thursday, April 1, 6:00-9:00 p.m.
North American Kant Society, Session 2, Friday, April 2, 7:00-10:00 p.m.
North American Nietzsche Society, Wednesday, March 31, 6:00-9:00 p.m.
North American Society for Social Philosophy, Saturday, April 3, 6:00-8:00 p.m.
North American Spinoza Society, Session 1, Wednesday, March 31, 6:00-9:00 p.m.
North American Spinoza Society, Session 2, Friday, April 2, 7:00-10:00 p.m.
North American Wittgenstein Society, Session 1, Wednesday, March 31, 6:00-9:00 p.m.
North American Wittgenstein Society, Session 2, Saturday, April 3, 6:00-9:00 p.m.

P
Philosophy of Religion Group, Saturday, April 3, 6:00-9:00 p.m.
Philosophy of Time Society, Saturday, April 3, 8:00-10:00 p.m.

R
Radical Philosophy Association, Session 1, Thursday, April 1, 6:00-8:00 p.m.
Radical Philosophy Association, Session 2, Saturday, April 3, 6:00-8:00 p.m.

S
Sartre Circle, Wednesday, March 31, 8:00-10:00 p.m.
Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy, Thursday, April 1, 6:00-9:00 p.m.
Society for Asian and Comparative Philosophy, Session 1, Wednesday, March 31, 6:00-8:00 p.m.
Society for Asian and Comparative Philosophy, Session 2, Saturday, April 3, 6:00-9:00 p.m.

Society for Business Ethics, Saturday, April 3, 8:00-10:00 p.m.

Society for Empirical Ethics, Thursday, April 1, 6:00-8:00 p.m.

Society for German Idealism, Session 1, Wednesday, March 31, 6:00-9:00 p.m.

Society for German Idealism, Session 2, Saturday, April 3, 6:00-9:00 p.m.

Society for Lesbian and Gay Philosophy and the APA Committee on the Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender People in the Profession, Saturday, April 3, 8:00-10:00 p.m.

Society for Natural Religion, Session 1, Wednesday, March 31, 8:00-10:00 p.m.

Society for Natural Religion, Session 2, Thursday, April 1, 8:00-10:00 p.m.

Society for Phenomenology and Analytic Philosophy, Friday, April 2, 7:00-10:00 p.m.

Society for Philosophy and Public Affairs, Friday, April 2, 7:00-10:00 p.m.

Society for Philosophy in the Contemporary World, Session 1, Friday, April 2, 7:00-10:00 p.m.

Society for Philosophy in the Contemporary World, Session 2, Saturday, April 3, 6:00-8:00 p.m.

Society for Realist/Antirealist Discussion, Session 1, Wednesday, March 31, 6:00-9:00 p.m.

Society for Realist/Antirealist Discussion, Session 2, Thursday, April 1, 6:00-9:00 p.m.

Society for Skeptical Studies, Saturday, April 3, 6:00-9:00 p.m.

Society for Student Philosophers, Session 1, Thursday, April 1, 8:00-10:00 p.m.

Society for Student Philosophers, Session 2, Saturday, April 3, 6:00-8:00 p.m.

Society for Women in Philosophy, Session 1, Wednesday, March 31, 6:00-9:00 p.m.

Society for Women in Philosophy, Session 2, Thursday, April 1, 6:00-8:00 p.m.

Society for the Advancement of American Philosophy, Graduate Student Section, Wednesday, March 31, 6:00-9:00 p.m.

Society for the Advancement of American Philosophy, Session 1, Thursday, April 1, 8:00-10:00 p.m.

Society for the Advancement of American Philosophy, Session 2, Friday, April 2, 7:00-10:00 p.m.

Society for the Metaphysics of Science, Session 1, Thursday, April 1, 6:00-9:00 p.m.

Society for the Metaphysics of Science, Session 2, Friday, April 2, 7:00-10:00 p.m.

Society for the Philosophic Study of the Contemporary Visual Arts, Session 1, Thursday, April 1, 6:00-8:00 p.m.
Society for the Philosophic Study of the Contemporary Visual Arts, Session 2, *Friday, April 2, 7:00-9:00 p.m.*

Society for the Philosophical Study of Marxism, *Thursday, April 1, 8:00-10:00 p.m.*

Society for the Philosophy of History, Session 1, *Thursday, April 1, 6:00-9:00 p.m.*

Society for the Philosophy of History, Session 2, *Friday, April 2, 7:00-10:00 p.m.*

Society for the Philosophy of History, Session 3, *Saturday, April 3, 6:00-9:00 p.m.*

Society for the Philosophy of Sex and Love, *Friday, April 2, 7:00-10:00 p.m.*

Society for the Study of Philosophy and the Martial Arts, *Thursday, April 1, 6:00-9:00 p.m.*

Society for the Study of Process Philosophy, *Thursday, April 1, 6:00-8:00 p.m.*

Society for the Study of the History of Analytical Philosophy, *Saturday, April 3, 6:00-9:00 p.m.*

Society of Christian Philosophers, *Wednesday, March 31, 6:00-9:00 p.m.*

Society of Indian Philosophy and Religion, *Thursday, April 1, 6:00-9:00 p.m.*

**W**

Western Phenomenology Conference, *Saturday, April 3, 6:00-9:00 p.m.*
SPECIAL SESSIONS SPONSORED BY APA COMMITTEES

WEDNESDAY, MARCH 31

Best Placement Practices: Helpful Information for Graduate Students and Placement Directors (II-K)
Arranged by the APA Committee on Academic Career Opportunities and Placement
4:00-6:00 p.m.

THURSDAY, APRIL 1

Beyond Blackboard: Teaching Philosophy with Technology (III-J)
Arranged by the APA Committee on Philosophy and Computers
9:00 a.m.-Noon

Environmental Justice and Indigenous Peoples (III-K)
Arranged by the APA Committee on the Status of Indigenous Philosophers
9:00 a.m.-Noon

California Dreaming: How Race Alerts and Alters the State, Now and Then (IV-H)
Arranged by the APA Committee on the Status of Asian and Asian-American Philosophers and Philosophies
1:00-4:00 p.m.

Experimental Philosophy in the Classroom (IV-I)
Arranged by the APA Committee on the Teaching of Philosophy
1:00-4:00 p.m.

From the University to the K-12 Classroom: Introducing Philosophy to Young People (V-K)
Arranged by the APA Committee on Pre-College Instruction in Philosophy
4:00-6:00 p.m.
The Israeli-Palestinian Conflict and the Possibility of Dialogue (V-L)
Arranged by the APA Committee on International Cooperation
4:00-6:00 p.m.

**FRIDAY, APRIL 2**

Practicing Public Philosophy: Reflection and Dialogue I (VI-K)
Arranged by the APA Committee on Public Philosophy
9:00 a.m.-Noon

Practicing Public Philosophy: Reflection and Dialogue II (VII-L)
Arranged by the APA Committee on Public Philosophy
1:00-4:00 p.m.

Experiments in Teaching Introduction to Philosophy (VIII-K)
Arranged by the APA Committee on Philosophy in Two-Year Colleges
4:00-6:00 p.m.

**SATURDAY, APRIL 3**

Arranged by the APA Committee on the Status of Indigenous Philosophers
9:00 a.m.-Noon

Ethics and the Nature of ‘Other:’ Analyzing European Philosophers in Comparison with Chinese Perspectives (X-J)
Arranged by the APA Committee on International Cooperation
1:00-4:00 p.m.

Neuromaging Techniques and Human Nature (X-K)
Arranged by the APA Committee on Philosophy and Medicine and the Society for Philosophy and Technology
1:00-4:00 p.m.

Feminism and Humour (XI-J)
Arranged by the APA Committee on the Status of Women
4:00-6:00 p.m.

Romanell Lecture (XI-K)
Arranged by the APA Committee on Lectures, Publications and Research
4:00-6:00 p.m.
ABSTRACTS OF COLLOQUIUM, SYMPOSIUM, AND INVITED PAPERS

USING WIKIS IN PHILOSOPHY (III-J)
MARK ALFINO, GONZAGA UNIVERSITY

A wiki is a type of internet-based collaboration software that allows groups of people to easily co-author content. It’s most famous application is the world-wide Wikipedia. This session explores ways of using wiki software in teaching philosophy. Wikis are generally valuable to faculty because they allow easy management and updating of content (primarily text, images, and links). Students may be asked to post model work to the wiki, engage in collaborative research using the wiki as a medium for sharing findings, contribute notes, additional detail, or questions to lectures, collaborate with other students on test preparation, or host student projects. We will also discuss technical features of wikis and limitations of their usefulness.

A PRIORI CONCEPTS AND “RELATION TO AN OBJECT” (XI-H)
LUCY ALLAIS, UNIVERSITY OF THE WITWATERSRAND

This paper gives a reading of those passages in Kant’s Transcendental Deduction of the categories in which Kant says that the categories are necessary for relation to an object that is compatible with recognising Kant’s view that intuitions are singular, immediate representations which give us objects, and that this is something that concepts could never do. I argue that Kant’s intention is to show the categories to be conditions of attributing properties to objects, and that what is meant by relation to an object is referential thought. However, I distinguish between the requirements of referential thought and the requirements of being perceptually presented with an object and argue that Kant’s argument does not imply that the categories are necessary for things to be perceptually presented to us. And I argue that Kant’s reasons for thinking that the categories are necessary for referential thought do not depend on his idealism.

SOCIAL EXTERNALISM AND THE KNOWLEDGE ARGUMENT (VIII-I)
TORIN ALTER, UNIVERSITY OF ALABAMA–TUSCALOOSA

You might possess the concept of arthritis even if your conception of that disease is inaccurate or impoverished (Burge 1979, Putnam 1975). The concept is yours but, if you’re like most people, you’ll defer to experts regarding its extension. Arguably, similar claims apply to many of our concepts. This view is sometimes called social externalism. Derek Ball (forthcoming) and Michael Tye (2009) argue that social externalism is true
of our phenomenal concepts. They also argue that this fact undermines a popular response to Frank Jackson’s (1982) knowledge argument known as the phenomenal concept strategy (Stoljar 2005). And Ball argues that the same fact undermines the knowledge argument itself. I will argue that Ball and Tye fail to undermine the knowledge argument or the phenomenal concept strategy. Those lines of reasoning might have to be modified to make them consistent with social externalism, but not in ways that make them weaker.

SLIPS AND REVEALED PREFERENCE (II-F)

SANTIAGO AMAYA, WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY IN ST. LOUIS

Slips of action are interesting exceptions to the principle that intentional action reveals preference. Yet their philosophical value has been underestimated. Several stereotypes promote a view of slips similar to pre-Darwinean views of fossils: curiosities with mundane explanations. Once these stereotypes are exposed, however, slips turn out to be like fossils in yet another respect: traces of normal processes not visible to everyday observation. The paper argues that slips of action are not mistakes due to absent-mindedness, lack of attention, temporary forgetfulness, or some abnormality. It also distinguishes slips from some common forms of irrationality. In the end, it is argued that slips are side-effects of reasonable routines of intention formation, in concrete, side-effects of a system of default reasoning.

COERCION, STATES, AND THE PRACTICAL FUNCTION OF PRINCIPLES OF RESPONSIBILITY (VI-E)

SCOTT A. ANDERSON, UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA

When philosophers have asked how coercion affects moral responsibility, they have largely analyzed the way coercion impacts the coercee’s psychology, compelling her, and thereby undermining the freedom of her will. This understanding of coercion is unsuited to explain why states commonly exempt coercees from responsibility for coerced actions. This essay offers a different analysis of coercion that indicates why states have good reason to regulate it, and in so doing, to reduce or deny the responsibility of agents for actions performed due to illicit private coercion. It also argues that such principles of responsibility can have a practical function, which helps explain why agents bear responsibility for actions taken in the light of such principles, and how such principles can constrain what agents are to be held responsible for.

THE PLEASURES OF PSYCHIC HARMONY IN PLATO’S REPUBLIC (I-I)

KELLY ARENSON, UNIVERSITY OF MEMPHIS

After Plato establishes in Book 9 of the Republic that each of the three parts of the soul has its own particular pleasure, he declares the rational part’s pleasure to be greatest, and then concludes that “the one in whom that part [viz., the rational] rules has the most pleasant life” (583a). This paper
Abstracts of Colloquium, Symposium, and Invited Papers

 contends that Plato has at least two argumentative strategies for proving reason’s hedonic superiority in Book 9: on the one hand, he attempts to show, rather unsuccessfully, that rational pleasures are metaphysically superior to other psychic pleasures; on the other, he contends that the parts of the philosopher’s soul coexist harmoniously such that the soul as a whole experiences the most pleasures. I argue that the latter claim reveals the psychic holism inherent in the most pleasant life and is more in line with Plato’s thinking about psychic harmony and pleasure elsewhere in the *Republic*.

**FREEDOM, BACKTRACKERS, AND THE FIXITY OF THE PAST (I-F)**

*PAUL R. AUDI, UNIVERSITY OF NEBRASKA–OMAHA*

How should the intuition that the past is “fixed” be cashed out? In particular, does the fixity of the past entail that there are no true backtracking counterfactuals? These issues bear importantly on the question of whether freedom and determinism are compatible. If the fixity of the past can be reconciled with the truth of certain backtracking counterfactuals, then there is a way to resist some of the strongest arguments for incompatibilism, notably van Inwagen’s consequence argument. Here I argue that the most plausible construals of the fixity of the past are compatible with the truth of the relevant backtrackers. Compatibilism, for that reason, has a promising line of response to particularly troublesome incompatibilist objections.

**CLOSURE RECONSIDERED (IX-H)**

*YUVAL AVNUR, SCRIPPS COLLEGE*

Most solutions to the skeptical paradox about justified belief assume that closure for justification holds, since the rejection of closure is widely regarded as a non-starter. I argue that the rejection of closure is not a non-starter, and that its problems are no greater than the problems associated with the more standard anti-skeptical strategies. I do this by sketching a simple version of the unpopular strategy and rebutting the two most common arguments against it. The upshot is that dissatisfaction with standard, closure-accepting theories of justification, according to which we are somehow justified in believing that we are not brains in vats (or otherwise massively deceived), need not lead to skepticism.

**BEING F INTRINSICALLY AND EXTRINSICALLY (V-H)**

*RALF BADER, UNIVERSITY OF ST. ANDREWS*

According to the duplication account of intrinsicality, x is F intrinsically iff all duplicates of x are F, while x is F extrinsically iff x is F and some duplicate of x fails to be F. In this paper, I will show that this account is inadequate since it mistakenly makes being F intrinsically and being F extrinsically incompatible. This inadequacy of duplication principles can be illustrated by cases involving objects that have both intrinsic and extrinsic value. This problem affects not only duplication accounts, but also other accounts of intrinsicality that are extensional in nature, such
as combinatorial or mereological accounts. The problem with all these accounts is that they only assess whether a property is had and not how it is had. They thereby ignore important hyperintensional differences in the ways in which properties can be had.

**Presentism, Eternalism, and Existence Simpliciter (VI-I)**

*Alex Baa, University of Texas–Austin*

Presentism—the view that only the present is real—is at odds with eternalism—the view that past, present, and future are ontologically on a par. Some are skeptical that there is any substantive disagreement between presentists and eternalists. Both sides claim to disagree, for example, over whether dinosaurs exist simpliciter. But what exactly is this notion of existence simpliciter, and why think that we need it? I answer the skeptic by demonstrating the need for existence simpliciter and showing how it fits into our scheme of existence concepts.

**Autonomy and Creative Responsibility (I-J)**

*Eric Barnes, Southern Methodist University*

I develop a notion of “creative responsibility” which is an important component of human autonomy which is clearly distinct from moral responsibility but ignored in contemporary literature on free will. A person who vigorously deploys powers of creative thought in deliberating about what to do (including what to believe) displays a kind of autonomy that allows him to escape the power of a local culture to induce conformity in its members. This confers upon his actions a kind of “originatory value.” The notion of creative responsibility is useful to compatibilists in arguing that determinism does not drain human action of originatory value (contra Nozick and Kane) but also useful to the incompatibilist who should concede that creative responsibility confers an kind of autonomy on individuals that can supplement the incompatibilist program.

**Vague Entailment (VIII-H)**

*David B. Barnett, University of Colorado–Boulder*

On the dominant view of vagueness, if it is vague whether Harry is bald, then it is unsettled, not merely epistemically, but metaphysically, whether Harry is bald. This view entails the following proposition: that clear vagueness as to whether Harry is bald clearly does not entail that Harry is bald. I argue against the proposition, and thus against the dominant view.

**Tolstoy and Nussbaum on Innocence (VI-J)**

*Svetlana Beggs, University of California–Riverside*

In many of her works Martha Nussbaum argues that a life lived in the spirit of innocence and simplicity is antithetical to moral maturation and flourishing. In sharp contrast, Leo Tolstoy frequently praises simple, meek persons (often peasants) who live in the spirit of innocence and writes of them that they are the ones who live full, meaningful, morally rich lives.
Far from naive, Tolstoy’s moral ideal makes good sense and, in the end, Nussbaum and Tolstoy agree more than disagree. Where they do greatly differ is in their conceptions of what impedes moral maturation. Their points of views and recommendations regarding the road to maturation, therefore, greatly differ as well. But both largely converge on what counts as a mature moral life: a life lived with our eyes fully open, ready to deal with complex particularity of other people.

THE PROTO-MORALITY OF LIFE: PRIMARY RECOGNITION IN AXEL HONNETH’S READING OF PHENOMENOLOGY OF SPIRIT (V-F)

J. C. BERENDZEN, LOYOLA UNIVERSITY NEW ORLEANS

Axel Honneth has recently argued that there is a basic level of affective interpersonal relations that must be in place before one can take up a cognitive relation to the world of objects. This form of relation, which could be called “primary recognition,” is also taken to be a necessary precursor of developed forms of human sociality. Primary recognition might then have a critical import, insofar as those forms of social interaction that do not properly develop this initial form of recognition can be seen as distorted or pathological. Honneth further, in a recent essay, finds a similar kind of view in Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit, and he argues that the initial description of “recognition” in that text amounts to a kind of “proto-morality.” This paper will examine Honneth’s arguments regarding the proto-morality in Hegel’s Phenomenology, and consider how this concept might be put to further use.

BERKELEY’S “DEFENSE” OF “COMMONSENSE” (V-I)

SETH BORDNER, UNIVERSITY OF NORTH CAROLINA–CHAPEL HILL

Depending on the interpretation, Berkeley’s claims that his immaterialism is a defense of commonsense are either foolishly optimistic or intentionally dissembling. It is agreed on all accounts, though, that his philosophy is no defense of commonsense. Unfortunately, the received interpretations fundamentally misunderstand the way in which Berkeley conceives his immaterialism to stand as a defense of commonsense. In this paper, I give new answers to two old questions: what does Berkeley think he is defending in the defense of commonsense, and how does he go about defending it? I argue that Berkeley’s immaterialist defense of commonsense is best understood not as an apology for commonly held opinions, but as a weapon to be used against what he sees as a threat to the valuable faithful and anti-skeptical tendencies of the vulgar. That is, Berkeley’s defense of commonsense just is his attack on materialism and its concomitant representational realism.

MORAL CONSTRUCTIVISM AND EVOLUTIONARY PSYCHOLOGY (IX-G)

JEFFREY BRAND-BALLARD, GEORGE WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY

Some philosophers (Joshua Greene, Peter Singer, Walter Sinnott-Armstrong) argue that research on the empirical underpinnings of our
moral beliefs supports either skepticism or error theory concerning some of our moral intuitions, such as the widespread intuition that it’s wrong to push the big man off the footbridge in a variation of the trolley problem. I review some of these “debunking arguments” and examine the most prominent rebuttal in the literature: moral constructivism (Neil Levy, Sharon Street, Hallvard Lillehammer, Guy Kahane). Taking T.M. Scanlon as a paradigm constructivist, I agree that constructivism blocks empirical challenges, but I argue that constructivism actually facilitates a different way of empirically debunking some of our moral intuitions, including ones that support deontology. Empirical research can provide clues to what rules would be rejected by reasonable people with evolutionary histories different from ours. Constructivists should recognize that such empirical evidence bears on the moral facts.

Spatial Content and Motoric Significance (II-H)

Robert Briscoe, Ohio University

This paper presents an interpretation of three claims central to Gareth Evans’s theory of egocentric spatial representation. It also answers objections to Evans’s theory that arise from a failure to distinguish between the objective, egocentric spatial content of a perceptual experience and what I call its “motoric significance.”

Do We Perceive Natural Kind Properties? (II-H)

Berit Brogaard, University of Missouri-St. Louis

I respond to three arguments aimed at establishing that natural kind properties occur in the experiential content of visual experience: the argument from phenomenal difference, the argument from mandatory seeing, and the argument from associative agnosia. I conclude with a simple argument against the view that natural kind properties occur in the experiential content of visual experience.

Back to Stalemate: The Motivational Internalism/Externalism Debate (IX-I)

Danielle Bromwich, National Institutes of Health

Motivational Externalists have claimed a victory of sorts in recent years. They claim to have shown that the burden of proof lies firmly on their opponent’s—the Motivational Internalist’s—shoulders. In this paper, I critically examine the arguments designed to establish a presumption on behalf of externalism, and conclude that these attempts to shift the burden of proof are either predicated on a false philosophical psychology or simply fail to show anything other than a conceptual tie between the positions.

The Body as Instrument and as “Person” in Kant’s Moral Philosophy (III-G)

Aaron Bunch, Washington State University

I argue that an account of the human body as a mere instrument of moral agency (see Gregor 1963 and Denis 2001) cannot explain Kant’s duties to
oneself as an animal and moral being. To properly account for Kant’s view on suicide, self-mutilation, and sexual self-defilement, the human body must be regarded not merely as the instrument of a moral agent, but as an aspect of the moral agent herself, as a constituent of the indissoluble or “absolute” unity of a human person. The body thereby shares in the dignity of moral personhood, which constrains our treatment of it. The bio-medical ethics literature recognizes Kant’s non-instrumental view in its discussion of the donation and sale of body parts (Chadwick 1989, Gerrand 1999, Munzer 1993), but does not consider its relevance to Kant’s account of suicide or sexual self-defilement. In closing, I consider briefly whether Kant provides a sufficiently specific criterion for “intrinsicically degrading” treatment.

**INTEGRATING YOGA INTO AN INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY CLASS: EXPERIMENTS IN EXPERIENTIAL PEDAGOGY (VIII-K)**

**KEN BURAK, NORTHAMPTON COMMUNITY COLLEGE**

Here I present a unit useful for any Introduction to Philosophy course that wishes to address dualism. To begin: is any non-dualistic initiative doomed to failure because it must dualistically oppose dualism to non-dualism? Yoga answers in two ways: first: dualism is not wrong, but a possibility: the mind can take its leave of the body, but it can also, through yoga, contact and engage the body deeply. Secondly, mind-body dualism can only be overcome through such an engagement. The answer to dualism lies not in the chatter of the philosopher’s mind, but in the silence and equanimity of the yogi’s pose. But to approach the problem honestly, students will have to do what they are seldom asked to do in a philosophy class: actually rise out of their chairs, and engage their bodies.

**PARTS OF SINGLETONS (X-H)**

**BEN CAPLAN, OHIO STATE UNIVERSITY**

**PAT REEDER, OHIO STATE UNIVERSITY**

**CHRIS TILLMAN, UNIVERSITY OF MANITOBA**

Here’s a view that we like: Cary is a part—not just a member, but a part—of his singleton, the set whose sole member is Cary. Here’s another view that we like: the mereological difference between Cary and his singleton—what you get when you subtract Cary from his singleton, so to speak—is the empty set. Putting these views together, we get the view that Cary’s singleton is composed of Cary and the empty set: or, more suggestively, that {Cary} is composed of Cary and {}. We like this view, too. In this paper, we develop a view on which Cary’s singleton is composed of Cary and the empty set.
**KANT ON MORAL DILEMMAS (III-G)**

*Michael Cholbi, California State Polytechnic University–Pomona*

Every philosopher grants there are apparent moral dilemmas but are there genuine dilemmas, situations in which, no matter what an agent does, she acts wrongly? In debates about the existence of genuine dilemmas, Kant is typically identified as a clear and uncompromising denier of such dilemmas. Here I argue that Kant’s view is not in fact a metaphysical stance on moral dilemmas at all. Instead Kant defends a more subtle, methodological view according to which the denial of moral dilemmas is a regulative ideal for moral deliberation. On this view, practical reason both assumes the non-existence of moral dilemmas and aspires to their resolution. Kant’s denial of moral dilemmas is thus a regulative principle of practical reason whose authority rests on its being a consequence of our acceptance of the Categorical Imperative as practical reason’s supreme principle.

