FROM THE GUEST EDITOR

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SUBMISSION GUIDELINES AND INFORMATION
FROM THE GUEST EDITOR

The Timeliness of Translating Chinese Philosophy: An Introduction to the APA Newsletter Special Issue on Translating Chinese Philosophy

Ben Hammer

If there is one theme running through all of the articles in this issue, it is that of timeliness. There is an urgency in reevaluating how we, the Western audience, approach Chinese philosophy: how we study it, how we explain it to others, and how we translate it. There is more than one reason this reevaluation is timely.

There are cycles in academia. Old projects are revived with new data and new perspectives. In the sixteenth century, toward the end of China’s Ming Dynasty, Catholic missionaries from Europe began to arrive in China, wave after continuous wave. Their goal was to convert the locals, and in their efforts they studied and translated Chinese philosophy in earnest. As this tide faded away, a new wave of Protestant missionaries took its place, with their own translation work. Enter the twentieth century and new generations of sinologists, though with less firsthand experience in China than the missionaries, attempted to tackle Chinese philosophy in a more academic, less religious way. We do not need to come to a consensus on whether they succeeded; we only need to recognize that through these cycles, progress was being made on how ancient Chinese texts were being rendered into Western languages. We are now two full decades into the twenty-first century, and the tide has come back again.

China is rising to power in an unprecedented way. It is neither cliché nor irrelevant to mention in this philosophy newsletter China’s growing economic, political, and military power. These are not the reasons why people study the beautiful world of Chinese philosophy. They are the reasons why so many people are studying it. China is poised to become a, if not the, superpower of this century. It is completely expected that so many institutions and individuals around the world are trying to understand it. Is not Chinese philosophy a good place to start?

Since most of us reading this newsletter have at least a vague idea of what Western philosophy is, we must understand that to then learn Chinese philosophy is truly to reinvent the wheel. It is necessary to start from the most basic notions of what philosophy is to be able to understand what Chinese philosophy is.

In the West, religion is religion and philosophy is philosophy. In China, this line does not exist. For China and its close East Asian neighbors, Confucianism has guided the social and spiritual lives of people for thousands of years in the same way the Judeo-Christian tradition has guided people in the West. It is a feeling we have in our bones that there exists a persistent tradition that connects me and my people to our past and our future. In this sense Confucianism is analogous to religion in the West. And yet in Confucianism there is no god to whom we can address all our ultimate questions. Confucianism has historically been recognized by the government as the ideology that binds people to each other and to the state itself, and yet it has never been institutionalized the way Judeo-Christianity has: there is no church, no pope. Confucianism in China has never been recognized as a state religion, and yet for more than one thousand years the civil service entrance exams were based on how familiar the candidate was with Confucian texts. To learn Chinese philosophy, to start from the most basic notions, means to question what philosophy and religion are.

Such questions come at a precarious time in Western society. Nationalist movements and xenophobic sentiments are rising. Social conflict and international wars, healthcare and immigration, these issues are debated daily but the situations are hardly improving. This makes many call into question the sanctity of long-standing institutions that were once unquestionable: government based on democracy, economies based on capitalism, philosophies based on Greek ideas of logic, a legal system based on Roman ideas of justice. Our grand institutions and traditions are revealing their inherent flaws. It is enough to make some sinologists offer up Chinese-inspired alternatives.

Confucius’s philosophy can be divided into two levels: political theory and personal cultivation. Of the more than four hundred passages in the Analects of Confucius, every passage treats on at least one of the two. Modern sinologist and political theorist Daniel Bell’s sinological research focuses on Confucian political theory. His corpus of work invokes traditional Chinese ideas on governance as possible alternatives to the two-party, electoral democracy systems visibly struggling in the West. The sinological work of Henry Rosemont Jr. focuses on Confucian personal...
cultivation. He believes much of the decaying social and moral fabric in the West can be mended through appeals to Confucian philosophy. These proposals would have been laughable if introduced a mere few decades ago. Now, however, they are quite timely.

This time, this age we are in, is no longer a time when Chinese philosophies are regarded as quaint and exotic, to be found on bookshelves next to transcendental meditation and crystal gazing. China is the largest country in the world by population. It is influencing the entire world, and its ancient sages have something to say about what real philosophy is. There is, however, one large problem: they say it in Chinese.

Thus we come to the theme of this issue, Translating Chinese Philosophy. The language of ancient Chinese philosophy is so different from modern English, I would dare say there is no exercise that could better capture the definition of translation as being "re-creation." To express what faraway Chinese philosophers preached to a twenty-first-century Western audience takes more than immense skill. It takes great imagination and creativity. This is why, no doubt, Edward Shaughnessy declares unequivocally in his present contribution, "translation is an art, not a science." In this issue each contributor approached the topic in his or her uniquely valuable way.

In the first article, Roger Ames’s starting point is Wing-tsit Chan’s Source Book in Chinese Philosophy. As Ames points out, Chan set the standard in 1963 for many of the terms we use for translating Chinese philosophy. However, conditions change. Bars are raised. Standards need recalibrating. Ames has spent much of his influential career advocating that students learn to take Chinese philosophy “on its own terms.” This means situating Chinese philosophies and philosophers in their native context, and making a conscious effort not to express Chinese philosophy using Western philosophical terms. Western philosophy is not the only philosophy. Western religion is not the only religion. Translating Chinese philosophical works using the lexicon of logic, rights, individualism, abstract principles, and other philosophical terms we are comfortable with does a great disservice to a tradition that does not contain such ideas. It infuses Chinese philosophy with our Western biases, and in turn takes us further away from, rather than closer to, Chinese wisdom. Ames is compiling a new Source Book in Confucian Philosophy, and his contribution to this issue is a discussion of his many considerations for doing so, and why, almost sixty years after Chan, it is time to do it again.

In the second article, Tian Chenshan, a former student of Ames and currently director at the Center for East West Relations at Beijing Foreign Language University, expands on Ames’s proposition by claiming that the most central terms in Chinese philosophy have no direct correspondence with any words in English. Importantly, the difficulty of translating goes beyond incompatible lexicons. He observes, “The languages of China and the West are imbued with their own unique world views, epistemologies, ideologies, and value systems.” To force a pairing of Chinese-to-English translations would be to wrongly insinuate the West’s legacy of logic (philosophy) and monotheism (religion) into Chinese philosophy. This is why Tian, Ames, and so many of their collaborators place more importance on the well-thought-out explanation of key Chinese philosophical terms than on their actual translation.

The third article comes from three young Western scholars working in China, at the forefront of a massive soft power push by the Chinese government. As America rose to global dominance after World War II, it made aggressive efforts to exert its political, economic, and military influence around the world. Ironically, it was America’s culture that spread more rapidly and was accepted more readily. This was America’s “soft power.” Now that the Dragon is rising, it wishes to copy this success story. Though this time around, the exportation of culture will not be an involuntary side effect. It is deliberate. “Part of the Chinese Communist Party’s Soft Power Initiative is to expand the country’s cultural appeal, and academically speaking, philosophy is at the top of the list. The proclaimed aim of translating and publishing one hundred books a year and the booming number of translation projects funded directly by the central government at one yuan per character, are indeed telling.” In this sense, the study and translation of something as classical as Chinese philosophy could not be more closely linked to the geopolitics of the twenty-first century. Again, timeliness. Dimitra Amarantidou, Daniel Sarafinas, and Paul J. D’Ambrosio are not translating Chinese philosophy. They are translating the works of modern Chinese scholars who write about Chinese philosophy. This endeavor presents them with unique translation obstacles. Not only are ancient Western and Chinese philosophy fundamentally different, the way that modern Western scholars and modern Chinese scholars talk and think about philosophy is different. Even ideas on something as seemingly insignificant as academic protocol vary greatly across the oceans. Plagiarism is the cardinal sin in the halls of Western academia, but repeating what one has previously read is a sign of learning in the East. As the bridges between these two foreign lands, how can these translators most appropriately translate a Chinese professor’s words for a Western reader? They are the first to admit they do not have all the answers. But like any sincere scholar, they are asking the right questions.

Edward Shaughnessy has been well known for decades in sinology circles for his work on early Chinese historiography, particularly because of his use of all the methods and tools available to a classical scholar. He utilizes the ancient commentary of received texts (the ancient texts that have been handed down generation to generation), the documents that have been unearthed at modern archeological sites, and a slew of textual criticism subfields to reconcile the two. His present contribution to this newsletter chooses three highly specialized fields of textual scholarship—etymology, paleography, and sonics—to demonstrate the subtle considerations which enter into translating ancient Chinese. But despite the technicality of this article, it also speaks to larger themes and trends in contemporary translation. The material that is available to us today is not the same material available to us yesterday. Or tomorrow. Shaughnessy points out that advances are constantly being made in the theoretical fields, and new physical discoveries are being made which broaden
the sea of material we have to work with. His present contribution, and his larger body of work as a whole, teach us an important lesson: a translation, no matter how good, always has an expiration date. The passage of time and the changing of conditions will always require improved translations for new generations. If nothing else, even an excellent translation from one hundred years ago will use an English vernacular that reads uncomfortably to us. This does not even touch upon advances in the field. Shaughnessy’s work embodies this principle. There are at least eleven translations of the I Ching, Book of Changes, going back as far as 1867. The majority of them are translations based on the received text. In 1998 Shaughnessy published I Ching, The Classic of Changes: The First English Translation of the Newly Discovered Second-Century B.C. Mawangdui Texts (Ballantine Press). Then in 2014 he published Unearthing the Changes: Recently Discovered Manuscripts of and Relating to the Yi Jing (Columbia University Press). Conditions change. Resources change. Needs change. All translations have a time stamp on them, and they all have an expiry date.

This issue culminates with an important article that goes beyond reviewing where we are. It previews things to come. Carl Gene Fordham, a promising doctoral student in Peking University’s Chinese Department, opens up the possibility of a new branch of scholarship: “premodern text translation.” It is a disciple defined by its interdisciplinary nature. “[T]his field has the potential to explore many new and exciting questions that cannot be adequately addressed by sinology or translation studies as singular disciplines.” The best translator of ancient Chinese philosophy texts would ideally be well versed in translation technique and theory, modern Chinese, ancient Chinese, textual criticism, and philosophy. It is rare that the translators of the past can claim to be expert in all these fields. This may seem like too much to expect from a translator, but it is not unrealistic. In fact, it is a trend that is already emerging. “Over the past two decades during which this interdisciplinary field has developed, universities throughout China have been training premodern text translators in the hope that China may, one day, produce its own high-quality translations of the literature it rightly prizes as part of its intangible cultural heritage.” The time is ripe for this new field to establish itself. China is making a push to export its literary culture in the form of high quality translations accessible to Western readers. The Chinese government and universities provide educational programs to educate new generations of Chinese and foreign scholars, they give generous grants for such work, and they provide platforms for publishing. On the Western side, conditions are also becoming more advantageous for this enterprise. In the twentieth-century, China scholars did not always have easy logistical access to China and its academic resources. Today’s generation of sinologists can and often do come to China to live and learn for as long as they desire. The sharing of academic work through the internet and the digitization of ancient texts deliver a world of resources to anyone’s desk. Furthermore, since a wave of China studies has captured the attention of mainstream Western academia over the last two decades, with independent Chinese studies or East Asian studies departments popping up in our best institutions of higher learning, young Western scholars have the opportunity to completely dedicate themselves to these fields. Long gone are the days when sinological debates in the West were monopolized by scholars who began their formal training in Western subjects, and then at some point later in their career decided to “move on” to sinology. This new discipline, premodern text translation, then, is a very natural outgrowth of its time.

I will make the assumption that all of the contributors herein agree with me when I say, I hope this issue on Chinese philosophy is not an instance of preaching to the choir. If the only readers of this newsletter on questions surrounding Chinese philosophy and its corresponding translation work are students and professionals who already specialize in Chinese philosophy, then I am afraid this issue will not achieve its potential. Our hope is that those who do not specialize in Chinese philosophy will begin to see the position that Chinese philosophy is due in the vast array of world philosophies. The new theories and techniques that arise from Chinese philosophical translation can be critically absorbed into the translation work of any other language. True philosophers, lovers of wisdom, looking for insights to improve their lives, can reach out to Chinese wisdom with great benefit. Teachers and students of Western philosophy can enhance their grasp of world philosophy more fully and reflect on their own specialty more clearly by understanding what philosophy means in China.

NOTES

1. It is hard for the Western mind to reconcile a religion with no institutions. Robert Bellah was on to something when he called Confucianism a “civil religion.” See Philip J. Ivanhoe and Sungmoon Kim, eds., Confucianism, a Habit of the Heart (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2016).


5. A typical example of this would be the 45-page introductory section titled “Philosophical and Linguistic Background” that precedes the main text of Ames and Rosemont’s translation of the Analects. See Roger T. Ames and Henry Rosemont Jr., The Analects of Confucius: A Philosophical Translation (New York: Ballantine Books, 1998).

Preparing a New Sourcebook in Classical Confucian Philosophy

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AN INTERPRETIVE STRATEGY

Over the past few years I have been keeping out of mischief by working on a new bilingual Sourcebook in Classical Confucian Philosophy designed to serve the needs of both Chinese and Western students of Chinese philosophy. This project has given me the occasion to reflect on some of the translation challenges we must face in doing our best to move between very different philosophical traditions. In Wing-tsit Chan’s pioneering contribution to this important initiative, A Source Book In Chinese Philosophy (Princeton, 1963), his choice was to provide his readers with a considerable volume of translated textual materials organized chronologically, with a minimum of philosophical commentary and little by way of providing an interpretive context. The Chan Source Book is foundational in the sense that, in what it includes and what it excludes, it has circumscribed the parameters of the corpus for a generation of students of Chinese philosophy. For example, pre-Qin philosophy is much emphasized while Han dynasty texts and figures have minimal coverage. Again, in setting a high standard in the quality of his translations, Chan has also galvanized a specific formula of translations of key philosophical terms, promoting what scholars have since come to regard as a standard if not “literal” rendering of the classical Chinese philosophical vocabulary. For its time, Chan’s Source Book was a quantum advance both in coverage and in quality on what had serendipitously been translated from the Chinese philosophical classics. But then again, each generation is called upon to build its own connector to the generation that follows, and we need a new sourcebook for ours.

In my efforts to compile a new Sourcebook, looking back on where we are, I have two closely related worries. I will give an account below of why I believe that we have not paid sufficient attention to locating these philosophical classics within their own interpretive contexts. Indeed, by default we have inadvertantly transplanted these texts into a worldview and a commonsense not their own. Fully aware that worldviews are in the fullness of time invested in our natural languages, the consequence of this omission is the danger of uncritically perpetuating the same formula for rendering key philosophical terms, where this now standard vocabulary has encouraged a sense of literalness and familiarity with an erstwhile “Chinese” philosophical vocabulary.

Friedrich Nietzsche in Beyond Good and Evil reflects upon how a specific worldview is sedimented into the very language that speaks it:

Nietzsche is certainly not endorsing any theory of strong linguistic determinism—that is, the idea that our languages constrain us necessarily to think in certain ways. Rather, he is simply observing that a language and its syntax—in his example here, the Indo-European family of languages—over time become invested with a particular cultural narrative’s insights into what makes the human experience meaningful. Natural languages and their structures tend to reveal the default worldview of the cultures that speak them. Said another way, our languages “speak” us as much as we speak our languages, disposing us to entertain experience in one way as opposed to another, and prompting us to ask some questions rather than others.

Indeed, this same Nietzsche, reflecting on how languages such as French and German came to be gendered—la table and le soleil—allows that “when man gave all things a sex he thought, not that he was playing, but that he had gained a profound insight. . . .”2 In fact, the corpus of Nietzsche himself is an object lesson in the very problem of translation and interpretation he ponders. Our languages are conservative in wanting to speak from within their own narratives, and tend to resist new ideas in proportion to the disjunction these ideas have with what has gone before. Commonsense is obstinate. Thus, when Nietzsche attempts to critique a persistent transcendentalism that has become entrenched within the languages and cultural experience of the Abrahamic traditions captured in his famous proclamation “God is dead,” he must himself become linguistically dexterous. He has little choice but to turn to and rely heavily upon rhetorical devices and literary tropes rather than the more “literal” expository language available to him precisely because he is frustrated, compromised, and even betrayed by the deeply committed language in which he is attempting to give voice to his revolutionary ideas.

A point that was drilled into me by my teachers was that different cultures think differently, and that philosophically, we elide important distinctions among them at our peril. The distinguished British sinologist, Angus Graham, for example, ascribes unique and evolving categories and conceptual structures to different cultural traditions, and in so doing, challenges the Saussuran structuralist distinction between langue (universal and systematic linguistic structures and rules governing all languages) and parole (diverse and open-ended speech acts in any of our natural languages).3 All the same, we might borrow and take liberties with Saussure’s distinction that abandons his structuralist assumptions to make Graham’s point. We can use langue (language) to contrast the evolved, theoretical, and conceptual structure of a given language
system shaped by an aggregating cultural intelligence over millennia that makes organized speech possible, with parole (speech) as the application of this natural language in the individual utterances we make.” Graham and we fellow pluralists need such a distinction to reinforce our claim that the Chinese language has not developed and does not have available to it either an indigenous concept or a term that can capture the Abrahamic notion of “God,” while at the same time allowing us to insist that the same Chinese language has all of the semantic and syntactic resources it needs to give a fair and robust account of such an idea. And likewise, there is no vocabulary available in our Western languages to do justice to the conceptual structure of Confucianism. We cannot say 仁 in English, or in German either, although we can say lots about this key Confucian notion in both European languages, and get pretty clear on what it means.

Recently, and specifically in reference to the classical Chinese language, Graham concludes that in reporting on the eventful flow of Chinese qi cosmology, “the sentence structure of Classical Chinese places us in a world of process about which we ask ‘Where is it moving?’ Like many (but not all) of us, Graham is persuaded that different populations within always changing cultural milieus appeal to different concepts and ways of thinking and living. And Graham spent his illustrious career doing his very best to bring some clarity to these differences. What Graham is saying here is that any perceived coherence in the emergent order of things that is assumed in Confucian cosmology, while being abstract and theoretical, is resolutely historicist and situated, and hence has to be qualified by a location, by a particular time in its evolution, and also by its applications.

