


Teaching Philosophy



SPRING 2020

VOLUME 19 | NUMBER 2

LETTER FROM THE EDITORS

Tziporah Kasachkoff and Eugene Kelly

SUBMISSION GUIDELINES

ARTICLE

Yakir Levin

Devoting a Course to the Exploration of a Book: Journeying Intellectually with the Students

REVIEW ESSAY

C.D.C. Reeve's Translation of Aristotle: De Anima

Reviewed by Rosemary Twomey

POEMS

Poems by Felicia Nimue Ackerman

To Teachers Who Hope to Inspire Their Students

To Those Who Think the Unexamined Life Is Not Worth Living

To Cynthia Ozick

In Praise of Campus Culture Wars

Alexandru Manafu

Philosophy Rap

BOOKS RECEIVED

ADDRESSES OF CONTRIBUTORS



APA NEWSLETTER ON

Teaching Philosophy

TZIPORAH KASACHKOFF AND EUGENE KELLY, CO-EDITORS

VOLUME 19 | NUMBER 2 | SPRING 2020

LETTER FROM THE EDITORS

Tziporah Kasachkoff

THE GRADUATE CENTER, CITY UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK

Eugene Kelly

NEW YORK INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY

We are happy to welcome readers to the spring 2020 issue of the *APA Newsletter on Teaching Philosophy*. This issue features one article on teaching, a review essay on C.D.C. Reeve's new translation of Aristotle's *De Anima*, poems by two philosophers, and a list of recently published books that will be of interest to philosophy instructors.

The article on teaching, by Yakir Levin of Ben Gurion University of the Negev (Israel), describes a series of courses that he teaches to advanced undergraduate and graduate students. These courses, which Levin himself describes as "idiosyncratic," are, as readers will readily see, indeed unusual. Each has as its focus a book specially chosen by Levin for its philosophical interest, both to Levin himself and to his students. The books are read by both Levin and his students *as the course progresses* so that the philosophical exploration and discussion of the content of the book represents a philosophical journey that both instructor and students take together as, week-to-week, they examine and deliberate about the book's thesis and its supporting arguments. Levin describes in some detail how he conducts the courses, tells us of some of the books he has used as the foci for such courses, and includes a sample syllabus. He also indicates what he requires of the students in the courses and, importantly, the benefit—for both his students and for himself—of teaching such courses as he describes.

(As Levin indicates in a footnote, he believed that the fact that the courses are so atypical would disqualify an account of them from being suitable material for our publication. One of the editors thought otherwise on the grounds that—*notwithstanding* that most of us are required to teach courses that *introduce* the various fields of philosophy to students—many philosophy instructors do offer advanced elective courses in which students have the opportunity to bring their philosophical perspective to matters presented in books that are not part of the "philosophy canon." But, as Levin notes in his footnote, *the readers should be judge*. We would appreciate any feedback readers wish to share with us.)

We are happy to publish a review essay in this issue, written by Rosemary Twomey, of the new translation by C.D.C. Reeve of Aristotle's *De Anima*. Twomey's essay comprehensively covers what Reeve's translation achieves, and indicates how the Reeve translation of *De Anima* compares with other, earlier, editions. Twomey makes some interesting observations about Reeve's introduction to the volume as well as about the many notes that Reeve appends to the translated text. Twomey also gives readers a good sense of some of the complexities of translating Aristotle, and of how other translators' different choices might affect the readers' understanding of Aristotle's thought. Of especial usefulness are Twomey's citations of, and references to, these other translations for this allows interested readers to make comparisons between Reeve's choices and those of others. Twomey also indicates for readers the varying usefulness of the Reeve translation for, on the one hand, Greek scholars and, on the other hand, for initiates.

In this issue, we also offer a number of poems, submitted by (long-term and much appreciated contributor) Felicia Nimue Ackerman of Brown University and also by (first-time contributor) Alexandru Manafu of York University. We welcome the playful insights of both these writers.

As always, we include a list of books that we have received from publishers which might be of interest to our readers. And, again, as always, we encourage our readers to suggest themselves as reviewers of books and other materials that they think may fruitfully be used either in the classroom or in their own preparation. It is especially useful to receive reviews of materials from those philosophy instructors *who have used those materials in their own classrooms and so can comment from experience on the merits and/or disadvantages of their use*.

