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

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APA STUDIES ON

Teaching Philosophy

TZIPORAH KASACHKOFF AND EUGENE KELLY, CO-EDITORS

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LETTER FROM THE EDITORS

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We welcome our readers to the fall 2023 edition of the *APA Studies in Teaching Philosophy*. We begin and end with poetry, the first one reflecting on the process of teaching and learning, authored by John DeCarlo of Hofstra University. We end with three amusing poems on teaching and learning by Felicia Nimue Ackerman of Brown University. Additionally, we offer three articles on teaching.

Our first paper, "Summer Experiments in Pedagogical Innovation," is a collaborative effort by Russell Marcus and Catherine Schmitt, both of Hamilton College. The paper reports on experiments in teaching philosophy that were conducted by volunteer professors and students. The courses were held outside the normal college curriculum and students were given no grades. The program was "designed to push the limits of students' imaginations through innovative philosophical pedagogy." The courses and their titles were "Philosophers Reimagine the World: A Conceptual Toolbox," "Disagreement in the Digital Age: Philosophical Reflections about/with New Technology," and "Philosophy and Comedy." Students were encouraged to use exaggeration and even silliness in an effort to devise new solutions to old problems in a changing intellectual environment. For example, for the old question of whether there is intelligent life on other planets, students were asked to "invent [their] own creative form of alien life." They responded in one case by inventing "tiny bacteria-like aliens that communicate through pheromone release" and, in another, by inventing "giant sea like creatures that lived on Jupiter." The instructor then asked them questions such as, "Would we be able to communicate with your aliens?" In general, the instructors write, the program "centers on student engagement, risk-taking, and finding joy in philosophy studying and teaching."

Our second article, "Plagiarism and the Indispensability of Authorship," is by Isaac Nevo of Ben-Gurion University. Professor Nevo begins with an analysis of the concept of plagiarism in which he distinguishes it from related concepts such as dishonesty of claims, theft of property, and the corruption of some common good. He then defines the normative issue in plagiarism as "mis-applied credit for an original contribution to some common good, deemed worthy of reward." He later turns to a criticism of certain post-modern and post-structuralist theories of texts and authorship, some of which would make plagiarism as a normative issue nugatory since, if these theories are correct, there would be no proprietary rights to violate or author to divest of recognition. Professior Nevo notes the kinds and scale of plagiarism committed by faculty and students alike. He views the prevalence of the problem as coming from "failures of affected institutions to act vigorously against it. . . . It goes without saying that the whole academic world stands to lose."

Our third article, "Ethics Olympiad," is by Matthew Wills, who is the project manager of this Australian institution. The Olympiad is a series of formal discussions among students in which teachers offer oversight and score the participants on their philosophical acumen based on standards that are outlined for us by the author. The Ethics Olympiad that is described by Wills is an adaptation to Australian and East Asian conditions of the Ethics Bowls that were founded in the US in 1995.

The Olympiad as it is described by Matthew Wills has brought student "teams" together from schools in Australia, East Asia, and the United States for structured online discussions about social issues that have moral implications. A few of these issues are described by the author. The aim of these discussions is not the learning of philosophy as such, but the cultivation of good reasoning skills, encouraging the mastery of facts relevant to the issue being discussed, and developing the capacity to formulate a convincing account of the moral content of the issues discussed. Professor Wills provides us with many techniques for the organization and evaluation of such Olympiads and gives an account of how new issues for discussion are developed and formulated in a way that is appropriate to the ages of the participants.

SUBMISSION GUIDELINES

We always encourage our readers to suggest themselves as reviewers of books and other material that they think may be especially good for classroom use. Philosophy teachers may describe and reflect on their classroom innovations and experiences on our platform. Further, we welcome articles that respond, comment on, or take issue with any of the material that appears within our pages. Please remember that our publication is devoted to pedagogy and not to theoretical discussions of philosophical issues. This should be borne in mind not only when writing articles but also when reviewing material for our publication.

As always, the following guidelines for submissions should be followed:

All papers should be sent to the editors electronically. The author's name, the title of the paper and full mailing address should appear on a separate page. *Nothing that identifies the author or his or her institution should appear within the body or within the footnotes/endnotes of the paper.* The title of the paper should appear on the top of the paper itself.

Authors should adhere to the production guidelines that are available from the APA. For example, in writing your paper to disk, *please do not use your word processor's footnote or endnote function; all notes must be added manually at the end of the paper.* This rule is extremely important, for it makes formatting the papers for publication much easier.

All articles submitted to the *Studies in Teaching* undergo anonymous review by the editorial committee:

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POEM

The Philosophical Circus

John DeCarlo
HOFSTRA UNIVERSITY

Come One, Come All!

Amid echoes of ancient ontological currents
And the sweetness of Spring's butterfly grass
Welcome to the Long Island Philosophical Society!

Here, and only here, will you
Witness the gravitas of the strongman
Easily dead-lifting multiple metaphysical dimensions

The daring agility and logical certainty of trapeze artists
Oscillating to and fro with gestures of grace and elegance

A mime, with tender cheek, rosey nose and unspoken glance,
Intimating primordial dances of the sacred and profane

Lions and Tigers leaping through fierce flames of ethical tensions

Jugglers, right and left, alternating the flow of dialectics
With the fluidity of reversals and inversions

The balance and finesse of acrobats
Adroitly flipping with keen analysis &
Tumbling with elongated synthesis

And all the while, admire the knife thrower and his daggers
Hitting the marks of truth, beauty and goodness –
Never slighting the flesh of humanity &

Don't overlook the epistemological midget
Quietly slipping into the thinnest phases of the sublime &

The magician, amid raspberry blooms and silky silhouettes,
Conjuring up energetic particles from the purity of merriment

Yea, Come One, Come All!
And savor joyful melody's deepest refrain
In sweet harmony with our Philosophical Reign!!

ARTICLES

Summer Experiments in Pedagogical Innovation

Russell Marcus and Catherine Schmitt
HAMILTON COLLEGE

In summer 2022 we directed (Russell) and attended (Catherine) the Hamilton College Summer Program in Philosophy (HCSPiP), which offered three unique courses designed to push the limits of students' imaginations through innovative philosophical pedagogy. Professors Anthony Weston (emeritus, Elon University) taught "Philosophers Reimagine the World: A Conceptual Toolbox for 21st Century Possibilists"; Mike Barnes (Australian National University) taught "Disagreement in the Digital Age: Philosophical Reflection About/With New Technology"; and Ashley Pryor (University of Toledo) taught "Philosophy and Comedy." Each course ran for ten ninety-minute sessions over two weeks. The program culminated in a live-streamed conference in which instructors reported on their work. This essay is a report on the classes, written in the hopes of disseminating some of the innovations.

Unlike other summer philosophy programs, the focus of the HCSPiP is not primarily to prepare students for further

studies in philosophy, but to encourage and disseminate pedagogical innovation for undergraduates. Each year, we solicit applications from faculty for creative proposals for new ways to teach. We provide twenty eager undergraduate students, three graduate student tutors, no content requirements, no prescribed classroom structure, and no grades. Students are compensated for their time with stipends and the opportunity to learn in an environment that is free of the constraints and pressures of their typical educational institutions: learning philosophy for the sake of learning. Students and faculty can broaden their ideas of how philosophy may be edifying and fun. We measure the success of our courses mainly with post-program feedback, in the forms of surveys for students and instructors. We also encourage instructors to disseminate the results of their experiments in presentations and journal articles, with the hope that they will find homes in philosophy classrooms.

Anthony Weston, using pedagogy as conceived in his book, *Teaching as the Art of Staging*, taught a course meant to broaden students' views of how philosophy could be applied outside the classroom. On the first day of class he presented each table of students with a plastic cup of water and posed the question, "How many ways can you empty the water without moving the cup?"

We quickly went to work brainstorming: "You could soak it up with a sock!"

"I could drink it with a straw."

"We could tip the table—but would that count as moving the cup?"

"We could wait for it to evaporate!"

When the class came back, exhausted of ideas, together we had come up with thirty-six different methods of removing water from our cups.

Then Weston announced, "Now empty the cup using a method that we haven't come up with yet."

At first shocked, because we thought we had discussed every strategy possible, the class quickly began to search for new solutions. My table used a disemboweled pen as a vacuum, covering one end of the barrel with a finger to pull water out of the cup; soon every table in the room was soaked by quick thinking and new ideas. Even when we thought we had found every solution, there were still more discoveries to be made. Weston was teaching us to trust ourselves to persist past what can seem like the end of our work, to remember that further progress is possible even when we think we have exhausted all solutions.

Over the next two weeks Weston asked us to think in new ways and stretch ourselves to find diverse solutions to problems. One day we worked in teams to invent ways to show how large-scale time might be alternatively conceived; we recalibrated our minds to view the present as a period of ten thousand years as suggested by Stewart Brand and then invented and drew plans for constructing something that reflected large-scale time—elaborate rituals for celebrating centuries and millennia, giant sun-powered clocks, and time-keeping circuses. No ideas were disregarded. Weston challenged us to think bigger, making the looming problems of the present such as climate change and women's rights and poverty seem like tiny blips in the course of time rather than the gutting catastrophes we often felt them as.

Any ideas worth thinking were worth thinking *more*. We read portions of Weston's book, *Creativity for Critical Thinkers*. There, he described different strategies for creativity, including the exotic association method and the tool of exaggeration. For exotic associations, we opened books to random pages, closed our eyes, and put a finger down on the page; whichever word it pointed to would be used as a catalyst for new ideas. Weston promoted using the tool of exaggeration to "take some feature of the problem and push it as far as it can go," as we did in the water experiment. Imagine perfect solutions first, and then backtrack to find plausible compromises. Such creative activities may seem a little silly, but that's the point. "A little silliness may be just what we need. Randomness—generating possible prompts without filters—is exactly what it may take to break out of the rut that we happen to be in (but can't quite see)."[1]

One day, we used the Drake equation, which is commonly used to estimate the number of extraterrestrial civilizations in the Milky Way, to form our own conclusions about the probability of alien life existing in the universe; we came up with numbers ranging from three planets containing alien life to hundreds of thousands. Then, we were asked to invent our own creative form of alien life. We invented tiny bacteria-like aliens that communicated through pheromone release, aliens that existed as the spots in your vision when you stood up too fast, and giant sea monster-like creatures that lived on Jupiter. As the class came back to present their new alien concepts, Weston asked, "Would we, as humans, be able to communicate with your invented alien?"

"Probably not."

"Even if we could make contact, I don't think it would be a good idea. . ."

"Our aliens wouldn't be able to communicate like humans do."

