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THE AMERICAN
PHILOSOPHICAL ASSOCIATION

Central Division Program

The American Philosophical
Association
Central Division

One Hundred Tenth
Annual Meeting



Hilton New Orleans Riverside
New Orleans, Louisiana

February 20–23, 2013

Proceedings and Addresses of The American Philosophical Association

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Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association, the major publication of the American Philosophical Association, is published five times each academic year in the months of September, November, January, February, and May.

Each annual volume contains the programs for the meetings of the three divisions; the membership list; presidential addresses; news of the association and its divisions and committees, and announcements of interest to philosophers. Other items of interest to the community of philosophers may be included by decision of the editor or the APA board of officers.

Microfilm copies are available through National Archive Publishing Company, Periodicals/Acquisitions Dept., P.O. Box 998, Ann Arbor, MI 48106-0998. (<http://www.napubco.com>). Certain back issues may be obtained from the APA.

All correspondence should be sent to the APA, 31 Amstel Avenue, University of Delaware, Newark, DE 19716, directed to the appropriate staff member as follows: Erin Shepherd for inquiries and publication copy concerning programs of the divisional meetings, general issues of the *Proceedings*, announcements, awards to members, and advertising; Janet Sample for membership information, address changes, and memorial minutes; and the executive director for letters to the editor.

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LETTER FROM THE SECRETARY-TREASURER

To All Members of the Association:

You are cordially invited to attend the one hundred tenth annual meeting of the Central Division at the Riverside Hilton Hotel, New Orleans, February 20–23, 2013. This year's program committee has organized an extensive array of thirty-five colloquia, seven submitted symposia, twenty-seven invited symposia, eight author-meets-critics sessions, and three invited paper sessions. Our program also includes twelve sessions organized by APA committees and over sixty-seven affiliated group sessions. In addition, Elisabeth Lloyd will give the John Dewey Lecture.

This issue of the *Proceedings* contains a complete convention program, including scheduled group meetings. At the back of this issue, you will find a meeting registration form, a form for reserving tables at the receptions, and maps of the hotel's location and meeting rooms. Many of these materials are also available on the APA website. Also included are information forms concerning the 2014 meeting and the 2013–2014 nominating committee for your use if you have suggestions for future meetings or wish to offer your services to the division.

1. HOTEL INFORMATION

The 2013 APA Central Division Meeting will be held at the Hilton New Orleans Riverside, Two Poydras Street, New Orleans, LA 70130 (telephone (504) 561-0500). The room rate for regular members and non-members is \$199 per night. The student room rate is \$169 per night. These room rates include complimentary in-room Internet access. Rooms are available on a first-come, first-served basis and are subject to availability. Reservations must be made by January 21 to be assured the APA rate. Please note that student room reservations will be verified to confirm student status. If the person making the reservation is not a student member he or she will be charged the regular member or non-member rate. The tax rate for the Hilton New Orleans Riverside is 13%. There is also a \$2.00 occupancy tax and a \$1.00 city tax. Check-in time is 3:00 p.m. and check-out time is noon. Please be sure to let the hotel know if you are physically challenged and will need special accommodations. The Hilton New Orleans Riverside prefers reservations be made online at the following URL: <http://bit.ly/apa2013centralhotel>. From this URL you will be able to select your member type (regular, non-member, or student) and register for the hotel room at the appropriate rate. If you are unable to reserve online, please call the hotel at (504) 561-0500. For further information, consult the APA's website at <http://www.apaonline.org>.

The Hilton New Orleans Riverside provides detailed travel information on its website at <http://www3.hilton.com/en/hotels/louisiana/hilton-new-orleans-riverside-MSYNHHH/maps-directions/index.html>.

2. MEETING REGISTRATION

The APA Central and Eastern Divisions have adopted the following rates for registration at their meetings effective for the 2012–2013 academic year:

Regular APA Members	\$100 on-site	\$80 advance
Student APA Members	\$35 on-site	\$25 advance
Non-APA Members	\$150 on-site	\$120 advance

The Central Division rebates a portion of the member's and non-member's fees to the APA national office to support the general costs of the APA. All remaining registration income is used to support the expenses of the meeting and the operations of the Central Division. You may pre-register for the meeting through the APA's website at <http://www.apaonline.org/> or by using the pre-registration information form found at the back of this issue. Advance registration rates are available until February 20 for registration through the website; for advance registration by mail, the deadline is January 23. Payment is accepted by cash (on-site only), check, or credit card.

Registration includes admission to the reception on Thursday evening; non-registrants, such as spouses, partners, or family members, who wish to attend this reception may purchase tickets at the registration desk, or at the door of the reception, for \$10. ***Please note that all persons attending the convention are required to register. This includes invited participants and participants in group meetings.*** Registration fees are vital to the conduct of APA conventions, since convention revenues are the principal source of revenue with which the divisions support the costs of holding meetings.

3. INFORMATION ON SESSION LOCATIONS

Following the procedure begun in all three divisions in 2008–2009, this printed program does not include the rooms in which individual meeting sessions are to be held. Instead, this information will be made available at the meeting itself, in a program supplement that will be distributed at the meeting registration desk on the third floor.

4. PLACEMENT SERVICE

The placement service will open for business at 5:00 p.m. on Wednesday, February 20, and continue in operation through noon, Saturday, February 23 (see the program for specific times, and check the meeting registration desk on the third floor for information about the locations of placement service operations). Job seekers are urged to pre-register for placement when registering for the meeting online, or by indicating candidacy on the pre-registration form provided at the back of this issue. Since many job interviews are pre-arranged on the basis of advertisements in *Jobs for Philosophers (JFP)*, and since the placement service will not post notices

of positions that have already been advertised in *JFP*, job seekers are advised to consult *JFP* in advance of the meeting. (*JFP* is available to APA members through the APA's website.)

Whether interviewing in a suite or at a table, all interviewers must be registered for the meeting. In addition, each interviewing *department* must register for the placement service. If registering for the meeting online, *one* interviewer per department should select the option to register for the placement service. If registering by mail or fax, please submit an "Advance Registration" form for each interviewer, and one "Placement Service Registration for Interviewing Departments" form for each interviewing department (these forms are located at the end of this issue of the *Proceedings*).

Policy on Interviews in Sleeping Rooms. At its 1994 meeting the APA board of officers adopted the policy of prohibiting job interviews in sleeping rooms at divisional meetings. We ask your cooperation in implementing this policy. Interviews in the living rooms of suites are, of course, permissible under this policy, and interviewing departments may also make use of the placement service interview area.

A placement ombudsperson, either the chair or a member of the APA Committee on Academic Career Opportunities and Placement, will be available in the placement service area for anyone encountering problems with the interviewing process.

5. BOOK EXHIBITS

The publishers' book exhibits will be located on the second floor in Hilton Exhibit Center A. Exhibits will be open 9:00 a.m.–5:00 p.m. on Thursday and Friday and 9:00 a.m.–noon on Saturday.

6. RECEPTIONS AND RECEPTION TABLES

The reception on Thursday, February 21, will begin at 8:30 p.m. in the Jefferson Ballroom. Complimentary beer and soft drinks are provided at this reception, which is open only to those who have either registered for the convention or purchased special tickets for the reception (available to spouses, partners, or family members for \$10 both at the registration desk and at the door of the reception). The presidential reception on Friday, February 22, will begin at 9:00 p.m. in the Jefferson Ballroom, and refreshments will be available on a cash-bar basis.

Departments and societies are invited to reserve one of the large round tables at the receptions. These tables will be numbered, and a chart will be posted and distributed at registration giving the table locations along with an index showing, for each table, who has reserved it. The fee for reserving a table is \$25. If you wish to reserve a table, please use the form included in the back pages of this issue of the *Proceedings* and on the APA's website or call or email Linda Smallbrook at the APA national office (phone (302) 831-1113, fax (302) 831-3372, email lindas@udel.edu). The deadline for making table reservations is January 28, 2013.

7. BUSINESS MEETING

The annual business meeting of the Central Division will be held Friday, February 22, at 12:15 p.m. in the Jefferson Ballroom. Regular items of business include reports from divisional and national officers and committees and the nomination of officers for 2013–2014. The 2013 nominating committee will present a slate of nominees for the positions of vice president, divisional representative, member-at-large of the executive committee, and the four members of the 2013 nominating committee. The report of the nominating committee will be posted in the registration area twenty-four hours prior to the business meeting and is also printed on page 146 of this issue of the *Proceedings*. Nominations from the floor are also accepted if proposed by a group of ten members. In accordance with divisional rules, voting for candidates will be by mail or secure electronic ballot.

Please note that only APA members who are affiliates of the Central Division have voting rights at this meeting. The list of regular members that appears in the November issue of the *Proceedings* is used to determine the list of eligible voters for the three subsequent divisional meetings. Certification of persons as voting affiliates of the Central Division will take place at the entrance to the business meeting itself, for those wishing to attend and vote.

The minutes of the 2012 executive committee meeting and draft minutes of the 2012 business meeting are published in this issue of the *Proceedings*, pp. 140–145.

8. PRESIDENTIAL ADDRESS

President Margaret Atherton will present the 2013 presidential address, “Dr. Johnson Kicks the Stone, Or Can the Immaterialisms of Berkeley’s *Principles* and *Three Dialogues* Be Reconciled,” at 6:00 p.m. on Friday. She will be introduced by Steven Nadler, vice president of the Central Division.

9. JOHN DEWEY LECTURE

The John Dewey Lectures, generously sponsored by the John Dewey Foundation, have been presented annually at each American Philosophical Association meeting since 2006. Each John Dewey Lecture is given by a prominent and senior American philosopher who is invited to reflect, broadly and in an autobiographical spirit, on philosophy in America. The Central Division is pleased to announce that the 2013 John Dewey Lecture will be given by Elisabeth Lloyd on Thursday, February 21, at 2:20 p.m. (Session II-B). The lecture will be introduced by Alison Wylie. A reception, hosted by the John Dewey Foundation, will follow in the same room.

10. GRADUATE STUDENT TRAVEL STIPEND RECIPIENTS

As in past years, the Central Division executive committee awards stipends of \$300 each to help defray the travel expenses of graduate students whose papers are accepted for the program. Starting with the 2006 program, the executive committee has decided to provide a stipend for every graduate

student whose paper is accepted. The executive and program committees are pleased to announce the names of the twenty-two recipients of stipends for this year:

Joseph Q. Adams (Rice University): “Stories and Their Place in Theories,” symposium paper in session IV-F (Friday, 12:45 p.m.)

Nathaniel Bulthuis (Cornell University): “A Problem of Material Supposition in the Semantics of Walter Burley,” paper 1 in Session II-J, “Medieval Philosophy” (Thursday, 2:20 p.m.)

Amber Carlson (University of Notre Dame): “A True Mode of Union: Reconciling Real Distinction and True Union in the Cartesian Human Being,” paper 1 in session III-H, “Seventeenth Century Metaphysics” (Friday, 9:00 a.m.)

Patrick Connolly (University of North Carolina–Chapel Hill): “Lockean Superaddition and Lockean Humility,” paper 3 in session III-H, “Seventeenth Century Metaphysics” (Friday, 9:00 a.m.)

Matt Duncan (University of Virginia): “New Possibilities for the Cosmological Argument,” paper 2 in session V-J, “Philosophy of Religion” (Friday, 3:00 p.m.)

Michael Istvan (Texas A&M University): “Universal Properties in Spinoza’s God,” paper 2 in session III-H, “Seventeenth Century Metaphysics” (Friday, 9:00 a.m.)

Theodore Korzukhin (Cornell University): “Conditionals and the Newcomb Problem,” paper 2 in session I-I, “Decision Theory” (Thursday, 12:10 p.m.)

Matthew Lee (University of Notre Dame): “Credence and Correctness: In Defense of the Threshold View,” paper 1 in session VI-K, “Knowledge and Belief” (Saturday, 9:00 a.m.)

Kraig Martin (Baylor University): “Closure of Inquiry and the Sufficiency of Knowledge,” paper 3 in session VI-K, “Knowledge and Belief” (Saturday, 9:00 a.m.)

Colin McLearn (Cornell University): “Kant and McDowell on Perceptual Givenness,” paper 2 in session VII-J, “Kantian Epistemology” (Saturday, 2:30 p.m.)

Joshua Mugg (York University): “A Defense of the Dispositional Account of Modality from the Modal Problem of Constitution: Ordinary Objects as Properties,” paper 2 in session IV-G, “Material Constitution” (Friday, 12:45 p.m.)

Tyler Paytas (Washington University in St. Louis): “Duty, Love, and the *Summum Bonum*: A Kantian Response to the Alienation Objection,” paper 1 in session I-G, “Happiness and Well-Being” (Thursday, 12:10 p.m.)

Caleb Perl (University of Southern California): “Why Political Liberalism Can’t Handle the Truth,” paper 2 in session VI-L, “Political Philosophy and the Question of Democracy” (Saturday, 9:00 a.m.)

Katharine Schweitzer (Emory University): “Negotiation, Deliberation, and Reasonable Disagreement,” paper 2 in session VII-K, “How to Get Along in the World” (Saturday, 2:30 p.m.)

William Smith (University of Notre Dame and Emory University): “Parfit’s Profoundest Problem,” paper 3 in session VI-H, “Metaethics” (Saturday, 9:00 a.m.)

Joseph Stenberg (University of Colorado–Boulder): “The Case of <P> and <P&P>,” paper 2 in session V-I, “Grounding and Truth-Making” (Friday, 3:00 p.m.)

Philip Swenson (University of California–Riverside): “What Can We Learn From Deterministic Frankfurt-Style Cases?” paper 2 in session IV-J, “Ethical Theory: Realism and Determinism” (Friday, 12:45 p.m.)

Joshua L. Tepley (Saint Anselm College): “On the Manifold Senses of ‘Substance’ in Heidegger,” paper 1 in session VII-H, “Heidegger, Adorno, and Habermas” (Saturday, 2:30 p.m.)

Andrea Viggiano (Cornell University): “On a Proposal about the Content of Moral Explanatory Claims,” paper 1 in session III-I, “Moral Claims and the Matter of Justice” (Friday, 9:00 a.m.)

Jeffrey J. Watson (Arizona State University): “Mental Causation: Two Notions of Sufficiency,” paper 1 in session VI-I, “Philosophy of Mind” (Saturday, 9:00 a.m.)

Preston J. Werner (University of Nebraska): “Does Phenomenal Character Determine Intentional Content?” paper 1 in session III-K, “Consciousness and Phenomenal Character” (Friday, 9:00 a.m.)

Aleks Zarnitsyn (University of Illinois–Chicago): “Fictioning Thought Experiments,” paper 3 in session VII-G, “Empirical Ethics, Experimental Philosophy, and Methodology” (Saturday, 2:30 p.m.)

11. 2014 PROGRAM COMMITTEE

The 2014 program committee invites contributions for the 2014 annual meeting, which will be held at the Palmer House Hilton in Chicago, February 26–March 1. Vice President Steven Nadler has appointed the following program committee for this meeting:

- Eric Brown (Washington University in St. Louis), chair
- Lisa Downing (Ohio State University)
- Matthew McGrath (University of Missouri–Columbia)
- Jennifer McKittrick (University of Nebraska–Lincoln)
- Diane Perpich (Clemson University)
- Geoff Pynn (Northern Illinois University)
- Richard Samuels (Ohio State University)
- Robin Smith (Texas A&M University), *ex officio*
- David Sobel (University of Nebraska–Lincoln)
- Meghan Sullivan (University of Notre Dame)
- Helga Varden (University of Illinois–Urbana-Champaign)

Peter Vranas (University of Wisconsin–Madison)
Eric Wiland (University of Missouri–St. Louis)

12. CALL FOR PAPERS, 2014

The program committee for 2014 invites APA members to submit papers for presentation at the one hundred eleventh annual meeting, to be held in Chicago, Illinois, at the Palmer House Hilton hotel, February 26–March 1, 2014. The deadline for submission for the 2014 meeting is **June 1, 2013**. Both colloquium and symposium papers are considered. Authors may only submit one paper, with the exception that authors may submit both colloquium and symposium versions of the same paper (in such cases, at most one of the two versions will be accepted for presentation). Papers may be submitted in electronic format through the APA's website at www.apaonline.org or in hard copy mailed to the APA National Office, University of Delaware, Newark, DE 19716. (Please mark the words "Central Division Papers" on the envelope in which the copies are sent.) Colloquium papers are limited to 3,000 words and symposium papers to 5,000 words. Each paper must be accompanied by an abstract of no more than 150 words. Hard-copy submissions should include a separate title page with the author's name and a word count. Since papers will be strictly blind reviewed, the paper itself should not contain the author's name or institution or any other references from which the author's identity might easily be inferred (papers containing such information may be disqualified). Papers that have been submitted elsewhere for publication may be submitted, provided that their authors can certify that they will not appear in print prior to the meeting for which they are submitted; the division may remove a paper from its program if it learns that it will have been published prior to the program. The Central Division will not include on its program any paper that has already been scheduled for inclusion on the program of any other APA divisional meeting program. The program committee regrets that it is unable to return submitted papers.

13. PARTICIPATION

APA members who wish to be considered as commentators or session chairs for the 2014 meeting should use the program information form provided later in this issue of the *Proceedings*. The following resolution of the Central Division, adopted at the 1980 Business Meeting, will be of interest to prospective participants:

"The APA is the sole professional organization that serves and represents all American philosophers. To give better effect to the foregoing statement, the executive committee of the Central Division publicly affirms its desire that the composition of its officers, committees, and programs reflect the diversity of its membership in such respects as methodology, problem area, and type of employment or institutional affiliation."

14. NOMINATIONS

The Central Division executive committee also invites suggestions from

Central Division affiliates about appropriate candidates for Central Division offices. Suggestions may be sent to the secretary-treasurer for the division (currently Robin Smith) or to the chair of the nominating committee. The nominating committee for the elections to take place in spring 2013 has already completed its work, and the next nominating committee will be elected in spring 2013 and chaired by the past president of the division (which will at that time be Margaret Atherton). Nominations are required each year for vice president, for one member of the executive committee, and for the nominating committee. Nominees for office must be both APA members and affiliates of the Central Division.

15. PROGRAM INFORMATION

The meeting program, including the main sessions organized by the APA and group sessions organized by affiliated groups, forms part of this issue. Abstracts of invited and contributed papers are also included. A limited number of copies of the program will be available at registration. An online version of the program is also available on the APA's website, www.apaonline.org. The web version may be updated periodically, as necessary, to incorporate late changes in the program.

16. SPECIAL THANKS FROM THE SECRETARY-TREASURER

I wish to acknowledge with gratitude the generous support of the College of Liberal Arts of Texas A&M University for the Central Division office.

On behalf of the Executive and Program Committees, I extend to every member of the American Philosophical Association an invitation to take part in our one hundred tenth annual meeting.

Robin Smith
Secretary-Treasurer, APA Central Division

CENTRAL DIVISION COMMITTEES, 2012–2013

EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE, 2012–2013

President: Margaret Atherton

Vice President: Steven Nadler

Past President: Peter Railton

Divisional Representative: Paula Gottlieb

Secretary-Treasurer: Robin Smith

Term 2010–2013: Marya Schechtman

Term 2011–2014: Valerie Tiberius

Term 2012–2015: Nick Huggett

PROGRAM COMMITTEE, 2013

Anne Jaap Jacobson, *chair*

Dominic Bailey

Istvan Berkeley

John Bickle

Josh Brown

Stephen Daniel

Peggy DesAutels

Anton Ford

Nicoletta Orlandi

Hilde Lindemann

John McClendon

Robin Smith, *ex officio*

Jeanine Weekes Schroer

NOMINATING COMMITTEE, 2012–2013

Peter Railton, *chair*

Berit Brogaard

Charlotte Brown

Jennifer Lackey

Constance Meinwald

THE AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL ASSOCIATION

CENTRAL DIVISION ONE HUNDRED TENTH ANNUAL MEETING PROGRAM

FEBRUARY 20–23, 2013
HILTON NEW ORLEANS RIVERSIDE

WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 20

REGISTRATION

5:00–10:00 p.m., registration desk (third floor)

PLACEMENT SERVICE

5:00–10:00 p.m., HEC B (second floor)

G0-1. Association for Symbolic Logic

6:00–10:00 p.m.

Topic: Contributed Papers

EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE MEETING

7:00–11:00 p.m.

THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 21

REGISTRATION

8:30 a.m.–5:00 p.m., registration desk (third floor)

PLACEMENT SERVICE

8:30 a.m.–5:00 p.m., HEC B (second floor)

BOOK EXHIBITS

9:00 a.m.–5:00 p.m., HEC A (second floor)

THURSDAY MORNING

GROUP AND COMMITTEE SESSIONS, THURSDAY MORNING

(see Group Meeting Program for details)

Session GI: 9:00 a.m.–noon

GI-1: Adam Smith Society

GI-2: Committee on Pre-College Instruction in Philosophy

GI-3: Society for the Philosophic Study of Genocide and the Holocaust

GI-4: Society for Systematic Philosophy

GI-5: Society for Analytical Feminism

GI-6: Society for the Study of the History of Analytical Philosophy

GI-7: Nicolai Hartmann Society

GI-8: American Society for Value Inquiry

GI-9: Marxism and Philosophy Association

GI-10: Society for the Advancement of American Philosophy

GI-11: Philosophy of Time Society

GI-12: Association for Symbolic Logic

GI-13: International Berkeley Society

GI-14: Society for the Metaphysics of Science

GI-15: Society for the Philosophic Study of the Contemporary Visual Arts

THURSDAY AFTERNOON/EVENING

GROUP AND COMMITTEE SESSIONS, THURSDAY AFTERNOON/EVENING

(see Group Meeting Program for details)

Session GII: 5:25–7:25 p.m.

GII-1: North American Kant Society

GII-2: Society for Asian and Comparative Philosophy

GII-3: Society of Christian Philosophers

GII-4: Society for the Philosophic Study of Genocide and the Holocaust

GII-5: Joint Session: Association for Informal Logic and Critical Thinking
and the American Association of Philosophy Teachers

GII-6: Hume Society

GII-7: Committee on Institutional Cooperation

GII-8: Association for Symbolic Logic

GII-9: Charles S. Peirce Society

GII-10: North American Nietzsche Society

GII-11: Midwest Society for Women in Philosophy

GII-12: Society for the Philosophic Study of the Contemporary Visual Arts

Session GIII: 7:30–10:30 p.m.

GIII-1: North American Division of the Schopenhauer Society

GIII-2: Society for the Philosophy of Agency

GIII-3: Society for Lesbian and Gay Philosophy

GIII-4: International Society for Environmental Ethics

GIII-5: Nicolai Hartmann Society

GIII-6: Joint Session: Association for Informal Logic and Critical Thinking
and the American Association of Philosophy Teachers

GIII-7: North American Society for Social Philosophy

GIII-8: Association for Philosophy of Education

GIII-9: Society for the Philosophy of Creativity

GIII-10: Josiah Royce Society

GIII-11: Society for the History of Political Philosophy

SESSION I, 12:10–2:10 P.M.

**I-A. Invited Papers: Philosophically Pursuing Trayvon Martin:
Historical Contexts and Contemporary Manifestations**

12:10–2:10 p.m.

Chair: Matthew Johnson (Interdenominational
Theological Center)

Speaker: George Yancy (Duquesne University)

Commentator: John Mendez (Mind Sight Counseling and
Consultation)

Speaker: Janine Jones (University of North Carolina–
Greensboro)

Commentator: James E. Roper (Michigan State University)

I-B. Invited Paper: Embodied Cognition

12:10–2:10 p.m.

Chair: Istvan Berkeley (University of Louisiana–Lafayette)

Speaker: Robert A. Wilson (University of Alberta)

Commentator: Robert D. Rupert (University of Colorado–Boulder)

I-C. Submitted Symposium

12:10–2:10 p.m.

Chair: Joshua Brown (University of Houston)

Speaker: Manolo Martinez (Universitat de Barcelona)
“Signalling Games and Modality”

Commentators: Justin C. Fisher (Southern Methodist University)
Sinan Dogramaci (University of Texas–Austin)

I-D. Submitted Symposium

12:10–2:10 p.m.

Chair: David A. Hunter (Ryerson University)

Speaker: Roman Altshuler (State University of New York–
Stony Brook)

“Need We Choose Our Reasons?”

Commentator: Natika Newton (Nassau Community College)

I-E. Submitted Symposium

12:10–2:10 p.m.

Chair: John Altschul (Loyola University New Orleans)

Speaker: Fred Harrington (Edgewood College)

“An Interest Theory of Rights”

Commentator: Samantha Brennan (University of Western Ontario)

I-F. Submitted Symposium

12:10–2:10 p.m.

Chair: Melinda B. Fagan (Rice University)

Speaker: Larry A. Herzberg (University of Wisconsin–Oshkosh)

“On Knowing How I Feel”

Commentator: Brie Gertler (University of Virginia)

I-G. Colloquium: Happiness and Well-Being

12:10–2:10 p.m.

12:10–1:10 “Duty, Love, and the *Summum Bonum*: A Kantian
Response to the Alienation Objection”

Chair: Jennifer Johnson (University of Chicago)

Speaker: Tyler Paytas (Washington University in St. Louis)
Graduate Student Travel Stipend Recipient

Commentator: Ian Blecher (School of the Art Institute of Chicago)

1:10–2:10 “Well-Being: What Matters Beyond the Mental?”

Chair: Jennifer Bulcock (Rice University)

Speaker: Jennifer Hawkins (Duke University)

Commentator: Howard L. M. Nye (University of Alberta)

I-H. Colloquium: Aristotle I

12:10–2:10 p.m.

12:10–1:10 “Aristotle on the Pleasure of Courage”

Chair: Damon Watson (Marquette University)

Speaker: Erica Holberg (Utah State University)

Commentator: Tyler Huismann (University of Colorado–Boulder)

1:10–2:10 “Aristotle’s Presentist Account of Time and the Charge of Circularity”

Chair: Van Tu (University of Colorado–Boulder)

Speaker: Kenneth A. Boyce (University of Notre Dame)

Commentator: John Helsel (University of Colorado–Boulder)

I-I. Colloquium: Decision Theory

12:10–2:10 *p.m.*

12:10–1:10 “On Defining Strategy”

Chair: Robert Barnard (University of Mississippi)

Speaker: Ashton Sperry (University of Missouri)

Commentator: Richard Samuels (Ohio State University)

1:10–2:10 “Conditionals and the Newcomb Problem”

Chair: Randall E. Auxier (Southern Illinois University–Carbondale)

Speaker: Theodore Korzukhin (Cornell University)

Graduate Student Travel Stipend Recipient

Commentator: Charles B. Cross (University of Georgia)

I-J. Colloquium: Aesthetics

12:10–2:10 *p.m.*

12:10–1:10 “The Relationship between Aesthetic Value and Cognitive Value”

Chair: Madeleine Ransom (University of British Columbia)

Speaker: Antony Aumann (Northern Michigan University)

Commentator: Jay Miller (Wellesley College)

1:10–2:10 “Imagination and Film”

Chair: James R. Hamilton (Kansas State University)

Speakers: J.C. Boyle (San Diego State University), Jordon Schummer (San Diego State University), and Mark Wheeler (San Diego State University)

Commentator: Nicholas Riggle (New York University)

I-K. Colloquium: Social and Political Philosophy

12:10–2:10 *p.m.*

12:10–1:10 “Displacing Multiculturalism with an Alternative”

Chair: Mary C. Coleman (Illinois Wesleyan University and Tulane University)

Speaker: Yuanfang Dai (Michigan State University)

Commentator: Sarah Hansen (Vanderbilt University)

1:10–2:10 “Xenophobia and Racism”

Speaker: Ronald Sundstrom (University of San Francisco)

Commentator: José Jorge Mendoza (Worcester State University)

I-L. Committee on Pre-College Instruction in Philosophy*12:10–2:10 p.m.***SESSION II, 2:20–5:20 P.M.****II-A. Invited Symposium: Nietzsche, Moral Psychology, and Empirical Psychology***2:20–5:20 p.m.*

Chair: Sheridan Hough (College of Charleston)

Speakers: Joshua Knobe (Yale University)

Brian Leiter (University of Chicago)

Commentators: Maudemarie Clark (University of California–Riverside)

David Dudrick (Colgate University)

II-B. Invited Session: The John Dewey Lecture*2:20–5:20 p.m.*

Chair: Alison Wylie (University of Washington)

Speaker: Elisabeth Lloyd (Indiana University)

II-C. Invited Symposium: Current Approaches in Critical Race Theory*2:20–5:20 p.m.*

Chair: Troy Kozma (University of Wisconsin–Barron County)

Speakers: José Jorge Mendoza (Worcester State University)

“Xenophobia and the Need for Immigrant Rights”

Falguni A. Sheth (Hampshire College)

Tommy J. Curry (Texas A&M University)

II-D. Invited Symposium: Suarez*2:20–5:20 p.m.*

Chair: Sydney Penner (Oxford University)

Speakers: Benjamin Hill (University of Western Ontario)

“Being and Its Forms in the *Metaphysical Disputations*”

Helen Hattab (University of Houston)

“Targeting Substantial Forms: Suárez’s A Priori Defense and Descartes’s Refutation”

Daniel Heider (Faculty of Theology, University of South Bohemia)

“Universals: Suárez, Hurtado de Mendoza, and Early Modern Philosophy”

II-E. Invited Symposium: Disagreement

2:20–5:20 p.m.

- Chair: Sara Bernstein (Duke University)
 Speakers: Adam Elga (Princeton University)
 David Christensen (Brown University)
 Brian Talbot (University of Colorado–Boulder)
 Julia Staffel (University of Southern California)

II-F. Author Meets Critics: Jody Azzouni, *Talking about Nothing*

2:20–5:20 p.m.

- Chair: Stephan Blatti (University of Memphis)
 Critics: Matti Eklund (Cornell University)
 Jeffrey W. Roland (Louisiana State University)
 Response: Jody Azzouni (Tufts University)

II-G. Author Meets Critics: Casey Perin, *The Demands of Reason: An Essay on Pyrrhonian Skepticism*

2:20–5:20 p.m.

- Chair: Dominic Bailey (University of Colorado–Boulder)
 Critics: Eric A. Brown (Washington University in St. Louis)
 Rachel Singpurwalla (University of Maryland)
 Response: Casey Perin (University of California–Irvine)

II-H. Colloquium: Philosophy of Science

2:20–5:20 p.m.

2:20–3:20 “Inference to the Best Explanation and the Importance of Peculiarly Explanatory Virtues”

- Chair: Paula Smithka (University of Southern Mississippi)
 Speaker: David W. Harker (East Tennessee State University)
 Commentator: Robert Richardson (University of Cincinnati)

3:20–4:20 “‘Model-building’ and the Identity-Individuation-Individuality of Objects in Cognitive Neurosciences”

- Chair: Carl Gillett (Northern Illinois University)
 Speaker: Ioan Muntean (Indiana University-Purdue University)
 Commentator: Kenneth Aizawa (Centenary College of Louisiana)

4:20–5:20 “Can Primitive Laws Explain?”

- Chair: Michael Cundall (North Carolina A&T State University)
 Speaker: Tyler Hildebrand (University of Colorado–Boulder)
 Commentator: Neil A. Manson (University of Mississippi)

II-I. Colloquium: Philosophy of Language2:20–5:20 *p.m.*

2:20–3:20 “Against Referential Intentions”

Chair: Tadeusz W. Zawidzki (George Washington University)

Speaker: Karen Lewis (Barnard College, Columbia University)

Commentator: Michele Feist (University of Louisiana–Lafayette)

3:20–4:20 “Descriptions and Comparison Semantics of Want”

Chair: Robert Stufflebeam (University of New Orleans)

Speaker: Yu Izumi (University of Maryland–College Park)

Commentator: Daniel A. Krasner (Metropolitan State University–Denver)

4:20–5:20 “A Defense of Scott Soames’s Arguments for Millianism”

Chair: Joseph S. Ullian (Washington University in St. Louis)

Speaker: Thomas W. Peard (Baker University)

Commentator: Adam A. Kovach (Marymount University)

II-J. Colloquium: Medieval Philosophy2:20–5:20 *p.m.*

2:20–3:20 “A Problem of Material Supposition in the Semantics of Walter Burley”

Chair: Anthony J. Lisska (Denison University)

Speaker: Nathaniel Bulthuis (Cornell University)

Graduate Student Travel Stipend Recipient

Commentator: Eric W. Hagedorn (St. Norbert College)

3:20–4:20 “Augustine’s *Confessions* and Platonic Recollection”

Chair: Michael Mendelson (Lehigh University)

Speaker: Michael Siebert (University of Toronto)

Commentator: Sarah Catherine Byers (Boston College)

II-K. Colloquium: The Virtuous Life2:20–5:20 *p.m.*

2:20–3:20 “Virtue Ethics and Revisionary Conceptions of Rightness”

Chair: Erin A. Frykholm (University of Kansas)

Speaker: Jason R. Kawall (Colgate University)

Commentator: Margaret R. Holmgren (Iowa State University)

3:20–4:20 “Humility as Affirmative Capacity”

Chair: Peter Brian Barry (Saginaw Valley State University)

Speaker: Judith Andre (Michigan State University)

Commentator: Kathryn J. Norlock (Trent University)

4:20–5:20 “How We Hurt the Ones We Love”

Chair: John Rudisill (College of Wooster)

Speaker: Ingrid V. Albrecht (Ball State University)

Commentator: Margaret G. Holland (University of Northern Iowa)

II-L. Colloquium: Kant on Moral Motivation

2:20–5:20 *p.m.*

2:20–3:20 “Not Yet Holy: Kant on Striving for Virtue”

Chair: Melissa M. Kozma (University of Wisconsin–Barron County)

Speaker: Mavis Biss (Loyola University Maryland)

Commentator: Krista Thomason (Swarthmore College)

3:20–4:20 “Kant’s Demonstration of Negative Freedom”

Chair: Jeanine M. Grenberg (St. Olaf College)

Speaker: Benjamin S. Yost (Providence College)

Commentator: Patrick Kain (Purdue University)

4:20–5:20 “Kant’s Three Models of Moral Perfection”

Chair: Susan Castro (Wichita State University)

Speaker: Melissa Seymour Fahmy (University of Georgia)

Commentator: Jennifer Uleman (Purchase College–SUNY)

II-M. Committee on Inclusiveness and Committee on the Teaching of Philosophy: Workshop on Teaching Philosophy Inclusively

2:20–5:20 *p.m.*

Chair: Charlotte Witt (University of New Hampshire)

Speakers: Kristie Dotson (Michigan State University)

Manyul Im (University of Oklahoma)

Elena Ruiz-Aho (Florida Gulf Coast University)

Charlotte Witt (University of New Hampshire)

Naomi Zack (University of Oregon)

RECEPTION

8:30 *p.m.*–midnight, Napoleon Ballroom (third floor)

FRIDAY, FEBRUARY 22

REGISTRATION

8:30 *a.m.*–5:00 *p.m.*, registration desk (third floor)

PLACEMENT SERVICE

8:30 *a.m.*–5:00 *p.m.*, HEC B (second floor)

BOOK EXHIBITS

9:00 *a.m.*–5:00 *p.m.*, HEC A (second floor)

FRIDAY MORNING

SESSION III, 9:00 A.M.–NOON

III-A. Invited Symposium: Ethics in the Circumstances and Choices of GLBT People

9:00 a.m.–noon

Chair: John Corvino (Wayne State University)

Speakers: Claudia Card (University of Wisconsin–Madison)
“Surviving Homophobia”

Timothy F. Murphy (University of Illinois College of Medicine)

“The Conditions under Which People May Have Children”

Lance Wahlert (University of Pennsylvania) and
Autumn Fiester (University of Pennsylvania)

“The Crying Game: Is There a Moral Duty in the Timing of Transgender Disclosure?”