SUBMISSION GUIDELINES

When writing for our publication, bear in mind that we are devoted to accounts and discussions of successful *pedagogy* in the philosophy classroom and not to theoretical discussions of philosophical issues. This should be borne in mind not only by those who write articles but also for those who review material for our publication.

As always, we encourage our readers to suggest themselves as reviewers of books and other materials. It is especially useful to hear from philosophy instructors *who have used those materials in their own classrooms and so can comment*

from experience on the merits and/or disadvantages of their use.

We warmly encourage our readers to write for our publication. We welcome papers that respond to, comment on, or take issue with any of the material that appears within our pages.

Guidelines for submitting papers to be considered for publication in the *APA Newsletter on Teaching Philosophy*

The author's name, the title of the paper, and full mailing address should appear on a *separate* sheet of paper or, if the paper is sent to the editors electronically, on a note that will not print out within the text of the paper itself.

Nothing that identifies the author or his or her institution should appear within the body of the paper or within its footnotes/endnotes. The title of the paper should appear on the top of the paper itself.

Please submit the paper in electronic form. If this is not possible, four complete copies of the paper should be sent to one of the co-editors listed below. Authors should adhere to the production guidelines that are available from the APA.

In writing your paper in electronic form, **please do not use your word processor's footnote/ endnote function; all notes should be added manually at the end of the paper.**

All articles submitted to the newsletter undergo anonymous review by the members of the editorial committee:

Tziporah Kasachkoff, co-editor
Emerita, PhD Program in Philosophy
The Graduate Center, CUNY
(tkasachkoff@yahoo.com)

Eugene Kelly, co-editor
New York Institute of Technology (ekelly@nyit.edu)

Robert Talisse
Vanderbilt University (robert.talisse@vanderbilt.edu)
Andrew Wengraf (andrew.wengraf@gmail.com)

Contributions should be sent (if not electronically) to:

Tziporah Kasachkoff, PhD Program in Philosophy,
The Graduate School, The City University of New
York, 365 Fifth Avenue, New York, NY 10016, at
tkasachkoff@yahoo.com

and/or

Eugene Kelly, New York Institute of Technology,
Department of Social Science, Old Westbury, NY
11568, at ekelly@nyit.edu

ARTICLE

*Devoting a Course to the Exploration of a Book: Journeying Intellectually with the Students*¹

Yakir Levin

BEN GURION UNIVERSITY OF THE NEGEV

For quite some time by now, I have been teaching at the advanced undergraduate/graduate level only, where all the students attending my classes have had a solid background in philosophy, and many of them also in psychology *cum* cognitive neuroscience. Each of the courses/seminars I have given since my teaching took that route (and to some extent even before that insofar as my advanced courses were concerned) has been based on a book that I think will be of interest to both the students and myself. I usually choose books that deal with central philosophical issues in the areas in which I myself am interested—philosophy of mind, metaphysics, and history of philosophy—or in areas with which I would like to be more acquainted. From time to time I also choose books that have relevance to issues that are on the current public and cultural agenda—e.g., fake-facts; the importance of the value of truth; identity, diversity, pluralism, and authenticity; and liberal democracy. Every now and then I also choose a classical text—e.g., Augustine's *Confessions*; and Plato's *Phaedo*—into which I myself would like to delve. Apart from the latter texts, the books on which my courses are based are books that I myself haven't yet read beforehand and are therefore books which I will cover *with* the students rather than in preparation for the course/seminar that the students take with me. That is, I advance with the reading along with the students rather than read the whole text before they do.

In selecting a book for a course, I usually read a few reviews of the book (if there are any), and then quickly browse through the entire book. I try to choose books that are central, wide-ranging, and as self-contained as possible. During the period in which I have been teaching in this manner, only once a choice that I made turned out to be a failure. The students and I struggled with the book for two or three classes, and then, together deciding that it wasn't worth the effort, we switched to a different book on a related topic—one which all of us greatly enjoyed reading and learning from.

In a typical course of this type, the students and I read the book to which the course is dedicated cover-to-cover. If the book is comprised of between ten and fourteen chapters, each three-hour class is dedicated to covering one of the book's chapters. (There is one class held per week and thirteen to fourteen weeks in the semester.) The students and I read one of the book's chapters during the week before the class that is to be devoted to that chapter, and then we discuss that chapter in class. Sometimes it happens that we do not finish discussing a particular chapter in one class session and in that case—and since I don't take it as necessary to discuss each chapter in full—we just move on to the next chapter *unless* we find the topics we haven't managed to discuss particularly interesting or important.

