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FROM THE EDITOR

Lori Gallegos
TEXAS STATE UNIVERSITY

One of the jobs of philosophers is to reveal important truths that have been, incidentally or intentionally, covered over. Each of the four authors in this issue take up the task of excavating and interpreting histories, influences, and identities that have been erased, ignored, or hidden.

The issue begins with an essay by Eric Chavez that resists an essentializing historiography of some of the most important Mexican philosophers of the early twentieth century, the Flores Magón brothers, whose work and political movement—the Partido Liberal Mexicano—helped to inspire the Mexican Revolution. The essay, titled “(Re)covering the Indigenous Affinities of the Partido Liberal Mexicano,” explores Indigenous cultural influences—largely unacknowledged in the scholarly literature—on the Magón brothers’ writing and political work. Chavez invites us to examine these “Indigenous affinities” with a critical lens so as to avoid applying overly simplistic categorizations to the Magón brothers’ work. The publication of this essay coincides with the one hundredth anniversary of the death Ricardo Flores Magón (1873–1922).

The second article in this issue, written by Alexander V. Stehn, resists the suppression of the linguistic identities of his students at the University of Texas Rio Grande Valley. In the essay, titled “Philosophizing in Tongues: Cultivating Bilingualism, Biculturalism, and Biliteracy in an Introduction to Latin American Philosophy Course,” Stehn argues that the Anglocentric monolingualism that structures most educational institutions in the US fails to recognize, honor, and engage the bilingualism, biculturalism, and biliteracy of students like his. He argues that although his bilingual students are a large numerical majority, monolingual educational programs unfairly minoritize them. In response to these concerns, Stehn shares his bilingual course design, his experiences in teaching philosophy bilingually, and his students’ reflections on their experience in his course.

This issue concludes with two short essays in conversation about how best to interpret the significance of recently recovered writings by the Cuban thinker and national hero José Martí, which appear to contradict some of his previous work and challenge standard interpretations of his political philosophy. The author of the first essay, Jorge Camacho, argues that these writings reveal that Martí had a vision of society that was hierarchical and ethnocentric, leading him to support policies in the interest of the white, Western, modernizing state. Susana Nuccetelli argues to the contrary that we should continue to see Martí as committed to rejecting racism. She proposes that we draw a distinction between what Martí said in particular writings and what he should have said in light of his own philosophical commitments to Krausism.

CALL FOR SUBMISSIONS

APA Studies on Hispanic/Latino Issues in Philosophy is accepting contributions for the fall 2023 issue. Our readers are encouraged to submit original work on any topic of style as it relates to Hispanic/Latino thought, broadly construed. We publish original, scholarly treatments, as well as meditaciones, book reviews, and interviews. Please prepare articles for anonymous review.

ARTICLES

All submissions should be accompanied by a short biographical summary of the author. Electronic submissions are preferred. All essay submissions should be limited to 5,000 words (twenty double-spaced pages) and must follow the APA guidelines for gender-neutral language and The Chicago Manual of Style formatting. All articles undergo anonymous review.

BOOK REVIEWS

Book reviews in any area of Hispanic/Latino philosophy, broadly construed, are welcome. Submissions should be accompanied by a short biographical summary of the author. Book reviews may be short (500 words) or long (1,500 words). Electronic submissions are preferred.

DEADLINES

The deadline for the spring issue is November 15. Authors should expect a decision by January 15. The deadline for the fall issue is April 15. Authors should expect a decision by June 15.

Please send all articles, book reviews, queries, comments, or suggestions electronically to the editor, Lori Gallegos, at LoriGallegos@txstate.edu, Department of Philosophy, Comal Building 102, Texas State University, 601 University Drive, San Marcos, TX 78666.

FORMATTING GUIDELINES

The APA Studies adhere to The Chicago Manual of Style. Use as little formatting as possible. Details like page numbers, headers, footers, and columns will be added later. Use tabs

### ARTICLES

**Recovering the Indigenous Affinities of the Partido Liberal Mexicano: Kneading Spivak into the Philosophy and Writings of the Flores Magón Brothers and the PLM**

Eric Chavez

**UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS AT EL PASO**

The Flores Magón brothers are undoubtedly some of the most contested figures in the history of the Mexican Revolution. Scholars such as James D. Cockcroft categorize them as intellectual precursors to the Mexican Revolution.1 Other scholars such as Juan Gómez-Quíñones deem the magonistas “sembradores,” or sowers of seeds, not just for the Mexican Revolution, but—given the transnational persecution and character of the magonistas—also precursors to the Chicano Movement of the 1960s and 1970s.2 Yet other scholars like Mitchell Cowen Verter and Colin M. MacLachlan3 place greater emphasis on the European anarchist influence upon the principles of the magonistas and their political movement, the Partido Liberal Mexicano (PLM). What is troubling is that neither the historiography nor the historical memory produced by this literature seriously considers the Indigenous influences on the Flores Magón brothers or the Indigenous presence within the PLM. The Indigenous influence and presence within this revolutionary movement have been neglected and conceived within a European paradigm of liberalism, anarchy, or communism.

In this essay, I argue that this negligence by historians of the PLM’s Indigenous affinities creates a kind of epistemic injustice against Indigenous groups while simultaneously reifying a Eurocentric perspective. By exploring these Indigenous affinities within the PLM’s praxis, this essay aims to uncover an untapped emancipatory potential of the PLM’s Indigenous affinities within the PLM and their praxis of liberation. Spivak’s postcolonial approach generates a critical lens for examining the PLM’s Indigenous affinities. For instance, when uncovering how the PLM represented an Indigenous heritage in their writings and rhetoric, this representation of indigeneity also enacts a shift in political representation from proxy to portrait: from *Vertretung* to *Darstellung*. Spivak defines *Vertretung* as treading in someone else’s shoes, “as much a substitution as representation.”4 Spivak defines *Darstellung* as a “placing there”5 and as the “concept of representation as staging.”6 In other words, there are two types of representation, one done by proxy or by substitution, and another done by creating a re-presentation or a portrait of those we claim to represent. Importantly, Spivak notes that both kinds of representation cannot be done without essentializing the constituency we claim to represent. As Spivak stipulates, “It is not possible to be non-essentialist . . . the subject is always centered.” She continues to clarify this inherent relationship between representation and essentialism by saying that “the relationship between the two kinds of representation brings in, also, the use of essentialism because no representation can take . . . place without essentialism.”7 With this warning, Spivak helps us maintain a critical attitude and leads us to ask if the PLM, by representing Indigenous notions of communalism, land, and liberty, was not simply essentializing Mexico’s Indigenous past as a mere instrument for the party’s propaganda or more truly representing their political ideals from an Indigenous heritage.

**LIBERALISM AND THE COLONIAL STATE IN LATE NINETEENTH-CENTURY MEXICO**

Mexico gained independence from Spain in 1821, agreed upon in the Plan of Iguala. However, French intervention did not allow the Mexican nation-state to be run by a Mexican-native leader until Benito Juárez defeated Emperor Maximilian in 1867. From 1524 to 1867, Mexico’s territorial and political landscape gradually shifted from an Indigenous social polity to a European-Catholic society under the auspices of the Constitution of 1857 and the Laws of Reform. The concept of property, of course, was key to implementing liberal reforms during Juárez’s administration. Mariano Otero, a young, liberal politician and jurist during the 1840s, quickly identified the acquisition of private property as the “generating principle” of Mexico’s future society.8 This “generating principle” became the antithesis of the traditional communal way of life practiced by most Indigenous people. Collective access to lands, not the private holding of land, was how Indigenous peoples understood and navigated the world. Mexican anthropologist Benjamin Maldonado explains the notion of territory among Oaxacan Indigenous tribes as follows: “This territory is the domain of the community, composed of interrelated families mediated through ritual ties and a community life based upon reciprocity.”9 This notion of territory based upon reciprocity and community entirely runs counter to the liberal ideals of individualism, social progress, and economic development. The notion of reciprocity and community, foundational to Flores Magón and the PLM, was one way to enunciate an Indigenous way of life—an alternative third space—within Porfirio Díaz’s regime, which began in 1876.

**THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK**

I will utilize Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak’s notion of a shifting representation between *Vertretung* and *Darstellung* to trace
The period from 1867 to 1876 in Mexico is known as the “Restored Republic,” when Juárez and his successor, Sebastián Lerdo de Tejada, expanded the state’s presence. Gilbert M. Joseph and Jürgen Buchenau explain that “the Restored Republic began reorganizing the educational system, emphasizing mathematics, science, and ‘pragmatic knowledge’ over the humanities.”

Joseph and Buchenau conclude that “the Restored Republic paved the way for a more muscular centralized state, albeit one clothed in the guise of liberal federalism.” Thus, when Díaz rose to power, he not only inherited the liberal tradition created by Juárez but also inherited an established system of centralized government based on European models.

Even though Díaz was Lerdo’s nemesis, Díaz promoted himself as Juárez’s rightful heir in the liberal tradition. According to Charles A. Hale, a renowned historian of Mexican liberalism during the nineteenth century, “The political thought of the era is best characterized as a triumphant and official liberalism, in contention with positivist concepts and yet gradually transformed by them.” In other words, as Hale argues, “Liberalism after 1867 became transformed from an ideology in combat with an inherited set of institutions, social arrangements, and values into a unifying political myth.” This appropriation of liberalism—this pre-established unifying ideology—to fit positivist ends served Díaz to justify his ascendency to the presidency in the wake of the Battle of Tecoac and the Plan of Tuxtepec during the winter of 1876, where Díaz’s forces roundly defeated Lerdo’s claim as the rightful inheritor of the Juárez regime.

In a tragic sense of historical irony, both Juárez and Díaz were born in the state of Oaxaca and came from Indigenous lineage. Nevertheless, both regimes systematically appropriated native communal lands to fit their idea of historical progress. Under the Juárez regime, the Ley Lerdo transferred many communal ejidos into private holdings. Under the Porfiriato, these communal lands were sold to foreign and Mexican investors. The Indigenous notion of comunalidad ran counter to the modernization projects of both the Juárez and Díaz regimes. The Indigenous peoples who resisted the implementation of the Ley Lerdo, such as the Mayan in Yucatan and the Yaqui in Sonora, faced violent repression and wars of attrition by the Díaz regime.

Another way we can see an early appreciation for an Indigenous heritage is that Ricardo and Enrique adopted the nickname “Guachita” when referring to their mother, Margarita. This nickname can be interpreted to refer to both Margarita’s character as a fiercely loyal mother and a mestiza, a mixed person of Spanish and Indian heritage.

