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JOSEPH LEN MILLER, MANAGING EDITOR

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FROM THE MANAGING EDITOR

Joseph Len Miller
WEST CHESTER UNIVERSITY

This is our first issue of *APA Studies on Native American and Indigenous Philosophy* which will include a new, ongoing series entitled, "Key Concepts in Indigenous Philosophy." In each issue we will try to include a few brief (in terms of length—not depth) pieces in which Indigenous philosophers write about how they would define or explain a particular concept that is central to Indigenous philosophy. Our reviewers and the APA Committee on Native American and Indigenous Philosophy thought this would be a good series to include in the journal because not only does it offer a streamlined, accessible resource for people wanting to engage with Native American and Indigenous philosophy, but it also highlights the diversity of thought when it comes to key concepts in Indigenous philosophy. Since this is our first issue in which we're doing this, the question we posed to our two authors, Ashley Lance (Blue Lake Rancheria Tribal Member, Yurok Descendant) of Cambridge University and Getty Lustila (Choctaw Nation of Oklahoma) of Northeastern University, was incredibly broad but foundational. Before considering key concepts in Native American and Indigenous philosophy in future issues, it will be important to get contrasting conceptions of what exactly constitutes Indigenous philosophy. Thus, the first two contributions in this series are offering their takes on answering the question, "What is Indigenous philosophy?"

After these wonderfully insightful pieces, we have three articles that each, in one way or another, focus on the application of Indigenous philosophy to contemporary concepts and practices. First, we have "Critiques of Colonial Scholarship" by undergraduate student Tristan Gosselin (Red River Métis) of the University of Toronto. In this paper, Gosselin explores Indigenous scholarship for colonial critiques of the work of philosopher and theologian Bernard Lonergan. By engaging with Lonergan's work in a decolonial manner, Gosselin does an incredible job of highlighting examples of what constitutes a colonial critique, as well as demonstrating how those critiques can be applied to more contemporary figures like Lonergan. Second, Rene Ramirez from Loyola University Chicago turns "to Vine Deloria Jr.'s (Lakota) writings on time and place to formulate what a place-based account of time entails"[1] in "Local Time: A Placed-Based Account of Time in Vine Deloria Jr.'s Various Works." As Ramirez states, "where theorists have adeptly outlined the weaponization of temporality under Western coloniality, they have yet to offer a particular account of time that favors indigenous resistance."[2] It is towards this end that Ramirez draws from Deloria Jr. to explain how his conception of *local time* is grounded in particularities involving location and communal relations, and is cyclically arranged. Lastly, we have "*Wahkootowin* Vegetarianism: When Is It Okay to Eat Your Kin?" by John R. Miller (Métis Nation) from the University of Toronto. In this paper Miller draws "on the ethical principles of the Métis nation to argue that for most Métis people, it is now impermissible to kill animals for their meat."[3] The way he makes this argument, however, is to articulate the conditions that would morally permit Métis people to hunt and consume animals. Given the *demandingness* of these conditions, Miller concludes that they do not apply to most Métis people, and, as such, "most Métis people ought to be vegetarians, according to principles drawn from our own tradition."

We are thrilled to be able to include each of these pieces in our spring issue. Not only do they represent the diversity of topics in Indigenous philosophy, but they also do a wonderful job of subtly highlighting key concepts, applications, and the commonalities of Indigenous philosophy. Hopefully, this issue contributes to our continual aim of striking a balance between explaining Indigenous concepts and frameworks and addressing contemporary issues faced by Indigenous peoples and communities. We hope that these articles serve as a way of honoring our traditions, ideas, and ancestors, as well as invite readers to engage with Native American or Indigenous philosophy.

NOTES

1. Ramirez, "Local Time," in this issue, 9.
2. Ramirez, "Local Time," in this issue, 9.
3. Miller, "*Wahkootowin* Vegetarianism," in this issue, 9.

FROM THE CHAIR

With Respect and Gratitude: Avoiding Epistemic Servitude and Epistemilation

Joseph Len Miller
WEST CHESTER UNIVERSITY

Last summer, I had the honor of serving as one of the "experts" on Indigenous philosophy for NEWLAMP (The Northeast Workshop to Learn About Multicultural Philosophy) along with Getty Lustila (Choctaw Nation, Northeastern University), Yann Allard-Tremblay (Huron-

Wendat First Nation, McGill University), and Shelbi Nawhilet Meissner (Luiseño and Cupeño, University of Maryland). This workshop, graciously and wonderfully organized by Candice Delmas (Northeastern University),[1] was "designed to give philosophy teachers the tools to approach, and successfully integrate in their general undergraduate courses, contemporary issues in Native American, Indigenous and Land-Based social and political philosophy." It was an incredibly moving and enriching experience given the wonderful participants[2] that attended the workshop, and I appreciate everyone who contributed.

One of the main things that was focused on was how to engage *respectfully* with Native American or Indigenous philosophy. As a follow-up to that workshop, I wanted to convey some thoughts that I know have been exchanged between Indigenous peoples doing philosophy. Whenever discussing Indigenous ideas or Indigenous frameworks, invariably, someone will ask something like, "Oh, is this like Spinoza's such-and-such?" While most of the time this seems to be a well-intended attempt at understanding an unfamiliar concept, there are plenty of times where it's dismissive—and, despite the best intentions, can be discouraging or even harmful. I can only speak from personal experience, but, as an example, once during a job interview, I had someone ask me if the Indigenous conceptions of "nature" were similar to Spinoza's conception of God. As I was unfamiliar with Spinoza, I said I didn't know.[3] What followed was a "conversation" wherein I was made to feel like I didn't understand Indigenous philosophy because I was unfamiliar with Spinoza's work. Everything I said was being translated into Spinoza-speak, and everything I was told, I had to try and translate (to the best of my ability) into Indigenous-philosophical-terms. Rather than my interlocutors trying to understand Indigenous philosophy, it felt like I was being tasked with understanding Spinoza.

This experience isn't the only time this kind of thing has occurred to me, but it's one that stuck with me since 1) it was during a job interview, and 2) it was one of the more combative instances of, if I'm being *extremely* charitable, someone trying to understand or engage with Indigenous philosophy. Since our committee and journal editors want to encourage non-Indigenous people to engage with Indigenous philosophy more frequently, I thought this would be a good space to discuss some things to keep in mind when wanting to engage with Indigenous philosophy in a respectful manner (as the participants at NEWLAMP did). As such, I offer the following forms of epistemic injustices as examples of things to avoid when engaging with Indigenous philosophy.

There are two forms of epistemic injustice that I'd like highlight as occurring frequently against Indigenous peoples in academic contexts. I've labeled these injustices as *epistemic servitude* and *epistemilation*.[4] Epistemic servitude occurs when someone's ideas are used merely in the service of justifying or promoting another person's ideas. In other words, when an idea is taken out of one context (i.e., worldview) and used to justify an idea in a different worldview, epistemic servitude has been committed. This is an injustice because it completely ignores or diminishes the relevant contexts in which the idea developed. Aside from being epistemically bad, this is morally problematic given the vast history of this kind of erasure that Indigenous peoples continue to endure. This isn't just disrespectful—it's a consequence and continuation of settler colonialism. Epistemilation occurs when a distinctive idea from one person or group is explained in terms that subsume that idea as being a part of another particular system of knowledge (or a particular "worldview"). Though seemingly similar to epistemic servitude, this injustice occurs when an idea from one worldview is dismissed or not engaged with *on its own terms* because it is assumed to be either identical or similar enough to another idea in another worldview. This is an injustice because, again, it ignores or diminishes the context (e.g., the history, culture, a particular language, etc.) in which the idea developed. However, it's also uniquely unjust because it, perhaps indirectly, prioritizes or privileges Western, Anglo-philosophical thoughts and traditions. In both cases, the context or worldview in which an idea developed is ignored or diminished, but they differ, oddly enough, in how they treat or compare Indigenous ideas and concepts with more familiar or Western concepts. In cases of epistemic servitude, Indigenous thought is taken to be good enough to be taken out of its particular context or worldview. It's used to justify Western claims and practices (i.e., claims and practices that exist in, and developed out of, Western contexts) that are perhaps difficult to justify in Western terms (i.e., it's greater than). In cases of epistemilation, Indigenous thought is taken to *not* be good enough to be taken out of its particular context or worldview. Indigenous thought isn't understood, or engaged with, in its particular context (i.e., it's less than). In either case, Indigenous thought is used for whatever purpose helps the settlers. It's used in the service of settler colonialism.

The aim here isn't to shame anyone who has committed these injustices—I'm sure most of us that have ever tried or desired to do comparative philosophy have either made these mistakes or come close. The aim is to highlight and name these injustices so that they can be brought to the attention of teachers and researchers wanting to engage with Native American or Indigenous philosophy.

As frequently as these occur, and as hard as they can be to avoid sometimes, I'm encouraged and hopeful given my recent experiences with people wanting to engage with Native American or Indigenous thought. I generally assume no ill will or bad intentions when these occur, but I want to make sure it's clear that even if that's the case, these practices still ought to be avoided.

Part of me wants to see these injustices optimistically—"if these are occurring (without malice), that means people are trying to, or at least want to, understand and engage with Indigenous philosophy!" While growing interest in Native American and Indigenous philosophy is great, these sorts of engagements still perpetuate a hierarchy of thought in philosophy that makes increasing diversity and inclusivity more difficult. And yet, as hard as it may be at times to increase diversity and inclusivity, it's still happening. Things, it seems, are getting better (albeit slowly). I'm encouraged by Indigenous graduate students that I've met who are engaging with Indigenous thought despite little-to-

no infrastructural support or resources. I'm encouraged by the "academic elders"[5] who cleared our path and continue to work in Indigenous philosophy despite having gone through much more of a struggle than most of us working in it nowadays. I'm encouraged by the increasing number of Indigenous philosophers that I continue to randomly meet (at conferences, in reading groups, through email, etc.). I'm encouraged by the increased presence of Indigenous philosophy at the APA conferences, as well as the increase in job postings seeking people who work in Indigenous or decolonial thought. I'm encouraged that my own department at West Chester University has actively taken steps to decolonize our curriculum and courses (soon I'll be able to teach upper- and lower-level courses on Native American philosophy!). I'm encouraged by the work that my colleagues in the APA's Committee on Native American and Indigenous Philosophers[6] are doing, as well as the work done by our journal's reviewers.[7] I'm encouraged by the development of Philosophy of Indigenous Education (PINE)[8] and the activities they've undertaken. I'm encouraged by the people who, albeit too cautiously sometimes, ask me and my peers about Indigenous philosophy. I'm encouraged by the organizers and participants at NEWLAMP—I encourage all of us wanting to engage with Indigenous thought to aspire to engage with it in the manner that they did. And I'm encouraged by those of you that are reading this. Mvto (thank you).

All these encouraging developments and occurrences make the need to avoid these epistemic injustices even more important. Simply engaging with Indigenous thought isn't enough to help diversify philosophy and make it more inclusive. The engagement has to be done respectfully. Just as merely adding an Indigenous author to your syllabus doesn't mean you've "decolonized" your reading list or course, memorizing things about Indigenous philosophy (e.g., concepts, arguments, inference patterns, stories, etc.) doesn't count as *knowing* Indigenous philosophy if you have to commit epistemic injustices to understand—and it certainly doesn't count as respectful engagement. While I hope the discipline takes some time to be grateful for the increased interested in Indigenous thought, I also hope that we'll take some time to reflect on *how* we're engaging with Indigenous thought and that we make sure we do it vrakkueckv (respectfully).

NOTES

1. Co-organizers include Alexander Guerrero (Rutgers University), Helena de Bres (Wellesley College), Gina Schouten (Harvard University), and Nancy Bauer (Tufts University).
2. Mvto (thank you) to Emmalon Davis (University of Michigan), Rebeccah Leiby (Elon University), Michaila Peters (Boston College), Mariana Beatriz Noé (Harvard University), Dana Francisco Miranda (University of Massachusetts Boston), Alida Liberman (Southern Methodist University), Jeanine Weekes Schroer (University of Minnesota Duluth), Michelle Saint (Arizona State University), Sandra Raponi (Merrimack College), Andréa Daventry (California State University, San Bernardino), James Garrison (Baldwin Wallace University), Cara Green (Colorado College), Aaron Lawler (Waubonsee Community College), Sarah Kizuk (Skidmore College), Robin Muller (California State University), Andrew Frederick Smith (Drexel University), Christopher Blake-Turner (Oklahoma State University), Madeline Ward (Western New England University), Margaret Betz (Rutgers University), Nicole Dular (Notre Dame of Maryland University), Gretchen Ellefson (Southern Utah University), Susan Stark (Bates College), Timothy M. Kwiatek (Cornell University), Stephen Minister (Augustana University), P.B Hope (Stanford University), Emma Prendergast (Utah Tech University), Juan Carlos González (Colby College), and maggie castor (Stony Brook University).
3. I also didn't know what they meant by "Indigenous conceptions of 'nature,'" but that's now irrelevant.
4. I imagine this being pronounced similarly to 'assimilation.' However, if I've spelled it poorly, I'd be happy for someone to spell it in such a way as to make the pronunciation obvious.
5. People like Anne Waters, Brian Burkhart, and Kyle Whyte, as well as those who have passed including Viola F. Cordova and Vine Deloria Jr.
6. Brian Burkhart, Andrew Smith, Getty Lustila, Kat Wehrheim, Shelbi Nahwilet Meissner, and Alessandro R. Moscaritolo Palacio.
7. Anne Waters, Agnes Curry, and Andrea Sullivan-Clarke.
8. Getty Lustila, Shelbi Nahwilet Meissner, Janella Baxter, John Miller, and Ashley Lance.

