Proceedings and Addresses of The American Philosophical Association

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Each annual volume contains the programs for the meetings of the three Divisions; the membership list; Presidential Addresses; news of the Association, its Divisions and Committees, and announcements of interest to philosophers. Other items of interest to the community of philosophers may be included by decision of the Editor or the APA Board of Officers.

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All correspondence should be sent to the APA, 31 Amstel Avenue, University of Delaware, Newark, DE 19716, directed to the appropriate staff member as follows: Erin Shepherd for inquiries and publication copy concerning programs of the Divisional meetings, general issues of the Proceedings, announcements, awards to members, and advertising; Janet Sample for membership information, address changes, and memorial minutes; and the Executive Director for letters to the editor.

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LETTER FROM THE SECRETARY-TREASURER

To All Members of the Association:

You are cordially invited to attend the One Hundred Eighth Annual Meeting of the Central Division at the Minneapolis Hilton Hotel, March 30-April 2, 2011. This year’s program committee has organized an extensive array of thirty-three Colloquia, three submitted Symposia, twenty-six invited Symposia, and twelve Author-Meets-Critics sessions. Our program also includes thirteen sessions organized by Committees of the APA and over fifty-five affiliated group sessions. In addition, the Central Division is host to the 2011 Romanell Lecture (given by Jaegwon Kim), and our John Dewey Lecturer is Bernard Boxill.

This issue of the Proceedings contains a complete convention program, including scheduled group meetings. At the back of this issue, you will find a meeting registration form, a form for reserving tables at the receptions, and maps of the hotel’s location and meeting rooms. Also included are information forms concerning the 2012 meeting and the 2011-2012 Nominating Committee, for your use if you have suggestions for future meetings or wish to offer your services to the Division.

1. HOTEL INFORMATION

The Hilton Minneapolis Hotel is at 1001 Marquette Avenue South, Minneapolis, MN 55403. For more information on the hotel, see its web site at http://www.minneapolis.hilton.com/.

Hotel reservations should be made directly with the hotel either through the Internet or by telephone (the Hilton Minneapolis, like most hotels today, prefers not to receive reservation requests by mail or fax). To reserve through the Internet, go to the Minneapolis Hilton’s web site (http://www.minneapolis.hilton.com/) and enter your dates in the “Check availability” block. Then, enter either “PHI” (for regular rates) or “PHS” (for the student rates) in the Group/Convention Code field. Please note that the hotel will ask the APA National Office to confirm that those requesting the student rate are APA Student Associate members. To reserve by telephone, call the Minneapolis Hilton reservations department at +1-888-933-5363, explain that you are attending the American Philosophical Association 2011 Central Division meeting, and give the appropriate group code as above.

To be assured of a room at the special convention rate, you should act promptly. Our convention block of rooms will be maintained by the hotel only until March 1, 2011. After that time, any unused rooms in the block
will be released to other guests, and convention registrants may be unable to obtain the special rates or appropriate rooms.

**Arriving by air:** Most major airlines fly to Minneapolis-St. Paul International airport (MSP). For information concerning the airport, see [http://www.mspairport.com/](http://www.mspairport.com/). The airport is 16 miles from downtown Minneapolis. The most economical form of **ground transportation** to the hotel is Minneapolis Light Rail (fare $1.75). Trains run every 7-8 minutes during peak hours and usually every 10-15 minutes at other times (between 10:30 p.m. and 5:00 a.m., service is less frequent). There are Light Rail stops in Terminal 1-Lindbergh and Terminal 2-Humphrey. In Terminal 1, go to the Tram Level (one level below baggage claim) and take the Tram to the Transit Center. When you exit the Tram, follow the signs for the Light Rail Station. In Terminal 2, take the Skyway from Level 2 to the parking facility and then go down one level by escalator or elevator to the Light Rail station platform, on the north side of the MSP Value Parking ramp. To reach the hotel, take the train to Nicollet Mall Station. The hotel is approximately six blocks southwest on Marquette (Marquette is one block southeast of Nicollet Mall). **Taxi fare** is $25-$35. Various **shuttle services** have ticket counters in the Ground Transportation Atrium, one floor up from the Tram Level (Level T) in Terminal 1-Lindbergh. **Shared-ride service** is available through [SuperShuttle](http://www.supershuttle.com, telephone 612-827-7777) at rates beginning at $16. For further information on van and shuttle services, taxis, light rail, etc., see the MSP Ground Transportation page at [http://www.mspairport.com/GroundTransportation/](http://www.mspairport.com/GroundTransportation/) and the Minneapolis Metro transit page at [http://www.metrotransit.org/](http://www.metrotransit.org/).


**Arriving by train:** Consult [http://www.amtrak.com](http://www.amtrak.com) for schedules and fares.

### 2. Meeting Registration

**NOTE:** BEGINNING THIS ACADEMIC YEAR, ALL THE APA DIVISIONS HAVE ADOPTED HIGHER RATES FOR ON-SITE REGISTRATIONS. While advance rates are unchanged from last year, on-site registration is now subject to a $30 premium for non-student registrants and $5 premium for students. This is intended to encourage as many members as possible to register in advance, so as to alleviate the congestion at the meeting registration desk. Rates for registration are as follows:

- **Regular APA Members** $90 on-site $60 advance
- **Student APA Members** $15 on-site $10 advance
- **Non-APA Members** $120 on-site $90 advance

The Central Division rebates $10 of the Member’s and Non-Member’s fee to the APA National Office to support the general costs of the APA.
All remaining registration income is used to support the expenses of the meeting and the operations of the Central Division. You may pre-register for the meeting through the APA’s web site, http://www.apaonline.org/ (click “Conference Registration” in the left-side menu) or by using the pre-registration information form found at the back of this issue. The deadline for pre-registration is **March 7, 2011**.

Registration includes admission to the reception on Thursday evening; non-registrants who wish to attend this reception may purchase tickets at the Registration Desk, or at the door of the reception, for $10. **Please note that all persons attending the convention are expected to register (this includes invited participants and participants in the Group Meetings)**. Registration fees are vital to the conduct of APA conventions, since convention revenues are the only source of income for the Divisions.

### 3. Information on Session Locations

Following the procedure begun in all three Divisions in 2008-09, this printed program does not include the rooms in which individual meeting sessions are to be held. Instead, this information will be made available at the meeting itself, in a program supplement that will be distributed at the Registration Desk. The locations of the Registration Desk, Book Exhibits, Placement Service, Placement Interview Area, Presidential Address, and Receptions are, however, included in the program.

### 4. Placement Service

The Placement Center will open for business at 5:00 p.m. on Wednesday, March 30, and continue in operation through Noon, Saturday, April 2 (see the Program for specific times, and check the Meeting Registration Desk in the Red Wing Room on the third floor for information about the locations of Placement Center operations). Job seekers are urged to pre-register for Placement by submitting the pre-registration form provided at the back of this issue. Since many job interviews are pre-arranged on the basis of advertisements in *Jobs for Philosophers (JFP)*, and since the Placement Center will not post notices of positions that have already been advertised in *JFP*, job seekers are advised to obtain copies of *JFP* in advance of the meeting and to bring them to the meeting. (*JFP* is available to APA members upon request, at no extra charge. Requests should be addressed to the APA National Office, University of Delaware, Newark, DE 19716.)

**Policy on Interviews in Sleeping Rooms.** At its 1994 meeting the APA Board of Officers adopted the policy of prohibiting job interviews in sleeping rooms at Divisional meetings. We ask your cooperation in implementing this policy. Interviews in the living rooms of suites are, of course, permissible under this policy, and interviewing departments may also make use of the Placement Center interview area.

*A Placement Ombudsperson, either the Chair or a member of the APA Committee on Academic Career Opportunities and Placement, will be available in the Placement Service area for anyone encountering problems with the interviewing process.*
5. **BOOK EXHIBITS**

The publishers’ book exhibits will be located on the third floor in the Minneapolis Grand Ballroom, Salons A, B, and C. Exhibits will be open 9:00 a.m.-5:00 p.m. on Thursday and Friday and 9:00 a.m.-Noon on Saturday.

6. **RECEPTIONS AND RECEPTION TABLES**

The reception on Thursday, March 31, will begin at 8:30 p.m. in Salon D of the Minneapolis Grand Ballroom on the third floor. Complimentary beer and soft drinks are provided at this reception, which is open only to those who have either registered for the convention or purchased special tickets for the reception (available for $10 both at the registration desk and at the door of the reception). The Presidential Reception on Friday, April 1, will begin at 9:00 p.m. in the same location. Tickets are not required for admission to the Friday reception, and refreshments are available on a cash-bar basis.

Departments and societies are invited to reserve one of the large round tables at the Receptions. These tables will be numbered, and a chart will be posted and distributed at Registration giving the table locations along with an index showing, for each table, who has reserved it. The fee for reserving a table is $25. If you wish to reserve a table, please fill out and mail the form included in the back pages of this issue of the *Proceedings* or call or email Ms. Linda Smallbrook at the APA National Office (phone +1 302-831-1113, fax +1 302-831-3372, email lindas@udel.edu). The deadline for making table reservations is March 7, 2011.

7. **BUSINESS MEETING**

The annual Business Meeting of the Central Division will be held Friday, April 1, at 12:15 p.m. in the Minnesota Grand Ballroom, Salon D. Regular items of business include reports from Divisional and National officers and committees and the nomination of officers for 2011-2012. The 2010-2011 Nominating Committee will present a slate of nominees for the positions of Vice President, Member of the Executive Committee, and the four members of the 2011-2012 Nominating Committee. The Report of the Nominating Committee will be posted in the registration area 24 hours prior to the Business Meeting and is also printed on page 157 of this issue of the *Proceedings*. Nominations from the floor are also accepted if proposed by a group of ten members. In accordance with Divisional rules, voting for candidates will be by mail ballot.

Central Division affiliate members should note that proposed amendments to the Bylaws of the Central Division will be considered for adoption at this meeting. Under the current Bylaws of the Central Division, amendments to the Bylaws are adopted by vote at a Divisional Business Meeting. Please see the text of the proposed amendments, which would change this procedure, on pp. 161-163 of this issue of the *Proceedings of the APA*.
Please note that only APA members who are affiliates of the Central Division have voting rights at this meeting. The list of regular members that appears in the November 2010 issue of the *Proceedings* is used to determine the list of eligible voters for the three subsequent Divisional meetings. Certification of persons as voting affiliates of the Central Division will take place at the entrance to the Business Meeting itself, for those wishing to attend and vote.

The Minutes of the 2010 Executive Committee Meeting and draft minutes of the 2010 Business Meeting are published in this issue of the *Proceedings*, pp. 149-151.

8. **Presidential Address**

President Claudia Card will present the 2011 Presidential Address, “Surviving Long-Term Mass Atrocities: U-Boats, Catchers, and Ravens,” at 4:45 p.m. on Friday. She will be introduced by Peter Railton, Vice President of the Central Division.

9. **John Dewey Lecture**

The John Dewey Lectures, generously sponsored by the John Dewey Foundation, have been presented annually at each American Philosophical Association meeting since 2006. Each John Dewey Lecture is given by a prominent and senior American philosopher who is invited to reflect, broadly and in an autobiographical spirit, on philosophy in America. The Central Division is pleased to announce that the 2011 John Dewey Lecture will be given by Bernard Boxill on Thursday, March 31, at 2:20 p.m. (Session II-A). The lecture will be introduced by Bill E. Lawson. A reception, hosted by the John Dewey Foundation, will follow in the same room.

10. **Patrick J. Romanell Lecture**

The Central Division is host to the 2011 Patrick J. Romanell Lecture, entitled “Naturalism, Physicalism, and the Mind,” which will be given by Jaegwon Kim.

11. **Graduate Student Travel Stipend Recipients**

As in past years, the Central Division Executive Committee awards stipends of $300 each to help defray the travel expenses of graduate students whose papers are accepted for the program. Starting with the 2006 program, the Executive Committee has decided to provide a stipend for every graduate student whose paper is accepted. The Executive and Program Committees are pleased to announce the names of the seventeen recipients of stipends for this year:

- **Sean Aas** (Brown University): “Circularity and Normative Expressivism.” Paper 2 in Session IV-J, ‘Metaethics’ (Friday, 1:30 p.m.)

Mavis Biss (University of Wisconsin–Madison): “Perfect Duties to Oneself and Latitude of Choice: A Question of Morality or Prudence?” Paper 1 in Session III-I, ‘Kantian Ethics’ (Friday, 9:00 a.m.)

Ryan Byerly (Baylor University): “Evidentialism, Attitudinalism, and a Causal-Construal Account of the Supports Relation.” Paper 2 in Session II-I, ‘Epistemology’ (Thursday, 2:20 p.m.)

Nathan Carson (Baylor University): “Thick Ethical Concepts Still Cannot Be Disentangled: A Critical Response to Payne, Blomberg, and Blackburn.” Paper 1 in Session IV-J, ‘Metaethics’ (Friday, 1:30 p.m.)

Amandine Catala (University of Colorado–Boulder): “Self-Determination, Justice, and Flourishing: Reframing the Normative Question of Secession.” Paper 2 in Session III-H, ‘Social and Political Philosophy’ (Friday, 9:00 a.m.)

Caleb Cohoe (Princeton University): “Aristotle, Zeno, and Continuity.” Paper 2 in Session VI-I, ‘Ancient and Medieval Philosophy’ (Saturday, 2:15 p.m.)

Ezra J. Cook (Northwestern University): “Knowability and Singular Thought: De Re Knowledge and Semantic Ascent.” Paper 2 in Session III-J, ‘Probing Epistemic Possibility’ (Friday, 9:00 a.m.)


Victor Kumar (University of Arizona): “Empathy and Moral Know-How.” Paper 3 in Session V-J, ‘Moral Epistemology’ (Saturday, 9:00 a.m.)

Brian Mondy (University of Miami): “Why Inquiry Has (At Least) Two Aims.” Paper 1 in Session IV-K, ‘Epistemology’ (Friday, 1:30 p.m.)

Justin Remhof (University of Illinois–Urbana-Champaign): “Objects, Worldmaking, and Nihilism in Nietzsche.” Paper 2 in Session I-H, ‘Metaphysics’ (Thursday, 12:10 p.m.)

Jeffrey A. Snapper (University of Notre Dame): “Why the Vagueness Argument Is Unsound.” Paper 3 in Session III-G, ‘Ontology’ (Friday, 9:00 a.m.)

Steven Swartzer (University of Nebraska–Lincoln): “Unmanifested Desires Unmasked.” Paper 1 in Session III-L, ‘Moral Psychology’ (Friday, 9:00 a.m.)

Adam R. Thompson (University of Nebraska–Lincoln): “A Defense Against Quidditism.” Paper 1 in Session II-H, ‘Metaphysics’ (Thursday, 2:20 p.m.)

Patrick Todd (University of California–Riverside): “Soft Facts and Ontological Dependence.” Paper 2 in Session III-K, ‘Philosophy of Religion’ (Friday, 9:00 a.m.)

Elizabeth Victor (University of South Florida): “Self, Agency, and World: A Response to Korsgaard’s Self-Constitution.” Paper 2 in Session III-I, ‘Kantian Ethics’ (Friday, 9:00 a.m.)
12. 2012 Program Committee

The 2012 Program Committee invites contributions for the 2012 annual meeting, which will be held at the Palmer House Hilton in Chicago, February 15-18, 2012. Vice President Peter Railton has appointed the following Program Committee for this Meeting:

Sanford Goldberg (Northwestern University), Chair
James Bohman (St. Louis University)
James P. Butler (Berea College)
Janice L. Dowell (Bowling Green State University)
Ray Elugardo (University of Oklahoma)
Claire S. Horisk (University of Missouri)
Anja Jauernig (University of Notre Dame)
Diane Jeske (University of Iowa)
Jennifer Lackey (Northwestern University)
Amy M. Schmitter (University of New Mexico)
Robin Smith (Texas A&M University), ex officio
Anita Superson (University of Kentucky)
Michael Titelbaum (University of Wisconsin–Madison)
Andrea Westlund (University of Wisconsin–Milwaukee)

13. Call for Papers, 2012

The Program Committee for 2012 invites APA members to submit papers for presentation at the one hundred ninth annual meeting, to be held in Chicago, Illinois, at the Palmer House Hilton hotel, February 15-18, 2012. The deadline for submission for the 2012 meeting is June 1, 2011. For additional details on how and where to submit papers for consideration, please see the section on Paper Submission Guidelines later in this issue of the Proceedings.

14. Participation

APA members who wish to be considered as commentators or session chairs for the 2012 meeting should use the Program Information Form provided later in this issue of the Proceedings. The following resolution of the Central Division, adopted at the 1980 Business Meeting, will be of interest to prospective participants:

“The APA is the sole professional organization that serves and represents all American philosophers. To give better effect to the foregoing statement, the Executive Committee of the Central Division publicly affirms its desire that the composition of its officers, committees, and programs reflect the diversity of its membership in such respects as methodology, problem area, and type of employment or institutional affiliation.”
15. NOMINATIONS

The Central Division Executive Committee also invites suggestions from Central Division affiliates about appropriate candidates for Central Division offices. If you would like to propose anyone for consideration, please see the instructions in this issue of the Proceedings.

16. PROGRAM INFORMATION

The Program of the meeting, including the main sessions organized by the APA and group sessions organized by affiliated groups, forms part of this issue. Abstracts of invited and contributed papers are also included. A limited number of copies of the Program will also be available at registration. A world-wide-web version of the Program is also available at the APA's web site, http://apaonline.org/ (this site also includes pointers to additional sources of information on the Internet about the Minneapolis area). The web version may be updated periodically, as necessary, to incorporate late changes in the Program.

17. SPECIAL THANKS FROM THE SECRETARY-TREASURER

I wish to acknowledge with gratitude the generous support of the College of Liberal Arts of Texas A&M University for the Central Division office.

On behalf of the Executive and Program Committees, I extend to every member of The American Philosophical Association an invitation to take part in our One Hundred Eighth Annual Meeting.

Robin Smith
Secretary-Treasurer, APA Central Division
CENTRAL DIVISION COMMITTEES, 2010-2011

EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE, 2010-2011

President: Claudia Card
Vice President: Peter Railton
Past President: Sally Sedgwick
Divisional Representative: Julia Driver
Secretary-Treasurer: Robin Smith
Term 2008-2011: Russ Shafer-Landau
Term 2009-2012: Lynn Joy
Term 2010-2013: Marya Schechtman

PROGRAM COMMITTEE, 2011

Bill E. Lawson, Chair
Rod Bertolet
Stephan Blatti
David K. Chan
David R. Cunning
Howard Curzer
Kristie Dotson
Carla Fehr
Robert Gooding-Williams
Charles Mills
Georgette Sinkler
Robin Smith, ex officio
Peter B. M. Vranas

NOMINATING COMMITTEE, 2010-2011

Sally Sedgwick, Chair
Patricia Blanchette
Eric A. Brown
Sanford Goldberg
Russ Shafer-Landau
THE AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL ASSOCIATION

CENTRAL DIVISION
ONE HUNDRED EIGHTH
ANNUAL MEETING PROGRAM

MARCH 30- APRIL 2, 2011
MINNEAPOLIS HILTON HOTEL

WEDNESDAY AFTERNOON/EVENING, MARCH 30

REGISTRATION
5:00-10:00 p.m., Registration Area (Red Wing, third floor)

PLACEMENT SERVICE
5:00-9:00 p.m., Rochester (third floor)

EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE MEETING
7:00-10:00 p.m.

THURSDAY MORNING, MARCH 31

REGISTRATION
9:00 a.m.-5:00 p.m., Registration Area (Red Wing, third floor)

GROUP SESSIONS, THURSDAY MORNING
(see Group Meeting Program for details)

Session GI: 9:00 a.m.-12:00 p.m.
GI-1: American Society for Aesthetics
GI-2: American Society for Philosophy, Counseling, and Psychotherapy
GI-3: Society for the Philosophic Study of the Contemporary Visual Arts
GI-4: Philosophy of Time Society
GI-5: Society for the Study of the History of Analytical Philosophy
GI-6: Philosophy of Religion Group
GI-7: American Association of Philosophy Teachers
GI-8: International Society for Environmental Ethics
GI-9: Hume Society
GI-10: American Society for Value Inquiry
GI-11: Society for the Metaphysics of Science
GI-12: International Society of Chinese Philosophy
GI-13: Adam Smith Society

**Placement Interview Area**
8:00 a.m.-6:00 p.m., Rochester (third floor)

**Book Exhibits**
9:00 a.m.-5:00 p.m., Minneapolis Grand Ballroom-Salon A, B, and C (third floor)

**Thursday Afternoon/Evening, March 31**

**Session I - 12:10-2:10 p.m.**

**I-A. Invited Symposium: Roundtable on Pedagogical Challenges and Strategies around Issues of Race, Class, Gender, and Sexuality**
12:10-2:10 p.m.
Chair: Elizabeth Minnich (Association of American Colleges and Universities)
Speakers: Donna D. Marcano (Trinity College)
Alison Bailey (Illinois State University)
Mariana Ortega (John Carroll University)
Kyle Powys Whyte (Michigan State University)

**I-B. Invited Session: The Patrick J. Romanell Lecture**
12:10-2:10 p.m.
Chair: Hilary Kornblith (University of Massachusetts)
Speaker: Jaegwon Kim (Brown University)
“Naturalism, Physicalism, and the Mind”

**I-C. Submitted Symposium: Allocation and Distribution**
12:10-2:10 p.m.
Chair: Virginia Klenk (Emerita, Minnesota State University–Moorhead)
Speaker: Christopher Freiman (College of William and Mary)
Commentators: Evan Riley (College of Wooster)
Sorin Baiasu (University of Keele)
I-D. Submitted Symposium: Ability, Beta 2, and the Consequence Argument
12:10-2:10 p.m.
Chair: Jason Decker (Carleton College)
Speaker: William Paul Demsar (Independent Scholar)
Commentator: Colin Klein (University of Illinois at Chicago)

I-E. Colloquium: Philosophy of Biology
12:10-2:10 p.m.
12:10-1:10 p.m.
Chair: Alan C. Love (University of Minnesota–Twin Cities)
Speaker: Mark K. Spencer (University of Buffalo)
“Eternal and Historical Kinds”
Commentator: Chad Wiener (Portland State University)
1:10-2:10 p.m.
Chair: Carla Fehr (Iowa State University)
Speaker: Robert Northcott (University of Missouri–St. Louis)
“Fitness and Selective Explanations”
Commentator: André Ariew (University of Missouri)

I-F. Colloquium: Medical Ethics
12:10-2:10 p.m.
12:10-1:10 p.m.
Chair: DaWayne Judd (Independent Scholar)
Speaker: Bertha Alvarez Manninen (Arizona State University at the West Campus)
“What Did ‘Octomom’ Do Wrong?: Exploring the Ethics of Fertility Treatments”
Commentator: Camisha Russell (Pennsylvania State University)
1:10-2:10 p.m.
Chair: Kevin M. Graham (Creighton University)
Speaker: Adam Kadle (University of Tennessee)
“Flouting the Demands of Justice?: Physician Participation in Executions”
Commentator: Jennifer L. Vest (University of Central Florida)

I-G. Colloquium: Philosophy of Logic and Mathematics
12:10-2:10 p.m.
12:10-1:10 p.m.
Chair: David L. Clemenson (University of St. Thomas [St. Paul])
Speaker: Katalin Bimbo (University of Alberta)  
“Default Reasoning with fde”  
Commentator: Matthew Carlson (Indiana University–Bloomington)  
1:10-2:10 p.m.  
Chair: Malte Willer (University of Chicago)  
Speaker: Fabrizio Cariani (Northwestern University)  
“Mathematical Induction and Explanatory Value in Mathematics”  
Commentator: Julian C. Cole (Buffalo State College)

I-H. Colloquium: Metaphysics  
12:10-2:10 p.m.  
12:10-1:10 p.m.  
Chair: Mark Coppenger (Southern Baptist Theological Seminary)  
Speaker: John Christopher A. Keller (Niagara University)  
“Paraphrase and the Symmetry Objection”  
Commentator: Jeffrey C. Goodman (James Madison University)  
1:10-2:10 p.m.  
Chair: Yubraj Aryal (Purdue University)  
Speaker: Justin Remhof (University of Illinois–Urbana-Champaign)  
“Objects, Worldmaking, and Nihilism in Nietzsche”  
Graduate Student Travel Stipend Recipient  
Commentator: Mark Alfano (CUNY Graduate Center)

I-I. Colloquium: Gadamer and Phenomenology  
12:10-2:10 p.m.  
12:10-1:10 p.m.  
Chair: J. J. McFadden (University of Chicago)  
Speaker: Joshua Wretzel (Binghamton University)  
“How to Speak With the Dead: Brandom and Gadamer on the Dialogical Relation Between Past and Present”  
Commentator: David T. Vessey (Grand Valley State University)  
1:10-2:10 p.m.  
Chair: Lee Goldsmith (Northwestern University)  
Speaker: Eric Chelstrom (Grand Valley State University)  
“A Response to Gadamer’s Use of Horizons in His Criticisms of Husserl on Intersubjectivity”  
Commentator: Theodore George (Texas A&M University)
I-J. **Colloquium: Good and Evil**

*12:10-2:10 p.m.*

12:10-1:10 p.m.

Chair: Henry R. West (Macalester College)
Speaker: Joseph Q. Adams (Rice University)
“Origin Sensitive Goods”

*Graduate Student Travel Stipend Recipient*
Commentator: Dale Dorsey (University of Kansas)

1:10-2:10 p.m.

Chair: Timothy Shiell (University of Wisconsin–Stout)
Speaker: Todd C. Calder (Saint Mary’s University)
“Is Evil Just Very Wrong?”
Commentator: Hallie Rose Liberto (University of Wisconsin–Madison)

I-K. **Colloquium: Aesthetics and Fiction**

*12:10-2:10 p.m.*

12:10-1:10 p.m.

Chair: Mae Lynn Liou (University of Illinois–Chicago)
Speaker: Eva M. Dadlez (University of Central Oklahoma)
“Seeing and Imagination: Emotional Response to Fictional Film”
Commentator: Roy T. Cook (University of Minnesota)

1:10-2:10 p.m.

Chair: Lara Ostaric (St. Michael’s College)
Speaker: Nathan Ross (Oklahoma City University)
“Beyond Truth and Lie: On the Role of Fiction in Friedrich Schlegel’s Political Philosophy”
Commentator: Elizabeth Millàn (DePaul University)

I-L. **Colloquium: Punishment**

*12:10-2:10 p.m.*

12:10-1:10 p.m.

Chair: Elizabeth Mauritz (Michigan State University)
Speaker: Benjamin S. Yost (Providence College)
“The Irrevocability of Capital Punishment”
Commentator: Jill Graper Hernandez (University of Texas–San Antonio)
1:10-2:10 p.m.
Chair: Zachary Cogley (Northern Michigan University)
Speaker: Krista K. Thomason (Mount Holyoke College)
“A Retributive Defense of Shaming Punishments”
Commentator: Tina Fernandes Botts (University of Memphis)

I-M. Committee on Philosophy in Two-Year Colleges: How to Obtain a Position at the Community College
12:10-2:10 p.m.
Chair: Bill Hartmann (St. Louis Community College–Forest Park)
Speakers: Thomas Urban (Houston Community College)
Brian J. Huschle (Northland College)
Donna Werner (St. Louis Community College–Meramec)
Scott W. Sinclair (St. Louis Community College–Forest Park)
Nnachi J. Umennachi (Scott Community College)
Kevin K. J. Durand (Henderson State University)

SESSION II - 2:20-5:20 P.M.

II-A. Invited Session: The John Dewey Lecture
2:20-5:20 p.m.
Chair: Bill E. Lawson (University of Memphis)
Speaker: Bernard Boxill (University of North Carolina–Chapel Hill)
“Distributive Justice and Corrective Justice”

A reception sponsored by the John Dewey Foundation will follow the lecture in the same room.

II-B. Invited Symposium: Deontic logic
2:20-5:20 p.m.
Chair: Peter B. M. Vranas (University of Wisconsin–Madison)
Speakers: Mark A. Brown (Syracuse University)
“Deontic Logic and Time”
Paul McNamara (University of New Hampshire)
“Toward a More Fine-Grained Conceptual Scheme for Moral Statuses”
Mark Schroeder (University of Southern California)
II-C. Invited Symposium: Embodied Cognition and Human Action
2:20-5:20 p.m.
Chair: Joseph Owens (University of Minnesota)
Speakers: Frederick Adams (University of Delaware)
“Embodied Cognition Is Sweeping the Planet”
Robert D. Rupert (University of Colorado–Boulder)
“Embodiment, Cognition, and Consciousness”
Mark Rowlands (University of Miami)
“Embodied Cognition and Its Discontents: Gestures in the Direction of an End Game”

II-D. Invited Symposium: Women in Early Modern Philosophy
2:20-5:20 p.m.
Chair: Mary Ellen Waithe (Cleveland State University)
Speakers: Alice Sowaal (San Francisco State University)
Eileen O’Neill (University of Massachusetts–Amherst)
Commentator: Don Garrett (New York University)

II-E. Author Meets Critics: Noël Carroll, On Criticism
2:20-5:20 p.m.
Chair: Ted Cohen (University of Chicago)
Critics: Cynthia A. Freeland (University of Houston)
Alan Goldman (College of William and Mary)
Author: Noël Carroll (CUNY, The Graduate Center)

II-F. Author Meets Critics: Daniel C. Russell, Practical Intelligence and the Virtues
2:20-5:20 p.m.
Chair: Nancy E. Snow (Marquette University)
Critics: Julia Driver (Washington University in St. Louis)
Rachana Kamtekar (University of Arizona)
Liezl van Zyl (University of Waikato)
Author: Daniel C. Russell (Wichita State University)

II-G. Informational Session: String Theory for Philosophers
2:20-5:20 p.m.
Chair: J. Brian Pitts (University of Notre Dame)
Speakers: Jeffrey A. Harvey (Enrico Fermi Institute, University of Chicago)
Dean Rickles (University of Sydney)
II-H. Colloquium: Necessities and Essences

2:20-5:20 p.m.

2:20-3:20 p.m.
Chair: Katherine Biederman (Cornell College)
Speaker: Adam R. Thompson (University of Nebraska–Lincoln)
“A Defense Against Quidditism”

Graduate Student Travel Stipend Recipient
Commentator: Dustin Locke (Claremont McKenna College)

3:20-4:20 p.m.
Chair: Sun Kyeong Yu (Minnesota State University–Mankato)
Speaker: Daniel Lim (University of Cambridge)
“Conceivability, Property Individuation, and Strong Necessities”
Commentator: Piotr Boltuc (University of Illinois–Springfield)

4:20-5:20 p.m.
Chair: Fabrice Pataut (Institut d’Histoire et de Philosophie des Sciences et des Techniques, Paris)
Speaker: Luke Elwonger (University of Nebraska–Lincoln)
“Physical Constants and Essentialist Arguments for Necessitarianism”

Graduate Student Travel Stipend Recipient
Commentator: Bradley Rettler (University of Notre Dame)

II-I. Colloquium: Epistemology

2:20-5:20 p.m.