**ARISTOTLE ON REFERENCE AND GENERALITY (X-F)**

*Philip Corkum, University of Alberta*

Mathematical logic typically has a heterogeneous semantic theory. Subjects and predicates have distinct semantic roles: subjects refer; predicates characterize. A sentence is true if the object to which the subject refers is correctly characterized by the predicate. Traditional term logic, by contrast, has a homogeneous theory: both subjects and predicates refer. A sentence is true if the subject and predicate name one and the same thing. In this paper, I’ll argue that we can ascribe to Aristotle the view that both subjects and predicates refer, while holding that he would deny that a sentence is true just in case the subject and predicate name one and the same thing. In particular, I’ll argue that Aristotle’s core semantic notion is one of containment, not identity: an ordinary predication such as “Greeks are mortal” is true just in case a certain mereological relationship obtains between the distinct referents of the relevant terms.

**A FEMINIST DEFENSE OF CAPITALISM (II-B)**

*Ann Cudd, University of Kansas*

An important feminist critique of capitalism is that it inevitably causes inequality. I argue that there is a vast middle ground between unfettered global capitalism and economic systems that either fail to engage with world trade or those that forcibly impose egalitarian solutions. Within this middle ground there is room for a progressive capitalism that minimizes inequality to a level that is morally acceptable, while still keeping the engine of innovation in gear. I will argue that this kind of capitalism is morally superior to its alternatives on three grounds. First, it promotes technical innovation that tends, in the medium run, to improve quality and length of life. Second, it truly maximizes freedom, taking into account both positive and negative aspects of freedom. Third, it reduces the oppression of traditional societies that impose hierarchies of gender and caste. In all three ways capitalism promotes a feminist definition of social progress.
CONFLICT IN THE ARISTOTELIAN CITY: DESIRE FOR EQUALITY AND COMPETITION FOR POWER (X-F)

CANDICE DELMAS, BOSTON UNIVERSITY

Essential to the art of statesmanship, according to Aristotle, is the knowledge of the causes of political disorder (stasis). These causes are complex and abounding; yet Aristotle identifies one unique source of stasis: the human desire for equality. Against the standard emphasis on citizens' shared sense of justice, I offer a new reading of this desire for equality, based on the distinction between concept and conception. Thus for Aristotle, I argue, people share a concept of justice insofar as they agree that justice is proportionate equality; but they advance competing—and mistaken—conceptions of justice to determine each person's due. These disagreements, and the desire for equality which generates them, crystallize around the question of the allocation of political power. Crucially, Aristotle takes these conflicting conceptions of justice as a given of political reality, and as the basic premise of his investigation into the best practicable regime.

SAVING THE FEW (VII-J)

TYLER DOGGETT, UNIVERSITY OF VERMONT

In forced choices between saving a larger group and a smaller, non-overlapping group, it is permissible to save the smaller group. Consider a different case: you have a forced choice between saving an extremely happy person and a quite sad one. You can save the sad one. Consider a different case: you have a forced choice between saving the happy person or the sad one. If you save the happy person, you can spare someone else a quite minor loss. Still, you can save the sad one. I argue there are no important differences between this last case and the first. Since you can save the few in the last, you can save them in the first.

IMAGES FOR THE SAKE OF THE TRUTH IN PLATO'S SYMPOSIUM (IX-J)

YANCY HUGHES DOMINICK, SEATTLE UNIVERSITY

Alcibiades, in Plato's Symposium, says that he will praise Socrates through images (215a4-5). He assures his companions, however, that this "is no joke: the image will be for the sake of the truth" (215a6). Alcibiades then describes Socrates as full of images, and as speaking in words that are "bursting with images of virtue" (222a3-4). This focus on Socrates' images seems in tension with the view that Socrates exemplifies the proper lover earlier described. The successful lover gives birth "not to images of virtue," but to "true virtue" (212a). How can Socrates burst with images yet exemplify the lover who generates not images, but true virtue? This question urges us toward a firmer grasp of this unique Socrates (221c-d) and his exemplary character. Despite the apparent tension in the text, Socrates does indeed model the successful lover: Socrates is filled with images, but those images engender true virtue in others.
FLEXIBLE CONTEXTUALISM ABOUT “OUGHT” AND ATTITUDE-ATTRIBUTIONS (V-J)

JANICE DOWELL, UNIVERSITY OF NEBRASKA–LINCOLN

In the philosophy of language and linguistics literature, contextualism about modals used normatively, such as “must,” “ought,” and “may,” is the canonical view. Its great advantage is its ability, if correct, to provide a simple and highly unified explanation for a great variety of language use. Recently, Gunnar Bjornsson, Stephen Finlay and Brian Weatherson have raised puzzles that seem to show that contextualists are unable to provide a fully satisfying explanation of the interaction of modals and attitude-ascriptions in the context of normative disagreement. Here I lay out and defend a version of flexible contextualism that, I argue, avoids the puzzles posed by those authors. A further advantage of my account is that it provides a non-ad hoc, prediction-generating, explanatory, and general story about how contexts selects intuitively plausible values for a modal expression’s parameters. That account, in relying upon publicly manifestable, referential intentions, fits perfectly with well-worked out, Gricean accounts of language use. The ability of the account to generate predictions and explanations rests on its well-developed procedure for identifying the contents of such intentions, through an identification of the nature of the disposition to use and evaluate utterances that having such an intention confers. Finally, the account also fits with a plausible, Kaplanian account of how contexts determines domain restrictions in the case of quantification over individuals. In the literature on quantification over individuals, it is agreed on all sides that such quantifiers are context-sensitive. So, it is an important advantage of my account that modals, as quantifier expressions, receive a precisely parallel treatment.

WHAT IS THE WILL? (I-J)

LAURA W. EKSTROM, COLLEGE OF WILLIAM AND MARY

This paper concerns the notion of will in contemporary analytic debates over the nature of free agency. It addresses the following questions: Is there a sensible, legitimate issue concerning freedom of the will, distinct from the question of freedom of action? If so, what is that issue? What purposes are served by use of the term “will” in free will theory? I distinguish two broad senses of the term “will” and point out that, on one of these senses, there are no interesting, special issues concerning freedom of the will. However, on the other sense, there are such issues, and they are complex and worthy of further attention. Finally, I sketch the outlines of a theory of will in the second sense, one that emphasizes what I see as an appropriate direction for progress in continued work on free agency.

REASONS, CAUSES, AND NEUROPSYCHOLOGY: AN ESSAY ON GEOMETRICAL GERRYMANDERING (I-G)

ANDREAS ELPIDOROU, BOSTON UNIVERSITY

In this essay, the dichotomy between the space of reasons and the space of causes—one commonly employed in philosophy of mind, perception, and
action—is criticized. An examination of this dichotomy in light of findings from neuropsychology (especially, visual agnosia) leads to a dilemma: either the dichotomy fails to fulfill its function (namely, to dichotomize), since there are phenomena which cannot be characterized by either pair of the dichotomy; or, it does succeed, but in doing so, obscures the phenomena which it set out to explain. A choice between a false or a procrustean dichotomy is not much of a choice.

**EXPERIMENTAL PHILOSOPHY IN INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY: OPPORTUNITIES AND CHALLENGES (IV-I)**

*Emily Esch, College of St. Benedict and St. John’s University*

*Chris Weigel, Utah Valley University*

To the extent that experimental philosophy involves an internal dispute about methodology, it will not be seen as having immediate significance to a typical undergraduate. Hence, including it involves careful thought about what it will bring to the classroom as a whole, to the majority of students. In this session we will discuss possible answers to the following questions: What unique discussions can experimental philosophy bring to a class? How can we best integrate experimental philosophy with traditional texts? What challenges does teaching experimental philosophy face? Through case studies, we explore two different approaches to integrating experimental philosophy into Introduction to Philosophy courses. The first case study will explore using polling in a way similar to that advocated by Nadelhoffer and Nahmias (“Polling as Pedagogy” 2008). The second case study will explore teaching Nichols and Knobe’s “Moral Responsibility and Determinism” (2007) in a unit on Free Will and Moral Responsibility.

**FAITH AND KNOWLEDGE FIGHT AND MAKE UP: JACQUES DERRIDA’S PHILOSOPHICAL PROPOSAL FOR THE ‘SOURCES’ OF RELIGION (XI-E)**

*Matthew S. Haar Farris, Graduate Theological Union*

This paper critically examines Derrida’s theory that religion, both conceptually and in practice, is a response to the other. For Derrida, “religion” is defined by the fact that it is divided at its source by the mutually hostile and hospitable relationship between faith and knowledge. Like inoculating oneself in order to develop resistance to a virus, religion is continually stabilizing and sacralizing itself by temporarily destabilizing and de-sacralizing itself, appropriating the other that threatens it, especially technoscience. Derrida calls this general economy of religion auto-immunization. The purpose of this presentation is twofold: 1) to explain how the radical demand to respond to the other is an essential characteristic of Derrida’s texts on religion; and 2) to elucidate Derrida’s theory of auto-immunization as the general economy of “religion.”
IS THE CAPACITY TO UNDERSTAND MORAL NORMS A PRECONDITION OF BLAMEWORTHINESS? (X-G)

**ARASH FARZAM-KIA, QUEEN'S UNIVERSITY**

Traditionally, the capacity to understand moral norms has been taken to be a necessary condition of blameworthiness. According to one such account, implicit in moral criticism is a demand that the agent comply with moral norms, a demand which is unintelligible if the agent lacks the capacity to understand what the applicable norms are. In this essay I argue that the content of moral address, and therefore the conditions of its intelligibility, have been largely misunderstood. Arriving at a correct account of the content of moral address suggests that moral address is not undermined by the agent’s incapacity to understand the nature of moral norms. It follows that the inability of the agent to understand moral norms does not render moral criticism inappropriate. This provides the basis for a “strict liability” account of moral criticism.

LIBERTARIAN AUTONOMY AND INTRINSIC MOTIVES (III-F)

**CARLO FILICE, STATE UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK–GENESEO**

This paper suggests that libertarians should avail themselves of a system of natural and autonomy-friendly motivational foundations—intrinsic motives. A psyche equipped with intrinsic motives could allow for some degree of character-formation that is genuinely and robustly autonomous. Such autonomy would rest on motives that are one’s own in the most direct way: they are part of one’s natural make-up. A model with intrinsic motives helps libertarians to explain how a robust type of autonomy is possible. Without intrinsic motives libertarian agents are only guaranteed a thin degree of absolute free will.

ARISTOTLE ON BELIEF AND RATIONALITY: FICTION, RESPONSE, RESTRAINT (X-F)

**IAN FLORA, UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN–ANN ARBOR**

In book 3, chapter 3 of his *On the Soul*, Aristotle gives several arguments meant to demonstrate the type non-identity of belief (*doxa*) and imagination (*phantasia*). I focus on one of these (3.3.427b21-4) that gets very little attention, though it can lead us deep into Aristotle’s theory of human rationality, doxastic epistemology, and psychology of fiction. For Aristotle, believing an object to have a response-dependent feature is sufficient to have the response, while imagining that it does is not sufficient. Imagination does, however, cause affective response, pace most commentary on this passage. A discussion of the *Poetics* makes this clear. Animals, which have phantasia in place of belief and knowledge, cannot avoid being moved by their mental content: there are no skeptical animals. Humans, by contrast, can withhold their commitment when of sound mind. This is part of what makes humans rational.
WILLING UNIVERSAL LAW VS. UNIVERSALLY LAWFUL WILLING: WHAT KANT’S SUPREME PRINCIPLE OF ETHICS SHOULD HAVE BEEN (III-G)

SCOTT E. FORSCHLER, INDEPENDENT SCHOLAR

Kant’s Formula of Universal Law (FUL) attempts to derive morality from a universalizability test, which considers whether an agent could will or endorse all other agents following some maxim. But this standard is inadequate because it gives counter-intuitive results in cases where other agents are not following principles which are so universalizable. It also fails to capture Kant’s original insight that the good (justified) will must conform to law as it wills. An alternative principle does capture this intuition, and furthermore it allows us to distinguish between principles that produce different results when all agents are also following the principle versus cases where only some or no other agents are doing so. Modal logic can be used to symbolize the distinction between the two principles and highlight Kant’s error, which has unfortunately been followed by many Kantians through the present day.

THE PROBLEM OF ENHANCED CONTROL (III-F)

CHRISTOPHER EVAN FRANKLIN, UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA–RIVERSIDE

Event-causal libertarians have a distinct advantage over agent-causal libertarians in constructing a coherent and empirically plausibly theory of agency since their theories seem to differ from compatibilists theories only in requiring that some of our actions are undetermined. The problem facing event-causal libertarianism is to explain how such accounts, with so little difference, can secure more control than compatibilism. This is the problem of enhanced control: how can indeterminism, the mere absence of determinism, enhance control? I argue that event-causal libertarians can meet this objection by rejecting the usual analysis of free will as solely consisting in powers. Freedom, in contrast to will, concerns not what powers an agent has, but what opportunities he has to exercise these powers. On the basis of this distinction, I argue that indeterminism is relevant to increasing our control not because it gives us new powers, but rather new opportunities.

NONIDEAL THEORY (III-D)

CHRISTOPHER FREIMAN, UNIVERSITY OF ARIZONA

Much of political philosophy occurs within ideal theory, which models individuals and institutions as strictly compliant with the principles of justice. Yet problems in political philosophy tend to be exclusive to nonideal theory—they arise only when compliance with justice is not strict. I argue that this tension gives rise to a tendency among theorists to invoke nonideal assumptions to generate social problems and then to illicitly revoke those assumptions when generating institutional solutions. The lesson here, I argue, is to undertake institutional analysis entirely from the perspective of nonideal theory. Our aim should be to devise political institutions that function well when compliance is not assured, as these
are the conditions that necessitate political institutions in the first place. To do this, we’ll need to rethink the solutions to many of the standard problems in political philosophy.

ETHICS WITH YOUNG PEOPLE (V-K)

SUSAN GARDNER, CAPILANO UNIVERSITY
Ethics, insofar as it informs action, cannot be taught through a process of information transfer. To behave ethically, one needs to learn how to yank one’s actions out from under the controlling influence of desires and circumstance through the self-empowering force of objective reasoning. Such “process learning” is anathema to educators under pressure to live up to accountability standards that are easily graded. However, refusing the opportunity to foster responsible effective practical reasoning in our youngsters dooms them to slavery by appetite, sense, and situational forces. The antidote is Philosophy for Children, a program that has been knocking at the doors of schools around the world for the last 40 years. With a more precise theoretical message of what good thinking looks like, its payoff, and what “truth” has to do with it, we may yet see a better day when philosophy is in every classroom worldwide.

HEGEL’S PROJECT OF RECONCILIATION AND RADICAL POLITICAL CRITICISM (V-F)

JEFF GAUTHIER, UNIVERSITY OF PORTLAND
I explore what might be meant by a politics of reconciliation and consider whether or not radical social criticism is compatible with it. I begin by placing the concept of reconciliation in Hegel’s broader system, attending to how it answers the “contradictions” of other ways of establishing moral and political obligation. I then take up reconciliation as it is developed in the Philosophy of Right, with special attention to Michael Hardimon’s discussion of the project. I conclude that even if Hegel is right about the need to rely upon existing institutions and practices in developing moral and political critique, this is insufficient to justify the conclusion that fundamental changes in existing social and political orders might not be called for.

EMERGENT CONSCIOUSNESS AND ONTOLOGICAL FUNDAMENTALITY (X-I)

DANIEL GIBERMAN, STANFORD UNIVERSITY
On what I call the “builder conception” of ontological fundamentality, the fundamental properties are those whose localized, mereologically basic exemplifications fix the facts of the whole world. This view is attractive because it fits well with the ontologically economical view that microphysics grounds all macro facts. However, the view is threatened by the possibility of emergent properties, that is, properties that fail to supervene on the properties of the mereologically basic parts of the objects that exemplify them; for if emergence is possible then there are cases in which property distributions across micro objects fail to fix macro facts. I consider a popular kind of putative example of emergence, involving conscious organisms,
and argue that such examples are suspect. If I am right then the threat to the builder conception from the possibility of emergence is lessened.

SLOTS IN UNIVERSALS (X-I)

CODY GILMORE, UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA–DAVIS

Slot theory, as I use the term, is the view that (i) there exist such entities as argument places, or “slots,” in universals, and that (ii) a universal u is n-adic if and only if there are n slots in u. I argue that those who take properties and relations to be abundant, fine-grained, non-set-theoretical entities face pressure to be slot theorists. Given such a theory of properties and relations, the most natural strategies for paraphrasing away “slot-talk” have significant drawbacks.

TWO CONCEPTIONS OF PERSONAL RESPONSIBILITY (VI-E)

WILLIAM GLOD, INSTITUTE FOR HUMANE STUDIES

Neutral paternalism claims that if some action A goes against person P’s beliefs and values, then it might be appropriate to interfere with A in order to bring P’s actions back into alignment with her beliefs and values. By contrast, what I call the Responsibility Principle (RP) holds that even in cases where an agent is committed to acknowledging the irrationality of her action A, it follows that she should take responsibility and refrain from performing A, rather than deferring to a paternalist for correction of her irrationality. This essay sketches two ways of cashing out the conception of self-responsibility one might use to support RP. The first, or “maximand,” conception does not rule out neutral paternalism. The second conception holds that self-responsibility is a moral demand on others to refrain from paternalistic interferences. This latter conception gives more convincing grounds for RP to defeat neutral paternalism.

VAN INWAGEN’S TWO FAILED ARGUMENTS FOR THE BELIEF IN FREEDOM (I-J)

ZACHARY J. GOLDBERG, ARIZONA STATE UNIVERSITY

In chapter 6 of An Essay on Free Will, Peter van Inwagen presents an influential argument that we are justified in believing we are free. He does so by claiming that the determinist’s objection to the argument for the belief in freedom fails in the exact same way that the skeptic’s argument fails to prove that none of our empirical beliefs are justified. I show that this strategy to defend the belief in freedom fails due to a disanalogy. In a different (but related) argument, van Inwagen concludes that deliberating while holding the belief that you are free is inconsistent. He suggests that (1) inconsistency is an epistemic defect and (2) it is implausible that some truth is such that your simply believing it would make epistemically defective your engaging in so basic an activity as deliberation. Finally, I show that this argument fares no better than the former.
THE IMPOSSIBILITY OF DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE (VII-H)

PAUL GOMBERG, CHICAGO STATE UNIVERSITY

This paper argues from sociological assumptions that distributive justice—conceived as just distribution of income and wealth—is impossible. Income and wealth are central to many distributive conceptions of justice. Contemporary theorists, following John Rawls, believe that theories of justice should not rely on controversial ideas of what makes life good. Thus, given their silence about what substantively constitutes a good life, these philosophers propose using income and wealth as neutral measures of each person’s resources. This approach has unintended consequences. Any proposed distribution either allows or forbids income and wealth inequalities. If it allows inequalities it unjustly deprives those who have less of social esteem; a society where income and wealth are equal is impossible. Because it either leads to injustice or proposes the impossible, distributive justice is impossible. The arguments should encourage us to think about justice in contribution rather than distribution.

PROTAGORAS WAS NOT A RELATIVIST TO ME (IX-J)

JERRY GREEN, TEXAS TECH UNIVERSITY

In the Theaetetus Plato portrayed Protagoras as a proponent of epistemological relativism, the view that all beliefs are true for their believers. I believe this view of Protagoras is mistaken, despite its nearly unanimous acceptance. The evidence suggests that Protagoras was not a relativist at all. A close reading of the Theaetetus reveals that Plato never ascribes relativism to Protagoras directly, but instead exerts considerable effort to continually distance his claims from Protagoras himself. Moreover, what few details of Protagoras’ purported theory Plato does give are incompatible with relativism. Finally, the few extant Protagorean fragments and the dialogue Protagoras both either fail to support or directly contradict a relativist theory. The virtually ubiquitous acceptance to Protagorean relativism is, if not simply incorrect, at least lacking in textual support. Though we cannot say with certainty what Protagoras did think, we can be fairly certain that Protagoras was not a relativist.

RIGHTS AND POLITICAL AUTHORITY IN HOBBES (VI-D)

MICHAEL GREEN, POMONA COLLEGE

Hobbes held that political authority is derived from a social contract in which subjects both authorize a sovereign to act on their rights and surrender their rights of governing themselves. The two parts of the social contract appear to conflict with one another: how can subjects authorize someone to act on their rights if they also surrender those rights? I will offer an interpretation of Hobbes’s theory of rights that shows how the two parts are consistent. Authorization gives the sovereign a kind of power while surrendering rights limits the subjects’ liberties.
ARE ALL ATTITUDES PROPOSITIONAL ATTITUDES? (I-G)
ALEX GRZANKOWSKI, UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS–AUSTIN

Intensional transitive verb constructions, such as “John loves Sally” seem, much like propositional attitude reports, to be reports of mental states. In fact, it is tempting to think that the intensional transitive reports are, in some way, to be assimilated to reports of the second kind. Such a move is supported by the observation that propositions are a well motivated object of the attitudes. But are all attitudes propositional attitudes? I argue that they are not by showing that the states to which the intentional transitive constructions answer don’t even supervene on the states to which the propositional attitudes answer.

THE PROBLEM OF CLASSIFICATION: KANT’S REPLY TO LOCKE (II-G)
LUDMILA GUENOVA, HARVARD UNIVERSITY

Kant was much influenced by Locke’s view that our classification of objects into natural kinds is ultimately haphazard, since our general ideas represent merely the objects’ nominal rather than real essences. In responding to Locke, Kant struggles to devise a rigorous method by which to demonstrate that our empirical concepts do capture the fundamental causal properties of objects. I argue that this method is provided by Kant’s theory of systematicity. On Kant’s view, we can exhibit the validity of an empirical concept if we locate it within a total system of concepts and laws. Kant thus turns Locke’s argument on its head: Whereas for Locke the construction of a hierarchy of genera and species only exemplifies the inherent arbitrariness of our classification, for Kant this hierarchy serves as the sole means by which can absolve our empirical concepts of such arbitrariness.

ETHICAL NATURALISM AS TRANSCENDENTAL ANTHROPOLOGY (II-F)
JOHN HACKER-WRIGHT, UNIVERSITY OF GUELPH

In this paper, I argue that one important strain of Aristotelian ethical naturalism employs what Jonathan Lear has called transcendental anthropology. Lear’s Wittgenstein holds that successful language use requires shared, reflective understanding of a form of life by the language’s users; this understanding is partially constitutive of the meaning of our expressions, and it cannot be derived from observation of our activities, hence it is transcendental. I argue that Aristotelian ethical naturalism should be understood as having a similar transcendental component. Grasping the goodness or badness of human action requires an understanding of action as intentional. As Anscombe has argued, this understanding depends on the agent’s non-observational knowledge of what she is doing and this understanding in turn requires non-observational insight into the agent’s form of life. Appreciating the transcendental aspect of Aristotelian naturalism is, I argue, crucial for fending off some common objections to Aristotelian naturalism.
KANTIAN ETHICS AND NONIDEAL THEORY (III-D)

ROBERT HANNA, UNIVERSITY OF COLORADO–BOULDER

The purpose of this paper is to apply a Sartrean existential insight to an investigation of the logic of Kantian moral principles in a nonideal world, by developing a new interpretation and conservative extension of Kant’s highly influential and equally notorious ethical theory. I call this new interpretation and conservative extension “the Hierarchical Paraconsistent Logic Interpretation,” and if I am correct, it provides a unified solution to three classical problems in Kantian ethics: (1) the problem of universalizability, or the apparent epistemic indeterminacy of tests for the generalizability and consistency of moral principles, (2) the problem of rigorism, or the apparent over-strictness, apparent overgeneralization, and apparent overly-extended strictly universal scope, of moral principles, and and above all, (3) the problem of moral dilemmas, or the apparent inconsistency between equally legitimate absolutely universal moral principles.

EXPLAINING ABSENCES (VI-F)

MICHAEL DEAN HARTSOCK, UNIVERSITY OF MISSOURI

It is standardly argued that if causation is a relation, absences cannot be causes or effects. Relations need relata, and absences are nothing at all. Helen Beebee and Achille Varzi have addressed this problem by arguing that commonsense negative causal judgments are false, but have causal explanations as counterparts. I argue that this approach fails. In prevention cases—causation of an absence—the Beebee-Varzi view entails that no explanation is possible. Instead, I argue that intuitively plausible negative causal statements pick out, by negative description, causal relata. Thus we preserve the view that causation is a relation and vindicate commonsense.