III-B. Invited Symposium: Language and Society

9:00 a.m.–noon

Chair: Yolonda Wilson (Duke University)

Speakers: Luvell Anderson (Pennsylvania State University)
Vanessa Wills (St. Joseph’s University)

Commentator: Chike Jeffers (Dalhousie University)

III-C. Invited Symposium: Race and Evolution

9:00 a.m.–noon

Chair: Jeanine Weekes Schroer (University of Minnesota–Duluth)

Speakers: Luc Faucher (l’Université du Québec à Montréal)
Koffi N. Maglo (University of Cincinnati)

Ron Mallon (Washington University in St. Louis)
“How to Be a Biological Racial Realist”

Quayshawn Spencer (University of San Francisco)

III-D. Invited Symposium: Philosophy of Neuroscience: Where We’ve Come, Where We’re Going

9:00 a.m.–noon

Chair: John Bickle (Mississippi State University)

Speakers: Carl F. Craver (Washington University in St. Louis)
Rick Grush (University of California–San Diego)

Valerie Gray Hardcastle (University of Cincinnati)
“Marr’s Levels Revisited: Understanding How Brains Break”

III-E. Invited Symposium: Know How*9:00 a.m.–noon*

Chair: Kaija Mortensen (St. Norbert College)

Speakers: Jason Stanley (Rutgers University)
Alva Noë (University of California–Berkeley)

Peter Railton (University of Michigan)

“Problems with Intellectualism”

Ellen Fridland (Humboldt University, Berlin, and
Tufts University)

“Problems with Intellectualism”

III-F. Author Meets Critics: Jesse J. Prinz, *Beyond Human Nature: How Culture and Experience Shape Our Lives**9:00 a.m.–noon*

Chair: Nancy A. Lawrence (Tulane University)

Critics: Stephen Downes (University of Utah)
Cheshire Calhoun (Arizona State University)
Sharyn Clough (Oregon State University)

Response: Jesse J. Prinz (The Graduate Center, CUNY)

III-G. Colloquium: Epistemology*9:00 a.m.–noon**9:00–10:00* “Sure the Emperor Has No Clothes, but You
Shouldn’t Say That”

Chair: Erica L. Neely (Ohio Northern University)

Speakers: Rachel McKinnon (University of Waterloo)
Paul Simard Smith (University of Waterloo)

Commentator: Troy W. Cross (Reed College)

10:00–11:00 “The Non-Epistemic Features of Epistemic Luck”

Chair: Chris Tillman (University of Manitoba)

Speaker: Brian Kim (Columbia University)

Commentator: Roger White (Massachusetts Institute of
Technology)*11:00–noon* “Coherence, A Prioricity, and Logic”

Chair: Barbara Abbott (Michigan State University)

Speaker: Ted Poston (University of South Alabama)

Commentator: Sarah Black Jones (Northern Michigan University)

III-H. Colloquium: Seventeenth Century Metaphysics*9:00 a.m.–noon**9:00–10:00* “A True Mode of Union: Reconciling Real
Distinction and True Union in the Cartesian
Human Being”

- Chair: Michael LeBuffe (Texas A&M University)
 Speaker: Amber Carlson (University of Notre Dame)
Graduate Student Travel Stipend Recipient
 Commentator: Marleen Rozemond (University of Toronto)
 10:00–11:00 “Universal Properties in Spinoza’s God”
Graduate Student Travel Stipend Recipient
 Chair: J. Thomas Cook (Rollins College)
 Speaker: Michael Istvan (Texas A&M University)
 Commentator: Charles Huenemann (Utah State University)
 11:00–noon “Lockean Superaddition and Lockean Humility”
 Chair: Lewis Powell (State University of New York–Buffalo)
 Speaker: Patrick Connolly (University of North Carolina–
 Chapel Hill)
Graduate Student Travel Stipend Recipient
 Commentator: Shelley Weinberg (University of Illinois–Urbana-
 Champaign)

III-I. Colloquium: Moral Claims and the Matter of Justice

- 9:00 a.m.–noon
 9:00–10:00 “On a Proposal about the Content of Moral
 Explanatory Claims”
 Chair: Daniel D. Moseley (University of North Carolina–
 Chapel Hill)
 Speaker: Andrea Viggiano (Cornell University)
Graduate Student Travel Stipend Recipient
 Commentator: Charles B. Kurth (Washington University in St.
 Louis)
 10:00–11:00 “Not All ‘Oughts’ Imply ‘Cans’”
 Chair: William E. Morris (Independent Scholar)
 Speaker: Alexandra King (Brown University)
 Commentator: Hannah Tierney (University of Arizona)
 11:00–noon “Unjust Situations”
 Chair: Robyn R. Gaier (Viterbo University)
 Speaker: Kevin Houser (Indiana University)
 Commentator: Vanessa Carbonell (University of Cincinnati)

III-J. Colloquium: Aristotle II

- 9:00 a.m.–noon
 9:00–10:00 “Aristotle’s Epistemology: Credence, Belief, and
 Knowledge”
 Chair: Robin Smith (Texas A&M University)
 Speaker: Ian McCready-Flora (Columbia University)
 Commentator: Gregory C. Salmieri (Boston University)

10:00–11:00 “The Elemental Transformations in *On Generation and Corruption* II.4”

Chair: Allan Gotthelf (Rutgers University)

Speaker: Mary Krizan (University of Colorado–Boulder)

Commentator: Tim Crowley (University College Dublin)

11:00–noon “Aristotle on the Infallibility of Proper-Object Perception: *Metaphysics* Γ 5, 1010b1-1011a2”

Chair: Ian Crystal (Louisiana State University)

Speaker: Evan Keeling (University of São Paulo, Brazil)

Commentator: Iakovos Vasiliou (The Graduate Center, CUNY)

III-K. Colloquium: Consciousness and Phenomenal Character

9:00 a.m.–noon

9:00–10:00 “Does Phenomenal Character Determine Intentional Content?”

Chair: Fiona Macpherson (University of Glasgow)

Speaker: Preston J. Werner (University of Nebraska)

Graduate Student Travel Stipend Recipient

Commentator: Esa Diaz-Leon (University of Manitoba)

10:00–11:00 “Keeping It Real: Fineness of Grain, Intentional Inexistents, and the Targetless HOTs Debate”

Chair: Dustin Tune (Rice University)

Speaker: Vincent Picciuto (University of Maryland)

Commentator: Myrto Mylopoulos (The Graduate Center, CUNY)

11:00–noon “The Phenomenal Character of Thinking”

Chair: Todd Ganson (Oberlin College)

Speaker: David Tostenson (Fort Hays State University)

Commentator: William Dylan Sabo (Occidental College)

III-L. Committee on Philosophy and Law: Law across Borders

9:00 a.m.–noon

Chair: Matthew Lister (Sturm College of Law, University of Denver)

Speakers: Kristen Hessler (State University of New York–Albany)

“Political Legitimacy and Women’s Human Rights”

Gerardo Vildostegui (Rutgers School of Law–Camden)

“On the Puerto Rican ‘Status Question’”

Jens Ohlin (Cornell University Law School)

“The Duty to Capture”

III-M. Committee on the Status of Asian and Asian-American Philosophers and Philosophies: Memory, Consciousness and the Self: A Buddhist Perspective

9:00 a.m.–noon

Chair: JeeLoo Liu (California State University–Fullerton)

Speakers: Douglas L. Berger (Southern Illinois University–Carbondale)

“Between Nyāya and Buddhism: Memory and an Impermanent Self”

Cristian Coseru (College of Charleston)

“Presence and Temporality: A Buddhist Approach to Phenomenal Consciousness”

Matt MacKenzie (Colorado State University)

“Luminosity, Subjectivity, and Temporality: An Examination of Buddhist and Advaita Views of Consciousness”

Commentator: JeeLoo Liu (California State University–Fullerton)

FRIDAY AFTERNOON/EVENING

GROUP AND COMMITTEE SESSIONS, FRIDAY AFTERNOON/EVENING

(see Group Meeting Program for details)

Session GIV: 7:15–10:15 p.m.

GIV-1: Society for Business Ethics

GIV-2: Society for the History of Political Philosophy

GIV-3: Society for the Study of the History of Analytical Philosophy

GIV-4: International Society for Environmental Ethics

GIV-6: Society for Realist-Antirealist Discussion

GIV-7: Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy

GIV-8: American Society for Aesthetics

GIV-9: Society for the Philosophical Study of Education

GIV-10: William James Society

GIV-11: Nicolai Hartmann Society

GIV-12: American Society for Value Inquiry

BUSINESS MEETING

12:15–1:15 p.m., Jefferson Ballroom (third floor)

SESSION IV, 12:45–2:45 P.M.**IV-A. Invited Papers: Philosophy Born of Struggle: Historical Overview***12:45–2:45 p.m.*

Chair: Kimberly Harris (Pennsylvania State University)

Speaker: J. Everet Green (Mercy College)

Commentator: Paul Gomberg (Chicago State University)

Speaker: Zay Green (Independent Scholar)

Commentator: Clanton C. W. Dawson (Bethune Cookman University)

IV-B. Invited Papers: Philosophy of Video Games and Virtual Worlds*12:45–2:45 p.m.*

Chair: Peter Ludlow (Northwestern University)

Speakers: Jon M. Cogburn (Louisiana State University)

Mark Silcox (University of Central Oklahoma)

Jeff McLaughlin (Thompson Rivers University)

IV-C. Invited Paper: Why Were There Sense Data?*12:45–2:45 p.m.*

Chair: Brian P. McLaughlin (Rutgers University)

Speaker: Richard Grandy (Rice University)

Commentator: Martin Hahn (Simon Fraser University)

IV-D. Submitted Symposium*12:45–2:45 p.m.*

Chair: Patrick J. Fleming (James Madison University)

Speaker: John Mumm (Fordham University)

“Two Functions of Moral Language: Rethinking the Amoralist”

Commentator: Mark Decker (Northland College)

IV-E. Submitted Symposium*12:45–2:45 p.m.*

Chair: Walter E. Schaller (Texas Tech University)

Speaker: Michael Moehler (Virginia Tech University)

“Impartiality, Priority, and Justice: The Veil of Ignorance Reconsidered”

Commentators: Charlotte Brown (Illinois Wesleyan University)

Mark Criley (Illinois Wesleyan University)

IV-F. Submitted Symposium*12:45–2:45 p.m.*

Chair: Daniel A. Campana (University of La Verne)

- Speaker: Joseph Q. Adams (Rice University)
 “Stories and Their Place in Theories”
 Commentator: Sheridan Hough (College of Charleston)

IV-G. Colloquium: Material Constitution

12:45–2:45 p.m.

- 12:45–1:45* “Plurality and Parity: Composition versus Constitution”

Chair: Guy Rohrbaugh (Auburn University)

Speaker: Roxanne Kurtz (University of Illinois–Springfield)

Commentator: Helen Daly (Colorado College)

- 1:45–2:45* “A Defense of the Dispositional Account of Modality from the Modal Problem of Constitution: Ordinary Objects as Properties”

Chair: Mark Lafrenz (State University of New York–Buffalo)

Speaker: Joshua Mugg (York University)

Graduate Student Travel Stipend Recipient

Commentator: Joshua Spencer (University of Wisconsin–Milwaukee)

IV-H. Colloquium: Epistemic Justification

12:45–2:45 p.m.

- 12:45–1:45* “A Meno Problem for Evidentialism”

Chair: Bruce Hunter (University of Alberta)

Speaker: Daniel M. Mittag (Albion College)

Commentator: Peter Graham (University of California–Riverside)

- 1:45–2:45* “Justification Is Potential Knowledge”

Chair: Jill Hunter (Athabasca University)

Speaker: Jonathan Ichikawa (University of British Columbia)

Commentator: Chase B. Wrenn (University of Alabama)

IV-I. Colloquium: Philosophy of Crime

12:45–2:45 p.m.

- 12:45–1:45* “The Criminalization of Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing in Global Contexts: A Hybrid Solution”

Chair: Jacob M. Held (University of Central Arkansas)

Speaker: Jill Delston (Washington University in St. Louis)

Commentator: Matthew Lister (Sturm College of Law, University of Denver)

- 1:45–2:45* “Hard Times after Hard Time: Are Ex-Offender Restrictions Justified?”

Chair: Evan Riley (College of Wooster)

Speaker: Zachary Hoskins (Washington University in St. Louis)

Commentator: Mane Hajdin (Santa Clara University)

IV-J. Colloquium: Ethical Theory: Realism and Determinism*12:45–2:45 p.m.**12:45–1:45* “Moral Psychology and General Principles: Why the Moral Realist Should Not Fret over Disagreement”

Chair: Elizabeth Victor (Southern Illinois University–Edwardsville)

Speaker: Chris D. Meyers (University of Southern Mississippi)

Commentator: Angel Pinillos (Arizona State University)

1:45–2:45 “What Can We Learn From Deterministic Frankfurt-Style Cases?”

Chair: Chris Weigel (Utah Valley University)

Speaker: Philip Swenson (University of California–Riverside)
Graduate Student Travel Stipend Recipient

Commentator: Adam R. Thompson (University of Nebraska–Lincoln)

IV-K. Committee on Philosophy in Two-Year Colleges: Credentials*12:45–2:45 p.m.*

Chair: Thomas Urban (Houston Community College)

Speakers: Brian J. Huschle (Northland College)
Nnachi J. Umennachi (Scott Community College)

Mark Thorsby (Lone Star Community College)

Anthony E. Thomas (Kiswaukee Community College)

Bill Hartmann (St. Louis Community College–Forest Park)

Donna Werner (St. Louis Community College–Meramec)

Basil Edward Smith (Saddleback College)

Thomas Herrnstein (Northwest Arkansas Community College)

IV-L. Committee on Lectures, Publications, and Research: Funding for Philosophy*12:45–2:45 p.m.***SESSION V, 3:00–6:00 P.M.****V-A. Invited Symposium: Perceptual Justification***3:00–6:00 p.m.*

Chair: Scott Sturgeon (University of Birmingham)

Speakers: Susanna Siegel (Harvard University)

Matthew McGrath (University of Missouri–Columbia)

Commentator: Nicholas L. Silins (Cornell University)

V-B. Invited Symposium: Happiness and Well-Being*3:00–6:00 p.m.*

Chair: Lorraine L. Besser-Jones (Middlebury College)

Speaker: Valerie Tiberius (University of Minnesota)
“Well-being for the Uninformed: Prudential
Reasons and the Value Fulfillment Theory”Commentators: Daniel M. Haybron (Saint Louis University)
Gwen Bradford (Rice University)**V-C. Invited Symposium: Problems for Philosophers:
Discourse and Exclusion***3:00–6:00 p.m.*

Chair: Mark Lance (Georgetown University)

Speakers: Catherine Hundleby (University of Windsor)
Rebecca Kukla (Georgetown University)**V-D. Invited Symposium: Locke on Substance***3:00–6:00 p.m.*

Chair: Stephen Daniel (Texas A&M University)

Speaker: Justin Broackes (Brown University)
“Locke, Substance, and the Embarrassment of an
Aristotelian Idea”Commentator: Galen Strawson (University of Reading and
University of Texas–Austin)Speaker: Matthew Stuart (Bowdoin College)
“Locke’s Confused Idea of Substance”

Commentator: Lex Newman (University of Utah)

V-E. Invited Symposium: Expression and Meaning*3:00–6:00 p.m.*

Chair: Peter W. Hanks (University of Minnesota–Twin Cities)

Speaker: Dorit Bar-On (University of North Carolina–Chapel
Hill)

“Expression: Acts, Products, and Meaning”

Commentators: Mitchell S. Green (University of Virginia)
Joelle Proust (Institut Jean-Nicod, Paris)**V-F. Author Meets Critics: Eric Marcus, *Rational Causation****3:00–6:00 p.m.*

Chair: Matthias Haase (University of Leipzig)

Critics: Ram Neta (University of North Carolina–Chapel Hill)
Kieran Setiya (University of Pittsburgh)

Response: Eric Marcus (Auburn University)

V-G. Author Meets Critics: Rocco J. Gennaro, *The Consciousness Paradox: Consciousness, Concepts, and Higher-Order Thoughts*

3:00–6:00 p.m.

Chair: William Robinson (Iowa State University)

Critics: Robert Van Gulick (Syracuse University)

Josh Weisberg (University of Houston)

William Seager (University of Toronto)

Response: Rocco J. Gennaro (University of Southern Indiana)

V-H. Colloquium: Hegel

3:00–6:00 p.m.

3:00–4:00 “Hegel on Newton’s Unspeakable Metaphysics”

Chair: Sebastian Rand (Georgia State University)

Speaker: Garrett Bredeson (Vanderbilt University)

Commentator: Edward Halper (University of Georgia)

4:00–5:00 “Hegel on the Actualization of the Concept of the Will”

Chair: William Maker (Clemson University)

Speaker: Mark Alznauer (Northwestern University)

Commentator: Christopher L. Yeomans (Purdue University)

5:00–6:00 “Hegel and the Rabble”

Chair: Donald Verene (Emory University)

Speaker: Joshua W. Anderson (Saint Louis University)

Commentator: Michael Allen (East Tennessee State University)

V-I. Colloquium: Grounding and Truth-Making

3:00–6:00 p.m.

3:00–4:00 “Getting Grounded”

Chair: Aaron Griffith (University of California–Irvine)

Speaker: Alexander Skiles (University of Notre Dame)

Commentator: Dustin Locke (Claremont McKenna College)

4:00–5:00 “The Case of <P> and <P&P>”

Chair: Cathleen Muller (Marist College)

Speaker: Joseph Stenberg (University of Colorado–Boulder)

Graduate Student Travel Stipend Recipient

Commentator: Christopher E. Tweedt (Baylor University)

5:00–6:00 “Presentism and Distributional Properties”

Chair: Reuben Stern (University of Wisconsin–Madison)

Speaker: Philip R. Corkum (University of Alberta)

Commentator: Andrew M. Bailey (Yale University/Yale-NUS College)

V-J. Colloquium: Philosophy of Religion

3:00–6:00 p.m.

3:00–4:00 “Aesthetics and Religion in Schelling’s
Philosophical Letters”

Chair: S. Pierre Lamarche (Utah Valley University)

Speaker: Jeremy Proulx (Eastern Michigan University)

Commentator: Robert S. Gall (Bethany College)

4:00–5:00 “New Possibilities for the Cosmological Argument”
*Graduate Student Travel Stipend Recipient*Chair: Tyron Goldschmidt (University of Wisconsin–
Stevens Point)

Speaker: Matt Duncan (University of Virginia)

Commentator: Andrew Cortens (Boise State University)

5:00–6:00 “Can God Satisfice?”

Chair: Christina Van Dyke (Calvin College)

Speaker: Klaas Kraay (Ryerson University)

Commentator: D. Gene Witmer (University of Florida)

**V-K. Joint Session Sponsored by Committee on Inclusiveness
and the Committee on Philosophy and Law: Disability:
New Perspectives on Justice, Well-being, and Virtue**

3:00–6:00 p.m.

Chair: Thomas E. Hill, Jr. (University of North Carolina–
Chapel Hill)

Speakers: Lawrence T. Becker (Hollins University)

“Distillation, Habilitation, and Whole Lives: Toward
More Inclusive Frames of Reference for Philosophy”

Adam Cureton (University of Tennessee)

“Some Virtues of Disability”

Mark Moller (Denison University)

“Welfare Theory and the Disability Paradox”

Anita Silvers (San Francisco State University)

“Inclusive Justice, Affirmative Action, and Moral/
Legal Standing”**V-L. Committee on Philosophy in Two-Year Colleges: How to
Obtain a Position at the Community Colleges**

3:00–6:00 p.m.

Chair: Bill Hartmann (St. Louis Community College–
Forest Park)

Speakers: Brian J. Huschle (Northland College)

Nnachi J. Umennachi (Scott Community College)

Mark Thorsby (Lone Star Community College)

Anthony E. Thomas (Kiswaukee Community College)
 Thomas Urban (Houston Community College)
 Donna Werner (St. Louis Community College–
 Meramec)
 Basil Edward Smith (Saddleback College)
 Thomas Herrnstein (Northwest Arkansas
 Community College)

**V-M. Committee on the Teaching of Philosophy: The Underbelly
 of Philosophical Pedagogy: Aesthetics, Genealogy, and
 the Question of Activism**

3:00–6:00 p.m.

Chair: James Griffith (DePaul University)
 Speakers: Karolin Mirzakhani (DePaul University)
 “Keeping Up Appearances: Hegel and *Aesthetics: Lectures on Fine Art*”
 Perry Zurn (DePaul University)
 “Active Intolerance: Lessons from Foucault’s
Prisons Information Group”
 Ali Beheler (DePaul University)
 “Nietzsche, Genealogy, Pedagogy”

PRESIDENTIAL ADDRESS

6:15–7:15 p.m., Napoleon Ballroom (third floor)

Introduction: Steven Nadler, vice president, APA Central Division
 Address: “Dr. Johnson Kicks the Stone, Or Can the
 Immaterialisms of Berkeley’s *Principles* and
Three Dialogues Be Reconciled?”
 Margaret Atherton, president, APA Central Division

PRESIDENTIAL RECEPTION

9:00 p.m.–midnight, Napoleon Ballroom (third floor)

SATURDAY, FEBRUARY 23

REGISTRATION

8:30 a.m.–noon, registration desk (third floor)

PLACEMENT SERVICE

8:30 a.m.–noon, HEC B (second floor)

BOOK EXHIBITS

9:00 a.m.–noon, HEC A (second floor)

SATURDAY MORNING

SESSION VI, 9:00 A.M.—NOON

VI-A. Invited Symposium: Digital Humanities

9:00 a.m.—noon

Chair: Cameron Buckner (University of Houston)

Speaker: Lisa Spiro (National Institute for Technology in Liberal Education and Anvil Academic)

“Why and How: Exploring the Significance of Digital Humanities for Philosophy”

Speaker: Tony Beavers (University of Evansville)
Title TBA

Speakers: Isobel Grundy (University of Alberta) and Patricia Clements (University of Alberta)
Title TBA

Speaker: David Bourget (University of London)
Title TBA

VI-B. Invited Symposium: Reflections on Disability and Philosophy

9:00 a.m.—noon

Chair: Anita Silvers (San Francisco State University)

Speaker: Licia Carlson (Providence College)

“Re-Imagining Intellectual Disability: The Ethical Significance of Musical Experience”

Commentator: Adam Cureton (University of Tennessee)

Speaker: Joseph Stramondo (Michigan State University)
“Why Bioethics Needs a Disability Moral Psychology and Epistemology”

Commentator: Bryce Huebner (Georgetown University)

VI-C. Invited Symposium: Buddhism and Philosophy of Mind

9:00 a.m.—noon

Chair: Ellen Fridland (Humboldt University, Berlin, and Tufts University)

Speakers: Cristian Coseru (College of Charleston)

“Reflexivity and the First-Person Stance: Coming to Terms with Phenomenal Consciousness”

Charles Siewert (Rice University)

“Phenomenality and Self-Consciousness”

Jay L. Garfield (Smith College, University of Melbourne)

“I Am a Brain in a Vat (or Perhaps a Pile of Sticks by the Side of the Road)”

- VI-E. Author Meets Critics: Cordelia Fine, *The Delusions of Gender***
 9:00 a.m.–noon
 Chair: Nicoletta Orlandi (Rice University)
 Critics: Edouard Machery (University of Pittsburgh)
 Charlotte Witt (University of New Hampshire)
 Ginger Hoffman (St. Joseph's University)
 Response: Cordelia Fine (University of Melbourne)
- VI-F. Author Meets Critics: Sebastian Luft, *Subjectivity and Lifeworld in Transcendental Phenomenology***
 9:00 a.m.–noon
 Critics: David Carr (Emory University)
 Hanne Jacobs (Loyola University Chicago)
 Jeffrey Yoshimi (University of California–Merced)
 Response: Sebastian Luft (Marquette University)
- VI-G. Author Meets Critics: Sebastian Rödl, *Categories of the Temporal***
 9:00 a.m.–noon
 Critics: Michael Thompson (University of Pittsburgh)
 Adrian Haddock (University of Stirling)
 Response: Sebastian Rödl (Universität Basel)
- VI-H. Colloquium: Metaethics**
 9:00 a.m.–noon
 9:00–10:00 “Irreducibly Normative Properties”
 Chair: David A. Merli (Franklin & Marshall College)
 Speaker: Chris Heathwood (University of Colorado–Boulder)
 Commentator: Gunnar Björnsson (Umeå University and University of Gothenburg)
 10:00–11:00 “Internalism about Normative Reasons for Action”
 Chair: David H. Sanford (Duke University)
 Speaker: Leonard A. Kahn (U.S. Air Force Academy)
 Commentator: Andy Engen (Illinois Wesleyan University)
 11:00–noon “Parfit’s Profoundest Problem”
 Chair: Fritz J. McDonald (Oakland University)
 Speaker: William Smith (University of Notre Dame and Emory University)
 Commentator: Michelle Mason (University of Minnesota–Twin Cities)
Graduate Student Travel Stipend Recipient

VI-I. Colloquium: Philosophy of Mind*9:00 a.m.–noon**9:00–10:00* “Mental Causation: Two Notions of Sufficiency”

Chair: Hannah A. Bondurant (Independent Scholar)

Speaker: Jeffrey J. Watson (Arizona State University)

Graduate Student Travel Stipend Recipient

Commentator: Jennifer J. Matey (Florida International University)

10:00–11:00 “Volition and Higher-Order Representation”

Chair: Henry Jackman (York University)

Speaker: George Seli (The Graduate Center, CUNY)

Commentator: Andrew Melnyk (University of Missouri)

11:00–noon “Perception and Passivity”

Chair: Michael Bergmann (Purdue University)

Speaker: Richard Kenneth Atkins (Fordham University)

Commentator: Mark Lance (Georgetown University)

VI-J. Colloquium: Plato*9:00 a.m.–noon**9:00–10:00* “Cephalus and the Myth of Er: Why Do the Producers Value Justice?”

Chair: Marta Jimenez (Emory University)

Speaker: Haewon Jeon (Northwestern University)

Commentator: Emily A. Austin (Wake Forest University)

10:00–11:00 “Plato on the Pleasures of Smell”

Chair: Shawn P. Loht (Tulane University)

Speaker: Emily Fletcher (University of Toronto)

Commentator: Thomas M. Tuozzo (University of Kansas)

11:00–noon “Forms and the Origin of Self-Predication”

Chair: Frank Grabowski (Rogers State University)

Speaker: David Ebrey (Northwestern University)

Commentator: David Apolloni (Augsburg College)

VI-K. Colloquium: Knowledge and Belief*9:00 a.m.–noon**9:00–10:00* “Credence and Correctness: In Defense of the Threshold View”

Chair: Glenn Ross (Franklin & Marshall College)

Speaker: Matthew Lee (University of Notre Dame)

Graduate Student Travel Stipend Recipient

Commentator: Kenneth Easwaran (University of Southern California)

- 10:00–11:00 “A Puzzle for Accounts of Rationality”
 Chair: Joshua Schechter (Brown University)
 Speaker: Ali Hasan (University of Iowa)
 Commentator: Foad Dizadji-Bahmani (London School of Economics)
- 11:00–noon “Closure of Inquiry and the Sufficiency of Knowledge”
 Chair: Meghan Masto (Lafayette College)
 Speaker: Kraig Martin (Baylor University)
Graduate Student Travel Stipend Recipient
 Commentator: Shyam Nair (University of Southern California)

VI-L. Colloquium: Political Philosophy and the Question of Democracy

- 9:00 a.m.–noon
- 9:00–10:00 “A Critique of the All-Affected Principle of Democratic Inclusion”
 Chair: Eric Smaw (Rollins College)
 Speaker: Matt S. Whitt (Warren Wilson College)
 Commentator: Eugene Heath (State University College–New Paltz)
- 10:00–11:00 “Why Political Liberalism Can’t Handle the Truth”
 Chair: Rebecca Bamford (Quinnipiac University)
 Speaker: Caleb Perl (University of Southern California)
Graduate Student Travel Stipend Recipient
 Commentator: Edward Song (Louisiana State University)
- 11:00–noon “A Rejection of Colorblindness”
 Chair: Timothy Shiell (University of Wisconsin–Stout)
 Speaker: Yolonda Wilson (Duke University)
 Commentator: Julie V. Kuhlken (Independent Scholar)

VI-M. Committee on Philosophy and Medicine: A Tribute to Bernard Gert

- 9:00 a.m.–noon
- Chair: Leonard A. Kahn (U.S. Air Force Academy)
 Speakers: Michael Ferry (Stone Hill College)
 Michael Nair-Collins (Florida State University)
 Rosamond Rhodes (Mount Sinai School of Medicine and the Graduate Center, CUNY)
 “Medical Ethics: Common or unCommon Morality”
 Heather J. Gert (University of North Carolina–Greensboro)
 “Human Nature”

VI-N. Committee on the Teaching of Philosophy: Teaching Modern Philosophy

9:00 a.m.–noon

Chair: Christopher F. Zurn (University of Massachusetts–Boston)

Speakers: Molly Sturdevant (DePaul University)

“Marginalia versus the Canon: Who Must We Teach?”

James Griffith (DePaul University)

“Early Modern Philosophy as an Introduction to Philosophy”

Amanda Parris (DePaul University)

“Teaching Modernities”

SATURDAY AFTERNOON/EVENING

GROUP AND COMMITTEE SESSIONS, SATURDAY AFTERNOON/EVENING

(see Group Meeting Program for details)

Session GV: 12:15–2:15 p.m.

GV-1: Society for Asian and Comparative Philosophy

GV-2: Central Division Sartre Circle

GV-3: Bertrand Russell Society

GV-4: Personalist Discussion Group

GV-5: Philosophy of Religion Group

GV-6: Concerned Philosophers for Peace

GV-7: Radical Philosophy Association

GV-8: Conference of Philosophical Societies

GV-9: North American Nietzsche Society

GV-10: Society for the Metaphysics of Science

GV-11: International Association for the Philosophy of Sport

SESSION VII, 2:30 P.M.–5:30 P.M.

VII-A. Invited Session: The Liberatory Thought of Martin Luther King, Jr.

2:30–5:30 p.m.

Chair: Richard Jones (Howard University)

Speaker: Robert Birt (Bowie State University)

Commentator: Floyd Hayes, III (Johns Hopkins University)

Chair: Brittany O’Neal (Michigan State University)

Speaker: Stephen C. Ferguson, II (North Carolina Agricultural and Technical State University)

Commentator: John H. Humphrey (North Carolina A&T State University)

VII-B. Invited Symposium: Does “Reason ... Exist Whole and Complete in Each of Us”? (Descartes)

2:30–5:30 p.m.

Chair: Robert G. Brice (Loyola University New Orleans)

Speakers: Candace Vogler (University of Chicago)

Naomi Scheman (University of Minnesota and Umeå University)

“Metalinguistic Approaches to Belief and Meaning”

Christopher Gauker (University of Cincinnati)

VII-C. Invited Symposium: Courage as a Contemporary Virtue

2:30–5:30 p.m.

Chair: Joseph Trullinger (Mississippi State University)

Speaker: Shaun Nichols (University of Arizona)

Title TBA

Speakers: Cynthia Pury (Clemson University) and Charles Starkey (Clemson University)

Title TBA

Speaker: Tamler Sommers (University of Houston)

“Courage: The Forgotten Virtue in the Philosophy of Punishment”

Speaker: Charles M. Young (Claremont Graduate University)

Title TBA

VII-D. Invited Symposium: Multimodal Perception

2:30–5:30 p.m.

Chair: Clare Batty (University of Kentucky)

Speakers: Casey O’Callaghan (Rice University)

Ophelia DeRoy (Institute of Philosophy, University of London)

Mohan Matthen (University of Toronto)

VII-E. Invited Symposium: Philosophy of Science and Political Engagement

2:30–5:30 p.m.