When Graham asks after human nature within the context of Confucian cosmology, for example, he avers that erstwhile “human nature” is conceived of as an ongoing and evolving process rather than as some essential “timeless” property or universal endowment. Thus, beyond the question of “What is it?” he must also ask the other questions: “Where was it thought of in this way?” “Whence did we come to mean this?” “How did it serve us to think of it in this way?” and, perhaps most importantly, “Whither is its impetus in defining who we will become?” Indeed, we might invoke a distinction found in the first among the Confucian classics, the Yi Jing or Book of Changes. While cosmic order and all that emerges within it have certainly been understood in general and persistent terms (long 洞), at the same time, they must always be qualified by the local, the specific, and the transitory (bian 變). For Confucian cosmology, in the ongoing transformation of the world around us, we must respect the where, the when, and the who as aspects integral to this ineluctable process. The crucial implication of Graham’s insight into Confucian cosmology is that all of the rational structures that might be appealed to in expressing an understanding of the human experience—that is, whatever theories, concepts, categories, and definitions we might reference—are themselves all ultimately made vulnerable to change by the always shifting organs and objects of their application. In the flux and flow of experience, making sense of a changing world is itself a changing process.

In fairness to the new translations that have continued to appear over the past generation, we must ask the question: At the end of the day, can European languages, freighted as they are with a historical commitment to substance ontology—what Jacques Derrida has called “logocentrism” and “the language of presence”—actually “speak” the processual worldview that grounds these Chinese texts? Can these canonical texts such as the Book of Changes and the Expansive Learning (Daxue) be translated into English and still communicate the worldview that is invested in them? And more to the point, given my project as it is presently at hand, how does my Sourcebook propose to address the challenge of trying to locate these Chinese texts within their own implicit worldviews?

RESOURCES FOR DEVELOPING A BASIC CHINESE VOCABULARY

An astute Ludwig Wittgenstein insists that “the limits of our language mean the limits of our world.” If this is the case, in order to take Chinese philosophy on its own terms, we will quite literally need more language. The premise then is that there is no real alternative for these students but to cultivate a nuanced familiarity with the key Chinese vocabulary itself. The self-conscious strategy of this Sourcebook is to enable students of Confucian philosophy to read the seminal texts by going beyond simple word-for-word translation. This alternative is to provide these students with a pathway to develop their own sophisticated understanding of a cluster the most critical Chinese philosophical terms. Indeed, word-for-word translation can in the long run be counterproductive to the extent that it encourages students in reading these texts to inadvertently rely upon the usual implications of the translated term (for example, “Heaven”) rather than on the range of meaning implicit in the original Chinese term itself (for example, 天). When students read 天 as “Heaven” rather than as 天, they are certain to read the text differently, and in all likelihood, in a way heavily freighted with Western theological assumptions.

By way of analogy, if we reflect on our best efforts to read and teach classical Greek philosophy, most of us do not have an expert knowledge of the original language texts. But in developing a sophisticated understanding of an extended cluster of the most important Greek philosophical terms—logos, nomos, nous, phusis, kosmos, eidos, psyche, soma, arche, alethea—and so on—we are with imagination, able to get behind our own uncritical Cartesian assumptions and at least in degree, read these Greek texts on their own terms. In a similar way, by seeking to understand and ultimately appropriate the key philosophical vocabulary around which the Chinese texts are structured, students will be better able to locate these canonical texts within their own original intellectual assumptions. The only alternative to attempting to take the tradition on its own terms is to participate in a further colonializing of Chinese philosophy and the truncating of its long history. We have to resist the unconscious and patently spurious assumption that this tradition’s fairly recent encounter with the vocabulary of the Western academy has been its defining moment. Such an uncritical approach places the uniqueness, the heterogeneity, and the intrinsic worth of the Chinese philosophical tradition at real risk.
It is in this effort to take Chinese philosophy on its own terms then, that the first section of this *Sourcebook* is an attempt to explicate the tradition’s own indigenous presuppositions and its own evolving self-understanding. A careful reading of the introductory essay to our *Sourcebook*, “Chinese Natural Cosmology: An Interpretive Context,” will hopefully sensitize the reader to some of the ambient and persistent assumptions that have given the Confucian philosophical narrative its unique identity over time. It is these same presuppositions that inform the philosophical vocabulary and set the parameters from which their meanings in context must be parsed.

Are we then to understand that these generic, persistent cultural assumptions are essential and unchanging conditions of Chinese cosmology? Of course not. We have to unload this “essentialism” charge and respect presuppositions that inform the philosophical vocabulary and set the parameters from which their meanings in context must be parsed. Is unloading this charge, then, that the first section of this *Sourcebook* is an attempt to explicate the tradition’s own indigenous presuppositions and its own evolving self-understanding. A careful reading of the introductory essay to our *Sourcebook*, “Chinese Natural Cosmology: An Interpretive Context,” will hopefully sensitize the reader to some of the ambient and persistent assumptions that have given the Confucian philosophical narrative its unique identity over time. It is these same presuppositions that inform the philosophical vocabulary and set the parameters from which their meanings in context must be parsed.

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Indeed, over the last several centuries of cultural encounter, the vocabulary established for the translation of classical Chinese texts into Western languages has been freighted by an often-unconscious Christian framework, and the effects of this “Christianization” of Chinese texts are still very much with us. There are numerous examples of grossly inappropriate language having become the standard equivalents in the Chinese/English dictionaries that we use to perpetuate our understanding of Chinese culture: “the Way” (dao 道), “Heaven” (tian 天), “benevolence” (ren 仁), “righteousness” (yi 義), “rites” (li 禮), “virtue” (de 德), “substance” (ti 體), “principle” (li 理), “material substance” (qi 氣), and so on. Can a Western student read the capitalized “Heaven” as anything other than a metonym for the familiar notion of a transcendent God? Is living a life as someone’s son or daughter a “rite”? Should we reduce what is quite literally the image of cultivated, consummate human beings in all their aspects—cognitive, moral, aesthetic, religious, somatic—to a single, patently Christian virtue: “benevolence”? When and in what context would a native English speaker ever utter the word “righteousness?”

Chinese philosophy understood through this existing formula of translations has been formed traditionally and today, to theorize their own traditions through a largely Western conceptual structure. As such, many of the more philosophically-inclined sinologists who have been involved in the recent translation of canonical Chinese works are now acknowledging that a fuller inventory of semantic matrices might be necessary for the translation of these philosophical texts, and are struggling to get beyond the default, “commonsensical” vocabularies of their native cultural sensibility.

AN INTERPRETIVE ASYMMETRY: VERNACULAR ASIAN LANGUAGES AND THE LANGUAGE OF MODERNITY

Beyond the “Christianizing” and “orientalizing” of the Confucian tradition, there is a further asymmetry that continues to plague our best attempts to make responsible comparisons between the Chinese and Western philosophical narratives. To state the problem simply, we have been given to relentlessly theorizing the Chinese tradition according to our Western philosophical assumptions, shoehorning Chinese concepts into categories that are not its own. We are given to pondering with some philosophical nuance: “Is Mohist utilitarianism agent-neutral or agent relative?” but it would not occur to us to ask if John Stuart Mill is an early or latter day Mohist. Again, we are given to a penetrating debate on: “Is Confucian ethics an Aristotelian aretæic ethic or a Humean-inspired sentimentalist ethic?” but it would not occur to us to ask if Aristotle, and Hume too, are classical or perhaps later Confucians. Kwong-loi Shun has recently made much of this asymmetry:

[T]here is a trend in comparative studies to approach Chinese thought from a Western philosophical perspective, by reference to frameworks, concepts, or issues found in Western philosophical discussions. This trend is seen not only in works published in the English language, but also in those published in Chinese. Conversely, in the contemporary literature, we rarely find attempts to approach Western philosophical thought by reference to frameworks, concepts, or issues found in Chinese philosophical discussions.

As Shun observes, this problem is as true in the writings of contemporary Chinese intellectuals as it is of their Western counterparts, speaking as they do a vernacular language transformed by its encounter with a dominating Western modernity, and thus deploying a largely Western conceptual structure—a Western langue—even while speaking their own vernacular language. In the middle and late nineteenth century, the institutional apparatus of Western education was transplanted wholesale to reconfigure East Asian education to its very core. The institutions of European and American education—the public-school systems through to the universities with their disciplinary taxonomies and curricula—were imported whole cloth into the East Asian cultures of Japan, China, Korea, and Vietnam. First, the Meiji Japanese reformers and then the Chinese, Korean, and Vietnamese intellectuals, at once enamored of and overwhelmed by Western modernity, created their own Sinitic equivalencies drawn largely from traditional Chinese literary resources, to appropriate and give voice to the conceptual and theoretical language of the imported Western academic culture. The vocabulary of modernity with its liberating enlightenment ideas was translated into, and transformed fundamentally, the vernacular languages of East Asia, prompting these cultures themselves, then and today, to theorize their own traditions through a largely Western conceptual structure.

The complexity and the politics of this process of synchronizing the East Asian languages with the vocabulary of Western modernity, and the role that the Chinese literary tradition served as a resource for constructing this vocabulary, have been discussed in considerable detail by Columbia professor Lydia H. Liu. In thinking through the impact of this newly emerging conceptual structure as it surfaced and reconfigured the discourse of modern Chinese academic literature, Liu herself probes the “discursive construct of the Chinese modern.” “I am fascinated,” says Liu, . . . by what has happened to the modern Chinese language, especially the written form, since its early exposure to English, modern Japanese, and other foreign languages. . . . The true object of my theoretical interest is the legitimation of the “modern” and the “West” in Chinese literary discourse as well as the ambivalence of Chinese agency in these mediated processes of legitimation.

READING PHILOSOPHICAL TEXTS PHILOSOPHICALLY

The preparation of any new Sourcebook in Confucian philosophy must take account of another recent confluence of circumstances that is promoting a reevaluation of the
classical Chinese corpus. First, we are living in exciting times. A continuing series of truly dramatic archaeological digs in China are providing us with earlier versions of extant texts that have not suffered the distortions unavoidable over the course of some two thousand years of transmission. Again, these same finds are also offering us access to documents that disappeared from sight millennia ago. In many cases, these recovered texts as they surface are requiring a reassessment of our previous understanding of the principal philosophical works that are defining of the classical period, and that have served the tradition as its canonical core ever since. The recent recovery of these new versions of existing philosophical texts and the further discovery of many others that have been long lost, in occasioning the retranslation of many of the classics, have provided an opportunity for philosophers to step up and rethink our standard renderings of the philosophical vocabulary.

At the very least, these newly available archaeological resources provide a compelling reason for the retranslation of the selected texts from the seminal texts included in the Sourcebook. However, if possible, in addition to the reevaluation made necessary by these new and exciting finds, there is yet an even more compelling reason to take up the project of offering a new Sourcebook in Confucian philosophy. Until recently, most professional Western philosophers have had little interest in claims on the part of proponents of Confucian philosophy that there is much of philosophical significance in the texts of ancient China. Indeed, it can be argued that geographical rather than philosophical criteria are being evoked in deciding what is philosophical. Again, an exclusively Western philosophical narrative rather than family resemblances that obtain among a plethora of philosophical traditions continues to be appealed to as a reason for excluding alternative philosophical traditions from proper investigation. As a consequence, texts that are profoundly “philosophical” are not being treated as such within the sanctum of professional philosophy. William James was almost right when he began his 1901 Gifford lectures at Edinburgh University by admitting that, “to us Americans, the experience of receiving instruction from the living voice, as well as from the books of European scholars, is very familiar. . . It seems the natural thing for us to listen whilst the Europeans talk.” James is reporting on a self-understanding of the discipline of professional philosophy that is in important degree alive and well more than a century later. The only caveat offered here would be the he would have been more accurate had he included the Asian and African philosophers along with the Americans as the seemingly “natural” audience for European philosophy.10

PHILOSOPHY IN REVOLUTION: OPENING A SPACE FOR CHINESE PHILOSOPHY

But we need not invoke the profundity of Chinese philosophy to problematize some of the persisting assumptions within the Western tradition that have excluded Chinese philosophy from consideration as philosophy. Indeed, the revolution currently taking place within the Western philosophical community itself might be fairly described as an attempt to “think process” and to reinstate wisdom. It provides an opening and an invitation to take Chinese philosophy more seriously. That is, an internal critique continues to be waged within professional Western philosophy under the many banners of process philosophy, hermeneutics, post-structuralism, postmodernism, neo-pragmatism, neo-Marxism, deconstructionism, feminist philosophy, and so on, that takes as a shared target what Robert Solomon has called “the transcendental pretense”—idealism, rationalism, objectivism, formalism, logocentrism, essentialism, the master narrative, onto-theological thinking, “the myth of the given”—the familiar reductionistic “isms” that have emerged as putatively novel choices to allow philosophers to switch horses on the merry-go-round of systematic philosophy. In place of a Cartesian philosophical language that privileges the function of clear and distinct ideas in our erstwhile quest for an objective, apodictic certainty, vocabularies of process, change, particularity, creative advance, and indeed productive vagueness have increasingly come into vogue. These recent developments in Anglo-European philosophy have themselves begun to foreground an interpretative terminology more relevant to the articulation of Confucian culture.

The main problematic in a Cartesian dualistic worldview was one of closure articulated in the vocabulary of the quest for certainty guaranteed by clear and distinct ideas, the attainment of objective truth, and the reconciliation and ultimate salvation that follows from it. By contrast, a main problematic in the correlographic cosmology we associate with “process turn” in Western philosophy in the many varieties enumerated above, is one of personal cultivation and disclosure—that is, of an aestheticism. To use Chinese terminology, the aspiration of such cultivation is wisdom, and the creative extension of an evolving cultural pattern of becoming consummately human (dao 道) that is ultimately derived from the uniqueness of those persons who contribute to it. There is a synergy in being shaped by and in turn shaping the world around one. Novelty emerges in the interface between the force of environing natural, social, and cultural conditions, and one’s own creative contribution to one’s context.

One of the most interesting ramifications of the increasing popularity of process language, from the perspective of our present project, is that the stimulation offered by the need to better understand Asian sensibilities, is in fact recursive. While process vocabularies are leading to increasingly productive interpretations of the classical Chinese world, these process interpretations of Chinese texts in turn provide us with new lenses through which to see our own Western sensibilities. Previously ignored or misconstrued elements within our own cultural self-understanding are beginning to receive new and decidedly more coherent interpretations.11

Classical Chinese cosmology subscribes to the mantra, “the only kind of creativity is situated co-creativity.” And, in the wake of the process thinkers A. N. Whitehead and John Dewey, a sustained reflection by philosophers on the alternatives to transcendentalism and the many dualisms that mark its presence that are to be found in the classical Chinese assumptions about cosmic order may pay us important philosophical dividends. The pervasive Chinese
assumption about the always emergent nature of order might at this particular historical moment provide us with a salutary intervention in the Western philosophical narrative. That is, in this classical Chinese worldview there is an alternative nuanced and sophisticated processual way of thinking about cosmology that can join this ongoing internal critique of transcendentalism taking place within the professional discipline of philosophy itself. Simply put, with the present surge of interest in Whitehead and particularly the American pragmatists, these newly emerging Western versions of process philosophy as they mature within our own philosophical culture can, with profit, draw both substance and critique from a Chinese tradition that has been committed to various forms of process philosophy since the beginning of its recorded history.

The happy conclusion that may be anticipated from these recent developments is that an era in which philosophy and philosophical thought have been considered essentially Anglo-European monopolies is drawing to a close. And further, while Western philosophy—primarily British, French, and German philosophy—constituted the mainstream curriculum for the discipline of world philosophy in the twentieth century, the revolution that is taking place within the Western academy itself presages a time when the process sensibilities pervasive in the long Chinese philosophical narrative may well become increasingly relevant in helping us find our way forward to a more inclusive understanding of world philosophy.

NOTES

2. Friedrich Nietzsche, A Nietzsche Reader, trans. by R. J. Hollingdale (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1977), 86. One wonders what in the early days of these languages would prompt the French speakers to understand the sun as masculine and the moon as feminine, while their German cousins thought the opposite.
3. Saussure uses the analogy of a chess game, where langue are the fixed rules that govern the game while parole are the actual, varied moves made by different people that come to constitute any particular game.
4. I am “borrowing” this distinction from Saussure because I do not want to endorse any kind of structuralism that would allow for a severe separation between langue and parole, instead siding with the sentiments of a Zhuangzi or a Mikhail Bakhtin who would see these two dimensions of language as mutually shaping and evolving in their always dialectical relationship. Utterances gradually change the structure of language, and the changing structure orients and influences the utterances that it makes possible. For them, what we think about and how we think about it are coterminous and mutually shaping.
7. Hans-Georg Gadamer uses “prejudices” not in the sense that prejudice is blind, but on the contrary, in the sense that our prejudgments can facilitate rather than obstruct our understanding. That is, our assumptions can positively condition our experience. But we must always entertain these assumptions critically, being aware that the hermeneutical circle in which understanding is always situated requires that we must continually strive to be conscious of what we bring to our experience and must pursue increasingly adequate prejudgments that can inform our experience in better and more productive ways.

The Impossibility of Literal Translation of Chinese Philosophical Texts into English

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This is a problem that has perplexed scholars for a very long time. How, indeed, may one approach the task of translating the works of Chinese philosophers into a foreign language? It is necessary to free oneself from the way of thinking that prompts questions like “How do we translate x term into English?” Word-for-word translation is not a prerequisite for the successful introduction of Chinese philosophy to the outside world. There is no term in any Western language that corresponds perfectly to its Chinese counterpart, as there is virtually no shared vocabulary between the two linguistic regions. The languages of China and the West are imbued with their own unique worldviews, epistemologies, ideologies, and value systems. One may observe all of these features in the non-dualistic (一多不分) nature of the Chinese philosophical canon and the script it was written in. The conceptual symbolic languages (概念符号语言) of the West are representatives of the dualistic (一多二元) system, which manifests its own version of these features. Their philosophical cultures are bound up with the singular noumenon of the “God” concept and the idea that human beings are, like all things in the universe, individuals. The reason they differ so greatly from the Sinitic languages is because they feature a completely different cosmological narrative.
Thus, the languages of China and the West tell their own stories in completely different ways by making use of concepts, vocabularies, and systems of logic that are strikingly dissimilar. Since the two do not share any interchangeable functions, people have encountered serious problems when translating Chinese philosophy into Western languages, and have also brought about much confusion. This has particularly been the case when missionaries have been the translators; the comparative philosophers David Hall and Roger Ames described the English-Chinese and Chinese-English dictionaries they produced as "disasters." With a little bit of reflection, one finds fundamental differences in almost any example of word-for-word translation between Chinese and English. Even everyday words like "everyone," "goodbye," and "sorry" differ greatly from their counterparts in Chinese 大家, 再見, and 对不起, as their literal meanings do not match each other at all.