ESCAPING BERGMANN’S DILEMMA FOR INTERNALISM (IX-H)

ALI HASAN, UNIVERSITY OF IOWA

In Justification Without Awareness (2006), Michael Bergmann presents a dilemma for internalism from which he claims there is “no escape”: The awareness allegedly required for justification is either strong awareness, which involves conceiving of some justification-contributor as relevant to the truth of a belief, or weak awareness, which does not. Bergmann argues that the former leads to an infinite regress of justifiers, while the latter conflicts with the “clearest and most compelling” motivation for endorsing internalism, namely, that for a belief to be justified its truth must not be an accident from the subject’s perspective. Bergmann’s dilemma might initially seem to have the force of a knock-down argument against the classical internalist accounts he considers, if not against all forms of internalism. I argue, however, that neither horn of Bergmann’s dilemma is successful. Classical internalists can hold on to the main motivation for internalism and avoid an infinite regress.
A Reconciliation Between Radical and Liberal Feminism (VII-H)

Carol Hay, University of Massachusetts–Lowell

Many feminist critiques of liberalism claim that liberalism provides a problematic framework for understanding women’s oppression. Feminist liberals have replied that liberalism provides the best explanation of what is wrong with women’s oppression. I argue that this longstanding antagonism between liberalism and feminism is based on a fundamental mistake. Radical feminist critiques of liberalism often concern its method of discovering oppressive harms, while liberal moral theory typically seeks to justify the idea that these harms are serious wrongs. I demonstrate that radical feminists and liberals have often talked past each other in this way by focusing on Lisa Schwartzman’s recent critique of Martha Nussbaum, but I believe the point holds more generally. Once we see that radicals have been generally right about what is the best method for uncovering oppressive practices, while liberals have been generally right about the explanation of exactly what is wrong with these practices, we can see hope for a promising reconciliation between radical feminism and liberalism.

New York Is Just New York: An Account of Genuine Proper Names in Fiction (IV-F)

Joe Hedger, Arizona State University

The problem of genuine names occurring in fictions has garnered much less attention than its more glamorous cousin—viz. the problem of vacuous or empty names—but perhaps a careful examination of the former may shed some light on the latter, as well as on aesthetics more generally. In this paper I argue that proper names occurring in fiction directly refer to actual persons, places and things. I offer a theory for consideration which handles Kroon’s Real-Fictional Problem. I also present some reasons why this theory is preferable to the highly influential account of Lewis’s “Truth in Fiction” which is initially endorsed by Kroon and French. I present an objection to the modal realist solution involving anaphora and argue that my suggestion better accords with our intuitions about fiction, and also it is more applicable to other areas of aesthetics.

Mirroring Is Not Always Simulation (I-G)

Mitchell Herschbach, University of California–San Diego

Mirror neurons and systems are commonly appealed to as mechanisms enabling mindreading, i.e., understanding other people’s mental states. Such neural mirroring is usually treated as evidence of mental simulation rather than folk psychological theorizing. I will call into question this assumed connection between mirroring and simulation theory, arguing that mirroring does not necessarily constitute mental simulation. A resemblance relation between a neural process in an observer and a neural process of the same type in a target agent, as found in mirroring processes, is not sufficient for mental simulation. I argue that mental simulation further requires that the mental process in the attributor serve
as a model of the target mental process in the other person. To show that this requirement is not always met by mirroring processes, I describe a model of intention attribution using a motor mirroring process that should not be characterized as interpersonal mental simulation.

SECOND-ORDER PROPERTIES CAN “BRING NEW POWERS INTO THE WORLD” (X-I)

ERIC HIDDLESTON, WAYNE STATE UNIVERSITY

Jaegwon Kim’s Causal Inheritance argument aims to show that second-order properties “bring no new causal powers into the world,” and thus do not exist (or at least are not “causal kinds”). I consider different senses in which second-order properties could fail to “bring causal powers into the world.” I present cases in which second-order properties do appear to “bring new causal powers” in the sense the argument requires. I argue in addition that the cases I describe are problematic for reductionist views more generally.

PHENOMENAL CONCEPTS AND THE MODE OF PRESENTATION PROBLEM (VII-I)

EMMETT L. HOLMAN, GEORGE MASON UNIVERSITY

The phenomenal concept strategy (PCS) is a popular strategy for defending physicalist theories of mind against criticisms. According to PCS, there are special, first person perspective “phenomenal concepts” that can explain away the intuitions that consciousness cannot be physical which underlie such criticisms. But PCS must give an account of the mode of presentation of phenomenal concepts that is consistent with physicalism and otherwise satisfactory in its own right. Taking an argument by Horgan and Tienson (2001) as my point of departure, I argue that this is an as yet unresolved problem for PCS. Construing phenomenal concepts as pure self directed type demonstratives, as proposed by Levin (2007) and (perhaps) Loar (1990, 1997) can be shown not to succeed in this regard, and there are prima facie reasons to think that recent “quotational” construals of phenomenal concepts cannot either.

SENSATIONS AND MIND-BODY UNION IN DESCARTES’S PHILOSOPHY OF MIND (XI-G)

JOSEPH W. HWANG, CALIFORNIA STATE UNIVERSITY–CHICO

After having argued for the real distinction between mind and body in his Meditations, Descartes argues that the mind and the body, though distinct substances, are united. He argues for their union with the premise that if I have sensations, such as the sensations of pain and hunger, then my mind and my body must be united. Why does Descartes think this premise is true? What is it about sensations that Descartes believes implies that there is such a union? I argue for a new account of this premise on the basis of observing two key characteristics of the qualitative nature of sensations, namely, the way sensations present things, and the subject of such sensations. These two key characteristics of sensations (coupled with one other premise) explain why Descartes believed that sensations (e.g., the sensation of pain) require the union of mind and body.
CONTEXTUALISM ABOUT INTRINSIC VALUE (VII-K)

JUSTIN JEFFREY, UNIVERSITY OF IDAHO

Intrinsic value has a central but problematic place in moral theory. The skepticism surrounding intrinsic value is understandable, and exists in part because of Moore’s famous redescription of the concept near the beginning of the 20th century. Moore attempted to clarify the concept, but in so doing seems to me to have changed it considerably. Some of these changes were regrettable but they have been hard to shake. I offer in this paper a way to rescue intrinsic value by invoking a strategy most famously used to ward off global skepticism in the field of epistemology. More specifically, I take a contextualist approach to the semantics of intrinsic value ascriptions. This contextualist approach shows promise for those who would like to preserve much of the functionality of intrinsic value but shed its problematic Moorean aspects.

A NECESSITARIAN ACCOUNT OF COUNTERFACTUAL CONDITIONALS (VI-F)

AMY KAROFSKY, HOFSTRA UNIVERSITY

There are several problems with the contingentarian view of counterfactual conditionals: First, one nonobtaining fact cannot follow from another. Second, a particular individual cannot be the referent of any proposition expressing a counterfact. Third, a proposition that is known to be false cannot be used as an antecedent. Fourth, the consideration of counterfactual conditionals is not merely philosophically futile, it encourages bad reasoning. All of these problems disappear with the rejection of contingentarianism. On the necessitarian account, there are no genuine counterfactual conditionals. The perspicuous reading of any (so-called) counterfactual conditional is a nonconditional, universal proposition about properties and natural kinds. Since the nature of properties is necessary the generalizations involve necessities, only. Finally, unlike the consideration of counterfactuals, the consideration of general propositions is consistent with the basic metaphysical principles that underlie reality and is, thus, philosophically productive.

GROUNDING ETHICS IN PHILOSOPHICAL PSYCHOLOGY (II-E)

PAUL KATSAFANAS, UNIVERSITY OF NEW MEXICO

How might Nietzsche be relevant for contemporary ethical theory? I argue that the bulk of Nietzsche’s writing is concerned with the question of how normative claims can be justified. Nietzsche develops an original and compelling answer to this foundational question. He seeks to show that facts about the nature of human motivation and willing generate a non-optional standard of success for human action. In this talk, I reconstruct Nietzsche’s central argument for this conclusion. I contend that Nietzsche’s argument is structurally analogous to constitutivist theories of practical reason, which seek to ground normative claims in facts about action’s constitutive features. I show that Nietzsche’s argument can be understood as an empirically grounded version of constitutivism. Nietzsche’s work
therefore engages with concerns that are currently at the forefront of ethical theory.

**TESTIMONY, EPISTEMIC EGOISM, AND EPISTEMIC CREDIT (I-E)**

*JASON KAWALL, COLGATE UNIVERSITY*

It is generally acknowledged that testifiers play creditable roles in the production of knowledge in others. But is such credit epistemically relevant, and is an agent more successful *qua* epistemic agent insofar as she is a successful testifier? I argue that, *ceteris paribus*, agents deserve equal epistemic credit for their role in producing knowledge in others to that which they would receive for a similarly salient role in acquiring similar knowledge for themselves. The core of the paper consists in a sustained defence of this proposal against a series of objections. I further develop the proposal by drawing upon a distinction between constitutive and auxiliary forms of credit that allows us to avoid attributing epistemic credit to agents in problematic cases. If the current proposal is correct, our understanding of successful epistemic agents needs to be expanded to take into account their role in producing epistemically valuable states in others.

**PRACTICAL DIALECTIC IN PLATO’S PHILEBUS (III-H)**

*BRIAN KEADY, UNIVERSITY OF DENVER*

It is not uncommon for readers of Plato to think that he views systematic question-and-answer as the only appropriate method for pursuing, and ultimately attaining, truth and genuine knowledge. It is also easy to assume that the question-and-answer procedure spans the full compass of Platonic dialectic given its pervasiveness in the philosophical methods that are developed and practiced in the dialogues. Drawing primarily from the *Philebus*, in this paper I argue that, contrary to popular critical opinion, (1) Plato indicates that we can also seriously pursue knowledge while engaged in everyday affairs, and (2) in several places he makes clear that dialectic is not limited to the question-and-answer method.

**SAFETY DRILLS (VII-F)**

*MATTHEW J. KENNEDY, UNIVERSITY OF NOTTINGHAM*

Recently several philosophers have argued that a kind of epistemic safety is necessary for knowledge. In reaction several philosophers have proposed counterexamples to this idea, arguing that there are examples of “unsafe knowledge.” In this paper I describe a basic principle for ordering cases or possible worlds in terms of their similarity to cases or worlds of interest. “Close” cases should preserve the epistemically relevant features of the cases of interest. This principle allows us to disarm the proposed counterexamples, and defend the idea that safety is necessary for knowledge.
THE PLANE OF *REPUBLIC* 587D (II-I)

**MATTHEW KING, YORK UNIVERSITY**

Many readers object to the way Socrates arrives at the conclusion in Book 9 of the *Republic* that the philosopher-ruler lives 729 times as pleasantly as the tyrant. I argue that Socrates’s calculation is not merely contrived to reach the number 729. I will demonstrate that Socrates’s initial move of multiplying the distance between the tyrant and the oligarch by the distance between the oligarch and the philosopher-ruler implies something that could profoundly enhance our understanding of the *Republic*: the *Republic*’s scheme of character-types should be filled out by applying the necessary/lawful/unlawful distinction to reason and thumos and not just to appetite, thereby bringing into view four more types in addition to the five explicitly identified in Book 8. This is particularly important in that it allows us to better understand the non-ruling philosopher and the sophist in relation to the philosopher-ruler.

G.E. MOORE’S EPISTEMOLOGICAL LEGACY (IV-G)

**JEREMY KIRBY, ALBION COLLEGE**

I advance an interpretation of Moore’s response to Idealism and Skepticism that acknowledges both an appreciation of the philosophical and meta-philosophical position wherein he is located, while avoiding some of the pitfalls into which other recent interpretations have fallen.

A DEFENSE OF EPISTEMIC PERMISSIVISM (XI-F)

**MATTHEW C. KOPEC, UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN–MADISON**

The Uniqueness Thesis, which holds, roughly, that there is a unique rational response to any body of evidence, has recently attracted interest within the disagreement literature. But even though the truth or falsity of this thesis might impact how one should react to disagreement with an evidential peer, it has received little direct argument. The exception is White (2005) who argues for the thesis by way of arguing against various forms of its negation. First, this paper hopes to show that White’s main argument fails. I will then raise a counterexample to Uniqueness, and finish by presenting a view according to which counterexamples to Uniqueness are widespread.

THE BALDWIN EFFECT RECONSIDERED: A GAME-THEORETIC ANALYSIS (III-I)

**GRACIELA KUECHLE, UNIVERSITÄT WITTEÑ/HERDECKE**  
**DIEGO RIOS, UNIVERSITÄT WITTEÑ/HERDECKE**

The Baldwin effect is a process by which learnt traits become integrated into the genome through a non-Lamarckian mechanism. From its inception, the Baldwin effect has been regarded with skepticism. The objective of this paper is to relativize this assessment. Our contribution is twofold. To begin with, we provide taxonomy of the different arguments that have been advocated in its defense, and distinguish between three
justificatory dimensions—feasibility, plausibility and likelihood—that have been unduly conflated. Second, we sharpen the debate by providing an evolutionary game theoretic perspective that is able to generalize previous results. The upshot of this paper is that the mechanism envisaged by Baldwin is less puzzling than commonly thought.

**VIRTUE EPISTEMOLOGY NATURALIZED (VI-G)**

*VICTOR KUMAR, UNIVERSITY OF ARIZONA*

On a certain naturalized conception of epistemology we have reason to believe in knowledge because it is ineliminable from our best empirical theories of cognition and behavior; we can better understand what knowledge is by thinking about what it must be in order to play the causal-explanatory roles assigned to it in empirical theories. My primary interest in the essay is the causal-explanatory relationship between epistemic virtue and knowledge. Epistemic virtues explain, from a design stance, how we, as environmentally-embedded, computational systems, receive and process information in order to generate accurate representations. But they also explain, from an intentional stance, how we, as epistemic agents, attend to and control evidence, and reason about what we should believe. The one causal-explanatory relationship is machine-like; the other agentive. The upshot is a vindication of a certain sort of hybrid internalist-externalist theory of knowledge.

**CURIOSITY AND THE RESPONSE-DEPENDENT VALUE OF UNDERSTANDING (I-D)**

*JONATHAN KVANVIG, BAYLOR UNIVERSITY*

Curiosity is sometimes thought of in terms of a desire to know, but I argue that it is best understood differently. Given a proper understanding of curiosity, I then argue for a generality claim about it, and use these two features to show how curiosity can form the basis for a response-dependent value of understanding. This account provides an answer to a central value question in epistemology, the question of the relationship between the value of knowledge and the value of understanding.

**ON A HUMANITARIAN DUTY OF INTERVENTION (VII-G)**

*DAVID LEFKOWITZ, UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND*

Theorists typically reject a duty of humanitarian intervention on the grounds that it violates the reasonable cost proviso on the general moral duty to provide assistance to those at great risk of serious harm. Here I offer a critical response to Cecile Fabre’s recent defense of this claim. In contrast to Fabre, I contend that conscription for the purpose of ensuring a number of suitably trained military professionals sufficient to carry out low-risk humanitarian interventions does not undermine the autonomy or prospects for a flourishing life of those compelled to complete this service. Furthermore, I argue that the pool of those with a duty to participate in humanitarian interventions is quite large. Since only a relatively small number of those will actually need to do so, and an even smaller number
will actually suffer harm as a result, the expected cost to each agent with the duty is not unreasonable.

REFLECTION AND SOCIAL METACOGNITION (VI-H)

CHRISTOPHER LEPOCK, UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO

Alston and Sosa hold that epistemic value is determined by truth-conduciveness and that having reflective access to the grounds of one’s beliefs is epistemically valuable. They derive the latter claim from the former via what I call the “metacognition lemma,” the idea that the capacity to monitor and regulate belief-formation is truth-conducive. I argue that their derivation won’t work for believers in isolation. Rather, reflective access is truth-conducive because it enables us to communicate the grounds of our beliefs to others, and thus permits them to monitor our reliability.

FALLIBILISM AND CONCESSIVE KNOWLEDGE ATTRIBUTIONS (IV-G)

CLAYTON LITTLEJOHN, UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS–SAN ANTONIO

Lewis thought that the fallibilist view was hopeless. If you want to avoid skepticism, Lewis thought you ought to be an infallibilist and a contextualist. He thought that concessive knowledge attributions (e.g., “I know that Harry is a zebra, but it might be that he’s a cleverly disguised mule”) were contradictory and that they were overt statements of the fallibilist’s view. Dougherty and Rysiew have argued that CKAs are pragmatically defective rather than semantically defective. Stanley thinks that these three are wrong about the fallibilist’s commitments and that the pragmatic response to Lewis fails. I shall argue that there are problems with Dougherty and Rysiew’s response to Stanley’s criticisms having to do with their account of epistemic modals and that there are problems with Stanley’s response to Lewis. I’ll offer my own defense of fallibilism and try to show that CKAs are not something fallibilists should be worried about.

SAVING THE NEUTRALITY INTUITION FROM BROOME (VII-J)

S. MATTHEW LIAO, OXFORD UNIVERSITY

The neutrality intuition, according to which adding a person to a world is ethically neutral in itself, is particularly important in the field of population ethics. While John Broome finds this intuition strongly attractive, he argues that this intuition has counterintuitive implications and that therefore we must give it up. In this paper, I argue that these counterintuitive implications may be more apparent than real, and that Broome’s arguments do not by themselves show that we must give up the neutrality intuition.

A HYBRID VIEW OF THE ONTOLOGY OF CONSENT (VI-E)

XIAOFEI LIU, UNIVERSITY OF MISSOURI–COLUMBIA

Theorists debate over the ontology of consent. A subjective view holds that consent is essentially a mental state of permission. A performative view holds that consent is essentially a behavior that expresses that permission. Further, there is a hybrid view, according to which consent consists of
both a mental component and a behavioral component. In this paper, I will argue for a different hybrid view, a view that consent can be either a mental act of permission or a behavior that expresses permission.

**STATISTICAL LEARNING IN LANGUAGE ACQUISITION: IMPLICATIONS FOR MORAL PSYCHOLOGY AND THE “LINGUISTIC ANALOGY” (IX-I)**

*Theresa Lopez, University of Arizona*

A powerful argument for moral nativism appeals to features common to linguistic cognition and moral cognition. This “linguistic analogy” argument is situated in the framework of Chomskian linguistics. As those in the Chomskian tradition take there to be an innate faculty of the mind that guides language learning, those who advance the ‘linguistic analogy’ defend the existence of an innate moral faculty that guides and constrains the child’s acquisition of a moral competence. Defenders of each nativist position appeal to poverty of stimulus (POS) arguments, which cite the early emergence of specialized cognitive capacities. An emerging body of research in psycholinguistics, suggesting that young children are endowed with efficient, domain-general statistical learning mechanisms, introduces a serious challenge to the POS argument for linguistic nativism. In this paper, I consider how such findings bear on the parallel argument for moral nativism.

**INDIVIDUATING THE SENSES (IX-E)**

*Fiona Macpherson, University of Glasgow*

What makes the senses, such as vision, touch, taste, smell and hearing, different from each other, and what features of a sense determine that it is the type of sense that it is? There is disagreement among both philosophers and scientists about what criteria should be used to individuate the senses. I consider these in the light of new facts and research. For example, we now know that humans and animals seem to have senses that are in some ways different from the five just mentioned. For example, balance in humans, and electric and infra-red senses in some animals. In addition, scientists are creating devices that promise to extend or replace human senses. I will argue that, contrary to previous thought, we don’t have to choose between the existing criteria. Rather, the new facts invite us to use all of the criteria to form a fine-grained taxonomy of the senses.

**SAFETY AND LOTTERIES (VII-F)**

*Mark Makin, Yale Divinity School*

Fans of a safety condition on knowledge often informally remark that if you know something, you couldn’t easily have been wrong about it. In reply to a familiar problem with safety involving lottery cases, Duncan Pritchard has reformulated safety such that, roughly, if you know something, you could somewhat easily have been wrong about it, but you couldn’t very easily have been wrong about it. In this paper, I argue that fans of safety à la Pritchard—those who believe safe true belief is both necessary and
sufficient for knowledge—are committed to the view that in many cases we know that our lottery ticket will lose. In many cases we couldn’t very easily have been wrong about losing the lottery; that is to say, in many cases the nearest possible worlds are worlds in which we still lose the lottery.

CONTINGENCY AND RELATIVE SIGNIFICANCE DEBATES IN BIOLOGY (I-H)

ANDREW MARGENOT, CONNECTICUT COLLEGE
Derek Turner, Connecticut College

In a series of papers, John Beatty has argued that the contingency of evolutionary history explains why relative significance debates are more prevalent in biology than in other areas of science. This paper develops an objection to Beatty’s project. We observe that one of the many relative significance debates in biology concerns the relative significance of contingency vs. convergence in evolutionary history. To attempt to explain that debate by appeal to the contingency of evolutionary history would be circular. After developing this objection and examining one reply that Beatty could make, we offer our own alternative explanation for the prevalence of relative significance debates in biology, one that avoids this circularity problem.

MORAL COHERENCE, VALUE FRAGMENTATION, AND EPISTEMIC JUSTIFICATION (VI-G)

Patricia Marino, University of Waterloo

In this paper, I address, and challenge, a particular—and common—way of understanding moral coherence on which it is understood “richly,” as involving norms of systematicity and unity, and in which the good of coherence is epistemic, grounded in the connection between coherence and truth. I argue first that the most common way of supporting such views—an appeal to the idea that beliefs that “support and explain” one another—does not get us very far in the absence of question-begging assumptions about the unified nature of value. One response to this difficulty is what I call the “piggy-backing” strategy: to say that analogies between scientific reasoning and moral reasoning allow us to explain the epistemic value of moral coherence. Working with some contemporary views of scientific coherence, I argue that this strategy fails, partly because the fragmented way we value makes such analogies useless.

THE UNITY OF PLATO’S TIMAEUS-CRITIAS (II-I)

Mason Marshall, Pepperdine University

Why in the Timaeus-Critias is Timaeus’s cosmology juxtaposed with Critias’s story of Atlantis? And why is the Timaeus-Critias presented as a sequel to the sort of statecraft carried out in the Republic? Offering an explanation, I argue that (1) the cosmology belongs with the Atlantis tale insofar as they both are part of an attempt to discern what the phenomenal world allows for and what it disallows, and (2) this sort of attempt is integral to the brand of statecraft carried out in the Republic. In a word,
the *Timaeus-Critias* is a sustained effort to extend a kind of investigation which consumes a great deal of the *Republic*.

**HOPING AGAINST HOPE (VII-F)**

*Adrienne Martin, University of Pennsylvania*

The orthodox view of hope is that hoping for an outcome is desiring it under conditions of uncertainty. But two people who equally desire an outcome they both believe is extremely unlikely to occur may nevertheless hope to different degrees—one may “hope against hope,” while the other entertains only a mild hope. I propose that hope involves an evaluative stance toward the subjective probability of the hoped-for outcome obtaining: it is or is not good enough to justify specific choices, feelings, and moods. I relate this proposal to Kahneman’s and Tversky’s prospect theory of risky decisions and argue that, if this theory is true, we should see this evaluative stance as part of the orthodox view. I then show how my proposal is different from and preferable to Philip Pettit’s view that hope involves the “cognitive resolve” to treat the hoped-for outcome as likely to obtain.

**THE SOVEREIGN IN THE POLITICAL THOUGHT OF HANFEIZI AND THOMAS HOBBES (VI-D)**

*Al Martinich, University of Texas–Austin*

Both Hanfeizi and Hobbes believe in absolute sovereignty, that is, that the sovereign should have a monopoly on political power and may regulate almost any aspect of life. Both also explain the characteristics of the sovereigns in terms of some ultimate entity. For Hanfeizi, the sovereign is like *dao*, the Way, and for Hobbes the sovereign is a mortal god. It is often held, as a consequence of these views, that each supports arbitrary rule. I will argue that that is not true because both prescribe principles of justice and fairness for a good state. For Hanfeizi, the good state is a stable one; for Hobbes, it is a stable one that preserves a comfortable life for the subjects.

