

January 2012
Volume 85, Issue 3

Proceedings and Addresses

of The American Philosophical Association



apa

THE AMERICAN
PHILOSOPHICAL ASSOCIATION

Central Division Program

The American Philosophical
Association
Central Division

One Hundred Ninth
Annual Meeting



Palmer House Hilton Hotel
Chicago, Illinois

February 15 - 18, 2012

Proceedings and Addresses of The American Philosophical Association

Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association (ISSN 0065-972X) is published five times each year and is distributed to members of the APA as a benefit of membership and to libraries, departments, and institutions for \$75 per year. It is published by The American Philosophical Association, 31 Amstel Ave., University of Delaware, Newark, DE 19716. Periodicals Postage Paid at Newark, DE and additional mailing offices. POSTMASTER: Send address changes to *Proceedings and Addresses*, The American Philosophical Association, University of Delaware, Newark, DE 19716.

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Proceedings and Addresses of The American Philosophical Association, the major publication of The American Philosophical Association, is published five times each academic year in the months of September, November, January, February, and May.

Each annual volume contains the programs for the meetings of the three Divisions; the membership list; Presidential Addresses; news of the Association, its Divisions and Committees, and announcements of interest to philosophers. Other items of interest to the community of philosophers may be included by decision of the Editor or the APA Board of Officers.

Microfilm copies are available through National Archive Publishing Company, Periodicals/Acquisitions Dept., P.O. Box 998, Ann Arbor, MI 48106-0998 ([HTTP://WWW.NAPUBCO.COM](http://www.napubco.com)). Certain back issues may be obtained from the APA.

All correspondence should be sent to the APA, 31 Amstel Avenue, University of Delaware, Newark, DE 19716, directed to the appropriate staff member as follows: Erin Shepherd for inquiries and publication copy concerning programs of the Divisional meetings, general issues of the *Proceedings*, announcements, awards to members, and advertising; Janet Sample for membership information, address changes, and memorial minutes; and the Executive Director for letters to the editor.

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ISSN 0065-972X

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LETTER FROM THE SECRETARY- TREASURER

To All Members of the Association:

You are cordially invited to attend the One Hundred Ninth Annual Meeting of the Central Division at the Palmer House Hilton Hotel, Chicago, February 15-18, 2012. This year's program committee has organized an extensive array of thirty-five Colloquia, eight submitted Symposia, twenty-seven invited Symposia, eight Author-Meets-Critics sessions, and three Invited Paper sessions. Our program also includes thirteen sessions organized by Committees of the APA and over fifty-five affiliated group sessions. In addition, the John Dewey Lecture will be given by Ruth Millikan.

This issue of the *Proceedings* contains a complete convention program, including scheduled group meetings. At the back of this issue, you will find a meeting registration form, a form for reserving tables at the receptions, and maps of the hotel's location and meeting rooms. Also included are information forms concerning the 2013 meeting and the 2012-2013 Nominating Committee, for your use if you have suggestions for future meetings or wish to offer your services to the Division.

1. HOTEL INFORMATION

The Palmer House Hilton Hotel at 17 Monroe, Chicago, IL 60603. For more information on the hotel, see its web site at http://www1.hilton.com/en_US/hi/hotel/CHIPHHH-Palmer-House-a-Hilton-Hotel-Illinois/index.do.

Hotel reservations should be made directly with the hotel either through the Internet or by telephone (like most hotels today, the Palmer House prefers not to receive reservation requests by mail or fax). To reserve through the Internet, go to the Palmer House's web site (see above) and enter your dates in the "Check availability" block. Then, enter either "AMP" (for regular rates) or "AMS" (for the student rates) in the Group/Convention Code field. Please note that the hotel will ask the APA National Office to confirm that those requesting the student rate are APA Student Associate members. To reserve by telephone, call the Palmer House reservations department at +1-877-865-5321, explain that you are attending the American Philosophical Association 2012 Central Division meeting, and give the appropriate group code as above.

To be assured of a room at the special convention rate, you should **act promptly**. Our convention block of rooms will be maintained by the hotel only until **January 15, 2012**. After that time, any unused rooms in the block will be released to other guests, and convention registrants may be unable to obtain the special rates or appropriate rooms.

•**Chicago Airports:** Chicago is served by O'Hare International and Chicago Midway airports. Virtually all airlines fly to O'Hare, and many also fly to Midway, which has the advantages of being closer to the Loop and somewhat less crowded.

Ground Transportation from O'Hare and Midway: The most economical way to reach the hotel is the **Chicago Transit Authority** trains (fare \$2.25 as of Oct. 2011). From O'Hare, take the **CTA Blue Line** from the station between Terminals 2 and 3 (follow the signs for "Trains to City"). Get off at the Monroe/Dearborn station and go east on Monroe to the hotel entrance between State and Wabash. Travel time is about 45 minutes (an hour or more during rush hours), and trains run every ten minutes (with reduced schedules Sunday and late at night). From Midway, the **CTA Orange Line** runs every ten minutes and will take you to the Loop in about half an hour (get off at the Adams/Wabash stop. There are hotel entrances on the west side of Wabash and on Monroe. For further information, including a map of the downtown area CTA routes and stations, see the Chicago Transit Authority's web site at <http://www.transitchicago.com/>

•**Airport shuttle buses** to the loop are (at this writing) \$29 one way/\$55 round trip from O'Hare, \$22 one way/\$39 round trip from Midway for a single fare. Pair and group tickets are substantially cheaper (as low as \$14 per passenger from O'Hare or \$12 from Midway). Buses go directly to Loop hotels, including the Palmer House. Allow an hour from Midway, an hour and a half from O'Hare; (time varies considerably, especially with heavy traffic). Buses leave every 10-15 minutes, and return buses leave the Palmer House every half hour from the Monroe Street side. You can make advance reservations at <http://www.airportexpress.com/>.

•**Taxi fare** is \$35-\$40 from O'Hare, \$25 from Midway. For two or more passengers, flat-rate ride sharing fares are available. Travel time to/from O'Hare ranges from half an hour in light traffic to an hour or more in heavy traffic (on Friday afternoon, it can exceed two hours). If you're in a hurry, a taxi is usually the fastest way to go except when traffic is at its worst, when the CTA is probably fastest (provided that you are traveling with one very small suitcase).

•**Accessible transportation:** The CTA stations at both Midway and O'Hare are wheelchair-accessible, but not all stations in the Loop area have elevators. The closest Blue Line stop to the Palmer House with an elevator is Jackson, two long blocks from the Palmer House at Jackson and State Streets. In the Loop area, the Orange Line from Midway is on elevated tracks. The closest elevator-equipped Orange Line station is Van Buren, another long block south of the Jackson station. Call the Elevator Status Hotline at 1-888-968-7282 and press 5 to check for elevator service problems (TTY 1-888-282-8891). All CTA buses have lifts or ramps. Contact the RTA Travel Information Center at 1-312-836-7000 for updated information. Maps and other information are available at <http://www.transitchicago.com/maps/accessible.html>, and a brochure on accessibility is available at <http://www.transitchicago.com/downloads/brochures/ada.pdf> (text version <http://www.transitchicago.com/welcome/ada.txt>).

•**Driving to Chicago:** See http://www1.hilton.com/en_US/hi/hotel/CHIPHHH-The-Palmer-House-Hilton-Illinois/directions.do for maps and driving directions to the Palmer House. Hotel valet parking is \$51 per day for hotel guests.

•**Amtrak:** Amtrak trains arrive at Union Station, which is about ten blocks (some long) west on Canal between Adams and Jackson, across the Chicago River. The 151 bus goes to the hotel area (stop at State and Adams). A taxi to the Palmer House is about \$10. Consult <http://www.amtrak.com> for schedules and fares.

2. MEETING REGISTRATION

Beginning in 2011, academic year, all the APA Divisions adopted higher rates for on-site registrations, so that on-site registration is now subject to a \$30 premium for non-student registrants and \$5 premium for students. This is intended to encourage as many members as possible to register in advance, so as to alleviate the congestion at the meeting registration desk. Rates for registration are as follows:

Regular APA Members	\$90 on-site	\$60 advance
Student APA Members	\$15 on-site	\$10 advance
Non-APA Members	\$120 on-site	\$90 advance

The Central Division rebates \$20 of the Member's and Non-Member's fee to the APA National Office to support the general costs of the APA. All remaining registration income is used to support the expenses of the meeting and the operations of the Central Division. You may pre-register for the meeting by using the pre-registration information form found at the back of this issue. The deadline for pre-registration is **January 18, 2012**. Payment is accepted by cash, check, or credit card.

Registration includes admission to the reception on Thursday evening; non-registrants who wish to attend this reception may purchase tickets at the Registration Desk, or at the door of the reception, for \$10. ***Please note that all persons attending the convention are expected to register (this includes invited participants and participants in Group Meetings).*** Registration fees are vital to the conduct of APA conventions, since convention revenues are the only source of income for the Divisions.

3. INFORMATION ON SESSION LOCATIONS

Following the procedure begun in all three Divisions in 2008-09, this printed program does not include the rooms in which individual meeting sessions are to be held. Instead, this information will be made available at the meeting itself, in a program supplement that will be distributed at the Registration Desk. The locations of the Registration Desk, Book Exhibits, Placement Service, Placement Interview Area, Presidential Address, and Receptions are, however, included in the program.

4. PLACEMENT SERVICE

The Placement Center will open for business at 5:00 p.m. on Wednesday, February 15, and continue in operation through noon, Saturday, February 18 (see the Program for specific times, and check the Meeting Registration Desk on the second floor for information about the locations of Placement Center operations). Job seekers are urged to pre-register for Placement by submitting the pre-registration form provided at the back of this issue. Since many job interviews are pre-arranged on the basis advertisements in *Jobs for Philosophers (JFP)*, and since the Placement Center will not post notices of positions that have already been advertised in *JFP*, job seekers are advised to obtain copies of *JFP* in advance of the meeting and to bring them to the meeting. (*JFP* is available to APA members upon request, at no extra charge. Requests should be addressed to the APA National Office, University of Delaware, Newark, DE 19716.)

Policy on Interviews in Sleeping Rooms. At its 1994 meeting the APA Board of Officers adopted the policy of prohibiting job interviews in sleeping rooms at Divisional meetings. We ask your cooperation in implementing this policy. Interviews in the living rooms of suites are, of course, permissible under this policy, and interviewing departments may also make use of the Placement Center interview area.

A Placement Ombudsperson, either the Chair or a member of the APA Committee on Academic Career Opportunities and Placement, will be available in the Placement Service area for anyone encountering problems with the interviewing process.

5. BOOK EXHIBITS

The publishers' book exhibits will be located on the second floor (for the location see the program supplement). Exhibits will be open 9:00 a.m.-5:00 p.m. on Thursday and Friday and 9:00 a.m.-Noon on Saturday.

6. RECEPTIONS AND RECEPTION TABLES

The reception on Thursday, February 16, will begin at 8:30 p.m. (see the Program Supplement for location). Complimentary beer and soft drinks are provided at this reception, which is open only to those who have either registered for the convention or purchased special tickets for the reception (available for \$10 both at the registration desk and at the door of the reception). The Presidential Reception on Friday, February 17, will begin at 9:00 p.m. Tickets are not required for admission to the Friday reception, and refreshments are available on a cash-bar basis.

Departments and societies are invited to reserve one of the large round tables at the Receptions. These tables will be numbered, and a chart will be posted and distributed at Registration giving the table locations along with an index showing, for each table, who has reserved it. The fee for reserving a table is \$25. If you wish to reserve a table, please fill out and mail the form included in the back pages of this issue of the *Proceedings* or call or email Ms. Linda Smallbrook at the APA National Office (phone +1

302-831-1113, fax +1 302-831-3372, email lindas@udel.edu). The deadline for making table reservations is January 15, 2012.

7. BUSINESS MEETING

The annual Business Meeting of the Central Division will be held Friday, February 16, at 12:15 p.m. in the Wabash Parlor. Regular items of business include reports from Divisional and National officers and committees and the nomination of officers for 2012-2013. The 2012 Nominating Committee will present a slate of nominees for the positions of Vice President, Divisional Representative, Member of the Executive Committee, and the four members of the 2012 Nominating Committee. The Report of the Nominating Committee will be posted in the registration area 24 hours prior to the Business Meeting and is also printed on page 171 of this issue of the *Proceedings*. Nominations from the floor are also accepted if proposed by a group of ten members. In accordance with Divisional rules, voting for candidates will be by mail ballot.

Please note that only APA members who are affiliates of the Central Division have voting rights at this meeting. The list of regular members that appears in the November issue of the *Proceedings* is used to determine the list of eligible voters for the three subsequent Divisional meetings. Certification of persons as voting affiliates of the Central Division will take place at the entrance to the Business Meeting itself, for those wishing to attend and vote.

The Minutes of the 2011 Executive Committee Meeting and draft minutes of the 2011 Business Meeting are published in this issue of the *Proceedings*, pp. 161-164.

8. PRESIDENTIAL ADDRESS

President Peter Railton will present the 2012 Presidential Address, "That Obscure Object, Desire," at 6:00 p.m. on Friday. He will be introduced by Margaret Atherton, Vice President of the Central Division.

9. JOHN DEWEY LECTURE

The John Dewey Lectures, generously sponsored by the John Dewey Foundation, have been presented annually at each American Philosophical Association meeting since 2006. Each John Dewey Lecture is given by a prominent and senior American philosopher who is invited to reflect, broadly and in an autobiographical spirit, on philosophy in America. The Central Division is pleased to announce that the 2012 John Dewey Lecture will be given by Ruth Millikan on Thursday, February 16, at 2:20 p.m. (Session II-H). The lecture will be introduced by Dan Ryder. A reception, hosted by the John Dewey Foundation, will follow in the same room.

10. AWARD OF QUINN PRIZE

The Quinn Prize is awarded in honor of Philip L. Quinn for recognition of service to philosophy and philosophers, broadly construed. The Quinn Prize for 2011 has been awarded by the Board of Officers to Karen Hanson.

The prize will be presented to her by the Chair of the Board of Officers, Michael Bratman, at 9:30 p.m. on Thursday during the evening reception.

11. GRADUATE STUDENT TRAVEL STIPEND RECIPIENTS

As in past years, the Central Division Executive Committee awards stipends of \$300 each to help defray the travel expenses of graduate students whose papers are accepted for the program. Starting with the 2006 program, the Executive Committee has decided to provide a stipend for every graduate student whose paper is accepted. The Executive and Program Committees are pleased to announce the names of the 36 recipients of stipends for this year:

Gualtiero Piccinini (University of Missouri, St. Louis) and **Justin Garson** (Hunter College, CUNY): “Abstract Pattern Idealization and Explanatory Models.” Paper 2 in Session VII-J, ‘Philosophy of Science’ (Saturday 2:30 p.m.)

Charity Anderson (Saint Louis University): “Fallibilism and the Flexibility of Epistemic Modals.” Paper 2 in Session V-J, ‘Conditionals, Epistemic Modals, and Two-Dimensionalism’ (Friday 3:00 p.m.)

Andrew M. Bailey (University of Notre Dame): “The Elimination Argument.” Paper 2 in Session IV-E, ‘Personal Identity and Composition’ (Friday 12:45 p.m.)

Matthew A. Benton (Rutgers University): “Knowledge Norms in Conflict.” Paper 2 in Session VI-L, ‘Epistemology and Language’ (Saturday 9:00 a.m.)

Kenneth A. Boyd (University of Toronto): “Assertion and Intentional Fools.” Paper 1 in Session VI-L, ‘Epistemology and Language’ (Saturday 9:00 a.m.)

Alexander Paul Bozzo (Marquette University): “Spinoza’s Theory of Attributes.” Paper 3 in Session VII-L, ‘Rationalism’ (Saturday 2:30 p.m.)

Matthew Braddock (Duke University): “From Insensitivity to Moral Debunking.” Paper 1 in Session II-I, ‘Moral Psychology’ (Thursday 2:20 p.m.)

Mihnea D. I. Capraru (Syracuse University): “A New Source of Data About Singular Thought.” Paper 2 in Session IV-F, ‘Singular Thought and Intentionalism’ (Friday 12:45 p.m.)

Matthew Carlson (Indiana University, Bloomington): “Inferential Dependence.” Paper 3 in Session II-M, ‘Semantics and Logic’ (Thursday 2:20 p.m.)

Ezra J. Cook (Northwestern University): “Semantic Blindness, Indirect Attributions, and Eavesdroppers.” Paper 3 in Session VI-L, ‘Epistemology and Language’ (Saturday 9:00 a.m.)

Wesley D. Cray (Ohio State University): “Omniscience and Worthiness of Worship.” Paper 2 in Session I-G, ‘Philosophy of Religion’ (Thursday 12:10 p.m.)

Stephen Davey (University of Texas at Austin): “The Problem with (Quasi-Realist) Expressivism.” Paper 1 in Session VII-H, ‘Metaethics’ (Saturday 2:30 p.m.)

Kory DeClark (University of Southern California): “Acceptance and Fair Play.” Paper 2 in Session II-K, ‘Political Obligation and Social Contract Theory’ (Thursday 2:20 p.m.)

Andreas Elpidorou (Boston University): “Why Seeing Is Not Deducing: Phenomenal Concepts, the Knowledge Argument, and *A Priori* Entailment.” Paper 1 in Session II-L, ‘Philosophy of Perception’ (Thursday 2:20 p.m.)

Christopher Gibilisco (University of Nebraska, Lincoln): “David Lewis and Contingent Second-Order Predication.” Paper 3 in Session II-J, ‘Properties’ (Thursday 2:20 p.m.)

Fredrik Haraldsen (University of Miami): “Russellian Two-Dimensionalism.” Paper 3 in Session V-J, ‘Conditionals, Epistemic Modals, and Two-Dimensionalism’ (Friday 3:00 p.m.)

Joseph Hedger (Syracuse University): “The Truth about Racial Slurs: Using Kaplan’s Framework to Provide a Semantic Theory of Derogatory Epithets.” Paper 1 in Session II-M, ‘Semantics and Logic’ (Thursday 2:20 p.m.)

David Ivy (University of Texas at Austin): “Naïve Realism and the Screening-Off Problem.” Paper 3 in Session II-L, ‘Philosophy of Perception’ (Thursday 2:20 p.m.)

Marija Jankovic (Indiana University): “Collective Intentions behind Communication”. Paper 1 in Session I-I, ‘Collectives’ (Thursday 12:10 p.m.)

Tim Jankowiak (University of California, San Diego): “Space and the Objectivity of Sensation in Kant.” Paper 1 in Session III-J, ‘Kant and Hegel’ (Friday 9:00 a.m.)

Ashley Graham Kennedy (University of Virginia): “Idealization and Explanation in Astrophysics.” Paper 3 in Session VII-J, ‘Philosophy of Science’ (Saturday 2:30 p.m.)

Peter Nichols (University of Wisconsin, Madison): “Stage Theory and the Platitude.” Paper 1 in Session IV-E, ‘Personal Identity and Composition’ (Friday 12:45 p.m.)

Tyler Paytas (Washington University in St. Louis): “In Defense of Scalar Consequentialism.” Paper 3 in Session III-K, ‘Consequentialism and Theories of Well-Being’ (Friday 9:00 a.m.)

Luke P. Phillips (Indiana University): “Contempt and the Capacity for Evil.” Symposium Paper in Session I-A (Thursday 12:10 p.m.)

Daniel Pilchman (University of California, Irvine): “Knowledge as a Primary Good.” Paper 2 in Session I-E, ‘Epistemic Value’ (Thursday 12:10 p.m.)

Gregory S. Poore (Baylor University): “Aristotelian Compassion.” Paper 3 in Session VII-I, ‘Emotions and Sentiments’ (Saturday 2:30 p.m.)

Alexandru Radulescu (University of California, Los Angeles): “The Logic of Indexicals.” Paper 2 in Session II-M, ‘Semantics and Logic’ (Thursday 2:20 p.m.)

Bryan Reece (University of Oklahoma): “The Voluntary in *Nicomachean Ethics* III.1.” Paper 1 in Session III-I, ‘Aristotle’ (Friday 9:00 a.m.)

Christopher M. Rice (Fordham University): “Defending Objective List Theories of Well-Being.” Paper 1 in Session III-K, ‘Consequentialism and Theories of Well-Being’ (Friday 9:00 a.m.)

Mark T. Schranz (University of Toronto): “Basic Interests and Freedom as Nondomination.” Paper 1 in Session III-L, ‘Political Liberty and Recognition’ (Friday 9:00 a.m.)

Philip Shadd (Queen’s University (Canada)): “Assessing the Luck Egalitarian Principle.” Paper 2 in Session V-I, ‘Egalitarianism and Moral Luck’ (Friday 3:00 p.m.)

Paul Silva (University of Connecticut): “The Special Composition Question, Transitivity, and Ordinary Objects.” Paper 1 in Session IV-I, ‘Metaphysics and Metametaphysics’ (Friday 12:45 p.m.)

Nicholas Tebben (Johns Hopkins University): “A Paradox of Consequentialism.” Paper 2 in Session III-K, ‘Consequentialism and Theories of Well-Being’ (Friday 9:00 a.m.)

Adam R. Thompson (University of Nebraska, Lincoln): “Frankfurt Cases, Gettier, and the Principle of Alternative Possibilities.” Paper 2 in Session VII-K, ‘Free Will’ (Saturday 2:30 p.m.)

12. 2013 PROGRAM COMMITTEE

The 2013 Program Committee invites contributions for the 2013 annual meeting, which will be held at the New Orleans Hilton in New Orleans, February 20-23. Vice President Margaret Atherton has appointed the following Program Committee for this Meeting:

Anne Jaap Jacobson (University of Houston), Chair;

Dominic Bailey (University of Colorado, Boulder)

Istvan Berkeley (Louisiana State University)

John Bickle (Mississippi State University)

Josh Brown (University of Houston)

Stephen Daniel (Texas A&M University)

Peggy DesAutels (University of Dayton)

Anton Ford (University of Chicago)

Nico Orlandi (Rice University)

Hilde Lindemann (Michigan State University)

John McClendon (Michigan State University)

Robin Smith (Texas A&M University)

Jeanine Weeks Schroer (University of Minnesota, Duluth)

13. CALL FOR PAPERS, 2013

The Program Committee for 2013 invites APA members to submit papers for presentation at the one hundred and tenth annual meeting, to be held

in New Orleans, Louisiana, at the New Orleans Hilton hotel, February 20-23, 2013. The deadline for submission for the 2013 meeting is **June 1, 2012**. Both Colloquium and Symposium papers are considered. Authors may only submit one paper, with the exception that authors may submit both Colloquium and Symposium versions of the same paper. Papers may be submitted in electronic format through the APA's web site at <http://www.apaonline.org> or in hard copy mailed to the APA National Office, University of Delaware, Newark, DE 19716. (Please mark the words "Central Division" on the envelope in which the copies are sent.) Colloquium papers are limited to 3,000 words and Symposium papers to 5,000 words. Each paper must be accompanied by an abstract of not more than 150 words. Hard-copy submissions should include a separate title page with the author's name and a word count. Since papers will be strictly blind-reviewed, the paper itself should not contain the author's name or institution or any other references from which the author's identity might easily be inferred (papers containing such information may be disqualified). Papers that have been submitted elsewhere for publication may be submitted, provided that their authors can certify that they will not appear in print prior to the meeting for which they are submitted; the Division may remove a paper from its program if it learns that it will have been published prior to the program. The Central Division will not include on its program any paper that has already been scheduled for inclusion on the program of any other APA divisional meeting program. Authors are limited to a single submission, with an exception allowed for submitting both Colloquium and Symposium versions of the same paper (in such a case, at most one of the two versions will be accepted). The Program Committee regrets that it is unable to return submitted papers.

14. PARTICIPATION

APA members who wish to be considered as commentators or session chairs for the 2013 meeting should use the Program Information Form provided later in this issue of the *Proceedings*. The following resolution of the Central Division, adopted at the 1980 Business Meeting, will be of interest to prospective participants:

"The APA is the sole professional organization that serves and represents all American philosophers. To give better effect to the foregoing statement, the Executive Committee of the Central Division publicly affirms its desire that the composition of its officers, committees, and programs reflect the diversity of its membership in such respects as methodology, problem area, and type of employment or institutional affiliation."

15. NOMINATIONS

The Central Division Executive Committee also invites suggestions from Central Division affiliates about appropriate candidates for Central Division offices. If you would like to propose anyone for consideration, please see the instructions in this issue of the *Proceedings*.

16. PROGRAM INFORMATION

The Program of the meeting, including the main sessions organized by the APA and group sessions organized by affiliated groups, forms part of this issue. Abstracts of invited and contributed papers are also included. A limited number of copies of the Program will also be available at registration. A world-wide-web version of the Program is also available at the APA's web site, <http://www.apaonline.org/> (this site also includes pointers to additional sources of information on the Internet about the Chicago area). The web version may be updated periodically, as necessary, to incorporate late changes in the Program.

17. SPECIAL THANKS FROM THE SECRETARY-TREASURER

I wish to acknowledge with gratitude the generous support of the College of Liberal Arts of Texas A&M University for the Central Division office.

On behalf of the Executive and Program Committees, I extend to every member of The American Philosophical Association an invitation to take part in our One Hundred Ninth Annual Meeting.

Robin Smith

Secretary-Treasurer, APA Central Division

CENTRAL DIVISION COMMITTEES, 2011-2012

EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE, 2011-2012

President: Peter Railton

Vice President: Margaret Atherton

Past President: Claudia Card

Divisional Representative: Julia Driver

Secretary-Treasurer: Robin Smith

Term 2009-2012: Lynn Joy

Term 2010-2013: Marya Schechtman

Term 2011-2014: Valerie Tiberius

PROGRAM COMMITTEE, 2012

Sanford Goldberg, *Chair*

James Bohman

James P. Butler

Janice L. Dowell

Ray Elugardo

Claire Horisk

Anja Jauernig

Diane Jeske

Jennifer Lackey

Amy M. Schmitter

Robin Smith

Anita Superson

Michael Titelbaum

Andrea Westlund

NOMINATING COMMITTEE, 2011-2012

Claudia Card, *Chair*

John M. Doris

Peter Hylton

Mi-Kyoung Lee

Lisa Shabel

THE AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL ASSOCIATION

CENTRAL DIVISION ONE HUNDRED NINTH ANNUAL MEETING PROGRAM

FEBRUARY 15-18, 2012
PALMER HOUSE HILTON HOTEL

WEDNESDAY EVENING, FEBRUARY 15

PLACEMENT INTERVIEW AREA

5:00-10:00 p.m., Spire Parlor (sixth floor)

PLACEMENT QUIET INTERVIEW SPACE

5:00-10:00 p.m., Harvard Room (third floor)

REGISTRATION

5:00-10:00 p.m., Registration Area (sixth floor)

EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE MEETING

7:00-10:00 p.m., Cresthill Room (third floor)

THURSDAY MORNING, FEBRUARY 16

PLACEMENT INTERVIEW AREA

8:30 a.m.-5:30 p.m., Spire Parlor (sixth floor)

PLACEMENT QUIET INTERVIEW SPACE

8:30 a.m.-5:30 p.m., Harvard Room (third floor)

REGISTRATION

8:30 a.m.-5:30 p.m., Registration Area (sixth floor)

BOOK EXHIBITS

9:00 a.m.-5:00 p.m., Adams Ballroom (sixth floor)

GROUP AND COMMITTEE SESSIONS, WEDNESDAY EVENING*(see Group Meeting Program for details)***Session G0: 6:00-9:00 p.m.**

G0-1: Society for Philosophy in the Contemporary World

GROUP AND COMMITTEE SESSIONS, THURSDAY MORNING*(see Group Meeting Program for details)***Session GI: 9:00 a.m.-Noon**

GI-1: International Society for Environmental Ethics

GI-2: Society for Asian and Comparative Philosophy

GI-3: American Society for Value Inquiry

GI-4: Philosophy of Time Society

GI-5: American Society for Aesthetics

GI-6: Society for the Philosophical Study of Education

GI-7: Society for the Metaphysics of Science

GI-8: Radical Philosophy Association

GI-9: International Association for Computing and Philosophy

GI-10: Society for the Philosophic Study of Genocide and the Holocaust

GI-11: Max Scheler Society

THURSDAY AFTERNOON/EVENING, FEBRUARY 16**GROUP AND COMMITTEE SESSIONS, THURSDAY AFTERNOON/EVENING***(see Group Meeting Program for details)***Session GII: 5:30-7:30 p.m.**

GII-1: North American Kant Society

GII-2: American Society for Value Inquiry

GII-3: International Society for Environmental Ethics

GII-4: North American Nietzsche Society

GII-5: American Association of Philosophy Teachers

GII-6: Hume Society

GII-7: Personalist Discussion Group

GII-8: Society of Christian Philosophers

GII-9: Society for Business Ethics

GII-10: Committee on Institutional Cooperation

Session GIII: 7:40-10:40 p.m.

GIII-1: Society for Analytical Feminism

GIII-2: Society for Systematic Philosophy

GIII-3: Society for the Philosophic Study of the Contemporary Visual Arts

GIII-4: American Society for Philosophy, Counseling, and Psychotherapy

GIII-5: Bertrand Russell Society

GIII-6: Max Scheler Society

GIII-7: Adam Smith Society

GIII-8: Association for the Development of Philosophy Teaching

GIII-9: Society for the Philosophic Study of Genocide and the Holocaust

GIII-10: Joint Session: Society for the Philosophy of Creativity and the Society for the Study of Process Philosophies

GIII-11: North American Society for Social Philosophy

I-A. Submitted Symposium

12:10-2:10 p.m.

Chair: Claudia Card (University of Wisconsin–Madison)

Speaker: Luke P. Phillips (Indiana University)
“Contempt and the Capacity for Evil”

Commentator: Kathryn J. Norlock (Trent University)

I-B. Submitted Symposium

12:10-2:10 p.m.

Chair: Lynne Rudder Baker (University of Massachusetts)

Speaker: Boris C. Kment (Princeton University)
“Are All Fundamental Facts Purely Qualitative?”

Commentator: Reina Hayaki (University of Nebraska)

I-C. Submitted Symposium

12:10-2:10 p.m.

Chair: Edward Slowik (Winona State University)

Speaker: Jessica Gordon-Roth (University of Illinois,
Chicago)

“A Reconsideration of Locke on Persons as Modes”

Commentator: William Uzgalis (Oregon State University)

I-D. Submitted Symposium

12:10-2:10 p.m.

Chair: Paul Warren (Florida International University)

Speaker: Gregory C. Salmieri (University of North Carolina,
Chapel Hill)

“Does Virtue Make Money or Make it Good (How to Understand *Apology* 30b2-4)”

Commentator: Paul Carelli (University of North Florida)

I-E. Colloquium: Epistemic Value*12:10-2:10 p.m.**12:10-1:10* "Justification and Truth: Our Epistemic Telos and Skopos"

Chair: Bruce Hunter (University of Alberta)

Speaker: Sarah Wright (University of Georgia)

Commentator: Marian David (University of Notre Dame)

1:10-2:10 "Knowledge as a Primary Good"
Graduate Student Travel Stipend Recipient

Chair: Nick Leonard (Northwestern University)

Speaker: Daniel Pilchman (University of California, Irvine)

Commentator: Jason R. Kawall (Colgate University)

I-F. Colloquium: Language and Normativity*12:10-2:10 p.m.**12:10-1:10* "Reasons as Explanations"

Chair: David Henderson (University of Nebraska)

Speaker: John Brunero (University of Missouri, St. Louis)

Commentator: Karsten Stueber (Holy Cross)

1:10-2:10 "On Advising Well"

Chair: Sandra Lapointe (McMaster University)

Speaker: Dana Howard (Brown University)

Commentator: Rebecca Stangl (University of Virginia)

I-G. Colloquium: Philosophy of Religion*12:10-2:10 p.m.**12:10-1:10* "A Property-Based Cosmological Argument"

Chair: Samuel Newlands (University of Notre Dame)

Speaker: Travis Dumsday (Livingstone College)

Commentator: Elizabeth Goodnick (University of Notre Dame)

1:10-2:10 "Omniscience and Worthiness of Worship"
Graduate Student Travel Stipend Recipient

Chair: Katharyn Waidler (Wheaton College)

Speaker: Wesley D. Cray (Ohio State University)

Commentator: Lea Schweitz (Lutheran School of Theology, Chicago)

I-H. Colloquium: Vagueness*12:10-2:10 p.m.**12:10-1:10* "Sorensen on the Vaguely Vague"

Chair: Gerald Vision (Temple University)

Speaker: Greg Novack (Wayne State University)

Commentator: Chris Kennedy (University of Chicago)

- 1:10-2:10* “The Sorites Paradox and Borderline Cases”
 Chair: David Liebesman (Boston University)
 Speaker: Helen Daly (Colorado College)
 Commentator: Diana Raffman (University of Toronto)

I-I. Colloquium: Collectives

12:10-2:10 p.m.

12:10-1:10 “Collective Intentions behind Communication”
Graduate Student Travel Stipend Recipient

- Chair: Andrew P. Mills (Otterbein University)
 Speaker: Marija Jankovic (Indiana University)
 Commentator: Karen Lewis (University of Southern California)
1:10-2:10 “Theseus Incorporated: Philosophy of Mind,
 Material Constitution, and the Ontology of the
 Criminal Law”
 Chair: Don E. Scheid (Winona State University)
 Speaker: Christopher R. Green (University of Mississippi)
 Commentator: Kendy M. Hess (College of the Holy Cross)

I-J. Colloquium: Mind and Metaphysics

12:10-2:10 p.m.

12:10-1:10 “Is Scientific Inference Holistic in Any Sense That
 Matters for Cognitive Science?”
Graduate Student Travel Stipend Recipient

- Chair: Colin Klein (University of Illinois at Chicago)
 Speakers: Timothy Fuller (Ohio State University)
 Richard Samuels (Ohio State University)
 Commentator: Shannon Spaulding (Washington University in St.
 Louis)
1:10-2:10 “Realization and Causation”
 Chair: Matthew Mullins (Northwestern University)
 Speaker: Mark B. Couch (Seton Hall University)
 Commentator: Meghan Sullivan (University of Notre Dame)

I-K. Committee on Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and Transgender People in the Profession

12:10-2:10 p.m.

- Chair: Raja Halwani (School of the Art Institute of Chicago)
 Speakers: Stephanie Kapusta (University of Western Ontario)
 “A Philosophical Account of Transgender
 Narratives of Incongruence”
 Cori Wong (Pennsylvania State University)
 “Where are the Gay Girls? Recognizing
 Homophobia”

I-L. Committee on Academic Career Opportunities and Placement

12:10-2:10 p.m.

II-A. Author Meets Critics: Patricia Smith Churchland, *Braintrust: What Neuroscience Tells Us about Morality*

2:20-5:20 p.m.

Chair: Colin Klein (University of Illinois at Chicago)

Critics: Owen Flanagan (Duke University)

Thomas Hurka (University of Toronto)

Edouard Machery (University of Pittsburgh)

Response: Patricia Smith Churchland (University of California, San Diego)

II-B. Author Meets Critics: Gillian Russell, *Truth in Virtue of Meaning: A Defense of the Analytic/Synthetic Distinction*

2:20-5:20 p.m.

Chair: Albert Casullo (University of Nebraska–Lincoln)

Critics: Jeffrey Speaks (University of Notre Dame)

Kirk Ludwig (Indiana University)

Response: Gillian Russell (Washington University in St Louis)

II-C. Invited Symposium: Socratic Prudence

2:20-5:20 p.m.

Chair: James P. Butler (Berea College)

Speakers: Naomi Reshotko (University of Denver)

“Socratic Prudentialism: Ethics without Morality”

Iakovos Vasiliou (CUNY Graduate Center)

(Title to be announced)

Commentator: Mi-Kyoung Lee (University of Colorado)

II-D. Invited Symposium: The Uniqueness Thesis

2:20-5:20 p.m.