SUBMISSION GUIDELINES AND INFORMATION

We invite you to submit your work for consideration for publication in *APA Studies on Native American and Indigenous Philosophy*. Work submitted goes through anonymous peer review. Our project in this journal is to engage in scholarly and pedagogical conversations that further develop this field in its integrity. We accept work that foregrounds these philosophical perspectives. We also accept work that addresses the professional and community concerns regarding Native American and indigenous philosophies and philosophers of all global indigenous nations. This is an inherently decolonial project. **We do not accept work that engages merely in comparative exercises or uses Native American and Indigenous philosophy merely to solve the philosophical or practical problems generated by Western thinking.**

We welcome comments and responses to work published in this or past issues. We also welcome work that speaks to philosophical, professional and community concerns regarding Native American and indigenous philosophies and philosophers of all global indigenous nations. Editors do not limit the format of what can be submitted; we accept a range of submission formats including but not limited to papers, opinion editorials, transcribed dialogue interviews, book reviews, poetry, links to oral and video resources, cartoons, artwork, satire, parody, and other diverse formats. In all cases, however, references should follow the Chicago Manual of Style and include endnotes rather than in-text citations. For further information, please see the Guidelines for Authors available on the APA website. Please submit material electronically to Joseph Miller (JMiller4@wcupa.edu). For consideration for the fall 2025 issue, please submit your work by June 15, 2025.

KEY CONCEPTS IN INDIGENOUS PHILOSOPHY: WHAT IS *INDIGENOUS* PHILOSOPHY?

Ashley Lance
CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY

As an Indigenous person from California, it would be inappropriate not to acknowledge the wildfires that recently devastated Los Angeles and the surrounding areas. In part, this reflection on Indigenous philosophy is driven by some of the discourse that inherently follows any wildfire—that is, questions of how this fire could have been prevented. While there are many answers to fire prevention, especially those that prioritize the impacts of climate change, one area I want to connect to the question of Indigenous philosophy is the use of traditional ecological knowledge for controlled burns.

Where, in the past, it has felt that people were generally unaware of the practices of controlled burning by tribes in California, it is now (usually) consistently brought into the conversation. How it gets discussed is what I want to focus on. Online, while there are often articles that address the topic in a balanced and informed manner, there are still people discussing these practices in a less than useful way. In one instance, there was a TikTok where a person began by stating they were going to share a piece of Indigenous knowledge and wisdom that was taught to them. What was shared? That tribes have practiced controlled burns. The comment section thanked the person for sharing. Some comments went further. In one instance a commenter shared that they had done a cleansing and reading of their new house in LA, and they felt like mother earth was mad.

What's this have to do with Indigenous philosophy? I think that Indigenous philosophy can help us explain why this type of discourse about Indigenous practices, especially those that are as important as controlled burns, is both unhelpful and patronizing. In the first instance, Indigenous philosophy is something that can help us evaluate the epistemic landscape of statements like the above—being willing to ask questions like who shared this knowledge with you? What people? Are you allowed to be sharing this? Questions like these emphasize respectful and appropriate approaches to knowledge sharing and highlights immediately where the poster goes wrong. Here, what is wrong with the post is not just the language being used, or that the "wisdom" being shared is something that is basic and well known, but that at every step it demonstrates how to not interact with Indigenous knowledge—by appealing to stereotypes, by being unspecific, and by not considering the potential impacts of knowledge sharing.

As a contrast, there is a moment in Octavia Butler's *Parable of the Sower* where Lauren is attempting to get her friend to seek out more knowledge for survival:

> "Read this." I handed her one of the plant books. This one was about California Indians, the plants they used, and how they used them—an interesting, entertaining little book. . . . "So we learn to eat grass and live in the bushes?" she muttered.
>
> "We learn to survive," I said.[1]

We learn no information about what this book is, which tribes it documents, or how Lauren's father came into possession of this book. In some ways, the complaints I have about the post seem relevant here. But what I want to emphasize from this short passage is the defense of knowledge by Lauren, that it cannot be reduced to eating grass but is integral for survival.

Butler's novel is currently being called prophetic—for its prediction of a large wildfire in Los Angeles, around this exact date in 2025. However, the novel imagines California Indians as a piece of the past, even if our knowledge is a key to survival. What Indigenous philosophy can and should be is a way to keep us in the present and future. Its primary function is to help us negotiate and think through our relationships with each other, the land, and knowledge. The wildfires in California are one instance where Indigenous philosophy reminds us of the stakes of applying and sharing our traditional knowledges.

Indigenous philosophy is learning to survive.

NOTES

1. O. E. Butler, *Parable of the Sower* (London: Headline Publishing Group, 1993), 50–51.

Getty L. Lustila
NORTHEASTERN UNIVERSITY

The first time I was asked the question "What is Indigenous philosophy?" in earnest was by a student the first day of my course PHIL 2492: Indigenous Philosophy at Northeastern University. I remember feeling vulnerable, and even a bit annoyed. After all, this student did not understand the cardinal rule: never ask a philosopher was philosophy is. This breach of protocol was compounded by the fact that, here I was, an early career Native philosopher unsure of what it meant for me to be Indigenous.

Sure, I am an enrolled member of my tribe, the Choctaw Nation of Oklahoma. However, outside of voting in tribal elections, learning Chata (which no one in my family speaks), and engaging in ceremony, I was often unclear on what it meant to be Choctaw, much less Indigenous. Yes, I know: "sing in me, oh muse, and through me tell the tale of the urban Native." I am not here to go on about walking in two worlds—others more competent than myself have that covered—only to say that life flashed before my eyes when asked that question and I have been thinking about it since.

And no, this is not the part where I give you the answer to that question. Not because I am playing at being the medicine man but because I am still not sure. I *am* sure there is a joke in there somewhere, perhaps multiple ones, though I will leave that to the reader. What I can tell

you is what I have learned through teaching Indigenous philosophy. But first, a story.

This past semester was the most difficult of my career, and there was a day that marked amongst my lowest days generally. On that day, I decided to postpone our scheduled discussion and take the students outside. After sitting down—the grass was wet—which made this uncomfortable, and looking at each other a bit dumbfounded—which is always uncomfortable—I asked them a question, which also happened to be the theme of our course: "What does it mean to be a good relative?"

What followed was a winding discussion about the nature of relationality, how to build communities that create the conditions for being good relatives to one another, and what to do with folks that seemed hell bent on being bad ones. Throughout there was a bit of crying, a few laughs, and a couple heated moments, none of which seemed to derail the intense thinking and caring that we were doing with and for each other in the moment. After the allotted time passed, I stopped and said:

"Well, we just did it."

"What did we do?"

"We tried our hand at being good relatives."

There was a collective groan, a few eyerolls—but everyone was grinning. My students had long before identified my flare for the dramatic.

When class was over the problems we identified still existed. They still felt hopeless, or at least bigger than one person or one generation. But for a few moments on that unseasonably warm afternoon, we caught each other and saw the promise held out by working to be a better relative. For my Native students this meant listening to their aunties (a joke); for my non-Native students, it meant acting to remember that they were *in fact* relatives (not a joke). For all of us it meant reckoning with the persisting realities of settler colonialism, the way that these realities contribute to the dispossession of Indigenous lands and life, and how they seemingly obstruct the possibility of real friendship and community.

Big thoughts, even paralyzingly so on an otherwise difficult day. But we all knew that the work did not stop there. In some ways it had just begun, and would need to begin again, and again. So, what is the point? After all this, what is Indigenous philosophy? I am still not sure. All I know is it is what we were doing on that November day. And for me, this urbanite Choctaw two-world walker, it is enough to begin again, to create those spaces and to work to be present in them when I can.

"I thought we were going to get a definition of Indigenous philosophy. Oh well, skoden."

ARTICLES

Critiques of Colonial Scholarship

Tristan Gosselin
UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO

INTRODUCTION

The objective of my work was to engage the scholarship of Jesuit philosopher and theologian Bernard Lonergan (1904–1984) through the lens of decoloniality. To achieve this objective, the research procedure was divided into two phrases. The first phase required an examination of Indigenous scholarship, primarily in the fields of philosophy and theology, to formulate a collection of colonial critiques present throughout the literature. The second phase required an examination of Bernard Lonergan's work to identify the colonial structures present in his scholarship, informed by the aforementioned collection of colonial critiques. I identified four pertinent critiques that appear throughout Lonergan's scholarship: the linear conception of time, the disregard for spatial particularities, the promotion of individualism, and the employment of the *colonial gaze*. The following work has divorced these critiques from their original application by Lonergan to instead present a broader analysis of the ideological and epistemic tools weaponized within settler-states' ideological apparatuses (e.g., colonial scholarship) to valorize Indigenous land dispossession.

WHAT IS COLONIAL SCHOLARSHIP?

Eve and Tuck assert that "decolonisation is not a metaphor"[1] and instead posit that decolonization refers exclusively to the undoing of Indigenous land dispossession. If decolonization is the undoing of Indigenous land dispossession, then "settler-colonial scholarship" can be understood as a body of work that produces, perpetuates, or normalizes Indigenous dispossession.

CRITIQUE 1: COLONIAL SCHOLARSHIP CONCEPTUALIZES TIME AS LINEAR

Colonial scholarship promotes a linear conception of time. This informs the relationship between the passage of time and progress, which can be understood as "progressive"[2] history. In his 1972 book, *God is Red*, Vine Deloria Jr. critiques colonialism's linear conception of time by illuminating the constructed relationship between the passage of time and progress. As Deloria succinctly writes, "the very essence of Western European identity involves the assumption that time proceeds in a linear fashion."[3] He further expands upon this point by asserting that the Western European identity functions with the assumption that at a point in its linear narrative, it had become the global leader.[4] The significance of a linear conception of time to the supremacy of Western European identity explains its prioritization of temporality over spatiality.[5] Therefore, the Western European identity and its accompanying normative beliefs are not understood as the product of a particular spatial context, but rather understood temporally as the exemplification of "progression." This identity then

becomes the metric by which all other identities and normative beliefs are comparatively measured.

Deloria asserts that a linear conception of time is analogous to the "doctrine of cultural evolution."[6] Non-adherence to its norms then supposes inferiority, and subsequently natural elimination under this doctrine. Therefore, a linear conception of time naturalizes the elimination of Indigenous peoples. Because the normative beliefs of Indigenous peoples do not adhere to those of the settler-colonial project, they cease to exist contemporarily. Instead, Indigenous peoples represent a stage of cultural progression that the colonial project has advanced from. This illustrates why settler-colonial historical narratives are often "narrow in scope, singular and isolated,"[7] as they must construct the cultural evolution that has resulted in settler supremacy. Settler scholarship often promotes the narrative that Indigenous peoples are timeless, or represent an antiquated people of the land they now inhabit. In this narrative, the exclusion of Indigenous peoples from the contemporary age leases the land to settler-colonial interests.

Franz Fanon asserts that "colonialism is not simply content to impose its rule upon the present and the future of a dominated country"[8] but that it also "turns to the past of the oppressed people, and distorts, disfigures, and destroys it."[9] According to Fanon, historical narratives are paramount to forming a national identity.[10] As previously demonstrated, Eurocentricity is the metric by which all other cultures are comparatively measured. Eurocentric historical narratives are not content in simply antiquating a contemporary people, but must also impose value-judgments upon that antiquated people, ultimately to promote notions of Indigenous barbarity or incompetence in comparison to settler civility.

The settler-colonial state apparatuses mobilize historical narratives to construct national identity. Colonial scholarship's progressive historical narratives fabricate the normative narrative of Western evolution that ranges from the ancient Greek empire, to the ancient Roman empire, to the medieval era, to the renaissance, and then to the Enlightenment. The contemporary settler-colonial nation is posited as the heir to the excellence of past civilisations. The excellency of the Ancient Roman empire then does not reflect the excellency of the settler-colonial nation, but rather demonstrates a excellency that the nation has surpassed. As "guardians of the world,"[11] ordained by a progressive history, Western Europeans became the arbiter of order. Deloria expresses that this notion of supremacy inspired "Crusades, the Age of Exploration, the Age of Imperialism, and the recent crusade against Communism."[12] This ideology illustrates settler-colonial project's doctrine of Indigenous land dispossession. As arbiters of order, the agents of settler-colonialism were affirmed by the notion that they could optimize the land better than its original inhabitants could.[13]

CRITIQUE 2: COLONIAL SCHOLARSHIP DISREGARDS SPATIAL PARTICULARITIES

Colonial scholarship disregards spatial particularities. Spatial particularities refers to the mutually informing relationship between land and knowledge generation. Land is not the sole informant of knowledge generation, but an aspect of a holistic system that encompasses "the formations of culture, and the relations of power in which these concepts are located."[14] The concept of spatial particularities may be best understood in contrast to universality applicability. A disregard for spatial particularities upholds the assumption that Eurocentric epistemologies, ideologies, and theologies have universal applicability. Linklater disrupts the normalization of universal applicability by referring to this colonial structure as a "separate and distinct understanding of the world."[15] The disregard for spatial particularities, and the notion of universal applicability it informs, enables colonial thought to be divorced from the context "where they originally made sense."[16] Universal applicability is paramount to the valorization of colonial thought in the landmass currently referred to as the "Americas." This disregard of spatiality further culminates in the notion that "the world does not matter."[17]

The insignificance of the world is the thesis from which two arguments originate: first, that universality applicability is possible; second, that the Earth can be objectified. While the first argument supports the ideological state apparatuses of the settler-colonial project, the second supports the project's extractive endeavors. The result is an anthropocentric worldview where "humans hold a position of superiority over Earth and its other occupants."[18] In this worldview, land-based relationality and reciprocity are neglected. One's spatial particularity is not regarded as a context to be considered in analysis, as the Earth has no agency. In the colonial conception of space, if any relationship between humans and the Earth were to be drawn, it would be one of unilateral imposition. This is to say that settlers may consciously engage the Earth, but the Earth has no agency to engage them. This allows colonial scholarship to simply omit spatial considerations unless they may be mobilized in the retention of power.

CRITIQUE 3: COLONIAL SCHOLARSHIP PROMOTES INDIVIDUALISM

Colonial scholarship promotes individualism. According to Linda Tuhiwai Smith, this individualism is presented through colonial methodologies that forego holistic research frameworks.[19] Thus, colonial research methodologies fail to consider the relationality between humans, the land, and its other inhabitants.[20] The culmination of individuality's prioritization in scholarship is the rejection of relationality and reciprocity within its analyses.[21] The omission of relationality in colonial scholarship's analyses can be understood as an ideological product of the settler property regime.