In a letter from Ricardo to Enrique dated September 24, 1899, Ricardo laments that Guachita was sick with the flu. In this letter, Ricardo connects his mother’s poor health with the horrid working conditions of campesinos and workers in the tobacco fields in the Valle Nacional of Oaxaca. He interprets bad working conditions accompanied by bad health as systematically done by corporate interests to keep the poor masses in a state of servitude:

That is the fruit of the season, added with pneumonia, typhus, and other herbs; those ailments that the inhabitants of Mexico are so accustomed to that they do not even take notice anymore . . . more so the workers from the Valle Nacional, being mistreated and malnourished, do not have the necessary strength to resist these ailments. . . . Those people from the Valle Nacional, Valle Real, Usila, Osumacín, and all those tobacco fields suffer more than being in hell itself.
The connection between something so personal (your mother getting the flu) and the plight of the working-class Mexican masses displays the deep affinities between the Flores Magón brothers’ upbringing and the oppression of Indigenous campesinos in the fields of Oaxaca.

To be sure, modernity under the Díaz regime was a brutal colonialist project. Indigenous people were supposed to assimilate into the national mestizo imaginary and lose vestiges of pre-modern “savagery.” According to Mexican scholar Benjamín Maldonado Alvarado, “At the beginning of the 20th century, there was a population of about 12 million inhabitants in Mexico of which the majority were Indigenous people living in small rural communities and on haciendas.” In Oaxaca, the Flores Magón’s home state, most people were Indigenous. According to Francis R. Chassen-López, “In 1878, of the state’s 753,540 inhabitants, approximately 77 percent were Indigenous, 18 percent mestizo, 3 percent black, and 2 percent white. In 1890, the Indigenous population was 78 percent and the black population 1.25 percent.” Just by sheer numbers and proximity, the Flores Magón brothers undoubtedly were exposed to many of the ideologies of communal and reciprocal labor espoused by Indigenous groups in Oaxaca. Such ideology of collectivism would later develop into an entire political movement against the exploitation of Mexican workers by the Porfiriato and foreign capital, as well as a basis for their modification of European models of anarchism and communist thought to fit Indigenous campesinos’ demands for land and liberty.

Still another marker of higher-class status in comparison to their Indigenous neighbors was that the Flores Magón brothers were able to attend school in Mexico City. In 1883, the Flores Magón family moved to Mexico City where Ricardo was able to attend the Escuela Nacional Primaria. Although all Flores Magón brothers would attend law school, only one of them, Jesus, became a lawyer by profession. During their time in Mexico City, however, Ricardo and Enrique openly embraced anti-Porfirian politics and were exposed to communist and radical thinkers from abroad. Thus, given that the Flores Magón brothers did not spend too much time in Oaxaca growing up, many scholars have dismissed any Indigenous influence stemming from their childhood. However, these scholars completely ignore how the Flores Magón brothers understood class antagonisms in Oaxaca and Mexico City, not in the European sense of a homogenous mass of an industrial working class, but in terms of the exploitation of the Indigenous campesino. Their formal education in Mexico City and their communal upbringing in Oaxaca made the Flores Magón brothers acutely aware of the inequalities plaguing both Indigenous campesinos and urban workers.

In a letter from Ricardo to Enrique on September 17, 1899, Ricardo urges his younger brother to take his education seriously: “Begin by reading history, geography, physics, and natural science, Castilian grammar, and only then can you begin to understand philosophy, which is extremely beautiful.” Ricardo and Enrique were positioned to comprehend the reality of oppressed Indigenous people while also having the intellectual faculty to adapt radical philosophies from abroad to fit local needs. Mexican historians Juan Carlos Beas and Manuel Ballesteros argue that “Magonismo is nourished fundamentally by three currents: Mexican liberalism, European anarchism, and Indigenous communalism.” This ability to navigate between their Indigenous influences and Western European philosophies proves how the Flores Magón brothers enacted a dialectics of representation between Vertretung and Darstellung. However, collapsing the Flores Magón brothers to either of these representations would only partially describe their historical experience. Seriously examining the Indigenous affinities in the writings and philosophy of the Flores Magón brothers and kneading these writings with Spivak’s dialectic between Vertretung and Darstellung can help us expand our analytical horizons based on European standards of indigeneity.

PLM AND ITS INDIGENOUS AFFINITIES

What is the PLM? The Partido Liberal Mexicano (PLM) began as a reaction to the increasing power of the Porfiriato, which completely gutted the liberal Constitution of 1857 and allowed for indefinite re-elections. During their time at the Escuela Nacional Preparatoria in Mexico City, the Flores Magón brothers joined the “Centro Antireeleccionista Estudiantil” and began to passionately protest against Díaz’s third reelection as president. By creating their own oppositional parties and publications of political manifestos that would accelerate their exile into the United States, the early radicalization of the Flores Magón brothers can be seen as an enactment of the dialectics of representation in the dual sense of treading with and portraying Mexico’s Indigenous campesinos. By forming this dialectic between Vertretung and Darstellung (i.e., the proxy and the portrait), the Flores Magón brothers were able to create a third space of resistance and emancipation from the colonial grip of modernity and European models of anarchism-communism.

The Flores Magón brothers, via liberal clubs, were creating their own identity and third space within the Díaz regime. By the end of the century, Ricardo and Enrique were well-established members of liberal clubs in Mexico City. One of those liberal clubs where Ricardo and Enrique made their mark was the Club Liberal Ponciano Arriaga. On February 5, 1901, the Club Liberal Ponciano Arriaga and other liberal clubs around the nation gathered in San Luis Potosí for the first Gran Congreso Liberal. At this Congress, various local and regional liberal clubs represented fourteen states. The purpose of this Congress was to create the Junta Organizadora to better coordinate anti-re-electionist efforts across the nation. At the same time, the PLM was created as the umbrella organization that would coordinate local liberal clubs under the auspices of the Junta. The Junta, in 1906, was composed by Ricardo Flores Magón, Enrique Flores Magón, Antonio I. Villareal, Práxedes G. Guerrero, Manuel S. Vásquez, Agustín Pacheco, Francisco Manrique, Filiberto Vázquez, Abraham Rico, Telefero Viguerilla, Felix Rubalcaba, and Cenobio Orozco. Since the Club Liberal Ponciano Arriaga was the most robust and active liberal club at the time, this first coordinating Junta was composed of these select members. Following a communal spirit, the Junta would regularly rotate its members via annual open elections. This way, leadership was not limited to an elite group, with hierarchies minimized and accountability based on a collective sense of agency.
Examining how the PLM identified itself as a political group in opposition to the Díaz regime and how it represented its Indigenous constituency, Spivak’s distinction between *Vertretung* and *Darstellung* can be illuminating. It is important to note that using the term *magonismo* to describe the PLM and its political praxis is a misnomer that counters the PLM’s and the Junta’s philosophy of collective action and communal autonomy. This philosophy of collective action and communal autonomy indicates an Indigenous heritage. It demonstrates how the PLM navigated the relationship between its Indigenous constituency and the Junta Organizadora, treading the line between *Vertretung* as a proxy and *Darstellung* as a portrait of indigeneity. To be sure, the principle of communalism was foundational for the PLM. The very first resolution of this Gran Congreso Liberal, a meeting of oppositional parties from all over Mexico that would give official birth to the PLM, reads, “The Congreso Liberal formally declares that it has no personalistic goals, nor alliances of any kind with the more or less salient personalities of the current militant politics of the nation.” Understanding how labels and categories such as liberal, anarchist, and *magonismo* encapsulate the PLM into a particular ideology, instantiating certain ulterior political motives is crucial. Instead, scholars should try to grant a more complex and organic evolution of the PLM than is usually relegated.

The way the Díaz regime suppressed the PLM and forced them into exile in the United States demonstrates how tenacious and ever-evolving this movement was. The Díaz regime would quickly suppress any opposition, yet the perseverance of the PLM is admirable. Every time the Díaz regime would suppress and imprison the Flores Magón brothers or any other member of the Junta, the PLM’s propaganda would defiantly publish a new journal, albeit under a different moniker. For instance, one of the first newspapers that the Flores Magón brothers edited was *El Ahuizote*. Díaz quickly suppressed this newspaper, but it was soon revived under the new name of *El Hijo del Ahuizote*. Predictably, state censorship suppressed this journal as well. However, as a symbol of open defiance, the PLM would further change the name of its newspaper and continue to publish *El Niño del Ahuizote*, then *El Bisnieto del Ahuizote*, and so on. This stubborn and adaptable resistance would characterize the Flores Magón brothers until Ricardo died on November 21, 1922, in a prison cell in Leavenworth, Kansas.

This stubbornness and adaptability to oppression is also a shared characteristic with Indigenous ways of communal living and resistance. As Beas and Ballesteros state regarding the role of Indigenous people throughout Mexico’s history: “The Indigenous nations that since ancient times have inhabited the current Mexican territory have been direct actors of the great social convulsions that have shaken the country. From that moment when the first Iberian conqueror laid his foot, cross, blood, and gunpowder on these lands, most of the Indian peoples offered a necessary, tenacious, and violent resistance whose purpose was, and has been, to conserve and recover lands, forests, customs, and life itself.” This recovery of “lands, forests, customs, and life itself” aligns perfectly with the foundational document for PLM’s praxis: the PLM’s official political program signed by the Junta on July 1, 1906.

Thus, using Spivak’s dialectic of representation, I argue that the PLM showed their affinity to Indigenous principles by proxy and portrait. For example, the PLM’s Political Program and Indigenous principles of communalism have similar goals. Notably, Section 48 and Section 50 of the PLM Political Program explicitly demand “protection of the Indigenous race” and the restitution of communal lands, “especially for the Yaquis, Mayas, and other tribes, communities, or individuals their territory they were displaced from.” Land and Liberty! *Tierra y Libertad!* This was the signature motto that the PLM utilized as they took a more radical turn following the incarceration of Ricardo Flores Magón, Librado Rivera, and Antonio I. Villareal by the Furlong Detective Agency in collaboration with the Los Angeles Sheriff Department on August 23, 1911. Some scholars argue that the PLM used this slogan before Emiliano Zapata used it as his own and that both the PLM and the Zapatistas had delegates in communication using this motto as a common ground. Yet, calling this a “radical” turn is still maintaining the framework of analysis under a Eurocentric gaze. Ricardo took as inspiration the philosophy of *comunalismo*, characterized by the communal lifestyle he experienced while a youth in Oaxaca. In an article, “El Pueblo Mexicano es Apto para el Comunismo,” Ricardo states:

> In Mexico, there are about four million Indians who, until twenty or twenty-five years ago, lived in communities, possessing common lands, waters, and forests. Mutual support and reciprocity were the rule of these communities, in which authority was felt only when the agents who would collect tribute made their periodic appearance or when the rural police arrived in search of men to force them into the army. . . . Everyone had the right to land, water for irrigation, forest for firewood, and wood to build huts.