Chair: Michael Titelbaum (University of Wisconsin–Madison)

Speakers: E. J. Coffman (University of Tennessee) and
Nathan Ballantyne (Fordham University)

“Conciliationism and Uniqueness”

Roger White (Massachusetts Institute of
Technology)

(Title to be announced)

Thomas Kelly (Princeton University)

(Title to be announced)

II-E. Invited Symposium: Justice and Climate Change*2:20-5:20 p.m.*

Chair: James McCollum (Saint Louis University)

Speakers: Paul Baer (Georgia Institute of Technology)

Simon Caney (University of Oxford)

Darrell Moellendorf (San Diego State University)

II-F. Invited Symposium: Stereotype Threat*2:20-5:20 p.m.*

Chair: Charles W. Mills (Northwestern University)

Speakers: Lawrence Blum (University of Massachusetts,
Boston)

"Some Moral Problems with 'Stereotype Threat'"

Sarah-Jane Leslie (Princeton University)

(Title to be announced)

Howard McGary (Rutgers University)

*(Title to be announced)***II-G. Invited Session: Sentiment, Taste and Judgment in the Eighteenth Century***2:20-5:20 p.m.*

Chair: George Dickie (University of Illinois at Chicago)

Speaker: Alex Rueger (University of Alberta)

"Pleasure of Taste, Moral Sentiment, and Judgment
in Kant, 1770-1790"

Commentator: Melissa R. Zinkin (Binghamton University)

Speaker: James Shelley (Auburn University)

"The Joint Verdict of True Judges"

Commentator: Timothy M. Costelloe (College of William and
Mary)**II-H. Invited Session: The John Dewey Lecture***2:20-5:20 p.m.*Chair: Dan Ryder (University of British Columbia
(Okanagan))

Speaker: Ruth Millikan (University of Connecticut)

"Advice"

*A Reception sponsored by the John Dewey Foundation will follow
the lecture and question period at approximately 4:00 p.m.***II-I. Colloquium: Moral Psychology***2:20-5:20 p.m.**2:20-3:20 "From Insensitivity to Moral Debunking"**Graduate Student Travel Stipend Recipient*

- Chair: Mark Wells (Bowling Green State University)
 Speaker: Matthew Braddock (Duke University)
 Commentator: Justin Horn (University of Wisconsin–Madison)
 3:20-4:20 “Appetitive Desires and the Fuss About Fit”
 Chair: Julia Driver (Washington University in St. Louis)
 Speaker: Steven Swartzler (University of Nebraska–Lincoln)
 Commentator: Fred Schueler (University of Delaware)
 4:20-5:20 “Is Your Amygdala a Deontologist or a Consequentialist? A Defense of Kantian Moral Psychology”
 Chair: Billy Dunaway (University of Michigan, Ann Arbor)
 Speaker: Chris D. Meyers (University of Southern Mississippi)
 Commentator: Mark N. Jensen (Hope College)

II-J. Colloquium: Properties

- 2:20-5:20 *p.m.*
 2:20-3:20 “Properties and Mereological Nihilism”
 Chair: Joshua DiPaolo (University of Massachusetts, Amherst)
 Speaker: Patrick Monaghan (University of Iowa)
 Commentator: Ben Caplan (Ohio State University)
 3:20-4:20 “Properties as Places”
 Chair: Timothy Sundell (University of Kentucky)
 Speaker: Sam Cowling (University of Massachusetts, Amherst)
 Commentator: Alexander Skiles (University of Notre Dame)
 4:20-5:20 “David Lewis and Contingent Second-Order Predication”
Graduate Student Travel Stipend Recipient
 Chair: Stephanie Lewis (Municipal Capital Management, LLC)
 Speaker: Christopher Gibilisco (University of Nebraska, Lincoln)
 Commentator: Jeffrey A. Snapper (University of Notre Dame)

II-K. Colloquium: Political Obligation and Social Contract Theory

- 2:20-5:20 *p.m.*
 2:20-3:20 “Structurally Accounting for the Significance of Hypothetical Choice in Social Contract Arguments”
 Chair: Walter E. Schaller (Texas Tech University)
 Speaker: Douglas R. Paletta (University of Pennsylvania)
 Commentator: John Rudisill (College of Wooster)

3:20-4:20 "Acceptance and Fair Play"

Graduate Student Travel Stipend Recipient

Chair: Carl Cohen (University of Michigan, Ann Arbor)

Speaker: Kory DeClark (University of Southern California)

Commentator: Edward Song (Louisiana State University)

4:20-5:20 "A Critique of Estlund's Normative Consent Theory"

Chair: Timothy Shiell (University of Wisconsin–Stout)

Speaker: Emily M. Crookston (Washington University in St. Louis)

Commentator: Matt S. Whitt (Warren Wilson College)

II-L. Colloquium: Philosophy of Perception

2:20-5:20 p.m.

2:20-3:20 "Why Seeing Is Not Deducing: Phenomenal Concepts, the Knowledge Argument, and *A Priori* Entailment"

Graduate Student Travel Stipend Recipient

Chair: Carl Gillett (Northern Illinois University)

Speaker: Andreas Elpidorou (Boston University)

Commentator: William S. Robinson (Iowa State University)

3:20-4:20 "Logic and Perceptual Content"

Chair: Todd Ganson (Oberlin College)

Speaker: Jeffrey J. Watson (Arizona State University)

Commentator: Philippe Chuard (SMU)

4:20-5:20 "Naïve Realism and the Screening-Off Problem"

Graduate Student Travel Stipend Recipient

Chair: Russell Wahl (Idaho State University)

Speaker: David Ivy (University of Texas at Austin)

Commentator: Gordon B. Knight (Iowa State University)

II-M. Colloquium: Semantics and Logic

2:20-5:20 p.m.

2:20-3:20 "The Truth about Racial Slurs: Using Kaplan's Framework to Provide a Semantic Theory of Derogatory Epithets"

Graduate Student Travel Stipend Recipient

Chair: Ernesto Rosen Velasquez (University of Dayton)

Speaker: Joseph Hedger (Syracuse University)

Commentator: Dawn Starr (Ohio State University)

3:20-4:20 "The Logic of Indexicals"

Graduate Student Travel Stipend Recipient

Chair: Michael Liston (University of Wisconsin–Milwaukee)

Speaker: Alexandru Radulescu (University of California, Los Angeles)

Commentator: Lynsey Wolter (University of Wisconsin–Eau Claire)

4:20-5:20 "Inferential Dependence"
Graduate Student Travel Stipend Recipient

Chair: Katalin Bimbo (University of Alberta)

Speaker: Matthew Carlson (Indiana University, Bloomington)

Commentator: Ronald W. Loeffler (Grand Valley State University)

Reception

8:30 p.m.-12:30 a.m., *Red Lacquer Room (fourth floor)*

At approximately 9:30 p.m. during the Reception, the Chair of the Board of Officers, Michael Bratman, will present Karen Hanson with the 2011 Quinn Prize for service to philosophy and philosophers, broadly construed.

FRIDAY MORNING, FEBRUARY 17

PLACEMENT INTERVIEW AREA

8:30 a.m.-5:00 p.m., *Spire Parlor (sixth floor)*

PLACEMENT QUIET INTERVIEW SPACE

8:30 a.m.-5:00 p.m., *Harvard Room (third floor)*

BOOK EXHIBITS

9:00 a.m.-5:00 p.m., *Adams Ballroom (sixth floor)*

III-A. Author Meets Critics: Robert Stalnaker, *Our Knowledge of the Internal World*

9:00 a.m.-Noon

Chair: Joseph Mendola (University of Nebraska–Lincoln)

Critics: Laura Schroeter (University of Melbourne)

Joseph Levine (University of Massachusetts,
Amherst)

Response: Robert Stalnaker (Massachusetts Institute of
Technology)

III-B. Invited Symposium: Science and Metaphysics

9:00 a.m.-Noon

Chair: Nick Huggett (University of Illinois at Chicago)

Speakers: Jessica Wilson (University of Toronto)

"Two Routes to Metaphysical Emergence in the
Thermodynamic Limit"

Alyssa Ney (University of Rochester)

(Title to be announced)

James Ladyman (University of Bristol)

(Title to be announced)

III-C. Invited Symposium: The Metaphysics of Moral Realism*9:00 a.m.-Noon*

Chair: Russ Shafer-Landau (University of Wisconsin–Madison)

Speakers: Tristram McPherson (Virginia Tech)
“What Is at Stake in Debates between Normative Realists?”Terence Cuneo (University of Vermont)
“Noncausal Moral Explanations”David Enoch (Hebrew University of Jerusalem)
“Against Quietism”**III-D. Invited Symposium: Opera and Philosophy***9:00 a.m.-Noon*

Chair: Jenefer Robinson (University of Cincinnati)

Speakers: Peter Kivy (Rutgers University)
*(Title to be announced)*Lydia Goehr (Columbia University)
“The Life and Death of Bohème, or, Painting the Red Sea Red”Richard Schacht (University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign)
“Opera Matters”**III-E. Invited Symposium: Adaptive Preferences***9:00 a.m.-Noon*

Chair: Andrea Westlund (University of Wisconsin–Milwaukee)

Speakers: Ann E. Cudd (University of Kansas)
“Adaptations to Oppression: Preference and Resistance”Paul H. Benson (University of Dayton)
“Stereotype Threat and Relational Autonomy”

Commentator: Donald W. Bruckner (Pennsylvania State University, New Kensington)

III-F. Invited Symposium: The Epistemology of Groups*9:00 a.m.-Noon*

Chair: Jennifer Lackey (Northwestern University)

Speakers: Alexander Bird (University of Bristol)
*(Title to be announced)*Alvin I. Goldman (Rutgers University)
(Title to be announced)

Philip Pettit (Princeton University)
 “How to Tell If a Group Is an Agent”

III-G. Invited Session: Deontic Modals

9:00 a.m.-Noon

Chair: Janice L. Dowell (University of Nebraska, Lincoln)

Speaker: Fabrizio Cariani (Northwestern University)
 “The Subjective/Objective Distinction: What It Can
 and Can’t Do for You”

Commentator: Alex Silk (University of Michigan, Ann Arbor)

Speaker: Kai von Fintel (Massachusetts Institute of
 Technology)
 “The Best We Can Expect: In Defense of a
 Classical Approach to Deontic Modality”

Commentator: Nate Charlow (University of Toronto)

III-H. Colloquium: Moral Responsibility and Action Theory

9:00 a.m.-Noon

9:00-10:00 “Galen Strawson versus George Sher on Moral
 Responsibility”

Chair: George Sher (Rice University)

Speaker: Stephen Kershner (State University of New York–
 Fredonia)

Commentator: Matthew Talbert (West Virginia University)

10:00-11:00 “An Actional Account of Refraining”

Chair: Luca Ferrero (University of Wisconsin–
 Milwaukee)

Speaker: Brandon Johns (University of Southern California)

Commentator: Michelle Mason (University of Minnesota–Twin
 Cities)

11:00 a.m.-Noon “Are the Late Stage Demented Responsible for Past
 Crimes?”

Chair: Jessica Gordon-Roth (University of Illinois,
 Chicago)

Speaker: Annette S. Dufner (University of Toronto)

Commentator: Katrina Sifferd (Elmhurst College)

III-I. Colloquium: Aristotle

9:00 a.m.-Noon

9:00-10:00 “The Voluntary in *Nicomachean Ethics* III.1”
Graduate Student Travel Stipend Recipient

Chair: Paula Gottlieb (University of Wisconsin–
 Madison)

Speaker: Bryan Reece (University of Oklahoma)

Commentator: Susan Sauvé Meyer (University of Pennsylvania)

10:00-11:00 “Aristotle on the Boundary Between Physics and Metaphysics”

Chair: Anthony Preus (Binghamton University)

Speaker: Margaret E. Scharle (Reed College)

Commentator: David Ebrey (Northwestern University)

11:00 a.m.-Noon “Aristotle’s Theory of Essence”

Chair: John Thorp (University of Western Ontario)

Speaker: Allan Bäck (Kutztown University)

Commentator: Emily Katz (Michigan State University)

III-J. Colloquium: Kant and Hegel

9:00 a.m.-Noon

9:00-10:00 “Space and the Objectivity of Sensation in Kant”
Graduate Student Travel Stipend Recipient

Chair: Brian Watkins (Duke University)

Speaker: Tim Jankowiak (University of California, San Diego)

Commentator: Lisa Shabel (Ohio State University)

10:00-11:00 “Identifying the Gap in Kant’s Critical Philosophy”

Chair: Sebastian Luft (Marquette University)

Speaker: Bryan Hall (Indiana University Southeast)

Commentator: David Landy (San Francisco State University)

11:00 a.m.-Noon “God, Incarnation, and Metaphysics in Hegel’s
Philosophy of Religion”

Chair: Sally Sedgwick (University of Illinois at Chicago)

Speaker: Paolo D. Bubbio (University of Sydney)

Commentator: Mark Alznauer (Northwestern University)

III-K. Colloquium: Consequentialism and Theories of Well-Being

9:00 a.m.-Noon

9:00-10:00 “Defending Objective List Theories of Well-Being”
Graduate Student Travel Stipend Recipient

Chair: Kirsten Egerstrom (Syracuse University)

Speaker: Christopher M. Rice (Fordham University)

Commentator: Jason R. Raibley (California State University, Long Beach)

10:00-11:00 “A Paradox of Consequentialism”

Graduate Student Travel Stipend Recipient

Chair: Dennis R. Cooley (North Dakota State University)

Speaker: Nicholas Tebben (Johns Hopkins University)

Commentator: Dale Dorsey (University of Kansas)

11:00 a.m.-Noon “In Defense of Scalar Consequentialism”

Graduate Student Travel Stipend Recipient

- Chair: Henry R. West (Macalester College)
 Speaker: Tyler Paytas (Washington University in St. Louis)
 Commentator: Robert F. Card (State University of New York–
 Oswego)

III-L. Colloquium: Political Liberty and Recognition

9:00 a.m.-Noon

9:00-10:00 “Basic Interests and Freedom as Nondomination”
Graduate Student Travel Stipend Recipient

- Chair: Judith Wagner DeCew (Clark University)
 Speaker: Mark T. Schranz (University of Toronto)
 Commentator: James Kelly (Miami University of Ohio)

10:00-11:00 “Political Recognition”

- Chair: Zac Cogley (Northern Michigan University)
 Speaker: Raf A.A. Geenens (Katholieke Universiteit Leuven)
 Commentator: Michael J. Monahan (Marquette University)
 11:00 a.m.-Noon “Libertarian Paternalism: Improving Decisions
 While Preserving Liberty?”

Chair: Daniel D. Moseley (University of North Carolina,
 Chapel Hill)

Speaker: J.S. Swindell Blumenthal-Barby (Baylor College of
 Medicine)

Commentator: Piers Norris Turner (Ohio State University)

III-M. Committee on the Teaching of Philosophy: The Value of Graduate Student Teacher Training for the Profession of Philosophy

9:00 a.m.-Noon

Chair: Betsy Newell Decyk (California State University–
 Long Beach)

- Speakers: Francis Bottenberg (Stony Brook University)
 Adam J. Bowen (University of Illinois, Urbana-
 Champaign)
 Andrew N. Carpenter (Ellis University)
 David Concepcion (Ball State University)
 Betsy Newell Decyk (California State University–
 Long Beach)
 Clint Jones (University of Kentucky)
 Rachel Tillman (Stony Brook University)
 Christine Wieseler (University of South Florida)

III-N. Committee on the Status of Women: The Politics of Peace: Sara Ruddick’s Legacy and the Arab Spring

9:00 a.m.-Noon

Chair: Diana Tietjens Meyers (University of Connecticut)

- Speakers: Bat-Ami Bar On (Binghamton University)
 “The ‘Public Square’ and the ‘People’”
- Margo Okazawa-Rey (Fielding Graduate University)
 “When Is War Over? Feminist Reflections on
 Conflict and ‘Post’-Conflict”
- Sally Scholz (Villanova University)
 “Peacemakers, Resisters, and Ordinary Angry
 Mothers: Building Ruddick’s Global Feminist
 Solidarity after the Arab Spring”

III-O. Committee on Public Philosophy: Is there hope? Has Philosophy Contributed to Progress?

9:00 a.m.-Noon

- Chair: Owen Anderson (Arizona State University)
- Speakers: Robyn R. Gaier (Viterbo University)
 “Grief’s Pain and Wisdom’s Love: A Lesson on
 Philosophy and Progress from ‘Self-Reliance’”
- Mark Tschaepe (University of Minnesota,
 Rochester)
 “Hypothetical to Technical: Philosophy’s
 Unheralded Contribution to Making Useful Tools”
- Shane J. Ralston (Pennsylvania State University,
 Hazleton)
 “Hope, Growth and Progress: Three Cornerstones
 of Pragmatism”
- Owen Anderson (Arizona State University)
 “On Hope and Philosophical Progress”

Registration

9:00 a.m.-5:00 p.m., Registration Area (sixth floor)

FRIDAY AFTERNOON/EVENING, FEBRUARY 17

GROUP AND COMMITTEE SESSIONS, FRIDAY AFTERNOON/EVENING

(see Group Meeting Program for details)

Session GIV: 7:30-10:30 p.m.

- GIV-1: Society for the Advancement of American Philosophy*
- GIV-2: Society for the Philosophic Study of the Contemporary Visual Arts*
- GIV-3: Concerned Philosophers for Peace*
- GIV-4: Society for the Philosophic Study of the Contemporary Visual Arts*
- GIV-5: Society for the History of Political Philosophy*
- GIV-6: Society for Asian and Comparative Philosophy*

GIV-7: Society for the Philosophical Study of Education

GIV-8: Søren Kierkegaard Society

GIV-9: Midwest Society for Women in Philosophy

GIV-10: Association for Informal Logic and Critical Thinking

GIV-11: Association for the Development of Philosophy Teaching

GIV-12: Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy

GIV-13: Society of Christian Philosophers

GIV-14: Society for the Study of the History of Analytical Philosophy

BUSINESS MEETING.

Noon-12:45 p.m., Wabash Parlor (third floor)

IV-A. Submitted Symposium: Assent in Sextus and in Hume

12:45-2:45 p.m.

Chair: Annemarie Butler (Iowa State University)

Speaker: Donald L. M. Baxter (University of Connecticut)
"Assent in Sextus and Hume"

Commentator: Richard Bett (Johns Hopkins University)

IV-B. Submitted Symposium

12:45-2:45 p.m.

Chair: Michael J. Glanzberg (Northwestern University)

Speaker: Peter B. M. Vranas (University of Wisconsin–
Madison)
"A General Definition of Argument Validity"

Commentator: Joshua Schechter (Brown University)

IV-C. Submitted Symposium

12:45-2:45 p.m.

Chair: Lauren Leydon-Hardy (Northwestern University)

Speaker: Jeff Engelhardt (Georgetown University)
"Synchronic Causal Preemption"

Commentator: Jonathan D. Jacobs (Saint Louis University)

IV-D. Submitted Symposium

12:45-2:45 p.m.

Chair: Nicholas Zavediuk (Saint Louis University)

Speaker: Hsin-Wen Lee (Tunghai University)
"The Identity Argument for National Self-
Determination"

Commentator: Colleen M. Murphy (Texas A&M University)

IV-E. Colloquium: Personal Identity and Composition*12:45-2:45 p.m.**12:45-1:45* “Stage Theory and the Platitude”*Graduate Student Travel Stipend Recipient*

Chair: L. Nathan Oaklander (University of Michigan–Flint)

Speaker: Peter Nichols (University of Wisconsin, Madison)

Commentator: Jay M. Newhard (East Carolina University)

1:45-2:45 “The Elimination Argument”*Graduate Student Travel Stipend Recipient*

Chair: Marya Schechtman (University of Illinois at Chicago)

Speaker: Andrew M. Bailey (University of Notre Dame)

Commentator: H. E. Baber (University of San Diego)

IV-F. Colloquium: Singular Thought and Intentionalism*12:45-2:45 p.m.**12:45-1:45* “A Defense of Singular Intentionalism”

Chair: Robert Hanna (University of Colorado–Boulder)

Speaker: Seishu Nishimura (Shiga University, Japan)

Commentator: Janet Levin (University of Southern California)

1:45-2:45 “A New Source of Data About Singular Thought”*Graduate Student Travel Stipend Recipient*

Chair: Marshall D. Abrams (University of Alabama at Birmingham)

Speaker: Mihnea D. I. Capraru (Syracuse University)

Commentator: Arthur Sullivan (Memorial University of Newfoundland)

IV-G. Colloquium: Formal Epistemology*12:45-2:45 p.m.**12:45-1:45* “Penn and Teller Host the Newcomb Game”

Chair: Kenneth Easwaran (University of Southern California)

Speaker: R. Eric Barnes (Hobart and William Smith Colleges)

Commentator: Susan Vineberg (Wayne State University)

1:45-2:45 “Reliability for Degrees of Belief”

Chair: Kenneth A. Boyce (University of Notre Dame)

Speaker: Jeffrey S. Dunn (DePauw University)

Commentator: Lara Buchak (University of California, Berkeley)

IV-H. Colloquium: Epistemic Justification*12:45-2:45 p.m.**12:45-1:45* “Unjustified Defeaters”

- Chair: Ali Hasan (University of Iowa)
 Speaker: David J. Alexander (Iowa State University)
 Commentator: Michael Bergmann (Purdue University)
 1:45-2:45 “The Explanatory Argument for Factualism”
 Chair: Peter Murphy (University of Indianapolis)
 Speaker: Ian P. Schnee (Western Kentucky University)
 Commentator: Richard Fumerton (University of Iowa)

IV-I. Colloquium: Metaphysics and Metametaphysics

12:45-2:45 *p.m.*

- 12:45-1:45 “The Special Composition Question, Transitivity,
 and Ordinary Objects”
Graduate Student Travel Stipend Recipient

- Chair: Alicia Finch (Northern Illinois University)
 Speaker: Paul Silva (University of Connecticut)
 Commentator: Holly Kantin (University of Wisconsin–Madison)
 1:45-2:45 “The Language of the Ontology Room”
 Chair: Sean Foran (Bowling Green State University)
 Speaker: Daniel Z. Korman (University of Illinois at Urbana-
 Champaign)
 Commentator: Sara Bernstein (Duke University)

IV-J. Committee on Philosophy and Medicine: Disease and Dysfunction

12:45-2:45 *p.m.*

- Chair: Mark Sheldon (Northwestern University)
 Speakers: Daniel M. Hausman (University of Wisconsin–
 Madison)
 Luc Faucher (l’Université du Québec à Montréal)
 Peter H. Schwartz (Indiana University Center for
 Bioethics)

IV-K. Committee on Pre-College Instruction in Philosophy: Philosophy in Action: A Live Demonstration of Doing Philosophy with Elementary, Middle, and High School Students

12:45-2:45 *p.m.*

- Speakers: Bart Schultz (University of Chicago)
 Steve Goldberg (Oak Park River Forest High School)

IV-L. Committee on Philosophy in Two-Year Colleges: Credentials Policy for Two-Year Colleges

12:45-2:45 *p.m.*

- Chair: Thomas Urban (Houston Community College)

Speakers: Brian J. Huschle (Northland College)
 Nnachi J. Umennachi (Scott Community College)
 Mark Thorsby (Lone Star College)
 Anthony E. Thomas (Kiswaukee Community
 College)
 Bill Hartmann (St. Louis Community College–
 Forest Park)
 Thomas Herrnstein (Moorehead Community
 College)

**V-A. Author Meets Critics: Jeremy Fantl, Matthew McGrath,
*Knowledge in an Uncertain World***

3:00-6:00 p.m.

Chair: Matthias Steup (Purdue University)

Critics: Ram Neta (University of North Carolina at Chapel
 Hill)

Baron Reed (Northwestern University)

Stewart Cohen (University of Arizona)

Responses: Jeremy Fantl (University of Calgary)
 Matthew McGrath (University of Missouri–
 Columbia)

**V-B. Invited Symposium: The Three Hundredth Anniversary of
 Rousseau's Birth**

3:00-6:00 p.m.

Chair: Penelope Deutscher (Northwestern University)

Speakers: Frederick Neuhouser (Barnard College, Columbia
 University)

“The Critical Function of Genealogy in Rousseau's
Second Discourse”

Kate Abramson (Indiana University, Bloomington)
(Title to be announced)

Commentator: Hans Lottenbach (Kenyon College)

V-C. Invited Symposium: Implicature

3:00-6:00 p.m.

Chair: Barbara Abbott (Michigan State University)

Speakers: Wayne A. Davis (Georgetown University)
 “Grice's Razor and Epistemic Invariantism”

Ernest Lepore (Rutgers University) and Matthew
 Stone (Rutgers University)

“Communication and Knowledge of Language”

Commentator: Mitchell S. Green (University of Virginia)

V-D. Invited Symposium: Probabilism and Accuracy*3:00-6:00 p.m.*

- Chair: Aaron Bronfman (University of Nebraska)
 Speakers: James Joyce (University of Michigan)
 Hannes Leitgeb (Ludwig-Maximilians-University Munich)
 Richard Pettigrew (University of Bristol)
 Robert G. Williams (University of Leeds)

V-E. Invited Symposium: Moral Authority*3:00-6:00 p.m.*

- Chair: Anita Superson (University of Kentucky)
 Speakers: David Copp (University of California, Davis)
(Title to be announced)
 Ralph Wedgwood (University of Southern California)
 “The Weight of Moral Reasons”
 Sarah Stroud (McGill University)
(Title to be announced)

V-F. Invited Symposium: War, Character, and Virtue*3:00-6:00 p.m.*

- Chair: Robert Hoag (Berea College)
 Speakers: Nancy Sherman (Georgetown University)
 Shannon French (Case Western Reserve University)
 Commentator: Carl Ficarrotta (University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill)

V-G. Invited Symposium: Learning from the Past: Why Study the History of Philosophy?*3:00-6:00 p.m.*

- Chair: Robin Smith (Texas A&M University)
 Speakers: Daniel Garber (Princeton University)
(Title to be announced)
 Robert Pasnau (University of Colorado–Boulder)
 “Philosophical Beauty”
 Rachel Barney (University of Toronto)
(Title to be announced)

V-H. Colloquium: Ancient Philosophy*3:00-6:00 p.m.*

- 3:00-4:00* “Reason and Value in Plato”
 Chair: Blake Hestir (Texas Christian University)

- Speaker: Tushar Irani (Wesleyan University)
 Commentator: Sean Kelsey (University of Notre Dame)
 4:00-5:00 “Socrates’ Prayer to Pan in the *Phaedrus*”
 Chair: George Harvey (Indiana University Southeast)
 Speaker: Dan Werner (SUNY at New Paltz)
 Commentator: John M. Mouracade (University of Alaska–Anchorage)
 5:00-6:00 “Universal Flux in Heraclitus”
 Chair: Eric C. Sanday (University of Kentucky)
 Speaker: Mark A. Johnstone (McMaster University)
 Commentator: Patricia Curd (Purdue University)

V-I. Colloquium: Egalitarianism and Moral Luck

- 3:00-6:00 p.m.
 3:00-4:00 “Against the Equal Consideration of Interests”
 Chair: Melissa M. Kozma (University of Wisconsin–Barron County)
 Speaker: Christopher S. King (Vanderbilt University)
 Commentator: Ryan P. Mott (Marquette University)
 4:00-5:00 “Assessing the Luck Egalitarian Principle”
Graduate Student Travel Stipend Recipient
 Chair: Blain Neufeld (University of Wisconsin–Milwaukee)
 Speaker: Philip Shadd (Queen’s University (Canada))
 Commentator: Nir Eyal (Harvard University)
 5:00-6:00 “The Aid That Leaves Something to Chance”
 Chair: Seth Mayer (Northwestern University)
 Speaker: Kenneth Walden (Dartmouth College)
 Commentator: Tyler Doggett (University of Vermont)

V-J. Colloquium: Conditionals, Epistemic Modals, and Two-Dimensionalism

- 3:00-6:00 p.m.
 3:00-4:00 “Dominance Conditionals and Adams’s Thesis”
 Chair: Stefan Kaufmann (Northwestern University)
 Speaker: Theodore Korzukhin (Cornell University)
 Commentator: Malte Willer (University of Chicago)
 4:00-5:00 “Fallibilism and the Flexibility of Epistemic Modals”
Graduate Student Travel Stipend Recipient
 Chair: Luke Elwonger (University of Nebraska–Lincoln)
 Speaker: Charity Anderson (Saint Louis University)
 Commentator: John Mackay (University of Wisconsin–Madison)
 5:00-6:00 “Russellian Two-Dimensionalism”
Graduate Student Travel Stipend Recipient

Chair: Edward S. Hinchman (University of Wisconsin–Milwaukee)

Speaker: Fredrik Haraldsen (University of Miami)

Commentator: Heidi Savage (University of Rochester)

V-K. Colloquium: Issues in Political Philosophy

3:00-6:00 p.m.

3:00-4:00 “Public Health Care and Security”

Chair: Elizabeth Foreman (Saint Louis University)

Speaker: Daniel Bader (University of Toronto)

Commentator: Chad W. Flanders (Saint Louis University)

4:00-5:00 “Educational Opportunity: Why We Should Move Beyond the Equality and Equal Citizenship Standards in Favor of ‘Open Access’”

Chair: Max Cherem (Kalamazoo College)

Speaker: S. Stewart Braun (University of Virginia)

Commentator: Christopher Latiolais (Kalamazoo College)

5:00-6:00 “Accounting for Global Climate Change: A New Approach to Collective Responsibility”

Chair: Joshua W. Anderson (Saint Louis University)

Speaker: Anthony P. Smith (Saint Cloud Technical and Community College)

Commentator: Larry May (Vanderbilt University)

V-L. Committee on Philosophy and Computers: Machine Consciousness

3:00-6:00 p.m.

Chair: David L. Anderson (Illinois State University)

Speakers: Ned Block (New York University)

“Can Thinking about Machines Help Us Understand Consciousness?”

Peter Boltuc (University of Illinois–Springfield)

“Non-Reductive Machine Consciousness”

Terence Horgan (University of Arizona)

“The Real Moral of the Chinese Room: Understanding Requires Understanding-Phenomenology”

Robert Van Gulick (Syracuse University)

“Humans and Other Conscious Machines – One Way or Many?”

V-M. Committee on the Teaching of Philosophy: Africana Philosophy: Pedagogical Perspectives on the Black Experience

3:00-6:00 p.m.

Chair: Daw-Nay Evans (DePaul University)

Speakers: Tommy J. Curry (Texas A&M University)
Paul C. Taylor (Pennsylvania State University)
D. A. Masolo (University of Louisville)

V-N. Committee on the Status of Asian and Asian-American Philosophers and Philosophies: New Work in Asian/Comparative Ethics

3:00-6:00 p.m.

Chair: Peimin Ni (Grand Valley State University)

Speakers: Emily McRae (University of Oklahoma)
"Transforming Emotions and Living Morally: Some Tibetan Buddhist Perspectives"
Charles Goodman (Binghamton University)
"From Madhyamaka to Consequentialism"
Peimin Ni (Grand Valley State University)
"How Moral Is Confucius?"
Brook Ziporyn (Northwestern University)

PRESIDENTIAL ADDRESS

6:15-7:15 p.m., Red Lacquer Room (fourth floor)

Introduction: Margaret Atherton (University of Wisconsin–Milwaukee)

Speaker: Peter Railton (University of Michigan–Ann Arbor)
"That Obscure Object, Desire"

PRESIDENTIAL RECEPTION

8:30 p.m.-12:30 a.m., Red Lacquer Room (fourth floor)

SATURDAY MORNING, FEBRUARY 18

PLACEMENT INTERVIEW AREA

8:30 a.m.-Noon, Spire Parlor (sixth floor)

PLACEMENT QUIET INTERVIEW SPACE

8:30 a.m.-Noon, Harvard Room (third floor)

BOOK EXHIBITS

9:00 a.m.-Noon, Adams Ballroom (sixth floor)

REGISTRATION

9:00 a.m.-Noon, Registration Area (sixth floor)

VI-A. Author Meets Critics: Susanna Siegel, *The Contents of Visual Experience*

9:00 a.m.-Noon

Chair: James Genone (Stanford University)

Critics: John Bengson (University of Wisconsin–Madison)

Susanna Schellenberg (Rutgers University)

Kathrin Glüer-Pagin (University of Stockholm)

Response: Susanna Siegel (Harvard University)

VI-B. Author Meets Critics: Derk Pereboom, *Consciousness and the Prospects of Physicalism*

9:00 a.m.-Noon

Chair: Leopold Stubenberg (University of Notre Dame)

Critics: Brie Gertler (University of Virginia)

Terence Horgan (University of Arizona)

Andrew Melnyk (University of Missouri)

Response: Derk Pereboom (Cornell University)

VI-C. Author Meets Critics: Mark Schroeder, *Being For*

9:00 a.m.-Noon

Chair: Eric Wiland (University of Missouri–St. Louis)

Critics: Allan Gibbard (University of Michigan)

James Dreier (Brown University)

Seth Yalcin (University of California, Berkeley)

Response: Mark Schroeder (University of Southern California)

VI-D. Invited Session: New Approaches to Old Figures: Recent Work in Feminist History of Philosophy

9:00 a.m.-Noon

Chair: Amy M. Schmitter (University of Alberta)

Speaker: Karen Margrethe Nielsen (University of Western Ontario)

“Aristotle on the Imperfect Deliberative Capacities of Women”

Commentator: Julie Ward (Loyola University Chicago)

Speaker: Karen Detlefsen (University of Pennsylvania)

“Cavendish on Women’s Education and Freedom”

Commentator: Eileen O’Neill (University of Massachusetts–Amherst)

VI-E. Invited Symposium: The Ethics of Eating Animals*9:00 a.m.-Noon*

Chair: Matthew C. Halteman (Calvin College)

Speakers: Alastair Norcross (University of Colorado)
Ted A. Warfield (University of Notre Dame)
David De Grazia (George Washington University)**VI-F. Invited Symposium: Theories of Recognition***9:00 a.m.-Noon*

Chair: Michael Allen (East Tennessee State University)

Speakers: Kenneth Baynes (Syracuse University)
"Recognition and Moral Obligation"
Joel Anderson (Utrecht University (The Netherlands))
"Autonomy's Dependence on Recognition:
Psychological Harm, Participatory Parity, and
Social Freedom"
Anthony S. Laden (University of Illinois at Chicago)
(*Title to be announced*)**VI-G. Invited Symposium: Philosophy of Language and Society***9:00 a.m.-Noon*

Chair: Claire Horisk (University of Missouri)

Speakers: Christopher Hom (Texas Tech University)
(*Title to be announced*)
Adele Mercier (Queen's University (Canada) and
LOGOS (University of Barcelona))
Mary Kate McGowan (Wellesley College)
"On Silencing and Sincerity"**VI-H. Colloquium: Moral Rights and Autonomy***9:00 a.m.-Noon**9:00-10:00* "The Impossibility of Purely Content-Neutral
Accounts of Autonomy"Chair: Elizabeth Silverstein (University of Wisconsin-
Milwaukee)

Speaker: Mark Piper (James Madison University)

Commentator: James Rocha (Louisiana State University)

10:00-11:00 "In Support of a Restricted Moral Specification for
Rights"

Chair: Mavis Biss (Loyola University Maryland)

Speaker: Hallie Rose Liberto (University of Connecticut,
Storrs)

Commentator: Andrew Botterell (University of Western Ontario)

- 11:00 a.m.-Noon "Can We Wrong Inviolable Persons?"
 Chair: Leanne Kent (St. Norbert College)
 Speaker: Andrew Peter Ross (Queen's University (Canada))
 Commentator: David K. Chan (University of Wisconsin–Stevens Point)

VI-I. Colloquium: British Empiricism

- 9:00 a.m.-Noon
 9:00-10:00 "Locke and 'the Hinge upon Which Liberty Turns'"
 Chair: Dan Yim (Bethel University (Saint Paul, MN))
 Speaker: Julie Walsh (University of California, San Diego)
 Commentator: Shelley Weinberg (University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign)
 10:00-11:00 "Good Breeding and Its Laws: Hume on Politeness, Conversation, and Delicacy of Taste"
 Chair: Corliss Swain (St. Olaf College)
 Speaker: Krista Rodkey (Indiana University)
 Commentator: Livia Guimaraes (Universidade Federal de Minas Gerais)
 11:00 a.m.-Noon "Reid's Complaint against Hume's Maxim: Conceivability, Possibility, and Reductio Reasoning"
 Chair: Margaret A. Watkins (Saint Vincent College)
 Speaker: Lewis Powell (Wayne State University)
 Commentator: Todd Buras (Baylor University)

VI-J. Colloquium: Nineteenth and Twentieth Century German Philosophy

- 9:00 a.m.-Noon
 9:00-10:00 "Argument, Attitude, and Eros in Nietzsche's Revaluation Project"
 Chair: Corey Katz (Saint Louis University)
 Speaker: Joseph Swenson (University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign)
 Commentator: Rex Welshon (University of Colorado–Colorado Springs)
 10:00-11:00 "Why Husserl Never Became an Idealist"
 Chair: Thomas Nenon (University of Memphis)
 Speaker: Dallas Willard (University of Southern California)
 Commentator: David T. Vessey (Grand Valley State University)
 11:00 a.m.-Noon "The Paradox of Fate: Decisionism, Quietism, and Fatalism in Heidegger's *Being and Time*"
 Chair: William McNeill (DePaul University)
 Speaker: Michael J. Sigrist (George Washington University)
 Commentator: Lawrence J. Hatab (Old Dominion University)

VI-K. Colloquium: Social Philosophy*9:00 a.m.-Noon**9:00-10:00* “Cooperation in the We-Mode, Legitimacy and Immigrant Inclusion”

Chair: Eric Smaw (Rollins College)

Speaker: Anna Moltchanova (Carleton College)

Commentator: Joseph Kupfer (Iowa State University)

10:00-11:00 “Why So Serious: An Inquiry on Racist Jokes”

Chair: Kris Sealey (Fairfield University)

Speaker: Luvell Anderson (Pennsylvania State University)

Commentator: David Miguel Gray (Vanderbilt University)

VI-L. Colloquium: Epistemology and Language*9:00 a.m.-Noon**9:00-10:00* “Assertion and Intentional Fouls”
Graduate Student Travel Stipend Recipient

Chair: Brian Montgomery (University of Missouri)

Speaker: Kenneth A. Boyd (University of Toronto)

Commentator: Geoffrey Pynn (Northern Illinois University)

10:00-11:00 “Knowledge Norms in Conflict”
Graduate Student Travel Stipend Recipient

Chair: Axel Mueller (Northwestern University)

Speaker: Matthew A. Benton (Rutgers University)

Commentator: Alexander Jackson (Boise State University)

11:00 a.m.-Noon “Semantic Blindness, Indirect Attributions, and Eavesdroppers”
Graduate Student Travel Stipend Recipient

Chair: Jared Peterson (Northwestern University)

Speaker: Ezra J. Cook (Northwestern University)

Commentator: Benj Hellie (University of Toronto)

VI-M. Committee on Philosophy in Two-Year Colleges: Finding a Job at a Two-Year College*9:00 a.m.-Noon*

Chair: Bill Hartmann (St. Louis Community College–Forest Park)

Speakers: Brian J. Huschle (Northland College)

Nnachi J. Umennachi (Scott Community College)

Mark Thorsby (Lone Star College)

Anthony E. Thomas (Kiswaukee Community College)

Bill Hartmann (St. Louis Community College–Forest Park)

Thomas Herrnstein (Moorehead Community College)

**VI-N. Committee on the Status and Future of the Profession:
The Humanities Indicators: Overview and New Data on
Philosophy Degree Completers**

9:00 a.m.-Noon

Chair: David Schrader (American Philosophical Association)

Speaker: Carolyn Fuqua (NORC)

A brief introduction to an online resource developed by the American Academy of Arts & Sciences, accompanied by a presentation of a newly developed indicator that tracks the number and characteristics of those completing philosophy degrees in U.S. colleges and universities.