Many scientists have made calculations using the Drake equation and many attempts to contact aliens, for example by the SETI Institute, have been made to no avail. Yet, we all devised aliens that couldn't be contacted through radio wave projections into the universe. Other life forms might exist in totally different ways from ourselves; failure to make contact with aliens meant nothing about their existence. Some philosophical questions require us to understand humans and our social and political relationships better, like how to improve the justness of our political arrangements. Others, like the nature of personhood or value, might require thinking beyond human-centric perspectives to develop non-chauvinistic characterizations of those concepts.

In the second week, our class took a field trip to Common Place Land Cooperative, an intentional community in Truxton, NY. Intentional communities are voluntary residential organizations designed for social cohesion and interdependence. Common Place operates on principles of environmental stewardship, using consensus to make collective decisions. In preparation, we had explored records from previous alternative living communities in the US in the Hamilton College library archives. We approached the field trip with lots of questions: Is it possible for "Ecovillages" to operate on a large scale? Is seclusion necessary for an alternative living community—is seclusion a good thing? Are alternative communities the best way to challenge social norms? We spent the trip hauling wood, making salad, caging peach trees, moving gravel, and using compostable toilets, engaging the community throughout. While we came to the experience with ideas of living sustainably by driving electric cars and using paper straws, the off-grid, agricultural eco community presented a wildly different way of reimagining sustainability.

Weston urged students to step back to reform their ideas about modern problems. Innovative philosophical thinking is a gateway into viewing modern solutions as springboards into worlds of new ideas. In classrooms, encouraging students to evaluate what they take for granted about the world around them can lead to critical thinking about how to better fix problems. Activities similar to the water cup, alien, or time-drawing projects require students to stretch their minds and think creatively beyond what we imagine our limits to be, while working and communicating collaboratively.

By the end of Weston's course, some students were enthralled by the prospect of living in an ecovillage and others were fascinated by the probabilities of extraterrestrial life. Teaching creativity and how to reimagine different aspects of the world leads to more mindful philosophy students who are prepared to challenge social constructs and norms.

Mike Barnes dived into the implications of the quickly growing internet in his course. We had prepared by reading John Stuart Mill's *On Liberty* and Sarah Jeong's *The Internet of Garbage* before the program began. We started the course framed by both the idealism of free speech and the shocking realities of how harmful what is published on the internet can be to people's psyches and safety.

Throughout the course, Barnes asked us to communicate in various ways. It became quickly apparent that the medium through which discussions occurred changed conversational dynamics, sometimes radically. In one class, we placed sticky notes on the classroom board with our opinions, anonymously, to indicate the media platform we used most, allowing us freely to represent what each of us liked about a diverse range of platforms. Another day, we wrote down our thoughts on Mill's harm principle and read them aloud. Writing down answers made it harder to hide or adjust our opinions. Since we couldn't change our answers the conversation never evolved beyond initial reactions.

Towards the end of the course, we all joined an online anonymous group chat to answer some class discussion questions. We typed and sent messages incognito. Despite our being otherwise thoughtful, the anonymous conversation quickly devolved into streams of lewd comments, shaming, and spam. Philosophical discussion was nearly impossible over such a platform. Taking a step back to discuss online anonymity in conjunction with Jeong's claim that online discourse has enabled catastrophes, students learned that anonymity combined with the minimal time required to put ideas online drastically changes what people are willing to say and do.

It quickly became apparent that Mill's ideals of freedom of speech and minimal governmental control are obsolete in a world where global communication allows for widespread hate speech and subliminal messaging. We grappled with the concept that people naturally surround themselves with media that agrees with them, creating echo chambers of specific political or scientific ideas that reject all outside opinions and even facts. We questioned our own self-determination. Are we in control of our own beliefs and actions if, as Joeng described, Facebook can make more of us vote and Google can tailor search results to our past patterns? Many current media platforms employ fact-checking, but we discussed the difficulties of effective curation and how unbiased fact-checking is impossible since every curator has personal opinions. The best escape seemed to be an off-grid Ecovillage!

Teaching students how their media of communication change what they say and think is valuable in helping young philosophers understand the opinions and ideas they and others present. An exploration of various ways to discuss, communicate, and collect information can teach students their own subconscious biases and how their worlds can be changed by the online platforms they use. Through experimenting with anonymity and identification in writing, typing, reading, and voting exercises, Barnes demonstrated how the media with which we engage can drastically alter our thoughts. We walked away fascinated by how the social media platforms we use impact our interactions with friends and strangers, as well as the beliefs we hold.

Professor Ashley Pryor began her course with icebreakers in the form of improvisation games. Most of us had never done improv or acting before and the games set the stage for a classroom of quick thinking and lightheartedness, which contrasted with the labored contemplation—and its often concomitant hesitancy—commonly found in a traditional classroom. We spent the first two days learning philosophical theories of comedy, interspersing improv activities with small-group work. We built conceptual foundations by exploring different theories of comedy. We looked at superiority theory, a view adopted by Aristotle and the Stoics, which postulated that comedy arises from ridiculing others to make ourselves feel superior, as well as incongruity theory, a view held by Kant and Kierkegaard, which held that discrepancy between reality and our expectations was the primary cause of laughter. For students, these discussions raised the question of whether laughter was ethical. Realizing the discomfort among students with some contemporary comedians,

Pryor paused the abstract theoretic work to encourage us to choose three controversial current comedians for a cancellation trial: Each student came into class on Thursday as either a prosecutor, a defendant, or a jury member, ready to apply theories of comedy, ethics, and politics in order to decide whether Dave Chapelle, Louis C.K., and Bill Burr should be allowed comedic platforms.

"Chapelle makes people laugh using superiority-theory-type comedy and thus is alienating already marginalized groups!"

"But John Stuart Mill would say that he should be allowed freedom of speech!"

"Wait but is public alienation of marginalized groups directly encouraging physical harm? I think Mill would say that the harm principle applies here!"

"Then should we cancel him completely or just regulate his material? How do we draw solid lines between what's okay to joke about and what's problematic?"

The exercise merged the worlds of philosophy, comedy, and policy, raising questions of the harm that comedy can do, and exploring possibilities, both prudential and ethical, for regulating sexist, transphobic, and racist messaging.

Other highlights of the course included a workshop with an improv troupe from Second City Chicago, and a class on satire writing, led by the course tutor, Chris Bousquet (Syracuse University). Bousquet and Pryor encouraged students to create their own satire based on news stories they found appalling, using tools such as exaggeration and repetition of increasingly outrageous ideas, both of which connected to work we did with Weston. We practiced improv games, evaluated ethical dimensions of new comedy, and workshopped writing pieces which satirized Fourth of July celebrations, new abortion laws, the banning of juuls, and more. In one popular improv game, Pryor asked students to act as different characters while a party host tried to guess their roles: conservative grandpa, person with smelly feet, giraffe, garden gnome.

Working with improv helped us to train ourselves to listen carefully to others, a skill essential to good philosophy and emphasized by Tina Fey. "The second rule of improvisation is not only to say yes, but YES, AND. You are supposed to agree and then add something of your own. . . . YES, AND means don't be afraid to contribute. It's your responsibility to contribute. Always make sure you're adding something to the discussion. Your initiations are worthwhile."[2] We practiced saying "YES, AND" in improv scenes, creating bigger ideas and adding more energy into dialogues. The course culminated in a performance that included both improvisational games and satire pieces.

Our regular philosophy classes have conditioned us to believe that refined and carefully contemplated thoughts are most valuable to philosophical discourse. In contrast, Pryor encouraged us to take risks, to let go of our conditioned beliefs, and find new ideas and value in spontaneous exclamations during improv. Asking students to acknowledge previous ideas and build on them by using "YES, AND" as a tool could be used to facilitate better conversations in classrooms. A comedians-on-trial activity could be directed in any class on applied ethics or political philosophy, and is an attractive way to bring philosophical theory into contact with students' extracurricular interests. Improv-like warm-up exercises could be utilized in any philosophy classroom as both ice breakers and ways to make students feel encouraged to contribute openly. There are good reasons for philosophers to think slowly at times. Pryor taught the benefits of quick thinking, particularly in classroom settings: building community, removing barriers, and finding new perspectives.

The program served as a brief collision between many different viewpoints and pedagogies. The unique ideas of each student, tutor, and professor could be expressed and discussed both inside and outside the classroom, leading students to engage with their peers in deep discussions about how they view the world and their place within it. In post-program surveys, 89 percent of students agreed or strongly agreed that their classes showed them new ways to learn and 83 percent agreed or strongly agreed that the program changed the way they think about philosophy and its role in their lives. In their anonymous feedback, we heard the following:

> I think this program and this course in particular helped me feel a lot more free and curious about how a philosophical outlook can energize any of the work I do. . . . After three years of philosophy courses, I felt that I was stuck in a certain (flawed) philosophical, analytical mode of thinking that started to become repetitive and routine. These [courses] definitely helped address that feeling. . . . The class gave me a much better awareness of when and how I was participating in discussions. . . . With philosophy readings, it's easy to figure out a central thesis, attempt to understand the piece, decide if I agree, and stop there. But there's always a baseline assumption that needs to be questioned, or a way to take the argument further in the world, and I will be looking for those pieces in future classes. . . .

Most summer philosophy programs for undergraduates focus on preparing students for graduate school, often with the laudable goal of diversifying the discipline by supporting students from identity groups underrepresented in philosophy. HCSPiP, instead, centers on student engagement, risk-taking, and finding joy in philosophy studying and teaching, providing an inclusive environment to explore together. Weston, Barnes, and Pryor employed innovative teaching strategies which changed the way students partook in classroom activities and understood the concepts they were learning. Students were left with new perspectives on how philosophy can change the world.

NOTES

1. Weston, *Teaching as the Art of Staging*, 14.
2. Fey, *Bossypants*, 137.

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Plagiarism and the Indispensability of Authorship

Isaac Nevo

BEN-GURION UNIVERSITY

As commonly understood, plagiarism is a form of theft and dishonesty which occurs when one person intentionally puts one's name to the already expressed ideas of another, and falsely claims them to be his or her own. The theft in question is of a non-tangible good—credit (academic, literary, or other)—which is due to another. The dishonesty consists in misrepresentation of original authorship to third parties, for example, university authorities, professional colleagues, the scholarly record,[1] or the public at large. Plagiarism is, thus, a two-sided offense with both direct and indirect victims, namely, those on the one hand whose credit has been robbed, and those on the other who suffer the damages of degraded practices. In this paper I shall defend a normative conception of plagiarism, involving theft of credit and dishonest misrepresentation as basic ingredients, against various attempts to take the sting out of plagiarism charges by contextualizing the notions of authorship and originality which underlie the normative force of the term. However, the normative aspect of plagiarism is not to be captured by any general definition of the term. It is, rather, a "family resemblance" concept, governed by overlapping similarities rather than conditions that are jointly necessary and sufficient. Correspondingly, there are varieties of plagiarism, involving different degrees and forms of theft or dishonesty that are exemplified in diverse cases.