Chair: Peggy DesAutels (University of Dayton)

Speakers: Miriam Solomon (Temple University)

Title TBA

Matthew Brown (University of Texas–Dallas)

“The Unity of Science and Politics: Themes from Dewey and Neurath”

Heidi Grasswick (Middlebury College)

“Responsible Trust in Science: The Implications of Situated Knowing”

VII-EE. Invited Symposium: Truthmakers

2:30–5:30 p.m.

Chair: Michelle Montague (University of Texas–Austin)

Speakers: Kit Fine (New York University)

Graham Oddie (University of Colorado–Boulder)

Commentator: Meghan Sullivan (University of Notre Dame)

VII-F. Author Meets Critics: Ted Sider, *Writing the Book of the World*

2:30–5:30 p.m.

Critics: Amie L. Thomasson (University of Miami)

Paul Audi (University of Nebraska–Omaha)

Response: Ted Sider (Cornell University)

VII-G. Colloquium: Empirical Ethics, Experimental Philosophy and Methodology

2:30–5:30 p.m.

2:30–3:30 “An Empirical Account of Expert Intuition”

Chair: Michael Bruno (Mississippi State University)

Speaker: Theodore Bach (Bowling Green State University
Firelands College)

Commentator: Adam Feltz (Schreiner University)

3:30–4:30 “An Empirical Perspective on Enlightened Self-Interest”

Chair: Daniel Hartner (Rose-Hulman Institute)

Speaker: Stephen G. Morris (College of Staten Island)

Commentator: Remy Debes (University of Memphis)

4:30–5:30 “Fictioning Thought Experiments”

Chair: Donovan Wishon (University of Mississippi)

Speaker: Aleks Zarnitsyn (University of Illinois–Chicago)
Graduate Student Travel Stipend Recipient

Commentator: Arthur Morton (Saint Xavier University)

VII-H. Colloquium: Heidegger, Adorno, and Habermas

2:30–5:30 p.m.

2:30–3:30 “On the Manifold Senses of ‘Substance’ in Heidegger”

Chair: Julian Young (Wake Forest University)

Speaker: Joshua L. Tepley (Saint Anselm College)
Graduate Student Travel Stipend Recipient

Commentator: William Blattner (Georgetown University)

3:30–4:30 “On Truth Content and False Consciousness in Adorno’s Aesthetic Theory”

Chair: Tom Huhn (School of Visual Arts, New York)

Speaker: Nathan Ross (Oklahoma City University)

Commentator: Rocío Zambrana (University of Oregon)

4:30–5:30 “History and Critique in Hegel and Habermas”

Chair: David Duquette (Saint Norbert College)

Speaker: Nicholas Mowad (Georgia College)

Commentator: Andrew Buchwalter (University of North Florida)

VII-I. Colloquium: Having and Rearing Children

2:30–5:30 *p.m.*

2:30–3:30 “Some Arguments Against Parental Licensing”

Chair: Kimberly J. Leighton (American University)

Speaker: Christopher Freiman (College of William and Mary)

Commentator: Anthony J. Rudd (St. Olaf College)

3:30–4:30 “Are Children Persons?”

Chair: Kimberly J. Leighton (American University)

Speaker: Amy Gilbert (Eastern University)

Commentator: Claudia Mills (DePauw University and University of Colorado)

4:30–5:30 “Molding Conscientious, Hard-Working, and Perseverant Students”

Chair: Kimberly J. Leighton (American University)

Speaker: Jennifer Morton (City University of New York)

Commentator: Zac Cogley (Northern Michigan University)

VII-J. Colloquium: Kantian Epistemology

2:30–5:30 *p.m.*

2:30–3:30 “Why Is Kant’s Transcendental Deduction So Difficult?”

Chair: Arata Hamawaki (Auburn University)

Speaker: Justin Shaddock (Williams College)

Commentator: Adrian Switzer (University of Western Kentucky)

3:30–4:30 “Kant and McDowell on Perceptual Givenness”

Chair: Lara Ostaric (Temple University)

Speaker: Colin McLearn (Cornell University)

Graduate Student Travel Stipend Recipient

Commentator: Nathan Bauer (University of Chicago)

4:30–5:30 “Fichte’s False Dilemma”

Chair: Rafeeq Hasan (University of Chicago)

Speaker: Bryan Hall (Indiana University Southeast)

Commentator: Reed Winegar (Fordham University)

VII-K. Colloquium: How to Get Along in the World

2:30–5:30 p.m.

2:30–3:30 “Remedial Theories of Secession and Territorial Justification”

Chair: Ann E. Cudd (University of Kansas)

Speaker: Amandine Catala (University of Colorado–Boulder)

Commentator: Jonathan Peterson (Loyola University New Orleans)

3:30–4:30 “Negotiation, Deliberation, and Reasonable Disagreement”

Chair: John Protevi (Louisiana State University)

Speaker: Katharine Schweitzer (Emory University)

Graduate Student Travel Stipend Recipient

Commentator: Jon Garthoff (University of Tennessee)

4:30–5:30 “The Social Value of Knowledge: Characterizing Benefits in Developing World Research”

Chair: Jonathan Peterson (Loyola University New Orleans)

Speaker: Danielle Wenner (Cleveland Clinic)

Commentator: Kathryn Pogin (University of Notre Dame)

VII-L. Committee on the Status of Women: Pushing the Boundaries: Mary Whiton Calkins at the Sesquicentennial of Her Birth

2:30–5:30 p.m.

Chair: Mary Ellen Waithe (Cleveland State University)

Speakers: Rebecca Zufelt (University of Dallas)

“Mary W. Calkins: An Advocate for the Self”

Mathew A. Foust (Lander University)

“Calkins, James, and the War against War”

Karyn J. Boatwright (Kalamazoo College), Bridget B. Nolan (Kalamazoo College), and Charlene Boyer Lewis (Kalamazoo College)

“Mary Whiton Calkins: The Quest Continues”

This session is co-sponsored by the Society for the Study of Women Philosophers, the Society for the Psychology of Women, and the Society for the History of Psychology.

GROUP MEETING PROGRAM

GROUP SESSION GI: THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 21, 9:00 A.M.–NOON

GI-1. Adam Smith Society

9:00 a.m.–noon

Chair: Remy Debes (University of Memphis)

Speaker: Geoffrey Sayre-McCord (University of North Carolina–Chapel Hill)

“Hume and Smith on Sympathy, Approbation, and Moral Judgment”

Commentator: John McHugh (Denison University)

GI-2. Committee on Pre-College Instruction in Philosophy: How Do You Know It’s Working? Assessment in Philosophy for Children

9:00 a.m.–noon

Speakers: Steve Trickey (American University)

Thomas E. Wartenberg (Mount Holyoke College)

Carol Gardosik (Sam Houston State University)

Steven Goldberg (Oak Park and River Forest High School)

GI-3. Society for the Philosophic Study of Genocide and the Holocaust

9:00 a.m.–noon

Topic: Theodor Adorno on Auschwitz and the Concept of Genocide

Chair: James R. Watson (Loyola University New Orleans)

Speakers: Natalie Nenadic (University of Kentucky)

“The Imperative of ‘Thinking’ after Auschwitz: The Genealogy of the Concept of Genocidal Rape”

James Murphy (DePaul University)

“Nietzsche after Auschwitz: Reification and Damaged Life in *Negative Dialectics*”

Ryan Crawford (Webster University, Vienna)

“Adorno’s Man with No Skin: Utopia, Barbarism, and the Body”

Max Zirngast (Institut für Philosophie, University of Vienna)

“Specters of Armenia: Adorno and Žižek on Genocide”

Roman Widholm (University of Vienna)
 “What Do We Mean by ‘Traversing through the Part’? On Adorno’s Concept of Mourning and a Class of Nearly Neutral Objects It Entails”
 André Mineau (University of Quebec–Rimouski)
 “Holocaust Survivors and the Concept of Genocide”

GI-4. Society for Systematic Philosophy

9:00 a.m.–noon

Topic: Reason and Politics

Chair: Richard Velkley (Tulane University)
 Speakers: Richard Dien Winfield (University of Georgia)
 Robert Berman (Xavier University)
 Carl Rapp (University of Georgia)

GI-5. Society for Analytical Feminism

9:00 a.m.–noon

Chair: Robin S. Dillon (Lehigh University)
 Speaker: Susanne Sreedhar (Boston University)
 “Samuel von Pufendorf on Gender and the Family: Revisiting the Debates over Feminism and Early Modern Social Contract Theory”
 Commentator: Elizabeth Edenberg (Vanderbilt University)
 Speaker: Kathryn Swanson (University of Minnesota)
 “Mitigating Epistemic Injustice by Practicing Partiality: Choosing to Trust in Courtroom Testimony”
 Commentator: Nancy V. Daukas (Guilford College)
 Speaker: Esa Diaz-Leon (University of Manitoba)
 “‘Woman’ as a Politically Significant Term: A Solution to the Puzzle”
 Commentator: Marianne Janack (Hamilton College)

GI-6. Society for the Study of the History of Analytical Philosophy

9:00 a.m.–noon

Topic: Logical Form

Chair: Nicholas F. Stang (University of Miami)
 Speakers: Julie Brumberg (CNRS-Paris)
 “The Origins of Logical Hylomorphism”
 Sandra Lapointe (McMaster University)
 “Is Logic Formal? Bolzano and Kant”
 Danielle Macbeth (Haverford College)
 “Logical Form in Mathematical Practice”

GI-7. Nicolai Hartmann Society*9:00 a.m.–noon***Topic: Nicolai Hartmann: Aporia and Progress in Philosophy**

Speakers: Roberto Poli (University of Trento)

“Nicolai Hartmann’s Theory of Ontological Categories”

Keith R. Peterson (Colby College)

“Structure and Genesis in Ontology: Hartmann on Stratification, Causality, and Emergence”

Frederic Tremblay (University of Buffalo)

“Nicolai Hartmann’s Theory of Universals”

GI-8. American Society for Value Inquiry: Naomi Zack, *The Ethics and Mores of Race**9:00 a.m.–noon*

Chair: Thomas Magnell (Drew University)

Critics: Jorge L. A. Garcia (Boston College)

Jason Hill (DePaul University)

Steve Haladay (Canisius College)

Response: Naomi Zack (University of Oregon)

GI-9. Marxism and Philosophy Association*9:00 a.m.–noon***Topic: Marxism and Crisis**

Chair: Peter Amato (Drexel University)

Speakers: Jeanne Schuler (Creighton University)

Patrick Murray (Creighton University)

GI-10. Society for the Advancement of American Philosophy*9:00 a.m.–noon***Topic: Emerson’s Abandoned Selves and Self-Abandonment**

Chair: Kandace Riddle (Southern Illinois University–Carbondale)

Speakers: Kelly Dean Jolley (Auburn University)

“Skeptical Writing: Montaigne, Emerson, and Emerson on Montaigne”

David K. O’Connor (University of Notre Dame)

“Emerson and the Representation of Genius”

Steven G. Affeldt (Le Moyne College)

“Ascent and Resignation: The Structure of Liberation in ‘The Poet’”

Commentator: Jennifer Gurley (Le Moyne College)

GI-11. Philosophy of Time Society*9:00 a.m.–noon*

- Chair: Richard Hanley (University of Delaware)
 Speaker: Kathy Fazekas (University of Connecticut)
 “B Theory Passage and Special Relativity”
 Commentator: Philip R. Corkum (University of Alberta)
 Speakers: Vasilis Tsompanidis (Universidad Nacional
 Autónoma de México)
 “Mental Files and Times”
 Richard Hanley (University of Delaware)
 “Just-So Stories of Affecting the Past”
 Commentator: Richard Hanson (University of Wisconsin Colleges)

GI-12. Association for Symbolic Logic*9:00 a.m.–noon*

Topic: Invited Session: Logic in Undergraduate Philosophy Education

GI-13. International Berkeley Society*9:00 a.m.–noon*

Topic: Authors Reply to Critics: A Roundtable

- Chair: Seth Bordner (University of Alabama)
 Speakers: John R. Roberts (Florida State University)
 “Berkeley’s Mental Realism”
 Marc Hight (Hampden-Sydney College)
 “Why Ideas Have an Ontological (and not Merely Epistemic) Status”
 Stephen Daniel (Texas A&M University)
 “How Berkeley Redefines Substance”
 Keota Fields (University of Massachusetts–Dartmouth)
 “Berkeley’s Metaphysics of Perception”
 Scott C. Breuninger (University of South Dakota)
 “Berkeley and the Irish Enlightenment: How ‘Irish’ are ‘We Irish?’”

GI-14. Society for the Metaphysics of Science*9:00 a.m.–noon*

Topic: Situated Affectivity and the Ontology of Emotion

- Chair: Carl Gillett (Northern Illinois University)

Speakers: Achim Stephan (Cognitive Science, Osnabruck University) and Sven Walter (Cognitive Science, Osnabruck University)

“EEEEmotions: From Embodied to Enactive Affectivity”

Bryce Huebner (Georgetown University) and Trip Glazer (Georgetown University)

“Can Emotions Serve as Signals for Social Recalibration?”

GI-15. Society for the Philosophic Study of the Contemporary Visual Arts

9:00 a.m.–noon

Topic: Philosophy of Film and Video Games

Speakers: Shawn P. Loht (Tulane University)
“The Earth Ethics of The Tree of Life”

Dan Flory (Montana State University)
“Imaginative Resistance and Avatar”

Brock Rough (University of Maryland)
“Principles of Generation of Fictional Truths in Video Games”

GROUP SESSION GII: THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 21, 5:25–7:25 P.M.

GII-1. North American Kant Society: Author Meets Critics: Susan Meld Shell and Richard Velkley, *Kant’s Observations and Remarks: A Critical Guide*

5:25–7:25 p.m.

Chair: Robert B. Loudon (University of Southern Maine)

Critics: Jane Kneller (Colorado State University)
Katerina Deligiorgi (University of Sussex)

Responses: Susan Meld Shell (Boston College)
Richard Velkley (Tulane University)

GII-2. Society for Asian and Comparative Philosophy

5:25–7:25 p.m.

Topic: Contemporary Approaches to Buddhist Ethical Texts

Chair: Stephen Harris (Illinois Institute of Technology)

Speakers: Ethan Mills (University of New Mexico)
“Vasubandhuan Phenomenalism as a Buddhist Ethical Practice”

Amy Donahue (Kennesaw State University)
“For the Cowherds—A Feminist Virtue-Based

Account of Conventional Truth in Madhyamaka Epistemology”

Stephen Harris (Illinois Institute of Technology)
“Reductionism about Persons and Impartial Benevolence in Śāntideva and Parfit”

Emily McRae (University of Oklahoma)
“Transforming Anger: Buddhist Approaches to the Morality of Anger”

GII-3. Society of Christian Philosophers

5:25–7:25 p.m.

Topic: William P. Alston Memorial Lecture

Speaker: Peter van Inwagen (University of Notre Dame)
The William Alston Memorial Lecture: “C. S. Lewis on Naturalism”

Chair: Christina Van Dyke (Calvin College)

GII-4. Society for the Philosophic Study of Genocide and the Holocaust

5:25–7:25 p.m.

Chair: André Mineau (University of Quebec–Rimouski)

Speakers: Marcus Zöchmeister (Sigmund Freud University, Vienna)

“Adorno, Lacan: Critic and the Real”

David Pettigrew (Southern Connecticut State University)

“W. G. Sebald’s *Austerlitz: Between Adler and Adorno*”

Erik Vogt (Trinity College (Hartford) and University of Vienna)

“Opera as Accompaniment to Genocide? Some Comments on Lacoue-Labarthe’s *Auseinandersetzung* with Adorno”

James R. Watson (Loyola University New Orleans)
“Redemptive Philosophy in Administered Society”

GII-5. Joint Session Sponsored by the Association for Informal Logic and Critical Thinking and the American Association of Philosophy Teachers

5:25–7:25 p.m.

Topic: New Approaches to Designing Critical Thinking Courses

Chair: Paul Wagner (University of Houston–Clear Lake)

- Speakers: Maria Sanders (Lone Star College–CyFair)
 “Preserving Character in the Classroom: A Virtue-Based Approach to Teaching Informal Logic and Critical Thinking”
- Lisa Cassidy (Ramapo College of New Jersey)
 “Doing ‘Civic Scene Investigation’ in Critical Thinking Classes”
- Lawrence A. Lengbeyer (U.S. Naval Academy)
 “The Potential of Argument Mapping”

GII-6. Hume Society

5:25–7:25 p.m.

- Chair: Abraham S. Roth (Ohio State University)
- Speaker: Donald L. M. Baxter (University of Connecticut)
 “Hume on Substance”
- Commentator: Justin Broackes (Brown University)
- Speaker: Galen Strawson (University of Reading and University of Texas–Austin)
 “Hume on Personal Identity: ‘No Difficulty in the Case’”
- Commentator: Charles Huenemann (Utah State University)

GII-7. Committee on Institutional Cooperation

5:25–7:25 p.m.

GII-8. Association for Symbolic Logic

5:25–7:25 p.m.

Topic: Contributed Papers

GII-9. Charles S. Peirce Society

5:25–7:25 p.m.

- Chair: James Liszka (State University College–Plattsburgh)
- Speaker: Claudine Tiercelin (Collège de France)
 Presidential Address: “The Relevance of Peirce’s Scientific Metaphysics”
- The Winner of the 2012 Essay Contest:*
- Speaker: Masato Ishida (University of Hawaii, Manoa)
 “Revisiting Convergence: A Peircean Reply to Quine’s Two Problems”

GII-10. North American Nietzsche Society*5:25–7:25 p.m.*

Chair: Lawrence J. Hatab (Old Dominion University)

Speakers: Justin Remhof (University of Illinois–Urbana-Champaign)

“Remarks on Nietzsche’s Conception of Truth”

Alexander Prescott-Couch (Harvard University)

“Genealogy and the Structure of Interpretation”

GII-11. Midwest Society for Women in Philosophy*5:25–7:25 p.m.***GII-12. Society for the Philosophic Study of the Contemporary Visual Arts***5:25–7:25 p.m.***Topic: Philosophy of Film and Art**

Chair: Dan Flory (Montana State University)

Speakers: Ilan Safit (Pace University)

“Seeing Thoughts, Thinking Images: Aristotle’s Cinema”

Sander H. Lee (Keene State College)

“Sartrean Themes in Woody Allen’s *Vicky Christina Barcelona*”**GROUP SESSION GIII: THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 21, 7:30–10:30 P.M.****GIII-1. North American Division of the Schopenhauer Society***7:30–10:30 p.m.*

Chair: David E. Cartwright (University of Wisconsin–Whitewater)

Speakers: Alex Neill (University of Southampton)

“Schopenhauer on the Discontinuity of Music with the Non-Musical Arts”

Luciana Samamé (Universidad Nacional de Córdoba–Secyt)

“Schopenhauer on Aesthetic Tranquility: A Genuine Experience of Happiness”

David Netherton (University of Wales)

“From Aesthetical Judgment to Broken Teleology: Schopenhauer’s Reply to Kant’s *Third Critique*”

Sandra L. Shapshay (Indiana University/Indiana University Center for Bioethics)

“Schopenhauer, Darwin and the Ideas”

GIII-2. Society for the Philosophy of Agency

7:30–10:30 p.m.

Topic: Strawson's *Freedom and Resentment*

Chair: Zac Cogley (Northern Michigan University)

Speaker: John Martin Fischer (University of California–Riverside)

“Peter Strawson and the Facts of Agency”

Commentator: Dana K. Nelkin (University of California–San Diego)

Speaker: Daniel Justin Coates (University of Chicago Law School)

“Responsibility without (Panicky) Metaphysic”

Commentator: Jada Twedt Strabbing (Fordham University)

GIII-3. Society for Lesbian and Gay Philosophy

7:30–10:30 p.m.

Chair: John Corvino (Wayne State University)

Speakers: Carol Viola Ann Quinn (Metropolitan State University of Denver)

“Intersexuality and the Demand for Heterosexual Normalcy”

Dennis R. Cooley (North Dakota State University)

“When Civil Rights Should and Shouldn't Be Put to the Popular Vote”

GIII-4. International Society for Environmental Ethics: Author Meets Critics: Carl Cranor, *Legally Poisoned: How the Law Puts Us at Risk from Toxicants*

7:30–10:30 p.m.

Chair: James P. Sterba (University of Notre Dame)

Critics: Andrew Askland (Arizona State University)
Kevin Elliott (University of South Carolina)

Response: Carl Cranor (University of California–Riverside)

GIII-5. Nicolai Hartmann Society

7:30–10:30 p.m.

Speakers: Eugene Kelly (New York Institute of Technology)
“Aesthetical Mysteries: Hartmann on the Limits of Aesthetics”

Predrag Cicovacki (College of the Holy Cross)

“Hartmann on Values: Their Ranks, Antinomies, and Synthesis”

Joachim Fischer (Technische Universität Dresden)
 “Philosophy of Mind: Structure and Relevance of
 Hartmann’s *Probleme des Geistigen Seins* for the
 Humanities and Social Sciences”

**GIII-6. Joint Session Sponsored by the Association for
 Informal Logic and Critical Thinking and the American
 Association of Philosophy Teachers**

7:30–10:30 p.m.

Topic: Psychology and Critical Thinking

Chair: Frank Fair (Sam Houston State University)

Speakers: Cathal Woods (Virginia Wesleyan College)

“Rationality and Irrationality: The Role of
 Psychology in Critical Thinking Courses”

Frank Zenker (Lund University, Sweden)

Timothy A. Kenyon (University of Waterloo)

“Teaching to Combat Biased Reasoning in Critical
 Thinking Courses”

H. E. Baber (University of San Diego)

“Teaching Psychologically Based Informal
 Fallacies”

Jonathan Ellis (University of California–Santa Cruz)

“Motivated Reasoning in Critical Thinking”

**GIII-7. North American Society for Social Philosophy: Author
 Meets Critics: Jeffrey Reiman, *As Free and as Just as
 Possible: The Theory of Marxian Liberalism***

7:30–10:30 p.m.

Critics: James Boettcher (Saint Joseph’s University)

Ann E. Cudd (University of Kansas)

Jacob M. Held (University of Central Arkansas)

Response: Jeffrey Reiman (American University)

GIII-8. Association for Philosophy of Education

7:30–10:30 p.m.

Speakers: Michael Tiboris (University of California–San Diego)

“Undermatching and Personal Autonomy”

Harry Brighouse (University of Wisconsin–
 Madison)

“Evaluating Education Policy”

Commentator: Jaime Ahlberg (University of Florida)

GIII-9. Society for the Philosophy of Creativity

7:30–10:30 p.m.

Topic: The Creative Career of Arthur Danto

Chair: Stephen H. Bickham (Mansfield University)

Speakers: David Seiple (City University of New York)
“Creativity and Spirit in the Work of Arthur Danto”
Crispin Sartwell (Dickinson College)
“Danto as Writer”

Commentator: Phillip Seng (University of Maryland–Baltimore County)

*Co-sponsored by the Library of Living Philosophers***GIII-10. Josiah Royce Society**

7:30–10:30 p.m.

Topic: Temporality and Community

Chair: Randall E. Auxier (Southern Illinois University–Carbondale)

Speakers: John D. Glenn (Tulane University)
“Now and Then: Considerations of Two Arguments about Time”
J. L. Roche (Southern Illinois University–Carbondale)
“Roycean Interpretation and Temporality in Community Disaster”**GIII-11. Society for the History of Political Philosophy**

7:30–10:30 p.m.

Topic: Plato, Tragedy and Comedy

Chair: Ronna Burger (Tulane University)

Speakers: Gwenda-lin Grewal (University of Dallas)
“Sophocles’ Antigone: Burying the Body, Revealing the Soul”
Mark Pryor (Tulane University)
“The Tragicomic View of Politics in *Republic VIII*”
Derek Duplessie (Tulane University)
“Socrates’ Analysis of Comedy in Plato’s *Philebus*”
Alexandre Priou (Tulane University)
“Irony and Opinion: Plato’s *Theaetetus* as the Absent *Philosopher*”
Evanthia Speliotis (Bellarmine College)
“Plato’s *Statesman* and the Necessary Being of Becoming”

GROUP SESSION GIV: FRIDAY, FEBRUARY 22, 7:15–10:15 P.M.
GIV-1. Society for Business Ethics: Author Meets Critics: David Schwartz, *Consuming Choices*

7:15–10:15 p.m.

Chair: Mikhail Valdman (Virginia Commonwealth University)

Critics: Richard Galvin (Texas Christian University)
Alastair Norcross (University of Colorado)

Response: David Schwartz (Randolph College)

GIV-2. Society for the History of Political Philosophy: Richard Velkley, *Heidegger, Strauss, and the Premises of Philosophy: On Original Forgetting*

7:15–10:15 p.m.

Chair: Martin Sitte (Independent Scholar)

Critics: Michael Davis (Illinois Institute of Technology)
Susan Meld Shell (Boston College)

Rachel E. Zuckert (Northwestern University)

Michael Ehrmentraut (St. John's College–Santa Fe)

Frank Schalow (University of New Orleans)

Response: Richard Velkley (Tulane University)

GIV-3. Society for the Study of the History of Analytical Philosophy

7:15–10:15 p.m.

Topic: Russell on Acquaintance

Chair: Kelly Dean Jolley (Auburn University)

Speakers: Ian Proops (University of Texas–Austin)
“Russellian Acquaintance”

Michael Kremer (University of Chicago)

“Acquaintance before ‘On Denoting’”

Michael F. Martin (University of California–Berkeley)
“Acquaintance and Memory”

GIV-4. International Society for Environmental Ethics

7:15–10:15 p.m.

Topic: Environment and Justice

Chair: Paul Haught (Christian Brothers University)

Speaker: David Morrow (University of Alabama–Birmingham)
“Fairness in Allocating the Carbon Budget”

Commentator: John Nolt (University of Tennessee)

- Speaker: Philip Smolenski (Queen's University (Ontario))
"The Climatic Difference Principle"
- Commentator: Ian A. Smith (Loyola University New Orleans)
- Speakers: Barrett Emerick (Saint Mary's College of Maryland)
and Emily Saari (Global Campaign for Climate
Action)
"Population, Climate Change, and Gender Justice"
- Commentator: Chaone Mallory (Villanova University)
- Speaker: Amy Ihlan (St. Catherine University)
"The 'Polluter Pays' Principle Backwards and
Forwards"
- Commentator: Philip Maloney (Christian Brothers University)

GIV-6. Society for Realist-Antirealist Discussion

7:15–10:15 p.m.

Topic: Quantifier Variance and Realism

- Speakers: Eli Hirsch (Brandeis University)
"Quantifier Variance and Sider's Structure"
- Jody Azzouni (Tufts University)
"What Is *Really* Wrong with Quantifier Variance?"
- Josh Brown (University of Houston)
"Two Kinds of Quantifier Variance"
- Otávio A. Bueno (University of Miami)
"Quantifier Variance and Realism about Structure"

GIV-7. Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy

7:15–10:15 p.m.

- Chair: Mark Wheeler (San Diego State University)
- Speakers: Joel Mann (St. Norbert College)
"Accidentalism as an Ancient Ancestor of Double
Effect: On Some Problems in Antiphon's Third
Tetralogy"
- Daniel Propson (Wayne State University)
"Forget Anamnesis"
- Jonathan Hecht (Indiana University–Bloomington)
"Free Will in the *Republic*"

GIV-8. American Society for Aesthetics

7:15–10:15 p.m.

- Chair: John Gibson (University of Louisville)
- Speaker: Espen Hammer (Temple University)
"Happiness and Pleasure in Adorno's Aesthetics"

- Commentator: Brady Bowman (Pennsylvania State University)
 Speaker: Sonia Sedivy (University of Toronto)
 “Beauty and the Aesthetic Presence of the World”
 Commentator: Christopher Grau (Clemson University)
 Speaker: Robert Chodat (Boston University)
 “Are Novels Aesthetic Objects?”
 Commentator: Kristin Boyce (Johns Hopkins University)

GIV-9. Society for the Philosophical Study of Education

7:15–10:15 p.m.

- Chair: David L. Mosley (Bellarmine University)
 Speakers: David L. Mosley (Bellarmine University)
 “The End(s) of Nietzsche’s Teaching”
 Hugh Leonard (University of New Brunswick)
 and Emory Hyslop-Margison (University of New Brunswick)
 “Threats to Democratic Citizenship in Public Education”
 Matthew Dewar (Lake Forest High School, Illinois)
 “Health as Wholeness: Recovering the Ontological Significance of Health in School Health Education”
 Boyd Bradbury (Minnesota State University)
 “The Mirage of Educational Equity among Involuntary Minorities and an Involuntary Majority: A Comparison of Public Educational Systems Serving Indigenous Populations in the United States and South Africa”

GIV-10. William James Society

7:15–10:15 p.m.

Topic: William James and Buddhism

- Chair: Lee A. McBride (College of Wooster)
 Speakers: John Holder (St. Norbert College)
 “James and the Neuroscience of Buddhist Meditation”
 Masato Ishida (University of Hawaii–Manoa)
 “The Metaphysics of Pluralistic Manifestations in James and East-Asian Buddhism”
 Joel Krueger (University of Copenhagen)
 “‘Pure Experience’ and the Perception of Other Minds in James and Zen”
 Commentator: Richard Hayes (University of New Mexico)

GIV-11. Nicolai Hartmann Society*7:15–10:15 p.m.*

Speakers: Claudia Luchetti (University of Tübingen)

“The Discovery of Apriori Knowledge: Hartmann’s Interpretation of Plato’s Theory of Recollection”

Carlo Scognamiglio (University of Rome, La Sapienza)

“The Dilemma of Freedom In Nicolai Hartmann’s Theory of Spiritual Being”

Claudius Vellay (University of Paris)

“From Hartmann to Lukács: The Ontological Turn of Marxism”

GIV-12. American Society for Value Inquiry*7:15–10:15 p.m.***Topic: The Meaning of Life**

Chair: G. John M. Abbarno (D’Youville College)

Speakers: Kimberly Blessing (Buffalo State College)

“Theism, Atheism and Meaningfulness of Life”

Michael Patton, Jr. (University of Montevallo)

“Private Language and Private Meaning: The Social Construction of the Meaning of Life”

GROUP SESSION GV: SATURDAY, FEBRUARY 23, 12:15–2:15 P.M.**GV-1. Society for Asian and Comparative Philosophy***12:15–2:15 p.m.***Topic: Philosophical Conversations East and West**

Chair: David Chai (University of Toronto)

Speakers: Hans W. Gruenig (Tulane University)

“Living the Good Life: Reclaiming Conditional Happiness and Pleasure in Theravada Buddhism”

David Chai (University of Toronto)

“Being and the Abyss: Heidegger’s Leap into Daoist Nothingness”

Bongrae Seok (Alvernia University)

“Shame as a Moral Disposition: Confucian Shame and Virtue”

Aaron Fehir (Saint Leo University)

“Deceived into the Truth: Kierkegaard, Buddhism, and the Problem of Conflicting-Truth Claims”

Joseph John (Southern Illinois University–
Carbondale)
“Why Indian Buddhism is Not Pessimistic”

GV-2. Central Division Sartre Circle

12:15–2:15 p.m.

- Chair: Constance Mui (Loyola University New Orleans)
- Speakers: Diane Perpich (Clemson University)
“Alone in a Crowd: Sartre on Group Identity”
- Matthew C. Eshleman (University of North
Carolina–Wilmington)
“Sartre’s Ontological Pluralism: An Existential
Meditation on the Verb ‘To Be’”
- Ronald E. Santoni (Denison University and Clare
Hall, Cambridge)
“The Prevalence of ‘Bad Faith’ in Sartre’s Overall
Thought—and Its Extensive Influence”

GV-3. Bertrand Russell Society

12:15–2:15 p.m.

- Speakers: James Connelly (Trent University)
“On Type* Distinctions in Russell’s 1913 Theory of
Knowledge Manuscript”
- Gregory Landini (University of Iowa)
“Russell’s Philosophy of Mathematics: A Graphic
Logicism Notebook”
- Jolen Galaugher (McMaster University)
“Rethinking Russell’s Substitutional Theory”

GV-4. Personalist Discussion Group

12:15–2:15 p.m.

Topic: The Liberation of the Person

- Chair: Randall E. Auxier (Southern Illinois University–
Carbondale)
- Speaker: Andrew Irvine (Maryville College)
“The Personal, the Impersonal, and Liberation: A
Critical Reading of Gustavo Gutiérrez’s *On Job*.”
- Commentator: Juan Alejandro Chindoy (Southern Illinois
University–Carbondale)

GV-5. Philosophy of Religion Group

12:15–2:15 p.m.

- Chair: Robert Stewart (New Orleans Baptist Theological
Seminary)

Speaker: Robert Audi (University of Notre Dame)
 Commentators: E. J. Lowe (Durham University)
 Robert C. Roberts (Baylor University)

GV-6. Concerned Philosophers for Peace

12:15–2:15 p.m.

Topic: Love, Justice for Nonhumans, and Risking Oneself

Chair: Greg Moses (Independent Scholar)

Speakers: Predrag Cicovacki (College of the Holy Cross)
 “Strength to Love and be Nonviolent: Analyzing King’s Sermons”

Carlo Filice (State University of New York–Geneseo)
 “Some Institutional Conditions for a Just Society with Nonhumans: The Mixed System and Democracy”

Danielle Poe (University of Dayton)
 “Responding to Need: Martin Luther King Jr. and Leymah Gbowee”

GV-7. Radical Philosophy Association

12:15–2:15 p.m.

Topic: Differential Treatment: Limits and Justifications

Chair: Ken Levy (Louisiana State University)

Speakers: Kristina Lebedeva (DePaul University)
 “Kristeva’s Abject and the Problem of Disability”

James Rocha (Louisiana State University)
 “Sexuality in the Workplace: The Homophobic Sexual Harassment Accusation”

GV-8. Conference of Philosophical Societies

12:15–2:15 p.m.

