NEWSLETTER ON HISPANIC/LATINO ISSUES IN PHILOSOPHY

FROM THE EDITOR, Arleen L. F. Salles

REPORT FROM THE CHAIR, Susana Nuccetelli

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Gregory Fernando Pappas
“The American Challenge: The Tension between the Values of the Anglo and the Hispanic World”

Ivan Marquez, Interviewer
“Knowing Self in Power and Truth: An Interview with Linda Martín Alcoff, Professor of Philosophy, Political Science, and Women’s Studies and Meredith Professor for Teaching Excellence, Syracuse University, Syracuse, New York”

ANNOUNCEMENTS
This issue of the *Newsletter* presents the article winner of the 2005 APA Prize in Latin American Thought. In the article “The American Challenge: The Tension between the Values of the Anglo and the Hispanic World,” Gregory Pappas raises a wonderful series of issues regarding the possibility and desirability of integrating and balancing diverse cultural values that appear to pull in different directions. Pappas takes as a starting point the widely held view that there are two cultures, one Hispanic/Latino and the other Anglo/Saxon, that each embraces specific values, and that their respective values are in tension. The question is, what follows from this? On one view, represented by Samuel Huntington, the existing tension between values is to be avoided by protecting typically Anglo/Saxon values and promoting the assimilation of Hispanics. Pappas rejects this view after careful examination of the arguments used to defend it. Instead, he draws from the work of the Cuban philosopher Jorge Mañach and the American philosopher John Dewey to show the advantages of an alternative view, according to which the existence of conflicting values plays an instrumental role in that it allows for mutual modification, transformation, and learning. In his article, Pappas identifies the philosophical issues involved and discusses how a good understanding of the notion of balance can make a difference in our analysis and approach to the issue of cultural differences.

This issue of the *Newsletter* also includes a comprehensive interview with Linda Martín Alcoff that gives an excellent glimpse of her central ideas and an overview of her work.

I would like to encourage our readers to send along papers, letters, announcements, and suggestions that might help toward creating a more diversified newsletter. We want to continue to offer issues filled with thought-provoking contributions, so please send us your work and thoughts. Articles that address recent developments in Hispanic/Latino thought and reflections on topics of interest to the philosophical community are welcome. Please submit two copies of essays. References should follow *The Chicago Manual of Style*.

If you have published a book that is appropriate for review in the *Newsletter on Hispanic/Latino Issues in Philosophy* send us a copy of your book. Consider volunteering a book review. All items and inquiries should be sent to Arleen L. F. Salles at Division of Humanities, College of Professional Studies, St. John’s University. sallesa@stjohns.edu

As the chair of the Committee on Hispanics, I am happy to report that our committee this year has aggressively pursued its goals of promoting the teaching of Latin American philosophy and raising the profile of Hispanics in the profession. For one thing, we had a central role in the successful application for an NEH Summer Institute on Latin American philosophy. In this, our aim was to make a contribution to the field so that topics from Latin American thought, broadly construed, begin to be incorporated into the curriculum. The grant was approved by the NEH, and this is a unique event in the history of the discipline in the United States. Thanks to that grant, Jorge Gracia and I were able to conduct the Summer Institute at SUNY/Buffalo in June 2005, gathering four invited scholars and twenty-five college instructors for a period of four weeks. The experience was fruitful and encouraging. I hope that this is just the first in a series of activities aimed at establishing Latin American philosophy in the profession.

This year the Committee also welcomed a new editor of the *Newsletter*, Arleen Salles. She brings to the *Newsletter* her experience as an editor of several collections of essays, and her interest in Latin American philosophy and ethics. She has formed an editorial board, which will soon bring about improvements in our *Newsletter*.

Furthermore, in December 2004 the Committee granted the first APA prize to essays in Latin American philosophy. Bernie Cantens’s and Manuel Vargas’s essays shared this prize. In addition, the Committee offered sessions at the three APA Divisional meetings, attracting considerable interest among participants of these conferences. Many stayed after the sessions to make inquiries about our committee and to show their support for other activities we may undertake at Division meetings in the future. As a result, we have broadened our reach.

Clearly, the moment is favorable for teaching and research in Latin American thought. I look forward to suggestions about how to accelerate this trend—and also welcome input regarding plans for possible panels, special sessions, and other events that we might sponsor at future Divisional meetings. The Committee will discuss these and other issues at its annual gathering in December 2005.
**ARTICLES**

**The American Challenge: The Tension between the Values of the Anglo and the Hispanic World**

Gregory Fernando Pappas  
*Texas A & M University*

In 1975, the Cuban philosopher Jorge Mañach claimed that the  
“Americans of the North and of the South...have very different  
ways of feeling, of thinking, and of acting.”¹ He shared with the  
North American philosopher John Dewey² the belief that in the  
Hispanic/Latin and in the Anglo-Saxon worlds different values  
are emphasized. These differences are so acute that they lead  
to opposition or tension. In his notes on Mexico, Dewey said:  
“The contact of a people having an industrialized, Anglo-Saxon  
psychology with a people of Latin psychology is charged with  
high explosives.”³ In comparing the “Anglo-Americans” with  
the “Spanish-Latin temper,” he said, “The two mix no better  
than oil and water.”⁴ For Mañach to live in the “frontier,” as  
the place of contact between these two cultures, is to live in tension,  
instability, ambiguity, and perhaps anxiety.

For those of us who live in between these two cultures, there  
is much truth in these remarks. If many Hispanic-Americans live  
in between cultures that make implicit but conflicting demands  
about values, then perhaps there is more to the problematic and  
ambiguous character of their existence than just trying to make  
sense of their hybrid identity. But this issue is of importance not  
just to Hispanic-Americans. Today more than ever the contact  
between these two cultures is inevitable in and outside of North  
America. In “The Hispanic Challenge” and in a new book,⁵  
Samuel P. Huntington, a respected public intellectual, alerts  
us about a brewing tension that may undermine the values  
that he identifies with the United States. Hispanic culture is a  
threat not just to national identity and to the English language  
but to the “Anglo-Protestant values” derived “from the founding  
settlers and include the work ethic and individualism.”⁶ Among  
the “irreconcilable differences” that tend to generate  
a “cultural clash” are differences regarding work, self-reliance  
(individuality), “the concept of time epitomized in the mañana  
syndrome, the ability to achieve results quickly, and attitudes  
toward history, expressed in the cliché that Mexicans are  
obessed with history, Americans with the future.”⁷

Since the publication of Huntington’s “Hispanic Challenge,”  
there have been many refutations of Huntington’s views but  
none that confronts his claims about value from a philosophical  
or ethical point of view. This is what I intend to do in this paper.  
I carry on this sort of refutation by reconstructing the shared  
view of Mañach and Dewey, two philosophers (from the two  
cultures that concern Huntington) who seem to agree with  
Huntington’s view of culture and their values? The difficulties here are  
hold these premises without the need to abandon a pluralistic  
view of culture evident in Huntington’s view. To refute Huntington  
on this issue from a philosophical perspective, one would  
benefit from recent scholarship in multiculturalism about  
the heterogeneous nature of cultures.¹⁰ I am not interested in  
carrying this refutation here. It may be objected that by focusing  
on (4a) I am granting too much to Huntington. But Huntington  
must be refuted at all levels. Moreover, underlying his support  
of (1), (2), and (3) are assumptions easy to refute. But it is  
necessary to confront this inferences regarding values.

I. The Mañach-Dewey Thesis Reconsidered

Are Mañach and Dewey, however, equally vulnerable in regard to  
(1), (2), and (3)? Is there any plausible way in which one can  
hold these premises without the need to abandon a pluralistic  
view of culture and their values? The difficulties here are  
similar to comparisons often made between “Western” and  
“Oriental” culture. We may doubt that there is any empirical  
basis for claiming even the vaguest of similarities among the  
many Hispanic cultures. Tenet (1) seems to homogenize what  
is in reality heterogeneous. One can also object that (1) is  
“stretching” the concept of a “culture” or of “identity.” Jorge  
Gracia, for example, has a strong fear of homogenization and a  
very strict view of “identity.”¹¹ I have no doubt he would question  
(1). But, recently, Jose Medina, Iris Young, and I have provided  
a more relational or functional view of identity where identity  
does not preclude differences and is relative to context.¹² I am  
on not going to settle the issue here, but it is clear that even if  
controversial, (1) is not totally implausible. There may be a way  
to qualify (1) that avoids the problem of homogenization. The  
vague resemblance between Hispanic cultures in comparison  
to other world cultures may be a good reason to lump them  
together under one name, even if one acknowledges the  
cultural diversity of the Hispanic world.