**A QUESTION UNTHUGHT OF BY PHILOSOPHERS (XI-G)**

*Jennifer S. Marusic, Brandeis University*

Hume claims to be the first philosopher to raise a certain question about the nature of belief, asking what the difference between belief and the simple conception of something is. Yet it isn’t clear what exactly Hume’s new question is, nor why he takes it to be new. I argue that Hume is responding to predicative models of judgment, according to which judgment consists in predication. David Owen claims that Hume’s question is new because it presupposes a rejection of the predicative model of judgment, and Hume is the first philosopher to reject this model of judgment. However, earlier philosophers, including Descartes, also reject the predicative model of judgment. I propose that Hume rightly takes his question to be importantly new, because his account of belief, unlike Descartes’s theory of judgment, treats belief as paradigmatically a state arrived at in response to evidence that is less than certain.
PHILOSOPHY 101 AND EXPERIMENTAL PHILOSOPHY (IV-I)

Joshua May, University of California—Santa Barbara

During a recent stint teaching Introduction to Philosophy, I seized the opportunity to mix in some experimental philosophy. I did this in two ways: (a) I put a few articles on experimental philosophy on the syllabus, and (b) I ran a survey at the end of the course to gain information on students’ impressions of philosophy having taken the course. The results were quite interesting given that things turned out almost exactly opposite from what I expected, at least for the hypotheses I was most interested in testing. First, I expected students to largely dislike the course. (After all, most students seem to loathe philosophy!) Second, I expected to find most students drawn to the topic of experimental philosophy. Third, I expected students to find the material on experimental philosophy rather interesting. But, for the most part, the results don’t support any of these predictions.

WHAT IN THE WORLD IS WEAKNESS OF WILL? (VI-J)

Joshua May, University of California—Santa Barbara

Ever since Davidson’s seminal paper “How Is Weakness of Will Possible?” philosophers have tended to identify weakness of will with akrasia (i.e. acting contrary to one’s judgments about what is best for one to do). However, there has been some recent debate about whether this at all captures the ordinary notion of weakness of will if there is one at all. Richard Holton argues that it doesn’t while Al Mele claims that to a certain extent it does. As Mele recognizes, the question about the ordinary notion (if it exists) is one apt for empirical investigation. My plan is to evaluate Mele’s studies and report an experiment of my own in order to help figure out what in the world weakness of will is. I tentatively conclude that neither Mele nor Holton is quite right. There either is no ordinary notion here or it is at best a cluster concept.

CLICKERS: RESTORING PURPOSE, FOCUS, AND INTENSITY IN THE TRADITIONAL CLASSROOM (III-J)

Gregory R. Mayes, California State University—Sacramento

CPS RF response pads (aka: clickers) are hand held devices that allow students to communicate directly with an instructor’s laptop. Clickers provide a delightfully counterintuitive solution to the problem of technology induced distractions in the classroom: give them another piece of technology. Used properly, clickers not only eliminate these distractions completely, but provide a strong incentive for the student to be prepared for class and to stay focused during it. They also raise the bar on instructor preparedness and delivery.
NO TIME LIKE THE PRESENT (VI-I)

DAVID McELHOES, UNIVERSITY OF MARYLAND–COLLEGE PARK

Michael Fara and Timothy Williamson (2005) present a compelling argument against David Lewis’ counterpart theory. They argue that Lewis’ theory fails to capture vital aspects regarding the logic of actuality. In this paper, I extend their argument from the modal case to the temporal: I use it to argue against Theodore Sider’s (2001) stagist theory of time and persistence. I argue that the results of Fara and Williamson’s investigation show that quantification over temporal counterparts leads one to deny certain claims regarding the present moment that are undeniable.

INHERENCE-CAUSATION-CONCEIVABILITY IN SPINOZA OR ON SPINOZA’S WELL-GROUNDED BIFURCATIONS (VIII-J)

YITZHAK MELAMED, JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY

In the current paper I examine and criticize one of the boldest and most fascinating readings of Spinoza of the past few years. In his outstanding new book, Michael Della Rocca suggests a strict identification of the relations of inherence, causation, and conceivability in Spinoza. Against Della Rocca’s claim that the bifurcation of efficient causation (into causation which is, and is not, accompanied by inherence) constitutes an illegitimate brute fact, I will argue that the bifurcation of causation in Spinoza is paralleled by a bifurcation of conceivability and that the two relations are grounded in the foundational bifurcation of existence into substance and modes. If we are to recognize the reality of modes in Spinoza, we must also acknowledge the bifurcations that result from the bifurcation of existence into substance and modes.

KNOWLEDGE AND THE ACTION-GUIDING ROLE OF ASSERTIONS (IV-E)

GIOVANNI MION, SOUTHERN METHODIST UNIVERSITY

The paper argues that the traditional understanding of the role played by linguistic communication obscures the connection, recently emphasized by Jason Stanley in Knowledge and Practical Interests (2005), between knowledge and action. More precisely, the paper argues that if we assume that the primary function of language is not to share thoughts, but to achieve practical goals, and, accordingly, that assertions play primarily an action-guiding role (as opposed to a mind-revealing role), then we are in a better position to explain the semantic import of practical factors upon knowledge.

PLATO ON WORDS, PARTS OF WORDS AND MEANING (X-E)

DEBORAH MODRAK, UNIVERSITY OF ROCHESTER

If thought is internalized speech (Phlb. 38c-39b), then intelligibility is dependent upon the adequacy of our linguistic representations. Knowledge is dependent upon the mind’s ability to grasp and manipulate intelligible objects. These topics involve a cluster of interrelated questions
that Plato addresses in the *Cratylus* and *Theaetetus*. The Cratylus grapples with them as part of an analysis of meaning and linguistic practices. What makes a word a correct linguistic representation of what it signifies? In the *Theaetetus*, Plato seeks to find a satisfactory definition of knowledge. What makes a particular case of grasping a specific idea an instance of knowing? Semantic questions and epistemological ones are all of a piece for Plato since the underlying issues concern intelligibility and representational adequacy. Nevertheless, because the issues are framed differently, commentators have tended to look at each dialogue separately. This paper examines Plato’s conception of the shared foundations of language and knowledge.

**The Largest Proper Parts of a Whole: A Mereological Reason Why the Thesis of Composition as Identity Is False (XI-I)**

*Patrick Monaghan, University of Iowa*

According to the thesis of composition as identity, a mereological whole is nothing over and above the parts that compose it. In recent years, this thesis has generated quite a lot of controversy. However, while several arguments have been introduced to refute the thesis, since they have all been based on various assumptions concerning general metaphysics that the proponents of the thesis will simply reject out of hand, these arguments are all inadequate. Consequently, if the thesis is to be refuted, what is needed is an argument that is based on an assumption pertaining to the metaphysics of mereology that the proponents of the thesis cannot reject in such a way. In this paper, I defend one such argument, which is couched in terms of the notion of the largest proper parts of a mereological whole.

**Moving on for Community’s Sake: A (Self-Respecting) Kantian Account of Forgiveness (X-G)**

*Kate Moran, Brandeis University*

This paper sketches a Kantian account of forgiveness and argues that it is distinguished by three features. First, Kantian forgiveness is best understood as the revision of the actions one takes toward an offender, rather than a change of feeling toward an offender. Second, Kant’s claim that forgiveness is a duty of virtue tells us that we have two reasons to sometimes be forgiving: forgiveness promotes both our own moral perfection and the happiness of our moral community. Third, we have a duty to withhold forgiveness if we think forgiveness will cause or encourage our offender to wrong us again. This duty to sometimes withhold forgiveness stems from our duty of self-respect, which Kant repeatedly describes as a duty to ourselves to ensure that we are not harmed again.

**Performative Constructivism (IX-G)**

*Dylan W. Murray, Georgia State University*

Constructivist ethical theories (e.g., contractualist theories), which claim that certain ethical truths are constituted by the results of constructivist
procedures (e.g., social contracts), face a frequent objection. If constructivist
procedures are grounded on prior normative considerations, which many
constructivists admit, and if the ethical truths that result from the procedures
are completely determined by these prior considerations, then many worry
that the procedures themselves are redundant, and so eliminable. Here,
I present a general strategy to avoid this worry that evokes a recurrent,
but often implicit, feature of constructivist procedures—namely, that most
(e.g., social contracts and hypothetical choice procedures) are a species
of performative. Recognizing constructivist procedures as performatives
can assure their ineliminability, as performatives are necessary to make
some things the case.

ATTENTION AND PERCEPTUAL CONTENT (VII-I)

BENCE NANAY, SYRACUSE UNIVERSITY AND UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA

There has been a recent flood of counterexamples against intentionalism,
the view, according to which the phenomenal character of an experience
supervenes on the content of this experience. These counterexamples
all have the same structure: two perceptual experiences have the
same content, but they have different phenomenal character because
our attention is different in the two cases. I argue that these alleged
counterexamples presuppose an implausible concept of attention,
therefore they do not jeopardize intentionalism. But even if one is not
interested in the intricate debates surrounding intentionalism, the role
attention plays in these examples is extremely important as it helps us to
clarify how we should (and how we should not) think about perceptual
content.

THE STRUCTURE OF A QUANTUM WORLD (I-H)

JILL NORTH, YALE UNIVERSITY

I argue that the fundamental space of a (non-relativistic) quantum
mechanical world is configuration space, even though this is a very high-
dimensional space. For this is the space needed to define the dynamics
of the theory. I argue from general considerations governing how we
infer the fundamental space of any physical theory, to the conclusion
that we should be realists about configuration space: we should think
that this space exists, that it is fundamental, and that it has a definite,
particular structure. Ordinary three-dimensional space exists, but it is non-
fundamental. Instead, it emerges from fundamental configuration space. I
argue for this view and compare it with some recent alternatives.

RAWLS’ PROBLEM WITH ASSUMPTIONS (VII-H)

DOUGLAS PALETTA, UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA

Rawlsians face a problem in how to understand the moral assumptions
like freedom and equality that structure the contractarian account of
justification. On the Kantian interpretation, the assumptions are substantive
moral claims and explain the significance of choosing principles in the
original position. However, nothing within the contractarian account can justify these assumptions. Retreating to purely political interpretations of freedom and equality deflates the concepts so that using them is less controversial. However, the deflated political interpretation of the ideals precludes them from explaining the significance of choosing principles in an appropriate bargaining position. So, Rawls either fails to justify central moral assumptions or sacrifices the significance of the social contract.

**ARE THE FOLK OBJECTIVISTS ABOUT MORALITY?** (VII-K)

**JOHN PARK, DUKE UNIVERSITY**

**HAGOP SARKISSIAN, CITY UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK–BARUCH COLLEGE**

Moral philosophers of varying theoretical commitments maintain that ordinary, pre-philosophical folk are objectivists about morality, that they view moral issues as having a single correct answer as opposed to several correct answers that are all true relative to a given perspective or culture. This empirical claim has been an article of faith for many philosophers, a datum that must be captured or explained by any theory of morality. But is the claim correct? After reviewing some of the extant philosophical and psychological literature on this topic, we present evidence from a new study suggesting that even while folk often speak in objectivist terms, they might, at some deeper level, embrace relativism about morality.

**DOUBLE EFFECT, SINGLE EXPLANATION** (IV-E)

**SARAH PAUL, BOWDOIN COLLEGE**

Intentional agency seems to bring with it a special kind of knowledge: we generally know what we are doing intentionally without needing to appeal to observation of ourselves in action. But how far does this non-observational knowledge of agency extend? This paper contends that it is not limited to knowledge of what we intend to be doing, as it is generally supposed; in addition, we often know without observation that we are bringing about the foreseen but unintended ‘double effects’ of our intended actions. It is argued that one candidate explanation of non-observational knowledge of agency, Strong Cognitivism about intention, faces a serious challenge in accounting for this fact, whereas the Inferential Theory offers a straightforward explanation. Focusing on knowledge of double effects thus provides a helpful datum in our theory choice.

**EMOTION AND THE VALUE OF UNDERSTANDING** (VI-H)

**ADAM PELSER, BAYLOR UNIVERSITY**

Understanding essentially involves grasping or appreciating significant explanatory relations in complex bodies of information. Appreciating the relative value of some explanatory relations over others is an inherently emotional process, as is evaluative perception generally. Understanding thus essentially involves emotionally perceiving some explanatory relations in complex bodies of information as better than others, according to the concerns and desires motivating inquiry. Moreover, the positive emotional
feeling that accompanies awareness of one’s own understanding, in contrast to the emotional frustration and disappointment that accompany failure to understand important matters, reveals that we have a deep and widely shared desire to understand. That we naturally perceive understanding as valuable is the primary ground and justification—absent defeaters—for our belief that understanding is (objectively) valuable. Emotions are thus importantly constitutive of the nature of understanding and integral to our understanding and appreciation of its value.

**NO (NEW) TROUBLES WITH OCKHAMISM (I-F)**

*Garrett Pendergraft, University of California–Riverside*

David Widerker rejects Ockhamism on the basis of a scenario in which an agent’s ability to alter the fact that God knows that a future action will be performed apparently implies an impossible ability to alter a hard fact about the past. This is an indirect argument insofar as it de-emphasizes the question of whether God’s beliefs are soft. But this strategy succeeds only if the fact under consideration is truly (and clearly) a hard fact about the past. Moreover, the fact has to be such that refraining from the relevant future action will require altering that clearly hard fact. Unfortunately, in the scenario Widerker presents, the posited fact is not what it needs to be. It either entails the occurrence of the action in question or it does not—but, as I will demonstrate, in neither case should the Ockhamist conclude that our freedom to do otherwise is in danger.

**NOZICKEAN SENSITIVITY, INDUCTIVE EVIDENCE, AND CORNEA (II-J)**

*Tim Perrine, Calvin College*

Stephen Wykstra, Calvin College

Arguments from evil are now “evidential,” not “logical.” Many non-theists adduce various empirical features of evil as strong inductive evidence against theism. Many theists argue that given the gap between us and the theistic God, these features aren’t strong evidence at all. This standoff connects to a debate in epistemology: does good evidence needs to be epistemically “sensitive”? We explore the connection by rebutting recent arguments of Justin McBrayer. McBrayer attacks Steve Wykstra’s critique of Rowe’s well-known “noseeum” arguments based on CORNEA. McBrayer notes that CORNEA resembles “sensitivity constraints” found, paradigmatically, on Nozick’s truth-tracking account of knowledge. But “Nozickean sensitivity” is widely seen as unable to handle inductive knowledge; CORNEA, argues McBrayer, similarly fails. For CORNEA “is a sensitivity constraint on evidence, and inductive evidence is often insensitive.” If right, this is bad news for CORNEA, since CORNEA purports to test precisely inductive evidence. But if wrong, it’s an opportunity. If CORNEA can vindicate itself against McBrayer’s counterexamples, it may also help resuscitate Nozickean sensitivity. McBrayer’s counterexamples involve subjunctives, which he treats using standard Lewis semantics for counterfactuals. We argue that a proper use of Lewis semantics requires a distinction between two evidential contexts. We clarify the distinction
using Bayes’ theorem, taking the subjunctives as conditional probabilities. This spotlights fatal ambiguities in McBrayer’s counterexamples, and vindicates CORNEA by a more sensitive use of standard Lewis semantics.

LINGUISTIC CONTEXTUALISM AND FIGURATIVE LANGUAGE (V-G)

MARK PHELAN, YALE UNIVERSITY

In ordinary instances of communication propositional contents are intuitively grasped as the meanings of utterances. Linguistic Contextualists contend such utterance meanings are partially determined by context-sensitive processes that operate on pronounced expressions, but are not linguistically mandated. I discuss some such processes commonly posited by contextualists, and some principles to which they appeal to constrain utterance interpretation. I then use examples to suggest that the intuitive meanings of figures of speech (i.e., metaphors, metonymies, etc.) are calculable and suitably constrained according to the relevant processes and principles. Thus, contextualism identifies figurative meanings (like literal meanings) with utterance meanings. This presents a problem about how to differentiate literal and figurative utterances. I suggest an account of figurative language that is available to contextualists and respects the distinction language users draw between figurative and literal utterances.

PHENOMENAL CONCEPTS AND THE NATURE OF PHENOMENAL CONSCIOUSNESS (VII-H)

VINCENT PICCIUTO, UNIVERSITY OF MARYLAND–COLLEGE PARK

This paper adapts an account of phenomenal concepts to form a novel version of a dual-content, higher-order representationalist theory of phenomenal consciousness: the higher-order quotational thought theory. Contrary to the received view of phenomenal concepts, which merely employs phenomenal concepts in response to various anti-physicalist arguments, it is argued that such concepts partly constitute phenomenally conscious states. Thus, in addition to providing a response to anti-physicalist arguments, it is argued that phenomenal concepts can play an important explanatory role in an account of the nature of phenomenally conscious states. After discussing three potentially insurmountable problems for standard higher-order theories, it is shown that the novel version introduced avoids such problems and has additional explanatory advantages over similar, competing dual-content theories.

TOWARD A LESS CONFIDENT COGNITIVISM (IV-E)

LEWIS POWELL, UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA

Cognitivism about intention is the view that intentions involve beliefs. The principle motivation for the view is to explain norms on intention by appeal to norms on belief. The dominant versions of Cognitivism achieves these explanations at the cost of the very controversial assumption that no agent can intend to do something without believing that they will do it. If this fairly counterintuitive commitment is necessary to achieve the cognitivist’s explanatory aims, the view is that much less appealing. In this
paper, I develop versions of cognitivism that achieve the same explanatory success without having to embrace this counterintuitive requirement. The views developed invoke and explore considerations about semantic differences arising from slight shifts in tense or aspect, such as “S will Φ,” “S is Φ-ing,” and “S is going to Φ.”

**PLATO’S KINETIC THEORY (I-I)**

*BRIAN PRINCE, RICE UNIVERSITY*

In his later dialogues, Plato uses kinesis as a category to cover all forms of change. If he had successfully explained all forms of change as kineses, then his definition of soul would have allowed him to claim that souls are the source of all change. Readers of the later dialogues are aware, of course, that Plato does not make these claims straightforwardly. But he does seem to be collecting the pieces of such a theory in his late dialogues. I will argue here that the *Timaeus* contains three theories that make all non-psychic changes kineses. These are 1) the elemental theory, which accounts for qualitative change, 2) the section on time, accounting for temporal change, and 3) the *hypodoche*, explaining the existence of the space in which all changes occur. I then consider whether we should read “kinesis” as “change in general” or as “locomotion,” preferring the latter.

**OBJECT THEORY AND AR (V-H)**

*DANIEL RABINOFF, UNIVERSITY OF MANITOBA*

This paper examines certain paradoxes as they pertain to possible worlds construed as maximal entities of some sort of other. I present two common views of possible worlds, one which construes them as maximal properties, the other construing them as maximal states of affairs. I examine a couple well known paradoxes that arise from these theories. I’ll then present a third view of possible worlds given by Otávio Bueno and Edward Zalta. According to this view possible worlds are abstract objects that represent maximal possibilities in a particular way. This theory is supposed to have the virtue of easily avoiding the forementioned paradoxes. I’ll argue that this view does not avoid the paradoxes any better than the two stated orthodox views.

**THE PROBLEM OF NEGATIVE EXISTENTIALS INADVERTENTLY SOLVED (IV-F)**

*GREG RAY, UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA*

The problem of negative existentials is one of the classic problems in philosophy of language, but in this talk, I mean to argue that latter-day developments in truth-theoretic semantics solved this problem without any help from us, and due to accidents of history, no one noticed. Some have worked hard to develop a solution to the problem using the tools of truth-theoretic semantics—Tyler Burge (1974), Larson and Segal (1995), and, at book-length, Mark Sainsbury (2005), have developed such treatments. In each of these cases, the core idea is to drive the semantic theory on offer with a non-standard logic. But I will argue that straight-up, classical-if-
you-like truth-theoretic semantics already solves the problem of negative existentials without special work.

JUSTIFICATION AS THE APPEARANCE OF KNOWLEDGE (VI-H)

STEVEN REYNOLDS, ARIZONA STATE UNIVERSITY

Adequate epistemic justification is best conceived as the appearance, over time, of knowledge to the subject. “Appearance” is intended literally, not as a synonym for belief. It is argued through consideration of examples that this account gets the extension of “adequately justified belief” at least roughly correct. A more theoretical reason is then offered to regard justification as the appearance of knowledge: If we have a knowledge norm for assertion, we do our best to comply with this norm when we express as assertions only beliefs that appear to us to be knowledge. If we are doing our best, there is little point in further sanctions. So a norm of knowledge for assertion would lead to a secondary norm of justified belief as the appearance of knowledge, marking a point at which our assertions may be corrected but should not be blamed.

AGENT CAUSATION AND ACTING FOR REASONS (III-F)

REBEKAH L. H. RICE, SEATTLE PACIFIC UNIVERSITY

The Agent-Causal Theory of Action claims that an event counts as an action when, and only when, it is caused by an agent. Randolph Clarke is sometimes characterized as defending a “hybrid” view which incorporates both agent-causation and event-causation. According to Clarke, an action is a behavior that is both caused by the agent (i.e., agent-caused) and caused by the agent’s reasons (i.e., event-caused). The central merit of the view, Clarke contends, is that it secures the agent’s control over her action while also offering a satisfying account of reason-explanation. This paper aims to show that Clarke’s version of the agent-causal theory fails to adequately account for what it is to act for a reason. And it thereby fails to account for the sort of action properly understood to characterize much, if not all, significant human activity.

NIETZSCHE AND MORAL OBLIGATION (II-E)

SIMON ROBERTSON, UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHAMPTON

There is a growing appreciation that many of Nietzsche’s central concerns arise from, and engage with, the same traditions that shape contemporary ethical thought. Nonetheless, there may also be a common suspicion that what Nietzsche himself gestured towards has by now been articulated, and articulated more cogently, by other writers. Drawing upon the structure of an argument I have sketched elsewhere, in this paper I fill in some of its details in order to reconstruct a Nietzschean critique of obligation-centered moral theory. In doing so, I show that Nietzsche’s critique, although not dissimilar from that offered by some more recent morality critics, not only pushes in slightly different directions but may have more bite.
MUSIC, MOOD, AND MISATTRIBUTION (XI-B)

Jenifer Robinson, University of Cincinnati

There is good empirical evidence that music can arouse at least some of the “garden-variety” emotions, such as fear, sadness, and joy, that it is capable of expressing. But it’s unclear how this can happen. Cognitive appraisal theorists claim that emotions appraise a situation in terms of its significance to survival and/or well-being: in sadness, for example, a situation is appraised as an occurrence of loss. But there is no relevant loss involved in listening to sad music. According to Jesse Prinz’s “embodied appraisal” theory, emotions are a species of perception and the emotions apparently aroused by music are a kind of perceptual illusion, but the feelings aroused seem genuine. Some philosophers of music have argued that music can arouse only moods or emotional feelings, but it’s still unclear what the mechanism of arousal can be in that case. I argue that misattribution theory can perhaps explain this puzzling phenomenon.

BLAME AND THE MORAL RELATIONSHIP (X-G)

Andrew Peter Ross, Queen’s University

In Moral Dimensions, T. M. Scanlon argues that blame is primarily concerned with, and operates as a response to, the impairment of human relationships. Significantly, explaining blame as relationship-dependent, commits Scanlon to the view that we are in an ongoing relationship with all potentially blameworthy agents. Prior to any form of interaction, or so Scanlon argues, we have a moral relationship with all rational agents. R. Jay Wallace, in a forthcoming essay, argues that it is misleading to think of the moral relationship as anything more than a merely notional connection. I interpret the significance of Wallace’s claim to lie in the fact that a notional connection cannot account for the particular way in which we focus on, and feel vulnerable to, the attitudes of immoral strangers. In response to Wallace, I argue that the contractualist understanding of justifiability can account for the shortcomings of a notional connection.

ON THE DEBT OF GADAMERIAN HERMENEUTICS TO SCHILLER’S LETTERS ON AESTHETIC EDUCATION (XI-E)

Nathan Ross, Oklahoma City University

This paper examines the relation of Schiller’s Letters on Aesthetic Education to Gadamer’s philosophical hermeneutics, particularly by examining the concepts of “play” and “appearance” in Schiller’s thought. The paper points out parallels between the two thinkers which remain unacknowledged in Gadamer’s critique of Schiller. The first main section of the paper examines the notion of play in Schiller, pointing out that Schiller conceives of play in a medial voice, much as Gadamer does. This means that Schiller’s conception of art is not one-sidedly subjective in the way that Gadamer believes. The second section directly takes on Gadamer’s claim that Schiller’s notion of aesthetic appearance sunders art from truth, by arguing that Schiller conceives of appearance as a mode of truth.
LOVE OF LIVING OR BEING-TOWARDS-DEATH? HEIDEGGER CONTRA FRANKFURT (VIII-F)

B. SCOT ROUSSE, NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY

Harry Frankfurt has recently argued that the biological instinct for self-preservation, or “love of living,” plays “a comprehensively foundational” role in the constitution of our practical identities. He argues in general that most basic commitments and cares which guide an agent’s personal practical reflection are best conceived on the model of naturalistic facts, foundational for and located completely without the normative space of reasons. The claim is that in questions of practical identity there is a definite priority of the factual over the normative. Martin Heidegger on the other hand argues that human identity cannot ultimately bottom out in any natural facts except, perhaps, the fact of human mortality. I show that, on the Heideggerian view, the existential and normative significance that Frankfurt finds in the naturalized “love of living” is better captured by the idea that a human identity is fundamentally a lived out in the manner of “being-toward-death.”