Topic: Ways of Philosophy

Chair: G. John M. Abbarno (D’Youville College)

Speakers: David Schrader (University of Delaware)
 Kate Winingar (University of Southern Maine)
 G. John M. Abbarno (D’Youville College)

GV-9. North American Nietzsche Society

12:15–2:15 p.m.

Chair: Richard Velkley (Tulane University)

Speakers: Jeffrey Church (University of Houston)
 “Nietzsche’s Early Perfectionism: A Cultural Reading of ‘The Greek State’”

Mark Alfano (University of Oregon and Princeton University)

“How One Becomes What One Is Called: On the Relation Between Traits and Trait-Terms in Nietzsche”

GV-10. Society for the Metaphysics of Science

12:15–2:15 p.m.

Topic: Composition and Causation in the Sciences

Chair: Kenneth Aizawa (Centenary College of Louisiana)

Speakers: Carl Gillett (Northern Illinois University)

“The Parts of Science”

Thomas W. Polger (University of Cincinnati) and Larry Shapiro (University of Wisconsin–Madison)

“In Defense of Interventionist Solutions to Exclusion”

GV-11. International Association for the Philosophy of Sport

12:15–2:15 p.m.

Speakers: Pam Sailors (Missouri State University)

Charlene Weaving (St. Francis Xavier University) and Sarah Teetzel (University of Manitoba)

“Lentius, Inferius, Debilius: The Ethics of ‘Not Trying’ on the Olympic Stage”

Amber L. Griffioen (University of Konstanz)

“Why Jim Joyce Wasn’t Wrong: Baseball and the Euthyphro Dilemma”

GV-12. Society for the Philosophy of History

12:15–2:15 p.m.

MAIN AND GROUP MEETING PARTICIPANTS

ABBARNO, G. John M. (D'Youville College).....	GIV-12, GV-8
ABBOTT, Barbara (Michigan State University).....	III-G
ADAMS, Joseph Q. (Rice University).....	IV-F
AFFELDT, Steven G. (Le Moyne College).....	GI-10
AHLBERG, Jaime (University of Florida).....	GIII-8
AIZAWA, Kenneth (Centenary College of Louisiana).....	II-H, GV-10
ALBRECHT, Ingrid V. (Ball State University).....	II-K
ALFANO, Mark (University of Oregon and Princeton University).....	GV-9
ALLEN, Michael (East Tennessee State University).....	V-H
ALTSCHUL, John (Loyola University New Orleans).....	I-E
ALTSHULER, Roman (State University of New York–Stony Brook).....	I-D
ALZNAUER, Mark (Northwestern University).....	V-H
AMATO, Peter (Drexel University).....	GI-9
ANDERSON, Joshua W. (Saint Louis University).....	V-H
ANDERSON, Luvell (Pennsylvania State University).....	III-B
ANDRE, Judith (Michigan State University).....	II-K
APOLLONI, David (Augsburg College).....	VI-J
ASKLAND, Andrew (Arizona State University).....	GIII-4
ATHERTON, Margaret (University of Wisconsin–Milwaukee)	
.....	Presidential Address
ATKINS, Richard Kenneth (Fordham University).....	VI-I
AUDI, Paul (University of Nebraska–Omaha).....	VII-F
AUDI, Robert (University of Notre Dame).....	GV-5
AUMANN, Antony (Northern Michigan University).....	I-J
AUSTIN, Emily A. (Wake Forest University).....	VI-J
AUXIER, Randall E. (Southern Illinois University–Carbondale)	
.....	I-I, GIII-10, GV-4
AZZOUNI, Jody (Tufts University).....	II-F, GIV-6
BABER, H. E. (University of San Diego).....	GIII-6
BACH, Theodore (Bowling Green State University Firelands College)	
.....	VII-G
BAILEY, Andrew M. (Yale University/Yale-NUS College).....	V-I
BAILEY, Dominic (University of Colorado–Boulder).....	II-G

BAMFORD, Rebecca (Quinnipiac University).....	VI-L
BAR-ON, Dorit (University of North Carolina–Chapel Hill).....	V-E
BARNARD, Robert (University of Mississippi).....	I-I
BARRY, Peter Brian (Saginaw Valley State University)	II-K
BATTY, Clare (University of Kentucky)	VII-D
BAUER, Nathan (University of Chicago).....	VII-J
BAXTER, Donald L. M. (University of Connecticut).....	GII-6
BEAVERS, Tony (University of Evansville)	VI-A
BECKER, Lawrence T. (Hollins University)	V-K
BEHELER, Ali (DePaul University).....	V-M
BERGER, Douglas L. (Southern Illinois University–Carbondale).....	III-M
BERGMANN, Michael (Purdue University)	VI-I
BERKELEY, Istvan (University of Louisiana–Lafayette).....	I-B
BERMAN, Robert (Xavier University)	GI-4
BERNSTEIN, Sara (Duke University)	II-E
BESSER-JONES, Lorraine L. (Middlebury College)	V-B
BICKHAM, Stephen H. (Mansfield University)	GIII-9
BICKLE, John (Mississippi State University).....	III-D
BIRT, Robert (Bowie State University)	VII-A
BISS, Mavis (Loyola University Maryland).....	II-L
BJÖRNSSON, Gunnar (Umeå University and University of Gothenburg)	VI-H
BLATTI, Stephan (University of Memphis).....	II-F
BLATTNER, William (Georgetown University)	VII-H
BLECHER, Ian (School of the Art Institute of Chicago)	I-G
BLESSING, Kimberly (Buffalo State College).....	GIV-12
BOATWRIGHT, Karyn J. (Kalamazoo College).....	VII-L
BOETTCHER, James (Saint Joseph’s University)	GIII-7
BONDURANT, Hannah A. (Independent Scholar).....	VI-I
BORDNER, Seth (University of Alabama).....	GI-13
BOURGET, David (University of London).....	VI-A
BOWMAN, Brady (Pennsylvania State University)	GIV-8
BOYCE, Kenneth A. (University of Notre Dame)	I-H
BOYCE, Kristin (Johns Hopkins University).....	GIV-8
BOYLE, J. C. (San Diego State University).....	I-J
BRADBURY, Boyd (Minnesota State University)	GIV-9
BRADFORD, Gwen (Rice University).....	V-B
BREDESON, Garrett (Vanderbilt University).....	V-H
BRENNAN, Samantha (University of Western Ontario).....	I-E
BREUNINGER, Scott C. (University of South Dakota)	GI-13
BRICE, Robert G. (Loyola University New Orleans).....	VII-B

BRIGHOUSE, Harry (University of Wisconsin–Madison).....	GIII-8
BROACKES, Justin (Brown University).....	V-D, GII-6
BROWN, Charlotte (Illinois Wesleyan University).....	IV-E
BROWN, Eric A. (Washington University in St. Louis).....	II-G
BROWN, Joshua (University of Houston).....	I-C, GIV-6
BROWN, Matthew (University of Texas–Dallas).....	VII-E
BRUMBERG, Julie (CNRS-Paris).....	GI-6
BRUNO, Michael (Mississippi State University).....	VII-G
BUCHWALTER, Andrew (University of North Florida).....	VII-H
BUCKNER, Cameron (University of Houston).....	VI-A
BUENO, Otávio A. (University of Miami).....	GIV-6
BULCOCK, Jennifer (Rice University).....	I-G
BULTHUIS, Nathaniel (Cornell University).....	II-J
BURGER, Ronna (Tulane University).....	GIII-11
BYERS, Sarah Catherine (Boston College).....	II-J
CALHOUN, Cheshire (Arizona State University).....	III-F
CAMPANA, Daniel A. (University of La Verne).....	IV-F
CARBONELL, Vanessa (University of Cincinnati).....	III-I
CARD, Claudia (University of Wisconsin–Madison).....	III-A
CARLSON, Amber (University of Notre Dame).....	III-H
CARLSON, Licia (Providence College).....	VI-B
CARR, David (Emory University).....	VI-F
CARTWRIGHT, David E. (University of Wisconsin–Whitewater).....	GIII-1
CASSIDY, Lisa (Ramapo College of New Jersey).....	GII-5
CASTRO, Susan (Wichita State University).....	II-L
CATALA, Amandine (University of Colorado–Boulder).....	VII-K
CHAI, David (University of Toronto).....	GV-1
CHINDOY, Juan Alejandro (Southern Illinois University–Carbondale)	
.....	GV-4
CHODAT, Robert (Boston University).....	GIV-8
CHRISTENSEN, David (Brown University).....	II-E
CHURCH, Jeffrey (University of Houston).....	GV-9
CICOVACKI, Predrag (College of the Holy Cross).....	GIII-5, GV-6
CLARK, Maudemarie (University of California–Riverside).....	II-A
CLEMENTS, Patricia (University of Alberta).....	VI-A
CLOUGH, Sharyn (Oregon State University).....	III-F
COATES, Daniel Justin (University of Chicago Law School).....	GIII-2
COGBURN, Jon M. (Louisiana State University).....	IV-B
COGLEY, Zac (Northern Michigan University).....	VII-I, GIII-2
COLEMAN, Mary C. (Illinois Wesleyan University and Tulane University).....	I-K

CONNELLY, James (Trent University)	GV-3
CONNOLLY, Patrick (University of North Carolina–Chapel Hill)	III-H
COOK, J. Thomas (Rollins College).....	III-H
COOLEY, Dennis R. (North Dakota State University)	GIII-3
CORKUM, Philip R. (University of Alberta).....	V-I, GI-11
CORTENS, Andrew (Boise State University)	V-J
CORVINO, John (Wayne State University)	III-A, GIII-3
COSERU, Cristian (College of Charleston).....	III-M, VI-C
CRANOR, Carl (University of California–Riverside)	GIII-4
CRAYER, Carl F. (Washington University in St. Louis).....	III-D
CRAWFORD, Ryan (Webster University, Vienna).....	GI-3
CRILEY, Mark (Illinois Wesleyan University)	IV-E
CROSS, Charles B. (University of Georgia)	I-I
CROSS, Troy W. (Reed College)	III-G
CROWLEY, Tim (University College Dublin).....	III-J
CRYSTAL, Ian (Louisiana State University)	III-J
CUDD, Ann E. (University of Kansas).....	VII-K, GIII-7
CUNDALL, Michael (North Carolina A&T State University).....	II-H
CURETON, Adam (University of Tennessee)	V-K, VI-B
CURRY, Tommy J. (Texas A&M University).....	II-C
DAI, Yuanfang (Michigan State University).....	I-K
DALY, Helen (Colorado College)	IV-G
DANIEL, Stephen (Texas A&M University).....	V-D, GI-13
DAUKAS, Nancy V. (Guilford College).....	GI-5
DAVIS, Michael (Illinois Institute of Technology).....	GIV-2
DAWSON, Clanton C. W. (Bethune Cookman University)	IV-A
DEBES, Remy (University of Memphis)	VII-G, GI-1
DECKER, Mark (Northland College)	IV-D
DELIGIORGI, Katerina (University of Sussex).....	GII-1
DELSTON, Jill (Washington University in St. Louis)	IV-I
DEROY, Ophelia (Institute of Philosophy, University of London)	VII-D
DESAUTELS, Peggy (University of Dayton)	VII-E
DEWAR, Matthew (Lake Forest High School, Illinois)	GIV-9
DIAZ-LEON, Esa (University of Manitoba).....	III-K, GI-5
DILLON, Robin S. (Lehigh University)	GI-5
DIZADJI-BAHMANI, Foad (London School of Economics).....	VI-K
DOGRAMACI, Sinan (University of Texas–Austin)	I-C
DONAHUE, Amy (Kennesaw State University)	GII-2
DOTSON, Kristie (Michigan State University)	II-M
DOWNES, Stephen (University of Utah).....	III-F
DUDRICK, David (Colgate University).....	II-A

DUNCAN, Matt (University of Virginia)	V-J
DUPLESSIE, Derek (Tulane University).....	GIII-11
DUQUETTE, David (Saint Norbert College).....	VII-H
EASWARAN, Kenneth (University of Southern California).....	VI-K
EBREY, David (Northwestern University)	VI-J
EDENBERG, Elizabeth (Vanderbilt University)	GI-5
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ABSTRACTS OF COLLOQUIUM AND SUBMITTED SYMPOSIUM PAPERS

“STORIES AND THEIR PLACE IN THEORIES” (IV-F)

JOSEPH Q. ADAMS (*RICE UNIVERSITY*)

This paper develops two arguments that together vindicate Professor Nussbaum’s puzzling claim that stories—myths, folktales, legends, dramas, and the like—are the appropriate source material for the conception of human nature driving her capabilities approach to the good. If the statement of the good is to be universal because objective, then its foundation—the account of human nature—better include propositions of the highest credentials. Surely facts, grounded in science, are going to be the appropriate source. Not stories. Right? The first argument “beefs up” stories and concludes that, appropriately worked up, stories deliver our most cherished beliefs about what it is to be a human being, what I call a convictive conception of human nature. The second argument “tones down” objectivity and shows that such a conception attains the strongest reasonable level of objectivity. The second argument draws on an enduring lesson of analytic philosophy of science: that our best world scientific theories are the product not of revising our beliefs against (what turn out to be) mysterious external facts, but of a process of adjudication that appeals, at its base, to our values. Stories which deliver cherished beliefs are, on this picture, quite as close to knowledge as things get. But there’s more: if values determine science and if the good organizes our values, then stories turn out to be not just more commendable than originally thought, but, indeed, the only rationally appropriate source material we have.

“HOW WE HURT THE ONES WE LOVE” (II-K)

INGRID V. ALBRECHT (*BALL STATE UNIVERSITY*)

I suggest that love involves its own forms of expectation and disappointment. When those we love disappoint us, they hurt our feelings. The attitude of hurt feelings, unlike other second personal reactive attitudes, does not have a third personal analogue (the way that indignation is the third personal corollary of resentment). I take this as evidence that the expectations involved in love are not objective in the way that the moral is objective. Nor, however, is love a matter of mere preference. Next, I argue that Kant’s work in the *Critique of Judgment* introduces this different type of expectation. Whereas moral judgments are universally communicable, judgments of beauty, in contrast, implicitly involve only second personal address: I appeal to your personal experience with a particular object.

This provides the conceptual space for an account of love according to which love involves in a form of practical necessity that is uniquely second personal.

“NEED WE CHOOSE OUR REASONS?” (I-D)

ROMAN ALTSHULER (*STATE UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK—STONY BROOK*)

Philosophers often claim that agents are capable not only of choosing how to act, but also of choosing the reasons on which they act, discounting other reasons for the same action. This claim, which I will call the Reason Choosing Thesis (RC), occurs in a number of contexts: in defenses of the causal theory of action, in attacks on Humean accounts of motivation, and in defenses of Kant’s account of moral worth. But these appeals to RC are rarely defended; rather, the thesis is most commonly taken as a given about our capacities as rational agents and used as a premise in further arguments. I will attempt to distinguish RC in its strongest form from some competing, and less problematic, theses, and argue that once it is so distinguished, there is no good reason to believe that RC is true. But not to worry: there is no reason we would need it to be true, either.

“HEGEL ON THE ACTUALIZATION OF THE CONCEPT OF THE WILL” (V-H)

MARK ALZNAUER (*NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY*)

One of the most obscure of Hegel’s doctrines is his claim that any concept must be understood together with its actualization. In this talk, I will explore the role the actualization thesis plays in Hegel’s theory of the will. I show that Hegel’s account of the actualization of the concept of the will in the introduction to the *Philosophy of Right* defends a controversial thesis about responsible agency: to wit, that beings which possess the psychological capacities necessary for free action, chief among them the capacity to act on reasons, can only fully realize those capacities, and so become responsible agents, by becoming self-conscious of their rationality or freedom.

“HEGEL AND THE RABBLE” (V-H)

JOSHUA W. ANDERSON (*SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY*)

This paper is a discussion of the rabble in the context of Hegel’s *Philosophy of Right*. First, I briefly present how Hegel discusses the formation of a rabble. I then consider Michael Allen’s and James Bohman’s arguments regarding the domination inherent in Hegel’s theory. Finally, I show that the rabble are precisely the “class” of people that Marx needs to bring about change in the organization of society. Interestingly, there is a surprising similarity between Hegel’s discussion of the rabble and justified disobedience and the Marxism of Huey Newton.

“HUMILITY AS AFFIRMATIVE CAPACITY” (II-K)

JUDITH ANDRE (*MICHIGAN STATE UNIVERSITY*)

Virtues can sometimes be usefully analyzed as skills. Current accounts of humility suggest that it is a negative skill: the humble person has learned

not to boast, not to overestimate her own achievements, not to take herself too seriously. Each of these, however, is related only contingently to humility, which instead requires a positive skill: humble acceptance of new and unflattering information about oneself. The skill includes recognizing pain, softening one's resistance to it, and integrating the initially painful information comfortably into one's self-concept. Humility is essentially a cultivated, ongoing openness to specific sorts of facts, a decidedly affirmative capacity.

“PERCEPTION AND PASSIVITY” (VI-I)

RICHARD KENNETH ATKINS (FORDHAM UNIVERSITY)

Non-normativists maintain that perceptions are not subject to normative assessments; they are neither good nor bad. This thesis and an argument based on the passivity of perception to support it are stronger than is sometimes supposed. However, reflection on why the argument fails reveals in what way perceptions are subject to normative assessments.

“THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN AESTHETIC VALUE AND COGNITIVE VALUE” (I-J)

ANTONY AUMANN (NORTHERN MICHIGAN UNIVERSITY)

It is sometimes held that “the aesthetic” and “the cognitive” are separate categories. Enterprises concerning the former and ones concerning the latter have different aims. They require distinct modes of attention and reward divergent kinds of appreciation. This position has its detractors. They typically maintain that cognitive values can bear upon aesthetic ones. Works of art can be profound or insightful; they can teach us in non-trivial ways. Moreover, this often contributes to their aesthetic merits. I, too, reject the independence or autonomy of aesthetic and cognitive categories. However, I develop a radically different defense of this position, one that inverts the traditional strategy. I show that a work's aesthetic merits can bear upon its cognitive ones and, more provocatively, its philosophical ones.

“AN EMPIRICAL ACCOUNT OF EXPERT INTUITION” (VII-G)

THEODORE BACH (BOWLING GREEN STATE UNIVERSITY FIRELANDS COLLEGE)

Experimental philosophers question the epistemic value of philosophical intuitions on the basis of the susceptibility of intuitions to epistemically irrelevant factors such as ordering effect and cultural background. Defenders of philosophical intuitions respond that philosophical expertise produces intuitions that, while not immune to the philosophically irrelevant, are more epistemically reliable than folk intuitions. The experimentalists, in turn, have challenged this “expertise defense” on empirical grounds. Specifically, they claim that there is no empirical evidence to support the view that expert philosophical intuitions are superior to folk intuitions. We address this challenge and provide empirical support for the expertise defense. We argue that, given a certain view about the psychological processes that underlie intuition, an important body of empirical research

reveals that experts are better specifically at intuiting than novices. We develop an empirically grounded model of expert intuition that provides support for the expertise defense and indicates new directions for future experimental research on philosophical intuitions.

“NOT YET HOLY: KANT ON STRIVING FOR VIRTUE” (II-L)

MAVIS BISS (LOYOLA UNIVERSITY MARYLAND)

In this paper I consider how Kant’s presentation of the duty to moral self-perfection in the Doctrine of Virtue relates to his discussion of moral revolution and moral reformation in *Religion Within the Limits of Reason Alone* and provide provisional solutions to two puzzles: How exactly does purity of moral disposition relate to striving for virtue? And does the fulfillment of the duty to moral self-perfection consist in striving for moral progress or in actually progressing towards holiness? These questions concern both what the duty to self-perfection is, what its nature is, and how it is to be fulfilled in the course of an individual life.

“ARISTOTLE’S PRESENTIST ACCOUNT OF TIME AND THE CHARGE OF CIRCULARITY” (I-H)

KENNETH A. BOYCE (UNIVERSITY OF NOTRE DAME)

Various commentators have charged Aristotle’s discussion of time in *Physics* IV 10-14 with being illicitly circular. In this paper, I defend Aristotle’s account from such charges. I do so by arguing that those who make them fail to properly understand Aristotle’s aims. In particular, I argue that Aristotle is attempting to dissolve certain puzzles that arise for him because he holds a presentist view of time. I further argue that once Aristotle’s aims are properly understood, the charge that his account of time is illicitly circular is seen to be misplaced.

“IMAGINATION AND FILM” (I-J)

J. C. BOYLE (SAN DIEGO STATE UNIVERSITY)

JORDON SCHUMMER (SAN DIEGO STATE UNIVERSITY)

MARK WHEELER (SAN DIEGO STATE UNIVERSITY)

It is widely accepted in the philosophy of film that the imagination plays an important, indeed essential, part in how we view films. We argue, on the contrary, that we almost never engage in imaginative activity when viewing films and, hence, that imagining is unnecessary for film viewing.

“HEGEL ON NEWTON’S UNSPEAKABLE METAPHYSICS” (V-H)

GARRETT BREDESON (VANDERBILT UNIVERSITY)

In his *Encyclopaedia* Hegel singles Newton out as the target of some of his fiercest polemics. In this paper I will try to explain just *why* Newton holds such significance for Hegel. As I see it, Newtonian physics represents, for Hegel, one possible—and dangerous—endpoint for natural philosophy. Far from overcoming the rationalist attempt to provide a rigorous foundation for physics, Newton in fact remains tacitly committed to it, even while he disavows the very resources needed to render the rationalist

presuppositions intelligible and permit their systematic criticism. As the philosopher of the understanding (*Verstand*) *par excellence*, Newton's worldview is peculiarly well-suited to the study of nature in all its contingency and manifoldness, but just because of this it constitutes a significant obstacle for the natural philosopher, whose distinctive task is to dialectically trace the development of nature into spirit.

“A PROBLEM OF MATERIAL SUPPOSITION IN THE SEMANTICS OF WALTER BURLEY” (II-J)

NATHANIEL BULTHUIS (CORNELL UNIVERSITY)

Walter Burley's (c. 1275–c. 1345) theory of the *propositio in re* has garnered interest from contemporary scholars of medieval philosophy well over the last quarter century. But I argue that that theory is at odds with a theory of late medieval semantics to which Burley was a primary contributor—the theory of supposition. In particular, the theory of the *propositio in re* cannot accommodate sentences in natural or mental language whose subject terms have material supposition, in which a term stands for itself or for another term in the language of which it is a part. Burley does provide some recourse to this problem in his last commentary on the *Perihermeneias*. However, Burley's remarks there require a wholesale abandonment of the standard view of material supposition. More importantly, those remarks are too incomplete to constitute a comprehensive revision of the theory of material supposition, for reasons that I highlight.

“A TRUE MODE OF UNION: RECONCILING REAL DISTINCTION AND TRUE UNION IN THE CARTESIAN HUMAN BEING” (III-H)

AMBER CARLSON (UNIVERSITY OF NOTRE DAME)

Descartes believes that mind and body are both really distinct and yet substantially united in the human being. While attempts to uphold both claims appear to render Descartes inconsistent, I argue that Descartes can hold these claims without contradiction. Drawing inspiration from Descartes' January 1642 letter to Regius, I argue that mindbody union is best understood as a mode. Beginning with a brief sketch of Descartes' conception of substances and attributes, I situate his technical definition of modes within his larger substance metaphysics. On this basis I argue for the intelligibility of understanding union as a mode. Once it is clear that modal union is consistent with Cartesian metaphysics, I argue that this is the key insight when attempting to reconcile real distinction and true union. Paired with the realization that Descartes employs two definitions of real distinction, Descartes is able to assert real distinction and true union without contradiction.

“REMEDIAL THEORIES OF SECESSION AND TERRITORIAL JUSTIFICATION” (VII-K)

AMANDINE CATALA (UNIVERSITY OF COLORADO–BOULDER)

Because secession centrally involves taking away a territory, a successful normative theory of secession must give a credible account of when a seceding group has a valid territorial claim. One of the most prominent

types of normative theory of secession is remedial theories of secession. I argue that while remedial theories address the question of territorial justification, they fail to do so adequately, because their account is both arbitrary and internally inconsistent. I argue that addressing the question of territorial justification non-arbitrarily and consistently requires adopting a broader and morally more plausible conception of justice than that on which remedial theories explicitly rely; and I show that this broader conception of justice is implicit in remedial theories' account of territorial justification. Recognizing this, however, has significant implications for remedial theories, as it considerably broadens the scope of valid territorial claims, and hence of valid secessionist claims.

“LOCKEAN SUPERADDITION AND LOCKEAN HUMILITY” (III-H)

PATRICK CONNOLLY (UNIVERSITY OF NORTH CAROLINA—CHAPEL HILL)

Did Locke believe that God had superadded powers to bodies? Do some objects have powers which are unrelated to their natures? This question has split commentators. Some claim the answer is yes and others claim the answer is no. This paper argues that both of these positions are mistaken and that Locke was agnostic on the issue. I show that Locke embraced a robust epistemic humility. This epistemic humility includes ignorance of the real essences of bodies, of the causal processes underlying the production of natural phenomena, and of God's method of creation. I show that this epistemic humility entails an agnostic response to the question of superaddition. Locke did not intend to claim that bodies either do or do not have non-natural or superadded properties. Instead, his primary goal in discussing the topic was to emphasize the strict limits to human knowledge.

“PRESENTISM AND DISTRIBUTIONAL PROPERTIES” (V-I)

PHILIP R. CORKUM (UNIVERSITY OF ALBERTA)

Presentists face a challenge from truthmaker theory: if you hold both that the only existing objects are presently existing and that truth supervenes on being, then you will be hard pressed to identify some existent on which a given true but traceless claim about the past supervenes. One response is to appeal to distributional properties so to serve as presently existing truthmakers for past truths. Distributional properties are irreducible to non-distributional properties, if the extension over which the property is distributed is possibly gunky. This argument for irreducibility from the possibility of gunk is unavailable to the presentist who, I argue, is committed to the necessary instantaneity of the present. Since no alternative argument for irreducibility is forthcoming, a presentist ought to deny that distributional properties can serve as truthmakers.

“DISPLACING MULTICULTURALISM WITH AN ALTERNATIVE” (I-K)

YUANFANG DAI (MICHIGAN STATE UNIVERSITY)

The postcolonial critique of multiculturalism proposes to foster solidarity among women in different cultures, but the proposal is impracticable

because it cannot break free from the multiculturalist framework. Although the postcolonial feminist critique grasps the complexity and variability of cultures and the potential interconnections between cultures, it does not explicitly suggest going beyond multiculturalism. I argue postcolonial critics such as Uma Narayan and Chandra Mohanty unwittingly adopt aspects of the positions that they otherwise reject. That is, they assume that there is no problem with multiculturalism itself. I conclude by proposing a shift from multiculturalism to an alternative. From the theoretical perspective, the alternative to multiculturalism must hold a dynamic concept of culture, which allows us to see that cultures are not only internally contested but also interactive and mutually constitutive. From the practical perspective, the alternative must be helpful to facilitate solidarity across cultural differences.

“THE CRIMINALIZATION OF MONEY LAUNDERING AND TERRORIST FINANCING IN GLOBAL CONTEXTS: A HYBRID SOLUTION” (IV-I)

JILL DELSTON (WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY IN ST. LOUIS)

What are the obligations of global actors in preventing terrorism? Is consent required to create an obligation, or do the correctness of its goals ground its legitimacy? In this paper, I consider these questions with respect to a subset of international law: anti-money laundering and combating the financing of terrorism (AML/CFT). AML/CFT institutions are international in scope; span criminal, administrative, and civil law; and bring together issues of rule of law and the role of international standards. First, I present the current legal framework for AML/CFT and identify two competing sources of justification: objective value and consent. I explain the problems with the status quo. Second, I argue objective value cannot provide the sole source of justification due to what I call the choice problem. Third, I pose a solution by combining the two distinct foundations for obligation. This account provides a way to evaluate and reform AML/CFT legal institutions.

“NEW POSSIBILITIES FOR THE COSMOLOGICAL ARGUMENT” (V-J)

MATT DUNCAN (UNIVERSITY OF VIRGINIA)

There is a very old idea that the whole universe and everything in it must have been caused to exist by something outside of itself. This idea has been refined and reformulated over the past few millennia so as to provide support for various versions of the Cosmological Argument for God's existence. Today the status of the Cosmological Argument is disputed, but many philosophers believe that the soundness of the argument ultimately rests on the truth of the Principle of Sufficient Reason, which states that, for every contingent thing x , there is some other thing outside of x that causes x 's existence. Such philosophers think that if the Principle of Sufficient Reason is false, then the Cosmological Argument fails; but if this principle is true, then the Cosmological Argument is sound and God exists. In this paper I offer new support for the Cosmological Argument by demonstrating that if the Principle of Sufficient Reason is even possibly true, the Cosmological Argument is sound and God exists. So either the Principle of Sufficient Reason is necessarily false, or God exists.

“FORMS AND THE ORIGIN OF SELF-PREDICATION” (VI-J)

DAVID EBREY (NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY)

Plato infamously makes claims like “largeness is large” and “piety is pious,” which scholars typically call “self-predications.” Although Socrates treats these claims as obviously true, they generally seem to us not only false, but a category mistake: piety is not even the sort of thing that can be pious. In this paper I argue that to understand self-predication we need to rethink how Plato conceives of things like largeness and piety, which he calls “forms.” Since Socrates accepts self-predication in dialogues typically thought of as early or transitional, I look for an explanation that does not presuppose claims only found in the middle dialogues. I propose that Plato thinks of forms as something I call a “true appearance.” I briefly argue that this account has precedent in uses of the terms translated “form,” *eidos* and *idea*.

“KANT’S THREE MODELS OF MORAL PERFECTION” (II-L)

MELISSA SEYMOUR FAHMY (UNIVERSITY OF GEORGIA)

In this paper I argue that three distinct models of moral perfection are found in Kant’s moral philosophy: the pure disposition to duty model, the approximating the holy will model, and the multitude of virtues model. Acknowledging these three models demonstrates that the Kantian ideal of moral perfection is not as cold or one-dimensional as it has been thought to be. However, acknowledging these three models of moral perfection also raises questions, the most vexing of which is whether or not these models are compatible with one another. I argue that the multitude of virtues model at least appears to be in tension with the pure disposition to duty model insofar as the former entails cultivating sensible dispositions that threaten to contaminate the latter. Despite the recent attention paid to Kant’s theory of virtue, this tension has not been adequately addressed.

“PLATO ON THE PLEASURES OF SMELL” (VI-J)

EMILY FLETCHER (UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO)

The pleasures of smell hold a surprisingly prominent status in the account of pleasure in Book IX of the *Republic*. Although they are the only explicit examples of pure pleasures, free from the distorting effects of pain (584b), the pleasures of smell do not fit clearly into Socrates’ argument about the value of different types of pleasure. Their purity sets them apart from the unreal, deceptive pleasures of appetite, and yet their bodily nature distinguishes them from the rational pleasures associated with knowledge and virtue. I argue that the difficulty of accounting for the pleasures of smell within the larger context of the discussion of pleasure in *Republic* IX signals the beginning of a change in Plato’s attitude towards at least some sensory pleasures, which ultimately results in the much more sophisticated analysis of the pleasures of smell, as well as other aesthetic pleasures, in the *Philebus*.

“SOME ARGUMENTS AGAINST PARENTAL LICENSING” (VII-I)

CHRISTOPHER FREIMAN (COLLEGE OF WILLIAM AND MARY)

Hugh LaFollette argues that the state should require the licensing of all parents. He claims that licensing procedures will protect children from the hazards of incompetent parenting just as licensing procedures protect us from incompetent drivers, surgeons, and pharmacists. Moreover, if we accept that the right to parent in the case of adoption should be conditional on a demonstration of parental competence, then the right to parent in the case of procreation should be conditional on a demonstration of parental competence. I object to parental licensing for three reasons: (i) the *prima facie* right to procreate is stronger than the *prima facie* right to adopt; (ii) the incentives facing designers and administrators of parental licensing procedures would bias them toward excessively strict procedures resulting in an undersupply of licenses; (iii) the principles invoked on behalf of parental licensing have unacceptable eugenic implications.

“ARE CHILDREN PERSONS?” (VII-I)

AMY GILBERT (EASTERN UNIVERSITY)

Our concept of what it is to be a person is, arguably, our primary moral concept—the concept on which we ground all our moral claims and systems. If this is true, defining the scope and meaning (the extension and intension) of this concept will be a crucial task for any moral theory. For neo-Kantian theories, what it means to be a person is to be an autonomous rational agent—which requires one to create an evaluative distance between her desires and herself so that her desires can “conform to the law of her will.” However, such an understanding of the meaning of personhood excludes children, and especially infants, from its scope. This, on my view, should serve as a *reductio* of the neo-Kantian concept of persons and lead us to seek for an alternative understanding of our primary moral concept.

“FICHTE’S FALSE DILEMMA” (VII-J)

BRYAN HALL (INDIANA UNIVERSITY SOUTHEAST)

In the *Science of Knowledge*, Fichte holds there are only two mutually exclusive options for understanding the grounds of experience. Either experience is grounded on the object as a thing-in-itself (dogmatism) or it is grounded on the subject as an absolute intelligence (idealism). Using Kant’s argument from the Transcendental Deduction of the Categories in the *Critique of Pure Reason*, I will argue that Fichte’s dilemma is a false one. Fichte does not consider the possibility that experience could be grounded *both* on the object and the subject, but this is precisely the position that Kant defends in the Transcendental Deduction. Properly understanding Kant’s position offers a way of avoiding Fichte’s turn toward the “absolute” by grounding experience wholly within the bounds of sense.