SATURDAY AFTERNOON/EVENING, FEBRUARY 18

GROUP AND COMMITTEE SESSIONS, SATURDAY AFTERNOON/EVENING

(see Group Meeting Program for details)

Session GV: 12:15-2:15 p.m.

GV-1: North American Nietzsche Society

GV-2: Society for Systematic Philosophy

GV-3: North American Division of the Schopenhauer Society

GV-4: North American Society for Social Philosophy

GV-5: Society for Asian and Comparative Philosophy

GV-6: Philosophy of Religion Group

GV-7: International Association for the Philosophy of Sport

GV-8: Radical Philosophy Association

GV-9: Josiah Royce Society

GV-10: International Berkeley Society

VII-A. Author Meets Critics: Georges Dicker, *Berkeley's Idealism: A Critical Examination*

2:30-5:30 p.m.

Chair: Benjamin Hill (University of Western Ontario)

Critics: Margaret Atherton (University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee)

Samuel C. Rickless (University of California, San Diego)

Response: Georges Dicker (SUNY College at Brockport)

VII-B. Invited Symposium: Indicative Conditionals

2:30-5:30 p.m.

Chair: Peter Ludlow (Northwestern University)

- Speakers: Dorothy Edgington (Birkbeck College, University of London)
(Title to be announced)
- Anthony Gillies (Rutgers University)
(Title to be announced)
- Angelika Kratzer (University of Massachusetts)
 “Hunting Down the Material Conditional”

VII-C. Invited Symposium: Fundamental Structure and Categories

2:30-5:30 p.m.

- Chair: Valia Allori (Northern Illinois University)
- Speakers: L. A. Paul (University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill)
(Title to be announced)
- Jonathan M. Schaffer (Rutgers University)
 “Structural Equation Models of Metaphysical Structure”
- Jason Turner (University of Leeds)
(Title to be announced)

VII-D. Invited Symposium: Aristotelian Metaphysics

2:30-5:30 p.m.

- Chair: Errol Katayama (Ohio Northern University)
- Speaker: Kathrin Koslicki (University of Colorado, Boulder)
 “Hylomorphic Substances”
- Commentators: Michael Rea (University of Notre Dame)
 Theodore Scaltsas (University of Edinburgh)

VII-E. Invited Symposium: The Practice of Deliberative Democracy

2:30-5:30 p.m.

- Chair: James Bohman (St. Louis University)
- Speakers: Michael Neblo (Ohio State University)
 Cristina Lafont (Northwestern University)
 Thomas Christiano (University of Arizona)

VII-F. Invited Symposium: Rankings in Philosophy

2:30-5:30 p.m.

In the US and abroad, rankings of academic departments and universities have become increasingly common, and now play an important role in determining student choices, funding allocations, hiring practices, and strategic planning. The purpose of this panel is to permit a wide-ranging discussion of this phenomenon—its reality, methodologies, and prospects.

- Chair: Peter Railton (University of Michigan)
 Speakers: Louise Antony (University of Massachusetts, Amherst)
 Kieran Healy (Duke University)
 Brian Leiter (University of Chicago)
 Jennifer Saul (University of Sheffield)
 Jonathan Dancy (University of Texas at Austin)

VII-G. Invited Symposium: Feminist Approaches to Equality

2:30-5:30 p.m.

- Chair: Christie Hartley (Georgia State University)
 Speakers: Eva Feder Kittay (Stony Brook University)
(Title to be announced)
 Marilyn Friedman (Vanderbilt University)
 “Unequal Consenters and Political Illegitimacy”
 Commentator: John Baker (University College Dublin)

VII-H. Colloquium: Metaethics

2:30-5:30 p.m.

- 2:30-3:30* “The Problem with (Quasi-Realist) Expressivism”
Graduate Student Travel Stipend Recipient
 Chair: Andrew James McAninch (Indiana University, Bloomington)
 Speaker: Stephen Davey (University of Texas at Austin)
 Commentator: Wayne Downs (University of Kentucky)
3:30-4:30 “Moral Sentiments and the Nature of Moral Properties”
 Chair: Emily Kelehan (Illinois Wesleyan University)
 Speaker: Eric Vogelstein (Jefferson College of Health Sciences)
 Commentator: Michael Slote (University of Miami)
4:30-5:30 “Yes, Virginia, There Is a Genuinely Metanormative Constructivism”
 Chair: Helga Varden (University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign)
 Speaker: Mary C. Coleman (Illinois Wesleyan University)
 Commentator: Kyla Ebels Duggan (Northwestern University)

VII-I. Colloquium: Emotions and Sentiments

2:30-5:30 p.m.

- 2:30-3:30* “Anger: Sometimes Appropriate, Never a Virtue”
 Chair: Jesse Summers (Rice University)
 Speaker: Ian Stoner (University of Minnesota)
 Commentator: Remy Debes (University of Memphis)

- 3:30-4:30 “Non-Branching Moderate Moralism”
 Chair: Alessandro Giovannelli (Lafayette College)
 Speaker: W. Scott Clifton (University of Washington)
 Commentator: Lara Ostaric (St. Michael’s College)
- 4:30-5:30 “Aristotelian Compassion”
Graduate Student Travel Stipend Recipient
 Chair: Gabriel Richardson Lear (University of Chicago)
 Speaker: Gregory S. Poore (Baylor University)
 Commentator: Kristen Inglis (University of Pittsburgh)

VII-J. Colloquium: Philosophy of Science

- 2:30-5:30 p.m.
- 2:30-3:30 “Functions Must Be Performed at Appropriate Rates in Appropriate Situations”
 Chair: Hayley Clatterbuck (University of Wisconsin–Madison)
 Speakers: Gualtiero Piccinini (University of Missouri, St. Louis)
 Justin Garson (Hunter College, CUNY)
 Commentator: Daniel M. Hausman (University of Wisconsin–Madison)
- 3:30-4:30 “Abstract Pattern Idealization and Explanatory Models”
Graduate Student Travel Stipend Recipient
 Chair: Michael D. Goldsby (University of Wisconsin–Madison)
 Speakers: Collin Rice (University of Missouri)
 Yasha Rohwer (University of Missouri–Columbia)
 Commentator: William Wimsatt (University of Chicago and University of Minnesota)
- 4:30-5:30 “Idealization and Explanation in Astrophysics”
Graduate Student Travel Stipend Recipient
 Chair: John Basl (Bowling Green State University)
 Speaker: Ashley Graham Kennedy (University of Virginia)
 Commentator: Otávio A. Bueno (University of Miami)

VII-K. Colloquium: Free Will

- 2:30-5:30 p.m.
- 2:30-3:30 “Event-Causal Libertarianism, Functional Reduction, and the Disappearing Agent Argument”
 Chair: Amy Flowerree (Northwestern University)
 Speaker: Christopher E. Franklin (Biola University)
 Commentator: Molly Gardner (University of Wisconsin–Madison)

- 3:30-4:30 "Frankfurt Cases, Gettier, and the Principle of Alternative Possibilities"
Graduate Student Travel Stipend Recipient
 Chair: Derek Green (Northwestern University)
 Speaker: Adam R. Thompson (University of Nebraska, Lincoln)
 Commentator: Justin Capes (Florida State University)
- 4:30-5:30 "Against Counterfactuals of Libertarian Freedom: There Is Nothing I Would Have Done If I Could Have Done Otherwise"
 Chair: J. Thomas Cook (Rollins College)
 Speakers: Paul C. Anders (Mount Marty College) and Joshua Thurow (Mount Marty College)
 Commentator: Charles M. Hermes (University of Texas at Arlington)

VII-L. Colloquium: Rationalism

- 2:30-5:30 *p.m.*
- 2:30-3:30 "Descartes and the Danger of Irresolution"
 Chair: Patricia Easton (Claremont Graduate University)
 Speaker: Shoshana R. Brassfield (Frostburg State University)
 Commentator: Lisa Shapiro (Simon Fraser University)
- 3:30-4:30 "Johann Clauberg's Account of Mind-Body Interaction"
 Chair: Anat Schechtman (University of Chicago)
 Speaker: Andrew R. Platt (University of Delaware)
 Commentator: Raffaella De Rosa (Rutgers University–Newark)
- 4:30-5:30 "Spinoza's Theory of Attributes"
Graduate Student Travel Stipend Recipient
 Chair: Charles Huenemann (Utah State University)
 Speaker: Alexander Paul Bozzo (Marquette University)
 Commentator: Diane Steinberg (Cleveland State University)

GROUP MEETING PROGRAM

GROUP SESSION G0: WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 15, 6:00-9:00 P.M.

G0-1. Society for Philosophy in the Contemporary World

6:00-9:00 p.m.

Topic: Power, Oppression, and Ideology

Chair: Tim Christie (University of British Columbia)

Speakers: Mark T. Schranz (University of Toronto)

“Some Thoughts on Republican Power”

Natalie Nenadic (University of Kentucky)

“Hannah Arendt, Genocide, and Sexual Atrocities”

Jacob M. Held (University of Central Arkansas)

“Shifting the Anti-Pornography Debate:
Pornography as Symptom”

GROUP SESSION G1: THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 16, 9:00 A.M.-NOON

G1-1. International Society for Environmental Ethics

9:00 a.m.-Noon

Chair: Marion Hourdequin (Colorado College)

Speakers: J. Michael Scoville (Eastern Michigan University)

“Historical Environmental Values”

Christopher M. Rice (Fordham University)

“The Value of Human Relationships with Other
Species”

Matthew Meyer (University of Wisconsin–Eau
Claire)

“Out of Sight, Out of Mind: Toward a
Phenomenology of Disposable Things”

Ben Almassi (College of Lake County)

“Climate Change and the Ethics of Individual
Emissions: A Response to Sinnott-Armstrong”

G1-2. Society for Asian and Comparative Philosophy

9:00 a.m.-Noon

Topic: Philosophies of Japan and India

Chair: Christian Coseru (College of Charleston)

- Speakers: Michael Hagan (University of Louisville)
 “Wonderful, Whatever Being: An Exploration and Synthesis of Giorgio Agamben’s Thus and Shin’ichi Hisamatsu’s Such”
- Susan M. Purviance (University of Toledo)
 “Finger Philosophy: Moral Sentimentalism and the Mumokan”
- Kenneth Faber (Vanderbilt University)
 “The Magnificent Dharmadhatu: Ultimate Reality from the Dzogchen Perspective”
- Christian Coseru (College of Charleston)
 “Are Reasons Causally Relevant for Action? Dharmakirti’s Karyanumana Argument and the Embodied Cognition Paradigm”

GI-3. American Society for Value Inquiry

9:00 a.m.-Noon

Topic: Poverty and Justice

- Chair: Thomas Magnell (Drew University)
- Speakers: Joseph Betz (Villanova University)
 “On Poverty and Justice”
- Jonelle DePetro (Eastern Illinois University)
 “Justice and Poverty: US Food Policy and the Poor”

GI-4. Philosophy of Time Society

9:00 a.m.-Noon

- Chair: L. Nathan Oaklander (University of Michigan–Flint)
- Speaker: Michelle C. M. Beer (Florida International University)
 “Temporal Experience and the B-Theory”
- Commentator: L. Nathan Oaklander (University of Michigan–Flint)
- Speaker: Amy Seymour (University of Notre Dame)
 “The Advantages of All-Falsism”
- Commentator: Timothy Button (Cambridge University)

GI-5. American Society for Aesthetics: Cynthia A. Freeland, *Portraits and Persons*

9:00 a.m.-Noon

- Chair: John Gibson (University of Louisville)
- Critics: Paul Guyer (University of Pennsylvania)
 Ronald de Sousa (University of Toronto)
 Amelie Rorty (Boston University)
- Response: Cynthia A. Freeland (University of Houston)

GI-6. Society for the Philosophical Study of Education*9:00 a.m.-Noon*

- Speakers: Linda O'Neill (Northern Illinois University)
 "Cultivating Dispositions: Philosophy Inside and Outside Teacher Education"
- Emery J. Hyslop-Margison (University of New Brunswick) and Matthew Rogers (University of New Brunswick)
 "Education as a Field of Study and Applied Research Methods: A Mismatch?"
- Sheron Fraser-Burgess (Ball State University)
 "Reconfiguring Social Justice for 21st Century Educational Equity"
- Charles Howell (Northern Illinois University)
 "Privatizing Public Higher Education: Some Ethical Challenges"
- Joseph S. Freedman (Alabama State University)
 "Conceptual Frameworks in Historical Context — Their Uses in Academia and Beyond"

GI-7. Society for the Metaphysics of Science*9:00 a.m.-Noon***Topic: Kinds: Natural and Scientific**

- Chair: Carl Gillett (Northern Illinois University)
- Speakers: Anjan Chakravarty (Northern Illinois University)
 "Perspectival Frameworks for Scientific Taxonomy"
- Matthew H. Slater (Bucknell University)
 "Is Our Epistemology Writing Checks That Our Metaphysics Can't Cash?"
- Neil E. Williams (University at Buffalo (SUNY))
 "'Disease' Is Not a Natural Kind Term: A Tale of Two Diseases"

GI-8. Radical Philosophy Association*9:00 a.m.-Noon***Topic: Affect and Political Community**

- Chair: Francey Russell (University of Chicago)
- Speakers: Kieran Aarons (DePaul University)
 "The Economy of Affect and the Category of the 'Intolerable' in Political Philosophy"
- Thomas Nail (University of Denver)
 "Solidarity and Affective Citizenship"

Amanda Parris (DePaul University)
 “A Critique of the Politics of Hope”

GI-9. International Association for Computing and Philosophy

9:00 a.m.-Noon

Topic: Computer Simulations in the Humanities

Chair: Marvin Croy (University of North Carolina–Charlotte)

Speakers: Marshall D. Abrams (University of Alabama at
 Birmingham)

“Simulating Coherence in Cultural Evolution”

Marcus Christen (University of Zürich)

“Shiny Moral People: A Modeling Approach towards
 Understanding Moral Hypocrisy within a Society”

Gillian Crozier (Laurentian University)

“Singing to Neighbors: Modeling Acoustic
 Adaptation in Bird Songs”

Ruth Poproski (Carnegie Mellon University)

“Simulation for Understanding the Gricean
 Dynamic in Language Use”

Graham Sack (Columbia University)

“Modeling Narrative Structures: An Agent Based
 Approach to Plot and Characterization”

Scott Weingart (Indiana University)

“Modeling the Flow of Information through the
 Republic of Letters”

GI-10. Society for the Philosophic Study of Genocide and the Holocaust

9:00 a.m.-Noon

Topic: Faith-Based Genocide

Chair: André Mineau (University of Quebec at Rimouski)

Speakers: Anne O’Byrne (SUNY Stony Brook)

“Born Catholic: Ethnicity and the Choice of
 Religion”

Natalie Nenadic (University of Kentucky)

“Hannah Arendt, The United Nations, and the
 Srebrenica (Bosnia) Genocide”

Sonia Fournier (University of Quebec at Rimouski)

“Tutsi Genocide in Rwanda: Images for Education
 in Schools”

James R. Watson (Loyola University New Orleans)

“The Faith-Based Initiative Against the American
 Working Class”

GI-11. Max Scheler Society*9:00 a.m.-Noon*

Chair: Eugene Kelly (New York Institute of Technology)

Speakers: Susan Gottloeber (National University of Ireland
Maynooth)“The Value of the Person: Scheler’s Personalism as
a Contribution to Contemporary Discussions in
Ethics”

Keith R. Peterson (Colby College)

“Bringing Values Down to Earth: Max Scheler and
Environmental Philosophy”Timothy McCune (Southern Illinois University at
Carbondale)“The Quality of Life: Max Scheler on Population,
the Modern *Ethos* and Loving Adjustment”

Thomas le Bon (Université Paris-Sorbonne)

“The Anthropological Meaning of the Valorization
of Work in Max Scheler’s *The Bourgeois*”

Michael Gabel (Universität Erfurt)

“The Roots and Context of Technological
Understanding in Max Scheler”**GROUP SESSION GII: THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 16, 5:30-7:30 P.M.****GII-1. North American Kant Society***5:30-7:30 p.m.***Topic: The Mary Gregor Lecture**

Chair: Robert B. Loudon (University of Southern Maine)

Speaker: Heiner F. Klemme (University of Mainz)

“Kant on Moral Self-Determination and Self-
Knowledge”

Commentator: Susan Meld Shell (Boston College)

GII-2. American Society for Value Inquiry*5:30-7:30 p.m.*

Chair: G. John M. Abbarno (D’Youville College)

Speakers: Yubraj Aryal (Purdue University)

“Affect, Body, and the Ethical Self”

John Brittingham (Southern Illinois University at
Carbondale)“The Intricacies of the Flesh: An Attempted
Phenomenology of Incarnate Experience”

GII-3. International Society for Environmental Ethics*5:30-7:30 p.m.***Topic: Greening Philosophy Beyond Environmental Ethics**

Chair: Jennifer Everett (DePauw University)

Speakers: Chris J. Cuomo (University of Georgia)

“Ecophilosophy as World Philosophy:
Opportunities and Challenges”

Kyle Powys Whyte (Michigan State University)

“Greening Philosophy, Education and Deliberation”

Amber Katherine (Santa Monica Community
College)

“The Case for Greening Philosophy 101”

GII-4. North American Nietzsche Society*5:30-7:30 p.m.*

Chair: Lawrence J. Hatab (Old Dominion University)

Speakers: Eric Campbell (University of California, San Diego)

“Nietzsche’s Free Spirits and the Beauty of Illusion”

Alex Prescott-Couch (Harvard University)

“Nietzsche, Genealogy, and Historical Individuals”

GII-5. American Association of Philosophy Teachers*5:30-7:30 p.m.*

Chair: Andrew N. Carpenter (Ellis University)

Speakers: Russell Marcus (Hamilton College)

“The Bully, the Solipsist, and the Sponge: Three
Types of Philosophy Students and the Challenges
They Raise”

Andrew N. Carpenter (Ellis University)

“Looking in the Mirror: Helping Students to
Evaluate Their Own Deep Seated Ethical Beliefs”

Russell Marcus (Hamilton College)

“Three In-Class Logic Problems (and Their
Solutions): Disparate Student Abilities, Excessive
Homework Grading, and the Underemphasized
Connection Between Logic and Philosophy”**GII-6. Hume Society***5:30-7:30 p.m.*Speaker: Miren Boehm (University of Wisconsin-
Milwaukee)

“Hume’s Two and the Same Definitions of Cause”

Commentator: Abe Roth (Ohio State University)

Speaker: Jonathan Cottrell (New York University)
 “Hume’s Propriety Principle”

Commentator: Donald L. M. Baxter (University of Connecticut)

GII-7. Personalist Discussion Group

5:30-7:30 p.m.

Topic: Personalism in a Secular Age

Chair: Randall E. Auxier (Southern Illinois University–
 Carbondale)

Speaker: Stanley M. Harrison (Marquette University)

GII-8. Society of Christian Philosophers

5:30-7:30 p.m.

Topic: Science, Morality, and Theism

Chair: Scott Ragland (Saint Louis University)

Speakers: Michael Bergmann (Purdue University)

“Theism, Atheism, and Evolutionary Accounts of
 Moral Belief”

Robin Collins (Messiah College)

“The Fine-Tuning Teleological Argument”

GII-9. Society for Business Ethics

5:30-7:30 p.m.

Topic: Leadership Ethics

Chair: John Boatright (Loyola University Chicago)

Speakers: Robert Audi (University of Notre Dame)

“The Ethics of Entrepreneurial Leadership: The
 Power of Management and the Management of
 Power”

Joanne Ciulla (University of Richmond)

“The Moral Challenges of Leadership”

Alfred Gini (Loyola University Chicago)

“Business, Ethics, and Leadership in a Post-Enron
 Era”

GII-10. Committee on Institutional Cooperation

5:30-7:30 p.m.

GROUP SESSION GIII: THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 16, 7:40-10:40 P.M.**GIII-1. Society for Analytical Feminism***7:40-10:40 p.m.*

- Chair: Robin S. Dillon (Lehigh University)
- Speaker: Ben Almassi (College of Lake County)
"Feminist Reclamations of Masculinity"
- Commentator: Kathryn J. Norlock (Trent University)
- Speaker: Maureen Linker (University of Michigan–Dearborn)
"Intellectual Empathy: A Proposal for Training
Virtuous Hearers and Epistemically Vulnerable
Knowers"
- Commentator: Theresa W. Tobin (Marquette University)
- Speaker: Peter Higgins (Eastern Michigan University)
"The Intersectionality Thesis"
- Commentator: Alison Bailey (Illinois State University)

GIII-2. Society for Systematic Philosophy*7:40-10:40 p.m.***Topic: Hegel and the Logic of Objectivity**

- Chair: Robert Berman (Xavier University)
- Speakers: Greg Moss (University of Georgia)
Graham Schuster (University of Georgia)
Richard Dien Winfield (University of Georgia)

GIII-3 Society for the Philosophic Study of the Contemporary Visual Arts*7:30-10:30 p.m.***Topic: Philosophy and Film**

- Chair: Dan Flory (Montana State University)
- Speakers: Dan Shaw (Lock Haven University)
"Nietzsche's Perspectivism and Citizen Kane"
- Phillip Seng (University of Maryland, Baltimore
County)
"The Torture Debate and Gregor Jordan's
Unthinkable"
- Dimitrios Latsis (University of Iowa)
"Dwelling, Seeing, Meaning: Cinematic
Landscapes and Merleau-Ponty's Late Thought
on Nature"

GIII-4. American Society for Philosophy, Counseling, and Psychotherapy

7:40-10:40 p.m.

Chair: Samuel Zinaich, Jr. (Purdue University Calumet)

Speakers: Amy E. White (Ohio University Zanesville)

“A Millian Argument for the Restriction of Psychologically Harmful Pornographic Materials?”

Samuel Zinaich, Jr. (Purdue University Calumet)

“Philosophical Counseling and the Moral Permissibility of Diagnosing Clients”

GIII-5. Bertrand Russell Society

7:40-10:40 p.m.

Speakers: Russell Wahl (Idaho State University)

“The Supreme Maxim and the Principle of Acquaintance”

Dustin Olson (McMaster University)

“From the Maxim to the Postulates: Inference in Russell’s Scientific Philosophy”

Sean P. Morris (University of Illinois, Chicago)

“Quine, Russell, and Naturalism: A Logical Account”

James Connelly (York University)

“Russell and Wittgenstein on Logical Form and Judgement”

Gregory Landini (University of Iowa)

“Russell and the Curious Calculi of Wittgenstein and Spencer Brown”

GIII-6. Max Scheler Society

7:40-10:40 p.m.

Chair: Zachary Davis (St. Johns University)

Speakers: Eric Mohr (Duquesne University)

“Solidarity in Scheler and Habermas”

Olivier Agard (Université Paris-Sorbonne)

“Max Scheler’s Philosophical Anthropology in the Current Discussion on ‘Human Exception’”

Joachim Fischer (Technische Universität Dresden)

“Phenomenological Social Theory as a Foundation of Sociology: The Alternative of Max Scheler and Alfred Schütz”

Giulana Gerace (University of Pavia)
 “Positionality and Normative Ought in Max
 Scheler’s Formalism in *Ethics and Non-Formal
 Ethics of Values*”

Günter Frölich (Universität Ulm)
 “Formal Structures in Max Scheler’s Ethics”

GIII-7. Adam Smith Society

7:40-10:40 p.m.

GIII-8. Association for the Development of Philosophy Teaching

7:40-10:40 p.m.

Topic: Knowing Intangibles Today

Speakers: Michael M. Kazanjian (Triton College)

“Language and Intangibles”

Robert Lichtenbert (Editor, *The Meaning of Life*)

“Ways of Knowing Intangibles”

GIII-9. Society for the Philosophic Study of Genocide and the Holocaust

7:40-10:40 p.m.

Topic: Faith-Based Genocide

Chair: James R. Watson (Loyola University New Orleans)

Speakers: David Pettigrew (Southern Connecticut State
 University)

“Political and Cultural Dimensions of Faith-based
 Genocide in Bosnia”

André Mineau (University of Quebec at Rimouski)

“The Foundations for SS Argumentation in the
 Holocaust”

Erik Vogt (Trinity College (Hartford, CT))

“Some Remarks on (Religious) Fundamentalism
 as Politics of Knowledge”

GIII-10. Joint Session Sponsored by Society for the Philosophy of Creativity, Society for the Study of Process Philosophies: *Nature and Logos*

7:40-10:40 p.m.

Topic: Authors and Discussants: *Nature and Logos*—The Influence of Whitehead on Merleau-Ponty

Chair: Stephen H. Bickham (Mansfield University)

Speakers: William Hamrick (Southern Illinois University
 Edwardsville)

“The Creative Becoming of the Flesh”

Scott W. Sinclair (St. Louis Community College–
Forest Park)

“Nature and Logos, Appreciation and Extension”

John Cogan (Independent Scholar)

“Ruminations across Borders”

Jan Van der Veken (Katholieke Universiteit Leuven)

“Meeting Merleau-Ponty”

GIII-11. North American Society for Social Philosophy: Michael L. Gross, *Modern Dilemmas of Modern War: Torture, Assassination, and Blackmail in an Age of Asymmetric War*

7:40-10:40 p.m.

Chair: Jacob M. Held (University of Central Arkansas)

Critics: Bat-Ami Bar On (Binghamton University)

David K. Chan (University of Wisconsin–Stevens
Point)

Response: Michael L. Gross (University of Haifa)

GROUP SESSION GIV: FRIDAY, FEBRUARY 17, 7:30-10:30 P.M.

GIV-1. Society for the Advancement of American Philosophy

7:30-10:30 p.m.

Topic: Intellectual Colonialism and American Philosophy

Chair: Lee A. McBride (College of Wooster)

Speakers: Deane Curtin (Gustavus Adolphus College)

“Liberal Imperialism: Pragmatic Responses from
India”

Scott Pratt (University of Oregon)

“Against Empire: American Indian Philosophy and
the Logic of Sovereignty”

Stuart Rosenbaum (Baylor University)

“Resisting Imperialism in the Colonies”

**GIV-2. Society for the Philosophic Study of the Contemporary
Visual Arts**

7:30-10:30 p.m.

Topic: Aesthetic Experience

Chair: Dan Shaw (Lock Haven University)

Speakers: Jenefer Robinson (University of Cincinnati)

“How to Experience Architecture”

Bassam Romaya (Gettysburg College)

“The Void in and as Visual Art”

Sara Northerner (University of Western Kentucky)
 “From Husserl’s Image Consciousness to
 Merleau-Ponty’s Flesh and Chiasm: The
 Phenomenological Essence of Image”

GIV-3. Concerned Philosophers for Peace

7:30-10:30 p.m.

Topic: Philosophies of Nonviolence

Speakers: Predrag Cicovacki (College of the Holy Cross)
 “Tolstoy’s Ethics of Christian Love and
 Nonviolence”

R. Paul Churchill (George Washington University)
 “The Philosophy of Nonviolence of the Late
 American Philosopher J. Glenn Gray”

Tracy Nicholls (Lewis University)
 “Peace through...? Exploring Peacebuilding
 Initiatives”

GIV-5. Society for the History of Political Philosophy: Michael Davis, *The Soul of the Greeks*

7:30-10:30 p.m.

Chair: Ronna Berger (Tulane University)

Critics: Jacob Howland (University of Tulsa)
 Evanthia Speliotis (Bellarmine College)
 Jonathan Badger (St. John’s College, Annapolis)
 Nalin Ranasinghe (Assumption College)
 Patrick Goodin (Howard University)

Response: Michael Davis (Sarah Lawrence College)

GIV-6. Society for Asian and Comparative Philosophy

7:30-10:30 p.m.

Topic: Issues in Chinese and Comparative Philosophy

Chair: Eric S. Nelson (University of Massachusetts,
 Lowell)

Speakers: Alan Levinovitz (University of Chicago)
 “The Zhuangzi and You: Defining an Ideal Without
 Contradiction”

Rafal Banka (Jagiellonian University)
 “Transformative Potential of Conceptual Schemes in
 Comparative Philosophy: The Case of the Laozi”

Bongrae Seok (Alvernia College)
 “Buren and Ren: Mencius’s Theory of Moral
 Emotion”

James Garrison (University of Vienna)
 “Foucault and Confucianism”

Eric S. Nelson (University of Massachusetts,
 Lowell)
 “Recognition, Resentment, and Alterity in the
 Analects of Confucius”

GIV-7. Society for the Philosophical Study of Education

7:30-10:30 p.m.

Speakers: Cheu-Jey Lee (Indiana University-Purdue
 University, Fort Wayne)
 “Praxis Epistemology”

Allan Johnston (Columbia College and DePaul
 University)

“Simulation, Seduction, Education: a Baudrillardian
 Reading of Post-Modern Education”

David L. Mosley (Bellarmine University)

“Nietzsche’s Gay Science as a Philosophy (of
 Education?)”

Guillemette Johnston (DePaul University)

“The Inner Processes of the Intellectual Body:
 Modes of Knowledge Acquisition in 17th- and
 18th Century Western Philosophical Discourse in
 Light of the Yogic Definition of Consciousness”

Sam Rocha (Wabash College)

“Yes. But What Do You Mean by ‘Action?’”

GIV-8. Søren Kierkegaard Society

7:30-10:30 p.m.

Topic: Kierkegaard and Plato, Kant, and God’s Revelation

Chair: George Connell (Concordia College)

Speakers: C. Stephen Evans (Baylor University)

“Paradoxicality as a Criterion of an Authentic
 Revelation”

Anthony J. Rudd (St. Olaf College)

“Kierkegaard’s Platonic Teleology”

Daniel W. Murphy (Saint Peter’s College)

“Crossing Paths and Crossing Boundaries: On
 Kierkegaard’s Relation to Kant”

Commentator: George Connell (Concordia College)

GIV-9. Midwest Society for Women in Philosophy*7:30-10:30 p.m.***GIV-10. Association for Informal Logic and Critical Thinking***7:30-9:30 p.m.*

Chair: Kevin Possin (Winona State University)

Speakers: Frank Fair (Sam Houston State University)

"Intelligence, IQ Tests, and Critical Thinking"

Marcus Gillespie (Sam Houston State University)

"The Critical thinking Assessment Test [CAT]:
Assessing CT in Science Courses""Critical Review of the Collegiate Learning
Assessment [CLA] Test"Panelists: Robert H. Ennis (University of Illinois at Urbana-
Champaign)

Kevin Possin (Winona State University)

GIV-11. Association for the Development of Philosophy Teaching*7:30-10:30 p.m.***GIV-12. Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy***7:30-10:30 p.m.*

Chair: Elizabeth Asmis (University of Chicago)

Speakers: Christopher C. Paone (Southern Illinois University,
Carbondale)

"Anaxagoras and an Aesthetics of Nature"

Timothy Hyde (Stony Brook University)

"Pleonexia: The Conceptual Key to the Kallipolis"

John Thorp (University of Western Ontario)

"*Homeopoesis*: Aristotle on Nutrition and Growth"**GIV-13. Society of Christian Philosophers***7:30-10:30 p.m.***Topic: The Ontological Argument—In Memory of Gareth B. Matthews**

Chair: Scott McDonald (Cornell University)

Speakers: Lynne Rudder Baker (University of Massachusetts)

"Updating Anselm Again"

William E. Mann (University of Vermont)

"Locating the Lost Island"

Edward Wierenga (University of Rochester)
 “The Ontological Argument and Objects of Thought”

A reception will follow this session.

GIV-14. Society for the Study of the History of Analytical Philosophy

7:30-9:30 p.m.

Topic: Transcendental Idealism in the *Tractatus*

Chair: Sandra Lapointe (McMaster University)

Speakers: Robert Hanna (University of Colorado–Boulder)

Michael Potter (University of Cambridge)

Peter Sullivan (University of Stirling)

GROUP SESSION GV: SATURDAY, FEBRUARY 18, 12:15-2:15 P.M.

GV-1. North American Nietzsche Society

12:15-2:15 p.m.

Chair: Richard Schacht (University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign)

Speakers: Justin Remhof (University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign)

“Naturalism, Causality, and Constructivism in Nietzsche’s Conception of Science”

Joshua Andresen (American University of Beirut)

“Nietzsche Contra Dennett”

GV-2. Society for Systematic Philosophy

12:15-2:15 p.m.

Topic: Hegel on Religion

Speakers: Robert Berman (Xavier University)

“Self-Knowledge as Key to Hegel’s Phenomenological Account of Religion”

Benjamin Crowe (University of Utah)

“Reason and Cultus”

Commentators: Greg Moss (University of Georgia)

Graham Schuster (University of Georgia)

GV-3. North American Division of the Schopenhauer Society

12:15-2:15 p.m.

Speakers: Sandra L. Shapshay (Indiana University/Indiana University Center for Bioethics)

“Schopenhauer’s Methods in Aesthetics, a Case Study”

Roger Paden (George Mason University)
 “Schopenhauer, Nietzsche, and Klimt”

Marie-Michèle Blondin (Ludwig-Maximilians
 Universität, München)
 “The Concept of Heart in Schopenhauer’s
 Philosophy”

Kien-How Goh (Independent Scholar)
 “The Role of the Intellect in Schopenhauer’s
 Theory of Action”

GV-4. North American Society for Social Philosophy

12:15-2:15 p.m.

Topic: Shared Experiences and Emotions

Speakers: Ingrid V. Albrecht (University of Illinois at Urbana-
 Champaign)

“Getting It: Love, Humor, and Joint Emotion”

Ami Harbin (Dalhousie University)

“Three Models of Shared Experience and Social
 Agency”

Naomi Scheman (University of Minnesota and
 Umeå University)

“On Emotional (Un)Intelligibility”

GV-5. Society for Asian and Comparative Philosophy

12:15-2:15 p.m.

Topic: East Looks West: Chinese Interpreters of Western Philosophy

Chair: Ronnie Littlejohn (Belmont University)

Speakers: Ronnie Littlejohn (Belmont University)

“Chinese Receptions of Western Philosophy”

Jinli He (Trinity University)

“Wang Guowei’s Interpretation of Kant”

Vincent Shen (University of Toronto)

“Evolutionism through Chinese Eyes: Yan Fu, Ma
 Junwu and Their Translations on Darwinian
 Evolutionism”

Robin Wang (Loyola Marymount University)

“Zhang Shiyong and Contemporary Chinese
 Scholars’ Appreciation of Hegel”

GV-6. Philosophy of Religion Group: Paul Moser, *The Evidence for God: Religious Knowledge Reexamined*

12:15-2:15 p.m.

Chair: Bradley N. Seeman (Taylor University)

Critics: Charles Taliaferro (Saint Olaf College)

Katharyn Waidler (Wheaton College)

Response: Paul Moser (Loyola University Chicago)

GV-7. International Association for the Philosophy of Sport

12:15-2:15 p.m.

Speakers: Jeffrey P. Fry (Ball State University)

“Coaching, Moral Psychology, and ‘the Hidden Brain’”

Deborah Vossen (St. Francis Xavier University)

“Grasshopperian Utopianism: Games, Real Life and the End of the Existence”

GV-8. Radical Philosophy Association

12:15-2:15 p.m.

Topic: Arendt, Politics, and Judgment: Conceptualizing Freedom

Chair: Thomas Thorp (St. Xavier University, Chicago)

Speakers: D. Cole (Ball State University)

“The Social and the Political in Arendt’s Analysis of Little Rock”

Matthew Wester (Miami University of Ohio)

“Solidarity and Reflective Judgment”

Amanda Holmes (Miami University of Ohio)

“Politics as Performance: Arendt and the Labor Movement”

GV-9. Josiah Royce Society

12:15-2:15 p.m.

Topic: Digital Critical Editions of Royce and Peirce

Chair: Randall E. Auxier (Southern Illinois University–Carbondale)

Speakers: Andre de Tienne (Institute of American Thought)

“The START Program”

David E. Pfeifer (Indiana University/Purdue University, Indianapolis)

“Digital Volumes and On-line Flexibility in Critical Editions”

GV-10. International Berkeley Society

12:15-2:15 p.m.