Although this article was published in *Regeneración* in September 1911, Ricardo is recounting his memories of his own experience with his local Indigenous neighbors from Eloxochitlán and finding common ground for a multiethnic social revolution nationally.

In practice, the PLM had military alliances with Indigenous tribes who were also in arms against the Díaz regime. In the northern state of Sonora, PLM members could forge alliances with the Yaqui people, who were already in a lengthy confrontation against the so-called *yoris*. In 1875, the Captain-General of the Yaqui, Cajeme, led a confederation of Sonoran natives to recover communal territories they had lost as a consequence of the Ley Lerdo of 1856. In this quasi-permanent war, the Porfirian army was about to exterminate Cajeme and his people. Besides sharing a common enemy, the PLM also shared with the Yaqui people the signature motto of “Land and Liberty.” In a speech given on May 31, 1914, condemning the US occupation of Tampico, Veracruz, Ricardo urges his audience to
Remember Rio Blanco, remember Cananea, where the bullets from the government soldiers smothered in blood, in the throats of the proletarians, the voices that asked for bread; remember Papantla, remember Juchitán, remember the Yaqui, where the machine guns and rifles of the government decimated the energetic inhabitants who refused to deliver to the rich the lands which gave them subsistence.

This juxtaposition of the strikes in Rio Blanco and Cananea by miners (many of whom were Indigenous as well) along with the brutal suppression of Indigenous peoples throughout Mexico shows how Ricardo and the PLM were highly conscious of the deep affinities between oppressed peoples in Mexico, regardless of their ethnicity, class, or cultural background. For Ricardo, the category of the oppressed proletarian was not exclusive to urban industrial workers. However, given the geography and demographics of Mexico during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, an Indigenous person in Oaxaca, per se, also shared similar experiences of exploitation as a miner in Sonora or an industrial worker in Mexico City. In short, the PLM realized that the proletarian was not a homogenized mass but varied from region to region. However, the mechanisms and structures of oppression—namely, the Díaz regime—remained constant.

**CONCLUSION**

The PLM and the Flores Magón brothers never explicitly labeled themselves as an Indigenous movement. However, even though they did not share the same Indigenous blood, the PLM and Indigenous groups in Mexico shared the same experience of state-led oppression. So, how do we impose an identity upon the PLM? How did they identify themselves? Were the PLM liberals, anarchists, communists, or Indigenous? Using the theoretical framework of Vertretung and Darstellung given to us by Spivak, we can better highlight and critique the essentializing historiography of the PLM and the Flores Magón brothers into an academic category that reifies the Western imperative towards private and individual ownership; that is, towards a neo-colonialism. Thus, if we are to investigate the role of the PLM before and after the Mexican Revolution, we must first problematize such essentialist interpretations and critically examine the dialectics between indigenismo, magonismo, and European anarcho-communism. In other words, by considering the dialectics of representation highlighted by Spivak—the representations between Vertretung and Darstellung—and the way in which the PLM broadcasted their Indigenous influences by proxy and by portrait, we can become resistant to the neocolonialist historiography of the Flores Magón brothers and their political movement.

**NOTES**

7. Spivak, “Can the Subaltern Speak?” 73.
15. Hale, *The Transformation of Liberalism in Late Nineteenth-Century Mexico, 3.*
17. For instance, Article Two of the Plan the Tuxtepec captures Díaz’s battle cry against Lerdo: “no reelection.” Following the Plan of Tuxtepec, Article Eight reads: “Those who morally and pecuniary, directly or indirectly, cooperate to support the Government of Mr. Sebastián Lerdo de Tejada will be held accountable. . . .”
20. “Gauchita,” in Latin America today, popularly refers to a respected and good-looking woman. Gauchita can also be interpreted as a diminutive of the masculine word, “gaúcho,” whom, according to Encyclopedia Britannica, “were usually mestizos (persons of mixed European and Indian ancestry) but sometimes were white, black, or mulatto (of mixed black and white ancestry).” For more, see https://www.britannica.com/topic/gaucho.
Philosophizing in Tongues: Cultivating Bilingualism, Biculturalism, and Biliteracy in an Introduction to Latin American Philosophy Course

Alexander V. Stehn
UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS RIO GRANDE VALLEY

La universidad europea ha de ceder a la universidad americana. La historia de América, de los incas acá, ha de enseñarse al dedillo, aunque no se enseña la de los arcontes de Grecia. Nuestra Grecia es preferible a la Grecia que no es nuestra. Nos es más necesaria.

– José Martí, “Nuestra América”

The European university must bow to the American university. The history of America, from the Incas to the present, must be taught in clear detail and to the letter, even if the archons of Greece are overlooked. Our Greece must take priority over the Greece which is not ours. We need it more.

José Martí argued for the need to create a university that would truly serve the diverse peoples of “Nuestra América” by teaching the Indigenous histories and philosophies of the Incas, Maya, and Aztecs—to name only the most well-known “archons” of what we typically call “Latin

INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW

Imagine yourself teaching the English translation of the Cuban philosopher José Martí’s “Nuestra América” to a classroom full of undergraduates in a general education course. Imagine further that the majority of your students spoke Spanish before they spoke English and still speak Spanish much of the time, but that the existing system of “bilingual” education in US schools “successfully” transitioned them to English-only classes within the first two to three years of their academic careers. Would teaching Martí’s essay to them monolingually in English contribute to their academic success and pique their interest in Latin American philosophy? Or would it effectively fail to communicate Martí’s famous identification of “Nuestra América” with what we now call “Latin America,” fail to engage their Spanish-speaking reality, fail to explore the Americanness of their “Hispanic” or “Latinx” identities, and fail to philosophically challenge the widespread assumption among English speakers that “America” is a country rather than a continent?

When I was hired in 2010 as an assistant professor of philosophy at the University of Texas–Pan American, which became part of the University of Texas Rio Grande Valley (UTRGV) in 2015, I began teaching philosophy courses monolingually in English to bilingual students like the ones I just asked you to imagine teaching. It took me a few years to realize how bilingual my students were, in part because I am not from the Rio Grande Valley (RGV), but also because I was simply doing what was expected of me. This article describes why I used to teach Introduction to Latin American Philosophy monolingually in English, why I stopped, and how I am now teaching it using a flexible bilingual pedagogy, also sometimes called a translanguaging pedagogy, that has been transformative for my students and for me. By drawing upon the ventajas/assets y conocimientos/knowledges of our richly varied bilingualisms and biliteracies, the revised course contributes to the B3 (bilingual, bicultural, and biliterate) vision of UTRGV. Students have the opportunity to honor, theorize, and cultivate their bicultural identities by “philosophizing in tongues” rather than being forced to assimilate to the monolingual ideology that prevails across both mainstream Anglophone philosophy and the system of higher education in the United States of America.

WHOSE UNIVERSITY? WHOSE LANGUAGE, PHILOSOPHY, AND CULTURE?

José Martí argued for the need to create a university that would truly serve the diverse peoples of “Nuestra América” by teaching the Indigenous histories and philosophies of the Incas, Maya, and Aztecs—to name only the most well-known “archons” of what we typically call “Latin
America”—even if it meant displacing the Greeks or the Western canon. Martí’s philosophy of education is deeply relevant to contemporary scholarly debates about what it means for today’s institutions of higher education to become true Hispanic-serving institutions rather than mere Hispanic-enrolling institutions. Any US institution of higher education that has at least 25 percent Hispanic undergraduate enrollment will be designated by the federal government as an HSI, but this is not enough. A designation comes from the outside; an identity must be assumed from within. Administrators, faculty, staff, and students must work together to build a Latinx-serving organizational culture and institutional identity that 1) helps Latinx students experience a sense of belonging on campus; 2) develops and reinforces a positive ethnic identity among Latinx students; 3) connects Latinx students on campus; 2) develops and reinforces a positive ethnic identity among Latinx students; 3) connects Latinx students on campus; and 4) offers ethnic studies curricula and other courses with faculty and staff on campus who speak Spanish; 4) offers ethnic studies curricula and other courses with faculty and staff on campus who speak Spanish; 4) offers ethnic studies curricula and other courses with faculty and staff on campus who speak Spanish; and 5) supports faculty, staff, and administrators who both serve as role models and agents of change who “disrupt barriers to success for Latinx students.”

As a faculty member at UTRGV, where our vision is to become an authentic HSI by becoming a bilingual, bicultural, and biliterate (B3) university, I am deeply committed to this work. The question I have asked myself repeatedly while redesigning PHIL 1305: Introduction to Latin American Philosophy as a bilingual course is ¿Que es nuestra América? especially as it appears from the perspective of the RGV, where more people speak Spanish than English. But before we get to the RGV, we should consider the system of higher education across Texas, where Introduction to Latin American Philosophy is rarely or never offered. In contrast, Introduction to Philosophy is offered at most two- and four-year public institutions, listed as PHIL 1301 in the Texas Common Course Numbering System, and is part of the “Language, Philosophy, and Culture” area of the General Education Core Curriculum—i.e., the forty-two Semester Credit Hours in “liberal arts, humanities, and sciences and political, social, and cultural history that all undergraduate students of an institution of higher education are required to complete before receiving an academic undergraduate degree.”

In our pluralistic world of languages, philosophies, and cultures, the singular nouns that name the Foundational Component Area “Language, Philosophy, and Culture” hint at the Anglocentric ideology pervading the history of higher education in Texas: the language is English, the philosophy is European, and the culture is Anglo. Rarely is the point put so flatly today, but it would have certainly been clear to the authors of the Texas Constitution of 1876 who called for the establishment of “a university of the first class” to serve “the people of Texas.”

But what would “a university of the first class” look like if it was deliberately built to serve “the [Hispanic] people of Texas”? When UTRGV was founded in 2015 it became the largest HSI university in Texas and the second largest nationwide, with 29,001 “Hispanic or Latino Origin” students constituting 90.8 percent of the total student body of 31,939 as of fall 2021. HSIs do not collect data on the linguistic abilities of their students, but consider the bilingual language profiles that I gathered from my students just before the COVID-19 pandemic. On average, my students started learning Spanish 1.3 years before they started learning English and thus reported that they felt comfortable speaking Spanish before they felt comfortable speaking English. Yet they reported very little instruction (less than four years) in Spanish from elementary school to college, whereas they reported an average of twelve years of schooling in English. In a normal week with friends, students reported speaking Spanish roughly 30 percent of the time and English roughly 70 percent of the time. This also matches the level at which they reported thinking in Spanish (30 percent of the time) and English (70 percent of the time). However, in an average week with their families, they reported speaking more Spanish (60 percent of the time) than English (40 percent of the time). On average, students rated their ability to understand Spanish as 10 percent higher than their ability to understand English, rated their English-speaking ability as 20 percent higher than their Spanish-speaking ability, and rated their ability to write in English an average of 35 percent higher than their ability to write in Spanish. Most students also reported that they felt more like themselves when speaking English. But they nevertheless identified more with Spanish-speaking culture, and they were slightly more desirous of being perceived as native Spanish-speakers than as native English-speakers. Although a more extensive university-wide survey is still needed, my small survey clearly indicates the bilingualism, biculturalism, and biliteracy of students that my original English monolingual course was failing to recognize, honor, and engage.