“INFERENCE TO THE BEST EXPLANATION AND THE IMPORTANCE OF PECULIARLY EXPLANATORY VIRTUES” (II-H)

DAVID W. HARKER (*EAST TENNESSEE STATE UNIVERSITY*)

Inference to the best explanation has at times appeared almost indistinguishable from a rule that recommends simply that we should infer the hypothesis which is most plausible given available evidence. In this paper I argue that avoiding this collapse requires the identification of peculiarly explanatory virtues and consider Woodward’s concept of invariance as an example of such a virtue. An additional benefit of augmenting IBE with Woodward’s model of causal explanation is also suggested.

“AN INTEREST THEORY OF RIGHTS” (I-E)

FRED HARRINGTON (*EDGEWOOD COLLEGE*)

According to the interest theory of rights, the function of rights is to protect the interests of the rightholder. Prominent criticisms of the interest theory point out apparent discrepancies between rights and rightholders’ interests. There are rights that do not seem to further the interest of the rightholder, such as rights that stem from occupational or social roles, and rights where the beneficiaries are not the rightholders, such as those arising from third-party beneficiary contracts.

I defend a version of the interest theory by offering an interpretation of interests as based on goals, aims for which we ought to strive given facts about ourselves and our circumstances. With interests as based on goals, an interest is that which will further the goals of the various entities in a particular interaction or relationship. The nature of any particular interest is determined by the goal serving as the basis for that interest. The basing goals may be constituted by subjective desires or plans, or they may be constituted by socially or legally constructed roles. Insofar as an individual is in a particular role or function, that individual has certain goals that are objectively part of that role. Additionally, there are fundamental interests based on goals that an individual cannot help but have given the kind of entity one is. At the heart of these fundamental interests for humans are project pursuit and avoidance of severe suffering.

I argue that this interpretation of interests is intuitively plausible, provides a deeper explanation of interests within rights theory, and enables the interest theory of rights to meet its most prominent objections.

“A PUZZLE FOR ACCOUNTS OF RATIONALITY” (VI-K)

ALI HASAN (*UNIVERSITY OF IOWA*)

Fumerton (1990) and Foley (1990) discuss a simple puzzle for any philosophical account of rationality. The puzzle, in short, is that we have conflicting plausible claims regarding rationality: on the one hand, it is possible to have a rational but false belief about the rationality of another belief; on the other hand, some intuitive inter-level principles seem to rule

out this possibility. At least initially, it seems that none of the options are very appealing: (a) deny the possibility of rational false beliefs about one's own rationality; (b) deny the intuitive inter-level principles of rationality that seem to conflict with this possibility; or (c) proliferate senses of rationality in order to accept both the possibility of rational error and these principles. I support the second of these options by explaining why these inter-level principles are false and yet so tempting to accept.

“WELL-BEING: WHAT MATTERS BEYOND THE MENTAL?” (I-G)

JENNIFER HAWKINS (DUKE UNIVERSITY)

Philosophers assume that more matters for well-being than simply mental states. However, this has more than one possible meaning. I distinguish two options. On the first, the assumption is that mind-independent events count for assessing how good my life is, whether I know about them or not. Desire-fulfillment theories are typically praised for handling well the extramental dimensions of well-being. They do so by following the first option. However, the idea that more matters than mental states could also mean it is important to have a connection with reality, i.e., to have knowledge of the significant facts about one's self and one's life (not knowledge generally). Rather than place value on an event by itself, the second option places value on the obtaining of a certain relation between events and the mind. While the second option has not often been recognized, I argue that it is what matters for well-being.

“IRREDUCIBLY NORMATIVE PROPERTIES” (VI-H)

CHRIS HEATHWOOD (UNIVERSITY OF COLORADO–BOULDER)

Those who maintain that normative or evaluative properties cannot be reduced to, or explained in terms of, natural properties have difficulty explaining what these properties are. I identify an interesting and informative fact about irreducibly normative properties that goes some way towards elucidating them in non-normative terms: that to attribute a normative or evaluative property to something is necessarily to commend or condemn that thing. This view characterizes normativity in terms of the natural phenomenon of performing certain familiar speech acts. It explains how a property can be at once descriptive (as, in some trivial sense, all genuine properties must be) and evaluative: in describing things by attributing these properties, we can't help but also be making an evaluation. The paper (i) explains the initial problem, (ii) clarifies the solution just described, (iii) explains further work that the hypothesis can do, and (iv) defends it against some objections.

“ON KNOWING HOW I FEEL” (I-F)

LARRY A. HERZBERG (UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN–OSHKOSH)

A few decades ago, Alvin Goldman developed an influential causal-reliabilist analysis of noninferential perceptual knowledge. More recently he developed a quasi-perceptual view of introspection that invites a similar analysis of noninferential introspective knowledge. However, to

date neither he nor anyone else has offered such an analysis. In this paper I begin to fill that gap by using Goldman's view of introspection to develop a causal-reliabilist analysis of what I call affect-direction knowledge: noninferential, introspective knowledge of how one is feeling emotionally, and of about what one is feeling that way. While the analogy between noninferential perceptual knowledge and affect-direction knowledge turns out to be fairly strong, complications arise from both the complexity of "directed affect" and the incompleteness of Goldman's theory of introspection. I conclude by identifying several areas where further research would be most helpful.

"CAN PRIMITIVE LAWS EXPLAIN?" (II-H)

TYLER HILDEBRAND (*UNIVERSITY OF COLORADO—BOULDER*)

Laws of nature are supposed to explain the uniformity of nature, and it is becoming increasingly common to treat lawhood and lawful explanation as wholly unanalyzable primitives (see John Carroll's *Laws of Nature* (1994) and Tim Maudlin's *The Metaphysics Within Physics* (2007)). Explanatory power can be purchased by accepting new primitives. Furthermore, scientists invoke laws in their explanations, and they do so without providing any supporting metaphysics. For these reasons, one might suspect that, whatever defects wholly primitive laws of nature may have, explanatory weakness isn't one of them. I'll argue that this is a mistake. Laws need to be analyzed to a certain degree in order to explain the uniformity of nature. In the course of giving my argument, I'll suggest an analysis that appears to possess the explanatory power we seek.

"ARISTOTLE ON THE PLEASURE OF COURAGE" (I-H)

ERICA HOLBERG (*UTAH STATE UNIVERSITY*)

Because virtuous action is the fulfillment of our nature and so is constitutive of good living, Aristotle argues for a conceptual connection between virtuous action and pleasure. Yet courage does not seem to conform to this account of virtuous action. Because courageous action involves confronting the fearful, which is painful, and because courageous action can fail to achieve the desired (and presumably pleasant) goal, it seems contrary to experience to claim that all truly courageous action is pleasant. I offer a defense of Aristotle's claim that courageous action is necessarily pleasant. To do this, I give a more detailed explanation of the hierarchical, metaphysical relation between process and activity in courageous action. Virtuous activity, as instantiated in courageous actions, is necessarily pleasant because it is an end-in-itself and complete, and so requires pleasure as the full engagement of the agent in the action.

"HARD TIMES AFTER HARD TIME: ARE EX-OFFENDER RESTRICTIONS JUSTIFIED?" (IV-I)

ZACHARY HOSKINS (*WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY IN ST. LOUIS*)

The question of whether restrictive policies on ex-offenders are morally justified has received little attention from philosophers. This paper contends that, once we scrutinize the arguments offered by advocates of

various ex-offender restrictions, they turn out either to be unjustified or to be justified in only a narrow range of cases. First, I present a presumptive case for treating ex-offenders as restored to full standing in the political community. Next, I consider various defenses that have been offered of ex-offender restrictions. Of these, only considerations of risk reduction are ever persuasive. In a limited range of cases, these considerations may override the presumptive case in support of equal opportunities for ex-offenders. But even in such cases, an ex-offender's right to equal opportunities is only overridden, not canceled entirely. Thus society may be obliged to compensate ex-offenders for restricting, in the interests of risk reduction, their access to important goods.

“UNJUST SITUATIONS” (III-I)

KEVIN HOUSER (INDIANA UNIVERSITY)

There is very broad consensus about precisely what items in the world can properly elicit our affect-laden evaluative judgments of “unjust” and “unfair”—namely, persons, their actions, and their attitudes. Other items so labeled are thought to be labeled in terms of their connection to the injustice of these canonical items. I'll separate out interpersonal and situational “oughts,” then challenge the explanatory primacy of the former by sketching just how the situation of suffering can elicit an “ought” which has proven less visible to the usual interpersonal analyses (an intuition strongly appearing in the moral luck literature, which I do not here have space to discuss).

“JUSTIFICATION IS POTENTIAL KNOWLEDGE” (IV-H)

JONATHAN ICHIKAWA (UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA)

I develop a novel theory of epistemic justification. A subject's belief is justified, on my view, if and only if it is “potential knowledge” in a sense I will explain. I suggest that it is not circular or otherwise objectionable to characterize justification in terms of knowledge, and situate my project with respect to the “knowledge first” program in epistemology. I identify a series of desiderata for a theory of justification, and suggest that the approach defended fares well with respect to it. I argue that my approach is preferable to recent proposals in a similar spirit, and suggest that anti-individualism about content in rendering the extension intuitively plausible.

“UNIVERSAL PROPERTIES IN SPINOZA'S GOD” (III-H)

MICHAEL ISTVAN (TEXAS A&M UNIVERSITY)

Spinoza has gained a reputation, more common at certain periods of scholarship than others, for believing that no entity is able to share any degree of strict identity with any other entity, a reputation, that is, for endorsing an ontology where nothing can have the intrinsic capacity to be wholly present in multiple entities at one and the same time. I argue, on the contrary, that Spinoza is a realist concerning universals. In section one, I outline the two basic nominalist analyses that are possible for Spinoza to

give of an entity being characterized, and make clear that these are in fact the only antirealist options. In section two, I argue that Spinoza can endorse neither of the two nominalist analyses of a mode being characterized, and that he must in fact endorse a realist analysis.

“DESCRIPTIONS AND COMPARISON SEMANTICS OF WANT” (II-I)

YU IZUMI (*UNIVERSITY OF MARYLAND—COLLEGE PARK*)

One of the problems for Russell’s quantificational analysis of definite descriptions is that it generates unattested readings in the context of non-doxastic attitude verbs such as want. The Fregean-Strawsonian presuppositional analysis is designed to overcome such shortcomings of Russell’s quantificational analysis while keeping its virtues. Schoubye (forthcoming), however, criticizes the Fregean-Strawsonian solution to the problem of non-doxastic attitude verbs as being inadequate by generalizing the problem to indefinite descriptions. Schoubye claims that the generalized problem calls for a radical revision of the semantics of definite and indefinite descriptions, and he attempts to develop a dynamic semantic account of descriptions. In this paper I defend the standard nondynamic semantics of descriptions by refuting Schoubye’s objections to the Fregean-Strawsonian analysis. I argue that, once we take into account Villalta’s (2008) recent analysis of non-doxastic attitude verbs, we can solve Schoubye’s generalized problem concerning descriptions.

“CEPHALUS AND THE MYTH OF ER: WHY DO THE PRODUCERS VALUE JUSTICE?” (VI-J)

HAEWON JEON (*NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY*)

Plato in the *Republic* is often viewed as denying the possibility that the producers can possess virtue in a meaningful way. According to such a reading, the producers can never have the right motivation no matter how justly they behave outwardly. This is because without the desire or capacity to do philosophy, they cannot appreciate immaterial things like harmonious soul and virtue except as means to some appetitive good. Surely Plato would not consider such people genuinely virtuous. I argue against this reading. To do so, I examine the way Plato opens and closes the dialogue. I argue that Plato’s portrayals of the old businessman Cephalus and the Myth of Er are meant to tell us how non-philosophers can recognize the importance of psychic harmony and the importance of justice as psychic harmony. Plato’s message is that there is hope for everyone.

“INTERNALISM ABOUT NORMATIVE REASONS FOR ACTION” (VI-H)

LEONARD A. KAHN (*U.S. AIR FORCE ACADEMY*)

Internalism, in its strongest form, is the view that an agent has a normative reason to do a particular action in a given set of circumstances only if she actually has a motive to do the action. Here, I offer the Possibility Argument for internalism, which runs as follows: S has a reason to do F in C only if she can do F in C, and S can do F in C only if she is motivated to do F in

C. Moreover, S is motivated to do F in C only if S has some motive M such that S's doing F in C raises the prior probability that M will be realized. Therefore, S has a reason to do F in C only if S has some motive M such that S's doing F in C raises the prior probability that M will be realized.

“VIRTUE ETHICS AND REVISIONARY CONCEPTIONS OF RIGHTNESS” (II-K)

JASON R. KAWALL (*COLGATE UNIVERSITY*)

In response to recent criticisms of virtue ethical accounts of right action, Liezl van Zyl and Daniel Russell have argued that these criticisms are misguided insofar as they rest on an incorrect understanding of what virtue ethicists mean by “right action.” They stress that virtue ethicists do not endorse a strong connection between (i) right action and (ii) what any given agent ought to do in a given set of circumstances. Rather, “right action” is a matter of action assessment, and indicates that a given action is morally praiseworthy. I argue that this proposed change in the understanding of “right action” is significant enough that virtue ethicists are discussing a different concept. I then examine the accounts of right action given by Russell and van Zyl; I argue that these accounts, even when understood as accounts of moral praiseworthiness or excellence, face important problems and are in need of revision.

“ARISTOTLE ON THE INFALLIBILITY OF PROPER-OBJECT PERCEPTION: *METAPHYSICS* Γ 5, 1010B1-1011A2” (III-J)

EVAN KEELING (*UNIVERSITY OF SÃO PAULO, BRAZIL*)

Concentrating on a difficult passage in *Metaphysics* Γ, this essay discusses Aristotle's claim that perceptions of the proper objects of each sense are infallible. I conclude that his view is not that such objects are always perceived correctly, but that they are perceived with more authority than other sorts of objects and that some additional criteria are necessary.

“THE NON-EPISTEMIC FEATURES OF EPISTEMIC LUCK” (III-G)

BRIAN KIM (*COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY*)

If we say that an event is lucky, this entails that no one deserves the beneficial outcomes of that event's occurrence. This is an evaluative feature of luck that modal analyses of epistemic luck, like the one offered by Duncan Pritchard, fail to account for. In response, I turn to analyze the connection between skillful action and luck. Using this analysis, I argue that a satisfactory account of epistemic luck should appeal to the deliberative rather than modal properties of justified beliefs. And by considering the pragmatic account of justified belief given by Fantl and McGrath, I show how such a deliberative account of justified belief can account for this non-epistemic feature of epistemic luck.

“NOT ALL ‘OUGHTS’ IMPLY ‘CANS’” (III-I)

ALEXANDRA KING (BROWN UNIVERSITY)

In this paper, I will argue that certain actions that we are intuitively obligated to perform are actions that do not follow the clean demarcation between actions and mental states. These are actions that necessarily involve mental states beyond intentionality. Since we often cannot have certain mental states on command, or even muster them over a reasonable amount of time, these obligations are counterexamples to some versions of “ought” implies “can.”

“CONDITIONALS AND THE NEWCOMB PROBLEM” (I-I)

THEODORE KORZUKHIN (CORNELL UNIVERSITY)

The debate on the Newcomb problem continues, but one aspect of it has been long neglected. It was recognized early on that one’s views on the Newcomb problem are somehow connected with, and motivated by, certain conditionals. So, Lewis expressed the basic one-boxing intuition this way: “[One-boxers] are convinced by indicative conditionals: if I take one box I will be a millionaire, but if I take both boxes I will not.” (Lewis 1981a, 377). The proponents of two-boxing, by contrast, often appeal to subjunctives, as Lewis himself did: “We [two-boxers] are convinced by counterfactual conditionals: If I took only one box, I would be poorer by a thousand than I will be after taking both” (Lewis 1981a, 377). But, surprisingly, the nature of this connection has not been addressed head-on: *how* is one guided by conditionals to an answer to the Newcomb problem? I argue that the relevant reasoning involves an appeal to a peculiar dominance principle I will call the Dominance Norm (DN), a principle that is of interest because it is *neutral* as between one-boxing and two-boxing solutions. In the light of DN, the debate between one-boxers and two-boxers can be seen as a debate about the semantics of indicative conditionals, not a debate over matters of normative fact. I illustrate the connection between semantics and decision theory with two examples: Stalnaker’s semantics and the Adams probabilistic semantics.

“CAN GOD SATISFICE?” (V-J)

KLAAS KRAAY (RYERSON UNIVERSITY)

Two prominent arguments for atheism are the problem of no best world and the evidential argument from evil. The former seeks to show, a priori, that theism is impossible. The latter seeks to show, a posteriori, that theism is improbable. Certain critics of both arguments have appealed implicitly, in most cases, to the notion of divine satisficing: they have held that while God cannot achieve the best outcome in the relevant context, God must and can achieve an outcome that is good enough. But they have not adequately defended the idea that an essentially unsurpassable being can coherently be thought to satisfice. I cast doubt on this idea. Voltaire famously said that the perfect is the enemy of the good. If what I say here is correct, it seems that the enmity is mutual: “good enough” is not good enough for God.

“THE ELEMENTAL TRANSFORMATIONS IN *ON GENERATION AND CORRUPTION* II.4” (III-J)

MARY KRIZAN (UNIVERSITY OF COLORADO—BOULDER)

Aristotle’s elemental transformations, as a limiting case of material change, are important in evaluating Aristotle’s commitment—or lack thereof—to prime matter. Hence, it should be rather surprising that few contemporary scholars have made a serious effort to provide an interpretation of the elemental transformations themselves. It is my modest goal in this paper to provide a plausible account of the elemental transformations, as discussed in *On Generation and Corruption* II.4. I argue that each type of change explains the relationship between an element and one of the three that it is able to change into, and thus, the three types of change are necessary and sufficient for a complete analysis of Aristotle’s claim that each element is able to change into each of the others.

“PLURALITY AND PARITY: COMPOSITION VERSUS CONSTITUTION” (IV-G)

ROXANNE KURTZ (UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS—SPRINGFIELD)

Some objects are ontologically on a par in terms of ontological demandingness. Consider three statues. Bipartisan is a symmetric statue with both hands extended in welcome. Both hands are essential. Coincident with Bipartisan are Democrat (extending its left hand) and Republican (extending its right hand). Each has its relevant hand essentially. Plausibly, Bipartisan involves greater ontological demands. But, Democrat and Republican seem ontologically on a par—it seems no harder to be one than the other. According to mereological composition with extensionality, the relationship between coincident objects is straightforward: numerical identity. To entice compositionists to forfeit such elegance to countenance distinct coincident objects, we need another relationship that holds between them, like material constitution. But here’s the meta-metaphysical rub. Because of ontological parity, for constitution to explain the relationship between distinct coincident objects, we must reject common wisdom according to which constitution is transitive and asymmetric. Rather, it is neither.

“CRENDENCE AND CORRECTNESS: IN DEFENSE OF THE THRESHOLD VIEW” (VI-K)

MATTHEW LEE (UNIVERSITY OF NOTRE DAME)

Whether and how an epistemology of confidence (e.g., Bayesian probabilism) limits the options for an epistemology of outright belief depends on just how confidence and belief are related. Currently, the most prominent view of the relationship between belief and confidence is the Threshold View, according to which believing a proposition is simply a matter of having a sufficiently high degree of confidence in that proposition. In this paper I examine one of the most important objections that has been raised against the Threshold View—namely, the Correctness Objection. The objection is that beliefs can be correct or incorrect in a way that degrees of confidence cannot be, and therefore belief is not to be identified with a sufficiently high degree of confidence. I reply to

two versions of the Correctness Objection, one due to Fantl and McGrath (2009) and the other due to Ross and Schroeder (2011).

“AGAINST REFERENTIAL INTENTIONS” (II-I)

KAREN LEWIS (BARNARD COLLEGE, COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY)

Some have argued (e.g., Stalnaker 1998, van Rooy 2001, Dekker 2004) that the right account of discourses such as (1) involve appealing to the referential intentions of speakers.

(1a) A woman walked in.

(1b) She ordered some wine.

Specifically, when a speaker utters (1a) she has a particular woman in mind; this woman is the referent of the pronoun *she* in (1b). I argue that there is little evidence for such a view. First, the presence of referential intentions fails to pattern with felicitous anaphora on indefinite descriptions. Second, the view makes bad predictions about the truth conditions of sentences containing anaphoric pronouns. Finally, I argue that even pronominal contradiction cases, which are supposed to be the best evidence for the view, are no evidence for the view at all.

“CLOSURE OF INQUIRY AND THE SUFFICIENCY OF KNOWLEDGE” (VI-K)

KRAIG MARTIN (BAYLOR UNIVERSITY)

Alan Millar and Jonathan Kvanvig, in a recent discussion on the value of knowledge, consider the question of when it is legitimate to cease an investigation. Millar argues that one needs reflective knowledge before one can justifiably close an inquiry, while Kvanvig argues that epistemic justification is sufficient. Jeremy Fantl and Matthew McGrath have recently argued that if you know p , then p is warranted enough to justify you in ϕ -ing, for any ϕ . This principle (which they call KJ) entails that if you know that p , then p is warranted enough to justify you in closing inquiry into whether or not p . In this paper, I am interested not just in any ϕ ; I am interested in the act of closing inquiry. I defend a principle that is weaker than KJ, but according to which knowledge is sufficient for legitimately closing inquiry. If you know that p , you can close inquiry into whether or not p . In defending this principle, I object to Millar's claim that reflective knowledge is necessary for justified closure of inquiry, and I consider whether potential counterexamples (offered by Barron Reed and Jessica Brown) to Fantl and McGrath's KJ thesis are problems for the thesis that knowledge entails justified closure of inquiry.

“SIGNALLING GAMES AND MODALITY” (I-C)

MANOLO MARTINEZ (UNIVERSITAT DE BARCELONA)

It is widely held that it is unhelpful to model our epistemic access to the modal realm on the basis of perception and thus, for example, maintain that there is a bodily mechanism attuned to the modal aspects of things. In this paper I defend modalizing mechanisms. I show how a population

of perfectly non-intentional senders and receivers in a Lewis-Skyrms evolutionary signalling game evolves to a signalling system in which information about what is merely possible is communicated. The process by which this happens, and its end state, are thoroughly non-spooky.

“ARISTOTLE’S EPISTEMOLOGY: CREDENCE, BELIEF, AND KNOWLEDGE” (III-J)

IAN MCCREADY-FLORA (COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY)

Aristotle denies that animals can form beliefs (*doxa*) on the grounds that they lack something called *pistis*, which is necessary for belief. Representing the world through belief is part of what makes human cognition unique, since belief requires reason, which only humans have. A proper understanding of Aristotle’s view of human rationality, therefore, requires understanding his views on belief. There is, however, little discussion or understanding of *pistis*, the very reason that beliefs require rationality. This short discussion addresses the nature of *pistis* and its relation to *doxa*. I propose that *pistis*, for Aristotle, is “credence,” a measure of subjective probability that varies in strength. Its strength represents an epistemic evaluation, since it measures the level of conviction that a claim is true. Belief is impossible without credence, for Aristotle, because one can only form a belief if one has high enough credence in what is to be believed.

“SURE THE EMPEROR HAS NO CLOTHES, BUT YOU SHOULDN’T SAY THAT” (III-G)

RACHEL MCKINNON (UNIVERSITY OF WATERLOO)

PAUL SIMARD SMITH (UNIVERSITY OF WATERLOO)

In the norms of assertion literature there has been continued focus on a wide range of odd-sounding assertions that have been collected under the umbrella of Moore’s Paradox. The precise nature of Moorean absurdity has long been a contested topic. Our aim in these brief remarks is not to attempt to settle that question decisively, but rather to present some new data bearing on it, and to argue that this new data is best explained by a new account of Moorean absurdity.

“KANT AND McDOWELL ON PERCEPTUAL GIVENNESS” (VII-J)

COLIN MCLEAR (CORNELL UNIVERSITY)

Kant is often considered the source of an influential line of thought in epistemology, one which argues that a subject’s perceptual awareness of her environment must draw upon her conceptual capacities—to think otherwise is to fall prey to a “myth” concerning the nature of the perceptual given. Recent versions of this argument, most prominently by John McDowell, hold that rational epistemic capacities must already be involved in the getting of what is given, if that given is to play an epistemic role for the subject. Kant, I shall argue, is an unwilling participant in this attack on the given. Not only does he embrace a notion of the perceptual given that McDowell thinks objectionable, Kant also provides the resources to show how we might deny McDowell’s argument while embracing its central insight viz. that warrant for assent requires accommodating a subject’s rational perspective.

“MORAL PSYCHOLOGY AND GENERAL PRINCIPLES: WHY THE MORAL REALIST SHOULD NOT FRET OVER DISAGREEMENT” (IV-J)

CHRIS D. MEYERS (UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN MISSISSIPPI)

One of the standard, classic arguments against moral realism is that there is too much moral disagreement for realism to be plausible. The strength of this argument depends partly on the extent of this disagreement, which is largely an empirical matter. A recent revival of the argument from disagreement appeals to empirical evidence allegedly indicating that there is in fact sufficient moral disagreement to make realism implausible. I will argue that the empirical evidence is not successful in refuting moral realism because the extent of disagreement is consistent with moral realism, as long as the moral facts consist of a pluralistic set of *prima facie* duties, such as that of Ross’s moral theory. Not only is Rossian-style pluralism consistent with the empirical evidence of disagreement, but it might even be possible—given a few very plausible assumptions—that empirical evidence could support this kind of Rossian moral realism.

“A MENO PROBLEM FOR EVIDENTIALISM” (IV-H)

DANIEL M. MITTAG (ALBION COLLEGE)

Evidentialists analyze epistemic justification in terms of two notions: propositional justification and doxastic justification. I argue that this picture gives rise to a Meno problem for evidentialism. Specifically, evidentialists need to account for the additional epistemic value a doxastically justified doxastic attitude possesses as compared to a doxastic attitude that is merely propositionally justified. I consider the nature of the problem facing evidentialism and critically discuss two attempts to account for this additional epistemic value. Then, I present the alternative I favor. According to this alternative, while the nature of doxastic justification is analyzed in terms of propositional justification, the value of doxastic justification is not. Doxastic justification is more fundamentally epistemically valuable than propositional justification.

“IMPARTIALITY, PRIORITY, AND JUSTICE: THE VEIL OF IGNORANCE RECONSIDERED” (IV-E)

MICHAEL MOEHLER (VIRGINIA TECH UNIVERSITY)

In this article, I defend the veil of ignorance against the objection that the device is inadequate for deriving demands of justice, because it enforces a stronger form of impartiality than Kant’s categorical imperative and, primarily as a consequence, it generally leads to anti-prioritarian conclusions. I show that the moral ideal of impartiality that is expressed by the veil of ignorance is not essentially different from Kant’s notion of impartiality and that it does not generally lead to anti-prioritarian conclusions. Although the moral ideal of impartiality that is modeled by the veil of ignorance demands solid justification for favoring particular positions of society, it does not rule out prioritarianism. Rather, the anti-prioritarian conclusions reached by many theories of justice that rely on veil of ignorance reasoning are a result of the complex structures of these

theories and the way that they combine and weigh different moral ideals, as well as their informational bases.

“AN EMPIRICAL PERSPECTIVE ON ENLIGHTENED SELF-INTEREST” (VII-G)

STEPHEN G. MORRIS (COLLEGE OF STATEN ISLAND)

Despite numerous attempts to establish that one's own interests are tied to the interests of others, philosophers have achieved only minor victories in their efforts to demonstrate this compatibility. A main theme of this essay is that recent empirical research provides us with the tools necessary for reaching more plausible conclusions about how self-interest and the interests of others are connected. This research suggests that the connection is somewhat different from how philosophers have traditionally conceived of it.

“MOLDING CONSCIENTIOUS, HARD-WORKING, AND PERSEVERANT STUDENTS” (VII-I)

JENNIFER MORTON (CITY UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK)

As teachers know, the hard-working, conscientious, and dedicated student is often the one who gets good grades, attends college, and finds a decent job. Recent research confirms that non-cognitive dispositions, those exhibited by the aforementioned model student, matter for achievement. I sketch an argument that a liberal egalitarian could use to justify teaching some of these dispositions because they are broadly instrumental in pursuing most reasonable conceptions of a good life. However, we must be careful when offering such arguments to be sensitive to the social, cultural, and institutional facts on which the truth of the instrumental claims depend. Only instrumental claims that are true in a diversity of just conditions and whose truth does not depend on justice undermining conditions should be offered in an argument of this sort.

“HISTORY AND CRITIQUE IN HEGEL AND HABERMAS” (VII-H)

NICHOLAS MOWAD (GEORGIA COLLEGE)

Hegel has been criticized by Habermas, among others, for allegedly proscribing internal critique (critique of one's own nation-state), arguing that such a critique can never be properly philosophical. However, Habermas's criticism is based on a misunderstanding of the role Hegel gives history, and of the consequent difference between nation-states of antiquity and the political identity that becomes possible subsequently, above all in modernity. In this paper I show what Hegel's position is, what Habermas's criticism of Hegel is, and how Habermas's criticism is mistaken.

“A DEFENSE OF THE DISPOSITIONAL ACCOUNT OF MODALITY FROM THE MODAL PROBLEM OF CONSTITUTION: ORDINARY OBJECTS AS PROPERTIES” (IV-G)

JOSHUA MUGG (YORK UNIVERSITY)

Dispositional accounts of modality (DAM) ground modal claims in dispositional properties of objects. Some state of affairs *x* is possible just

in case there is (or was) a disposition for x or for a further disposition for x . Common solutions to the grounding problem (cases where two objects share all their matter but differ in their modal properties) are not available to the DAM theorist because dispositions are intrinsic and possessed in virtue of an object's material. In this paper I defend dispositional accounts of modality from the problem of constitution by suggesting that we understand statues as properties of objects. That is, statues are ways lumps of material are. Further details depend upon one's understanding of properties in terms of tropes or universals. I argue that each of these positions can solve the puzzle at hand, concluding that DAM is not threatened by the phenomenon of constitution.

“TWO FUNCTIONS OF MORAL LANGUAGE: RETHINKING THE AMORALIST” (IV-D)

JOHN MUMM (FORDHAM UNIVERSITY)

The figure of the amoralist has played a central role in the debate between moral judgment internalists and externalists. Unfortunately, the debate has led to an impasse based on conflicting intuitions. In this paper, I argue that we can move forward by drawing a distinction between two functions of moral language. My contention is that moral language primarily functions to allow human beings to deliberate together. However, it also functions to keep track of the assumptions and standards of evaluation of the community in which it operates. Externalists are correct to countenance the possibility of a character who sincerely and competently makes moral judgments without corresponding motivation. But internalists are correct to doubt that these moral judgments are in an important sense genuine. This is because amoralists only engage in moral discourse in its secondary and derivative (though still important) function of tracking the current state of moral thought. Though they might be sincere and competent in their application of moral concepts, they are not playing the co-deliberative game in which moral judgments have their ultimate significance. On the basis of these considerations, I will defend a modified version of internalism according to which there is a necessary connection between genuine moral judgments and motivation, where “genuine” judgments are distinguished from other kinds insofar as they form part of a practice of co-deliberation.

“‘MODEL-BUILDING’ AND THE IDENTITY-INDIVIDUATION-INDIVIDUALITY OF OBJECTS IN COGNITIVE NEUROSCIENCES” (II-H)

IOAN MUNTEAN (INDIANA UNIVERSITY-PURDUE UNIVERSITY)

This paper instigates an analysis of the identity, individuation, and individuality of objects (IIIO) in cognitive neuroscience. I start by rejecting three common stances towards IIIO in cognitive neuroscience: deflationism, reductionism, and metaphysical fundamentalism. Against reductionism I show that models in cognitive neuroscience exhibit diversity and variety of idealization not common in their physical counterparts: one feature is an uncommon combination of mathematical models with non-quantitative models. Against metaphysical fundamentalism I show that

III O in cognitive neuroscience is not an ordinary type of III O because the operations of model building, idealization, abstractions, and fictionalization, are crucial in generating the III O. Models in cognitive neuroscience are not reciprocally consistent and I discuss the III O of mechanistic model building and the III O of the dynamical system theory. In passim I discuss the parallel between a so-called structuralism interpretation in biology and in cognitive neuroscience inspired by recent work on structures in biology (French 2011). I endorse the idea that research on the III O concepts of physics and biology is germane and fruitful to their philosophical analysis in cognitive neurosciences by focusing on the process of “model building.” Cognitive neuroscience instantiates a “multi-model idealization,” à la Weisberg (2007), which generates incompatible features: one of them is the very III O of cognitive entities. This III O resulting from this multi-model idealization is peculiar and philosophically intriguing.

“DUTY, LOVE, AND THE *SUMMUM BONUM*: A KANTIAN RESPONSE TO THE ALIENATION OBJECTION” (I-G)

TYLER PAYTAS (WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY IN ST. LOUIS)

Kant held that an action has moral worth only if it is done from the motive of duty. Critics object that this emphasis on duty is alienating because it precludes agents from acting out of love and sympathy. I argue that the most popular Kantian responses to this objection are inadequate. I propose a new response that appeals to Kant’s account of the “highest good.” The ultimate aim of moral life is not to perform as many morally worthy actions as possible. According to Kant, the *summum bonum* of a possible world obtains when complete virtue is combined with complete happiness. Human happiness requires that we sometimes act from the motives of love and sympathy rather than duty. While such actions do not possess genuine moral worth, they are necessary for pursuit of the highest good. Thus, one can fully embrace Kant’s rationalist moral psychology without experiencing alienation.