Chair: Margaret Atherton (University of Wisconsin–
Milwaukee)

Speakers: Katia Saporiti (University of Zurich)
“Berkeley’s Concept of Time”

David Raynor (University of Ottawa)
“Reticence about Divine Archetypes”

MAIN AND GROUP MEETING PARTICIPANTS

AARONS, Kieran (DePaul University).....	GI-8
ABBARNO, G. John M. (D'Youville College).....	GII-2
ABBOTT, Barbara (Michigan State University).....	V-C
ABRAMS, Marshall D. (University of Alabama at Birmingham)	IV-F, GI-9
ABRAMSON, Kate (Indiana University–Bloomington).....	V-B
AGARD, Olivier (Université Paris-Sorbonne).....	GIII-6
ALBRECHT, Ingrid V. (University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign)	GV-4
ALEXANDER, David J. (Iowa State University).....	IV-H
ALLEN, Michael (East Tennessee State University).....	VI-F
ALLORI, Valia (Northern Illinois University).....	VII-C
ALMASSI, Ben (College of Lake County)	GI-1, GIII-1
ALZNAUER, Mark (Northwestern University)	III-J
ANDERS, Paul C. (Mount Marty College)	VII-K
ANDERSON, Charity (Saint Louis University).....	V-J
ANDERSON, David L. (Illinois State University).....	V-L
ANDERSON, Joel (Utrecht University (The Netherlands))	VI-F
ANDERSON, Joshua W. (Saint Louis University)	V-K
ANDERSON, Luvel (Pennsylvania State University)	VI-K
ANDERSON, Owen (Arizona State University).....	III-O
ANDRESEN, Joshua (American University of Beirut).....	GV-1
ANTONY, Louise (University of Massachusetts, Amherst)	VII-F
ARYAL, Yubraj (Purdue University)	GII-2
ASMIS, Elizabeth (University of Chicago).....	GIV-12
ATHERTON, Margaret (University of Wisconsin–Milwaukee)... ..	VII-A, GV-10
AUDI, Robert (University of Notre Dame)	GII-9
AUXIER, Randall E. (Southern Illinois University–Carbondale)	GII-7, GV-9
BABER, H. E. (University of San Diego)	IV-E
BÄCK, Allan (Kutztown University).....	III-I
BADER, Daniel (University of Toronto).....	V-K
BADGER, Jonathan (St. John's College, Annapolis).....	GIV-5
BAER, Paul (Georgia Institute of Technology)	II-E
BAILEY, Alison (Illinois State University)	GIII-1
BAILEY, Andrew M. (University of Notre Dame).....	IV-E
BAKER, John (University College Dublin)	VII-G
BALLANTYNE, Nathan (Fordham University).....	II-D

BANKA, Rafal (Jagiellonian University)	GIV-6
BAR ON, Bat-Ami (Binghamton University)	III-N, GIII-11
BARNES, R. Eric (Hobart and William Smith Colleges).....	IV-G
BARNEY, Rachel (University of Toronto)	V-G
BASL, John (Bowling Green State University)	VII-J
BAXTER, Donald L. M. (University of Connecticut).....	IV-A, GII-6
BAYNES, Kenneth (Syracuse University)	VI-F
BEER, Michelle C. M. (Florida International University)	GI-4
BENGSON, John (University of Wisconsin–Madison).....	VI-A
BENSON, Paul H. (University of Dayton)	III-E
BENTON, Matthew A. (Rutgers University)	VI-L
BERGER, Ronna (Tulane University).....	GIV-5
BERGMANN, Michael (Purdue University)	IV-H, GII-8
BERMAN, Robert (Xavier University)	GIII-2, GV-2
BERNSTEIN, Sara (Duke University)	IV-I
BETT, Richard (Johns Hopkins University)	IV-A
BETZ, Joseph (Villanova University)	GI-3
BICKHAM, Stephen H. (Mansfield University)	GIII-10
BIMBO, Katalin (University of Alberta)	II-M
BIRD, Alexander (University of Bristol).....	III-F
BISS, Mavis (Loyola University Maryland).....	VI-H
BLOCK, Ned (New York University).....	V-L
BLONDIN, Marie-Michèle (Ludwig-Maximilians Universität, München)	GV-3
BLUM, Lawrence (University of Massachusetts, Boston).....	II-F
BOATRIGT, John (Loyola University Chicago)	GII-10
BOEHM, Miren (University of Wisconsin–Milwaukee)	GII-6
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BOLTUC, Peter (University of Illinois–Springfield)	V-L
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ABSTRACTS OF COLLOQUIUM AND SUBMITTED SYMPOSIUM PAPERS

UNJUSTIFIED DEFEATERS (IV-H)

DAVID J. ALEXANDER (IOWA STATE UNIVERSITY)

A number of philosophers including Michael Bergmann, Alvin Goldman, John Greco, and James Pryor have claimed that unjustified beliefs can be defeaters. In this paper, I show that Pryor's account of the possibility of such defeaters is insufficient. According to Pryor, an unjustified belief can function as a defeater because it can undermine *rational belief*—a necessary but not sufficient condition of justified belief. I argue that *inferentially unjustified* beliefs cannot undermine rational belief. This is because an inferentially unjustified belief is one that, all things considered, one should rationally disregard. If so, then only *non-inferentially unjustified* beliefs are candidates for being unjustified defeaters. However, I show that there can only be such beliefs if there is no presumption in favor of one's beliefs. Since it is far from obvious that there is no such presumption, Pryor's account does not suffice to show that unjustified defeaters are possible.

AGAINST COUNTERFACTUALS OF LIBERTARIAN FREEDOM: THERE IS NOTHING I WOULD HAVE DONE IF I COULD HAVE DONE OTHERWISE (VII-K)

PAUL C. ANDERS (MOUNT MARTY COLLEGE)

In the contemporary literature concerning the existence of counterfactuals of libertarian freedom much attention has been given to the grounding objection in which it is argued, simply stated, that there exists no actual state of affairs that could ground the truth or falsehood of any particular counterfactual of freedom. Very little attention, comparatively, has been given to a different sort of problem—whether libertarian freedom is compatible with there being true counterfactuals of freedom. This latter problem seems much more serious. In this paper we present the problem and consider a variety of responses to it. We do not argue that the notion of libertarian freedom is itself false or unintelligible. We conclude that recent replies to this latter problem do not vindicate the theorist who holds both to a libertarian account of freedom and to there being true counterfactuals of freedom.

FALLIBILISM AND THE FLEXIBILITY OF EPISTEMIC MODALS (V-J)

CHARITY ANDERSON (SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY)

Epistemic modals such as “might” and “must” have a complex semantics. The standard story is that epistemic modals quantify over a domain of possibilities compatible with *what is known*. Recent work has focused on *whose* epistemic base is relevant: the speaker or some relevant group, which may or may not include the speaker. In this paper, I argue that epistemic modals are flexible in a way that has gone largely unnoticed. “Might *p*” can be true relative to a restricted body of S’s evidence, even if false relative to S’s total evidence. This flexibility resolves a recent problem in the literature concerning fallibilism and the standard view of epistemic modals. Section 1 introduces the problem, namely, that the two positions seem to be in tension. Section 2 argues for the intrasubjective flexibility of epistemic modals. Section 3 explains how intra-subjective flexibility of epistemic modals dissolves the apparent tension.

WHY SO SERIOUS: AN INQUIRY ON RACIST JOKES (VI-K)

LUVELL ANDERSON (PENNSYLVANIA STATE UNIVERSITY)

Joking is ubiquitous. Our normal everyday conversations are peppered with them. Jokes serve a variety of purposes, e.g., they can be cathartic, entertaining, used as social correctives, used for ice-breaking purposes, as well as carrying out insults. In this paper, I focus on racial jokes and present a view that determines when a joking utterance is *merely racial*, *racially insensitive*, and *racist*. The basic thesis is that *merely racial* jokes have a particular aim and audience uptake of that aim. Merely racial jokes are contrasted with *racist* and *racially insensitive* jokes, both of which involve a breakdown with one or both of the criteria just mentioned. Before elaborating the positive view, I survey alternative views and raise objections for each. I then discuss stereotypes and their relation to racism. Finally, I present the positive view and entertain possible objections.

PUBLIC HEALTH CARE AND SECURITY (V-K)

DANIEL BADER (UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO)

One of the most common justifications among bioethicists for public health care is Norman Daniels’s argument that public health care is necessary for the equalization of opportunity. In this paper, I argue that Daniels’s account is fundamentally misguided. It answers the wrong questions, and it provides incorrect answers. Instead, I offer what I call the “security account” of health care. According to my account, the right to public health care is simply an extension of our right to life and the security of the person. This account has the advantage of accounting for our basic intuition that the purpose of health care should be health.

THE ELIMINATION ARGUMENT (IV-E)

ANDREW M. BAILEY (UNIVERSITY OF NOTRE DAME)

Animalism is the view that we are animals: living, breathing, wholly material beings. Despite its considerable appeal, animalism has come under fire. Other philosophers have had much to say about objections to animalism that stem from reflection on personal identity over time. But one promising objection by Hud Hudson (“The Elimination Argument”) has been overlooked. In this paper, I will remedy this situation and examine the Elimination Argument in some detail. I will argue that the Elimination Argument is both unsound and unmotivated. I will further argue that Hudson (and those sympathetic to Hudson’s general views about the material world) may have no reason to believe one of its premises.

PENN AND TELLER HOST THE NEWCOMB GAME (IV-G)

R. ERIC BARNES (HOBART AND WILLIAM SMITH COLLEGES)

The Newcomb problem has played a central role in two distinct philosophical disputes, one being evidential vs. causal decision theory, and the other being the orthodox vs. revisionist theory of rationality. There has been little interaction between these disputes, but there are interesting relationships between them, and these come out more vividly when the game is altered by making both boxes transparent. I argue that this traditionally central feature of the game is actually a red herring. Given most people’s theoretical commitments, the game is essentially the same with two transparent boxes. However, examining the game with only transparent boxes can clarify both philosophical disputes and the confusing concept of rational irrationality. This essay begins with a parable about how various players might react to the traditional and altered Newcomb games. It then goes on to reflect on the lessons that can be gleaned from this parable.

ASSENT IN SEXTUS AND HUME (IV-A)

DONALD L. M. BAXTER (UNIVERSITY OF CONNECTICUT)

How is it possible for Hume to be both withering skeptic and constructive theorist? I recommend an answer along the lines of the Pyrrhonian’s answer to the question how it is possible to suspend all judgment yet engage in active daily life. Sextus distinguishes two kinds of assent—one suspended across the board and one involved with daily living. The first is an act of will based on appreciation of reasons; the second is a causal effect of appearances. I suggest that Hume makes the same distinction, only he extends the sort of assent involved in the Pyrrhonist’s daily life to theoretical matters as well. He is a skeptic both in finding no reason to grant the one sort of assent and in being subject to the other. I begin by explaining this Frede-type interpretation of Sextus over the rival view of Burnyeat. Next, I suggest that Hume’s version of the distinction is that between belief as an act “of the cogitative part of our natures” and as an act of the “sensitive” part (1.4.1.8). Hume’s version can be fleshed out in

the way I suggest by regarding it, as Dugald Stewart did, to be derived from a lengthy discussion of Ralph Cudworth's. I then summarize how Treatise 1.4.1, "Scepticism with regard to reason," shows both that active endorsement is never merited and that passive acquiescence cannot be avoided.

KNOWLEDGE NORMS IN CONFLICT (VI-L)

MATTHEW A. BENTON (*RUTGERS UNIVERSITY*)

Several philosophers endorse both the Knowledge Norm of Assertion as well as a Knowledge Norm of Belief. This paper argues that it is problematic to endorse both norms; as such, the best position, if one is attracted to each, is to adopt a knowledge norm for either assertion or belief, and endorse a truth norm for the other. In closing, I briefly argue that given the problems raised, the most plausible of these options will have to be the Knowledge Norm of Assertion and the Truth Norm of Belief.

ASSERTION AND INTENTIONAL FOULS (VI-L)

KENNETH A. BOYD (*UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO*)

The knowledge norm of assertion states that it is appropriate to assert that p only if one knows that p . Opponents claim that there are classes of cases in which the norm dictates that assertion is inappropriate, contra intuitive judgment. Some knowledge norm proponents have attempted to explain these data by arguing that propriety in assertion is twofold, consisting of one dimension that tracks adherence to constitutive rules ("primary propriety"), and another dimension that tracks whether the subject has reason to believe she has adhered to said rules ("secondary propriety"). Here I offer a defence of the strategy of distinguishing multiple sense of propriety in assertion (and, with it, the knowledge norm of assertion), but with a twist: I reject the orthodox notion of secondary propriety and replace it with one that tracks whether the subject adheres to the practical goals of assertion.

SPINOZA'S THEORY OF ATTRIBUTES (VII-L)

ALEXANDER PAUL BOZZO (*MARQUETTE UNIVERSITY*)

Spinoza contends that the one substance—God—has a multiplicity of attributes, each of which constitutes the essence of God. Some commentators have attempted to save Spinoza from a *prima facie* inconsistency by endorsing a non-identity interpretation of substance and attribute. In such cases, God is not strictly identical to any given attribute; rather, the attributes merely refer to or denote substance. I challenge this interpretation by arguing that, apart from its failing to correspond to Spinoza's ontological claims, it equally fails to address a number of passages that suggest a strict identity interpretation of substance and attribute.

FROM INSENSITIVITY TO MORAL DEBUNKING (II-I)

MATTHEW BRADDOCK (DUKE UNIVERSITY)

Consider the Debunking Argument: the best explanation of our moral judgments does not appeal to their truth, so we are unjustified in holding our moral judgments. Recent discussion fixates on the explanatory premise. But even if we grant the explanatory premise, it is a wide open question how to get from there to the debunking conclusion. This paper considers whether arguments from epistemic insensitivity can bridge the gap. Three aims: this paper reconstructs Richard Joyce's (2001) argument from insensitivity, develops a strong objection to Joyce's argument, and then, based on this discussion, develops a novel and better argument from (a related sort of) insensitivity that secures the inference from the explanatory premise to the debunking conclusion.

DESCARTES AND THE DANGER OF IRRESOLUTION (VII-L)

SHOSHANA R. BRASSFIELD (FROSTBURG STATE UNIVERSITY)

Descartes's approach to practical judgments (i.e., judgments about what is beneficial or harmful, or what to pursue or avoid) is almost exactly the opposite of his approach to theoretical judgments (i.e., judgments about the true nature of things). Instead of the cautious skepticism for which Descartes is known, throughout his ethical writings he recommends developing the habit of making firm judgments and resolutely carrying them out, no matter how doubtful and uncertain they may be. Descartes, strikingly, takes irresolution to be the source of *vice*, having a *weak soul*, and all remorse and repentance. I offer an analysis of irresolution that explains why Descartes makes the avoidance of irresolution such a central theme in his moral writings and illuminates. Irresolution is, for Descartes, the source of weakness of will and its opposite, resolution, is an essential component of virtue.

EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY: WHY WE SHOULD MOVE BEYOND THE EQUALITY AND EQUAL CITIZENSHIP STANDARDS IN FAVOR OF "OPEN ACCESS" (V-K)

S. STEWART BRAUN (UNIVERSITY OF VIRGINIA)

In response to the problem that equality of educational opportunity (EEO) faces with leveling down, Elizabeth Anderson and Debra Satz have both developed adequacy standards of educational opportunity according to which all students should possess an education sufficient to ensure their status as equal citizens. In this paper, I critique both EEO and the equal citizenship standards, arguing that EEO cannot easily evade the leveling down objection and that the equal citizenship standards fail to prepare students for the competitive nature of the labor market and higher education system. As an alternative, I argue in favor of what I call "Open Access." Open Access does not demand equality, but does require that students have access to an education that provides them with the skills and academic knowledge necessary to compete for the valued career and educational positions for which they possess the requisite natural ability.

REASONS AS EXPLANATIONS (I-F)

JOHN BRUNERO (UNIVERSITY OF MISSOURI, ST. LOUIS)

Some philosophers have argued that no informative analysis of the concept of a (normative) reason can be given. Against this view, John Broome has argued that we can analyze reasons in terms of the concepts of *explanation* and *ought*. On his view, reasons to n are either facts which explain why one ought to n (what he calls “perfect reasons”) or facts which play a for- n role in weighing explanations (what he calls “*pro tanto* reasons”). In this paper, I argue against Broome’s analysis of reasons. I agree with Broome that reasons are best thought of as explanations, but I suggest that we instead analyze reasons in terms of the concepts of *explanation* and *good*. In my view, some fact F is a reason for A to if and only if F explains why A ’s n -ing would be good, and A ’s n -ing is possible.

GOD, INCARNATION, AND METAPHYSICS IN HEGEL’S PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION (III-J)

PAOLO D. BUBBIO (UNIVERSITY OF SYDNEY)

In this paper, I draw upon the “post-Kantian” reading of Hegel to examine the consequences Hegel’s idea of God has for understanding his metaphysics. In particular, I apply Hegel’s “recognition-theoretic” approach to his theology. Within the context of this analysis, I focus especially on the incarnation and sacrifice of Christ. I conclude by sketching some of the consequences Hegel’s idea of a God who renounces his own divinity has for an idealistically conceived metaphysics. My main thesis is that Hegel’s turn to Christianity can be regarded as indicative of his endorsement of social and political freedoms that are characteristic of modernity. That is, modern freedoms are cognate with a certain *idea* of God. Thus, the notion of incarnation is conceived as the expression of a spirit that advances only insofar as it is willing to *withdraw* and “make room” for the other.

ARISTOTLE’S THEORY OF ESSENCE (III-I)

ALLAN BÄCK (KUTZTOWN UNIVERSITY)

Aristotle denies that a universal is a substance. Yet a definition, the formula of the essence, is a statement composed of universals—and the substance is identical to its essence. Aristotle calls genera and species “secondary substances,” where these are universals “said of” the individuals. Yet he says that no universal names a substance. Moreover, if genera and species also are substances strictly, then we have “substances of substances”—a conclusion that Aristotle rejects too. Accordingly many modern scholars find Aristotle’s account of substance and essence mystifying. Yet even more mystifying is Aristotle’s aplomb: he thinks that he has offered a clear solution to what has being primarily. I suggest that reading what he says simply and literally goes a long way to offering a simple solution. I shall present it in as much detail as I can here.

A NEW SOURCE OF DATA ABOUT SINGULAR THOUGHT (IV-F)

MIHNEA D. I. CAPRARU (SYRACUSE UNIVERSITY)

Philosophers have justified extant theories of singular thought in two ways: either through intuitions about which thoughts are singular, or through wide-ranging theories motivated by data from other philosophical areas. This means that we have been using, disturbingly, only one source of data *about* singular thought; I propose therefore a new data source: coherent agreement. When we agree with a general thought about Paris, we cannot coherently deny about Paris the thought's subject-position descriptive content. On the other hand, when we agree with a *singular* thought about Paris, we may coherently deny about Paris any descriptive content, other than the thought's own mental predicate. I formulate a test for singular thought and a method for the extraction of subject-position descriptive content from general thought, and I thereby illustrate how coherent agreement provides one of the new sources of data that we need about singular thought.

INFERENCEAL DEPENDENCE (II-M)

MATTHEW CARLSON (INDIANA UNIVERSITY, BLOOMINGTON)

According to an influential position in the epistemology of logic, there are basic principles of deductive inference which are used to justify all other principles of inference, but cannot themselves be justified inferentially. The reason for this is that, in making an inference, one must use or rely on a principle of inference, so any attempt to justify the basic principles of inference would be circular—it would require application of the very principles that one is trying to justify. However, the key idea in this argument, that in making an inference one must use a principle of inference, is not well-understood. I explicate of this idea, which I call “inferential dependence,” in such a way that we make progress in understanding and evaluating a variety of positions and arguments in the epistemology of logic.

NON-BRANCHING MODERATE MORALISM (VII-I)

W. SCOTT CLIFTON (UNIVERSITY OF WASHINGTON)

A prominent discussion in aesthetics is that between moderate autonomists and moderate moralists. Moderate autonomists hold that moral and aesthetic criticism never, while moderate moralists hold that they occasionally, legitimately overlap. In this paper I present two possible structures that moderate moralist accounts could have—branching and non-branching structures. Branching accounts show that there is a relation between moral and aesthetic criticism, but it's not direct. Non-branching accounts purport to show that moral features of artworks are connected to some of the aesthetic features in a linear way. I argue that Noël Carroll's moderate moralist account is branching, which leaves him with a dilemma: his account is either self-undermining or consistent with moderate autonomism. I provide a moderate moralist account with

a non-branching structure. In this account moral criticism bears directly on aesthetic criticism—moral features causally relate to certain aesthetic features. Finally I answer two objections to my view.

YES, VIRGINIA, THERE IS A GENUINELY METANORMATIVE CONSTRUCTIVISM (VII-H)

MARY C. COLEMAN (*ILLINOIS WESLEYAN UNIVERSITY*)

I think that constructivism is a more plausible metanormative theory than realism. However, my aim in this paper is to defend a much more modest claim: there is a type of constructivism that is both genuinely metanormative and different from any type of realism. In section two, I raise four questions that I believe a theory must answer in order to count as metanormative, and I briefly sketch the answers that the kind of constructivist view I propose gives to them. In section three, I discuss two recent attempts to show that any supposedly metanormative constructivism collapses into realism, and I argue that the constructivism I propose does not fall prey to either of these objections.

SEMANTIC BLINDNESS, INDIRECT ATTRIBUTIONS, AND EAVESDROPPERS (VI-L)

EZRA J. COOK (*NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY*)

In this paper I argue that cross-contextual criticism causes problems for the epistemic contextualist. I generate these problems through indirect reports and eavesdropper cases. To draw this out, I first distinguish the kind of semantic blindness operative in contextualist cases from a kind that should not be considered bothersome. This is significant in that arguments by the contextualist generally appeal to cases of blindness in the weak sense to explain away blindness in the strong sense. Then I develop a case involving indirect reports between low and high standards contexts that creates some serious problems for the contextualist, problems that require appeal to strong semantic blindness for their most plausible resolution. Finally, I treat some possible responses available to the contextualist, and show that none provide acceptable results.

REALIZATION AND CAUSATION (I-J)

MARK B. COUCH (*SETON HALL UNIVERSITY*)

This paper considers a problem in our understanding of theories of realization. I first describe a problem which exists with standard accounts of realization, what I call the sufficiency problem. I then explain a way of addressing this problem by appealing to some neglected resources from theories of causation. I end by explaining how work on the notion of realization has much to learn from those working on causation.

PROPERTIES AS PLACES (II-J)

SAM COWLING (*UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS, AMHERST*)

Familiar forms of property realism identify properties with *sui generis* ontological categories like universals or tropes and posit a fundamental instantiation relation that unifies objects with their properties. In this

paper, I develop and defend locationism, which identifies properties with locations and holds that the occupation relation that unifies objects with their locations also unifies objects with their properties. My defense proceeds by illustrating the theoretical virtues of fertility and parsimony that locationism enjoys. Towards this end, I outline the locationist's metaphysics of alien properties and show how it improves upon the account of alien properties offered by competing forms of property realism.

OMNISCIENCE AND WORTHINESS OF WORSHIP (I-G)

WESLEY D. CRAY (OHIO STATE UNIVERSITY)

At first glance, the properties *being omniscient* and *being worthy of worship* might appear to be perfectly compatible in the sense that it appears that there is nothing in principle stopping a being from instantiating both. But there are reasons to be worried about this purported compatibility, as it turns out that, depending on our commitments with respect to certain kinds of knowledge and notions of personhood, it might be the case that no being—God included—could instantiate both. In this paper, I lay out and motivate this claim before going on to consider a variety of responses—some more plausible than others—that may be offered by the theist. My goal is not to argue definitively for any of these responses over any of the others, but rather to get clear on what the options are.

A CRITIQUE OF ESTLUND'S NORMATIVE CONSENT THEORY (II-K)

EMILY M. CROOKSTON (WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY IN ST. LOUIS)

In this paper, I criticize Estlund's normative consent theory. Although Estlund is correct that the consent theorist relies on a morally arbitrary, but intuitively appealing asymmetry between the moral status of consent and non-consent, his solution to the problem begs the question in precisely the same way he accuses his opponents of begging the question. Ultimately, I conclude that while Estlund's criticism is correct, his own defense of normative consent is just as worthy of criticism.

THE SORITES PARADOX AND BORDERLINE CASES (I-H)

HELEN DALY (COLORADO COLLEGE)

Many attempts to solve the sorites paradox use the notion of borderline cases. The ordinary, loose meaning of "borderline case," however, is inadequate to the job. Here I make two distinctions that allow us to differentiate some of the possible notions of borderline cases. I then argue that one of those notions is particularly well-suited to being the cornerstone of a semantic theory of vagueness in terms of borderline cases. This is the crux of my account: Borderline cases are a vaguely bounded collection of items in a sorites sequence, each of which can be judged in more than one way.

THE PROBLEM WITH (QUASI-REALIST) EXPRESSIVISM (VII-H)

STEPHEN DAVEY (UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS AT AUSTIN)

In this paper I raise an objection to quasi-realist expressivism (QRE), with focus on Alan Gibbard's version as he develops it in *Thinking How to Live*. My objection concerns the failure of QRE to provide an understanding of certain types of normative judgments (and expressions of normative judgments) that deserve a distinct place in our normative repertoire and, hence, with its failure to realize its purported advantages over realism. Because the general expressivist strategy involves understanding the identification of some feature as a reason to act in terms of what one does when one treats that feature as a reason to act, it leaves some types of normative judgments and utterances unexplained, namely, those an understanding of which requires a notion of identification as distinct from treatment. The quasi-realist move, I argue, merely conceals the more general failure of expressivism to distinguish identification from treatment.

ACCEPTANCE AND FAIR PLAY (II-K)

KORY DeCLARK (UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA)

First offered in earnest only 60 years ago, the fair play (or fairness) argument is one of the most interesting and plausible solutions to the problem of political obligation circulating today. Philosophers have generally taken two approaches to the argument: the *acceptance* approach (first explicitly proposed by John Rawls, and later discussed in detail by A.J. Simmons in his *Moral Principles and Political Obligations*), and the *goods* approach (advocated most forcefully in recent years by George Klosko). My limited aim in this paper is to reveal problems with the acceptance approach that have been overlooked in the literature on political obligation. I argue that no conception of acceptance explains how we plausibly incur obligation by receiving goods from cooperative schemes. I therefore attempt to extend the critique of the principle of fairness from its contentious political application to its more widely accepted plausibility as a moral principle.

ARE THE LATE STAGE DEMENTED RESPONSIBLE FOR PAST CRIMES? (III-H)

ANNETTE S. DUFNER (UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO)

The paper investigates whether it is plausible to ascribe responsibility for past actions to the late stage demented. The concern is based on the fact that policy makers in the U.S. and in Britain are starting to wonder what to do with prison inmates in the later stages of dementia who do not remember their crimes anymore. To investigate the problem it is to some extent possible to draw on arguments from the debate about advance directives for the late stage demented regarding life prolonging medical procedures. As it turns out, though, these positions cannot simply be adopted to solve the problem of responsibility ascriptions. This paper argues that the late stage demented are not responsible for past crimes. Moreover, this position is independent of the question whether advance directives of the demented should be binding.

A PROPERTY-BASED COSMOLOGICAL ARGUMENT (I-G)

TRAVIS DUMSDAY (*LIVINGSTONE COLLEGE*)

I formulate a modest new cosmological argument, one concluding to an immaterial causal agent or agents on the basis of certain contingent facts regarding geometrical/structural properties.

RELIABILITY FOR DEGREES OF BELIEF (IV-G)

JEFFREY S. DUNN (*DEPAUW UNIVERSITY*)

We often evaluate beliefs, beliefs states, and belief-forming processes for reliability. This is normally done in the context of beliefs that are all-or-nothing. How does such evaluation go when we're considering beliefs that come in degrees? I consider an answer proposed by Alvin Goldman, which focuses on the degree of truth-possession had by a set of beliefs. I argue the proposal is inadequate, but for an interesting reason. When we are dealing with all-or-nothing belief, reliability leads to truth-possession. However, I argue that when it comes to degrees of belief, reliability and truth-possession part ways. Goldman's proposal thus fails to be a good metric for evaluating degrees of belief for reliability. I conclude by proposing an alternative metric that does not have this problem and consider *why* we might care about assessments of reliability if they are not tied directly to truth-possession.

WHY SEEING IS NOT DEDUCING: PHENOMENAL CONCEPTS, THE KNOWLEDGE ARGUMENT, AND A *PRIORI* ENTAILMENT (II-L)

ANDREAS ELPIDOROU (*BOSTON UNIVERSITY*)

It is a widely held assumption that the Phenomenal Concept Strategy (PCS) is committed to the claim that phenomenal concepts are special: a subject can come to possess or acquire a phenomenal concept only if the subject has previously undergone the type of phenomenal experience to which the phenomenal concept refers. Indeed, not only do many proponents of PCS explicitly grant this claim, but opponents of PCS have also recently objected to PCS on grounds that there are no concepts with such possession or acquisition conditions. In this essay, I argue that this widespread assumption is false. PCS, as a response to epistemic arguments against physicalism, is not tied to a thesis concerning the possession or acquisition conditions of phenomenal concepts.

SYNCHRONIC CAUSAL PREEMPTION (IV-C)

JEFF ENGELHARDT (*GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY*)

This paper makes a case for a synchronic analog of late causal preemption. Plausibly, arguments implicitly appealing to synchronic causal preemption have been employed for various philosophical tasks. For instance, what has been characterized as overdetermination in the many discussions of the problem of causal exclusion is more aptly characterized as synchronic causal preemption. The idea at work is that if X is metaphysically prior to

Y, and both X and Y purport to cause Z, then just as if X were temporally prior to Y, X causally preempts Y in bringing about Z and any other effect that it would seem both X and Y bring about. Of the proposed solutions to the problem of causal exclusion, none remains solvent if the problem is raised by appeal to preemption rather than overdetermination.

EVENT-CAUSAL LIBERTARIANISM, FUNCTIONAL REDUCTION, AND THE DISAPPEARING AGENT ARGUMENT (VII-K)

CHRISTOPHER E. FRANKLIN (BIOLA UNIVERSITY)

Event-causal libertarians maintain that an agent's freely bringing about a choice is reducible to states and events of the agent bringing about the choice. Agent-causal libertarians deny this, arguing that free will requires that, in addition to the casual role of states and events of the agent, the agent qua substance also be causally involved. Derk Pereboom (2007) and Meghan Griffith (2010) have defended agent-causal libertarianism on this score by arguing that on event-causal libertarianism the agent disappears at the crucial moment of action, failing to settle himself which decision he makes. Call this the disappearing agent argument. I argue that event-causal libertarians can dismantle this objection by enriching their analysis of free will to include a functional reduction of the role of the agent in self-determination.

IS SCIENTIFIC INFERENCE HOLISTIC IN ANY SENSE THAT MATTERS FOR COGNITIVE SCIENCE? (I-J)

TIMOTHY FULLER (OHIO STATE UNIVERSITY)

RICHARD SAMUELS (OHIO STATE UNIVERSITY)

What implications do accounts of scientific inference have for theories of quotidian cognition? We argue that failing to distinguish between different types of theories of scientific inference—including normative, population-level, competence, and performance theories—has led to fundamental misunderstandings of the implications. We charge Fodor in particular with such a misunderstanding. His conception of “central processes” and critiques of theories of cognitive architecture are centrally based on a holistic conception of scientific inference. We argue that Fodor's claims concerning the “global” nature of scientific hypothesis formation and confirmation are multiply ambiguous. Further, so we claim, any disambiguated version of Fodor's holism is either implausible, unsuitable for informing theories of our cognitive architecture, or both. We attempt to learn from Fodor's mistakes, however, and outline more promising relations that might hold between theories of everyday cognition and theories of scientific theory construction and corroboration.

FUNCTIONS MUST BE PERFORMED AT APPROPRIATE RATES IN APPROPRIATE SITUATIONS (VII-J)

GUALTIERO PICCININI (UNIVERSITY OF MISSOURI, ST. LOUIS)

JUSTIN GARSON (HUNTER COLLEGE, CUNY)

We respond to a recent critique by Kingma (2010) of Christopher Boorse's Biostatistical Theory (BST) of functions by sketching a novel and improved version of BST, which provides the first naturalistic explication of the phenomenon that functions ought to be performed at appropriate rates in appropriate situations. Roughly, our theory maintains that (i) functions are typical contributions to survival or reproduction (when a trait contributes to survival and reproduction), (ii) situations appropriate for the performance of a function are typical situations in which a trait contributes to survival or reproduction, (iii) appropriate rates of functioning are rates that are adequate contributions to survival and reproduction (in situations appropriate for the performance of that function), and (iv) dysfunction is the inability to perform a function at an appropriate rate in appropriate situations.

POLITICAL RECOGNITION (III-L)

RAF A.A. GEENENS (KATHOLIEKE UNIVERSITEIT LEUVEN)

One of the most conspicuous developments in recent political thought is the reconceptualization of social conflicts in terms of a struggle for recognition. In this paper, I argue that philosophers writing in this domain have mostly overlooked one important form of recognition. In the interactions and conflicts that spring up over the exercise of collective power, citizens appear to seek a form of recognition that is intrinsically political. I differentiate this idea of "political recognition" from other accounts of recognition. In the case of political recognition, recognition is not sought for a prepolitical identity (Taylor, Honneth), nor is the relation of recognition primarily epistemic (Habermas). Instead, political recognition refers to the distribution of power. Democratic decision-making, understood as a power-distributive game, allows citizens to recognize each other as fellow "power-holders" and to display their willingness to hand over a part of the power over their own lives to each other.

DAVID LEWIS AND CONTINGENT SECOND-ORDER PREDICATION (II-J)

CHRISTOPHER GIBILISCO (UNIVERSITY OF NEBRASKA, LINCOLN)

Andy Egan (2004) claims that David Lewis's theory of properties will lead to contradictory set-membership in the case of contingent second order properties, as in being green contingently having the property of being somebody's favorite property. However, I will argue that Egan's objection relies on Lewis accepting genuine monadic relational properties, the existence of which Lewis explicitly rejects in his discussion of properties in *On the Plurality of Worlds* (1986). Furthermore, I will show that Lewis's system has the machinery to account for second-order contingent predication without relational properties, via genuine relations between

properties and individuals. I also examine a rival solution to Egan's objection proposed by Joseph Melia and Duncan Watson (2009), and show why my solution is to be preferred.

A RECONSIDERATION OF LOCKE ON PERSONS AS MODES (I-C)

JESSICA GORDON-ROTH (UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS, CHICAGO)

What Locke says about persons and diachronic identity in Book II, Ch. XXII of the *Essay* launched the modern debate over persons and their persistence conditions. However, what Locke says about the persistence conditions of persons seems to be in tension with Locke's definition of "person"—and this apparent tension leaves the reader wondering whether Locke thinks persons are substances or modes. Edmund Law was the first to argue that Lockean persons are modes (in 1769). Ruth Mattern (1980) and Antonio LoLordo (2010) follow in Law's footsteps. In this paper, I give arguments against Law's reading of Locke on persons, and then contend that although Mattern and LoLordo draw our attention to passages of the *Essay* that are certainly worth considering, if we want to give a holistic and accurate reading of Locke on persons, these passages do not offer evidence that Locke thinks persons are modes. Moreover, there is compelling evidence to the contrary, if we consider what Locke says about substance, power, and agency in other parts of the *Essay*.

THESEUS INCORPORATED: PHILOSOPHY OF MIND, MATERIAL CONSTITUTION, AND THE ONTOLOGY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW (I-I)

CHRISTOPHER R. GREEN (UNIVERSITY OF MISSISSIPPI)

Recent attacks on corporate criminal liability employ reductionistic reasoning familiar to the exclusion problem of mental causation and eliminative solutions to the problem of material constitution. Recent defenses of non-reductive physicalism and other solutions to the problem of material constitution, however, offer a way for the criminal law to make sense of corporate properties that are multiply realizable in the actions of a corporation's employees. The criminal law is an appropriate vehicle for correcting replacement-of-employees-survivable, reasons-responsive teleological structures that contribute to the commission of crimes by a corporation's employees. Group psychology has good claim to be a legitimate special science, and the criminal law presupposes higher-order entities and rejects the sort of exclusion principle that would put different-level entities in competition. However, corporate criminal liability should be subject to a good-faith compliance ("bad apple") defense that would preclude corporate punishment unless a corporate custom or policy contributed to a crime.

IDENTIFYING THE GAP IN KANT'S CRITICAL PHILOSOPHY (III-J)

BRYAN HALL (INDIANA UNIVERSITY SOUTHEAST)

In a letter to Christian Garve from September 21st, 1798 Kant claims that he feels the "pain of Tantalus" given the problem of effecting a "Transition

from the metaphysical foundations of natural science to physics,” without which there will be a “gap” in the Critical philosophy. Unfortunately, in this letter, Kant does not make clear what the gap is or how the transition is supposed to bridge the gap. Resolving these issues requires examining Kant’s so-called *Opus postumum*, which contains unfinished drafts of Kant’s transition project. In this paper, I will examine two of the more recent attempts to identify the gap and to explain the transition’s role in filling the gap. I will argue that both these attempts are either textually or philosophically suspect. In contrast, I will offer a competing interpretation that avoids the problems that these other views face.

RUSSELLIAN TWO-DIMENSIONALISM (V-J)

FREDRIK HARALDSEN (UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI)

I argue that treating names as bound variables lets us capture the “two-dimensional” behavior of certain names in a semantic framework consistent with a Russellian treatment of names. While I doubt that all proper names behave like bound variables, there are reasons to think that certain proper names, such as so-called descriptive names—and perhaps empty names—exhibit this behavior, and I point out that recognizing a certain diversity in our theory of proper names does not require that one give up what is, essentially, a unified theory; names are still structurally simple expressions that require individuals and nothing else as semantic values. If they are bound expressions rather than constants, however, we can obtain a treatment equivalent to the treatment offered by two-dimensional semantics, without relying on special operators, a multitude of name-intensions, or rigidifications, but by simple, familiar, and intuitive scope-operations.