Patrick Wolfe describes how the process of Indigenous land dispossession was not carried out exclusively by the state, but by individuals encouraged by the settler-

colonial project's property regime.[22] Wolfe describes the once landless European settlers as "rabble"[23] who facilitated the "lethal interlude"[24] between discovery and the "extinguishment of native title."[25] While this illuminates the necessity of Indigenous elimination in European settlement, it further exposes the relationship between violence and the settler property regime. Thus, for the colonial project, individual settlers were agents of the settler-colonial state's construction, who often employed violence to facilitate Indigenous land dispossession.[26] The ideological product of this can be denoted as "white possessiveness,"[27] which Gareau and Swain argue, poses an "existential problem or difficulty for Indigenous nations/peoples and communities/collectivities."[28] Ultimately, the settler property regime and its accompanying white possessiveness posits that individuals are not only able to possess land, but that this possession is a right guaranteed by the settler-colonial state.[29]

Colonial possessiveness, informed by the promotion of individualism, extends from the privatization of land to representations of Indigeneity. As Gareau writes, "the power of possessiveness is everywhere, informing and deploying a structural racism that permeates everything."[30] As previously discussed, the self-assured supremacy of the "Western European identity"[31] is the metric by which encountered cultures are comparatively measured and hierarchized in colonial scholarship. Audra Simpson expands upon this point by writing that settler scholars have assumed the responsibility of containing cultural difference "into neat, ethnically defined territorial spaces that now needed to be made sense of, ordered, ranked, governed, and possessed."[32] Settler scholars maintain a hegemony in the representation of Indigenous peoples. The categorization described by Simpson does not function to simply present racial caricaturizations of Indigenous peoples, but instead as an agent of land dispossession. As settlers have hegemony in the representation of Indigenous peoples, they construct notions of authenticity. Tuck describes how this creates the notion that "portrays contemporary Indigenous generations to be less authentic, less Indigenous than every prior generation in order to ultimately phase out Indigenous claims to land and usher in settler claims to property."[33]

CRITIQUE 4: COLONIAL SCHOLARSHIP EMPLOYS THE *COLONIAL GAZE*

Colonial scholarship often employs the *colonial gaze*. The colonial gaze, or what Abolson describes as "colonial mirrors or comparisons"[34] refers to how the settler-colonial state's ideological apparatuses represent Indigenous peoples with the settler identity set as the normative metric of analysis. In colonial scholarship, this comparison is often weaponized to propagate notions of Indigenous inferiority. Through the colonial gaze, Indigenous peoples are subjected to analysis under the colonial structures that have facilitated their dispossession, such as a linear conception of time, a disregard for spatial particularities, and the promotion of individualism. These fundamental settler-colonial ideological and epistemic positions are antithetical to many Indigenous knowledges and lifeways. Resultantly, the analyses drawn are those of nonadherence. As Coultard writes, "there is nothing 'inherent' about the perceived 'inferiority' attributed to colonized subjects by the dominant society, nor is there anything 'natural' about the so-called 'complexes' they suffer as a result. Both are the product of colonial social relations: 'If there is a flaw, it lies not in the 'soul' of the [colonized] individual, but in his environment.'"[35]

The representation and recognition of Indigenous peoples is paramount to the settler-colonial project. A strategy of settler-colonial nation building is the retention of symbolic elements of Indigeneity to articulate its difference and independence.[36] Patrick Wolfe provides the example of Australia's progressive government attaching Indigenous symbolism to its public buildings and national airlines.[37] For Wolfe, the ideological motivation behind these ostensibly dialectical presentations is rooted in the settler-colonial project's underlying justification.[38] In the case of Australia, the justification for settler-colonialism was that the project would better utilize the land.[39] It is logical then that Indigenous motifs may become entangled with commercial enterprise within the nation. Thus, representations of Indigenous peoples can range from blatantly racist depictions, to the "progressive" incorporation of symbolism. This demonstrates how "the native repressed continues to structure settler-colonial society"[40] in controlled ways entirely beneficial to the latter. Settler intuitions maintain a hegemony in Indigenous representation, and resultantly evokes it in strategic nation-building efforts. This is enacted both to articulate difference and to assert dominance through the fruits of the settler-colonial project. These presentations do not demand genuine engagement with Indigenous peoples.

Often, the colonial gaze is purposely superficial to assert the superiority of the settler-colonial project. Real engagement with Indigenous peoples, their epistemologies, ideologies, would demand an undoing of the self-legitimation the settler-colonial project has exerted through its ideological state apparatuses. What if settler-colonial scholarship were to take seriously the notion that spatial particularities matter, or that the passage of time does not intrinsically suppose linear progression? Resultantly, the ideologies of which Indigenous land dispossession is dependent upon would begin to unravel. In the words of Audra Simpson, "knowing and representing people within those places required more than military might."[41] For this reason, the settler-colonial project's ideological state apparatuses, such as its academy, are cautious in their engagement and representation of Indigenous peoples. This illuminates the often reductionist and essentialist presentations of Indigenous peoples present in colonial scholarship. These ideological and epistemic positions must be continuously evoked in colonial scholarship to maintain the settler-colonial project. They are not just constructive to just what the individual settler believes to be true, but to the maintenance of land dispossession.

CONCLUSION

It is pertinent that considerations of the settler-colonialism project critically examine the ideological state apparatus and its production of colonial scholarship. As Patrick Wolfe succinctly writes, settler-colonialism "is a structure

not an event."[42] The ideological positions of a linear conception of time, a disregard for spatial particularities, the promotion of individualism, and the colonial gaze, are all appendages of the settler-colonial structure. The danger of these ideologies is their naturalisation that renders their presentation innocuous. It is challenging to understand the relationship between a linear conception of time and structure of settler-colonialism without understanding how this ideological position legitimates and advances Indigenous land dispossession. As Simpson posits, the settler colonial project is not solely sustained by "military might."[43] It is vital that scholarship is treated as a potential weapon of colonial expansion and legitimation.

NOTES

1. Tuck and Yang, "Decolonization Is Not a Metaphor," 1–40.
2. Jojola, "Toward a Cyclical Model of Indigenous History."
3. Deloria, *God Is Red*, 62.
4. Deloria, *God Is Red*, 62.
5. Deloria, *God Is Red*, 72.
6. Deloria, *God Is Red*, 68.
7. Jojola, "Toward a Cyclical Model of Indigenous History," 6.
8. Fanon, "On National Culture," 210.
9. Fanon, "On National Culture," 210.
10. Fanon, "On National Culture," 209.
11. Deloria, *God Is Red*, 62.
12. Deloria, *God Is Red*, 62.
13. Wolfe, "Settler Colonialism," 389.
14. Smith, *Decolonizing Methodologies*, 48.
15. Linklater, "A Discussion on Traditional Tribal Religious Philosophical Beliefs."
16. Deloria, *God Is Red*, 65.
17. Deloria, *God Is Red*, 68.
18. Cordova, "Time, Culture, and the Self."
19. Smith, *Decolonizing Methodologies*, 55.
20. Smith, *Decolonizing Methodologies*, 55.
21. Smith, *Decolonizing Methodologies*, 56.
22. Wolfe, "Settler Colonialism," 393.
23. Wolfe, "Settler Colonialism," 393.
24. Wolfe, "Settler Colonialism," 393.
25. Wolfe, "Settler Colonialism," 393.
26. Wolfe, "Settler Colonialism," 393.
27. Gareau and Swain, "Indigenous Knowledges."
28. Gareau and Swain, "Indigenous Knowledges."
29. Tuck and Yang, "Decolonization Is Not a Metaphor," 24.
30. Gareau and Swain, "Indigenous Knowledges."
31. Deloria Jr., *God Is Red*, 62.
32. Simpson, "Ethnographic Refusal," 97.
33. Tuck and Wang, "Decolonization Is Not a Metaphor," 12.
34. Absolon, *Kaandossiwin*, 261.
35. Coulthard, "The Plunge into the Chasm of the Past," 48.
36. Wolfe, "Settler Colonialism," 389.
37. Wolfe, "Settler Colonialism," 389.
38. Wolfe, "Settler Colonialism," 389.
39. Wolfe, "Settler Colonialism," 389.
40. Wolfe, "Settler Colonialism," 390.
41. Simpson, "Ethnographic Refusal," 95.
42. Wolfe, "Settler Colonialism," 388.
43. Simpson, "Ethnographic Refusal," 95.

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Local Time: A Placed-Based Account of Time in Vine Deloria Jr.'s Various Works

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INTRODUCTION

Recent work elaborating on the longstanding effects of settler colonialism have diagnosed the function of time in justifying and perpetuating coloniality. In particular, it is helpful to consider Kevin Bruyneel and Mark Rifkin, whose recent works outline how time has been used throughout US political history to designate indigenous peoples as underdeveloped. By doing so, settlers seek to justify genocidal policies that civilize the "savage Indian" and further ensconce the "right" view of history and progress.[1] Where theorists have adeptly outlined the weaponization of temporality under Western coloniality, they have yet to offer a particular account of time that favors indigenous resistance.

With the aforementioned political discussions orienting my approach, I turn to Vine Deloria Jr.'s (Lakota) writings on time and place to formulate what a place-based account of time entails.[2] I begin with Deloria's critique of Western Christianity in *God Is Red*, where he first introduces the implications and limitations of a strictly temporal worldview. Following this distinction, using Deloria's later texts, I construct a spatial account of time as grounded within a particular location, structured in communal relationships, and cyclical in arrangement. I term this place-based temporality *local time*.[3]

CRITIQUE OF CHRISTIANITY AS A TEMPORAL RELIGION

Before defining *local time*, it is necessary to distinguish how Western Christianity maintains a temporal worldview. In effect, by emphasizing time, Western Christianity neglects to recognize the centrality of place in non-Western societies and ultimately facilitates colonial expansion. Furthermore, even when not seen as originating from a particular culture or religion, time continues to function as a metric to organize all experiences within a linear time and telos. To paint this picture, I look at *God is Red* where Deloria first makes his distinction between temporal and spatial religions.[4]

Deloria diagnoses that there is a metaphysical difference in how particular peoples view space and time; where American Indians hold place as sacred and central to cultural practice, Deloria claims that "immigrants [Western Europeans] review the movement of their ancestors across the continent as a steady progression of basically good events and experiences."[5] Because of this, Western Europeans come to see "history—time—in the best possible light."[6] Deloria claims that this difference reflects the distinct religious frameworks which Western-Europeans and indigenous peoples carry into their cultural and political beliefs; namely, the significance of place, or lack of, in religious practice. Distinguishing two broad categories of religion in "Thinking in Time and Space," he describes that the Western European identity is formed from a religion which champions temporality and diminishes the role of place. Meanwhile, indigenous religions are more centrally organized around place.

At its core, Deloria claims that Western Europeans assume a temporal worldview in which time proceeds linearly between an origin and towards an eventual end point.[7] Where linearity merely describes the structure, he reinforces that by assuming that time is linear. Western European Christians also believe themselves as the inheritors of a divine plot which demands colonizing others to secure their eventual destiny.[8] This destiny not only provides structure and a narrative for imperialism but it also conscripts the entire globe within the destiny of a particular people.[9] Time, despite being organized around a select few, needs to either eliminate or include others within its progress narrative.[10] Deloria argues that every aspect of society and culture, even political and economic events, can be conscripted under linear time to ensure the stability of the Western telos and past. In this regard, Western Europeans act as the central players in progress and history, organizing those they encounter within this overarching narrative. For instance, those termed "savage" or "uncivilized," are located somewhere on the timeline of progress but occupy a particular period of European development which the West has moved past. Hence, Western Christian temporality organizes others within its story and creates social and racial hierarchies using its own metrics of linear progress.

Where colonialism in the Americas was founded on a religious narrative, Deloria argues that, over time, the Christian component of Western temporality became secularized through history and science. By globalizing its own narrative of progress, Western Christianity became the metric for organizing temporal experiences and interactions with the world while appearing as universal and objective. In "Do We Need a Beginning?" Deloria argues that Western science accepts "Time as real and linear," deriving this concept directly from Christianity.[11] While he attaches time directly to science in other works, here he remarks on how philosophers carry religious assumptions about time into early discussions of scientific observations.

Therefore, we see the world through a "uniformitarian, homogeneous passage of time."[12] In doing so, "that appropriation [of time] now forces us to link everything in one grand temporal scenario in which life struggles from single-celled creatures to the complexity we find today."[13] In other words, Deloria argues that Christian linear time persists in the Western perception of scientific progress and development. Science, although adopting the secular language of incremental change, does not unseat the religious belief that time is linear. Instead, it further cements it as a universal metaphysical concept.[14]

In addition to concealing the linear perception of time within science, the new secular temporal framing had to repurpose the established "truths" of Christian creation and destiny. Deloria writes, "to dethrone god as the originator of life and substitute 'mother nature' or 'blind chance,' as science has done, is simply to remain within the original framework of inquiry."[15] Science substitutes the Christian creator and myth of progress with evolutionary chance and explains linear progression through constant incremental change.[16] In either the religious or secular description, linear time and progress are maintained, whether that be through rejoining a divine being in the afterlife or becoming a more fit creature for our environment.

In its secular appearance, linear time has universalized itself and obscured its cultural and religious origins, yet it still continues to serve a distinct purpose in facilitating colonialism. Where Christianity offered religious motivation for colonizing others through conversion, science instead uses reason to spread its knowledge across any place and time. Deloria writes,

> Without "a spatial point of view" time and history can be globalized and universalized. The particular needs, values, and history of a particular place can be universalized over all places through the coloniality of power. Particular needs, values, and knowledge can be universalized across time and space and forced onto people of other places at any time.[17]

In effect, by establishing an abstract concept of time that explains social origins, an eventual goal, and the mechanism of change, Western Christian linear time universalizes its perspective beyond its spatial origin. Furthermore, it now applies itself indiscriminately to places and peoples by appealing to universal reason. In other words, a temporal account of reality reflects how "time and history have been abstracted into something universal," and, as I will show in the next step of this overview, in our relation to time, we neglect to see how fundamental place is in our experience of reality.[18]

PLACEHOOD AND SACRED PLACES

If history operates as an extension of linear time, effectively separating people from the land and diminishing a spatial perspective, is an indigenous account of history and temporality possible? I argue that a spatial account of time is possible, and that we can define its key features by tracing Deloria's discussions of time and place in his other texts. Following his critique of Western Christian temporality in "Thinking in Time and Space," Deloria does not offer an explicit indigenous account of time. So, to make this claim, I highlight how indigenous culture/religion opposes Western Christian temporality by grounding experience within a spatial perspective. By linking together several of Deloria's discussions of place, I develop a non-linear sense of time and history which I term *local time* to stress its origins in placehood. In the following section I highlight a fundamental feature of *local time*: placehood.