However, even if we grant (1), (2) is also problematic.  
What empirical evidence is there for the claim that each culture  
emphasizes different values? How can Dewey and Mañach, two  
empirically minded and careful philosophers, dare to make  
such vague generalizations about cultures and their values?  
We must be critical of the Mañach-Dewey thesis but not  
by assuming a “straw man” version of their view. The above  
tenets need to be understood in the context of their overall  
philosophies. First, there is no assumption here of a Latin or  
the other has of positive worth. This would be the balance, the  
synthesis to which the cultural frontier invites us.”¹³

In sum, Dewey and Mañach seem to share with Huntington  
the following controversial tenets:

(1) There is a Hispanic/Latino culture and an Anglo-Saxon  
culture.

(2) In these two cultures different values are emphasized.

(3) There is a tension between the values of each culture.

From these premises Huntington concludes that:

(4a) This tension must be avoided. The values in tension  
are irreconcilable and will undermine the “Anglo-  
protestant” values.

But Mañach and Dewey conclude that:

(4b) This tension can be an opportunity to maintain an ideal  
relation of balance.

In this paper, I will be mostly concerned with how (4a) and  
(4b) can follow from (1), (2), and (3), but first, I must briefly  
address tenets (1), (2), and (3). Needless to say, there is much  
here that needs to be questioned. More importantly, it is worth  
noting that the agreement between Huntington and Dewey-Mañach  
regarding (1), (2), and (3) is superficial. Dewey and Mañach  
do not assume the simplistic and homogenizing view of  
cultures evident in Huntington’s view. To refute Huntington  
with (4a) one would have to confront his claims about value from  
philosophical positions, one would benefit from recent scholarship in  
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We must be critical of the Mañach-Dewey thesis but not  
by assuming a “straw man” version of their view. The above  
tenets need to be understood in the context of their overall  
philosophies. First, there is no assumption here of a Latin or
Anglo “essence” necessarily and exclusively tied to certain values. Tenet (2) simply assumes a comparative judgment about values that are no more than emphases, dependent on historical conditions. We are comparing accents of temperament and of conduct, and not exclusive modalities. For example, Mañach explains that “the fact that Anglo-Saxons are mainly volitional does not prevent them from harboring sentimentalism, even though they may try to hide it. Neither does the predominance of sensibility in Hispanic people signify a purely emotional aptitude.” However, this still raises some difficult epistemological questions about how to determine the “emphasis,” “accents,” or “predominance” of some values over others in a culture.

Scientific studies in the form of polls or any quantifiable method may be used to examine and support the Mañach-Dewey thesis. For example, plenty of studies done in the last decade support the generalization that work is highly valued in Anglo-Saxon cultures. The importance of relationships over the individual in Hispanic cultures can be supported by studies that show the role of the family in all rituals and daily activities. However, neither Mañach nor Dewey appealed to these methods. The basis for their claims was their personal experiences. But they did not find these experiences, therefore, subjective or irrelevant.

Dewey once wrote that “every culture has its own collective individuality.” Not every Hispanic individual has (or needs to have to count as a Hispanic) the “collective individuality” of the group or culture as a whole. Nor can we assume that acquaintance with a certain number of individuals (i.e., the majority) will be sufficient to experience what is a “predominant” value in a culture. First-hand experience with works of art and habitual forms of association may be important. We experience the predominant tendencies or general values emphasized in a culture in a qualitative and immediate way. We do this before we inquire into the usual empirical data that would support our judgments. Different ways of life have distinctive rhythms, accents, and patterns that can be discerned and compared by those who have the sensitivity to experience them. These personal experiences must be subject to criticism and to further inquiry in any of the academically recognized ways to prove and verify hypotheses about cultures, but there is no good reason to dismiss them a priori.

But one may object that there is no way to determine whether the personal and direct experiences of cultures are nothing more than problematic cultural stereotypes. How do we know that Dewey’s experience of Hispanic cultures was not distorted by the common prejudices of his time? Furthermore, it could be argued that polling as a corrective of cultural misinterpretations in people’s personal experiences does not work; the polling may still be capturing widely held stereotypes. Dewey’s answer to these skeptical challenges is straightforward, but I am aware it is not going to convince those who want theoretical certainty. We start where we are, in the midst of the pre-reflective personal immediate qualitative experiences we have of cultures. In open-minded people (an important condition!), these experiences change and are transformed by inquiry, but we must return to them as our guide. If we have prejudices or stereotypes that distort our immediate experience of other cultures then, hopefully, we will find out through inquiry and further experiences. There is no privilege-theoretical-objective (”God’s eye view”) standpoint in which we must come to know a culture. There is, of course, a lot more work to be done if one is to defend (1) and (2) from the empirical and pluralistic perspective of Mañach and Dewey. My aim here is merely to suggest that even with regard to these premises these philosophers have a more defensible view than Huntington.

Tenet (3) makes a very specific claim about the “tension” between two particular cultures. What does this “tension” come to? It seems impossible to determine this without having at least some vague notion of the particular values in tension. We encounter a similar problem in trying to understand (4). Tenet (4) is a normative claim that prescribes “balance.” We will shortly consider what this could mean, but without some examples of the particular values that are the subject matter of the Mañach-Dewey thesis, we are left with a very abstract, empty, and dubious analysis. What particular tension of values did Mañach and Dewey have in mind? I do not think it is all that difficult to come up with a tentative and incomplete list of values. They have been assumed countless times in the writings of philosophers and in personal accounts. Huntington’s recent remarks are also helpful in this regard. Let us then assume, for the sake of argument and content, that the following list represents a roughly adequate description of the traits or values that are emphasized in each of the cultures in comparison.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Anglo-Saxon</th>
<th>Hispanic/Latin</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Traits or Values:</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Success</td>
<td>- Tranquility</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Quantity, time</td>
<td>- Quality</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Technique, information</td>
<td>- Emotions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Action, organization, control</td>
<td>- Appreciation, patience, resignation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Individualism, merit, privacy</td>
<td>- Relationships, loyalty, community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Fast, efficiency</td>
<td>- Slow-tempo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Classifications, rankings, rules</td>
<td>- Continuities, unity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Work</td>
<td>- Play, celebration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Future, change, novelty</td>
<td>- Present, past, tradition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Planning, prevention</td>
<td>- Spontaneity, intuition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Precise, concise</td>
<td>- Flowery, metaphors, rituals</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This is not the place for a detailed comparison between items in this list. We must, however, make sense of the claim that there can be a “tension,” and later a “balance,” between these values. We should be able to evaluate these claims even if we have serious doubts about the connection of these values with the two particular cultures. (In other words, tenets (3) and (4) may be defensible even if (1) and (2) are false).

Whether they are in a culture, a person, or a concrete relationship, the above traits do seem to be in some sort of tension. For example, organization and efficiency are many times the number-one enemy of the spontaneity required to enjoy and appreciate present experience. Emotional involvement and play often prevent one from adequate planning, prevention, and work. The tension between the importance of relationships and the values of individualism and privacy is, in fact, the basis of debates in contemporary political theory.

Notice that the “tension” here is not between what is contrary or opposite in meaning. From a moral point of view, the tension is not between good and evil but between goods (values) that “pull us” in a different direction in situations. The perfect scenario would be one in which all these values are maximized, but each can be a threat to the other if overemphasized. We can, for example, play while we work, but too much play tends to undermine work. Too much emphasis on community (relationships) is a threat to individuality. Moreover, some of these traits tend to degenerate (as values) if there is a total neglect or under emphasis of some other traits. For example, work without some play results in drudgery; individuality
without community results in isolated selves and the problems we associate with an excessive individualism. This gives us a clue as to how to understand the relation among these values according to the Mañach-Dewey thesis and, in particular, their prescription about “balance” ((4b) above). We must conceive our list of values as taking place between extreme poles. These poles are the result of excesses of the above values.