THE TRUTH ABOUT RACIAL SLURS: USING KAPLAN’S FRAMEWORK TO PROVIDE A SEMANTIC THEORY OF DEROGATORY EPITHETS (II-M)

JOSEPH HEDGER (SYRACUSE UNIVERSITY)

In this paper I adopt Kaplan’s framework for distinguishing between descriptive and expressive content. Racial slurs are an especially difficult challenge for truth-conditional semantics because of their projection behaviors. That is to say, the offensive content of slurs “scopes out” of logical operators. I argue that racial slurs express contempt and lack descriptive content, so that many sentences containing slurs are not truth apt. Intuitively, “Obama is the first black President” and “Obama is the first S President” (where S is a racial slur) express two very different thoughts. Since the two sentences do not express the same proposition, the truth conditions may be different. My theory accounts for the intuition of the ordinary speaker who refuses to assent to the truth of the latter sentence, although she accepts the truth of the first. Weaknesses of rival theories (including those put forth by Williamson, Hom, and Richard) are also discussed.

ON ADVISING WELL (I-F)

DANA HOWARD (BROWN UNIVERSITY)

To advise well one must do more than merely happen to give good advice. Those who advise well are engaged in a particular sort of intentional activity guided by a particular set of norms. But what sort of activity is this? And what norms guide it? Following Austin's classification of the types of forces that speech acts can have, I argue that the advising as an activity is demarcated by its illocutionary force: advising is an action constituted by certain utterances made under certain felicity conditions. The action that is so constituted is that of offering an answer to the question: "What shall I do?" Once the distinctive features of advising as an activity have been determined, we can begin to articulate the norms of doing so in a trustworthy manner. To advise well one must offer an answer to the above question sincerely, practicably, and in well-reasoned manner.

REASON AND VALUE IN PLATO (V-H)

TUSHAR IRANI (WESLEYAN UNIVERSITY)

This paper explores the way in which Plato conceives of the forms as objects of value in his dialogues. According to Gregory Vlastos, speaking of the forms in a value-laden sense gives rise to a puzzle in Platonic metaphysics that is "not wholly free from an incoherence" ("Degrees of Reality in Plato," *Platonic Studies*, pp. 63-64). To resolve this puzzle, I focus in this paper on ourselves as *valuers*—that is, on the way in which Plato believes the forms affect us. I focus in particular on his conception of rational eros in the dialogues and argue that the philosopher's love of forms is best understood as a kind of rational compulsion. Approaching Vlastos's puzzle from this direction gives us an idea of how the forms might be viewed as value laden. It also goes some way towards an understanding of Plato's metaphysics that's less otherworldly and mystical than Vlastos suggests.

NAÏVE REALISM AND THE SCREENING-OFF PROBLEM (II-L)

DAVID IVY (UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS AT AUSTIN)

Many regard the *naïve realist theory of perception* to best capture the nature of ordinary visual experience as it strikes us upon simple reflection. However, for almost as many, this renders it all the more regrettable that the theory is ultimately untenable. In this paper, I come to naïve realism's defense by responding to a putative difficulty known as the *screening-off problem*. The problem arises from an apparent tension between naïve realism's account of ordinary visual experience and the fact that a visually hallucinating subject can be unable to know, by mere introspection alone, that she not seeing ordinary objects in her environment. M. G. F. Martin and William Fish provide distinct, but unsatisfactory, responses to the problem. Before offering an alternative naïve realist response, I explain naïve realism, motivate it, and criticize its principal contemporary competitor, the *intentionalist theory of perception*.

COLLECTIVE INTENTIONS BEHIND COMMUNICATION (I-I)

MARLIJA JANKOVIC (INDIANA UNIVERSITY)

In this paper, I present an argument in support of the idea that *communication* is an essentially intentional action type. This is a type of action that can only be performed by a group of agents who are acting together intentionally. My argument is based on the difficulties that the predominant individualist approach to communication, developed by Paul Grice, has in characterizing the *overt*ness of communicative intention. In part 1, I present three accounts of overtness and show that the Gricean framework does not provide a systematic account of communication that can serve as a basis for deciding between them and, thus, fails to explain an important feature of communication. In part 2, I develop an account of communicative intention that *explains* why communicative intention has to be overt. On this account an utterer's communicative intention is necessarily an intention to contribute to a collective intentional action.

SPACE AND THE OBJECTIVITY OF SENSATION IN KANT (III-J)

TIM JANKOWIAK (UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, SAN DIEGO)

Kant is less than clear regarding the status of sensations as species of representations. Sometimes he hints that they are not representations at all, and other times he seems to suggest that they are only representational insofar as they refer to the sensory state of the subject itself. Most commentators read Kant along one of these two lines, but I argue that on Kant's considered view, sensations are tasked with the representation of objects in space. I first show that the passages which would appear to rule out sensations as object-representing are in fact fully consistent with sensations having such a function. Then I explain how sensations carry out this function. Although they are not representations in the full sense that intuitions and concepts are, they nevertheless can represent spatial objects in virtue of being synthesized in intuition with the a priori representation of space.

AN ACTIONAL ACCOUNT OF REFRAINING (III-H)

BRANDON JOHNS (UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA)

Refraining is intuitively intentional behavior. Behavior that is intentional is actional. Hence, the desire for an actional account of refraining. But if action necessarily involves doing something, then it's puzzling how refraining could properly constitute action. Wouldn't it rather be inaction? In this paper, I sketch an account of refraining that takes seriously the idea that refrainings are actions. One difference between my account and other actional accounts of refraining is that mine is sensitive to what I call non-intentional omissions: omissions that are neither intentional nor unintentional. This sensitivity, I suggest, results in a more plausible actional account of refraining.

UNIVERSAL FLUX IN HERACLITUS (V-H)

MARK A. JOHNSTONE (*McMASTER UNIVERSITY*)

Since antiquity, the name of Heraclitus has been widely associated with the view that everything in the world is in a constant state of change or motion. However, in more recent times attributing this view to Heraclitus has become highly controversial. In this paper, I first briefly examine the nature and history of this dispute. I then advance a way of understanding Heraclitus that does justice both to the insights of critics of the traditional “universal flux” interpretation of his thought, and to Heraclitus’ apparently high opinion of his own originality. On this interpretation, Heraclitus was reacting *against* a way of understanding the world as consisting of distinct and unconnected entities or things, and sought to replace it with a view of reality as an interconnected, dynamic whole. Although this view was highly original, he did not maintain a doctrine of “universal flux.”

IDEALIZATION AND EXPLANATION IN ASTROPHYSICS (VII-J)

ASHLEY GRAHAM KENNEDY (*UNIVERSITY OF VIRGINIA*)

Although models are used in every branch of science, these epistemic tools are especially important in astrophysics, a field in which experimental manipulation is not possible. In what follows, I will examine the use of an idealized model in astrophysics, and show that the idealizations in this model play an important explanatory role. I claim that it is because of the idealizations in this model, rather than in spite of them, that the model has explanatory power. This claim can be extended to the use of idealized models in the sciences more generally, and thus it gives important insight into the nature of model explanation.

GALEN STRAWSON VERSUS GEORGE SHER ON MORAL RESPONSIBILITY (III-H)

STEPHEN KERSHNER (*STATE UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK—FREDONIA*)

Galen Strawson’s argument is a search for a responsibility-foundation. It rests on three assumptions. First, if a person is responsible for an act, then he chose that act and is responsible for that choice. Second, if a person is responsible for his choice, then it flowed, at least in part, from his character state and he is responsible for that state. Third, if a person is responsible for his character state, then his choice brought about that state, at least in part, and he is responsible for that choice. Libertarian and soft-determinist philosophers might attack the second and third assumptions, but it is doubtful that their attacks succeed. A third attack tries to show that the third assumption rests on the searchlight theory and that it is false. This attack severs the connection between responsibility and control and gets the wrong results on agents created with complete psychologies.

AGAINST THE EQUAL CONSIDERATION OF INTERESTS (V-I)

CHRISTOPHER S. KING (*VANDERBILT UNIVERSITY*)

As a theory of democracy the Equal Consideration of Interests (ECI) is, among other things, a theory of democratic authority—hence, of what

is necessary and sufficient for there to be a general duty on the part of citizens to obey democratic outcomes. This essay challenges (ECI) on the grounds that it could not create democratic authority in certain kinds of cases referred to as “epistemic.” For such cases, it is important that the procedure not only account of the equal input of citizens. It should be reliable in getting outcomes right, even if that detracts from the equal consideration of interests. A few objections are considered.

ARE ALL FUNDAMENTAL FACTS PURELY QUALITATIVE? (I-B)

BORIS C. KMENT (PRINCETON UNIVERSITY)

Are all fundamental facts about the world purely qualitative (i.e., are all facts wholly grounded in qualitative facts)? Or do the fundamental facts include, in addition, facts about which specific individuals there are, and how the qualitative properties and relations are distributed over them? Call the view that all fundamental facts are qualitative “anti-individualism.” Proponents of this position are committed to (at least a restricted version of) the following supervenience thesis (which is commonly called “anti-haecceitism”): there can be no possible world where exactly the same purely qualitative claims hold, but where different claims about specific individuals are true. I argue that anti-haecceitism creates considerable problems in the theory of chance and the theory of counterfactuals. Anti-haecceitism therefore ought to be rejected, and anti-individualism should consequently be rejected as well.

THE LANGUAGE OF THE ONTOLOGY ROOM (IV-I)

DANIEL Z. KORMAN (UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS AT URBANA-CHAMPAIGN)

Defenders of surprising ontological theses (e.g., universalism and eliminativism) have devised a variety of strategies for reconciling their views with ordinary discourse and ordinary belief. I consider one such strategy, according to which ontologists are to stipulatively re-introduce their quantifiers in a way that ensures that their quantifiers “carve reality at its joints,” and then go on as before making such surprising ontological utterances as “there are no statues” or “there is something composed of my nose and the Eiffel Tower” in this new language, a.k.a., “Ontologese.” I challenge this strategy on epistemological grounds, by arguing that such ontologists have no reason whatsoever to believe the propositions expressed by these sentences of Ontologese.

DOMINANCE CONDITIONALS AND ADAMS’S THESIS (V-J)

THEODORE KORZUKHIN (CORNELL UNIVERSITY)

Many currently available theories of indicative conditionals endorse Adams’s Thesis, the claim that an indicative “if P, then Q” is assertible just in case $p(Q|P)$ is high. I argue that Adams’s Thesis is false, by considering some dominance conditionals that arise in the context of the Newcomb problem. Similar considerations tell against strict-conditional theories in the style of Angelika Kratzer.

THE IDENTITY ARGUMENT FOR NATIONAL SELF-DETERMINATION (IV-D)

HSIN-WEN LEE (TUNGSHAI UNIVERSITY)

Several philosophers argue that the interest in preserving a national group's identity is sufficient to justify the group's right to create its own autonomous government. This type of arguments is commonly referred to as the identity argument. In this paper, I consider whether the identity argument successfully justifies the right of a national community to establish an independent state. To do so, I first explain three important steps in the argument and then consider whether or not these steps successfully justify the right. I argue that the argument relies crucially on the Optimal Protection Principle, which, unfortunately, does not apply to the case of a national community. Thus, the identity argument does not justify the right of a national community to establish an independent state.

IN SUPPORT OF A RESTRICTED MORAL SPECIFICATION FOR RIGHTS (VI-H)

HALLIE ROSE LIBERTO (UNIVERSITY OF CONNECTICUT, STORRS)

Advocates of Moral Specification claim that the very form of any right includes the specific conditions under which an exception to the right is justifiable. Such exceptions are not infringements of the right, since the right is specified in such a way to accommodate those exceptions. Those who deny Moral Specification typically hold that justifiable exceptions to rights are simply justifiable *infringements* of rights. On this latter view, the infringement of the right still matters morally; it is just outweighed by the considerations that justify the infringement. I will advocate a middle-ground between the two views under debate. In some cases moral rights are justifiably infringed, and in other cases justifiable exceptions to the right are built into the composition of the right. The difference depends on the role that rights play within any particular ethical theory.

IS YOUR AMYGDALA A DEONTOLOGIST OR A CONSEQUENTIALIST? A DEFENSE OF KANTIAN MORAL PSYCHOLOGY (II-I)

CHRIS D. MEYERS (UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN MISSISSIPPI)

Joshua Greene and Peter Singer argue, on the basis of empirical evidence, that deontological moral judgments result from emotional reactions while dispassionate reasoning leads to consequentialist judgments. Without denying the dual-process model, I argue that the evidence does not support the claims that consequentialism is inherently more rational or less emotional than deontology. First, the experiments employ a functional definition of "deontological" that is so broad as to include any non-consequentialist judgment (not necessarily Kantian judgments specifically). Secondly, Kantian judgments sometimes conflict with our immediate emotional reactions as much as consequentialist judgments do. Finally, the results of the experiments are partly due to the use of trolley-car type dilemmas which best outcomes against our emotional response. Other sorts of dilemmas, in which our emotions favor the best outcomes but violate other norms, would likely show that consequentialist

judgments are emotionally based while rational deliberation leads to Kantian judgments.

COOPERATION IN THE WE-MODE, LEGITIMACY AND IMMIGRANT INCLUSION (VI-K)

ANNA MOLTCHANOVA (CARLETON COLLEGE)

Many liberal democracies are reevaluating their commitment to multiculturalism. I utilize Raimo Tuomela's notions of the we-mode and the I-mode cooperation to explore how the terms of immigrant inclusion in a liberal democracy need to be modified to foster a flourishing multicultural environment. I argue that a liberal-democratic society, in order to preserve the legitimacy of its power over immigrants, ought to construct its group ethos so as not to prevent immigrants from being able to cooperate as group members in the we-mode.

PROPERTIES AND MERELOGICAL NIHILISM (II-J)

PATRICK MONAGHAN (UNIVERSITY OF IOWA)

Mereological Nihilism—MN, for short—is the view that no entity has any proper parts. While this view has received some critical attention as of late, in my opinion many of its critics have taken the wrong track. The standard complaint against MN is that it is false because it entails a kind of eliminativism about ordinary material objects, e.g., tables and chairs, plants and animals, planets and stars, etc. Now, to be sure, the proponent of MN must concede that his or her view does indeed entail such an eliminativism, given the plausible-seeming assumption that something could be such an object only if it has proper parts. But at the same time, he or she can still attempt to save the phenomenon of ordinary material objects by claiming that while, strictly speaking, no such objects exist, some mereological atoms are arranged table-wise, others are arranged chair-wise, and so forth. So, for that reason, despite the fact that I too reject MN as false, I do not find the standard complaint against that view to be persuasive. In my opinion, the problem with MN is not that it fails to save the phenomenon of ordinary material objects, but rather that it fails to save the phenomenon of the properties that they are ordinarily said to possess. Indeed, the purpose of this paper is to defend the premises of an argument that Mereological Nihilism is false because there are certain properties that are actually possessed yet cannot be possessed either individually by any single mereological atom or collectively by any two or more such atoms.

STAGE THEORY AND THE PLATITUDE (IV-E)

PETER NICHOLS (UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN, MADISON)

To say that identity is what matters in survival is to say that the relation that grounds practical issues such as egoistic concern for the future, responsibility for past actions, and the like, David Lewis (1976) calls this thesis a "platitude of common sense," but it is difficult to uphold in light of fission cases. Ted Sider (1996, 2001) argues that his stage-theoretic version

of four-dimensionalism upholds the platitude. I argue that stage theory fails to account for the fact that the platitude is a *metaphysical* thesis about the identity *relation*. Since stage theory analyzes tensed identity statements via the temporal counterpart relation, it is *this* relation that matters on this theory—not identity. Thus, stage theorists cannot uphold the *commonsense* platitude that identity is what matters in survival.

A DEFENSE OF SINGULAR INTENTIONALISM (IV-F)

SEISHU NISHIMURA (SHIGA UNIVERSITY, JAPAN)

Intentionalism is a view which regards perceptual experience as having intentional content. Intentionalism can be divided into two sorts: singular intentionalism and general intentionalism. The former maintains that perceptual content involves singular content which is individuated by the perceived particular object. The latter insists that perceptual content does not involve singular content; rather, perceptual content is purely general. General intentionalism is thought by many to face an insuperable problem, which is called the “argument from veridical hallucination.” Recently, however, Adam Pautz has argued that the general intentionalist can avoid this problem. My intention in this paper is twofold: first, to argue that Pautz’s attack on the argument from veridical hallucination is not fully successful, and secondly, to dismiss a couple of objections to singular intentionalism. If my arguments are correct, they will provide a strong *prima facie* motivation for holding singular intentionalism.

SORENSEN ON THE VAGUELY VAGUE (I-H)

GREG NOVACK (WAYNE STATE UNIVERSITY)

Sorensen (2010) offers some examples of predicates such that it’s vague whether they are vague. In this paper I argue that these examples fail, but that examples of the vaguely vague are nevertheless forthcoming.

STRUCTURALLY ACCOUNTING FOR THE SIGNIFICANCE OF HYPOTHETICAL CHOICE IN SOCIAL CONTRACT ARGUMENTS (II-K)

DOUGLAS R. PALETTA (UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA)

Social contract arguments face a persistent challenge—that the choices of bargainers in hypothetical situations do not matter. If they are not significant, the *contracting* part of the social contract loses its force and only the moral assumptions remain. then why invoke a social contract? I argue social contract theorists can respond to this challenge by appropriately structuring the bargaining position. Following Rawls’s approach to the contract—leaving aside his Kantian assumptions—all contractarians, even Hobbesians, can reinterpret how the social contract justifies principles. Roughly, rather than use moral assumptions to restrict otherwise irrelevant choices, they can ensure the trustees in the bargaining stage of the argument choose in a morally significant way. Doing so clarifies the significance of hypothetical choices and their positive contribution to social contract arguments.

IN DEFENSE OF SCALAR CONSEQUENTIALISM (III-K)

TYLER PAYTAS (WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY IN ST. LOUIS)

Scalar consequentialism is the view that information about which outcomes are good, bad, better, worse, best, or worst constitute the only moral facts. Concepts such as “right,” “wrong,” “duty,” and “obligation” are eliminated. Part of the motivation for scalar consequentialism comes from its ability to respond to the well-known demandingness objection by denying that morality makes any demands at all. Despite this theoretical advantage, scalar consequentialism has not been well-received. Among the primary objections are that it is not action-guiding, and that it has deeply counter-intuitive implications such as the inability to judge that murder is wrong. I aim to defend scalar consequentialism against these objections. I argue that scalar consequentialism is sufficiently action-guiding, and that elimination of “right” and “wrong” is not as problematic as critics claim.

CONTEMPT AND THE CAPACITY FOR EVIL (I-A)

LUKE P. PHILLIPS (INDIANA UNIVERSITY)

Intuitively, there are some character-based violations of important interpersonal obligations that fail to justify contempt as a reactive attitude. For example, it would not be appropriate for Jason to feel contempt toward Medea. That is explained by the fact that Medea fails to exhibit the requisite property of lowness, which I interpret as culpable incapacity. Medea’s moral failing stems instead from some positive deformity of character. What follows is that certain awful character-based violations of interpersonal obligations deserve more moral recognition respect than those that are merely contemptible. Nevertheless, that higher level of respect is compatible with a higher level of censure.

KNOWLEDGE AS A PRIMARY GOOD (I-E)

DANIEL PILCHMAN (UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, IRVINE)

Questions about the value of knowledge have received substantial attention in the last decade, though consensus on solutions remains elusive. The following is a novel answer to those questions. I claim that knowledge is valuable because it is a primary good. It is useful for any possible plan a person might set for himself. It is an elegant bundle of cognitive tools that is more valuable than any one of its proper parts (at least) because of its greater instrumental value across contexts. Without proposing any substantive theory about the nature of knowledge, my hypothesis provides intuitive answers to persistent questions about the value of knowledge. Consequently, it illuminates the importance of the instrumental contribution of any proper part to knowledge itself and suggests a direction for continued inquiry into the nature of knowledge.

THE IMPOSSIBILITY OF PURELY CONTENT-NEUTRAL ACCOUNTS OF AUTONOMY (VI-H)

MARK PIPER (JAMES MADISON UNIVERSITY)

It may be asked whether there are any normative commitments that necessarily attend being autonomous. Let us call this “the normativity question.” Those who support a substantive view respond to the question in the affirmative. Those who support a content-neutral view respond to the question in the negative. In the present paper I wish to argue that the normativity question should be answered in the affirmative. I will not proceed by attempting to establish particular normative commitments that must attend autonomous living, however. My argument will be more formal in character. I will argue that a proper appreciation of what it means for a theory to be normatively “substantive,” coupled with an understanding of what is involved in any putatively content-neutral account of autonomy, implies that normatively content-neutral autonomy accounts in any strict sense are impossible. If correct, this shows that the traditional substantive/content-neutral dichotomy has to be abandoned.

JOHANN CLAUBERG’S ACCOUNT OF MIND-BODY INTERACTION (VII-L)

ANDREW R. PLATT (UNIVERSITY OF DELAWARE)

Janet Broughton (among others) has argued Descartes’s views on causation ultimately led him to reject the thesis that corporeal motions causally contribute to sensations in the mind. Following Eileen O’Neill, I take Descartes to believe that his causal principles—articulated, for example, in the *Third* and *Sixth Meditation*—are compatible with causal interaction between the human mind and body. I defend this reading by examining a Cartesian account of mind-body and body-mind interaction presented by Johann Clauberg (1622-1665). I argue—following Herman Müller and Winfried Weier—that his theory of the mind-body union implies that human minds and bodies causally interact. Clauberg’s work thus shows how a Cartesian thinker tries to reconcile interactionism with Descartes’s causal principles—and gives us evidence of how Descartes could have elaborated on his position.

ARISTOTELIAN COMPASSION (VII-I)

GREGORY S. POORE (BAYLOR UNIVERSITY)

It is generally agreed that Aristotelian compassion involves three conceptual elements, the third of which is similar vulnerability. It is thought that in order to feel Aristotelian compassion on a sufferer, one must consider oneself or those one deeply cares about vulnerable to similar suffering. I challenge this notion and deny that similar vulnerability is necessary, conceptually or otherwise, for Aristotelian compassion. After briefly considering the nature of Aristotelian emotions, I examine Aristotle’s account of compassion and the common interpretation of the vulnerability criterion, represented by Martha C. Nussbaum. I argue that Nussbaum’s conceptual interpretation is incorrect, primarily on grounds of a passage in the *Rhetoric* that is overlooked in the literature. I conclude

by considering possible interpretations of the role of similar vulnerability, and propose that for Aristotle similar vulnerability provides one possible concern by which the perception of suffering becomes the emotion of compassion.

REID'S COMPLAINT AGAINST HUME'S MAXIM: CONCEIVABILITY, POSSIBILITY, AND REDUCTIO REASONING (VI-I)

LEWIS POWELL (WAYNE STATE UNIVERSITY)

David Hume endorsed the thesis that conceivability implies possibility, and, Thomas Reid, in his *Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man*, offered four objections against this maxim. In this paper, I take up Reid's fourth objection, which focuses on mathematical reasoning, and, more specifically, on reductio ad absurdum reasoning. Reid objects that, by adopting the maxim, Hume is forced to regard as illegitimate (and, indeed, impossible) the practice of proof by reductio ad absurdum. The crux of the issue is that reductio requires supposition of the impossible, and Hume needs to define supposition in terms of conception. I show how Hume can maintain the maxim, analyze supposition in terms of conception, and still evade Reid's objection. The result is a sketch of how reductio reasoning would work for Hume.

THE LOGIC OF INDEXICALS (II-M)

ALEXANDRU RADULESCU (UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, LOS ANGELES)

According to Kaplan (1989), (1) is a valid argument:

(1) It's raining today. Therefore, it's raining today.

In Kaplan-style semantics, "today" gets its semantic value from a context. (1) comes out valid if we assume that we have the same context for the premise and the conclusion: for any model, for any context, if the premise of (1) is true in that context, so is the conclusion. In this paper I show that we need not force contexts to stay fixed throughout an argument. I thus answer the simple and powerful argument given in Soames (2010, p. 101-102), which claims to show that we must keep contexts fixed. Moreover, I redefine the notion of validity, so that it is applicable to arguments with sentences in contexts, in order to show that we can have such a notion even if we do not keep a context fixed throughout an argument.

THE VOLUNTARY IN *NICOMACHEAN ETHICS* III.1 (III-I)

BRYAN REECE (UNIVERSITY OF OKLAHOMA)

Aristotle's treatment of the voluntary and the involuntary has generated an extensive literature. Not only is it intrinsically interesting to discover Aristotle's views on the matter, but the concepts he invokes in the course of his explanation are of considerable interest in contemporary discussions of free will, moral responsibility, and intentional action. Controversy surrounds Aristotle's remarks in *Nicomachean Ethics* III.1, and focus on his definitional aim is warranted. I advance an interpretation of Aristotle's

account of voluntariness as developed in III.1 on which being internally sourced is necessary and sufficient for being voluntary, and choice (αἴρεσις), which implies knowledge of relevant particulars, is the means by which whatever is brought about voluntarily is internally sourced. This interpretation is controversial, but I will show that it is textually well-founded and attributes to Aristotle a view of voluntariness that is more philosophically plausible than the one the alternative interpretation attributes to him.

DEFENDING OBJECTIVE LIST THEORIES OF WELL-BEING (III-K)

CHRISTOPHER M. RICE (FORDHAM UNIVERSITY)

According to objective list theories, well-being is constituted by a plurality of basic, objective goods such as friendship, meaningful knowledge, achievement, autonomy, aesthetic experience, and pleasure. In this paper, I defend theories of this kind as the best accounts of human well-being. To this end, I first show how objective list theories cohere with humans' everyday judgments about the kinds of things that make life go well. I then respond to two perennial objections to these theories. Here, I argue that there is no *a priori* or conceptual reason to favor monistic theories of well-being over pluralistic theories (such as objective list theories). And, I argue that some kinds of things can contribute to well-being whether or not they are pleasant or desired by the individuals they benefit. In these ways, I defend objective list theories of well-being.

ABSTRACT PATTERN IDEALIZATION AND EXPLANATORY MODELS (VII-J)

COLLIN RICE (UNIVERSITY OF MISSOURI)

YASHA ROHWER (UNIVERSITY OF MISSOURI-COLUMBIA)

Michael Weisberg (2007) has recently characterized three kinds of idealization: Galilean, minimalist, and multiple models." Evolutionary biologists often use various kinds of idealization in constructing models of biological phenomena, such as the Hawk-Dove game. This model assumes that interactions between players are random, behavioral choices are limited, the payoff structure is stable across interactions, the population is of infinite size, and so on. Such highly idealized models are pervasive in biological theorizing. We first argue that the process and motivation that leads to the introduction of these idealizations is not captured by Weisberg's categories. We suggest there is at least a fourth kind of idealization—abstract pattern idealization—that is especially important to evolutionary biology. This kind of idealization violates the truth requirement for something to be an explanation. In response, we argue that certain idealized models can be explanatory without being explanations.

GOOD BREEDING AND ITS LAWS: HUME ON POLITENESS, CONVERSATION, AND DELICACY OF TASTE (VI-I)

KRISTA RODKEY (INDIANA UNIVERSITY)

In her article “Appearing Respectful: The Moral Significance of Manners,” Sarah Buss gives a brief analysis and criticism of Hume’s account of manners. I argue that her analysis of Hume is inadequate, and that by considering Hume’s remarks on manners in “On the Rise of the Arts and Sciences” and “Of the Delicacy of Taste and Passions” we see Hume offers us an attractive and robust account of the relationship between manners and morals.

CAN WE WRONG INVIOABLE PERSONS? (VI-H)

ANDREW PETER ROSS (QUEEN’S UNIVERSITY (CANADA))

Non-consequentialist approaches to moral reasoning often attempt to capture a familiar, if slightly elusive, sense of moral wrongness. In particular, many non-consequentialists give a central role to the idea that there is a distinction to be made between acting wrongly and wronging someone. In *Intricate Ethics*, Frances Kamm attempts to reconcile her theory of inviolability with this distinction. In this essay, I argue that the inviolability approach cannot make sense of the capacity to be wronged. Specifically, I argue that the inviolability approach faces the following dilemma: either Kamm’s explanation of wrongdoing renders the concept of inviolability superfluous or the capacity to be wronged is a mysterious, metaphysical accident.

DOES VIRTUE MAKE MONEY OR MAKE IT GOOD (HOW TO UNDERSTAND APOLOGY 30B2-4) (I-D)

GREGORY C. SALMIERI (UNIVERSITY OF NORTH CAROLINA, CHAPEL HILL)

Depending on how one construes the Greek at *Apology* 30b2-4, Socrates says either that money and everything else good for men comes from virtue or that money and everything else becomes good for men because of virtue. I defend the first option (which is agreed to be the more natural construal) against arguments (from Burnet, Taylor, and Burnyeat) that it commits Socrates to something he could not have held.

ARISTOTLE ON THE BOUNDARY BETWEEN PHYSICS AND METAPHYSICS (III-I)

MARGARET E. SCHARLE (REED COLLEGE)

Physics VIII argues for the distinction between two kinds of substances—natural substance and immovable substance—that mark off the boundary between physics and metaphysics. It does this by means of an argument that shows that the first mover must be a changeless mover and thereby cannot be a naturally changing entity. *Physics* II.2 distinguishes the science of nature from the science of metaphysics by the fact the former is concerned with composites of matter and form, while the latter concerns separable form(s). *Physics* II’s argument for this distinction is analogous to

the argument of *Physics* VIII. But *Physics* II's argument trades on the fact that something cannot be its own nature since that would be tantamount to thinking that something could be in itself, which Aristotle takes to be incoherent for similar reasons to the ones he offers in *Physics* VIII's discussion of self-movement.

THE EXPLANATORY ARGUMENT FOR FACTUALISM (IV-H)

IAN P. SCHNEE (*WESTERN KENTUCKY UNIVERSITY*)

I argue for Factualism: the view that all of a subject's reasons for belief are facts. Her reasons are not her mental states or the propositional contents of her mental states. First, all reasons are explanatory in the following sense: whenever S believes that *p* for a reason, one can say that S believes that *p* because *q*, where "*q*" refers to S's reason. Second, it always follows from this schema that it is a fact that *q* and that the fact that *q* is S's reason. Philosophers have been led to deny either of these premises because they have misinterpreted linguistic evidence or because they have attempted to defend Factualism in the wrong way (by denying the factivity of "because"). I then argue that the most plausible version of Factualism holds that nonpsychological facts can be among one's reasons—a result at odds with traditional forms of epistemic internalism.

BASIC INTERESTS AND FREEDOM AS NONDOMINATION (III-L)

MARK T. SCHRANZ (*UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO*)

In this paper I examine the relationship between basic interests Philip Pettit's notion of freedom as nondomination specifically to show that republican political theory doesn't have indeterminate policy implications in many important areas. Adapting a strategy originally suggested by Ian Shapiro, I argue that a republican account of basic interests greatly reduces the potential for indeterminate policy implications that has been identified by Christopher McMahon, and moreover, also greatly reduces the potential for certain republican institutions to be abused by the dominant class in a society.

ASSESSING THE LUCK EGALITARIAN PRINCIPLE (V-I)

PHILIP SHADD (*QUEEN'S UNIVERSITY (CANADA)*)

According to egalitarians, it is unfair for individuals to suffer from unchosen disadvantages. On the basis of this premise, they defend redistribution to those who suffer such disadvantages. In this paper, I expose a gap in this line of reasoning. Following a point made by Michael Sandel, I first show why this premise is self-defeating as a justification for redistribution. What is needed to fill in the gap and supplement this premise is an explanation of why a disadvantaged person has a claim over the resources held by others. I then consider two possible justifications of such a claim. The first (exemplified by Ronald Dworkin) invokes a hypothetical agreement, and the second (exemplified by Seana Shiffrin) depends upon a particular characterization of the joint social product. Citing weaknesses in both approaches, I conclude that neither succeeds in bridging the gap.

THE PARADOX OF FATE: DECISIONISM, QUIETISM, AND FATALISM IN HEIDEGGER'S
BEING AND TIME (VI-J)

MICHAEL J. SIGRIST (*GEORGE WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY*)

Heidegger states that Dasein exists explicitly as fate. I explore whether this commits Heidegger to fatalism, and if so, whether voluntarism or quietism follows from that. I distinguish between ontic and ontological fate. I argue that Dasein perhaps has the resources to overcome the former, but not the latter. All the same, I argue, ontological fatalism does not entail either voluntarism or quietism. Statements to the contrary result from misunderstanding how fate emerges out of Dasein's temporality and the relationship between fate and action.

THE SPECIAL COMPOSITION QUESTION, TRANSITIVITY, AND ORDINARY OBJECTS (IV-I)

PAUL SILVA (*UNIVERSITY OF CONNECTICUT*)

Series-style answers to the special composition question are one way of answering the special composition question that can permit the existence of all and only "ordinary" objects while at the same time avoiding crucial counterexamples that beset other ways of answering that question. One would think that such answers should at least be logically possible. Peter van Inwagen has argued that they are not because they entail the non-transitivity of the parthood relation. I challenge this. In what follows I argue that there is a way of embracing them that does not entail the non-transitivity of parthood. The proposed solution to this difficulty generates an unexpected problem for co-locationists.

ACCOUNTING FOR GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE: A NEW APPROACH TO COLLECTIVE
RESPONSIBILITY (V-K)

ANTHONY P. SMITH (*SAINT CLOUD TECHNICAL AND COMMUNITY COLLEGE*)

Global climate change (GCC) is one of the largest challenges facing society today. This paper explores the collective and moral nature of GCC. Here, I argue using Strawson's account of the morally reactive attitudes that the United States is morally responsible for GCC. But, if this is true it raise a problem of trying to account for why this is true. I further argue that Feinberg's idea of direct contributory fault for collective responsibility will not work for GCC. I show that there is no contributory fault for any particular person and GCC because the amount of green house gases that the average American is responsible for is minuscule. In order to account for the collective moral responsibility of GCC I work on retooling the causal condition. To do this, I develop my own account of contributing causal factors to account for the causal connection between an individual and GCC.

ANGER: SOMETIMES APPROPRIATE, NEVER A VIRTUE (VII-I)

IAN STONER (UNIVERSITY OF MINNESOTA)

The disposition to anger is a difficult character trait for virtue ethicists to classify. On the one hand, anger is with good reason traditionally classified as a deadly vice. On the other hand we have, in many advocates for social justice, examples of virtuous people whose disposition to anger is part of what we admire about them. One solution to this apparent conflict, developed by Lisa Tessman, is an argument that circumstances of oppression can require a different set of virtues than circumstances of social justice. In short, in circumstances of oppression, chronic anger may be only appropriate disposition. I offer an alternative solution: the praiseworthy anger of some oppressed agents is not a character trait at all. It is, instead, the most common manifestation of the virtue of self-respect, when that self-respect is under assault.

APPETITIVE BESIRES AND THE FUSS ABOUT FIT (II-I)

STEVEN SWARTZER (UNIVERSITY OF NEBRASKA-LINCOLN)

Many motivational cognitivists believe that cognitive motivational states (typically moral beliefs) must be besires. According to the common interpretation, these besires are unitary propositional attitudes with both belief-like and desire-like “directions of fit.” This view, *Besire Cognitivism*, has been challenged as ad hoc, extravagant, in conflict with folk psychology, and possibly incoherent. In this paper, I provide a response to these standard objections to besires—one motivated independently of the standard cognitivist intuitions about the motivational efficacy of moral judgments. I float the hypothesis about the nature of so-called appetitive desires, a paradigmatic class of motivational attitudes, and argue that this hypothesis is committed to the existence of besires. However, I argue, this hypothesis is immune to the standard objections to besires. The upshot is that there is nothing bizarre about besires, *per se*. If *Besire Cognitivism* is objectionable, it is not so for positing besires.

ARGUMENT, ATTITUDE, AND EROS IN NIETZSCHE’S REVALUATION PROJECT (VI-J)

JOSEPH SWENSON (UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS, URBANA-CHAMPAIGN)

While Nietzsche’s attempt at a “Revaluation of All Values” is undoubtedly central to an understanding of his philosophical project as a whole, there is widespread disagreement about just what this evaluative project is trying to accomplish. Much recent work on Nietzsche tends to frame his revaluation project primarily in terms of a theoretical argument meant to change our beliefs about the ultimate nature of our values. This paper takes a different approach. I argue that a more personal entry-point into Nietzsche’s revaluation project is discovered in his attempt to replace our attitudes towards the authority of traditional values with a new kind of practical erotic attitude. The personal and practical authority of love, I argue, introduces a new goal for revaluation that yields no new unified Nietzschean “theory of value” but rather offers a basic re-envisioning of

what our attitudes towards values might look like once they are shorn of their traditional forms of philosophical security, stability, and reassurance.

LIBERTARIAN PATERNALISM: IMPROVING DECISIONS WHILE PRESERVING LIBERTY? (III-L)

J.S. SWINDELL BLUMENTHAL-BARBY (BAYLOR COLLEGE OF MEDICINE)

Richard Thaler and Cass Sunstein have argued that it is ethically defensible that people should become “choice architects” and learn about the various ways in which choices can be influenced and directed by the environment, and then work to design environments, broadly construed, that influence individuals towards choices that make them better off. Doing so is ethically permissible, so the argument goes, because (1) it makes people better off, and (2) such influence attempts are perfectly compatible with individual liberty. In this paper I leave aside objections to and conceptual concerns about the first claim—that architecting people’s choices would make people “better off,” and instead focus on the soundness of the second claim—that architecting people’s choices is compatible with liberty.