In contrast to Christian Western Europeans, who see time as fundamental, Deloria defines American Indian religions as spatial, meaning they require a connection to particular places for cultural practices.[19] Place, as I will define in this paper, is more than a space in which we are located; it also denotes the experiences and the relations that we have in that location, whether that be with other humans, the land itself, or a more-than-human community.[20] We can see the connection to place most clearly in Deloria's discussions of sacred places which highlight the epistemic and ethical role that sacred places reveal.

To understand how time functions in a spatial account, I investigate how spaces become sacred and inform one's relation to the land. Following this, I draw out the temporal elements that sacred places entail. Deloria references this relationship in his remarks on the difference of revelation in temporal and spatial religions. In comparison to the universal message and experience offered in temporal religions, "revelation [in a spatial religion] was seen as a continuous process of adjustment to the natural surroundings and not as a specific message valid for all times and places."[21] Insofar as religious practice and revelations are tied to a particular place, then we must look at the processes that make places sacred. In "Sacred Places and Moral Responsibility," Deloria remarks on four senses in which a place can be understood as sacred. By demonstrating how places are understood or made sacred, Deloria articulates how indigenous spirituality survives today and is capable of producing new sacred locations.[22]

Deloria's first two senses of the sacred refer primarily to human experiences in a particular place which hold significance to a community. In the first sense of the sacred, he defines that a place is sacred in order to honor the immense human effort which took place there.[23] In the second sense of the sacred, a place is made sacred because an experience lives on in community memory.[24] Not dissimilar to the first sense, this is referring to events which are necessary to share with the community for moral education. In other words, the sacred place must be remembered to remember the lesson.

Following these two senses of the sacred, Deloria articulates a third sense in which an "overwhelming holiness where the Higher Powers, on their own initiative, have revealed Themselves to human beings."[25] In this case, the creator makes themself apparent and bestows sacredness on a location, making it a site for spiritual practice.[26] The creator establishes our experiences and allows us to engage in relations with other beings, which, in this case, we come to realize on sacred land.[27] In the third sense, sacred places guide human activity by providing the means of

accessing moral guidance through our direct interactions with that place. Place is made an active participant in our moral education and, therefore, is seen as a teacher. In summary, across the first three descriptions of the sacred, a place is not inert land; instead, it is an active agent within the indigenous community. Land actively conditions our experiences and plays an epistemic role, which allows us to remember communal experiences and learn moral lessons.

Deloria offers a final sense in which things can be seen as sacred. Insofar as there are higher powers in nature that remain involved with human beings, there is potential for new sacred locations to be produced. If sacred places can appear and be created in any of the three senses, we have to consider the potential for future sacred places in how we orient ourselves toward land and the world around us. Deloria urges, "people must always be ready to experience new revelations at a new location. If this possibility did not exist, all deities and spirits would be dead."[28] And "consequently, we always look forward to the revelation of new sacred places and ceremonies."[29] Deloria argues that this makes us responsible for the earth in consideration of future sacred sites and the experiences which could create them.[30] It is important to emphasize here that indigenous spatial practice is not located in the past. Instead, it is made active through the first three descriptions and futural in this fourth sense. The possibility for a place to be sacred extends our understanding of sacred places to include existing sacred places in addition to all places as *potentially* sacred. To the effect that all places are potentially sacred, all land and place is fundamental for spiritual practice and must be preserved for this sake.[31]

To draw out the temporal elements in placehood and sacred places, I want to consider how Deloria's descriptions structure a relationship between past, present, and future. So far, through the writings I've chosen, we have come to realize land as the connection between the past and present. As Deloria remarks, across the first three instances of sacredness, human activity and divine presence can occur in the past. However, despite having occurred in the past, these experiences are not inaccessible or unfelt in the present.[32] By accessing sacred places and engaging with the land, these occurrences and teachings are made present and available to our community today. Furthermore, in the case of future sacred places, if everything has the potential to be sacred, then it must be treated as sacred in the current moment to preserve this potential for future generations.

I interpret placehood this way to subvert the linear notion of past and future which we encountered in Christian linear time. As discussed earlier, Christian temporality maintains a linear timeline of events, which also points to an eventual purpose/destiny. We are located somewhere along this line in the present moment and are limited in our relationship to the past. In contrast to this, a spatial account of time allows us to actively engage with the past and future via our activity with the land. The past can exist in a spatial account of time, but sacredness allows us to bind it to a particular place and make it manifest in the present. Thus, by rooting time in place, we are always actively situated within the past and future since these are physical locations in space. Additionally, by making places sacred, it emphasizes the active epistemic and moral role that placehood plays in community.[33] Likewise, if something can occur in the future and make a place sacred, it is also sacred to us today. Through activity with the land, the past and future collapse into the present moment where indigenous peoples always find themselves in an active relationship with earlier and later generations.

Before moving further, I want to clarify that I do not think a place-based account of time indicates an ongoing presentness. I think the concepts of past, present, and future, borrowed from Christian linear temporality, are unable to grasp the relational aspects of indigenous cultures and place-based time. Relationships in these accounts are never limited only by time; instead, they draw attention to how one is influenced by and influences others. Events can occur and their influence might not be fully realized, yet this does not limit how and in what way events influence communal memory and activity. Hence, to break down how space gives way to an alternative view of time, we have to better understand how indigenous peoples think of relationships with other beings beyond sacred places where land is fundamental to recognizing communal relations.

POWER AND PLACE: A COMMUNITY OF RELATIONS

In this section, I develop a second sense of *local time*. Using Vine Deloria Jr.'s and Daniel Wildcat's (Yuchi, Muscogee) discussions in *Power and Place*, I articulate how communal relations contribute to a sense of time that is based in place. Already, we have seen how a spatial perspective uses land to ground its sense of time in a particular place and location; I build from this account of space to demonstrate how place is more than geography—it also denotes a particular arrangement of communal relationships. Insofar as relationships influence and inform our positions in the world, we inherit responsibilities to others as they inherit responsibilities to us.[34] Hence, the value that we hold in place is oriented towards the betterment of the community.

In *Power and Place*, Deloria and Wildcat claim that, in order to understand our experiences, we have to reflect on them as a product of complex relationships with the world.[35] This means that, at the metaphysical level, all entities are capable of engaging with and influencing one another. Everything is fundamentally related in some way, so we, as part of this network, can understand the world by unpacking our experiences within it. Thus, to understand our experiences, Deloria and Wildcat introduce two concepts: power and place. Power and place allow us to make sense of who we are, how we are connected to others, and in what way these relationships influence us. They define "power [as] the living energy that inhabits and/or composes the universe," and "place [as] the relationship of things to each other."[36] While still somewhat unclear in its ethical significance, Deloria and Wildcat argue that power and place can be best articulated when placed into "a simple equation: power and place produce personality."[37] Power + Place = Personality, sometimes written as the P3 formula, is used to understand

how one produces a particular personality, or experience of the world, when understood in relation to others.

To clarify further, Deloria and Wildcat expound that power is the living energy that exists throughout every being and in the universe. Power is not exclusive to humans. Rather, every entity contains some element of power. Power is not something to be realized in the abstract or quantifiable; instead, Deloria and Wildcat describe that it is felt and learned through engaging with other beings. Only after being alongside others can we realize how their influence shapes our capacities for action. They continue, "in ordinary language we can call power amorphous, for it takes many forms, some overt and some latent. We are conscious of the former, while the latter lie dormant and have an existence of (to) which we are not initially conscious."[38] Power then is something that we can observe but that may not be perceivable in all situations. If power appears to us personally, then our relationship to power is limited by our epistemic capacity to understand who we are in relation with and how their influence matters. How power appears to us in one scenario might be obscured or hidden in another; thus, realizing one's power is an ongoing process.

Following their definition of power, Deloria and Wildcat argue that because it is amorphous and can only be understood through our experiences, we must inspect our relationships with others. Yet, building from our earlier sense of place as geographical, they define place as locating one within a community of relations and processes. Deloria and Wildcat write that "place or space is concrete and palpable."[39] Hence, we can understand a sense of place as similar to how we are always located in a particular geographical sense of place. They continue, "Place is not merely the relationship of things, resources, or objects, it is the site where dynamic processes of interaction occur—where processes between living beings or other-than-human persons occur."[40] Where place refers to a physical location in Deloria's account of sacred places, we have an additional sense of the term as denoting a metaphysical location as well. Namely, place refers to the site where processes and interactions with other things occur.

As we understand Deloria and Wildcat's account so far, place refers to more than mere geography; it includes how one is situated within a relationship with other beings. They explain, "the point should be obvious: we, human beings . . . are intimately connected and related to, in fact dependent on, the other living beings, land, air, and water of the earth's biosphere."[41] That is, where we might consider our relations with other people, Deloria and Wildcat argue for a broad concept of others to include non-human entities as well. Our relatedness means that we are "inextricably bound up with the existence and welfare of the other living beings and places of the earth: beings and places, understood as persons possessing power."[42] Places are persons who possess power. Thus, others have the potential to influence us and be influenced by us. Not only are we related, but the well-being of others also becomes necessary for us to pursue. Hence, our well-being is mutually upheld within our relationship; what matters for others must also matter for us.

With this articulation of place as relational and spatial, I transition here to discuss how this produces the communal aspect in *local time*. As discussed in the previous section, if we consider how placehood makes events in time located in a particular place, then we must also consider in what ways place implicates our relations as immanent in time. I argue this move is similar to how I discussed the futural aspect of sacred places.[43] If we understand our relations as structuring what things matter, then the existence of others in the past, current, and future demand consideration in determining what experiences matter now. The things that matter to our community of relations also matter whether they are located in the past or the future.

By broadening our community to include those who have existed and will exist, then we must consider what is needed to sustain their well-being. For indigenous peoples, the family is thought of as "a multigenerational complex of people, and clan and kinship responsibilities extended beyond the grave and far into the future."[44] With this inter-generational family in mind, our responsibility for maintaining their well-being is also implicated across time. For instance, "remembering a distant ancestor's name and achievements might be equally as important as feeding a visiting cousin or showing a niece how to sew and cook."[45] As mentioned here, one's community is multigenerational in scope. The influence that those ancestors maintain is still meaningful, not unlike those we maintain with our current relations. We are still responsible for them, just as they were responsible for us. The distance across generations is not limited to those we directly engage with but includes those who came before us and those who will outlive us. Nonetheless, they are relatives and kin to whom we hold responsibilities because we share influence and connection.

Our relations with the non-human world also implicate generations across time. As mentioned earlier, water is a being that possesses power and influences us. We, in turn, also influence water. We are equally implicated in its well-being because, without it, we would not survive. Further, plant life and animals that partake of the water are implicated in our relationship with water. Being responsible and in relation to water requires us to be cognizant of how its well-being is implicated in our relationship to present and future generations. What would have happened to us if our ancestors failed to protect and respect their relationship to the water? What will happen to the generations of people and non-humans that must also thrive from that same source of water?[46]

Place is central for linking us across generations and informs how we ought to engage with each other in community. By orienting time from within a space, we are implicated with those we are in relation with through various responsibilities. I argue that this communal aspect is the second component of *local time*. Time, by being dependent on place, includes a community of others. The well-being of others is inextricably tied to our own well-being. More than a simple community, we are made in kinship. Thus, when one is responsible for others across time, those relationships are equally meaningful to the relations we hold in the present.

When time is made communal through a sense of place, it considers past and future relationships. However, this is not to say that indigenous cultures also maintain a sense of linear progress or teleology. Deloria, addressing this point, distinguishes the telos in linear time from the concern we share about future generations. Christian linear temporality includes a developing view of progress that spans across places towards its destiny—*local time* and a sense of place are concerned with the present reality and the practice of community values at this moment. Deloria clarifies that "there is little dependence on the concept of progress either on an individual or community basis as a means of evaluating the impact of religious practices. Value judgments involve present community realities and not a reliance on part of the future."[47] In other words, there is a difference in how the future factors into a spatial account versus a linear account of time. Acting in deference to others begins with a community that transcends a single generation, so the observance of these community values is always present. The eventual end of linear time requires a concept of progress that moves society from the past into the future. Hence, it is in consideration of this eventual future that current behavior or religious practice is affirmed or rejected. Because indigenous people actively engage with the land, and their behavior is organized by a community of relations, there is no consideration of an eventual end. Rather, relations are organized with respect to those who came before and those who will come after. Thus, *local time* understands place as more than geographical; place denotes one's particular community and the values which inform and direct one's activity with land.

PERSONALITY AND CYCLICALITY

Across the previous sections, I defined the role that place fulfills within indigenous communities and elaborated on how placehood entails particular community relationships and activity. In this section, I will explain and develop the third and final characteristic of *local time*: cyclicality.[48] *Local time's* cyclical quality is articulated through the method by which we come to understand our relations with others. While this is not necessarily cyclical, the process by which we learn about others requires our maintenance of conditions which foster community well-being. This requires an understanding of the depth of relations and a responsibility to produce what Deloria and Wildcat term *personality*. Whereas personality broadly refers to our experience with the world as conditioned by others, this is not a product of a single process. Rather, it is an ongoing reflective experience enabled by one's engagement with others. Hence, building from how place implicates us within a community across time, our process of engaging with that community reveals the cycles of what is necessary to create personality.