Theft and dishonesty are clearly normative terms of both ethics and law, and what makes these concepts applicable to literary or scientific credit is the relative value placed, in different settings, on the twin concepts of authorship and originality, and the consequent recognition and rewards that authorship and originality merit. More specifically, the issue in plagiarism is mis-applied credit for an original contribution to some common good deemed worthy of reward rather than, as the matter is often formulated, an issue of intellectual "property" which may be legally protected in copyrights, patents, or other legal devices. Plagiarism infringes upon credit that is owed, not necessarily property that is owned. Such credit may take many forms other than financial remuneration. Indeed, the concept of plagiarism has long preceded the developments of the various copyright laws and protections. Related ethical issues concern how the common good that is jeopardized by plagiarism is to be understood, what excellences (and sacrifices) the common good requires, how contributions to it are rewarded, in what ways such rewards can be "stolen," and what damage results upon such misrepresentation.

In the academic setting the common good is understood to be the advancement and dissemination of knowledge for which the introduction of theoretical novelties generated by original theorists and scholars (or groups thereof) is held to be essential. By contrast, in the realm of literary fiction the good served may be thought of as the enrichment of culture through unique expressions of human experience. What novelty is to knowledge, uniqueness is to literary culture; and both are goods that are forms of the excellence of originality which is revealed in personal or collective accomplishments that can easily be laid claim to by pretenders. In both realms of activity original authorship is an excellence thought to be worthy of (different kinds of) social reward.

The distinction between the ethical issue of plagiarism and the legal issue of copyrights is often mistakenly conflated. Plagiarism may occur where no copyright protections are present and copyright violations need not involve plagiarism at all. One may plagiarize texts in the public domain, and one may republish, or translate, a copyright protected text (piracy) without plagiarizing it, i.e., without making any false claims of self-authorship. The understanding of a text as property distinguishable from the physical book in which the text appears—the type vs. the token—appeared in early modern times with the development of print and markets for books, and it was publishers rather than authors who first sought and received these protections.[2] Before that time there was not much to be gained by legally protecting texts as property. But the ethics of recognizing authors has a longer history, as the very term "plagiarism," coined in the first century AD by the Roman poet Marcus Valerius Martialis (Martial; c.48–104, AD), suggests. Lacking the relevant (modern) notion of texts as "owned property," Martial highlighted literary theft as a kind of symbolic kidnapping[3] in which it is not a tangible product that is stolen but what may be viewed as the creative identity of a person.[4]

In this paper, the focus will be on plagiarism as an ethical concern in the academic setting—that is, in scientific and scholarly research and in higher education and teaching. In these contexts, the common good to be served is the production and dissemination of knowledge, valued both for its own sake and for the sake of service to society. To contribute to that common good is to introduce some novelty to the body of existing knowledge or its application, such originality then being rewarded with some form of academic credit and benefit. The point of these rewards is, obviously, to enhance further knowledge by encouraging those whose capabilities have proven adequate to the task of producing it. When it comes to teaching, the originality of students is taken to consist in their independence in formulating hypotheses or reaching conclusions "in their own words," even when these "words" are not, strictly

speaking, novel contributions to human knowledge. Again, the point is to develop in students the capacities requisite for the production of knowledge or its expert application.

THE POSSIBILITY OF AUTHORSHIP AND ORIGINALITY

This common understanding of plagiarism as an ethical concern involving authorial originality has not gone unchallenged. Broadly speaking, two lines of argument have been offered against this view. As noted above, some following Foucault regard both authorship and plagiarism to be modern (and Western) constructs, born of the understanding of texts as property, which developed in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.[5] On this line of reasoning, projecting the concepts of authorship and plagiarism upon pre-modern, or non-Western cultures (or educational systems) is ill-conceived. Others, following structuralist and post-structuralist reasoning, speak rather of the "death of the author,"[6] viewing the very idea of authorial originality as a myth.

On this account, a problem arises for any view of "plagiarism" as a normative term of criticism since, according to this view, the normative force of the charge of plagiarism is anchored upon the notions of "authorship" and "originality" and therefore depends upon the viability of these terms. If, however, authorship is a matter of convention or social construction and has no fixed or independent grounding of its own, the charge of plagiarism loses its normative force. Ron Scollon (1995), for example, has argued that "the common-sense view of texts as commercial products, and of the author as the manufacturer of those texts . . . represent the economic/ideological system which arose in Europe in the time of the enlightenment."[7] On this view, norms of authorship are not applicable to pre-modern or non-Western writing. Rather, "it is difficult if not impossible to maintain that any clear understanding is ever possible of just who might stand in the role of the private authorial self."[8] Scollon concludes that without such clarity any attribution of authorship is nothing but a "historically established system for the distribution of social power and privilege,"[9] a fact that belies universal application of anti-plagiarism norms across cultural and historical boundaries.

A similar argument regarding the impossibility of originality and authorship appears in Pennycook (1996) and Chandasoma et al. (2004). Alastair Pennycook objects to the "unilateral" deployment of the concept of plagiarism in the context of international collegiate education, particularly, as that notion is used in non-Western educational settings. "My chief interest," he says, "was to describe what has increasingly been promoted as a global academic norm and to contextualize it as a particular cultural and historical practice."[10] Pennycook's purpose is to find room for cultural differences in the understanding both of what learning is and of the role that memory and repetition (rather than originality and individuality) might have in it. Pennycook writes: "what I am trying to get at is the ways in which relationships to text, memory, and learning may differ. To deal equitably with our students, we need to appreciate such differences."[11] While preserving some room for the (normative) possibility of "transgressive" textual borrowing, Pennycook argues for greater flexibility regarding the standards by which such transgression is to be judged.

Pennycook's respect for other cultures' ways of viewing what is important in the realm of education is laudable. However, in "contextualizing" plagiarism for these good purposes, no strong argument against authorship or originality of the kind Pennycook offers is required. Plagiarism is committed only when there is an *intention* to deceive and steal credit. However, when "borrowing" is practiced by, say, Chinese students as part of the learning practices to which they are accustomed, no such intention exists and therefore no basis appears for the charge of plagiarism. Pennycook does, however, go for a much stronger argument to establish his point. In that argument he questions the concept of authorship altogether. (As it turns out, although he makes the argument about authorship, he then shies away from its conclusion, seeing it as possibly "too relativistic,"[12] and he falls back on the weaker conclusion that while "unacceptable borrowing practices" should be criticized, accusations of plagiarism in intercultural contexts ought not to be "unilateral" or culturally insensitive. The latter claim is, as I argued above, fully compatible with a normative notion of plagiarism.)

Pennycook makes the case against authorship and originality in the following terms:

> The postmodern and poststructuralist positions on language, discourse, and subjectivity . . . raise serious questions for any notion of individual creativity or authorship. If, instead of a Self or an Identity, we consider the notion of subjectivity . . . then we arrive at more or less a reversal of the speaking subject creating meaning: we are not speaking subjects but spoken subjects, we do not create language but are created by it. As I suggested earlier, the question then becomes not so much one of who authored a text but how we are authored by texts.[13]

Taking the concepts of originality and authorship to be nothing but a modernist myth, Pennycook concludes that the charge of plagiarism has nothing on which to rest other than the power of ruling academic elites. Since texts are not authorial productions but rather collections of permanently circulating signs beyond the control of any subject, no "texts" are original and no individual stands alone as originator and producer. What follows from this is that individual authors are "constructed" by texts, culturally (and collaboratively) produced, and textual borrowing is therefore not plagiarism but merely the inevitable drift of words from text to text (through which authorship is constructed). When university instructors tell students to avoid plagiarism by using only "their own words," they are setting them an impossible task since no words are ever genuinely our own. Pennycook tries to sharpen this point by quoting Barthes:

> A text is not a line of words releasing a single "theological" meaning (the "message" of the author-God) but a multi-dimensional space in which a variety of writings, none of them original,

> blend and clash. The text is a tissue of quotations drawn from the innumerable centers of culture.[14]

The conclusion appears to be that since no text is original, none can be plagiarized. There remains no normative basis on which charges of plagiarism can be made.

In what follows, I shall take a closer look at the various arguments by which the postmodern critique of authorship had been conducted. I shall look first at the argument from "writing" (to be found in Pennycook and Barthes), and then at an argument regarding names of authors, the argument from "naming" (to be found in Foucault). Both are deeply flawed and so do nothing to undermine authorship in the sense required for a normative notion of plagiarism.

WRITING AS TEXTUAL BORROWING

Consider, first, the argument from writing. Writing, it is argued, is not the expression of ideas that are present in the mind of a writer, a (productive) subject to whom meanings are present independently of their written expression. Rather, a written text is, in Pennycook's language, a stream of "borrowings" which cross-refer to one another independently of any "author's" control. In Derridean language, written signs are "iterable," i.e., multiply re-applicable in further cases, with each iteration being somewhat different from the previous instance, with the result that differences are introduced by deferral (*différance*).[15] For Derrida, what follows from this is that the meaning of the sign is constructed, if at all, by the indefinitely open class of its iterations, and not by the supposedly determinative intentions of its "original author." Hence, the author is, in a sense, created by the text, not the text by the author. As an expressive subject, i.e., an independent source of meaning, the author is just a myth. As Barthes puts it, the ideas supposedly residing in the mind are nothing but the "dictionary" of a speaker's language, which is in no way originally her own.

Pennycook concludes that "these challenges to the notion of the author and individual creativity, and this argument that meanings are in a sense in circulation, that language is constantly cycled and recycled, raise profound questions about how we consider the notion of textual borrowing or plagiarism."[16]

There are many assumptions hidden in the line of argument just presented that would be hard to establish by independent philosophical arguments. One such assumption is that language, or writing, is just a collection of signs, or words, rather than a structured grammar (and compositional semantic structure) both of which enable a "competence" far exceeding the mere iteration of signs. The fundamental fallacy in the argument from writing is that although it is true that words, or signs, are not original with any person, and, therefore, all words are "borrowed," or "iterated," from previous "writings," what does not follow is Pennycook's claim that no thoughts, or propositions, are original with any person. Thoughts are composed of words in sentential and semantic structures, and such constructions may go on to figure in larger theoretical or narrative compositions. Novelty and originality pertain to such compositions and not to their component words or phrases. As a generative and compositional structure, language makes possible the formation, on the basis of a finite number of words and rules, of indefinitely many new sentences and propositions, and these new sentences can be further composed into larger blocks of meaningful text in theoretical or narrative or dramatic or poetic formations. It is in these compositions that original authorship finds its expression.