Tragically, it took higher education in the Rio Grande Valley almost a full century to stop denigrating Spanish—the predominant local language as well as the dominant language of Latin American philosophy—and begin treating it as a valuable academic language. Edinburg College was founded in 1927, became Pan American College in 1952, Pan American University in 1971, University of Texas–Pan American in 1989, and merged with The University of Texas–Brownsville to form the University of Texas Rio Grande Valley in 2015. Part of UTRGV’s new vision was to become a bilingual, bicultural, and biliterate (B3) university by offering courses across the entire university curriculum in English, in Spanish, and bilingually. This represented a major attempt to institutionally reverse course from what the philosopher and Pan American University alumna Gloria Anzaldúa analyzed in her groundbreaking chapter “How to Tame a Wild Tongue.” Anzaldúa and other Mexican American students were forced to take a “speech test” and “speech classes” at Pan American College/University from the 1950s to the 1970s to get rid of their Mexican accents and underscore Anglo-accented English as the only acceptable academic language. Anzaldúa powerfully summarized these attempts to academically enshrine an Anglocentric monolingualism as follows: El Anglo con cara de inocente nos arrancó la lengua. This is precisely what was and still is happening across Texas and nationwide insofar as educational institutions fail to academically respect, engage, and build upon the varieties of Spanish spoken by so many students and their families.

When I first offered Introduction to Latin American Philosophy at the University of Texas–Pan American
in 2011, I did what was expected of me by teaching it exclusively in English. So even though I was doing something rare and good by introducing Latinx students to Latin American philosophy, I was still contributing to the ongoing minoritization of bilingual students in the RGV. Far from being a neutral language of instruction, English is effectively weaponized when it functions as the only acceptable academic language, an act of “linguistic terrorism” that Anzaldúa pointed out by quoting Ray Gwn Smith: “Who is to say that robbing a people of its language is less violent than war?” 18 From the perspective of the dominant raciolinguistic ideology of Anglocentric monolingualism that structures most educational institutions in the US, the RGV is full of minorities. But from a more critical, historical, and place-based perspective, the Mexican and/or Mexican American people in the RGV who speak Spanish are the overwhelming majority, even though they have been minoritized for over a century, making them a “historically minoritized population.”19 Data from the American Community Survey across the RGV for the 2014–2018 period shows that a minority (21.1 percent) of the five years and over population speaks only English at home, whereas the vast majority (80.7 percent) speaks Spanish at home. Since 92.6 percent of UTRGV’s student body in 2020–2021 enrolled from the RGV—where, again, 80 percent of households speak Spanish—our bilingual students do not constitute anything close to a numerical minority, but they have been unfairly minoritized by monolingual educational programs and schools.

At the PK-12 level, 95.9 percent of the 422,858 students enrolled in the Region One Education Service Center area that contains the Rio Grande Valley are classified by the state of Texas as Hispanic,20 which means that at least 95.9 percent of these students and their families can reasonably claim a right to a bilingual, bicultural, and biliterate (B3) heritage and future. Yet only 7.5 percent of students in Region One are enrolled in a dual language bilingual education program that can be said to serve B3 goals. In other words, the overwhelming majority of Spanish-dominant students who enter RGV schools are placed in “bilingual” and ESL programs with “transitional” (read: monolingual English) academic aims, whereas the Hispanic students who enter RGV schools speaking English never even receive the false promise of “bilingual” education. It has been more than twenty years since Angela Valenzuela incisively criticized the process of “subtractive schooling” by which US-Mexican youth progress through schools designed to make them less rather than more bilingual and bicultural,21 but it is still the dominant paradigm in the RGV today, as well as nationwide.

During the Chicano/a or Mexican American Civil Rights movement, activists and scholars began to imagine and demand experimental additive bilingual education programs, which began to receive some support in a handful of local schools and at our university in the early 1970s. But the overall legacy of the Bilingual Education Act of 1968 and its subsequent development was subtractive and assimilationist so that “thousands of teachers and school leaders have been trained to implement bilingual education not as a means to raise bilingual or biliterate children, but rather to create English-speaking and English-literate children.”22 Contrast this with the exciting B3 alternative envisioned by UTRGV:

After decades of submitting to the assimilationist impulses of the Bilingual Education Act, the University of Texas Rio Grande Valley has committed itself to a sustained analysis of the history of bilingualism in this region. During the past decade, faculty and administrators have gradually built a Center for Bilingual Studies, a Center for Mexican American Studies, and an Office of Translation and Interpreting, all of which are overseen by a B3 (Bilingual, Bicultural, Biliterate) Institute. The B3 Institute’s broad goal is to create a bilingual, bicultural, and biliterate institution (see De La Trinidad et al., 2017). This falls in line with UTRGV’s inaugural strategic plan, which calls for the development of a bilingual university that also values biculturalism and biliteracy. From a historical standpoint, the explicit call for bilingualism directly counters the spirit and purpose s of the speech test and the intentional work to “tame the wild tongue” of Mexican-American students.23

From a historical standpoint, UTRGV’s B3 vision should be understood as organically related to some of the most important demands made by local high school and college students participating in the Chicano/a movement. For example, the Edcouch-Elsa High School Walkout of 1968 took place less than fifteen miles east of UTRGV’s Edinburg campus. Some of the estimated 192 students who participated in the walkouts had been in conversation with members of Pan American College’s chapter of the Mexican American Youth Organization (MAYO). Two of the fifteen demands they shared with the Edcouch-Elsa school board on November 7, 1968, are especially resonant with UTRGV’s B3 vision:

8. That, as Chicano students, we be allowed to speak our mother tongue, Spanish, on school premises without being subjected to humiliating or unjust penalties,

9. That courses be introduced, as a regular part of the curriculum, to show the contributions of Mexicans and Mexican Americans to this state and region. For instance, factual accounts of the history of the Southwest and Texas, courses in Mexican history and culture. Also, that qualified, certified teachers be hired to teach these courses.24

For our purposes, it is important to note that these two demands are practically and conceptually separate. The right to speak Spanish without being punished is presented alongside the demand for courses in Mexican and Mexican American history and culture, but there does not seem to be any explicit demand that these courses be taught in Spanish or bilingually. In an educational context where students were routinely humiliated and physically punished for merely speaking Spanish, it would have certainly been difficult to even imagine much less demand that these courses be taught in Spanish or bilingually.
This same lack of imagination, which I suffered from the first time that I taught Introduction to Latin American Philosophy, pervades the subdiscipline of Latin American philosophy in the United States, but there are signs that it may be changing. Consider, for instance, APA Studies on Hispanic/Latino Issues in Philosophy (formerly the APA Newsletter on Hispanic/Latino Issues in Philosophy), which has been publishing articles on how to teach Latin American philosophy at both the undergraduate and graduate levels for the last twenty years. There are outstanding discussions of course design, including possibilities for course content (books, articles, films, artworks, etc.), innovative assignments, alternative grading structures, high-impact pedagogies, and more. There is also a consistent stream of lament that more materials are not available in English translation, but only recently has the possibility been explicitly raised that Latin American philosophy courses in the US could be taught bilingually or in Spanish. In fact, the fall 2021 issue on Education and Pedagogy contains an outstanding article on bicultural/bilingual philosophy in the US-Mexico Border by Manuela Alejandro Gomez and an excellent article about teaching a core philosophy class in Spanish by Minerva Ahumada. In contrast, across the previous twenty years and volumes, only two articles—one by Cynthia Paccacerqua and the other by Mariana Alessandri, both faculty at UTRGV—explicitly characterized some of the American college students being taught Latin American philosophy as bilingual, bicultural, or biliterate. Consider Paccacerqua’s description:

This syllabus was designed with a particular student population in mind; as a professor of philosophy at UTPA, my students are predominantly Mexican-American and are mostly from the Rio Grande Valley. This means, among other things, that my students are to a large extent bilingual (in varying degrees); have a good understanding of the history of US-Mexico relations; are aware of the nature of generational differences among members of the Mexican-American community (i.e., among the Mexican people who have always resided in Texas and the subsequent arrival of Mexican peoples by crossing the later established border); have the lived experience of the political, cultural, and social dynamics of border life; live in what is perceived as a relatively culturally homogeneous Mexican-American community; have a rather strong identity attachment to the idea of mestizaje.25

Paccacerqua’s characterization of our students is refreshingly focused upon their experience, upon who they are and what they know rather than upon merely what they lack.26 But only very recently did our university begin the process of systematically building upon our students’ bilingual experiences, identities, conocimientos, and ventajas.26 As a Rio Grande Valley native, alumna of Pan American College, and participant in the Chicano/a movement, Anzaldúa beautifully expressed the linkage between bilingualism, biculturalism, and biliteracy and imagined a future in which she and other bilingual students could more fully and proudly participate in the educational system:

Ethnic identity is twin skin to linguistic identity—I am my language. Until I can take pride in my language, I cannot take pride in myself. Until I can accept as legitimate Chicano Texas Spanish, Tex-Mex, and all the other languages I speak, I cannot accept the legitimacy of myself. Until I am free to write bilingually and to switch codes without having always to translate, while I still have to speak English or Spanish when I would rather speak Spanglish, and as long as I have to accommodate the English speakers rather than having them accommodate me, my tongue will be illegitimate.29

Anzaldúa pushed me to redesign my course to affirm Spanish as philosophically, linguistically, and culturally valuable in order to contribute to the “Language, Philosophy, and Culture” section of our undergraduate core curriculum in a way that decolonizes the Anglocentric ideology that frames higher education in the United States.30 I am still wrestling with how best to do it, but I am at least prepared to give a preliminary report based on teaching increasingly B3 versions of PHIL 1305: Introduction to Latin American Philosophy over the last three academic years.