In continuation with Deloria and Wildcat's discussion of power and place, I explicate personality as a product of the P3 formula and a process that describes our understanding of a sense of place.[49] Before getting into particular descriptions of personality, Wildcat offers one interpretation. He writes,

> I understand Deloria's idea of personality as the substantive embodiment, the unique realization, of all the relations and power we embody. Because each of us is someplace and, but for a few exceptions, never in exactly the same place as anybody else, our personalities are unique. Our phenomenal existence entails a spatial dimension and variations in power relations with other persons in the world. Therefore, *personality* as Deloria uses the term is a metaphysical concept, fundamentally different from the popular science view that what and who we are can be reduced to genetics or biochemical mechanisms.[50]

Working from Wildcat's interpretation, we can articulate how personality operates as more than a "particular experience of reality."[51] Wildcat describes that we are to understand each thing as organized according to its position, its capacity to influence, and how it realizes this power. Personalities are the sum of these two factors. To recognize our own personality, one needs to reflect on the power they have and how they are positioned within relations. Personality encapsulates the total of what it means to be placed within a community.

To better understand personality and, in particular, how we come to learn the personality of others, I defer to some of the examples that Deloria and Wildcat examine. They write that personalities can be "understood by anyone who has had the long-term friendship of a dog, cat, bird, or 'individual' of another species."[52] In this case, personality is not an abstract concept, but it requires personal engagement to understand. By being in contact and forming friendships, we form an understanding of pets as distinct personalities. That is, "we (each of us having such a friendship) know our other-than-human person is an individual, different from others of the same kind or breed. Why? Because we know them as persons: we learn through experience their personality."[53] Therefore, we come to learn the personality of that individual by growing to understand their relation to us and their distinct influence on other beings. Those with personalities are distinct individuals to whom we hold particular relationships. Additionally, personality is something that is easily recognized over time and through experiences.

In summary, personality can only be learned through our relationships with other beings, and it is by this process that we come to see them as people with unique personalities. Hence, personality is the result of comprehending the power of others and how they are placed. However, insofar as we are limited in our understanding of others based on the way we relate to them, realizing personalities is a constant effort. Likewise, because we are entities with power and placed in community with others, then the personalities of others are always being developed through our experiences with them.

To clarify this point, consider water. Water possesses a unique personality which can be understood by seeing where it is placed and how one is related to it. I can look out of my window right now and see Lake Michigan. It is cold and windy, so there are waves which sway against the snow-covered rocks. I know this is typical for the season, although I remember instances where it is extremely still

and quiet. The water was also warm in the summer, even though it is cold now. Further, I am familiar with Lake Michigan, but I am hesitant to claim we are friends despite my geographical proximity. I can infer a personality from it, but I also imagine how my understanding of its personality might change if I were a fisherman on the pier, a frequent swimmer, or sitting in the sand. In this way, my method of relating to the lake also alters my perception and understanding of its personality. All the while, I drink the water from this immense being and recognize how it shapes the culture and city adjacent to it. I recognize its power but only insofar as I reflect on its capacity to influence me and, in turn, my ability to influence it. Similar to my relationship with particular family members, we are kin, but sometimes after thinking through how well I know them, I come to realize how shallow my impression is. Being relatives and kin does not mean we have immediate knowledge of another person; however, this relation does mean I have the capacity to learn via my personal experience. Perhaps, if I engaged with them more frequently, I could gain a better sense of their personality. Personalities are constantly in flux and informed by one's experience, so to gather an understanding of personality I must first be in contact with an other.

In addition to outlining personality and the process of understanding it, Deloria and Wildcat argue that there is an ethical imperative to help realize personality and preserve one's sense of individuality. They write, "completing the relationship focuses the individual's attention on the results of his or her actions. Thus, the Indian people are concerned about the products of what they did, and they sought to anticipate and consider all the effects of their actions."[54] By recognizing the personality of another, we are obligated to realize our actions as always having an effect, and thus we must consider how we influence others regardless of them being past, current, or future persons.[55] Having a relationship with another being is one aspect of knowing personality, but with this knowledge, one inherits the obligation to complete this relationship and anticipate in what way our actions affect others.

Building from this conversation on personality, I want to draw out how this allows for a cyclical experience of time. To understand this temporal element, it's helpful to consider how indigenous peoples come to know and experience their relationship to the world and various beings. For instance, in experiences with plant relatives, some peoples developed planting systems that reveal time as cyclical. Deloria and Wildcat write, "plants, because they have their own life cycles, taught Indians about time."[56] Working with the land and entities in the world demonstrates how certain beings experience time in different cycles. Furthermore, they continue, "this knowledge about corn and the manner in which its growth cycle correlated with that of the plants of the mountains some 500 miles away was very sophisticated and involved the idea of time as something more complex than mere chronology. Time was also growth of all things toward maturity."[57] To reiterate, experience with the world shows that time is not a measurement; rather, it can be better understood as the cycles and processes of beings working towards maturity. Since personality acts as a form of experiential knowledge and understanding of what one requires, it plays a central role in knowing what one requires to mature throughout their distinct cycle. Thus, by learning how something comes to maturity, we understand time as recurring processes, patterns, and experiences with others, not as a simple chronology of events.[58]

By encouraging a personal engagement with the world, Deloria and Wildcat claim that an indigenous account of things "must be personal and incapable of expansion and projection to hold true universally."[59] What we understand as personality from this process of reflecting on power and place remains a distinct engagement with the world. It can only be the product of one's experience from a particular location. In other words, any knowledge we learn might not be universal.

For us to understand the process of maturity and the sense of time that entities maintain in their cyclicality, Deloria and Wildcat draw attention to how our understanding must be separated from linear teleological time. They claim that a psychologization of how things behave based on our experiences with them is necessary to understand the process of maturation. This is not scientific knowledge but a practice of knowing something and understanding its personality through lived experiences with that being. Deloria and Wildcat write that "being interested in the psychological behavior of things in the world and attributing personality to all things, Indians began to observe and remember how and when things happened together."[60] Thus, with these experiences, "there was consequently, no firm belief in cause and effect, which plays an important role in Western science and thinking. But Indians were well aware that when a certain sequence of things began certain other elements or events would also occur."[61] In other words, by forgoing cause and effect, we learn of things as persons and develop knowledge via our experiences.

Linear time in religion and science rely on abstract processes in which there is already a predicted or hypothesized outcome. Psychologizing others allows for a variety of outcomes and respects the potential for things to occur otherwise. In comparison to the linear cause and effect, which Deloria and Wildcat reject, there is potential for understanding the world via applying experience through correlation. Additionally, personality and a psychological understanding of correlation forms knowledge through our relations with others and how they interact within a wider community of beings.

The cycles of other beings demonstrate a different process of coming to maturity, which we come to know by learning these personalities. Additionally, uncovering and understanding personality reveals aspects of one's temporality. Because personality requires engaging in one's sense of place, time is necessarily tied to this place and provides the context for the maturation processes to occur. To clarify how cyclicality operates, Deloria writes that time "must be conceived as cyclical in nature, endlessly allowing the repetition of patterns of possibilities."[62] Hence, time can be understood as cyclical because it requires the reproduction of patterns and possibilities for various processes of maturity. Cyclicality, as Deloria outlines in the earlier quote, denotes what things require for maturation.

Insofar as we learn what others require for maturation by understanding their personalities, we then come to realize time as cyclical. Deloria and Wildcat question that, because things are understood as personalities with respective cycles of maturation, what does this reveal when we consider how time is experienced as cyclical? I argue that the "cyclical patterns of possibilities" act as the template that organizes indigenous accounts of time in opposition to linear time.[63]

As mentioned, spatial religions are distinct to their respective community, values, and location. Thus, it is limited by its geography and reference one's particular sense of place and community. Insofar as we are engaged with the cycles of others and their processes of maturation, we are necessarily bound into their cyclicality of experiencing and organizing time. Similarly, because we maintain a cycle distinct to our own maturing personalities, others are also bound into our sense of time.

If time is cyclical and bound to particular places and communities, we must also realize that it cannot be generalized across locations. Deloria remarks,

> Space has limitations that are primarily geographical, and any sense of time arising within the religious experience becomes secondary to present geographical existence. The hazard that appears within the spatial conceptions of religion is the effect that missionary activity has on its integrity when it tries to leave its homeland. Can it leave the land of its nativity and embark on a program of world or continental conquest without losing its religious essence in favor of purely political or economic considerations? Are ceremonies restricted to particular places, and do they become useless in a foreign land?[64]

Deloria articulates that space possesses some limitations when we consider the importance of place for spiritual practice. The necessity for particular places limits the proselytization of spatial religions, further emphasizing the centrality of place, and implicates our engagement with people and time as spatially tied. One place cannot be substituted for another. While proselytizing is not a concern for most indigenous practices, this implies that time is always particular to a place and cannot be abstracted away from it.[65]

IS THERE INDIGENOUS HISTORY?

By establishing an understanding of *local time*, which centers our relations to land, I want to clarify whether it can produce an account of history. Deloria has articulated the effect of linear time and how it has become the method of obscuring placehood and narrowing the focus of history towards the development of a particular culture and race. Can there be a history that avoids this abstraction and still honors spatiality? Is *local time* sufficient for creating an account of indigenous history? I argue that *local time* can produce a corresponding sense of history insofar as it holds place as central to the experience and remembrance of events.

Returning to the text, Deloria argues that a spatial account of history is possible given that it remains rooted in its place of occurrence and cannot be abstracted away from space. Recall how linear temporality enabled the abstraction and delocalization of people and time from the land. If we subvert this process and consider history and experiences that have occurred in relation to a particular place, then we can produce a record of time in the land on which it occurred. We need to rethink history as spatial by viewing change as place-dependent and localized to a particular community and set of relations. Thus, a spatial account of history is possible insofar as it remains tied to the place in which it occurred. If we oppose the abstract notion of change which linear time argues for, as Deloria suggests, change can be maintained and explained through one's relationship with others as described in that place.

I want to develop this one step further. As Deloria and Wildcat describe, everyone maintains a distinct sense of place, and, because no place is situated the same, we have to conclude that the history of places is multiplicitous. Thus, the question of whether there can be an indigenous account of history misunderstands and generalizes a linear sense of history as univocal. Places are always unique and, thus, there are multiple histories which one can engage with through the land.

With this possibility of multiple histories, I want to reiterate and clarify that history itself is not the problem; it is how linear time devalues land and eventually abstracts away from it that is the key issue. Time as an abstract concept is delinked from the land. In its current condition, Western temporality and religion "like to believe that the histories created by Western science and religions are the proper way to understand the world."[66] Temporality feigns control over the entities it encounters and becomes detached from the context in which it is founded. Most of all, as Deloria states, this aspect of control makes us "no longer in awe of anything except [our]selves."[67] Despite this, there is hope when we consider *local time* as reconnecting us to the land and centering our history around the spatial and relational context where time is located.

CONCLUSION

By working through several of Vine Deloria Jr.'s texts, I constructed *local time* to emphasize the core features of an indigenous spatial perspective. To articulate my account of *local time*, I first recounted Deloria's critique of Christian linear time. After establishing how Christian linear time became secular and enabled the abstraction of time from a sense of place, I then introduced the first characteristic of *local time*, place. The importance of land and place, as established through Deloria's account of sacred places, articulates that time is directly tied to a location and cannot be separated from it. Time, as located in space, allows us to access various points in time through activity with the land instructed by our community. As a result, time is communal. By being communal, we have to listen and recreate the conditions to sustain our community well-being. This requires us to learn and reproduce the conditions necessary to allow for each community member's cycles of maturity. Thus, *local time* is cyclical in arrangement.

In conclusion, I want to reiterate a point included by Deloria and Wildcat in *Power and Place*. Members of marginalized groups often discuss our experiences, our cultural knowledge, and our beliefs as separate from the world of Western knowledge. Still, it is important to realize that, while a particular conception of time is culturally derived, we do not necessarily have to be raised in indigenous cultures to understand and adopt a more robust sense of space. Especially in light of the environmental destruction and extractive practices that the West has developed, these lessons are even more necessary for us all. Deloria and Wildcat warn that "we American Indians have done ourselves a great disservice by speaking of 'living in two worlds.'"[68] Indigenous accounts, in realizing our relationality to the natural world, also emphasize the relationality between us as members of the greater community. Thus, understanding ourselves as members of separate worlds betrays the experience of existing within a shared reality with shared problems and solutions.

Embracing our relations also means embracing our capacity to change our behavior and engage with our neglected relations. Having introduced *local time* as a spatial account of time, I argue that we can learn to engage with our place-based existence and realize our obligations to the world and others around us. We must consider life and time as different from linear progression and delocalized time.