The original author of a text is not so completely submerged under the stream of borrowings, citations, and words that already belong to others as to be considered non-existent ("dead"). Originality in the use of language, both in everyday discourse as well as in science and literature, is not a matter of the words used—whether they are one's own or not—but rather a matter of how they are further composed. The argument from writing, as put forth by Pennycook and his sources, is insensitive to this function of language. (Indeed, Pennycook goes on to deny it.) Pennycook's mistake is to assume that the basic unit of meaning in language is the individual word, or sign, and since words/signs are in common circulation, novelty can arise only by the introduction of entirely original words/signs, or not at all. But, clearly, this is a flawed view of language. The unit of meaning (as taught by a different tradition of philosophical thought, from Frege to Chomsky and from Wittgenstein to Davidson) is not the word but sentences, or propositions, the stock of which can be indefinitely generated from a finite set of words and rules. In one sense of novelty, each sentence we produce is new, a member of an indefinitely large set though composed of commonly used words that are not our own. In a more interesting sense, groups of sentences are composed into theories, stories, and poems, introducing more complex possibilities of novelty and originality for which we might care enough to claim authorship. But in all cases originality lies in composition, not in words.

Pennycook confronts the argument from language as a generative/compositional structure in a way that reveals both his indebtedness to post-structuralism and the limitations of his approach. Quoting Goethe to the effect that "everything clever has already been thought; one must only try to think it again,"[17] he goes on to dismiss the compositional view of language in the following terms: "Rather than the generativist-grammarian view of language as an infinite production of sentences—a view which suggests that such linguists have rarely been in a conversation. . .—is it not far more significant to focus on the social production and the circulation of meanings?" He goes on to conclude that "A view of language that relates its use to social, cultural, and ideological domains suggests that we need to go beyond a view of language as an infinite series of decontextualized sentences or as the idiosyncratic production of a completely free-willed subject."[18] These claims are hardly persuasive. The alternative he presents—that there is nothing new to say, but only to mimic, or quote, or borrow, what others have already said—is hardly a very attractive view, and certainly an exorbitant price to pay for an account of language as a social or cultural entity. Furthermore, Pennycook is mistaken in thinking that a compositional view of language negates its social dimension. While linguistic competence is, surely,

an individual asset and part of each individual's psycholinguistic endowment, vocabulary is just as surely social and inherited, as are reference and interpretation. The view implicit in Pennycook's argument that we must choose between the social and the compositional dimensions of language use is false and rests on a false dichotomy.[19] We need not choose between the social and the compositional dimensions of language use. As language users we recognize our linguistic communications as both compositional AND social.

WHAT'S IN A NAME: FOUCAULT'S ARGUMENT

A different argument against the commonsense view of authorship, which Pennycook draws on in his case against plagiarism, can be found in Foucault's celebrated paper "What Is an Author?" (1977 [1969]).[20] In that paper, Foucault expressed unease regarding "empty slogans" about the death of "God and man,"[21] and sought a more specific analysis of the construction of authorship by considering how authors are named. Foucault aimed at a historical understanding of authorship, and utilized what he saw as the special semantic status of the names of authors to criticize the modernist view. Complaining that the argument from writing (*ecriture*) eliminates the author as an external presence only to leave the writing as an abstraction, i.e., a system of endless citations and borrowings without any concrete historical anchoring, Foucault tries to re-establish a role for a named author as a historically constructed figure. For Foucault, the question becomes, "What is the name of an author?"[22] Or how should the functioning of an author's name be understood? I shall call this the "argument from naming," to be distinguished from the argument from writing analyzed above.

The argument is based on a theory of naming derived from John Searle. On Searle's view, the meaning of a name cannot be reduced simply to descriptions pertaining to the bearer of that name. A proper name has a designative function that is not reducible to descriptions that are true of the person who bears that name. Were it the case that the name "Aristotle" meant, say, "The teacher of Alexander the Great," then the statement "Aristotle was the teacher of Alexander the Great" would be a necessary analytic truth (and known a priori). Clearly, however, it is a contingent fact that Aristotle taught Alexander (or that he taught anyone at all). Had he not taught Alexander, the name "Aristotle" would still apply to him as a designation, though the description would not. However, Searle claimed that the meaning of the name could be identified with a cluster of descriptions commonly held true of its bearer. Names "function not as descriptions, but as pegs on which to hang descriptions," so it is a necessary truth that "Aristotle has the logical sum, inclusive disjunction, of properties commonly attributed to him. . . ."[23] Foucault understands this as pointing to a balance between description and designation in the meaning of a name, and so he has claimed that "The proper name and the name of an author oscillate between the poles of description and designation, and granting that they are linked to what they name, they are not totally determined either by their descriptive or designative function."[24]

It is worth noting here that Searle's view has received a scathing critique by Saul Kripke.[25] On Kripke's view, proper names have no descriptive function. Names are, in his parlance, "rigid designators," by which Kripke means that they designate their bearers in all possible worlds regardless of how they are described, or of what is true of them in one or another counterfactual situation. Descriptions, by contrast, are non-rigid designators. They designate different bearers in different possible worlds, depending on what is true of them in those worlds. Hence, pace Searle, no disjunction of identifying descriptions of Aristotle need be true of him, but the name "Aristotle" would still designate the same person, Aristotle, in all possible worlds.

Foucault attributes to proper names a designative as well as a descriptive function, and notes that proper names do have a designative function which is independent of any description. He thus says that the name "Pierre Dumont" continues to refer to the same person, even if, contrary to fact, Dumont was not living in Paris, did not have blue eyes, and was not a doctor in his profession. As Kripke would put it, the name "Dumont" rigidly designates the person whose name it is in all these possible worlds. However, according to Foucault, with the names of authors, things are quite different. Names of authors designate by certain relevant descriptions and are, for this reason, quite different in their meanings from names of ordinary persons. In Foucault's words: "the link between a proper name and the individual being named and the link between an author's name and that which it names are not isomorphous and do not function in the same way."[26] By way of an illustration Foucault offers an account of the name "Shakespeare." Being the name of an author, that name is, in his view, descriptive in a way that proper names are not. Had it turned out that Shakespeare had not written the sonnets commonly attributed to him, or that it was Francis Bacon who wrote the famous plays that we now associate with Shakespeare, then that would change the way the name "Shakespeare" functions, namely, it would have a different referent. In the former case it would name whoever did write the sonnets while in the latter case it would refer to Bacon. Hence, as Foucault puts it, "the name of an author is not precisely a proper name among others."[27] In other words, names of authors refer by description and so are, in Kripke's terms, non-rigid designators.

Before looking at Foucault's conclusions, it is worth noting that he offers no supporting argument to establish his assertion that the names of authors are logically different from other proper names, and in the context of attempting to establish the "disappearance" of the author (as an external point of reference), the claim seems to be question-begging. Why should names of authors be different in this regard from proper names generally? Clearly, if it turned out that someone else wrote the sonnets, or that Bacon wrote the whole Shakespearean oeuvre, "Shakespeare" would still be the name of the person humbly born in Stratford. It would not be Bacon's name, nor that of the sonnet writer. Rather, we would say that Bacon's plays (or the sonnets) were wrongly attributed to Shakespeare.

Taking the name of an author to be a descriptive term, designating its bearer only through a selection of relevant, text-specifying descriptions, Foucault reaches the conclusion that the author—the bearer of the name—is a function of the texts that are associated with the name. And since the concept of a text is a historical phenomenon, having to do with such developments as print and book-markets for which texts are "objects of appropriation," so, he claims, is the concept of an author. As Foucault also puts it, "We can conclude that, unlike a proper name, which moves from the interior of a discourse to the real person. . . , the name of the author remains at the contours of text—separating one from the other, defining their forms, and characterizing their mode of existence. It points to the existence of certain groups of discourse and refers to the status of this discourse within a society and culture."[28] Still, Foucault does not eliminate any and every designative function from the author's name so constructed: "The author's name is not a function of a man's civil status, nor is it fictional; it is situated in the breach. . . ."[29]

As noted, my main criticism of this argument is that its major premise that an author's name is not a proper name because it is primarily descriptive, and not designative, is left without any justifying grounds. It is merely stated and appears to be question-begging. At any rate, it is hard to see how any of this serves to undermine the normative conception of plagiarism, namely, the misrepresentation of authorship for the purpose of receiving undeserved credit.

VARIETIES OF PLAGIARISM

While the normative view of plagiarism survives the attacks that I have noted above on authorship and originality, the principles of the normative account may be seen to shed light on a whole variety of cases not usually considered under the term "plagiarism." Consider, for example, the following range of cases.

Academics typically collaborate in researching, writing, and publishing together as co-authors. At times, one partner unilaterally takes the jointly conceived material that he or she produced with others and republishes that material in another form and venue—say, a book, journal article, or popular presentation—while suppressing the fact of co-authorship and presenting the work as exclusively his or her own. The other author(s) may or may not receive some acknowledgement within the newly published work, but his or her status as an author is denied. In some such cases, the offending party may be protected by (non-exclusive) copyrights, and where significant power differentials exist between the parties (as between an established professor and a graduate student or aspiring academic), the offender may have institutional support. Typically, having lost authorial credit, the aggrieved party may also be subject to academic losses such as loss of professional recognition, and, because of this, perhaps also loss of employment prospects and promotions. As well, given that evidence of past collaborative work has been "appropriated" good academic work could be laid to waste as further collaboration may be made less likely.

Cases such as the one just described may not be viewed as "standard" cases of plagiarism. It is certainly not a case of one person copying someone else's material and publishing or submitting that material as one's own—which seems to be what one has in mind by a "standard" case of plagiarism. Nevertheless, the requisite elements of plagiarism, namely, theft of credit and (dishonest) misrepresentation, are clearly present. In plagiarism, credit is stolen by presenting someone else's work as one's own; it is only a minor tweaking of the term to apply it to the suppression of a collaborator's authorship by presenting collaborative work as exclusively one's own.