**Vices:**

- Over-organization - Disorganization
- Stress - Levity (Lack of seriousness)
- Mechanization - Impersonality - Over-relaxed
- Impatience - Inefficiency
- Unrest, hurry, breathlessness - Suffocating common bonds
- Undervaluing of tradition - Over-prevention of risk - Laziness
- Drudgery, boredom, routine - Quantification - Over-enjoyment of the present
- Standardization - Instrumentalism - No planning
- Loneliness - Idle playfulness
- Social status is solely determined by individual effort and dollars - Reality is mystical - Social status is solely determined by history and relationships

There is a sense in which this second list is prior to the list of values. When members of the two cultures we are comparing seek to criticize the other, they usually appeal to one or more of these “vices.” The basis for the insults, prejudices, and stereotypes that people from these two worlds have of each other are based on the exaggerated manifestations of the traits valued by each culture. All cultures have their own possible excesses, but behind them are values. This is what is seldom recognized. Dewey notes how much easier it is for one culture to appreciate the vices of the other:

The Anglo-Saxon races have the habit of scoffing at the Latin races for what they regard as their levity and lack of seriousness in their moral attitude towards the world. It is a good thing to turn matters around and look at ourselves. The judgment which the Latin races pass upon the Anglo-Saxon is that they are hard, angular, and without the delicate susceptibility to attend to the needs of others; that they set up their mark and go at it roughshod, regardless of the feelings of others. If we call them light and frivolous, they call us hard, and coarse, and brutal.

In the last section of this paper, I use this framework about values/vices to evaluate Huntington’s recent warnings about Hispanics (and his conclusion, (4a) above), but we can already begin to appreciate some crucial differences. From the standpoint of Mañach and Dewey, what Huntington seems afraid of are not the values emphasized in Hispanic culture but the excesses of these values that could occur with the increasing “Hispanization” of the United States. This and the fact that he is mostly silent about the possible “vices” of Anglo-Saxon culture seem to commit Huntington to a good/evil dichotomy (or rhetoric) where the Anglo-Saxon values are good and the Hispanic ones are antithetical or a threat to what is good. This is very different from the above Mañach-Dewey framework where there is the possibility of evil (as excesses) at both sides of the cultural divide. To guard against excesses on both sides is the ideal task. This is the task of balance, a task that can unite the Hispanic and the Anglo-Saxon world. But what is “balance”? Can this be accomplished while these cultures preserve their distinctive emphasis on certain values? And is this nothing more than another utopian dream of philosophers out of touch with historical reality?

**II. Balance as the Ideal**

Mañach claimed that the two cultures in question “have no reason to exclude one another, but on the contrary they are called to complement and enrich one another” in a relation of “balance.” It is of great importance for America and for the whole world—above all for the world of Western values—that these two great areas of culture not only comprehend each other but that they establish real mutuality. It is important that each of them preserve its particular values and emulate the universal values of the other.

If there is a tenet in the Mañach-Dewey thesis that requires philosophical clarification it is (4), since it is a normative claim. There are different traditional philosophical conceptions of “balance.” Which one is assumed and worthy of our aspirations in the confrontation between Hispanic and Anglo culture? There is a quantitative notion of balance as the maintenance of a certain measurable proportion between things. Usually the proportion is one of equality (i.e., same in magnitude, quantity, degree, or worth). There are at least two versions of this quantitative notion of balance. Neither one can be the ideal sort of relation prescribed by the Mañach-Dewey thesis.

First, there is balance as compensation. This notion of balance is assumed by ancient religious doctrines, according to which there is a law in nature by which events tend eventually to be balanced out. If in this life we engaged in too much pleasure, our next life will bring much pain. Notice that in this sense, the notion of balance does not entail that the elements to be balanced out must interact or affect each other in any significant way. In fact, it does not even require that the elements in question coexist. One can achieve balance by a compensation that takes place across time. An excess of x at time t could be balanced by procuring deficiency of x (and perhaps excess of y) at some other time. For example, one might say, “I will spend three days engaging in excessive play, to compensate for the last three days of drudgery.” Is this what Mañach and Dewey had in mind? This view would entail that a balanced life could be one of a continuous alternation (i.e., compensation) between the excesses of Latin and Anglo culture. Yet this is hardly worthy of aspiration.

There is also the quantitative notion of balance as moderation (or as the mean between extremes). In this interpretation balance is simply an equidistant midpoint between the extremes of each culture (i.e., between the vices I have presented). Excesses and deficiencies can be measured and can be corrected by simply adding or subtracting accordingly. So, for example, there is in principle a measurable mean between the two poles of being too organized and being totally disorganized. To maintain moderation is to avoid moving beyond that mean. The problems with this view should be obvious. How does one determine equal amount or distance relative to the extremes? Does the mean fall inside the Anglo side or the Hispanic side? But even if we could find some exact equidistant midpoint, is it worthy of aspiration?

This conception of the ideal has undesirable consequences. It discourages the particular cultures from excelling in any one value dimension for the sake of moderation. Is it desirable that the plurality of distinctive cultures in North and South America should aim at the same mean, so that the whole hemisphere becomes one balanced but homogenous culture in regard to values? Does this mean, for example, that people in the Anglo...
world for the sake of moderation must not continue to be
couraged to excel in what they are particularly good at, for
example, planning and organizing events? If this is what balance
means, then many would rather live in a world where excess is
the norm. Furthermore, this interpretation just fails to capture an
important aspect of the Mañach-Dewey vision: the notion that
the tension between the values of these cultures is something to
be embraced and not superseded.

Is there in the philosophies of Mañach or Dewey a different
conception of balance than the ones we have considered?
There is in Dewey, though he was not always explicit about it.  
Here are, in concise form, its main tenets:

a. Balance is a relation between forces in opposition or
tension.
b. Balance is an interactive process where these forces
are transformed in a tensive but reinforcing relation.
c. Balance is a relation between elements of an organic
whole that avoid excess and deficiency.

The notion of balance as the opposition between contrary elements can be traced as far back as pre-Hispanic Latin
America. According to Alfredo Lopez Austin it was essential to
the worldview of the Anahuacs, the inhabitants of Mesoamerica
in the central plateau of Mexico. Dewey’s notion of balance
arose from his interest in biological and artistic models.

Balance in the life of an organism is something temporal
and dynamic. It is achieved by a counteraction of forces that
is not achieved for all time. Rather, it is like riding a bicycle;
individuals continuously correct tendencies to tilt excessively
in one direction or the other. The restoration of balance is not a
return to a prior state of balance. In fact, no particular balance
is ever strictly speaking the same balance. In the shift from
imbalance to balance, there is a transformation of the factors
in opposition. Moreover, this transformation is not one in which
the factors are dissolved into an undifferentiated new unity (i.e.,
where there is no longer tension). There is instead an “organic
unity,” which “must be interpreted in terms of the interaction,
of actual reinforcement between the parts, and not in terms of
any one thing which somehow includes all others.”

The notion of balance as a unity where tension is
preserved is present in art. In art, “equilibrium comes about
not mechanically and inertly but out of, and because of,
tension.” In the balance of an organic whole, the parts are
interdependent in that what happens to one affects the other.
When there is an excess of one of the parts (too much), there
is also a deficiency (not enough) of some other part. Dewey
explains this in works of art. “There is no such thing as a force
strong or weak, great or pretty, in itself... To say that one part of
a painting, drama, or novel is too weak, means that some related
part is too strong—and vice versa.” This is important from the
point of view of someone who seeks cues from experience
as to when a balance might be threatened, or how it is to be
maintained. The artist becomes aware that he has introduced
too much variation only when he experiences not enough order.
Not enough stability or order might be a sign that we are being
too flexible. What is sometimes referred to as the excessive
individualism of our American society is, in fact, experienced
as a deficiency in our communal bonds.