2:20-3:20 p.m.
Chair: Joy E. Laine (Macalester College)
Speaker: Leo W. Iacono (University of Nebraska–Lincoln)
“Psychological Answers to Contextualist Cases”
Commentator: Jennifer Nagel (University of Toronto)

3:20-4:20 p.m.
Chair: Pieranna Garavaso (University of Minnesota–Morris)
Speaker: Ryan Byerly (Baylor University)
“Evidentialism, Attitudinalism, and a Causal-Construal Account of the Supports Relation”

Graduate Student Travel Stipend Recipient
Commentator: William D. Rowley (University of Rochester)
Main Program

4:20-5:20 p.m.
Chair: Jonathan Matheson (University of North Florida)
Speaker: Michael J. Shaffer (St. Cloud State University)
"Pragmatic Encroachment Penalized"
Commentator: Benjamin J. Bayer (Loyola University of Chicago)

II-J. Colloquium: Ethics
2:20-5:20 p.m.
2:20-3:20 p.m.
Chair: Kate Padgett Walsh (Iowa State University)
Speaker: Robyn R. Gaier (Saint Louis University)
"The Second-Person Perspective and Moral Motivation: Why an Externalist Account Is Needed"
Commentator: Karen E. Stohr (Georgetown University)

3:20-4:20 p.m.
Chair: Scott E. Forschler (St. Cloud Technical and Community College)
Speaker: Peter A. Sutton (Virginia Union University)
"Moore’s ‘New’ Open Question Argument"
Commentator: Robert E. Shanklin (University of Southern California)

4:20-5:20 p.m.
Chair: John Rudisill (College of Wooster)
Speaker: Matthew C. Braddock (Duke University)
"Defusing the Demandingness Objection"
Commentator: Justin Jeffrey (University of Saint Thomas [St. Paul])

II-K. Colloquium: Action Theory
2:20-5:20 p.m.
2:20-3:20 p.m.
Chair: Michael Lavin (Clarke University)
Speakers: Dwight Furrow (San Diego Mesa College) and Mark Wheeler (San Diego State University)
"Getting a Grip: Agential Authority and the Stability of Intentions"
Commentator: Mary Clayton Coleman (Illinois Wesleyan University)

3:20-4:20 p.m.
Chair: Christopher L. Yeomans (Purdue University)
Speaker: Jesse Summers (University of California–Los Angeles)
"What Happens When J. David Velleman Acts?"
Commentator: Chris D. Meyers (University of Southern Mississippi)
4:20-5:20 p.m.
Chair: Richard T. DeGeorge (University of Kansas)
Speaker: Amanda Roth (University of Michigan)
“Dynamic Deliberation of Ends”
Commentator: Patrick J. Fleming (James Madison University)

II-L. Committee on Philosophy and Medicine: Potentiality at the Beginning and End of Life
2:20-5:20 p.m.
Chair: Leonard A. Kahn (U.S. Air Force Academy)
Speakers: Bertha Alvarez Manninen (Arizona State University at the West Campus)
David Hershenov (University at Buffalo)
Jason Thomas Eberl (Indiana University/Purdue University–Indianapolis)
John P. Lizza (Kutztown University of Pennsylvania)

II-M. Committee on Public Philosophy: Public Philosophy and Public Rationality: Solving Public Problems through Philosophical Discussion?
2:20-5:20 p.m.
Chair: Owen Anderson (Arizona State University)
Speakers: Mark Brouwer (Wabash College)
Stephen Webb (Wabash College)
Surrendra Gangadean (Paradise Valley Community College)

II-N. Committee on Pre-College Instruction in Philosophy: Thomas E. Wartenberg, Big Ideas for Little Kids: Teaching Philosophy through Children’s Literature
2:20-5:20 p.m.
Chair: Deborah Tollefsen (University of Memphis)
Critics: Sara Goering (California State University–Long Beach)
Rory E. Kraft (Michigan State University)
James Kelly (Miami University)
Author: Thomas E. Wartenberg (Mount Holyoke College)

RECEPTION
8:30 p.m.-Midnight, Minneapolis Grand Ballroom-Salon D (third floor)
GROUP SESSIONS, THURSDAY AFTERNOON/EVENING
(see Group Meeting Program for details)

Session GII: 5:30-7:30 p.m.
GII-1: International Society of Chinese Philosophy
GII-2: Committee on Institutional Cooperation
GII-3: North American Nietzsche Society
GII-4: Society for Realist-Antirealist Discussion
GII-5: Radical Philosophy Association
GII-6: Central Division Sartre Circle
GII-7: North American Kant Society
GII-8: American Society for Value Inquiry
GII-9: Society of Christian Philosophers

Session GIII: 7:40-10:40 p.m.
GIII-1: Association for Informal Logic and Critical Thinking
GIII-2: Society for the Philosophical Study of Education
GIII-3: North American Society for Social Philosophy
GIII-4: Society for the Philosophy of Creativity
GIII-5: International Society for Comparative Studies of Chinese and Western Philosophy
GIII-6: Great Lakes Mind and Science Consortium
GIII-7: Society for the Philosophic Study of the Contemporary Visual Arts
GIII-8: Society for the Study of Process Philosophies
GIII-9: Society for Lesbian and Gay Philosophy

FRIDAY MORNING, APRIL 1

REGISTRATION
9:00 a.m.-5:00 p.m., Registration Area (Red Wing, third floor)

PLACEMENT INTERVIEW AREA
8:00 a.m.-6:00 p.m., Rochester (third floor)

BOOK EXHIBITS
9:00 a.m.-5:00 p.m., Minneapolis Grand Ballroom-Salon A, B, and C (third floor)
SESSION III - 9:00 A.M.-NOON

III-A. Invited Symposium: Aristotle through a Medieval Lens: Christian, Jewish, Muslim

9:00 a.m.-Noon

Chair: Kenneth Seeskin (Northwestern University)
Speakers:
  Allan Bäck (Kutztown University)
  “The Potential Being of Aristotle and the Possible Being of Avicenna”
  Edward Halper (University of Georgia)
  “Maimonides’ Transformation of Aristotle’s Ethics”
  Robert Miner (Baylor University)
  “Aquinas as Reader of Aristotle: The Case of Magnanimity”

III-B. Invited Symposium: Frederick Douglass, Slavery, the Existential Self

9:00 a.m.-Noon

Chair: A. Todd Franklin (Hamilton College)
Speakers:
  Timothy J. Golden (University of Memphis)
  (Title to be announced)
  Frank Kirkland (Hunter College)
  “Does an Existential Self Play a Role in Frederick Douglass’s Critique of Slavery?”
  George Yancy (Duquesne University)
  (Title to be announced)
  Lewis Gordon (Temple University)
  “Enslavement, Existence, and Freedom in the Thought of Frederick Douglass”

III-C. Invited Symposium: Taking Character Seriously

9:00 a.m.-Noon

Chair: Karin Fry (University of Wisconsin–Stevens Point)
Speakers:
  Candace L. Upton (University of Denver)
  Christian Miller (Wake Forest University)
  Daniel M. Haybron (Saint Louis University)
Commentator: John M. Doris (Washington University in St. Louis)

III-D. Invited Symposium: Transsexuality and Personal Identity

This session is co-sponsored by the APA Committee on Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender Persons in the Profession

9:00 a.m.-Noon

Chair: Mindi Torrey (Michigan State University)
Speakers:  Talia Bettcher (California State University–Los Angeles)
“Intimacy, Phenomenology, and Trans Body Dysphoria”
Miqqi Alicia Gilbert (York University)
“Esse Est Interagere: To Be Is to Interact, Or, There Is No Intelligibility without Visibility”
Christine Overall (Queen’s University)
“Transgender, Cisgender, and Aspirational Identity”

Commentators:  Georgia Warnke (University of California–Riverside)
Loren Cannon (California State University–Humboldt)

III-E. **Author Meets Critics: Gary M. Gutting, *What Philosophers Know***

9:00 a.m.-Noon

Chair:  Peter W. Hanks (University of Minnesota–Twin Cities)
Critics:  William G. Lycan (University of North Carolina–Chapel Hill)
          David Henderson (University of Nebraska)
          Joseph Margolis (Temple University)
Author:  Gary M. Gutting (University of Notre Dame)

III-F. **Author Meets Critics: Paul S. Loeb, *The Death of Nietzsche’s Zarathustra***

9:00 a.m.-Noon

Chair:  Kathleen Marie Higgins (University of Texas–Austin)
Critics:  Clancy Martin (University of Missouri–Kansas City)
          Lawrence Hatab (Old Dominion University)
Author:  Paul S. Loeb (University of Puget Sound)

III-G. **Colloquium: Ontology***

9:00 a.m.-Noon

9:00-10:00 a.m.

Chair:  Catherine Sutton (Virginia Commonwealth University)
Speaker:  Charlie Tanksley (University of Virginia)
          “The Distributivity of Masses”
Commentator:  Meg Wallace (University of Kentucky)
10:00-11:00 a.m.
Chair: Einar Duenger Bohn (University of Oslo)
Speaker: Daniel Giberman (Stanford University)
“Is There No End to Priority Monism?”
Commentator: Alexander Skiles (University of Notre Dame)

11:00 a.m.-Noon
Chair: Panayot Butchvarov (University of Iowa)
Speaker: Jeffrey A. Snapper (University of Notre Dame)
“Why the Vagueness Argument Is Unsound”
Commentator: Chris Tillman (University of Manitoba)

III-H. Colloquium: Social and Political Philosophy
9:00 a.m.-Noon

9:00-10:00 a.m.
Chair: Howard McGary (Rutgers University)
Speaker: Matt Waldren (University of Wisconsin–Madison)
“Liberal Neutrality and Educational Neutrality”
Commentator: Roderick M. Stewart (Austin College)

10:00-11:00 a.m.
Chair: John Torrey (University of Memphis)
Speaker: Amandine Catala (University of Colorado–Boulder)
“Self-Determination, Justice, and Flourishing: Reframing the Normative Question of Secession”
Commentator: J. Angelo Corlett (San Diego State University)

11:00 a.m.-Noon
Chair: Tristram McPherson (University of Minnesota–Duluth)
Speaker: Jeffrey J. Watson (Arizona State University)
“Mending the Broken Promises of the Past: On Responsibility to Repair Historical Wrongs”
Commentator: Luvell Anderson (Rutgers University)

III-I. Colloquium: Kantian Ethics
9:00 a.m.-Noon

9:00-10:00 a.m.
Chair: Heidi M. Giebel (University of Saint Thomas [St. Paul])
Speaker: Mavis Biss (University of Wisconsin–Madison)
“Perfect Duties to Oneself and Latitude of Choice: A Question of Morality or Prudence?”

Graduate Student Travel Stipend Recipient
Commentator: Sean McAleer (University of Wisconsin–Eau Claire)

10:00-11:00 a.m.
Chair: Howard Curzer (Texas Tech University)
Speaker: Elizabeth Victor (University of South Florida)
“Self, Agency, and World: A Response to Korsgaard’s Self-constitution”

Graduate Student Travel Stipend Recipient
Commentator: Ariela Tubert (University of Puget Sound)

11:00 a.m.-Noon
Chair: Robert B. Louden (University of Southern Maine)
Speaker: Peter Brian Barry (Saginaw Valley State University)
“The Kantian Case Against Torture”

Commentator: Walter E. Schaller (Texas Tech University)

III-J. Colloquium: Probing Epistemic Possibility

9:00 a.m.-Noon

9:00-10:00 a.m.
Chair: Anastasia Panagopoulos (University of Minnesota)
Speaker: Kraig Martin (Baylor University)
“Epistemic Possibility and Closure of Inquiry”

Commentator: Andrew Moon (University of Missouri–Columbia)

10:00-11:00 a.m.
Chair: Timothy Fuller (Ohio State University)
Speaker: Ezra J. Cook (Northwestern University)
“Knowability and Singular Thought: De Re Knowledge and Semantic Ascent”

Graduate Student Travel Stipend Recipient
Commentator: Jeffrey Dunn (DePauw University)

11:00 a.m.-Noon
Chair: Lauren Woomer (Michigan State University)
Speaker: David Alexander (Iowa State University)
“Inferential Internalism and the Argument from Responsible Belief”

Commentator: Kelly M. Becker (University of New Mexico)
III-K. Colloquium: Philosophy of Religion

9:00 a.m.-Noon
Chair: Sandra Menssen (University of Saint Thomas [St. Paul])

9:00-10:00 a.m.
Speaker: Kenneth A. Boyce (University of Notre Dame)
“The Multiverse and the Inverse Gambler’s Fallacy: A Response to Nick Bostrom on Behalf of Roger White”
Commentator: James Harrington (Loyola University of Chicago)

10:00-11:00 a.m.
Speaker: Patrick Todd (University of California–Riverside)
“Soft Facts and Ontological Dependence”
Commentator: Fritz J. McDonald (Oakland University)

11:00 a.m.-Noon
Speaker: Travis Dumsday (University of North Carolina–Chapel Hill)
“Why (Most) Atheists Have a Duty to Pray”
Commentator: Wes Morriston (University of Colorado–Boulder)

III-L. Colloquium: Moral Psychology

9:00 a.m.-12:00 p.m.

9:00-10:00 a.m.
Chair: James Lindemann Nelson (Michigan State University)
Speaker: Steven Swartzer (University of Nebraska–Lincoln)
“Unmanifested Desires Unmasked”
Commentator: Naomi Reshotko (University of Denver)

10:00-11:00 a.m.
Chair: Daniel C. Shartin (Worcester State University)
Speaker: Allen Coates (East Tennessee State University)
“Enkrasia and Responding to Reasons”
Commentator: Noell Birondo (Augustana College)

11:00 a.m.-Noon
Chair: Daniel D. Moseley (University of North Carolina–Chapel Hill)
Speaker: Maura E. Tumulty (Colgate University)
“Explaining Mismatches Between Belief and Behavior”
Commentator: Paul Prescott (Syracuse University)

9:00 a.m.-Noon
Chair: Nathan Nobis (Morehouse College)
Speakers: Jennifer Everett (DePauw University)
          Kathie Jenni (University of Redlands)
          Gregory Mellema (Calvin College)

III-N. Committee on the Status of Women: Technology and Reproductive Autonomy

9:00 a.m.-Noon
Chair: Diane Michelfelder (Macalester College)
Speakers: Dana S. Belu (California State University–Dominguez Hills)
          “A Phenomenological Interpretation of Modern Childbirth”
          Sylvia Burrow (Cape Breton University)
          “Reproductive Technology and Reproductive Autonomy”
          Elizabeth Soliday (Washington State University–Vancouver)
          “Maternal Medical Patients’ Rights Reflected in Women’s Reported Childbirth Experiences”

Friday Afternoon/Evening, April 1

Business Meeting

12:15-1:15 p.m., Minneapolis Grand Ballroom-Salon D (third floor)

Session IV - 1:30-4:30 p.m.


1:30-4:30 p.m.
Chair: Leonard Harris (Purdue University)
Speakers: Lucius T. Outlaw (Vanderbilt University)
          “Philosophy and American Apartheid: Further Considerations of Race and Philosophy”
          Paul C. Taylor (Pennsylvania State University)
          “Toward a Postcolonial Analytic Philosophy”
          Falguni A. Sheth (Hampshire College)
          “Critical Race Theory: Making Space for Migration and Diaspora”
IV-B. Invited Symposium: The Substantivalist/Relationist Debate on Space-Time

1:30-4:30 p.m.
Chair: Katherine Brading (University of Notre Dame)
Speakers: Oliver Pooley (Oxford University)
         Gordon Belot (University of Michigan–Ann Arbor)
Commentator: Robert DiSalle (University of Western Ontario)

IV-C. Invited Symposium: Parts and Wholes in Early Modern Philosophy

1:30-4:30 p.m.
Chair: David R. Cunning (University of Iowa)
Speakers: Alan Nelson (University of North Carolina–Chapel Hill)
          “Getting Involved in Spinoza”
          Yitzhak Melamed (Johns Hopkins University)
          “Spinoza’s Mereology”
          Samuel Levey (Dartmouth College)
          “Part, Whole, Quantity, Infinity in Leibniz”

IV-D. Invited Symposium: Instrumental Reason

1:30-4:30 p.m.
Chair: David K. Chan (University of Wisconsin–Stevens Point)
Speakers: Michael E. Bratman (Stanford University)
          Kieran Setiya (University of Pittsburgh)
          “Intention, Plans, and Ethical Rationalism”
          Niko Kolodny (University of California–Berkeley)
          “Toward a Principle of Instrumental Transmission”

IV-E. Author Meets Critics: James P. Sterba and Jan Narveson, Is Liberty Compatible with Equality?

1:30-4:30 p.m.
Chair: Valerie Tiberius (University of Minnesota)
Critics: Allan Gibbard (University of Michigan)
         Laurence Thomas (Syracuse University)
         Peter Vallentyne (University of Missouri-Columbia)
Authors: James P. Sterba (University of Notre Dame)
         Jan Narveson (University of Waterloo)
IV-F. Author Meets Critics: Paula Gottlieb, *The Virtue of Aristotle’s Ethics*

1:30-4:30 p.m.

Chair: Robin Smith (Texas A&M University)
Critics: Hendrik Lorenz (Princeton University)
        Iakovos Vasiliou (CUNY Graduate Center)
Author: Paula Gottlieb (University of Wisconsin–Madison)

IV-G. Colloquium: Zombies and Brains

1:30-4:30 p.m.

1:30-2:30 p.m.

Chair: William S. Robinson (Iowa State University)
Speaker: Jason M. Ford (University of Minnesota–Duluth)
        “How to Banish Zombies and Disembodied Minds with a Can of Rocks”
Commentator: Robert J. Howell (Southern Methodist University)

2:30-3:30 p.m.

Chair: David Beisecker (University of Nevada–Las Vegas)
Speaker: Kevin W. Sharpe (St. Cloud State University)
        “Property Dualists Should Be Substance Dualists: The Zombie Argument”
Commentator: Justin T. Tiehen (University of Puget Sound)

3:30-4:30 p.m.

Chair: David Hershenov (University at Buffalo)
Speaker: Joungbin Lim (University of Virginia)
        “Two Dilemmas of the Eliminativist Ontology of Brains”
Commentator: Mark D. Reid (Wilkes University)

IV-H. Colloquium: Philosophy of Language

1:30-4:30 p.m.

1:30-2:30 p.m.

Chair: Jennifer Case (Attorney, Shelby County Public Defender)
Speaker: John J. Gabriel (Washington University in St. Louis)
        “Super-Truth and Direct Reference”
Commentator: Heimir Geirsson (Iowa State University)

2:30-3:30 p.m.

Chair: Andrew P. Mills (Otterbein College)
Speaker: Alexander R. Pruss (Baylor University)
        “Moorean Sentences, Sincerity, and Norms of Assertion”
Commentator: Don T. Fallis (University of Arizona)
3:30-4:30 p.m.
Chair: Erica L. Neely (Ohio Northern University)
Speakers: Susana Nuccetelli (St. Cloud State University) and Gary Seay (City University of New York)
“The Semantic Naturalist Fallacy”
Commentator: Lynne Tirrell (University of Massachusetts–Boston)

IV-I. Colloquium: Persons and Animals
1:30-4:30 p.m.
1:30-2:30 p.m.
Chair: Joshua Thurow (Mount Marty College)
Speaker: Gary Varner (Texas A&M University)
“Persons, Near-Persons and ‘the Merely Sentient’ in the Autonoetic Consciousness Paradigm”
Commentator: Marya Schechtman (University of Illinois–Chicago)
2:30-3:30 p.m.
Chair: Mark Bernstein (Purdue University)
Speaker: Elizabeth A. Foreman (Saint Louis University)
“What’s Wrong with Speciesism?”
Commentator: Christopher Grau (Clemson University)
3:30-4:30 p.m.
Chair: Nicoletta Orlandi (Rice University)
Speaker: Adam Green (Saint Louis University)
“Perceiving Persons”
Commentator: Bryce Huebner (Georgetown University)

IV-J. Colloquium: Metaethics
1:30-4:30 p.m.
1:30-2:30 p.m.
Chair: Mark Decker (Northland College)
Speaker: Nathan Carson (Baylor University)
“Thick Ethical Concepts Still Cannot Be Disentangled: A Critical Response to Payne, Blomberg, and Blackburn”
Graduate Student Travel Stipend Recipient
Commentator: David Killoren (University of Wisconsin–Madison)
2:30-3:30 p.m.
Chair: Brian J. Huschle (Northland College)
Speaker: Sean Aas (Brown University)
“Circularity and Normative Exprivism”

*Graduate Student Travel Stipend Recipient*

Commentator: David A. Merli (Franklin and Marshall College)

3:30-4:30 p.m.

Chair: Gary L. Hardcastle (Bloomsburg University of Pennsylvania)

Speaker: Andrew Payne (St. Joseph’s University)
“Is Goodness a Determinable Property?”

Commentator: Michael J. Zimmerman (University of North Carolina–Greensboro)

**IV-K. Colloquium: Epistemology**

1:30-4:30 p.m.

1:30-2:30 p.m.

Chair: Lory Lemke (University of Minnesota–Morris)

Speaker: Brian Mondy (University of Miami)
“Why Inquiry Has (At Least) Two Aims”

*Graduate Student Travel Stipend Recipient*

Commentator: Reza Lahroodi (University of Northern Iowa)

2:30-3:30 p.m.

Chair: Robert G. Brice (Loyola University–New Orleans)

Speaker: Ethan Mills (University of New Mexico)
“Is Skepticism Inevitable?”

Commentator: Jonathan Stoltz (University of St. Thomas)

3:30-4:30 p.m.

Chair: Justin P. McBrayer (Fort Lewis College)

Speaker: Yasha Rohwer (University of Missouri–Columbia)
“Lucky Understanding Without Knowledge”

Commentator: Jason Rogers (University of Rochester)

**IV-L. Committee on Academic Career Opportunities and Placement: The Draft APA Handbook on Best Placement Practices**

1:30-4:30 p.m.

**IV-M. Committee on Philosophy and Law: Scott Shapiro, Legality**

1:30-4:30 p.m.

Critics: William A. Edmundson (Georgia State University)
Don Loeb (University of Vermont)

Author: Scott Shapiro (Yale University)
IV-N. Committee on International Cooperation  
1:30-4:30 p.m.

Presidential Address  
4:45-5:45 p.m., Minneapolis Grand Ballroom-Salon D (third floor)  
Introduction: Peter Railton (University of Michigan–Ann Arbor)  
Speaker: Claudia Card (University of Wisconsin–Madison)  
“Surviving Long-Term Mass Atrocities: U-Boats, Catchers, and Ravens,”

Presidential Reception  
8:30 p.m.-12:30 a.m., Minneapolis Grand Ballroom-Salon D (third floor)

Group Sessions, Friday Afternoon/Evening  
(see Group Meeting Program for details)

Session GIV: 7:00-10:00 p.m.  
GIV-1: Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy  
GIV-2: Society for the Philosophical Study of Education  
GIV-3: Radical Philosophy Association  
GIV-4: Bertrand Russell Society  
GIV-5: Society for Analytical Feminism  
GIV-6: Society for Business Ethics  
GIV-7: Society for the Advancement of American Philosophy  
GIV-8: Midwest Society for Women in Philosophy  
GIV-9: International Society for Environmental Ethics  
GIV-10: Society of Christian Philosophers (this session meets 1:30-3:30 p.m.)

Saturday Morning, April 2

Registration  
9:00 a.m.-Noon, Registration Area (Red Wing, third floor)

Placement Interview Area  
8:00 a.m.-Noon, Rochester (third floor)

Book Exhibits  
9:00 a.m.-Noon, Minneapolis Grand Ballroom-Salon A, B, and C (third floor)
SESSION V - 9:00 A.M.-NOON

V-A. Invited Symposium: 25 years of The Fragility of Goodness
9:00 a.m.-Noon
Chair: Malcolm Schofield (University of Cambridge)
Speakers: Paul Woodruff (University of Texas–Austin)
“Learning from Nussbaum to Read Tragic Poets as Ethical Thinkers”
Juha Sihvola (University of Helsinki)
“The Fragility of Goodness Revisited: The Aristotelian Background of Martha Nussbaum’s Political Liberalism and Capabilities Approach”
Joan C. Tronto (University of Minnesota)
“The Fragility of Goodness and Feminist Tragedians”
Responding: Martha Nussbaum (University of Chicago)

V-B. Invited Symposium: Carnap’s Legacy for Metaontology
9:00 a.m.-Noon
Chair: Christopher Pincock (Purdue University)
Speakers: Robert Kraut (Ohio State University)
Matti Eklund (Cornell University)
Thomas Hofweber (University of North Carolina–Chapel Hill)

V-C. Invited Symposium: Race and Education
9:00 a.m.-Noon
Chair: Charles Mills (Northwestern University)
Speaker: Derrick Darby (University of Kansas)
“Is Educational Adequacy Enough for Racial Justice?”
Commentators: Lawrence Blum (University of Massachusetts–Boston)
Harry Brighouse (University of Wisconsin–Madison)

V-D. Memorial Symposium: The Philosophy of William P. Alston
9:00 a.m.-Noon
Chair: Alvin Plantinga (University of Notre Dame)
Speakers: Alvin I. Goldman (Rutgers University)
Peter van Inwagen (University of Notre Dame)
Marilyn McCord Adams (University of North Carolina–Chapel Hill)
V-E. Author Meets Critics: Daniel Garber, *Leibniz: Body, Substance, Monad*

9:00 a.m.-Noon

Chair: Robert M. Adams (University of North Carolina–Chapel Hill)

Critics: Donald Rutherford (University of California–San Diego)
Brandon C. Look (University of Kentucky)

Author: Daniel Garber (Princeton University)

V-F. Author Meets Critics: Elliott Sober, *Evidence and Evolution*

9:00 a.m.-Noon

Chair: Martin Curd (Purdue University)

Critics: Sahotra Sarkar (University of Texas–Austin)
Branden Fitelson (Rutgers University)
Roger Sansom (Texas A&M University)

Author: Elliott Sober (University of Wisconsin)

V-G. Colloquium: Moral Psychology

9:00 a.m.-Noon

9:00-10:00 a.m.

Chair: J. Thomas Cook (Rollin College)

Speaker: Jason Lopez (Indiana University)

“A Method for Characterizing Self-Deception”

Commentator: Michael Byron (Kent State University)

10:00-11:00 a.m.

Chair: Troy Kozma (University of Wisconsin–Barron County)

Speaker: Lauren E. Fleming (University of Puget Sound)

“The Possibility of Personal Commitment”

Commentator: Allen Habib (University of Calgary)

11:00 a.m.-Noon

Chair: Alice MacLachlan (York University)

Speaker: Scott O’Leary (Fordham University)

“Emotions and the Motivational Problem”

Commentator: Margaret A. Watkins (Saint Vincent College)

V-H. Colloquium: Mental Causation

9:00 a.m.-Noon

9:00-10:00 a.m.

Chair: Raphael Sassower (University of Colorado–Colorado Springs)
Speaker: Andrei A. Buckareff (Marist College)  
“A Problem for Intralevel Mental Causation”  
Commentator: Eric R. Kraemer (University of Wisconsin–La Crosse)

10:00-11:00 a.m.  
Chair: Jeff Johnson (Saint Catherine University)  
Speaker: Dwayne Moore (Wilfrid Laurier University)  
“Can Fragile Events Solve the Causal Exclusion Problem?”  
Commentator: Ben Caplan (Ohio State University)

11:00 a.m.-Noon  
Chair: Monica Berrier (University of Minnesota)  
Speaker: Douglas Keaton (University of Cincinnati)  
“Exclusion, Causal Role Realization, and Realization as Determination”  
Commentator: Joseph A. Baltimore (West Virginia University)

V-I. Colloquium: Global Justice  
9:00 a.m.-Noon  
9:00-10:00 a.m.  
Chair: William Allen (University of Memphis)  
Speaker: Idil Boran (York University)  
“The Problem of Exogeneity in Debates on Global Justice”  
Commentator: Bryan Smyth (University of Memphis)

10:00-11:00 a.m.  
Chair: Gabriella Beckles-Raymond (University of Memphis)  
Speaker: Jorn Sonderholm (George Washington University)  
“World Poverty and Individual Freedom”  
Commentator: Çigdem Yazici (Koç University)

11:00 a.m.-Noon  
Chair: Samaiyah Jones Scott (University of Memphis)  
Speaker: Joshua Mousie (University of Guelph)  
“Locke and the Provisos of Property”  
Commentator: Daniel M. Layman (University of North Carolina–Chapel Hill)

V-J. Colloquium: Moral Epistemology  
9:00 a.m.-Noon  
9:00-10:00 a.m.  
Chair: Benjamin Huff (Randolph-Macon College)
Speaker: Sarah A. Wright (University of Georgia)
“Partitioning Virtuously”
Commentator: Travis J. Rodgers (Florida State University)

10:00-11:00 a.m.
Chair: William Day (Le Moyne College)
Speaker: Elizabeth Tropman (Colorado State University)
“Non-Inferential Moral Knowledge”
Commentator: Deborah Mower (Youngstown State University)

11:00 a.m.-Noon
Chair: Marion Hourdequin (Colorado College)
Speaker: Victor Kumar (University of Arizona)
“Empathy and Moral Know-How”

Graduate Student Travel Stipend Recipient
Commentator: Remy Debes (University of Memphis)

V-K. Colloquium: Saving Lives
9:00 a.m.-Noon

9:00-10:00 a.m.
Chair: Jerry Green (University of Texas–Austin)
Speaker: Vanessa Carbonell (University of Cincinnati)
“Sacrifice and Moral Obligation”
Commentator: Sean P. Walsh (University of Minnesota–Duluth)

10:00-11:00 a.m.
Chair: Dennis Arjo (Johnson County Community College)
Speaker: Leonard A. Kahn (U.S. Air Force Academy)
“Rule Consequentialism and Disaster”
Commentator: Andrew Terjesen (Rhodes College)

11:00 a.m.-Noon
Chair: Jerry Kapus (University of Wisconsin–Stout)
Speaker: Paul Tulipana (Georgia State University)
“Saving the Many and the Value of Human Life in Scanlon’s Contractualism”
Commentator: Alastair Norcross (University of Colorado)

V-L. Committee on Indigenous Philosophers
9:00 a.m.-Noon

Chair: George Rudebusch (Northern Arizona University)
Speakers: Robert M. Figueroa (University of North Texas)
“Risking Recognition: New Assessment Strategies for Environmental Justice and American Indian Communities”
Brian Yazzie Burkhart (Woodbury University)
“On The Killing of Navajo Sheep in the 1930s: A Case Study in Environmental Justice”

Kyle Powys Whyte (Michigan State University)
“Environmental Justice and American Indian Communities: Political Not Traditional”

V-M. Committee on Philosophy in Two-Year Colleges: Credentialing

9:00 a.m.-Noon
Chair: Bill Hartmann (St. Louis Community College–Forest Park)
Speakers: Thomas Urban (Houston Community College)
Brian J. Huschle (Northland College)
Donna Werner (St. Louis Community College–Meramec)
Nnachi J. Umennachi (Scott Community College)
Kevin K. J. Durand (Henderson State University)

V-N. Committee on Philosophy and Computers: Discussion on Online Education in Philosophy

9:00 a.m.-Noon
Chair: David L. Anderson (Illinois State University)
Speakers: Bernd Estabrook (Illinois College)
"The Inevitability of Online Education: Defining Needs in Educational Technology"
John Barker (University of Illinois–Springfield)
"Delivering a Philosophy B.A. Entirely Online?"
Piotr Boltuc (University of Illinois–Springfield)
"Various Philosophies of Teaching Philosophy Online"
Terry Weldin-Frish (Oxford University and University of Illinois–Springfield)
"Comparison of Various Online Programs in Philosophy"
Kristen Zbikowski (Hibbing Community College)
"An Invitation for Reflection: Teaching Philosophy Online"
SATSATURDAY AFTERNOON/EVENING, APRIL 2

SESSION VI - 2:30-5:30 P.M.

VI-A. Invited Symposium: Ethics of Testimonial Knowledge
2:15-5:15 p.m.
Chair: Lisa Kennedy (Michigan State University)
Speaker: Jennifer Lackey (Northwestern University)
Commentator: Ben Almassi (College of Lake County)
Speaker: Deborah Tollefsen (University of Memphis)
Commentator: Sanford Goldberg (Northwestern University)

VI-B. Author Meets Critics: Stephen C. Angle, Sagehood
2:15-5:15 p.m.
Chair: Joel Kupperman (University of Connecticut)
Critics: Christine Swanton (University of Auckland)
Owen Flanagan (Duke University)
Justin Tiwald (San Francisco State University)
Author: Stephen C. Angle (Wesleyan University)

VI-C. Memorial Symposium: The Philosophy of Paul Ziff
2:15-5:15 p.m.
Chair: Paul Benacerraf (Princeton University)
Speakers: Selim Berker (Harvard University)
Peg Brand (Indiana University-Purdue University–Indianapolis)
Gilbert Harman (Princeton University)
Dale W. Jamieson (New York University)

VI-D. Author Meets Critics: Mark Johnston, Surviving Death
2:15-5:15 p.m.
Chair: Stephan Blatti (University of Memphis)
Critics: Steven Luper (Trinity University)
Dean W. Zimmerman (Rutgers University)
Rae Langton (Massachusetts Institute of Technology)
Author: Mark Johnston (Princeton University)

VI-E. Author Meets Critics: Alfred R. Mele, Effective Intentions: The Power of Conscious Will
2:15-5:15 p.m.
Chair: Tomis Kapitan (Northern Illinois University)
Critics: Robert Kane (University of Texas–Austin)
Mark Balaguer (California State University–Los Angeles)
Author: Alfred R. Mele (Florida State University)
VI-F. Author Meets Critics: Thomas McCarthy, *Race, Empire, and the Idea of Human Development*

2:15-5:15 p.m.

Chair: Darrell Moore (DePaul University)
Critics: Sankar Muthu (University of Chicago)  
Lorenzo Simpson (SUNY-Stony Brook)
Author: Thomas McCarthy (Northwestern University)

VI-G. Submitted Symposium: *Is Heidegger’s Ontological Difference a Sharp or Gradual Difference?*

2:15-4:15 p.m.

Chair: Lawrence Vogel (Connecticut College)
Speaker: Taylor Carman (Barnard College)
Commentator: Steven Crowell (Rice University)

VI-H. Colloquium: *Early Modern Philosophy*

2:15-5:15 p.m.

2:15-3:15 p.m.

Chair: Seth Jones (University of Iowa)
Speaker: Raffaella De Rosa (Rutgers University–Newark)  
“The Real Challenge of Locke’s Critique of Nativism”
Commentator: Benjamin D. Hill (University of Western Ontario)

3:15-4:15 p.m.

Chair: Matthew C. Simpson (Luther College)
Speaker: Jesse Newton (University of Virginia)  
“Locke, Language, and Meta-Philosophy: An Interpretation of Book III of the *Essay*”
Commentator: Nicholas Jolley (University of California–Irvine)

4:15-5:15 p.m.

Chair: John Whipple (University of Illinois–Chicago)
Speaker: Alison Peterman (Northwestern University)  
“On Spinoza’s Physical Interlude”
Commentator: Andrew D. Youpa (Southern Illinois University–Carbondale)

VI-I. Colloquium: *Ancient and Medieval Philosophy*

2:15-5:15 p.m.

2:15-3:15 p.m.