As noted above, plagiarism is a dual offense involving both theft of credit and misrepresentation of authorship. Of these two components, theft of credit is sufficient (when intentional), but not necessary (as attested by cases of "commercial plagiarism," where one buys a paper authored and sold to one by another, unmerited authorship, where authorship is claimed by someone who has not contributed to the writing of, or the research for, that for which authorship is claimed, or self-plagiarism, where no "stealing" is at issue). On the other hand, misrepresentation of authorship, while necessary, may not be sufficient to indicate plagiarism (as this might occur as a result of unintentional lapses, e.g., cryptomnesia,[30] or in cases where a student lacks sufficient understanding of the relevant norms regarding quotation and attribution).[31] Nevertheless, some combination of the two components is typical of the range of cases which we view as constituting "plagiarism." Like other general terms, "plagiarism" merits a "family resemblance" account, where there is a network of similarities among cases and some core examples, rather than any clear boundary between the cases.[32]

We may, thus, distinguish varieties of plagiarism, not all of which satisfy all the various conditions, but some of which are sufficiently similar to core cases in some normatively salient respects. Among the various sorts of plagiarism that may be recognized are (1) plagiarism by copy/paste, on the part of students, who typically make no public claim of authorship, or established academics, who do make such claims, albeit either without quotation or attribution or with only insufficient and misleading ones. In some cases, paraphrasing may serve in place of simple copying, thereby further disguising the origin of the work;[33] (2) plagiarism by fake authorship of various kinds,[34] which typically does not produce duplicate papers (and cannot be mechanically detected). I include here various forms of "guest authorship" by free riders who have made no substantive contribution to the writing of or research for the texts on which their names appear. Among this class may be theses-supervisors, heads of laboratories, providers of funding, or others who exercise power to gain authorship status and reap its rewards; (3) self-plagiarism, namely, republishing the same material one has previously published under one's own name but in another venue and without any reference to the fact that the material had been previously published (there are, of course, legitimate cases of repeating one's writings from previously published works, for example, when one duplicates a section on methodology for a piece of research that forms the basis for more than one publication); (4) plagiarism by suppression of co-authorship, which amounts to repackaging co-authored material as a single-authored new publication;

(5) plagiarism by pre-empting someone else's not-yet-published results to which one has been exposed in an academic (or other) capacity, while rushing to publish them first; (6) commercial plagiarism, namely, the buying of academic papers in the open market. Clearly, the above list is not exhaustive, and other forms of plagiarism are imaginable.[35] These different varieties exemplify theft of credit or dishonest (mis)-representation of authorship in different ways and degrees.

Theft of credit and misrepresentation of authorship are intentional, motivated actions, and motive and intent inform the normative horizons of the offense of plagiarism. Unintentional cases may lead to different charges, e.g., violation of copyrights, accountability for untoward consequences, or charges of incompetence. Against this, however, it might be argued that a more operational definition of plagiarism is needed, especially for purposes of detection, one whose application does not depend on assessments of motive or intent. The busy editors of science journals should not worry about such subjective components when apparent plagiarism is detected by digital or other means. But matters are not always quite as simple as that. Publishers, editors, conference organizers, teachers, and others—impatient with the need, and not having the means to determine intent—may take a merely practical perspective that will not do justice to the full complexity of the phenomenon in question.[36]

In the academic setting, students typically plagiarize by "cheating" on their assignments. According to the website of the International Center for Academic Integrity (ICAI), surveys (conducted by Donald McCabe) reveal that the percentage of graduate students who admit to some form of plagiarizing is 43 percent, and the percentage of undergraduates who admit to it is a staggering 68 percent.[37] Commonly, students copy from an existing source (or from one another) into their term papers without indicating the copying and the source, that is, without proper quotation marks and/or attribution. Students often use various techniques. They may copy from a single source (in whole or in part), they may intermingle several sources, they may "patchwork" the copied material with original phrasings, or they may paraphrase to serve as a veil for their appropriation of the work of others. Quotation marks may be either entirely missing or insufficient to indicate the full use of the copied material, thus leading to the impression that the work is the student's own. Similarly, attribution may be entirely missing, or insufficient to indicate the full scope of use, again creating a misleading impression. Admittedly, in these cases, the consequences of credit-theft to its (direct) victims are minimal since these assignments usually go no further than the instructor's pile of papers to grade and no public grabbing of credit takes place. But the instructor is misled, his or her work is exploited, and the grade system, predicated as it is on meritocratic principles, is undermined, with deleterious consequences, in the aggregate, for higher education at large.

Even worse cases are those where the cheating process is commercialized, as when students buy term papers in the open market and put their names on them before handing them in as their own. (A few clicks in Google will lead one to the various websites that offer "essay-writing services" to students worldwide. From the number of such competing sites, one can infer that there is an active market in academic papers for college students.) In such commercial transactions, no theft of credit is at issue, and no duplicate papers exist in any public form to be detected (unless the same essay is sold more than once). But the corruption involved constitutes an even graver threat to the integrity of academic teaching, raising questions as to the viability of higher education in its role as providing competent experts for the service of society. Experts, whether in teaching or engineering, are supposed to have earned their credentials, not to have bought them.

Buying term papers in the open market is, obviously, a case of corruption. But not all cases of student plagiarism are equally offensive, and some are excusable if not entirely benign. On this point, Pennycook and Chandrasoma et al. (1996, 2004) do have important things to say. Students may become implicated in plagiarism charges unwittingly, and the immediate referral of such cases to investigative bodies and disciplinary courts may be ill-conceived. Indeed, these authors convincingly detail varieties of unquoted and unattributed uses of prior texts, assigned or unassigned, through which students legitimately express their learning curves, their reliance on what they take to be common knowledge, and even their inchoate resistance to forms of knowledge production that deny their cultural heritage. Coming from traditional systems of primary and secondary education where studying is often a matter of learning by rote, undergraduate students cannot be assumed to understand, without prior instruction, either the purposes of academic writing, the principles, rules, and conventions of academic work, or the boundaries between appropriate and inappropriate use of existing sources. Hence, the prevalence of plagiarism among undergraduate students, as documented above, may reflect lack of clarity among students regarding the relevant norms of quotation as much as low standards of morality on the part of the student population. At this level, confronting plagiarism is, first and foremost, a matter of making sure that the principles and standards are well understood, and only secondarily a matter of discipline and punishment. These priorities are clearly to be reversed when it comes to graduate students. At that level, the principles of academic meritocracy and the rules of citation and attribution can be assumed to be fully internalized. Graduate students are prospective researchers and teachers as they learn to produce theses and dissertations that become part of the public academic record.

A scandal involving the prevalence of plagiarism in doctoral dissertations submitted to German universities is documented and discussed by Debora Weber-Wulff (2014). As she describes, cases of plagiarism have been discovered a-plenty in doctoral dissertations in Germany, particularly in the aftermath of a scandal involving a popular German politician, the Minister of Defense, Karl-Theodor zu Guttenberg. A popular website, VroniPlag Wiki, has been set up to track cases of plagiarism in dissertations submitted to German institutions. Many such cases have been exposed and documented, some leading to doctorates being rescinded. Given the prevalence of plagiarism in

higher education generally, it should come as no surprise that the problem travels upwards in the academic ladder, affecting not just undergraduates but doctoral students as well in their dissertation work. But it does show that the problem is real and disturbing, undermining credibility of university education at its highest levels, as well as the credentials and authority of experts who come out of these institutions. As Weber-Wulff states, "doctoral students who do not understand what constitutes plagiarism are a danger to the future of science if they continue to work in this plagiarizing way."[38]

Looking at student plagiarism, let us review the damage wrought by this level of plagiarism to the system of higher education and to the public at large. As noted, the theft of credit issue is, for the most part, not a serious concern, though it can become so in theses and dissertations that do enter the public domain after having been approved. A plagiarized dissertation may, if successful, redirect citations from an original work to a non-original one, thereby "enslaving" someone else's work for the benefit of the thief. In our day and age, with citations becoming the measure of "impact"—questionable though that measure might be—this is the mechanism whereby credit is siphoned off from where it belongs. However, I believe that the greater negative moral impact of student plagiarism lies in its degradation of the system of higher education. With studies that show 43 percent to 68 percent plagiarism in students' work, clearly, most of it is not caught and the plagiarizers reap the benefit of good grades that were not honestly earned. If 43 percent to 68 percent of students' GPA is, thus, unjustly earned, the degrees such students receive, which are held to testify to a level of expertise that the students have gained in their studies, are similarly diluted. They become false coins. Somewhere along the line, the public stands to suffer as its service providers will be less competent than the public was led to believe (and paid for in taxes). The effect on society is cumulative. It will not be immediately noticed, but over the long run services will decline, whether in teaching, economics, or engineering, and trust in the system of higher education will gradually erode. Perhaps this is the price universities are paying for having become providers of mass tertiary education, rather than elite institutions of research, but it is not an inevitable price, and it could be minimized by educators and university managers through appropriate policies regarding student plagiarism.

Students are not the only ones in the academic setting who plagiarize. Faculty plagiarism in publishing and research is also a growing problem. A recent study, a meta-analysis of surveys, estimates the percentage of scientists having reported awareness of plagiarism by others to be 30 percent. (Self-admissions of plagiarism by scientists are estimated at 1.7 percent).[39] A recent report in *The Washington Post* (January 26, 2020) details a public call by a committee of the Russian Academy of Science for the retraction of 2,528 research papers published in 541 Russian journals, alleging plagiarism of various forms.[40] A Russian group called "Dissernet," active since 2013, has claimed to uncover thousands of cases in some 1,500 journals as well as 7,251 cases of academic degrees given on the basis of plagiarized work. The Russian case may not be typical, as political pressure on Russian institutions to over-produce may have added to the competitive pressures felt by scientists worldwide as their publications are quantitatively measured for citations and impact. But, clearly, the Russian case shows that science is not immune to corruption and the brave interventions of the Russian Academy of Science, Dissernet in Russia, and VroniPlag Wiki in Germany are laudable.

Clearly, the damage of professorial plagiarism is manyfold greater than it is in the case of student plagiarism. First, these are the cases where the damage to the direct victims must be taken very seriously. If the theft is conducted by copy/paste at a distance, without adequate quotation and attribution, the credit is embezzled by redirecting citations from original to plagiarized work. Where the theft is by fake authorship, extorted from subordinates by threats of various kinds, the damage may become as bad as sabotaging the careers of younger researchers, or leaving them with a strong sense of an identity infringed by an unscrupulous "strongman" shielded by an indifferent academic setting. Secondly, beyond compromising the meritocratic reward system on which the academy depends for its reputation, real damage is wrought to science itself and to the published record, which will now lead people astray as they consult it for further research. Those 30 percent of scientists who have detected plagiarism in others (and have not, presumably, made this information public) will, like the rest of us, continue to operate in a degraded and corrupted system, losing trust in it just a step or two before the general public does. In educational contexts, the plagiarists become the teachers of the next generation of students, and that clearly bodes ill to the chances of properly educating the young.