NOTES

1. Mark Rifkin and Kevin Bruyneel discuss the implications of adopting settler-time at the institutional level. Rifkin articulates this account in *Beyond Settler Time* to show how settler-time acts as an organizing principle in the experience of indigenous peoples. Kevin Bruyneel's *The Third Space of Sovereignty* also articulates the effects of placing indigenous people "in the past" or "pre-history" within US legal interpretation to extend plenary power over sovereign indigenous nations.
2. In this paper, I often slip between using the term space, place, land or placehood to denote the spatial aspect and emphasis that my sources and I argue for. In any case, they refer to the same spatial and locational component that I elaborate on throughout.
3. It is worth noting that, while Deloria himself didn't positively identify and define place-based time across his work, I piece together what one might look like.
4. Deloria, "Thinking in Time and Space," *God Is Red: A Native View of Religion*, 61–76. I also include brief exegesis from *Evolution, Creationism, and Other Modern Myths* to substantiate the claim that linear temporality is still contained even in secular discussions of time. Towards the end of this section, I include a secondary source to inspect how a temporal lens devalues the role of space in our relationship to the world.
5. Deloria, "Thinking in Time and Space," 61–62.
6. Deloria, "Thinking in Time and Space," 61–62. While Deloria mentions here that Western society is founded on a sense of temporality, it still maintains a sense of place, though diminished. For the sake of brevity, I will not be discussing this in entirety, but I acknowledge that space and time are still connected and somewhat fundamental even in the Western temporal culture. Also, I want to make a quick note on terminology; throughout this paper, I use the terms "Indian," "American Indian," or "Indigenous," for different reasons. "Indian" or "American Indian" are highly contentious terms, however Deloria's usage of it often reflects the specific context of this identity within US colonial and legal history. Often times when pulling from Deloria's texts I reiterate his descriptions of indigenous peoples as American Indians for the sake of continuity. Other times, I use "indigenous" to highlight the context which informs a particular indigenous identity. Where the tribal affiliation of concepts or individuals are known I will then use each groups preferred identification.
7. Deloria, "Thinking in Time and Space," 62.
8. Deloria, "Thinking in Time and Space," 62.
9. Deloria, "Thinking in Time and Space," 62.
10. Deloria "Thinking in Time and Space," 67–68.
11. Deloria, "Do We Need a Beginning?" in *Evolution, Creationism, and Other Modern Myths*, 15. Emphasis in original text.
12. Deloria, "Do We Need a Beginning?" 15.
13. Deloria, "The Nature of 'Religion,'" 131.
14. Deloria has more writings on evolution, but I will only gloss these when relevant in this argument.
15. Deloria., "Do We Need a Beginning?" 14.
16. I think this is sufficient to acknowledge the preservation of religious temporality into Western culture, although it is very superficial. Deloria criticizes science and evolution in several works, however I understand that this is generally to criticize how it serves to systematize and exhaust all meaning into one "secular" metric.
17. Burkhart, *Indigenizing Philosophy Through the Land*, 24. Brian Burkhart's work was key in piecing together this paper given that he expands on spatial-temporal distinction in Deloria's work and articulates the epistemic function of land/place in ethics.
18. Burkhart, *Indigenizing Philosophy Through the Land*, 24.
19. Deloria, Thinking in Time and Space, 61–62.
20. Deloria, "Thinking in Time and Space," 66.
21. Deloria, "Thinking in Time and Space," 66.
22. Deloria, "Sacred Places and Moral Responsibility," *God Is Red*, 271–86. For the sake of brevity, although introducing the first two descriptions of sacredness that Deloria offers in his text, I only analyze the last two since these most effectively reflect the relationship between place and temporality. It is worth noting that Deloria writes this particular article to make indigenous accounts of sacredness legible to non-indigenous audiences. At times, he makes some anthropocentric and overly general statements on the connection between sacred sites and land. I try my best to clarify that sacredness is inherent to land/non-human entities and is not always derivative of human activity.
23. An example that Deloria offers here is the battle of Gettysburg. This battlefield is land reserved in remembrance of the lives lost.
24. Deloria, "Sacred Places," 275–77.
25. Deloria, "Sacred Places," 278–79.
26. It is important to note that, while Deloria denotes a presence of "Higher Powers," most indigenous religions hold things sacred because their existence is owed to a creator—how this is defined is more particular to each culture.
27. Although alluding to a Creator can seem like it appeals to the same concept of a creator/god that Christian religions also believe, the creator for some indigenous cultures refers to the world both as a being and an organization of beings. What is important to center and preserve in this idea of a Creator is the presence of a personality. I speak more on this term in later sections of this paper, but it mainly encourages us to have a personal relationship to the world not as an inert object but as a living person to which we hold responsibilities and obligations towards.
28. Deloria, "Sacred Places," 281.
29. Deloria, "Sacred Places," 281.
30. Deloria marks out this fourth sense of sacred places to show how indigenous religion is not static but, in fact, actively engages with the world as a living practice. The US federal government denies the further expansion of sacred indigenous sites and, therefore, denies the living and changing aspects of native culture and religion.
31. Referring back to my earlier note on terminology, sacred places are places in which we can receive moral guidance or engage with community practices. For one to behave morally, these locations are necessary to inform our actions, but moral activity

extends beyond these sacred places. Furthermore, sacred places are not entirely sacred because of the moral lessons which are tied to it. Rather, they are sacred in themselves. It might seem tautological, but a place is sacred because our activity with it makes this known. Additionally, all things *are* sacred within most indigenous understandings of reality.

32. The terms past, present, and future are still somewhat derivative of Christian linear temporality, however, for the sake of clarity and later problematization of these terms, I use them here.

33. Some linguistic limitations appear here as I try to discuss the orientation of past, present, and future from a spatial account of time. Where Christian linear time maintains this order to show history and a society's eventual destination, to engage and describe *local time* requires us to problematize these terms and show their limitations when applied to a spatial perspective. Deloria's account of sacred places enables our active participation in time via our engagement with space.

34. We are responsible to others in preserving the potential for the wellbeing of those who came before and those who will follow. This is similar to some existing frameworks of relational ethics. While I am approaching from within the canon of indigenous scholars that articulate their distinct cultural and spiritual perspective, in future works, I want to develop how these are similar and dissimilar from feminist ethical accounts as well.

35. Deloria and Wildcat, *Power and Place*, 2.

36. Deloria and Wildcat, *Power and Place*, 22–23. These are dense concepts. While I do my best to describe them briefly here, I can only include a partial description to how power and place function for Deloria and Wildcat overall. Place is geographical but it also denotes a particular way in which one is in relation to others. Place is distinct to the entity in question. To understand one's power, we have to inspect how one influence others and how they are influenced in return. This is cyclical in a relational sense but not yet in the temporal. I will focus on this aspect of cyclicality in the next section of this paper.

37. Deloria and Wildcat, *Power and Place*, 22–23.

38. Deloria and Wildcat, *Power and Place*, 140.

39. Deloria and Wildcat, *Power and Place*, 144.

40. Deloria and Wildcat, *Power and Place*, 144.

41. Deloria and Wildcat, *Power and Place*, 13.

42. Deloria and Wildcat, *Power and Place*, 13.

43. Because places have the potential to be sacred, they must also be treated as sacred in our current moment.

44. Deloria and Wildcat, *Power and Place*, 44.

45. Deloria and Wildcat, *Power and Place*, 44.

46. Protests against the Dakota Access Pipeline (DAPL), are prime examples of what it means to consider place as a site of relations between people and other living things. Its proposed route crosses the Missouri River, and, in event of an oil spill, its position jeopardizes clean water for people and ecosystems downriver. The Missouri River is a site of immense power. Its influence not only includes those that directly partake in it but also includes the water sources which it feeds and supplies.

47. Deloria, "Thinking in Time and Space," 67.

48. At the beginning, I wrote a footnote describing how I use place and space interchangeably. Following the discussion on place in the first section, I want to add that I sometimes use these terms interchangeably with land. This does not completely entail all of the same characteristics as place. Land operates as an agent which organizes us in space and so we are placed by it. To some degree, land operates as the key entity which always has a sense of place. While we have become delocalized through a sense of time, land has remained local and particular, although it has lost its robust sense of sacredness. It is worth clarifying, however, that everything is placed, so land does not singularly refer to place.

49. For the sake of simplicity and clarity, the P3 formula is defined as Power + Place = Personality.

50. Deloria and Wildcat, *Power and Place*, 145.

51. Deloria and Wildcat, *Power and Place*, 22–23.

52. Deloria and Wildcat, *Power and Place*, 145.

53. Deloria and Wildcat, *Power and Place*, 145.

54. Deloria and Wildcat, *Power and Place*, 23.

55. Deloria and Wildcat, *Power and Place*, 75. Wildcat articulates the undergirding claim that Deloria makes: Power + Place = Personality as motivated by the elimination of the nature/human distinction. By realizing that there is no separation, we can better understand that nature and our place within the world is always embedded with others. Wildcat, speaking on Deloria's account, writes, "Deloria's power-and-place-equal-personality equation, or P3 formula, makes for a spatial metaphysics of experience. The TC3 expression, technology, community, communication, and culture, is an attempt to identify the natural cultural feature of human beingness. P3 and TC3 are not rigorous mathematical expressions; rather, I think both are symbolic expressions that can serve as mnemonic devices that preclude thinking of technology, or for that matter any of the key features of human culture, as outside of nature."

56. Deloria and Wildcat, *Power and Place*, 25.

57. Deloria and Wildcat, *Power and Place*, 25.

58. To clarify further, while there is some element of teleology present in cyclical time, the key idea is that time is distinct to the beings and our particular relationships to them. Further, time is not made universal like in the case of Western linear time. Time as cycles remains oriented towards the particular and cannot be abstracted away from it. Similarly, growth does mean maturity, but maturity is always in reference to the being in question, not a general state that something immediately develops into. Instead, maturity is a characteristic relative to the individual and its/their way of engaging with others. For instance, some plants mature when they bear fruit, and some people mature differently than others.

59. Deloria and Wildcat, *Power and Place*, 22–23.

60. Deloria and Wildcat, *Power and Place*, 26.

61. Deloria and Wildcat, *Power and Place*, 26.

62. Deloria, "Thinking in Time and Space," 69.

63. Deloria, "Thinking in Time and Space," 69.

64. Deloria, "Thinking Through Time and Space," 69.

65. At this point, I would also like to flag the possibility of there being ways in which technology can further expand and enable us to maintain communal relations across vast distances. Consider the instantaneous communication we can achieve today. Someone can live in one time zone and work in an entirely different time zone all while maintaining their relationships across time and space. Geography might still be limiting in regard to accessing a sacred location, but communal relations offer one way considering these questions.

66. Deloria, "The Nature of 'Religion,'" 125–26.

67. Deloria, "The Nature of 'Religion,'" 125–26. Changed from "themselves" to "ourselves" to show how many of the readers that engage with this work are coming from a Western frame of mind and temporal ordering.

68. Deloria and Wildcat, *Power and Place*, 115.

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Wahkootowin *Vegetarianism: When Is It Okay to Eat Your Kin?*

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Perhaps the most famous food item of the North American Plains Nations behind bannock is pemmican—a mixture of animal fat, dried meat, and sometimes dried berries. Pemmican is an exceptionally calorie-dense food, useful for survival during long journeys or in the harsh conditions of the Canadian subarctic.[1] The use of animal products for survival is a long history of the Plains peoples. However, as conditions have changed, the lifestyle of Indigenous peoples has also changed.[2] In this paper, I want to draw on the ethical principles of the Métis nation to argue that for most Métis people, it is now impermissible to kill animals for their meat. But to make that argument, I want to start by making the complementary argument: for some Métis people, it *is* permissible to hunt and consume animals. The conditions under which hunting is permissible are quite demanding, however, and once I have explained them, it will be clear why most Métis people ought to be vegetarians, according to principles drawn from our own tradition.

To make my case, I first introduce *wahkootowin*, a Métis/Cree term which is translated here as *kinship*. I will explain four key features of kinship: mutual support, reciprocity, decency, and order.[3] I argue that mutual support places quite pressing demands on us if we want killing to be permissible. Reciprocity, order, and decency also limit our conduct regarding others.[4] Taken together, the principles of *wahkootowin* require concrete, nontransferrable acts of support for the land and the creatures on that land to make hunting permissible. It would be exceedingly rare for a Métis person living in an urban area, where alternatives are available, to meet these demands. For most Métis people, then, it is almost always impermissible to hunt animals and to consume meat.

WHEN IT'S OKAY TO EAT YOUR KIN

As I said above, I will begin by laying out the case *for* eating kin. First, let me give a brief explanation of *wahkootowin*, the central ethical concept I use to understand Métis ethical thought. *Wahkootowin* has a few important features for us here. First, the concept of *wahkootowin* has a very wide scope. Métis elder Maria Campbell says that while the term is often used only for human familial relations now, "at one time, from our place it meant the whole of creation. And our teachings taught us that all of creation is related and interconnected to all things within it. Wahkotowin[5] means honoring and respecting those relationships."[6] The wide scope of *wahkootowin* relationships brings along with it a wide scope of obligations. There are obligations that arise between humans and other humans, but also between humans and nonhuman animals, humans and plants, and humans and the land.[7]

On a *wahkootowin* view of ethics, it can't be the status of kin that makes eating impermissible. Otherwise, it would be impermissible to eat plants! We need another explanation.[8] And I want to take a more difficult case than plants, since the permissibility of consuming plants is not controversial. So, let us consider the case of the buffalo. The Plains Nations have historic relationships with the buffalo which are ancient, ongoing, and involve hunting and consumption.[9] Among the Cree and Métis for whom *wahkootowin* is a central concept in ethical life, clearly, it is sometimes permissible to hunt and consume beings to whom we have a *wahkootowin* relationship. It is in keeping with *wahkootowin* principles to sometimes eat kin.

First, we will see what each of the four main characteristics of *wahkootowin* have to say about the topic. As we go, I will develop my interpretation of each characteristic and apply it to this case. We will go along in the order Macdougall presents them: first mutual support, then reciprocity, decency, and finally order.[10] Throughout, I will emphasize a feature of *wahkootowin* relationships that is vital to my argument and comes from the nature of kinship relations in general: the idea that kinship relationships are not fungible. The relata of *wahkootowin* relationships are not interchangeable; the particulars of the related parties are relevant to the relationship itself, and so are the obligations and privileges generated by that relationship.

MUTUAL SUPPORT

It is hardly hyperbolic to say that killing and consuming another being seems like almost the *least* supportive act one could take toward them. So, it looks like mutual support might be impossible in conditions of killing and consumption. But upon reflection, it is not so clear. I think there are two ways to look at this. First, we might say that it is the buffalo as a collective to which the Plains Nations provide support. If we go this way, then we can say that some hunting is permissible, as long as the Nations continue protecting the land and the herds. In this case, mutual support is met because the buffalo provide the means of subsistence, and the Plains Nations provide the means of life for the buffalo in return, through their stewardship of the land.

There is something too easy about this response, however. *Wahkootowin* relations can form the basis of nation-to-nation or group-to-group obligations.[11] But what about the case of an individual hunter and an individual buffalo? Reference to the collective does not explain how that hunter is upholding their *wahkootowin* obligations to that particular buffalo. If we model our moral relationships off of kinship relationships, then the most basic case seems

to be a direct relation between two beings, not a nation-to-nation relation.[12] Collective support might be a sufficient explanation for some less impactful action, but it seems that the scale of harm that killing involves is out of step with the support offered by supporting the collective buffalo. The collective relationship between the people and the buffalo is not sufficient to justify the hunting of individual buffalo.