Chair: Eric W. Hagedorn (University of Notre Dame)
Speaker: Krisanna Scheiter (University of Pennsylvania)  
“Aristotle on Epithumia and the Emotions”
Commentator: George Rudebusch (Northern Arizona University)
3:15-4:15 p.m.
Chair: Kristopher G. Phillips (University of Iowa)
Speaker: Caleb Cohoe (Princeton University)
“Aristotle, Zeno, and Continuity”
Graduate Student Travel Stipend Recipient
Commentator: Jeremy Kirby (Albion College)

4:15-5:15 p.m.
Chair: Brett S. Gaul (Southwest Minnesota State University)
Speaker: Peter Hartman (University of Toronto)
“Durand of St.-Pourçain and Mental Representations”
Commentator: Susan Brower-Toland (St. Louis University)

VI-J. Colloquium: Philosophy of Perception
2:15-5:15 p.m.

2:15-3:15 p.m.
Chair: David H. Sanford (Duke University)
Speaker: Richard Kenneth Atkins (Fordham University)
“Perceptual Normativity and Accuracy”
Commentator: Ali Hasan (University of Iowa)

3:15-4:15 p.m.
Chair: Keith Gunderson (University of Minnesota–Twin Cities)
Speaker: Kristjan Laasik (University of Miami)
“Towards Solving Alva Noë’s Problem of Perceptual Presence”
Commentator: Jared G. Bates (Hanover College)

4:15-5:15 p.m.
Chair: Samuel C. Wheeler, III (University of Connecticut)
Speaker: Jason P. Leddington (Bucknell University)
“What We Hear”
Commentator: Rocco J. Gennaro (Indiana State University)

VI-K. Colloquium: Philosophy of Mind
2:15-5:15 p.m.

2:15-3:15 p.m.
Chair: Stephanie Lewis (Municipal Capital Management, LLC)
Speaker: Mark D. Bauer (Virginia Tech)
“Multiple Realizability and the Mental Constraint Thesis”
Commentator: Carrie Figdor (University of Iowa)
3:15-4:15 p.m.
Chair: Jacob Berger (Graduate Center, CUNY)
Speaker: James C. Blackmon (San Francisco State University)
“Searle’s Wall”
Commentator: Andrew Melnyk (University of Missouri–Columbia)

4:15-5:15 p.m.
Chair: Dimitria Electra Gatzia (University of Akron)
Speaker: Andreas Elpidorou (Boston University)
“Extending Phenomenal Concepts”
Commentator: Alex Grzankowski (University of Texas–Austin)

VI-L. Committee on Indigenous Philosophers: Symposium on Vine Deloria Jr.
2:15-5:15 p.m.
Chair: Kyle Powys Whyte (Michigan State University)
Speakers: Lorraine Mayer (Brandon University)
“American Indians and Philosophy: A Response to Vine Deloria”
Thomas Michael Norton-Smith (Kent State University, Stark Campus)
“Deloria, Sacred Places, and Circularity”
Luan Fauteck Makes Marks (Tanam Institute)
“Responsibilities vs. Rights: Vine Deloria, Jr. and Environmental Justice”

GROUP AND COMMITTEE SESSIONS, SATURDAY AFTERNOON
(see Group Meeting Program for details)
Session GV: 12:15-2:15 p.m.
GV-1: Josiah Royce Society
GV-2: Society for the Advancement of American Philosophy
GV-3: Experimental Philosophy Society
GV-4: Society for the Study of Indian and Tibetan Buddhist Philosophy
GV-5: American Maritain Association
GV-6: Concerned Philosophers for Peace
GV-7: North American Division of the Schopenhauer Society
GV-8: Philosophy of Religion Group
GV-9: International Society for Comparative Studies of Chinese and Western Philosophy
GV-10: APA Committee on Indigenous Philosophers
GV-11: William James Society
GV-12: North American Nietzsche Society
GROUP MEETING PROGRAM

GROUP SESSION GI: THURSDAY, MARCH 31, 9:00 A.M.-NOON

GI-1. American Society for Aesthetics

9:00 a.m.-Noon
Speaker: Noël Carroll (CUNY, The Graduate Center)
“Art, Emotion, Attention”
Commentator: (To be announced)
Speaker: Jesse J. Prinz (CUNY Graduate Center)
“Seeing with Feeling”
Commentator: Guy Dove (University of Louisville)
Speaker: Anne Eaton (University of Illinois–Chicago)
(Title to be announced)
Commentator: (To be announced)

GI-2. American Society for Philosophy, Counseling, and Psychotherapy

9:00 a.m.-Noon
Topic: Philosophical Counseling: In Theory and Practice
Chair: Samuel Zinaich (The Institute for Critical Thinking)
Speakers: Elena Ruiz-Aho (Florida Gulf Coast University)
(Title to be announced)
Kevin Aho (Florida Gulf Coast University)
“On the (Im)possibility of Understanding the Psychopathologies of Colonialism”

GI-3. Society for the Philosophic Study of the Contemporary Visual Arts

9:00 a.m.-Noon
Topic: Wittgenstein, Narration, and Erotics in Aesthetics
Chair: Dan Flory (Montana State University)
Speakers: Craig Fox (California University of Pennsylvania)
“Why Wittgenstein and Film?”
Mario Sligan (University of Chicago)
“Implicit Fictional Narrators in Literature and Film: A Case for Asymmetry”
Richard Gilmore (Concordia College)
“The Erotic Hitchcock”
GI-4. Philosophy of Time Society
9:00 a.m.-Noon

Topic: Trenton Merricks’s Growing-Block View of Time

Speakers: Andrew M. Bailey (University of Notre Dame)
“Come Back, Growing Block”

James Fahey (Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute)
“The Past is Dead—Long Live the Past! Time, Change and the Growing Block”

GI-5. Society for the Study of the History of Analytical Philosophy
9:00 a.m.-Noon

Topic: Truth in Analytical Philosophy

Chair: Christopher Pincock (Purdue University)

Speakers: Fraser MacBride (University of Cambridge)
“Russell on Relations and Judgement”

Joshua Schwartz (University of Chicago)
“Quine and the Problem of Truth”

Paul Cudney (University of South Florida) and Eric Winsberg (University of South Florida)
“Through Tarski, Darkly: A Typology of Contemporary Concepts of Truth”

GI-6. Philosophy of Religion Group
9:00 a.m.-Noon

Topic: The Work of J. L. Schellenberg

Chair: Daniel Howard-Snyder (Western Washington University)

Speakers: J. L. Schellenberg (Mount St. Vincent University)
Andrew Chignell (Cornell University)
Terence Cuneo (University of Vermont)

Commentator: J. L. Schellenberg (Mount St. Vincent University)

GI-7. American Association of Philosophy Teachers
9:00 a.m.-Noon

Topic: Teaching Modern Philosophy Survey Courses

Chair: J. Jeremy Wisnewski (Hartwick College), Monica Greenwell Janzen (Hennepin Technical College), and Susan Hawthorne (Mount Holyoke College)

Speakers: Emily Esch (College of St. Benedict)

“Philosophy as Experiential Education”
Ramona Cristina Ilea (Pacific University)
“Beyond Service Learning: Civic Engagement in Philosophy Classes”

Barbara Fultner (Denison University)
“What Is the Place of Oral Examination in a Philosophy Course?”

Douglas Walcerz (York College of Pennsylvania) and Dennis M. Weiss (York College of Pennsylvania)
“External Evaluation in Large Enrollment Introduction to Philosophy Courses”

GI-8. **International Society for Environmental Ethics**

*9:00 a.m.-Noon*

**Topic:** Perspectives on Ecocentrism, Moral Considerability, and Humans’ Place in Nature

**Chair:** Chris Diehm (University of Wisconsin–Stevens Point)

**Speakers:**
- Antoine C. Dussault (University of Montreal)
  “What Moral Psychology for Ecocentrism?”
- John Basl (University of Wisconsin–Madison)
  “Extensionism, the Levels of Selection, and the Moral Considerability of Non-Individuals”
- Tom Sparrow (Duquesne University)
  “The Necessity of Place in Spinoza and Merleau-Ponty”

GI-9. **Hume Society: Helen Beebee, Hume on Causation**

*9:00 a.m.-Noon*

**Chair:** Abe Roth (Ohio State University)

**Critics:**
- Don Garrett (New York University)
- Angela Coventry (Portland State University)

**Author:** Helen Beebee (University of Birmingham)

GI-10. **American Society for Value Inquiry**

*9:00 a.m.-Noon*

**Topic:** Values and Well Being

**Chair:** Thomas Magnell (Drew University)

**Speakers:**
- Anthony Cunningham (St. John’s University [Minnesota])
  “Immersion: Final Ends and Flourishing”
- Mary Lenzi (University of Wisconsin–Platteville)
  “Looking for Happiness by Increasing Personal Capabilities and Skills in Higher Education”
GI-11. Society for the Metaphysics of Science  
9:00 a.m.-Noon  
**Topic:** Metaphysics and Science  
**Chair:** Carl Gillett (Northern Illinois University)  
**Speakers:**  
- Michael Silberstein (Elizabethtown College): “Metaphysics and Science or Science and Metaphysics: I Know the Lines but What’s Our Motivation?”  
**Commentator:** Kenneth Aizawa (Centenary College of Louisiana)  

GI-12. International Society of Chinese Philosophy  
9:00 a.m.-Noon  
**Topic:** Gongfu and Its Counterpart: The Paths of Moral Cultivation for Confucius and Aristotle  
**Chair:** Huaiyu Wang (Grand Valley State University)  
**Speakers:**  
- Peimin Ni (Grand Valley State University): “Morality or Technique: Constructing a Confucian Gongfu Ethics”  
- Chenyang Li (Nanyang Technological University): “What if Confucianism Does Not Have an Essence”  
- Huaiyu Wang (Grand Valley State University): “Xiao (Filial Devotion) and the Gongfu Process of Confucian Moral Cultivation”  
- May Sim (College of the Holy Cross): “Knowledge and Happiness in Aristotle and Confucius”  

GI-13. Adam Smith Society  
9:00 a.m.-Noon  
**Chair:** Remy Debes (University of Memphis)  
**Speaker:** Michael B. Gill (University of Arizona): “Moral Pluralism in Smith’s Theory of Moral Sentiments”  
**Commentator:** Colin Heydt (University of South Florida)  

**GROUP SESSION GII: THURSDAY, MARCH 31, 5:30-7:30 P.M.**  

GII-1. International Society of Chinese Philosophy  
5:30-7:30 p.m.  
**Topic:** The Ethical and Medical in Classical Chinese Thought
Chair: Huaiyu Wang (Grand Valley State University)
Speakers: Stephen Walker (University of Chicago)
“The Unity of Dao: Ethics and Metaethics in the Qiwulun”
Wei Zhang (University of South Florida)
“A Classical Chinese Medical Philosophy—in Comparative Perspective”
Alexus McLeod (University of Dayton)
“Jia Yi and Lu Jia on Shame, Self-Cultivation, and Social Order”

GII-2. Committee on Institutional Cooperation
5:30-7:30 p.m.
Topic: Business Meeting

GII-3. North American Nietzsche Society
5:30-7:30 p.m.
Speakers: Alex Prescott-Couch (Harvard University)
“Nietzsche and Williams on the Use of History”
Scott Jenkins (University of Kansas)
“Nietzsche’s Use of Monumental History”

GII-4. Society for Realist-Antirealist Discussion: Lee J. Braver,
A Think of This World: A History of Continental Anti-Realism
5:30-7:30 p.m.
Chair: Mark Okrent (Bates College)
Critic: Samuel C. Wheeler III (University of Connecticut)
Author: Lee J. Braver (Hiram College)

GII-5. Radical Philosophy Association
5:30-7:30 p.m.
Topic: The Problem of Pornography
Chair: Christa Hodapp (University of Kentucky)
Speakers: Jacob M. Held (University of Central Arkansas)
“Welcome to Pornland, Or, the Shifting Focus of the Anti-Pornography Debate”
Natalie Nenadic (University of Kentucky)
“Heidegger, Modernity, and Pornography”
Michelle R. Catlin (University of Kentucky)
“When ‘No’ Is Not an Option: Pornography and the Problem of Consent”
GII-6. Central Division Sartre Circle

5:30-7:30 p.m.
Chair: Constance Mui (Loyola University–New Orleans)
Speakers: Danielle LaSusa (Southwest Minnesota State University)
“Sartre’s Spirit of Seriousness and the Bad Faith of ‘Must-See’ Tourist Sites”
Matthew C. Eshleman (University of North Carolina–Wilmington)
“On Sartre and the Law of Identity”

GII-7. North American Kant Society

5:30-7:30 p.m.
Chair: Robert B. Louden (University of Southern Maine)
Speaker: Jens Timmerman (University of St. Andrews)
The Mary Gregor Lecture: “Kantian Dilemmas? Moral Conflict in Kant's Ethical Theory”
Commentator: Frederick Rauscher (Michigan State University)

GII-8. American Society for Value Inquiry

5:30-7:30 p.m.
Topic: Values in Reproduction and Children
Chair: G. John M. Abbarno (D'Youville College)
Speakers: Kimberly J. Leighton (American University)
“Reproduction Risks”
Jason Grinnell (Buffalo State College)
“Adoption Asymmetries”

GII-9. Society of Christian Philosophers

5:30-7:30 p.m.
Chair: Clyde Ragland (Saint Louis University)
Speaker: Robert M. Adams (University of North Carolina–Chapel Hill)
“Philosophical Issues in Schleiermacher’s Christology”

GROUP SESSION GIII: THURSDAY, MARCH 31, 7:40-10:40 P.M.

GIII-1. Association for Informal Logic and Critical Thinking

7:40-10:40 p.m.
Chair: Weston Jorde (Dakota County Technical College)
Speakers: Susana Nuccetelli (St. Cloud State University) and Gary Seay (City University of New York)
“Experimental Philosophy and Cognitive Diversity”
Don Hatcher (Baker University)
“The Ethics of Belief Revisited: Why Religious Beliefs Must Be Subject to Critique”

Panel Discussion: “Critical Thinking Across the Curriculum: Is Philosophy Asleep at the Job?”
Panelists: Robert H. Ennis (University of Illinois–Urbana-Champaign)
Don Hatcher (Baker University)
Kevin Possin (Winona State University)

GIII-2. Society for the Philosophical Study of Education
7:40-10:40 p.m.
Topic: Critical Thinking and Curriculum: History, Uses, Relevance, Meaning
Speakers: Joseph S. Freedman (Alabama State University)
“Critical Thinking, Creativity, and the Curriculum: A Preliminary Pre-History and Some Ramifications Thereof for Contemporary Academic Instruction”
Dibakar Pal (Independent Scholar)
“Of Scholarly Writing and Creative Writing (A Satirical Approach)”
Nesreen Akhtarkhavari (DePaul University)
“Critical Thinking in the Language and Culture Classroom: Opening the Global Portal”
Alan Clinton (University of Miami)
“Desire, Critical Thinking, and Research Writing in the Sciences”
David L. Mosley (Bellarmine University)
“Nietzsche, Beethoven, and the Composition of History”
Alison Spacciapoli
“‘Why Does This Pertain to Me?’ The Importance of Criticism and Theory in a High School English Classroom”
Philip L. Smith (Ohio State University)
“Looking At Dewey’s Philosophy of Education as a Theory of Curriculum Rather Than as a Model for Teaching”

7:40-10:40 p.m.
Speaker: Lewis Gordon (Temple University)
Commentators: Charles Mills (Northwestern University)
Kevin M. Graham (Creighton University)
GIII-4. Society for the Philosophy of Creativity

7:40-10:40 p.m.

**Topic:** Deleuze, Whitehead, and Bergson on Creativity

Chair: John Cogan (Eckerd College)

Speaker: Keith A. Robinson (University of South Dakota)
“Creativity in Deleuze and Whitehead”

Commentator: John R. Hartmann (Southern Illinois University–Carbondale)

Speaker: Leonard Lawlor (University of Memphis)
“The Creation of Concepts in Bergson”

Commentator: Pete A. Y. Gunter (University of North Texas)

GIII-5. International Society for Comparative Studies of Chinese and Western Philosophy

7:40-10:40 p.m.

**Topic:** Comparative Perspectives on Empirical Psychology and Virtue Ethics

Chair: Joel Kupperman (University of Connecticut)

Speakers:
- Nancy E. Snow (Marquette University)
  “The Geography of Thought Revisited: Reflections on Situationism and the Psychology of Asians”
- Hagop Sarkissian (Baruch College–CUNY)
  “Virtue and Imposition”
- Christian Miller (Wake Forest University)
  “The Real Challenge to Virtue Ethics from Empirical Psychology”
- Stephen C. Angle (Wesleyan University)
  “Seeing Confucian ‘Active Moral Perception’ in Light of Contemporary Psychology”

Commentator: Joel Kupperman (University of Connecticut)

GIII-6. Great Lakes Mind and Science Consortium

7:40-10:40 p.m.

Chair: Colin Klein (University of Illinois–Chicago)

GIII-7. Society for the Philosphic Study of the Contemporary Visual Arts

7:40-10:40 p.m.

**Topic:** Duty, Beauty, and Comedy in Film

Chair: Richard Gilmore (Concordia College)

Speakers:
- Daw-Nay Evans (DePaul University)
  “The Duty of Reason: Kantian Ethics in *High Noon*”
Mélanie V. Walton (Hiram College)
“Classical and Kantian Dichotomies in Cocteau’s *La Belle et la Bête*”

Sheryl Tuttle Ross (University of Wisconsin–La Crosse)
“500 Days of Summer: A Post-Modern Romantic Comedy”

GIII-8. Society for the Study of Process Philosophies
7:40-10:40 p.m.

**Topic:** Whiteheadian Philosophy

Chair: Scott W. Sinclair (St. Louis Community College–Forest Park)

Speakers: William Hamrick (Southern Illinois University Edwardsville)
“A Whiteheadian Key to Merleau-Ponty’s Fundamental Thought”

Gary L. Herstein (Muskingum College)
“Whitehead’s Theory of Extension: Spatial Reasoning as the Bridge between Logic and Metaphysics”

S. Cheyenne Boylen (Sonoma State University)
“Emotion as Process: A Tribute to Alfred North Whitehead”

GIII-9. Society for Lesbian and Gay Philosophy
7:40-10:40 p.m.

Speakers: Bassam Romaya (Gettysburg College)
“Queer Perspectives and the Just War Tradition: Prospects for a Queer War Theory”

Natasha Noel Liebig (University of South Florida)
“The Trauma of Coming-Out and the Plasticity of Body Image and Body Schema”

Commentator: Dennis R. Cooley (North Dakota State University)

GROUP SESSION GIV: FRIDAY, APRIL 1, 7:00-10:00 P.M.

GIV-1. Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy
7:00-10:00 p.m.

Chair: Anthony Preus (Binghamton University)

Speakers: Andrew Payne (St. Joseph’s University)
“Justice as Self-Transmitting Power and Just Acts in *Republic 4***

Jerry Green (University of Texas–Austin)
“Self-Love in the Aristotelian Ethics”
Yancy Hughes Dominick (Seattle University)
“Climate and Teleology in Aristotle’s Physics II.8”

GIV-2. Society for the Philosophical Study of Education
7:00-10:00 p.m.
Topic: Non-Western Contributions to the Philosophy of Education and Other Concerns
Speakers: Don Hufford (Newman University)
“Connecting a Confucian Sensibility to a Philosophy of Education”
Emery J. Hyslop-Margison (University of New Brunswick)
“The Legacy of Cartesian Dualism in Educational Thought”
Antonina Lukenchuk (National-Louis University)
“Madame Blavatsky Re-visited: Interlinking the Orient and the Occident”
Sam Rocha (Ohio State University)
“The Ambiguity of ‘Spanish’”
Kaori Takano (University of Dayton)
“The Roles of the Media and Educators: A Critical Analysis of Food Education in Japan”
Thenjiwe Emily Major (University of Botswana)
“Paolo Freire’s Education for Freedom”
Cheu-Jey Lee (Indiana University-Purdue University-Fort Wayne)
“On the Problem of Emancipation in Education”

GIV-3. Radical Philosophy Association
7:00-10:00 p.m.
Topic: Undocumented People: Political Philosophy at the Intersection of Race, Ethnicity, Class, and the Nation-State
Chair: Amelia Wirts (Boston College)
Speakers: José Jorge Mendoza (University of Oregon)
“The Political Philosophy of Undocumented Immigration”
Kim Diaz (Texas A&M University)
“U.S. Border Wall: A Poggean Analysis of Illegal Immigration”
Carlos Alberto Sanchez (San Jose State University)
“On Documents and Subjectivity: The Case of Mexican Immigrants”
Eduardo Mendieta (SUNY–Stony Brook)
“The Right to Have Rights: Immigration, Citizenship, and Law”

**GIV-4. Bertrand Russell Society**

7:00-10:00 p.m.

Speakers: Kevin C. Klement (University of Massachusetts–Amherst)
“Early Russell on Plurals and Types”
Benjamin Hassman (University of Iowa)
“How a Non-Effective Yablo Paradox Works”
Iva Apostolova (Carleton University)
“Russell’s Two Theories of Memory”
Dustin Olson (McMaster University)
“Russell’s Compatibilist Theory of Time and Succession in Four Dimensions”

**GIV-5. Society for Analytical Feminism**

7:00-10:00 p.m.

Chair: Robin Dillon (Lehigh University)
Speaker: Elizabeth Victor (University of South Florida)
“The Paradox of Banning Scientific Inquiry: Another Look at Kitcher’s *Science, Truth, and Democracy*”
Commentator: Kristen Intemann (Montana State University)
Speaker: Esa Diaz-Leon (University of Manitoba)
“What Is Social Construction?”
Commentator: Cathleen Muller (Marist College)
Speaker: Pieranna Garavaso (University of Minnesota–Morris)
“Psychological Continuity and Trauma”
Commentator: Hilde Lindemann (Michigan State University)

**GIV-6. Society for Business Ethics**

7:00-10:00 p.m.

**Topic:** Multinationals, Developing Nations, and Human Rights

Chair: Jeffrey Moriarty (Bentley University)
Speakers: Barbara Frey (University of Minnesota)
Ian Maitland (University of Minnesota–Twin Cities)
Florian Wettstein (University of Saint Thomas [St. Paul])
GIV-7. Society for the Advancement of American Philosophy  
7:00-10:00 p.m.  

**Topic:** Pragmatism, Theism, and Community  

**Speakers:**  
- Tad Bratkowski (Southern Illinois University–Carbondale)  
  “Rorty on Heidegger and Derrida: Magic Words, Ascetic Priests, and the Apparent Hypocrisy”  
- Serge Grigoriev (Ithaca College)  
  “When Adam Dalf and Eve Span: Rorty, Religion, and the Politics of the Poor”  
- Jacob Lynn Goodson (College of William and Mary)  
  “William James and the Virtues of a Community of Interpretation”  
- Alan Van Wyk (Hamline University)  
  “Necessity Without Privilege: The Secularization of God and a Politics of Possibility”

GIV-8. Midwest Society for Women in Philosophy  
7:00-10:00 p.m.  

**Topic:** Reproductive Justice  

**Speakers:**  
- Sonya Charles (Cleveland State University)  
  “Reproductive Justice and Domestic Violence”  
- Jennifer Benson (Washington College) and Allison Wolf (Simpson College)  
  “Medicalizing the Reproduction of Whiteness”

GIV-9. International Society for Environmental Ethics  
7:00-10:00 p.m.  

**Topic:** Frameworks for Environmental Policy and Practice  

**Chair:** Marion Hourdequin (Colorado College)  

**Speakers:**  
- Greg Bognar (New York University)  
  “Can the Maximin Principle Serve as a Basis for Climate Change Policy?”  
- Anthony Reeves (SUNY–Binghamton) and Jamie Kelly (Vassar College)  
  “Strict Liability as a Framework for Environmental Injury: Three Moral Arguments”  
- Howard Curzer (Texas Tech University), Peter Muhlburger (Texas Tech University), Gad Perry (Texas Tech University), and Mark Wallace (Texas Tech University)  
  “Environmental Research Ethics: Extensions of the Three Rs”
GIV-10. Society of Christian Philosophers
1:30-3:30 p.m. (NOTE TIME)
Topic: Executive Committee Meeting

GROUP SESSION GV: SATURDAY, APRIL 2, 12:15-2:15 P.M.

GV-1. Josiah Royce Society
12:15-2:15 p.m.
Chair: Kara Barnette (University of Oregon)
Speakers: Vincent Colapietro (Pennsylvania State University)
          Kimberly Garchar (Kent State University)
          Benjamin Craig (Southern Illinois University–Carbondale)
Commentator: Matt Jacobs (University of Oregon)

GV-2. Society for the Advancement of American Philosophy
12:15-2:15 p.m.
Topic: Book Session on Jacob Goodson and Brad Stone,
      Richard Rorty and Philosophical Theology
Speakers: Roger Ward (Georgetown College)
          “Therapy to Apocalypse: Encountering the Abyss of
          Epistemology in James and Rorty”
          Brad Elliott Stone (Loyola Marymount University)
          “Can There Be Hope without Prophecy?”
          Keith Starkenburg (Trinity Christian College)
          “What the Apostles Will Let Us Get Away with
          Saying: Plantinga and Rorty on the Social
          Establishment of Religious Belief”

GV-3. Experimental Philosophy Society
12:15-2:15 p.m.
Speakers: Stephanie Samayoa (Schreiner University)
          “Heuristics, Life Sustaining Treatments, and
          Paternalism”
          Adam Feltz (Schreiner University)
          Chad Gonnerman (Indiana University–Bloomington),
          Shane Reuter (University of Evansville), and
          Jonathan Weinberg (Indiana University–Bloomington)
          “More Oversensitive Intuitions: Print Fonts and
          Could Choose Otherwise”
          Joe Paxton (Harvard University)
          “Overriding Moral Intuitions”
Chandra Sripada (University of Michigan–Ann Arbor)
“Being the Source of Yourself: Folk Intuitions about Free Will and ‘Ultimate Control’”
Julio Bermúdez (Catholic University of America)
“The Empirical Profile of Beauty”
Brian Robinson (CUNY Graduate Center)
“The Danger of Data-Driven Theories”

GV-4. Society for the Study of Indian and Tibetan Buddhist Philosophy
12:15-2:15 p.m.
Topic: The Nature of Consciousness in Indo-Tibetan Buddhist Philosophy

GV-5. American Maritain Association
12:15-2:15 p.m.
Topic: Catholic Perspectives on Recent Protestant Philosophy of Religion
Chair: Jorge L. A. Garcia (Boston College)
Speakers: Laura L. Garcia (Boston College)
“Mavrodes on Natural and Revealed Theology”
Thomas D. Sullivan (University of Saint Thomas [St. Paul])
“Swinburne and Plantinga: Appreciation and Challenges”

GV-6. Concerned Philosophers for Peace
12:15-2:15 p.m.
Topic: Conceptualizing Communication as Intercultural
Chair: Danielle Poe (University of Dayton)
Speakers: Samuel Imbo (Hamline University)
“Intercultural Dialogue in Muslim-majority Malaysia”
Gail M. Presbey (University of Detroit Mercy)
“Intercultural Communication and the Case of Arizona’s Ban on Ethnic Studies”
Eric Skoglund (Guest Panelist)
“Intercultural Communication and the Case of Urban Art in Minneapolis”
GV-7. **North American Division of the Schopenhauer Society**

12:15-2:15 p.m.

**Topic:** In memory of G. Steven Neeley, Esq.

Chair: Edward E. Erdmann (University of Wisconsin–Whitewater)

Speakers: David E. Cartwright (University of Wisconsin–Whitewater)

“Schopenhauer and Neeley”

Jörg Bernardy (Universität Hildesheim, Institut für Philosophie)

“Pure Knowledge and Pure Experience: A Comparative Study of Schopenhauer and Nishida”

Dale E. Snow (Loyola University Maryland)

“Schopenhauer and Schelling on Nature”

Nicholas Guardiano (Southern Illinois University)

“Schopenhauer and Proust on the Periods of Life”

GV-8. **Philosophy of Religion Group**

12:15-2:15 p.m.

**Topic:** The Work of J. L. Schellenberg

Chair: Daniel Howard-Snyder (Western Washington University)

Speakers: Daniel Howard-Snyder (Western Washington University)

J. L. Schellenberg (Mount St. Vincent University)

Wes Morriston (University of Colorado–Boulder)

Commentator: J. L. Schellenberg (Mount St. Vincent University)

GV-9. **International Society for Comparative Studies of Chinese and Western Philosophy**

12:15-2:15 p.m.

**Topic:** Aristotelian Justice and the Mencian Virtues

Chair: Sean P. Walsh (University of Minnesota–Duluth)

Speakers: Howard Curzer (Texas Tech University)

“There Ain’t No Justice: The Shocking Absence of Aristotelian Virtues in the *Mencius*”

Heidi M. Giebel (University of Saint Thomas [St. Paul])

“In Search of the Missing Virtue(s): Justice, Liberality, and Benevolence in Aquinas and Mencius”

Sean McAleer (University of Wisconsin–Eau Claire)

“Mencius and Aristotle on Friendship and Justice”
Sean P. Walsh (University of Minnesota Duluth)
“Justice, Liberality, and Abject Poverty for Mencius’ Junzi and Aristotle’s Megalopsychos”

GV-10. Committee on Indigenous Philosophers: Business Meeting
12:15-2:15 p.m.

GV-11. William James Society
12:15-2:15 p.m.
Topic: The One [Philosopher] and the Many [Applications]: Pluralistic Uses of William James
Speakers: Trevor Pearce (University of Western Ontario)
“The Biological Roots of Pragmatism: William James and Organism-Environment Interaction”

Cecilia Watson (University of Chicago)
“Men of Light and Men of Line: Pragmatism’s Debt to Visual Art”

Michael Dieciuc (Independent Scholar)
“How Pragmatism Guides the Resurgence in Psychedelic Research”

Trygve V. R. Throntveit (Harvard University)
“The Political Ethics of William James”

GV-12. North American Nietzsche Society
12:15-2:15 p.m.
Topic: Nietzsche, Psychology, and Genealogy
Chair: William S. Schroeder (University of Illinois–Urbana-Champaign)

Speakers: Antony Aumann (Northern Michigan University)
“On the Cognitive Value of Literature: the Case of Nietzsche’s Genealogy”

Joseph Swenson (University of Illinois–Urbana-Champaign)
“Sublimation and Affirmation in Nietzsche’s Psychology”
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ABSTRACTS OF COLLOQUIUM AND SUBMITTED SYMPOSIUM PAPERS

CIRCULARITY AND NORMATIVE EXPRESSIVISM (IV-J)

**SEAN AAS (BROWN UNIVERSITY)**

*Semantic minimalism* presents to meta-normative expressivism a kind of crisis-in-opportunity: the opportunity, to explain the objectivity of normative judgment without transgressing the boundaries of a plausible ontological naturalism; the danger, that in so doing it loses its distinctness. Extant attempts to respond to this danger by making space for a distinctively irrealist expressivism don’t make space enough, in that they exclude forms of expressivism which maintain, *pace* more conventional forms of expressivism, that normative thoughts (like all thoughts, perhaps) cannot be explained in fundamentally non-normative terms. Such views might yet count as irrealist, I argue, so long as they maintain that normative thought, though representational in the *minimal* sense that a normative judgment is correct just in case its content obtains, is not representational in the *maximal* sense that the correctness or incorrectness of a normative judgments derives *ultimately* from the correctness of some (possibly identical) minimal representation or other.

ORIGIN SENSITIVE GOODS (I-J)

**JOSEPH Q. ADAMS (RICE UNIVERSITY)**

George Sher argues that a state may use non-reason-based methods to promote one conception of the good over another with no reduction, on balance, in the value of autonomy. The crucial move is this: a good chosen non-autonomously may be later chosen autonomously. One wonders, however, whether all goods exhibit this quality; whether there are some goods whose non-autonomous origin permanently taints all downstream impetuses for choosing them. I argue that such *origin-sensitive goods* exist. A good is origin-sensitive iff its being chosen via at least one non-reason-based method at $t_1$ makes it incapable of being chosen autonomously at any later time $t_{n+1}$. Knowledge, leisure, career, and moral excellence all turn out to be origin-sensitive with respect to otherwise permissible non-reason-based methods. Because of this, the value autonomy supports a qualified neutralism, that is, a prohibition of the use of certain non-reason-based methods of promoting certain goods.
Inferential Internalism and the Argument from Responsible Belief (III-J)
David Alexander (Iowa State University)

Inferential Internalists accept the Principle of Inferential Justification (PIJ), according to which one has inferential justification for believing P on the basis of E only if one has justification for believing that E makes probable P. In this paper, I critically assess a recent argument on behalf of PIJ due to Leite (2008). According to Leite, believing on the basis of reasons without satisfying PIJ is epistemically irresponsible. I contend that Leite’s argument supports not the internalist PIJ, but instead a principle consistent with externalism that I call the Principle of Reflective Inferential Defeat (RID). According to RID, to have inferential justification one need not be justified in believing that one’s reasons are good, but one must lack justification for not believing that they are good.