Those whose work has been plagiarized are, obviously, the most direct and main victims of plagiarism. Their ideas have been stolen, and given the intimacy of one's relation to one's own ideas, the victims of such theft have grounds for feeling personally violated. To be sure, not all direct victims of plagiarism are equally exposed but, typically, those at the lower rungs of the academic system, namely, younger academics without secure positions, or those suffering from the insecurities (and inequalities) associated with certain races, ethnicities, and/or gender, are likely to experience the consequences of having been plagiarized more acutely than others. Additionally, when the work of research students—or junior faculty—is involved, there is, in addition to the simple theft of credit, a breach of trust when the plagiarism has been committed by a thesis supervisor or senior faculty—a breach that adds insult to injury—which is not to deny that the insult may not itself be highly injurious. (In many such cases, the element of theft is covered up by the false claim that there was agreement, on the part of the person(s) plagiarized, to dual authorship. One should always be wary of such assertions because claims to "agreement" under conditions of great power differentials are often suspect. Sometimes, the reality behind such agreements is one of pressure consisting of implied threats to the victim's professional future.[41])

Plagiarism, in all its forms, threatens the excellence promised by academic meritocracy. It is made more prevalent by

failures of affected institutions to act vigorously against it, which is, perhaps, already a sign of meritocratic failure. It goes without saying that the whole academic world stands to lose.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

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NOTES

1. For a discussion of the impact of plagiarism on the scholarly record, see Dougherty, "Correcting the Scholarly Record in the Aftermath of Plagiarism."
2. See Foucault, "What Is an Author?" and Woodmansee, "The Genius and the Copyright."
3. According to the Oxford English Dictionary, the term originates "from Latin *plagiarius*, 'kidnapper' (from *plagium* 'a kidnapping,' from Greek *plagion*)." See Oxford Dictionary of English (Oxford University Press, 2010, 2017, 2019), MADict viewer, version 11.0.501.
4. For an account of the Roman poet Martial's accusations of plagiarism in the context of Roman law, see J. Mira Seo, "Plagiarism and Poetic Identity in Martial." Martial was apparently the first to use the term, which originally suggested the act of kidnapping a person with the aim of enslavement, for the purpose of complaining about the literary theft of his own poems. It is interesting to note that Martial focused on what J. Mira Seo, a literary historian of the Roman period, describes as the "materiality" of his texts, which have been represented by others as if they were their own, but without yet viewing those textual types as his own property (in the modern sense of the term). In Bk. 1, #52, of his *Epigrams*, Martial was asking a patron, Quinctianus, to stand up for him against a false appropriation of his poems (by a third party; another poet who took to reciting Martial's epigrams in public performances as his own) and "bring shame on the plagiary." The term was thus coined as a metaphor, betraying an awareness of the text as a type, separate from any performance (or book) token, the (mis)appropriation of which is more akin to the theft of identity than to other forms of stealing. See Martial, *Epigrams*. Book 1. *Epigrams* 52. Bohn's Classical Library (1897) http://www.tertullian.org/fathers/martial_epigrams_book01.htm.
5. Foucault, "What Is an Author?" 124.
6. Barthes, "The Death of the Author."
7. Scollon, "Plagiarism and Ideology," 24.
8. Scollon, "Plagiarism and Ideology," 25.
9. Scollon, "Plagiarism and Ideology," 25.
10. Pennycook, "Borrowing Others' Words," 218.
11. Pennycook, "Borrowing Others' Words," 218.
12. Pennycook, "Borrowing Others' Words," 226.
13. Pennycook, "Borrowing Others' Words," 209. It should be stressed that the structuralist and post-structuralist authorities that Pennycook relies on, e.g., Barthes and Foucault, were not discussing textuality or authorship in the contexts of plagiarism in college education, research, or literary production. These contexts arise by way of Pennycook's application of the structuralist and post-structuralists accounts to the question of plagiarism.
14. Pennycook, "Borrowing Others' Words," 210; the text quoted is from Barthes, "The Death of the Author," 146.
15. Derrida, "Signature, Event, Context."
16. Pennycook, "Borrowing Others' Words," 211.
17. Pennycook, "Borrowing Others' Words," 208. The aphorism is translated from J. W. Goethe, *Maximen und Reflexionen*. (Munchen, Germany: Deutscher Taschenbuch Verlag, 1963/1829), 52.
18. Pennycook, "Borrowing Others' Words," 208.
19. These considerations barely scratch the surface of a complex philosophical terrain. Admittedly, Chomsky ("New Horizons in the Study of Language") does consider the social dimension of language to be "epiphenomenal," taking its generative aspect to be part of our pre-social, biological heritage. I follow Davidson (1984) in emphasizing the need for a compositional semantics on top of a generative grammar, and both Davidson ("Truth and Meaning") and Wittgenstein (*Philosophical Investigations*) in emphasizing the impossibility of a private language and the social character of language use and semantic interpretation.
20. Originally delivered as a lecture in February 1969: Michel Foucault, "Qu'est-ce qu'un auteur?" *Bulletin de la Société Française de Philosophie* 63, no. 3 (1969): 73–104.
21. Foucault, "What Is an Author?" 121.
22. Foucault, "What Is an Author?" 121.
23. Searle, "Proper Names," 172; the point is repeated in Searle's *Speech Acts: An Essay in the Philosophy of Language* (1969), to which Foucault refers.
24. Foucault, "What Is an Author?" 121.
25. See Kripke, *Naming and Necessity*, 61, 74–75.
26. Foucault, "What Is an Author?" 122.
27. Foucault, "What Is an Author?" 122.
28. Foucault, "What Is an Author?" 123.
29. Foucault, "What Is an Author?" 123.
30. The APA Dictionary of Psychology defines "cryptomnesia" as "an implicit memory phenomenon in which people mistakenly believe that a current thought or idea is a product of their own creation when, in fact, they have encountered it previously and then forgotten it. Cryptomnesia can occur in any creative enterprise, as for example when an investigator develops a research idea that he or she believes is original whereas in actuality it can be documented that he or she saw or heard the idea at some earlier point in time. Also called **inadvertent plagiarism**; **unconscious plagiarism**." See The APA Dictionary of Psychology on line at https://dictionary.apa.org.
31. If there are cases of unintentional stealing, as in sleepwalking, then stealing should not count as sufficient. One doubts, however, that they merit the term "stealing." Cases of cryptomnesia, which come close to "sleepwalking," are better seen as unintended cases of misrepresentation, rather than theft. By contrast, cases of compulsion, as in kleptomania, are still intentional, and do merit the term. Kleptomaniac compulsion can serve as an excuse, but not as a change of category.
32. For general terms and family resemblances, see Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations*, 65–71; a "family resemblance" account has the effect of expanding the range of cases that fall under the term "plagiarism," so that it includes the whole variety of fraudulent authorship manipulations (some of which others might prefer to subsume under a more anemic general term such as "academic misconduct," which doesn't specify the nature of the problem).
33. Recently, as this paper is being prepared for publication, concern has arisen regarding the use of artificial intelligence devices (chatbots) for the purpose of artificially producing what appear to be coherent, or adequate, pieces of text and turning them in as student papers, or even as papers submitted for publication in academic venues. Clearly, if this turns out to be "the new normal," such use would constitute another variety of plagiarism, where credit is wrongfully claimed, and third parties are misled to the detriment of the academic profession which values and depends on originality of thinking, writing, and research. Indeed, the AI device itself could be thought of as plagiarizing the reams of material it goes through or reproduces in some form, without credit or quotation marks. That, too, forms a new "variety" of the old practice, with its two types of norm violations and two kinds of victims.
34. See Patience et al., "Intellectual Contributions Meriting Authorship." The authors describe various (conflicting) criteria of scientific authorship as specified by institutions such as the ICMJE, WAME, Harvard Medical school, or the NIH. These various

criteria "aim to reduce unethical practices—coercive authors, Honorary authorship, guest authorship, gift authorship, and ghost authorship." Apart from ghost authorship, which presents a different ethical problem, the other cases are all various forms of laying claim to authorship by people who have made no adequate contribution to the intellectual content of work in question.

35. In his novel, *Solar*, Ian McEwan portrays a fictional character who publishes as his own groundbreaking results of a student who died mysteriously and left his unpublished work with him as his professor. In her novel, *The History of Love*, Nicole Krauss depicts a case of plagiarizing a whole novel by a holocaust victim, presumed dead, who in fact survived, by another survivor who presents the work as his own. In these fictional works, the two normative aspects of plagiarism are vividly depicted.

36. Suppose, for example, A, B, and C collaborate in producing a research paper, and unbeknownst to A and B, C plagiarizes some other work in his part of the project. Are A and B plagiarists in our assessment? They are signed on a piece of work that is clearly a plagiary and may have been detected as such. But, of course, we may have to assess their motive and intention, indeed their knowledge, to come up with a judgment that is just. This could, obviously, have far-reaching consequences for the careers in question, and may come up as a practical issue the next time A or B attempt to publish a paper. Thus, a paper might be plagiarized while the authors may not all be plagiarists, so we need a fuller understanding of the nature of the offense if we are to render a judgment, which is not to say that the non-offending parties may not be accountable for other aspects of the event, including copyright violations and the need to alert the scientific community and clean up the mess. Science is based on trust, and anyone can fall victim to misplaced trust. All these considerations require a careful assessment of intent and motive. Operational technicalities will not do the job.

37. McCabe-ICAI Academic Integrity Surveys, https://academicintegrity.org/programs/mccabe-icai-academic-integrity-survey.

38. See Weber-Wulff, *False Feathers*, 60.

39. Pupovac and Fanelli, "Scientists Admitting to Plagiarism: A Meta-analysis of Surveys."

40. See Robyn Dixon, "Putin wanted Russian science to top the world. Then a huge academic scandal blew up," *The Washington Post*, January 17, 2020, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/europe/putin-wanted-russian-science-to-top-the-world-then-a-major-academic-scandal-blew-up/2020/01/16/f58239ec-34b9-11ea-898f-eb846b7e9feb_story.html. See also Jonathan Bailey, "The Plagiarism Epidemic in Russia," Plagiarism Today, January 13, 2020, https://www.plagiarismtoday.com/2020/01/13/the-plagiarism-epidemic-in-russia.

41. Typically, in such cases, the plagiarized material has not yet been settled in terms of copyrights or remains hidden in a local library in the form of a dissertation thesis, so the victim, if s/he wishes to pursue the matter, may be called upon to prove his or her case. This may involve confronting the plagiarists themselves and appealing to (perhaps untrusted) university authorities, or journal editors—both of which takes courage and tenacity and is likely be an unsettling experience.

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Ethics Olympiad

Matthew Wills

ETHICS OLYMPIAD PROJECT MANAGER

In my 2012 contribution to the *APA Newsletter on Teaching Philosophy*, I outlined the growth and popularity of Philosothons in Australasia. For the uninitiated, a Philosothon is a popular inter-school-based program involving school-age students engaging in philosophical discussions while being scored by philosophers.[1] Here, I will not outline the successes or failures of the Philosothon project, but instead focus on a more recent initiative called the Ethics Olympiad.