Cases like these are many and varied. By making use of traditional dictionaries, missionaries, sinologists, and even Chinese writers translating Chinese classics into English translated the non-dualistic (一多不分) cultural meaning of Chinese culture into Western dualistic (一多二元) cultural meaning. At times, there has even been a deliberate attempt to force Confucian doctrine and texts into a framework underpinned by the Christian ideology of the West, resulting in the creation of a second-rate product of Christian dogma. In response to this phenomenon, Ames has engaged in research that compares Chinese and Western philosophy and, by making use of comparative methods, was able to expound on the teachings of Chinese philosophy. He used this approach in his examination of the Analects of Confucius: A Philosophical Translation, which presented a Confucian notion of the world, its theory of knowledge, and system of beliefs, as well as how it views life and what it considers important. Ames considered these aspects on their own merits, and as the Chinese understand them, as separate from the words that are used in English to translate them. By doing this, he was able to examine how the default vocabulary used deviates from the intended meaning of the native Chinese concepts. By attaining a clear understanding of the semantic context of the philosophical culture presented in Chinese classic texts, or what Ames terms the "interpretive context," as well as the relevant historical and cultural context, he was able to produce a translation of the Analects that may very well be closer to the original meaning of the source text than the many versions that preceded it.

Take, for example, the term junzi 君子. The common translation used before Ames’s translation was “a man of virtue,” “noble person,” or “gentleman.” However, Ames translated it as “exemplary person.” Granted, many Chinese scholars have expressed their criticism of this translation. However, those who understand the comparative method in philosophy would probably acknowledge that there may be no term in English that is completely equivalent to junzi in Chinese. After all, is not a junzi a role model who aims for self-improvement, whose words and deeds exert influence on others? If one understands the junzi as such an individual, then Ames’s translation, while not encompassing all the various implied meanings of the term, conveys its primary characteristics. Ames was able to explain and translate many Chinese classics by making use of this comparative method of philosophy.

When the Chinese translate canonical texts from the West, for example, Marxist works, a relatively word-for-word rendering is sufficient to produce a Chinese-language edition, because Marxism is in itself a manifestation of the Western non-dualistic (一多不分) way of thinking. However, many mainstream dualistic (一多二元) cultural works from the West, once translated into Chinese, seem to lack equivalence to a large extent. Admittedly, relevant terms have entered the Chinese lexicon during the translation process; for example, “liberty” and “freedom” have both been rendered as ziyou 自由 in Chinese. However, Chinese lacks two different words for this concept as English does, and the concept in English is inseparable from a supposed existence of God which is seen as existing alongside individual human beings. The word ziyou in Chinese in fact obscures the significance of the original English term and takes on a completely different meaning. Since the Chinese language does not contain God-supposing features, ziyou appears intrinsic to the Chinese language but is in fact completely inequivalent when compared to the English concepts of liberty and freedom.

If we comprehend ziyou on the basis of its intrinsic meaning in Chinese, we need to consider the way these two characters were used in the Xiao Yao You 遨遊遊 (Carefree Wandering) chapter of the Zhuangzi 莊子 as denoting a free and unfettered state. Alternatively, one may consult the passage in the Analects of Confucius which reads: “When I was 70 years of age, I could follow my heart’s desires without overstepping the line” 七十從心所欲而不踰矩. Ziyou in the Chinese classics carries this kind of non-dualistic (一多不分) philosophical meaning, with the implication that people may only attain a carefree state if they understand the relationship between human beings and the heavens, and become at one with every manifestation of nature. This concept is completely at odds with the idea of freedom and liberty in English which is supposedly bestowed to man by God. That concept of personal freedom is a freedom from all kinds of obstacles and is expanded to the social and philosophical realm: I do as I please, and I will not accept interference from others, especially the government, so that I may indulge in desires of the material world. Thus, we have a view that any kind of learning originating from Western philosophy and touching upon Chinese and Western philosophical systems must be based on sources written in a Western language; one may not rely solely on Chinese translations of Western materials.

Any kind of scholarly work in Chinese that has been translated from a Western language exhibits structural differences originating from the semantics of Western culture, and may differ substantially from its source text.
Translating Today's Chinese Masters

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A wave of translating contemporary Chinese thinkers is sweeping through sinology and philosophy. Whether we are collectively following the “spirit of the times” or privately tackling and enjoying a peculiar philosophical discourse, a few things seem to be certain: for the past decade Western scholars have been increasingly interested in engaging with contemporary Chinese thought. The Chinese government has been consistently and generously sponsoring efforts to make works by contemporary thinkers accessible in foreign languages as well. Part of the Chinese Communist Party’s Soft Power Initiative is to expand the country’s cultural appeal, and academically speaking, philosophy is at the top of the list. The proclaimed aim of translating and publishing one hundred books a year and the booming number of translation projects funded directly by the central government at one yuan per character, are indeed telling. China is serious about cultivating a growing Chinese philosophical discourse, and China is envisioning the possibility, or the necessity, of making herself heard, recognized, and appreciated as a valuable contributor in global philosophical discourse.

But after the grants have been applied for, foreign press contracts secured, and the World Congress of Philosophy concludes, global cultural trends and generous funding projects boil down to the bittersweet nitty-gritty of translation. Along with the perennial issues of lexical equivalence and (un)translatability, there is a broader question that we as translators of contemporary Chinese thought are constantly faced with: How do we deal with a philosophical discourse vastly different from its Western counterpart? To put it more directly, would China’s Soft Power Initiative be better off leaving out monographs that so blatantly violate the most basic norms of scholarship in Western academia? Will our colleagues in North America and Europe simply laugh at the not so uncommon misquotations, blatant misreadings, and lack of references in books by China’s top philosophy professors? It is impossible to offer a single, definitive answer without a significant amount of reflection. Pointing to a larger cultural context, these questions underscore the need to think beyond word-level choices or grammatical adjustments and recognize what is uniquely Chinese about the contemporary Chinese philosophical discourse. Translation of modern Chinese thinkers is about more than managing the intricacies of a different linguistic medium—it is entering a different academic paradigm.

One characteristic of contemporary Chinese philosophy which might help reveal some of the problems unique to translating is that many of its authors can be, and in fact are, viewed not as academics, but as Masters. In the Western world it would be somewhat analogous to saying that they are not professors but philosophers—i.e., real philosophers. Continuing in the tradition of the Zi 子 or “masters”—those prominent thinkers and charismatic teachers of antiquity who led by example and are important insofar as they are personal role models in addition to offering philosophical reflections—contemporary Chinese thinkers demonstrate a predilection for philosophical discussion that often operates through the suggestiveness, ellipsis, and polysemy implemented in literary language. Before explaining away Chinese scholars’ relative disinterest in extreme precision of expression and abstract logical exposition, we might want to imagine ourselves for a moment on the other side of this philosophical coin. They are not trying to be academic commentators of philosophy—they are trying to philosophize. It would then perhaps be easier to see that Western notions of abstraction, argumentation, and reasoning are not rejected by Chinese thinkers. Rather, these methods are simply taken as “missing the mark.” Whereas solid, rational expositions are detached from and make no appeal to emotional realities, emotive truths contained within a line of poetry, for example, are considered as really getting to the heart of a matter. At the risk of making an “essentialistic” claim, we could say that this method of discourse has been the norm through most of the history of thought in China. The standard was set by the original Master himself, Confucius. Interspersed with quotations from the Book of Songs, the Book of Documents, and other classics, his claims were legitimized through emotive recognition of truth rather than through the impersonal syllogisms and logic of rational demonstration.

Grounded in an emotive reality, Chinese thinkers’ rhetoric is oriented towards what is considered “concrete significance.” From a “Master’s perspective,” extreme precision, abstraction, and rigor can only exist on a theoretical level—and are thereby of limited importance. While unquestionably robust, Chinese theories have always been consciously checked by practical considerations and the demand to address a concrete, contemporary reality. The concrete question of “how will this affect my life,” which really means “how will this influence my relationships with others,” is never far from a Master’s thought. Our challenge as translators lies in the decision to either effectively communicate this attitude to a Western audience with its preconceived notions of how philosophic discourse ought to be conducted in mind, or disregard the Western audience’s biases and reproduce the thinker’s ideas and style of presenting these ideas as close to the Chinese as possible, letting them stand on their own merits.

When, following the long tradition of Masters, renowned contemporary thinkers such as Li Zehou or Yang Guorong begin or end a paragraph with a quotation from the Book of Changes or a verse from the Book of Songs—two of the most obscure texts in the history of human thought, as translators...
we are left asking: To what extent should we explain this or that quotation? If that verse from the Book of Songs is never explained by the author, but used instead to evoke certain emotions or cue up a particular attitude from an audience presupposed to understand the reference, do we simply leave Western readers to figure out the associations for themselves? No matter whether we define a particular author’s intent or not, and no matter how we decide to define it, the simple fact remains: these quotations are meant to get a point across that is just as much emotional as it is rational. But how do we translators strike a balance between preserving a specific discursive style and helping readers get that point? The moment we explain or footnote these quotations are we not devaluing what the author, as a Master, is doing? Yet if we strive towards some degree of functional equivalence, how do we deal with the fact that our readers will likely be left confused? The challenge for Western readers, however, extends far beyond reflecting on what the passage means or why it was quoted. The very format employed may be seen as questionable, or, more cynically, as unprofessional. “Leave the wishy-washy emotions and feelings to poetry and literature,” one might protest, “philosophy is the realm of reason and clarity.” But in these instances the thinkers in question are not opting for one rhetorical trope over another, they are operating within an entirely different discourse that translators are asked to understand and take on its own terms.

Another more troublesome issue in contemporary Chinese academic practice is also explainable in terms of the age-old tradition of Masters attitude towards discussing philosophical issues. Disinterest in precision and appreciation of the general “feel” of a text occasionally result in blatant mistakes in the monographs we work on. How should we deal with those mistakes? Here is a characteristic example.

One of us has worked very closely with Li Zehou on his Response to Michael Sandel and Other Matters, not only translating the book, but publishing several papers and hosting a conference on this theme. This book is extremely popular in China—where Li Zehou is perhaps the most well-known Chinese thinker and Michael Sandel is easily the most popular Western philosopher. Li’s criticisms of Sandel are generally quite broad, but oftentimes inaccurate. For instance, Li makes some questionable comments regarding the discussion of the 1884 case of survival cannibalism “The Queen vs. Dudley and Stephens” in Sandel’s book Justice. Following a shipwreck, Tom Dudley, Edwin Stephens, and two other men were cast away in an open boat. After twenty days at sea, with the agreement of Stephens and Dudley, the captain killed the cabin boy and they ate him for four days until they were found and rescued. When they were put to trial they confessed and claimed they had acted out of necessity. Sandel wonders:

Is morality a matter of counting lives and weighing costs and benefits, or are certain moral duties and human rights so fundamental that they rise above such calculations? And if certain rights are fundamental in this way—be they natural, or sacred, or inalienable, or categorical—how can we identify them? And what makes them fundamental?

Li comments directly on Sandel, claiming that in this case the utilitarian principles should take priority over treating all humans as ends. Interestingly, however, he does not credit Sandel with steering his readers to exactly the same interpretation. Sandel ends his description by claiming the primacy of “consideration for the concrete circumstances, and the role of emotions in the decision.” He strongly implies, though does not directly state, that his view is an alternative to Sandel’s, when in fact it is almost identical.

In another example of conscious or unconscious misinterpretation, Li writes, “So why, as Sandel asks, should events for the revival of Nazism be forbidden but not events opposing racial segregation? This is not something that principles or suppositions such as the ‘veil of ignorance’ or ‘neutrality’ explain.” When completing the final draft of this translation for publication, the co-translator, Robert Carleo, was caught in a dilemma. Carleo wrote a comment in Trackchanges to co-author Paul D’Ambrosio: “This statement seems just too dicey for me, and I am tempted to delete it. (It’s wrong, isn’t it?) Li seems to think that these ideas work on a level below his own. . . . Is there any way to salvage this rare mention of topics actually close to the theme of this book? The point that Carleo does not explicitly mention, but which adds greatly to his ‘dicey’ impression, is that Sandel is in fact one of the most famous opponents of ‘veil of ignorance’ and ‘neutrality’ explanations, yet Li presents him as their champion. What should the translator do in this case? In which situations and to what extent are we legitimized to act as textual critics?

Such issues seem all the more difficult to handle when we reflect on the contradictory aspects they entail. They are private and shared, necessary while unanswerable, empowering and restrictive, a source of frustration as well as joy. Just as much eye-opening as they are maddening. They are common for anyone involved in the realities of contemporary Chinese translation. They reveal the challenges of interlingual communication in general, but, more particularly, they point to the need for translators to re-define, again and again, our role in each situation, and re-affirm our responsibility to decide for ourselves how to best tackle it. Carleo’s simple question “It’s wrong, isn’t it?” can help open up a larger discussion and increase awareness, but it does not, as in Carelo’s own experience, promise any definitive answer to our own, very specific problems. We cannot simply induce a widely applicable principle out of the individualized ways in which Carleo, or any translator, decides to deal with his or her dilemmas. These dilemmas are, and in fact should be, private and perpetual.

At the end of the day, holed up in our working spaces, staring at a blinking cursor, we need to answer these questions for ourselves. But if translation is an act of communication, we might not simply want to make sense to ourselves and our peers. We may need to be convincing, perhaps, to our own “ideal readers.” In our experience, whether we are dealing with the big question about the role of the translator or with those countless little questions about this or that word, it is helpful to bring to mind from time to time our own “Masters,” our “personal heroes” or sources of authority. How would I explain my choice to Henry Rosemont, Roger Ames, or Li Zehou and Yang Guorong...
Three Thoughts on Translating Classical Chinese Philosophical Texts

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There are disquisitions on the art of translating enough to fill a good-sized library, written by scholars who have devoted years to thinking about the problems involved in turning literature written in one language into literature of another language. In China, many colleges and universities have departments or even whole schools dedicated to translation. I have read only a very small portion of the works in those libraries and have never had the good fortune to take a course in translation. The closest I have to receiving an education in this art is a longtime friendship with David Tod Roy (1933–2017), one of the Western world’s greatest translators of Chinese traditional literature (his five-volume translation of Jin Ping Mei 金瓶梅, The Plum in the Golden Vase, is already recognized as a classic of this genre), but despite often discussing questions of translation with him I would not claim to have learned anything systematic about the topic. Nevertheless, throughout what has now grown to be a lengthy career of studying ancient Chinese literature I have been consistently concerned with problems of translation in my own work, and so the following thoughts on translating classical Chinese philosophical texts may not be entirely uninformed.

I propose to draw on my own past published translations to address three discrete and yet intimately related aspects of translating classical Chinese texts, especially what for want of a better term we can call philosophical texts. These three aspects are etymology, paleography, and sonics. By etymology, I intend both the etymology of the original Chinese word to be translated, and also the etymology of the English (or whatever other language one might be translating into) translation. Paleography, on the other hand, is strictly limited to the Chinese evidence. While it is often possible to use traditional dictionaries and other scholarly studies to trace ancient forms of the characters used to write particular words, in modern times it has become increasingly possible to augment this traditional evidence with newly unearthed evidence from throughout the first millennium that the Chinese language was being written. This is particularly important for me, since this is precisely the time when most of the literature that I study was first being written. By sonics, I mean at least some general attempt to approximate the sound of the original. Needless to say, it is not possible to make English sound like Chinese. Nor do I think it is generally advisable to try to replicate rhyme used in the original. However, I think it is often desirable to represent the rhythm of the original. And, as I will suggest at the end of this essay, there are certain special cases when it is essential to hear the sound of the text if one is to understand its sense. Attention to the sound of the original is particularly important when translating poetry, but it is by no means limited to the translation of poetry.

While the translations that I will offer here all take into account one or more of these aspects, in the end I often find the translation to be limited not so much by the flexibility of the English language (which, after all, is almost as flexible a linguistic medium as classical Chinese) as by the willingness of readers to tolerate locutions that are explicitly foreign to them (or perhaps by my assumptions of what readers might be willing to tolerate). This brings us to the question of the fundamental purpose of translation: is it to make the original Chinese text (or original text in any language, for that matter), which we might assume reads naturally in the original, read equally naturally in English (or in any other target language), or is it to hew as strictly as possible to the semantics and syntax of the Chinese original even at the cost of producing an unnatural-sounding English translation (though with the possible benefit of expanding—ever so slightly—what might be perceived as being natural-sounding English)? My answer to this question, as I will demonstrate with various translations, is inevitably something of a compromise. I strive to present as literal a translation as possible, one in which readers familiar with Chinese may still detect the Chinese original, but also that readers unfamiliar with Chinese might read as natural English. Needless to say, it is often difficult to satisfy both of these competing interests.

ETYMOLOGY

I suspect that most translators pay at least some attention to the etymology of key terms, both of the original language and of the target language into which they are translating. However, in the case of translations of classical Chinese philosophical texts, probably none has paid quite the attention that Peter A. Boomberg, the legendary professor of Chinese at the University of California at Berkeley, did so in two classic articles published in the 1950s. The first of these, entitled "The Semasiology of Some Primary Confucian Concepts," began with a call for translators of literature—"philologists" all—to show the same receptivity
to foreign influence as their scientific brethren to use the riches of all involved languages to invent new words.