There are many possible relations between the elements
that make up an organic whole. One reason for preferring a
one-sided, unbalanced relation is that it is often assumed to be
a sign of strength. There are works of art that succeed in getting
noticed because of an “effort to get strength by exaggeration
of some one element,” but Dewey believes that “such works
do not wear...no real strength is displayed, the counteracting
energies being only pasteboard and plaster figures. The seeming
strength of one element is at the expense of weakness in other
elements.” The problem with excesses is that they usually are
accompanied by, or lead to, deficiencies. Painters and writers
have the problem of “keeping down” a part so that other parts
can be “kept up.” This does not mean that all parts must remain
equal, as required by the quantitative notion of balance. In
Dewey’s organic conception, a relative predominance of one
element over another is compatible with balance. But the
strength or excellence of this element must significantly take
into account and be affected and reinforced by the other parts
that make up the whole (even if they are downplayed and in
tension with it). An “excess” or a “deficiency” is a problem that
results from the relative seclusion, confinement, oppression,
and suppression of one element over another in an organic
whole. Therefore, if balance is the mean between extremes, it is
not a fixed equidistant midpoint that we either attain or we are
out of balance. There is an indefinite number of ways in which
one can stay within the mean without falling into an extreme.
The balance of a bicycle rider is such that, at different times,
he can tilt to one side more than to the other without falling
down (i.e., off balance). In art this is done on purpose. The
artist might add a “touch of disorder” to add emphasis without
falling out of balance. She takes advantage of the “room” she
has between extremes.

This is the conception of balance presupposed by the
Mañach-Dewey thesis. It describes adequately the sort of
relation explained earlier between our two columns of values.
The values are in tension, but they are interdependent. How
could this view be used today to answer to Huntington and his
concern for the values that are threatened by the “Hispanic
challenge”? What are the skeptical challenges this normative
thesis faces today?

III. Balance and the “Hispanic Challenge”

The above analysis of balance conceives the “clash” of values
that worries Huntington in a very dynamic, open, and interactive
way. The Hispanic and the Anglo values do “pull” in opposing
directions, but their effect on each other and their tension can
be positive as part of the “counteracting of energies” required
for balance. Huntington perceives Hispanic culture as a threat,
but perhaps he confuses the values with their possible excesses,
or he just fails to appreciate the importance these other values
can have in keeping the Anglo-Saxon values from moving in an
exaggerated and stagnant direction. According to the Mañach-
Dewey framework, the best safeguard that the traits Huntington
considers as values will continue to be valuable is that they
remain in balance. They must hold a tensive relation with
the values that happen to be emphasized in Hispanic culture.
There is, therefore, at least a prima facie reason to consider the
“Hispanization” of America as a possible good thing.

Huntington wishes instead that Hispanics (and their
culture) assimilate to the Anglo-Saxon “melting pot,” but this
would lack the differences and tension that could benefit both.
Perhaps an analogy with marriage can help. My wife and I value
work and play, but she “tends” more toward work and I more
toward play. This is a source of tension, and sometimes there
is no easy way to solve our conflicts, but the tension is also
an opportunity to keep each other in balance, and with a marriage
that has enough variation (rhythm) to keep it interesting.

The problem with Huntington is that, for him, tension is
something that leads to fracture. He assumes that the only
other alternative to assimilation is a divided (or culturally
schizophrenic) society in which the United States loses its
distinctive cultural values. Mañach and Dewey provide an
alternative to this simplistic either/or. Neither homogeneity
nor the sort of heterogeneity in which there is no interaction
among cultures (and their values) is the ideal condition for the
flourishing of cultures. These are, in fact, the most common
conditions in which cultures, people, and relationships are prone to excesses in what they value.

Huntington is opposed to multicultural policies at home and abroad because they lead to an undesirable kind of fragmentation. He assumes, however, the same simplistic either/or of his opponents: either there is one homogeneous whole (a “melting pot”), or we are left with a pluralism of radically separated parts. What the Mañach-Dewey thesis proposes is the possibility of unity among diversity. This kind of unity, though applied in a more political context, was what thinkers like Simon Bolivar, Jose Marti, and Alain Locke hoped for.

In so far as multiculturalism is a move away from monistic and hierarchical ways of conceiving the status of cultural differences in our society, it is well-intended. The problem is that in extreme forms it assumes a pluralistic ideal that is also separatist. According to such views, a multicultural society is preserved by protecting, sheltering, and separating all cultures. Sometimes this is necessary and justified, but Dewey would not see this as ideal (i.e., as the best we can hope for). The best we can hope for is a society that maintains the relation of balance I have described, where cultural interchange goes well beyond mere cultural tolerance.

To be fair to Huntington, he is not against pluralism. In fact, he is against the imperialistic notion that the Anglo values must be spread across the globe. Instead of trying to spread our values across the world, Huntington thinks Americans should be concerned with their own house. There is a need to “reassert pride in our core values” because these values are being weakened or diluted by a multiculturalism that has accommodated other cultures. But he thinks this is especially worrisome in regard to Hispanic culture because of the present demographic, political, and geographical circumstances. More importantly, it is a strong culture with very different (almost opposing) values. It is hard to predict what will happen as a consequence of the Hispanicization of the United States. We may end up in fracture, war, and moral decline even if we were to try what Mañach and Dewey propose. They would, however, argue that we are not doomed to fracture into two opposing ethnic parts solely on the basis that the values of these two cultures are antithetical or in tension. In fact, in their view, this would be a reason for optimism.

Huntington may reply that even if he were to agree with Mañach and Dewey about what would be ideal, there are way too many obstacles for this ideal to be applicable to this particular confrontation between cultures. In theory, the values in tension can be reconciled, but the ideal requires a willingness on both sides to be open and affected by the other. This is not what we can expect of Hispanic culture. According to Huntington, unlike other cultures that have been part of the history of America, Hispanics are very resilient and they resist assimilation. The problem with his view is that the evidence points elsewhere. One could make the case that if there is a culture in the world that has been open to change and to interactions with other world cultures it is the Hispanic culture. What characterizes the history of Hispanic culture is an evolving “mestizaje,” which is almost the opposite of any tendency to remain pure or homogeneous. Hispanics may resist assimilation, but this is not necessarily because they are close-minded or ethnocentric. Openness does not require a willingness to assimilate; it just requires a willingness to be affected.

According to Mañach and Dewey, a United States that lives in tension between these two cultures (regarding what it values) is ideal provided balance is maintained through mutual interaction. There is no doubt that as a result of this transaction a transformation will occur. This does not mean, as Huntington fears, that these cultures must abandon the emphasis on those values that have made them distinctive and unique. For what is crucial to Dewey’s notion of balance is that the “parts” in tension have a supporting-adjusted relation and not that they have equal weight. When the display of strength and excellence of one factor is achieved by taking into account (or being affected by) other counteracting factors, there is the kind of reinforcement required for balance.

It is not clear why Huntington wishes the United States to remain a place where “Anglo Protestant” culture and values predominate. But even if we were to agree, his view that this predominance is better achieved by protecting the Anglo culture or expecting the assimilation of Hispanics is questionable. The values that Huntington cares about can predominate in the United States even if it is affected by and it affects the Hispanic culture that it coexists with. In fact, there is an indeterminate plurality of ways in which the balance between Latin and Anglo values can be achieved or maintained (i.e., an indefinite amount of possibilities that are still within balance). The ideal America could be comprised of a variety of cultures, each having a different proportion of the values presented (e.g., some “tilted” more toward play [and less work] than others). There is no reason to think, as Huntington does, that the collision between these two cultures will result in the United States losing its distinctive concern for certain values. What can give America genuine unity and strength is embracing its unity in tension. This is the best way to reassert and safeguard the values that Huntington thinks are in peril. The Anglo culture may need the Hispanic one to guard against its own excesses.

I return to my analogy. In the tension I experience with my wife (because of differences in character), the fact that we are able to keep each other in balance does not mean that we each have the same balance. We have not sacrificed our individuality to the unity that we have established. She remains the person in our relationship in whom “work” predominates; that is her character excellence even though in an indirect way I contribute to it. The marriages in which there are no differences (regarding our list of values), and the ones in which there are differences but there is no mutual transformation, are the most vulnerable to excess (vice).