A PARADOX OF CONSEQUENTIALISM (III-K)

NICHOLAS TEBBEN (JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY)

Consequentialist ethical theories do two things. First, they issue judgments about how it would be good for the world to be. Second, they provide agents with guidance, concerning what is to be done. In this paper I argue that there are situations in which these two aspects of consequentialism are in tension. I provide a handful of conditions that, when jointly satisfied, pick out situations in which consequentialist theories recommend that agents act in ways that do not contribute to making the world as it, by the theory’s own lights, ought to be.

FRANKFURT CASES, GETTIER, AND THE PRINCIPLE OF ALTERNATIVE POSSIBILITIES (VII-K)

ADAM R. THOMPSON (UNIVERSITY OF NEBRASKA, LINCOLN)

Contrary to the popular Principle of Alternative Possibilities (PAP), many find it intuitive that one is morally responsible despite having no alternative possibilities—“Look,” it’s said in light of Frankfurt Cases, “even if the intervener were absent from the scene, Jones would have made that decision.” For instance, Michael Otsuka rejects PAP on that basis but accepts that one is morally blameworthy for doing an action A only if she could instead have behaved in a manner for which she would have been entirely blameless. Adopting a popular strategy, Otsuka holds that Frankfurt Cases beg the question against incompatibilists. In this paper, employing insights from Edmund Gettier’s influential paper against the traditional analysis of knowledge I offer a new case, defend my case against standard objections, and show that my case against Otsuka’s principle highlights, instructively, that the popular strategy for defending PAP against Frankfurt Cases fails.

MORAL SENTIMENTS AND THE NATURE OF MORAL PROPERTIES (VII-H)

ERIC VOGELSTEIN (JEFFERSON COLLEGE OF HEALTH SCIENCES)

In this paper I propose a novel view of the nature of moral wrongness. On my view, the property of moral wrongness can be analyzed in terms of reasons for having the sentiments of compassion and respect. I argue that my account has advantages over other kinds of theories that attempt to ground morality in reasons for having sentiments, and suggest that my view is specially poised to account for a particular aspect of moral life: that we commonly chastise wrongdoers for failing to have a sufficient degree of compassion or respect.

A GENERAL DEFINITION OF ARGUMENT VALIDITY (IV-B)

PETER B. M. VRANAS (UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN—MADISON)

Besides pure declarative arguments, whose premises and conclusions are declaratives, and pure imperative arguments, whose premises and conclusions are imperatives, there are mixed-premise arguments, whose premises include both imperatives and declaratives, and cross-species arguments, whose premises are declaratives and whose conclusions are imperatives or vice versa. I propose a general definition of argument validity: an argument is valid exactly if, necessarily, every fact that sustains its premises also sustains its conclusion, where a fact sustains an imperative exactly if it favors the satisfaction over the violation of the imperative, and a fact sustains a declarative exactly if, necessarily, the declarative is true if the fact exists. I argue that this definition yields as special cases the standard definition of validity for pure declarative arguments and a previously defended definition of validity for pure imperative arguments, and I prove a series of theorems that render the definition usable.

THE AID THAT LEAVES SOMETHING TO CHANCE (V-I)

KENNETH WALDEN (DARTMOUTH COLLEGE)

I propose that a crucial point has been overlooked in the debate over John Taurek's "numbers problem" (we can save n people or $m < n$ people; what should we do?) has been overlooked. The initial distribution of people in this problem ought to be understood as effected by a kind of lottery. Several important consequences follow. For one, we can understand the lottery-based strategies proposed by some writers (simple and proportional) as depending on iterations of this original lottery, iterations that form an infinite sequence whose limit term is Taurek's procedure. Second, we see that saving the most people is the strategy selected by the principle that we ought to give everyone the greatest chance of being rescued consistent with everyone having the same chance—the very principle that Taurek adduced against this strategy and in defense of his own proposal.

LOCKE AND “THE HINGE UPON WHICH LIBERTY TURNS” (VI-I)

JULIE WALSH (UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, SAN DIEGO)

The chapter of Locke’s *Essay Concerning Human Understanding* entitled “Of Power” is notoriously difficult to interpret. One of the questions about “Of Power” that has vexed contemporary commentators as well as contemporaries of Locke is whether the inclusion of the concept of the power to suspend desire, added in the second edition, supports the view that Locke is an indeterminist about human liberty. My aim in this paper is to clarify what exactly Locke means by suspension. To this end I will analyze the little he does say about suspension with special attention to the analogies he uses in trying to make his meaning clear, and argue that these descriptions suggest that the ability to suspend is a passive power. I will conclude by sketching a resulting line of argument about the role suspension plays in Locke’s overall view of human freedom.

LOGIC AND PERCEPTUAL CONTENT (II-L)

JEFFREY J. WATSON (ARIZONA STATE UNIVERSITY)

We may be tempted to accept that perceptual contents have a logical structure—that conjunctions, disjunctions, negations, conditionals, and quantifiers are all part of how we represent the world as being when we perceive it. If the world is all that is the case, and what is the case has a logical structure, then how we see the world as being must, to be accurate, also have a logical structure. I argue against this temptation. Instead, I argue that the accuracy conditions for the representational content of perception involve relations other than those of conjunctions, disjunctions, negations, conditionals, and quantifiers.

SOCRATES’ PRAYER TO PAN IN THE *PHAEDRUS* (V-H)

DAN WERNER (SUNY AT NEW PALTZ)

The *Phaedrus* ends on a curious note, as Socrates offers a prayer to Pan. What is the significance of this prayer, and what are its connections to the rest of the dialogue? A close look at Socrates’ words reveals that they are a perfect coda to the afternoon conversation. The prayer is intimately linked to the whole of the *Phaedrus* on thematic, structural, and dramatic levels. It is also an enactment of the conversation which has come to a close, revealing the nature of the two interlocutors as well as the nature of Platonic writing. In this way, the prayer displays the “logographic necessity” which Socrates deems to be an essential feature of all good discourse.

WHY HUSSERL NEVER BECAME AN IDEALIST (VI-J)

DALLAS WILLARD (UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA)

In this paper I explain why, contrary to a widespread assumption, Edmund Husserl never became an idealist with respect to physical objects and the natural world. This may be seen from his consistent acknowledgments that physical objects and the “noemata” or “senses” in acts of perception directed upon them (1) have radically different natures and properties,

and (2) come before consciousness in radically different ways. Husserl repeatedly spells out these differences in great detail, ruling out any possibility that he could have adopted any of the forms of Idealism often attributed to him.

JUSTIFICATION AND TRUTH: OUR EPISTEMIC TELOS AND SKOPOS (I-E)

SARAH WRIGHT (UNIVERSITY OF GEORGIA)

What is the relationship between epistemic justification and truth? I argue that this relationship is nuanced and cannot be exhausted either through the claim that justified beliefs are reliably true or through the claim that justification aims at truth. Instead we should take a distinction from the virtue ethics of the ancient Stoics—that between our *telos*, or final end, and our *skopos*, or proximate target—and extend it into epistemology. Truth is not our *telos*, but only our *skopos*. This distinction allows us to explain both why knowledge is more valuable than true belief and why justified false belief is more valuable than unjustified false belief. Developed within a virtue epistemology framework, my view highlights the similarities between moral and intellectual virtues, while still maintaining the distinction between them; it also retains an important place for truth in the life of those exhibiting intellectual virtue.

ABSTRACTS OF INVITED AND SYMPOSIUM PAPERS

AUTONOMY'S DEPENDENCE ON RECOGNITION: PSYCHOLOGICAL HARM, PARTICIPATORY PARITY, AND SOCIAL FREEDOM (VI-F)

JOEL ANDERSON (*UTRECHT UNIVERSITY, THE NETHERLANDS*)

The possibilities for a person to develop and maintain autonomous agency depend extensively on a supportive social environment. Indeed, much of what makes disrespect, denigration, assault, and humiliation so pernicious are the effects that they can have on a person's sense of self and related capacities for effective agency. When misrecognition undermines a person's self-trust, self-respect, and self-esteem, it not only causes psychological suffering, it can also undermine a person's "agentic resources." Some theories of recognition (Honneth 1995, Anderson & Honneth 2005) have come under criticism for being overly "psychological" in this regard (Fraser 2003, Pippin 2008). This has led some recognition theorists to reformulate the interdependence of autonomy and recognition in Kantian or Rawlsian terms, as part of a framework of equal status and fair distribution regarding access to social practices, rights, and institutions. In his major recent book, *Das Recht der Freiheit* (2011), Honneth has argued that contractualist, equality-based accounts of this sort are unable to account for their own conditions of possibility. Drawing on this recent line of argument, I argue that the interdependence of autonomy and recognition comes fully into view only within an intersubjectivist framework that emphasizes three key ideas: (1) the contested normativity of *appropriate* recognition, (2) the social form of freedom that is secured only by institutionalized relations of recognition, and (3) the distinctively Hegelian idea that the expansion of possibilities for individual autonomy and freedom requires richer and more demanding forms of social coordination and recognition. Regarding this final point, however, theories of recognition continue to face the question of how to respond appropriately to potential "autonomy gaps," in which in expanding expectations regarding richer forms of autonomy outpace the development of the recognition relations and interpersonal attitudes they require.

STEREOTYPE THREAT AND RELATIONAL AUTONOMY (III-E)

PAUL H. BENSON (*UNIVERSITY OF DAYTON*)

The extensive literature in social psychology on the phenomenon of stereotype threat has not been examined closely in philosophical studies of personal autonomy and social oppression. Persons whose motives and actions are influenced by stereotype threat may suffer diminished autonomy; their actions can be prompted by anxiety or constricted attention caused by the agents' awareness that their conduct could confirm

an invidious stereotype of a social group to which they belong. Some of the implications of stereotype threat for autonomous agency can be explained by purely procedural accounts of autonomy that maintain that personal autonomy has no constitutively relational dimension. In these instances, stereotype threat obstructs autonomy as would other forms of coercion or intimidation. However, other aspects of stereotype threat suggest that persons acting in the face of the possibility that their actions may confirm negative group stereotypes can suffer reduced autonomy partly in virtue of their conceptions of their relationships with other persons, especially their sense of social belonging. From this perspective, psychological research on stereotype threat may contribute to the case for constitutively relational conceptions of autonomy. This paper explores the evidence that emerges from the literature on stereotype threat in support of some relational conception of autonomy. The paper also considers whether this evidence favors accounts of autonomy that incorporate robust normative conditions.

SOME MORAL PROBLEMS WITH “STEREOTYPE THREAT” (II-F)

LAWRENCE BLUM (UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS, BOSTON)

Claude Steele's work on stereotype threat is an exceptionally important research initiative and has had a particularly strong impact on education. Steele and his colleagues appear to show that people of every group will perform more poorly on relevant tasks if they are made acutely aware of stereotypes about their group's poor performance or abilities. I will discuss several concerns with this work, largely related to its undertheorizing of its normative dimensions: (1) It fails to take seriously that members of groups may have internalized the stereotypes themselves, so that the mechanism of their underperformance is not merely an interference in their mental focus. (2) It fails to distinguish actual stereotypes (rigid, false overgeneralizations) from valid generalizations about the group. Both might have deleterious effects on performance but what is going wrong in the two cases is importantly morally distinct. (3) It fails to give sufficient moral importance to the difference between groups who are actually stigmatized in the larger culture (e.g., blacks with respect to school performance), so that they carry this stigma with them across many situations, and groups for whom stereotypes can be “primed” in a given situation, such as white people not performing well at golf if told that the performance reflects “natural ability.” (4) Relatedly, there is a general unclarity in Steele's work about how localized and situationalized the stereotype threat is—whether it is just a pervasive stereotype in the culture, or something that can be created for a particular situation but has no significance beyond that. (5) Stereotype threat research understates the cognitive and moral resources individuals and schools have to help people understand the falsity of stereotypes as a way of helping individuals not be affected by them.

THE SUBJECTIVE/OBJECTIVE DISTINCTION: WHAT IT CAN AND CAN'T DO FOR YOU (III-G)

FABRIZIO CARIANI (NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY)

Kolodny and MacFarlane have recently argued that solving a class of paradoxes concerning the interaction of “ought” and conditionals requires jettisoning modus ponens for certain deontic conditionals. Following through the consequences of Kolodny and MacFarlane’s argument also requires several innovations to the semantics for deontic modals. It is tempting to block these seemingly radical consequences with a dismissive diagnosis of the paradoxes. In particular, some find it attractive to exploit an ambiguity between subjective and objective interpretations of “ought.” If the paradoxes only arise out of a confusion between subjective and objective oughts, it is said, there is no need to accept newfangled views about the logic of the conditional or modal semantics. I do not endorse these dismissive approaches, and, in this paper, I criticize a variety of them. There is some need for such a refutation because the original arguments used by Kolodny and MacFarlane fall short. Refuting dismissive approaches, however, implies accepting certain explanatory commitments and constrains what non-dismissive theories must look like.

CONCILIATIONISM AND UNIQUENESS (II-D)

E. J. COFFMAN (UNIVERSITY OF TENNESSEE)

NATHAN BALLANTYNE (FORDHAM UNIVERSITY)

Two theses are central to recent work on the epistemology of disagreement:

Conciliationism: In a revealed peer disagreement over P, each thinker should give at least some weight to her peer’s attitude.

Uniqueness: For any given proposition and total body of evidence, the evidence fully justifies exactly one level of confidence in the proposition.

We explore the outstanding question whether Conciliationism commits one to Uniqueness, and return a negative verdict. After setting out some preliminary matters (§1), we explain and criticize Kelly’s [2010] argument that Conciliationism commits one to Uniqueness (§2), thereby defeating his larger argument that Conciliationism deserves no dialectical special treatment. But this brings no comfort to Conciliationists: we argue that they’re committed to a disjunction, one of whose disjuncts is Uniqueness, that amounts to an extremely strong and unobvious position (§§3-4). If we are correct, theorists should not treat Conciliationism as a default position in debates about the epistemic significance of disagreement.

ADAPTATIONS TO OPPRESSION: PREFERENCE AND RESISTANCE (III-E)

ANN E. CUDD (UNIVERSITY OF KANSAS)

According to many feminist theories of oppression, a primary problem for overcoming oppression is that the victims become accustomed to their circumstances and even come to prefer them. Their preference for their oppressive conditions then form practical and moral obstacles to changing

them, since the oppressed act in ways to further those conditions and it seems cruel or unfair to take from the oppressed what they claim to prefer. Such preferences are called adaptive preferences, and transforming them seems to be an important goal of institutions that aim to improve the lives of the oppressed. Recent debates over adaptive preferences have focused on the goodness or badness of having adaptive preferences for the one who has them, or on how adaptive preferences impugn their agency and autonomy. While it is important to focus on the effects of adaptation on those who have adaptive preferences due to oppression, this paper argues that these debates overlook the moral obligation to resist oppression in order not to cause others to suffer its harms. I argue that there are important moral and political reasons to resist or intervene in order to transform adaptive preferences, and I explore when these reasons provide justification to override proscriptions on interfering in the lives of others.

NONCAUSAL MORAL EXPLANATIONS (III-C)

TERENCE CUNEO (UNIVERSITY OF VERMONT)

According to the Explanatory Challenge to moral realism, we have reason to believe that moral facts exist only if they do important explanatory work. In this essay, I sketch an account of how moral realists might meet this challenge. I maintain that there is a robust—albeit noncausal—explanatory role for moral facts to play: generating speech. According to the argument I offer, an agent's performing a locutionary act count-generates her performing an illocutionary act in virtue of her having various sorts of rights, responsibilities, and obligations. Some of these rights, responsibilities, and obligations are, however, plausibly viewed as being moral. If so, moral facts are plausibly viewed as being among those normative features that are ingredient in the count-generation of illocutionary acts such as asserting, promising, and commanding.

GRICE'S RAZOR AND EPISTEMIC INVARIANTISM (V-C)

WAYNE A. DAVIS (GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY)

Grice's Razor is a methodological principle that many philosophers and linguists have used to help justify pragmatic explanations of linguistic phenomena over semantic explanations. The principle originated in Grice (1975), and is based on his seminal theory of implicature. In Davis (1998), I argued that Grice's principle-based theory is thoroughly unsuccessful, undercutting Grice's Razor. Implicatures cannot be derived in any sense from general non-linguistic principles, but instead exist because of speaker intentions and second-order linguistic conventions. Nonetheless, Grice's Razor has recently been deployed in favor of invariantism over contextualism in the debate over whether "knows" is context-sensitive. A number of authors argue that an invariant semantics together with Grice's conversational principles can account for the contextual variability of knowledge claims that provides the evidence for contextualism.¹ I will show here that the defense of Grice's Razor found in these "Gricean invariantists," and its use against epistemic contextualism, display all

the problems I pointed out earlier. The everyday variation in acceptable knowledge claims is better explained in terms of implicature than indexicality, in my opinion, but general conversational principles shed little light on whether “know” is used hyperbolically, meiotically, or loosely in a context, although this issue is crucial in deciding what if anything “S knows p” implicates. I will present reasons favoring an account of the representative bank case in terms of loose use, making clear how they differ from Grice’s Razor.

¹Including Rysiew 2001, 2005, Schaffer 2004, Brown 2005, 2006, Black 2005; Hazlett 2007, and Pritchard 2010.

AGAINST QUIETISM (III-C)

DAVID ENOCH (HEBREW UNIVERSITY OF JERUSALEM)

A number of closely related worries—not so much about realism of whatever kind, as about the debate in which it is one of the competing views—are sometimes grouped together under the heading “quietism.” These worries, applied to the discussion of the normative, include doubts about the intelligibility of metanormative discussion; claims that significant metanormative discussion is impossible; assertions that metanormative debates—if at all intelligible—can only be decided by engaging in first-order, normative discourse itself; claims that apparently metanormative debate just is normative debate in disguise; the thought that the practice of engaging in normative discourse (perhaps like other practices) needs no justification that is external to it, and that it is anyway impossible to supply one; and so on. Such worries—often (though not always) put forward by those thinking of themselves as the friends of a fairly robust forms of realism, like Dworkin, Kramer, Parfit, and Scanlon—need both clarification and support. In this paper, I distinguish several distinct theses that seem to be members of the quietist family, and evaluate critically them as well as the argumentation offered to defend them. I do this partly by placing them in the philosophical context appropriate to them—that of “meta-metaphysics.” I conclude that quietist intuitions cannot be successfully defended.

UNEQUAL CONSENTERS AND POLITICAL ILLEGITIMACY (VII-G)

MARILYN FRIEDMAN (VANDERBILT UNIVERSITY)

A familiar liberal principle of governing legitimacy is that coercive political power should be exercised over people only with their consent, in some meaningful sense. Yet many persons, at any point in time, are incapable of giving meaningful consent. The liberal requirement thus introduces a profound inequality among persons who are otherwise formally equal citizens of a liberal political system. If the concept of hypothetical consent were to prove unworkable, the question would then arise: Should liberalism retain the requirement of consent as a condition of governing legitimacy when this requirement cannot be applied equally to all persons in a political system? This paper offers an answer to that question.

THE LIFE AND DEATH OF BOHÈME, OR, PAINTING THE RED SEA RED (III-D)

LYDIA GOEHR (COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY)

My talk investigates the life and death of Bohème given what I take to be a most significant scene in Puccini's opera: namely, the opening scene with its opening line: *Questo Mar Rosso*. Puccini's opera starts with the evocation of a painting that is supposed to be of the crossing of the Red Sea. Puccini and his librettists were not the first to paint this painting. In a history that turns out to be quite enigmatic, we find the same painting appearing in many guises, most notably as a merely red surface of red paint. But we should not be deceived by the mere appearance: the red surface conceals much that is most meaningful. How did a painting that was supposed to be of the crossing of the Red Sea end up as a surface, even as a "red square" of red paint? The answer takes us far beyond Puccini's opera into both the most melancholic and the most satirical strains of modernist aesthetic theory.

HYLOMORPHIC SUBSTANCES (VII-D)

KATHRIN KOSLICKI (UNIVERSITY OF COLORADO, BOULDER)

Hylomorphism is the position popular among neo-Aristotelian metaphysics according to which unified (such as presumably organisms) are in some sense compounds of matter (*hylē*) and form (*morphē*). Neo-Aristotelians also often find themselves drawn to an account of substancehood which centers on the idea that the substances are just those entities which are ontologically independent, according to some preferred notion of ontological independence. But if such alleged substance candidates as organisms are to be construed as compounds of matter and form, one wonders whether they will not then turn out to be ontologically dependent on entities numerically distinct from themselves (*viz.*, their form and possibly their matter as well) and thereby jeopardize their status as substances. In this talk, I will examine the tension between two prominent strands within neo-Aristotelian metaphysics, hylomorphism and independence criteria for substancehood, and explore some possible resolutions to this apparent conflict.

HUNTING DOWN THE MATERIAL CONDITIONAL (VII-B)

ANGELICA KRATZER (UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS)

Again and again, in the history of semantics, the brightest minds have fiercely defended material implication as the correct analysis for indicative conditionals. And, again and again, in the history of semantics, the brightest minds have fiercely opposed material implication as the correct analysis for indicative conditionals. I will show that any adequate theory of conditionals needs to provide the material implication interpretation as one possible, but only as one possible, interpretation for indicative conditionals. I will conclude with a suggestion about how and when the grammars of natural languages provide this interpretation.

COMMUNICATION AND KNOWLEDGE OF LANGUAGE (V-C)*ERNEST LEPORE (RUTGERS UNIVERSITY)**MATTHEW STONE (RUTGERS UNIVERSITY)*

Recent work in philosophy, linguistics, and cognitive science has focused new attention on the relationship between meaning and communication. Fundamental questions are at stake: How far do the rules of language go in settling utterance interpretation? What other processes and mechanisms are involved in our understandings of one another in conversation? One standard picture is given by Grice's theory of conversational implicature. The theory explains communication largely by appeal to truth-conditional meaning and general principles of rationality. We contest this view, and its descendants and successors, by arguing that wide-ranging linguistic knowledge and diverse interpretive mechanisms are typically at play in purported cases of conversational implicature. Our linguistic arguments highlight the heterogeneous conventions that govern such phenomena as indirect speech acts, temporal reference, and information structure. Our interpretive arguments highlight the distinctive reasoning involved in such different types of figurative language as metaphor, sarcasm, and irony. None of these cases can be conversational implicatures in the Gricean sense. Indeed, there may be no such thing.

ON SILENCING AND SINCERITY (VI-G)*MARY KATE MCGOWAN (WELLESLEY COLLEGE)*

Catharine MacKinnon claims that pornography silences women in a way that violates the right to free speech. This claim is, of course, controversial but, if it is correct, then the very free speech reasons for protecting pornography appear to also afford reason to restrict it. For this reason, it has gained considerable attention. The claim that pornography silences women by violating women's right to free speech is quite complex. In order to evaluate this silencing claim, several components of the claim must be distinguished and further clarified. First, the phenomenon of silencing must be defined. Second, the alleged connection between silencing and the free speech right requires both clarification and defense. Third, the alleged connection between silencing and pornography (or types of pornography) must be identified. This paper contributes to each of these three components. First, a new type of silencing, sincerity silencing, is here identified. Second, it is shown that sincerity silencing is plausibly regarded as a free speech violation. Third, several different ways that pornography (or its consumption) might plausibly bring about silencing are identified.

WHAT IS AT STAKE IN DEBATES BETWEEN NORMATIVE REALISTS? (III-C)*TRISTRAM MCPHERSON (VIRGINIA TECH)*

Central debates between normative realists appear to concern questions of metaphysical naturalism and reduction. However, there appear to be at least two strong reasons to worry about metaethicists' use of these metaphysical categories. First, discussions of these categories by

normative realists are often inconsistent, murky, or simply uninformative. This strengthens the hand of the realist's quietist and quasi-realist opponents, who suspect that the realist's "metaphysical" commitments are in fact misunderstood normative commitments. Second, importing a clear and standard account of these categories from the philosophy of mind also suggests an embarrassing diagnosis. On this taxonomy, leading normative realists who take themselves to be espousing radically different metaphysical views about the normative threaten to count instead as espousing minor variants of the same metaphysical view. This paper aims to address these challenges by clarifying what is at stake in metaphysical debates between normative realists. To do this, I develop and defend accounts of metaphysical naturalism and reduction. Roughly, to be a *natural* property is to be a member of the narrowest real metaphysical resemblance class that includes properties correctly postulated by our most successful natural sciences. For a property to be *reducible* is for the real definition of that property to be exhausted by a function of the reducing properties. I argue that this taxonomy has three significant theoretical virtues. First, it promises to vindicate the significant metaphysical differences that major normative realists take to exist between their views. Second, it clarifies the important metaphysical questions that are at stake in debates between these philosophers. Finally, it has substantive bite, casting doubt on the force of some arguments that are commonly deployed in debates between normative realists.

THE CRITICAL FUNCTION OF GENEALOGY IN ROUSSEAU'S *SECOND DISCOURSE* (V-B)

FREDERICK NEUHOUSER (BARNARD COLLEGE, COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY)

This paper examines the normative implications of Rousseau's use of genealogy in the *Discourse on the Origin of Inequality*, especially the relation between his genealogical claims and his critique of society. After arguing that the *Discourse* singles out *l'amour propre* as the psychological source of inequality, I reconstruct its account of the origin of inequality and its criteria for judging the legitimacy of inequalities. I am especially interested in the relations among Rousseau's use of genealogy and later genealogical projects, such as Nietzsche's.

ARISTOTLE ON THE IMPERFECT DELIBERATIVE CAPACITIES OF WOMEN (VI-D)

KAREN MARGRETHE NIELSEN (UNIVERSITY OF WESTERN ONTARIO)

In this paper, I discuss Aristotle's reasons for positing that "the deliberative part of the soul is entirely missing from a slave; a woman has it but it lacks authority; a child has it but it is incompletely developed" (*Politics* I, 13, 1260a11-14). What are the implications of Aristotle's insistence that the deliberative part is present in women, but in a way that differs from that of free males? In the ethics, Aristotle describes deliberation as causal inquiry that seeks to uncover acts that are up to us and conducive to our ends. He maintains that "what we decide to do is what we have judged [to be right] as a result of deliberation. For each one of us stops inquiring how to act as soon as he traces the principle to himself, and within himself to the

guiding part (*to hegoumenon*); for this is the part that decides" (*Nic. Eth.* III, 3, 1113a4-8). Insofar as Aristotle is prepared to grant that women are able to guide the activities of the household, what, exactly, are they missing? By attempting to answer this question, I believe we will come closer to appreciating the nature of Aristotle's conception of decision (*prohairesis*). Aristotle's scattered remarks about women and practical reasoning shed light on under-appreciated aspects of his ethics.

PHILOSOPHICAL BEAUTY (V-G)

ROBERT PASNAU (*UNIVERSITY OF COLORADO—BOULDER*)

Philosophers often justify their interest in the past on the grounds that the history of philosophy has much to teach us today—that we can contribute to the ongoing progress of philosophy by uncovering neglected truths from the past. Although this may sometimes be true, I argue that the study of philosophy's history admits of another justification: that we should study the history of philosophy simply because it is beautiful.

HOW TO TELL IF A GROUP IS AN AGENT (III-F)

PHILIP PETTIT (*PRINCETON UNIVERSITY*)

What, if anything, makes it appropriate to treat a group as an agent? Merely the instrumental utility of adopting an intentional stance? Or something more substantial: If not the presence of a soul, at least the presence of a suitable agential pattern? Recalling debates in the philosophy of individual agency, this paper addresses the issue between these two approaches and considers the question of how to tell if a group constitutes an agent.

SOCRATIC PRUDENTIALISM: ETHICS WITHOUT MORALITY (II-C)

NAOMI RESHOTKO (*UNIVERSITY OF DENVER*)

I explore the possibility that Socrates' "ethical" theory can be lifted off of the text and recommended as a contemporary ethical theory—a "Socratic Virtue Theory"—much as Aristotle's notions of virtue and character have been lifted away from the text and treated as a "Virtue Theory" that can compete with contemporary ethical theories. I outline the theory as I have understood it, showing that it is a coherent theory that has advantages over competing ethical theories. I furthermore argue that it advises behavior that is as much in concert with our intuitions about what is right and wrong as any other ethical theory does. The primary advantage of Socratic Prudentialism will be that it allows us to understand human behavior as "right" or "wrong" and "good," or "bad," without making use of any categorically separate notion of moral good and bad. We need not make foundational assumptions about pre-existing moral principles or a priori arguments about what would allow elements of human experience to be counted as morally good.

PLEASURE OF TASTE, MORAL SENTIMENT, AND JUDGMENT IN KANT, 1770-1790 (II-G)

ALEX RUEGER (UNIVERSITY OF ALBERTA)

According to a widely shared view, Kant had to establish the autonomy of taste, that is, separate beauty from morality, in order to argue for the moral relevance of aesthetics in the *Critique of Judgment*. This view is made plausible against the background of “rationalist” theories that secured the connection of taste to morality by understanding pleasure as a representation of perfection. I would like to amend this picture under a developmental perspective. I suggest (i) that Kant had to establish the *autonomy of morality* before he could develop the theory of taste; that is, only when he discovered the autonomy of the moral law (at around 1783/4) was he able to conceive of the possibility of judgments of taste having a claim to universal and necessary validity and, in fact, provide them with a deduction (in 1784). And (ii) I want to show that from this starting point, a natural line of thought leads to the need for a new faculty of the mind, the power of judgment, with an a priori principle that is *constitutive* for the feeling of pleasure and displeasure. Special attention will be paid to the changes in Kant’s view on the nature of pleasure and to the fact that once there is a constitutive principle for feeling, the pleasure of taste can no longer be regarded as a sensation.

OPERA MATTERS (III-D)

RICHARD SCHACHT (UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS, URBANA-CHAMPAIGN)

Opera, for Nietzsche, is serious business. I think he was right about that. For him, in *The Birth of Tragedy*, thinking of Wagnerian opera in particular, opera is heir to one of the greatest gifts of the Greeks not only to Western civilization but to humanity: tragedy, animated by the spirit of music” and born of the coupling of the arts and sensibilities that he baptized “Apollonian” and “Dionysian.” His assessment of Wagner changed greatly; but I think he was on to something important that can be seen in his writings from beginning to end: the capacity of the arts not only to reflect but also to shape, direct, and transform the sensibilities of human beings who encounter them and enter into them—the art that is opera most of all. I expand upon and develop this idea, touching upon a variety of “opera matters” that are relevant to it along the way. I also consider it to be crucial not only to the understanding of Nietzsche’s kind of naturalism (which I take to be a non-“scientific” one), but also to be the case for that kind of naturalism (and against its “scientific” rivals). This idea thus seems to me to be the key to a good and important answer to the question of whether, why, and how—both humanly and philosophically—opera matters.

STRUCTURAL EQUATION MODELS OF METAPHYSICAL STRUCTURE (VII-C)

JONATHAN M. SCHAFFER (RUTGERS UNIVERSITY)

For Carnap and Quine, metaphysics is about what there is. I argue for a re-orientation of metaphysics away from questions of what there is, towards questions of what grounds what. This is a return to an Aristotelian

conception of metaphysics, on which the ultimate grounds (“the substances”) are “the principles and causes” of all else. Metaphysics so conceived is an explanatory discipline, which seeks to identify what is fundamental, and to explain how derivative entities are grounded in what is fundamental. I will argue for the merits of an explanatory conception of metaphysics, and focus on rendering precise some of the underlying notions of metaphysical structure via the sorts of structural equation models now widely used for causal modelling. What emerges is a unified conception of metaphysical and causal explanation, backed by directed dependency relations.

THE JOINT VERDICT OF TRUE JUDGES (II-G)

JAMES SHELLEY (AUBURN UNIVERSITY)

If there is anything about which present-day critics of Hume’s account of the standard of taste will agree it is that Hume’s true judges will not agree. Malcolm Budd speaks for many when he locates the “principal weakness” of Hume’s account of the standard of taste in Hume’s “blithe optimism about the uniformity of response of his true judges of artistic value.” I argue that Hume’s optimism is not blithe—that it follows from Hume’s definition of a true judge that true judges will never disagree, and that it follows from his appeal to the test of time that true judges will agree often enough to support the particular kind of standard he has in mind.

THE BEST WE CAN EXPECT: IN DEFENSE OF A CLASSICAL APPROACH TO DEONTIC MODALITY (III-G)

KAI VON FINTEL (MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY)

The classical semantics for deontic modals treats them as quantifiers over possible worlds sensitive to a circumstantial modal base and an ordering of the worlds in the modal base. We show that recent critiques of the classical semantics fail to establish the need to move to alternative approaches. We discuss four well-known challenges:

- Problems having to do with right upward monotonicity (Ross’s Paradox, Professor Procrastinate)
- Moral Dilemmas
- The interpretation of certain deontic conditionals (such as “if p , ought p ”)
- Information sensitivity (Miners Paradox)

In each case, we show that the data can be captured in well-motivated ways within the classical semantics, contrary to doomsday pronouncements in recent work. We also argue that some proposed alternatives do not in fact make correct predictions.

THE WEIGHT OF MORAL REASONS (V-E)

RALPH WEDGWOOD (UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA)

Most of us believe the following two theses: (i) we are all subject to non-trivial moral requirements; and (ii) whenever we are subject to a moral requirement, we have overriding or compelling reason for acting accordingly. But why exactly are these two theses true? This paper explores how that question might be answered within the context of a broadly *value-based* conception of reasons for action—according to which all reasons for action arise from the way in which the available courses of action count, in various ways, as good or bad things to do. It is argued that this question cannot plausibly be answered by arguing that non-moral reasons never conflict with moral reasons. It is also not plausible to appeal to the idea that moral reasons somehow “silence” or “exclude” the non-moral reasons: in any normal case in which moral reasons and non-moral reasons conflict, and the moral reasons are compelling or overriding, this is simply because the moral reasons *outweigh* the non-moral reasons. Some philosophers have suggested that the correct account of the distinction between moral *requirements* and *supererogatory* moral reasons will guarantee the truth of the second thesis (that whenever we are subject to a moral requirement, we have overriding reason for acting accordingly). Even if this is true, it would still be the case that for every moral requirement, we would have to explain *why* the relevant moral reasons are so weighty that they outweigh all countervailing non-moral reasons. The answer must simply be that moral values are in a sense “big values,” liable to generate especially weighty reasons that outweigh the reasons that arise from other values. In conclusion, some suggestions are made about why moral values should be “big values” in this way.

TWO ROUTES TO METAPHYSICAL EMERGENCE IN THE THERMODYNAMIC LIMIT (III-B)

JESSICA WILSON (UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO)

Thermodynamic macro-features are often supposed to have been reduced—theoretically, explanatorily, and metaphysically—to statistical mechanics (SM) and associated (probabilistic functions of) micro-features. This neat picture is threatened, however, by the fact that the derivations of thermodynamic features in SM-theoretic terms make sense only in the thermodynamic limit (TL), in which particle number N and volume V go to infinity. Here I consider how the appeal to the TL bears on the metaphysical status of phase transitions. I reject eliminativism about such transitions, and side with Menon and Callender in supposing that these are not robustly emergent. I then argue, drawing on my account of Weak emergence as involving an elimination in degrees of freedom, that attention to the TL provides two reasons to think that phase transitions are weakly metaphysically emergent from micro-physical goings-on.

SESSIONS SPONSORED BY APA COMMITTEES

THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 16

(Topic to be announced) (I-K)

Sponsored by the Committee on Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and Transgender People in the Profession

12:10-2:10 p.m.

(Topic to be announced) (I-L)

Sponsored by the Committee on Academic Career Opportunities and Placement

12:10-2:10 p.m.

FRIDAY, FEBRUARY 17

The Value of Graduate Student Teacher Training for the Profession of Philosophy (III-M)

Sponsored by the Committee on the Teaching of Philosophy

9:00 a.m.-Noon

The Politics of Peace: Sara Ruddick's Legacy and the Arab Spring (III-N)

Sponsored by the Committee on the Status of Women

9:00 a.m.-Noon

Is there hope? Has Philosophy Contributed to Progress? (III-O)

Sponsored by the Committee on Public Philosophy

9:00 a.m.-Noon

Disease and Dysfunction (IV-J)

Sponsored by the Committee on Philosophy and Medicine

12:45-2:45 p.m.

Philosophy in Action: A Live Demonstration of Doing Philosophy with Elementary, Middle, and High School Students (IV-K)

Sponsored by the Committee on Pre-College Instruction in Philosophy

12:45-2:45 p.m.

Credentials Policy for Two-Year Colleges (IV-L)

Sponsored by the Committee on Philosophy in Two-Year Colleges
12:45-2:45 p.m.

Machine Consciousness (V-L)

Sponsored by the Committee on Philosophy and Computers
3:00-6:00 p.m.

Africana Philosophy: Pedagogical Perspectives on the Black Experience (V-M)

Sponsored by the Committee on the Teaching of Philosophy
3:00-6:00 p.m.

New Work in Asian/Comparative Ethics (V-N)

Sponsored by the Committee on the Status of Asian and Asian-American Philosophers and Philosophies
3:00-6:00 p.m.

SATURDAY, FEBRUARY 18**Finding a Job at a Two-Year College (VI-M)**

Sponsored by the Committee on Philosophy in Two-Year Colleges
9:00 a.m.-Noon

The Proposed Humanities Indicators of the AAAS (VI-N)

Sponsored by the Committee on the Status and Future of the Profession
9:00 a.m.-Noon

ALPHABETICAL LIST OF GROUP SESSIONS

Sessions sponsored by affiliated groups are listed below in alphabetical order of sponsoring group. Sessions sponsored jointly by more than one group are listed once for each sponsor.