In the latter case we spend more than one class on a given chapter, and that may come on the expense of later chapters—i.e., sometimes we don't manage to cover a book in full. The price of this might be that we miss interesting material that is to be found further on in the book. But in the spirit of Wittgenstein's saying that in philosophy the race goes to the one who can run slowest, we don't rush anywhere. We go with the discussion wherever it takes us, and that's a great part of the fun.

While I try to choose books that aren't too lengthy, it has also happened that I chose fairly lengthy books. It has even happened once that a book that I chose—Robert Pasnau's *Metaphysical Themes 1274–1671*—was so lengthy (it is comprised of thirty chapters and is almost eight hundred pages long) that I devoted a year-long double seminar to it. The students in this particular seminar were a very dedicated group who really "got into it" and we all greatly enjoyed the book and learned a lot from it. In books where the chapters are fewer in number than the number of class meetings in the semester, more than one class meeting is devoted to the discussion of each chapter. This is what often happens in the case of books which have fewer but rather lengthy chapters. And if the book is a bit short for a whole semester's treatment of it, we read parts of another book that deals with related topics. This is what happened in a class that I gave this year: we started by reading, cover-to-cover, A. A. Long's rather short monograph *Greek Models of Mind and Self*, a gem of a book that contains five not very long chapters. We then moved on to read quite a few chapters from Stephen Everson's *Psychology*, a fine collection of essays by different authors on topics related to Long's book. But this is relatively rare occurrence as usually the books I choose are sufficiently lengthy to serve for a whole semester's study.

It has also happened twice or thrice that I have dedicated a seminar's weekly four-hour-class to a book. One such seminar was devoted to Tyler Burge's *Origins of Objectivity*, which although comprising only eleven chapters, is almost six hundred pages long. Another such seminar was devoted to Evan Thompson's *Waking, Dreaming, Being*, which, again, although comprising only ten chapters, is almost four hundred fifty pages long. Both these seminars were at the graduate level.

Below you will find a brief description of courses/seminars that I gave in the last academic year, as well as one that I gave this year, each conducted in the manner described above. Due to the form of these courses (described above), the syllabus for each is not very detailed. I have therefore appended a syllabus of only one of these courses, as that syllabus is pretty much exemplary of the others.

As can be seen from the examples given below, the topics of my courses/seminars are rather varied. Each of these courses forms a sort of journey with the students, one in which neither I nor the students know in advance how it will develop, or where it will lead—a true intellectual adventure. I myself usually learn a lot from these classes—indeed, often enough, points raised and discussed in them find their way into my own work—and when they go well, I enjoy them tremendously. Judging from the

student papers at the end of the course, it appears that the students get a lot from them as well. It is also the case that, since I read the books along with the students, and so do not have to prepare much in advance apart from doing the week-to-week reading of the chapters to be discussed in that week's class, I am able to offer completely new courses/seminars each and every year. Indeed, each year I now offer four such new courses—two per semester. Having been teaching for quite a long time, I have reached a point where I find it difficult to repeat a course while still maintaining the joy of teaching the material of that course. I need fresh intellectual experiences and excitement both to do the teaching properly and also to enjoy the teaching. It is also the case that, not only do my many years of teaching motivate my manner of teaching, but together with the skills and background knowledge that I have acquired along the way, they enable me to teach in that manner.

Besides the personal motivation behind my manner of teaching, there is, of course, also a pedagogical motivation. As Kant is reported to have said, his intentions in teaching weren't to teach philosophy but rather to teach philosophizing "not thoughts merely for repetition but thinking." This is, in a sense, what any philosophy course worthy of the name is supposed to do (or so it seems to me). I think that collectively thinking with students through a major philosophical work—indeed, *doing* philosophy together *with* them—is a particularly good way of achieving such a goal, i.e., of improving students' thinking-cum-analytical-cum-philosophical skills. My teaching manner, then, is a way of helping students achieve this goal. But, of course, it requires some intellectual maturity on the part of the students, and some prior—indeed, considerable—initiation into the intricate practice of philosophical thinking. That's why my particular manner of teaching suits upper-level students and not beginners. My manner of teaching also does not suit students who would like to be taught in a very orderly and systematic way. In my experience, however, advanced students who are willing to participate in an intellectual adventure—though at times haphazard and often leading to unexpected destinations—are students who greatly benefit from the manner of teaching described here. But not only do they profit from this manner of teaching, they delight in it as well.