“A DEFENSE OF SCOTT SOAMES’S ARGUMENTS FOR MILLIANISM” (II-I)

THOMAS W. PEARD (BAKER UNIVERSITY)

In his paper “Beyond Millianism,” Leo Iacono presents sustained criticism of Scott Soames’s defense of Millianism in Soames’s prominent work *Beyond Rigidity*. Iacono argues that Soames’s principal arguments for Millianism fail. While Iacono’s descriptivist analysis of the semantics of proper names is innovative, he needs to address Soames’s (and others’) telling criticisms of descriptivism, as well as Church’s objections to sententialist accounts of “that”-clauses in propositional attitude ascriptions. Additionally, the arguments Iacono presents for his position are for the most part not conclusive.

“WHY POLITICAL LIBERALISM CAN’T HANDLE THE TRUTH” (VI-L)

CALEB PERL (*UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA*)

Suppose you hold that state coercion is legitimate only if it’s justifiable only by considerations that all reasonable citizens could accept. Call this conviction the Core Doctrine of political liberalism. You might wonder what attitudes you can expect other reasonable citizens to take to that doctrine—whether they think it’s true, or believe it. John Rawls thought not. Others—like Joshua Cohen, David Estlund, and Joseph Raz—disagree, and doubt that it’s coherent to accept the Core Doctrine without believing that the Core Doctrine is true. Rawls is right and these revisionists wrong. I construct a reasonable citizen who accepts the Core Doctrine without believing that it’s true. So the assumptions that drive Cohen, Estlund, and Raz must be mistaken. Recognizing this fact imposes surprising constraints on the shape that political liberalism can take.

“KEEPING IT REAL: FINENESS OF GRAIN, INTENTIONAL INEXISTENTS, AND THE TARGETLESS HOTs DEBATE” (III-K)

VINCENT PICCIUTO (*UNIVERSITY OF MARYLAND*)

In this paper I present an argument against a prominent version of the higher-order thought theory of consciousness defended by David Rosenthal and Josh Weisberg (R&W). I argue that targetless HOTs do pose a problem for R&W, but not for the reasons that others have given. Targetless HOTs illustrate that the view cannot account for one of the central features of phenomenally conscious states, viz., their fineness of grain. Section 1 lays out R&W’s version of HOT theory. Section 2 discusses Block’s version of the targetless HOT objection and why it fails. Section 3 presents my argument against R&W. Section 4 concludes.

“COHERENCE, A PRIORICITY, AND LOGIC” (III-G)

TED POSTON (*UNIVERSITY OF SOUTH ALABAMA*)

The purpose of this paper is to assess the role of logical principles within a coherentist epistemology. I focus on Laurence Bonjour’s claim that any conception of coherence must rely on logical principles such as the law of noncontradiction which itself requires a justification independent of coherence considerations. Bonjour supports this claim by arguing that any coherentist attempt to justify logical principles is circular and, furthermore, that some logical principles are required to specify the conception of coherence. Consequently, Bonjour argues that epistemic coherentism cannot be a complete theory of epistemic justification. I argue against these claims: epistemic circularity is not a special problem for coherentism and, further, the conception of coherence does not require unrevisable, a priori logical principles. The upshot of this paper is that logical principles do not pose a special problem for a coherentist epistemology.

“AESTHETICS AND RELIGION IN SCHELLING’S *PHILOSOPHICAL LETTERS*” (V-J)

JEREMY PROULX (EASTERN MICHIGAN UNIVERSITY)

This paper is an attempt to interpret Schelling’s *Philosophical Letters on Dogmatism and Criticism* in the context of Schelling’s dispute with the theological faculty at the Tübingen Stift. It is argued that Schelling deploys an aesthetic model of religion as an alternative to the dogmatic approach that merely attempted to support pre-existing religious beliefs and moral convictions with clever philosophical arguments. Specifically, it is argued that Schelling develops a notion of creative reason that at once celebrates the creative power of human freedom and recognizes the way in which freedom must yield in the face of the exigency of that which is created. Some gestures are also made towards the relevance of Schelling’s thinking to current philosophy of religion.

“ON TRUTH CONTENT AND FALSE CONSCIOUSNESS IN ADORNO’S AESTHETIC THEORY” (VII-H)

NATHAN ROSS (OKLAHOMA CITY UNIVERSITY)

Interpreting Adorno, I argue that art can only be “true” in an aesthetic, and not epistemic sense, by understanding it as a mimesis of false consciousness. The first part of the paper shows how Adorno considers art as a form of mimesis, thus distinguishing it from the ontology of representation. I argue that while there are many forms of mimesis, Adorno gives specific significance to the way in which modern art imitates social rationality. In the final section, I argue that art can be true by imitating “false consciousness” and thus transforming it. I explain Adorno’s notion of false consciousness through three features: (1) bifurcation of enjoyment from work, (2) sadistic enjoyment of violence, and (3) false identification with the consciousness of the group. In his *Aesthetic Theory*, Adorno charges the “true” artwork with the task of undoing each of these features of false consciousness through its own formal methods.

“NEGOTIATION, DELIBERATION, AND REASONABLE DISAGREEMENT” (VII-K)

KATHARINE SCHWEITZER (EMORY UNIVERSITY)

Normative political theorists have drawn a sharp contrast between the outcome of rational deliberation and a negotiated settlement or compromise. Deliberation is said to involve reason-giving about principles. Negotiation is said to involve only strategic bargaining over interests. I argue that this theoretical distinction between deliberation and negotiation is false. Negotiation can involve reason-giving and may take principles as an object. Moreover, negotiation partners can demonstrate mutual respect in the same way in which deliberators do ideally. Evaluating critically the negative connotation associated with negotiating can help us respond to reasonable pluralism more effectively through deliberation. Deliberation is an activity in which individual preferences are transformed into a collective decision. Creating consensus on an issue that admits reasonable disagreement will involve negotiation and mutual concessions. I contend

that modifying theories of deliberation to include a role for negotiation will help political liberals resolve rather than displace problems of pluralism.

“VOLITION AND HIGHER-ORDER REPRESENTATION” (VI-I)

GEORGE SELI (*THE GRADUATE CENTER, CUNY*)

What is the cognitive use of a volition's being conscious, as distinct from the use of its representational content, which presumably serves to guide action? Especially where consciousness is construed as phenomenal character, the utility of consciously willing to do something is not apparent. I argue that volitional consciousness occurs infrequently, and that its function is to enable a cognitive process that is itself infrequent: what Patrick Haggard has described as a “late whether decision.” This is a decision made just prior to movement either to desist (by vetoing the volition) or go ahead with the action (by preserving the volition). I base my account on a higher-order theory of phenomenal consciousness, and argue that the late whether decision process recruits a representation of the volition, and thus requires conscious volition. This result is significant given that the function of state consciousness is left in question by the higher-order account.

“WHY IS KANT'S TRANSCENDENTAL DEDUCTION SO DIFFICULT?” (VII-J)

JUSTIN SHADDOCK (*WILLIAMS COLLEGE*)

Kant calls his Transcendental Deduction of the Categories “the most difficult thing that could ever be undertaken on behalf of metaphysics” (4:260). Interpreters have found it not just difficult to understand, however, but downright impossible. I will consider two of the greatest problems. First, Kant seems to contradict his Deduction's conclusion just as he sets out to prove it. Second, Kant seems to argue for his Deduction's single conclusion twice over in the *Critique's* revised B-edition. I will argue for original solutions to these problems. In so doing, I aim to illustrate Kant's conceptions of justification, objectivity, and our subjectivity.

“AUGUSTINE'S *CONFESSIONS* AND PLATONIC RECOLLECTION” (II-J)

MICHAEL SIEBERT (*UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO*)

R. J. O'Connell is well known for arguing that Augustine maintained a Platonic recollection view of learning in the *Confessions*. He takes *Confessions* 10.20.29 as a text that strongly supports his view. Scott MacDonald has recently offered an alternative interpretation of the text that avoids Platonic recollection. In this paper, I argue that his alternative cannot work. This is because it conflicts with a basic epistemological principle that Augustine seems to accept in the *Confessions* and throughout his works, namely, that the cognition of an original is prior to the cognition of its image.

“GETTING GROUNDED” (V-I)

ALEXANDER SKILES (UNIVERSITY OF NOTRE DAME)

There has recently been much discussion and dispute in metaphysics regarding the nature and extent of grounding (“metaphysical dependence,” the “non-causal in virtue of” relation). Yet there is a growing consensus that one cannot reductively analyze what the relation of grounding is. I oppose this consensus by developing and defending a way to do so. The key is to extend the concept of reductively analyzing what a property or relation is to facts, and understand different ways for a thing to be grounded as corresponding to reductive analyses of different facts involving that thing.

“PARFIT’S PROFOUNDEST PROBLEM” (VI-H)

WILLIAM SMITH (UNIVERSITY OF NOTRE DAME AND EMORY UNIVERSITY)

Derek Parfit is concerned with the need to defend morality against rational immoralism (Parfit 2011, 141–149) and proposes to offer a defense with a substantive moral theory on which we have decisive reasons to act morally (*Ibid.*, 148). To do so, he defends the Kantian Contractualist Formula, which holds that “everyone ought to follow the principles whose universal acceptance everyone could rationally will, or choose” (*Ibid.*, 342). Unfortunately, Parfit’s is only entitled to understand “could rationally will” as “would have sufficient (rather than decisive) reason to choose.” Thus, Parfit’s defense of morality has bleak implications that he sought to avoid.

“ON DEFINING STRATEGY” (I-I)

ASHTON SPERRY (UNIVERSITY OF MISSOURI)

Game theorists cannot rationally assess strategic behavior without a well-defined concept of a strategy. They have thus far based their studies on two definitions. One, a strategy is a provisional plan of action, where a player decides on an action at the current moment and only decides on a future action when the opportunity arises. This definition leaves future choices open-ended, a desirable quality. Two, a strategy is a function that assigns an action to every stage in a game a player can possibly reach. This definition provides mathematical precision. Despite their wide use, these definitions are conceptually different to the point of affecting how game theorists rationally assess behavior. I define a strategy as a relation between the set of a player’s reachable stages and the set of possible actions at those stages. The result is a definition that allows open-ended choices while providing mathematical precision.

“THE CASE OF <P> AND <P&P>” (V-I)

JOSEPH STENBERG (UNIVERSITY OF COLORADO–BOULDER)

In order to consistently hold a pair of truthmaker theses—the Conjunction and Disjunction Theses—Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra sets out to show that what makes a proposition <P> true does not make the proposition <P&P> true. In this essay, I argue that, under a plausible series of interpretations,

Rodriguez-Pereyra's attempt to show this fails. The attempt fails because it relies upon a distinction for which there is no grounding adequate for dealing with the <P> and <P&P> case.

"XENOPHOBIA AND RACISM" (I-K)

RONALD R. SUNDSTROM (UNIVERSITY OF SAN FRANCISCO)

Xenophobia is conceptually distinct from racism. Xenophobia is also distinct from nativism. Furthermore, theories of racism are largely ensconced in nationalized narratives of racism, which are often influenced by the black-white binary, which obscures xenophobia and shelters it from normative critiques; so, rather than philosophical accounts of racism subsuming racism, they end up neglecting this historically important category of exclusion and oppression. This paper addresses these claims, arguing for the first and last, and outlining the second. Just as philosophers have recently analyzed the concept of racism, clarifying it and pinpointing why it's immoral and the extent of its moral harm, so I will analyze xenophobia, and offer a pluralist account of xenophobia, with important implications for racism, which counters monistic conceptions of racism. This analysis is guided by the discussion of racism in recent moral philosophy, social ontology, and research in the psychology of racism and implicit attitudes.

"WHAT CAN WE LEARN FROM DETERMINISTIC FRANKFURT-STYLE CASES?" (IV-J)

PHILIP SWENSON (UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA-RIVERSIDE)

One of the major challenges facing those who appeal to Frankfurt-style cases in order to undermine the Principle of Alternative Possibilities (PAP) is to provide a plausible reply to the popular Dilemma Defense. One strategy for doing so is to maintain that, even without presupposing compatibilism, deterministic Frankfurt-style cases reveal that the mere lack of alternative possibilities is not relevant to moral responsibility. I will examine the prospects for this line of reply. My conclusion will be that, as of yet, the best attempts at generating a problem for PAP by appealing to deterministic FSCs are less than persuasive. Furthermore, since the appeal to deterministic FSCs abandons the original motivation behind the Frankfurt-style cases, it is unlikely that this strategy will ultimately prove successful.

"ON THE MANIFOLD SENSES OF 'SUBSTANCE' IN HEIDEGGER" (VII-H)

JOSHUA L. TEPLY (SAINT ANSELM COLLEGE)

The goal of this paper is to determine whether Heidegger's denial that human beings are substances is as radical as so many say it is. Of the half-dozen or so senses of "substance" found in Heidegger's work, I argue that denying human beings are substances in two of them is truly radical, and that Heidegger does deny that human beings are substances in these two senses. In the course of doing so I identify the proximate reasons Heidegger has for denying this, thereby opening a door for dialogue between Heideggerians and analytic philosophers over whether or not this denial is justified.

“THE PHENOMENAL CHARACTER OF THINKING” (III-K)*DAVID TOSTENSON (FORT HAYS STATE UNIVERSITY)*

I argue that, contrary to what some philosophers have maintained, occurrent conscious thinking does have phenomenal features, namely, a sense of ownership and agency (SOO and SOA). I first note that these features are widely acknowledged in the philosophical and psychological literature, and then argue that they are best understood as phenomenal features. The argument proceeds by noting that the most plausible alternative understanding of SOO and SOA, the view that they are merely second-order beliefs about our mental states, is implausible given the distinctive features of SOO and SOA. I also argue that certain interesting features of the phenomenal are also attributable to SOO and SOA. Once the distinctive features of SOO and SOA are understood and contrasted with beliefs, I maintain that they can best be understood as a *sui generis* phenomenal feature of occurrent conscious thinking.

“ON A PROPOSAL ABOUT THE CONTENT OF MORAL EXPLANATORY CLAIMS” (III-I)*ANDREA VIGGIANO (CORNELL UNIVERSITY)*

Many contemporary meta-ethicists reject moral explanations. Faced with the observation that, in our actual practice, we do offer and accept moral explanatory claims, their reply is not that our practice is, under this respect, flawed, but that these claims do not mean what they might appear to. A claim of the form “M-ness causes E” (with “M” a moral predicate) does not ascribe causal efficacy to the property of being M, say opponents of moral explanations: it is rather to be analyzed as “The non-moral property N-ness that makes things M causes E.” This proposal, they claim, allows them to avoid being committed to detecting a serious mistake in our actual practice. My claim is that the proposal in question does not deliver the good it is advertised for: specifically, I argue that it cannot accommodate our practice of relying on inductive considerations in coming to accept moral explanatory claims.

“MENTAL CAUSATION: TWO NOTIONS OF SUFFICIENCY” (VI-I)*JEFFREY J. WATSON (ARIZONA STATE UNIVERSITY)*

Jaegwon Kim’s Exclusion Arguments make use of two principles, the Causal Closure of the Physical Domain and the Exclusion Principle, that both invoke the notion of a sufficient cause. I will try to explain why the phrase “sufficient cause” admits of two interpretations: one on which a cause is “sufficient” in the technical sense of being a logically “sufficient condition” of its effect, and one on which a cause is “sufficient” in the ordinary language sense of being “enough,” such that nothing else is needed to bring the effect about. I will argue that Kim’s opponent can evade his argument by only accepting that mental events are sufficient causes of physical events in the ordinary sense of being complete, rather than the technical sense of permitting a deduction.

“THE SOCIAL VALUE OF KNOWLEDGE: CHARACTERIZING BENEFITS IN DEVELOPING WORLD RESEARCH” (VII-K)

DANIELLE WENNER (CLEVELAND CLINIC)

There has recently been tremendous growth in the conduct of clinical trials in the developing world. This rapid increase motivates an important ethical question: what is owed to developing world communities who host externally-sponsored research? In this paper, I discuss potential frameworks for answering this question. I begin by critiquing two contrasting positions, and I argue that both fail to take appropriate account of the types of benefits which can morally ground research in the developing world. I briefly analyze a third position which attempts to address the relevance of different types of benefits, and argue that it emphasizes the wrong types of benefits. Finally, I propose a new approach to assessing the benefits due to host communities in the developing world. In doing so, I highlight the need to bring risk-benefit calculations explicitly to bear on these considerations and emphasize the importance of the concept of socially valuable knowledge.

“DOES PHENOMENAL CHARACTER DETERMINE INTENTIONAL CONTENT?” (III-K)

PRESTON J. WERNER (UNIVERSITY OF NEBRASKA)

A growing research project in the metaphysics of intentionality has centered on Phenomenal Intentionality. Proponents of phenomenal intentionality share a commitment that, for at least some paradigmatically intentional states, their phenomenal character constitutively determines their narrow intentional content. If phenomenal character constitutively determines intentional content, then any two states with the same phenomenal character will have the same narrow intentional content. I argue that two different people can be in intrinsically identical phenomenological states without sharing the same narrow intentional content.

“A CRITIQUE OF THE ALL-AFFECTED PRINCIPLE OF DEMOCRATIC INCLUSION” (VI-L)

MATT S. WHITT (WARREN WILSON COLLEGE)

This paper criticizes recent theories of transnational democracy for inadvertently preserving the functional logic, if not the physical frameworks, of modern territorial sovereignty. In order to extend democracy beyond the borders of the nation-state, David Held and others seek morally justified criteria for distinguishing between the insiders and outsiders of transnational political communities. I argue that these criteria function much like the territorial borders of modern sovereignty, insofar as they determine the site and scope of democracy without being susceptible, or even responsive, to the democratic politics they make possible. By facilitating democratic decision-making at the expense of self-determination, these criteria undercut the legitimacy of transnational democracy. As an alternative, I examine the work of Carol Gould, which more adequately recognizes the political agency of potential members of transnational democracies.

“A REJECTION OF COLORBLINDNESS” (VI-L)*YOLONDA WILSON (DUKE UNIVERSITY)*

The term “colorblind” has been used to describe a range of views. According to one conception of colorblind, no one thinks about race anymore because we have moved beyond it. This conception holds both descriptive and normative sway for many. This view relies on two assumptions that need to be unpacked. The first assumption is that thinking about race means that we cannot see one another as individuals. The second assumption undergirding this conception is that putting a troubling racial history behind us requires that we also put race behind us. My project is a rejection of the colorblind ideal. I argue that eliminating racism will sometimes require us to pay more, rather than less, attention to race. Far from being committed to a colorblind ideal, I think that race may sometimes be a necessary, although never sufficient, condition in our moral reasoning.

“KANT’S DEMONSTRATION OF NEGATIVE FREEDOM” (II-L)*BENJAMIN S. YOST (PROVIDENCE COLLEGE)*

This paper develops an interpretation of Kant’s demonstration of negative freedom—the capacity to be motivated to action by reason rather than sensibility—that centers on his motivational internalism. I defend the attribution of internalism by showing how internalism flows from Kant’s conception of practical spontaneity. The rest of the argument goes as follows: if the moral law is the fundamental law of the will, we will sometimes judge that we ought to act as the law prescribes. Given internalism, we will then generate a motive to act in that way. Since it is a pure rational judgment that generates the motive, the motive will be rational by virtue of its pedigree. Possessing such a motive, we are able to act independently of all sensible motives. If we are able to act independently of all sensible motives, we have the capacity to act in a negatively free way.

“FICTIONING THOUGHT EXPERIMENTS” (VII-G)*ALEKS ZARNITSYN (UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS—CHICAGO)*

Thought experiments have been accepted methodology in the philosophy of personal identity and have had a profound impact on the shape of the debate. But as cases get more fantastic, it becomes less clear how they can give knowledge. It has been argued that they do not function like thought experiments in science. But if they are just fanciful stories, why should metaphysicians bother with them? I argue that learning from thought experiments should be thought of as like learning from fiction, and not the other way around. Building on a model of the cognitive value of fiction from aesthetics, I argue that thought experiments provide insights into the complex interactions and interdependence between different elements that constitute our form of life. While such a methodological overhaul may be seen as a change of subject, the move is congenial to the recent theoretical developments in the philosophical literature on personal identity.

ABSTRACTS OF INVITED AND SYMPOSIUM PAPERS

“EXPRESSION: ACTS, PRODUCTS, AND MEANING” (V-E)

DORIT BAR-ON (UNIVERSITY OF NORTH CAROLINA—CHAPEL HILL)

The notion of expression has been put to many uses in philosophy, yet it has received surprisingly little direct theoretical attention. Drawing on certain distinctions I employ in earlier work, I try to show how, properly understood, the notion of expression can help address standing puzzles in seemingly disparate areas: a puzzle about so-called first-person authority (in the philosophy of mind and epistemology) a puzzle about the motivational character of ethical claims (in metaethics), and a puzzle about the origins of meaning (in the philosophy of language). In each case, I argue that failure to draw crucial distinctions has led to undue dismissal of substantive expressivist proposals that could potentially resolve the relevant puzzles.

“RESPONSIBLE TRUST IN SCIENCE: THE IMPLICATIONS OF SITUATED KNOWING” (VII-E)

HEIDI GRASSWICK (MIDDLEBURY COLLEGE)

Though many social epistemologists have turned their attention to the epistemological underpinnings of trusting the testimony of other individuals, this paper investigates trust in the testimony of scientific institutions, considering the requirements of a “responsible trust,” where the trust in the institution matches the trustworthiness of the institution. The feminist thesis of socially situated knowledge suggests that the trustworthiness of scientific institutions may not be the same from all vantage points (Scheman 2001). This point complicates issues of trust and trustworthiness. Adopting a situated approach to knowing, this paper argues that scientific institutions need to earn their trustworthiness across a broad range of social locations. Among the requirements for such trustworthiness from a particular social location is the need for available evidence that scientific institutions are taking up and answering questions of significance for the occupants of that social location. The paper concludes that engagement between scientific communities and particularly located lay communities is an important component of identifying questions of significance, and making available evidence of such uptake by scientific institutions.

“MARR’S LEVELS REVISITED: UNDERSTANDING HOW BRAINS BREAK” (III-D)*VALERIE HARDCASTLE (UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI)*

David Marr (1982) advocates for three independent levels of understanding for any information-processing device, such as a human brain: the level of computational theory, the level of representation and algorithm, and the level of hardware implementation. It was clear early on that these levels are much more intertwined with one another than Marr originally believed. And cognitive scientists have discussed the viability of these distinctions since then. Now, thirty years out, we ask: what can we learn from contemporary research in computational neuroscience that might shed light on the feasibility of Marr’s proposal?

Much work in computational neuroscience now focuses on brains performing less than optimally. That is, while the original programs in cognitive neuroscience and the like aimed to articulate what the components of thought were in ideal terms, much research now looks at how and why brains fail to function as they should. This focus on impairment affects how one can understand Marr’s three levels. In this presentation, we use a method of exploring impulsivity and behavioral inhibition based on a neural network/population activity model of the cortico-striatal circuitry as a case study to refine Marr’s original distinctions. In particular, we will show that the computational level should be redefined, for simply knowing the goal of a computation may not tell us much about why something has gone wrong and why the information-processing device is exhibiting abnormal behavior. We will also argue that how representations are used in contemporary models is different from what Marr originally envisioned.

“PROBLEMS WITH INTELLECTUALISM” (III-E)*ELLEN FRIDLAND (HUMBOLDT UNIVERSITY, BERLIN, AND TUFTS UNIVERSITY)*

In his most recent book, *Know How*, Jason Stanley (2011) defends an Intellectualist account of knowledge how. In this paper, I will focus specifically on one claim that Stanley forwards in chapter one: I will focus on Stanley’s claim that automatic mechanisms can be used by the Intellectualist in order to terminate Ryle’s regress. I will argue that the proposed solution to the regress, regardless of how propositions are individuated, cannot provide an adequate Intellectualist account of skillful action. I should note that the solution to Ryle’s regress is central to the Intellectualist agenda. If Stanley fails to stop the regress or stops the regress by appealing to nonpropositional knowledge, then his Intellectualist project fails.

“METALINGUISTIC APPROACHES TO BELIEF AND MEANING” (VII-B)*CHRISTOPHER GAUKER (UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI)*

The project of providing a reductive analysis of the representation relation has made little progress in twenty years. The attempt to ground linguistic meaning in the expression of thought has foundered on a failure to ground

the content of language-independent mental representations. One can question as well the utility of the concept *concept* in the explanation of cognition. Yet there ought to be something to say about the nature of belief and linguistic meaning. An alternative is to content ourselves with an account of the role that talk of belief and talk of meaning play in the conduct of goal-directed conversations. The character of such accounts may be indicated with the following claims: If I say that Mary believes the lecture will be in room 210, I may not be trying to explain Mary's behavior; rather, I may be trying to answer on Mary's behalf a question about where the lecture will be. If I say that "gatto" in Italian means cat, I am not saying that the extension of "gatto" is the set of cats; rather, I am saying that in speaking Italian we should use "gatto" where, in speaking English, we would use "cat." This presentation will sketch accounts along these lines and identify some of the challenges that such accounts must meet.

"ORLANDO" (VI-A)

ISOBEL GRUNDY (UNIVERSITY OF ALBERTA)

While many would call *Orlando: Women's Writing in the British Isles from the Beginnings to the Present* (<http://orlando.cambridge.org>) a database, we call it a textbase, since it consists not of raw data but of freshly written prose. It arose from a desire to do women's literary history online, and offers a lively and nuanced account of the production, characteristics, reception, and inter-relation of literary texts across a span of centuries. This complex, multiple, often contested narrative draws on the power of the computer, through a specialized encoding system designed for purpose by the project team. Since it is almost impossible to explain without props how *Orlando* works, we will demonstrate its functionality by recreating a user's experience of it: showing some author entries, historical timelines, and results of searches on various literary-historical developments, processes, and concepts.

The demonstration will indicate how the encoding that supports the prose can re-order material into a multitude of different meaningful selections and shapes; how the encoding embodies a set of critical principles about literature, history, and the lives of women.

The paper will consider *Orlando's* own means of production: its composition, support from the academic system, publication by Cambridge University Press, ongoing revision and updating, reception so far, and prospects for sustainability (the great bugbear of digital projects in the humanities) and further experiment.

"I AM A BRAIN IN A VAT (OR PERHAPS A PILE OF STICKS BY THE SIDE OF THE ROAD)" (VI-C)

JAY L. GARFIELD (SMITH COLLEGE AND UNIVERSITY OF MELBOURNE)

I explore the phenomenology suggested by the fourth-century Indian Buddhist philosopher Vasubandhu in Trisvabhaavanirdeśa (*Treatise on the Three Natures*) focusing on the simile of the elephant developed in verses

27–30. I use Putnam’s “brain in a vat” hypothesis as a lens through which to examine Vasubandhu’s strategy, and argue that a proper understanding of Putnam’s and Vasubandhu’s figures suggests a deep critique of the illusion of the givenness of experience.

“XENOPHOBIA AND THE NEED FOR IMMIGRANT RIGHTS” (II-C)

JOSÉ JORGE MENDOZA (WORCESTER STATE UNIVERSITY)

Among philosophers who work on the ethical and political implications of immigration, a near consensus has formed around the view that racist or ethnocentric immigration policies are wrong and must be rejected. With this caveat firmly in place, philosophers have turned their attention almost exclusively to determining whether a legitimate political community has the presumptive right to exclude any and all non-members on grounds other than race or ethnicity, or if all persons, including non-members, have certain basic rights and protections that would entitle them to be admitted into most, if not all, political communities. The assumption is that by not allowing for the possibility of racist or ethnocentric immigration policies, we can rest assured that, whichever position we take on the immigration issue, that position will not entail a xenophobic outcome—an outcome that reduces certain members’ civic standing to that of permanent outsider.

On the surface, this assumption appears sound, but a problem with it emerges when we take into consideration two important points. First, this assumption relies on the idea that immigration controls can only be driven by xenophobia and ignores the possibility that they can be the cause of xenophobia. Second, philosophers have overlooked the issue of enforcement and expulsion (i.e., deportation) strategies. This oversight is problematic because these strategies are currently the sites where xenophobia remains largely unabated by past immigration reforms. My argument is therefore twofold. First, I want to make the case that philosophers who deal with the issue of immigration cannot dispense with the xenophobia concern as easily as they have with racism and ethnocentrism. Second, I want to put forward the positive claim that the way to combat xenophobia is to advocate for more immigrant rights.

“HOW TO BE A BIOLOGICAL RACIAL REALIST” (III-C)

QUAYSHAWN SPENCER (UNIVERSITY OF SAN FRANCISCO)

In this talk, I will show that the case for biological racial realism is more formidable than philosophers have thought, provided that one adopts the right semantic, metaphysical, and biological assumptions. Specifically, I will argue that given a referentialist account of the meaning of “race,” a genuine kind account of “biological racial realism,” a fuzzy graph-theoretic account of metapopulations, and the landmark results from Noah Rosenberg et al. (2002; 2005) on human population substructure, one can fashion a respectable account of race as the “B-partition” of metapopulations in a species (or “BPM race theory”). After developing this nuanced biological theory of race, I defend it against popular criticisms, such as semantic objections (e.g., Lewontin and Feldman 2008), metaphysical objections

(e.g., Gannett 2003, Kaplan and Winther 2012, etc.), and sampling and other methodological objections (e.g., Kittles and Weiss 2003, Kalinowski 2011, etc.). I finish by discussing how BPM race theory can explain how human races evolved as both biological entities and social constructs.

**“WHY BIOETHICS NEEDS A DISABILITY MORAL PSYCHOLOGY AND EPISTEMOLOGY”
(VI-B)**

JOSEPH STRAMONDO (MICHIGAN STATE UNIVERSITY)

A careful study of the field of professional bioethics' encounters with disability activism reveals a sustained pattern of conflict that spans the full breadth of bioethical topics. After briefly describing the emergence of this tension, I will argue that it is not *merely* a conflict between two insular communities of “disability activists” and “bioethicists,” but between those who have experienced disability and those who have not. That is, I maintain that it is a mistake to think of this conflict as arising from a difference in ideology or political commitments, because it is a much deeper difference—one rooted in moral psychology and epistemology. Further, I will argue that, since the dominant moral framework of bioethics has been constructed around the moral psychology and epistemology of non-disabled people, disabled people often feel alienated from the project of bioethics, which has been constructed as—to borrow a term from Margaret Urban Walker—a zone of distrust for them. To create a zone of trust within bioethics for disabled people, the profession must fully develop new understandings of bioethics' core moral concepts and principles that arise from the experience of disability, and re-center the discipline on these revisions. Only this sort of full-scale remodeling of bioethics' core moral principles—taking into account the moral knowledge produced by life with a disability—could possibly hope to realize the field's potential to truly, fundamentally critique the moral structure of biomedicine's practices and institutions. While I do claim that subtle differences in moral psychology and epistemology have produced these tensions between disabled and non-disabled people evaluating bioethical dilemmas, the field will only be able to progress past these conflicts when all bioethics is disability bioethics.

**“WELL-BEING FOR THE UNINFORMED: PRUDENTIAL REASONS AND VALUE
FULFILLMENT THEORY” (V-B)**

VALERIE TIBERIUS (UNIVERSITY OF MINNESOTA)

Desire or preference theories of well-being have long been a popular option for philosophers and economists. Though this hasn't often been explicitly noticed, one explanation for it might be that these theories are well poised to make sense of how claims about well-being supply prudential reasons. Desires are often thought to play an important role in the explanation of practical reasons. But desire theories also have some problems. Actual desire theories do not give us any critical purchase on our intrinsic desires and this weakens their ability to support genuinely normative reasons. Idealized desires theories, such as full information

theory, do make room for our intrinsic desires to be mistaken, but they also introduce the possibility that what is good for us is something we (our actual, uninformed selves) couldn't possibly recognize as good for us. In this paper I defend a theory that defines well-being in terms of value fulfillment, and what a person has prudential reason to do in terms of her modestly revised values. This theory is analogous to desire theories and shares some of their advantages, but it is distinct in ways that avoid some of the problems with desire theories.

SESSIONS SPONSORED BY APA COMMITTEES

THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 21

How Do You Know It's Working? Assessment in Philosophy for Children (GI-2)

Sponsored by the Committee on Pre-College Instruction in Philosophy

9:00 a.m.–noon

Workshop on Teaching Philosophy Inclusively (II-M)

Sponsored by the Committee on Inclusiveness

2:20–5:20 p.m.

FRIDAY, FEBRUARY 22

Law across Borders (III-L)

Sponsored by the Committee on Philosophy and Law

9:00 a.m.–noon

Memory, Consciousness and the Self: A Buddhist Perspective (III-M)

Sponsored by the Committee on the Status of Asian and Asian-American Philosophers and Philosophies

9:00 a.m.–noon

Credentials (IV-K)

Sponsored by the Committee on Philosophy in Two-Year Colleges

12:45–2:45 p.m.

Funding for Philosophy (IV-L)

Sponsored by the Committee on Lectures, Publications, and Research

12:45–2:45 p.m.

Disability: New Perspectives on Justice, Well-being and Virtue (V-K)

Sponsored by the Committee on Inclusiveness and the Committee on Philosophy and Law

3:00–6:00 p.m.

How to Obtain a Position at the Community Colleges (V-L)

Sponsored by the Committee on Philosophy in Two-Year Colleges
3:00–6:00 p.m.

The Underbelly of Philosophical Pedagogy: Aesthetics, Genealogy, and the Question of Activism (V-M)

Sponsored by the Committee on the Teaching of Philosophy
3:00–6:00 p.m.

SATURDAY, FEBRUARY 23**A Tribute to Bernard Gert (VI-M)**

Sponsored by the Committee on Philosophy and Medicine
9:00 a.m.–noon

Teaching Modern Philosophy (VI-N)

Sponsored by the Committee on the Teaching of Philosophy
9:00 a.m.–noon

Pushing the Boundaries: Mary Whiton Calkins at the Sesquicentennial of Her Birth (VII-L)

Sponsored by the Committee on the Status of Women
2:30–5:30 p.m.