A

Adam Smith Society: *GIII-7, Thu, 7:40-10:40 p.m.*

American Association of Philosophy Teachers: *GII-5, Thu, 5:30-7:30 p.m.*

American Society for Aesthetics: *GI-5, Thu, 9:00 a.m.-Noon*

American Society for Philosophy, Counseling, and Psychotherapy: *GIII-4, Thu, 7:40-10:40 p.m.*

American Society for Value Inquiry: *GI-3, Thu, 9:00 a.m.-Noon*

American Society for Value Inquiry: *GII-2, Thu, 5:30-7:30 p.m.*

Association for Informal Logic and Critical Thinking: *GIV-10, Fri, 7:30-9:30 p.m.*

Association for the Development of Philosophy Teaching: *GIII-8, Thu, 7:40-10:40 p.m.*

Association for the Development of Philosophy Teaching: *GIV-11, Fri, 7:30-10:30 p.m.*

B

Bertrand Russell Society: *GIII-5, Thu, 7:40-10:40 p.m.*

C

Committee on Institutional Cooperation: *GII-10, Thu, 5:30-7:30 p.m.*

Concerned Philosophers for Peace: *GIV-3, Fri, 7:30-10:30 p.m.*

H

Hume Society: *GII-6, Thu, 5:30-7:30 p.m.*

I

International Association for Computing and Philosophy: *GI-9, Thu, 9:00 a.m.-Noon*

International Association for the Philosophy of Sport: *GV-7, Sat, 12:15-2:15 p.m.*

International Berkeley Society: *GV-10, Sat, 12:15-2:15 p.m.*

International Society for Environmental Ethics: *GI-1, Thu, 9:00 a.m.-Noon*

International Society for Environmental Ethics: *GII-3, Thu, 5:30-7:30 p.m.*

J

Josiah Royce Society: *GV-9, Sat, 12:15-2:15 p.m.*

M

Max Scheler Society: *GI-11, Thu, 9:00 a.m.-Noon*

Max Scheler Society: *GIII-6, Thu, 7:40-10:40 p.m.*

Midwest Society for Women in Philosophy: *GIV-9, Fri, 7:30-10:30 p.m.*

N

North American Division of the Schopenhauer Society: *GV-3, Sat, 12:15-2:15 p.m.*

North American Kant Society: *GII-1, Thu, 5:30-7:30 p.m.*

North American Nietzsche Society: *GII-4, Thu, 5:30-7:30 p.m.*

North American Nietzsche Society: *GV-1, Sat, 12:15-2:15 p.m.*

North American Society for Social Philosophy: *GIII-11, Thu, 7:40-10:40 p.m.*

North American Society for Social Philosophy: *GV-4, Sat, 12:15-2:15 p.m.*

P

Personalist Discussion Group: *GII-7, Thu, 5:30-7:30 p.m.*

Philosophy of Religion Group: *GV-6, Sat, 12:15-2:15 p.m.*

Philosophy of Time Society: *GI-4, Thu, 9:00 a.m.-Noon*

R

Radical Philosophy Association: *GI-8, Thu, 9:00 a.m.-Noon*

Radical Philosophy Association: *GV-8, Sat, 12:15-2:15 p.m.*

S

Society for Analytical Feminism: *GIII-1, Thu, 7:40-10:40 p.m.*

Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy: *GIV-12, Fri, 7:30-10:30 p.m.*

Society for Asian and Comparative Philosophy: *GI-2, Thu, 9:00 a.m.-Noon*

Society for Asian and Comparative Philosophy: *GIV-6, Fri, 7:30-10:30 p.m.*

Society for Asian and Comparative Philosophy: *GV-5, Sat, 12:15-2:15 p.m.*

Society for Business Ethics: *GII-9, Thu, 5:30-7:30 p.m.*

Society for Philosophy in the Contemporary World: *G0-1, Wed, 6:00-9:00 p.m.*

Society for Systematic Philosophy: *GIII-2, Thu, 7:40-10:40 p.m.*

Society for Systematic Philosophy: *GV-2, Sat, 12:15-2:15 p.m.*

Society for the Advancement of American Philosophy: *GIV-1, Fri, 7:30-10:30 p.m.*

Society for the History of Political Philosophy: *GIV-5, Fri, 7:30-10:30 p.m.*

Society for the Metaphysics of Science: *GI-7, Thu, 9:00 a.m.-Noon*

Society for the Philosophic Study of Genocide and the Holocaust: *GI-10, Thu, 9:00 a.m.-Noon*

Society for the Philosophic Study of Genocide and the Holocaust: *GIII-9, Thu, 7:40-10:40 p.m.*

Society for the Philosophic Study of the Contemporary Visual Arts: *GIII-3, Thu, 7:40-10:40 p.m.*

Society for the Philosophic Study of the Contemporary Visual Arts: *GIV-2, Fri, 7:30-10:30 p.m.*

Society for the Philosophical Study of Education: *GI-6, Thu, 9:00 a.m.-Noon*

Society for the Philosophical Study of Education: *GIV-7, Fri, 7:30-10:30 p.m.*

Society for the Philosophy of Creativity: *GIII-10, Thu, 7:40-10:40 p.m.*

Society for the Study of Process Philosophies: *GIII-10, Thu, 7:40-10:40 p.m.*

Society for the Study of the History of Analytical Philosophy: *GIV-14, Fri, 7:30-9:30 p.m.*

Society of Christian Philosophers: *GII-8, Thu, 5:30-7:30 p.m.*

Society of Christian Philosophers: *GIV-13, Fri, 7:30-10:30 p.m.*

Søren Kierkegaard Society: *GIV-8, Fri, 7:30-10:30 p.m.*

PLACEMENT SERVICE INFORMATION

Mike Morris will be the Coordinator for the APA Placement Service at the 2012 Central Division Meeting. Questions concerning the Service should be directed to Mike at The American Philosophical Association, University of Delaware, 31 Amstel Avenue, Newark, DE 19716. He can also be reached by telephone at (302) 831-2012, fax: (302) 831-8690, or email: mpmorris@udel.edu.

APA PLACEMENT SERVICE GENERAL HOURS OF OPERATION:

Wednesday, February 15:	Placement Information, 5:00 – 10:00 p.m., Meeting Registration Desk (Sixth Floor) Placement Interviewing, 5:00 – 10:00 p.m., Spire Parlor (Sixth Floor)
Thursday, February 16:	Placement Information, 8:30 a.m. – 5:30 p.m., Meeting Registration Desk (Sixth Floor) Placement Interviewing, 8:30 a.m. – 5:30 p.m., Spire Parlor (Sixth Floor)
Friday, February 17:	Placement Information, 8:30 a.m. – 5:00 p.m., Meeting Registration Desk (Sixth Floor) Placement Interviewing, 8:30 a.m. – 5:00 p.m., Spire Parlor (Sixth Floor)
Saturday, February 18:	Placement Information, 8:30 a.m. – Noon, Meeting Registration Desk (Sixth Floor) Placement Interviewing, 8:30 a.m. – Noon, Spire Parlor (Sixth Floor)

APA PLACEMENT SERVICE LOCATIONS

The Placement Desk will be located at the Meeting Registration Desk (sixth floor), and the Interviewing Area will be in the Spire Parlor (sixth floor). In the event that additional space is needed for interviewing, the location will be posted near the Meeting Registration Desk.

JOB CANDIDATES – MEETING REGISTRATION DESK (SIXTH FLOOR)

1. Candidate Numbers will be assigned at the Placement Desk.
 2. The location of a Job Interview will be available from the Placement staff, or posted on the bulletin board at the information desk.
 3. Additional “Request for Interview” forms will be available at the Placement Desk.
-

4. APA Membership Applications will be available at the APA Meeting Registration Desk.
5. Information and instructions for using the Service will be available at the Placement desk (also see following pages), and posted on the information bulletin board.
6. The mailboxes for Job Candidates will be located at the Placement Desk.
7. A complete set of Job Postings will be available at the Placement Desk.
8. A message for the APA Placement Ombudsperson can be left at the Placement Desk.

INTERVIEWERS – MEETING REGISTRATION DESK (SIXTH FLOOR)

1. **Interviewers check in here**—as soon as possible upon arrival.
2. Payments for **On-Site Interviewing Departments** will be received here.
3. Space will be provided here for interviewers to check their files.
4. “Request for Interview” forms received from job candidates that have been reviewed by interviewers **should be returned** here.
5. A list of interviewing table assignments will be posted on the Placement Information Bulletin Board.

INTERVIEWING AREA – SPIRE PARLOR (SIXTH FLOOR)

1. APA Interviewing Tables will be located here.
2. In the event that additional space for interviewing is needed, we will post the additional location on the Placement Information Bulletin Board.

INFORMATION AND INSTRUCTIONS FOR JOB CANDIDATES

REQUIREMENTS FOR USING THE PLACEMENT SERVICE

1. You **must be an APA member** in order to use the Service. Placement is a benefit of membership for candidates, and there is no additional charge to use this service. Membership applications are available on the APA web site (www.apaonline.org) or by contacting the APA National Office (302) 831-1112, or at the Membership/Registration desk at the Meeting.
 2. You **MUST REGISTER** for the **MEETING** in order to use the Service.
 - If you **register in advance** for the meeting and indicate that you will be a candidate (an advance registration form is located at the back of this issue), a candidate number will be assigned in the National Office and will appear on the back of your badge. You **must** pick up your badge from the APA Registration staff prior to using the Placement service.
 - If you register on-site for the meeting, present your badge to the Placement Staff, who will be available to assign you a candidate number in the “Placement Service” line.
-

WHAT TO BRING WITH YOU

1. Your copies of recent issues of *Jobs For Philosophers*.
2. Several copies of your *curriculum vitae*. If you run out of CVs at the meeting, the hotel has a copy center located in the Business Center.

HOW TO USE THE PLACEMENT SERVICE

After you have picked up your registration materials from the APA Registration staff, you are ready to use the Service. If you do not yet have a candidate number on the back of your badge, please go to the job candidates' area at the Meeting Registration Desk (Sixth Floor) to receive one.

JOB CANDIDATES' AREA – MEETING REGISTRATION DESK (SIXTH FLOOR)

Here you will find a file folder (mailbox) with your candidate number on it. All communications addressed to you during the meeting will be placed there. Your folder contains:

1. "Request for Interview" forms. Additional forms will be available from the Placement staff. **Be sure that your Placement Number appears at the top of all forms.**
2. A "Locator" form for you to list your name and hotel address. Please do not remove this form from your folder. This is used only in the event that we need to contact you during the meeting.

JOB POSTINGS

New jobs (not having appeared in the *Jobs for Philosophers*) will be posted on a bulletin board in the Placement Service Area. You should check this board regularly for new postings. Each ad should contain instructions on how to apply.

INSTITUTIONS THAT HAVE CHECKED IN WITH PLACEMENT

The names of institutions that have registered to use the Service will be posted on the bulletin board (updated regularly) in *alphabetical order*. Each listing will indicate the following:

1. If the listing institution has checked in with Placement.
2. If the institution is accepting interview requests at the meeting.
3. The relevant *JFP* for the institution's opening(s).
4. Where the institution plans on interviewing (Table with number assignment).
5. Miscellaneous notes deemed appropriate by the Placement staff or the institution.

SUBMITTING AN INTERVIEW REQUEST FORM

Complete the *top* portion of the "Request for Interview" form and attach a copy of your CV. **Be sure that your candidate number appears at the**

top of all forms. After you have completed the necessary information, place your request form and CV in the box marked *Requests for Interviews* which will be prominently displayed on the Placement Service Desk. Your “Request” will be forwarded to the institution by a staff member.

INTERVIEWS

After your “Request” has been reviewed by a representative from the institution, the form will be returned to your file folder with the institution’s response appearing on the *bottom* of the form. Check your file folder often so that you can be certain to receive your messages promptly.

By Noon on February 18, all “Requests” submitted by you should have been returned to your file folder, and you should remove them at that time. Occasionally, an institution may retain applications to review at a later date. If you applied for a job that had been posted and the institution did not check in with the Service during the meeting, it is suggested that you contact the institution by mail.

INTERVIEWING LOCATIONS

Some departments will be conducting interviews at tables located in the Spire Parlor (Sixth Floor). Other interviewing table locations will be posted if additional space is required. Each institution using a table for interviewing will be assigned a table number. The table numbers assigned to institutions will be posted on the bulletin board in the Placement Service Area.

ADVICE FOR JOB APPLICANTS

The APA Committee on Career Opportunities offers the following advice for job applicants: The schedule for those seeking jobs and those Departments offering positions is difficult for all concerned. From the point of view of Departments, any publication date for *Jobs for Philosophers* is a compromise between the competing demands imposed by the need to get funding for positions, so the later the better, and by the need to have time to process applications, so the sooner the better. From the point of view of job applicants, there are also competing demands: the sooner it is published, the more time to apply, but the later it is published, the more opportunities will be available. There is no easy solution to this problem, but you can ease your difficulties somewhat by being prepared when the *JFP* is published. You should have your *curriculum vitae* ready to put in an envelope, a generic draft of a letter of application ready to be fine-tuned for particular job opportunities, and the rest of your file ready for mailing. This means talking to those who are to write letters of recommendation long before the *JFP* is due to arrive, preparing material about your teaching capacities, and selecting a writing sample for those Departments that request it. Applications should be complete, as well as clearly organized. It is to your advantage to send in your application as soon as possible after an ad appears.

INFORMATION AND INSTRUCTIONS FOR INTERVIEWERS

REQUIREMENTS FOR USING THE PLACEMENT SERVICE

1. It is expected that **all individual interviewers will register for the meeting** either by using the registration form found at the back of this issue or by stopping at the Meeting Registration Desk (Sixth Floor) to register on-site prior to using the Placement Service.
2. All **Departments (not individuals)** planning to interview at the meeting should complete the Placement Service advance registration form found on our web site, www.apaonline.org or at the end of this section. Upon receipt of an advance registration form additional information pertaining to the Placement Service will be sent to the attention of the contact person listed on the form. In the event that we send Placement forms either via email or mail, please be sure to complete these and return them to our office **at your earliest opportunity**. Not doing so may cause your materials to arrive after the Staff has already left the office to travel to the meeting. In this case, we **must** have you fill out the forms again on site. If time does not allow sending them to us, please bring them with you and turn them in at the Placement Desk.

CHECKING IN WITH THE SERVICE

Before you begin to interview candidates, please check in with the Placement Staff (Meeting Registration Desk, Sixth Floor). We will need to know that you have arrived on site for candidates inquiring about your institution. Additional information will be requested from you (or confirmed if your department pre-registered) at this time as well.

Some institutions accept interview requests at the meeting; some of these job notices may have appeared in *Jobs for Philosophers* while others are unpublished positions. A new, unpublished position will be assigned an AD# and posted on the bulletin board in the Placement Service area. If you are bringing such a job notice with you to the meeting, please provide the Placement Staff with **four** copies of the notice for the position you are advertising. Such a position announcement should be typed on *one side only* in a good size and easy to read font, and be as brief as possible. Only positions that have **not** appeared in *Jobs for Philosophers* will be posted. If you would like a position that has been posted at this meeting to appear on our website immediately following the meeting, or in the next issue of *Jobs for Philosophers*, you need to submit this ad immediately. If you need assistance with this, contact the APA National Office.

Some institutions interview by prearrangement after placing an advertisement in *Jobs for Philosophers* and then contacting candidates prior to the meeting. When you arrange an interview with candidates, please inform them that they **must be APA Members in order to use the Service and they must register for the meeting in order to use the Service**.

If you plan to conduct job interviews anywhere other than at the interviewing tables/suites we have provided, please let us know your plans

because candidates often come to us to ask questions about the location/time (etc.) of their interviews, and we need to have complete, up-to-date information in order to help them (and you).

Departments using a **Suite** for interviewing will need to complete an interview schedule form at the time they check in with the Service. Doing so enables the Service to notify the candidates you wish to interview of your interviewing location. **Be assured that only those candidates listed on your interview schedule will be told the location of your hotel room, unless you have directed us to give this information to all candidates who ask.** Departments interviewing at tables **DO NOT** need to complete this form.

N.B.: If you are conducting interviews in a hotel room, please be aware of the following policy statement adopted by the APA Board of Officers at its November 2004 meeting:

“Departments should not conduct Job Interviews in non-suite hotel rooms. Candidates who are subject to such interviews can appeal to the APA and are guaranteed anonymity.” (Originally published in *Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association*, Vol. 78, No. 5, pp. 23, 119.)

APA INTERVIEWING TABLES

The Placement Service provides numbered tables for interviewing purposes; you will receive your table number assignment when you check in. These table number assignments will also be posted on the Placement Service Bulletin Board. Should additional space for interviewing tables be necessary, this location will be posted as well.

INSTITUTION FILE FOLDER (MAILBOX)

There will be a file folder bearing the name of your institution located at the Meeting Registration Desk (Sixth Floor). Requests for interviews from candidates will be placed in this file folder.

REVIEWING INTERVIEW REQUESTS

When a candidate requests an interview with your institution, you should receive her/his *curriculum vitae* attached to a “Request for Interview” form. The bottom of this form is to be completed by you and returned to Placement staff. If an interview is granted, space is provided on this form to list the time, date, and location of the interview. If you are *unable to interview a candidate*, space for this response is also provided on the form. Any request you receive in an envelope contains confidential material and should be destroyed rather than returned to the candidate. As a matter of professional courtesy, *all requests should receive a response*. When a candidate receives a “Request” form back without a response, he or she is likely to assume that the material *has not been reviewed* and might return this to you via our service or contact your institution by mail.

Each candidate is assigned a numbered file folder to facilitate prompt communication between interviewers and candidates. Materials that you wish to transmit to a registered candidate should be handed in to the Placement Service staff located at the Meeting Registration Desk (Sixth Floor), and will be delivered to the candidate by our staff.

APA STATEMENT ON PLACEMENT PRACTICES

The APA Committee on the Status and Future of the Profession reminds you of its Statement on Placement Practices: The APA discourages the nomination by graduate departments of job seekers for positions in philosophy, and the submission of their dossiers in response to announcements of positions, without their knowledge or interest. This may seriously mislead those who are conducting searches, and may have unfortunate consequences both for them and for genuinely interested applicants. Graduate departments using a nomination procedure or submitting dossiers on behalf of job seekers should either attest explicitly that the candidate wishes to be considered for the positions in question, or (preferably) ensure that the job seekers themselves submit personal letters of application for these positions. Departments conducting searches are encouraged to recommend or require explicitly (in their position announcements) that each candidate, to be assessed of full consideration, should submit a personal letter of application for and interest in the announced position.

A Placement Ombudsperson will be available at the meeting. Please see the Placement Service Staff if you would like to contact the Ombudsperson.

**Placement Service Registration for Interviewing Departments
 APA 2012 Central Division Meeting
 Palmer House Hilton Hotel, Chicago, IL - February 15-18, 2012**

Only one form is required for each interviewing department. Once completed, this can be faxed to (302) 831-8690.

Institution: _____ Department: _____

Contact: _____ Phone: _____

Address: _____

City, State, Zip Code: _____ Email: _____

All persons conducting interviews should be registered** for the Central Division Meeting as well as the department being registered with the Placement Service.

**Registered members of the department who will be conducting interviews:

Our department will:

_____ need interviewing table(s) Quantity of Tables _____

-or-

_____ conduct interviews in a hotel suite (you must contact Linda Smallbrook to reserve a suite)

Our department will:

_____ provide suite # and list of prearranged candidates to whom suite information may be given

-or-

_____ bring suite # and allow service to give to anyone who requests it

Our department will:

_____ conduct prearranged interviews only

-or-

_____ accept interview requests on-site

Please list the JFP issue(s) (if any) in which this job was advertised: _____

Registration Fees (Please Check One): _____ Pre-Registration, By February 1: \$50.00

_____ *Regular Registration, After February 1: \$75.00

Credit Card Type: (Circle One) VISA / MASTERCARD

Credit Card #:

Exp. Date: /

Last 3 Digits on back of card:

Name on Card: _____ Phone #: _____

Signature: _____ Email: _____

***Check #: _____ Check Date: _____ Check Amount _____

***Payable to: The American Philosophical Association. The APA only accepts checks drawn on U.S. banks in U.S. funds, or Int'l. Money Orders in U.S. funds. There is a \$10 charge for all returned checks. **If PAYMENT is not received in our office by February 1, 2012 you MUST pay the on-site fee! Please mail form and payment to: Attn: Mike Morris, Placement, The American Philosophical Association, 31 Amstel Avenue, University of Delaware, Newark, DE 19716.

PLACEMENT BROCHURE

This brochure offers some advice to those seeking jobs in philosophy. Like all advice it is to be taken with a grain of salt. It is based on the collective wisdom of the APA's Committee on Academic Careers and Placement in Fall 2004 (Larry May [chair], Andrew Light, Frank Ryan, Abby Wilkerson, Melissa Zinkin, Nancy Holland, Rebecca Copenhaver, Mark Timmons, David Tuncellito). Collective wisdom is probably somewhat less controversial than collective punishment, but more controversial than almost everything else. Nonetheless, we hope that some of what we recommend will prove helpful to some of you, some of the time. Job seeking is one of the most difficult things that people can engage in. Anything that reduces that difficulty has value.

1. WHEN TO START THINKING ABOUT JOBS

It is never too early to start thinking about the job market. During your first years in graduate school you should be thinking about which papers your teachers have liked. After the end of term, take the paper back to the professor who liked it and ask two questions:

What can I do to improve this paper and make it marketable for a conference or for publication?

Which conference or journal would be best suited for a paper like mine?

You don't need to do a lot of this. One or two of your best essays, sent first to a conference and then to a journal, will do nicely. Only send out your very best work to conferences, for that is what you want to be remembered for.

In addition, in these early years in graduate school, you should try to put together a good assortment of courses that you have TAed for or taught independently. You should try to TA for all of the major introductory courses (introduction to philosophy, ethics, logic and critical thinking) as well as some specialized or advanced courses in your areas of specialization and competence. At some universities, such as the large state schools, the trick will be to limit your teaching so that you can get good writing done. At other schools, you may have to be creative to get enough teaching experience (try contacting small colleges and community colleges in your area). Most importantly, keep your teaching evaluations from these courses. Or if course evaluations do not routinely have students evaluate TAs, design your own and administer it during the last week of classes (then have a departmental secretary collect and hold them for you until grades are turned in so students don't think you will retaliate against them).

A note of caution: Given the current and foreseeable demand for low-paid adjunct courses it can be very tempting to take on a large amount of adjunct teaching. Given the large number of graduate students seeking such teaching it can also be very tempting to take every course that is offered to you in order to ensure your place in the adjunct pool. The result sometimes can be a vicious cycle of taking more and more low-paid adjunct teaching that can impede your ability to finish your dissertation.

All other things being equal, and they hardly ever are, you could also use the early years in graduate school to get a bit (but only a bit) of service or administrative experience. The easiest here is to volunteer for a departmental committee, like the colloquium or admissions committee. If there are opportunities to work with an actual administrator, especially a Dean or higher, on a special project, you should jump at the opportunity since a letter from said administrator will make you look more attractive to administrators who will hire you down the road. Do not (repeat: do not) spend much time at this. Service is clearly a very distant third-place, after research and teaching, for the vast majority of jobs. No one gets hired on the basis of service, standing alone, unless you want to be hired into an administrative job. Remember too that one should be cautious about spending too much time on departmental or campus politics. Indeed, try to stay out of departmental politics altogether, which can come back to bite you. You are a transient in graduate school, and should not treat this as a permanent position.

It is a good idea to join the APA as soon as you can—the rates for student members are very low. And make sure to check the box on the application form saying that you would like to receive the publication called: *Jobs for Philosophers* (it's free—but you have to check the box to get it). Once you get this publication, you can scan through it and think to yourself: Do any of these jobs sound interesting to me? What do I need to do to stand the best chance of getting the job I like the most? Note whether there are any such jobs. If not, consider another career. If so, notice what combinations of things employers are looking for (for example, notice that most jobs in philosophy of science or mind also want someone who can teach logic; and most jobs in ethical theory or political philosophy also want someone who can teach applied ethics).

Another good source of experience and professional contacts can be found in the numerous smaller specialized societies organized around particular sub-fields of philosophy, affinity groups, or particular periods or figures, such as the Society for Women in Philosophy, the International Society for Environmental Ethics, or the Society for Realist/Antirealist Discussion. Such organizations can be invaluable for helping to establish you in the field and providing a set of interlocutors who can improve your work. One of the best ways to find such organizations is to survey the Group Meetings listings in the program for each divisional APA conference.

In general, use the early years in graduate school to learn as much philosophy as you can. Also, begin to develop a specialty in philosophy, and perhaps also begin to develop a competence outside of philosophy,

such as political science or computer science (although for certain jobs you might not want to highlight this). Use these early years to figure out if you really want to spend your life in a philosophy department, and to begin to get a sense of what it means to be a “professional” philosopher. While it is very romantic to want to be a philosopher, like being a poet one does not live by thoughts and words alone. The way to support yourself is by getting a job as a member of a profession, and our profession, as odd as it may sound, is teaching and publishing in philosophy, which is not especially romantic, but is better than many other jobs we know.

2. WHEN TO GO INTO THE “MARKET”

One of the most important decisions you will make is when to go into the philosophy job market. This is especially important because many graduate students go in too early and waste years of their lives. The job market process is a nearly full-time job. So if you go in early and you don’t have enough of your dissertation done, you can find yourself six months later with no job prospects and no more done on your dissertation than when you started. Do this a couple of years and you nearly place yourself out of the market by being too long in graduate school—taking too long to finish a dissertation is almost always seen as a bad sign of how long it will take you to finish anything else.

So, when is it optimal to go into the job market? While this varies a bit, the best time is when you are nearly done with your dissertation. “Nearly done” is a relative term. If you have a five-chapter dissertation, “nearly done” can mean four chapters drafted and approved by your committee, and the other chapter at least begun. Or it can mean, all five chapters drafted and some fairly minor revisions needed. At bare minimum, you need three of those five chapters done by early September. The main reason for this is that you need your dissertation committee chair to say, in a letter he or she will write in late September, “Yes, Jones will be done and ready to start undistracted in the Fall.” But this is not enough, since everyone’s committee chair will say that, or else your application process is simply a waste of time. In addition, the committee chair must offer evidence to back up this claim, such as, that all five chapters are drafted and only need minor revisions, or some such. Optimally, the letter from your committee chair will say: “We have set December 8th as the defense date.” This is optimal because by the time you get to the Eastern Division meetings in late December, folks will know whether you are really done or not. January defense dates are good as well, because departments will be making hiring decisions by late January or early February, typically.

In normal years there are a lot more applicants for jobs in philosophy than there are jobs. So, employers are looking for reasons to throw out applications. The first cut at most schools is “whether the candidate is done, or will be done by September.” Unless you can make a strong case for this, and your dissertation committee chair can back you up, you are unlikely to make the first cut, and hence likely to have wasted six months or more. Don’t delude yourself. It normally takes two months of relatively

uninterrupted work to draft a good chapter, so it will take six months of very hard work to draft more than half of a dissertation, depending on your other commitments. If you haven't started seriously writing your dissertation by March, you don't stand much of a chance of being more than halfway done by September. But also don't wait too long. While the national average is seven years from BA to completion of the Ph.D., if after completing your coursework you take longer than three years to write the dissertation, potential employers will start to wonder whether this is a sign that you will not be able to write enough in your probationary period to be able to get tenure. So, our best advice is not to go into the market until you are done with the dissertation, or at very least "nearly done."

3. THE SYSTEM

In America in philosophy, the majority of jobs are advertised in *Jobs for Philosophers* in October and November and then first interviews (a half hour to an hour in length) are conducted at the APA Eastern Division meetings between Christmas and New Year's day. If you make it through the convention, then two or three people will be flown to campus for a two-day intensive interview, where you will meet all of the faculty members and present a professional paper, or teach a class, and increasingly both. There are also jobs advertised after New Year's day, although far fewer than before New Year's. These jobs will typically have their first interviews at the Pacific or Central Division meetings in late March or late April respectively. But many of these jobs will not be tenure track, but instead they are rather late announcements for temporary positions of one or more years. Some schools will do first interviews by phone, but these are still very rare. If you are seriously on the market, you should plan to go to the APA Eastern Division meetings and apply to jobs out of the October and November *JFPs*, and then keep applying throughout the year.

Many graduate students go to their first APA meeting when they go on the job market. While certainly understandable due to financial constraints, we strongly advise you to attend a meeting of the APA prior to going on the market. In particular, going to an Eastern APA meeting may help you avoid the "shell shock" of going to one of these meetings only when it "counts." We would also hope that attending these meetings without the pressure of being on the market will help you see the positive aspects of these conferences, especially the ability to reconnect with friends in the field and make new friends that you otherwise might not see in the academic year. Also, reading a paper or being a commentator might help get you a job in the following years.

4. THE "VITA"

One of the main ways to tell whether you are ready to go on the market is whether you can put together a respectable vita by early September. A vita is simply an academic resume, but it is not really very simple at all. You should show your vita to various faculty members and put it through the kind of drafting process that you would use for a term paper. For most

applicants, the vita should be two to three pages long, with three to four pages for dissertation abstract and summary of teaching evaluations as supplements to the vita.

- a) Address – list your departmental and home addresses and phone numbers. Also list where you can be reached right up to the beginning of the Eastern APA convention (December 27).
 - b) Area of specialization – this is optimally two or three areas of philosophy that you are especially qualified in. The dissertation is the primary, often only, basis for proof of a specialization. To figure out what would be good combinations of specialization, consult back issues of *Jobs for Philosophers* and then make sure that your dissertation really does cover those areas.
 - c) Area of competence – this is optimally four or five areas of philosophy that you are ready to offer courses in, different from your specialized areas. The best way to demonstrate this is in terms of what you have taught or TAed.
 - d) Publications or conference presentations – this could be one area of the vita or several, depending on what you have accomplished. Do not pad your vita with very minor things (or optimally, list them under a separate category for minor publications). Try to list the most significant first—they don't need to be in chronological order. Make sure to indicate whether something was peer refereed.
 - e) Teaching experience – list TA experience in a separate category from autonomous teaching. List the dates and places of the experience.
 - f) Special honors and awards – list whatever seems relevant to a job search in philosophy. Mainly focus on things you earned in graduate school.
 - g) Recommendation writers – list the names of all of those who will write letters for you and the addresses and phone numbers for them. This list should include all three (or four) members of your primary dissertation committee, as well as someone who will write specifically about your teaching—preferably someone who has good first-hand experience of it. And it is sometimes an especially good thing to be able to have someone write for you who is not a faculty member at your department or school. Those letters are more believable since the reputation of the recommendation writer is not tied up with whether you get a job or not. For example, if you give a conference paper and have a commentator who liked the paper, ask that person to write a letter for you; act similarly for a paper you have written about a prominent philosopher who has read your work and appreciated it, but such letters are limited in scope. It often is a good idea to give to prospective letter writers a letter from you that indicates what things optimally you'd like them to cover in the recommendation, and give them lots of time—ask them by Sept. 1.
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- h) List of graduate courses taken: list all courses (including those you audited) along with the name of the professor and the semester taken. It is often a good idea to group these by subject areas rather than merely to present them chronologically. **DO NOT LIST GRADES**—no one cares anymore.
- i) Summary of selected course evaluations: on no more than two sheets of paper, list five or six sets of teaching evaluations, displayed in graphic form that is easy to read
- j) Dissertation abstract—on one or two sheets of paper give a detailed description of the arguments of the dissertation. Provide a summary paragraph and long paragraphs on each chapter. [NOTE: if you can't easily provide this abstract then you are definitely not ready to go on the market.]

It is hard to stress enough how important it is to get the vita just right. The trick is not to pad the vita and yet to list all of the important stuff about your fledgling professional life.

On a more mundane subject, normal white paper and average size typeface work best. This is why you need lots of feedback and redraftings to get it right. If you have any questions about how you “appear” through the vita, ask people you can trust to give you frank advice, and then, with several such pieces of advice, make a decision about how you want to “appear.”

Do not waste your time applying for jobs that list an AOS different from the ones you list on the vita.

5. THE COVER LETTER

The cover letter for each job application should basically be a one-page attempt to demonstrate that you fit the job description. This means that you should highlight aspects of the vita that demonstrate your qualifications for the things mentioned in the job ad. You should have a paragraph on teaching and a paragraph on research, at bare minimum.

The cover letter is sometimes the only thing that members of a hiring committee read, so take your time with it and try to convey as much information as you can in a page or so without being excessively wordy or using terms and expressions that may be esoteric to a particular sub-field of philosophy—keep in mind that most people reading this letter will not be working in the specialty area in which you work. It is not a problem to go over one page in length, but remember that folks may not read the second page.

If at all possible, put the cover letter on departmental stationary. If you already have a job, this is easy. But if you are still in graduate school, most departments will let you use departmental stationary. If your department secretary complains about the cost of letterhead stock, merely ask for one sheet, and then photocopy it and print your covering letter on the photocopied departmental letterhead.

6. THE WRITING SAMPLE

You will need to supply at least one writing sample with each application. It is commonly thought that the writing sample should come from the dissertation. If it does not, people may wonder whether the dissertation is indeed almost done. You should take a chapter from the dissertation and make it a free-standing 25-page paper. If you have a paper that has been accepted for publication, you should include this as well; but especially if it is not from the dissertation, this should be included in addition to, not instead of, the dissertation chapter.

In all cases, the writing sample should be your very best work. After all, someone may actually read it and base the whole interview on it. How embarrassing it will be for you if you really don't think that thesis is defensible anymore. Writing samples should be very carefully edited for typos and infelicities of style, since this is the only piece of your work members of a hiring committee are likely to see. You should never send out a writing sample that has not been seen, and critiqued, by several people in your field, even if these are only fellow graduate students. Do not assume that even if people have seen earlier drafts of the writing sample, say when it was merely a chapter, that is good enough. As with everything else you send out for the purposes of getting a job, only send things out that others have looked at for you in advance. [Note: Your writing sample should not be the same as the professional paper you deliver on campus, lest folks think that you only have one good idea.]

7. WHICH SCHOOLS TO APPLY TO

Our standard advice is that if you are serious about the job market you should be able to apply to 30-80 jobs before Christmas. Of course, it is a waste of everyone's time to apply to jobs that you are not qualified for, or for which you do not have the right AOS. But so many jobs list open specializations, or merely list courses to be taught, that it shouldn't be hard to find quite a number of jobs that one is qualified for out of the 300-plus advertised in the October and November issues of *Jobs for Philosophers*.

Many students decide to do a more limited search. In order to accomplish this goal they try to determine which departments are most likely to hire them, and then only apply to those schools. For instance, if someone really wants to teach applied ethics, then one often applies only to jobs that list applied ethics as an AOS, rather than also to jobs that list ethical theory or political philosophy as specializations. In deciding whether to pursue this strategy, you should realize that departments often change their minds about precisely what they want. If you do a limited search, still apply to as many jobs as you can from those that you are qualified for. Remember that you don't have to take every job that is offered, but unless you get an offer from somewhere you won't get a job at all.

8. PREPARING FOR THE INTERVIEW

Before going to the APA Eastern convention for the first round of job interviews, everyone should first have a mock interview. If this is not a regular feature of your graduate program, mock interviews are easy to organize on your own. Merely find two or three faculty members, give them a copy of your vita a few minutes in advance (to make it seem like the real thing) and have them sit in a room with you for an hour and role-play.

The first half of the interview should be about research, and it should begin with someone asking you to describe your dissertation in about ten minutes. The “Spiel” should be memorized and well-rehearsed in front of a mirror. Of course, you will rarely get through ten minutes before questions start flying. And that’s good—since the whole point of an interview is to have a conversation where three things are learned: how good a philosopher you are, what kind of a teacher you are likely to be, and whether you will be a good conversationalist as a colleague. Since you won’t normally be allowed to finish the “Spiel” front-load it with the most interesting ideas.

The second half of the mock interview, like most of the real interviews you will face, should be focused on teaching. You should come prepared to discuss in detail how you would teach courses that would naturally fall out of your areas of specialization and competence. Be prepared to explain what you think students should get out of a given course in order to motivate your teaching approach. Prepare elaborately for these mock interviews, as well as for the real one, and bring sample syllabi for a host of courses you are likely to be asked to teach.

At the mock interview, those mocking you should put on different hats, preferably trying to simulate folks who will indeed interview you. For that reason, wait to do this until early to middle December so it is likely that you will have started to hear from schools. Also, ask the mockers to be brutally frank with you. A lot of what goes wrong in interviews is easy to fix if you know about it in advance. It is easy to redo your “Spiel.” And, if you bite your thumb or scratch your rear end, this can easily be corrected once you know it. If you look distracted, you can sit up straight and then lean forward. If you look too intense or nervous, you can slide down in the chair and slump a little. If you look too buttoned-up, unbutton; if you look too laid-back, button-up, etc.

When you get interviews, go onto the departmental web site and look at the courses that would naturally fall into your specialization and competence. It is also a good idea to try to get a sense of what type of school it is. And if this is a “plum” job for you, you might want to read some things that people in the department, especially those in your area, have written.

At nearly every real interview, you will be asked if you have any questions for them, so make that part of the mock interview as well. If you don’t know this you can be flummoxed by this question—so have one or two questions, ideally based on your knowledge of the department and the

curriculum, e.g.: “Are your 400 level courses only upper level undergraduate courses or are there both graduate students and undergraduate students in these courses?” Don’t be too provocative here and generally stay away from salary issues.