A BILINGUAL INTRODUCTION TO LATIN AMERICAN PHILOSOPHY FOR UTRGV STUDENTS

When my children were born in 2012 and 2014, I began to experience the difficulty of raising them to be bilingual, bicultural, and biliterate in an Anglocentric educational context. Without this lived experience, which Anzaldúa theorized as conocimiento,31 I probably would not have realized how wrongheaded it was to teach Introduction to Latin American as a monolingual English class to predominantly bilingual students. Fortunately, the birth of UTRGV and the first formulations of its B3 vision followed directly upon the early joys and problems of raising my children in Spanish along with my wife and colleague Mariana Alessandri. In her article thinking through what kind of world we should be building for our children and our students, she wrote:

Whether Anzaldúa meant her speaking Spanish in the classroom to be a political act, it was likely taken as one. Chicano Spanish, Spanglish, code-switching, bilingualism, diglossia—however one wants to refer to the multilingualism that is present here in the form of English and Spanish—is still considered dangerous today; Spanish and Spanglish are contentious in and outside of the classroom. I suggest that we can use this to our advantage; since using a border tongue is already read as a political act, we should use it for political purposes. Speaking a border tongue says that atravesados are legitimate, that the tongue spoken here—the otherwise “secret language”—is to be made public rather than kept private, affirmed instead of denied.32

I have thus designed three subsequent iterations of my course (2018–2021) to be progressively more bilingual.
If we momentarily pretend that “course content” is language-neutral, my redesigned course remains quite similar to the small number of other Latin American philosophy courses offered by institutions of higher education in the US, since much of my course was designed by borrowing from my professional peers, and my commitment to offering all texts in both Spanish and English means that I am still limited by the relative lack of texts available in English translation. Nevertheless, in one sense, redesigning my course to be bilingual was as simple as providing the Spanish originals of the texts I was already assigning as English translations. In a few cases, I also needed to provide additional Spanish translations of the Nahautl, Latin, or Portuguese originals. Here is the resulting list of Spanish-language texts along with their original dates of publication (as well as the original languages of publication when they are translations):

3. Miguel León-Portilla, La filosofía náhuatl estudiada en sus fuentes (1956)
4. Bernardino de Sahagún, Alonso Vegerano de Cuauhítlan, Martín Jacobita, y Andreés Leonardo de Tlatelolco, Los diálogos de 1524: Coloquios y doctrina Cristiana con que los doce frailes de San Francisco, enviados por el papa Adriano VI y por el emperador Carlos V, convirtieron a los indios de la Nueva España. En lengua mexicano y española (facsimile edition published in 1986 from the 1564 Nahautl and Spanish original)
5. Bartolomé de las Casas, Apología o declaración y defensa universal de los derechos del hombre y de los pueblos (Spanish translation of the 1550 Latin original)
6. Bernardino de Sahagún y sus colaboradores indígenas, El Códice Florentino o Historia general de las cosas de Nueva España (Spanish portion of the 1577 Nahautl and Spanish original)
7. Sor Juana Inés de la Cruz, “Respuesta a Sor Filotea de la Cruz” (1691)
8. Simón Bolívar, “Carta de Jamaica” y “El Discurso de Angostura” (1819)
9. Domingo Faustino Sarmiento, Facundo, o civilización y barbarie (1845)
10. Juan Bautista Alberdi, Bases y puntos de partida para la organización política de la República Argentina (1852)
11. José Martí, “Nuestra América” (1891) y “Mi raza” (1893)
12. José Carlos Mariátegui, “El problema primario del Perú” (1924) y “El problema del indio” (1928)
14. Enrique Dussel, Filosofía de la liberación (1971)
15. Paulo Freire, Pedagogía del oprimido (Spanish translation of the 1968 Portuguese original)
16. Rigoberto Menchú, Me llamo Rigoberta Menchú y así me nació la conciencia (1982)

This reading list points to the plurality of places and languages—and thus the plurality of philosophies and cultures—throughout Latin America. In my previous monolingual English Introduction to Latin American Philosophy course, it was easier to miss the significance of the fact that the philosophies we study were originally published in Nahautl, Latin, Spanish, Portuguese, and Tex-Mex.

The philosophies, languages, and cultures covered in an introductory course can never hope to be exhaustive or even comprehensive, but I aim to make them representative. Nahautl represents Indigenous philosophy; Latin represents the importance of the Medieval Christian worldview, scholasticism, and its impact on the Americas through European conquest and colonization; and Spanish represents the bulk of the Latin American philosophical tradition, with the major exception of Portuguese, which represents Brazilian philosophy. The language of Gloria Anzaldúa’s work is contentious to name, but it is the closest to the bilingual tongues and bicultural identities of my students, which she invites her readers to approach with an open heart and mind in the last paragraph of her preface to Borderlands/La Frontera:

The switching of “codes” in this book from English to Castillian Spanish to the North Mexican dialect to Tex-Mex to a sprinkling of Nahauto to a mixture of all of these, reflects my language, a new language—the language of the Borderlands. There, at the juncture of cultures, languages cross-pollinate and are revitalized; they die and are born. Presently this infant language, this bastard language, Chicano Spanish, is not approved by any society. But we Chicanos no longer feel that we need to beg entrance, that we need always to make the first overture—to translate to Anglos, Mexicans and Latinos, apology blurring out of our mouths with every step. Today we ask to be met halfway. This book is our invitation to you—from the new mestizas.23
I am not Hispanic or Latinx by birth, but I am a cultural and linguistic mestizo by choice in the sense that Anzaldúa develops in “La conciencia de la mestiza: Towards a New Consciousness.” My course tries to meet Anzaldúa and my students—most of whom are Mexican, Mexican American, Latinx, or Hispanic by birth—halfway by making our classroom a place where we philosophize in tongues, discovering and/or uncovering the Spanish (and the Nahautl in the Spanish) that lies just underneath or outside the monolingual English classrooms that have colonized the RGV. In the process, we can discover and/or uncover more than five centuries of Indigenous, Spanish, Mexican, and Pan American roots that make us who we are and our campus in Edinburg, TX what it is.

Ordinarily, a philosophy course taught in the US would provide all the course readings in English, covering over the roots of any ideas, concepts, or texts that have their origins in other languages. But when I provide all the course readings in a Spanish course pack (as well as an English course pack), students can plainly see that almost all the readings were originally published in Spanish. With three types of exceptions—students who are Mexican nationals, or who were educated at least partially in another Spanish-speaking country, or who were fortunate enough to have participated in a dual language program that ran all the way through high school—most students have never been encouraged to read difficult academic texts in Spanish. Many are surprised and excited to discover that they can do so. If they report back that they have trouble reading the Spanish, I explain to them that they will most likely have trouble reading the English as well because philosophy is hard to read in any language, especially at first! But I also explain that they are better prepared to understand the course readings given their degrees of bilingualism and borderlands experiences than the students I used to teach at Penn State.

My larger aim is to encourage students to go from being ambivalent about their bilingualism and bicultural identities to being proud of their bilingualism and bicultural identities. The path to achieve this is theorized best by Anzaldúa in the readings we discuss near the end of the course, but the whole course is structured historically to explore how our identities and worldviews have been shaped by European colonization and Indigenous resistance across the Americas. The course develops the basic thesis that most Americans (North Americans and Latin Americans) are in fact mestizos—complex mixtures of the languages, philosophies, and cultures that have mixed in the Americas since 1492—but that our diverse heritages have been systematically covered over by the Eurocentric and Anglocentric education system so that we have trouble recognizing the “Latin American” side of “American” history and identity.

This “covering over” is theorized by Enrique Dussel as el encubrimiento del otro as part of what he calls la invención de América.14 Challenging the simplistic narrative that Christopher Columbus discovered America in 1492, Dussel argues that Columbus invented the Indians by projecting an Asiatic character onto them because he wrongly believed that he had arrived in the West Indies. The Spanish conquistadores y colonizadores who came after him followed suit by violently “covering over” the Indigenous peoples rather than truly encountering them as human beings. In an analogous way, the Spanish-speaking and Mexican or Latinx cultural characteristics of our students are typically “covered over” by Anglocentric educational ideology and practices. In other words, our students have been academically taught to disassociate themselves from Spanish and their Mexican, Latin American, and/or Latinx identities.

To help students begin to reflect on the history of this encubrimiento and how it might still haunt us, I have them prepare for our discussion of Dussel’s work by conducting a self-quiz. I ask them to take out a blank sheet of paper and list the names of as many Latin American countries as they can think of. I also ask them to list as many Latin American languages as they can. Emphasizing that this activity is not for a grade, I have students report how many countries and languages they were able to name. The following pattern consistently emerges: the vast majority of students cannot name more than two or three Latin American countries (besides Mexico, no country shows up consistently on their lists). At most 5 percent to 10 percent of the students can successfully name more than five Latin American (or Caribbean) countries. There is usually some discussion about whether Puerto Rico is a country, which leads to a broader conversation about whether Latin America includes the Caribbean. I then show students the list of thirty-three countries in Latin America and the Caribbean according to the United Nations, and I ask them to brainstorm reasons that might explain why we as a class can name so few of them. Inevitably, someone will point out that they have been taught nothing (or almost nothing) about Latin America in school.15 As for Latin American languages, students can only consistently name Spanish. One or two might name Portuguese. Most semesters, no one names an Indigenous language like Quechua, Mayan, Guarani, Aymara, or Nahautl (to name only the top five language groups among approximately thirty million speakers of Indigenous languages in Latin America). At this point, I think students expect me to shame them for their ignorance following the deficit model, but I instead point out how these results illustrate Dussel’s thesis that the Indigenous languages, philosophies, and cultures of the Americas have ironically been “covered over” rather than encountered in the “discovery” of America. As we proceed to further discuss how America was invented (rather than discovered) by Columbus and other Europeans, I ask students to consider the possibility that Latin America—and by extension their Latinx heritage—has been “covered over” by the fact that they are not taught about it in school.

In other words, their “ignorance” does not reflect their identity; it is rather something they have been taught! The very same public school system that has labeled them as “Hispanic” or “Latinx” or “English Learner” was carefully designed to prevent their encounter with the ongoing history of colonization and resistance in the Americas that makes them who they are.

In fact, most Latinx students have been taught that assimilating to an “American” way of being and doing things is the only way to succeed, but this “American”
identity has been invented in a way that covers over many Americans. In contrast, my course highlights multiple ways of being American, including bilingual and bicultural ways, so that students gain a philosophical perspective that enables them to embrace both the US-American aspects of their culture and identity and the Mexican or Latin American aspects of their culture and identity. I frame this by saying that the course will offer them the opportunity to discover Latin American philosophy and reflect upon how it is related to their past, present, and future.