What Did “Octomom” Do Wrong?: Exploring the Ethics of Fertility Treatments (I-F)
Bertha Alvarez Manninen (Arizona State University at the West Campus)

The advent and development of various forms of fertility treatments have made the dream of parenthood concrete for many who cannot achieve it through traditional modes of conception. Yet, like many scientific advances, fertility treatments have been misused. Although still rare compared to the birth of singletons, the number of triplets, quadruplets, and other higher-order multiple births have quadrupled in the past thirty years, mostly due to the increasing use of fertility treatments. Yet the gestation of multiple fetuses can result in dire consequences for them. They can be miscarried, stillborn, or die shortly after birth. When they do survive, they are often born prematurely and with a low birth weight, and may suffer from a lifetime of physical or developmental impairments. The objective of this paper is to explore the moral permissibility of certain uses of fertility treatments given the known dangers that may result from higher-order multiple births.

Perceptual Normativity and Accuracy (VI-J)
Richard Kenneth Atkins (Fordham University)

The accuracy intuition—that a perception is good if, and only if, it is accurate—can be cashed out either propositionally or representationally. The propositional understanding is correct. The representational understanding is not, but reflection on why it’s not reveals that perceptual normativity is a kind of successfulness.

The Kantian Case Against Torture (III-I)
Peter Brian Barry (Saginaw Valley State University)

In the law, legal prohibitions of torture are common and typically couched in absolutist terms. Yet it is arguably possible to maintain both that torture should be absolutely prohibited by the law while maintaining that torture is morally permissible in some circumstances while not being a moral
I propose to consider, then, the absolutist case against torture—or, simply, the absolutist case—that torture is always and everywhere morally wrong. I first propose a heuristic for evaluating the absolutist case and then consider a series of Kantian arguments for it, including a series of arguments that violates the Kantian prohibition against using people merely as a means to an end but also arguments inspired by Kant's concern with virtue. Ultimately, I conclude that no Kantian argument supports the absolutist case—that neither a Kantian appeal to humanity or to virtue suffice to show that torture is absolutely prohibited.

**Multiple Realizability and the Mental Constraint Thesis (VI-K)**

*Mark D. Bauer (Virginia Tech)*

Shapiro has argued that the multiple realizability thesis for psychology, despite its broad acceptance, is far from being a well-established thesis. He suggests that not only do many of the standard examples of multiple realizability fail to be clearly examples but a competing thesis ("the mental constraint thesis") that human-like minds are severely constrained in their physical realization is the more likely thesis. I will argue, however, that Shapiro's mental constraint thesis is not a competing thesis with the multiple realizability thesis. Further, once it is understood how these theses are compatible, the widespread acceptance of multiple realizability looks entirely reasonable.

**Default Reasoning with FDE (I-G)**

*Katalin Bimbo (University of Alberta)*

Default logic was introduced as an amendment to classical logic to enable a modeling of certain non-monotonic inferences. We introduce default rules into fde, the logic of first-degree entailments, and we define a constructive procedure to generate extensions. We consider some standard examples in this context, and then we prove that our definition yields exactly the same set of extensions as the fixed point based definition does. Fde with default rules is less likely to lead to absolute inconsistency than classical logic with default rules, which is clearly an advantage of the present approach.

**Perfect Duties to Oneself and Latitude of Choice: A Question of Morality or Prudence? (III-I)**

*Mavis Biss (University of Wisconsin-Madison)*

In this paper I focus on Kant's presentation of perfect duties to oneself as a moral being in the Doctrine of Virtue (Tugendlehre) of the Metaphysics of Morals in order to argue that the ambiguity and ambivalence in Kant's account of latitude of choice with respect to duties of virtue calls his straightforward division between morality and prudence into question. According to the prudential latitude model, the kind of action one does to fulfill ethical duties is a moral choice, while the degree of action is a prudential choice. Kant does not clearly outline which duties fit this model,
nor is it clear whether his position makes good sense of the boundary between morality and prudence given his concern with moral self-preservation and cultivation. I draw on Barbara Herman’s work to explain the tension between Kant’s view of obligatory ends and his statement of the prudential latitude view.

**SEARLE’S WALL (VI-K)**

*JAMES C. BLACKMON (SAN FRANCISCO STATE UNIVERSITY)*

John Searle has objected to computational theories of mind with an objection we can call Searle’s Wall. Even his wall, he claims, implements the WordStar program according to the standard definition of implementation because there is some “pattern of molecule movements” that is isomorphic to the formal structure of WordStar. Program implementation, Searle charges, is merely observer-relative and thus not an intrinsic feature of the world. I argue, first, that analogous charges involving other concepts (motion and meaning) lead to absurdities no one accepts. Second, I show that Searle’s interpretation of the computationalist’s position is incoherent, yielding the consequence that nothing computes anything. I propose an alternative account, one that is in accordance with the way engineers, programmers, and cognitive scientists use the concept of computation in their empirical research and development. This alternative interpretation provides the basis of a philosophical analysis of program implementation.

**THE PROBLEM OF EXOGENEITY IN DEBATES ON GLOBAL JUSTICE (V-I)**

*IDIL BORAN (YORK UNIVERSITY)*

The aim of this paper is to examine the procedure of developing a theory of global justice from the cosmopolitan ideal, favored by many cosmopolitan theorists. The paper reveals that this way of engaging in inquiry on global justice is vulnerable to what will be referred to as “the problem of exogeneity.” This problem arises because theorists seek to articulate recommendations for global justice, from a conception of justice that is completely external to the economic and business transactions that make up the structure of global markets. I propose an alternative approach, whereby problems of justice are identified endogenously, from within the structure of global markets and business operations. I explain how the proposed approach can bring to light new insights for debates on global justice, without compromising overall cosmopolitan motivations. This can potentially advance the debates by bringing more nuances and theoretical sophistication.

**THE MULTIVERSE AND THE INVERSE GAMBLER’S FALLACY: A RESPONSE TO NICK BOSTROM ON BEHALF OF ROGER WHITE (III-K)**

*KENNETH A. BOYCE (UNIVERSITY OF NOTRE DAME)*

Many have claimed that the apparent fine-tuning of the universe is evidence that our universe is but one of numerous (perhaps infinitely many) other universes. This claim, however, has been forcefully challenged by Roger
White. White, developing an objection originally put forward by Ian Hacking, compellingly argues that those who claim that the fine tuning of our universe provides evidence for there being a large number of universes commit what Hacking dubbed “the inverse gambler’s fallacy.” In this paper, I defend White’s thesis from an objection to it that has been raised by Nick Bostrom.

DEFUSING THE DEMANDINGNESS OBJECTION (II-J)
MATTHEW C. BRADDOCK (DUKE UNIVERSITY)

A popular objection in moral philosophy has this form:

(premise) Moral view X is too demanding.
(premise) If a moral view is too demanding, it is mistaken.
(conclusion) Therefore, moral view X is mistaken.

This paper does three things: (i) it clarifies the structure of the various demandingness objections on the market, (ii) develops a very formidable and philosophically interesting form of the demandingness objection that targets a wide scope of views, and (iii) challenges this formidable objection with an argument from unreliability the form of which may, interestingly, be effectively deployed in other areas of philosophy.

A PROBLEM FOR INTRALEVEL MENTAL CAUSATION (V-H)
ANDREI A. BUCKAREFF (MARIST COLLEGE)

Recently, John Gibbons has proposed a solution to the problem of causal exclusion for nonreductive physicalism in the philosophy of mind. Gibbons’s solution relies on treating mental causation as intralevel mental to mental causation, rather than as involving any interlevel mental to physical causation. I raise problems for Gibbons’s intralevelist solution that stem from action-theoretic considerations. Specifically, I focus on the failure of Gibbons’s proposal to account for the problem of basic causal deviance in the etiology of action. The upshot of my argument is that the intralevelist proposal Gibbons offers to rescue nonreductive physicalism is less promising than it appears at first glance.

EVIDENTIALISM, ATTITUDINALISM, AND A CAUSAL-CONSTRUAL ACCOUNT OF THE SUPPORTS RELATION (II-I)
RYAN BYERLY (BAYLOR UNIVERSITY)

In a forthcoming collection of essays, philosophers Keith DeRose, Duncan Pritchard, and Alvin Goldman present prima facie serious concerns for Conee’s and Feldman’s (C&F’s) evidentialist views. In this paper, I will show that all three authors have overlooked a central feature of the commentary C&F have offered on EJ. They have overlooked what I will call C&F’s attitudinalist constraint on the supports relation—that an experience or belief e supports a proposition p for a subject S only if S takes a certain kind of attitude toward the relation between e and p. Unfortunately, C&F’s attitudinalist constraint makes justification too hard to come by.
There is, however, another view about the supports relation which will dispel the concerns of DeRose, Goldman, and Pritchard just as well as the attitudinalist constraint and which is not subject to this criticism. This view I call my Causal-Constreual Account of the supports relation.

**IS EVIL JUST VERY WRONG? (I-J)**  
**TODD C. CALDER (SAINT MARY’S UNIVERSITY)**  
Is evil a distinct moral concept? Or are evil actions just very wrong actions? Some philosophers have argued that evil is a distinct moral concept. These philosophers argue that evil is qualitatively distinct from ordinary wrongdoing. Other philosophers have argued that evil is only quantitatively distinct from ordinary wrongdoing. On this view, evil is just the very wrong. In this paper I argue that evil is qualitatively distinct from ordinary wrongdoing. The first part of the paper is critical. I argue that a recent attempt by Luke Russell to show that evil is only quantitatively distinct from ordinary wrongdoing fails. I then argue that evil is not just the very wrong on any plausible theory of wrongdoing and evil. Toward the end of the paper I sketch a theory of evil that makes a genuinely qualitative distinction between evil and wrongdoing.

**SACRIFICE AND MORAL OBLIGATION (V-K)**  
**VANESSA CARBONELL (UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI)**  
One way of delineating the boundary between obligation and supererogation is by appealing to the notion of sacrifice. An action cannot be obligatory, we seem to think, if it involves too much of a sacrifice. But if sacrifice is to play so important a role in our moral theory—that is, the role of absolving us of moral obligations—then surely we need a precise account of just what sacrifice is. In this paper, I argue that the notion of sacrifice that could properly play this role is one that is objective rather than subjective, normative rather than descriptive, and subject to a constraint of public intelligibility. A sacrifice, I argue, is a gross loss of well being, where well being is defined agent-neutrally. My account preserves our intuition that not just anything can count as a sacrifice, while nevertheless explaining unusual cases.

**MATHEMATICAL INDUCTION AND EXPLANATORY VALUE IN MATHEMATICS (I-G)**  
**FABRIZIO CARIANI (NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY)**  
Marc Lange recently argued that almost all proofs by mathematical induction fail to provide explanations of their conclusions. His arguments turn on showing that for each argument by mathematical induction X, there is another argument Y, for the same conclusion such that (i) X and Y have the same claim to be considered the explanation of the conclusion and (ii) X and Y cannot both explain the conclusion. I argue that Lange’s argument turns on ignoring several ways in which arguments can come to have different explanatory values. Once those are appreciated, (i) fails in a number of interesting cases. However, I do not take the moral to be that
mathematical inductions are explanatory. Rather, I conclude by sketching a view on which there is no uniform answer to the question whether mathematical inductions explain their conclusions.

Is Heidegger’s Ontological Difference a Sharp or Gradual Difference?

(VI-G)

Taylor Carman (Barnard College)

Central to Heidegger’s philosophy is what he calls the “ontological difference,” the difference between entities or what is (das Seiende) and being (das Sein). Is the ontological difference a sharp or a gradual difference? On the one hand, Heidegger seems to endorse Hegel’s thesis that “Pure being and pure nothing are...the same,” for being is literally no thing, i.e., not an entity. The opposite of nothing is therefore not being, but something, or entities—and surely the distinction between nothing and something is a sharp distinction. But this is not obvious. Heidegger rejects the thesis, common to Kant and Hegel, that being is simple, hence inaccessible to thought. Moreover, he is at least sympathetic to a long metaphysical tradition that goes back to the Presocratics, and which includes Plato, Descartes, and Kant, that countenances degrees of being. And to say that there are degrees of being is to say that the difference between being and nonbeing (or, better, between something and nothing) is a gradual difference. So, although logically the distinction between something and nothing could be said to be sharp, that purely logical distinction sheds no light on Heidegger’s notion of “the nothing” (das Nichts), which he denies is an artifact of negation, understood either logically or psychologically. The ontological difference is therefore sharp in one sense and gradual in another. Metaphysically, it may be gradual, inasmuch as we can understand (as some have understood) the difference between something and nothing as a gradual difference. Methodologically, however, the difference remains sharp, since “ontological” questions have transcendental status in relation to “ontic” questions.

Thick Ethical Concepts Still Cannot Be Disentangled: A Critical Response to Payne, Blumberg, and Blackburn (IV-J)

Nathan Carson (Baylor University)

Thick ethical concepts like “generous” and “cruel” frequently structure our evaluative experiences. Phenomenologically, the evaluative and descriptive aspects of these concepts appear to constitute a thoroughly entangled, seamless apprehension of, say, cruelty. Non-cognitivism standardly holds that evaluative and descriptive aspects of these concepts can be disentangled. Against this, I contend that the most recent and strongest non-cognitivist arguments for disentanglement fail. First, I articulate several problems thick concepts traditionally pose for non-cognitivists. Then I examine Payne’s (2005) and Blomberg’s (2007) recent endorsements of disentanglement, showing why each account fails. Finally, I address Blackburn’s older (1992; 1998), but stronger arguments for disentanglement. I argue that Aristotelian cognitivists can accommodate
Blackburn’s insights, while he cannot consistently affirm them. Until successful disentanglement arguments are forthcoming, we can accept the phenomenologically integrated character of evaluative appearances through thick ethical concepts, retaining the presumption in favor of metaethical cognitivism about value that their entanglement provides.

**Self-Determination, Justice, and Flourishing: Reframing the Normative Question of Secession (III-H)**

**Amandine Catala (University of Colorado–Boulder)**

Advantages of the three main types of normative theory of secession include their respective emphasis on certain social values (self-determination, justice, flourishing) and attention to certain normative constraints (state viability, protection of human rights, territorial justification). Each theory focuses on one social value and on one or two normative constraints. The theories’ problems are that they each neglect at least one of the normative constraints, thereby yielding inadequate answers to the normative question of secession. I argue that these problems are due to the theories’ misconstruing the social values on which they respectively rely, which in turn is due to their relying primarily on only one value. I argue that a framework that is able to incorporate all three values by balancing them against each other precludes altogether the theories’ problems. I therefore propose a new theory of secession, which combines current theories’ advantages without reproducing their problems.

**A Response to Gadamer’s Use of Horizons in His Criticisms of Husserl on Intersubjectivity (I-I)**

**Eric Chelstrom (Grand Valley State University)**

In this paper, I respond to one facet of Hans Georg Gadamer’s critique of Edmund Husserl’s account of intersubjectivity. Specifically, I respond to Gadamer’s criticisms that are centered on horizon intentionality. While Gadamer’s critique is motivated by realist concerns, contra Husserl’s transcendental idealism, I argue Gadamer overreaches in his criticisms. Gadamer’s critique underplays the asymmetry essential to intersubjective experiences. While he points to areas that the Husserlian account can be improved upon, his criticisms are not devastating against the Husserlian project.

**Enkrasia and Responding to Reasons (III-L)**

**Allen Coates (East Tennessee State University)**

Agents are enkritic when they intend to do what they believe they ought to do and are akratic otherwise. That rationality requires you to be enkritic is uncontroversial. But as we will see, the same psychological mechanisms that lead you to be akratic can also lead you to be enkritic, and enkrasia produced in this way is no more rational than akrasia. Thus it is possible to become enkritic in the wrong way, and so what I will call the *enkritic requirement* demands that you become enkritic in the right way. The aim
of this paper is to find a formulation of this requirement that best captures this demand.

**ARISTOTLE, ZENO, AND CONTINUITY (VI-I)**

_Caleb Cohoe (Princeton University)_

Aristotle’s distinctive understanding of continuity allows him to give an elegant solution to Zeno’s paradox of half-distances. In contrast to the classical modern conception, Aristotle holds that continuity is basic. The continuous is infinitely divisible but actually undivided. Its parts are only potential. Zeno’s paradox requires an actually infinite number of divisions in the continuous. It assumes that every motion is composed of an infinite number of motions. Aristotle argues that when a motion is actually divided at some midpoint the mobile must arrive at and then depart from this point. This necessitates some interval of rest and thus the motion will no longer be continuous. A motion cannot be composed of many motions. The mobile does not arrive at and depart from each half-distance but goes through them all potentially by going through the whole.

**KNOWABILITY AND SINGULAR THOUGHT: DE RE KNOWLEDGE AND SEMANTIC ASCENT (III-J)**

_Ezra J. Cook (Northwestern University)_

In 1963 Frederic Fitch published a paper titled “A Logical Analysis of Some Value Concepts.” In this paper he introduced six theorems, of which little was discussed. Hart and McGinn (1976) pointed out that Theorem 5 collapses a weak epistemic principle commonly attributed to verificationists or anti-realists into a position of naive idealism: all truths are known by some person at some time. It is the purpose of this paper to examine theorems 4 and 5, as it has been noted that these theorems establish necessary limits on one’s epistemic ability independently of any considerations related to the commitments of the anti-realist, and to then show that the only way in which this collapse can be generated is through singular thought about abstract objects.

**SEEING AND IMAGINATION: EMOTIONAL RESPONSE TO FICTIONAL FILM (I-K)**

_Eva M. Dadlez (University of Central Oklahoma)_

In his “Seeing Theory,” Malcolm Turvey maintains that we respond emotionally to cinematic representations rather than thoughts entertained in imagination. He argues against what I will refer to as the thought/imagination theory (a theory Turvey ascribes to Noel Carroll and Murray Smith) both from ontological parsimony and by proposing a more ontologically correct candidate for the role of object/cause of our emotional response. I will contend that these arguments fail, not least because Turvey fails to acknowledge the familiar characterization of emotions as evaluations or construals. These latter may, in fact, prove to be the very thoughts whose involvement in our experience of film Turvey denies.
THE REAL CHALLENGE OF LOCKE’S CRITIQUE OF NATIVISM (VI-H)
RAFFAELLA DE ROSA (RUTGERS UNIVERSITY–NEWARK)

This paper offers a new interpretation of Locke’s challenge to the doctrine of innateness. I disagree with recent claims that Locke’s arguments undermine nativism. But I also argue that this conclusion does not diminish their lasting contribution to the old and new debate over concept acquisition. Their lasting contribution consists in raising awareness—among nativists of all times—of the necessity to be clear about the nature of the hidden structure of thought. More precisely, why is this hidden structure specified in intentional as opposed to non-intentional terms? And what are the motivations underlying each specification? This is the real challenge of Locke’s critique of nativism. I reach these conclusions by first laying out the varieties of dispositional nativism that Locke was attacking; by discussing the basic structure of Locke’s arguments and, finally, by assessing their strengths and weaknesses.

ABILITY, BETA 2, AND THE CONSEQUENCE ARGUMENT (I-D)
WILLIAM PAUL DEMSAR (INDEPENDENT SCHOLAR)

Alicia Finch and Ted Warfield have published a version of the consequence argument that utilizes the following inference rule: Beta 2: \[\lnot p \land \Box (p \supset q) \supset \lnot q\] where \(p\) is the proposition that describes the past and the laws of nature and \(\lnot p\) is “\(p\) and nobody has or ever had any choice about \(p\).”

Clearly, the validity of Beta 2 depends on its content. What is meant here by ‘having a choice’? To have a choice about something is to possess a certain sort of ability. To lack a choice is to lack that ability. The consequence argument, then, at bottom, alleges that if determinism is true, we lack an ability. What kind of ability does the incompatibilist allege we lack if determinism is true? It is my contention that any adequate answer to this question creates serious trouble for the consequence argument. In order to see why this is the case I must introduce two definitions. An epistemic ability is a kind of ability that requires some kind of positive epistemic condition; one that requires an agent to possess some kind of “know how.” A non-epistemic ability is simply one that has no such requirement. The dilemma can be stated as follows: If the consequence argument is sound then we lack some sort of ability. The ability in question is either epistemic or non-epistemic. If it is a non-epistemic ability then Agglomeration, a rule that is widely considered to be false, is true. If it is an epistemic ability, then Beta 2 is false, and the argument is invalid. Moreover, it looks as if any new rule that might be formulated will face the same difficulty. In fine, either Agglomeration is true or the consequence argument is invalid.

WHY (MOST) ATHEISTS HAVE A DUTY TO PRAY (III-K)
TRAVIS DUMSDAY (UNIVERSITY OF NORTH CAROLINA–CHAPEL HILL)

Drawing on principles relating to the duty of easy rescue, I argue that any atheist who is less than wholly certain of the non-existence of a God or gods will in some circumstances be morally obliged to pray.
EXTENDING PHENOMENAL CONCEPTS (VI-K)

ANDREAS ELPIDOROU (BOSTON UNIVERSITY)

According to a recently raised objection against the phenomenal concept strategy (Tye 2009), phenomenal concepts can be under- or over-extended and as a consequence, they are deferential. But if they are deferential, then one can be in possession of them even without having undergone the experience-type to which they refer. Despite pronouncements to the contrary, the objection concludes that there is nothing special about phenomenal concepts: phenomenal concepts are not conceptually isolated from all other (non-phenomenal) concepts that a subject may possess. But if conceptual dualism goes, then the phenomenal concept strategy must go too. In this essay, I defend the phenomenal concept strategy from this objection.

PHYSICAL CONSTANTS AND ESSENTIALIST ARGUMENTS FOR NECESSITARIANISM (II-H)

LUKE ELWONGER (UNIVERSITY OF NEBRASKA—LINCOLN)

One argument for the necessitarian position is via an essentialist theory of the transworld identity of properties. In this paper I defend such a theory of the identity of properties and its necessitarian consequences from one major criticism. To focus the paper I center the discussion on a single critic, E.J. Lowe. In his book, The Four Category Ontology, he offers a criticism of the essentialist argument for necessitarianism via an analogy with other forms of transworld identity and intuitions about the contingency of the physical constants. I undermine the usefulness of Lowe’s analogy by examining the purposes of attributions of properties. I also show that the essentialist’s position can allow it to accommodate the intuitions of contingency in a way that fits best with the purpose behind property attributions.

THE POSSIBILITY OF PERSONAL COMMITMENT (V-G)

LAUREN E. FLEMING (UNIVERSITY OF PUGET SOUND)

While social acts of commitment such as promises and legal contracts are familiar and frequently discussed, the idea of a binding commitment to oneself has received relatively little attention. Indeed, the very possibility of a normative personal commitment may seem mysterious—if I make a commitment to myself, and that commitment isn’t irrevocable, it seems that I must have the power to release myself. But if I can “let myself off the hook,” this seems to empty personal commitments of any truly binding force. Nonetheless, many of us seem to share the experience of having bound ourselves to some course of action or goal simply by willing ourselves to be bound in the absence of any social act of commitment. While some of our private goals, New Year’s resolutions, and so on are merely wishful thinking or aspirations, at least sometimes we seem genuinely to bind ourselves through a private act of the will. In this paper, I attempt to defend the possibility of normative personal commitments, and analyze them on a “vector” model. On this model, a successful personal commitment
requires a volitional act that builds on an antecedently valuable end or goal. This picture limits our power of personal commitment in a way that rules out implausibly trivial or absurd commitments while recognizing the normative effect of our volitional activity.

**How to Banish Zombies and Disembodied Minds with a Can of Rocks (IV-G)**

*JASON M. FORD (UNIVERSITY OF MINNESOTA–DULUTH)*

Two of the most powerful thought experiments in favor of dualism are the “disembodiment argument” and the “zombie argument.” I hope to illustrate the common intuition behind two of the most recent and persuasive in this family, Kripke and Chalmers. Both need, and provide, ways to distinguish between “mere imagination” and the sort of conceivability that provides a guide to metaphysical possibility (“seriously conceivable,” for convenience). Whether the arguments are cast in terms of “rigid designators,” or of “primary intensions,” they share a common strategy. I will attempt to conduct a demonstration that shows that we can, following the guidelines of Kripke and Chalmers for “seriously conceiving,” conceive the truth of a necessary falsehood. If I am successful, the exercise will undermine the reliability of Kripke’s and Chalmers’s methods for distinguishing the “serious” from the “mere,” and hence, undermine their arguments for dualism.

**What’s Wrong with Speciesism? (IV-I)**

*ELIZABETH A. FOREMAN (SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY)*

In examining the role that “borderline human cases” play in arguments for or against speciesism, it becomes clear that many philosophers think the cases pose a dilemma. Either we must acknowledge that borderline human cases possess fewer of the morally salient characteristics than some non-human animals (thus allowing that we are unjustified in caring more about those humans than their non-human counterparts), or we must attempt to justify privileging our own species in some way, which is notoriously difficult. I examine some of the moves available to those who accept the dilemma as posed, highlighting the ways in which I think these moves are unsatisfactory. Ultimately, I argue that seeing these cases as posing a dilemma pre-judges the case in favor of the speciesist, and understanding the ways in which these cases need not force a dilemma would help clarify the debate for both sides.

**Allocation and Distribution (I-C)**

*CHRISTOPHER FREIMAN (COLLEGE OF WILLIAM AND MARY)*

John Rawls distinguishes between “allocative justice” and “distributive justice.” Allocative justice concerns the division of a given bundle of goods at a particular time; distributive justice concerns the division of the burdens and benefits of ongoing social cooperation. I argue that a failure to heed Rawls’s distinction is a source of confusion in recent political philosophy. Furthermore, I speculate that explicitly minding the distinction between
distribution and allocation will lead us to favor non-comparative principles of distributive justice.

**GETTING A GRIP: AGENTIAL AUTHORITY AND THE STABILITY OF INTENTIONS (II-K)**  
*Dwight Furrow (San Diego Mesa College)*  
*Mark Wheeler (San Diego State University)*

Most recent conceptions of autonomy assert that self-governing agents direct their actions by means of attitudes that have the authority to speak for the agent—they constitute her evaluative standpoint. In this paper we consider the view that agential authority is located, in part, in the stability of an agent’s intentions—a view shared by Michael Bratman and Harry Frankfurt that traces its lineage to Lockean views of personal identity. We argue that neither Bratman nor Frankfurt successfully account for the stability of intentions and that agential authority cannot be located solely in the psychological connections of the Lockean self. We come to this conclusion via an analysis of Frankfurt’s notion of love.

**SUPER-TRUTH AND DIRECT REFERENCE (IV-H)**  
*John J. Gabriel (Washington University in St. Louis)*

Supervaluationism seemingly reconciles our intuition that vagueness yields indeterminacy with our commitment to classical logic’s theorems. To achieve this, supervaluationism introduces “super-truth,” truth on every admissible precisification. On supervaluationism, intuitively indeterminate statements containing vague terms are neither super-true nor super-false, while theorems containing vague terms are always super-true. And super-truth, supervaluationism says, is identical to truth (or at least is a suitable truth proxy). I argue supervaluationism is incompatible with vague directly referential terms. I argue the admissible precisifications of a vague term are those alternative meanings of that term that are relevantly similar to the term’s ordinary meaning/content. I further argue, on supervaluationism, vague directly referential terms lack any ordinary content. Thus, there’s nothing for the alternative meanings of a vague directly referential term to be similar to and, thus, no set of admissible precisifications. Finally, I argue super-truth is neither identical to nor a suitable proxy for truth.

**THE SECOND-PERSON PERSPECTIVE AND MORAL MOTIVATION: WHY AN EXTERNALIST ACCOUNT IS NEEDED (II-J)**  
*Robyn R. Gaier (Saint Louis University)*

In this paper, I will explain the key components of Stephen Darwall’s second-personal account, and I will provide sufficient evidence for the fact that his account presupposes an internalist framework. I will then proceed to argue that Darwall’s second-personal, internalist account provides an inadequate explanation of what is happening in cases where an otherwise second-personally competent agent is completely unmotivated to act morally—specifically drawing upon Darwall’s example of Joseph Stalin to argue my case. I will conclude that the inadequacy of Darwall’s account
with respect to moral motivation rests upon his assumption of an internalist framework.

**IS THERE NO END TO PRIORITY MONISM? (III-G)**

*Daniel Giberman (Stanford University)*

Priority monism is the view that the world is ontologically prior to its proper parts (Schaffer 2009a, 2009b, 2010, Forthcoming). A mereologically *junky* world is one in which every part is a proper part. The possibility of junk puts dialectical pressure on the defender of priority monism in a way to be explained. One response to the pressure is to deny that junky worlds are coherent. The aim of the present note is to argue that this response is less than compelling.

**PERCEIVING PERSONS (IV-I)**

*Adam Green (Saint Louis University)*

Mirror neurons have received much attention in both the scientific and philosophical community. Within philosophy, Alvin Goldman has claimed that mirror neurons constitute critical empirical evidence in favor of a simulation theory of mindreading. Roughly, the simulation theory is that one comes to understand the mental states of others by using one’s mind as a working model of the mind of the other. In this paper, I demonstrate that one can give an empirically and scientifically motivated account of mirror neuron activity that does not appeal to concepts to which simulation theory has a privileged claim. I show that mirror neurons can and perhaps should be thought of as facilitating a kind of person perception. Thus, the argument of this paper undercuts Goldman’s attempt to appropriate mirror neurons in the mindreading debate but does so in a manner that preserves the importance of mirror neurons for mindreading.

**DURAND OF ST.-POURÇAIN AND MENTAL REPRESENTATIONS (VI-I)**

*Peter Hartman (University of Toronto)*

A staple of medieval cognitive psychology in scholastic philosophy was a special entity called a “species,” a form or likeness of the cognized object by means of which it is cognized. As is well known to scholars of the period, the precise nature and role of species was the subject of intense debate. On one extreme, certain authors, notably Thomas Aquinas, defended the thesis that a species was involved in every form of cognitive activity, from vision on up to our most abstract thoughts. On the other extreme, William Ockham and others denied species altogether. Durand of St.-Pourçain, a Dominican theologian active in Paris at the beginning of the 14th century, is perhaps most famous as one of the earliest to reject species. Durand argues that in direct cognition a species is not necessary as a representation of the object, for if it were, then we would be aware of it. Many have argued that Durand simply misunderstands the species theory, for a species is not a representation in which the object is cognized but by means of which it is cognized, and one need not be aware of such
a representation. I will argue that Durand’s criticism should be viewed as a burden of proof argument. Durand, unlike Ockham, retains the general apparatus of species, telling us that species were originally introduced into the domain of cognitive psychology from the domain of optics where they had a precise explanatory role. However, such species are not representations, and so one must provide additional argumentation for this. I close by considering some options the proponent of species might make, deciding that none of them is any good.

Psychological Answers to Contextualist Cases (II-I)
Leo W. Iacono (University of Nebraska–Lincoln)

In responding to the cases that motivate epistemic contextualism, invariantists sometimes appeal to psychological bias in order to explain intuitions that according to them are incorrect. These invariantists disagree about which form of psychological bias most plausibly explains the intuitions. But this internal debate is beside the point, since the whole strategy of appealing to psychological bias in order to explain the intuitions is flawed. If psychological bias explains the intuitions elicited by the contextualist cases, then those intuitions had no tendency to support contextualism in the first place. Invariantists who appeal to psychological bias do not provide independent evidence that the contextualist cases elicit intuitions that do not support contextualism. Thus the psychological bias approach amounts to assuming, without evidence, that the intuitions elicited by the contextualist cases do not support contextualism.

Flouting the Demands of Justice?: Physician Participation in Executions (I-F)
Adam Kadlac (University of Tennessee)

Those who consider the ethics of physician participation in state mandated executions tend to bracket the question of whether the death penalty should be abolished. I argue that these issues rise or fall together. Either justice demands that certain criminals be executed for their crimes, such that there can be no specifically ethical barrier to physicians participating in the process, or ethical concerns about physician participation constitute an ethical objection to the practice of capital punishment.

Rule Consequentialism and Disaster (V-K)
Leonard A. Kahn (U.S. Air Force Academy)

According to rule consequentialism (RC) it is right for agent A to do action F in circumstances C if and only if A’s doing F in C is in accordance with the ideal code, where the ideal code is the set of rules which, if accepted by all, would have consequences which are better than any alternative set of rules. Though RC is an attractive theory for those who wish to place agent-centered constraints within a consequentialist framework, some claim it has problems in circumstances where the only way to avoid disaster is to violate the ideal code. There are, in fact, two distinct disaster objections.
RC can avoid the first by making use of a meta-rule within the ideal code itself. The second objection is not a problem for RC specifically but for any theory that incorporates agent-centered constraints into its account of rightness or its decision procedure.

EXCLUSION, CAUSAL ROLE REALIZATION, AND REALIZATION AS DETERMINATION (V-H)

DOUGLAS KEATON (UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI)

Over the past twenty-or-so years, non-reductive physicalists in the philosophy of mind have wavered between two ways of solving the Problem of Causal Exclusion. Philosophers have either (i) denied the Principle of Causal Exclusion, opting instead for a version of compatibilism, or (ii) denied that the neurological properties upon which mental properties supervene are causally explanatory of the effects of mental properties. It has been assumed that (ii) requires abandoning the most common solution to the mind/body problem, realization understood as causal role-playing, in favor of some other form of realization, typically realization understood as determination. I argue that it is possible to hold (ii) without abandoning the causal role-playing account of realization. This result opens new avenues of research for causal role functionalism.