A few technical points about my courses:

- (1) Attendance in the classes comprising a course is compulsory—i.e., students must attend at least ten classes out of thirteen in the semester.
- (2) Apart from the required weekly reading, students are required to write one relatively short mid-term paper (usually on one of the chapters in the book that we are reading). I do not grade these papers, but I do sit and discuss each student's paper with him or her *tête-à-tête*.
- (3) I assign a second, longer, paper whose topic and relevant bibliography I announce to the students—i.e., all students in the course write on the same topic. I do grade this longer, final paper and this grade becomes the student's final grade in the course.

- (4) Generally, the papers I assign are not long but do require of the student that she or he think carefully and deeply about the philosophical issues that have been raised by our reading and/or by related issues that have come up for discussion.
- (5) My courses/seminars take place in our departmental seminar room, which contains a long oblongish table. I limit the number of students participating in a course so that we can all comfortably sit around this table. The average number of students in my courses is twelve—sometimes a bit more, sometimes a bit less. I take it to be crucial to the character of my courses that we sit in class sessions as we do and that the number of students is limited.
- (6) Since I want the discussion in class to take its own course and to structure itself in real-time as it develops, usually I don't come to class with a very clear or definitive idea of how the class session should run. Usually, I also don't make detailed notes on a chapter to be discussed in a class session before that session. After a class session, by contrast, I extensively summarize for myself the discussion, and the main points and ideas that arose within it.

SAMPLE COURSES/SEMINARS

A Seminar on Louis Sass's Madness and Modernism: Insanity in the Light of Modern Art, Literature, and Thought (revised version)

In this book, Sass (a clinical psychologist) outlines his phenomenological approach to schizophrenia, and suggests that we might best understand this mental disorder by means of suggested parallels with modernism in both literature and the visual arts. Some such parallels are, for example, (a) defiance of convention, (b) distortions of time, and (c) strange transformations of the self. In the course of drawing these parallels between schizophrenia and major modernist literary and artistic trends, Sass makes reference to the works of such artists and writers as Kafka, Beckett, and Duchamp, and to the ideas of philosophers such as Nietzsche, Heidegger, Foucault, and Derrida.

Sass's book (in its revised version) has eleven chapters. We read the book cover-to-cover, devoting one class session to each chapter. Some of the discussions of some of the chapters spilled over to further class sessions (that were supposed to be devoted to subsequent chapters), which is why it took us thirteen weeks to read the entire book.

I should mention that among the fourteen students who took this seminar—many of whom were majoring in both philosophy and psychology—five students were actually working with schizophrenic patients, and one was a PhD psychology student whose dissertation was on schizophrenia. Not surprisingly, the personal experience and background knowledge of these students greatly enriched the discussion in class.

Syllabus for the Seminar:

Ben-Gurion University of the Negev
Department of Philosophy

Madness and Modernism

1st Semester, 2019

Lecturer: Professor Yakir Levin, yakirl@bgu.ac.il.

Office Hours: Tuesdays, 14:00-15:00, or by appointment, Diller Building (74), room 336.

Time and Location: Wednesdays, 17:00-20:00, Diller Building (74), room 343.

Seminar Description:

The similarities between madness and modernism in both literature and the visual arts are striking: defiance of convention, nihilism, extreme relativism, distortions of time, strange transformations of self, and much more. In this seminar we shall examine a severe psychopathology such as schizophrenia in light of these similarities. On the psychopathological side we shall rely on clinical work and reports by both patients and therapists. On the modernist side we shall refer to the works of such artists and writers as Kafka, Beckett, and Duchamp, and to the ideas of philosophers such as Nietzsche, Heidegger, Foucault, and Derrida.