**EXAMPLES OF FLEXIBLE BILINGUAL TEACHING STRATEGIES**

I am always nervous on the first day of class, and speaking Spanish with anyone besides my own children makes me even more nervous. So I begin introducing myself and then the course in English. Here is the first paragraph of the course description from the English version of my syllabus: 

To get an idea of how this historical Introduction to Latin American Philosophy will work, let’s think critically about what people mean when they say that Christopher Columbus discovered America. Could Columbus truly discover a “New World” if roughly 50 million people already lived there (about the same number of people who lived in Europe at the time)? Instead of speaking about the “discovery” of “America,” should we conceptualize these events and their legacies as: 1) the European invention of America, 2) the European conquest of millions of native peoples, and/or 3) the European colonization of more than one quarter of the Earth’s lands (none of which were called “America” by the various peoples who had lived there for at least 15,000 years)? What then is America (or Latin America)? Who are the Americans (or the Latin Americans or Amerindians)? What are their philosophies? Is the story of America (or Latin America) a story of civilization and progress, a story of colonialism and violence? What does Latin American Philosophy have to teach us here today in the South Texas-Northern Mexico borderlands? These are the kinds of questions that we’ll think through carefully as we study over 500 years of Latin American Philosophy.

When I get to the end of the first page of the syllabus, I switch to Spanish and begin referring to the Spanish version of the syllabus that is part of the Spanish-language course pack. I explain (in Spanish) how it makes me uncomfortable to speak Spanish, but that I also think it is a beautiful language, that I had to learn it in order to become an expert in Latin American philosophy, and that I am so dedicated to my children growing up bilingually that I spoke with them exclusively in Spanish until my first child, Santiago, was five years old and his brother, Sebastián, was three. Después de contar esa historia personal, explico un poco de la visión B3 de UTRGV, e invito los estudiantes hablar English, Español, o Spanglish como quieran. Entonces empiezo a filosofar en español, preguntando a los estudiantes: ¿Quién descubrió América? A veces alguna contesta que era los vikingos, pero normalmente me contestan: Cristóbal Colón descubrió América. Entonces sigo con otra pregunta: ¿Se puede descubrir un lugar donde ya viven 50 millones de personas? Si everything goes well, students begin to argue with me and each other about the philosophical definition of discover. If everything goes really well, the discussion takes place in Spanish, English, and Tex-Mex. For the rest of the semester, we use the bilingual course readings to explore core issues of Latin American philosophy, especially as they pertain to language and identity.

Getting each student to use their full language repertoire can be challenging. Many find it difficult to speak Spanish in the classroom, even though they might find it perfectly normal to speak Spanish with friends or at home. But that just gives us more to talk about as we explore why and how this happens. The linguistic foundation of the course is the fact that all readings are provided in both Spanish and English, and I refer to both versions of the text in every class, using mostly Spanish when discussing the Spanish text and mostly English when discussing the English. Some days, when I am feeling brave, I try to challenge myself by teaching more in Spanish than in English, but I rarely succeed. In any case, I try to respond to students in whichever language they address me in, or to translanguage with them if they translanguage with me. I like to think that being open and vulnerable about my own linguistic abilities, limitations, and desire for growth helps encourage students to step outside their own linguistic comfort zones, or perhaps more accurately, to expand their sense of where they feel en casa to our classroom and the university.

Of course, some students never choose to read, speak, or write in more than one language, and I make it clear that they will not be penalized. They can earn an A in the course using just one language. Instead of trying to force a language policy on them using some kind of stick in the tradition of linguistic terrorism, I offer them carrots by continuously incentivizing the use of more than one language with bonus points. For example, if they choose to take their first quiz in English, they can earn bonus points for writing even one of their answers on the second quiz in Spanish or for taking the Spanish version of the quiz but writing their answers in English. I use the same basic incentive structure for the course’s three major essay assignments: a student who writes their first essay in English can receive points for writing their second essay in Spanish or even for writing a paragraph in Spanish or Spanglish if writing their whole 1,500-word essay that way is too daunting. Students have multiple options for their final exam, but one of them includes producing a three- to five-minute digital testimonio that relates one of the topics discussed in class to their own experiences or those of their family. I often find that students who did not feel comfortable with texts in Spanish nevertheless find it natural to narrate their testimonios in Spanish or by translanguageing. Regardless of what we are doing inside or outside of class, my aim throughout the course is twofold: to encourage bilingual and biliterate practices and, in doing so, to help students recognize these bicultural aspects of their identities as valuable and worth cultivating even though most have been trained not to do so in academic settings.
The first two times I offered this course bilingually, in spring 2018 and fall 2019, there was no official “X” designation for bilingual course sections. When UTRGV first began piloting sections of formally designated bilingual course sections in fall 2016, bilingual or translanguaging sections were labeled with the letter “E” for español. Spanish-only or at least Spanish-dominant courses did not have their own designation. Then, to more clearly mark which sections were Spanish-only or Spanish-dominant, the registrar decided to designate these Spanish sections with an “E,” temporarily leaving translanguaging or bilingual sections like mine unmarked. But in fall 2020, the registrar implemented the current arrangement of “E” for español and “X” for bilingual courses, and my course sections received a formal bilingual designation for the first time.

I mention this transition in labeling course sections to illustrate the challenges UTRGV has faced even in establishing the basic infrastructure for bilingual courses. Another major hurdle, especially for my colleagues who teach Spanish-only or Spanish-dominant “E” sections, was getting UTRGV’s Center for Online Learning and Teaching Technology to create a fully Spanish user interface and course shell to use on Blackboard, or getting UTRGV’s Office of Faculty Success and Diversity to update and distribute a Spanish syllabus template each semester. To this day, the software used by the registrar’s office cannot handle accent marks, so a student whose last name is Peña will appear on my course roster as Pena, a microaggression that completely changes the meaning of their name. But at least anecdotally, I noticed a considerable shift in how much Spanish my students were using after my course was formally designated by the registrar as bilingual. The “X” designation effectively conveys UTRGV’s formal academic recognition of the equal legitimacy of Spanish for course purposes, and I think it emboldened more students to speak, read, and/or write in Spanish or Spanglish. At the end of the semester, students anonymously completed their standard course evaluations, but I also recently added these optional questions:

This X course section was taught bilingually (English and Spanish). Do you think UTRGV should offer more bilingual classes?

98 percent of respondents (fifty out of fifty-one) answered “Yes.”

What recommendations would you give Dr. Stehn to improve the bilingual aspects of the course?

The responses varied, but every single one cast the bilingual aspects of the course in a positive light. A few students mentioned that keeping up with our Spanish conversations was difficult but worth it. Others pointed out ways that the course still had more English than Spanish and made helpful suggestions about how I could incorporate more Spanish. Many expressed appreciation that they could use both languages, e.g., “I loved that I was able to show both my American and Mexican side. . . . I was able to type my essays in English and switch to Spanish to really show the emphasis of what I believed.”

Student comments also suggest that they found the bilingual classroom environment to be both academically more challenging and more comfortable, which strikes me as the perfect winning combination. Here is a student response that clearly articulates this sense of comfort:

I think the course itself and Dr. Stehn give the students a sense of freedom or comfort of being who we are, therefore it’s not so much the quantity of how many times we speak in Spanish or English, but rather that we feel comfortable enough to talk with whichever we feel most comfortable in that moment/day. Anxiety or nervousness can increase the accent of a non-English speaker, so when speaking in large crowds, it helps to know that we are not forced to talk in either. We won’t be reprimanded because we all understand what the other person is saying, and eventually by the end of the course, I noticed how people who were shy to speak in Spanish were trying it out, and vice versa with Spanish speakers who were shy to speak in English. People came out of their shell.

CONCLUSION AND IMPLICATIONS

Introducing my students, roughly 90 percent of whom are Hispanic or Latinx, to Latin American philosophy rather than only offering the standard Introduction to [Anglo-European] Philosophy makes sense, but the radical idea of offering PHIL 1305X: Introduction to Latin American Philosophy as a bilingual course makes even more sense. Unfortunately, the educational system in the RGV, Texas, and the US is still designed to encase students, including emergent bilinguals, in an English monolingual shell. For some, this eventually becomes academically comfortable, and speaking Spanish in academic contexts becomes strange, undesirable, or even unthinkable. A miniscule number of these students will enroll in PHIL 1305X: Introduction to Latin American Philosophy, but for those who do, the experience of being in a bilingual classroom, encouraged to speak, read, and write in Spanish, is transformative.
to Latin American Philosophy. Those who do will learn to
differentiate between the monolingual academic shell
that was imposed upon them and the bilingual, bicultural,
and biliterate identity that they might choose to cultivate
academically in order to push back against the hegemonic
monolingual, monocultural, and monoliterate ideology
that has structured their schooling.

As a university, we need to continue increasing the number
of courses and course sections being offered bilingually or
in Spanish. But if UTRGV's B3 vision is to become a reality,
we will need far more feeder schools with dual language
programs from Pre-K to Grade 12 throughout Region
One with the broader support of the Texas Association
for Bilingual Education and the Texas Education Agency.
UTRGV will also need to cultivate more partnerships
with local parents, community organizations, and school
districts; improve our bilingual teacher education program,
especially the portions designed to facilitate teaching in
Spanish for dual language programs; and offer more
professional development opportunities for UTRGV faculty
who would like to teach their courses bilingually or in
Spanish. There is much work to be done, pero como dice
Gloria Anzaldúa, vale la pena.\textsuperscript{5}

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Education Research and Instruction 23, no. 1 (2021). I am grateful to the
JBERI’s editors for granting reprint permission as well Lori Gallegos,
who supported printing this revised version in APA Studies on Hispanic/
Latino Issues in Philosophy where more philosophers might find it.

Notes

1. Originalmente publicado en La Revista Ilustrada de Nueva York,
    Estados Unidos, el 10 de enero de 1891, y en El Partido Liberal,
    México, el 30 de enero de 1891.

2. English translation by Elinor Randall in Latin American Philosophy
    for the 21st Century: The Human Condition, Values, and the
    Search for Identity, eds. Jorge J. E. Graca and Elizabeth Millán-

3. I place the federally recognized term “Hispanic” and the
    neologism “Latinx” in quotes for their first use because their
    appropriateness is frequently contested by people who prefer
    other ethnic labels (e.g., Latino/a, Mexican American, Mexican,
    Chicano/a, Chicano, etc.) or reject ethnic labels altogether.
    Throughout the remainder of the article, I typically use Mexican
    or Mexican American because they are typically favored by
    my students or Latinx for the reasons outlined by Robert Eli
    Sanchez, Latin American and Latinx Philosophy: A Collaborative

4. Angela Cerece and Adrian Blackledge, “Translanguaging in the
    Bilingual Classroom: A Pedagogy for Learning and Teaching?”