PARAPHRASE AND THE SYMMETRY OBJECTION (I-H)

JOHN CHRISTOPHER A. KELLER (NIAGARA UNIVERSITY)

In this paper I argue that the most influential objection to the use of paraphrase in philosophy—what I call the symmetry objection—is a failure. The objection is presented most famously by William Alston in “Ontological Commitments” (Alston 1963), but versions of it have appeared in a variety of recent papers as well. Since paraphrase is an important component of Quinean approaches to meta-ontology, the paper constitutes a partial defense of Quinean meta-ontology. The symmetry objection has been formulated in three different ways, corresponding to three different conceptions of the role of paraphrase in philosophy. I argue that these conceptions of the role of paraphrase are inadequate, and I explicate an alternative theory of paraphrase’s role in philosophy that is not subject to any form of the symmetry objection.

EMPATHY AND MORAL KNOW-HOW (V-J)

VICTOR KUMAR (UNIVERSITY OF ARIZONA)

Empathy gives us access to morally significant information about the psychological states of other moral subjects and is therefore an important epistemic resource for moral agents. In particular, empathic projection of oneself into another’s emotional condition supports moral know-how. To know how to alleviate another person’s grief, for instance, is often in part to have an insider’s tacit appreciation of how the other’s emotional state would change if one were to do or say various things. In this essay, I draw on empirical research into empathy as I explore its contribution to moral know-how.
TOWARDS SOLVING ALVA NOÉ’S PROBLEM OF PERCEPTUAL PRESENCE (VI-J)

KRISTJAN LAASIK (UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI)

Alva Noë has developed his enactive view of perception as a solution to the problem of perceptual presence (PPP). Noë argues that when we perceptually experience an object, certain aspects that we, strictly speaking, cannot see, the object’s back side, for example, are nevertheless perceptually present for us. The PPP is the problem of how to conceive of these aspects’ perceptual presence. Noë’s solution is that they are “present as absent” in the sense that we have sensorimotor expectations about them. I will argue that Noë’s solution is unsuccessful, since his account of “presence as absence” is incomplete, needing to be complemented by the idea of fulfillment-conditional content (FC). FC is a kind of content that allows perceptual experience, in a peculiar manner, to corroborate itself in the course of its unfolding. The idea of FC is a largely neglected Husserlian idea.

WHAT WE HEAR (VI-J)

JASON P. LEDDINGTON (BUCKNELL UNIVERSITY)

Following Berkeley, contemporary philosophers of perception typically endorse the view that the only immediate objects of hearing are sounds. In this case, we hear things only in virtue of hearing the sounds that they make. This paper argues that careful attention to features of auditory phenomenology should lead us to reject this view as a throwback to an otherwise discredited empiricism. Instead, we should embrace the view that we hear sound-producing events in hearing the sounds that they make, just as we see things in seeing the colors that they have. Pace Berkeley, the auditory experience of a sound source is not mediated by the experience of a sound any more than the visual experience of an object is mediated by an experience of its color.

CONCEIVABILITY, PROPERTY INDIVIDUATION, AND STRONG NECESSITIES (II-H)

DANIEL LIM (UNIVERSITY OF CAMBRIDGE)

David Chalmers’s so-called Conceivability Argument against physicalism is based on a controversial principle (CP)—that conceivability is a reliable guide to possibility. Chalmers treats CP as a single, monolithic principle but, I argue, it is better construed as a combination of two principles: the Property Individuation Principle (PI) and Hume’s Dictum (HD). Breaking CP into its component parts is beneficial for at least two reasons. First, it simplifies the debate by reducing it to a problem in general ontology. Second, it exposes some flaws in the reasoning behind Chalmers’s rejection of strong necessities.

TWO DILEMMAS OF THE ELIMINATIVIST ONTOLOGY OF BRAINS (IV-G)

JOUNGBIN LIM (UNIVERSITY OF VIRGINIA)

Some animalists think that there are no brains. They rather think that there are just atoms arranged brainwise in one’s skull—these atoms do not
compose anything. They argue that this eliminativist ontology of brains solves a too many thinkers problem of animalism. In this paper I critically examine the eliminativist ontology of brains, especially Eric Olson’s version. I argue that his theory faces two different dilemmas. One way to block these dilemmas is to endorse the maximality principle. But I argue that the maximality principle is not a viable option for animalists.

**A Method for Characterizing Self-Deception (V-G)**

*Jason Lopez (Indiana University)*

There is as much disagreement over how to explain self-deception as there is disagreement over what it is. In this paper I will focus on methods of characterizing what self-deception is, which will end up narrowing down its possible explanations. The paper will begin with a survey of Alfred Mele’s methods of characterizing self-deception. It will turn out, however, that all of his methods have the problem of allowing two very different mental acts to count as self-deception. In order to rectify this problem, I will adapt one of Mele’s methods and argue that self-deception is when a self actively and intentionally deceives itself.

**Epistemic Possibility and Closure of Inquiry (III-J)**

*Kraig Martin (Baylor University)*

I reject three accounts of what it means to say that an event or fact is epistemically possible. Keith DeRose, Michael Huemer, and Dougherty/Rysiew each argue for a specific account of epistemic possibility. I argue that each of these accounts is in conflict with the judgment intuitively rendered in some important counterexamples. Instead of trying to understand epistemic possibility in the manners suggested by these philosophers, I argue that we should employ the concept of closure of inquiry. I argue, roughly, that p is no longer epistemically possible for S when S is justified in closing inquiry concerning p.

**Is Skepticism Inevitable? (IV-K)**

*Ethan Mills (University of New Mexico)*

Barry Stroud claims skepticism is inevitable in epistemology, while Michael Williams argues that skepticism is the result of contingent presuppositions. Who is right? I argue that non-Western philosophy can help find an answer. If skepticism is an intuitive part of the human condition, it should arise in a tradition of epistemology as sophisticated as that of classical India. There are arguments from ignorance based on dreams in the work of Buddhist philosopher Vasubandhu (c. 400 CE). While Vasubandhu is often seen as an idealist, I support a phenomenalist interpretation in which the conclusion is that what is immediately present to the mind are appearances or sense-data. Hence, we should suspend judgment on the question of the external world and there is a standing invitation to skepticism 1,200 years before Descartes. Given similar intellectual conditions, similar reasoning arises, thus offering support for the intuitive nature of skepticism.
WHY INQUIRY HAS (AT LEAST) TWO AIMS (IV-K)

BRIAN MONDY (UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI)

James was the first to argue that we have two distinguishable aims with regard to belief: we want to believe the truth and we want to avoid believing falsehoods. The argument that is usually given for this conclusion is that either aim in isolation can be satisfied by believing everything or alternatively believing nothing. I argue that James’s claim is more at home in the domain of inquiry, rather than as an argument about belief in general. I then provide an argument that we have two distinguishable aims in inquiry. I begin by considering some necessary conditions for inquiry: an inquirer must be trying to answer a question, and she must use evidence to answer the question. I use these features of inquiry to argue that an inquirer must both aim at information and error avoidance.

CAN FRAGILE EVENTS SOLVE THE CAUSAL EXCLUSION PROBLEM? (V-H)

DWAYNE MOORE (WILFRID LAURIER UNIVERSITY)

In recent years, Jaegwon Kim has argued that no single event can have more than one sufficient cause occurring at a given time. Thus, since there is an individually sufficient physiological cause for why someone cries, overdetermining mental causes can be excluded. In this paper I argue that an appeal to fragile events can solve this problem. Events are only overdetermined if the absence of one of the purported causes continues to produce the same event. Events are fragile if slight changes to the time or manner in which they occur yield different events. Thus, if events are fragile the same effect will not occur in the absence of one of its purported causes. This means that the effect under consideration, the effect which by definition has both a mental and a physical cause, can only be overdetermined if it can have only the physical cause—which is impossible.

LOCKE AND THE PROVISOS OF PROPERTY (V-I)

JOSHUA MOUSIE (UNIVERSITY OF GUELPH)

In this paper I argue against communitarian readings of Locke. Influenced by the work of Macpherson and Tully, I address authors in philosophy and economics that attempt to draw from Locke’s Two Treatises a notion of property in civil society that is still obligated to the proviso of property that Locke explains in 2T, Ch. 5. I argue that these readings fail to understand the transitional aspect of Locke’s social contract theory (i.e., moving from the state of nature to civil society). Given the fact that Locke’s impetus for establishing the notion of civil society is to find a sense of security for property that cannot be found in the natural condition, I argue that with the establishment of civil society and contract, Locke aims to have property based solely on the agreements reached in contract. Hence, all previous, natural provisos of property are to be void in civil society, and any sense of the “natural” (as in his reference to natural law in § 134) must be understood as politicized nature (i.e., nature in conjunction with
the bounds of society and contract). That is, contra the communitarian reading, Locke’s references to nature should always be seen as qualified: there are natural principles and provisos that are in play in the state of nature and there are those that are reformulated in civil society (“natural law”), but there is no homogeneous sense of the natural that is found within both. Therefore, I conclude by saying that, although I am in favor of the overall project of the communitarian authors (finding state’s rights for property, especially when it concerns environmental property), any attempt to find these principles within Locke’s *Two Treatises* is forced to overlook the transitional nature of his understanding of contract, which is without a homogenous concept of nature that can be found in the state of nature, as well as in civil society.

**LOCKE, LANGUAGE, AND META-PHILOSOPHY: AN INTERPRETATION OF BOOK III OF THE ESSAY (VI-H)**

*Jesse Newton (University of Virginia)*

In this paper I argue that Book III of Locke’s *Essay Concerning Human Understanding* is not a hodgepodge of philosophical topics tenuously hung together and oddly stuck in between Books II and IV, as some have often criticized. Instead I argue that Book III presents a uniform line of reasoning whose fundamental argument is meta-philosophical: that most philosophical problems arise from impression in language. In order to demonstrate this, I first outline Locke’s meta-philosophical argument in Book III, showing how he coherently develops this. Second, I offer textual evidence for thinking this was in fact Locke’s primary agenda. Finally, I offer some speculation concerning several other topics in the *Essay* that may be benefited when read through the lens of Locke’s meta-philosophy.

**FITNESS AND SELECTIVE EXPLANATIONS (I-E)**

*Robert Northcott (University of Missouri–St. Louis)*

Is natural selection a cause of evolutionary outcomes—or, far from being their cause, is it just a statistical summary of those outcomes? Against orthodoxy, many philosophers have argued recently for the latter position. A central motivation is that the sense of fitness appealed to by selective explanations is crucially different from the sense relevant to evolutionary outcomes. It therefore becomes unclear how the former really can explain the latter. So far, pro-causalist replies have failed to address this mismatch issue satisfactorily. Not coincidentally, neither have they stated satisfactorily the exact causal variables supposedly characteristic of selective explanations. I argue that importing recent work from the theory of causal explanation enables us to remedy both these defects.
THE SEMANTIC NATURALIST FALLACY (IV-H)
SUSANA NUCCE TELLI (ST. CLOUD STATE UNIVERSITY)
GARY SEAY (CITY UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK)

More than a century ago, G. E. Moore famously attempted to refute ethical naturalism by offering the so-called Open Question Argument (OQA), also charging that all varieties of ethical naturalism commit the naturalistic fallacy. Although there is consensus that OQA and the naturalistic fallacy charge both fail, OQA is sometimes vindicated, but only as an argument against naturalistic semantic analyses. The naturalistic fallacy charge, by contrast, usually finds no takers at all. This paper aims chiefly at vindicating a version of the naturalistic fallacy. We first argue that the openness of the question OQA raises against such analyses hinges on self-ascriptive, comparative judgments of content, which may be considered a priori warranted. We then provide independent reasons for the claim that the sort of mistake committed by naturalistic analyses in fact amounts to a pragmatic fallacy of a kind familiar in petitio principii and other forms of viciously circular inference.

EMOTIONS AND THE MOTIVATIONAL PROBLEM (V-G)
SCOTT O’LEARY (FORDHAM UNIVERSITY)

Recently, several philosophers have used emotions to solve the motivational problem, the problem of maintaining that moral judgments are cognitive and motivating. These authors claim emotions are cognitive and affective states, refuting the Humean psychology of mind. Yet, these philosophers all conflate affectivity with conativity. Although emotions are affective, an additional argument is needed to secure the claim that they are motivational states. I argue that McDowell, Zagzebski, and Döring each fail to provide a convincing argument for emotions’ intrinsic motivational role. Emotions are intimately linked to motivation and practical reasoning, but they are not directly motivational. While I might flee out of fear, I might also aggressively fight back, or “freeze like a deer in the headlights.” There is no conceptual connection between a token emotion and a particular motivational response. Thus, emotions fail to solve the motivational problem on these two separate accounts.

IS GOODNESS A DETERMINABLE PROPERTY? (IV-J)
ANDREW PAYNE (ST. JOSEPH’S UNIVERSITY)

Against Peter Geach and Judith Jarvis Thomson, who claim that goodness is always a matter of being good-relative-to-type, Michael Zimmerman has defended a general concept of intrinsic value. Although all goodness is a matter of being good in some way, he suggests that there is a way of being good that is that of being intrinsically good and not just a way of being intrinsically good as virtue or intrinsically good as pleasure. Zimmerman’s defense of this concept of intrinsic value relies on a comparison between goodness and determinable properties such as color. However, goodness is not similar to a determinable property. A determinable property
supervenes on a unified base of properties while the different types of intrinsic goodness (pleasure, knowledge, virtue) supervene on disparate groups of descriptive properties. As a result, Zimmerman’s argument in defense of a general concept of intrinsic value is flawed.

ON SPINOZA’S PHYSICAL INTERLUDE (VI-H)

ALISON PETERMAN (NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY)

It is almost universally claimed or assumed that Spinoza’s so-called “physical interlude” following I1p13 of the Ethics is his definitive statement about physics. This paper argues that it is not, and that the physical interlude should be understood to contain two parts: first, a part which Spinoza regards as proven geometrically, which is about the nature of composite individuals in general, and second, a part which is suggested by experience and subject to revision, which is about bodies. Because of Spinoza’s theory of knowledge, these two parts together cannot comprise our knowledge of finite bodies.

MOOREAN SENTENCES, SINCERITY, AND NORMS OF ASSERTION (IV-H)

ALEXANDER R. PRUSS (BAYLOR UNIVERSITY)

I shall offer several examples showing that it is possible to assert “Q and I don’t believe that Q” sincerely, justifiedly, and correctly. Collectively the examples and variants on them show the falsity of the following plausible principles: (a) it is absurd to assert “Q and I don’t believe that Q” (G. E. Moore); (b) justification to assert p entails justification to assert that one believes p (Gareth Evans); (c) the sincerity condition on assertion is that one believes what one says (John Searle); (d) to say something that one does not believe is to lie (a common folk belief); (e) to assert (to someone) something that one believes to be false is to lie (Don Fallis); and (f) the norm of assertion is at least as strong as belief.

OBJECTS, WORLDMAKING, AND NIHILISM IN NIETZSCHE (I-H)

JUSTIN REMHOF (UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS–URBANA-CHAMPAIGN)

Nietzsche’s treatment of objects is puzzling. Recent commentators have argued that he is a common sense realist, an eliminativist, or a reductionist. An argument is presented against these in favor of a constructivist or worldmaking reading. Worldmaking is the thesis that an object’s being interpreted as some thing or other will in part but non-trivially constitute the identity conditions of that object. After attempting to make Nietzsche’s worldmaking a defensible philosophical position it is suggested that he might have held this view because of its role in combating a central cause of nihilism.

LUCKY UNDERSTANDING WITHOUT KNOWLEDGE (IV-K)

YASHA ROHWER (UNIVERSITY OF MISSOURI–COLUMBIA)

Can one still have understanding in situations that involve the kind of epistemic luck that undermines knowledge? Kvanvig (2003, 2009) says
yes, DePaul and Grimm (2007), and Grimm (2006, forthcoming), Kvanvig’s critics, say no. In this paper I show that the cases put forward by Kvanvig’s critics are focused on a particular kind of understanding; the understanding of a particular system or mechanism. I argue that there is another kind of understanding that so far has not been discussed in the debate concerning the nature of understanding: the understanding that occurs when a new true belief is integrated into an already integrated set of true beliefs. I argue that this kind of understanding, unlike the former, is not susceptible to the kinds of luck that undermine knowledge. Therefore there is a kind of understanding that can be lucky.

BEYOND TRUTH AND LIE: ON THE ROLE OF FICTION IN FRIEDRICH SCHLE格尔’S POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY (I-K)
NATHAN ROSS (OKLAHOMA CITY UNIVERSITY)

This paper examines the role of aesthetic experience in the early political writings of Friedrich Schlegel, particularly his Essay on Republicanism (1798). First the paper gives a brief summary of Schlegel’s conception of aesthetic experience, in which he argues that all art is an attempt to bridge the gap between “finite” and “infinite,” between experience of tangible sense objects and experience of ungraspable ideas, such as freedom. I illustrate this theory by relating it to fictional writing in particular and to the theory of the novel in German Romantic thought. In the second part of the essay, I then demonstrate that Schlegel applies this aesthetic theory in his political philosophy as well. He considers the state as a fiction, that is to be critiqued using the standards of aesthetic philosophy.

DYNAMIC DELIBERATION OF ENDS (II-K)
AMANDA ROTH (UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN)

In this paper I posit “dynamic deliberation”—a type of deliberation that expands the boundaries of decision-problems and allows us to rationally adopt, revise, and reject ends. I argue that this dynamic conception of deliberation improves upon a purely instrumentalist conception in five ways. First, means-end reasoning seems vulnerable to a kind of dogmatism about ends that is not apparent in dynamic deliberation. Second, dynamic deliberation allows for a type of learning about ends that is unaccounted for on the means-end picture. Third, in contrast to the means-end picture, the dynamic picture allows resolving of problems (which, on my view, is a vital component of moral progress). Fourth, the dynamic model coheres better with our phenomenological experience of making certain kinds of decisions about how to live. And finally, dynamic deliberation makes room for the role of “experiments in living” in helping us to learn which ends are worth pursuing.
ARISTOTLE ON EPITHUMIA AND THE EMOTIONS (VI-I)

KRISANNA SCHEITER (UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA)

Aristotle often includes *epithumia*—our appetitive desire for food, drink, and sex—in his list of emotions, but he leaves *epithumia* out of his discussion of individual emotions in the *Rhetoric*. This has led many commentators to wonder whether or not Aristotle considers it an emotion. W.W. Fortenbaugh and Stephen Leighton argue that *epithumia* is not an emotion like anger, fear, and pity. Fortenbaugh argues that *epithumia* is a bodily drive, whereas emotions are essentially “cognitive.” Leighton claims that for Aristotle emotions are all those pleasures and pains that alter our judgments and *epithumia* does not alter our judgments. In this paper I argue that *epithumia* does in fact belong in the same category as anger, fear, and pity. *Epithumia* is not merely a bodily drive, as Fortenbaugh and Leighton characterize it, but involves cognition, which, I explain, places it in the realm of emotion.

PRAGMATIC ENCROACHMENT PENALIZED (II-I)

MICHAEL J. SHAFFER (ST. CLOUD STATE UNIVERSITY)

Recently a number of variously motivated epistemologists have argued that knowledge is intrinsically pragmatic—let us refer to them here as the *encroachers*. They endorse what amounts to the following thesis:

(PE) $K_p \equiv$ it is rational for S to employ p (appropriately) in S’s practical reasoning.

In this paper I challenge PE by presenting a perfectly clear and potent counter-example to the claim that its being rational for S to employ p (appropriately) in S’s practical reasoning is a necessary condition for S’s knowing that p. What will make this even more telling as a counter-example is that the case involved does not solely turn on the degree to which the agent is justified in believing the relevant proposition(s) in the case in question.

PROPERTY DUALISTS SHOULD BE SUBSTANCE DUALISTS: THE ZOMBIE ARGUMENT (IV-G)

KEVIN W. SHARPE (ST. CLOUD STATE UNIVERSITY)

Property dualism is appealing, in part, because it promises to accommodate a fairly robust commitment to the Cartesian intuition that mentality, in particular phenomenal consciousness, is something radically unique without capitulating to the Cartesian demand for immaterial substances. Yet, despite its initial appeal, I don’t think that the combination of property dualism and substance monism is tenable. I offer a new reason for thinking that property dualists should be substance dualists drawing on the possibility of zombies. Here’s the argument (in brief): property dualism entails the possibility of a zombie world (a physical duplicate of the actual world that does not contain phenomenal consciousness), but if a zombie world is possible, then—since I am essentially phenomenally conscious—
it follows that, for any physical object, x, possibly, x exists and I fail to exist. Assuming the necessity of identity, substance dualism follows. Thus, property dualists should be substance dualists.

**Why the Vagueness Argument Is Unsound (III-G)**

*Jeffrey A. Snapper (University of Notre Dame)*

Considerations of vagueness suggest to some that composition is unrestricted. Central to this line of thought is the intimate connection between composition and number—when composition occurs the number of things increases. However, the connection is not clear enough, especially if vagueness is semantic indeterminacy. In this paper I argue that Theodore Sider’s vagueness argument for unrestricted composition fails because the sub-argument from vague composition to a vague numerical sentence fails.

**World Poverty and Individual Freedom (V-I)**

*Jorn Sonderholm (George Washington University)*

Nicole Hassoun has recently defended the view that the relatively affluent members of the world’s population are, *prima facie*, obligated to ensure that the global institutional system enables all people to meet their basic needs. This paper is a critical discussion of Hassoun’s argument in favor of this view. Hassoun’s argument is first presented. In sections three and four, I try to bring out a number of formal and informal problems with the argument. Section five discusses a number of possible replies to the worries raised in section four. The conclusion of the paper is that Hassoun’s argument should be rejected. There are two independent and individually sufficient reasons for this conclusion: the argument is invalid and contains at least one false premise.

**Eternal and Historical Kinds (I-E)**

*Mark K. Spencer (University of Buffalo)*

Some natural kinds are thought to be kinds because of a shared essence, others because of extrinsic relations among kind-members. Ruth Millikan calls the former “eternal kinds” and the latter “historical kinds.” I argue that all natural kinds are both quasi-eternal and historical. Drawing on the work of Richard Boyd, I argue that all kinds have a shared “homeostatic property cluster.” I show how traditionally historical kinds, like biological kinds, have a quasi-eternal aspect, and how traditionally eternal kinds, like physical kinds, have a historical aspect. I introduce Thomas Aquinas’s distinction among three senses of the term “essence” in order to clarify how all kinds are both quasi-eternal and historical. This distinction allows us to see better different aspects of the scientific experience of kinds. The objection of Marc Erashefsky that such an account is circular is considered and answered.
WHAT HAPPENS WHEN J. DAVID VELLEMAN ACTS? (II-K)

JESSE SUMMERS (UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA–LOS ANGELES)

J. David Velleman’s “What Happens When Someone Acts?” criticizes the belief-desire model of human action for being unable to account for agency. Velleman provides three cases that demonstrate this failure. He then provides his own account of agency: agency is expressed when one acts on a desire to act in accordance with reasons. Using three counterexamples analogous to his own cases, I show that Velleman’s position falls to the same criticisms that he makes of the belief-desire model. I suggest that Velleman may not have found a problem with the belief-desire model of action, but has only shown that agency cannot be accounted for by any causal account of action. I conclude by wondering why a belief-desire model of action should have to account for agency.

MOORE’S “NEW” OPEN QUESTION ARGUMENT (II-J)

PETER A. SUTTON (VIRGINIA UNION UNIVERSITY)

For the last 107 years, metaethicists have overlooked the best version of G. E. Moore’s open-question argument. This despite the fact that it appears on the same page of Principia Ethica as his other, weaker versions of the argument. This other, better open-question argument does not rely on introspection of the meanings of ethical terms, and so does not fall to the standard criticisms of Moore. In this paper, I present this “new” open-question argument and show that Moore has done to naturalistic ethics something like what Plato’s Euthyphro does to supernaturalistic ethics, and that both sorts of ethicists will need to answer some of the same objections.

UNMANIFESTED DESIRES UNMASKED (III-L)

STEVEN SWARTZER (UNIVERSITY OF NEBRASKA–LINCOLN)

According to behavioral dispositionalism, desiring that \( p \) is, roughly, a matter of being disposed to behave or act in ways one thinks would bring it about or make it more likely that \( p \). This essay examines the dispositionalist's response to the fact that desires are not guaranteed to produce these characteristic manifestations. It is widely acknowledged that this is unproblematic; many commonplace dispositions can be masked and thereby prevented from manifesting as well. I supplement this picture by offering a further analogy between desires and commonplace dispositions in the way both can vary in degree. This analogy provides the resources for a superior explanation of why agents sometimes fail to do what would promote particular desires. The analogy also has interesting implications: it predicts that desire attributions are likely a vague and context-sensitive matter and it might be extended to support an alternative to behavioral dispositionalism.
THE DISTRIBUTIVITY OF MASSES (III-G)

CHARLIE TANKSLEY (UNIVERSITY OF VIRGINIA)

In this paper I argue that masses are distributive. That is, I argue that, for example, every proper part of a mass of water is itself some water. This is somewhat counterintuitive, as it implies that a single oxygen atom can be “some water” just as the water in the pool is “some water.” But I argue that the distributivity of masses follows if we accept a plausible argument that F. J. Pelletier gave for the conclusion that every count noun has a mass noun analogue.

A RETRIBUTIVE DEFENSE OF SHAMING PUNISHMENTS (I-L)

KRISTA K. THOMASON (MOUNT HOLYOKE COLLEGE)

Although most shaming punishments are often defended on grounds that they are effective deterrents or that they properly express public discontent, I argue that they can be justified on retributive grounds. Critics claim that shaming punishments conflict with the basic tenets of retributivism: rather than emphasizing the equal worth of persons, shaming punishments simply aim to humiliate. I argue instead the primary goal of shaming punishments is to damage the public reputation of the offender and that damaging someone’s reputation can still address the offender as a moral subject. Specifically, shaming punishments are morally appropriate for offenses like defamation, where the offender’s intention is to disgrace another. I conclude by suggesting that a public apology is an appropriate example of a shaming punishment.

A DEFENSE AGAINST QUIDDITISM (II-H)

ADAM R. THOMPSON (UNIVERSITY OF NEBRASKA–LINCOLN)

Some think that the identity of all fundamental natural properties is fixed by a dispositional essence—i.e., roughly, for all fundamental natural properties $F$, $F$ is $F$ in virtue of the fact that $F$ is essentially disposed to $\psi$. Others hold that the identity of fundamental natural properties is fixed by something other than a dispositional essence. Call the former view dispositional monism (DM). Call the latter view categorical monism (CM). Proponents of (DM) charge (CM) theorists with a commitment to a view on which fundamental natural properties are individuated by mysterious quiddities. I offer a defense on behalf of (CM) theorists by identifying a non-mysterious binary relation that can play the identity fixing role and to which (CM) theorists are antecedently committed.

SOFT FACTS AND ONTOLOGICAL DEPENDENCE (III-K)

PATRICK TODD (UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA–RIVERSIDE)

Perhaps the main reply to the argument for the incompatibility of divine foreknowledge and human freedom is “Ockhamism.” Ockhamists distinguish between certain sorts of facts about the past: “hard facts” and “soft facts.” According to the Ockhamist, once we see that God’s past beliefs about our future free decisions are merely “soft” facts about the
past, no threat remains to freedom. Though a substantial literature arose in connection with this distinction, it remains notoriously vexed. It is time, I believe, to revisit these issues. I argue that the attempts to analyze the hard/soft fact distinction got off on fundamentally the wrong track. The centrally important feature of soft facts is that they (in some sense) depend on the future. I argue that the literature on the distinction has failed to capture the sense of dependence at stake, and gesture towards what an adequate account will really look like.

**NON-INFERENTIAL MORAL KNOWLEDGE (V-J)**

_Elizabeth Tropmann (Colorado State University)_

In a series of recent papers, Walter Sinnott-Armstrong has developed a novel argument against moral intuitionism. I suggest a defense on behalf of the intuitionist against Sinnott-Armstrong’s objections. Rather than focus on the main premises of his argument, I instead examine the way in which Sinnott-Armstrong construes the intuitionistic position. I believe that Sinnott-Armstrong’s understanding of intuitionism is mistaken. In particular, I argue that Sinnott-Armstrong mischaracterizes non-inferentiality as it figures in intuitionism. To the extent that Sinnott-Armstrong’s account of intuitionism has been adopted by other uncritically, intuitionists have cause for concern. Once we embrace an alternative, and more accurate, reading of what is non-inferential about intuitionistic moral knowledge, certain elements of Sinnott-Armstrong’s case against intuitionism are significantly weakened. But perhaps more importantly, this paper helps clarify what circumspect intuitionists mean when they claim that some moral knowledge is non-inferential.

**SAVING THE MANY AND THE VALUE OF HUMAN LIFE IN SCANLON’S CONTRACTUALISM (V-K)**

_Paul Tulipana (Georgia State University)_

It has been widely thought that Scanlon’s contractualism cannot adequately account for the class of moral cases in which an agent is forced to choose between saving a smaller number of lives and saving a larger number. This paper argues that this is incorrect, and that Scanlon, his critics, and his defenders have so far overlooked a way that contractualism can deliver the intuitively correct result in these cases without revision anywhere in the theory and in particular without recourse to interpersonal aggregation. All that is required is that we accept Scanlon’s claim that we all agree that human life is of great value. Accepting this claim, it is argued, entails a class of agent-relative or “personal” reasons that are determinative of the intuitively correct results in these cases, and in relevantly similar ones.

**EXPLAINING MISMATCHES BETWEEN BELIEF AND BEHAVIOR (III-L)**

_Maura E. Tumulty (Colgate University)_

Sometimes a subject’s behavior fails to match what would be expected of her, given certain beliefs that have been attributed to her. This may
lead to uncertainty as to whether or not the subject truly has the beliefs in question. This uncertainty can be resolved by ascribing two determinate states to the subject: a belief, and another state (not necessarily a belief) that conflicts with it. The conflict explains the production of the behavior that fails to fit with the original attribution. Alternatively, the uncertainty could be embraced rather than resolved. The subject can be described as not fully believing the content in question, so that an attribution of belief to her is neither flatly true nor flatly false. The second approach is preferable. It respects our intuitions about the possibility of unmotivated forgetting, and it complements a view of folk-psychology that is independently attractive.

**PERSONS, NEAR-PERSONS AND “THE MERELY SENTIENT” IN THE AUTONOETIC CONSCIOUSNESS PARADIGM (IV-I)**

**GARY VANER (TEXAS A&M UNIVERSITY)**

From a utilitarian perspective, the abilities to consciously recall the past and to consciously anticipate the future (autonoetic consciousness) are morally significant because they allow an individual to “relive” past experiences (both good and bad) and to “pre-experience” the future. This paper summarizes two arguments for the claim that these abilities give greater moral significance to the lives of individuals with episodic memory and the ability to consciously plan for the future. It then gives two parallel arguments in favor of the analogous claim on behalf of individuals who are able to take a biographical perspective on their lives. The result is a moral hierarchy of moral significance, with persons (who have a biographical sense of self) at the top, “the merely sentient” at the bottom, and individuals with episodic memory and some ability to consciously plan for the future (but not biographical consciousness) in between.

**SELF, AGENCY, AND WORLD: A RESPONSE TO KORSGAARD’S SELF-CONSTITUTION (III-I)**

**ELIZABETH VICTOR (UNIVERSITY OF SOUTH FLORIDA)**

In her most recent work, *Self-Constitution: Agency, Identity, and Integrity*, Christine Korsgaard synthesizes her prior arguments to build a more cohesive account of the nature of action, the constitution of personal or practical identity, and the normativity of the principles of practical reason. As with any undertaking of this kind, there are always some critics left unaddressed and new criticisms on the horizon. This paper will examine how Korsgaard’s account of agency, and consequently her account of when and under what circumstances an agent can change her mind, presents new limitations to her account of action. I will recommend developing a more robust account of personal identity, one that includes an agent’s circumstances and motivational set as part of what determines her reasons, and thus filling out the story of how an agent changes her mind and the role the external world plays in constituting her ends.
LIBERAL NEUTRALITY AND EDUCATIONAL NEUTRALITY (III-H)
MATT WALDREN (UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN–MADISON)

This paper addresses the relationship between liberal neutrality and educational neutrality. Some liberal neutralists have attempted to distance themselves from educational neutrality by arguing that neutrality constraints should apply to some areas of government, but not to others, and that education is one area where neutrality constraints do not apply. This paper argues that the same arguments that justify accepting liberal neutrality also justify accepting educational neutrality. Therefore, liberal neutralists ought to accept educational neutrality. Educational neutrality has, however, received trenchant criticism in the political philosophy of education literature. Because of this criticism, liberal neutralists should be much more concerned with defending educational neutrality than they have been.

MENDING THE BROKEN PROMISES OF THE PAST: ON RESPONSIBILITY TO REPAIR HISTORICAL WRONGS (III-H)
JEFFREY J. WATSON (ARIZONA STATE UNIVERSITY)

I consider the argument that it is inconsistent to expect future generations to keep promises or treaties made by present generations, and yet for present generations not to accept the responsibility to make reparations or compensation for agreements made and broken by previous generations. I consider a key premise: that intrinsic to the act of promising is accepting the duty to repair the wrong if one breaks the promise. I argue instead that while this reparative duty is entailed by the act of promising, it is not a part of the intentional act. I suggest instead that a collectivist account of collective responsibility is required for historical obligations.