For the humanist, however, linguistic barriers still stand as inviolable as if they were property lines of demarcation between cultural autarchies. Proud of his own heritage, often to the point of self-sufficiency, the humanist—who is essentially a “philo-logist,” that is, a lover of his native logos, or, at best, of that of his cultural area or subcivilization—is loath to permit the infiltration of the tiniest logospore of foreign extraction into the well-guarded precincts of his native literary tradition. In moments of magnanimity or spiritual weakness, he concedes the possibility of admitting a few spores, but only for the purpose of observation in the test tubes of his botanical laboratory. They may sojourn there under quaint labels in semilearned transcription, transliteration, Romanization, or Latinization, or “in the native character,” so that their exotic origin, and suspected virulence, could be easily apprehended by visiting minors or other innocents. Under no circumstances can these cells be allowed to come into mixogamous contact with the jealously protected gynoecia of the carefully nurtured word-plants of his native soil. The risk of having the beautifully laid-out garden turn into a jungle of linguistic hybrids and neological monstrostities is too appalling, and the unhappy asthmatic horticulturalist rededicates himself anew to the desperate holding actions against the clouds of coryza-laden pollen drifting from beyond his cultural horizon. 3

The thought of trying to translate this passage into Chinese, whether classical or modern, provides some notion of the difficulty of accepting the translations that Boodberg proposes for what he identifies as “some primary Confucian concepts,” such as junzi 君子, de 德, ren 仁, and yi 義, among others. For junzi 君子, Boodberg’s “lordling” is perhaps readily intelligible, and I myself have often used his compromise “lord’s-son” for this term. However, despite his vigorous argument in defense of neologism, his “indarrectitude” for de 德 has, as far I know, never been used even by his most ardent disciples. While the translations “co-humanity” and “selfshipful compropriety” or “proper selfshipfulness” for ren 仁 and yi 義 are obviously intended to shock readers out of a too ready familiarity with these important virtues, Boodberg’s nods toward “humanity” and “propriety,” based on the graphs’ fundamental components ren 人 “human” and wo 我 “we,” are certainly acceptable by any standard. Indeed, such commonly seen translations of ren 仁 as “benevolence,” “perfect virtue,” “altruism” or “Goodness,” none of which acknowledges the “human” in the word, not only fail to acknowledge the word’s original Chinese etymology, but are—each in their own way—for more limited in their range of meaning than the simple and straightforward “humane” or “humanity.”

It is obvious that in this 1953 article, Boodberg was being intentionally provocative—and also intentionally playful—in his even more etymological neologisms. The provocation—and the playfulness—was only magnified in his even better known 1957 Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies article “Philological Notes on Chapter One of the Lao Tzu.”4 After providing etymological analyses of almost every individual word in the first chapter of the Laozi 老子, Boodberg offered the following translation of the entire chapter (the scansion of the Chinese text being that given by Boodberg himself).

道可道非常道
名可名非常名
無名天地之始
有名萬物之母

故
常無欲以觀其妙
常有欲以觀其徼
此兩者同出而異名
同謂之玄
玄之又玄
眾妙之門

Lodehead lodehead-brooking : no forewonted lodehead;
Namecall namecall-brooking : no forewonted namecall.

Having-naught namecalling : Heaven-Earth’s fetation,
Having-aught namecalling : Myriad Mottlings’ mother.

Affirmable,
Forewont
Have-naught

Desired—for to descry in view the circuit-luminaria;

These pairing ones at-one
Egressing,
Diverse namecall :

At-one—bespeak such : Darkling,
Adarkling such, again adarkling

The thronging sublinaria’s gate.
The Jabberwocky quality of the translation is much of its fun, but Boodberg was not just being needlessly provocative. Take his translation of the famous first two lines:

道可道非常道，

名可名非常名:

Lodehead lodehead-brooking: no forewonted lodehead;

Namecall namecall-brooking: no forewonted namecall.

These lines are usually translated as something like “The way that can be spoken of is not the constant way; the name that can be named is not the constant name” (D. C. Lau) or “The Tao that can be told is not the eternal Tao; the name that can be named is not the constant name” (Wing-tsit Chan). Boodberg is absolutely right in principle to note that the verbal dao 道 following ke 可 ought to have a similar meaning to the nominal dao 道 that begins the sentence, in the same way that the verbal ming 名 “to name” is the same word as the nominal ming 名 “name” in the second line. And he is also right in practice to note that the verbal form dao 道 “to follow” or “to lead” (along a road) is not only strictly cognate with dao 道, but is indeed just another form of the same word. An ideal translation ought to reflect this relationship between the noun and verb of the first sentence here, just as the translations noted above do so for the second sentence. Whether Boodberg’s “Lodehead lodehead-brooking” is the best way to reflect this relationship is perhaps best left for the individual reader to decide. Boodberg’s “lodehead” is an elaboration of “leadway” or “lode,” for which he provides the glosses “(way,” “course,” “journey,” “leading,” “guidance”; cf. “lodestone” and “lodestar”), adding the “head” (shou 首) which is the phonetic component of the Chinese character dao 道 and which, as Boodberg also notes, may also contribute to the meaning of the character, viz. “to head,” i.e., “to tend in a certain direction.”

In my own published study and translation of this chapter, “On Inconstant Ways,” I attempted to do something similar, but less provocatively, offering for the two lines:

Ways that can lead are inconstant ways.

Names that can name are inconstant names.

Of course, on a superficial level, “way” or “ways” for the nominal dao 道 and “lead” for the verbal dao 道 (i.e., 導) do not reflect the relationship between the two words any better than do “Way” and “speak” or “Tao” and “tell,” the translations of D. C. Lau and Wing-tsit Chan. I was tempted to use “roads” instead of “ways,” which has at least a closer sonic relationship with “lead” than does “way,” and which may even share some etymological relationship, however remote. But in the end I chose to use “way” (or “ways”) because it has become such an established translation for dao 道 (or the Tao or Dao) that it seemed necessary to maintain it. I can appreciate that Professor Boodberg would regard this as an unnecessary compromise, but at least he would approve that it is not just a transliteration such as Tao or Dao.

My rendering of dao 道 as “ways” points to a perennial problem in the translation of classical Chinese philosophical texts. It is well known that the Chinese language, and especially classical Chinese, does not differentiate between singular and plural nouns. Moreover, it does not require an article before the noun, whether the definite “The Way” or “The Tao” of D. C. Lau and Wing-tsit Chan, noted above, or just the indefinite article “a” or “an,” not to mention that Chinese—whether modern or classical—knows nothing of English rules of capitalization. To me, the second of these problems is usually more important than the first (consider the difference in connotation between “the Way” and “a way”), and I find it is often possible to avoid it by using the plural without any harm to the meaning.

A related, and to me more intractable, question concerns the final clauses of these two sentences: fei chang dao 非常道 and fei chang ming 非常名. Should the fei 非 negate the entire clause (i.e., “not constant ways” and “not constant names”) or, as I have rendered it, just the following chang 常 (i.e., “inconstant ways” and “inconstant names”? The difference between these renderings is so subtle that it may not matter, and is, in any event, probably impossible to decide (though I do think that the positive “inconstant ways” and “inconstant names” is philosophically more interesting). Once again, Professor Boodberg:

The close juncture of fei with the following word often results in a certain syntactic ambiguity. There is, for instance, no grammatical criterion which would enable us to decide whether 非常人 also fei ch'ang jen yeh means “(X) is not (fei) a common (ch'ang) man,” or “(X) is an uncommon (fei-ch'ang) man.” Idiom-conscious readers will incline towards the second choice, fei-ch'ang, “uncommon,” “extraordinary” being a common idiom (as an adjective), readers well-grounded in the syntactical pattern fei . . . yeh might insist on the essential correctness of the first. This dilemma must have affected the thinking of many a translator of the Lao Tzu with its two fei-ch'ang.

I bring this up here mainly as a means of segueing into the next section of these random thoughts: on the question of paleography. Professor Boodberg did not fail to offer his understanding of the word chang 常:

S 1.5 and S 2.5 常 ch'ang, “constant,” “regular,” “common,” “ordinary,” “persistent,” “conventional,” “enduring,” never meant “eternal” or “absolute” in our sense, as wrongly by so many translators of the first couplet of the Lao Tzu. As an epithet, it is used to characterize “long-customed,” “long-vested” things and habits, both in the positive sense of “time-honored” (“regular,” “customary,” and “enduring”) and in the negative sense of “time-worn” (“commonplace,” “ordinary,” and “routine”).

I agree with everything Boodberg says here vis-à-vis the word chang, and yet the matter is not so straightforward. It has always been known that chang was the word used in the Han dynasty as a substitute for the word heng 恒 after use of that latter word was prohibited because it was
the name of Liu Heng 刘恒 (202–157 BC), who reigned as Emperor Wen 漢文帝 (r. 180–157 BC) of that dynasty. Heng does, in fact, have the sense “eternal” or “enduring.” More important, in both of the Mawangdui 素王堆 manuscripts of the Laozi, both of which were copied before Emperor Wen died and thus before this taboo became effective, these clauses read fei heng dao ye 非恆道也 and fei heng ming ye 非恆名也. Thus, translators cannot be faulted for translating either the chang of the received text or the heng of the manuscripts as “eternal.” However, even though heng was almost surely the original reading of the passage, it does not require the sense of “eternal,” since it also shares with chang the sense of “constant” (but none of chang’s other senses of “common,” “ordinary,” “persistent,” “conventional”). My own rendering of “inconstant” was given in the full knowledge of the manuscripts’ reading.

In the end, I am reasonably confident that the translation I have offered above is not only philosophically more coherent than the traditional translations, but is also consistent with the earliest attested Chinese interpretations of the passage. Nevertheless, I am even more confident that it will not be the final attempt to render this enigmatic passage into English, or any other language, for that matter. But it must be the last word of this section on etymology.

PALEOGRAPHY

The twentieth century brought to China a new academic discipline that has had a very significant influence on the study of all aspects of Chinese literature: archaeology. The importance of archaeology was first impressed on Chinese paleographers due to the discovery of inscriptions on Shang oracle bones, but as archaeology developed over the course of the century, the awareness of this importance continued to grow. Especially since the last quarter of the twentieth century, often termed the Golden Age of Chinese Archaeology, the discovery not only of ever more inscribed oracle bones, but also thousands of inscribed bronze vessels, and—more or less for the first time—records from the Warring States, Qin, and Han periods written on bamboo and silk, prompted numerous calls to “rewrite” the history of ancient China, including also the history of early Chinese literature. More and more it is becoming recognized that studies of China’s received literary tradition should also be informed by unearthed documents of all kinds.

One of my own first forays into the translation of China’s received literature was a translation of the Mawangdui manuscript of the Zhou Yi 周易 or Zhou Changes. As noted above, the tomb from which these manuscripts were unearthed, Tomb 3 at Mawangdui, was closed in 168 BC. At the time of its discovery in early 1974, this manuscript was certainly the earliest witness available to the early text of the Zhou Yi. Probably copied in the mid-170s BC, it was some 350 years older than the otherwise oldest evidence of the text, the Xiping 西平 Stone Classics text, which was quite fragmentary. While the Mawangdui manuscript was nearly complete, at least for the hexagram and line statements of the “classic” text, and while the contents largely coincided with the received text, it perhaps not unexpectedly contained many variants vis-à-vis the received text. Many of these variants were phonetically related to the characters contained in the received text, and were generally perceived to be just different ways of writing the same words, what is known in Chinese as “phonetic loans” (jiāijiézi 偕借字), essentially different “spellings” of the word. In the case of a line such as fei long zai tian 飛龍在天, which corresponds to the line fei long zai tian 飛龍在天 in the received text, it is clear that fei, which means “cockroach,” is indeed just a different way of writing the word fei “to fly,” now routinely written with the character 飛. Indeed, in the Han dynasty fei “to fly” was often written as 飛, not only in manuscripts unearthed from that period, but also in received texts from the time. In any event, any translation of the line that insisted on reading that word as “cockroach” instead of some permutation of “to fly” (such as “flying”) would surely be wrong.

However, not all variants are quite so easily related. Take the name of the hexagram in which the line above is found, the famous first hexagram in the Zhou Yi: Qian 乾. It is much debated just what this character, which in most contexts is usually read as gan “dry,” means in the received text. Most early (and also late) commentators simply gloss it as jian “vigorous.” This is certainly possible, but very hard to demonstrate from context since other than as the hexagram name, the character only occurs in the text once (well, actually twice, since it occurs as a duplicative binome: qianqian 乾乾): one clause of the Nine in the Third line of the hexagram reads junzi zhong ri qianqian 君子終日乾乾 “the lord-son throughout the day is乾乾” vigorous.” In the manuscript, the name of the hexagram is written as jian “key.” Virtually all Chinese scholars whose work I have seen simply assume that this jian “is another way of writing jianxi “vigorous,” which in turn is but another way of writing the qian乾乾 of the received text. Thus, the circle is completed and the reading of the received text is confirmed. But at what price? The circle may be complete, but at the price of simply erasing the manuscript. In my translation of the manuscript, I insisted that if the surface reading of the manuscript can make sense, it was my responsibility as a translator to reflect that sense. To be sure, in the sentence “junzi zhongqi jianjian 君子終日鍵鍵”, the grammar requires that jianjian 鍵鍵 serve as a predicate adjective for which “vigorous” would be appropriate. However, there are also cases within the Zhou Yi in which the name of a hexagram is used in two or more different ways, as if the authors of the text were intentionally taking advantage of the inherent polysemy of the Chinese writing system. As such, jian “key” seems to me to be a reasonable meaning for the name of the hexagram which, after all, opens the text. And so I translated the name of that first hexagram as “Key.”

If most Chinese colleagues simply shake their head at this translation (as I have seen them do on several occasions), the few who have taken note of my translation of a still earlier manuscript of the Zhou Yi, that in the collection of the Shanghai Museum, positively howl that I have transgressed against all norms of translation and exegesis. The Shanghai Museum manuscript was robbed from some unknown tomb, probably in the vicinity of Jingzhou 荊州, Hubei in the late autumn of 1993. It was purchased by the museum early in 1994. Although the archaeological context of the manuscript has been lost, as well as some two-thirds of its contents, the paleographic evidence suffices to show that the manuscript was copied sometime in the second
half of the Warring States period, probably about 300 BC. Thus, it is now the oldest witness to the text of the Zhou Yi, even if a somewhat fragmentary witness.15

The first hexagram, at least according to the sequence of hexagrams in the received text, preserved, albeit only partially, in the Shanghai Museum manuscript is the fourth hexagram, known in the received text as 恩蒙, another word for which there are several meanings, including “type of plant, dodder”; “lush, luxuriant”; “to cover”; “to wear on the head”; “to trick”; “occcluded”; “ignorant”; “confused”; “youth.” In the Zhou Yi tradition, the character is variously explained as “youth” or “ignorance,” with many commentators combining the two meanings (i.e., “the ignorance of youth” or “Youthful Folly”).16 Although the bamboo strip bearing the hexagram name as well as the first two line statements has been lost from the manuscript, the formulaic nature of the four remaining line statements shows that the manuscript must have written the name of this hexagram as 蒙. In conventional script, 蒙 is the standard graph for the word 恩, “long-haired dog.” What could a “long-haired dog” have to do with the ignorance of youth? Chinese scholars whose work I have consulted concerning this question have invariably regarded 恩 as a simple phonetic loan for 恩蒙,17 and thus understand its occurrence in the hexagram as meaning either “youth” or “ignorance,” or one of the other meanings hallowed by the Zhou Yi tradition. For instance, Pu Maozuo 普茅左, the editor of the manuscript, notes that the Jingdian shiwen 經典釋文 of Lu Deming 陸德明 (556–627) indicates 恩蒙 as an alternative pronunciation of 蒙, and thus assumes that both 蒙 and 蒙 stand for the same word, which he regards as 恩 “youth; ignorance.”18 On the other hand, this shows that at least one text of the Zhou Yi still in circulation by the beginning of the seventh century wrote the name of this hexagram (and the occurrence of the same graph in all of the line statements) as 蒙. There is no question that 恩 and 恩蒙 were sufficiently similar in pronunciation that 蒙 could be used to write 恩蒙. Nevertheless, it stands to reason that the opposite could also be true; that is, 蒙 could also be used to write 恩蒙. In fact, this is an argument made by the Japanese scholar Ōno Yuji 大野裕司.19 He notes that in line statements of this hexagram such as 恩蒙/蒙 and 蒙/蒙, “long-haired dog” makes better sense as an object of the verbs 恩 “to bind” and 蒙 “to hit” than does “the ignorance of youth.” Even in the Six in the Fifth line statement, 蒙/蒙 僅蒙/蒙, “young; youth” could describe a long-haired puppy just as well as a child, ignorant or otherwise. Examining another line statement in the received text of this hexagram, which, however, has not survived in the manuscript, may provide further support for reading 恩蒙 as 蒙蒙, and thus as “long-haired dog.” The Nine in the Second line reads:

包蒙吉納婦吉子克家

Wrapping the 恩蒙. Auspicious. Taking a wife: auspicious; a son can marry.