5. Ofelia García and Angel M. Y. Lin, “Translanguaging in Bilingual
    Education,” in Bilingual and Multilingual Education, eds. Ofelia
    García, Angel M. Y. Lin, and Stephen May (Switzerland: Springer

6. Laura I. Rendón, Amaury Nora, and Víjaj Kanagala, Ventajas/ Assets y
    Conocimientos/Knowledge: Leveraging Latin@ Strengths to Foster Student Success
    (The University of Texas at San Antonio: Center for Research and Policy in Education, 2014).

7. The phrase “philosophizing in tongues” honors the philosophical
    legacy of Gloria Anzaldúa, especially her “Speaking in Tongues: A
    Letter to 3rd World Women Writers.” Gloria Anzaldúa and Cherríe
    Moraga, This Bridge Called My Back: Writings by Radical Women of

8. See Gina A. García, Becoming Hispanic-Serving Institutions: Opportunities for
    Colleges and Universities, Reforming Higher Education: Innovation and the Public Good
    (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2019).

9. Gina A. García, “Defined by Outcomes or Culture? Constructing an
    Organizational Identity for Hispanic-Serving Institutions,”
    1135–1145.

10. There is no master catalog of courses across institutions of
    higher education in Texas, but UTRGV is certainly the only
    institution to offer an Introduction to Latin American Philosophy
    as part of the general education/core curriculum. A few other
    Texas institutions—e.g., University of Texas at El Paso, Texas A&M
    University, and Texas State University—offer advanced courses in
    Latin American philosophy.

    capitol.texas.gov/Docs/ED/htm/ED.61.htm.

    utsystem.edu/about/history-university-texas-system.


14. In fall 2019, I administered a Spanish-English Bilingual Profile
    to sixty-two students enrolled in PHIL 1305: Introduction to
    Latin American Philosophy across two course sections with
    a response rate of 92 percent (57 responses). I adapted the
    following instrument by simplifying it for teaching rather
    than research purposes: David Birdsong, Libby M. Gerken,
    and Mark Amengual, “Bilingual Language Profile: An Easy-To-
    la.utexas.edu/bilingual/.

15. Gloria Anzaldúa, Borderlands/La Frontera: The New Mestiza, 4th

16. Deborah Cole and Rob Johnson, “How to Tame a Wild Tongue’:
    Gloria Anzaldúa’s Borderlands/La Frontera and the 1960s Era
    Speech Test and Speech Classes at Pan American College,” in
    El Mundo Zurdo 4: Selected Works from the 2013 Meeting of
    the Society for the Study of Gloria Anzaldúa, eds. T. Jacqueline
    Cuevas, Larissa Mercado-López, and Sonia Saldívar-Hull (San

17. Anzaldúa, Borderlands/La Frontera, 76; italics in original.

18. Anzaldúa, Borderlands/La Frontera, 75.

19. José Dávila-Montes, Gabriel González Núñez, and Francisco
    Guajardo, “On Not Taming the Wild Tongue: Challenges and
    Approaches to Institutional Translation in a University
    Serving a Historically Minoritized Population,” TTR: Traduction,
    terminologie, rédaction 32, no. 2 (2019).

    net/cms/lib/TX10003661/Centricity/Domain/3/Demographic20
    Profile%202021%20%20Stats.pdf.

21. Angela Valenzuela, Subtractive Schooling: US-Mexican Youth and

    the Wild Tongue,” 45.

    the Wild Tongue,” 45.

24. US Senate, Hearings, Reports and Prints of the Senate Select
    Committee on Equal Educational Opportunity: Part 4—Mexican

25. One other article thoughtfully discussed the importance of
    teaching bicultural students bilingually, but it is focused upon
    a program designed for children: Yolanda Chávez Leyva and
    Amy Reed-Sandoval, “Philosophy for Children and the Legacy
    of Anti-Mexican Discrimination in El Paso Schools,” APA Newsletter
    on Hispanic/Latino Issues in Philosophy 16, no. 1 (Spring 2016):
    17–23. The article’s conclusion would nevertheless apply equally
    well to college students. “Importantly, engaging in philosophical
    dialogue with children and youth in both Spanish and English
    (that is, using both languages in a single session) not only
    responds to local historical resistance to anti-Mexican linguistic
    discrimination; it also expands kids’ opportunities to engage
    philosophically” (21).
José Martí and the Indigenous Population of the Americas

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José Martí, the Cuban patriot and national hero, has been the subject of endless debate and scholarship in Cuba and abroad. When he died in 1895, at age forty-two, battling against Spanish troops in the West of Cuba, he left his fellow citizens to put together his massive collections of chronicles and poems, disseminated all over Latin America and deciphering his vision of the nation. That vision was supposed to be one of the “sacred pillars” of the republic. So it is no surprise that successive interpretations of his work have emphasized his constructive, fulfilling, and inclusive views of Cubans. Such political drive behind his work has led his fellow citizens to idolize him, avoiding the rough contours of his philosophical vision. So far, critics have interpreted his work within the intellectual framework of four main traditions: Kraussism, American transcendentalism, liberalism, and positivism. In my books, I acknowledge the impact these traditions on Martí. Still, I emphasize texts written by him, previously marginalized by scholars, which would not situate him among Krauss’s and Emerson’s most spiritualist followers. Instead, I position him among the liberal intellectuals, or “civilizing politicians” such as Faustino Domingo Sarmiento, aristocratic liberals such as John Stuart Mill and Alexis de Tocqueville, or closer to the positivists in México.

These thinkers underscored the importance of science and progress for their societies and the need to acculturate large sectors of the population that were illiterate or belonged to different ethnic groups. For these reasons, I pointed out Martí’s troubling perspectives on Indigenous and black people in his “North American Scenes,” to his personal diaries, and his essay “Nuestra América [Our America]” that most critics read as a staunch defense of these countries’ sovereignty and of unprotected populations. In these texts, Martí supports Indigenous acculturation, and their confinement in the American reservations. He praises the Carlisle Indian Industrial school in the United States where the objective was to “kill the Indian and save the men,” and he shows his fear of black people for what they could “inherit” from their ancestors in Africa.

These views, I argue, were standard among Eurocentrists and white supremacists that valued Western education, civilization, and whiteness over non-whiteness and “savagery,” and wanted to bring Latin America closer to Europe. In several of my articles and my book Etnografía, política y poder, José Martí y la cuestión indígena, I show that Martí’s ideas of cultural superiority had concrete manifestations in his writings, particularly in his support of General Julio A. Roca’s military campaign in La Pampa and Patagonia, where thousands of Amerindians lived and were captured, killed, dispossessed of their land, and their children distributed among the wealthy families. In his newspaper articles in La America of New York, written while holding the post of “chancellor” of the Argentinean
consulate in that city, Martí praised General Roca’s “desert campaign” and compared the natives to animals or criminals; retreating to their last “hideouts.” In the same manner, he hailed the arrival of families from Italy, “poetic Italian workers,” that were coming to replace the native population in the newly “conquered” territories, whitening the country and building a modern European agricultural infrastructure with fast communications. In his chronicle of 1883, Martí writes: “Where the invading Indians ran on fantastic horses, the railroads run today as spokesmen of the new times.” His only wish was that Buenos Aires “does the same campaigns in industry . . . worthy of those marvelous and centaurean ones, which gave the appearance of gods to men.” According to the Buenos Aires press, the justification for the “conquest of the desert” was the incursions of the indigenous people on the border. These indigenous people were accused of stealing cattle for which they went to jail, but according to Milcíades Peña the real justification was money: to make those lands available to foreign capital, the Creole oligarchy, cereal production, and grazing.

Thus, even if Martí criticizes Domingo Faustino Sarmiento in his famous essay “Nuestra América” for opposing “civilization” to “barbarity,” in other articles he praises the Argentinian government for carrying out this policy and he expresses his admiration for intellectuals such as Estanislao S. Zeballos (1854–1923), showing his full agreement with the “magnificent generation” that had turned Argentina into one of the most developed nations in Latin America in the early 1890s, rivaling, as he said, states such as Massachusetts in the number of schools. No wonder, in “Nuestra América,” Martí alerts Latin America’s ruling class of the need to give a space in their republics to the masses of black people and Indians that were discriminated against and to be on guard for the “incultos” or illiterates that could destroy the institutions created by the State. It was his admiration for the “magnificent generation” of the 1880s that led him to translate a book where the Argentinian government gives its reasons to annex the territories of Misiones, in the northern part of Buenos Aires, that was inhabited by Guarani Indians. Martí took on this translation for free after he resigned from his post at the Argentinian consulate. These territories were annexed in 1881 by General Roca, but in none of his chronicles does Martí stop to wonder what Amerindians living there thought of these annexations and violent war. On the contrary, Martí supported these actions because he believed in the right of the state to expand its inner frontiers beyond the provinces that surrounded Buenos Aires, much in the same way the US did when they waged war on the Native Americans.

In this regard, Martí followed a generation of politicians who saw themselves inheriting territories that formerly belonged to the Spanish empire that created “fictional borders,” which they accepted without considering the Amerindians’ right to their ancestral land. Instead, they ruled these territories as they pleased, which was a continuation of a policy of colonial dispossession that began five hundred years before. The only difference was that this time, the Creole state claimed possession of these lands and used the law to force these communities to give it up under the pretext that they did not have ownership titles for them or did not make them produce. That is what happened in Guatemala, under General Justo Rufino Barrios, where Martí supported a similar policy of land expropriation. He even thought of becoming a coffee producer—something he did not do—and instead came to the United States, where he lived for fifteen years, and saw firsthand the appalling conditions the Native Americans lived in.

Nonetheless, during his stay in North America, Martí continued to refer to indigenous people as less socially developed than whites, as “children.” He believed it was better for them to abandon their habits, lands, and traditional customs and become “regular” peasants or American citizens. He did not believe in the superiority of his biological inheritance, but his culture. He was not a “naturalist” thinker, but someone who put his trust in the progress of history and in education to “help” them move towards a higher degree of sociocultural development. This way of thinking was typical of intellectuals influenced by Charles Darwin and Herbert Spencer. It was a vision of history anchored in a progressive and linear time, which objectified the Native peoples and denied them the present they shared with the speaker (denial of coevalness according to anthropologist Johannes Fabian). Thus, Martí talks in his articles of “a superiority that is nothing more than a degree in time” between the races. It was an optimistic view of humanity and history that divided the world between socially developed and backward societies. It was a view rooted in what he called “the beautiful human march” that, according to Jean Lamore, was the product of Martí reading sociocultural evolutionists such as Edward Burnett Tylor, Lewis Henry Morgan, and John Lubbock.