GROUP SESSIONS

Sessions sponsored by affiliated groups are listed below in alphabetical order of sponsoring group. Sessions sponsored jointly by more than one group are listed once for each sponsor.

A

Adam Smith Society: *GI-1, Thu, 9:00 a.m.–noon*

American Association of Philosophy Teachers: *GII-5, Thu, 5:25–7:25 p.m.*

American Association of Philosophy Teachers: *GIII-6, Thu, 7:30–10:30 p.m.*

American Society for Aesthetics: *GIV-8, Fri, 7:15–10:15 p.m.*

American Society for Value Inquiry: *GI-8, Thu, 9:00 a.m.–noon*

American Society for Value Inquiry: *GIV-12, Fri, 7:15–10:15 p.m.*

Association for Informal Logic and Critical Thinking: *GII-5, Thu, 5:25–7:25 p.m.*

Association for Informal Logic and Critical Thinking: *GIII-6, Thu, 7:30–10:30 p.m.*

Association for Philosophy of Education: *GIII-8, Thu, 7:30–10:30 p.m.*

Association for Symbolic Logic: *G0-1, Wed, 6:00–10:00 p.m.*

Association for Symbolic Logic: *GI-12, Thu, 9:00 a.m.–noon*

Association for Symbolic Logic: *GII-8, Thu, 5:25–7:25 p.m.*

B

Bertrand Russell Society: *GV-3, Sat, 12:15–2:15 p.m.*

C

Central Division Sartre Circle: *GV-2, Sat, 12:15–2:15 p.m.*

Charles S. Peirce Society: *GII-9, Thu, 5:25–7:25 p.m.*

Committee on Institutional Cooperation: *GII-7, Thu, 5:25–7:25 p.m.*

Concerned Philosophers for Peace: *GV-6, Sat, 12:15–2:15 p.m.*

Conference of Philosophical Societies: *GV-8, Sat, 12:15–2:15 p.m.*

H

Hume Society: *GII-6, Thu, 5:25–7:25 p.m.*

I

International Association for the Philosophy of Sport: *GV-11, Sat, 12:15–2:15 p.m.*

International Berkeley Society: *GI-13, Thu, 9:00 a.m.–noon*

International Society for Environmental Ethics: *GIII-4, Thu, 7:30–10:30 p.m.*

International Society for Environmental Ethics: *GIV-4, Fri, 7:15–10:15 p.m.*

J

Josiah Royce Society: *GIII-10, Thu, 7:30–10:30 p.m.*

M

Marxism and Philosophy Association: *GI-9, Thu, 9:00 a.m.–noon*

Midwest Society for Women in Philosophy: *GII-11, Thu, 5:25–7:25 p.m.*

N

Nicolai Hartmann Society: *GI-7, Thu, 9:00 a.m.–noon*

Nicolai Hartmann Society: *GIII-5, Thu, 7:30–10:30 p.m.*

Nicolai Hartmann Society: *GIV-11, Fri, 7:15–10:15 p.m.*

North American Division of the Schopenhauer Society: *GIII-1, Thu, 7:30–10:30 p.m.*

North American Kant Society: *GII-1, Thu, 5:25–7:25 p.m.*

North American Nietzsche Society: *GII-10, Thu, 5:25–7:25 p.m.*

North American Nietzsche Society: *GV-9, Sat, 12:15–2:15 p.m.*

North American Society for Social Philosophy: *GIII-7, Thu, 7:30–10:30 p.m.*

P

Personalist Discussion Group: *GV-4, Sat, 12:15–2:15 p.m.*

Philosophy of Religion Group: *GV-5, Sat, 12:15–2:15 p.m.*

Philosophy of Time Society: *GI-11, Thu, 9:00 a.m.–noon*

R

Radical Philosophy Association: *GV-7, Sat, 12:15–2:15 p.m.*

S

Society for Analytical Feminism: *GI-5, Thu, 9:00 a.m.–noon*

Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy: *GIV-7, Fri, 7:15–10:15 p.m.*

Society for Asian and Comparative Philosophy: *GII-2, Thu, 5:25–7:25 p.m.*

Society for Asian and Comparative Philosophy: *GV-1, Sat, 12:15–2:15 p.m.*

Society for Business Ethics: *GIV-1, Fri, 7:15–10:15 p.m.*

Society for Lesbian and Gay Philosophy: *GIII-3, Thu, 7:30–10:30 p.m.*

Society for Realist-Antirealist Discussion: *GIV-6, Fri, 7:15–10:15 p.m.*

Society for Systematic Philosophy: *GI-4, Thu, 9:00 a.m.–noon*

Society for the Advancement of American Philosophy: *GI-10, Thu, 9:00 a.m.–noon*

Society for the History of Political Philosophy: *GIII-11, Thu, 7:30–10:30 p.m.*

Society for the History of Political Philosophy: *GIV-2, Fri, 7:15–10:15 p.m.*

Society for the Metaphysics of Science: *GI-14, Thu, 9:00 a.m.–noon*

Society for the Metaphysics of Science: *GV-10, Sat, 12:15–2:15 p.m.*

Society for the Philosophic Study of Genocide and the Holocaust: *GI-3, Thu, 9:00 a.m.–noon*

Society for the Philosophic Study of Genocide and the Holocaust: *GII-4, Thu, 5:25–7:25 p.m.*

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- Society for the Philosophic Study of the Contemporary Visual Arts: *GI-15, Thu, 9:00 a.m.–noon*
- Society for the Philosophic Study of the Contemporary Visual Arts: *GII-12, Thu, 5:25–7:25 p.m.*
- Society for the Philosophical Study of Education: *GIV-9, Fri, 7:15–10:15 p.m.*
- Society for the Philosophy of Agency: *GIII-2, Thu, 7:30–10:30 p.m.*
- Society for the Philosophy of Creativity: *GIII-9, Thu, 7:30–10:30 p.m.*
- Society for the Philosophy of History: *GV-12, Sat, 12:15–2:15 p.m.*
- Society for the Study of the History of Analytical Philosophy: *GI-6, Thu, 9:00 a.m.–noon*
- Society for the Study of the History of Analytical Philosophy: *GIV-3, Fri, 7:15–10:15 p.m.*
- Society of Christian Philosophers: *GII-3, Thu, 5:25–7:25 p.m.*

W

- William James Society: *GIV-10, Fri, 7:15–10:15 p.m.*
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PLACEMENT SERVICE INFORMATION

Questions concerning the service should be directed to Mike Morris at the American Philosophical Association, University of Delaware, 31 Amstel Avenue, Newark, DE 19716, telephone: (302) 831-2012, fax: (302) 831-8690.

APA PLACEMENT SERVICE GENERAL HOURS OF OPERATION:

Wednesday, February 20:	Placement Information, 5:00–10:00 p.m., meeting registration desk (third floor) Placement Interview Tables, TBA
Thursday, February 21:	Placement Information, 8:30 a.m.–5:30 p.m., meeting registration desk (third floor) Placement Interview Tables, TBA
Friday, February 22:	Placement Information, 8:30 a.m.–5:00 p.m., meeting registration desk (third floor) Placement Interview Tables, TBA
Saturday, February 23:	Placement Information, 8:30 a.m.–noon, meeting registration desk (third floor) Placement Interview Tables, TBA

APA PLACEMENT SERVICE LOCATIONS

The placement desk will be located in the meeting registration area (third floor). Information concerning the location of the interviewing area will be available at the registration desk.

JOB CANDIDATES – MEETING REGISTRATION DESK (THIRD FLOOR)

1. Candidate numbers will be assigned when you register for the placement service.
 2. The location of a job interview will be available from the placement staff, or posted on the bulletin board at the information desk.
 3. If there are interviewing institutions accepting on-site interview requests, additional “Request for Interview” forms will be available at the placement desk.
 4. APA membership applications will be available at the APA meeting registration desk.
 5. Information and instructions for using the service will be available at the placement desk (also see following pages), and posted on the information bulletin board.
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6. Only candidates who are requesting interviews will receive a folder. Candidates who opt in can also receive notification via text message (SMS) when a response is received.
7. A complete set of job postings will be available at the placement desk.
8. A message for the APA placement ombudsperson can be left at the placement desk.

INTERVIEWERS – MEETING REGISTRATION DESK (THIRD FLOOR)

1. **Interviewers check in here**—as soon as possible upon arrival.
2. Payments for **on-site interviewing departments** will be received here.
3. Opportunity will be provided here for interviewers to check their files.
4. “Request for Interview” forms received from job candidates that have been reviewed by interviewers **should be returned** here.
5. A list of interviewing table assignments will be posted on the placement information bulletin board.

INTERVIEWING AREA – TBA

1. APA interviewing tables will be located here.
2. In the event that additional space for interviewing is needed, we will post the additional location on the placement information bulletin board.

INFORMATION AND INSTRUCTIONS FOR JOB CANDIDATES

REQUIREMENTS FOR USING THE PLACEMENT SERVICE

1. You **must be an APA member** in order to use the service. Placement is a benefit of membership for candidates, and there is no additional charge to use this service. Membership applications are available on the APA website (www.apaonline.org) or by contacting the APA national office at (302) 831-1112, or at the membership/registration desk at the meeting.
2. You **MUST REGISTER** for the **MEETING** in order to use the service.
 - If you **register in advance** for the meeting and indicate that you will be a candidate (we recommend that you register online at www.apaonline.org; an advance registration form is also located at the back of this issue), a candidate number will be assigned by the national office and will appear on the back of your badge. You **must** pick up your badge from the APA registration staff prior to using the placement service.
 - If you register on-site for the meeting, your placement number will be assigned when you register and will appear on the back of your badge.

WHAT TO BRING WITH YOU

1. Your laptop or smartphone with Internet access (Wi-Fi will not be provided in the hotel meeting area), or printouts of key *JFP* listings from the website.

2. Several copies of your *curriculum vitae*. If you run out of CVs at the meeting, the hotel has a copy center located in the Business Center.

HOW TO USE THE PLACEMENT SERVICE

After you have picked up your registration materials from the APA registration staff, you are ready to use the service. If you do not yet have a candidate number on the back of your badge, please go to the placement desk at the meeting registration desk (third floor) to receive one.

JOB CANDIDATES' AREA – MEETING REGISTRATION DESK (THIRD FLOOR)

“Request for Interview” forms will be available from the placement staff. **Be sure that your placement number appears at the top of all forms.**

JOB POSTINGS

New jobs (not having appeared on the *Jobs for Philosophers* website) will be posted on a bulletin board in the placement service area. You should check this board regularly for new postings. Each ad will contain instructions on how to apply.

INSTITUTIONS THAT HAVE CHECKED IN WITH PLACEMENT

The names of institutions that have registered to use the service will be posted on the bulletin board (updated periodically) in *alphabetical order*. Each listing will indicate the following:

1. If the listing institution has checked in with placement.
2. If the institution is accepting interview requests at the meeting.
3. Where the institution plans on interviewing (table with number assignment).
4. Miscellaneous notes deemed appropriate by the placement staff or the institution.

SUBMITTING AN INTERVIEW REQUEST FORM

Complete the *top* portion of the “Request for Interview” form and attach a copy of your CV. **Be sure that your candidate number appears at the top of all forms.** Include your cell phone number and check the box if you wish to be notified via text when a response is received. *Note: Normal text messaging fees from your service provider will apply.* After you have completed the necessary information, place your request form and CV in the box marked *Requests for Interviews*, which will be prominently displayed on the placement service desk. Your request will be forwarded to the institution by a staff member.

INTERVIEWS

After your request has been reviewed by a representative from the institution, the form will be returned to your file folder with the institution’s response appearing on the *bottom* of the form. By noon on February 23, all

requests submitted by you should have been answered. Occasionally, an institution may retain applications to review at a later date. If you applied for a job that had been posted and the institution did not check in with the service during the meeting, it is suggested that you contact the institution after the conference.

INTERVIEWING LOCATIONS

Some departments will be conducting interviews at tables (location TBA). Other interviewing table locations will be posted if additional space is required. Each institution using a table for interviewing will be assigned a table number. The table numbers assigned to institutions will be posted on the bulletin board in the placement service area.

ADVICE FOR JOB APPLICANTS

The APA Committee on Career Opportunities offers the following advice for job applicants: The schedule for those seeking jobs and those departments offering positions is difficult for all concerned. From the point of view of departments, any *JFP* ad publication date is a compromise between the competing demands imposed by the need to get funding for positions, so the later the better, and by the need to have time to process applications, so the sooner the better. From the point of view of job applicants, there are also competing demands: the sooner it is published, the more time to apply, but the later it is published, the more opportunities will be available. There is no easy solution to this problem, but you can ease your difficulties somewhat by being prepared. You should have your *curriculum vitae* ready to put in an envelope, a generic draft of a letter of application ready to be fine-tuned for particular job opportunities, and the rest of your file ready for mailing. This means talking to those who are to write letters of recommendation well in advance, preparing material about your teaching capacities, and selecting a writing sample for those departments that request it. Applications should be complete, as well as clearly organized. It is to your advantage to send in your application as soon as possible after an ad appears.

INFORMATION AND INSTRUCTIONS FOR INTERVIEWERS

REQUIREMENTS FOR USING THE PLACEMENT SERVICE

1. **All individual interviewers MUST register for the meeting** online at www.apaonline.org, by using the registration form found at the back of this issue, or by stopping at the APA registration desk (third floor) to register on-site prior to using the placement service.
2. **All departments (not individuals)** planning to interview at the meeting must register for the placement service on our website (www.apaonline.org) or complete the form at the end of this issue. Upon receipt of an advance registration form, additional information pertaining to the placement service will be sent to the attention of the contact person listed on the form. If you are completing a form and sending it by either mail or fax, please be sure to do so **at your earliest opportunity**.

Otherwise, your materials may arrive after the staff has left the office to travel to the meeting. In this case, you must fill out the forms again on site. If time does not allow you to send them in advance, please bring them with you and turn them in at the placement desk.

CHECKING IN WITH THE SERVICE

Before you begin to interview candidates, you must check in with the placement staff (meeting registration desk, third floor). We will need to know that you have arrived on site so that we can communicate that to candidates inquiring about your institution. At this time we will also request or confirm additional information as needed.

Some institutions accept interview requests at the meeting; some of these job notices may have appeared in *Jobs for Philosophers* while others are unpublished positions. A new, unpublished position will be posted on the bulletin board in the placement service area. If you are bringing such a job notice with you to the meeting, please provide the placement staff with **four** copies of the notice for the position you are advertising. Such a position announcement should be typed on *one side only* in a good size and easy to read font, and be as brief as possible. Only positions that have **not** appeared in *Jobs for Philosophers* will be posted.

Some institutions interview by prearrangement after placing an advertisement in *Jobs for Philosophers* and then contacting candidates prior to the meeting. When you arrange an interview with candidates, please inform them that they **must be APA members in order to use the service and they must register for the meeting in order to use the service**.

If you plan to conduct job interviews anywhere other than at the interviewing tables/suites provided, please let the placement service know your plans. Candidates often ask questions about the location and time of their interviews, and the staff need to have complete, up-to-date information in order to help them (and you). Departments using a **suite** for interviewing must provide an interview schedule form at the time they check in with the placement service. Doing so enables the service to notify the candidates you wish to interview of your interviewing location. **Be assured that only those candidates listed on your interview schedule will be told the location of your hotel room, unless you have directed staff to give this information to all candidates who ask.** Departments interviewing at tables **DO NOT** need to complete this form.

Note: If you are conducting interviews in a hotel room, please be aware of the following policy statement adopted by the APA Board of Officers at its November 2004 meeting: "Departments should not conduct job interviews in non-suite hotel rooms. Candidates who are subject to such interviews can appeal to the APA and are guaranteed anonymity." (Originally published in *Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association*, Vol. 78, No. 5, pp. 23, 119.)

APA INTERVIEWING TABLES

The placement service provides numbered tables for interviewing purposes; you will receive your table number assignment when you check in. These table number assignments will also be posted on the placement service bulletin board. Should additional space for interviewing tables be necessary, this location will be posted as well.

INSTITUTION FILE FOLDER (MAILBOX)

There will be a file folder bearing the name of your institution located at the meeting registration desk (third floor). Requests for interviews from candidates will be placed in this file folder.

REVIEWING INTERVIEW REQUESTS

When a candidate requests an interview with your institution, you should receive her/his *curriculum vitae* attached to a "Request for Interview" form. The bottom of this form is to be completed by you and returned to placement staff. If an interview is granted, space is provided on this form to list the time, date, and location of the interview. If you are *unable to interview a candidate*, space for this response is also provided on the form.

Any request you receive in an envelope contains confidential material and should be destroyed rather than returned to the candidate. As a matter of professional courtesy, *all requests should receive a response*. When a candidate receives a request form back without a response, he or she is likely to assume that the material *has not been reviewed* and might return this to you via our service or contact your institution following the meeting.

Materials that you wish to transmit to a registered candidate should be handed in to the placement service staff located at the meeting registration desk (third floor), and will be delivered to the candidate by our staff.

APA STATEMENT ON PLACEMENT PRACTICES

The APA Committee on the Status and Future of the Profession reminds you of its Statement on Placement Practices: The APA discourages the nomination by graduate departments of job seekers for positions in philosophy, and the submission of their dossiers in response to announcements of positions, without their knowledge or interest. This may seriously mislead those who are conducting searches, and may have unfortunate consequences both for them and for genuinely interested applicants. Graduate departments using a nomination procedure or submitting dossiers on behalf of job seekers should either attest explicitly that the candidate wishes to be considered for the positions in question, or (preferably) ensure that the job seekers themselves submit personal letters of application for these positions. Departments conducting searches are encouraged to recommend or require explicitly (in their position announcements) that each candidate, to be assessed of full

consideration, should submit a personal letter of application for and interest in the announced position. *A placement ombudsperson will be available at the meeting.*

PLACEMENT BROCHURE

This brochure offers some advice to those seeking jobs in philosophy. Like all advice it is to be taken with a grain of salt. It is based on the collective wisdom of the APA's Committee on Academic Careers and Placement in Fall 2004 (Larry May [chair], Andrew Light, Frank Ryan, Abby Wilkerson, Melissa Zinkin, Nancy Holland, Rebecca Copenhaver, Mark Timmons, David Tuncellito). Collective wisdom is probably somewhat less controversial than collective punishment, but more controversial than almost everything else. Nonetheless, we hope that some of what we recommend will prove helpful to some of you, some of the time. Job seeking is one of the most difficult things that people can engage in. Anything that reduces that difficulty has value.

1. WHEN TO START THINKING ABOUT JOBS

It is never too early to start thinking about the job market. During your first years in graduate school you should be thinking about which papers your teachers have liked. After the end of term, take the paper back to the professor who liked it and ask two questions:

What can I do to improve this paper and make it marketable for a conference or for publication?

Which conference or journal would be best suited for a paper like mine?

You don't need to do a lot of this. One or two of your best essays, sent first to a conference and then to a journal, will do nicely. Only send out your very best work to conferences, for that is what you want to be remembered for.

In addition, in these early years in graduate school, you should try to put together a good assortment of courses that you have TA-ed for or taught independently. You should try to TA for all of the major introductory courses (introduction to philosophy, ethics, logic and critical thinking) as well as some specialized or advanced courses in your areas of specialization and competence. At some universities, such as the large state schools, the trick will be to limit your teaching so that you can get good writing done. At other schools, you may have to be creative to get enough teaching experience (try contacting small colleges and community colleges in your area). Most importantly, keep your teaching evaluations from these courses. Or if course evaluations do not routinely have students evaluate TAs, design your own and administer it during the last week of classes (then have a departmental secretary collect and hold them for you until grades are turned in so students don't think you will retaliate against them).

A note of caution: Given the current and foreseeable demand for low-paid adjunct courses it can be very tempting to take on a large amount of adjunct teaching. Given the large number of graduate students seeking such teaching it can also be very tempting to take every course that is offered to you in order to ensure your place in the adjunct pool. The result sometimes can be a vicious cycle of taking more and more low-paid adjunct teaching that can impede your ability to finish your dissertation.

All other things being equal, and they hardly ever are, you could also use the early years in graduate school to get a bit (but only a bit) of service or administrative experience. The easiest here is to volunteer for a departmental committee, like the colloquium or admissions committee. If there are opportunities to work with an actual administrator, especially a Dean or higher, on a special project, you should jump at the opportunity since a letter from said administrator will make you look more attractive to administrators who will hire you down the road. Do not (repeat: do not) spend much time at this. Service is clearly a very distant third-place, after research and teaching, for the vast majority of jobs. No one gets hired on the basis of service, standing alone, unless you want to be hired into an administrative job. Remember too that one should be cautious about spending too much time on departmental or campus politics. Indeed, try to stay out of departmental politics altogether, which can come back to bite you. You are a transient in graduate school, and should not treat this as a permanent position.

It is a good idea to join the APA as soon as you can—the rates for student members are very low. And make sure to visit the Jobs for Philosophers (JFP) website—it's free to APA members. When reviewing JFP, you can scan through it and think to yourself: Do any of these jobs sound interesting to me? What do I need to do to stand the best chance of getting the job I like the most? Note whether there are any such jobs. If not, consider another career. If so, notice what combinations of things employers are looking for (for example, notice that most jobs in philosophy of science or mind also want someone who can teach logic; and most jobs in ethical theory or political philosophy also want someone who can teach applied ethics).

Another good source of experience and professional contacts can be found in the numerous smaller specialized societies organized around particular sub-fields of philosophy, affinity groups, or particular periods or figures, such as the Society for Women in Philosophy, the International Society for Environmental Ethics, or the Society for Realist/Antirealist Discussion. Such organizations can be invaluable for helping to establish you in the field and providing a set of interlocutors who can improve your work. One of the best ways to find such organizations is to survey the Group Meetings listings in the program for each divisional APA conference.

In general, use the early years in graduate school to learn as much philosophy as you can. Also, begin to develop a specialty in philosophy, and perhaps also begin to develop a competence outside of philosophy, such as political science or computer science (although for certain jobs

you might not want to highlight this). Use these early years to figure out if you really want to spend your life in a philosophy department, and to begin to get a sense of what it means to be a “professional” philosopher. While it is very romantic to want to be a philosopher, like being a poet one does not live by thoughts and words alone. The way to support yourself is by getting a job as a member of a profession, and our profession, as odd as it may sound, is teaching and publishing in philosophy, which is not especially romantic, but is better than many other jobs we know.

2. WHEN TO GO INTO THE “MARKET”

One of the most important decisions you will make is when to go into the philosophy job market. This is especially important because many graduate students go in too early and waste years of their lives. The job market process is a nearly full-time job. So if you go in early and you don’t have enough of your dissertation done, you can find yourself six months later with no job prospects and no more done on your dissertation than when you started. Do this a couple of years and you nearly place yourself out of the market by being too long in graduate school—taking too long to finish a dissertation is almost always seen as a bad sign of how long it will take you to finish anything else.

So, when is it optimal to go into the job market? While this varies a bit, the best time is when you are nearly done with your dissertation. “Nearly done” is a relative term. If you have a five-chapter dissertation, “nearly done” can mean four chapters drafted and approved by your committee, and the other chapter at least begun. Or it can mean, all five chapters drafted and some fairly minor revisions needed. At bare minimum, you need three of those five chapters done by early September. The main reason for this is that you need your dissertation committee chair to say, in a letter he or she will write in late September, “Yes, Jones will be done and ready to start undistracted in the fall.” But this is not enough, since everyone’s committee chair will say that, or else your application process is simply a waste of time. In addition, the committee chair must offer evidence to back up this claim, such as, that all five chapters are drafted and only need minor revisions, or some such. Optimally, the letter from your committee chair will say: “We have set December 8 as the defense date.” This is optimal because by the time you get to the Eastern Division meetings in late December, folks will know whether you are really done or not. January defense dates are good as well, because departments will be making hiring decisions by late January or early February, typically.

In normal years there are a lot more applicants for jobs in philosophy than there are jobs. So, employers are looking for reasons to throw out applications. The first cut at most schools is “whether the candidate is done, or will be done by September.” Unless you can make a strong case for this, and your dissertation committee chair can back you up, you are unlikely to make the first cut, and hence likely to have wasted six months or more. Don’t delude yourself. It normally takes two months of relatively uninterrupted work to draft a good chapter, so it will take six months of

very hard work to draft more than half of a dissertation, depending on your other commitments. If you haven't started seriously writing your dissertation by March, you don't stand much of a chance of being more than halfway done by September. But also don't wait too long. While the national average is seven years from BA to completion of the Ph.D., if after completing your coursework you take longer than three years to write the dissertation, potential employers will start to wonder whether this is a sign that you will not be able to write enough in your probationary period to be able to get tenure. So, our best advice is not to go into the market until you are done with the dissertation, or at very least "nearly done."

3. THE SYSTEM

In America in philosophy, the majority of jobs are advertised in *Jobs for Philosophers* in October and November and then first interviews (a half hour to an hour in length) are conducted at the APA Eastern Division meetings between Christmas and New Year's Day. If you make it through the convention, then two or three people will be flown to campus for a two-day intensive interview, where you will meet all of the faculty members and present a professional paper, or teach a class, and increasingly both. There are also jobs advertised after New Year's Day, although far fewer than before New Year's. These jobs will typically have their first interviews at the Pacific or Central Division meetings in late March or late April respectively. But many of these jobs will not be tenure track, but instead they are rather late announcements for temporary positions of one or more years. Some schools will do first interviews by phone or videoconference, but these are rare. If you are seriously on the market, you should plan to go to the APA Eastern Division meetings and apply to jobs posted on the JFP website in October and November, and then keep applying throughout the year.

Many graduate students go to their first APA meeting when they go on the job market. While certainly understandable due to financial constraints, we strongly advise you to attend a meeting of the APA prior to going on the market. In particular, going to an Eastern APA meeting may help you avoid the "shell shock" of going to one of these meetings only when it "counts." We would also hope that attending these meetings without the pressure of being on the market will help you see the positive aspects of these conferences, especially the ability to reconnect with friends in the field and make new friends that you otherwise might not see in the academic year. Also, reading a paper or being a commentator might help get you a job in the following years.

4. THE "VITA"

One of the main ways to tell whether you are ready to go on the market is whether you can put together a respectable vita by early September. A vita is simply an academic resume, but it is not really very simple at all. You should show your vita to various faculty members and put it through the kind of drafting process that you would use for a term paper. For most applicants, the vita should be two to three pages long, with three to four

pages for dissertation abstract and summary of teaching evaluations as supplements to the vita.

- a) Address – list your departmental and home addresses and phone numbers. Also list where you can be reached right up to the beginning of the Eastern APA convention (December 27).
 - b) Area of specialization – this is optimally two or three areas of philosophy that you are especially qualified in. The dissertation is the primary, often only, basis for proof of a specialization. To figure out what would be good combinations of specialization, consult back issues of *Jobs for Philosophers* and then make sure that your dissertation really does cover those areas.
 - c) Area of competence – this is optimally four or five areas of philosophy that you are ready to offer courses in, different from your specialized areas. The best way to demonstrate this is in terms of what you have taught or TA-ed.
 - d) Publications or conference presentations – this could be one area of the vita or several, depending on what you have accomplished. Do not pad your vita with very minor things (or optimally, list them under a separate category for minor publications). Try to list the most significant first—they don't need to be in chronological order. Make sure to indicate whether something was peer refereed.
 - e) Teaching experience – list TA experience in a separate category from autonomous teaching. List the dates and places of the experience.
 - f) Special honors and awards – list whatever seems relevant to a job search in philosophy. Mainly focus on things you earned in graduate school.
 - g) Recommendation writers – list the names of all of those who will write letters for you and the addresses and phone numbers for them. This list should include all three (or four) members of your primary dissertation committee, as well as someone who will write specifically about your teaching—preferably someone who has good first-hand experience of it. And it is sometimes an especially good thing to be able to have someone write for you who is not a faculty member at your department or school. Those letters are more believable since the reputation of the recommendation writer is not tied up with whether you get a job or not. For example, if you give a conference paper and have a commentator who liked the paper, ask that person to write a letter for you; act similarly for a paper you have written about a prominent philosopher who has read your work and appreciated it, but such letters are limited in scope. It often is a good idea to give to prospective letter writers a letter from you that indicates what things optimally you'd like them to cover in the recommendation, and give them lots of time—ask them by Sept. 1.
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- h) List of graduate courses taken: list all courses (including those you audited) along with the name of the professor and the semester taken. It is often a good idea to group these by subject areas rather than merely to present them chronologically. DO NOT LIST GRADES—no one cares anymore.
- i) Summary of selected course evaluations: on no more than two sheets of paper, list five or six sets of teaching evaluations, displayed in graphic form that is easy to read
- j) Dissertation abstract—on one or two sheets of paper give a detailed description of the arguments of the dissertation. Provide a summary paragraph and long paragraphs on each chapter. [NOTE: if you can't easily provide this abstract then you are definitely not ready to go on the market.]

It is hard to stress enough how important it is to get the vita just right. The trick is not to pad the vita and yet to list all of the important stuff about your fledgling professional life.

On a more mundane subject, normal white paper and average size typeface work best. This is why you need lots of feedback and redraftings to get it right. If you have any questions about how you “appear” through the vita, ask people you can trust to give you frank advice, and then, with several such pieces of advice, make a decision about how you want to “appear.”

Do not waste your time applying for jobs that list an AOS different from the ones you list on the vita.

5. THE COVER LETTER

The cover letter for each job application should basically be a one-page attempt to demonstrate that you fit the job description. This means that you should highlight aspects of the vita that demonstrate your qualifications for the things mentioned in the job ad. You should have a paragraph on teaching and a paragraph on research, at bare minimum.

The cover letter is sometimes the only thing that members of a hiring committee read, so take your time with it and try to convey as much information as you can in a page or so without being excessively wordy or using terms and expressions that may be esoteric to a particular sub-field of philosophy—keep in mind that most people reading this letter will not be working in the specialty area in which you work. It is not a problem to go over one page in length, but remember that folks may not read the second page.

If at all possible, put the cover letter on departmental stationary. If you already have a job, this is easy. But if you are still in graduate school, most departments will let you use departmental stationary. If your department secretary complains about the cost of letterhead stock, merely ask for one sheet, and then photocopy it and print your covering letter on the photocopied departmental letterhead.

6. THE WRITING SAMPLE

You will need to supply at least one writing sample with each application. It is commonly thought that the writing sample should come from the dissertation. If it does not, people may wonder whether the dissertation is indeed almost done. You should take a chapter from the dissertation and make it a free-standing 25-page paper. If you have a paper that has been accepted for publication, you should include this as well; but especially if it is not from the dissertation, this should be included in addition to, not instead of, the dissertation chapter.

In all cases, the writing sample should be your very best work. After all, someone may actually read it and base the whole interview on it. How embarrassing it will be for you if you really don't think that thesis is defensible anymore. Writing samples should be very carefully edited for typos and infelicities of style, since this is the only piece of your work members of a hiring committee are likely to see. You should never send out a writing sample that has not been seen, and critiqued, by several people in your field, even if these are only fellow graduate students. Do not assume that even if people have seen earlier drafts of the writing sample, say when it was merely a chapter, that is good enough. As with everything else you send out for the purposes of getting a job, only send things out that others have looked at for you in advance. [Note: Your writing sample should not be the same as the professional paper you deliver on campus, lest folks think that you only have one good idea.]

7. WHICH SCHOOLS TO APPLY TO

Our standard advice is that if you are serious about the job market you should be able to apply to 30–80 jobs before Christmas. Of course, it is a waste of everyone's time to apply to jobs that you are not qualified for, or for which you do not have the right AOS. But so many jobs list open specializations, or merely list courses to be taught, that it shouldn't be hard to find quite a number of jobs that one is qualified for out of the postings on the JFP website in October and November.

Many students decide to do a more limited search. In order to accomplish this goal they try to determine which departments are most likely to hire them, and then only apply to those schools. For instance, if someone really wants to teach applied ethics, then one often applies only to jobs that list applied ethics as an AOS, rather than also to jobs that list ethical theory or political philosophy as specializations. In deciding whether to pursue this strategy, you should realize that departments often change their minds about precisely what they want. If you do a limited search, still apply to as many jobs as you can from those that you are qualified for. Remember that you don't have to take every job that is offered, but unless you get an offer from somewhere you won't get a job at all.

8. PREPARING FOR THE INTERVIEW

Before going to the APA Eastern convention for the first round of job interviews, everyone should first have a mock interview. If this is not a

regular feature of your graduate program, mock interviews are easy to organize on your own. Merely find two or three faculty members, give them a copy of your vita a few minutes in advance (to make it seem like the real thing) and have them sit in a room with you for an hour and role-play.

The first half of the interview should be about research, and it should begin with someone asking you to describe your dissertation in about ten minutes. The “spiel” should be memorized and well-rehearsed in front of a mirror. Of course, you will rarely get through ten minutes before questions start flying. And that’s good—since the whole point of an interview is to have a conversation where three things are learned: how good a philosopher you are, what kind of a teacher you are likely to be, and whether you will be a good conversationalist as a colleague. Since you won’t normally be allowed to finish the “spiel” front-load it with the most interesting ideas.

The second half of the mock interview, like most of the real interviews you will face, should be focused on teaching. You should come prepared to discuss in detail how you would teach courses that would naturally fall out of your areas of specialization and competence. Be prepared to explain what you think students should get out of a given course in order to motivate your teaching approach. Prepare elaborately for these mock interviews, as well as for the real one, and bring sample syllabi for a host of courses you are likely to be asked to teach.

At the mock interview, those mocking you should put on different hats, preferably trying to simulate folks who will indeed interview you. For that reason, wait to do this until early to middle December so it is likely that you will have started to hear from schools. Also, ask the mockers to be brutally frank with you. A lot of what goes wrong in interviews is easy to fix if you know about it in advance. It is easy to redo your “spiel.” And, if you bite your thumb or scratch your rear end, this can easily be corrected once you know it. If you look distracted, you can sit up straight and then lean forward. If you look too intense or nervous, you can slide down in the chair and slump a little. If you look too buttoned-up, unbutton; if you look too laid-back, button-up, etc.