Of course, the image “包裹 恩蒙” 包蒙 “Wrapping the 恩蒙” is one of those enigmas that has made the Zhou Yi famous, and which has provided almost limitless license to translators and commentators alike. What could “wrapping youthful folly” possibly mean? The same Jingdian shiwen that noted the existence of a text in which 恩蒙 appears where we would normally expect 恩蒙, quotes the text of Zheng Xuan 鄭玄 (127–200) as reading this line as 悉包蒙彪蒙. To be sure, Zheng Xuan’s text wrote the second character as 蒙, but what is interesting is that the original meaning of the first character, 悉包, is “stripes (of a tiger).”20 Although this line is missing from the Shanghai Museum manuscript, if it were to read both characters as 悉包蒙彪蒙, might we then understand it as “a striped long-haired dog”? It seems to me to make at least as much sense as “wrapping youthful folly.” And so, in my translation of the Shanghai Museum manuscript, I translated 恩蒙 as “shaggy dog.” I would certainly not insist that this is “the correct” reading of the Zhou Yi, as if there were such a correct reading. However, I would suggest that it is not only a possible reading, but it is at least prima facie “the” reading of the manuscript. I would argue that as the first English-language translator of the Shanghai Museum manuscript of the Zhou Yi, I had a responsibility to reflect in my translation how the manuscript might contribute to our understanding of the many possibilities of meaning inherent in the text. To insist that a possible reading is impossible, simply on the basis of tradition, seems to me not only to be a rejection of the polysemy that is a defining feature of the Zhou Yi, but, perhaps more important in a general sense, it is a rejection of the call to “rewrite” early Chinese texts—a rejection of the contribution that archaeology and paleography can make in our understanding and translation of ancient Chinese texts.21

The Zhou Yi is by no means the only classical Chinese philosophical text for which unearthed manuscripts have complicated our reading—and our translations. The Li ji 律記 or Record of Ritual is usually regarded as one of the more straightforward of the Chinese classics, typically entailing relatively few problems of interpretation (at least in comparison with a text such as the Zhou Yi). And yet here too matters are not so straightforward. Until recently, the “Zi yi 繩衣 “Black Jacket” chapter was one of the more neglected texts in the Li ji, despite being one of the so-called four “Zi Si” chapters, texts attributed to Zi Si 子思 (483–402 BC), the grandson of Confucius (551–479 BC), chapters that include the famous “Zhong yong” 中庸 “Doctrine of the Mean.”22 This changed around the year 2000, with the publication first of the Guodian 庭郭店 manuscripts and then a few years later of the first volume of the Shanghai Museum manuscripts,23 both of which included manuscript copies of the Zi yi. Questions of interpretation—and thus of translation—arise with the very first passage of the manuscripts (the second passage in the received text). In the received text, this passage reads as follows:

子曰：好賢如縑衣，惡惡如巷伯，刑不順而民作怨，刑不試而民成服。

The Master said: “If one loves worthies as does ‘The Black Jacket’ and hates evil as does ‘The Elder of the Lane,’ then entitlements will not be gratuitous but the people will do as wished, and
punishments will not be used but the people will all submit.”

The Greater Odes says: “A proper model was King Wen, The ten-thousand countries acted sincerely.”

This seems to be eminently straightforward. However, both of the manuscripts write the last clause of what “the Master” said differently from the received text (for the convenience of publication, I here use a relaxed transcription method):

夫子曰：好美如好蠶衣，惡惡如惡巷伯，則民咸服而型不屯。

詩云：儀型文王，萬邦作孚。

M#1: Our Master said: “If one loves beauty as he loves 'The Black Jacket,' and if one hates evil as he hates 'The Elder of the Lane,' then the people will all be strong and the model will not crumble.”

The Poetry says: “A proper model was King Wen, The ten-thousand countries acted sincerely.”

There are several variants of greater or lesser significance between the two versions of the text here. However, for the purpose of the present discussion, I will focus only on the difference between the two phrases xing bu shi: 刑不試 of the received text and xing bu dun 型不屯 of the manuscripts.

The graphs 型 and 刑 are freely interchanged in early manuscripts, each graph being used indiscriminately to write the words “model” or “punishment, penalty” (some sense of the relationship between the two words might be gained by translating them as “form” and “reform” [in the sense of “reform school!”], respectively). The final character of the phrase in the manuscripts is 堆, which the editors of Guodian Chu mu zhujiian 郭店楚墓竹簡, the influential first publication of the Guodian manuscript, suggest be read as a protograph or phonetic loan for chun 銘 “to move;” thus suggesting that the 型 of the manuscript be read in the sense of xing 刑 “punishment”; i.e., “punishments will not (move;) be used.”

While this reading is certainly sensible according to most principles of Chinese textual criticism, it is important to note that it has surely been influenced by a desire to accord with the reading of the received text: xing bu shi 刑不試 “punishments will not be (tried;) used.” There are several reasons to question the correctness of this reading.

First, whether in the received text or in the manuscripts, the Shi jing quotation that concludes this passage includes the graph 型 clearly used in the sense of “model”:

儀型文王，萬邦作孚

A proper model was King Wen, The ten-thousand countries acted sincerely.

Since this is the one graph that links the two quotations of this passage, it would seem that a consistent reading for it might be preferable to one in which it is read in two different senses. Second, the general context of at least the first half of the manuscripts version of the Zi yi stresses that the ruler should serve as a model for the people; if this first chapter of the work is to serve as an introduction to this theme, it would be reasonable to expect 型 here to be read as “model,” if an appropriate meaning of 堆 can be given. As it turns out, 堆 is the protograph of a word family most members of which have connotations of “confused,” “dull,” or “broken”: e.g., 钧 or dun 钧 “confused, stupid”; dun 钧 “dull”; dun 堆 “worn, crumbled.” Without any need to posit a phonetic loan, perfectly good sense can be made by reading the phrase “the model will not crumble.” On the other hand, in the received text of the Zi yi, the sequence of the individual chapters is radically rearranged, such that the main theme of the first chapters is the proper use of punishments by government, and thus it is easy to understand why an editor of that text might understand xing, whether written as 型 or as 刑, as “punishment.” And in the political context of the Han dynasty, when the received text of the Zi yi was undergoing its final editing, the most influential arguments at court were against the use of corporal punishment; it is easy to see why an editor would be tempted to read this line as “punishments will not be used but the people will all submit.”

By considering the early forms of the two graphs in question, dun 堆 and shi 試, it is easy to see how such confusion could have arisen. The dun 堆 of the manuscripts is written , while the seal script form of 斃, the protograph of 試 (by way of 式) is written . The two graphs are so similar in shape that it would have been natural for a reader who interpreted 型 to mean “punishment” to assume that was but a variant form of , thus making—for him—good sense of the phrase: “punishments will not be (tried:) used.” Good sense, indeed, but a very different sense from the sense that the manuscripts wished to convey.

I review all of this paleography for this discussion of translating classical Chinese philosophical texts because most of the studies that I have seen employ various paleographic arguments to read the manuscripts in the same way as the received text: some variation on “punishments will not be (tried:) used.” This is true too of the most authoritative English translation, by Scott Cook, which adds several words to read: “then the people will all submit, and yet the implements of punishment will not be blunted [through overuse].” I think this sort of translation is all but indefensible in terms of the paleography of the manuscripts. What is more, based on what I said above about the main themes of the manuscripts’ version of the Zi yi, on the one hand, and the Li ji received text, on the other hand, although the translation certainly reflects the sense of the received text, it is quite incompatible with the sense of the manuscripts. If one had approached the manuscripts without reference to the corresponding received text, I am sure it would have been a relatively easy matter to give the sort of translation that I have offered: “the people will all be strong and the model will not crumble.” But, just as in the cases of the Zhou Yi manuscripts examined above, because scholars steeped in the tradition of the Chinese classics assume that the received text is somehow “correct,” then they view it as necessary to adapt their reading of any new manuscripts that might be unearthed to conform to their prior understanding of the received text. It seems to me, once again, that this misses the great opportunity that
archaeology and paleography offer us to “rewrite”—or at least to re-think—classical Chinese philosophical texts. It goes without saying that this rewriting or re-thinking should also inform our translations of those texts.

Having argued for the importance of unearthed manuscripts, I should hasten to add that any translation that one might offer of classical Chinese philosophical texts will be contingent upon one’s own purpose in translating. If one proposes to translate a text as it has been transmitted over the ages and as it is found in the received literature, then the evidence of any manuscript that might be discovered will only be incidental to this, and need not be reflected in the translation. On the other hand, if one proposes to translate a manuscript version of the text, then of course the evidence of the manuscript is crucial. The matter becomes more complicated if one proposes to translate the text according to its “original meaning,” even assuming that there is such a thing as its original meaning. In this case, it would seem necessary to take account of all relevant evidence, both the received text and any manuscripts that might be available. While the manuscripts are likely to be the earliest evidence, and thus according to most canons of literary criticism have the greatest weight, this will not invariably be true. In the end, the translator will often be called upon to make her own decision between two or more possible readings. After all, despite Professor Boodberg’s hopes, alluded to above, translation is an art, not a science.

SONICS
The final topic that I propose to discuss in these thoughts on translating classical Chinese philosophical texts is the matter of sonics: to what extent it may be possible or desirable to replicate the sound of the Chinese original. Needless to say, modern Chinese sounds very different from English—and from most other languages into which translators might seek to translate Chinese—not to mention the manifest difference between the sounds of modern Chinese and the sounds of ancient Chinese, if these latter can even be retrieved with any confidence. And yet the sounds of a text can play an important role in the way the reader understands the text. Let me clear, I am certainly not proposing the wholesale use of transliteration instead of translation. While there are occasional Chinese words that have been taken over into the English vocabulary, such as yin and yang for which translations such as “sunny” and “shady” would probably be less intelligible to most readers than the transliteration, transliteration generally represents little more than what Peter Boodberg has called “the mummification of foreign terms in the sarcophagus of transliteration” and “a latent xenophobia as an evidence of a cautious and precise scholarship.” What I intend by sonics has more to do with the rhythm of the original.

In classical Chinese philosophical texts, rhythm probably manifests itself most commonly in parallel structure. Parallel structure is pervasive throughout almost all genres of writing. The parallels are sometimes drawn explicitly in what Greek rhetoricians called anadiplosis (when the last word or words of one clause is or are repeated as the first word or words of the following clause) and the related sorites (a chain linking the tenets of an argument, such as the opening passage of the Da Xue 大學 or Great Learning).

I think many translators would agree that anadiplosis and sorites are such important structures that they should be reflected in any translation. On the other hand, many translators avoid replicating parallel structure at all costs. True, in the hands of a clumsy writer parallel structure can devolve into a fugue-like redundancy, and while it may have the pretense of eloquence in Chinese, in English, at least, it just sounds redundant. However, in the hands of a master writer, the parallels can sound almost Bach-like. I would suggest that a proper translation needs at least to try to sound out these parallels.

Pervasive as the rhythm of parallel structure is in classical Chinese philosophical texts, it probably goes without saying that rhythm is most important in the translation of poetry. Let us take the most famous poem in all of classical Chinese poetry—and one that has been translated perhaps more than any other poem (though not nearly as often as the Laozi) as an example: the poem “Guan ju” 關雎 from the Shi jing 詩經 or Classic of Poetry.

Let me give a not quite random sample of published translations, arranging them by date of publication.30

James Legge, Kwan Ts’eu (1871)

Kwan-kwan go the ospreys,
On the islet in the river.
The modest, retiring, virtuous, young lady: —
For our prince a good mate she.

Here long, there short, is the duckweed,
To the left, to the right, borne about by the current.
The modest, retiring, virtuous, young lady: —
Waking and sleeping, he sought her.
He sought her and found her not,
And waking and sleeping he thought about her. Long he thought; oh! long and anxiously; On his side, on his back, he turned, and back again. Here long, there short, is the duckweed, On the left, on the right, we gather it. The modest, retiring, virtuous, young lady: — With lutes, small and large, let us give her friendly welcome. Here long, there short, is the duckweed; On the left, on the right, we cook and present it. The modest, retiring, virtuous, young lady: — With bells and drums let us show our delight in her.

James Legge, *The Kuan Chü* (1876)

Hark! From the islet in the stream the voice Of the fish hawks that o’er their nest rejoice! From them our thoughts to that young lady go, Modest and virtuous, loth herself to show. Where could be found, to share our prince’s state So fair, so virtuous, and so fit a mate?

See how the duckweed’s stalks, or short or long, Sway left and right, as moves the current strong! So hard it was for him the maid to find! By day, by night, our prince with constant mind Sought for her long, but all his search was vain. Awake, asleep, he ever felt the pain Of longing thought, as when on restless bed, Tossing about, one turns his fevered head.

Here long, there short, afloat the duckweed lies; But caught at last, we seize the longed-for prize. The maiden modest, virtuous, coy, is found; Strike every lute, and joyous welcome sound. Ours now, the duckweed from the stream we bear, And cook to use with other viands rare. *He* has the maiden, modest, virtuous, bright; Let bells and drums proclaim our great delight.

V.W.X., *The Ospreys Woo* (1878)

As the ospreys woo On the river ait, So the graceful lass Has her manly mate.

As the coy marsh flowers Here and there do peep, So the graceful lass In his wakeful sleep.

But he seeks in vain, Brooding night and day, Ah me! ah me! Tossing rest away!

As the coy marsh-flower Chosen here and there, So the graceful lass; He in tune with her.

As the coy marsh-flower Gathered here and there, So the graceful lass, Bells now ring for her.

William Jennings, *Song of Welcome to the Bride of King Wen* (1891)

Waterfowl their mates are calling, On the islets in the stream. Chaste and modest maid! Fit partner For our lord (thyself we deem).

Waterlilies, long or short ones, Gather, right and left, their flowers. Now the chaste and modest maiden Lute and harp shall hail as ours. Long or short the waterlilies, Pluck them left and pluck them right. To the chaste and modest maiden Bell and drum shall give delight.

Arthur Waley, *Fair, Fair, Cry the Ospreys* (1937)

“Fair, fair,” cry the ospreys On the island in the river. Lovely is this noble lady, Fit bride for our lord.

In patches grows the water mallow; To left and right one must seek it. Shy was this noble lady; Day and night he sought her.

Sought her and could not get her; Day and night he grieved. Long thoughts, oh, long unhappy thoughts, Now on his back, now tossing on to his side.

In patches grows the water mallow; To left and right one must gather it. Shy is this noble lady; With great zither and little we hearten her.

In patches grows the water mallow; To left and right one must choose it. Shy is this noble lady; With gongs and drums we will gladden her.
Bernhard Karlgren, *Kuan ts’ü* (1944-45)

1. *Kwan-kwan* cries the *ts’ ü-kiu* bird, on the islet of the river; the beautiful and good girl, she is a good mate for the lord. 2. Of varying length is the *hing* waterplant, to the left and right we catch it; the beautiful and good girl, waking and sleeping he sought her: wished for her; he wished for her but did not get her, waking and sleeping he thought of her; longing, longing, he tossed and fidgeted. 3. Of varying length is the *hing* waterplant, to the left and right we gather it; the beautiful and good girl, guitars and lutes befriend her: hail her as a friend. 4. Of varying length is the *hing* waterplant, to the left and right we cull it as a vegetable; the beautiful and good girl, bells and drums cheer her.

Ezra Pound, *Hid! Hid!* (1954)

"Hid! Hid!" the fish-hawk saith,  
by isle in Ho the fish-hawk saith:  
"Dark and clear,  
Dark and clear,  
So shall be the prince's fere."

Clear as the stream her modesty;  
As neath dark boughs her secrecy,  
reed against reed,  
tall on slight  
as the stream moves left and right,  
dark and clear,  
dark and clear.

To seek and not find  
as a dream in his mind,  
think how her robe should be,  
distantly, to toss and turn,  
to toss and turn.

High reed caught in *ts’ai* grass  
so deep her secrecy;  
lute sound in lute sound is caught,  
touching, passing, left and right.  
Bang the gong of her delight.


Waterbirds on  
River islands!  
Shy the nymph our  
Shepherd's chosen.

Waterlilies  
Wreathe around her,  
Shy the nymph he  
Waking, sleeping,  
Never reaches;  
Waking, sleeping,  
Longing, longing,  
Turning, tossing.

Waterlilies  
To adorn her,
Night and morning he would yearn
Ah, so long, so long! – and restless
On his couch would toss and turn.

On the other hand, his first stanza seems forced:

Waterfowl their mates are calling,
On the islets in the stream.
Chaste and modest maid! Fit partner
For our lord (thyselwe deem).

It is compromises such as this that have caused most translators of poetry to refrain from trying to replicate the rhyme scheme of the Chinese original.

If a translation is to be faulted for too faithfully adhering to the sonic quality of the original, both in terms of beats per line and also for the rhyme, what is the translator to do? I believe it is possible both to translate every word of the original and to approximate at least the first of these sonic effects, by translating into an English verse of modified iambic tetrameter. The following is my own rendition.

Join Join cries the osprey
On the island of the river.
Shy and slender is the chaste girl,
A loving mate for the lord's son.

Up and down the water lilies,
To the left and right drifting them.
Shy and slender is the chaste girl,
Awake and asleep seeking her.

Seeking her without success,
Awake and asleep thinking of her.
Longing, oh, longing oh,
Tossing and turning to and fro.

Up and down the water lilies,
To the left and right picking them.
Shy and slender is the chaste girl.
With harp and lute befriending her.

Up and down the water lilies,
To the left and right choosing them.
Shy and slender is the chaste girl,
With bell and drum amusing her.

To be sure, the first line does not seem to adhere to the eight beats of every other line, but if I were to read this out loud, I would be sure to extend the "Join"s across two beats apiece, replicating at least somewhat both the way the line would be recited by a traditional Chinese reader, and also approximating the long high-pitched call of the osprey. True, there is no rhyme, but I have tried to compensate by translating the rhyming two-character description of the girl, 雅窕, which has long been held to be one of the keys to the poem, with an alliterative compound in English: "shy and slender." Arthur Waley's "Shy was this noble lady" seems entirely too understated, and also weirdly disembodied for the girl of the protagonist's dreams.