That is why I argue that Martí’s vision of society was temporal, hierarchical, and ethnocentric, allowing him to justify land dispossession and acculturation.

He did not believe in biological differences that could hinder their social advancement, although at the heart of the theory of sociocultural evolution, there is an ethnocentric drive that makes it as problematic as biological racism. Why? Because ethnocentrism becomes racism when it is used to express the cultural superiority of one ethnic group over another or in the case that the State uses it to support laws against ethnic minorities and in favor of whites.

No doubt, these are both forms of discrimination—ideological constructs—with obvious political and economic intentions that result in segregation and violations of the rights of members of minority groups for generations. Both ways of looking at race respond to the rationalizing logic of the modern state, as David Goldberg argues, which defended across the Americas the interests and aspirations of groups descended from Europeans. These states had a scale of values, a list of racial and cultural exclusions, based on which these other social subjects did not have the right to be part of and have a voice in the debate. To do so, they had first to set aside their cultural and material heritage and adopt the manners of the dominant culture.

Hence, as I have suggested in my book and articles on Martí, it is fair to say that the “desert campaign” in Argentina, which was nothing more than a war of extermination
against the “savage,” the policy of European immigration, and the belief that it was necessary to “kill the Indian and save the man” in American schools were policies guided by a white supremacist agenda that responded to the interests of the white, Western, modernizing state. Martí, as I said, enthusiastically supported these policies, which his biographers and critics ignored and continue to ignore today.¹¹

To conclude, Martí’s support of the war and annexation of these territories, his translation of the Argentinian government’s legal argument on the question of Misiones, his post at the Argentinian consulate in New York, and his praise for the Argentinian generation of his time show his complicity with the Argentinian and European policy of progress and civilization at the expense of the Indigenous communities that lived there. Martí supported these policies, disregarding what Indigenous communities thought of them or the traumatic effects they had on their lives. Some of the Indigenous survivors of General Roca’s military campaign took refuge in the northern territories of Misiones, where the government nonetheless arrived shortly afterwards to displace them. The diplomatic “allegation,” therefore, translated by Martí and presented to President Cleveland in 1894, is the culmination of a liberal policy of economic expansion, genocide, and repopulation of Argentina that Martí supported.

Why, then, do so many critics ignore these facts and focus instead on essays such as “Mi raza” or “Nuestra América”? Why do they defend Martí against any charges of racist bias or ethnocentric views? Principally, the chronicles referenced here have been marginalized by critics who frequently celebrate Martí for his patriotic and literary achievements. The Cuban government has continuously censored any opinion that goes against the established one and the only texts that have been translated into English speak of Martí’s devotion to his country, humanity, and his great literary skills. That is why most critics only focus on the chronicles he wrote near the end of his life, when he was actively engaged in organizing the war against Spain to liberate Cuba. In this time, Martí’s objective was to unite all Cubans—black and white—to defeat the colonial regimen. Thus, he minimized any references to the Haitian Revolution or the fear of black people because he believed these discussions could only serve to divide Cubans, which was one of the main purposes of the Spanish government. In addition, for many critics, and Cubans especially, Martí is still the Apostle, the greatest man that lived on this earth and there is nothing that can stain his figure. For this reason, I suggest looking at the lesser-known articles he wrote on the topic of race early in his life and not focusing so much on his latest writings, where he speaks more favorably about these communities and was influenced by social reformers such as the Friends of Indians organization and Henry George. These texts are problematic, to say the least, and should be taken into consideration when discussing his philosophical stance.

**NOTES**

1. I have discussed these issues in several of my books on Martí. See my article titled “José Martí: ‘la aristocracia intelectual’ y el concepto negativo de las masas,” Letras Hispanas 9, no. 1 (2013): 5–19.
3. This article only discusses Martí’s representation of Indigenous communities in the US and Latin America. In my book Miedo negro, poder blanco en la Cuba colonial (Madrid: Iberoamericano, 2015), I discuss his representation of black people and chronicles such as “Mi Raza” (My Race).
8. ———, Obras completas vol. 7, 324.
11. Martí was offered $800 by the Argentinian government to translate this book. That amount is equivalent today to $26,392.19 if we calculate the average inflation rate of 2.77 percent per year. He rejected the payment and did the work for free. The book is titled Argument for the Argentine Republic upon de Question with Brazil in regard to the Territories of Misiones (Washington, 1894).
21. “Martí, el evolucionismo y los indígenas. Reiteraciones sobre un mismo punto,” La Habána Elegante 55 (Summer 2014)
José Martí on Racism

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Some recent scholarship on the works of José Martí has revealed a number of previously lost writings that appear to challenge standard interpretations of the political philosophy of this great Cuban patriot, poet, and thinker. According to Jorge Camacho, a leading scholar in the field, at least in some of his writings, Martí comes out as having shared the deterministic racism against the Indigenous peoples of the Americas that prevailed among the Latin American elites of his time. True, his political thought on these matters might show some contradictions. But such contradictions in no way challenge my interpretation of Martí’s anti-racism in “Martí’s Liberal Anti-Positivism.”

However, my interpretation of Martí’s general political philosophy is incompatible with Camacho’s on this point: I reject that Martí was a positivist whose views on the identity of Latin Americans fall within the civilization-versus-barbarism tradition of figures such as Sarmiento and Alberdi. I reject this interpretation even if Camacho has textual evidence that at some point in his development Martí supported the genocidal war that General Julio Argentino Roca waged against the Amerindians of the Pampas in Argentina in the late-nineteenth century. I reject it even if Camacho has some evidence that Martí’s objection against anti-black racism was prompted by pragmatic considerations, such as that he was trying to enlist black Cubans in the fight for his nation’s liberation from Spanish colonial rule.

On my view, a more charitable interpretation of Martí’s views on racism is available. It stems from an understanding of the entailments for racism of his general philosophical outlook, Krausism, as well as from his argument in “Mi raza” (My Race) and some other representative writings, which suggest that Martí was committed to rejecting racism. In response to Camacho, I propose we first draw a distinction between what Martí actually said and what he should have said in light of his own philosophical commitments to Krausism. First, Martí was aware of Latin America’s social, economic, cultural, and racial diversity in the nineteenth century. Given Krausism’s vindication of harmony among all human beings and more broadly with nature, he should have vindicated the intrinsic moral value of all individuals and groups. Surely, the Martí unveiled by Camacho might have harbored certain racial prejudices against some ethnic and racial groups, including the Amerindians. And like many intellectuals of his time, he might have embraced some version of the civilization-versus-barbarism dichotomy. But he need not embrace the geographical and genetic determinism first championed in Latin America by figures such as Sarmiento and Alberdi. Furthermore, there is the Martí of “Mi raza,” an essay that clearly argues against anti-black racism. Reconstructing his arguments in a charitable way requires placing it in the content of Martí’s Krausism, a complex philosophical outlook from which the thesis that all groups of people deserve equal rights follows. As is well known, Martí in fact claimed that there is a single race, the human race. Somewhat less known, at least to philosophical audiences, is his objection to racism against people of African descent. His actual argument is not only ambiguous, but has a limited scope since it only targets one type of such racism: namely, racism based on the white racists’ belief that their own racial group is superior to black peoples and, by extension, any other group. The literature on racism shows that the bias of thinking that race determines moral standing comes in various types. Martí’s views on racism are closer to John Stuart Mill’s, who also seems to have endorsed a version of the civilization-versus-barbarism dichotomy (something not uncommon among theorists of the nineteenth century). Furthermore, like Mill, he might have supported an imperialist policy of coercion by education of the native populations of the world. But arguably, racism comes in degrees, and neither Martí nor Mill appear to have had a determinist conception of racial differences based on either geography or genetics. That would be incompatible with supporting the integration of the native peoples by education, which is, of course, a form of coercion.

In my book, I offer several reconstructions of Martí’s anti-racism argument. First, I reconstruct it as a slippery-slope argument holding that if white racists think they have a right to assert their racial superiority over black people, then black people also have the right to assert their racial superiority over the white people. If racists of one type or the other were to invoke empirical evidence in support of their alleged racial superiority, Martí can note that no such evidence exists, as demonstrated in the wide rejection of the Bell-Curve theory of Richard Hernstein and Charles Murray. I have suggested that, to render Martí’s argument stronger, he could have invoked his own Krausist conception of the intrinsic moral value of unity and harmony—or its converse, the intrinsic moral disvalue of division and conflict. Assuming that harmony among individuals, groups, and with nature is intrinsically morally good and conflict intrinsically morally bad, his anti-racist argument may now run this way:

1. If people from an ethnic/racial group proclaim their racial superiority over another group of people, then that would incite a reaction and create conflict.

2. Conflict is intrinsically morally bad.

3. Therefore, it is morally wrong for people of an ethnic group to proclaim their racial superiority over another group.

Of course, Marxists and anarchists among others would reply that premise (2), which assumes Krausism, begs the question against their own political philosophies. Yet there is a more compelling argument that’s still faithful to the concept of Nature of the Krausists and runs as follows:

1. Peace is intrinsically morally good but demands of Nature the recognition of human rights.

2. People whose human rights are violated through racial discrimination will fight for those rights.
3. War is incompatible with peace.

4. Therefore, racial discrimination is contrary to Nature, the enemy of peace, and intrinsically morally bad.

The Krausists’ assumptions here are captured by their concept “Nature.” If we want to avoid them, Martí’s argument can be recast as relying solely on strong evidence from history, the social sciences, and common sense about the intense pain and suffering often caused by racial conflicts. There is no need to make any Krausist assumption in order to object to racism along these lines. At the end of the day, on this charitable reconstruction, Martí has argued with a high degree of plausibility that racism leads to war or other forms of social discord, which are generally morally bad. Now even utilitarians can agree with him, given that war and social conflict increase the balance of pain over happiness in the world, and pain is intrinsically morally bad.

Of course, in other writings Martí may have had biases in favor of white people of European descent. In addition, he may have supported discriminatory policies against Amerindians, as Camacho’s work demonstrates. That would show inconsistencies with his own philosophical outlook of Krausism. But it falls short of showing that he was part of the racist tradition exemplified in Sarmiento’s proto-positivism and the positivism that came later. Did he actually support the genocidal campaigns against the Amerindians that took place by the end of the nineteenth century in various Latin American countries? If he did, he was inconsistent. But “Mi raza,” a representative anti-racist writing, provides evidence against any attempt to place him comfortably within the racist, positivist tradition.

NOTES

1. In addition to the essay by Jorge Camacho in this issue, see Camacho’s Étnografía, política y poder: José Martí y la cuestión indígena (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2013).


AUTHOR BIOS

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