GETTING A GRIP: AGENTIAL AUTHORITY AND THE STABILITY OF INTENTIONS (II-K)
DWIGHT FURROW (SAN DIEGO MESA COLLEGE)
MARK WHEELER (SAN DIEGO STATE UNIVERSITY)

Most recent conceptions of autonomy assert that self-governing agents direct their actions by means of attitudes that have the authority to speak for the agent—they constitute her evaluative standpoint. In this paper we consider the view that agential authority is located, in part, in the stability of an agent’s intentions—a view shared by Michael Bratman and Harry Frankfurt that traces its lineage to Lockean views of personal identity. We argue that neither Bratman nor Frankfurt successfully account for the stability of intentions and that agential authority cannot be located solely in the psychological connections of the Lockean self. We come to this conclusion via an analysis of Frankfurt’s notion of love.
HOW TO SPEAK WITH THE DEAD: BRANDON AND GADAMER ON THE DIALOGICAL RELATION BETWEEN PAST AND PRESENT (I-I)

Joshua Wretzel (Binghamton University)

I analyze the relation between interpreter and text in Brandom’s Tales of the Mighty Dead and that of Gadamer’s in Truth and Method. I analyze Brandom’s and Gadamer’s positions with respect to two shared premises: first, that the task of hermeneutics involves navigating a tension between the past of the text and the present of the interpreter; and second, that the dialogical relation is the proper means to negotiating this tension. I show that Brandom fails to live up to his own premises for two reasons: first, his methodology fails to accord the text the ontological status of a Thou, thereby precluding the possibility of a mutually recognitive relation between interpreter and text, and so past and present; and second, it also fails to mimic the phenomenology of dialogue, thereby precluding the possibility of a dialogical relation. I then show how Gadamer fares better on both counts.

PARTITIONING VIRTUOUSLY (V-J)

Sarah A. Wright (University of Georgia)

In this paper I apply a virtue approach in epistemology to the problem of explaining how we can reason well about probabilities. I begin by showing how important and basic partitioning is to our reasoning about probabilities. I then search for an explanation of how we perform this partitioning so easily and naturally in normal cases. Explanations based on Bayesian updating and on following rules for partitioning are considered, but rejected. I conclude by arguing that virtue epistemology—supplemented by parallels between learning a virtue and training up a connectionist network—gives the best explanation of how we are able to partition well, and hence how we are able to reason well about probabilities.

THE IRREVOCABILITY OF CAPITAL PUNISHMENT (I-L)

Benjamin S. Yost (Providence College)

One of the many arguments against capital punishment is that execution is irrevocable. One might think that the crucial factual premise of this argument—the irrevocability of capital punishment—is self-evidently true. It seemed so to Justice Brennan, who wrote that “the finality of death precludes relief.” But in “Is the Death Penalty Irrevocable?” Mike Davis argues that the death penalty is not irrevocable. While Davis does not adequately defend his claims, additional support comes from recent literature on the metaphysics of death, specifically the Pitcher-Feinberg theory of posthumous harm. Given this recent work, Davis’s argument can be developed in a way that merits careful consideration. After describing what his more robust account would look like, I conclude by arguing that it ultimately fails to make the case against irrevocability, insofar as it ignores the full set of practical requirements incumbent on legal institutions that wrongly punish someone.
EMBODIED COGNITION IS SWEEPING THE PLANET (II-C)
FREDERICK ADAMS (UNIVERSITY OF DELAWARE)

Embodied cognition is sweeping the planet. Are the symbols with which we think in the perceptual system, the motor system, or in a central system not based in either (an amodal system)? Embodied views claim the former. Standard cognitive views claim the latter. I will review some of the claims that are being made on the behalf of the embodied approach, in contrast to traditional views about cognition. I will then review some of the empirical literature and data being used to support the embodied approach to cognition. I’ll distinguish different degrees of strength of claims for embodiment. And finally, I’ll offer some pockets of resistance to the embodied approach.

THE POTENTIAL BEING OF ARISTOTLE AND THE POSSIBLE BEING OF AVICENNA (III-A)
ALLAN BÄCK (KUTZTOWN UNIVERSITY)

Aristotle separates the question of existence from the question of essence. Also, he asks if a thing is identical to its essence. He concludes that a substance is, while an accident is not, the same as its essence. All these essences are matched to the substances, the things that exist (ousiai); there would then not be any unactualized essences. Possibilities belonging to species, the types of things, are the potentialities of actually existing substances. Aristotle seems to hold to a principle of plenitude: whatever is possible must happen at some time. Moreover, he says that this world is the only one possible, as it has used up all available matter. Yet he also admits to unactualized possibilities: this cloak might or might not be cut up. These claims can be made consistent if he holds the principle of plenitude for types of individuals but not for the individuals, which may have unactualized possibilities. In contrast, Avicenna allows for unactualized types of things and implies that this world is not the only one possible. Then there would be unactualized essences and species and many possible worlds. Possibilities are no longer tied to the potentialities of actual things. This makes for a sharper distinction between essence and existence than Aristotle has: no longer is a substance identical to its essence; unactualized essences subsist without having actually existing substances to match them. Such claims about Aristotle and Avicenna are disputed and need support. I propose to support them. The most disputed ones are that Avicenna is not a determinist and that essences in themselves might have some sort of status independent of being in the divine intellect.
INTIMACY, PHENOMENOLOGY, AND TRANS BODY DYSPHORIA (III-D)
TALIA BETTCHEER (CALIFORNIA STATE UNIVERSITY–LOS ANGELES)

Although it may be too simple to accept the statement that trans people are “born in the wrong bodies,” there is a range of bodily discomfort that many trans people report feeling. How should the phenomenology of trans body dysphoria, as I will call it, be understood theoretically and in a way that takes seriously resistance to widespread transphobia and oppression? And what might the existence of such dysphoria show about the gendered self? In this paper, I argue that the phenomenology of trans body dysphoria ought to be understood within the broader context of intimate personhood. In this model, persons are defined in terms of gender-differentiated interpersonal boundaries of decency/privacy; and the body is structured by such moral boundaries. I argue that trans body dysphoria can be understood, in part, as dysphoria about the intimate body—that is, the body as structured by such boundaries. One consequence of this view is that attempts to understand trans body dysphoria as a split between internally felt body and externally seen body are too simple. Instead, the internal experience of one’s gendered body is precisely an experience of one’s body as a potential object for another—an object determined by gender-differentiated boundaries. Rather than situated at the point between internal and external experiences of oneself, the incongruence occurs between oppressive and resistant experiences of one’s body as a potential object for another—that is, as a gender-differentiated intimate person.

DEONTIC LOGIC AND TIME (II-B)
MARK A. BROWN (SYRACUSE UNIVERSITY)

Temporal considerations enter into our normative deliberations in a number of ways, some rather direct and obvious, others less conspicuous. This presentation will reflect on several of these, including the dynamics of normative circumstances, the role of time in conditional obligations, and the role time plays in our understanding of actions which incur, fulfill, reconfigure, invalidate, or violate normative commitments.

IS EDUCATIONAL ADEQUACY ENOUGH FOR RACIAL JUSTICE? (V-C)
DERRICK DARBY (UNIVERSITY OF KANSAS)

Some philosophers argue that fair educational opportunity only demands a public education that is adequate to prepare citizens from all walks of life to join an educated democratic elite. But critics object that this ideal of educational adequacy is insufficient for capturing the demands of justice insofar as it leaves persons with no basis to complain about educational inequalities that persist after this threshold of adequacy has been satisfied. These critics contend that we must adopt an ideal of educational equality to fully capture the demands of fair educational opportunity. I shall join this debate on the side of the critics by attending to the issue of racial inequalities in education. My complaint is that an adequacy approach is
insufficient to address important requirements for achieving racial justice in education. I develop this complaint by highlighting two shortcomings of this approach. Reliance upon an educated elite to serve the interests of the educationally disadvantaged may not result in the adoption of educational policies to close the racial achievement gap that attend to the full range of factors—including racial discrimination—that contribute to it. In addition, the ideal of educational adequacy leaves us unable to take issue with paying underachieving black students cash for grades as a matter of principle, which is a strike against this approach inasmuch as this controversial educational practice is compatible with leaving in place and possibility exacerbating racial inequalities in education.

**ESSE EST INTERAGERE: TO EXIST IS TO INTERACT, OR, THERE IS NO INTELLIGIBILITY WITHOUT VISIBILITY (III-D)**

*Miqqi Alicia Gilbert (York University)*

Using Butler’s (1990) quote regarding intelligible persons, I argue that personhood is a function of interaction, and that we are unable to interact with ungendered persons, thereby denying them personhood unless they are willing to submit to forced gendering. The unintelligible being, like an unintelligible message, is ignored and put aside. This non-person-being is an object without rights, without recognizability, and, hence, without existence. It means that the trans person, to be a person, must, as Butler says, be “gendered in conformity with recognizable standards of gender intelligibility” (69). It precludes the existence of a person qua trans person, but only as a conforming member of the gender binary. It entails that the cost of personhood is the invisibility of trans-ness, a price that may not be too high for some, but is impossibly high for others, and demands deception for all (Bettcher 2007). The trans-being who does not/cannot/will not conform to the standards of gender intelligibility within the larger cisgendered world is the being who is not a person, is the monster (Stryker 1994), the being that must be destroyed. And, if not destroyed, at the least denied meaning, taken as a Dada-ist message of nothingness and still denied life-force enhancing interaction. The revolt, the revolt of the monsters and of the slaves, of the gender-nonconforming and the category defiers and defilers is the demand that the binary be collapsed into itself so that like a gender black hole it implodes and disappears. The fear is that such bodies, the gender diverse presenters will demand intelligibility and thereby undermine the very existence of the rules and sensibilities of patriarchal society. The monsters will then be walking among us, and they will have become not only identifiable, and, worse, intelligible.

**MAIMONIDES’ TRANSFORMATION OF ARISTOTLE’S ETHICS (II-A)**

*Ed Halper (University of Georgia)*

It is well known that Aristotle’s *Metaphysics* was important for medieval philosophy because its proof for the existence of a first unmoved mover could be readily assimilated to the common theology of Judaism, Christianity, and Islam. That Aristotle also endorsed both multiple first
movers and an eternal physical world and rejected *creatio ex nihilo* posed difficulties that medieval philosophers had to overcome, difficulties common to all three traditions. Aristotle’s ethics was equally attractive to medieval philosophers because he justified rationally actions commanded by scriptures and because he offered an account of immortality that could be assimilated to scriptural views of salvation, but Aristotle also posed difficulties for medieval thinkers because his account of virtue did not coincide with scripture either in detail or extension. This paper explains how Maimonides transformed Aristotle’s ethics to make it conform to the ethics propounded in the Torah. His most basic move is to identify a large class of commandments with the acts of virtue whose repeated performance molds moral virtues in the soul. However, Maimonides faces at least four difficulties. The first is that observing the commandments produces the habit of acting as they command, not the habit of following the dictates of practical wisdom that Aristotle defines as virtue. Indeed, someone following commandments is not making his own choices and, thus, not exercising practical wisdom. The second is that since commanded actions are fixed, they cannot be appropriate to all circumstances. This paper argues that Maimonides resolved both problems by making ethics a theoretical science in which practical wisdom is cultivated by studying the commandments, rather than the practical science Aristotle understood.

The third problem is that there is a large class of religious commandments that have no obvious ethical benefit. This paper argues that Maimonides understands these commandments as political devices (what Aristotle calls *sophismata*) that indirectly cultivate both the virtues citizens need to live in a community and the opinions about God that are most fitting for their intellects. The final problem is the seeming impossibility that acts of virtue be rewarded by an unchanging first cause. This paper argues that Maimonides advances a cosmology that allows for such rewards, that is, for providence, in a select and limited way.

**Does an Existential Self Play a Role in Frederick Douglass’s Critique of Slavery? (III-B)**

**Frank Kirkland (Hunter College)**

A number of philosophers have tended to characterize the work of Frederick Douglass along the lines of existential thought alone. Such characterization entails reading Douglass in terms of a strongly lived familiarity or engagement with racial enslavement as a matter of and about which he renders meaningless, absurd, and as a matter whose existence he seeks to abolish. These become the desiderata of the “existential self” in Douglass. But if Douglass were existentialist in this regard alone, he could neither exemplify nor argue what such an engagement would be like were there not some normative orientation, showing that and how such an engagement renders racial slavery meaningless, serving as the impetus to slavery’s abolition. Without such an orientation, there is one problem that seems to follow from characterizing Douglass’s work existentially. Existentially a strongly lived familiarity with racial enslavement would
require some philosophical anthropology to sort of underwrite it. But the existential mantra “existence precedes essence” denies any distinguishing human way of life to serve as an anthropologically fixed or socially designated model. Existentially the lived familiarity with racial slavery could be in a state of suspension (more Harriet Jacobs than Frederick Douglass), committed to a life without a resolution or some kind of grounding in the normal sense. It could just as well leave one with nothing to say about racial slavery, save for that which has been and can be confirmed in the slave experience in and at a particular point in historical time. So my essay will spell out the normative orientation Douglass follows, guiding rather than serving the existential motifs in his thought.

TOWARD A PRINCIPLE OF INSTRUMENTAL TRANSMISSION (IV-D)

NIKO KOLODNY (UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA–BERKELEY)

For many philosophers, it is a truism that if there is reason for the end, then there is, because of that, reason to take the means. Whether reasons for ends derive from our desiring those ends, or whether they derive from their relation to things of independent value, these reasons “transmit” or “transfer” to their instruments. Assuming that there is such a phenomenon as “instrumental transmission,” what principles govern it? I make a positive proposal, “General Transmission,” which answers to three intuitive desiderata: that reason transmits to means that are “probabilizing,” “effective,” and “nonsuperfluous” with respect to the relevant end. I argue that General Transmission covers more cases, with greater specificity, than some other transmission principles that have been proposed. Moreover, I argue that these principles (except for one that is entailed by General Transmission) are vulnerable to counterexamples that General Transmission avoids. I close by raising, and trying in part to assuage, a doubt about instrumental transmission: that reasons for ends ever explain reasons for means.

TOWARD A MORE FINE-GRAINED CONCEPTUAL SCHEME FOR MORAL STATUSES (II-B)

PAUL MCNAMARA (UNIVERSITY OF NEW HAMPSHIRE)

Deontic logic, despite its merits, emerged in sin, many sins. One was the conflation of indifference with the conditions for optionality, a conflation which tacitly, but inexorably, rules out action beyond the call of duty. Another pervasive conflation, in both deontic logic and ethical theory, has been that of must with ought. Arguably, yet another conflation is that of action beyond the call with supererogation, and permissible suboptimality with suberogation. Other arguably important notions, like the least you can do, praiseworthiness, and blameworthiness have been largely ignored. Work has been done, but this area remains underexplored, and is of special interest to moral philosophy. We survey some of these issues, and then explore some simple semantic structures that allow for more expressive power and conceptual discrimination. We begin with a simple semantic framework (and a logic) for indifference, and then show that the semantics and logic for optionality (and contingency) is just a special case.
We then add a logic for *must*, and the *can* and *can't* of permissibility and impermissibility. Next, we order elements in the structures and add a logic for *ought*, and one for *the least one can do* which naturally emerges from the structures, as do operators for *action beyond the call* and *permissible suboptimality*. We note that a simple structure emerges naturally from intuitive reflections on either *indifference*, *must vs. ought*, *the least one can do*, *action beyond the call*, or *permissible suboptimality*. We sketch generalizations and expansions of the framework (e.g., to include *supererogation* and *suberogation*, or conditional versions of the notions). Whatever refinements are needed, the simple overarching approach appears to be on track, and promises a much better synchronization of deontic systems with the rich array of concepts from commonsense morality of special interest to moral philosophers.

**SPINOZA’S MERELOGY (IV-C)**

*Yitzhak Melamed (Johns Hopkins University)*

Early modern conceptions of substance are tightly related to mereological assumptions. Whether one substance can be part of another substance is in many cases a function of the understanding of the part-whole relation and the priority assigned to the parts or the whole. In this paper I study Spinoza’s mereology: the contrast between the whole-parts and substance-modes relations, Spinoza’s distinction between divisible and indivisible infinities, Spinoza’s theory of individuation, and finally, the notion of infinite modes as holistic totalities.

**AQUINAS AS READER OF ARISTOTLE: THE CASE OF MAGNANIMITY (III-A)**

*Robert Miner (Baylor University)*

When Aquinas reads Aristotle on greatness of soul (*megalopsuchia*), he takes note of the particular features of the *megalopsuchos* that so many readers find objectionable. But rather than blame these qualities, he claims that they are praiseworthy to the highest degree. Many contemporary readers have thought that Aristotle lacks an appropriate awareness of the virtue of humility, and that this lack is particularly evident in his portrait of the magnanimous man. But Aquinas does not seem interested in pressing this point against Aristotle. Where, then, does Aquinas revise Aristotle on magnanimity? Is there a revision at all? I show that while Aquinas does not criticize Aristotle at the points on which modern readers think he deserves criticism, it does not follow that his reading of Aristotle on magnanimity is uncritical. Aquinas goes beyond Aristotle in at least four respects: (1) his placement of magnanimity within the virtue of fortitude; (2) his far more elaborate consideration of the opposing vices; (3) his explicit connection of magnanimity to the passion of hope; (4) his implicit connection of magnanimity to charity, which he regards as the mother and form of all the virtues. These four points, I conclude, amount to a subtle but thoroughgoing revision of the Aristotelian virtue.
PHILOSOPHY AND AMERICAN APARTHEID: FURTHER CONSIDERATIONS OF RACE AND PHILOSOPHY (IV-A)

LUCIUS T. OUTLAW (VANDERBILT UNIVERSITY)

These “further considerations,” building on considerations published in my On Race and Philosophy, will be focused around the following questions: How has the development and institutionalization of academic philosophy in the United States been conditioned by de jure and de facto racial apartheid? What has been and should be done to extricate the enterprise of academic philosophy from such conditioning? To what ends?

TRANSGENDER, CISGENDER, AND ASPIRATIONAL IDENTITY (III-D)

CHRISTINE OVERALL (QUEEN’S UNIVERSITY)

I argue that the question of personal identity is not in principle different for those who are transsexual/transgendered than it is for those who are cisgendered. The reason is that gender is an aspirational identity, that is, a fundamental personal characteristic such that, if its possessor values it, s/he must maintain and reinforce it through ongoing action. One can aspire to exemplify a gender through bodily styling, self-presentation, and gendered activities, all of which must be ongoing for gender identity maintenance. A cisgendered person is an individual who aspires to a gender identity that is considered to be consistent with her or his genitalia and so-called secondary sex characteristics. A trans person is someone who aspires to a gender identity that is not considered to be consistent with her or his genitalia and so-called secondary sex characteristics. Most cultures make acting on one’s gender aspirations relatively easy and safe for cisgendered persons, and relatively difficult and dangerous for trans persons. But these differences do not change the aspirational nature of gender identity. In most cases, for both the trans person and the cisgendered person, gender is not optional, yet each one must constantly act in such a way as to validate their aspirational gender identity.

EMBODIMENT, COGNITION, AND CONSCIOUSNESS (II-C)

ROBERT D. RUPERT (UNIVERSITY OF COLORADO–BOULDER)

I begin this paper by examining possible ways in which phenomenological and scientific perspectives on embodiment might interact. I then argue for what I take to be the most plausible, scientifically grounded unification of these two approaches. In developing this argument, I appeal to claims about mental representation and neural realization. Discussions of these issues in the embodiment literature often muddy more water than they clarify. As part of a corrective enterprise, I argue that a proper understanding of the nature of embodied mental representations and their relation to neural realizers supports only a moderate embodiment thesis. In the final portion of the paper, I argue, in agreement with many fans of embodiment, that the embodied view helps to solve the problem of qualia. Proponents of embodiment theses will, however, be let down by the spirit of my solution; for it is straightforwardly materialist and representationalist, and it assigns no privileged role to the phenomenological experience of embodiment.
INTENTION, PLANS, AND ETHICAL RATIONALISM (IV-D)
Kieran Setiya (University of Pittsburgh)

Michael Bratman’s theory of intention owes part of its remarkable influence to the appearance of modularity: that its moral psychology, and its conception of the norms that govern intention, can be combined with different comprehensive theories of practical reason. I argue that this appearance is deceptive. Tracing Bratman’s evolving thoughts about the norms of rationality for intention, I show that his earlier theory is defective, while his later theory commits him to a comprehensive form of rationalism in ethics—a picture of just the kind he has criticized in others.

CRITICAL RACE THEORY: MAKING SPACE FOR MIGRATION AND DIASPORA (IV-A)
Falguni A. Sheth (Hampshire College)

In the last decade, there has been a remarkable expansion of subjects about which Critical Race Theorists are writing. The contours of Critical Race Theory (CRT) have been fluid enough to include concerns pertaining to the intersections of sexuality, ethnic identities, gender, and class. The field has been attentive to building upon and extending important methodologies that were introduced earlier in CRT, including Kimberle Crenshaw’s work on intersectionality and Charles Mills’ frameworks of the racial contract and the epistemology of ignorance. And yet, there appears to be a curious silence over political concerns such as migration, terrorism, and war, and conceptual concerns regarding “diasporic” subjects, namely those whose homes cannot be easily defined. These are concerns that are related but not quite core issues within Critical Race Theory. This paper will offer an argument for why these should become central concerns for Critical Race Theorists of many stripes.

THE FRAGILITY OF GOODNESS REVISITED: THE ARISTOTELIAN BACKGROUND OF MARTHA NUSSBAUM’S POLITICAL LIBERALISM AND CAPABILITIES APPROACH (V-A)
Juha Sihvola (University of Helsinki)

In her recent work in political philosophy Martha Nussbaum has systematically explored the tension between the irreversible plurality of human convictions and identities in modern societies, on the one hand, the democratic requirement of civic equality, on the other hand. She calls her position political liberalism, following John Rawls, but interprets in an original way in terms of human capabilities. The capabilities approach as developed by Nussbaum and Amartya Sen draws its original inspiration from Aristotle. It will be argued in the paper that many important ideas that would later become central in Nussbaum’s thinking are already well visible in the original way she interprets Aristotle in The Fragility of Goodness (FG) and become even more prominent in her articles on Aristotle dating from the same period. Five areas in Aristotle’s thought will be in focus: (1) the method of saving the phenomena, (2) the idea of non-scientific deliberation, (3) the account of human vulnerability and the role of external goods in a good human life, (4) the role of political institutions
in a just society, and (5) the role of tragic emotions in moral education. The plausibility of FG’s Aristotle as a historical interpretation will be explored with a conclusion that while some criticism in details is needed, the main lines still provide a solid basis for understanding Aristotle. Four topics will also be discussed in which the later development of Nussbaum’s political philosophy required parting company with Aristotle: (1) feminism, (2) the establishment of the idea of universal human dignity, inspired by the Stoics and Kant, (3) the importance of transnational justice, and (4) the protection of freedom from state intervention and the distinction between the political and the comprehensive.

FROM FLOURISHING TO MORTALITY: FEMINIST POLITICAL THEORISTS READ TRAGEDY (V-A)

JOAN C. TRONTO (UNIVERSITY OF MINNESOTA)

When Martha Nussbaum published The Fragility of Goodness in 1986 it was a path-breaking work in terms of ethical method and content. Among other innovations was her engagement with tragedy as a source for ethical and political insight. In her subsequent work, Nussbaum has developed an account of human flourishing that has become a touchstone for feminist activists around the globe. Not all feminist theorists have followed Nussbaum’s liberal feminism, though. Interestingly, many of those who have criticized Nussbaum’s feminist approach have circled back to tragedy, especially to Antigone, to advance arguments about the possible meanings of “humanism.” This essay surveys Nussbaum’s place in feminist political theory and considers how these divergent readings and understandings of tragedy help us to understand the contours of contemporary feminist political theory. Among writers to be considered: Elshtain, Dietz, Butler, Sands, and Honig.
SESSIONS SPONSORED BY APA COMMITTEES

THURSDAY, MARCH 31

How to Obtain a Position at the Community College (I-M)
Sponsored by the Committee on Philosophy in Two-Year Colleges
12:10-2:10 p.m.

Potentiality at the Beginning and End of Life (II-L)
Sponsored by the Committee on Philosophy and Medicine
2:20-5:20 p.m.

Public Philosophy and Public Rationality: Solving Public Problems through Philosophical Discussion? (II-M)
Sponsored by the Committee on Public Philosophy
2:20-5:20 p.m.

Author Meets Critics Session on Thomas E. Wartenberg, Big Ideas for Little Kids: Teaching Philosophy through Children’s Literature (II-N)
Sponsored by the Committee on Pre-College Instruction in Philosophy
2:20-5:20 p.m.

FRIDAY, APRIL 1

Invited Symposium: Transsexuality and Personal Identity (III-D)
Co-sponsored by the Committee on Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender Persons in the Profession
9:00 a.m.-Noon

Does It Matter What I Do? Student Engagement, Social Change and Teaching (III-M)
Sponsored by the Committee on the Teaching of Philosophy
9:00 a.m.-Noon
Technology and Reproductive Autonomy (III-N)
Sponsored by the Committee on the Status of Women
9:00 a.m.-Noon

The Draft APA Handbook of Best Placement Practices (IV-L)
Sponsored by the Committee on Academic Career Opportunities and Placement
1:30-4:30 p.m.

Author Meets Critics: Scott Shapiro’s Legality (IV-M)
Sponsored by the Committee on Philosophy and Law
1:30-4:30 p.m.

(Topic to be announced) (IV-N)
Sponsored by the Committee on International Cooperation
1:30-4:30 p.m.

Saturday, April 2

Symposium on Environmental Justice and Indigenous Peoples (V-L)
Sponsored by the Committee on Indigenous Philosophers
9:00 a.m.-Noon

Credentialing (V-M)
Sponsored by the Committee on Philosophy in Two-Year Colleges
9:00 a.m.-Noon

Discussion on Online Education in Philosophy (V-N)
Sponsored by the Committee on Philosophy and Computers
9:00 a.m.-Noon

Symposium on Vine Deloria Jr. (VI-L)
Sponsored by the Committee on Indigenous Philosophers
2:15-5:15 p.m.
GROUP SESSIONS

Sessions sponsored by affiliated groups are listed below in alphabetical order of sponsoring group. Sessions sponsored jointly by more than one group are listed once for each sponsor.

A
Adam Smith Society: GI-13, Thu, 9:00 a.m.-Noon
American Association of Philosophy Teachers: GI-7, Thu, 9:00 a.m.-Noon
American Maritain Association: GV-5, Sat, 12:15-2:15 p.m.
American Society for Aesthetics: GI-1, Thu, 9:00 a.m.-Noon
American Society for Philosophy, Counseling, and Psychotherapy: GI-2, Thu, 9:00 a.m.-Noon
American Society for Value Inquiry: GI-10, Thu, 9:00 a.m.-Noon; GII-8, Thu, 5:30-7:30 p.m.
Association for Informal Logic and Critical Thinking: GIII-1, Thu, 7:40-10:40 p.m.

B
Bertrand Russell Society: GIV-4, Fri, 7:00-10:00 p.m.

C
Central Division Sartre Circle: GII-6, Thu, 5:30-7:30 p.m.
Committee on Institutional Cooperation: GI-2, Thu, 5:30-7:30 p.m.
Concerned Philosophers for Peace: GV-6, Sat, 12:15-2:15 p.m.

E
Experimental Philosophy Society: GV-3, Sat, 12:15-2:15 p.m.

G
Great Lakes Mind and Science Consortium: GIII-6, Thu, 7:40-10:40 p.m.

H
Hume Society: GI-9, Thu, 9:00 a.m.-Noon

I
International Society for Comparative Studies of Chinese and Western Philosophy: GIII-5, Thu, 7:40-10:40 p.m.; GV-9, Sat, 12:15-2:15 p.m.
International Society for Environmental Ethics: GI-8, Thu, 9:00 a.m.-Noon; GIV-9, Fri, 7:00-10:00 p.m.
International Society of Chinese Philosophy: GI-12, Thu, 9:00 a.m.-Noon; GII-1, Thu, 5:30-7:30 p.m.
Proceedings and Addresses of the APA 84:

J
Josiah Royce Society: GV-1, Sat, 12:15-2:15 p.m.

M
Midwest Society for Women in Philosophy: GIV-8, Fri, 7:00-10:00 p.m.

N
North American Division of the Schopenhauer Society: GV-7, Sat, 12:15-2:15 p.m.
North American Kant Society: GII-7, Thu, 5:30-7:30 p.m.
North American Nietzsche Society: GII-3, Thu, 5:30-7:30 p.m.; GV-12, Sat, 12:15-2:15 p.m.
North American Society for Social Philosophy: GIII-3, Thu, 7:40-10:40 p.m.

P
Philosophy of Religion Group: GI-6, Thu, 9:00 a.m.-Noon; GV-8, Sat, 12:15-2:15 p.m.
Philosophy of Time Society: GI-4, Thu, 9:00 a.m.-Noon

R
Radical Philosophy Association: GII-5, Thu, 5:30-7:30 p.m.; GIV-3, Fri, 7:00-10:00 p.m.

S
Society for Analytical Feminism: GIV-5, Fri, 7:00-10:00 p.m.
Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy: GIV-1, Fri, 7:00-10:00 p.m.
Society for Business Ethics: GIV-6, Fri, 7:00-10:00 p.m.
Society for Lesbian and Gay Philosophy: GIII-9, Thu, 7:40-10:40 p.m.
Society for Realist-Antirealist Discussion: GII-4, Thu, 5:30-7:30 p.m.
Society for the Advancement of American Philosophy: GIV-7, Fri, 7:00-10:00 p.m.; GV-2, Sat, 12:15-2:15 p.m.
Society for the Metaphysics of Science: GI-11, Thu, 9:00 a.m.-Noon
Society for the Philosophic Study of the Contemporary Visual Arts: GI-3, Thu, 9:00 a.m.-Noon; GIII-7, Thu, 7:40-10:40 p.m.
Society for the Philosophical Study of Education: GIII-2, Thu, 7:40-10:40 p.m.; GIV-2, Fri, 7:00-10:00 p.m.
Society for the Philosophy of Creativity: GIII-4, Thu, 7:40-10:40 p.m.
Society for the Study of Indian and Tibetan Buddhist Philosophy: GV-4, Sat, 12:15-2:15 p.m.
Society for the Study of Process Philosophies: GIII-8, Thu, 7:40-10:40 p.m.
Society for the Study of the History of Analytical Philosophy: GI-5, Thu, 9:00 a.m.-Noon
Society of Christian Philosophers: GII-9, Thu, 5:30-7:30 p.m.; GIV-10, Fri, 1:30-3:30 p.m. (Executive Committee meeting)

W
William James Society: GV-11, Sat, 12:15-2:15 p.m.
Placement Service Information

Lindsay Palkovitz will be the Coordinator for the APA Placement Service at the 2011 Central Division Meeting. Questions concerning the Service should be directed to Lindsay at The American Philosophical Association, University of Delaware, 31 Amstel Avenue, Newark, DE 19716. She can also be reached by telephone at (302) 831-4298, fax: (302) 831-8690, or email: lindspal@udel.edu.

APA Placement Service General Hours of Operation:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Day</th>
<th>Placement Information</th>
<th>Placement Interviewing</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Wednesday, March 30:</td>
<td>5:00 – 9:00 p.m., Meeting Registration Desk (Red Wing, Third Floor)</td>
<td>5:00 – 9:00 p.m., Rochester (Third Floor)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thursday, March 31:</td>
<td>9:00 a.m. – 5:00 p.m., Meeting Registration Desk (Red Wing, Third Floor)</td>
<td>8:00 a.m. – 6:00 p.m., Rochester (Third Floor)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Friday, April 1:</td>
<td>9:00 a.m. – 5:00 p.m., Meeting Registration Desk (Red Wing, Third Floor)</td>
<td>8:00 a.m. – 6:00 p.m., Rochester (Third Floor)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saturday, April 2:</td>
<td>9:00 a.m. – Noon, Meeting Registration Desk (Red Wing, Third Floor)</td>
<td>8:00 a.m. – Noon, Rochester (Third Floor)</td>
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APA Placement Service Locations

The Placement Desk will be located at the Meeting Registration Desk (Red Wing, third floor), and the Interviewing Area will be in Rochester (third floor). In the event that additional space is needed for interviewing, the location will be posted near the Meeting Registration Desk.
JOB CANDIDATES – MEETING REGISTRATION DESK (RED WING, THIRD FLOOR)

1. Candidate Numbers will be assigned at the Placement Desk.
2. The location of a Job Interview will be available from the Placement staff, or posted on the bulletin board at the information desk.
3. Additional “Request for Interview” forms will be available at the Placement Desk.
4. APA Membership Applications will be available at the APA Meeting Registration Desk.
5. Information and instructions for using the Service will be available at the Placement desk (also see following pages), and posted on the information bulletin board.
6. The mailboxes for Job Candidates will be located at the Placement Desk.
7. A complete set of Job Postings will be available at the Placement Desk.
8. A message for the APA Placement Ombudsperson can be left at the Placement Desk.

INTERVIEWERS – MEETING REGISTRATION DESK (RED WING, THIRD FLOOR)

1. Interviewers check in here—as soon as possible upon arrival.
2. Payments for On-Site Interviewing Departments will be received here.
3. Space will be provided here for interviewers to check their files.
4. “Request for Interview” forms received from job candidates that have been reviewed by interviewers should be returned here.
5. A list of interviewing table assignments will be posted on the Placement Information Bulletin Board.