Instead, we need to focus on what mutual support means in the relationship between individual people and individual buffalo. So, let us step into the relationship of hunter and hunted. The support that the hunter receives from the body of the buffalo is relatively clear: sustenance and the means to sustain their life. This *could* be a legitimate case of support, since it is clearly analogous to the support received from plants. Could killing possibly be compatible with the hunter supporting the hunted, though? I think that it can be, if we pay attention to the nature of the relationship. The nature of a relationship that involves hunting is certainly complicated, and I think it is important to be careful about how we define such a relationship. There is a real danger of defining the relationship in such a way that it is trivial to get the answer that one desires.

What sort of definition of the relationship is appropriate? Well, it is more than mere *co- inhabitant*. The songbird in my back yard and I are co-inhabitants of Lək̓ʷəŋən territory. Our lives and needs almost never intersect, except when we startle each other in passing.[13] In a relationship that involves hunting, and for that hunting to be permissible, we need something more intimate than mere cohabitation. For the sake of ease, here, we can call this sort of relationship a *producer-consumer* relationship: I think that captures the plant case as well as the animal case. It also indicates that one important piece of the relationship is that one party is involved in taking from the other in some way. The question then becomes how such a relationship could fulfill the *wahkootowin* principles necessary to make hunting permissible.

I want to argue that mutual support is only plausibly met when the hunter is hunting for sustenance and when the hunter contributes properly to the land that supports the hunted creature, and to the hunted creature itself. The sort of contribution that is appropriate will vary from place to place, and from relationship to relationship. However, there are some practices that I think are clearly carried out as a means to fulfill this requirement. Some of the examples I take here will not come from Plains Nations, but I use them because I think that the insight here (and the permissibility of hunting) extends beyond the Plains Nations: other Indigenous peoples also stand in relations that make their hunting activities permissible, even if their ethical systems justify these activities in different ways.

So, let us begin with the laying down of tobacco: a classic in the stereotypical Native American depiction but a useful case for us here. What is the purpose of laying down gifts of any kind? First, many folks believe that the giving of the gift is an act of spiritual importance, exchanging energies or spiritual power with the land and the creature hunted.[14] If this is right, then the case for mutual support becomes much easier to make. But I do not want to make the easy argument, since I am myself not a particularly spiritual Indigenous person. So, for those of us less inclined to think along the lines of spirit gifting, what is to be said? I think that the laying down of tobacco, or other ceremonial actions around hunting, are one step in the process of making sure that the taking of animal life is carried out according to the principles of *wahkootowin*. However, the laying down of tobacco is not responsive to the mutual support requirement unless we think that there is a spiritual component to such activities. Mutual support must come from elsewhere, on a more secular view of *wahkootowin* ethics.

I think that mutual support, on the more secular *wahkootowin* view I prefer, consists in actions outside of gift-giving or the laying down of offerings and prayers. That's not to say that those actions don't have a place in my view (more on this later), but they do not serve the same purpose as they do for the more spiritual version of the *wahkootowin* view. Instead, mutual support for the hunted animal involves not just a general appeal to support for the community of the hunted creature, but concrete acts of support for the creature itself, or made in the anticipation that the creature would benefit. In this case, we can think of actions like controlled burns, the repatriation of unused remains to the ecosystem for recycling into the land, and the eventual fate of the hunter themselves, dying and returning to the land to support the creatures in the ecosystem.

Some positive obligations can be taken from what I have just said. In particular, the return of unused parts of a creature's body to the ecosystem from which they were taken is vital. It is true that this does not support the hunted creature, but it *does* provide support for the future creatures taken in a hunt. If I hunt near my home every year, then returning the unused remains to the site of the hunt (or reasonably nearby) will return the energy and nutrients to that ecosystem, which can provide support for the next generation of creatures, of whom I might later take once again. Controlled burns are another example—they can provide direct support to the hunted animal, in advance of the hunting, through preserving and providing resources to the ecosystem the creature depends on.

The key piece here is that these activities need to be carried out for a length of time before any act of "taking" becomes permissible. It is not enough for me, an urban Métis person, to move out to the country and begin to hunt because I promise I'll later care for the ecosystem—*even if I follow through on this promise*. To make hunting permissible would require me to spend enough time on the land to reasonably provide actual support for actual creatures who I might later hunt. This means that the process of forming the right kind of connection involves caretaking actions for a wide range of land for many months or even years, depending on the proposed hunting activity. It would take much longer for me to act in such a way that I am able to permissibly hunt buffalo than a rabbit, for instance, because the buffalo grow much more slowly, range across a good deal of territory, and so on. In all likelihood, I might reasonably expect to provide very little support for a buffalo over the course of even several years. On the other hand,

careful tending to the land might result in tangible support for smaller creatures which live in closer proximity over those several years.

My examples here might look like a recourse to my earlier answer about collective obligations to preserve the land, which I rejected. But I want to resist saying that my answer here is just a clever repackaging of a doctrine of collective support. There are two reasons: first, the examples I give do not fall prey to worries about fungibility. My examples require *me* to carry out particular actions. The actions of the Métis nation to preserve some land in Manitoba, for example, would not license me to go out to the land in Manitoba and hunt. I do not live on the land in Manitoba, and I do not have the connections to the ecosystem that would legitimate my hunting there. It is *my* contribution to *that* land and its support for *those* animals that meets (or fails, in my case) the principles of *wahkootowin* like mutual support.

Second, my examples are not examples of collective permission or support because they come with the temporal proviso—I am not covertly appealing to "supporting the buffalo as a Whole" or "supporting the land" because my examples demand that I actually have a reasonable expectation that my activities are carried out over a long enough time, and are impactful enough, that they *actually* provide support for *particular* beings. There is a distinction, then, between the argument for collective caretaking that I reject and the argument for individual, concrete acts of support for an ecosystem that I accept. The distinction lies in the fungibility of the obligations, and the temporal proviso I place on permissibility. The reason that the advocacy and stewardship of the Métis nation does not (on its own) license me to hunt in their territory is because the proper relationship between me and the land and creatures needs to be *direct* and is not transferrable.[15] The directness is a result of the nature of the obligations generated by *wahkootowin* relations, and the fact that those relations themselves are always direct.[16] It is not sufficient to depend on the advocacy and care of the Métis nation to make my eating meat permissible. To make eating meat permissible requires a mutually supportive, direct relationship between beings.

RECIPROCITY

Next, reciprocity. Here it is important to note that reciprocity is not identical to mutual support. In fact, as I will argue, it places extra demands on us in cases where relationships are unequal. In cases where the support offered by parties is more equal, it's easy to see how reciprocity can be fulfilled as long as mutual support is fulfilled. A relationship of mutual caretaking is sometimes given as a definition of reciprocity.[17] So, if we satisfy mutual support, i.e., if we take care of another and they take care of us, we have a relationship that exhibits reciprocity. So, one might say, a success in the act of hunting is the animal providing support for the hunter; as long as the hunter fulfills their side of the obligation, reciprocity is established and fulfilled. Another part of reciprocity can be the laying down of gifts and advocacy for the land and creatures. But if, as I maintain, the relationship of hunting is necessarily unequal, then reciprocity is not satisfied just because mutual support is satisfied. In cases of unequal relationships—like a relationship in which one party is killed—I characterize reciprocity as imposing increased demands of partiality and respect for some particular others.

In the case of hunting, I think it's clear the relationship *is* asymmetrical. The Plains Nations depend on the buffalo in a way that the buffalo do not depend on the Plains Nations, as far as hunting is concerned (buffalo do not eat people). I have already given an account that I think fulfills the demands of mutual support. It should be clear from what I've said above that the dependency relations between Plains Nations and the buffalo are not symmetrical. Reciprocity is partially satisfied by the requirement for mutual support, but not completely. The fact that a hunter takes *so much* from a buffalo when it takes its life, and can offer so much less in return, means that more is needed to fully satisfy reciprocity. A consumer relationship to the buffalo also requires an attitude of partiality and respect on the part of the Plains Nations toward the plains themselves and toward the creatures that live there.

Part of reciprocity is a commitment to respect toward other beings and the land itself. This respect manifests as a recognition of the authority of other beings to be included in our practical deliberation. To respect someone, in other words, is to take their needs, desires, and interests (their *ends*, in what follows) as relevant to our own practical deliberation. When we are trying to decide what to do, we have to take their ends as reasons in our deliberation. This doesn't mean that we abandon our own ends. Sometimes, what we owe to other beings is compatible with pursuing our own ends. And sometimes our ends outweigh the ends of others.

Respect only demands that we take others into account and take their ends seriously. The partiality requirement is much more straightforward—it makes good sense for me to feel more protective, to have more affection or positive feelings towards those beings who are close to me and who figure in my life most centrally. And indeed, the requirement for reciprocity demands that I feel positively toward those beings with whom I have asymmetrical *wahkootowin* relationships. The beings in my life that support me but that I can do little to support, like the trees and waters of my home, are owed partiality from me in virtue of the work they do to support my life.

This is a natural place to state explicitly that recognizing the ends of another being requires *attention* to the needs and capacities of that other being. But attention to those needs and capacities does not mean that nonhuman beings are ethically relevant *in virtue of* their capacities. On my view, it is not the ability to suffer that makes a nonhuman being morally relevant, nor the nascent rational autonomy of a human child that makes them count, morally speaking. *Wahkootowin* includes relations to all beings—a universal sense of kinship with the world and its inhabitants that brings all beings into the moral realm.[18] Attention to the capacities of the creatures at issue comes to be important when we begin to ask ourselves questions about how we could support another being, or what might be indecent to inflict upon them.

I argue that reciprocity is possible in relationships that involve killing and consuming. It is possible only when the requirements of mutual support are met and involves taking the ends of the beings under consideration as serious reasons for acting or refraining from acting. And

indeed, there are examples of just this happening. When the buffalo herd in Saint Albert National Park in Saskatchewan faced a declining population, members of the *mistawasis nēhiyawak* First Nation recognized that overhunting was a major part of the problem.[19] Among other things, an educational campaign was called for to teach Indigenous hunters about the status of the herd and discourage overhunting. The population has since begun to recover.[20] In this case, when the needs of the animals were understood by the hunters, change was taken to prioritize the ends of the beings on the land over the hunters. In this case, it is not just the buffalo themselves who were taken into account, since the buffalo are a "keystone" species in their habitats and the health of the entire ecosystem improves when buffalo are present.[21]

The ends not just of the buffalo but the entire ecosystem of their territory was taken into consideration by the hunters of that territory. This is a demonstration of respect in the sense that we discuss above. In this case, as long as the demands of mutual respect are met, we have two of the four *wahkootowin* principles being fulfilled by hunters. I do not mean here to weigh in on the particular case of the *mistawasis nēhiyawak* and the herd near their territory, to attempt to decide whether their hunting is permissible. I take their story only as an example of respect being shown to the land and other beings, especially the beings who are hunted. Sometimes, respect and partiality involve knowing when *not* to hunt.

DECENCY

The third *wahkootowin* principle, decency, has to do with what makes an action impermissible. If some act would be indecent, it is therefore impermissible. The question of precisely what makes something indecent is complicated to answer, but it has to do with what I elsewhere call the *success conditions* of the relationship between individuals. The success conditions for a relationship are, of course, sensitive to the context of the relationship—the parties involved, the nature of the relationship, and so on. However, the basic idea is that every relationship comes along with normative conditions. The purpose of a relationship of guardianship between a child and guardian, for example, involves providing the child with the proper protection and resources to allow the child to grow into healthy maturity. The precise requirements of that relationship will change over time, depending on material and technological resources, social structures, and so on.

Success conditions will be somewhat culturally sensitive, in addition to being sensitive to context and capacities even within a single culture. Nonetheless, we can say a little about the success conditions of a producer-consumer relationship to help make this part of the *wahkootowin* view clear. I want to argue that the producer-consumer relationship still involves some success conditions that have to do with cruelty and wastefulness, because of the extreme nature of killing and consuming. Care is especially owed because of the *prima facie* impermissibility of killing and consuming. One success condition of the consumer-producer relationship is that the killing and consuming needs to be done in a way that is careful to avoid undue pain and suffering. This is a display of respect, since it takes the interests of the animal and the land into consideration in the way that respect demands.

Care and respect manifest, in the most general case, as prohibitions on cruelty and wastefulness. That means that in the most general case of the producer-consumer relationship, it is indecent for the consumer to cause undue harm or suffering to the producer, and it is indecent for the consumer to waste anything that they take from the producer. These results are hardly surprising—we see similar sorts of admonitions in many cultures. Robin Wall Kimmerer discusses just the same sorts of prohibitions on harm and waste in her guidelines for what she calls the Honorable Harvest: two of the guidelines are "harvest in a way that minimizes harm" and "use it respectfully. Never waste what you have taken."[22] These prohibitions are general and unsurprising. They are general and unsurprising because these are the most general versions of the prohibitions brought about by the requirement of decency. The details—perhaps other, more surprising details—depend on the nature of relationships and the beings involved in the relationship. What is decent or indecent varies, as said above, based on context.

ORDER

Finally, we can spend some time discussing *order*, the final *wahkootowin* principle that must be met by anyone considering eating meat. I interpret order not as a call for a rigid hierarchy of kinship relationships, but rather as an *ideal* of smooth functioning of kinship relationships to which we should aspire, and as an ideal against which we can judge our actions in deliberation. The question of what it means for a kinship relationship to function smoothly is, again, not one that can be answered in the abstract. To answer that question, we must consider the purpose of a particular relationship, the sorts of dependencies that give rise to the relationship, and what it would mean to ensure the continuation of the relationship and the fulfillment of its success conditions, given the needs and capacities of the related parties.

In other words, we need to imagine what, in an ideal world, the relationship would demand of the parties so related. When we deliberate about what to do, we need to keep that imagined, ideal relationship in mind as a guide against which to examine our conduct. When we think of what an orderly network of *wahkootowin* relationships would look like, all of those relationships living up to the other principles and the obligations they generate, we can compare the sort of world our proposed actions would create in order to see if our proposed course of action is one that supports that ideal network of *wahkootowin* relationships or works against it. This is, of course, a complicated question in many cases, and in many cases reasonable people can disagree on the assessment of particular actions. Nonetheless, the guiding notion of a smoothly functioning network of kinship relationships is what order brings to the table, and

the value that it has for us in considering the question of whether and when to kill and consume other beings.