Before closing this discussion of the translation of "Guan ju," I should also like to make a plea for taking seriously the cry that the osprey makes at the beginning of the first line. The words guan-guan 聯聯 have traditionally been regarded as onomatopoeia, the sound that the osprey or ospreys make on the island in the river. Of the translations surveyed here, three (VWX, Jennings, and Cooper) neglect the sound entirely, two (Legge 1871 and Karlgren) render it in transliteration (kwan-kwan), and one (Legge 1976) gives the functional translation "Hark." Only two of the translators hear in the sounds a Chinese word: for Waley "Fair fair" and for Pound "Hid hid." I can imagine that Pound was inspired by the modern meaning of guan 聯: "to close, to latch," and as such he would have heard the fish-hawk to be commenting on the girl's being "hidden." In the Shi jing, when birds or animals are quoted as crying out, the cries are not just pure onomatopoeia; the sounds are necessarily written in Chinese characters, and it is my contention that these characters are almost always intended to convey meaning. In this case, whatever sounds the ospreys, or as I would argue, just a single osprey, may have made in reality (the best description that I have read of the cry of an osprey is that it sounds like a door turning slowly on a rusty hinge), the poet heard it to be saying in Chinese guan-guan. While Pound is correct that guan 聯, the character used in the received text to write the sound, now means "to close," and thus might have an extended connotation of "hidden" behind a gate, the etymology of this word has different connections. The key component of the character is guan 門, which serves as both the phonetic element and also as a pictograph of the original meaning of the word: it is the cross-bar that locks the two doors of a double-doored gate together. In the character, the "gate" component (門) is a later addition, contributing meaning, to be sure, but not basic to the character. The original sense of the word, in addition to "to close," is also "to join." That this is the meaning that was intended in this poem, or at least was understood to be intended by the earliest copyists of the poem, can be seen in the way the character is written in all of the earliest manuscripts that quote the poem: guan 關. Here too the gate component is secondary; the key component is 聯, which is a pictograph of two objects or bodies linked together. This is the original form of the Chinese characters guan 聯 and guan 聯, which mean "to penetrate" or "to link together" (as strings of Chinese coins). I think it is no coincidence that this was also the standard ancient Chinese euphemism for sexual union. Whatever the osprey may have been saying, the poet heard it to be saying "join-join," which, as the rest of the poem shows, was the main thing on the poet's mind. If we fail to hear this, we miss an important aspect of this poem. I would urge that it is the translator's responsibility to try in some way to replicate if not the sound of the Chinese, at least the sense of the osprey's cry—as heard by the poet.

CONCLUSION

According to the Mao zhuàn 毛傳 or Mao Tradition, the canonical source for understanding the Shi jing, the sound guan-guan is simply a "harmonious sound" (和聲). Elsewhere this is expanded to be "the paired bird calls
mutually harmonizing and pleasing each other” (niao sheng zhi liang xiang he yue ye 鳥聲之兩相和悅也). This is probably a fitting note on which to end this discussion of translating classical Chinese philosophical texts, with the hope that the original text and the translation might mutually harmonize, even if not to please each other. However, to move from the realm of aesthetics and music back to the humanities and linguistics, perhaps I should return to Peter Boodberg's translation of the opening couplet of the first chapter of the Laozi: Dao ke dao fei chang dao, ming ke ming fei chang ming 道可道非常道,名可名非常名. After offering four possible renditions:

I. (If/when/though) the way is way-able (i.e., brooks/admits treatment as a way, it is no common way.

(If/when/though) the name is namable (i.e., brooks/admits treatment as a name, it is no common name.

II. (When we) way (i.e., treat-as-the-way) the wayable (i.e., what brooks/admits treatment as a way, it is no common way.

(When we) name (i.e., treat as a name/its name) the namable, it is no common name.

III. If the way is wayable, (we) gainsay the common ways; if its name be namable, (we) gainsay the common names.

IV. Waying the wayable, (we) gainsay the common ways; naming the namable, (we) gainsay the common names.

To these translations, Boodberg adds the following explanation:

The polysyntactical ambiguity and seeming confusion and contradiction of the above renderings will prove, after a moment’s reflection, more apparent than real. It is not impossible moreover to construct a crude English replica of the original text reproducing all of its ambiguities.39

That “crude English replica” is of course “Lodehead lodehead-brooking: no forewonted lodehead; Namecall namecall-brooking: no forewonted namecall.” Much as I admire the spirit animating Boodberg's translation, I think it is possible to combine his etymological skill with recent advances in paleography and also a sensitivity to the rhythm of Chinese texts to translate classical Chinese philosophical texts into other English replicas, doubtless no less crude, but perhaps closer to the reading experience of both Chinese and English readers.

NOTES

1. Much of the material in this article has already appeared in various of my more specialized writings. I repeat it here in the hopes that it may be new to readers of the APA newsletter.


5. The first of these translations is that of D. C. Lau, Lao Tzu: Tao Te Ching (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1963), 57; the second from Wing-tsit Chan, The Way of Lao Tzu (Tao-te ching) (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1963), 97, For “175+” translations of this chapter, almost all of them similar to these two, see Bureau of Public Secrets, Lao Tzu: (175+ Translations of Chapter 1), at http://www.bopsecrets.org/gateway/passages/tao-te-ching.htm.


8. Note Boodberg's caustic comment on the use of transliterations: Without necessarily dislocating the delicate patterns of our traditional linguistic growth, we could surely essay, with some profit and edification, a few systematic and controlled experiments in the ingrafting of seemingly alien concepts on our linguistic texture. Healthy neology is not incompatible with literary norm, whileummunification of foreign terms in the sarcophagus of transliteration, with no gesture whatever toward the courtesy of translation, is as often the symptom of a latent xenophobia as an evidence of cautious and precise scholarship; and a well-executed calque is not necessarily to be condemned without hearing as a counterfeit caxony and denied probation as literary tender, Boodberg “The Semasiology of Some Primary Confucian Concepts,” p. 319.


10. Ibid., 603–604.

11. In my article “On Inconstant Ways,” in addition to providing a close grammatical analysis of the phrases, I also examine four different passages from the Wenzhi 文子, all of which explain the Laozi as an argument in favor of flexibility and against the perpetuation of time-worn precedents. I argue also that these Wenzhi passages should be regarded as earlier than the corresponding passages in the Huainainzi 淮南子, and that they are consistent with several notable pre-Qin attitudes concerning precedents.

these: we are not confined to the Mao recension as our ultimate source; we can, for the first time since the versions of the Three Schools were lost in early medieval times, have access to fragments, however incomplete, of a strikingly different early heterolectic tradition for the Poetry, and with it a different text of the songs. Because of the fragmentary nature of our evidence, we have more questions than answers, but our questions are getting better with every excavation (or, with lesser trust, purchase of looted grave goods). Those willing to make space for these questions “know” much less about the Poetry than our forebears. Those still under the sway of the traditional readings, including the May Fourth reading, have yet to grasp the magnitude of the challenges posed by the ancient manuscripts; Martin Kern, “Lost in Tradition: The Classic of Poetry We Did Not Know,” in Grace S. Fong ed., Haig Lectures on Chinese Poetry, Vol. 5 (Montreal: McGill University, Centre for East Asian Research, 2010), 31.

14. One such example is to be seen in the hexagram called 順卦. “Well” in the received text and 景 "Pit" in the Shanghai Museum manuscript. For my discussion of the polysemy inherent in this hexagram, see Edward L. Shaughnessy, Unearting the Changes: Recently Discovered Manuscripts of and Relating to the Yi Jing (New York: Columbia University Press, 2014), 59–66.


16. For instance, the Xun gua 序卦 commentary, basing itself on the traditional sequence of the hexagrams, moving from 尋 hexagram (R3), which is explained as “a plant first sprouting,” explains the name of the hexagram: wa sheng bi meng. 常生必慕 “When things are born they are necessarily loved.” The commentary of Wang Bi 王弼 (226–49), which serves as the basis of the orthodox exegetical tradition, explains the hexagram name as “a youth wishing to resolve that which confuses him” (yu jue suo huo ye sheng bi meng) (Shou Yi sheng bi meng (Sibu beiyao ed.), 119a). This is reflected in the English translation of Richard Wilhelm’s German translation of the hexagram name: ‘Youthful Folly’; see Richard Wilhelm, The I Ching of Book of Changes, trans. Cary F. Baynes (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1950), 20.

17. According to the phonetic reconstructions of Axel Schuessler, 曼 had an Old Chinese pronunciation of mòng and a Middle Chinese pronunciation of màng, whereas meng 夢 had Old Chinese and Middle Chinese pronunciations of mòng and màng respectively; see Axel Schuessler, Minimal Old Chinese and Later Han Chinese: A Companion to The Sibu Bei Yao Serica Recensia (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2009), 169.

18. Shanghai bowuguan cang Chu zhi shu (san), 137.


20. Lu Deming 陸徳明, Zhou Yi yin yi 周易音義 (Wuquibeizi zhai Yi jing ji cheng ed.), 907 (1.4a).

21. In my 2014 book Unearting the Changes, I concluded this section on variants in the Shanghai Museum manuscript of the Zhou Yi with the following statement about their implications for understanding the text:

What sort of exegetical principle can we derive from this discussion of the word jing in the Zhou Yi? I believe the fundamental philosophical thought of the Zhou Yi lies in change. The linguistic usage of the text would seem to be no exception. The diviners who created the hexagram and line statements seem to have very much appreciated the different senses of individual words, in the different line statements of a single hexagram often emphasizing different aspects of a single word family. In his 1985 doctoral dissertation, Richard Kunst highlighted this polysemous quality of the text.

In the case of the Yi, it may often be the case that a given word in a single context or in several adjacent contexts was meant from the beginning to be ambiguous. Or rather, put differently, it was the polysemous inherent in a word which gave it a numinous quality and led to its incorporation in the text in contexts capable of more than one reading. I often emphasize different aspects of a single word family, “The Original ‘Yijing’: A Text, Phonetic Transcription, Translation, and Indexes, with Sample Gloses” [Ph.D. diss.: University of California, Berkeley, 1985], 58.)

22. In the Western Zhou or Spring and Autumn periods, when the Zhou Yi was being composed, the words of these word families were often written with a single character. I suspect the ancient diviners were already well aware that words are variable, changeable, and that in creating the Yi, the Changes, they sought to exploit this feature of their language. However, later in the process of the transmission of the Changes, different schools of interpretation, which is to say the scribes of different times and places, were only able to choose a single one of these meanings to understand any given character; moreover, based on the writing conventions of their times, they were only able to use a single “correct” character to write it; Shaughnessy, Unearting the Changes, pp. 65–66.

I continue to think that this is a reasonable approach to the Zhou Yi in particular and also to the question of translating classical Chinese philosophical texts in general.

23. For a study of these chapters, done well before the discovery of the manuscripts that will be the topic of this discussion, see Jeffrey Kenneth Riegel, “The Four ‘Ts’ Ssu’ Chapters of the Li Chi: An Analysis and Translation of the Fang Chi, Chung Yang, Piao Chi, and Tsu” [Ph.D. diss.: Stanford University, 1978].


25. For a fuller discussion of this passage, together with citations of eighteen Chinese and Japanese studies that had been published prior to its publication, see Edward L. Shaughnessy, Rewriting Early Chinese Texts (Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 2006), 70–77. For a Chinese translation of this study, see Xian Yaxi, Zhou Yi, the Zhongguo gudai wenxian 重寫中國古代文獻 Zhou Boqu 自博群 tr. (Shanghai: Shanghai Guji chubanshe, 2012), 64–69.


27. For this word family, see Bernhard Karlgren, Granmattra Serica Recensia (1957; rpt. Kungsbacka, Sweden: Elders, 1972), #427.

28. This interpretation was first suggested to me by Li Ling 李零 in May 2000, and subsequently published as Li Ling, “Guodian Chu jian zhao ji” Guodian jianzhu lujuan, Daowen wenwu yanjiu yu wenhua yanjiu 19 (1999): 482, and Li Ling, Shang bo Chu jian san pian jiaoluo ji 博物館楚簡三篇校讀記 (Taipei: Wanjuan lou, 2002), 89.


32. On the other hand, to my mind all of his liberties are redeemed in his use of the text, especially its connection with the phonetically similar binomes yaqiao 美越 and yaxiao 好肴, and especially its connection with the phonetically similar binomes yaqiao 美越 and yoxiao 楚肴. For a discussion of the poetry, see Kern, “Lost in Tradition,” 42–46.

33. Early gloses for the word in this context are tong 通 “to penetrate” and jiao 交 “to join”, see Wang Xiangian 王先謙, Shi san jia yi jiu shu 三世家校校本 (rpt. Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1987),
4. Without wishing to anticipate the discussion below, I might note that both of these words were in ancient China standards euphemisms for sexual congress.

34. As for most Sinologist’s choice, Waley’s “Fair fair,” I suspect that only Waley knew whence it came, and he is no longer available to ask.

35. For my views on this, see “Arousing Images: The Poetry of Divination and the Divination of Poetry,” in Divination and Interpretation of Signs in the Ancient World, ed. Amar Annu Annu. Oriental Institute Seminars 6 (Chicago: The Oriental Institute of the University of Chicago, 2010), 61–75; and Xia Hanyi 夏含夷, “‘Xīng’ yu ‘xiàng’: Jianlun zhanbu he shige de guanxi ji qi dui Shi jing he Zhou Yi de xinClinton zheng xiangyan” 論論占卜和詩歌的關係及其對《詩經》和《周易》的形成之影響, Luojia jiangtan 羅欽講壇 6 (2011): 71–89.

36. For the cry of the osprey, see https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_KTpxps7mrw. The only discussion of bird calls that I have seen in the Chinese commentarial literature is that of Zheng Qiao 正喬 (1108–1166) in the Tong zhi 諏志: “In all species of geese and ducks, since their beaks are flat their sound is guan-guan; in species of chickens and pheasants, since their beaks are pointed, their sound is yao-yao; these are natural sounds. The beak of the osprey resembles that of ducks and geese, therefore its sound is like this, also getting the sense of the water’s edge”; quoted in Shi jing cidian, ed. Xiang Xi (Chengdu: Sichuan Renmin Libra, 1986), 144. This is nonsensical for two reasons. First, geese and ducks are quoted in the Shi jing as making both sounds like guan-guan (yong-yong 聚聚) and also yao-yao (ao-ao 敖敖). Second, the beak of the osprey is, in fact, pointed, and not flat like that of geese and ducks.

37. By analogy, in Edgard Allen Poe’s poem “The Raven,” the poet heard the raven to be saying “Lenore” and “Nevermore.” If we were not to hear this, we would fail to understand the psyche of the poet.

38. See Wang Xianqian, Shi Sanjia yi jishu 石三甲義技, 4.


**Introducing Premodern Text Translation: A New Field at the Crossroads of Sinology and Translation Studies**

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Over the past two decades, China has witnessed the rapid development of premodern text translation as a new, interdisciplinary field situated somewhere between traditional Chinese philology and translation studies, but also taking in elements of comparative literature, cultural studies, and other related disciplines. A plethora of books and journal articles have been published, a biennial conference has been held since 2002, and a number of universities have even started to offer doctorates in the specialization. Despite this, premodern text translation has not become a discrete field in Western academia, which is somewhat ironic considering that the vast majority of high quality, premodern text translations have hitherto been produced by scholars outside of China. And yet, unbeknownst to sinologists and translation scholars in the West, this field has the potential to explore many new and exciting questions that cannot be adequately addressed by sinology or translation studies as singular disciplines. Thus, this paper does not attempt to answer questions, but ask them instead. This may seem contrary to the typical way an academic article is written, but the fact is many of these questions have not been asked before in Western academia; in many cases, there are no answers available yet, only unexplored terrain for future scholars. This paper is the first time an English-language name for this discipline “premodern text translation” has even been put into print.

In preparation for this paper, I undertook two tasks. One was to review the major research produced in the field of premodern text translation, with the intention of providing a snapshot of the development of this interdisciplinary field to Western academics who would not otherwise have known of its existence. Two was to survey as many scholars who have published premodern text translations into English as possible, with the aim of understanding their attitude towards the development of this interdisciplinary. I wished to identify challenges they themselves faced during their translations of premodern Chinese texts, and determine how approaches adopted by interdisciplinary researchers could be used to better understand those challenges, and ideally formulate some relevant solutions.

Many of the most prolific translators of premodern texts are in their twilight years and difficult to contact, or have sadly passed away in recent years. I was fortunate, however, that over a dozen professors were able to take time out of their busy schedules to respond to questions I believe are relevant to the status of premodern text translation as a field in its own right. Some were even so helpful as to direct me to book chapters and articles discussing relevant topics. Based on their responses, I have summarized four aspects that I believe are most relevant for the introduction of this new field to Western academia, namely, the name and nature of premodern text translation, translator competence, preparatory work, and translation processes and methods.

**THE NAME AND NATURE OF PREMODERN TEXT TRANSLATION**

“Premodern text translation” is the tentative translation I offer for the Chinese term dianji fanyi 典籍翻譯. Although clunky, the advantage of “premodern text translation” over the rendering “classics translation” that is commonly used in China is that it acknowledges that the word dianji 典籍 denotes more than just the classic texts of the pre-Qin period—it includes virtually any text formed and circulated in China before the New Culture Movement of the mid 1910s and 1920s, and even encompasses texts written in non-Sinitic languages. Dianji is somewhat synonymous with guidian wenxian 古典文獻 (“ancient documents”), since the Chinese language does not clearly delineate between “ancient” and “imperial” the way English-speaking historians traditionally have in discourse on Chinese history. I welcome any other suggestions on how dianji fanyi might be translated into English; however, I have yet to come across a better rendering.

To give the reader some sense of the popularity and scope of premodern text translation as a research field in China, allow me to direct your attention to a book published in May 2019 entitled Selected Collected Commentaries on English Translations of the ‘Xue’er’ Chapter of the Analects, with the
First Chapter of James Legge’s ‘The Chinese Classics’ as a Base Text. Evidently, the field has matured to a point where translation critique of not only a single text but a single chapter can be treated to in-depth analysis and is able to attract funding for publication. The publication of this work was made possible by nearly two decades of hard work on the part of scholars in China to develop premodern text translation into a field in its own right. In the interests of space, it is not possible to enumerate every single piece of research that has been produced during that period, or even provide a definitive list of the most influential works. Rather, my aim is to introduce some of the key topics that have attracted the interest of scholars in China who do work in premodern text translation, and provide the relevant bibliographic information for those interested in reading more, and perhaps picking up where they left off.

To begin, let us take a look at some important works that provide historical background that informs our examination of premodern text translation. There are three scholars who have done some remarkable work in this area: David E. Mungello, David Honey, and Ming Dong Gu. Mungello has published extensively on the very first encounters between China and the West, and provided a much needed context; Honey has written Incense at the Altar, an extensive yet highly accessible introduction to the development of sinology and sinologists; while Gu’s Sinologism: An Alternative to Orientalism and Postcolonialism attempts to identify key historical trends at the macro level, and integrate them into a theoretical framework in which translation plays a key role. For a varied discussion on how early sinologists translated Chinese works into foreign languages, Sinologists as Translators in the Seventeenth to Nineteenth Centuries provides detailed examinations of specific case studies.