INTERVIEWING AREA – ROCHESTER (THIRD FLOOR)

1. APA Interviewing Tables will be located here.
2. In the event that additional space for interviewing is needed, we will post the additional location on the Placement Information Bulletin Board.

INFORMATION AND INSTRUCTIONS FOR JOB CANDIDATES

REQUIREMENTS FOR USING THE PLACEMENT SERVICE

1. You must be an APA member in order to use the Service. Placement is a benefit of membership for candidates, and there is no additional charge to use this service. Membership applications are available on the APA web site (www.apaonline.org) or by contacting the APA National Office (302) 831-1112, or at the Membership/Registration desk at the Meeting.
2. You MUST REGISTER for the MEETING in order to use the Service.
   - If you register in advance for the meeting and indicate that you will be a candidate (an advance registration form is located at the back of this issue), a candidate number will be assigned in the
National Office and will appear on the back of your badge. You must pick up your badge from the APA Registration staff prior to using the Placement service.

- If you register on-site for the meeting, present your badge to the Placement Staff, who will be available to assign you a candidate number in the “Placement Service” line.

**WHAT TO BRING WITH YOU**

1. Your copies of recent issues of *Jobs For Philosophers*.
2. Several copies of your *curriculum vitae*. If you run out of CVs at the meeting, the hotel has a copy center located in the Business Center.

**HOW TO USE THE PLACEMENT SERVICE**

After you have picked up your registration materials from the APA Registration staff, you are ready to use the Service. If you do not yet have a candidate number on the back of your badge, please go to the job candidates’ area at the Meeting Registration Desk (Red Wing, Third Floor) to receive one.

**JOB CANDIDATES’ AREA – MEETING REGISTRATION DESK (RED WING, THIRD FLOOR)**

Here you will find a file folder (mailbox) with your candidate number on it. All communications addressed to you during the meeting will be placed there. Your folder contains:

1. “Request for Interview” forms. Additional forms will be available from the Placement staff. Be sure that your Placement Number appears at the top of all forms.
2. A “Locator” form for you to list your name and hotel address. Please do not remove this form from your folder. This is used only in the event that we need to contact you during the meeting.

**JOB POSTINGS**

New jobs (not having appeared in the *Jobs for Philosophers*) will be posted on a bulletin board in the Placement Service Area. You should check this board regularly for new postings. Each ad should contain instructions on how to apply.

**INSTITUTIONS THAT HAVE CHECKED IN WITH PLACEMENT**

The names of institutions that have registered to use the Service will be posted on the bulletin board (updated regularly) in alphabetical order. Each listing will indicate the following:

1. If the listing institution has checked in with Placement.
2. If the institution is accepting interview requests at the meeting.
3. The relevant JFP for the institution’s opening(s).
4. Where the institution plans on interviewing (Table with number assignment).

5. Miscellaneous notes deemed appropriate by the Placement staff or the institution.

**SUBMITTING AN INTERVIEW REQUEST FORM**

Complete the top portion of the “Request for Interview” form and attach a copy of your CV. **Be sure that your candidate number appears at the top of all forms.** After you have completed the necessary information, place your request form and CV in the box marked *Requests for Interviews* which will be prominently displayed on the Placement Service Desk. Your “Request” will be forwarded to the institution by a staff member.

**INTERVIEWS**

After your “Request” has been reviewed by a representative from the institution, the form will be returned to your file folder with the institution’s response appearing on the bottom of the form. Check your file folder often so that you can be certain to receive your messages promptly.

By Noon on April 2, all “Requests” submitted by you should have been returned to your file folder, and you should remove them at that time. Occasionally, an institution may retain applications to review at a later date. If you applied for a job that had been posted and the institution did not check in with the Service during the meeting, it is suggested that you contact the institution by mail.

**INTERVIEWING LOCATIONS**

Some departments will be conducting interviews at tables located in Rochester (Third Floor). Other interviewing table locations will be posted if additional space is required. Each institution using a table for interviewing will be assigned a table number. The table numbers assigned to institutions will be posted on the bulletin board in the Placement Service Area.

**ADVICE FOR JOB APPLICANTS**

The APA Committee on Career Opportunities offers the following advice for job applicants: The schedule for those seeking jobs and those Departments offering positions is difficult for all concerned. From the point of view of Departments, any publication date for *Jobs for Philosophers* is a compromise between the competing demands imposed by the need to get funding for positions, so the later the better, and by the need to have time to process applications, so the sooner the better. From the point of view of job applicants, there are also competing demands: the sooner it is published, the more time to apply, but the later it is published, the more opportunities will be available. There is no easy solution to this problem, but you can ease your difficulties somewhat by being prepared when the *JFP* is published. You should have your curriculum vitae ready to put in an envelope, a generic draft of a letter of application ready to be fine-tuned for particular job opportunities, and the rest of your file ready for mailing.
This means talking to those who are to write letters of recommendation long before the *JFP* is due to arrive, preparing material about your teaching capacities, and selecting a writing sample for those Departments that request it. Applications should be complete, as well as clearly organized. It is to your advantage to send in your application as soon as possible after an ad appears.

**INFORMATION AND INSTRUCTIONS FOR INTERVIEWERS**

**REQUIREMENTS FOR USING THE PLACEMENT SERVICE**

1. It is expected that all individual interviewers will register for the **meeting** either by using the registration form found at the back of this issue or by stopping at the Meeting Registration Desk (Red Wing, Third Floor) to register on-site prior to using the Placement Service.

2. All **Departments (not individuals)** planning to interview at the meeting should complete the Placement Service advance registration form found on our web site, www.apaonline.org/divisions/central/index.aspx or at the end of this section.

Upon receipt of an advance registration form additional information pertaining to the Placement Service will be sent to the attention of the contact person listed on the form. In the event that we send Placement forms either via email or mail, please be sure to complete these and return them to our office **at your earliest opportunity**. Not doing so may cause your materials to arrive after the Staff has already left the office to travel to the meeting. In this case, we **must** have you fill out the forms again on site. If time does not allow sending them to us, please bring them with you and turn them in at the Placement Desk.

**CHECKING IN WITH THE SERVICE**

*Before you begin to interview candidates*, please check in with the Placement Staff (Meeting Registration Desk, Red Wing, Third Floor). We will need to know that you have arrived on site for candidates inquiring about your institution. Additional information will be requested from you (or confirmed if your department pre-registered) at this time as well.

Some institutions accept interview requests at the meeting; some of these job notices may have appeared in *Jobs for Philosophers* while others are unpublished positions. A new, unpublished position will be assigned an AD# and posted on the bulletin board in the Placement Service area. If you are bringing such a job notice with you to the meeting, please provide the Placement Staff with **four** copies of the notice for the position you are advertising. Such a position announcement should be typed on **one side only** in a good size and easy to read font, and be as brief as possible. Only positions that have **not** appeared in *Jobs for Philosophers* will be posted. If you would like a position that has been posted at this meeting to appear on our website immediately following the meeting, or in the issue of *Jobs for Philosophers*, you need to submit this ad immediately, following the close of the meeting via our website, https://member.apaonline.org/
Some institutions interview by prearrangement after placing an advertisement in *Jobs for Philosophers* and then contacting candidates prior to the meeting. When you arrange an interview with candidates, please inform them that they **must be APA Members in order to use the Service and they must register for the meeting in order to use the Service.**

If you plan to conduct job interviews anywhere other than at the interviewing tables/suites we have provided, please let us know your plans because candidates often come to us to ask questions about the location/time (etc.) of their interviews, and we need to have complete, up-to-date information in order to help them (and you).

Departments using a **Suite** for interviewing will need to complete an interview schedule form at the time they check in with the Service. Doing so enables the Service to notify the candidates you wish to interview of your interviewing location. **Be assured that only those candidates listed on your interview schedule will be told the location of your hotel room, unless you have directed us to give this information to all candidates who ask.** Departments interviewing at tables **DO NOT** need to complete this form.

N.B.: If you are conducting interviews in a hotel room, please be aware of the following policy statement adopted by the APA Board of Officers at its November 2004 meeting:

“Departments should not conduct Job Interviews in non-suite hotel rooms. Candidates who are subject to such interviews can appeal to the APA and are guaranteed anonymity.” (Originally published in *Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association*, Vol. 78, No. 5, pp. 23, 119.)

**APA Interviewing Tables**

The Placement Service provides numbered tables for interviewing purposes; you will receive your table number assignment when you check in. These table number assignments will also be posted on the Placement Service Bulletin Board. Should additional space for interviewing tables be necessary, this location will be posted as well.

**Institution File Folder (Mailbox)**

There will be a file folder bearing the name of your institution located at the Meeting Registration Desk (Red Wing, Third Floor). Requests for interviews from candidates will be placed in this file folder.

**Reviewing Interview Requests**

When a candidate requests an interview with your institution, you should receive her/his *curriculum vitae* attached to a “Request for Interview” form. The bottom of this form is to be completed by you and returned to Placement staff. If an interview is granted, space is provided on this form
to list the time, date, and location of the interview. If you are unable to interview a candidate, space for this response is also provided on the form. Any request you receive in an envelope contains confidential material and should be destroyed rather than returned to the candidate. As a matter of professional courtesy, all requests should receive a response. When a candidate receives a “Request” form back without a response, he or she is likely to assume that the material has not been reviewed and might return this to you via our service or contact your institution by mail.

Each candidate is assigned a numbered file folder to facilitate prompt communication between interviewers and candidates. Materials that you wish to transmit to a registered candidate should be handed in to the Placement Service staff located at the Meeting Registration Desk (Red Wing, Third Floor), and will be delivered to the candidate by our staff.

**APA Statement on Placement Practices**

The APA Committee on the Status and Future of the Profession reminds you of its Statement on Placement Practices: The APA discourages the nomination by graduate departments of job seekers for positions in philosophy, and the submission of their dossiers in response to announcements of positions, without their knowledge or interest. This may seriously mislead those who are conducting searches, and may have unfortunate consequences both for them and for genuinely interested applicants. Graduate departments using a nomination procedure or submitting dossiers on behalf of job seekers should either attest explicitly that the candidate wishes to be considered for the positions in question, or (preferably) ensure that the job seekers themselves submit personal letters of application for these positions. Departments conducting searches are encouraged to recommend or require explicitly (in their position announcements) that each candidate, to be assessed of full consideration, should submit a personal letter of application for and interest in the announced position.

A Placement Ombudsperson will be available at the meeting. Please see the Placement Service Staff if you would like to contact the Ombudsperson.
Placement Service Registration for Interviewing Departments
APA 2011 Central Division Meeting
Minneapolis, Minnesota
The Minneapolis Hilton Hotel
March 30-April 2, 2011

Only one form is required for each interviewing department. Fax to: (302) 831-8690.

Institution & Department: ______________________________________________________
Street Address__________________________________________________________________
City, State: ___________________________ Zip Code:________________________________
Email: _______________________________ Phone:___________________________________

All individuals conducting interviews should be registered** for the Central Division Meeting as well as the department being registered with the Placement Service.

**Registered members of the department who will be conducting interviews:
____________________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________________

Our department will:
_____ need interviewing table(s) Quantity of Tables_____ –or–
_____conduct interviews in a hotel suite (you must contact Linda Smallbrook to reserve a suite)

Our department will:
_____ provide suite # and list of prearranged candidates to whom suite information may be given–or–
_____ bring suite # and allow service to give to anyone who requests it

Our department will:
_____ conduct prearranged interviews only–or–
_____ accept interview requests on-site

Please list the JFP issue(s) (if any) in which this job was advertised: ________________________

Registration Fees (Please Check One): ______ Pre-Registration, By March 7: $50.00
                                                ______ *Regular Registration, After March 7: $75.00

Credit Card Type: (Circle One) VISA / MASTERCARD
Credit Card Number:
Expiration Date:
Last 3 Digits on back of card:

Name on Card: _______________________________ Phone #:________________
Signature: ___________________________________ Email:____________________

***Check #: ______________ Check Date: _____________ Check Amount_____

***Payable to: The American Philosophical Association. The APA only accepts checks drawn on U.S. banks in U.S. funds, or Intl. Money Orders in U.S. funds. There is a $30 charge for all returned checks. **If PAYMENT is not received in our office by March 7, 2010 you MUST pay the on-site fee! Please mail form and payment to: Attn: Placement Services, The American Philosophical Association, 31 Amstel Avenue, University of Delaware, Newark, DE 19716.
This brochure offers some advice to those seeking jobs in philosophy. Like all advice it is to be taken with a grain of salt. It is based on the collective wisdom of the APA's Committee on Academic Careers and Placement in Fall 2004 (Larry May [chair], Andrew Light, Frank Ryan, Abby Wilkerson, Melissa Zinkin, Nancy Holland, Rebecca Copenhaver, Mark Timmons, David Tuncellito). Collective wisdom is probably somewhat less controversial than collective punishment, but more controversial than almost everything else. Nonetheless, we hope that some of what we recommend will prove helpful to some of you, some of the time. Job seeking is one of the most difficult things that people can engage in. Anything that reduces that difficulty has value.

1. **When to Start Thinking about Jobs**

   It is never too early to start thinking about the job market. During your first years in graduate school you should be thinking about which papers your teachers have liked. After the end of term, take the paper back to the professor who liked it and ask two questions:

   - What can I do to improve this paper and make it marketable for a conference or for publication?
   - Which conference or journal would be best suited for a paper like mine?

   You don’t need to do a lot of this. One or two of your best essays, sent first to a conference and then to a journal, will do nicely. Only send out your very best work to conferences, for that is what you want to be remembered for.

   In addition, in these early years in graduate school, you should try to put together a good assortment of courses that you have TAed for or taught independently. You should try to TA for all of the major introductory courses (introduction to philosophy, ethics, logic and critical thinking) as well as some specialized or advanced courses in your areas of specialization and competence. At some universities, such as the large state schools, the trick will be to limit your teaching so that you can get good writing done. At other schools, you may have to be creative to get enough teaching experience (try contacting small colleges and community colleges in your area). Most importantly, keep your teaching evaluations from these courses. Or if course evaluations do not routinely have students evaluate TAs, design your own and administer it during the last week of classes (then have a departmental secretary collect and hold them for you until grades are turned in so students don’t think you will retaliate against them).
A note of caution: Given the current and foreseeable demand for low-paid adjunct courses it can be very tempting to take on a large amount of adjunct teaching. Given the large number of graduate students seeking such teaching it can also be very tempting to take every course that is offered to you in order to ensure your place in the adjunct pool. The result sometimes can be a vicious cycle of taking more and more low-paid adjunct teaching that can impede your ability to finish your dissertation.

All other things being equal, and they hardly ever are, you could also use the early years in graduate school to get a bit (but only a bit) of service or administrative experience. The easiest here is to volunteer for a departmental committee, like the colloquium or admissions committee. If there are opportunities to work with an actual administrator, especially a Dean or higher, on a special project, you should jump at the opportunity since a letter from said administrator will make you look more attractive to administrators who will hire you down the road. Do not (repeat: do not) spend much time at this. Service is clearly a very distant third-place, after research and teaching, for the vast majority of jobs. No one gets hired on the basis of service, standing alone, unless you want to be hired into an administrative job. Remember too that one should be cautious about spending too much time on departmental or campus politics. Indeed, try to stay out of departmental politics altogether, which can come back to bite you. You are a transient in graduate school, and should not treat this as a permanent position.

It is a good idea to join the APA as soon as you can—the rates for student members are very low. And make sure to check the box on the application form saying that you would like to receive the publication called: Jobs for Philosophers (it’s free—but you have to check the box to get it). Once you get this publication, you can scan through it and think to yourself: Do any of these jobs sound interesting to me? What do I need to do to stand the best chance of getting the job I like the most? Note whether there are any such jobs. If not, consider another career. If so, notice what combinations of things employers are looking for (for example, notice that most jobs in philosophy of science or mind also want someone who can teach logic; and most jobs in ethical theory or political philosophy also want someone who can teach applied ethics).

Another good source of experience and professional contacts can be found in the numerous smaller specialized societies organized around particular sub-fields of philosophy, affinity groups, or particular periods or figures, such as the Society for Women in Philosophy, the International Society for Environmental Ethics, or the Society for Realist/Antirealist Discussion. Such organizations can be invaluable for helping to establish you in the field and providing a set of interlocutors who can improve your work. One of the best ways to find such organizations is to survey the Group Meetings listings in the program for each divisional APA conference.

In general, use the early years in graduate school to learn as much philosophy as you can. Also, begin to develop a specialty in philosophy, and perhaps also begin to develop a competence outside of philosophy,
such as political science or computer science (although for certain jobs you might not want to highlight this). Use these early years to figure out if you really want to spend your life in a philosophy department, and to begin to get a sense of what it means to be a “professional” philosopher. While it is very romantic to want to be a philosopher, like being a poet one does not live by thoughts and words alone. The way to support yourself is by getting a job as a member of a profession, and our profession, as odd as it may sound, is teaching and publishing in philosophy, which is not especially romantic, but is better than many other jobs we know.

2. WHEN TO GO INTO THE “MARKET”

One of the most important decisions you will make is when to go into the philosophy job market. This is especially important because many graduate students go in too early and waste years of their lives. The job market process is a nearly full-time job. So if you go in early and you don’t have enough of your dissertation done, you can find yourself six months later with no job prospects and no more done on your dissertation than when you started. Do this a couple of years and you nearly place yourself out of the market by being too long in graduate school—taking too long to finish a dissertation is almost always seen as a bad sign of how long it will take you to finish anything else.

So, when is it optimal to go into the job market? While this varies a bit, the best time is when you are nearly done with your dissertation. “Nearly done” is a relative term. If you have a five-chapter dissertation, “nearly done” can mean four chapters drafted and approved by your committee, and the other chapter at least begun. Or it can mean, all five chapters drafted and some fairly minor revisions needed. At bare minimum, you need three of those five chapters done by early September. The main reason for this is that you need your dissertation committee chair to say, in a letter he or she will write in late September, “Yes, Jones will be done and ready to start undistracted in the Fall.” But this is not enough, since everyone’s committee chair will say that, or else your application process is simply a waste of time. In addition, the committee chair must offer evidence to back up this claim, such as, that all five chapters are drafted and only need minor revisions, or some such. Optimally, the letter from your committee chair will say: “We have set December 8th as the defense date.” This is optimal because by the time you get to the Eastern Division meetings in late December, folks will know whether you are really done or not. January defense dates are good as well, because departments will be making hiring decisions by late January or early February, typically.

In normal years there are a lot more applicants for jobs in philosophy than there are jobs. So, employers are looking for reasons to throw out applications. The first cut at most schools is “whether the candidate is done, or will be done by September.” Unless you can make a strong case for this, and your dissertation committee chair can back you up, you are unlikely to make the first cut, and hence likely to have wasted six months or more. Don’t delude yourself. It normally takes two months of relatively
uninterrupted work to draft a good chapter, so it will take six months of very hard work to draft more than half of a dissertation, depending on your other commitments. If you haven’t started seriously writing your dissertation by March, you don’t stand much of a chance of being more than halfway done by September. But also don’t wait too long. While the national average is seven years from BA to completion of the Ph.D., if after completing your coursework you take longer than three years to write the dissertation, potential employers will start to wonder whether this is a sign that you will not be able to write enough in your probationary period to be able to get tenure. So, our best advice is not to go into the market until you are done with the dissertation, or at very least “nearly done.”

3. THE SYSTEM

In America in philosophy, the majority of jobs are advertised in Jobs for Philosophers in October and November and then first interviews (a half hour to an hour in length) are conducted at the APA Eastern Division meetings between Christmas and New Year’s day. If you make it through the convention, then two or three people will be flown to campus for a two-day intensive interview, where you will meet all of the faculty members and present a professional paper, or teach a class, and increasingly both. There are also jobs advertised after New Year’s day, although far fewer than before New Year’s. These jobs will typically have their first interviews at the Pacific or Central Division meetings in late March or late April respectively. But many of these jobs will not be tenure track, but instead they are rather late announcements for temporary positions of one or more years. Some schools will do first interviews by phone, but these are still very rare. If you are seriously on the market, you should plan to go to the APA Eastern Division meetings and apply to jobs out of the October and November JFPs, and then keep applying throughout the year.

Many graduate students go to their first APA meeting when they go on the job market. While certainly understandable due to financial constraints, we strongly advise you to attend a meeting of the APA prior to going on the market. In particular, going to an Eastern APA meeting may help you avoid the “shell shock” of going to one of these meetings only when it “counts.” We would also hope that attending these meetings without the pressure of being on the market will help you see the positive aspects of these conferences, especially the ability to reconnect with friends in the field and make new friends that you otherwise might not see in the academic year. Also, reading a paper or being a commentator might help get you a job in the following years.

4. THE “VITA”

One of the main ways to tell whether you are ready to go on the market is whether you can put together a respectable vita by early September. A vita is simply an academic resume, but it is not really very simple at all. You should show your vita to various faculty members and put it through the kind of drafting process that you would use for a term paper. For most
applicants, the vita should be two to three pages long, with three to four pages for dissertation abstract and summary of teaching evaluations as supplements to the vita.

a) Address – list your departmental and home addresses and phone numbers. Also list where you can be reached right up to the beginning of the Eastern APA convention (December 27).

b) Area of specialization – this is optimally two or three areas of philosophy that you are especially qualified in. The dissertation is the primary, often only, basis for proof of a specialization. To figure out what would be good combinations of specialization, consult back issues of *Jobs for Philosophers* and then make sure that your dissertation really does cover those areas.

c) Area of competence – this is optimally four or five areas of philosophy that you are ready to offer courses in, different from your specialized areas. The best way to demonstrate this is in terms of what you have taught or TAed.

d) Publications or conference presentations – this could be one area of the vita or several, depending on what you have accomplished. Do not pad your vita with very minor things (or optimally, list them under a separate category for minor publications). Try to list the most significant first—they don’t need to be in chronological order. Make sure to indicate whether something was peer refereed.

e) Teaching experience – list TA experience in a separate category from autonomous teaching. List the dates and places of the experience.

f) Special honors and awards – list whatever seems relevant to a job search in philosophy. Mainly focus on things you earned in graduate school.

g) Recommendation writers – list the names of all of those who will write letters for you and the addresses and phone numbers for them. This list should include all three (or four) members of your primary dissertation committee, as well as someone who will write specifically about your teaching—preferably someone who has good first-hand experience of it. And it is sometimes an especially good thing to be able to have someone write for you who is not a faculty member at your department or school. Those letters are more believable since the reputation of the recommendation writer is not tied up with whether you get a job or not. For example, if you give a conference paper and have a commentator who liked the paper, ask that person to write a letter for you; act similarly for a paper you have written about a prominent philosopher who has read your work and appreciated it, but such letters are limited in scope. It often is a good idea to give to prospective letter writers a letter from you that indicates what things optimally you’d like them to cover in the recommendation, and give them lots of time—ask them by Sept. 1.
h) List of graduate courses taken: list all courses (including those you audited) along with the name of the professor and the semester taken. It is often a good idea to group these by subject areas rather than merely to present them chronologically. DO NOT LIST GRADES—no one cares anymore.

i) Summary of selected course evaluations: on no more than two sheets of paper, list five or six sets of teaching evaluations, displayed in graphic form that is easy to read

j) Dissertation abstract—on one or two sheets of paper give a detailed description of the arguments of the dissertation. Provide a summary paragraph and long paragraphs on each chapter. [NOTE: if you can't easily provide this abstract then you are definitely not ready to go on the market.]

It is hard to stress enough how important it is to get the vita just right. The trick is not to pad the vita and yet to list all of the important stuff about your fledgling professional life.

On a more mundane subject, normal white paper and average size typeface work best. This is why you need lots of feedback and redraftings to get it right. If you have any questions about how you “appear” through the vita, ask people you can trust to give you frank advice, and then, with several such pieces of advice, make a decision about how you want to “appear.”

Do not waste your time applying for jobs that list an AOS different from the ones you list on the vita.

5. THE COVER LETTER

The cover letter for each job application should basically be a one-page attempt to demonstrate that you fit the job description. This means that you should highlight aspects of the vita that demonstrate your qualifications for the things mentioned in the job ad. You should have a paragraph on teaching and a paragraph on research, at bare minimum.

The cover letter is sometimes the only thing that members of a hiring committee read, so take your time with it and try to convey as much information as you can in a page or so without being excessively wordy or using terms and expressions that may be esoteric to a particular sub-field of philosophy—keep in mind that most people reading this letter will not be working in the specialty area in which you work. It is not a problem to go over one page in length, but remember that folks may not read the second page.

If at all possible, put the cover letter on departmental stationary. If you already have a job, this is easy. But if you are still in graduate school, most departments will let you use departmental stationary. If your department secretary complains about the cost of letterhead stock, merely ask for one sheet, and then photocopy it and print your covering letter on the photocopied departmental letterhead.
6. **The Writing Sample**

You will need to supply at least one writing sample with each application. It is commonly thought that the writing sample should come from the dissertation. If it does not, people may wonder whether the dissertation is indeed almost done. You should take a chapter from the dissertation and make it a free-standing 25-page paper. If you have a paper that has been accepted for publication, you should include this as well; but especially if it is not from the dissertation, this should be included in addition to, not instead of, the dissertation chapter.

In all cases, the writing sample should be your very best work. After all, someone may actually read it and base the whole interview on it. How embarrassing it will be for you if you really don’t think that thesis is defensible anymore. Writing samples should be very carefully edited for typos and infelicities of style, since this is the only piece of your work members of a hiring committee are likely to see. You should never send out a writing sample that has not been seen, and critiqued, by several people in your field, even if these are only fellow graduate students. Do not assume that even if people have seen earlier drafts of the writing sample, say when it was merely a chapter, that is good enough. As with everything else you send out for the purposes of getting a job, only send things out that others have looked at for you in advance. [Note: Your writing sample should not be the same as the professional paper you deliver on campus, lest folks think that you only have one good idea.]

7. **Which Schools to Apply to**

Our standard advice is that if you are serious about the job market you should be able to apply to 30-80 jobs before Christmas. Of course, it is a waste of everyone’s time to apply to jobs that you are not qualified for, or for which you do not have the right AOS. But so many jobs list open specializations, or merely list courses to be taught, that it shouldn’t be hard to find quite a number of jobs that one is qualified for out of the 300-plus advertised in the October and November issues of *Jobs for Philosophers*.

Many students decide to do a more limited search. In order to accomplish this goal they try to determine which departments are most likely to hire them, and then only apply to those schools. For instance, if someone really wants to teach applied ethics, then one often applies only to jobs that list applied ethics as an AOS, rather than also to jobs that list ethical theory or political philosophy as specializations. In deciding whether to pursue this strategy, you should realize that departments often change their minds about precisely what they want. If you do a limited search, still apply to as many jobs as you can from those that you are qualified for. Remember that you don’t have to take every job that is offered, but unless you get an offer from somewhere you won’t get a job at all.

8. **Preparing for the Interview**

Before going to the APA Eastern convention for the first round of job interviews, everyone should first have a mock interview. If this is not a
regular feature of your graduate program, mock interviews are easy to organize on your own. Merely find two or three faculty members, give them a copy of your vita a few minutes in advance (to make it seem like the real thing) and have them sit in a room with you for an hour and role-play.

The first half of the interview should be about research, and it should begin with someone asking you to describe your dissertation in about ten minutes. The “Spiel” should be memorized and well-rehearsed in front of a mirror. Of course, you will rarely get through ten minutes before questions start flying. And that’s good—since the whole point of an interview is to have a conversation where three things are learned: how good a philosopher you are, what kind of a teacher you are likely to be, and whether you will be a good conversationalist as a colleague. Since you won’t normally be allowed to finish the “Spiel” front-load it with the most interesting ideas.

The second half of the mock interview, like most of the real interviews you will face, should be focused on teaching. You should come prepared to discuss in detail how you would teach courses that would naturally fall out of your areas of specialization and competence. Be prepared to explain what you think students should get out of a given course in order to motivate your teaching approach. Prepare elaborately for these mock interviews, as well as for the real one, and bring sample syllabi for a host of courses you are likely to be asked to teach.

At the mock interview, those mocking you should put on different hats, preferably trying to simulate folks who will indeed interview you. For that reason, wait to do this until early to middle December so it is likely that you will have started to hear from schools. Also, ask the mockers to be brutally frank with you. A lot of what goes wrong in interviews is easy to fix if you know about it in advance. It is easy to redo your “Spiel.” And, if you bite your thumb or scratch your rear end, this can easily be corrected once you know it. If you look distracted, you can sit up straight and then lean forward. If you look too intense or nervous, you can slide down in the chair and slump a little. If you look too buttoned-up, unbutton; if you look too laid-back, button-up, etc.

When you get interviews, go onto the departmental web site and look at the courses that would naturally fall into your specialization and competence. It is also a good idea to try to get a sense of what type of school it is. And if this is a “plum” job for you, you might want to read some things that people in the department, especially those in your area, have written.

At nearly every real interview, you will be asked if you have any questions for them, so make that part of the mock interview as well. If you don’t know this you can be flummoxed by this question—so have one or two questions, ideally based on your knowledge of the department and the curriculum, e.g.: “Are your 400 level courses only upper level undergraduate courses or are there both graduate students and undergraduate students in these courses?” Don’t be too provocative here and generally stay away from salary issues.
Very often you will be asked what your “next” project will be, now that you are nearing the end of your dissertation—you don’t have to have a super-detailed answer to this, but you should have some answer. Don’t try to make something up on the spur of the moment. A good strategy is to work up a project that spins off the dissertation, perhaps writing the chapter you never got to, or that is a natural follow-up to the dissertation. That way you can still talk about stuff you know something about.

9. WHAT TO WEAR

The best advice about what to wear is to wear what will make you comfortable. Men don’t need to wear a suit, nor do women. Jackets are pretty much required though. Don’t wear a loud tie or a loud scarf. You don’t want to be remembered later as that person with the weird thing on—much better to be remembered for what you said—the person who had a really interesting response to Smith’s hard question, for instance. Ties for men are not strictly required; but more men wear them than not, so... Women, as is true for men, can certainly wear pants, as long as they look professional, and indeed you might prefer them. In general, dress comfortably—the placement process will be uncomfortable enough as it is.

10. GENERAL CONVENTION ADVICE

If you can afford it, plan to spend two or three nights at the hotel where the convention occurs. And best not to have a roommate, unless it is someone you really trust. Things will be stressful enough without having anywhere to escape to (and watch cartoons, or the weather channel, or whatever relaxes you) between interviews. Also, for two of the evenings there will be receptions (still called “smokers” by most attendees, even though there hasn’t been any smoke or fire for many years) in the evening, often going on till late hours, and it is best not to have to navigate mass transit after midnight.

Generally, drink little if any alcohol during the convention. And try to stay away from folks who have been drinking and have interviewed you. Aside from this advice, though, there is nothing wrong with trying to find folks who interviewed you later in the day at the “smokers.” Many a job has been secured with an extra effort at finding and conversing with folks where you effectively get a second interview to only one for your competitors. Of course, don’t make a pest out of yourself. Look sheepish as you approach them, and ask if it is OK to continue the conversation that was begun earlier. Many departments make finding them at the smoker easy by reserving a table in the large hall where these events occur. When you enter the hall the APA will provide a list of the numbered tables that have been reserved by various departments. When departments have reserved a table they are signaling in part that they are encouraging candidates to stop by for a chat after the interview, so you should plan on coming by.
11. **APRES CONVENTION**

After the convention go back home and prepare a campus job talk. Better yet, you should have had such a talk already planned out in October. In any event, you should not delay doing this since you might get a call only a few days after the meetings asking you to fly out for a campus visit. Almost everyone wants either a formal or informal paper, and you should get one ready right away just in case. It is also a good idea to go over the convention with your placement director or mentor and see if follow-up e-mails might be warranted. Also try to set up a mock job talk—round up your friends and stray faculty members and make them sit down for an hour with you while you do a dress rehearsal.

If you get a job offer and still haven’t heard from a school you prefer, call them up. Nothing is lost here. If they don’t want you, and they have any manners at all, then they’ll let you down gently. But the worst thing is if they do want you but are merely being slow and you don’t give them enough notice about a deadline for another job.

12. **LATE BREAKING JOBS AND PERSISTENCE**

Keep yourself open to the possibility that nothing will happen as a result of the first round of job interviews. Keep sending out applications until you are sure you’ll be employed. This is psychologically hard to do, but it is necessary. Many of our students have gotten jobs in the second or third round, after the competition has diminished a bit. Those jobs are no less desirable, often, than those that interview at the Eastern. And always remember, you don’t have to stay in the same position forever.

As was briefly mentioned above, some jobs that are advertised in the Fall, and comparatively more advertised in the Spring, are not tenure-track but limited term appointments for a year or more. These jobs can be important stepping-stones to a good tenure-track job. While many if not most of these limited term positions are for sabbatical replacements and so not renewable, some can become gateways for permanent positions at the same institution. In addition, having letters of reference from members of a department who have gotten to know you as a colleague, rather than as a grad student, can be very valuable in helping you to land a tenure-track job.