My interpretation of order comes, in part, from a picture of the world given by Jicarilla Apache philosopher Viola Cordova. In her poem "How It Is: A Native American Creation Story," Cordova gives a description of the world as she sees it:

> Picture a landscape of shifting sand
> Nothing stays still
> Yet it is the same.
> The sand ripples
> Forms dunes Shifts.
> This is the way of the Universe:
> Stable shifting
> Shifting stability.[23]

Cordova also describes the universe as "harmonious, balanced, and stable despite occasional and temporary suddenness."[24] This notion of a stable but dynamic system is how order appears in *wahkootowin*, too, I argue. Networks of kinship fit the description Cordova gives above. The various beings offer matter and energy to the system and also take matter and energy from the system. New beings enter the system, others pass out of the system. Still, it is possible to have a sort of dynamic stability—order—in the system. Order serves as a sort of normative ideal, then, because we can frame the general stability of the system as a kind of exemplary state. Generally speaking, the promotion of stability is preferable, since the network of kin relations is based on relations of dependence and mutual support. It is practically wise and morally good to promote the stability of that system, since without it we would be left without the relations that make our lives possible and allow us to pursue our ends and fulfill our obligations.

Now that I have given a brief explanation of how the four principles of *wahkootowin* bear on the question of eating meat, I can give the short version of the conditions under which it is permissible to eat meat. First, in cases where life and death are on the line, it is permissible to eat meat if it is otherwise impossible to keep oneself, or those under one's care, adequately fed. This is an easy case, and hardly worth mentioning except to emphasize that the permissibility of eating meat changes in accordance with the material and technological conditions of a society. At one time, especially in the Métis homeland of the subarctic and prairies, the question of the permissibility of eating meat would hardly have been worth considering. The harsh and uncertain conditions of life in the historic North West would have made it impossible or impractical to depend only on a vegetarian diet. This also settles the question for those who have a medical reason to need meat (though it does not remove them from prohibitions on cruelty and wastefulness).

Putting aside the question of direct need, I want to give a picture of the sorts of conditions under which it would be permissible to *choose* to eat meat, on a *wahkootowin* view. The demands of mutual support, as I explained above, require a nonfungible and nontransferable long-term relationship to the land on which the hunting takes place. The hunter needs to carry out concrete acts of support for the land before and after the hunt. Reciprocity, at least in the form of partiality and respect for the creatures of that land, must be met. The hunter must refrain from acting in any indecent manner toward the objects of the hunt. This requires at least a commitment to avoiding undue harm (cruelty) and avoiding wastefulness. And finally, in their decision to hunt, the hunter must deliberate and consider whether the act of hunting is in accordance with the smooth functioning of *wahkootowin* relationships on that land.

WAHKOOTOWIN VEGETARIANISM

I have explained why it is sometimes permissible to eat meat on my *wahkootowin* view of ethics.

Next, I want to argue that the relationships required to make eating meat permissible hold for very few people. In a sentence, my view is that it *is* sometimes permissible to eat meat, but almost anyone reading such an argument in an academic paper will stand in relation to animals such that it is impermissible for them to eat meat. This should not be surprising, given the demands of mutual support, reciprocity, decency, and order. As we saw, mutual support requires much of a relationship to make killing permissible. Living in an urban setting, the demands of *wahkootowin* relationships that allow killing are almost always, I argue, too demanding to be met.

The main issue with urban living is that our connection to the land and animals we might consume is too distant and too mediated. Recall that the demands of mutual support require, at least, nontransferable acts of support for the land and the creatures on it. I think that the *permissibility* of hunting is likewise nontransferable. If I have a vegetarian cousin on the land who happens to live well, that doesn't license me to come to the land and hunt in their stead. The demands of the relationship and the permissions generated by the meeting of those demands are not transferable. They are not transferable as a result of the nature of *wahkootowin* relationships as kinship relationships—kinship relationships often generate obligations and permissions that are nontransferable. I can engage in romantic acts with my spouse, in virtue of meeting the demands of our relationship. I could not engage in romantic acts with my sibling's spouse in virtue of my sibling meeting the demands of their relationship. If I were allowed to do so at all, it would have to be in virtue of another sort of relationship that holds between me and my sibling's spouse.

There is a further practical problem with eating meat in an urban setting: It would be impractical to treat animals well enough for urban people to be able to meet the demands of mutual support. The amount of space that would be necessary to house the animals for an entire city to kill and consume would mean that the outskirts of every major city would need to be many hundreds of square kilometers of pasture and woodland. This is because, of course, the conditions in contemporary farms are obviously incompatible with the demands for decency, for respect, and for mutual support. I am pessimistic that raising any animal for food could be done in a way that meets all the *wahkootowin* principles, but even if it were possible,

industrial agriculture certainly fails to meet these demands. A radical transformation of the agricultural industry would be required to make meat eating permissible for city dwellers, and even then, it would require change to so much land that the obligations from respect and mutual support for *other* creatures would be abandoned.

So, the argument for a *wahkootowin*[25] vegetarianism is relatively straightforward. For Métis people living in situations where we do not have the relationships to the land that make it possible to fulfill our obligations to our nonhuman kin, it is *prima facie* impermissible to eat meat. While precise and up-to-date data is hard to find, it's clear that there has been a trend of increasing urbanization of Indigenous people in Canada.[26] The Métis are no exception. It is safe to say that for *at least* half of Métis people, they live urban lives which make the relationships to the land and other beings too mediated and distant to fulfill their *wahkootowin* obligations and make hunting permissible.[27] Since most of us can survive without eating meat, the principles of *wahkootowin* demand that we do so. I recognize that this conclusion is different than that drawn by many Indigenous people, urban or not. Eating meat is an important part of ceremony and culture for many Indigenous people, and traditional education often involves practical knowledge, like hunting. I want to move on from my argument, short and straightforward as it is, to complicate matters immediately and discuss exceptions and problem cases for the broad argument for vegetarianism that I've just given.

EXCEPTIONS AND CAVEATS

I've just given the short version of the *wahkootowin* argument for vegetarianism: almost no Métis person living off the land (by which I mean the opposite of "on the land," rather than "off the land" in the colloquial sense, i.e., depending on the land) is in a position to eat meat in a way that satisfies the requirements generated by *wahkootowin* relationships. It is only permissible to eat meat if one can satisfy the requirements generated by *wahkootowin* relationships. Therefore, it is permissible for almost no Métis person living off the land to eat meat. I think this argument is sound, but I also think there are many cases that are either unclear or straightforward exceptions.

First, the case of hunting for money. I think that hunting for commercial purposes—to sell or trade the meat, in other words—cannot on the face of it satisfy *wahkootowin* principles. But things are not always this clear. What about the case in which someone hunts to sell meat to buy a medication they need to live? It seems (and I think it is true) that this is a case of hunting where hunting is a matter of life and death for the hunter. So, caveat 1: hunting for money can be permissible, given the hunter satisfies the requirements of mutual support insofar as they are able, and the proceeds of the hunt are necessary for the hunter to live. We can extend this to cases in which a dependent child or other family member would be in danger without the proceeds of the hunt as well.

Next, consider gifts. I think that it *can* be permissible for Métis people living off the land to eat meat, if they meet a couple conditions: first, the meat must be hunted by a hunter for whom it is permissible to engage in the hunting. Second, the meat must be freely given as a gift, and in particular as a gift *fulfilling or establishing some part of a wahkootowin relationship*. The exchange of gifts is a part of how *wahkootowin* relationships are established and maintained,[28] and so the meat can be gifted by the hunter as a part of some other *wahkootowin* relationship. In this case, if the meat is hunted in a way that satisfies the demands of *wahkootowin*, the transfer of the meat is permissible. To be clear, it is not a transfer of the permissibility of hunting that is at issue, but rather the changing of the meat itself into a gift which is no longer commodified in the same way that it would be in an economic exchange.

Here is a good place to stop and discuss the idea of commodification. For my purposes here, a commodity is something that is traded in some market exchange. It has an exchange value, in other words—a price, in whatever currency, that someone is willing to pay the hunter for it. And it is precisely this exchange value, the idea that two things are interchangeable or *fungible*, that I think makes economic exchange of the products of hunting *prima facie* impermissible. Because the relationship that makes hunting permissible is nonfungible, and the act of market exchange presupposes the fungibility of the objects exchanged—the money, for example, is taken to be "worth" the meat, or fungible with it in some sense—there is a contradiction inherent in the market exchange of the proceeds of hunting. But this only exists in a market exchange of two supposedly fungible objects or commodities. In the case of gifts, no such contradiction is inherent in the idea of exchange, even reciprocal or mutual exchange.[29]

This caveat can be extended to ceremonial uses of the proceeds of hunting as well. As long as the meat has been hunted in a way that is permissible according to *wahkootowin* principles, if that meat is given to someone other than the hunter in the course of a ceremony, I think that consuming the meat can be permissible. It is important to note here, though, that I do not think that it would be permissible for *me*, an urban Métis person, to go hunt for ceremonial purposes. These caveats are not meant to make it permissible to hunt meat, only to consume it. The nonfungibility of the demands of *wahkootowin* relationships means that it is *prima facie* impermissible for someone to eat meat they did not hunt and did not hunt in the right way. The caveats here apply only to the permissibility to *consume* the proceeds of the hunt. They do not make it permissible to hunt.

Finally, an important caveat is that the *wahkootowin* ethics I have drawn on for my argument is not meant to be a comprehensive ethics for all people in all places at all times. It is an ethic drawn from the culture of the Métis and Cree people, and I claim only my own authority as a Métis person in making this argument. I have drawn on the words of my nation to craft this argument. I think it is correct for many Métis people to be vegetarian, based on the interpretation of *wahkootowin* and argument I give above. Nevertheless, I know that our relatives in other nations live in different conditions and by different concepts.

I intend here to give an argument for vegetarianism drawn from Métis principles, but not an argument that should apply to all nations. I have even noted that this argument does not advise vegetarianism for all Métis people. So, I hope it is clear that I have nothing to say about the diet and practices of other Indigenous nations and people. I would be failing to offer them the respect and partiality they deserve—I would be violating the *wahkootowin* principles of my own system of ethics—if I sought to speak for them or to offer an argument that I claim holds for all Indigenous people. The final caveat of this piece is that *wahkootowin*, like the obligations it generates, is particular, nontransferrable, concrete, and only intelligible and applicable in a Métis context.

NOTES

1. Foster, "Pemmican."
2. Statistics Canada, "Canada's Indigenous Population."
3. Macdougall, *One of the Family*, 8.
4. Miller, "Obligation, Accountability, and Anthropocentrism in Second-Personal Ethics," 14.
5. Campbell's variant spelling here is only the result of a difference in orthography, not in the concept at issue.
6. Campbell, "We Need a Return to the Principles of Wahkohtowin."
7. Campbell, "We Need a Return to the Principles of Wahkohtowin."
8. We might also stop here—why is it permissible to eat kin? Because it's permissible to eat plants, and plants are kin. But the fact that it is permissible to eat *some* kin does not do enough. Because it is also clearly impermissible to eat some kin: *human* kin. So there must be a more complicated account of the movement from kin generally to particular instances.
9. Saunders and Dubois, *Métis Politics and Governance in Canada*, 19–22.
10. Macdougall, *One of the Family*, 8.
11. Gaudry, *Kaa-Tipeyimishoyaahk – 'We Are Those Who Own Ourselves,'* 208–12.
12. Miller, "Obligation, Accountability, and Anthropocentrism," 15; 18.
13. This does not mean that we do not affect each other, though—the bird has important roles in the local ecosystem, and I can make choices that are better or worse in relation to the bird. For the purposes of this essay, though, the point is that we are not going to be as intimately connected as an animal I consider a candidate for food.
14. Ghostkeeper, *Spirit Gifting*, 12.
15. Miller, "Obligation, Accountability, and Anthropocentrism," 15; 18.
16. Miller, "Obligation, Accountability, and Anthropocentrism," 15; 18.
17. Meissner, "Teaching Reciprocity," 18.
18. Macdougall, *One of the Family* 3; Campbell, "We Need to Return to the Principles of Wahkotowin."
19. Derworiz, "Bison Population at Risk in Prince Albert National Park Due to Overhunting: Study."
20. Taylor, "Wild Bison in Prince Albert National Park See Signs of Growth after Years of Population Decline."
21. Derworiz, "Bison Population at Risk"; Crosschild et al., "Awakening Buffalo Consciousness, 14.
22. Kimmerer, *Braiding Sweetgrass*, 183. Cited in Wahinkpe Topa and Darcia Narvaez, *Restoring the Kinship Worldview: Indigenous Voices Introduce 28 Precepts for Rebalancing Life on Planet Earth*, 90.
23. Cordova, *How It Is*, 92.
24. Cordova, *How It Is*, 117.
25. While I want to limit this discussion to *wahkootowin*, I suspect Indigenous people from other nations will see things in this argument which are recognizable in the broad stroke, if not the details.
26. *Statistics Canada*, "Canada's Indigenous Population," 2023.
27. I am using one's status as urban here as a proxy for one's relationship as being too distant or mediated. But it is not enough merely to live outside urban areas. And it is possible, though I suspect very unlikely, that an urban Métis person could maintain these relationships and fulfill the obligations so as to make hunting permissible.
28. Adam Gaudry, *Kaa-Tipeyimishoyaahk - 'We Are Those Who Own Ourselves': A Political History of Métis Self- Determination in the North-West, 1830-1870* (University of Victoria, 2014), 144-5.
29. Much more can be said here. A full description of a gift economy, and the implications it has for *wahkootowin* ethics and the argument I have made here is beyond the scope of this paper. Nonetheless, I am open to the idea that in a gift economy, it might be more possible for more hunting and consumption of meat to be permissible.

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