An Ethics Olympiad is also an inter-school competition, but an important difference from a Philosothon is its focus on ethical issues. The Ethics Olympiad is based on the structure of an Ethics Bowl. Ethics Bowls have existed in the US since 1995.[2] We chose to call this event an Olympiad early on rather than an "Ethics Bowl" because "football bowls" are peculiar to the US. We refer to the event as an Olympiad and to students as "eth-letes" to emphasize the goal of excellence in moral reasoning.[3] In sum, the Ethics Olympiad offers a creative way for teachers to introduce ethical issues and cultivate good reasoning, using age-appropriate issues in a collaborative format. This project is not, strictly speaking, about the teaching of philosophy,

but is a useful pedagogical tool for teachers to use with students as they engage with contested ethical issues.

At an Ethics Olympiad schools are represented by one or two teams, and each team consists of five students. In the preparation for an Olympiad, cases involving an ethical judgment are provided early to the participating schools, thus giving the teams sufficient time to develop their thoughts on the cases before the event takes place. The ethical cases include real-life situations that require a moral decision. For example, a senior high school case might focus on the recent removal of a statue of the seventeenth-century philanthropist James Colston in Bristol because of his involvement in the slave trade. The case study might also explore the moral implications of the fact that a hero such as Winston Churchill was directly responsible for the deaths of many German civilians during World War II. The case study will include claims of those who support the disposal of such statues and counter claims from those who do not. Students are thus given various—indeed, opposing—perspectives so that they might develop their own views on the topic and consider claims they had not previously considered. While some cases are of international or national concern, other cases are more personal and/or familiar to a student context, such as a case dealing with two students sharing homework, where only one of the two students did the work.

The discussions are *not* debates. The teams are not required to take opposing views, and each team is encouraged to acknowledge and discuss views that are different from their own position.[4] Indeed, collaboration and generosity rather than competitiveness are the goals, goals clearly reflected in the marking key. The marking key highlights parameters such as respectful dialogue, moral reasoning, and the serious treatment of counter arguments.[5]

Our first Ethics Olympiad took place online between Austin High School, a school in Knoxville, Tennessee, and Hale School in Perth, Western Australia. On that day we also participated in a "scrimmage" (to use an Ethics Bowl term) between a team from Bentley High School in California, and Hale School in Perth, Western Australia. We used Skype with the Tennessee school and video conferencing technology with the school in California. Both US schools had participated in the first National High School Ethics Bowl at the University of North Carolina, so they were comfortable with both the process that we used and the types of ethical cases we presented. We had judges located in Australia and the United States, and I served as the moderator at the event. All the eth-letes, coaches, and judges loved the experience, and with that the Ethics Olympiad was born.

We ran Ethics Olympiads (online) occasionally over the next few years with other schools in other regions of Australia. We received a great deal of positive feedback from participants. The following is typical:

> *"The nature of this event being collaborative yet competitive is wonderful and so needed in our increasingly polarised world with algorithm-driven news feeds, where discourse is lacking. It was wonderful to have the expertise of skilled, highly qualified thinkers as judges. . . . Overall, a wonderful event." (Glenda McCarthy, Centralian Senior College - Alice Springs - Northern Territory - Australia)*

In 2017 we held face-to-face Ethics Olympiad trials at Scotch College in Melbourne, Victoria and at the Australian Catholic University in Canberra. Students gathered in teams representing their schools. The events were held in school halls with circular tables, each table having two teams of five students and a judge. I would moderate the event from a podium at the front of the hall (see Figure 1 below).

Figure 1. Face-to-face Ethics Olympiad 2018.

Following the success of this trial, over the next few years, we ran face-to-face events in most capital cities in Australia and New Zealand. Many hundreds of schools participated. Schools volunteered to host an event, welcoming teams from other schools in the region. I ran each Olympiad with a projector and microphone from the front of the hall. The program for the day was displayed on a PowerPoint and was projected onto a large screen at the front of the school hall. The presentation included team allocations for each heat, the ethical cases to be considered, and displayed timers for each of the heats.

During the morning, we ran three heats, assigning teachers to judge on each table. No teacher judged a team from his or her own school. They listened to the team's responses, engaged in the Q & A, and provided scores for both teams at the end of each heat. In the afternoon, professional philosophers from the local universities judged a final round between the top-ranked teams from the three heats in the morning. At the end of the day, medals were awarded to the winning team for that day (see Figure 2).[6]

Figure 2. Gold Medal awarded to all members of the top-ranked team.

With the arrival of COVID in 2020 we did a Zoom format trial for the first time. We did this with schools in China, specifically, schools associated with the China Ethics Bowl.[7] We used the same format in breakout rooms, and from all reports (including anonymous surveys sent to all

participants) the trial was very successful. (Interestingly, the introduction of our Olympiad in China coincided with a downturn in Australia/China relations, which led to trade sanctions and a frosty relationship between the two countries. Nevertheless, the Ethics Olympiad was constructive and friendly. In fact, we called these "the Friendly Games.")

Figure 3. New judging program.

Over the course of 2020 we developed online protocols for schools participating in Ethics Olympiads via Zoom. Later that year we ran twelve online regional events for middle school students. One of the benefits of the new online format was that philosophy lecturers as well as philosophy PhD students could participate as judges from anywhere in the world, and we trained over twenty-five judges from such countries as Australia, Brazil, Canada, New Zealand and the US. (Some were eager to join due to the adverse effects of COVID travel restrictions on their teaching loads.)

Currently, each Ethics Olympiad involves three or four heats with between ten and forty participating teams. At the commencement of the program, teams are allocated to different Zoom breakout rooms, each breakout room with two teams and a judge/moderator. Heats begin with introductions and a "getting to know each other" exercise. Each heat involves two rounds. The judge/moderator starts the heat with a coin toss determining which of the two teams will be Team A, and which is Team B. Team A is then presented with a case from the case set they were provided with earlier and a question. With that, the first round begins.

Recently, we introduced an online Ethics Olympiad application.[8] It consists of two parts, a "management" program and a "judges" program. The "management" program is used by the host to create the format of an event. This determines the number of heats, the cases that will be used, and the ethical questions presented to participants. Figure 3 displays the "judges" program, specifically an event consisting of four heats involving Queensland schools in May last year. The judges program is shared by the judge in their breakout room with participating teams during each heat. This application has fast-tracked, automated, and standardized timing and score submission.[9]

The judge clicks on the relevant heat to start the program in his or her breakout room. After the case is re-read (sometimes a video clip is played), teams are presented with a question on which the teams are to focus during the first round. Figure 4 is an image of the start of the round, with the question and stopwatch.

Once the judge presses "start" for Team A, the members of that team have two minutes to discuss their response to the question while muted. All contributions by team members are preceded with a period of deliberation and consultation. Each round deals with a different case, but Team A presents



Figure 4. New Online Application.

first, and Team B then critiques Team A's presentation, and then Team A responds to the critique. Each round ends with a period of Q & A from the judges. (See Figure 5 below for all the times.) Team B is then presented with a different case and question, and they go through the same format as described above. Time is allocated at the end of each heat to allow the judges to give feedback to the teams about where they were successful and where they need improvement.[10]

The new application includes a scoring page for each judge (see Figure 6). Judges are assessing their clarity, focus, and thoughtfulness. Teams are asked to consider the counter argument to their own position. Specifically, they look at whether their *presentation indicates an awareness of and*



Figure 5. Ethics Olympiad format.

thoughtful consideration of different viewpoints, including those that might loom large in the reasoning of individuals who disagree with that team's position.

Judges provide a total score out of sixty for each team at the end of each heat, and, once submitted, the scores are collated by the application. These scores are used to determine the gold, silver, and bronze medals awarded at the end of each Olympiad.

This new online application has also opened all sorts of possibilities. We have already made the application available to schools/universities to run their own Ethics Olympiad using current case sets.[11]

During 2021 the popularity of Ethics Olympiads continued to grow online. We had nearly six hundred teams participating during the height of COVID lockdowns. When a student/team was in lockdown, the new online Zoom program made it possible for the student or team to participate from home. Another unexpected benefit of the pandemic has been the acquisition, by teachers in many schools, of confidence and training in the use of Zoom.

The online format also made participation in Olympiads possible for a greater number of schools in many remote or regional parts of Australia and New Zealand, for example, Centralian High School in Central Australia in Alice Springs and Muslim schools such as Zahed School for Girls in New Zealand. We have even had several teams of home-schooled eth-letes participating.

At the request of primary school teachers in 2021, we introduced "Junior School" Ethics Olympiads for nine- to twelve-year-olds using age-appropriate cases. (We included film clips such as from *Babe*, where Farmer Arthur Hogsett says to Babe "We only eat animals that are stupid." Junior students are then given the question, "Do you think it is OK to eat animals if they are stupid?" We also use picture books with younger students, and these provide the starting point for each round.[12]

During 2022, we decided to make the Senior Ethics High School Olympiads available to other schools in Southeast Asia, including Singapore and Hong Kong, and, more recently, to schools in India. Also in 2022, we created an annual Ethics Olympiad for Canadian schools.[13] One of the benefits of the new Zoom format is that we have been able to run International Ethics Olympiad finals easily. Regional medal-winning schools from throughout the world are now

Home Admin Logout
Heat 1 Heat 2 Heat 3

Team A — No Team Selected
Clarity 0/5
Centrality 0/5
Thoughtfulness 0/5
Commentary Response 0/15
Judge Q&A Response 0/15
Commentary 0/10
Respectful 0/5

Team B — No Team Selected
Commentary 0/10
Clarity 0/5
Centrality 0/5
Thoughtfulness 0/5
Commentary Response 0/15
Judge Q&A Response 0/15
Respectful 0/5

Figure 6. Scoring page for judges.

eligible to participate at the international finals that are held each year.[14]

The recent introduction of Tertiary Ethics Olympiads has allowed us to return to the origins of the Ethics Bowl, wherein Australasian university students can now participate. The Ethics Bowl started in the 1990s as an intercollegiate initiative by Professor Robert Ladenson at the Illinois Institute of Technology. It grew from there to become a national US event with its own system of regional events culminating in an annual final: the US Intercollegiate Ethics Bowl. Prior to the recent Tertiary Ethics Olympiad, we had run events only for school-aged students, so in offering it to university students we are in a sense returning to its roots. We are now able to run international events with Australasian universities and US colleges. This year we held an International Tertiary Ethics Olympiad final between US and Australian Universities.[15]

One further recent development has been the introduction of a case writing competition. The ethical cases that we present for analysis and discussion at each Ethics Olympiad are vitally important to their success. The cases that we use are revised each year. Early in the creation of the Ethics Olympiad, we used US written cases, with permission, from the US High School Ethics Olympiad.[16] But we have found that while the cases available from the National High School Ethics Bowl were excellent, the establishment of a case writing competition here in Australia has enabled us to develop a collection of cases that are written for and about *Australasian* moral issues.[17]

Many of our judges are now alumni of the Ethics Olympiad, and some high school students have gone on to study philosophy at a tertiary level and have come back afterwards to judge at an Olympiad. Furthermore, we have had reports that due to student involvement in Ethics Olympiads, some schools have introduced ethics programs and others have recruited alumni to coach younger children in their school.[18]

I finish this paper as I started it, with a vote of thanks to the pioneers that created the Ethics Bowl. Since starting the Ethics Olympiad, I have always been happy to acknowledge its founder and the authors of the cases we have used. The event has developed substantially in its short history, and now we are drawing on cases written by and for Australasian students, thus producing programs and drawing on resources that are peculiar to a Southern Hemisphere event. In all of this there has been a significant "coming of age" for the Ethics Olympiad.