Huntington can reply that my marriage analogy is misguided and reveals what is wrong and naïve about the view I have defended. The unity of a marriage implies a special commitment and loyalty, and this is precisely what is in danger of disappearing in the United States because of the differences between the two cultures that are coming into contact. I would first remind Huntington how important loyalty is in the Hispanic world, and, more to the point, I would remind him of the particular way in which the analogy seems relevant. The sense of identity and mutual commitment in a marriage need not be based on homogeneity or assimilation. It can be based on the differences and on the tensive balanced relation this creates. Mañach and Dewey would argue something even stronger. A marriage in which one spouse is “assimilated” to the other erases tension, but it also diminishes the opportunity for growth and for preventing extremism (vices). The stability of this sort of marriage may seem attractive, but it makes for the sort of homogeneous and monotonous harmony where there is no variation or rhythm. The ideal sort of marriage is not easy; this is why it is an ideal. Both spouses must acknowledge as values the different values that predominate in the other and have a sense that they need each other. This is the possibility of reasserting one’s own values while also recognizing the values of the other.
In sum, the Mañach-Dewey vision does not provide an easy answer to the “Hispanic challenge,” but it does point to an alternative to value assimilation (homogeneity) and the sort of divisive-separatist scenario that worries Huntington. But we must confront some skeptical challenges. One may still object that we must be more realistic. Is the alternative direction envisioned by Mañach-Dewey a real possibility? Can contact between two cultures in tension result in not hindering the values that are cherished by each culture while also enriching both? One might concede that in principle (or theoretically) there could be instances where the above values are in tension but reconcilable. However, these situations are rare and, in any case, ephemeral. They are so ephemeral, and at so much cost, that for all practical purposes the effort to maintain a balanced integration (and avoid one-sidedness) is in the long run impossible and counterproductive. For to one who sees the desirability of one extreme, the attempt to introduce balance tends to lead one further and further into the opposite and undesired direction. For example, those who defend the spontaneity and emotional aspect of Hispanic culture might claim that any attempt to add Anglo order or organization would lead eventually to fixity and is therefore a threat to Hispanic values. Huntington may be thinking that the value of individuality may be in jeopardy once we allow the emphasis on relationships (and collectivism) that will come with the Hispanicization of America. He could argue that we rather suffer the evils of our excessive individualism than take the risk of losing it or moving toward collectivism. Notice that in this sort of argument the notion of a balance is undermined by a “slippery slope” fear. In other words, attempts to balance opposing tendencies eventually lead to a vice or failure. Therefore, since one cannot have the best of both tendencies, we might as well embrace one. In this debate, both sides will claim that any compromise or “in between” is deceptive or open to suspicion. However, these “slippery slope” arguments only show the risk and difficulties involved in trying to keep a workable balance; they do not prove that the possibility envisioned by Dewey and Mañach is not workable.

A more challenging argument to the Mañach-Dewey ideal would be based on the fact that it ignores political and historical realities. The optimistic vision of a common future for the Americas achieved through intercultural communication and mutual understanding between the Anglo world and the Hispanic world is not new. As I mentioned before, this was also the vision of José Martí and Simon Bolívar. But many philosophers have dismissed this as utopia unless we first confront the present political and economical conditions that continue to work against this vision. How can we even dream of balance and learning from each other if both the people and the nations in this “confrontation” are not equals in a significant moral or political sense? The unequal power relation, class struggles, and injustices have undermined the ideal relation between these two worlds.

I am not interested here in challenging the truth of these sorts of criticisms; they do need to be taken seriously. I must, however, say something in defense of the Mañach-Dewey vision. First, they do not deny that inquiry into actual conditions should be an integral part of any responsible examination and application of an ideal. In any case, the ideal relation that I have presented can make room for political considerations. Recall that the enemies of balance are “excess” or “deficiency.” These were defined as problems that result from the relative seclusion, confinement, oppression, and suppression of one factor over another in an organic whole. There is no reason why “factor” here applies just to values and not to the relation among the people who represent those values. It is, in fact, a condition of the “healthy” tension that I maintain with my wife that there also be an equal or balanced power relation between us. But even if this is a necessary condition, it is not sufficient. This leads me to the second point I want to make on behalf of the Mañach-Dewey thesis.

We cannot dismiss the Mañach-Dewey thesis because we must first wait for more favorable socio-political conditions. We can wait if we want, but there is more to the brewing tension between these two worlds than can be reduced to these conditions. Mañach and Dewey are pointing to a different type of obstacle or challenge that seems worth considering independently of other types of barriers that keep us from achieving the ideal sort of relation. In other words, even if all the political and justice problems in this relationship were somehow resolved tomorrow, we still would have a serious challenge in our hands with regard to values. In this Dewey and Mañach would agree with Huntington; culture does matter. There are deep cultural differences that cannot be pushed aside or reduced to any other challenge. Huntington’s emphasis on cultural differences (values) is a welcome alternative to the common tendency to reduce, and thereby oversimplify, national and international antagonisms to political conflicts motivated by self-interest.

Huntington is alerting us that the Hispanization of the United States could be “the end of the America we have known for more than three centuries. Americans should not let that change happen unless they are convinced that this new nation would be a better one.” If Mañach and Dewey were alive today, I think they would argue that this change does hold the promise of a better America. Huntington could argue that the Hispanic contribution toward a more balanced America is not needed, that things are fine the way they are. But if so, he is blind to the exaggerations of his own culture. I am sorry to say that the unbalanced America that Dewey criticized is still around. It is still the case that organization, efficiency, and “getting ahead” at all costs are predominant values and that many people are lonely. The recent wave of communitarians and call for civic responsibility in American society can be interpreted as a reaction to the rampant individualism that has affected our American society. Americans are spending more time at work than they did twenty years ago. In fact, America is the only high-tech (industrial) society for which it is true that the more it progresses financially and technologically, the more people work. To make things worse, it is a country where many people, while obsessed with the value of work, find themselves hired in meaningless work. Quantification is still the standard in many aspects of American life. For many Americans, better communication only means faster and with more people. America continues to be a restless place where one must protect oneself from waiters in restaurants who are ready to remove one’s plate if one is not eating. There seems to be no time to rest or to savor the consummations of life. James’s essay “The Gospel of Relaxation” is as relevant today as it was ninety-eight years ago.

Let me clarify what I am suggesting. I am not claiming that the gradual “Hispanization” of America is the solution to the excesses of American life. Moreover, there is no guarantee that this will contribute to a more balanced America. The outcome might be a worse situation, given that the cultures that are coming into contact (i.e., what has to be balanced) seem almost to be in opposition. Dewey was keenly aware of this. This is why he characterized the contact as “charged with high explosives.”

One must also worry about the human tendency to try to correct an excess with the opposite excess. America is no better off if it simply replaces its present excesses with those that characterize Hispanic culture. Dewey would agree that what
is needed is an intelligent, piecemeal transformation coming from within. This “from within” is important. Huntington makes the mistake of assuming that the “Hispanicization of America” is coming from the outside, that is, from south of the Rio Grande. Hispanic culture has always been part of America, but it has remained dormant or at the margins.

As we begin a new century, the new frontier and challenge of America will be to achieve a complementary and enriching integration between its Anglo and Hispanic sides. But by assuming that there is something irreconcilable about these two cultures when it comes to values, Huntington is helping divide the United States as much as the Hispanics he fears. It is openness to change and transformation that will unite us, not fear. The ideal relation is not assimilation to some antecedent and homogeneous value core but an evolving mutual modification where we learn from our tension. For Mañach and Dewey, if there is any evil it is the excesses that divide the United States as much as the Hispanics he fears. It is openness to change and transformation that will unite us, not fear. The ideal relation is not assimilation to some antecedent and homogeneous value core but an evolving mutual modification where we learn from our tension. For Mañach and Dewey, if there is any evil it is the excesses that divide the United States as much as the Hispanics he fears. It is openness to change and transformation that will unite us, not fear. The ideal relation is not assimilation to some antecedent and homogeneous value core but an evolving mutual modification where we learn from our tension. For Mañach and Dewey, if there is any evil it is the excesses that divide the United States as much as the Hispanics he fears. It is openness to change and transformation that will unite us, not fear. The ideal relation is not assimilation to some antecedent and homogeneous value core but an evolving mutual modification where we learn from our tension.