A number of books have been published in China which catalogue the history of foreign translations of Chinese literature. While there is no room to list them all here, Hanji Waiyishi 漢籍外譯史 is a good starting point as it covers a wide range of texts, periods, languages, and regions. Likewise, many works on missionary-translators have been published by Chinese scholars. Lastly, it is worth pointing out that most of the well-known premodern text translators have had biographies written about them, many of which provide insight into how they approached the task of translation. By reading about the life of, for example, James Legge, and then learning about that of Bernhard Karlgren or Ezra Pound, it is clear that premodern texts from China have been understood and rendered in a myriad of ways.

As regards the actual practice of premodern text translation, it has been examined to some degree by a handful of Western scholar-translators. However, it is worth mentioning that these examinations have been mostly restricted to the odd book chapter here and there. As insightful as they are, there has not yet been a full-length book treatment on the subject by a premodern text translator in Western academia. By contrast, the practice of premodern text translation has been analyzed at length by scholars in China. Notably, this interest in research has been accompanied by the publication of various textbooks aimed at training students in premodern text translation at the graduate level, for example, Zhongguo Dianji Yingyi 中國典籍英譯 by Wang Rongpei 汪榕培 and Wang Hong 王宏.

The sophistication of research in this field has also led to the development of some theoretical frameworks which attempt to ascribe overarching trends, principles, and ideologies to premodern text translation, often with a specific focus on Chinese poetry. It has also allowed for the publication of a large number of books dedicated to examining a particular translated edition of a premodern text, such as the full-length book treatment in Chinese by Wang Fanglu 王方路 of the Shijing 詩經, or by Wang Hui 王輝 in Chinese of the Zhongyong 中庸, to name a few. Much research has been done on the transmission and influence of specific translated editions of premodern texts, both from a bird’s eye view, and from the perspective of a particular ideology, such as Confucianism or Zhu Xi thought. Lastly, there is no lack of publications which explore a special topic related to premodern text translation that does not fall into the aforementioned categories. One of the most prevalent of those topics is how premodern text translation fits with the strategic aims of government and non-government organizations in China, for example, the Going Out policy.

However, the fundamental question of whether premodern text translation is essentially different from other kinds of translation—for example, literary translation, or translation of contemporary texts—has been left unexplored in Western academia. This question may not be as simple as it seems; let us consider the layers of complexity at work here.

To ask someone to translate a text written before the advent of modernity, or written in medieval or ancient times, is to ask him or her to render something written not only in a foreign language but in a foreign time. Translating modern Chinese into modern English is already an onerous task involving the transfer of the lexicon, grammar, and shared assumptions of two languages with almost no shared history or culture. And, yet, premodern text translation takes the task one step further: it asks us to translate texts written centuries, or even millennia, apart.

I note that The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2019 Edition) dedicated an entire entry to the subject of “Translating and Interpreting Chinese Philosophy.” It was written by the late Prof. Henry Rosemont Jr. who researched and translated widely on Chinese philosophy and religion. In the entry, Rosemont explains his rationale for singling out the translation of Chinese philosophy as a topic worthy of discrete investigation and inclusion in the encyclopedia:

There are no entries under “Translating and Interpreting . . .” for Greek Philosophy, for example, nor German Idealism or French Postmodernism. Even Indian philosophy lacks such an entry. This fact should bring home not just the singularity of the classical Chinese written language, compared to contemporary languages derived from the proto-Sanskrit Indo-European family of languages written in alphabetic scripts, but remind us as well of the greater distance between Chinese and other cultures from past to present.
This is where we are reminded of the truly global nature of this new field. Although this paper, for the sake of brevity, does not discuss premodern text translation of texts written in languages other than Chinese but formed and circulated in China such as ethnic minority literature, or indeed the languages of antiquity outside China, such as Ancient Greek or Latin, similar issues would presumably be encountered during these translation processes, and comparative research looking at these different premodern languages and the challenges they impose on the modern translator would be highly illuminating. In this way, premodern text translation has the potential to grow from a Chinese-focused field to an international one. Perhaps an eventual corollary would be the inclusion of the Chinese and other overlooked ancient civilizations in the discipline of classical studies, so that, for example, undergraduates would learn about Confucius and Laozi alongside Plato and Aristotle.

However, the consensus I discovered among the Western scholar-translators that I surveyed was that, while premodern texts have features which make them very different from modern texts, there is nothing about premodern text translation per se that sets it apart from other kinds of translation. Thus, when pressed to decide whether there were any intrinsic problems to premodern text translation, the professors for the most part expressed a concern for the needs and expectations of the audience, whether they be an academic or general one. Admittedly, this is a concern shared by almost any translator of almost any text.

Prof. Eric L. Hutton of the University of Utah, who among a myriad of academic achievements produced the translation Xunzi: the Complete Text (Princeton University Press, 2016), explained this point most eloquently by way of a “model” metaphor which may be applied equally to both premodern text translation and translation of other kinds of texts. Hutton approaches translation like an engineer would produce a model for the purposes of study and investigation, for example, for an aircraft or automobile. Given the complexity of most models, different engineers would add or omit features in their model depending on the aim of their investigation. Likewise, when rendering a text from Chinese into English, it is not possible for the translator to reproduce every possible feature of the source text in English. Instead, the translator is forced to select a limited number of the features of the source text to include in his or her “model” depending on the desired effect of the translation and its intended audience. This general principle applies equally to the translation of modern texts as it does to premodern texts, since the translator has objectives and audiences in both instances.

Having read the numerous articles written by other premodern text translators, and studied the feedback I have received via email from many others, I believe this is a common approach by scholar-translators in Western academia. However, I also discovered some challenges posed by premodern text translation that do not seem to be shared by modern text translation. Here I am aided by Prof. Michael Nylan from the University of California, Berkeley, whose extensive contributions include a complete translation of the Fayan  法言 (Exemplary Figures / Fayan, University of Washington Press, 2013). Among other practical aspects, Nylan has written of the “scissors-and-paste” style in which premodern texts were composed and how it influences the translation process:

Translators must be conscious of early conventions of writing in the period they are working on. Good writing, over and over again in the sources, is described by one of two synonymous binomial phrases: zhuwen 属文: putting together related passages and zhuifen 累文: compiling a text from preexisting units. . . . Compositions on a given theme are strung together from other passages (not necessarily devoted to the same topic) that contain the same vocabulary items or, more rarely, the same grammatical patterns. The repetition of particles conveyed to the reader/listener similarities in story lines, conclusions, and so forth. And since rhetoric often posited regularities, and parallelism by its very nature implies such regularities, without asking for a precise formulation liable to proof, parallel passages are ubiquitous.

Nylan goes on to point out that modern readers of Classical Chinese often look for logical connections where they are none. However, the transmitters of premodern Chinese texts did not consider logic important; rather, texts were designed to “establish the bona fides of its compilers by the display and repetition of well-worn tropes of high cultural literacy, memorized sayings, and some snippets of authoritative texts or proverbial wisdom, after which the compilers were free to try to formulate their most persuasive arguments.”

Another aspect peculiar to premodern text translation is it spans multiple genres and times. Taking in the available literature at a bird’s-eye view, it is evident that different genres present entirely different concerns for the translator. Take, for example, Classical Chinese poetry. Prof. Wilt L. Idema of Harvard University has spoken at length of its specificity: the way translators through the ages have grappled with preserving (or choosing not to preserve) rhyming schemes, metrical equivalence, and parallelism; the simplicity and directness of Classical Chinese poetry which is at odds with the highly rhetorical language of its counterpart in Western antiquity; the problem of annotations in poetry translation which read like jokes that have to be explained, and so on. And yet this is but one genre among the many in premodern Chinese literature: What of pre-Qin philosophical works, the fu 赋 rhapsodies of the Han dynasty, Yuan dynasty plays, or the famous novels of the Ming and Qing dynasties? These all come under the umbrella of premodern texts, and yet they each present their own distinctive challenges for the translator, and thus are deserving of separate investigations into topics such as translation process and method.

Here I wish to share the input of Olivia Milburn, professor of Chinese Seoul National University and translator of the ancient Chinese text Yuejueshu 越絕書 (The Glory of Yue: Brill, 2010). Milburn rightly points out that a key difference between translating modern and premodern texts is that, when it comes to the former, the author and his or
her contemporaries are usually available for consultation and clarification when problems arise. However, this is impossible for the latter. 25 Prof. E. Bruce Brooks from the University of Massachusetts Amherst and translator of The Original Analects (with A. Taeko Brooks: Columbia University Press, 1998) expressed a similar sentiment, describing premodern texts as anything but “authorial” in nature, which makes examination of them through the lens of translation theory incredibly problematic. Additionally, unlike most modern texts, premodern texts are products of long and continuous processes of adaptation. Thus, in Brooks’s view, to represent the premodern text as coherent and consistent is to lie about the text. 26

Milburn was also generous enough to elaborate on some of the specific challenges encountered by translators of pre-Qin texts, although the discussion could, to some extent, apply to premodern texts more broadly. Milburn explained that pre-Qin texts will at some point have been translated at least once into standard Qin-Han characters; however, due to problems such as manuscript errors, omissions, censorship, and any number of other issues, it is very difficult to determine the accuracy of the translation. In some cases, the received text accessible to the modern reader has become so garbled as to be incomprehensible. Again, I would posit that issues of this nature pose challenges for the translator that are unique to this field.

Lastly, a common concern among the professors surveyed was the importance of philology when translating premodern Chinese texts. Professor Emeritus of Chinese literature at the University of Washington David R. Knechtges, for instance, emphasized the point in an article he wrote which deconstructed his ongoing translation of the Wenxuan 文選 into English (Wen Xuan or Selections of Refined Literature in various volumes: Princeton University Press from 1982 onwards), concluding: “If we do not properly understand the language of our texts, we cannot hope to translate them correctly.” 27 Yet, in the view of Nylan, however much translation depends on philological work, translators must never equate translation work with philological work:

For the academic philologist preoccupied with lexicography and grammatical analysis, the single goal is clarity of meaning, but clarity often undermines the preservation of the most interesting features to be found in a historical or philosophical persuasion piece: the precise way that the text sets about to “intimate its meanings” in a compelling fashion. What damage a philologist equipped with a tin ear for English can do to a translation can be readily appreciated by reference to Bernhard Karlgren’s truly awful (i.e., incomprehensible and aesthetically offensive) translations of several of the Chinese classics. Widely admired and emulated prose in Han, pre-Han, and the immediate post-Han period conveyed the sheer delight of some of the author-compilers took in seeding their texts with intertextual allusions, larding them with enigmas and ambiguities, and devising dizzying verbal copia and reduplicative binomes of redoubtable hypnotic power but hazy meaning. Translators should aim to reproduce some measure of that same marvelous and magnetic richness, even if it seems sometimes to come perilously close to an over-the-top excess to our tastes today. 28

**TRANSLATOR COMPETENCE**

To many scholar-translators in the West, the question of translator competence may seem irrelevant to them. Perhaps, in their minds, a premodern text translation is produced by extensive and intensive reading of the text and its related sources, then translated into English as faithfully as possible, and that is that. Thus, they would argue, to investigate the question any further would be mere theorization. However, in the context of China today, this answer is probably inadequate. The reality is that premodern text translation is already a mainstay of translation programs at both the undergraduate and graduate level in China. Over the past two decades during which this interdisciplinary field has developed, universities throughout China have been training premodern text translators in the hope that China may, one day, produce its own high quality translations of the literature it rightly prizes as part of its intangible cultural heritage. And, regardless, what is the harm in examining more closely what is needed to produce better quality translations? Surely the better informed we are about how competence is formed in translator education, the more time can be saved in preparing students for this mammoth task.

On this particular question, I believe the scholar-translators from the West can find agreement with their counterparts in China; during my correspondence with them, I noted their shared emphasis on the importance of expertise in Classical and Literary Chinese, in particular a competence that goes beyond literate second-language acquisition. According to Nylan, not only are premodern text translators equipped with a level of premodern Chinese that few command, but perhaps equally important, they have an in-depth understanding of historical context without which a nuanced translation is not possible. Without these competencies, it seems true comprehension of the source text cannot be guaranteed, let alone an adequate translation. 29

However, the difficulty of attaining literacy in classical and literary Chinese should not be underestimated. Here I am aided by Prof. Robert G. Henricks from Dartmouth College, who contributed to English speakers’ understanding of ancient Chinese philosophy with a new translation of the Daodejing 道徳經 based on the Mawangdui Silk Texts (Lao-tzu: Te-tao ching: A New Translation Based on the Recently Discovered Ma-wang-tui Texts, Ballantine, 1992). In Henricks’s view, what makes classical and literary Chinese so difficult is its incredible terseness; much meaning is expressed in very few words, and even those words used may be polysemous or even imprecise. Additionally, grammatical structures may not define syntactical relationships with any kind of precision, and authors do not even use the particles at their disposal. 30

One should not forget, either, the issue of linguistic ability in English. In an address at Guangdong University of Foreign Studies on June 19, 2017, Prof. Idema set forth the common assumption that “literary translations are best produced by highly-educated native speakers of the target language with an intimate knowledge of the source language.” 31 Idema notes that, despite occasional exceptions such as the prolific Chinese scholar and translator Lin Yutang.
林语堂，the ideal situation is that literary translations (including translations of premodern texts) are done by native speakers of the target language in question. But has Idema’s assumption been tested by systematic, peer-reviewed research? From what I can tell, this is yet another gap in the field of premodern text translation. The Chinese poetry translator Prof. Xu Yuanchong 許淵沖 who is almost one hundred years of age, and professors Wang Rongpei 汪榕培 and Wang Hongyin 王宏印 who sadly passed away in 2017 and 2019, respectively, have contributed immensely to this field, and enjoy high fame and reputation within China. But the effect their non-nativeness has had on their translation process and product has not been adequately explored in the literature. In fact, this touches upon a broader issue that goes beyond the scope of this paper: Is it necessary for China to produce “its own” translations of Chinese literature, even if it means translating texts that have already been translated in the West? If so, how can this objective be realized? On this topic, Idema muses, “I don’t think translations carry a passport and have a nationality: once done, they travel freely and are available to readers all over the world. A rendition of a work of Chinese literature does not become better or more valuable because the translator worked inside China, but because the translator is of a superior quality.” Here one is reminded of the renowned British Orientalist-translator Arthur Waley who never stepped foot in Asia. I have also observed this phenomena in my own research work; although James Legge’s translation of the Confucian ritual text Liji 礼記 is over one hundred years old and in sore need of a more accurate and modern rendering, no complete translation into English has since been published in the West. While a translator from China did publish a complete English translation a few years ago, it has been largely ignored, being as it is lacking annotations, commentary, and a sound philological basis, not to mention full of grammatical errors.

Crucially, there is also philological competence. Though I did mention the field of philology in my description of the nature of premodern text translation, I devote some space here to explain what informs this ability to read and interpret documentary sources, including relevant reference works and secondary literature, related to the given text. In the case of canonical texts, this competence may be augmented by a kind of hermeneutical ability to make use of available sources to create new interpretations. In our correspondence, Prof. Idema pointed out that the older a given text, the more the translator will have to depend on the relevant philological scholarship, some of which is not necessarily limited to the scholarship in the source language. Furthermore, when working on pre-Qin texts, the translator inevitably has to decide whether to attempt a reconstruction of the perceived “original” text, or produce a translation that assimilates the interpretations of the canonical texts that have emerged over the past two millennia from the Han to the Qing dynasties. Again, it should be reiterated here that complex competencies like these are generally possessed by translators of premodern texts, and probably have little in common with translators of modern texts.

Ming Dong Gu, a professor of Chinese and comparative literature at the University of Texas at Dallas, goes one step further by suggesting that the ideal translator of premodern texts runs a gamut of roles during his or her practice:

Translation is not simply an act of rendering a source text into a target language, it is a complex hermeneutic act with the aim of producing a performative continuum in which the translator assumes the multiple roles of reader, scholar, critic, thinker, and writer. The outcome of such a hermeneutic act is a multiple textual spectrum with readerly translation at one pole and writerly translation at the other. ... In the final analysis, the ideal translator is not merely a competent reader who has a mastery of both source and target languages or a sensitive reader who is able to discover hidden connections in a source text. He or she should be a well-trained scholar who has intimate knowledge of source-text culture and target-text culture; a discerning critic who possesses a high literary sensitivity and can tell the strengths and weaknesses of a translated text; a practical thinker who can apply insights derived from reading, scholarship, and criticism to translation; and a creative writer who is worthy of being ranked among first-rate authors.

Prof. Gu touches upon something here that I believe to be central to premodern text translation and how it may enlighten us as to the core competencies of the budding premodern text translator, which in turn has implications for how we might train literary translators at the tertiary level who specialize in premodern texts. Should a premodern text translator be merely a competent bilingual, the resources available at the department of Chinese studies or translation studies would surely suffice; and yet considering the complex, multifaceted nature of the task at hand, these disciplines are not adequate in and of themselves. In light of this, it is necessary to consider an interdisciplinary approach.

In my interactions with the professors, I also asked whether they considered expertise in Western philosophy, or a classics education, to be a prerequisite for someone to translate a premodern Chinese text into English. The responses for this question were the most divided out of all the other questions. For that reason, I believe more research could, and indeed should, be done on whether this particular competence is essential for the aspiring premodern text translator.

As it happens, there has already been much written on the topic of comparative philosophy more broadly, and its implications for premodern text translation. Undoubtedly, the most vocal supporter of philosophical understandings would have to be Prof. Roger T. Ames of Peking University and the University of Hawai‘i at Mānoa whose translations include the Daodejing 道德經, Lunyu 論語, Zhongyong 中庸, Xiaojing 孝經, and Sunzi Bingfa 孫子兵法, with some being published with the subtitle “A Philosophical Translation.” There is little space in this paper to provide a detailed overview of Ames’s significant contributions to this field;
those interested in reading further need only consult the explanatory texts contained in any of these translated editions.