THE INDISPENSABILITY OF INTERSUBJECTIVE PROBABILITY (III-I)

DARRELL P. ROWBOTTOM, UNIVERSITY OF OXFORD

This paper argues that an intersubjective interpretation of probability is indispensable in understanding the rationality of science from the point of view of confirmation. It shows how intersubjective probabilities are superior to their subjective counterparts in a number of key respects, in a peculiar class of circumstances relevant to scientific practice. It also shows how group probabilities can be superior to individual probabilities even if rationality constraints other than coherence, e.g., as advocated by Objective Bayesians, are required of degrees of belief. Key considerations are the improved error correction that can occur, and the increased background knowledge that becomes available, through interaction and group decision-making.

QUOTATION AND COMPOSITIONALITY (IV-F)

PAUL SAKA, UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS–PAN AMERICAN

Belief reports command scholarly attention because they appear to violate the principle of compositionality. This is an illusion, however; the real problem lies with quotation. To preserve compositionality a number of semantic theories of quotation have emerged, but aside from their individual shortcomings I argue that they all fail for one grand empirical reason: semantic theories treat quotations as singular terms, yet many quotations function as predicates, prepositions, and other parts of speech. Instead of saying that quotations denote linguistic expressions, I propose that speakers refer to expressions by means of quotations. By shifting theoretical duties from semantic denotation to speaker reference, I am able to save the principle of compositionality. It comes at a price, though: while compositionality is preserved, it loses much of its traditional interest.
RESISTANCE AND RESENTIMENT: MAX SCHELER AND JORGE PORTILLA ON VALUES AND THEIR FRAGILITY (I-B)

CARLOS SANCHEZ, SAN JOSE STATE UNIVERSITY

The Mexican philosopher Jorge Portilla’s *Fenomenología del relajo* is perhaps the best example of the existential phenomenological tradition in 20th century Latin America. Borrowing from the canonical sources (Husserl, Heidegger, Scheler), Portilla produces a unique analysis of Mexican culture, one that, while grounded in a particular time and place, nonetheless achieves universal appeal, as it contributes and complements Max Scheler’s analysis of *ressentiment* through a concept Portilla calls “relajo.” *Relajo* is not identical to *ressentiment*; it turns out to be temporally prior to it but it is nevertheless, like Scheler’s notion, a non-reflective, yet conscious, act of suspending value and undermining its cultural, historical, and social force. This paper explores Portilla’s phenomenology of *relajo* and its relation to Scheler’s *Ressentiment*. It is safe to say that Portilla’s work represents the ultimate encroachment of the existential phenomenological tradition in Latin America—my aim is to show how this is the case.

CAN ONE BET ON ONE’S OWN IGNORANCE? (III-I)

JOHANNES SCHMITT, UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA

In this paper I shall investigate a well-know problem for Dutch book arguments for the Ratio formula, i.e. arguments that aim to show that anyone whose conditional subjective probability of C given A does not equal the ratio of their subjective probability of A & C and their subjective probability of A is thereby irrational. The problem is that some conditional probabilities of a subject cannot be captured by any (conditional) betting strategy offered by a bookie. I will suggest that the problem is closely related to the fact that for any subject there are some true propositions that are unknowable for the subject. I suggest a way to avoid the problem by choosing what I call an interpersonal betting strategy—I will then argue that this solution will not be universally acceptable and that it fails to vindicate the tight correspondence between betting prices and (conditional) degrees of belief.

WISDOM, COURAGE, AND NATURAL VIRTUE AT PROTAGORAS 349D-351A (III-H)

J. CLERK SHAW, UNIVERSITY OF TENNESSEE

In this paper, I examine some neglected difficulties in Socrates’s first attempt to show that courage is wisdom in the *Protagoras*. I then tentatively argue (with help from his second attempt and the Laches) that the most plausible resolutions of these difficulties reveal a complicated Socratic view of the relationships among boldness, courage, and wisdom. In particular, the difficulties are most easily resolved if Socrates accepts three grades of courage (natural courage, technical courage, and philosophical courage) and not just the last of these, as standard interpretations have it.
WHAT CONSTRUCTIVISM CANNOT ACCOMPLISH (IX-G)

LEE SHEPSKI, UNIVERSITY OF TENNESSEE

Many philosophers defend the view that morality is in some sense objective—roughly, that the most fundamental moral facts are the same for everyone. Many also defend the view that morality has normative authority—that rational agents normally have some reason to be moral. These theses are not uncontroversial, but prominent versions of expressivism, realism, and constructivism all attempt to accommodate both. I argue that constructivism cannot succeed in this attempt: constructivism can purchase objectivity only at the expense of normative authority and vice-versa. As I understand constructivism, both Kantian views and Ideal Observer theories count as constructivist. I examine an example of each of these types of theory (as developed by Christine Korsgaard and Michael Smith, respectively), explain why neither can accommodate both objectivity and normative authority, and conclude by drawing a general moral about constructivism.

THE RATE OF TIME’S PASSAGE IN THE MOVING SPOTLIGHT THEORY (VI-I)

BRADFORD SKOW, MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY

Objective becoming is notoriously difficult to make sense of, and asking “How fast does time pass?” is supposed to bring out one way in which it is obscure. In this paper I look at what the moving spotlight theory (which incorporates objective becoming) says about the rate at which time passes. There are many versions of this theory, and (I will argue) all of them have acceptable responses to a request for the rate of time’s passage. But looking at those responses points to problems with the primitive tense operators employed by the best version of the theory. I tentatively suggest a new version of the theory that avoids those problems.

THE MORAL CLOUT OF REASONABLE BELIEFS (III-D)

HOLLY M. SMITH, RUTGERS UNIVERSITY

It is often held that an action is subjectively right for an agent to do just in case that action is best for her to do in light of her ideal beliefs—the beliefs that it would be reasonable for her to have in the circumstances. This paper examines the arguments that might be offered for this view, finds them unpersuasive, and argues that compelling reasons can be found for holding that what is subjectively right for an agent to do is what it is best for her to do in light of her actual beliefs, however flawed, rather than the beliefs that it would be reasonable for her to have.

ASYMMETRICAL VIRTUE PARTICULARISM (VII-K)

REBECCA LYNN STANGL, UNIVERSITY OF VIRGINIA

In this paper, I defend an account of right action that I shall call asymmetrical virtue particularism. An action, on this account, is right just insofar as it is overall virtuous. But the virtuousness of an action in any particular respect, X, is deontically variant; it can fail to be right-making, either because it is
deontically irrelevant or because it is actually wrong-making. Finally, the account is asymmetrical insofar as the viciousness of actions, in contrast to the virtuousness of actions, is not deontically variant; if any action is vicious in some respect Y, then Y is always a wrong-making feature of any action whatever that has Y. This paper focuses on the asymmetricality thesis. Suppose one is trying to offer some virtue-ethical criterion of right action. And suppose that one also finds particularism convincing. Then, I shall argue, one ought to adopt asymmetrical virtue particularism.

**EPISTEMIC DESERT AND THE VALUE OF KNOWLEDGE (I-E)**
*Jerry Joseph Steinhofer, Brown University*

Whenever a subject knows a proposition, they have a true belief but are also worthy of that true belief. In this way, knowledge entails epistemic desert. The concept of epistemic desert allows for a simple and elegant solution to the value problem in epistemology. Knowledge is more valuable than mere true belief because (i) it is good to deserve a true belief and (ii) it is good to have a true belief and deserve to have that true belief. There are several significant advantages of this proposal. (1) It allows us to explain the value of knowledge by classifying knowledge as particular kind of valuable phenomena: deserved success. (2) It identifies a distinctive non-derivative epistemic final value that is associated with justification: the desert of true belief. (3) It identifies a consolidating epistemic value. (4) It is consistent with the view that true belief is the fundamental epistemic value.

**OVERCOMING OPPOSITES: NIETZSCHE’S MINIMAL METHOD OF REVALUATION (VIII-F)**
*Joseph Swenson, University of Illinois–Urbana-Champaign*

In this paper I argue the best overall entry point into Nietzsche’s attempt at a “revaluation of all values” is found neither through appeals to his most well-known doctrines (the Will-to-Power, Eternal Return, Ubermensch, etc.) nor through his critique of particular traditional values (selflessness, compassion, truth, etc.). Rather, I argue that prior to these much discussed features of Nietzsche’s project one finds a minimal methodological starting point for revaluation in his critical engagement with deeply rooted prejudices or “foreground estimates” that constitute the implicit evaluative background against which explicit traditional values and moral commitments show up as intelligible, binding, and purposive. In particular, I will focus on what Nietzsche considers to be the most pervasive background prejudice of the Western tradition: the metaphysical belief in the “opposition of values.” Through a consideration of this prejudice, I propose that Nietzsche’s most basic method of revaluation is best understood as an attempt to overcome traditional values and their background prejudices through a novel appropriation of their own traditional authority.
IN DEFENSE OF NONSOCRATIC SKEPTICISM (VI-J)

PHILIP SWENSON, UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA—RIVERSIDE

Gary Watson has defended a version of nonsocratic skepticism about weakness of will. Nonsocratic skepticism holds that, although it is possible for a person to act against his better judgement, no one ever does so while processing the ability to act in accordance with his better judgement. Bonnie Kent has offered three arguments for the conclusion that Watson’s version of nonsocratic skepticism does not provide an adequate account of weakness of will. My goal is to respond to each of these arguments. I maintain that Watson’s version of nonsocratic skepticism (or at least a version quite similar to his) can be developed in such a way that it avoids the force of Kent’s criticisms.

JOINT ATTENTION AND MORAL CHARISMA (IX-F)

ANDREW TERJESSEN, RHODES COLLEGE

It has long been thought that moral character can transform people you interact with, but it is less commonly held that the moral character of a leader can transform a community through the mere possession of good character (and not the exercise of it). In the Confucian tradition, the de of a leader can change the people and even the natural world. De has often been translated as “virtue,” but this translation loses the sense of moral charisma that can change a world. I suspect this is because it seems a bit too mystical for most normative ethicists. I will argue that studies of joint attention suggest a way in which to reclaim the moral charisma of virtue (in the East and West) as we may jointly attend to the world with a leader and have his attitude reshape how we view the world through joint attention.

PRAGMATIC INVARIANTISM AND EXTERNAL WORLD SKEPTICISM (IV-G)

ERIC THOMPSON, UNIVERSITY OF TENNESSEE

My primary objective in this paper is to show that Pragmatic Invariantism entails external world skepticism. Toward this end, I’ll first introduce a basic version of Pragmatic Invariantism (PI). Then I’ll introduce a sample skeptical hypothesis (SK) to the framework. From this I will show that it is extremely important that the phenomenally equivalent skeptical scenarios generated by SK are actually false. We’ll then see that by combining PI and SK, the effect will be to place extremely high demands upon evidence for ?SK. It will finally be observed that, while we may have good evidence for ?SK, we do not have extremely strong evidence sufficient for establishing ?SK. This supports my conclusion that any standard version of PI ultimately entails external world skepticism. If successful, my conclusion will critically undermine the current view that PI is actually a skeptically resistant position.
DOES DISAGREEMENT LEAD TO SKEPTICISM? (XI-F)

MICHAEL G. THUNE, JOLIET JUNIOR COLLEGE

Elsewhere, I offer my own positive view about the epistemological significance of disagreement. In this paper, I argue that Richard Feldman’s view (which holds that disagreement between “epistemic peers” very often requires that both sides suspend judgment about the proposition or propositions in dispute) is committed to the soundness of an argument which, I argue, contains a false premise. Other salient versions of the skeptical view have their critics; for space considerations, I focus only on Feldman’s version. To a significant extent, these other versions are like Feldman’s in their assumption that disagreements between epistemic peers typically involve epistemic symmetry between the relevant beliefs. Thus, showing that in a significant range of cases, such an assumption is or is likely to be false gives us a reason to think that the skeptical view about disagreement is generally mistaken.

POLLING AS PEDAGOGY: EXPERIMENTAL PHILOSOPHY IN A METAPHYSICS COURSE (IV-I)

KEVIN L. TIMPE, NORTHWEST NAZARENE UNIVERSITY

In “Polling as Pedagogy: Experimental Philosophy as a Valuable Tool for Teaching Philosophy,” Thomas Nadelhoffer and Eddy Nahmias argue that experimental philosophy is a pedagogically useful tool to bring into the classroom. Among the benefits they suggest are increasing student engage with the material, encouraging classroom discussion, increased distribution of class participation, and increased knowledge of what students find counterintuitive. In this presentation, I describe my own use of experimental philosophy in a metaphysics course. I describe the preparation and implementation of surveys, as well as the results of those surveys. I also consider what are some of the difficulties I encountered.

REVISING REVISIONISM (I-F)

KEVIN L. TIMPE, NORTHWEST NAZARENE UNIVERSITY

In a series of recent papers, Manuel Vargas has elaborated and defended a revisionist approach to free will and moral responsibility. In the present paper, I shall argue that for all its virtues, revisionism is not an alternative to the triad of compatibilism, hard determinism, and libertarianism; it is instead a kind of compatibilism. I begin by presenting revisionism in general and then discuss the particular form of revisionism that Vargas advocates. I then develop two interrelated arguments for the claim that Vargas’ revisionism is a particular species of compatibilism, and thereby ought to be labeled as such. Along the way, I point out reasons why this terminological precision is important, while also agreeing with Vargas that the focus on the compatibility issue may not track all important aspects of the free will and moral responsibility literatures.
CONTINGENCY AND RELATIVE SIGNIFICANCE DEBATES IN BIOLOGY (I-H)

ANDREW MARGENOT, CONNECTICUT COLLEGE
DEREK TURNER, CONNECTICUT COLLEGE

In a series of papers, John Beatty has argued that the contingency of evolutionary history explains why relative significance debates are more prevalent in biology than in other areas of science. This paper develops an objection to Beatty’s project. We observe that one of the many relative significance debates in biology concerns the relative significance of contingency vs. convergence in evolutionary history. To attempt to explain that debate by appeal to the contingency of evolutionary history would be circular. After developing this objection and examining one reply that Beatty could make, we offer our own alternative explanation for the prevalence of relative significance debates in biology, one that avoids this circularity problem.

SPECIES, GENES, AND THE TREE OF LIFE (I-H)

JOEL VELASCO, STANFORD UNIVERSITY

The Tree of Life represents the genealogical history of life. But there are multiple levels of biological organization. Here I argue that while species-based genealogies are not helpful, there are two ways of understanding genealogy for phylogenetics—organism centric and gene centric. The organismal view reduces the history of species to the history of organisms. This naturally connects with viewing the Tree as representing the full network of organismal connections. The gene-centric view defines an exclusive group as a group of organisms that forms a clade for more of the genome than any conflicting clade. On this view, taxa occupy a unique position on the “primary concordance tree.” But each gene has its own historical “tree of life.” I conclude by arguing that both organismal and gene-centric view and their corresponding trees of life are objectively real and play important, but different, roles in biological practice.

A LATIN AMERICAN PHILOSOPHY BEYOND PERNICIOUS KNOWLEDGE (I-B)

ALEJANDRO VALLEGA, CALIFORNIA STATE UNIVERSITY–STANISLAUS

This paper seeks a space for new directions in philosophical thought—a space not determined by the history, practices, and conceptual expectations of the subjective rationalism that sustains Western modern philosophy. I first outline specific characteristics of modern philosophy as viewed from a Latin American perspective; making explicit some of the practices and expectations that organize modernity and obscure and deny other possible forms of thought. I then explain how one might relocate thought in light of the recognition of total exteriority in Latin American philosophy, an exteriority that occurs out of concrete situated experiences and in contrast to the Western conception of temporality as a single lineal natural progression that must culminates with Western rationality. The paper closes with specific examples of how thought might be conceived from a position of radical exteriority. Some of the figures discussed are Augusto Salazar Bondi, Enrique Dussel, and Anibal Quijano.
CAN THERE BE ASSOCIATIVE POLITICAL OBLIGATIONS? (VII-G)

BAS VAN DER VOSSEN, INDEPENDENT SCHOLAR

The primary purpose of theories of political obligation is to establish the legitimacy of a state. Because these are typically thought to be enforceable, showing that subjects have political obligations might justify the state’s right to rule. According to the theory of associative obligation, the members of certain associations, namely good associations, have obligations in virtue of their membership. As a theory of political obligations, it holds that the subjects of good societies are obligated to obey the law. However, even if the theory succeeds in establishing the (controversial) conclusion that there are associative obligations, it still fails as a view about political obligation. The problem, I argue, is that the special bond identified in the associativist argument as generating obligations is typically dissolved by the very acts of disobedience. Therefore, the theory cannot support the enforcement of the law, and consequently fails to support the legitimacy of states.

THE LOCKEAN “ENOUGH-AND-AS-GOOD” PROVISO: AN INTERNAL CRITIQUE (VIII-G)

HELGA VARDEN, UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS—URBANA-CHAMPAIGN

An account of private property is central to a liberal theory of justice. Much of the appeal of the Lockean theory stems from its account of the so-called “enough-and-as-good” proviso, a principle which aims to specify each employable person’s fair share of the earth’s material resources. I argue that Lockeans fail to show how the proviso can be applied without thereby undermining a guiding intuition in Lockean theory. This guiding intuition is that by interacting in accordance with the proviso, employable persons interact as subject to the “laws of nature” rather than as subject to one another’s arbitrary will. Because Locke’s own and contemporary Lockean conceptions of the proviso subject some persons to some other persons’s arbitrary will, the proviso so conceived cannot function as it should, namely as a principle that restricts interacting persons’s actions reciprocally.

SEMANTIC NORMATIVITY AND NATURALISM (V-G)

CLAUDINE VERHEGGEN, YORK UNIVERSITY IN TORONTO

I distinguish among three senses in which meaning may be said to be normative, one trivial, the other two more robust. According to the trivial sense, meaningful expressions have conditions of correct application. According to the first robust sense, these conditions are determined by norms. According to the second robust sense, statements about meaning have normative implications. Normativity in one or the other of the robust senses, but not in the trivial sense, is commonly thought to pose a threat to naturalism. I argue that, given its trivial normativity, meaning cannot be normative in the first robust sense but it is normative in the sense that statements about the meaning of terms have hypothetical normative implications that are essential to meaning. I further argue that
this normativity itself poses no threat to naturalism. Rather, this normativity follows from the fact that the trivial normativity of meaning precludes its naturalization.

**Modal Supervenience and Modal Mereology (X-H)**

**SEAN DRYSDALE WALSH, UNIVERSITY OF MINNESOTA–DULUTH**

In this paper, I argue that (a) a wide variety of mereological views, including three and four-dimensionalism as well as universalism and restrictivism, falls prey to this inconsistent triad, and that (b) the solution to avoid this triad (and to avoid Cambridge Changes creating substantial changes) is to hold a modified modal form of mereological supervenience, and that (c) this solution points to the plausibility of a modal mereology as well, in which one is a universalist about possible composition and a restrictivist about actual composition.

**Virtues as Robust Traits—An Analysis of Doris’s Situationist Challenge (IX-I)**

**ELLIE HUA WANG, INDIANA UNIVERSITY–BLOOMINGTON**

Doris has recently challenged Aristotelian moral psychology on the basis that its commitment to widespread robust traits is not empirically supported. However, Doris does not specify a clear standard for possession of robust traits, and he does not use the experimental results in the way often presumed by his critics. As a result, critics have often read Doris in a way that is not only incompatible with his relevant remarks, but does not locate what Doris is really after. This paper aims to engage Doris’s challenge by giving the best interpretation of it. I first clarify the problems with a popular criticism of Doris by referencing his remarks, and identify his potential target by addressing the Aristotle conception of virtue development. I then show that Doris’s challenge best interpreted nonetheless neglects the complexity involved in virtue development and trait manifestation. Last, I point to empirical evidence supporting Aristotelian moral psychology.

**In Search of a Non-Counterfactual Foundation for Mechanistic Explanation (VI-F)**

**JONATHAN A. WASKAN, UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS–URBANA-CHAMPAIGN**

Resurgent interest in both mechanistic and counterfactual theories of explanation has led to a fair amount of discussion regarding the relative merits of these two approaches. James Woodward is currently the pre-eminent counterfactual theorist, and he criticizes the mechanists on the following grounds: Unless mechanists about explanation invoke counterfactuals, they can not make sense of claims about interactions between mechanism parts or of explanations that put forward absent knowledge of productive mechanisms. He claims that these shortfalls can be offset if mechanists will just borrow key tenets of his counterfactual theory, but this is something of a Trojan horse. Here I argue that Woodward’s critique is based upon the mistaken assumption that actualist-mechanists
about causal claims are committed to the idea that causal claims always make assertions about specific productive mechanisms. His critique fails, however, if there is a viable topic-neutral actualist-mechanist alternative.

**IS GOVERNMENT SUPEREROGATION POSSIBLE? (VIII-G)**

*Justin Weinberg, University of South Carolina*

Governments often perform acts that seem morally good, but which are not required by any plausible theory of justice. Acts which no one is required to perform, but would be morally good if performed, are supererogatory. Thus, it appears governments perform supererogatory acts. But is that what’s really happening? In this paper, I argue that because of the kind of agent government is, actual government supererogation is virtually impossible. If we wish to preserve the possibility of government supererogation, common views about the relationship between justice and morality, and the relationship between coercion and justice, must be revised.

**LOCKE’S INTERNAL EXTERNALISM (II-G)**

*Shelley Weinberg, University of Illinois*

Most scholarship sees Locke as endorsing a representational theory of perception, in which the direct object of thinking is an idea. Locke’s treatment of the inverted spectrum, however, seems to suggest the contrary: thinking isn’t about privately experienced mental objects, but about publicly available external causes. I argue that, for Locke, thinking is directed toward subjectively experienced mental items that at the same time succeed in acting as pure indicators of their causes. My account is different from other recent interpretations in that I do not think Locke gives up internalism with respect to simple ideas of sensation, for the “truth” of an idea is dependent on the conformity of elements internal to the perception of the idea. Key is the complexity involved in the perception of an idea, which helps to explain why the incorporation of externalist elements does not mean that Locke has or must give up internalism.


*Zhang Weiwei, Tsinghua University*

The paper elucidates human dignity and life theory of contemporary theologian and philosopher Max Scheler and Jacques Maritain. Its purpose is to view the premise of dignity and human life as the concept of Human Person related to God, the reason theory in scholastic philosophy, and possibility of universal theory of soul or ego instead of contextual historical ethics. From context of the Other, the paper compares to a different human existent context in Chinese coherent tradition, which is the harmony of universe and human, the authority of Human person originating from natural life and realistic existence similar to all natural creatures; this
ethos cannot produce the view of the dignity of life in the West. All cultures should face the questions of modernity for searching of self or a new self; I think Chinese culture should integrate another Truth theory or develop a new perspective on traditional Ren.

**PLATO’S CICADAS (IX-J)**

*DAN WERNER, SUNY AT NEW PALTZ*

Plato’s myth of the cicadas occurs at a crucial moment in the *Phaedrus*, since it marks the transition between the two halves of the dialogue. But just what is the purpose of this myth? I believe that Socrates is using it to offer a warning to Phaedrus. The message is that Phaedrus—and we as readers—should avoid an uncritical, sleeplike reaction to the just-completed palinode, and should not treat the speech as if it were the final word. Instead we must recognize the limitations of the palinode, and engage in a higher-order investigation of its claims via philosophical dialectic. The myth of the cicadas thus plays a metanarrative role, and dramatically exemplifies the notion of *psychagogia* (“leading of the soul”) which is central to the discussion of rhetoric in the second half of the *Phaedrus*. In this way, the myth helps to unify the dialogue as a whole.

**CHARACTER MATCHING AND THE ENVELOPE OF BELIEF (I-E)**

*GREGORY WHEELER, NEW UNIVERSITY OF LISBON*

The Lockean position on rational belief maintains that an individual fully believes a proposition just when her degree of confidence is high enough to pass some previously specified threshold. One historic challenge for the view is persuading a probabilist why he should bother with the Lockean position altogether. Scott Sturgeon (2008) has recently offered a probabilism-friendly defense of the Lockean position which turns upon a principle he calls “Character Matching.” In this paper I argue against accepting this normative principle and in doing so I present an alternative threshold view that I call the Envelope of Belief. My view maintains that full belief is sensitive not only to the evidence for a claim, but also to the ratio of the risk to reward from acting on the belief. The view is briefly contrasted with recent discussions of stake-sensitive accounts of belief as well.