Endnotes

2. Citations of the works of John Dewey in this article refer to the critical edition published by Southern Illinois University Press. In the citations, the initials of the series are followed by volume and page numbers. Abbreviations for the critical edition are:
   - *EW* The Early Works (1882-1898)
   - *MW* The Middle Works (1899-1924)
   - *LW* The Later Works (1925-1953)
8. This is a term that is now commonly used as a reference to the changes to the United States as a result of the rapid dramatic demographic changes of its growing Hispanic population.
15. Jorge Mañach (1898-1961) lived in Cuba, Spain, and the United States. He is known for his work on Jose Marti, but he also wrote about John Dewey. For Dewey’s experiences with the Hispanic world, read Jaime Nubiola’s “La recepción de Dewey en España e Hispanoamérica,” *Revista Española de Pedagogía*, 2001 (Spain).
18. For this I have relied on the writings of Latin American and North American philosophers, as well as consulted the experience of many who have been sufficiently exposed to both cultures. Some of these values are mentioned by Huntington in *Who We Are?* Dewey’s cultural comparisons can be found in “Pragmatic America” (*MW* 13:306-310), “Mexico’s Educational Renaissance” (*LW* 2:199-205), “From a Mexican Notebook” (*LW* 2:206-210), and “Imperialism Is Easy” (*LW* 3:158-162). See also Patrick Romainell, *The Making of the Mexican Mind* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1952). Among Latin American philosophers who have written about this issue are Jose Enrique Rodo in *Ariel* (New York: Las Americas Pub. Co., 1967), and Jorge Mañach in *The Frontier*.
21. Ibid., 78.
22. In Dewey one finds not only a description of balance consonant with Mañach but also a philosophical justification for why balance is essential to ideal activity in all of the different dimensions of human life. Dewey held the hypothesis that balance is the relation that can make experience educative, enriching, and aesthetic. Excessiveness and deficiency, on the other hand, are what characterize our most unfulfilling and non-educative moments.
26. Ibid., 185.
27. Ibid.
Knowing Self in Power and Truth: An Interview with Linda Martin Alcoff, Professor of Philosophy, Political Science, and Women's Studies and Meredith Professor for Teaching Excellence, Syracuse University, Syracuse, New York

Ivan Marquez, Interviewer
Associate Professor of Philosophy, Bentley College, Waltham, MA

Linda Martin Alcoff works in the areas of continental philosophy, epistemology, feminist theory, and race theory. From her first ground-breaking anthology, Feminist Epistemologies (Routledge, 1993), through her recent collection of autobiographical pieces by contemporary women philosophers, Singing in the Fire (Rowman & Littlefield, 2003), to her upcoming book on identities (forthcoming with Oxford University Press), Alcoff’s work has been marked by an interest in knowledge’s relation to historical/social context and subjectivity.

In her book Real Knowing (Cornell University Press, 1996) and in many articles, she argues, in opposition to many post-structuralists and pragmatists, for the preservation of a notion of truth as partly referential albeit inextricably tied to a context. Furthermore, and in connection to this, she also critiques pure proceduralism in the normative dimension, defining instead a notion of normativity that is substantive but context related, thus, not universal or absolute.

Alcoff, the daughter of a Panamanian professor of history, is conscious of her half-Latina identity. And her philosophical interventions oftentimes look at the connections between one’s knowledge and one’s particular positions as epistemological subject. Her next book will continue in this vein, sketching out a program in what she refers to as “political epistemology” that explores and exploits the emancipatory potential of the dynamic, constitutive, and ever-present relations between knowledge and knowing self.

1. Knowledge in the Contexts of Phenomenology, Hermeneutics, and Post-Structuralism

Marquez: You use phenomenology, hermeneutics, and post-structuralism to do critique. Can you explain how these three elements come together in your philosophical interventions?

Alcoff: I think of phenomenology and hermeneutics as approaches or orientations to philosophical problems that each help to reveal different aspects of an idea or object of analysis. Phenomenology counsels us to consider how the idea is related to lived experience, and hermeneutics instructs us to consider the effects of historical context on the interpretation and understanding of ideas. Both phenomenology and hermeneutics are necessary for philosophical analysis. For example, in regard to something like “the body,” phenomenology would suggest that we check how our philosophical representation of the body is related to our lived experience of embodiment. Sometimes this might cause us to reassess the philosophical representation, but at other times this might cause us to experience differently our lived embodiment. Hermeneutics, on the other hand, would suggest that we avoid assuming that what we understand today by a phrase like “the body” is what that phrase has always meant, or that how we understand it today is natural and self-explanatory. Thus, both phenomenology and hermeneutics help us to develop a critical and reflective consciousness about everyday beliefs and intuitions as well as the very formulation of philosophical problems. (For a good example of how to do this, by the way, see Jack Caputo’s essay, “Heidegger’s Scandal: Thinking and the Essence of the Victim,” in which he uses both phenomenology and hermeneutics to critique Heidegger’s formulation of the problems of philosophy). Post-structuralism is a different kind of fish. It’s more of a substantive theoretical tradition (such as existentialism, for example) than it is an approach or a method. Like existentialism, it is an historical development of a collection of thinkers who sometimes disagree, but there is a family resemblance among them nonetheless. These days I find myself more often frustrated with the limited way in which post-structuralism allows philosophy to proceed than I find it useful. It’s too unmoored and undirected in its critique, and I hate its strategic reductionism of everything (i.e., truth is strategic, articulations of the “good” are strategic, epistemology is strategic, and so on). Derrida’s critiques of metaphysics and Lyotard’s critiques of epistemology were interesting, useful, and partly right. Deleuze and Guattari’s attempt to think metaphysics differently is sometimes pretty interesting (though its real fruitfulness has not yet been shown). Irigaray has done a convincing archaeological analysis of some of the hidden forces behind Western philosophy. But I believe that post-structuralism has about outlived its usefulness, in my view. It is still stuck in critique, but what we need now is a new vision, and I haven’t found any of the recent attempts to pull out ethics or politics out of post-structuralism at all useful or convincing, which shouldn’t be surprising since that is not what it was intended to do.

Marquez: Your work reminds me of Marilyn Frye’s work in The Politics of Reality. You both use a robust phenomenology that looks inside and outside the self and in between selves to do critique. How/Why did you settle on that way of doing critique?

Alcoff: That’s a flattering comparison. Marilyn is a good analytic philosopher who often starts from linguistic usage to do critique and has the ability to come up with wonderfully concrete and memorable examples. I have learned from both elements of her work. It is fairly common in some parts of analytic philosophy to use concrete examples to do philosophical analyses. Often, however, these examples are made in the form of wild thought experiments (the violinist tied to one’s back, the brain in a vat), or excessively simple descriptions (Descartes’ wax, or Wittgenstein’s bricklayers). Marilyn makes use of more real world examples of social interaction (meeting a person of ambiguous gender and not knowing how to act). I try to do that as well. The point is not to make a real event the absolute judge and jury of philosophical ideas but to have a dialogue between the event and philosophical analysis—where each interrogates the other. In this case, her concrete examples have layers of complexity fruitful to unpack. I did not consciously settle in on any one way of critique. My philosophical training was pretty much split evenly between analytic and continental traditions, and I actually find the two work very well together. I do believe in exploring how things look from “inside” the self, as you put it, but that is never sufficient. Because what is “inside” is constitutively related to what is “outside.”

Marquez: Your approach is not only phenomenological but also post-structuralist. However, in opposition to many post-structuralists, you want to preserve a notion of truth as something more than justified belief, and a normative dimension that goes beyond the notion of “this is how we do it here.” Why is that so? And can you explain from your philosophical point of view how one takes that middle road between absolutism and relativism that seems to escape most post-structuralists?

Alcoff: Truth has a referential aspect to it, and it is a mistake to think that if we reject naïve referentialism then we have escaped reference altogether. I disagree with those in the pragmatic
tradition, such as Putnam, who argue that the concept of truth is built out of our understandings of justified beliefs and does not go beyond this. It’s easy to demonstrate that ordinary linguistic usage does not sustain such a view. Lots of times we hold out the possibility that a completely justified claim may yet not be true. What we want in seeking truth is not simply justification but to know what is really the case. Consider the example of the sexual abuse of children. In some of these cases, there is a lack of sufficient evidence even for the victim herself to know for sure all of what happened. But the truth matters enormously. This is not to deny that that truth may have multiple layers, that it may be open to a certain variability in interpretation. But the basic facts of touching, feelings, words spoken, actions taken, have less variability and have a referentiality to events that we aim for in aiming for the truth. The middle road between absolutism and relativism allows for interpretation that is indexed to historical and cultural context, but this doesn’t give us a dysfunctional relativism. Contexts, if I can put it like this, can speak to each other, can question each other, and can even be unified. Relativists like Rorty think that cultures are like linguistic prisons with no escape; he’s apparently never met a person fluent in more than one language.