For the other scholars I consulted such as Hutton, a background in Western philosophy is not an absolute prerequisite for the premodern text translator, though he acknowledges that some familiarity with Western philosophy and classics is helpful. In his view, since various English terms have a history of being used in connection with particular ideas, it is important to develop a sensitivity to the ways in which rendering Chinese terms one way or another brings them closer to or further away from the “baggage” that various English terms carry. For example, the notion of an agent’s “will” is particular to the Western philosophical and religious tradition, and to render the Chinese 慾 as “will” without careful consideration is risky since it is a loaded concept that carries with it certain philosophical and religious associations. However, Hutton concludes that the required sensitivity can be gained through general education and experience, and that it is not necessary to become an expert in Western philosophy and classics to become a successful premodern text translator.

For Henricks, philosophical training may only aid in the translation of some premodern texts, for example, Neo-Confucian writings. He provided the example of Angus Graham’s translations of some of the early texts using logic as a good example of that expertise in action. Nonetheless, Henricks emphasized that a philosophical education is not necessary for many of the early Chinese classics such as the Laozi, Zhuangzi, Lunyu, and Mengzi. In his view, there is no need to make these translations overly abstract because these texts are not inherently philosophical. Other professors acknowledge the usefulness of philosophical expertise, but deny its value as a prerequisite. For Prof. Edward L. Shaughnessy of the University of Chicago, for example, expertise in the variety of Chinese being translated—whether it be classical, literary, or vernacular—is more important.

One topic that merits further investigation is whether one’s understanding of Western philosophy—and the preconceived notions that inform part of that understanding—may actually prevent an accurate understanding of the Chinese source text. I am grateful to have received input on this point from Prof. Paul R. Goldin of the University of Pennsylvania, who published a translation of the Xiaojing 孝經 in 2005 (in Hawaii Reader in Traditional Chinese Culture, University of Hawaii Press), and will publish the first complete translation into English of Xinyu 新語 this year with Elisa Levi Sabattini entitled Lu Jia’s New Discourses: A Political Manifesto from the Early Han Dynasty. Goldin refers to this kind of accuracy as an “emic understanding,” which I believe to be an appropriate term for this phenomenon, as it denotes an understanding of the text on its own terms, rather than imposing systems of thought that have originated outside of China onto the text in question. There have been articles published on particular translators’ perceived biases, but I am unaware of any systematic research on emic versus etic understandings of premodern texts and their translations into English.

**PREPARATORY WORK**

In my view, an important part of premodern text translation should be considering the preparation required when taking on a translation of a premodern Chinese text. As I expected, the scholars I surveyed for this paper provided particularly detailed explanations on this subject. For all of them, consultation of documentary sources and traditional commentaries was viewed as an essential part of the preparatory work required for the translation of a premodern text, or at least a classic or canonical one. For Knechtges, even this is not enough:

Linguistic knowledge alone is not sufficient in most cases for a proper understanding of the meaning of a text. Although one may know the literal sense of all the words in a line and be able to explain their grammatical function and even to reconstruct their putative ancient or medieval pronunciation, such knowledge may not produce a correct translation. For example, in translating the fu on the capitals, which occupy the first six chuán of the Wen hsüan, I spent much time reading historical and archaeological studies of Changan, Loyang, Chengtu, Chien-k’ang, and Yeh. I became intimately familiar with such works as San-fu huang-t’u 三輔黃圖, the reports on archaeological excavations, and studies of early Chinese architecture. The capital of fu of Chang Heng and Pan Ku are replete with accounts of ritual, and it became necessary for me to acquire a thorough knowledge of the ritual classics Li chi 礼記 and Chou li 周禮 as well as the monographs in the Hou Han shu on ceremony and official dress.

Prof. Goldin was also generous in providing his perspective on preparatory work. In his view, translations into Vernacular Chinese and foreign languages may be consulted during the preparatory process as long as the translator is aware of the potential influence they may exert on comprehension and expression. Notably, this kind of preparation would probably not be necessary if one were translating modern, European texts, for example a novel by Honoré de Balzac. Hutton went one step further, arguing that it would be irresponsible or even disrespectful to proceed with a translation without consulting the previous scholarship of East Asian scholars, regardless of whether one agrees or not with how those scholars interpreted the text being translated.

From this topic, we can consider the question of vernacular Chinese translation: Should premodern text translators consult one, and if so, what effects does that vernacular translation have on the process and product of translation, either beneficial or detrimental? Idema advises premodern text translators to base their rendition on the source text and not on a translation into contemporary Chinese as was the case with many texts included in the Library of Chinese Classics. Again, I am interested in how this hypothesis can be proven true, rather than assuming it to be a fact, and this is where premodern text translation can assist us with its interdisciplinary approach.
Some professors emphasized the importance of understanding the intellectual context of the source text before beginning translation. Prof. Shaughnessy particularly emphasized this point. Shaughnessy gave the example of the Yi Jing 易經, a text that he himself has produced two translations for (I Ching: the Classic of Changes. Ballantine, 1998; Unearthing the Changes: Recently Discovered Manuscripts of the Yi Jing (I Ching) and Related Texts, Columbia University Press, 2014). Since it took almost a millennium for the Yi Jing to take form as a text, and then another two millennia for it to be used and interpreted by different people at different times, it has been understood in radically different ways. Since it is not possible to produce a synoptic translation that would account for all of these different interpretations, Shaughnessy concludes that one has to decide in advance which time period and interpretation to adopt, and then strive to remain true to this context. 44

The importance of making a glossary of key terms and their translations was also emphasized by many of the professors. Hutton, for example, pointed out that large projects are usually worked on continuously over long periods of time, meaning that translators are liable to forget translation choices made earlier on, resulting in inconsistent translations of the key terms, with the translator often unaware of the issue until much later on in the project. Hutton even laments that if he had made a list as he had progressed through the project it would have been easier to maintain consistency throughout the translation, rather than discovering inconsistencies at the end and then having to work back through the whole manuscript to try to address them. 45

Some professors emphasized the importance of investigating the linguistic background of key terms, especially high frequency ones. In Goldin’s view, many translators fail to do this, largely because to do so requires an ability that cannot be acquired without linguistic training. As a result, inadequate stock translations often persist in premodern text translations due in part to a lack of critical examination. 46 This is, perhaps, a whole topic in itself. It would be illuminating to investigate what linguistic tools and procedures may assist the premodern text translator, especially those that are often neglected by scholars whose primary specialization is, for example, philology, historiography, or poetics.

Prof. Milburn recommended running key words and phrases from the source text in major databases for Chinese literature. This kind of cross-referencing not only ensures the accuracy of the translation, but also determines whether parts are quoted in later sources. These parts, which provide similar content but in a different form, may then assist the translator with understanding problematic aspects of the text being translated.

Once these concerns at the word level are addressed, the professors were quick to stress that there is still a range of questions that needs to be resolved in terms of the purpose of the translation before getting started on the translation itself. In my communication, I identified some purposes that premodern text translators commonly strive for. I am indebted to Prof. Idema for assistance in brainstorming these: 47

- A new translation that would update the antiquated style of previous translation(s), for example, those published by James Legge over one hundred years ago.
- A new translation that would correct perceived mistakes in previous translation(s), for example, those done by scholars without philological training.
- A new translation that would incorporate new sources or materials, for example, excavated texts, commentaries, or recent scholarly discussion.
- A new translation based on a different edition that has been overlooked by previous translators, for example, one that has only recently been made available.
- A new translation for an audience that has been neglected by previous translators, for example, a non-specialist one.
- A new translation that brings out the literary qualities of the text, where others have focused on philological concerns, or vice versa.

TRANSLATION PROCESSES AND METHODS

Lastly, I asked the scholar-translators to elaborate on the processes and methods they used in their work on premodern texts. I believe that the following view of Prof. Jonathan Chaves of the George Washington University, an accomplished translator of classical Chinese poetry, may be taken as representative of the typical attitude towards the process of translation by premodern text translators in Western academia. Chaves identifies with the description of Buddhist sutra translation provided by the Song poet Mei Yaochen 梅堯臣 (1002–1060) who views translation as a ritualistic activity. In the view of Chaves, the inner workings of this activity cannot be expressed in words. He writes:

The fact is that the essence of the [translation] process has always, somewhat paradoxically perhaps, eluded verbal expression. Given a solid knowledge of the language in question, the literary translator should not go about his task with a preconceived theory of how to translate. After the job is done, he can, of course, analyze what has happened to his heart’s content. But while engaged in what must be at least partially a creative endeavor, he is best advised to emulate the monks of Mei Yao-ch’en’s poem and enter upon a ceremonial relationship with the original writer, to perceive as the poet has perceived, to experience what he has experienced. 48

This attitude towards translation could not be more strikingly different than that of translation studies researchers who, while admitting the difficulties involved in determining how exactly translators translate, would not claim the question unanswerable; indeed, the premise of their discipline more or less relies on the very proposition that at least some answers to this question may be revealed to the researcher. It is one of the key questions that signals the end of sinology and the beginning of translation studies—or, in our case, the beginning of the interdisciplinary field of premodern text translation.
I asked the professors to consider the translation process and methods, not only because they are two aspects that concern the daily work of every translator, but also because they are commonly neglected in translation studies or academia at large due to a common focus on the product, i.e., the target text. For those professors who believed the question answerable, they expressed a preference for faithful translation as a minimum standard, and idiomaticity and readability as secondary considerations. This is probably not surprising given that their translations are mostly for scholarly readers.

However, a common theme that I was able to identify in the professors’ feedback was a shared concern for the needs of the reader. For Idema, these needs may be addressed by providing substantial introductions to place the source text in its own culture, adding footnotes where unavoidable, or even including illustrations as visual aids to the reader. For Hutton, one way the needs of his readers can be addressed is by sharing his translation drafts with his undergraduate students to find places where they misunderstand what he is saying in his translation, sometimes in unusual ways he had not anticipated. The professor reported that the questions his students raised were helpful in identifying places where the translation was unclear or difficult to read.

Nylan has also written at length on aiding the reader in “decluttering” the main text of the translation by avoiding parenthetical remarks in the main text:

To this same end, translators should consider using separate glossaries or appendices that list (a) persons mentioned in the text . . . (b) official titles . . . (c) all place names . . . (d) key terms that appear in the main text . . . (e) book titles mentioned in the text. . . . The provision of such appendices allows both translators and readers to focus upon the English in the main text, which is surely the proper focus of their attention, while engorging or disgorging as many of the details as they choose.

Nylan also urges premodern text translators to provide introductions to their translations which include a biography of the author, brief history of the text, review of key terms used in the text, and comparisons of the work to masterworks widely available in English, which she believes allows readers to “immerse themselves in the world known to the original author.”

For scholar-translators like Prof. William H. Nienhauser, Jr., Halls-Bascom Professor of Classical Chinese Literature at the University of Wisconsin–Madison, attending to the needs of the reader should ideally be in line with the implied reader of the source text. Nienhauser describes how this principle applies to the translation series of Shiji 史記 of which he has been chief editor:

There may have been many things which struck the reader about this translation (neologisms such as “Grand Duke” and “Nobile Scion”, for example). However, I hope that it has become clear through the sample translation that the Shih chi is not only an integrated work in the sense that the various sections—annals, tables, treatises, hereditary houses, and biographies—are meant to be read and cross-referenced, but that Ssu-ma Ch’ien has also considered it an integral part of the other source materials then available on this subject. It may not be true that every Han reader could fall back on knowledge of every event or narrative when Ssu-ma Ch’ien demanded, but it is apparent that Ssu-ma Ch’ien expected his ideal reader to be able to do so. For this reason, it is vital to provide an annotative context for all translations intended for the modern scholarly reader. Our modern reader has, of course, the option of referring to or neglecting the relevant context given in our apparatus. While we recognize the tremendous loss in style and flavor the Shih chi suffers in any translation, we hope in this way at least to retain some of the spirit of Ssu-ma Ch’ien’s historiography in our rendition.

Notably, while Nienhauser’s approach to premodern text translation has been adopted by many of the other scholar-translators, it is also at odds with translators like Burton Watson who became well-known for producing translations that sacrificed philological accuracy for fluency and reader accessibility.

**PROSPECTS FOR PREMODERN TEXT TRANSLATION AS AN INTERDISCIPLINE**

Interdisciplines are not created in a vacuum; they are born out of necessity. Where there are important questions in a given field that cannot be answered by a singular discipline, new tools for analysis are made to meet the challenge, eventually resulting in the formation of a new body of knowledge. At the heart of every interdiscipline is not just intellectual curiosity, but an overt challenge to specialization.

In the case of premodern text translation, scholars are neither interested in the overly technical aspects of traditional Chinese philology, nor a study of premodern China through translation that makes no acknowledgment of the bilingual transfer process. While some scholars in those respective fields may show disinterest, or even aversion towards this new discipline, as this paper has demonstrated, premodern text translation has evolved into a field in its own right in universities in China. Since China is one of the very few nations today that boasts a continuous literary tradition spanning from antiquity to modernity, it is understandable that scholars and leaders in China alike have supported the development of this field with the hope that more research of this nature may be undertaken on a global level.

Having witnessed the rapid development of this discipline, I anticipate that discovery and exploration by international academia is somewhat likely in the near future. Parallels can be drawn here between premodern text translation and digital humanities, and how the latter is applied specifically to Chinese studies in the field of digital sinology. As fields like these continue to develop, it is anticipated that more opportunities for cooperation and consultation will
emerge, especially between academics and institutions in and outside of China. For example, projects which bring together scholars from China who specialize in a particular text with academics from English-speaking countries with a background in translation would be able to produce high-quality translations by integrating skills sets from both disciplines that individual scholars rarely (if ever) possess in equal quantities. Such projects would result in not only more research in this area but, crucially, more high-quality translations of premodern texts. It is this potential for application that sets premodern text translation apart from its related fields in which published translations are viewed as vehicles for study, and not objects of study in their own right.

Thus, let us persuade academics in the West currently producing research in their respective disciplines to consider the benefits of working in this dynamic, interdisciplinary field and, should they do so, show to them what progress has already been made. As it stands, premodern text translators outside of China rarely engage in constructive dialogue with their counterparts in China, and vice versa. By facilitating exchange between them, it is hoped that more, better quality premodern text translations may be produced, which aligns with the interests of both parties, not to mention the lottier cause of making traditional Chinese culture more accessible to a global audience. It will also have the benefit of preventing one side from having to reinvent the wheel each time a new study or translation project is carried out.

NOTES
1. The first conference on premodern text translation was held in October 2002 at Hebei Normal University, Shijiazhuang. The last one was held in October 2019 at Xi’an University of Technology, Xi’an. The next one—the twelfth session—is planned to be held at Ludong University in Yantai, Shandong province.
2. Jiang Zhe. Lunyu Xue'er: Yingyi Xuanben Huijiao Jishi: Yi Li Yaye 'zhongguo Jingdian' Diyi Juan Wei Diben [Selected Collected Commentaries on English Translations of the 'Xué'Er: Collected Commentaries on English Translations of Confucian Classics as a Base Text]. (‘論語·學而’英譯選本校集釋: 以李易安《中國經典》第一卷為底本). The first session was held in October 2002 at Hebei Normal University, Shijiazhuang. The last one was held in October 2019 at Xi’an University of Technology, Xi’an. The next one—the twelfth session—is planned to be held at Ludong University in Yantai, Shandong province.
6. See Ma Zuyi, Ma Zuyi’s Collected Works on Language: A History of Premodern Text Translation from Chinese into Other Languages.
REFERENCES


For an example of such a critique, see E. Bruce Brooks and A. Taeko Brooks, "The Unproblematic Confucius: Review of Burton Watson's 'The Analects of Confucius'."


SUBMISSION GUIDELINES AND INFORMATION

GOAL OF THE NEWSLETTER ON ASIAN AND ASIAN-AMERICAN PHILOSOPHERS

The APA Newsletter on Asian and Asian-American Philosophers and Philosophies is sponsored by the APA Committee on Asian and Asian-American Philosophers and Philosophies to report on the philosophical work of Asian and Asian-American philosophy, to report on new work in Asian philosophy, and to provide a forum for the discussion of topics of importance to Asian and Asian-American philosophers and those engaged with Asian and Asian-American philosophy. We encourage a diversity of views and topics within this broad rubric. None of the varied philosophical views provided by authors of newsletter articles necessarily represents the views of any or all the members of the Committee on Asian and Asian-American Philosophers and Philosophies, including the editor(s) of the newsletter. The committee and the newsletter are committed to advancing Asian and Asian-American philosophical scholarships and bringing this work and this community to the attention of the larger philosophical community; we do not endorse any particular approach to Asian or Asian-American philosophy.

SUBMISSION GUIDELINES

1) Purpose: The purpose of the newsletter is to publish information about the status of Asians and Asian Americans and their philosophy and to make the resources of Asians and Asian-American philosophy available to a larger philosophical community. The newsletter presents discussions of recent developments in Asians and Asian-American philosophy (including, for example, both modern and classical East-Asian philosophy, both modern and classical South Asian philosophy, and Asians and Asian Americans doing philosophy in its various forms), related work in other disciplines, literature overviews, reviews of the discipline as a whole, timely book reviews, and suggestions for both spreading and improving the teaching of Asian philosophy in the current curriculum. It also informs the profession about the work of the APA Committee on Asian and Asian-American Philosophers and Philosophies. One way the dissemination of knowledge of the relevant areas occurs is by holding highly visible, interactive sessions on Asian philosophy at the American Philosophical Association’s three annual divisional meetings. Potential authors should follow the submission guidelines below:

i) Please submit essays electronically to the editor(s). Articles submitted to the newsletter should be limited to ten double-spaced pages and must follow the APA submission guidelines.

ii) All manuscripts should be prepared for anonymous review. Each submission shall be sent to two referees. Reports will be shared with authors. References should follow The Chicago Manual Style.

iii) If the paper is accepted, each author is required to sign a copyright transfer form, available on the APA website, prior to publication.

2) Book reviews and reviewers: If you have published a book that you consider appropriate for review in the newsletter, please ask your publisher to send the editor(s) a copy of your book. Each call for papers may also include a list of books for possible review. To volunteer to review books (or some specific book), kindly send the editor(s) a CV and letter of interest mentioning your areas of research and teaching.

3) Where to send papers/reviews: Please send all articles, comments, reviews, suggestions, books, and other communications to the editor: Minh Nguyen (atnguyen@fgcu.edu).

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