**WHAT CAN WE KNOW ABOUT WHAT IT IS LIKE TO BE A DOLPHIN, AND WHY IT MATTERS: DOLPHIN CONSCIOUSNESS AND THE ETHICAL IMPLICATIONS (VII-J)**

*THOMAS WHITE, LOYOLA MARYMOUNT UNIVERSITY*

In the last twenty years, scientists studying a variety of large-brained mammals have discovered that cognitive abilities traditionally thought to be unique to humans are present in other mammals. Research on dolphins has provided the most dramatic picture of sophisticated intellectual and emotional abilities in nonhumans. This raises important questions about the character of dolphin consciousness and the ethics of human/dolphin contact. Any inquiry of such matters, however, must begin with Thomas
Nagel’s “What Is It Like to Be a Bat?” This paper follows Nagel’s lead by asking what we can know in answer to the question, what is it like to be a dolphin? I argue that a close study of recent scientific research on dolphins allows us both to heed Nagel’s cautions and to make preliminary inferences about dolphin subjective states. Accordingly, I conclude that at least one controversial practice—the Japanese “drive hunts”—is ethically indefensible.

**TERRITORY, AUTHORITY, AND THE PEOPLE: RETHINKING MODERN SOVEREIGNTY TODAY (VII-G)**

**MATT WHITT, VANDERBILT UNIVERSITY**

In this paper, I examine modern theories of sovereignty in order to clarify the stakes of contemporary reconfigurations of political authority and territory. I first argue that modern sovereignty is characterized by a tension between theological understandings of dominion and secular notions of authority. Together, these conflicting visions of sovereign command imagine the collective subject of sovereignty—“the people”—as both the creation of, and precondition for, sovereign rule. This tension appears throughout modern and contemporary political philosophy in the form of familiar problems and paradoxes. However, the tension has historically been occluded—but never resolved—by an appeal to territory as a criterion of collective subjection. By defining “the people” over whom a sovereign rules, territoriality renders modern ideals of sovereignty both theoretically coherent and practically realizable. As territorial sovereignty gives way to globalization, new criteria of subjection, such as ‘all-affected principles,’ stand to inherit this very modern function.

**ON THE EVOLUTIONARY DEBUNKING OF MORALITY (VI-G)**

**ERIK J. WIELENBERG, DEPAUW UNIVERSITY**

Evolutionary debunkers of morality maintain that the availability of evolutionary explanations for human moral beliefs threatens the view that humans possess moral knowledge. A crucial premise of the arguments of such debunkers is the claim that if S’s moral belief that P can be explained without appealing to the truth of P, then S’s moral belief that P lacks warrant. I sketch a possible evolutionary explanation for some human moral beliefs. I draw on this explanation to show that, given a reliabilist approach to warrant, the arguments of evolutionary debunkers can be resisted. On my account, some human moral beliefs are produced by reliable processes and hence may constitute knowledge even if such beliefs can be explained without appealing to their truth.

**PLATO’S METHODOLOGY IN REPUBLIC I-IV (III-H)**

**CHAD E. WIENER, PORTLAND STATE UNIVERSITY**

Vlastos argues that Plato discards *elenchus* for the method of hypothesis. Benson challenges this view but also claims that the method of hypothesis is Plato’s preferred method. I argue on behalf of Benson’s first claim
but show the second claim cannot be maintained by appealing to the methodology employed in Republic I-IV. Book I employs the *elenchus*. *Elenchus* reduces its interlocutors to silence so they can no longer say anything concerning the inquiry of justice. The method of hypothesis can continue in such circumstances (*Meno* 87b2-4). Books II-IV shift to answering a problem—whether justice is better than injustice or not. I argue that the city-soul analogy is really an example of problem reduction and employs the method of hypothesis to solve this problem. Such a method continues the inquiry but is inaccurate according to Plato (435c9-d5).

**A Defense of Epistemological Monism (IX-H)**

*Mark E. Wunderlich, Union College*

Contemporary epistemologists suppose that both truth-acquisition and error-avoidance are fundamental epistemological goals, and that these goals must be balanced in any viable theory of epistemic justification. I argue that epistemological monism, taking only error-avoidance to be a fundamental value, is a viable approach. The most salient charge against epistemological monism is that it leads to skepticism. I argue that at least with regard to the project of constructing a theory of epistemic justification, this charge is misguided.

**Al-Ghazali on the Oneness and Simplicity of the Necessary Existent (X-H)**

*Aladdin Yaqub, Lehigh University*

The medieval Islamic philosophers held a certain conception of the divine unity that assumes the necessary existent to be both one and simple: there is only one necessary existent and it admits no composition whatsoever. In *The Incoherence of the Philosophers* Al-Ghazali presents, on behalf of the philosophers, several arguments for this conception and his critique of these arguments. In this paper I consider six of these arguments and offer two possible interpretations of them. The first interpretation sees the first argument as employing the simplicity of the necessary existent to establish its oneness and the other five arguments as invoking oneness to establish simplicity. The second interpretation doesn’t offer a new reading for the first argument but sees the other five arguments as defending the simplicity of the necessary existent based on its basic concept. I present reconstructions of three arguments and explain my preference for the second interpretation.

**The Expansion of “Other than Being”: A Perspective of Political Philosophy on Levinas’s Ethics (X-J)**

*Jiang Yi, Beijing Academy of Social Sciences*

The concept of the Other has a central role in Levinas’ thought, by which we could comprehend all issues developed by the problem of being. No doubt, Levinas emphasizes the religious implication of the concept in his ontology. However, from the worldly perspective, the concept of the
Other has more significance for us in society. In this paper I discuss three questions as follows: How does Otherwise than Being go to the Other? What does the existence of the Other mean for us? How does Otherwise than Being become a topic in the political philosophy? The purpose of the paper is to show that the Other means not only alternative individuals different from us, but the society itself which has different features from every individuals in it, and the social relation among individuals.

EMANATION (OR LACK THEREOF?) IN PLATO AND PLOTINUS (I-I)

DAVID J. YOUNT, MESA COMMUNITY COLLEGE

Emanation is used by some commentators as a differentiator between the philosophies of Plato and Plotinus. However, I will show that the following claim is false: Plotinus has the view that lower entities or hypostases—Soul and Intellect—emanate from or, as Plotinus states, are “outflows” of higher principles or hypostases (that is, Soul emanates from Intellect, and Intellect emanates from the One), but Plato does not. I dispute this claim in two different ways: (1) Plotinus himself states that emanation is only a metaphor and not literal; and (2) even if we grant that Plotinus is an emanationist, Plato is committed at least to the spirit if not the letter or doctrine of emanation as well. If my argument succeeds, one will have to look away from emanation for a differentia between these thinkers. Objections against my view are considered as well.

ON CONFUCIAN GOLDEN RULE, KANT’S CATEGORICAL IMPERATIVE, AND BEAUVOIR’S RECIPROCAL CLAIM (X-J)

LIJUN YUAN, TEXAS STATE UNIVERSITY—SAN MARCOS

This paper will compare three meanings of the same notion of reciprocity, tracing their implications and influences in Chinese women’s status and inferiority. It will analyze why the reciprocal claim can help women to improve and promote their equality and empowerment under the Confucian idea of social harmony, which is compatible with feminist ethics of care.

EXPLOITATION AND NEGLECT (IX-D)

MATT ZWOLINSKI, UNIVERSITY OF SAN DIEGO

Most of us think that those who exploit the vulnerable—who take unfair advantage of them—are committing a serious moral wrong. This judgment persists even when the exploitation is mutually beneficial—that is, even when it leaves both parties better off than they were prior to the transaction. We might also think that those who neglect the vulnerable—who simply ignore their needs—are doing something wrong. But we generally think that neglect is not as bad as exploitation. This is puzzling, since mutually beneficial exploitation does something to make the vulnerable better off, while neglect does not. This paper explores the comparative moral wrongness of exploitation and neglect, setting out the conditions under which the former is worse than the latter, and discussing the implications.
of this difference for practical moral problems such as those involved in sweatshops and price gouging.
PLACEMENT SERVICE INFORMATION

Evonda Acevedo will be the Coordinator for the APA Placement Service at the 2010 Pacific Division Meeting. Questions concerning the Service should be directed to Evonda at The American Philosophical Association, University of Delaware, 31 Amstel Avenue, Newark, DE 19716. She can also be reached by telephone at (302) 831-2012, fax: (302) 831-8690, or email: eacevedo@udel.edu.

APA PLACEMENT SERVICE GENERAL HOURS OF OPERATION:

Wednesday, March 31: Placement Information, 11:00 a.m. – 8:00 p.m., Mezzanine
Thursday, April 1: Placement Information, 8:30 a.m. – 8:00 p.m., Mezzanine
Placement Interviewing, 8:30 a.m. – 8:00 p.m., Ascott, Bristol, and Derby
Friday, April 2: Placement Information, 8:30 a.m. – 5:00 p.m., Mezzanine
Placement Interviewing, 8:30 a.m. – 5:00 p.m., Ascott, Bristol, and Derby
Saturday, April 3: Placement Information, 8:30 a.m. – 1:00 p.m., Mezzanine
Placement Interviewing, 8:30 a.m. – 1:00 p.m., Ascott, Bristol, and Derby

APA PLACEMENT SERVICE LOCATIONS

The Placement Services will be located in the Mezzanine and Ascott, Bristol, and Derby rooms of the Westin St. Francis hotel as outlined below. For your convenience, maps of the hotel appear at the back of this issue.

JOB CANDIDATES – MEZZANINE

1. Candidate Numbers will be assigned at the Placement Desk.
2. The location of a Job Interview will be available from the Placement staff, or posted on the bulletin board at the information desk.
3. Additional “Request for Interview” forms will be available at the Placement Desk.
4. APA Membership Applications will be available at the APA Meeting Registration Desk.
5. Information and instructions for using the Service will be available at the Placement desk (also see following pages), and posted on the information bulletin board.

6. The mailboxes for Job Candidates will be located at the Placement Desk.

7. A complete set of Job Postings will be available at the Placement Desk.

8. A message for the APA Placement Ombudsperson can be left at the Placement Desk.

**Interviewers – Mezzanine**

1. Interviewers check in here—as soon as possible upon arrival.

2. Payments for On-Site Interviewing Departments will be received here.

3. Space will be provided here for interviewers to check their files.

4. “Request for Interview” forms received from job candidates that have been reviewed by interviewers should be returned here.

5. A list of interviewing table assignments will be posted on the Placement Information Bulletin Board.

**Interviewing Area – Ascott, Bristol, and Derby**

1. APA Interviewing Tables will be located here.

2. In the event that additional space for interviewing is needed, we will post the additional location on the Placement Information Bulletin Board.

**Information and Instructions for Job Candidates**

**Requirements for Using the Placement Service**

1. You must be an APA member in order to use the Service. Placement is a benefit of membership for candidates, and there is no additional charge to use this service. Membership applications are available on the APA web site (www.apaonline.org) or by contacting the APA National Office (302) 831-1112, or at the Membership/Registration desk at the Meeting.

2. You must register for the MEETING in order to use the Service.
   - If you register in advance for the meeting and indicate that you will be a candidate (an advance registration form is located at the back of this issue), a candidate number will be assigned in the National Office and will appear on the back of your badge. You must pick up your badge from the APA Registration staff prior to using the Placement service.
   - If you register on-site for the meeting, present your badge to the Placement Staff, who will be available to assign you a candidate number in the “Placement Service” line.
**WHAT TO BRING WITH YOU**

1. Your copies of recent issues of *Jobs For Philosophers*.
2. Several copies of your curriculum vitae. If you run out of CVs at the meeting, the hotel has a copy center located in the Business Center.

**HOW TO USE THE PLACEMENT SERVICE**

After you have picked up your registration materials from the APA Registration staff, you are ready to use the Service. If you do not yet have a candidate number on the back of your badge, please go to the job candidates’ area in the Mezzanine to receive one.

**JOB CANDIDATES’ AREA – MEZZANINE**

Here you will find a file folder (mailbox) with your candidate number on it. All communications addressed to you during the meeting will be placed there. Your folder contains:

1. “Request for Interview” forms. Additional forms will be available from the Placement staff. **Be sure that your Placement Number appears at the top of all forms.**
2. A “Locator” form for you to list your name and hotel address. Please do not remove this form from your folder. This is used only in the event that we need to contact you during the meeting.

**JOB POSTINGS**

New jobs (not having appeared in the *Jobs for Philosophers*) will be posted on a bulletin board in the Placement Service Area. You should check this board regularly for new postings. Each ad should contain instructions on how to apply.

**INSTITUTIONS THAT HAVE CHECKED IN WITH PLACEMENT**

The names of institutions that have registered to use the Service will be posted on the bulletin board (updated regularly) in **alphabetical order**. Each listing will indicate the following:

1. If the listing institution has checked in with Placement.
2. If the institution is accepting interview requests at the meeting.
3. The relevant *JFP* for the institution’s opening(s).
4. Where the institution plans on interviewing (Table with number assignment).
5. Miscellaneous notes deemed appropriate by the Placement staff or the institution.

**SUBMITTING AN INTERVIEW REQUEST FORM**

Complete the *top* portion of the “Request for Interview” form and attach a copy of your CV. **Be sure that your candidate number appears at the top of all forms.** After you have completed the necessary information,
place your request form and CV in the box marked **Requests for Interviews** which will be prominently displayed on the Placement Service Desk. Your “Request” will be forwarded to the institution by a staff member.

**Interviews**

After your “Request” has been reviewed by a representative from the institution, the form will be returned to your file folder with the institution’s response appearing on the **bottom** of the form. Check your file folder often so that you can be certain to receive your messages promptly.

By **1:00 p.m. on April 3**, all “Requests” submitted by you should have been returned to your file folder, and you should remove them at that time. Occasionally, an institution may retain applications to review at a later date. If you applied for a job that had been posted and the institution did not check in with the Service during the meeting, it is suggested that you contact the institution by mail.

**Interviewing Locations**

Some departments will be conducting interviews at tables in Ascott, Bristol, and Derby. Each institution using a table for interviewing will be assigned a table number. The table numbers assigned to institutions will be posted on the bulletin board in the Placement Service Area.

**Advice for Job Applicants**

The APA Committee on Career Opportunities offers the following advice for job applicants: The schedule for those seeking jobs and those Departments offering positions is difficult for all concerned. From the point of view of Departments, any publication date for *Jobs for Philosophers* is a compromise between the competing demands imposed by the need to get funding for positions, so the later the better, and by the need to have time to process applications, so the sooner the better. From the point of view of job applicants, there are also competing demands: the sooner it is published, the more time to apply, but the later it is published, the more opportunities will be available. There is no easy solution to this problem, but you can ease your difficulties somewhat by being prepared when the *JFP* is published. You should have your curriculum vitae ready to put in an envelope, a generic draft of a letter of application ready to be fine-tuned for particular job opportunities, and the rest of your file ready for mailing. This means talking to those who are to write letters of recommendation long before the *JFP* is due to arrive, preparing material about your teaching capacities, and selecting a writing sample for those Departments that request it. Applications should be complete, as well as clearly organized. It is to your advantage to send in your application as soon as possible after an ad appears.
Information and Instructions for Interviewers

Requirements for Using the Placement Service

1. It is expected that **all individual interviewers will register for the meeting** either by using the registration form found in the back of this issue or by stopping at the APA Registration Desk (Mezzanine) to register on-site prior to using the Placement Service.

2. All **Departments (not individuals)** planning to interview at the meeting should complete the Placement Service advance registration form found on our web site, http://www.apaonline.org/divisions/pacific/index.aspx or at the end of this section.

Upon receipt of an advance registration form additional information pertaining to the Placement Service will be sent to the attention of the contact person listed on the form. In the event that we send Placement forms either via email or mail, please be sure to complete these and return them to our office **at your earliest opportunity**. Not doing so may cause your materials to arrive after the Staff has already left the office to travel to the meeting. In this case, we **must** have you fill out the forms again on site. If time does not allow sending them to us, please bring them with you and turn them in at the Placement Desk.

Checking in with the Service

*Before you begin to interview candidates*, please check in with the Placement Staff (Mezzanine). We will need to know that you have arrived on site for candidates inquiring about your institution. Additional information will be requested from you (or confirmed if your department pre-registered) at this time as well.

Some institutions accept interview requests at the meeting; some of these job notices may have appeared in *Jobs for Philosophers* while others are unpublished positions. A new, unpublished position will be assigned an **AD#** and posted on the bulletin board in the Placement Service area. If you are bringing such a job notice with you to the meeting, please provide the Placement Staff with **four** copies of the notice for the position you are advertising. Such a position announcement should be typed on **one side only** in a good size and easy to read font, and be as brief as possible. Only positions that have **not** appeared in *Jobs for Philosophers* will be posted. If you would like a position that has been posted at this meeting to appear on our website immediately following the meeting, or in the issue of *Jobs for Philosophers*, you need to submit this ad immediately, following the close of the meeting via our website, https://member.apaonline.org/formredirect.aspx?p=JFP. If you need assistance with this, contact the APA National Office.

Some institutions interview by prearrangement after placing an advertisement in *Jobs for Philosophers* and then contacting candidates prior to the meeting. When you arrange an interview with candidates, please inform them that they **must be APA Members in order to use the Service and they must register for the meeting in order to use the Service**.
If you plan to conduct job interviews anywhere other than at the interviewing tables/suites we have provided, please let us know your plans because candidates often come to us to ask questions about the location/time (etc.) of their interviews, and we need to have complete, up-to-date information in order to help them (and you).

Departments using a Suite for interviewing will need to complete an interview schedule form at the time they check in with the Service. Doing so enables the Service to notify the candidates you wish to interview of your interviewing location. Be assured that only those candidates listed on your interview schedule will be told the location of your hotel room, unless you have directed us to give this information to all candidates who ask. Departments interviewing at tables DO NOT need to complete this form.

N.B.: If you are conducting interviews in a hotel room, please be aware of the following policy statement adopted by the APA Board of Officers at its November 2004 meeting:

“Departments should not conduct Job Interviews in non-suite hotel rooms. Candidates who are subject to such interviews can appeal to the APA and are guaranteed anonymity.” (Originally published in Proceedings and Addresses of The American Philosophical Association, Vol. 78, No. 5, pp. 23, 119.)

**APA INTERVIEWING TABLES**

The Placement Service provides numbered tables for interviewing purposes; you will receive your table number assignment when you check in. These table number assignments will also be posted on the Placement Service Bulletin Board. Should additional space for interviewing tables be necessary, this location will be posted as well.

**INSTITUTION FILE FOLDER (MAILBOX)**

There will be a file folder bearing the name of your institution located in the Candidates’ Area in the Mezzanine. Requests for interviews from candidates will be placed in this file folder.

**REVIEWING INTERVIEW REQUESTS**

When a candidate requests an interview with your institution, you should receive her/his curriculum vitae attached to a “Request for Interview” form. The bottom of this form is to be completed by you and returned to Placement staff. If an interview is granted, space is provided on this form to list the time, date, and location of the interview. If you are unable to interview a candidate, space for this response is also provided on the form. Any request you receive in an envelope contains confidential material and should be destroyed rather than returned to the candidate. As a matter of professional courtesy, all requests should receive a response. When a candidate receives a “Request” form back without a response, he or she is likely to assume that the material has not been reviewed and might return this to you via our service or contact your institution by mail.
Each candidate is assigned a numbered file folder to facilitate prompt communication between interviewers and candidates. Materials that you wish to transmit to a registered candidate should be handed in to the Placement Service staff located in the Mezzanine, and will be delivered to the candidate by our staff.

**APA Statement on Placement Practices**

The APA Committee on the Status and Future of the Profession reminds you of its Statement on Placement Practices: The APA discourages the nomination by graduate departments of job seekers for positions in philosophy, and the submission of their dossiers in response to announcements of positions, without their knowledge or interest. This may seriously mislead those who are conducting searches, and may have unfortunate consequences both for them and for genuinely interested applicants. Graduate departments using a nomination procedure or submitting dossiers on behalf of job seekers should either attest explicitly that the candidate wishes to be considered for the positions in question, or (preferably) ensure that the job seekers themselves submit personal letters of application for these positions. Departments conducting searches are encouraged to recommend or require explicitly (in their position announcements) that each candidate, to be assessed of full consideration, should submit a personal letter of application for and interest in the announced position.

*A Placement Ombudsperson will be available at the meeting. Please see the Placement Service Staff if you would like to contact the Ombudsperson.*
Placement Service Registration for Interviewing Departments
APA 2010 Pacific Division Meeting
Westin St. Francis – San Francisco, CA, March 31 – April 4, 2010

Only one form is required for each interviewing department. Once completed, this can be faxed to (302) 831-8690.
Institution: ___________________________ Department: ______________________________
Contact: _____________________________ Phone: _______________________________
Address:  _____________________________________________________________________
City, State, Zip: ___________________________ Email: _______________________________
All persons conducting interviews should be registered** for the Pacific Division Meeting as well as the department being registered with the Placement Service.
**Registered members of the department who will be conducting interviews:
_____________________________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________________________

Our department will:
____ need interviewing table(s) Quantity of Tables____
–or–
____ conduct interviews in a hotel suite (you must contact Linda Smallbrook to reserve a suite)

Our department will:
____ provide suite # and list of prearranged candidates to whom suite information may be given
–or–
____ bring suite # and allow service to give to anyone who requests it

Our department will:
____ conduct prearranged interviews only
–or–
____ accept interview requests on-site

Please list the JFP issue(s) (if any) in which this job was advertised: ______________________________
Registration Fees (Please Check One): ______ Pre-Registration, By March 5: $50.00
______ *Regular Registration, After March 5: $75.00
Credit Card Type: (Circle One) VISA / MASTERCARD
Credit Card #:  __________________________________________
Exp. Date: ___________________________ Last 3 Digits on back of card: _______

Name on Card: ___________________________ Phone #: ___________________________
Signature: ___________________________ Email: ___________________________
***Check #: ___________________________ Check Date: ___________________________
Check Amount __________________

***Payable to: The American Philosophical Association. The APA only accepts checks drawn on U.S. banks in U.S. funds, or Int’l. Money Orders in U.S. funds. There is a $10 charge for all returned checks. **If PAYMENT is not received in our office by March 5, 2010 you MUST pay the on-site fee! Please mail form and payment to: Attn: Evonda Acevedo, Placement, The American Philosophical Association, 31 Amstel Avenue, University of Delaware, Newark, DE 19716.
PAPER SUBMISSION GUIDELINES

Online Paper Submissions: Papers may be submitted either electronically or in hard copy by mail. For electronic submissions, follow the instructions on the APA web site. For hard copy submissions, mail to: Evonda Acevedo, ATTN: [Eastern, Pacific, or Central] Division Papers, The American Philosophical Association, University of Delaware, 31 Amstel Avenue, Newark, DE 19716, (302) 831-2012. Papers in any area are welcome. All papers are blind reviewed. Author’s name, institution, or references pertaining to the identity of the author must be removed from the paper, abstract, notes, and bibliography. Papers containing such identifying references may be rejected. Submitted papers are not returned to authors. Papers not accepted by one Division may be re-submitted for consideration to another Division. In submitting papers, authors warrant that those papers are entirely their own work or the joint work of the authors identified in the cover letter, and that, where appropriate, acknowledgement of the contributions of others has been made.

Graduate Student Travel Stipends and Awards: Papers to be considered for Graduate Student Travel Stipends/Awards must meet the criteria specified by each Division. For more information, visit the following address: www.apaonline.org/divisions/stipends/travelstipendsandprizesindex.aspx.

GUIDELINES FOR ALL THREE DIVISIONS

(*Guidelines 6, 7, 9, and 10 only apply to authors who are submitting papers in hard copy.)

1. Authors must be members in good standing of the APA.
2. 1 copy of the paper.
3. 1 copy of the abstract.
4. Colloquium papers are limited to 3,000 words.
5. Abstracts for colloquium papers are limited to 150 words.

*6. Title or cover page, which must include: a) title; b) word counts for all papers and abstracts; c) author’s contact information; d) the Division the paper is to be submitted for. If you are submitting your paper on-line, please exclude this information from your submission.

*7. Papers must be typed on one side of page, double spaced, 1-inch margins on all sides, all pages numbered, 10-12 pt. font.
8. No more than one submission by the same author for the same Division will be considered.
*9. Indicate name of Division on outside lower left side of the envelope containing the paper.

*10. Include a self-addressed stamped envelope to the National Office if you wish the receipt of your paper to be acknowledged.