Very often you will be asked what your “next” project will be, now that you are nearing the end of your dissertation—you don’t have to have a super-detailed answer to this, but you should have some answer. Don’t try to make something up on the spur of the moment. A good strategy is to work up a project that spins off the dissertation, perhaps writing the chapter you never got to, or that is a natural follow-up to the dissertation. That way you can still talk about stuff you know something about.

9. WHAT TO WEAR

The best advice about what to wear is to wear what will make you comfortable. Men don’t need to wear a suit, nor do women. Jackets are pretty much required though. Don’t wear a loud tie or a loud scarf. You don’t want to be remembered later as that person with the weird thing on—much better to be remembered for what you said—the person who had a really interesting response to Smith’s hard question, for instance. Ties for men are not strictly required; but more men wear them than not, so... Women, as is true for men, can certainly wear pants, as long as they look professional, and indeed you might prefer them. In general, dress comfortably—the placement process will be uncomfortable enough as it is.

10. GENERAL CONVENTION ADVICE

If you can afford it, plan to spend two or three nights at the hotel where the convention occurs. And best not to have a roommate, unless it is someone you really trust. Things will be stressful enough without having anywhere to escape to (and watch cartoons, or the weather channel, or whatever relaxes you) between interviews. Also, for two of the evenings there will be receptions (still called “smokers” by most attendees, even though there hasn’t been any smoke or fire for many years) in the evening, often going on till late hours, and it is best not to have to navigate mass transit after midnight.

Generally, drink little if any alcohol during the convention. And try to stay away from folks who have been drinking and have interviewed you. Aside from this advice, though, there is nothing wrong with trying to find folks who interviewed you later in the day at the “smokers.” Many a job has been secured with an extra effort at finding and conversing with folks where you effectively get a second interview to only one for your competitors. Of course, don’t make a pest out of yourself. Look sheepish as you approach them, and ask if it is OK to continue the conversation that was begun earlier. Many departments make finding them at the smoker easy by reserving a table in the large hall where these events occur. When you enter the hall the APA will provide a list of the numbered tables that have been reserved by various departments. When departments have reserved a table they are signaling in part that they are encouraging

candidates to stop by for a chat after the interview, so you should plan on coming by.

11. APRES CONVENTION

After the convention go back home and prepare a campus job talk. Better yet, you should have had such a talk already planned out in October. In any event, you should not delay doing this since you might get a call only a few days after the meetings asking you to fly out for a campus visit. Almost everyone wants either a formal or informal paper, and you should get one ready right away just in case. It is also a good idea to go over the convention with your placement director or mentor and see if follow-up e-mails might be warranted. Also try to set up a mock job talk—round up your friends and stray faculty members and make them sit down for an hour with you while you do a dress rehearsal.

If you get a job offer and still haven't heard from a school you prefer, call them up. Nothing is lost here. If they don't want you, and they have any manners at all, then they'll let you down gently. But the worst thing is if they do want you but are merely being slow and you don't give them enough notice about a deadline for another job.

12. LATE BREAKING JOBS AND PERSISTENCE

Keep yourself open to the possibility that nothing will happen as a result of the first round of job interviews. Keep sending out applications until you are sure you'll be employed. This is psychologically hard to do, but it is necessary. Many of our students have gotten jobs in the second or third round, after the competition has diminished a bit. Those jobs are no less desirable, often, than those that interview at the Eastern. And always remember, you don't have to stay in the same position forever.

As was briefly mentioned above, some jobs that are advertised in the Fall, and comparatively more advertised in the Spring, are not tenure-track but limited term appointments for a year or more. These jobs can be important stepping-stones to a good tenure-track job. While many if not most of these limited term positions are for sabbatical replacements and so not renewable, some can become gateways for permanent positions at the same institution. In addition, having letters of reference from members of a department who have gotten to know you as a colleague, rather than as a grad student, can be very valuable in helping you to land a tenure-track job.

It is also increasingly common for departments to advertise full time postdoctoral fellowships of one to three years. You might even consider looking for and taking one of these positions rather than initially seeking a tenure-track job. Most postdocs do not teach full loads and will allow you to build a strong record of publications. Helpful hint: Many postdoctoral positions are not advertised in *Jobs for Philosophers* when they are part of a college or university's on-going "society of fellows" program or part of an established research center. Those interested in such positions should

consult the job listings in the *Chronicle of Higher Education* and individual university web-sites.

13. PROBLEMS

If problems (of harassment, intimidation, or general annoyance) occur, talk to the APA staff or to the ombudsperson for the meetings, normally a friendly member of the very APA committee that wrote this brochure, and hence someone who cares about you. It is simply unacceptable for any job candidate to be made to feel uncomfortable because of comments about physical appearance, and certainly about sex or race. There is no reason not to complain, and the members of our committee who attend every APA meeting will not treat such complaints lightly.

If you are disabled, your right to full access in every aspect of the placement process *ought* to be extended without question or repercussion, just as you should be able freely to disclose your disability status. The APA is now beginning to address these problems, as are many institutions. In the meantime, candidates must not hesitate to request necessary accommodations, yet still have to strategize about disclosure or access requests. At the campus visit stage, wheelchair-accessible spaces cannot be assumed, yet are probably one of the simpler accommodations for most institutions, which may not be prepared to provide interpreter services or assume the travel costs of assistants. Candidates should carefully think through how they will negotiate these issues. Currently, the APA will provide a quiet interview room for candidates or interviewers for whom the large common interviewing area is inaccessible for reasons of disability such as, but not limited to, deafness, hearing impairment, cognitive impairments, or speech impairments. Contact the placement service if you need this provision. Additional concerns related to access or ableist bias in the placement process may be taken up with the placement ombudsperson through the APA placement service.

PAPER SUBMISSION GUIDELINES

Anonymous Review: Papers in any area are welcome. All papers are anonymously reviewed. Author's name, institution, or references pertaining to the identity of the author must be removed from the paper, abstract, notes, and bibliography. Papers containing such identifying references may be rejected. Submitted papers are not returned to authors. Papers not accepted by one Division may be re-submitted for consideration to another Division. In submitting papers, authors warrant that those papers are entirely their own work or the joint work of the authors identified in the cover letter, and that, where appropriate, acknowledgement of the contributions of others has been made.

Graduate Student Travel Stipends and Awards: To compete for a Travel Stipend/Awards, at the time of submission on-line, the "Apply For Stipend" check-box must be checked. Those papers that are sent directly to the APA National Office must be accompanied by a separate cover page indicating that the paper should be considered for a Stipend/Award. Those papers that are to be considered for a Travel Stipend/Awards must include a letter on departmental stationery and signed by the department chair or graduate advisor verifying that the author of the paper is a student in residence. The letter may be sent by post, courier, or fax. A scan of the letter may be sent as an email attachment. **Stipend letters should be sent by fax to (302) 831-8690, or by mail to: The American Philosophical Association, University of Delaware, 31 Amstel Avenue, Newark, DE 19716 PRIOR to the paper submission deadline. If the verification documentation is not received by the institution on the institution's letterhead by the paper deadline, the paper will NOT be considered for a Travel Stipend/Award.** For more information, see <http://www.apaonline.org>.

Submissions for Eastern, Central, and Pacific Divisions should be sent to:

ATTN: [Eastern, Pacific or Central] Division Papers

The American Philosophical Association

University of Delaware

Newark, DE 19716

(302) 831-1112

NOTE: Authors of *accepted* papers will be asked to submit a copy of their abstract by e-mail to the National Office.

EASTERN DIVISION:

Meeting is held December 27-30.

Selections are announced in May or June.

Papers accepted by either the Central Division or the Pacific Division may not be presented at any subsequent meeting of the Eastern Division.

Papers exceeding 3,000 words will not be considered as colloquium papers.

Submissions for consideration as symposium papers must not exceed a length of 5,000 words. Abstracts for symposium papers must not exceed a length of 300 words. Authors should be aware that only a few papers are selected for presentation as symposium papers. If authors wish to have a shortened version of their paper considered as a colloquium paper, they should submit the appropriately shortened version, along with a shortened abstract, simultaneously with the submission of the symposium paper.

Any paper submitted without an abstract will not be considered. Any paper whose abstract is deemed unacceptable by the Program Committee will not be accepted. No revised abstract submitted after the paper's acceptance will be published in the *Proceedings and Addresses of The American Philosophical Association* without the approval of the Program Committee.

PACIFIC DIVISION:

Papers and posters in any area are welcome. All papers and posters are anonymously reviewed.

Important Notices

The Pacific Division only accepts on-line submissions made through the APA submission web site. Submissions by post and by email are not accepted.

The Pacific Division now invites submissions for poster presentations.

Important Dates

Deadline for membership dues and new applications (in time for submission deadline): August 13

Deadline for submissions: September 1

Deadline for receipt of proof of graduate student status (for travel stipends): September 1

Submission Eligibility

1. Authors (and all co-authors) must be members in good standing of the APA at the time of submission.
 2. Each member may submit up to one paper or poster. Co-authorship does not abrogate this rule.
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3. Any paper or poster which is under consideration for publication elsewhere will be considered, provided that it will not appear in print until after the Divisional meeting is held. If this is the case, indicate when and where the paper or poster is expected to be published.
4. A paper or poster that has been on the Main Program at a past APA meeting (any division), or will be on the Main Program at a future Central or Eastern Division meeting, cannot be presented as a Main Program colloquium or symposium paper or poster at the Pacific Division meeting. However, papers not accepted by another Division may be submitted for consideration by the Pacific Division.
5. No one who is scheduled to appear in an invited session on the Main Program of a meeting may also present a submitted paper or poster as part of that same Main Program. Members who have already agreed to participate in invited sessions on the Main Program of a meeting are asked not to submit papers or posters for that same meeting. Please note that this does not apply to sessions organized by APA Committees or by affiliated groups.

Preparation for Anonymous Review

6. Submissions must be prepared for anonymous review. The author's (and any co-author's) name, institution, and references pertaining to the identity of the author must be removed from the paper, abstract(s), notes, and bibliography. Papers containing identifying references may be rejected.

Submission Process

7. A complete submission includes an abstract of not more than 150 words. Poster submissions additionally include a long abstract of not more than 750 words. Colloquium papers must not exceed 3,000 words. Symposium papers must not exceed 5,000 words. Authors should be aware that only a few papers are selected for presentation as symposium papers. If authors wish to have a shortened version of their paper considered as a colloquium paper, they should submit the appropriately shortened version simultaneously with the submission of the symposium paper. (This will be considered a single submission.)
8. The Pacific Division only considers submissions made through the APA web site. Postal submissions are not longer accepted. Submissions are not accepted by email.

Graduate Student Travel Stipends

9. A stipend of \$300 will be awarded to any graduate student whose paper or poster is accepted by the Program Committee in its normal, anonymous-review process.
 10. Eligibility is restricted to APA members or associate members who are graduate students in residence and in good standing at a MA or PhD program in philosophy. It is the author's responsibility to ensure that a letter verifying that author of the paper or poster is a student in residence is sent to the APA. The letter must be printed on departmental stationery and signed by the department chair or
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graduate advisor. It may be uploaded at the time of submission or it may be sent separately by post, courier, fax, or a scan attached to an email. The deadline for faxes and email attachments is September 1. The postmark deadline for post or courier is September 1. The letter should be sent to:

Attn: Mike Morris

The American Philosophical Association

31 Amstel Avenue

Newark DE 19716

phone: (302) 831-1112

fax: (302) 831-8690

If appropriate verification documentation is not sent by the deadline, the submission will not be considered for a Travel Stipend.

11. Co-authored papers and posters are not eligible for Graduate Student Travel Stipends unless all authors are graduate students.

Authors' Warrants and Permissions

12. In submitting papers or posters, authors warrant that their submissions are entirely their own work or the joint work of the named co-authors, and that, where appropriate, acknowledgement of the contributions of others has been made.
13. In submitting a paper or poster, its authors grant to The American Philosophical Association the nonexclusive worldwide right to publish the abstract of the paper or poster in the *Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association* and on the APA and Pacific Division web sites, in the event that the paper is accepted. Its authors also grant to The American Philosophical Association the nonexclusive worldwide right to post a preprint of the paper, in the form in which it was submitted, on the Pacific Division web site, for up to four months prior to the meeting for which the paper is accepted. (The Division will not publish a preprint provided that the authors so notify the Pacific Division in writing at the time the paper is accepted.)
14. Authors agree to provide accurate email addresses as part of their contact information and must notify the Pacific Division of any address changes that may occur between the time of submission and the meeting.

CENTRAL DIVISION:

Selections are announced in September, or before when possible.

Papers exceeding 3,000 words will not be considered as colloquium papers.

Submissions for consideration as symposium papers must not exceed a length of 5,000 words. Abstracts for symposium papers must not exceed a length of 300 words. Authors should be aware that only a few papers are selected for presentation as symposium papers. If authors wish to have a

shortened version of their paper considered as a colloquium paper, they should submit the appropriately shortened version, along with a shortened abstract, simultaneously with the submission of the symposium paper.

The Central Division will not include a paper on its meeting program if that paper (1) has already been presented or is scheduled for presentation on the Main Program of another APA Divisional meeting or (2) has been accepted for publication and will have actually been published prior to the Central Division meeting in question. If a paper is accepted for presentation and the Program Committee subsequently learns that it will have been published prior to the meeting, then that paper will be withdrawn from the meeting program.

DRAFT MINUTES OF THE 2011 CENTRAL DIVISION BUSINESS MEETING

**AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL ASSOCIATION
CENTRAL DIVISION
DRAFT MINUTES: 2011 BUSINESS MEETING**

**MINNEAPOLIS HILTON HOTEL, MINNEAPOLIS, MN
MINNEAPOLIS GRAND BALLROOM G
FRIDAY, APRIL 1, 2011**

1. CALL TO ORDER. President Claudia Card called the meeting to order at 12:21 PM and appointed Robert Audi parliamentarian for the meeting.
 2. APPROVAL OF MINUTES. The draft Minutes of the 2010 meeting, as printed in *Proceedings and Addresses of the APA*, Vol. 84 #3 (January 2011), pp. 149-151, were approved without correction.
 3. REPORT ON THE 2011 EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE MEETING. Secretary-Treasurer Robin Smith reported on the actions of the 2011 Executive Committee [See the draft Minutes of the 2011 Executive Committee meeting published immediately following these Minutes.]
 4. REPORT OF THE NOMINATING COMMITTEE. Past President Sally Sedgwick presented the Report of the 2009-2010 Nominating Committee, as printed in *Proceedings and Addresses of the APA*, Vol. 84 #3 (January 2011), p. 157, with one correction: Janet Folina declined her nomination for Member at Large of the Executive Committee after the meeting program had been printed, and the Nominating Committee then nominated Valerie Tiberius in her place. President Card noted that the Division's Bylaws allow additional nominations to be added from the floor by any group of ten members present and asked if there were such nominations forthcoming. None were proposed. The list of nominees as prepared by the Nominating Committee is therefore to be sent to mail ballot.
 5. REPORTS FROM THE BOARD OF OFFICERS, THE NATIONAL OFFICE, AND APA COMMITTEES. Executive Director David Schrader gave both his own report as Executive Director and, in place of Board Chair Anthony Appiah, who was unable to attend, a report from the Board of Officers. He congratulated Claudia Card and Program Committee Chair Bill E. Lawson for organizing an excellent program for the 2011 meeting and noted that attendance both at last year's and this year's Central Division meetings had been very good.
-

Reporting on behalf of the Board of Officers, he reviewed actions taken at the 2010 meeting of the Board, including the establishment of a committee on reducing the carbon footprint of the APA; an overview of the APA's financial situation in comparison with other professional societies, many of which, unlike the APA, derive income from higher meeting registration fees and the publication of journals; the acceptance of a proposal from De Gruyter to establish a Kant Prize; continued discussion of the Board of the issue of departmental rankings; and finally, the election of Michael Bratman as the next Chair of the Board, to take office July 1, 2011.

Reporting as Executive Director, Schrader reviewed the APA's efforts to persuade the governing boards of several institutions (among them Howard University and the University of Nevada) to reconsider their decisions to eliminate or drastically curtail Philosophy programs, noting that the APA had had successes in these efforts. Several members present, including Sally Sedgwick and Alison Jaggar, asked further questions about these cases and others and complimented Schrader on the effectiveness of these interventions. Schrader next discussed the plans for upgrading information technology (IT) support in the National Office and responded to questions about these plans.

6. **RECOGNITION OF GRADUATE STUDENT TRAVEL STIPEND WINNERS.** President Card read the names of those who had received Graduate Student Travel Stipend Awards, as printed on pages 5-6 of the *Proceedings and Addresses of the APA*, Vol. 84 #3 (January 2011), with the addition of Christian Laasik, whom the Executive Committee added to the list at its meeting on the previous Wednesday.
 7. **PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE BYLAWS OF THE CENTRAL DIVISION.** Secretary-Treasurer Smith presented two proposed amendments to the Bylaws of the Central Division. The first, proposed by the Executive Committee, is to change the procedure for amending the Bylaws from approval by a two-thirds majority vote at a Business Meeting to approval by a two-thirds majority of those voting in a mail ballot. The second, proposed by the 2010 meeting of the APA Board of Officers, is to insert the words "or secure electronic" between the word "mail" and the word "ballot" in two places [NOTE: THE TWO PROPOSED AMENDMENTS ARE PRINTED ON PP. 161-163 OF THE *PROCEEDINGS AND ADDRESSES OF THE APA*, VOL. 84 #3 (JANUARY 2011)]. Since the first of these would take effect immediately if adopted and thus require a mail ballot for any additional amendments, Smith proposed that the second be considered first. The second amendment was adopted unanimously. Next, the first amendment was adopted unanimously.
 8. **PROPOSED AMENDMENT TO THE BYLAWS OF THE APA.** Secretary-Treasurer Smith presented an amendment to the Bylaws of the APA proposed by the Board of Officers that would change Paragraph 7.4.A, giving the conditions of eligibility for election of the Chair of the Board, to read as follows:
"The Chair of the Board shall be elected by majority vote of the Board for a three-year term, once renewable.
-

A person is eligible to serve as Chair of the Board who meets the following conditions:

- a) Is at the time of election a member in good standing of the American Philosophical Association; and
- b) Is not at the time also serving as the Executive Director of the American Philosophical Association; and
- c) Meets one or both of the following conditions:
 - (1) Is or has been a president of a Division;
 - (2) Has at the time of election served for three or more years as a member of the Board.

When the terms of office of the Chair and the Executive Director terminate simultaneously, the term of the Chair shall be extended for one year.”

In a lengthy discussion, to which members Robert Audi, Julia Driver, Alison Jaggar, Claudia Card, and Sally Sedgwick contributed, the meeting debated whether to amend the proposed amendment before submitting it to mail ballot of the Division. At the end of the discussion, Sally Sedgwick moved as follows:

“Resolved, that the Central Division submit the proposed amendment by mail ballot to the members of the Central Division with a summary of the discussion of this amendment that took place at the 2011 Business Meeting of the Division.”

Robert Audi seconded, and the motion carried unanimously.

[Note: the summary of the discussion, as distributed to Central Division members in conjunction with the ballot on the proposed amendment, is printed as an Appendix following these Minutes.]

9. NEW BUSINESS. Under New Business, Sally Sedgwick and others noted that it is sometimes difficult to locate the room in which the Business Meeting is being held and requested that in the future, the time and place of the Meeting be publicized more prominently.
 10. MEMORIAL. President Card read the names of those members of the Association who had died since the last meeting of the Central Division:
 1. Richard (Brad) Angell
 2. Kurt Baier (Eastern Division President, 1977-78; Chair., APA Board of Officers, 1983-86)
 3. William A. Beebe
 4. Carolyn C. Black
 5. John F. Boler
 6. William Randolph Carter
 7. Charles Caton
 8. Paul Dietrichson
 9. Bernard Elevitch
 10. Joong Fang
-

11. C. S. Feagins
12. Joseph Flanagan
13. Lauren E. Fleming
14. Lawrence C. Foard
15. Anthony C. Genova
16. John J. Glanville
17. Reinhardt S. Grossmann
18. Paul Hoffman
19. Bruce A. Jannusch
20. Stanley B. Kaufman
21. Michael Kerlin
22. Douglas Knapp
23. Richard F. Kuhns
24. Richard Laplante (Student Associate Member)
25. Robert J. Lipkin
26. Ralph M. McInerney
27. Robert K. Meyer
28. John E. Murdoch
29. Warren Nord
30. William Placher*
31. Kurt Pritzig
32. Carl Putz
33. Mary Jane Reagan
34. Leroy Rouner**
35. John Edward Smith (Eastern Division President, 1981-82)
36. Jordan H. Sobel
37. Lawrence H. Starkey
38. Steven K. Strange
39. Stewart Thau
40. William W. Thomas
41. Sue Weinberg
42. William B. Williamson

**William Placher died in 2008. The APA was notified of his death 10/19/2010.*

***Leroy Rouner died in 2006. The APA was notified of his death 2/2010.*

11. ADJOURNMENT. The meeting was adjourned at 1:25 PM.

Respectfully submitted,
Robin Smith, Secretary-Treasurer
APA Central Division

APPENDIX TO THE MINUTES OF THE 2011 BUSINESS MEETING

The following summary of the discussion of the proposed amendment to the Bylaws of the APA was included with the ballot on that amendment sent to Central Division members in the 2011 elections:

On motion by Sally Sedgwick, with second by Robert Audi, the 2011 Central Division Business Meeting adopted the following resolution concerning the amendment to the Bylaws of the APA proposed by the Board of Officers at its 2010 meeting:

“Resolved, that the Central Division submit the proposed amendment by mail ballot to the members of the Central Division with a summary of the discussion of this amendment that took place at the 2011 Business Meeting of the Division.”

The motion was carried unanimously. In accordance with this motion, a summary of the discussion appears below.

In discussion at the 2011 Business Meeting, members raised the concern that selecting a Chair of the Board of Officers who had not previously been elected as a Divisional President would open the position of Chair to persons who might not have achieved the distinction that nominating committees have characteristically taken to be appropriate for the presidency. It was observed that the Chair often functions, both symbolically and substantively, as the representative of the academic profession of philosophy in many contexts and thus should possess the strongest record of achievement as a philosopher as well as abilities as a manager or administrator. Since the primary consideration in election to presidency of a Division is achievements as a philosopher, election to that office represents a broad endorsement by members of the Association of one's philosophical achievements. By contrast, for some positions on the Board of Officers, other qualifications are more important. [The Secretary-Treasurer adds as an example the position of Secretary-Treasurer.] It was noted in discussion that a major reason why the Board of Officers proposed this amendment is the difficulty that has sometimes been encountered in finding three candidates for the position of Chair of the Board from among prior Division Presidents who are willing to take on this burdensome office. Members tentatively advanced alternative versions of the proposed amendment, for instance language to the effect that if, in the process of selecting nominees, it has proved impossible to find three candidates from among past Division presidents within a certain period of time (perhaps three months), then eligibility for nomination would be

extended to other Board members as proposed. No member present made a motion to amend the proposed amendment, however.

MINUTES OF THE 2011 CENTRAL DIVISION EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE MEETING

AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL ASSOCIATION
CENTRAL DIVISION
DRAFT MINUTES OF THE 2011 EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE MEETING

MINNEAPOLIS HILTON HOTEL, BOARD ROOM 1
MINNEAPOLIS, MINNESOTA
WEDNESDAY, MARCH 30, 2011

Present: Claudia Card, Julia Driver, Marya Schechtman, Sally Sedgwick, Russ Shafer-Landau, Robin Smith. *Absent:* Lynn Joy, Peter Railton

1. President Claudia Card called the meeting to order at 7:01 PM.
2. Draft minutes of the 2010 meeting, as printed on pp. 157-160 of issue 84:3 (January 2011) of the *Proceedings of the APA*, were approved as printed.
3. The Agenda for the meeting was approved.
4. Past President Sally Sedgwick presented the report of the Nominating Committee, as follows:

For Vice-President and President-Elect:

Margaret Atherton (University of Wisconsin–Milwaukee)
Daniel Hausman (University of Wisconsin–Madison)
Alison Jaggar (University of Colorado, Boulder)

For Member-at-Large of the Executive Committee, term 2011-2014:

Gary Gutting (University of Notre Dame)
Mark Van Roojen (University of Nebraska)
Valerie Tiberius (University of Minnesota)

For the 2010-2011 Nominating committee (4 to be elected):

Berit Brogaard (University of Missouri, St. Louis)
Juli Eflin (Ball State University)
John Doris (Washington University in St. Louis)
Peter Hylton (University of Illinois, Chicago)
Mi-Kyoung Lee (University of Colorado, Boulder)
Fred Rush (University of Notre Dame)

Lisa Shabel (Ohio State University)

Corliss Swain (St. Olaf College)

Sedgwick noted that this differs from the Report as published in the 2011 Meeting Program because Janet Folina declined her nomination for the 2011-2012 Nominating Committee in January 2011, following which the Nominating Committee proposed Valerie Tiberius instead.

5. Secretary-Treasurer Robin Smith reported on the activities of the 2012 Program Committee, noting that it was in the process of completing the invited program. The members of the committee are:
 - Sanford Goldberg (Northwestern University), *Chair*
 - James Bohman (St. Louis University)
 - James P. Butler (Berea College)
 - Janice L. Dowell (University of Nebraska)
 - Reinaldo Elugardo (University of Oklahoma)
 - Claire Horisk (University of Missouri)
 - Anja Jauernig (University of Pittsburgh)
 - Diane Jeske (University of Iowa)
 - Jennifer Lackey (Northwestern University)
 - Amy M. Schmitter (University of Alberta)
 - Robin Smith (Texas AM University), *ex officio*
 - Anita Superson (University of Kentucky)
 - Michael Titelbaum (University of Wisconsin–Madison)
 - Andrea Westlund (University of Wisconsin–Milwaukee)
6. The Executive Committee approved the applications of the Charles Peirce Society and the Experimental Philosophy Society for affiliation with the Central Division and provisionally approved the application of the American Maritain Association provided that that group provide a copy of its constitution to the Secretary-Treasurer. Secretary-Treasurer Smith noted that an inquiry about affiliation was also received from the David Kellog Lewis Society but that documents had not yet been received.
7. Secretary-Treasurer Smith reported that no actions had been taken by the Executive Committee since the last annual meeting.
8. Secretary-Treasurer Smith presented the financial report for 2010-11. He noted that the report is necessarily an estimate since income and expenses for the 2011 meeting will not be known until after the meeting. Tentative projections are for higher registration income but lower book exhibit income than budgeted. Participation by publishers in the book exhibits continues to decline not only because of the state of the economy but also because of long-term changes in the publishing industry.
9. Secretary-Treasurer Smith reported on advertising revenue among the three Divisions, noting that the Central Division was allocated a total

of \$13,987 in fiscal 2010-11 to cover the costs of the 2011 Program Committee meeting, Graduate Student Travel Stipends in excess of \$3,000, and some audiovisual costs at the 2010 meeting.

10. The Executive Committee awarded a Graduate Student Travel Stipend to Kristjan Laasik (in addition to those awards already noted in the meeting program).
11. The Executive Committee briefly discussed the amendments to the Division Bylaws proposed by the 2010 Executive Committee meeting, those proposed by the 2010 APA Board of Officers meeting, and the amendment to the Bylaws of the APA proposed by the 2010 Board of Officers meeting. Since these matters must go to the Business Meeting for discussion, no actions were taken.
12. Secretary-Treasurer Smith presented a proposed budget for 2010-11.
13. The Executive Committee approved the agenda for the Business Meeting on motion by Sedgwick, seconded by Shafer-Landau.
14. The meeting adjourned at 8:21 PM.

Respectfully submitted,

Robin Smith

Secretary-Treasurer, APA Central Division

REPORT OF THE 2011-2012 NOMINATING COMMITTEE

The 2011-2012 Central Division Nominating Committee, composed of Claudia Card (Chair), John Doris, Peter Hylton, Mi-Kyoung Lee, and Lisa Shabel, proposes the following nominations for 2012:

FOR VICE-PRESIDENT AND PRESIDENT-ELECT:

Noël Carroll (City University of New York)
Robert Cummins (University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign)
Steven Nadler (University of Wisconsin–Madison)

FOR DIVISIONAL REPRESENTATIVE, TERM 2012-2015:

Lisa Downing (Ohio State University)
Paula Gottlieb (University of Wisconsin–Madison)
Anthony Laden (University of Illinois, Chicago)

FOR EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE MEMBER-AT-LARGE, TERM 2012-2015:

Kate Abramson (Indiana University, Bloomington)
Claire Horisk (University of Missouri)
Nick Huggett (University of Illinois, Chicago)

FOR THE 2012-2013 NOMINATING COMMITTEE (FOUR TO BE ELECTED):

Berit Brogaard (University of Missouri, St. Louis)
Charlotte Brown (Illinois Wesleyan University)
John Doris (Washington University in St. Louis)
Jennifer Lackey (Northwestern University)
Constance Meinwald (University of Illinois, Chicago)
Frederick Rauscher (Michigan State University)
Naomi Scheman (University of Minnesota)
Tim Schroeder (Ohio State University)
Deborah Tollefsen (University of Memphis)

The By-Laws of the Central Division contain this provision concerning nominations from the floor at the Business Meeting (Article 1.c):

“Upon receipt of the report of the Nominating Committee, additional nominations for the next year’s Nominating Committee, for officers, and members of the Executive Committee, may be made from the floor by any ten members of the Association affiliated with the Central

Division. Before ballots are prepared, the individuals nominated shall be invited by mail to signify their willingness to stand for election. No name shall appear on a ballot unless the individual named has filed a signed statement of willingness to stand for election.”

RESULTS OF THE 2011 APA CENTRAL DIVISION ELECTIONS

In the May-June 2011 Central Division elections:

- Margaret Atherton was elected Vice President for 2011-2012 (and thus President for 2012-2013).
 - Valerie Tiberius was elected Member at Large of the Executive Committee for the term 2011-2014.
 - John Doris, Peter Hylton, Mi-Kyoung Lee, and Lisa Shabel were elected to the 2011-2012 Nominating Committee.
 - The proposed amendment to the By-Laws of the APA was approved by a vote of 259 in favor and 24 opposed. Since this proposed amendment has also been approved by the Eastern and Pacific Divisions, the amendment is therefore adopted.
-

LIST OF ADVERTISERS AND BOOK EXHIBITORS

DUKE UNIVERSITY PRESS (A-176)

INDIANA UNIVERSITY PRESS (A-180)

MCGILL-QUEEN'S UNIVERSITY PRESS (A-174)

PHILOSOPHER'S INFORMATION CENTER (A-INSIDE BACK COVER)

PHILOSOPHY DOCUMENTATION CENTER (A-OUTSIDE BACK COVER)

PROGRAM IN THE HUMANITIES AND HUMAN VALUES AT UNC (A-180)

ROUTLEDGE (A-178-179)

SUNY PRESS (A-INSIDE FRONT COVER)

WESTVIEW PRESS (A-177)

FORMS

ADVANCE REGISTRATION FORM

HOTEL RESERVATION INFORMATION

RECEPTION TABLE REQUEST FORM

PROGRAM SUGGESTION FORM

CENTRAL 2012

ADVANCE REGISTRATION FORM FEBRUARY 15 – 18, 2012, CHICAGO, ILLINOIS

Fax this form with your credit card payment to Linda Smallbrook (302-831-3372). No cover sheet is needed. Or, mail this form with your payment to Linda Smallbrook, APA, University of Delaware, Newark, DE 19716. Payment must accompany your registration form. Note that on-site registration is now more expensive than advance registration.

Please print legibly. This information is used for your name badge.

Name: _____

Affiliation: _____

Street Address: _____

City, State, Zip: _____

Email: _____ Phone: _____

Advance Registration Fees (**Received by February 1, 2012** at the National Office)

- _____ \$10.00 APA Student Members
- _____ \$60.00 APA Regular, International & Emeritus Members
- _____ \$90.00 Nonmembers

We cannot process any advanced registrations at the National Office past the February 1st deadline. After that date you will need to register in Chicago and at higher rates: \$90 for regular/international/emergitus members; \$120 for non-members and \$15 for student members.

Placement Registration

Interviewers should also complete the Placement Registration Form. **Candidates** should check the space below if planning to use the service. Candidates **must** be a member of the APA in order to use the Placement Service. Placement is a free service for all current APA members.

_____ I will be a job candidate.

___ 1) **Check* (Payable to APA)**

*The APA can only accept checks drawn on a U.S. bank, in U.S. Dollars.

___ 2) Visa MasterCard Exp. Date

Last 3 digits on back of card

- - -

Name as it appears on Card: _____

Signature of Authorization: _____

Email: _____ Phone #: _____

APA CENTRAL 2012 HOTEL RESERVATION INFORMATION
American Philosophical Association, Central Meeting,
February 15 – 18, 2012
The Palmer House Hilton, 17 East Monroe Street, Chicago, IL 60603
Toll Free Number: 888-933-5363

Room rates for regular members and nonmembers begin at \$185.00 per night. Student room rates are \$129.00 per night. Please note that those persons making a student room reservation will be verified to confirm student status. If the person making the reservation is not a student member they will be charged the regular and nonmember rate. The tax rate for the Palmer House Hilton is 15.4%. Check-in time is 3:00 pm and check-out is 11:00 am. Please be sure to let the hotel know if you are physically challenged and will need special accommodations. Rooms are available on a first-come, first-served basis and subject to availability. **Reservations must be made by January 15 to be assured the APA rate.**

The Palmer House Hilton prefers that we make our reservations online.

Regular, nonmembers and students should use the following link:

<http://www1.hilton.com/en/US/hi/hotel/CHIPHHH-Palmer-House-a-Hilton-Hotel-Illinois/index.do>

The code for regular and nonmembers is AMP.

The code for student members is AMS.

For those persons unable to reserve online, please call the Hilton reservations department at 888-933-5363 and explain that you are attending the APA 2011 Central Meeting at the Palmer House Hilton and give them the appropriate codes listed above.

CENTRAL 2012

RECEPTION TABLE FORM FEBRUARY 15 – 18, 2012, THE PALMER HOUSE HILTON

Fax this form with your credit card payment to Linda Smallbrook (302-831-3372). No cover sheet is needed. Or, if you prefer, mail this form with your payment to Linda Smallbrook, APA, University of Delaware, Newark, DE 19716. Payment must accompany your registration form.

IMPORTANT NOTE: ALL TABLE RESERVATIONS MUST BE PAID FOR AT THE TIME OF PLACING THE RESERVATION. WE WILL BE UNABLE TO PROCESS YOUR FORM WITHOUT THE ACCOMPANYING PAYMENT. THANK YOU FOR YOUR UNDERSTANDING.

Receptions are scheduled to be held in the **Red Lacquer Room on the 4th floor on Thursday, February 16** (8:30 p.m. to midnight) and in the **Red Lacquer Room on Friday, February 17** (9:00 p.m. to midnight). The first night reception provides beer and soft drinks at no charge. **Admittance is by registration name badge or ticket only.** The second night reception is a cash bar. The charge for a table at both receptions is \$25.00 total. The deadline for receipt of reservations is February 1st. After that time we will still take reservations but your school's name will not appear in the handout.

To reserve a table, please complete the following and return to Linda Smallbrook, APA, University of Delaware, Newark, DE 19716; or fax the form to 302-831-3372.

Name: _____

School/Organization: _____

E-mail address: _____

Please select an option for payment and fill out the form completely if paying by credit card.

___ 1) **Check* (Payable to APA)**

***The APA can only accept checks drawn on a U.S. bank, in U.S. Dollars.**

___ 2) Visa MasterCard Exp. Date

Last 3 digits on back of card

- - -

Name as it appears on Card: _____

Signature of Authorization: _____

Email: _____ Phone #: _____

APA CENTRAL DIVISION PROGRAM SUGGESTION FORM

In order to foster diversity of and participation in the program of the Central Division, the Executive Committee invites submission of the following form:

(1) I would like to hear papers at the Divisional Meetings in the following areas:

(2) I would like to be considered as a Session Chair for papers in one of the following areas:

(3) I would like to be considered as a Paper Commentator for papers in one of the following areas:

To be considered as Commentator or Chair for the 2013 meeting, please submit this form, along with a CV, by August 1, 2012, to:

Anne Jaap Jacobson, Chair
2013 APA Central Program Committee
Philosophy Department
University of Houston
Houston, TX 77204-3004
ajjacobson@uh.edu

This form may be reproduced, and suggestions under (1) may be sent to Professor Jacobson or to:

Robin Smith, Secretary-Treasurer
APA Central Division
Department of Philosophy
Texas A&M University
College Station, TX 77843-4237
rasmith@tamu.edu


If you would like acknowledgement of receipt of your CV and form, please enclose a stamped, self-addressed postcard.

APA REGISTRATION POLICY

It is the policy of the APA that all persons attending sessions, including those who are participating as speakers, commentators or session chairs, are required to register for each meeting they attend. In addition, we have always recommended that all participants wear their APA badges during session hours to identify themselves as registered participants. In an effort better to enforce this policy we have begun a system of checking meeting attendees, randomly and anyone whom we suspect might not be registered, for proof of registration. If you are asked to provide proof of registration and are unable to do so, you will be asked to register immediately in order to enable you to attend sessions. Registration fees help subsidize every divisional meeting. Without that income we will be unable to ensure the quality and excellence of our meetings which you have come to expect. We thank you for your continued cooperation.

HOTEL DIAGRAMS

THIRD FLOOR



SIXTH FLOOR