It is also increasingly common for departments to advertise full time postdoctoral fellowships of one to three years. You might even consider looking for and taking one of these positions rather than initially seeking a tenure-track job. Most postdocs do not teach full loads and will allow you to build a strong record of publications. Helpful hint: Many postdoctoral positions are not advertised in *Jobs for Philosophers* when they are part of a college or university’s on-going “society of fellows” program or part of an established research center. Those interested in such positions should consult the job listings in the *Chronicle of Higher Education* and individual university web-sites.
13. PROBLEMS

If problems (of harassment, intimidation, or general annoyance) occur, talk to the APA staff or to the ombudsperson for the meetings, normally a friendly member of the very APA committee that wrote this brochure, and hence someone who cares about you. It is simply unacceptable for any job candidate to be made to feel uncomfortable because of comments about physical appearance, and certainly about sex or race. There is no reason not to complain, and the members of our committee who attend every APA meeting will not treat such complaints lightly.

If you are disabled, your right to full access in every aspect of the placement process ought to be extended without question or repercussion, just as you should be able freely to disclose your disability status. The APA is now beginning to address these problems, as are many institutions. In the meantime, candidates must not hesitate to request necessary accommodations, yet still have to strategize about disclosure or access requests. At the campus visit stage, wheelchair-accessible spaces cannot be assumed, yet are probably one of the simpler accommodations for most institutions, which may not be prepared to provide interpreter services or assume the travel costs of assistants. Candidates should carefully think through how they will negotiate these issues. Currently, the APA will provide a quiet interview room for candidates or interviewers for whom the large common interviewing area is inaccessible for reasons of disability such as, but not limited to, deafness, hearing impairment, cognitive impairments, or speech impairments. Contact the placement service if you need this provision. Additional concerns related to access or ableist bias in the placement process may be taken up with the placement ombudsperson through the APA placement service.
**PAPER SUBMISSION GUIDELINES**

**Online Paper Submissions:** Papers may be submitted either electronically or in hard copy by mail. For electronic submissions, follow the instructions on the APA web site. For hard copy submissions, mail to: Evonda Acevedo, ATTN: [Eastern, Pacific, or Central] Division Papers, The American Philosophical Association, University of Delaware, 31 Amstel Avenue, Newark, DE 19716, (302) 831-2012. Papers in any area are welcome. All papers are blind reviewed. Author’s name, institution, or references pertaining to the identity of the author must be removed from the paper, abstract, notes, and bibliography. Papers containing such identifying references will be rejected. Submitted papers are not returned to authors. Papers not accepted by one Division may be re-submitted for consideration to another Division. In submitting papers, authors warrant that those papers are entirely their own work or the joint work of the authors identified in the cover letter, and that, where appropriate, acknowledgement of the contributions of others has been made.

**Graduate Student Travel Stipends and Awards:** Papers to be considered for Graduate Student Travel Stipends/Awards must meet the criteria specified by each Division. For more information, visit the following address: www.apaonline.org/divisions/stipends/travelstipendsandprizesindex.aspx.

**GUIDELINES FOR ALL THREE DIVISIONS**

(*Guidelines 6, 7, 9, and 10 only apply to authors who are submitting papers in hard copy.)

1. Authors must be members in good standing of the APA.
2. 1 copy of the paper.
3. 1 copy of the abstract.
4. Colloquium papers are limited to 3,000 words.
5. Abstracts for colloquium papers are limited to 150 words.
6. Title or cover page, which must include: a) title; b) word counts for all papers and abstracts; c) author’s contact information; d) the Division the paper is to be submitted for. **If you are submitting your paper on-line, please exclude this information from your submission.**
7. Papers must be typed on one side of page, double spaced, 1-inch margins on all sides, all pages numbered, 10-12 pt. font.
8. No more than one submission by the same author for the same Division will be considered.
*9. Indicate name of Division on outside lower left side of the envelope containing the paper.

*10. Include a self-addressed stamped envelope to the National Office if you wish the receipt of your paper to be acknowledged.

11. Any paper which is under consideration for publication elsewhere will be considered, provided that it will not appear in print until after the Divisional meeting is held. If this is the case, indicate when and where the paper is expected to be published.

12. Papers are not accepted by e-mail.

13. Authors are advised to provide accurate email addresses as part of their contact information because they may be contacted by email, sometimes under urgent circumstances. Authors who expect to relocate between the date of submission and the date of the meeting should arrange for email forwarding, or else provide both current and new email addresses with their contact information.

14. No one who is scheduled to appear in an invited session on the Main Program of a meeting may also present a submitted paper as part of that same Main Program. Because of this policy, members who have already agreed to participate in invited sessions on the Main Program of a meeting are asked not to submit papers for that same meeting. Please note that this does not concern sessions organized by APA Committees or by affiliated groups.

**Eastern Division:**

Meeting is held December 27-30.

Selections are announced in May or June.

Papers accepted by either the Central Division or the Pacific Division may not be presented at any subsequent meeting of the Eastern Division.

Papers exceeding 3,000 words will not be considered as colloquium papers.

Submissions for consideration as symposium papers must not exceed a length of 5,000 words. Abstracts for symposium papers must not exceed a length of 300 words. Authors should be aware that only a few papers are selected for presentation as symposium papers. If authors wish to have a shortened version of their paper considered as a colloquium paper, they should submit the appropriately shortened version, along with a shortened abstract, simultaneously with the submission of the symposium paper.

Any paper submitted without an abstract will not be considered. Any paper whose abstract is deemed unacceptable by the Program Committee will not be accepted. No revised abstract submitted after the paper’s acceptance will be published in the *Proceedings and Addresses of The American Philosophical Association* without the approval of the Program Committee.
**PACIFIC DIVISION:**

Meeting is usually held at the end of March, but starting in 2009 moved to April.

Selections are announced in January.

A paper that has been on the Main Program at a past APA meeting (any division), or will be on the Main Program at a future Central or Eastern Division meeting, cannot be presented as a Main Program colloquium/symposium paper at the Pacific Division meeting.

All abstracts are not to exceed 150 words. For dual submissions (colloquium and symposium) only one abstract is required and should not exceed 150 words.

Submissions for consideration as colloquium papers must not exceed 3,000 words.

Submissions for consideration as symposium papers must not exceed a length of 5,000 words. Abstracts for symposium papers must not exceed a length of 300 words. Authors should be aware that only a few papers are selected for presentation as symposium papers. If authors wish to have a shortened version of their paper considered as a colloquium paper, they should submit the appropriately shortened version, along with a shortened abstract, simultaneously with the submission of the symposium paper. (This will be considered a single submission.)

**CENTRAL DIVISION:**

Meeting is usually held at the end of February or beginning of March.

Selections are announced in September, or before when possible.

Papers exceeding 3,000 words will not be considered as colloquium papers.

Submissions for consideration as symposium papers must not exceed a length of 5,000 words. Abstracts for symposium papers must not exceed a length of 300 words. Authors should be aware that only a few papers are selected for presentation as symposium papers. If authors wish to have a shortened version of their paper considered as a colloquium paper, they should submit the appropriately shortened version, along with a shortened abstract, simultaneously with the submission of the symposium paper.

The Central Division will not include a paper on its meeting program if that paper (1) has already been presented or is scheduled for presentation on the Main Program of another APA Divisional meeting or (2) has been accepted for publication and will have actually been published prior to the Central Division meeting in question. If a paper is accepted for presentation and the Program Committee subsequently learns that it will have been published prior to the meeting, then that paper will be withdrawn from the meeting program.
1. **CALL TO ORDER.** President Sally Sedgwick called the meeting to order at 12:18 p.m. and appointed Stephanie Lewis parliamentarian for the meeting.

2. **APPROVAL OF MINUTES.** The draft Minutes of the 2009 meeting, as printed in *Proceedings and Addresses of the APA*, Vol. 83 #3 (January 2010), pp. 155-156, were approved without correction.

3. **REPORT ON THE 2010 EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE MEETING.** Secretary-Treasurer Robin Smith reported on the actions of the 2010 Executive Committee. [See the draft Minutes of the 2010 Executive Committee meeting published immediately following these Minutes.]

4. **REPORT OF THE NOMINATING COMMITTEE.** Past President Peter van Inwagen presented the Report of the 2009-2010 Nominating Committee, as printed in *Proceedings and Addresses of the APA*, Vol. 83 #3 (January 2010), pp. 161-162. President Sedgwick noted that the Division’s Bylaws allow additional nominations to be added from the floor by any group of ten members present and asked if there were such nominations forthcoming. None were proposed. The list of nominees as prepared by the Nominating Committee is therefore to be sent to mail ballot.

5. **REPORTS FROM THE BOARD OF OFFICERS, THE NATIONAL OFFICE, AND APA COMMITTEES.** APA Executive Director David Schrader reported that at its 2009 meeting, the APA Board Officers:
   —Approved a motion for the APA to become a full member in the AAAS Science and Human Rights Coalition (David Schrader and Nancy Sherman appointed as representatives).
   —Set dues for the newly approved membership category of Teaching Associate have been set at $35, equal to the dues for International Associate members.
   —Approved discounted rates for advertisements in *JFP* from institutions in selected foreign countries where economic conditions make the standard rates burdensome.
—Endorsed the statement of the Coalition on the Academic Workforce concerning the employment of non-tenure-track faculty.
—Authorized the Executive Director to negotiate a contract with a new software firm.
—Chose Anita Silvers as the recipient of the Quinn Prize for Service to Philosophy and Philosophers.
—Adopted revisions to the APA Statement on Nondiscrimination.
—Appointed Jerome Schneewind as the APA Representative to the American Council of Learned Societies.

Executive Director Schrader also noted other activities of the APA National Office and APA Committees and called attention to the increased registration rates for on-site registrations at meetings adopted by the Eastern and Central Divisions and to be considered by the Pacific Division at its 2010 meeting. He ended by praising the work of the APA’s committees and of the staff of the APA National Office.

In discussion, Debra Nails asked whether there were measures that might be taken to slow or reverse the decline in revenue from book exhibits at the annual meeting. She asked in particular whether making it possible to attend the book exhibits without registering for the meeting would be desirable. Secretary-Treasurer Smith replied that the Division could take this suggestion under consideration but also noted that it would complicate the current efforts of all the Divisions to ensure that all those attending Divisional meetings have registered. In response to further questions, Secretary-Treasurer Smith also said that the Division did not have data concerning how many persons visit the book exhibits; that plenary sessions at meetings are very difficult to accommodate (as evidenced by the scheduling problems experienced in any year by the Division hosting the Carus Lectures); and that the Division would be glad to consider either extending or adjusting the hours of the book exhibits so as to allow for some time when the exhibits are open but no sessions are in progress, though any such adjustments would have to be made in a way that the exhibitors themselves found beneficial.

6. **RECOGNITION OF GRADUATE STUDENT TRAVEL STIPEND WINNERS.** President Sedgwick read the names of those who had received Graduate Student Travel Stipend Awards, as printed on pages 5-6 of the *Proceedings and Addresses of the APA*, Vol. 83 #4 (January 2010). She also noted that, as a result of action at the 2010 Executive Committee meeting, stipends had also been awarded to Salvatore Florio, Jonathan Matheson, and Drew Pierce.

7. **NEW BUSINESS.** No items were discussed under New Business.

8. **MEMORIAL.** President Sedgwick read the names of those members of the Association who had died since the last meeting of the Central Division:
   1. William Alston (Central Division President 1978-79)
   2. Myles Brand
   3. David H. Brownell
4. L. B. (Roy) Cebik
5. Frank B. Ebersole
6. Berkley Eddins
7. J. David Evans
8. M. G. Evans
9. Gustave E. Ferré
10. Lewis S. Feuer
11. Marjorie Grene (Pacific Division President 1971-72)
12. Donald F. Gustafson
13. Errol E. Harris
14. John Howie
15. Susan Hurley
16. Donald G. Jones
17. Matthias Lu
18. Neil R. Luebke
19. Roy Martinez
20. George McMullen
21. Kewal Krishman Mittal
22. Julius Moravcsik (Pacific Division President 1987-88)
23. Joseph B. Mow
24. Gerald E. Myers
25. John Pollock
26. Kingsley Price
27. Arthur Skidmore*
28. Janet Farrell Smith
29. Henry Smits
30. Richard Smyth
31. Gerald B. Strickler
32. William B. Thompson
33. Tom B. Wilson
34. Anthony Woozley

*Arthur Skidmore died in 2005, but the APA did not receive notice of his death until March 2009.

9. ADJOURNMENT. The meeting was adjourned at 1:04 p.m.

Respectfully submitted,
Robin Smith, Secretary-Treasurer
APA Central Division
MINUTES OF THE 2010 CENTRAL DIVISION EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE MEETING

AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL ASSOCIATION
CENTRAL DIVISION
DRAFT MINUTES OF THE 2010 EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE MEETING

PALMER HOUSE HILTON HOTEL, CRESTHILL ROOM
CHICAGO, ILLINOIS
WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 17, 2010


1. President Sally Sedgwick called the meeting to order at 7:01 p.m.

2. Draft minutes of the 2009 meeting, as printed on pp. 157-160 of issue 83:3 (January 2010) of the Proceedings of the APA, were approved as printed.

3. The Agenda for the meeting was approved with the addition of an item under New Business requested by Smith.

4. Past President Peter van Inwagen presented the report of the Nominating Committee, as follows:

For Vice-President and President-Elect:
Hugh J. McCann (Texas A&M University)
Steven Nadler (University of Wisconsin–Madison)
Peter Railton (University of Michigan–Ann Arbor)

For Member-at-Large of the Executive Committee, term 2010-2013:
Carla Bagnoli (University of Wisconsin–Milwaukee)
Marya Schechtman (University of Illinois–Chicago)
Paul Weithman (University of Notre Dame)

For Secretary-Treasurer, term 2010-2013:
Robin Smith (Texas A&M University)

For the 2009-2010 Nominating committee (4 to be elected):
Patricia Blanchette (University of Notre Dame)
Eric Brown (Washington University in St. Louis)
Justin D'Arms (Ohio State University)
Todd Ganson (Oberlin College)
Sanford Goldberg (Northwestern University)
Andrew Mills (Otterbein College)
Kieran Setiya (University of Pittsburgh)
Russell Shafer-Landau (University of Wisconsin–Madison)

5. President Sally Sedgwick presented a proposal to consider adopting a policy against allowing more than one nominee for the same office from the same department in a given year. Card asked if such conflicts had arisen in the past for any office other than Vice President, and Smith replied that the only cases he could recall concerned that office. Van Inwagen moved that the Executive Committee instruct the Nominating Committee for each year not to propose more than one nominee for the office of Vice President from the same academic department of philosophy. Card seconded. The motion carried unanimously.

6. Secretary-Treasurer Robin Smith reported on the activities of the 2010 Program Committee, noting that it was in the process of completing the invited program. The members of the committee are:

   Bill E. Lawson (University of Memphis), Chair
   Rod Bertolet (Purdue University)
   Stephan Blatti (University of Memphis)
   David K. Chan (University of Wisconsin–Stevens Point)
   Howard Curzer (Texas Tech University)
   Kristie Dotson (Michigan State University)
   Carla Fehr (Iowa State University)
   Robert Gooding-Williams (University of Chicago)
   Charles Mills (Northwestern University)
   Tamar Rudavsky (Ohio State University)*
   Georgette Sinkler (University of Illinois–Chicago)
   Robin Smith (Texas A&M University), ex officio
   Peter B. M. Vranas (University of Wisconsin–Madison)

*Tamar Rudavsky subsequently withdrew from the Program Committee in May 2010. David Cunning (University of Iowa) was appointed as her replacement.

7. The Executive Committee approved the applications of the Indiana Philosophical Association and the Great Lakes Mind and Science Consortium for affiliation with the Central Division.

8. Secretary-Treasurer Smith reported on actions taken since the last annual Executive Committee meeting. These actions included a decision at a special meeting held November 12, 2009, at the Palmer House to consider contract proposals from hotels for meetings in 2011 and 2013-2016, and the subsequent mail ballot on those proposals, authorized at that meeting. In that mail ballot, the Executive Committee unanimously approved a five-year contract proposal with the Hilton organization for meetings in Minneapolis (2011), Chicago (2012, 2014,
2016), New Orleans (2013), and St. Louis (2015), with substantial discounts and concessions resulting from the multi-year contract.

9. Secretary-Treasurer Smith presented the financial report for 2009-10. He noted that the report is necessarily an estimate since income and expenses for the 2010 meeting will not be known until after the meeting. Tentative projections are for higher registration income but lower book exhibit income than budgeted. Participation by publishers in the book exhibits continues to decline not only because of the state of the economy but also because of long-term changes in the publishing industry.

10. Secretary-Treasurer Smith reported on advertising revenue among the three Divisions, noting that the Central Division was allocated a total of $13,987 in fiscal 2009-10 to cover the costs of the 2010 Program Committee meeting, Graduate Student Travel Stipends in excess of $3,000, and some audiovisual costs at the 2009 meeting.

11. Secretary-Treasurer Smith presented a proposal to adopt higher rates for on-site (as opposed to advance) registration at Divisional meetings. Under the proposal, rates for advance registration will remain at their present levels, but on-site registration for regular members will increase from $60 to $90, on-site registration for non-members from $90 to $120, and on-site registration for graduate student affiliates from $10 to $15. Similar changes were adopted by the Eastern Division Executive Committee at its December 2009 meeting. Smith said that the purpose of this change is to encourage advance registration and thus reduce the congestion at the meeting Registration Desk and the resources needed for handling large numbers of on-site registrations (currently about 75% of registrations). After considerable discussion, the Executive Committee approved the proposal by a vote of 6-1. The Executive Committee also took note of the importance of bringing this to the attention of all members well before the next annual meeting and instructed the Secretary-Treasurer to take all possible measures to publicize it.

12. Secretary-Treasurer Smith reported on several requests from authors of submitted papers accepted at the 2010 meeting to be approved for Graduate Student Travel Stipends despite their not having been identified as eligible at the time of submission. After lengthy discussion, the Executive Committee decided by consensus to award stipends to three paper authors in addition to the seventeen already awarded: Salvatore Florio, Jonathan Matheson, and Drew Pierce. The Committee decided to leave the procedures for determining eligibility for stipends unchanged but instructed the Secretary-Treasurer to work with the National Office to improve the online submission section of the web site and the information provided on the web site concerning the process for applying for, and the criteria for eligibility for, Graduate Student Travel Stipends.

13. Secretary-Treasurer Smith made a preliminary proposal to the Executive Committee to consider a revision of the Central Division’s
Bylaws concerning their own amendment. Under the current Bylaws, amendment requires a vote of two-thirds of those voting at an annual Business Meeting. The Eastern and Pacific Divisions instead require that amendments to their Bylaws be adopted by approval of two-thirds of those voting in a mail ballot. Smith called attention to the requirement that an announcement of proposed amendments be sent to all Central Division affiliates at least a month in advance of the meeting in which those amendments are considered: thus, in order to propose an amendment for the 2011 Business Meeting, the Executive Committee must approve such a proposal now. Van Inwagen moved that the Executive Committee propose to the 2011 Business Meeting that the Bylaws be amended to become identical to the Eastern Division's amendment procedures. Card seconded. The motion carried unanimously.

[NOTE: The proposed amendment appears on pp. 161-163 of this issue of the Proceedings of the APA.]

14. Secretary-Treasurer Smith presented a proposed budget for 2010-11, Kraut moved that the proposed budget be adopted, and Joy seconded. After discussion of several details, the motion was carried unanimously. The Executive Committee also took note that the Treasurer’s Report for 2009-2010 must be modified to reflect the charge for three additional Graduate Student Travel Stipends.

15. The Executive Committee approved the agenda for the Business Meeting on motion by Sedgwick, seconded by Shafer-Landau.

16. Under New Business, Smith requested that the Executive Committee consider whether members of the Divisional Program Committee for a given meeting should be granted an exemption from paying registration fees for attendance at that meeting. Kraut moved that the Executive Committee adopt such an exemption, and Joy seconded. The motion was carried unanimously.

17. The meeting adjourned at 8:38 p.m.

Respectfully submitted,

Robin Smith
Secretary-Treasurer, APA Central Division
REPORT OF THE 2010-2011 NOMINATING COMMITTEE

The 2010-2011 Central Division Nominating Committee, composed of Sally Sedgwick (Chair), Patricia Blanchette, Eric A. Brown, Sandy Goldberg, and Russ Shafer-Landau, proposes the following nominations for 2011:

FOR VICE-PRESIDENT AND PRESIDENT-ELECT:
  Margaret Atherton (University of Wisconsin–Milwaukee)
  Daniel Hausman (University of Wisconsin–Madison)
  Alison Jaggar (University of Colorado–Boulder)

FOR EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE MEMBER-AT-LARGE, TERM 2010-2013:
  Janet Folina (Macalester College)
  Gary Gutting (University of Notre Dame)
  Mark van Roojen (University of Nebraska)

FOR THE 2011-2012 NOMINATING COMMITTEE (FOUR TO BE ELECTED):
  Berit Brogaard (University of Missouri–St. Louis)
  Juli Eflin (Ball State University)
  John Doris (Washington University in St. Louis)
  Peter Hylton (University of Illinois–Chicago)
  Mitzi Lee (University of Colorado–Boulder)
  Frederick Rush (University of Notre Dame)
  Lisa Shabel (Ohio State University)
  Corliss Swain (St. Olaf College)

The By-Laws of the Central Division contain this provision concerning nominations from the floor at the Business Meeting (Article 1.c):

“Upon receipt of the report of the Nominating Committee, additional nominations for the next year’s Nominating Committee, for officers, and members of the Executive Committee, may be made from the floor by any ten members of the Association affiliated with the Central Division. Before ballots are prepared, the individuals nominated shall be invited by mail to signify their willingness to stand for election. No name shall appear on a ballot unless the individual named has filed a signed statement of willingness to stand for election.”
RESULTS OF THE 2010 APA CENTRAL DIVISION ELECTIONS

In the May-June 2010 Central Division elections:

- Peter Railton was elected Vice President for 2010-2011 (and thus President for 2011-2012).
- Marya Schechtman was elected Member at Large of the Executive Committee for the term 2010-2013.
- Robin Smith was elected Secretary-Treasurer for 2010-2013.
- Patricia Blanchette, Eric Brown, Sandy Goldberg, and Russ Shafer-Landau were elected to the 2010-2011 Nominating Committee.
PROPOSALS TO AMEND THE BYLAWS OF THE CENTRAL DIVISION

Two different proposals to amend the Bylaws of the Central Division have been made that will be considered at the 2011 Business Meeting. The first proposal was made by the Executive Committee of the Central Division at its annual meeting in February 2010, and the second was made by the APA Board of Officers at its annual meeting in November 2010. (Under the Central Division’s Bylaws, 4.2, the Central Division Executive Committee and the APA Board of Officers are among the entities that may propose amendments to the Bylaws). These proposals are complementary, not conflicting, and in fact the proposal from the Board of Officers resulted from a motion made by Central Division officers at the Board of Officers Meeting. These proposed amendments would accomplish two purposes. First, they would change the method of amendment for the Bylaws from a vote at the Business Meeting to a mail ballot (thus bringing them into harmony with the method of amendment for the other two Divisions’ Bylaws and the Bylaws of the APA). Second, they would allow the use of secure electronic ballots as an alternative to mail ballots, wherever these are required, in parallel with a similar provision adopted by the Eastern Division in 2009. Note that the second measure only allows the use of secure electronic ballots at some future time when the APA has appropriate software support for this option: mail ballots are retained as an option.

I. Proposal from the Central Division Executive Committee. At its 2010 meeting, the Executive Committee of the Central Division voted to propose the following amendments to the Bylaws of the APA Central Division at the 2011 Business Meeting

“IA. That Article 4, Paragraph 1 of the Bylaws of the Central Division be replaced in its entirety with the following language:

1. Any proposed amendment of or addition to these by-laws must be presented for discussion at a regular Business Meeting and shall then be submitted to a mail or secure electronic ballot with passage dependent upon acceptance by two-thirds of those casting votes.”

“IB. That Article 4, Paragraph 3 of the Bylaws of the Central Division be amended by replacing the words “a vote is taken” with the words “the proposed amendments are discussed”, as follows:

3. Proposals to amend these by-laws must be announced to the members of the Association affiliated with the Central Division at least two weeks in advance of any meeting at which a vote is taken the proposed amendments are discussed.”
II. Proposal from the Board of Officers. At its 2010 meeting in November 2010, the APA Board of Officers adopted the following motion:

“That the Central Division of the APA consider the following amendments to its Bylaws at the soonest possible date:

IIA. That in Article 1, “Officers”, Paragraph 1, sentence 5, the words ”or secure electronic” be inserted between the words “mail” and “ballot”, as follows:

3. “Elections to office shall be by mail or secure electronic ballot of all members of the Association who are certified by the Executive Director as affiliated with the Central Division.”

IIB. That in Article 1, “Officers”, Paragraph 3, sentence 6, the words ”or secure electronic” be inserted between the words “mail” and “ballot”, as follows:

3. “The election of four nominees from among those nominated for the Nominating Committee will be by mail or secure electronic ballot of all members of the Association who are certified by the Executive Director as affiliated with the Central Division.”

IIC. That in Article 1, “Officers”, Paragraph 3, sentence 10, the words ”sent out” be stricken and the words ”or secure electronic” be inserted in their place, as follows:

3. “Ballots shall be counted six weeks after they are sent out mailed or posted electronically.”

IID. That in Article 2, “Meetings”, Paragraph 2, sentence 4, the words ”or secure electronic” be inserted between the words “mail” and “ballot”, as follows:

3. “Except for routine business matters and matters which by our Association or Division by-laws can only be voted on by mail or secure electronic ballot, no matter which would require action will be presented at the business meeting unless it has been submitted by a member to the Secretary-Treasurer of the Central Division in sufficient time in advance of the meeting (minimum: one month) to enable the Secretary-Treasurer to bring the matter to the attention of the members of the Association affiliated with the Central Division in advance of the business meeting.”

Under the current Bylaws of the Central Division, each of these amendments will be adopted if and only if it is approved by a vote of at least two-thirds of those voting at the 2011 Central Division Business Meeting. Publication of these proposed amendments in this issue of the Proceedings of the APA constitutes notice to all members of the Central Division in advance of that meeting, as required by Article 4, Paragraph 3 of the Bylaws. For reference, Article 4 of the Bylaws of the Central Division currently reads as follows:

1. These by-laws may be amended only by a vote of two-thirds of the members of the Association affiliated with the Central Division present at any business meeting held during a regular Central meeting of the Association.
2. Amendments to these by-laws may be proposed only by the Executive Committee, the Board of Officers, or members presenting a petition carrying the signatures of at least fifty members of the Association affiliated with the Central Division.

3. Proposals to amend these by-laws must be announced to the members of the Association affiliated with the Central Division at least two weeks in advance of any meeting at which a vote is taken.
INFORMATION CONCERNING CHILDCARE

Members who need child care during the 2011 Central Division meeting may wish to contact one of the following:

Jack & Jill Babysitting Services, Inc.
651-429-2963
http://jackandjillsittingservices.com

Nanny Professionals
651-221-0587
Contact: Jean Hanson
http://www.nannyprofessionals.com

Nannies from the Heartland
763-550-0219
http://nanniesheartland.com
A complete list of book exhibitors will be available online (www.apaonline.org) and at the Central Division Meeting.
LIST OF ADVERTISERS

CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS (A-174-175)
Duke University Press (A-178)
Harvard University Press (A-170)
Perseus Books Group (A-173)
Philosophy Documentation Center (A-Outside Back Cover)
Philosopher’s Information Center (A-179)
Routledge Publishers (A-172)
SUNY Press (A-Inside Front Cover)
Wadsworth Cengage Learning (A-171)
Wiley-Blackwell (A-176-177)
FORMS

ADVANCE REGISTRATION FORM

HOTEL RESERVATION INFORMATION

RECEPTION TABLE REQUEST FORM

PROGRAM SUGGESTION FORM
Please print legibly. This information is used for your name badge.

Name: ______________________________________________________________

Affiliation: ____________________________________________________________

Email:_____________________________________Phone:______________________

Advance Registration Fees (Received by March 7, 2010 at the National Office)

_____ $10.00 APA Student Members

_____ $60.00 APA Regular, International & Emeritus Members

_____ $90.00 Nonmembers

We cannot process any advanced registrations at the National Office past the March 7th deadline. After that date you will need to register in Minneapolis and at higher rates: $90 for regular/international/emeritus members; $120 for non-members and $15 for student members.

Placement Registration
Interviewers should also complete the Placement Registration Form. Candidates should check the space below if planning to use the service. Candidates must be a member of the APA in order to use the Placement Service. Placement is a free service for all current APA members.

_____ I will be a job candidate.

___ 1) Check* (Payable to APA)
   *The APA can only accept checks drawn on a U.S. bank, in U.S. Dollars.

___ 2) Visa□ MasterCard□ Exp. Date _______

Last 3 digits on back of card __________

Name as it appears on Card:______________________________

Signature of Authorization:______________________________

Email:_____________________________________Phone #: ______________________

Fax this form with your credit card payment to Linda Smallbrook (302-831-3372). No cover sheet is needed. Or, if you prefer, mail this form with your payment to Linda Smallbrook, APA, University of Delaware, Newark, DE 19716. Payment must accompany your registration form. Note that on-site registration is now more expensive than advance registration.
Room rates for regular members and nonmembers begin at $143.00 per night. Student room rates are $129.00 per night. Please note that those persons making a student room reservation will be verified to confirm student status. If the person making the reservation is not a student member they will be charged the regular and nonmember rate. The tax rate for the Minneapolis Hilton is 13.40%. Check-in time is 3:00 pm and check-out is noon. Please be sure to let the hotel know if you are physically challenged and will need special accommodations. Rooms are available on a first-come, first-served basis and subject to availability. **Reservations must be made by March 1, 2011 to be assured the APA rate.**

The Hilton Minneapolis prefers that we make our reservations online.

Regular and nonmembers should use the following link:


The code for regular and nonmembers is PHI.

Students will use the following link:

http://www.hilton.com/en/hi/groups/personalized/M/MSPMHHH-PHS-20110329/index.jhtml

The code for student members is PHS.

For those persons unable to reserve online, please call the Minneapolis Hilton reservations department at 888-933-5363 and explain that you are attending the APA 2011 Central Meeting and give them the appropriate codes listed above.
Fax this form with your credit card payment to Linda Smallbrook (302-831-3372). No cover sheet is needed. Or, if you prefer, mail this form with your payment to Linda Smallbrook, APA, University of Delaware, Newark, DE 19716.

Payment must accompany your registration form.

IMPORTANT NOTE: ALL TABLE RESERVATIONS MUST BE PAID FOR AT THE TIME OF PLACING THE RESERVATION. WE WILL BE UNABLE TO PROCESS YOUR FORM WITHOUT THE ACCOMPANYING PAYMENT. THANK YOU FOR YOUR UNDERSTANDING.

Receptions are scheduled to be held in the Grand Ballroom on March 31st (8:30 p.m. to midnight) and in the Grand Ballroom on April 1st (9:00 p.m. to midnight). The first night reception provides beer and soft drinks at no charge. Admittance is by registration name badge or ticket only. The second night reception is a cash bar. The charge for a table at both receptions is $25.00 total. The deadline for receipt of reservations is March 7th. After that time we will still take reservations but your school’s name will not appear in the handout.

To reserve a table, please complete the following and return to Linda Smallbrook, APA, University of Delaware, Newark, DE 19716; or fax the form to 302-831-3372.

Name: ______________________________________

School/Organization: ______________________________________________________

E-mail address: ____________________________________________________________

Please select an option for payment and fill out the form completely if paying by credit card.

___ 1) Check* (Payable to APA)
*The APA can only accept checks drawn on a U.S. bank, in U.S. Dollars.

___ 2) Visa □ MasterCard □ Exp. Date ___/___

Last 3 digits on back of card ___ ___ ___

Name as it appears on Card: __________________________________________________

Signature of Authorization: _________________________________________________

Email: ___________________________ Phone #: ________________________________
APA CENTRAL DIVISION PROGRAM SUGGESTION FORM

In order to foster diversity of and participation in the program of the Central Division, the Executive Committee invites submission of the following form:

(1) I would like to hear papers at the Divisional Meetings in the following areas:

(2) I would like to be considered as a Session Chair for papers in one of the following areas:

(3) I would like to be considered as a Paper Commentator for papers in one of the following areas:

To be considered as Commentator or Chair for the 2012 meeting, please submit this form, along with a CV, by August 1, 2011, to:
Sanford Goldberg, Chair
2012 APA Central Program Committee
Philosophy Department
Northwestern University
1880 Campus Drive
Evanston, IL 60208-2214
s-goldberg@northwestern.edu

This form may be reproduced, and suggestions under (1) may be sent to Professor Goldberg or to:
Robin Smith, Secretary-Treasurer
APA Central Division
Department of Philosophy
Texas A&M University
College Station, TX 77843-4237
rasmith@tamu.edu

If you would like acknowledgement of receipt of your CV and form, please enclose a stamped, self-addressed postcard.
APA Registration Policy

It is the policy of the APA that all persons attending sessions, including those who are participating as speakers, commentators or session chairs, are required to register for each meeting they attend. In addition, we have always recommended that all participants wear their APA badges during session hours to identify themselves as registered participants. In an effort better to enforce this policy we have begun a system of checking meeting attendees, randomly and anyone whom we suspect might not be registered, for proof of registration. If you are asked to provide proof of registration and are unable to do so, you will be asked to register immediately in order to enable you to attend sessions. Registration fees help subsidize every divisional meeting. Without that income we will be unable to ensure the quality and excellence of our meetings which you have come to expect. We thank you for your continued cooperation.
MEETING FACILITIES - THIRD FLOOR