When you get interviews, go onto the departmental website and look at the courses that would naturally fall into your specialization and competence. It is also a good idea to try to get a sense of what type of school it is. And if this is a “plum” job for you, you might want to read some things that people in the department, especially those in your area, have written.

At nearly every real interview, you will be asked if you have any questions for them, so make that part of the mock interview as well. If you don’t know this you can be flummoxed by this question—so have one or two questions, ideally based on your knowledge of the department and the curriculum, e.g.: “Are your 400 level courses only upper level undergraduate courses or are there both graduate students and undergraduate students in these courses?” Don’t be too provocative here and generally stay away from salary issues.

Very often you will be asked what your “next” project will be, now that you are nearing the end of your dissertation—you don’t have to have a super-detailed answer to this, but you should have some answer. Don’t try to make something up on the spur of the moment. A good strategy is to work up a project that spins off the dissertation, perhaps writing the chapter you never got to, or that is a natural follow-up to the dissertation. That way you can still talk about stuff you know something about.

9. WHAT TO WEAR

The best advice about what to wear is to wear what will make you comfortable. You don’t need to wear a suit, though jackets are pretty much required. Don’t wear a loud tie or a loud scarf. You don’t want to be remembered later as that person with the weird thing on—much better to be remembered for what you said—the person who had a really interesting response to Smith’s hard question, for instance. Ties for men are not strictly required; but more men wear them than not, so... For women, there is no preference for pants rather than a skirt or dress, or vice versa. In general, dress comfortably—the placement process will be uncomfortable enough as it is.

10. GENERAL CONVENTION ADVICE

If you can afford it, plan to spend two or three nights at the hotel where the convention occurs. And best not to have a roommate, unless it is someone you really trust. Things will be stressful enough without having anywhere to escape to (and watch cartoons, or the weather channel, or whatever relaxes you) between interviews. Also, for two of the evenings there will be receptions (still called “smokers” by most attendees, even though there hasn’t been any smoke or fire for many years) in the evening, often going on till late hours, and it is best not to have to navigate mass transit after midnight.

Generally, drink little if any alcohol during the convention. And try to stay away from folks who have been drinking and have interviewed you. Aside from this advice, though, there is nothing wrong with trying to find folks who interviewed you later in the day at the “smokers.” Many a job has been secured with an extra effort at finding and conversing with folks where you effectively get a second interview to only one for your competitors. Of course, don’t make a pest out of yourself. Look sheepish as you approach them, and ask if it is OK to continue the conversation that was begun earlier. Many departments make finding them at the smoker easy by reserving a table in the large hall where these events occur. When you enter the hall the APA will provide a list of the numbered tables that have been reserved by various departments. When departments have reserved a table they are signaling in part that they are encouraging candidates to stop by for a chat after the interview, so you should plan on coming by.

11. APRES CONVENTION

After the convention go back home and prepare a campus job talk. Better yet, you should have had such a talk already planned out in October. In any event, you should not delay doing this since you might get a call only a few days after the meetings asking you to fly out for a campus visit. Almost everyone wants either a formal or informal paper, and you should get one ready right away just in case. It is also a good idea to go over the convention with your placement director or mentor and see if follow-up emails might be warranted. Also try to set up a mock job talk—round up your friends and stray faculty members and make them sit down for an hour with you while you do a dress rehearsal.

If you get a job offer and still haven't heard from a school you prefer, call them up. Nothing is lost here. If they don't want you, and they have any manners at all, then they'll let you down gently. But the worst thing is if they do want you but are merely being slow and you don't give them enough notice about a deadline for another job.

12. LATE BREAKING JOBS AND PERSISTENCE

Keep yourself open to the possibility that nothing will happen as a result of the first round of job interviews. Keep sending out applications until you are sure you'll be employed. This is psychologically hard to do, but it is necessary. Many of our students have gotten jobs in the second or third round, after the competition has diminished a bit. Those jobs are no less desirable, often, than those that interview at the Eastern. And always remember, you don't have to stay in the same position forever.

As was briefly mentioned above, some jobs that are advertised in the fall, and comparatively more advertised in the spring, are not tenure-track but limited term appointments for a year or more. These jobs can be important stepping-stones to a good tenure-track job. While many if not most of these limited term positions are for sabbatical replacements and so not renewable, some can become gateways for permanent positions at the same institution. In addition, having letters of reference from members of a department who have gotten to know you as a colleague, rather than as a grad student, can be very valuable in helping you to land a tenure-track job.

It is also increasingly common for departments to advertise full time postdoctoral fellowships of one to three years. You might even consider looking for and taking one of these positions rather than initially seeking a tenure-track job. Most postdocs do not teach full loads and will allow you to build a strong record of publications. Helpful hint: Many postdoctoral positions are not advertised in *Jobs for Philosophers* when they are part of a college or university's on-going "society of fellows" program or part of an established research center. Those interested in such positions should consult the job listings in the *Chronicle of Higher Education* and individual university websites.

13. PROBLEMS

If problems (of harassment, intimidation, or general annoyance) occur, talk to the APA staff or to the ombudsperson for the meetings, normally a friendly member of the very APA committee that wrote this brochure, and hence someone who cares about you. It is simply unacceptable for any job candidate to be made to feel uncomfortable because of comments about physical appearance, and certainly about sex or race. There is no reason not to complain, and the members of our committee who attend every APA meeting will not treat such complaints lightly.

If you are disabled, your right to full access in every aspect of the placement process *ought* to be extended without question or repercussion, just as you should be able freely to disclose your disability status. The APA is now beginning to address these problems, as are many institutions. In the meantime, candidates must not hesitate to request necessary accommodations, yet still have to strategize about disclosure or access requests. At the campus visit stage, wheelchair-accessible spaces cannot be assumed, yet are probably one of the simpler accommodations for most institutions, which may not be prepared to provide interpreter services or assume the travel costs of assistants. Candidates should carefully think through how they will negotiate these issues. Currently, the APA will provide a quiet interview room for candidates or interviewers for whom the large common interviewing area is inaccessible for reasons of disability such as, but not limited to, deafness, hearing impairment, cognitive impairments, or speech impairments. Contact the placement service if you need this provision. Additional concerns related to access or ableist bias in the placement process may be taken up with the placement ombudsperson through the APA placement service.

PAPER SUBMISSION GUIDELINES

Anonymous Review: Papers in any area are welcome. All papers are anonymously reviewed. Author's name, institution, or references pertaining to the identity of the author must be removed from the paper, abstract, notes, and bibliography. Papers containing such identifying references may be rejected. Submitted papers are not returned to authors. Papers not accepted by one Division may be re-submitted for consideration to another Division. In submitting papers, authors warrant that those papers are entirely their own work or the joint work of the authors identified in the cover letter, and that, where appropriate, acknowledgement of the contributions of others has been made.

Graduate Student Travel Stipends and Awards: Verification of graduate student status must be submitted according to the divisional guidelines.

Submission via the online paper submission system is preferred. The Pacific Division only accepts submissions via the online system. Mailed submissions for Eastern and Central divisions may be sent to:

Mike Morris
ATTN: [Eastern or Central] Division Papers
The American Philosophical Association
University of Delaware
Newark, DE 19716
(302) 831-2012

NOTE: Authors of *accepted* papers will be asked to submit a copy of their abstract by email to the National Office.

CENTRAL DIVISION:

Meeting is usually held in February or March.

Selections are announced in September, or before when possible.

Papers exceeding 3,000 words will not be considered as colloquium papers. Abstracts for colloquium papers must not exceed a length of 150 words.

Submissions for consideration as symposium papers must not exceed a length of 5,000 words. Abstracts for symposium papers must not exceed a length of 300 words. Authors should be aware that only a few papers are selected for presentation as symposium papers. If authors wish to have a shortened version of their paper considered as a colloquium paper, they should submit the appropriately shortened version, along with a shortened abstract, simultaneously with the submission of the symposium paper.

The Central Division will not include a paper on its meeting program if that paper (1) has already been presented or is scheduled for presentation on the Main Program of another APA Divisional meeting or (2) has been accepted for publication and will have actually been published prior to the Central Division meeting in question. If a paper is accepted for presentation and the Program Committee subsequently learns that it will have been published prior to the meeting, then that paper will be withdrawn from the meeting program.

EASTERN DIVISION:

Meeting has generally been held December 27–30; will change to January beginning in 2015.

Selections are announced in May or June.

Papers accepted by either the Central Division or the Pacific Division may not be presented at any subsequent meeting of the Eastern Division. Any paper which is under consideration for publication elsewhere will be considered, provided that it will not appear in print until after the Divisional meeting is held. If this is the case, indicate when and where the paper is expected to be published.

Papers exceeding 3,000 words will not be considered as colloquium papers. Abstracts for colloquium papers must not exceed 150 words.

Submissions for consideration as symposium papers must not exceed a length of 5,000 words. Abstracts for symposium papers must not exceed a length of 300 words. Authors should be aware that only a few papers are selected for presentation as symposium papers. If authors wish to have a shortened version of their paper considered as a colloquium paper, they should submit the appropriately shortened version, along with a shortened abstract, simultaneously with the submission of the symposium paper.

Any paper submitted without an abstract will not be considered. Any paper whose abstract is deemed unacceptable by the Program Committee will not be accepted. No revised abstract submitted after the paper's acceptance will be published in the *Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association* without the approval of the Program Committee.

PACIFIC DIVISION:

Papers and posters in any area are welcome. All papers and posters are reviewed anonymously.

Important Notices

The Pacific Division only accepts online submissions made through the APA submission website. *Submissions by post and by email are not accepted.*

The Pacific Division now invites submissions for poster presentations.

Important Dates

Deadline for membership dues and new applications (dues payments from members who still owe dues for the current fiscal year and membership applications from new applicants who are joining the APA for the first time): August 13

Deadline for submissions: September 1

Deadline for receipt of proof of graduate student status (for travel stipends): September 1

Submission Eligibility

1. Authors (and all co-authors) must be members in good standing of the APA at the time of submission.
2. Each member may be the author (or co-author) of one paper or poster. (If Jones and Smith co-author a paper, neither is eligible to submit a second item.)
3. Any paper or poster which is under consideration for publication elsewhere will be considered, provided that it will not appear in print until after the Divisional meeting is held. If this is the case, indicate when and where the paper or poster is expected to be published.
4. A paper or poster that has been on the Main Program at a past APA meeting (any division), or will be on the Main Program at a future Central or Eastern Division meeting, cannot be presented as a Main Program colloquium or symposium paper or poster at the Pacific Division meeting. However, papers not accepted by another Division may be submitted for consideration by the Pacific Division.
5. No one who is scheduled to appear in an invited session on the Main Program of a meeting may also present a submitted paper or poster as part of that same Main Program. Members who have already agreed to participate in invited sessions on the Main Program of a meeting are asked not to submit papers or posters for that same meeting. Please note that this does not apply to sessions organized by APA Committees or by affiliated groups.

Preparation for Anonymous Review

6. Submissions must be prepared for anonymous review. The author's (and any co-author's) name, institution, and references pertaining to the identity of the author must be removed from the paper, abstract(s), notes, and bibliography. Papers containing identifying references may be rejected.

Submission Process

7. All submissions must include an abstract of not more than 150 words. Those submitting posters also provide a long abstract of not more than 750 words (the poster itself is not submitted). Colloquium papers must not exceed 3,000 words. Symposium papers must not exceed 5,000 words. Authors should be aware that only a few papers are selected for presentation as symposium papers. If authors wish to have a shortened version of their paper considered as a colloquium paper, they should
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submit the appropriately shortened version simultaneously with the submission of the symposium paper. (This will be considered a single submission.)

8. The Pacific Division only considers submissions made through the APA website. Postal submissions are not longer accepted. Submissions are not accepted by email.

Graduate Student Travel Stipends

9. A stipend of \$300 will be awarded to any graduate student whose paper or poster is accepted by the Program Committee in its normal, anonymous review process.
10. Eligibility is restricted to APA members or associate members who are graduate students in residence and in good standing at a M.A. or Ph.D. program in philosophy. It is the author's responsibility to ensure that a letter verifying that author of the paper or poster is a student in residence is provided to the APA. The letter must be formatted on departmental stationery and signed by the department chair or graduate advisor. It must be uploaded at the time of submission. If appropriate verification documentation is not supplied by the deadline, the submission will not be considered for a Travel Stipend.
11. Co-authored papers and posters are not eligible for Graduate Student Travel Stipends unless all authors are graduate students.

Authors' Warrants and Permissions

12. In submitting papers or posters, authors warrant that their submissions are entirely their own work or the joint work of the named co-authors, and that, where appropriate, acknowledgement of the contributions of others has been made.
 13. In submitting a paper or poster, its authors grant to the American Philosophical Association the nonexclusive worldwide right to publish the abstract of the paper or poster in the *Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association* and on the APA and Pacific Division websites, in the event that the paper is accepted. Its authors also grant to the American Philosophical Association the nonexclusive worldwide right to post a preprint of the paper, in the form in which it was submitted, on the Pacific Division website, for up to four months prior to the meeting for which the paper is accepted. (The Division will not publish a preprint provided that the authors so notify the Pacific Division in writing at the time the paper is accepted.)
 14. Authors agree to provide accurate email addresses as part of their contact information and must notify the Pacific Division of any address changes that may occur between the time of submission and the meeting.
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DRAFT MINUTES OF THE 2012 CENTRAL DIVISION BUSINESS MEETING

AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL ASSOCIATION
CENTRAL DIVISION
DRAFT MINUTES: 2012 BUSINESS MEETING

PALMER HOUSE HILTON HOTEL, CHICAGO, IL
WABASH PARLOR
FRIDAY, FEBRUARY 18, 2012

1. CALL TO ORDER. President Peter Railton called the meeting to order at 12:21 p.m. and appointed Robert Audi parliamentarian for the meeting.
 2. APPROVAL OF MINUTES. The draft minutes of the 2011 meeting, as printed in *Proceedings and Addresses of the APA*, Vol. 85 #3 (January 2012), pp. 161–164, were approved without correction.
 3. REPORT ON THE 2012 EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE MEETING. Secretary-Treasurer Robin Smith reported on the actions of the 2011 executive committee [see the draft minutes of the 2011 executive committee meeting published immediately following these minutes.]
 4. REPORT OF THE NOMINATING COMMITTEE. Past President Claudia Card presented the report of the 2011–2012 nominating committee, as printed in *Proceedings and Addresses of the APA*, Vol. 85 #3 (January 2012), pp. 171–172. President Railton noted that the division’s bylaws allow additional nominations to be added from the floor by any group of ten members present and asked if there were such nominations forthcoming. None were proposed. The list of nominees as prepared by the nominating committee is therefore to be sent to mail ballot.
 5. REPORTS FROM THE BOARD OF OFFICERS, THE NATIONAL OFFICE, AND APA COMMITTEES. Executive Director David Schrader gave both his own report as executive director and a report from the board of officers.
 6. RECOGNITION OF GRADUATE STUDENT TRAVEL STIPEND WINNERS. President Railton read the names of those who had received graduate student travel stipend awards, as printed on pages 6–8 of the *Proceedings and Addresses of the APA*, Vol. 85 #3 (January 2012).
 7. MEMORIAL. President Railton read the names of those members of the association who had died since the last meeting of the Central Division:
 1. Todd Bates
 2. Salvator Cannavo
 3. Helene Dwyer
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4. Lucius R. Eastman Jr.
 5. James W. Ellington
 6. Bernard Gert
 7. Jean Gabbert Harrell
 8. Harmon R. Holcomb III
 9. John Lewellyn King
 10. John Ladd
 11. Sue Larson
 12. Thelma Lavine
 13. Edward J. Machle
 14. Gareth Matthews
 15. Ernan McMullin (Central Division President 1983–84)
 16. Irving Panush
 17. Alan Pasch (Eastern Division secretary-treasurer 1965–69; first executive secretary of the APA [now called executive director] 1969–72.)
 18. Alan Paskow
 19. Robert J. Rafalko
 20. Richard Robin
 21. Claudia Schmidt
 22. Samuel Schneider
 23. Barbara C. Scholz
 24. Oswald Schrag
 25. Kenneth Stern
 26. R. Duane Thompson
 27. William Tolhurst
8. ADJOURNMENT. The meeting was adjourned at 1:25 p.m.

Respectfully submitted,
Robin Smith, Secretary-Treasurer
APA Central Division

MINUTES OF THE 2012 CENTRAL DIVISION EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE MEETING

AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL ASSOCIATION
CENTRAL DIVISION
DRAFT MINUTES OF THE 2012 EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE MEETING

CRESTHILL ROOM, PALMER HOUSE HILTON HOTEL
CHICAGO, IL
WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 16, 2012

Present: Margaret Atherton, Claudia Card, Julia Driver, Lynn Joy, Peter Railton, Marya Schechtman, Robin Smith, and Valerie Tiberius.

1. President Peter Railton called the meeting to order at 7:01 p.m.
2. Draft minutes of the 2011 meeting, as printed on pp. 167–169 of issue 85:3 (January 2012) of the *Proceedings of the APA*, were approved as printed.
3. The agenda for the meeting was approved.
4. Past President Claudia Card presented the report of the nominating committee, as follows:

For Vice-President and President-Elect:

Noel Carroll (The Graduate Center, CUNY)

Robert Cummins (University of Illinois–Urbana-Champaign)

Steven Nadler (University of Wisconsin–Madison)

For Member-at-Large of the Executive Committee, term 2012–2015:

Kate Abramson (Indiana University–Bloomington)

Clare Horisk (University of Missouri–Columbia)

Nick Huggett (University of Illinois–Chicago)

For Divisional Representative:

Lisa Downing (Ohio State University)

Paula Gottlieb (University of Wisconsin–Madison)

Anthony Laden (University of Illinois–Chicago)

For the 2012–2013 Nominating Committee (four to be elected):

Berit Brogaard (University of Missouri–St. Louis)

Charlotte Brown (Illinois Wesleyan University)

Jennifer Lackey (Northwestern University)

Constance Meinwald (University of Illinois–Chicago)

- Frederick Rauscher (University of Illinois–Chicago)
 Naomi Scheman (University of Minnesota–Twin Cities)
 Timothy Schroeder (Ohio State University)
 Deborah Tollefsen (University of Memphis)
5. Secretary-Treasurer Robin Smith reported on the activities of the 2013 Program Committee, noting that it was in the process of completing the invited program. The members of the committee are:
 Anne Jaap Jacobson (University of Houston), *Chair*
 Dominic Bailey (University of Colorado–Boulder)
 Istvan Berkeley (University of Louisiana–Lafayette)
 John Bickle (Mississippi State University)
 Joshua Brown (University of Houston)
 Stephen Daniel (Texas A&M University)
 Peggy DesAutels (University of Dayton)
 Anton Ford (University of Chicago)
 Hilde Lindemann (Michigan State University)
 John McClendon (Michigan State University)
 Nico Orlandi (Rice University)
 Janine Schroer (University of Minnesota–Duluth)
 Robin Smith (Texas A&M University), *ex officio*
6. The executive committee approved the application of the Society for the Philosophy of Judaism for affiliation with the Central Division. In accordance with standing policy, this application had been given tentative approval earlier by the secretary-treasurer, subject to review by the executive committee.
7. Secretary-Treasurer Smith reported that no actions had been taken by the executive committee since the last annual meeting.
8. The executive committee authorized the secretary-treasurer to discuss with the APA national office the transfer of funds held in the Central Division’s checking and investment accounts to the custody of the national office in order to facilitate more transparent accounting. Funds so transferred will remain under the control of the Central Division, as required by APA bylaws.
9. The executive committee approved increased rates of registration, to take effect at the 2013 meeting, as follows:

	Advance:	On-site:
Regular Members	\$80	\$100
Student Associates	\$25	\$35
Non-Members	\$120	\$150

These rates are identical to the rates approved by the Eastern Division effective for its 2012 annual meeting.

10. Secretary-Treasurer Smith reported on advertising revenue among the three divisions, noting that the Central Division was allocated a total of \$18,087, designated to defray the following expenses:

Program Committee meeting	\$5,987
Audiovisual expenses	\$10,000
Graduate Travel Stipends	\$2,100

11. The secretary-treasurer also noted that precipitous declines in advertising revenue for all three divisional meetings imply that this source of funding will become insufficient for current expense levels in the near future. The executive committee discussed how to deal with the anticipated loss of funding. Briefly, the major issues are increasing graduate student travel stipends (because of the current policy of awarding a stipend to every student associate whose paper is accepted for presentation on the main program and the rapidly increasing number of such members, these have grown to \$10,200 for 2012) and audiovisual charges (estimated at a total of \$24,000 for the 2012 meeting). The increased registration charges previously approved are estimated to net \$10,000–\$20,000 in additional revenue in 2013, which may be insufficient. The executive committee adopted the following resolution, to be circulated to all members:

“The executive committee of the Central Division will endeavor to continue providing a \$300 graduate student travel stipend for every student associate member whose paper is accepted for presentation on the annual meeting program. However, unless additional revenues can be secured or costs reduced, it cannot guarantee that this will be possible for the future. The executive committee is currently exploring measures to supplement funding and make savings in order to maintain our past practice, and it welcomes any suggestions from members about how to address this situation.”

In view of the high cost of audiovisual support, the executive committee instructed the secretary-treasurer to draft an email message, to be circulated to members of the division and all participants in the 2013 main program, explaining the problem of high audiovisual costs and announcing tightened procedures on providing such equipment for main program sessions, including an earlier deadline for request for data projectors in particular, a strict requirement that on-site requests will not be honored unless the participants pay the costs, and other measures as might be necessary.

12. Valerie Tiberius moved that the executive committee adopt a statement on program diversity similar to that adopted by the Pacific Division. After discussion, the executive committee adopted the following statement:

“It is the policy of the APA Central Division that its programs and the membership of its committees reflect the broad diversity of the profession. The executive committee is undertaking to develop appropriate procedures for assessing, encouraging, and sustaining

diversity in the annual meeting programs, and it welcomes suggestions from the membership concerning means of achieving this goal.”

In addition, President Railton appointed an *ad hoc* committee consisting of himself, Valerie Tiberius, and Marya Schechtman to explore measures for evaluating and increasing diversity and to report their results to the 2013 executive committee meeting.

13. The executive committee approved the agenda for the 2012 business meeting.
14. The meeting adjourned at 9:00 p.m.

Respectfully submitted,

Robin Smith

Secretary-Treasurer, APA Central Division

REPORT OF THE 2012–2013 NOMINATING COMMITTEE

The 2012–2013 Central Division nominating committee, composed of Peter Railton (Chair), Berit Brogaard, Charlotte Brown, Jennifer Lackey, and Constance Meinwald, proposes the following nominations for 2013:

FOR VICE-PRESIDENT AND PRESIDENT-ELECT:

Elizabeth Anderson (University of Michigan–Ann Arbor)
Charles Mills (Northwestern University)
Joan Weiner (Indiana University–Bloomington)

FOR EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE MEMBER-AT-LARGE, TERM 2013–2016:

Peggy DesAutels (University of Dayton)
Carl Gillett (Northern Illinois University)
Jeanine Grenberg (St. Olaf College)

FOR THE 2013–2014 NOMINATING COMMITTEE (FOUR TO BE ELECTED):

Sarah Buss (University of Michigan–Ann Arbor)
John Doris (Washington University in St. Louis)
Sebastian Luft (Marquette University)
Matthew McGrath (University of Missouri–Columbia)
Michael Rea (University of Notre Dame)
Kieran Setiya (University of Pittsburgh)
David Sosa (University of Texas–Austin)
Christina van Dyke (Calvin College)

FOR SECRETARY-TREASURER, TERM 2013–2016

Robin Smith (Texas A&M University emeritus)

“Upon receipt of the report of the nominating committee, additional nominations for the next year’s nominating committee, for officers, and members of the executive committee, may be made from the floor by any ten members of the Association affiliated with the Central Division. Before ballots are prepared, the individuals nominated shall be invited by mail to signify their willingness to stand for election. No name shall appear on a ballot unless the individual named has filed a signed statement of willingness to stand for election.”

RESULTS OF THE 2012 APA CENTRAL DIVISION ELECTIONS

In the May–June 2012 Central Division elections:

- Steven Nadler was elected vice president for 2012–2013 (and thus president for 2013–2014).
 - Paula Gottlieb was elected divisional representative for the term 2012–2015.
 - Nick Huggett was elected member at large of the executive committee for the term 2012–2015.
 - Berit Brogaard, Charlotte Brown, Jennifer Lackey, and Constance Meinwald were elected to the 2012–2013 nominating committee.
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LIST OF ADVERTISERS

DUKE UNIVERSITY PRESS (A-155)

MCGILL-QUEEN'S UNIVERSITY PRESS (A-171)

OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS (A-156-157)

PERSEUS BOOKS GROUP (A-151)

PHILOSOPHER'S INFORMATION CENTER (A-INSIDE BACK COVER)

PHILOSOPHY DOCUMENTATION CENTER (A-INSIDE FRONT COVER)

ROUTLEDGE (A-152-153)

STANFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS (A-149)

SUNY PRESS (A-INSIDE FRONT COVER)

TEMPLE UNIVERSITY PRESS (A-150)

TESS O'DWYER ARTS MANAGEMENT (A-154)

FORMS

ADVANCE REGISTRATION FORM

HOTEL RESERVATION INFORMATION

RECEPTION TABLE REQUEST FORM

PLACEMENT SERVICE REGISTRATION FORM

PROGRAM SUGGESTION FORM

Please note: Advance registration and placement service registration can also be performed online at www.apaonline.org.



2013 CENTRAL DIVISION MEETING

**February 20-23, The Hilton New Orleans Riverside
New Orleans, Louisiana**

ADVANCE REGISTRATION FORM

Please read this form carefully, as the registration process has changed.

To register online, please go to our website: www.apaonline.org

To register by fax, please send this form with your credit card payment to (302) 831-3372. No cover sheet is needed.

To register by mail, please mail this form to Melissa Milburn, 31 Amstel Avenue, Newark, DE 19716-4797.

The deadline for advance online registration is February 19, 2013, at 11:59 p.m.

The deadline for advance registrations mailed or faxed to the APA National Office is January 23, 2013.

After these deadlines, you will need to either register on site at the Central Division Meeting or at www.apaonline.org at the higher rate of \$35 for students, \$100 for members, and \$150 for non-members.

WE CANNOT ACCEPT REGISTRATION FORMS BY EMAIL.

REGISTRATION INFORMATION

Please print legibly. This information is used for your meeting name badge.

Name: _____

School/Organization: _____

Date of birth: ____/____/____ Phone Number: _____

ADVANCE REGISTRATION RATES

This form must be received by January 23, 2012 to receive advance rates.

- \$25 — APA Student Members
 \$80 — APA Regular, International, and Emeritus Members
 \$120 — Non-members

PLACEMENT REGISTRATION

Placement is available to APA members only.

- Check this box if you will be a job candidate and wish to register for the placement service.

PAYMENT METHOD

- Check (payable to APA) *The APA can only accept checks drawn on a U.S. bank, in U.S. dollars.*
 Visa
 Mastercard

Last 3 digits on back of card Exp. Date

- - -

Name as it appears on card: _____

Signature of Authorization: _____

Email address (for receipt): _____

Please print legibly.



2013 CENTRAL DIVISION MEETING

**February 20-23, The Hilton New Orleans Riverside
New Orleans, Louisiana**

HOTEL RESERVATION INFORMATION

The American Philosophical Association Central Division Meeting will be held February 20–23, 2013, in New Orleans, Louisiana. The meeting location is as follows:

**The Hilton New Orleans Riverside
Two Poydras Street
New Orleans, LA 70130
Phone Number: (504) 561-0500**

The room rate for regular members and nonmembers is \$199.00 per night. The student room rate is \$169.00 per night. Rooms are available on a first-come, first-served basis and subject to availability. **Reservations must be made by January 21 to be assured the APA rate.**

Please note that student room reservations will be verified to confirm student status. If the person making the reservation is not a student member they will be charged the regular and nonmember rate.

The tax rate for the Hilton New Orleans Riverside is 13%. There is also a \$2.00 occupancy tax and a \$1.00 city tax. Check-in time is 3:00 PM and check-out time is 12 noon.

Please be sure to let the hotel know if you are physically challenged and will need special accommodations.

The Hilton New Orleans Riverside prefers reservations be made online at the following URL:

<http://bit.ly/apa2013centralhotel>

From this URL you will be able to select your member type (regular/nonmembers or student) and register for the hotel room at the appropriate rate.

If you are unable to reserve online, please call the hotel at (504) 561-0500.



2013 CENTRAL DIVISION MEETING

**February 20-23, The Hilton New Orleans Riverside
New Orleans, Louisiana**

RECEPTION TABLE REGISTRATION FORM

Register for a reception table by fax: Fax this form with your credit card payment information to Melissa Milburn at (302) 831-3372. No cover sheet is needed.

Register for a reception table by mail: Mail this form with your payment to Melissa Milburn, APA, University of Delaware, Newark, DE 19716.

***ALL TABLE RESERVATIONS MUST BE PAID FOR AT THE TIME OF PLACING THE RESERVATION.
REGISTRATION FORMS RECEIVED WITHOUT PAYMENT WILL NOT BE PROCESSED.***

Receptions are scheduled to be held on Thursday, February 21 (8:30 PM to 12 midnight) and on Friday, February 22 (9:00 PM to 12 midnight). The first night reception provides beer and soft drinks at no charge. Admittance is by registration name badge or ticket only. The second night reception is a cash bar. The charge for a table at both receptions is \$25.00 total. The deadline for receipt of reservations is January 28, 2013. Registrations received after that date will be processed (space allowing) but the institution's name will not appear in the reception program.

WE CANNOT ACCEPT REGISTRATION FORMS BY EMAIL.

REGISTRATION INFORMATION

Please print legibly.

Name: _____

School/Organization: _____

Email Address: _____

PAYMENT METHOD

Check (payable to APA)

The APA can only accept checks drawn on a U.S. bank, in U.S. dollars.

Visa

Mastercard

Last 3 digits on back of card

Exp. Date

 - - -

Name as it appears on card: _____

Signature of Authorization: _____

Email address (for receipt): _____

Please print legibly.

Placement Service Registration for Interviewing Departments

APA 2013 Central Division Meeting

Hilton New Orleans Riverside, New Orleans, LA - February 20-23, 2013

Only one form is required for each interviewing department. Once completed, this can be faxed to (302) 831-8690.

Institution: _____ Department: _____

Contact: _____ Phone: _____

Address: _____

City, State, Zip Code: _____ Email: _____

All persons conducting interviews should be registered** for the Central Division Meeting as well as the department being registered with the Placement Service.

**Registered members of the department who will be conducting interviews:

Our department will (check one):

- need interviewing table(s) Quantity of Tables _____
- conduct interviews in a hotel suite (contact Linda Smallbrook at the National Office to reserve a suite)

Our department will (check one):

- provide suite number and list of prearranged candidates to whom suite information may be given
- bring suite number and allow service to give to anyone who requests it

Our department will (check one):

- conduct prearranged interviews only
- accept interview requests on-site

If appropriate, please list the dates this job was advertised in *JFP*: _____

- Registration fees (check one): Pre-registration, by February 1: \$50.00
 Regular registration, after February 1: \$75.00

Credit card type: (check one) VISA MASTERCARD

Credit card #: _____

Exp. date: ____ / ____ Last three digits on back of card: _____

Name on card: _____ Phone: _____

Billing street address: _____

Signature: _____ Email: _____

***Check #: _____ Check date: _____ Check amount _____

***Payable to: The American Philosophical Association. The APA only accepts checks drawn on U.S. banks in U.S. funds, or Int'l. Money Orders in U.S. funds. There is a \$10 charge for all returned checks. **If PAYMENT is not received in our office by February 1, 2012 you MUST pay the on-site fee! Please mail form and payment to: Attn: Mike Morris, Placement, The American Philosophical Association, 31 Amstel Avenue, University of Delaware, Newark, DE 19716.

APA CENTRAL DIVISION PROGRAM SUGGESTION FORM

In order to foster diversity of and participation in the program of the Central Division, the executive committee invites submission of the following form:

(1) I would like to hear papers at the divisional meetings in the following areas:

(2) I would like to be considered as a session chair for papers in one of the following areas:

(3) I would like to be considered as a paper commentator for papers in one of the following areas:

To be considered as commentator or chair for the 2014 meeting, please submit this form, along with a CV, by August 1, 2013, to:

Eric Brown, Chair
2014 APA Central Program Committee
Philosophy Department
Washington University
Campus Box 1073
St. Louis, MO 63130-4899
eabrown@wustl.edu

This form may be reproduced, and suggestions under (1) may be sent to Professor Brown or to:

Robin Smith, Secretary-Treasurer
APA Central Division
50 Arroyo Road
Jemez Springs, NM 87025
rasmith@apacentral.org

If you would like acknowledgement of receipt of your CV and form, please enclose a stamped, self-addressed postcard.

APA REGISTRATION POLICY

It is the policy of the APA that all persons attending sessions, including those who are participating as speakers, commentators or session chairs, are required to register for each meeting they attend. In addition, we have always recommended that all participants wear their APA badges during session hours to identify themselves as registered participants. In an effort better to enforce this policy we have begun a system of checking meeting attendees, both at random and if we suspect an attendee may not be registered, for proof of registration. If you are asked to provide proof of registration and are unable to do so, you will be asked to register immediately in order to attend sessions. Registration fees help subsidize every divisional meeting. Without that income we will be unable to ensure the quality and excellence of our meetings which you have come to expect. We thank you for your continued cooperation.

HOTEL DIAGRAMS