We are excited to see where the next steps will be taken.

NOTES

1. In 2012, I was awarded a Winston Churchill Fellowship to do research in the US with a view towards creating a national Australasian Philosothon. I visited various stakeholders and participated in Ethics Bowls over the course of my month-long visit to eight US states. People were very generous with their time, wisdom, and resources. I returned to Australia and established the Australasian Philosothon, which has run annually in Australasia since its inception in 2012. This is the report from the Fellowship: https://www.churchilltrust.com.au/fellow/matthew-wills-wa-2009/. This Philosothon and its website are now managed by the Australian Association of Philosophy: www.philosothon.org.
2. A great deal is owed to people in the US, particularly Professor Robert Ladenson who created the first Ethics Bowl, and then others involved in the management of the High School Ethics Bowls, such as Dr Alex Richardson, the director of the National High School Ethics Bowl, Professor Tom Wartenberg from Holyoke College, and Roberta Israeloff, the Director of the Squire Foundation. The model for the Intercollegiate Ethics Bowl became the basic model for the Australasian Ethics Olympiad, and the Ethics Olympiad adopted the rules and procedures for the National High School Ethics Bowl (NHSEB) in the US. This is the official site for the National US High School Ethics Bowl based at the Parr Centre for Ethics at the University of North Carolina: https://nhseb.unc.edu/.
3. Early on I realized that the concept of an "Ethics Bowl" was a specifically US locution and while I was familiar with the use of the term, I did not think it appropriate to adopt it in an Australian context. In part this was to avoid accusations of cultural appropriation. I created the name "Ethics Olympiad" soon after participating as a judge at the US National High School Ethics Bowl in 2013, in order both to retain the sporting metaphor, and to draw on a more internationally popular concept, namely, the Olympics. I wanted the name to signify a structured event that both promotes respectful dialogue between students and also rewards excellence (by means of medals given to teams of students that score highly). We refer to the students as "Eth-letes," a play on the word "Ath-lete." Like athletes, these students are in training for excellence, but here it is excellence in moral reasoning. (This terminology was also coined very early in the history of the Ethics Olympiad in 2013.)
4. Team B can agree with Team A, and in their commentary, they may even choose to develop Team A's argument further or ask questions of Team A that may challenge Team A or, perhaps, allow Team A to further develop claims that they put forth. Or they may present challenges that they themselves grappled with when preparing for the event and state their own responses to these challenges. Also, unlike what typically takes place in a debate, a team may change its position during the Heat. There is a sense, therefore, in which both teams are working together to build the best possible answer that they can to a difficult ethical question.
5. I am aware of some skepticism concerning the value of such competitions, the argument being that philosophy is ideally about the pursuit of wisdom without the extrinsic rewards that accompany this sort of event. (See Simon Kidd, "The Philosothon: Philosophy as Performance," *Journal of Philosophy in Schools* 9, no. 2 [2022]: 41–77, https://jps.bham.ac.uk/articles/abstract/160/). I am not unsympathetic to this argument, but I have written elsewhere responses to this criticism (e.g., in this article Dr. Alan Tapper and I argue that such competitions are not antithetical to philosophy: https://jps.bham.ac.uk/articles/10.46707/jps.9ii.151). There is also evidence to show that such interchanges do improve civility and confidence in young people. These events encourage young people and schools to develop skills in moral reasoning . . . and fall in love with philosophy. The following report was written by Dr. Rachel Buchanan in 2019. While it deals with Philosothons, its conclusions equally apply to the Ethics Olympiad (http://ethicsolympiad.org/AustralasianPhilosothonReportBuchanan.pdf). Herein, there is evidence students do go on to study philosophy after having been successful in these competitions.
6. Initially these Olympiads involved older (fifteen- to eighteen-year-old) secondary students. After the first twelve months we decided to offer Ethics Olympiads for Middle School students (twelve- to fifteen-year-olds) as well. This proved to be equally successful with nearly three hundred teams participating late in 2019. I traveled throughout Australia and New Zealand conducting Ethics Olympiads using this same structure each time, modifying it only slightly and developing protocols for use in the following year. Unfortunately, COVID-19 arrived early in 2020 when two hundred fifty teams were registered to participate in thirteen Olympiads across Australasia during May and so we were forced to cancel these events. Due to lockdowns and a general fear in schools about cross contamination, we had to cancel events and reimburse schools, notify judges, and cancel extensive travel plans throughout Australia and New Zealand. Despite these problems the pandemic proved to be the opportunity we needed to grow the event online extensively and internationally.

7. The China Ethics Bowl was introduced to China in 2019 as an International Affiliate of the US Ethics Bowl and was first known as the Shanghai Interscholastic Ethics Bowl (SIEB). The China Ethics Bowl is co-ordinated by a small committee chaired by Leo Huan overseeing four regional Ethics Bowls across China and providing support for regional organizers, including promotions, fundraising, material design, and international collaboration opportunities. The official website for the China Ethics Bowl is https://ethicsbowlchina.com/.

8. Previously, judges simply shared a PowerPoint program, set up for them, which included cases and timers for each heat, and scores were submitted separately via an email. The new online application has been designed specifically for Ethics Olympiads, allowing judges to easily share the online program in their Zoom breakout room with the same cases, timers, and a link for scoring.

9. This program was designed by one of our judges in Canada, Karamvir Singh. The online application is password protected and allows a host to set up an event using the current case set.

10. Unlike the US events where the judges announce the winner at the end of each heat, we made the decision early on at the Ethics Olympiad to provide only broad feedback during the event and provide the overall ranking of the teams, via email, only after the event. We did this in large part to reduce emphasis on the competitive side of the event.

11. The Hosting Licences we have made available enables anyone to run a heat as a practice or a scored event. In 2022 we decided to offer licensees to organizations/people to run their own Ethics Olympiads. With this license we are providing resources, technologies, training, and support that will allow others to host their own Ethics Olympiads. We offered five licenses in 2022 and all five were taken up. We are offering another five in 2023. More information is available at https://ethicsolympiad.yahoosites.com/hosting-licences1.html.

12. Please note that we only run three heats for Junior School students. One of the reasons that these Junior Ethics Olympiads have been very popular is that it gives students the chance to engage with other students from throughout their region, and even beyond. (A school on the South Island of New Zealand can be in a heat with a school in Tasmania, or Hong Kong, Perth, or Delhi.) Here is an example of a case we used at a recent Junior School Ethics Olympiad. This case uses a film clip from Professor Tom Wartenberg's wonderful collection, "What's the Big Idea" (http://whatsthebigideaprogram.com/). Here is the clip from *Babe*: http://vimeo.com/75045741. These clips can be embedded in the new software application and then shared in a breakout room. There is another case from the recent Junior School Ethics Olympiad, this time using a picture book: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jAdbpuGCbug.

13. These events are hosted by We Up Education in Canada by Archie Stapleton who is studying at Harvard. More information can be found at https://canadianethicsolym.wixsite.com/website-1.

14. We only run International Finals for "Senior" and "Middle" School students. We usually take the "Gold Medal" and "Silver Medal" winning team from each regional event held in a month. E.g We run Senior Ethics Olympiads in twenty separate regions around Australia, New Zealand, Singapore, Hong Kong, India, and in Canada. So, two teams from each of these events have been invited to participate on a designated date, which we call the International Ethics Olympiad final. Medals are again awarded to the top-ranked teams at this event. The Ethics Cup in the UK and the Ethics Bowl in the US use a similar format, drawing on winning schools in the regions to run finals at a broader level. In the UK the final is run at St Andrews's University in Edinburgh (https://ethicscup.wp.st-andrews.ac.uk/) and in the US the final for the High School Ethics Bowl is held at the University of North Carolina (https://nhseb.unc.edu/). A recent Ethics Olympiad Senior High School final involved forty teams from throughout Australasia, South-east Asia, India, and Canada. But the time difference between different regions was significant. For example, the start time for students in India was 6:30 a.m. (finishing at 11:30 a.m.) whereas the start time for the Canadian teams was 9 p.m., finishing at 1:30 a.m. Because of the time differences involved, it was not possible to include schools in Europe or the UK.

15. See program here: 2023 International Tertiary Ethics Bowl/Olympiad – Ethics Olympiad.

16. We always attribute authorship to the case-writing committee members who create these cases. Many and even most of the cases relate specifically to the US context.

17. Additionally, we have developed opportunities for organizations to sponsor Ethics Olympiad Case-Writing prizes. The Ethics Centre (Australia) and Humanity Matters (New Zealand) have sponsored monetary prizes for successful students, and we are now using student written cases in upcoming Senior and Middle School Ethics Olympiads.

18. We make a point of encouraging our judges to share their own journey with participating "eth-letes" and to highlight the value of studying philosophy at the university level. It is interesting and heartening to see alumni of an Ethics Olympiad coming back and participating as judges after they have gone on to study philosophy at university. (Some high school students have also gone on to participate successfully as undergraduate philosophy students in the Tertiary Ethics Olympiad mentioned previously.)

THREE POEMS

Felicia Nimue Ackerman
BROWN UNIVERSITY

The Table's Here?
The table's here, or so it seems,
If not a figment of my dreams.
I'd have to be extremely smart
To manage to refute Descartes.

Like the Past?
The future will be like the past;
That's what we all assume.
But look upon the wisdom vast
That comes from David Hume.

What's Natural Is Always Good?
"What's natural is always good,"
Say nature-lovers, firm and shrill.
To get beyond that, as we should,
Just take a leaf from J.S. Mill.

Who's the Frailest?

(First published in *Light*, https://lightpoetrymagazine.com/)

"The past few years we've seen a lot of conservative criticism about the 'snowflakes'
at our colleges and universities. . . . Not only do
conservative lawmakers whine about
acknowledging the realities of our political and social history; they're passing laws
against even discussing them. . . . Who are the real snowflakes?"

–From a letter to *The Boston Globe*

Mirror, mirror on the wall,
Who's the frailest of them all?
Who demands complete protection?
Who can't bear the least objection
To their own unswerving view?
Both sides now? Alas, it's true!