Marquez: Your relationship to Foucault is strong and deep but not devoid of conflict. Can you briefly explain what you consider to be the richness and the limitations of Foucault’s (rather than “a Foucaultian”) perspective?

Alcoff: Foucault is enormously important to me. Foucault provided a critical analysis of European modernity almost as useful as Marx’s critical analysis of European capitalism. His account of discipline helps us to see modernity’s “freedoms” very differently; his critique of the pathologization of the modern subject helps us gain some distance from the hegemonic psychological discourse of our own time; and his account of the interweavings of power and knowledge points the way forward to reviving and resuscitating an impotent epistemology. That said, I also find Foucault very problematic; he was androcentric and Eurocentric and shamefully unconcerned about the particular forms of violence suffered by women and children. And I am worried about the way in which Foucault’s work has been taken up in feminist theory and LGBT studies to justify the repudiation of identity politics and identity-based political movements. But you want me to stick to Foucault himself, and not the Foucaultian institution. I have found Foucault particularly useful for my own philosophical work because he combines two of my main interests: the analysis of subjectivity and the analysis of knowledge, and he approaches both with an effective historical consciousness (to import Gadamer’s phrase) of the political context within which both develop. Lyotard and Habermas are the other two principal continental philosophers who do epistemology, but Lyotard’s account is too one-dimensional and focused on the challenges to knowing, and Habermas’s early, wonderful work has been left behind in an increasingly untenable, pure, procedural model. Foucault has many problems as well—he does not pay enough attention to reference especially—but, as I said before, he gives us a good place to begin by announcing the equal importance of the power and the knowledge aspects, without reducing power to mere strategy or opportunism. I think Foucault gives us an invaluable starting point for reconfiguring the problematic of epistemology, but it is only a starting point.

Marquez: Martha Nussbaum, Amartya Sen, and Alasdair MacIntyre all have tried in their different ways to reformulate an Aristotelian naturalized perspective in order to avoid the very same problem of relativism that you seek to avoid. How does your own immanent perspective differ from their Aristotelian naturalized points of view?

Alcoff: I am less familiar with Sen’s than with Nussbaum’s or MacIntyre’s accounts, but my sense of all three is that they try to develop a minimal common denominator in order to provide a means for cross-cultural critique, so that we can have a yardstick to judge various practices by. And they do have a naturalized approach to what that common denominator is. My problem is not so much with their naturalized approach but with the ahistorical and decontextualized way of finding and presenting the natural. In other words, Sen and Nussbaum take Aristotle to be in a sense timeless and culturally universal. In contrast, I think the applicability of Aristotle should be on the table, not set aside as the grounds for being able to be at the table in the first place. This might seem to put me in the camp of the proceduralists, but your question assumes (rightly) that what I do share with the group of three you mentioned is their critique of pure proceduralism. I don’t think such a beast exists, and that we are always putting forward substantive values in setting out procedures. Those values need to be open to critical reflection, and historical and cultural self-awareness (which calling them universal absolutes tends to foreclose). Sen seems to me to be closer to proceduralism than Nussbaum because he doesn’t give a list of the actual human capabilities’ attributes as she has done. I agree with much of Eva Kittay’s critique of Nussbaum’s list and listmaking. The issue of cognitive disability is a good case, as Kittay points out. Nussbaum uses our historical and cultural moment’s understanding to suggest that people with severe cognitive impairment cannot exercise human capabilities, but this is just the kind of claim we need to be careful to remain open about as we are able to learn more from the cognitively disabled themselves (I’m thinking about the astounding changes in the way we think of autism now that some persons with severe autism have been able to write down their thoughts—on this see Doug Biklen’s amazing work). So we need a substantive universalism that will not close the door to its own cultural and historical locatedness. Two good examples of this are Satya Mohanty’s discussion of moral objectivism and Edward Said’s work at the end of his life on humanism. Mohanty suggests that at this historical stage we really have no idea whether there are moral universals because, given the pattern of colonialism, we have never truly tried to find out through real dialogues across difference. So he suggests we start the process. I think he is right to make this at least partly an empirical question. Said suggests that humanism involves the capacity of self-critique and that that critique must involve a consciousness about power as well as history and culture. This approach seems to me to be smarter than the capabilities approach alone, which can devolve into dogmatism. Humanism can be universally applied, but this means simply that critical and reflexive dialogues are universally applied. Relativism is not entailed from recognizing something’s cultural embeddedness. One must be honest about one’s own embeddedness and be open to learning something new. The anthropologist Renato Rosaldo is very good on showing why cultural relativism (which he supports) in no way entails ethical relativism (which he rejects). There may be some versions of cultural relativism that do entail ethical relativism, but this is not the kind that Rosaldo, Said, or many others, including myself, would support. In fact, the whole point of developing a critical self-awareness of one’s own positionality is to aim toward greater truth and understanding, not to stop the process of critique by claiming a relativism born of the particularity of one’s intellectual foundations. The more one comes to understand that particularity (i.e., one’s embeddedness), the more expansive and reliable one’s judgements can become.

Marquez: Your immanent approach uses concrete, particular data and descriptions of instances of daily life to develop philosophical positions. In this regard, it is very empirically
in Latin America. She was the secretary to a General (she had
in my father’s case. And there I was born. My mother worked
a truck. So they moved to Panama, which was back to Panama
from FSU, he was only able to get a job driving an ice cream
was having trouble finding work. With both a B.A. and an M.A.
B.A. My parents had my sister Vicki in Florida, but my father
Floridian from a poor family who had made it to college on a
FSU. There he met my mother, a white
it was Florida, where he finished high school and then went
pawn shop in Balboa, and his brother and sisters (my aunts
of well-known family in Panama City. His father had owned a
Alcoff:
Marquez:
II. Identity, Knowledge, Politics
Marquez: Can you talk about your Panamanian background?
Alcoff: I was born in Gorgas Hospital, in Ancon, Panama. My
father, Miguel Angel Martin, was from a very interesting and kind
of well-known family in Panama City. His father had owned a
pawn shop in Balboa, and his brother and sisters (my aunts
and my uncle) all were teachers at the main high school in the
city. They were middle class but far from wealthy, and the
neighborhood where my father grew up looks like a very poor
neighborhood by U.S. standards. Family legend has it my aunt
Lda demanded that the President of Panama give the family a
loan so they could finally purchase a home, and he did it. She
was quite a beauty, with a strong personality. My father had
apparently been something of a troublemaker as a teenager,
so the family did what is often done in such cases, which is to
send him to live with friends somewhere far away. In this
case it was Florida, where he finished high school and then went
to Florida State University. There he met my mother, a white
Floridian from a poor family who had made it to college on a
scholarship. They married immediately after she finished her
B.A. My parents had my sister Vicki in Florida, but my father
was having trouble finding work. With both a B.A. and an M.A.
from FSU, he was only able to get a job driving an ice cream
truck. So they moved to Panama, which was back to Panama
in my father’s case. And there I was born. My mother worked
as a secretary at the U.S. base there known as the Southern
Command—the seat of operations for all U.S. military activity
in Latin America. She was the secretary to a General (she had
majored in business, but in those days that was the equivalent
to secretarial school for women). My father did not work that I
know of. They had a difficult relationship and she felt very alone.
So when I was still a baby, my mother decided to leave him
and return to Florida. I thus grew up in Florida with her and my
older sister. My father has now passed away. He eventually got
his Ph.D. from the London School of Economics and became a
Professor of History at the University of Panama, where he
taught his whole career except during a period of the Torrijos
dictatorship in which he lost his job for almost ten years. Besides
my older sister, I have two younger sisters, Leslie and Aleika, and
a younger brother, Rafael (we all have different mothers). When
the Twin Towers fell on 9-11, my husband and I spent the day on
the couch watching CNN and trying to get through to his family
in New York (it turned out they were all okay, but traumatized).
I had not felt so close to war since 1989, when I spent another
day on the couch watching CNN and trying to get through to my
family in Panama the day after the U.S. invaded. When I finally
did get through on that day, I spoke to my brother who was
crouching under his dining room table watching U.S. planes
hitting targets in his neighborhood. I remember a colleague in
Syracuse saying to me later that week that I must have felt so
glad to be in the U.S.—but I didn’t at all. It felt like being behind
enemy lines. The demand that has become more insistent since
9-11 that Latinos here in the U.S. should assimilate and be loyal
is so clueless about the conflicting feelings we so often have about living in the midst of a country that oppresses our families?
Marquez: Speaking of conflicting feelings, there appears to
be at least two big ideas about what America is: (1) “White
America” (in this case borrowing the term from Eminem)
and (2) the “America” of Walt Whitman’s Democratic Vistas.
The two Americas can be simplistically contrasted saying that
one is antiliberal and the other one is liberal in J. S. Mill’s
sense of the term. We could say that the first one is not much
different from any other so-called closed, traditional society.
While the second one is conceived by some as the first true
open society (à la Popper) that self-consciously engages in
collective “experiments in living” (like Mill puts it) and that
allows for individuals to do likewise. To me, the United States’
present external “War on Terror” is a reflection of an internal
war between two camps adhering to these opposing visions of
America—camps that unfortunately seem to be evenly divided
and thus deadlocked.
At least from our particular historical standpoint, an
experimentalist, fallibilist epistemology, a democratic politics,
and an open society seem to be mutually implicated in a
constellation plotting the basic reference points for a form of life
that would be congenial with the vague vision of America (2).
And perhaps Latinos in the U.S. can be seen as representative of
a kind of epistemological subject who, on average, can feel
the division between these two Americas more intensely than the
average monocultural white American.
Do you see epistemological subjects as being differently
useful/capable to perform certain epistemological tasks? And
if so, do you perceive this to be presently the case with regards
to Latinos at this particular historical point in the U.S.? I am not
suggesting that Latinos will save the world, but only that perhaps
different experiences of being-in-the-world embody different
epistemological ways that enable and nourish different political
and social forms of life. And that Latinos’ hybrid, mestizo,
syncretic nature has on average an advantage when it comes
to promoting the form of life of America (2) at the dawn of the
twenty-first century.
Alcoff: I believe identities matter epistemologically, and their
political salience is actually derivative on their epistemic
salience. Identities do not determine one's political judgement or orientation (Latinos are politically all over the map), but they are rough and ready ways to categorize experiences, and from experiences we develop perceptual practices, what Gibson called affordances and Merleau-Ponty called habits of perception. That is, we are attuned to different elements in any given event or object. For Latinos, speaking very broadly, immigration issues, and having a dual citizenship of the heart, if not of the passport, are never far from the surface of our perspective on what happens in the United States. Also, there is tremendous poverty and discrimination, which convey an emotional valence to our responses to political leaders who promise to help the underclass.