11. Any paper which is under consideration for publication elsewhere will be considered, provided that it will not appear in print until after the Divisional meeting is held. If this is the case, indicate when and where the paper is expected to be published.

12. Papers are not accepted by e-mail.

13. Authors are advised to provide accurate email addresses as part of their contact information because they may be contacted by email, sometimes under urgent circumstances. Authors who expect to relocate between the date of submission and the date of the meeting should arrange for email forwarding, or else provide both current and new email addresses with their contact information.

14. No one who is scheduled to appear in an invited session on the Main Program of a meeting may also present a submitted paper as part of that same Main Program. Because of this policy, members who have already agreed to participate in invited sessions on the Main Program of a meeting are asked not to submit papers for that same meeting. Please note that this does not concern sessions organized by APA Committees or by affiliated groups.

**Eastern Division:**

Meeting is held December 27-30.

Selections are announced in May or June.

Papers accepted by either the Central Division or the Pacific Division may not be presented at any subsequent meeting of the Eastern Division.

Papers exceeding 3,000 words will not be considered as colloquium papers.

Submissions for consideration as symposium papers must not exceed a length of 5,000 words. Abstracts for symposium papers must not exceed a length of 300 words. Authors should be aware that only a few papers are selected for presentation as symposium papers. If authors wish to have a shortened version of their paper considered as a colloquium paper, they should submit the appropriately shortened version, along with a shortened abstract, simultaneously with the submission of the symposium paper.

Any paper submitted without an abstract will not be considered. Any paper whose abstract is deemed unacceptable by the Program Committee will not be accepted. No revised abstract submitted after the paper’s acceptance will be published in the Proceedings and Addresses of The American Philosophical Association without the approval of the Program Committee.
**PACIFIC DIVISION:**

Meeting is usually held at the end of March, but starting in 2009 moved to April.

Selections are announced in January.

A paper that has been on the Main Program at a past APA meeting (any division), or will be on the Main Program at a future Central or Eastern Division meeting, cannot be presented as a Main Program colloquium/symposium paper at the Pacific Division meeting.

All abstracts are not to exceed 150 words. For dual submissions (colloquium and symposium) only one abstract is required and should not exceed 150 words.

Submissions for consideration as colloquium papers must not exceed 3,000 words.

Submissions for consideration as symposium papers must not exceed a length of 5,000 words. Abstracts for symposium papers must not exceed a length of 300 words. Authors should be aware that only a few papers are selected for presentation as symposium papers. If authors wish to have a shortened version of their paper considered as a colloquium paper, they should submit the appropriately shortened version, along with a shortened abstract, simultaneously with the submission of the symposium paper. (This will be considered a single submission.)

**CENTRAL DIVISION:**

Meeting is usually held at the end of February.

Selections are announced in January, or before when possible.

Papers exceeding 3,000 words will not be considered as colloquium papers.

Submissions for consideration as symposium papers must not exceed a length of 5,000 words. Abstracts for symposium papers must not exceed a length of 300 words. Authors should be aware that only a few papers are selected for presentation as symposium papers. If authors wish to have a shortened version of their paper considered as a colloquium paper, they should submit the appropriately shortened version, along with a shortened abstract, simultaneously with the submission of the symposium paper.

The Central Division will not include a paper on its meeting program if that paper (1) has already been presented or is scheduled for presentation on the Main Program of another APA Divisional meeting or (2) has been accepted for publication and will have actually been published prior to the Central Division meeting in question. If a paper is accepted for presentation and the Program Committee subsequently learns that it will have been published prior to the meeting, then that paper will be withdrawn from the meeting program.
MINUTES OF THE 2009 PACIFIC DIVISION EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE MEETING

WESTIN BAYSHORE HOTEL, VANCOUVER, BRITISH COLUMBIA
WEDNESDAY, APRIL 8, 2009

Present: Joan MacGregor (Chair), Nancy Cartwright, Stewart Cohen, Paul Hurley, Dominic McIver Lopes, Ned Markosian, Nick Smith

Guests: Joseph Campbell, Rebecca Copenhaver

CALL TO ORDER: The meeting was called to order at 4:03 p.m.

ADOPTION OF AGENDA: The agenda was adopted.

APPROVAL OF MINUTES. The minutes of the meeting of March 19, 2008, were approved as printed in the February 2009 Proceedings.

BUSINESS ARISING FROM THE MINUTES: There was no business arising from the minutes.

REPORT OF SECRETARY-TREASURER: The Secretary-Treasurer reported that the Division’s operations have been successfully moved to the University of British Columbia, and he thanked his predecessor, Anita Silvers, whose informativeness and generosity ensured a smooth transition.

The 2009 meeting is the first Pacific Division meeting held in Canada since 1961. The international border has not inhibited levels of participation in the meeting, as measured by the number of papers submitted, the size of the program, and advance registrations. Although book displays have declined somewhat, this is a long-term trend.

The Division is in sound fiscal condition. Its reserves, held in money market accounts and certificates of deposit, have weathered the economic upheavals of the past year without loss and remain comfortably above the level advised for nonprofit societies. The Committee approved budgets for the 2008-9 and 2009-10 fiscal years that show modest surpluses, given assumptions of continued decline in book display revenues, a reduced rate of return on investments, a modest decline in registration numbers in 2010, and an increase in registration fees starting in 2010.

REPORT OF THE PROGRAM CHAIR: The Chair of the 2009 Program Committee reported a substantial increase in the number of papers submitted, especially in epistemology, philosophy of mind, ethics, and political philosophy. The acceptance rate for colloquium submissions was 33% and the acceptance rate for symposium submissions plunged from
12% in 2008 to 7% in 2009. The number of invited sessions rose in the same period from 54 to 62, with additional author-meets-critics sessions counting for the bulk of this increase.

NOMINATING COMMITTEE: Nancy Cartwright, Thomas Christiano, and Lisa Shapiro were appointed to the 2009-10 Nominating Committee, with Cartwright, who will be the immediate past president of the Division, to chair the Committee.

PROGRAM COMMITTEE: A list of candidates for appointment to three-year terms on the Program Committee was approved.

FUTURE MEETING SITES: The 2010 meeting is to be held at the Westin St. Francis Hotel in San Francisco, to be followed in 2011 by a meeting at the Hilton Bayfront Hotel in San Diego. The Secretary-Treasurer was directed to investigate Portland, Seattle, and San Francisco as possible sites of the 2012 and 2013 meetings of the Division.

ADVERTISING FEES: An ad hoc committee of the Eastern Division proposed to increase advertising rates. The Committee agreed to the increase in concert with Central and Eastern Divisions.

MINI-CONFERENCE PROPOSALS: Three proposals for mini-conferences were discussed. None were approved, but the Division will issue a call for proposals for mini-conferences in 2011 and 2012.

BUSINESS MEETING AGENDA: The agenda of the Business Meeting was approved.

APA COMMITTEE SESSION TITLES: A request was received from the APA Committee on Inclusiveness to change how sessions sponsored by APA Committees are listed in the meeting program. It was agreed that a less verbose and more informative format is desirable, and the Secretary-Treasurer will confer with his counterparts in the Central and Eastern Divisions in devising a new format.

ABSTRACTS: The Committee agreed that, starting with the 2010 meeting, abstracts of invited papers will be made available on the Division’s web site and in the Proceedings, at the option of their authors. In order to accommodate this, all abstracts will be limited to 150 words.

NEW BUSINESS: There was no new business.

ADJOURNMENT: The meeting adjourned at 7:11 p.m.

Respectfully submitted,

Dominic McIver Lopes
Secretary-Treasurer
MINUTES OF THE 2009 PACIFIC DIVISION BUSINESS MEETING

WESTIN BAYSHORE HOTEL, VANCOUVER, BRITISH COLUMBIA
THURSDAY, APRIL 9, NOON

CALL TO ORDER: President Nancy Cartwright called the meeting to order at 12:03 p.m.

ADOPTION OF THE AGENDA: The agenda was adopted.

APPROVAL OF THE MINUTES: The minutes of the meeting of March 20, 2008, were approved as printed in the February 2009 Proceedings.

BUSINESS ARISING FROM THE MINUTES: There was no business arising from the minutes.

ANNOUNCEMENTS: Names of APA members who had passed away since the last meeting were read and a moment of silence was observed.

REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-TREASURER: The Secretary-Treasurer reported that the transfer of the Division’s offices from San Francisco to Vancouver has been completed and that the Division is in sound fiscal condition with adequate reserves (see the Executive Committee Minutes). He also reported that the 2009 meeting program includes 972 participants in 222 main program sessions and 62 group sessions, and that registration numbers appear to be steady compared to recent years.

REPORT OF THE PACIFIC DIVISION EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE: Joan MacGregor, Chair of the Executive Committee, reported the actions of the Executive Committee (see the Executive Committee Minutes).

REPORT OF THE APA BOARD OF OFFICERS: There was no report of the Board of Officers.

REPORT OF THE NOMINATING COMMITTEE AND ELECTION OF OFFICERS: The chair of the Nominating Committee, Nicholas Smith, reported that the Committee had nominated Michael Tooley for office as Vice-President, Dominic McIver Lopes for the office of Secretary-Treasurer, and Julie Van Camp as Member at Large. The Secretary-Treasurer reported that there were no nominations by petition. Smith put a motion to elect the nominees. The motion carried unanimously.

PROPOSED AMENDMENT TO THE APA BY-LAWS: The APA Board of Officers proposed to the three Divisions that the Bylaws of the American Philosophical Association be amended to create a new category of membership, “Teaching Associates.” The proposal was announced on the APA web site at least one month in advance of this Business Meeting.
and has already been approved by the Business Meetings of the Central and Eastern Divisions for referral by mail ballot to the members of those Divisions. The amendment will be adopted if it is approved by a majority in each of the three Divisions. A motion was put to refer this proposal to the membership of the Division for approval. The motion carried unanimously.

**APA NON-DISCRIMINATION POLICY:** Alastair Norcross moved that

> Whereas the American Philosophical Association has a clear policy opposing discrimination based on race, color, religion, political convictions, national origin, sex, disability, sexual orientation, gender identification or age; and whereas several institutions that explicitly violate that policy with respect to sexual orientation have recently placed advertisements in *Jobs for Philosophers*; and whereas more than 1,400 members of the American Philosophical Association have signed a petition calling on the APA either to enforce its non-discrimination policy or to change it; the Executive Committee of the Pacific Division is directed to request that the APA Board of Officers and National Office consider whether the APA: (1) enforce its advertising in *Jobs for Philosophers*, or (2) clearly mark institutions with these policies as institutions that violate our anti-discrimination policy, or (3) publicly inform its members that it will not protect gay philosophers and remove its anti-discrimination policy to end the illusion that a primary function of the APA is to protect the rights of its members.

Norcross stated that there is some disagreement among members of the APA about the correct interpretation of the APA’s policy on non-discrimination, and that it is unclear how, if at all, the policy is enforced. The purpose of the motion is to seek clarification by having the policy and its enforcement placed on the agenda of the 2009 meeting of the Board of Officers. He added that all members should support this motion, no matter what their views on the underlying issues. MacGregor confirmed, on behalf of the Executive Committee, that, should the motion carry, the Division’s representatives to the Board will ensure that the matter is given full and careful attention by the Board and the National Office. The floor was opened to discussion and unanimous consent was given to allow members of other Divisions to speak. It was argued that the APA’s policy barring discrimination in hiring was, from its inception, intended to permit religiously affiliated institutions that restrict faculty hiring on confessional grounds to continue to do so, while barring them from discriminating in hiring or admissions on the basis of sexual orientation. It was further argued that such institutions may impose behavioral as well as confessional requirements on their faculty members without violating the APA’s policy. Noting that the latter claim is subject to dispute, Norcross countered that Board review of the policy and its enforcement is needed. A motion was put to close debate and the motion carried. In response to a parliamentary inquiry, the Chair noted that members who are affiliated with the Central
and Eastern Divisions are not eligible to vote. The main motion carried unanimously.

**NEW BUSINESS:** There was no new business.

**ADJOURNMENT:** The meeting adjourned at 12:55 p.m.

Respectfully submitted,

Dominic McIver Lopes
Secretary-Treasurer
Nancy Cartwright (Chair), Tom Christiano, Lisa Shapiro, and Dominic McIver Lopes (*ex officio*) served as the 2009-10 Nominating Committee. They have nominated the following APA Pacific Division members for terms beginning July 1, 2009: for Vice President: Alison Wylie and for Member at Large: Alastair Norcross.
CALL FOR PROPOSALS: PACIFIC DIVISION MINICONFERENCES

The Pacific Division invites proposals for one-day mini-conferences to be held in conjunction with its annual meetings in 2011 and 2012. The Division will provide a venue and support of up to $5,000 to defray direct expenses of the mini-conference.

The purpose of this program is to provide opportunities for collective exploration of important philosophical topics in more depth than is offered by the usual meeting schedule. Past mini-conferences are listed on the Pacific Division’s web page, apa-pacific.org.

Proposals should include (1) a list of the organizing committee’s members; (2) a description of the topic of the mini-conference that explains its timeliness, significance, and anticipated impact; (3) a list of potential and committed speakers; (4) plans for publicizing the mini-conference; and (5) a brief budget indicating what contribution the Pacific Division is asked to make. Proposals that budget expenditures aimed to attract an audience or maximize impact are more likely to be successful. Mini-conference organizing committees are expected to include at least one member of the Pacific Division. APA Committees are not eligible to apply.

Proposals should be submitted by email to the Secretary-Treasurer no later than March 14, 2010, for adjudication by the Division’s Executive Committee at the 2010 Annual Meeting. A number of considerations enter into the Committee’s decision—these include but are not limited to the availability of resources, the timeliness, significance, and potential impact of the mini-conference, the selection of speakers, the experience of the organizers, and the use of the budget to attract an audience. The decision of the Executive Committee is final.

Information about the Pacific Division’s annual meeting, including future meeting sites and dates, is available on the APA Pacific Division website, apa-pacific.org. For more information about the mini-conference program, please contact the Secretary-Treasurer.
LIST OF ADVERTISERS AND BOOK EXHIBITORS

A complete list of book exhibitors will be available online (www.apaonline.org) and at the Central Division Meeting.

CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS (A-208)
DUKE UNIVERSITY PRESS (A-202)
HARVARD UNIVERSITY PRESS (A-200)
MARQUETTE UNIVERSITY PRESS (A-203)
PARAGON HOUSE (A-207)
PERSEUS BOOKS GROUP (A-209)
PENN STATE PRESS (A-201)
PHILOSOPHY DOCUMENTATION CENTER (A-OUTSIDE BACK COVER)
ROUTLEDGE PUBLISHERS (A-204-206)
SUNY PRESS (A-INSIDE FRONT COVER)
WADSWORTH CENGAGE LEARNING (A-INSIDE BACK COVER)
FORMS

ADVANCE REGISTRATION FORM

HOTEL RESERVATION FORM
The American Philosophical Association complies with the Americans with Disabilities Act. Registrants requesting reasonable accommodation to participate in the Pacific Division meeting should contact the Secretary-Treasurer with a request as early as possible, and no later than March 1, 2010.

Please print legibly. **This information is used for your name badge.**

Name: ______________________________________________________________

Affiliation: ____________________________________________________________

Email: __________________________________________________________________

Advance Registration Fees (**Received by March 1, 2010** at the National Office)

- ______ $10.00 APA Student Members
- ______ $60.00 APA Regular, International & Emeritus Members
- ______ $90.00 Nonmembers

**We cannot process any advanced registrations at the National Office past the March 1st deadline. After that date you will need to register in San Francisco.**

Placement Registration

Interviewers should also complete the Placement Registration Form. **Candidates** should check the space below if planning to use the service. Candidates must be a member of the APA in order to use the Placement Service. Placement is a free service for all current APA members.

- ______ I will be a job candidate.

___ 1) Check* (Payable to APA)
*The APA can only accept checks drawn on a U.S. bank, in U.S. Dollars.

___ 2) Visa □ MasterCard □ Exp. Date __________

Last 3 digits on back of card __________

Name as it appears on Card: ______________________________________________________

Signature of Authorization: ___________________________________________________________________

Email: ____________________________________________________________________________ Phone #: __________________________
APA HOTEL RESERVATION FORM

The American Philosophical Association
Pacific Division Meeting, March 31 – April 3, 2010
The Westin St. Francis, 335 Powell Street, San Francisco, CA 94102
Phone 800 228 3000; Online reservation information will be posted on the APA web site as it becomes available. In addition, a current fax number for the hotel reservations department will be posted online as it becomes available.

DO NOT FAX THIS FORM TO THE APA NATIONAL OFFICE

Name:__________________________________________________________
Address:________________________________________________________
City:_________________________________State:_______Zip:____________
Home Phone:___________________Office Phone:  _____________________
E-mail Address:  _________________________________________________
Arrival:_________________________Departure:________________________
Sharing Room With:_______________________________________________
Handicapped Accessible Room: _____________________________________
Please check one:  Single ($179) __________ Double ($179)______________
Each additional person in room is $30.00/night.

Bed Preference:  King Bed______________Double Beds_________________

Rooms are subject to 14.08% tax per night. Check-in time is 3:00 p.m.; check-out time is 12:00 noon. Deadline to cancel a guaranteed reservation without penalty is 72 hours prior to arrival. Include first night’s deposit to confirm your reservation, or guarantee room with a credit card indicated below. Checks should be made payable to the Westin St. Francis and mailed to the address above. Please confirm your dates! If you fail to arrive on your confirmed check-in date, your entire reservation will be cancelled and you will be charged one night room & tax. If you are paying by credit card, please complete the information below.

Visa      MasterCard      Amex        Diner's Club   Discover          Exp. Date

Name as it appears on Card: _____________________________________________________
Signature of Authorization: _______________________________________________________
Email: _____________________________________ Phone #: __________________________

Rooms are available on a first-come, first-served basis and subject to availability. Reservations must be made by March 1, 2010 to be assured of the APA rate.
APA REGISTRATION POLICY

It is the policy of the APA that all persons attending sessions, including those who are participating as speakers, commentators or session chairs, are required to register for each meeting they attend. In addition, we have always recommended that all participants wear their APA badges during session hours to identify themselves as registered participants. In an effort better to enforce this policy we have begun a system of checking meeting attendees, randomly and anyone whom we suspect might not be registered, for proof of registration. If you are asked to provide proof of registration and are unable to do so, you will be asked to register immediately in order to enable you to attend sessions. Registration fees help subsidize every divisional meeting. Without that income we will be unable to ensure the quality and excellence of our meetings which you have come to expect. We thank you for your continued cooperation.
RESTAURANTS AND ATTRACTIONS

Use this section to plan visits to restaurants, museums (for families, there’s a wonderful new Disney Family Museum), and performances. Many San Francisco restaurants are small, so advance reservations are a good idea if you expect to have constraints on your time.

RESTAURANTS

Here are just a few of San Francisco’s good restaurants. Most (but not all) of the restaurants on this list are convenient to the downtown area near the hotel. Quite a few are within walking distance. For example, Belden Place, a close-by alley just east of Kearny between Bush and Pine, has six small restaurants serving lunch and dinner at both outdoor and indoor tables (see below for more detailed Belden Place restaurant information).

The St. Francis is the site of the high-end restaurant called Michael Mina. The St. Francis remains a favorite stop for afternoon tea, and a new lobby bar, The Onyx, has expanded the locations where philosophers can enjoy conversing.

Of note: the Ferry Bldg., at the foot of Market St., is an upscale version of Philadelphia’s Lexington Market, with informal restaurants featuring in-season produce (especially during the Farmer’s Market on Saturday). You can taste caviars (with champagne), sip exotic teas, or sample oysters. Plan to bring home a bag filled with boutique farm products: preserves, sausages, herbs, and similar bounty. You also can hop on a ferry to go across the Bay. To get there, catch a Market St. bus or trolley down to the Bay (or use BART).

Of further note: For dinner after a late evening session, see the Late Night Eating list after the general restaurant list.

The Westfield Mall is two blocks from the hotel (walk down Powell to Market—underground, the Mall merges into the Powell Muni and BART stations). Several branches of good local restaurants are in the Mall: Lark Creek Steakhouse (try the butter poached lobster, beer braised brussel sprouts, and Concord grape cheesecake with peanut butter shortbread crust), 593-4100; Straits (Singaporean menu, the salt plum and the cucumber margaritas go well with the food) 668-1783; and Zazil (Mexican inspired seafood, with such items as octopus carpaccio and carnitas de atun) 495-6379. By the time of your reading, Charlie Phan’s Out the Door version of his famous Slanted Door should be open. The Mall also has several sandwich and salad shops: Cocola Bakery (the Gucci of patisseries), and highly recommended Wichcraft (substantial sandwiches such as grilled cheddar with smoked ham and pear on cranberry-pecan bread and marinated white anchovies with soft cooked egg, roasted onion, and salsa
verde on country bread). Still not enough choice of foods? Westfield Mall also has a sprawling food court with local and nationally franchised fast food vendors, and a high end grocery store with 20,000 food items and take-out deli, rotisserie, pizza, bakery, salad bar, etc.

And here are some of our San Francisco restaurant recommendations:

**Absinthe**, brasserie, great frites, steak, duck confit, skate with polenta. 398 Hayes (at Gough), 551-1590.

**Alaturca**, bring a group to enjoy cold or hot meze. The pide—stuffed breads—are exceptional. Platters such as the lambchops are large enough to share. And try the sutlac pudding. Inexpensive. Walking distance. 869 Geary (at Larkin), 345-1011.

**Albona**, wonderful Italian food from the area of Trieste, moderately priced. 545 Francisco, 441-1040.

**Ame**, top flight, top price fusion restaurant in the St. Regis Hotel. Walking distance. 689 Mission, 284-4040.

**Ana Mandara**, Vietnamese Coastal cuisine. 891 Beach, 771-6800.

**B44**, good Catalan and Portuguese rustic food, try the small plates/roasted rabbit in hazelnut sauce/eight kinds of paella, indoor/outdoor eating. Walking distance. 44 Belden, 986-6287.

**Baguette Express**, inexpensive, very good and filling Vietnamese sandwiches (12 kinds). Walking distance. 666 Larkin, between Eddy and O'Farrell.

**Bambuddha Lounge**, excellent drinks, Asian-theme food such as five-spice duck on coconut pancakes, salt-cured salmon carpaccio on shrimp chips, macademia encrusted lamb chops, and sensual lemongrass custard. Walking distance. 601 Eddy at Larkin, 885-5088.

**Blue Plate**, stellar appetizers and side dishes like grilled pork chop with cranberry walnut compote, quirky surroundings. 3218 Mission St., 282-6777.

**Bocadillos**, highly recommended, reasonably priced Basque small plates, breakfast through dinner. The mid-day meal is mostly small sandwiches, two for $7.50. The warm Catalan sausage with manchego and arugula, chorizo with walnut spread and pardely, and serrano ham with tomato spread all are excellent. For dinner try tripe basquaise, pig trotters, prawns with fresh lemon confit, all at $7. 710 Montgomery (at Washington), 982-2622.

**Bodega Bistro**, despite its name, serves fresh and zingy Vietnamese food. Inexpensive. The pho (noodle soup) is recommended. Walking distance. 607 Larkin (at Eddy), 921-1218.

**Borobudur**, carefully traditional Indonesian food. We recommend ikan pepes, spice paste rubbed fish. Moderately priced. Walking distance. 700 Post at Jones, 775-1512.
**Boulevard**, Nancy Oakes’s American food, one of the City’s most popular restaurants. 1 Mission St., 543-6084.

**Brindisi Cucina di Mare**, cuisine of the region of Puglia, indoor/outdoor eating. Walking distance. 88 Belden Place, 593-8000.

**Café 52**, Mediterranean-California mix, tuna tartare, pomegranate lamb, prawns with horseradish orange marmalade sauce, indoor/outdoor dining. Walking distance. 52 Belden Place, 433-5200.

**Café Bastille**, Parisian ambiance, food uneven but the rack of lamb is wonderful, indoor/outdoor eating. Walking distance. 22 Belden Place, 986-5673.


**Cafe Museo**, the cafe in the Museum of Modern Art. 151 Third St. Drop in for a quick lunch between 10:00 a.m. and 6:00 p.m.

**Café Tiramisu**, pasta is a must order, but counter-carbers should try the sanddabs (a local flat fish) dure, indoor/outdoor dining. Walking distance. 28 Belden Place, 421-7044.

**Campton Place**, intricately crafted French food, tasting menus, high end breakfast, expensive. Walking distance. 340 Stockton, 955-5555.

**Canteen**, brunch, lunch, and dinner with some of the most exciting food in S.F. Walking distance. 817 Sutter near Jones, 928-8870.