So, yes, I do think Latinos will make a positive difference. Perhaps the most significant potential we have to offer is the idea of an open-endedness to what it means to be “American.” Because “America” encompasses a lot of territory, two continents, a plethora of nations, and several languages and cultures. Latinos are less likely than any other minority group to shed completely their old identities. Our nationalities are closer in geographical location to the U.S. than any other grouping save Native Americans. There is an inordinate amount of movement of bodies and monies between the U.S. and “home.”

Chauvinists like Samuel Huntington can only see this as a threat. He seems to believe as Woodrow Wilson said that “Any man who carries a hyphen about him has a dagger that he is ready to plunge into the vitals of the republic.” They can’t imagine a patriotism that extends beyond a single nation, a love that crosses borders. Their humanism is at best a colonial humanism, but what we hearken after is a decolonized humanism.

The idea that cultural identity cannot be transcended and that identities matter is less threatening if we think beyond monocultural terms and embrace and acknowledge the reality of multicultural identities. Monocultural identity politics can become fundamentalist, but multicultural identity politics is expansive, internally heterogeneous and, thus, not at all antithetical to open and critical debate. This is what Mignolo and others mean by calling for a pluritopic hermeneutics, an account of multicultural horizons of intelligibility and meaning. I think that the late, great Gloria Anzaldúa’s book Borderlands was taken up so widely precisely because it manifested a reflective pluritopic hermeneutics: a reflective engagement with her own heterogeneous identity without falsely smoothing over the conflicts but without a hopeless or fatalistic attitude about being mulatto (as one got with the image of the “tragic mulatto” a generation ago).

The treatment of Barack Obama who is just now emerging onto the national political scene is interesting to watch as the pundits grapple with his complex identity. There are two salutary lessons that Latinos should learn from the treatment of Obama: first, that we are not the only ones with complex identities, and we need to recognize this and make alliances with others, and second, that even multiple identities can get co-opted by the power structure and used for the purpose of maintaining the status quo.

So there is definite positive potential in Latino experience for refashioning the imagery and self-understanding of the United States. But that potential is only a potential: we need leaders who will make coalition with others, as well as intellectuals who will formulate the full political fruits of the potential that exists.

Marquez: Can you tell me something about your current work on identity, in particular, as it relates to the construction of Latina identity/identities in contemporary U.S.?

Alcoff: I am finishing up a book on identity, race, gender, and the self right now (perhaps it will be in press when this interview comes out—it will come out with Oxford University Press). I have three chapters in the book that address Latino issues: the question of Latino identity in relation to racial categories, the relationship between Latino identity and the black/white paradigm of racial politics so dominant in the U.S., and the implications of mixed race and mestizo identity. The book as a whole is an extended look at social identities—race and gender in particular—and the way in which identity has become suspect in both political and philosophical discussions. For at least fifteen years now, identity politics has been criticized as reifying, constraining, irrational, and politically retrograde, and this critique has flowed from a certain characterization of what identities are. I am taking on the critiques both of identity and of identity politics in this book, and developing an account of what identities really are (as against their caricatured portrayal by critics). My account is a broadly realist one, so I develop a realist account of race and of gender identity. Then, at the end, I discuss the idea of a decolonized humanism.

Marquez: What do you see yourself pursuing next in philosophy?

Alcoff: I already have the next book half done, but at my rate of writing that only means I may finish it in five rather than ten years! But this book will be going back to epistemology, to chart and analyze the development of a political epistemology that would do to, and for, epistemology what Marxian political economy did to, and for, the study of economics. I want to lay out what a research program of political epistemology would look like and address its most serious challenges, which involve the questions of truth and of reference in my view. And I try to bring into being a canon of work that already exists within this rubric, and then analyze the contributions of this work, from Horkheimer and Adorno, to Habermas, Foucault, feminist epistemologists, especially Helen Longino, and some of the new work relating post-colonial theory to epistemological questions such as Mignolo pursues.

Marquez: Thank you very much for your time.

Alcoff: You are welcome.

ANNOUNCEMENTS

New Scholarly Society Organized: The Southwestern Association for Latin American Philosophy

At last summer’s NEH Institute on Latin American Philosophy, held at the State University of New York at Buffalo, a group of participants met to form a new scholarly society, the Southwestern Association for Latin American Philosophy. They agreed that, for the purposes of the organization, “philosophy” would be construed broadly to include the work not only of philosophers, but also of social thinkers, historians, anthropologists, and writers on literature and the arts, insofar as they raise philosophical issues. Although the Association is envisioned as a regional society, meeting chiefly in Texas, Oklahoma, and New Mexico, it welcomes members from other states, and also from Mexico and other parts of Latin America. Its purpose is to promote scholarly research in Latin American thought and the teaching of Latin American thought in the Southwest. It is also intended as a forum in which members can share ideas, read each other’s work, and plan symposia and other events. For more information, please contact the

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Association’s president, Gary Seay, at the University of Texas–Pan American, Edinburg, Texas 78541. E-mail: gseay@panam.edu

APA Prize in Latin American Thought
I would like to bring to your attention that the essay prize in Latin American Thought now offered by the APA Committee on Hispanics is in need of a private sponsor. The prize amounts to $500.00 and is offered every year. It is designed to contribute toward promoting Hispanic philosophy in the United States. It aims at engaging philosophers in the United States in the study of philosophical issues specific to the diverse experience of Hispanic Americans and Latinos. As it intends to encourage fruitful work in Latin American thought, essays qualifying for it contain original arguments and broach philosophical topics clearly related to the specific experiences of Hispanic Americans and Latinos. The APA National Office has provided initial funding to launch it, but to be able to continue to offer it after December 2006, we'll need your help. With a small private endowment we can continue to encourage scholarship on the history and experiences of Latin Americans and their descendants in other parts of the world. Please contact me at snuccetell1@panam.edu