**Chaat Café**, irresistible naan serves as a wrap for sandwiches, noteworthy pakoras. Inexpensive. 320 Third at Folsom, 979-9946.

**Charanga**, inventive tapas-style Cuban/Caribbean cuisine, moderately priced. 2351 Mission St., 282-1813.

**Chaya Brasserie**, fresh and simple to point of starkness. 132 Embarcadero, 777-8688.

**Cha-Ya Vegetarian Japanese Restaurant**, vegan, very small. As good as the most expensive S.F. vegetarian restaurants. Moderately priced. 762 Valencia, 252-7825. After dinner walk 2 blocks north for dessert at Bombay Ice Cream, 552 Valencia.

**Chez Papa Resto**, walking distance across from Westfield Centre, good food, high moderate prices, a wonderful patio for lunch on a warm day. 4 Mint Plaza (also known as Jessie St.), 546-4134.

**Citizen Cake**, brunch, lunch, high tea, small plates of seafood, quick in and out before the theater. 399 Grove (at Gough), 861-2228.

**Cliff House**, a 1909 building at the far Western end of the City (ask the concierge for advice on public transportation), wonderful view overlooking Seal Rock, good food at moderate prices, recommended for weekend champagne buffet brunch complete with popovers. There is also a new upscale restaurant in the complex called Sutro’s that is suspended over the cliff just above the waves. 1090 Point Lobos, 386-3330.
Coi, most creative and of course high end with 10 course tasting menu changing daily. 373 Broadway, 393-9000.

Da Flora, a small quintessentially personalized San Francisco restaurant. Delicious Italian and Hungarian dishes with local and home-cured ingredients, and rave reviews for the desserts, specializes in Italian wines from small producers. Moderately plus priced. 701 Columbus (at Filbert), 981-4664.

Delfina, underground hit because of great food and modest prices. 3621 18th, 552-4055.

Dosa, south Indian, vegetarian, large menu, highly recommended, inexpensive. Two sites: 996 Valencia, 642-3672 or 1700 Fillmore, 441-3672.


El Farolito, one of the top 20 taquerias in the Bay Area. Open late. Excellent avocado-tomatillo sauce. 2779 Mission at 24th, 641-0758.

Elite Café, try the Cajun Sunday brunch, 10:00-3:00 p.m. 2049 Fillmore, 346-8668.


Farmerbrown, comfort and soul food, high moderate. Walking distance. 25 Mason, 409-3276.

Fifth Floor, complex and sophisticated, try the pork belly poached with truffles and roasted crispy. 12 Fourth St., 777-5558.

Fleur de Lys, extraordinary French food with Alsatian emphasis, a vegetarian tasting menu, brisk walking distance. 777 Sutter, 673-7779.

Flour and Water, new and acclaimed for hand-made pastas.

Foreign Cinema, very good Mediterranean food, oyster bar, you can watch a film while you dine, all-day Sunday dining on heated patio. 2534 Mission, 648-7600.

Fog City Diner, we like it for outdoor weekend brunch. 1300 Battery, 982-2000.

Gary Danko, creative dishes with seasonal ingredients, won the James Beard award for the best new restaurant in the U.S. and recent Zagat commendation as best in S.F. Some APA members judge that the price is very reasonable given the quality of the food. 800 North Point, 749-2060.

Gaylord India, venerable Indian restaurant with elaborate luncheon buffets. Ghirardelli Square, 771-8822.

Globe, serves dinner till 1 a.m., the city’s chefs eat here. 290 Pacific, 391-4132.
Grand Café, French, try the skate wing and braised rabbit, chef strongly recommended, and a great bar with excellent bar food. Very close walking distance. 501 Geary, 292-0101.

Great Eastern, largest selection of live seafood from tanks in the City, open to 1 a.m., BUT don’t order Americanized dishes or you will be turned over to the chef who specializes in tourists. 649 Jackson, 986-2500.

Greens, still a premiere vegetarian restaurant with an outstanding wine list. Building A, Fort Mason, 771-6222.

Hana Zen, a convivial yakitori bar (20 kinds). Walking distance. 115 Cyril Magnin near Ellis, 421-2101.

Hayes and Vine, wine bar with 600 choices, upscale nibbles including caviar. 377 Hayes, 626-5301.

Hayes Street Grill, classic fish house, excellent service. 320 Hayes, 863-5545.

Hung Ky, second best pho (Vietnamese noodle soup) in the City, southern style. An inexpensive and filling meal. Walking distance. 337 Jones (between Ellis and Eddy), 674-8278.

Isa, specializes in small French plates, moderate prices. 3324 Steiner St., 567-9588.

Jai Yun, very small restaurant in Chinatown, highly recommended adventure, call for reservations. Chef-owner speaks no English and little Cantonese (he’s from west of Shanghai). 923 Pacific Ave. (at Powell), 981-7438.

Jardiniere, exceptional execution and high prices to get it. 300 Grove, 861-5555.

Joubert’s, here the comfort food is from South Africa, try yam and corn soup, and stewy chicken peri-peri. Moderate prices. But be warned that the restaurant is far from Union Square, way out by the Great Highway that runs along the Pacific Ocean. 4115 Judah, 753-5448.

Kabuto A&S, both traditional and whimsically San Francisco sushi. Some say the best toro in the City. An exceptional sake list as well. Moderately priced for the quality. 5121 Geary near 16th, 752-5652.

Kokkari Estiatorio, beautiful ambiance with a wide selection of excellent Greek food, one of Thomas Keller’s favorite S.F. restaurants. 200 Jackson, 981-0983.

Kuleto’s, great for breakfast, Italian food from wood-burning oven Walking distance, half a block from the hotel. 221 Powell, 397-7720.

La Folie, intricately composed food, a high end S.F. institution. 2316 Polk, 776-5577.

Lahore Karachi, spinach and lamb curry, fish dishes a specialty, inexpensive. A long walk. 612 O’Farrell (at Leavenworth), 567-8603.
La Santaneca de la Mission, down-home Salvadoran cuisine with outstanding pupusas, corn masa pockets, tortillas with crema, and curtido (pickled cabbage). Breakfast through dinner. Inexpensive. 2815 Mission at 24th St. (take BART), 285-2131.

La Taqueria, one of the oldest and best in the Mission District. A top twenty taqueria pick. Try the carnitas and fresh fruit drinks. Ask for the crispy tacos, not on the menu. Inexpensive but high for a taqueria. 2889 Mission St., 285-7117.

Le Charm, friendly prices for French menu. 315 Fifth, 546-6128.

Le Colonial, upscale and innovative Vietnamese. Walking distance. 20 Cosmo Place, 931-3600.

La Folie, Lyonnaise cuisine. 2316 Polk, 776-5577.

Liberty Cafe, American with great wine list. 410 Cortland, 695-8777.

Lichee Garden, Cantonese family style. 1416 Powell, 397-2290.

Limon, moderately priced with the best Peruvian food in San Francisco. Pan-seared halibut or bouillabaise with a smoky Peruvian sauce are recommended, as is the spicy sweet sangria. 524 Valencia between 16th and 17th St., 252-0918. Limon Rotisserie is at 1001 S. Van Ness at 21st St., 821-2134.

Little Delhi, North Indian and Bengali, large menu, great desserts including Indian ice cream, inexpensive. Walking distance. 83 Eddy (at Mason), 398-3173.

L’Osteria del Forno, Italian. 519 Columbus, 982-1124.

Lulu, Excellent dishes from wood-fired oven; many fishes and roasted veggies. 816 Folsom, 495-5775.

Luna Park, another comfort food menu, this one with moderate prices. Start up with grilled artichokes or fries dipped in the lemon aioli, warm up with pot-au-feu or hunter’s pie, and finish up with a wedge of coconut cream pie big enough for a couple of diners. 694 Valencia, 553-8584.

Mandalay, Burmese cuisine (and Mandarin as well). Remarkable tea leaf and green papaya salads are recommended. Inexpensive. 4348 California (at Sixth Ave. in Richmond District), 386-3896.

Masa’s, back on top, excellent tasting menu, delicious meat and game dishes, and desserts. Walking distance. 648 Bush, 989-7154.

Maykadeh Persian Cuisine, exquisite food, full range of authentic ingredients. Try the lamb tongues in saffron and the wonderful desserts. North Beach site, a trek for good walkers—others are advised to call a cab. 470 Green, 362-8286

Max’s, at the corner past the St. Francis Carriage Entrance at Geary and Mason. Relatively inexpensive comfort food, opens for breakfast at 7:00 a.m. and is highly recommended. Excellent sandwiches, fresh fish, try the matzoh ball soup and cabbage soup, chopped chicken livers, wonderful salads and desserts. No reservations.
**Medicine New-Shojin Eatstation**, Japanese veggie, at lunch there are “foundation” sets ($8-$12) with base of rice, grains, or noodles, plus vegetable and pickle toppings, and soup. Try the custardy sesame tofu and the chilled coconut cup with silver ear mushrooms and toasted buckwheat. Inexpensive for downtown S.F. Walking distance. 161 Sutter, third floor of the Crocker Galleria, 677-4405.

**Millenium**, a destination vegetarian restaurant. 246 McAllister, 487-9800.

**Miller’s East Coast West Deli**, finally, a real New York deli in San Francisco, everything is good, the corned beef is home cured, and there is an extensive selection of smoked fish. Breakfast, lunch and dinner, inexpensive. 1725 Polk, 563-3542.

**Nettie’s Crab Shack**, high moderate fresh seafood, if you are here on a Sunday we recommend the crab feed, with a whole crab, salad, potatoes, and artichokes, and dessert. 2032 Union, 409-0300.

**Ngoc Mai**, 124 Vietnamese dishes, try the bun (cloud-like rice noodles), the goat curry, seafood chow mein. Only one dish over $7, but be warned—this restaurant closes at 7 p.m. 547 Hyde near Geary, 931-4899.

**Oola Restaurant**, we recommend the seafood chunk skewer on a confit of fennel and artichoke, sprinkled with fennel pollen, and the fig over blue cheese and onion jam tart, drizzled with chestnut honey. This is the San Francisco version of bistro food, and it is open till 1 a.m. Walking distance on Folsom between Fourth and Fifth. 860 Folsom, 995-2061.

**One Market**, fresh food that wows diners, petrale sole souffle, osso buco for two. 1 Market St., 777-5577.

**Pacific Catch**, fish prepared in many styles, from Baja fish and shrimp tacos to grilled ahi or salmon in a wasabi bowl. Sweet potato fries go with all. Inexpensive. 2027 Chestnut, 440-1950.

**Pagplac**, enormously popular Vietnamese restaurant with bargain-price tasting menu. Wraps, grills, clay pots and “seven flavors of beef” dinner. Cash only. Walking distance. 655 Larkin (near Ellis), 776-3234.

**Pakwan**, Pakistani, put your order in at the counter and wait. Try the eggplant Pakwan, chicken makhani, and lamb achar, all cooled down by yogurt raita. Inexpensive. Walking distance. 501 O’Farrell and 653 Clay.

**Pancho Villa Taqueria**, very moderate prices, one of the best of the Mission’s many taquerias. 3071 Mission, 864-8840.

**Pho Hoa**, some of the best pho (Vietnamese noodle soup) in the City, large bowl is excellent proof against any early morning chill, this restaurant opens at 8:00 a.m. for Vietnamese breakfast. Walking distance. 431 Jones (between Ellis and O’Farrell), 673-3163.

**Plouf**, more European than strictly French, this bistro serves mussels seven ways. Other star dishes keep the focus on seafood, prices are more moderate than the presentation and service would indicate. Top 100, indoor/outdoor eating. Walking distance. 40 Belden Place, 986-6491.
**Piperade**, Basque-inspired menu continues San Francisco’s pursuit of upscale comfort food. Try the squid bathed in a foie gras sauce with grapes, high moderate priced. 1015 Battery, 391-2555.

**Puccinni & Pinetti**, good trattoria food, try the devil’s food cake. 129 Ellis at Cyril Magnin, 392-5500.

**Quince**, French-Italian high end with some challengingly rare seasonal items. Long walking distance. 490 Pacific, 775-8500.

**R and G Lounge**, some of best Hong Kong food in town, try #2 Geoduck sashimi, #6 Salt-and-pepper crab, #11 Beef brisket and turnip in clay pot, #12 Dried scallops with chinese melon, #15 Fried stuffed bean curd, and (not on menu but ask for it) pea shoots or amaranth with three kinds of egg. 631 Kearny, 982-7877.


**RN74**, Michael Mina/Raj Parr wine bar with similarly high quality small plates. 301 Mission, 543-7474.

**Rotunda at Neiman Marcus**, great for lunch and cocktails, we recommend the truffle risotto and lobster pot au crème. Walking distance one block away, 362-3900.

**Saigon Sandwiches**, sets the standard for Vietnames-French sandwiches, open for breakfast, lunch and dinner, inexpensive. Walking distance. 560 Larkin at Eddy, 474-5698.


**Sam’s Grill**, classic San Francisco grill, excellent petrale sole, veal porterhouse, celery victor, moderate prices, brisk walk. 324 Bush, 421-0594.

**Scala’s**, first rate bistro, try the wood-oven roasted mussels. Not too expensive. Walking distance, 432 Powell, 395-8555

**Sears Fine Foods**, best pancakes in the world, now serving all day long. Inexpensive. Walking distance. 439 Powell St., 986-1160.

**Shanghai 1930**, elegant Shanghai combinations such as “fish pillows.” 133 Steuart, 896-5600.

**Shalimor**, one of Travel and Leisure Magazine’s top 50 restaurants, but no dish costs more than $8.00. Tandoori, curries, vegetarian dishes. No credit cards. 532 Jones, 928-0333.

**Slanted Door**, San Francisco’s most popular upscale Vietnamese restaurant, now situated in the Ferry Building at the foot of Market St., 861-8032.

**Suppenkuche**, good German with lots of beers and great specialties. 601 Hayes, 252-9289.

**Swan’s Oyster Depot**, an S.F. institution, seafood bar with a dozen stools and the freshest raw shellfish. Wonderful for breakfast oyster stew. 1517 Polk, 673-1101.
Tajine, has moved to a larger site with more than the original seven tables. Good bastilla and chicken tajine, and kebabs and sandwiches. Good for lunch Wed. and Thurs. Dinner nightly. Inexpensive but no longer in walking distance. 2080 Van Ness, 440-1718.

Taqueria Vallarta, another of the top twenty taquerias. Excellent beef tongue and gushy as well as gutsy burritos. On warm nights, try the stand outside the restaurant. 3033 24th St. near Treat, 826-8115.

Tepin Thai, try the green chicken curry and crying lady prawns. Moderately priced. 298 Gough, 863-9335.

Thai House Express, regional dishes such as spicy sausage, slow-braised pork leg, poached chicken over oil-cooked rice. Regarded as most authentic Thai street food in the Bay Area. Inexpensive. Open till midnight. Walking distance. 901 Larkin at Geary, 441-2248.

Thai Me Up, open only for lunch, good Thai food, no dish more than $5. 836 Mission, 777-0444.

Ti Couz, sweet and savoury crepes, large collection of hard ciders, modest prices. 3108 16th St., 252-7373.

Ton Kiang, top dim sum parlor in the City, some Hakka dishes, will take reservations for large parties. 5821 Geary, 386-8530.

Turtle Tower, best pho (noodle soup) in the City, in delicate northern style. Inexpensive. Walking distance. 631 Larkin St. (at Willow between Eddy and Ellis), 409-3333.

Yank Sing, 80 different dim sum on the carts at any time. 101 Spear St., 957-9300, also at 49 Stevenson St.

Yoshi’s San Francisco, first class jazz and artistic Japanese food, can be crowded depending on who is playing, expensive. 1330 Fillmore, 655-5600.

Vietnam II, an extensive menu including roast crab. For breakfast, lunch, or dinner, you can’t beat the pho at prices that go up to $6.50, large bowls of star anise-scented broth full of your choice of seafood, poultry, meat, vegetables. Inexpensive. Walking distance. 701 Larkin at Ellis. 885-1274.

Wexler’s, new high end barbecue and comfort food, lunch and dinner. Long walking distance. 568 Sacramento, 983-0102.

XYZ, beautiful food, service, people, prices to match. 181 Third, 817-7836.

Zuni Cafe, classic California cafe food, a favorite of philosophers for two decades, the cookbook based on Zuni Café’s offerings is the New York Times “best cookbook of 2002.” 1658 Market, 552-2522.

Late Night Eating (where S.F. chefs eat late at night)

Farmer Brown, see above list for description. Walking distance. 409-3276.

Globe, dinner till 1 a.m., great pizzas, frisson salad, mac-and-cheese, steak. Long walk. 290 Pacific (near Battery), 391-4132.
Oola, dinner till 1 a.m., see above restaurant list for description.

Ryoko, dinner till 2 a.m., a favorite sushi spot. Walking distance. 619 Taylor between Sutter and Post, 775-1028.

Thai House Express, dinner till midnight, see above restaurant list for description. Walking distance. 441-2248.

Yuet Lee, dinner till 3 a.m weekends and midnight weekdays. Calamari, scrambled eggs with prawns, and deep fried pig intestines for the more adventurous. Very long walk. 1300 Stockton (at Broadway), 982-6020.

THEATERS WITHIN WALKING DISTANCE OF HOTEL

(Tickets can be purchased across the street from the hotel, at the TIX in Union Square. Or try Theatre Bay Area, at www.theatrebayarea.org, or 415-433-7827 for tickets, including day of performance bargains.)

Cable Car Theatre: The Cable Car Theatre, an intimate space with low ceilings and a casual feel, presents a variety of mainstream and alternative off-Broadway shows. 430 Mason St. (415) 956-8497.

Curran Theatre: Although not as sumptuous as its neighbor, the Geary Theatre, this house does host many traveling Broadway shows. 445 Geary St. (415) 776-1999.

Geary Theatre: Home to the prestigious American Conservatory Theatre. This building’s beautiful 1909 facade—encrusted with colorful foliage—was recently cleaned and restored to its original luster. 415 Geary St. (415) 743-2228.

Golden Gate Theatre: Built in 1920 for the Orpheum circuit, the Golden Gate Theatre was designed by Gustav Albert Lansburgh, who also constructed S.F.’s Warfield and other theaters across the country. The theater, which used to present vaudeville and feature films in the vein of Radio City Music Hall, was restored in 1979 and now presents Broadway shows. 1 Taylor St. (415) 551-2000.

Il Teatro 450: Formerly known as the 450 Geary Studio Theatre, this small space now features productions by up-and-coming performers from the Bay Area. 450 Geary St. (415) 433-1172.

Lorraine Hansberry Theatre: This 300-seat theatre, which opened in 1981, is named after the African-American author of “Raisin in the Sun” and features productions written by black playwrights. The entrance is through the lobby of the Sheehan Hotel. 620 Sutter St. (415) 474-8800.

Marines Memorial Theater: Fun shows, often musical. 877-771-6900
PERFORMANCE SITE PHONE NUMBERS
(All in the 415 area code, some very close to hotel, all can be reached by public transportation. Call or check Internet for performance schedules.)

American Conservatory Theater  749-2228
Yerba Buena Center for the Arts  978-2787
Orpheum Theater  551-2000
San Francisco Ballet  865-2000
Fort Mason Theater  345-7575
Theatre Rhinoceros  861-5079
Victoria Theater  863-7576
San Francisco Opera  864-3330
San Francisco Performances  398-6449
San Francisco Symphony  864-6000
Project Artaud  626-DOME
Ticketmaster  512-7770
Teatre Zinzani  438-2668
Intersection for the Arts  626-2787
Exit on Taylor  675-5995
Zeum  749-2228
Actors Theatre  296-9179
Phoenix Theatre  789-8221

For current shows, and what’s playing in the dozens of small theaters, try the METROACTIVE website: http://metroactive.com/calendar/

For music events and clubs, try the following website: http://www.sanfrancisco.com/music/index.html

Ticketweb is a very comprehensive on-line service for Bay Area events: http://www.ticketweb.com/user/sfbay

Go to the Laughing Squid site for the underground “what’s on in San Francisco”: http://www.laughingsquid.org/

EXHIBITIONS AT SAN FRANCISCO MUSEUMS
Check information about special exhibitions on the Internet as we approach the Pacific Division meeting dates.

MUSEUMS AND GALLERIES
Sites within walking distance are asterisked. In addition to the (mostly public) sites listed below, there are dozens of private galleries within the blocks surrounding our hotel.
DeYoung Museum – Museum
50 Hogwara Tea Garden Drive in Golden Gate Park, (415) 863-3330. King Tut is here through March 28.

California Academy of Science and Steinhardt Aquarium, 55 Music Concourse Drive, Golden Gate Park (has a high-end restaurant for lunch/ dinner as well as extensive café), (415) 379-8000.

Palace of the Legion of Honor – Museum
100 34th Ave., San Francisco, CA, (415) 750-3600

Asian Art Museum-San Francisco – Museum (short bus or one-stop BART ride)
Civic Center, San Francisco, CA, (415) 557-6966

San Francisco Museum of Modern Art – Museum *
151 3rd St., San Francisco, CA, (415) 357-4000

Museum of the African Diaspora – Museum *
685 Mission Street, (415) 358-7200

Museum of Craft and Folk Art – Museum *
51 Yerba Buena Lane, San Francisco, CA, (415) 227-4888

Yerba Buena Center for the Arts – Gallery *
701 Mission St., San Francisco, CA, (415) 978-2787

Zeum (Museum of electronic media arts) *
Yerba Buena Roof Garden, 221 Fourth St, San Francisco CA (415) 777-2800

Cartoon Art Museum – Museum *
655 Mission Street, (415) CAR-TOON

California Academy of Sciences – Natural History and Anthropology Museum *
875 Howard St., San Francisco, CA, (415) 321-8000

Disney Family Museum – Museum
104 Montgomery in the Presidio (415) 345-6800

Folk Art International – Gallery *
140 Maiden Ln., San Francisco, CA, (415) 392-9999

(walk across Union Square to see this little Frank Lloyd Wright building with a mini-spiral ramp, a model for the Guggenheim)

Museum of Craft-Design – Museum *
550 Sutter St., San Francisco, CA, (415) 773-0303

Exploratorium – Museum
3601 Lyon St., San Francisco, CA, (415) 397-5673
San Francisco Women Artists – Gallery
370 Hayes St., San Francisco, CA, (415) 552-7392

San Francisco Performing Arts Library and Museum –
401 Van Ness Avenue, 4th Floor, War Memorial Performing Arts
Center, San Francisco, CA, (415) 255-4800

Pacific Heritage Museum – Museum
608 Commercial St., San Francisco, CA, (415) 399-1124

Contemporary Jewish Museum – Museum
121 Steuart St., San Francisco, CA, (415) 344-8800

S.F. African American Historical and Cultural Society
Fort Mason, San Francisco, CA, (415) 441-0640

Xanadu Tribal Art Gallery – Gallery *
140 Maiden Ln., San Francisco, CA, (415) 392-9999

American Indian Contemporary Arts – Other *
23 Grant Ave., San Francisco, CA, (415) 989-7003

Center For Electronic Art – School & Studio
250 4th St., San Francisco, CA, (415) 512-9300

Sfmoma Contemporary Extension
151 3rd St., San Francisco, CA

Museum of Russian Culture
2450 Sutter Street, San Francisco, CA, (415) 921-4082

Museo Italo-Americano – Museum
Fort Mason Center San Francisco CA (415) 673-2200

Capp Street Project – Gallery
525 2nd St., San Francisco, CA, (415) 495-7101

Chinese Historical Society of America – Museum
965 Clay, (415) 391-1188

Tattoo Art Museum
841 Columbus Avenue, San Francisco, CA, (415) 775-4991

Museum of the City of San Francisco – Museum
2801 Leavenworth, 3rd floor, San Francisco, CA, (415) 928-0289

Galeria de la Raza-Studio 24 – Gallery
2857 24th St., San Francisco, CA, (415) 826-8009

National Maritime Museum Library – Museum
Bay St. at Van Ness Ave., Bldg E, 3rd Flr, San Francisco, CA, (415)
556-9870
Mission Cultural Center for Latino Arts – School & Studio
2868 Mission Street, San Francisco, CA, (415) 821-1155

Steinhart Aquarium – Museum
Lincoln Way at 9th Ave., San Francisco, CA, (415) 221-5100

African American Art & Culture Complex – Gallery
762 Fulton St., San Francisco, CA, (415) 922-2049
2ND FLOOR

[Diagram of 2nd floor layout with rooms and facilities labeled]
12th Floor

Post Street

Library

Study

East Room

Club

Men's Restroom

Women's Restroom