Assignments and Grading Policy:

- Reading from week to week of the reading assignments from the book whose details are given below.
- Each week you will receive the reading assignment for the following week.
- All reading assignments will be put in advance on the Moodle site of the seminar.²
- In the middle of the semester there will be a short mid-term paper assignment. This paper will not be graded. But I will meet *tête-à-tête* with each and every one of you in order to discuss it. Submission date for this paper will be announced when you get this assignment.
- At the end of the seminar you will receive a topic, bibliography, and instructions for a longer seminar paper. Submission date for this paper is according to the Faculty regulations. This paper will be graded, and the grade you will get on it will be your final grade in the seminar.
- **Attendance Policy:**
You are required to attend at least ten out of the thirteen class sessions of the seminar.

- **Bibliography:**

Louis Sass, *Madness and Modernism: Insanity in the Light of Modern Art, Literature, and Thought*, revised edition (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017).

* * *

A Course on Quassim Cassam's *Self-Knowledge for Humans*

Cassam's book develops an account of self-knowledge that tries to do justice to the respects in which humans are *not* model epistemic subjects. The book rejects rationalist and other mainstream philosophical accounts of self-knowledge on the grounds that these accounts do not accurately account for how humans actually come to have knowledge about themselves. Instead, Cassam defends the view that inferences that we draw from both behavioral and psychological evidence constitute the basic source of our knowledge about ourselves. In addition, Cassam provides an account of how we come to have (what he calls) "substantial" self-knowledge, including the knowledge we have of the values we hold and of our character.

Cassam's book is divided into fifteen chapters, of which each of the first twelve were covered/discussed in class. The discussion of the first twelve chapters was sufficient to prepare students to read the last three chapters of the book on their own, and then to write and submit a final paper on some of the topics (such as self-ignorance and the value of self-knowledge) that are covered in these chapters.

A Course on Bernard Williams's *Truth and Truthfulness: An Essay in Genealogy*

In this book Williams explores the values of truth and truthfulness focusing on questions such as: What does it mean to be truthful? What role does truth play in our lives? Williams proceeds by deploying a Nietzschean genealogical method (appealing to both fictional and real genealogies) and in doing so he explores related values like sincerity and authenticity.

We read the book throughout the semester, devoting one class to discussion of each of its ten chapters. As in the seminar on Sass's book, and for similar reasons, it took us thirteen weeks to read the entire book.

A Course on Alvin I. Goldman's *Simulating Mind, The Philosophy, Psychology, and Neuroscience of Mindreading*

In this book Goldman seeks to make a case for the importance of simulation in both low-level and high-level tasks of third-person mind reading. Interdisciplinary to the core, the book bridges philosophy of mind, psychology, and neuroscience, thereby providing perhaps the definitive account of simulation theory. We read the book throughout the semester, devoting one class to discussion of each of its eleven chapters. As in the case of the former two courses, and for similar reasons, it took us thirteen weeks to read the whole book.

A Seminar on Anthony Appiah's *The Ethics of Identity*

In this book Appiah seeks to develop a Millian (i.e., liberal) account of identity that takes seriously both the claims of individuality—the task of self-creation or of making one's own life—and the larger claims of social categories such as gender, nationality, race, and religion through which we come to define ourselves as the persons we are.

Although 272 pages long, Appiah's book is divided into only six chapters, each of which is rather long, very rich in content, and raises many questions. Because of this, we read the text in fairly small portions, devoting, for example, five classes to discussion of the first two chapters of the book.

Before a semester starts, my university's computing department opens a Moodle website for each of my courses for that semester. It's a superb means for communicating with the students, e.g., for sending them collective emails (which I do at least once a week); for listing reading materials for the course; for giving instructions for the mid-term and final papers; for informing students of the details of occasional lectures and workshops that are relevant to the course and to which I recommend attendance.

Among the reading materials I put on the Moodle website of my courses, I usually include additional materials relevant to the book we are reading in those courses. For example, for the seminar on Appiah's book, *The Ethics of Identity*, I put on the site a few relevant articles from the press about voting patterns in Israel amongst different identity groups. Articles which had been part of an ongoing heated public debate about these issues. In addition, I put a reference to the website of a thought-provoking and very touching documentary which was shown on the Israeli public TV channel about the Queer community in Israel. (Needless to say, the students in class were much more familiar with this identity group than I, and I learned a lot from them during our discussion of this particular example in the context of our examination of Appiah's account of identity.)

Another example: for the course on Williams's *Truth and Truthfulness*, among other things that I placed on the Moodle site was an article about Bernard Williams and his intellectual legacy that appeared in the *Times Literary Supplement* as part of their marvelous series "Footnotes to Plato."

NOTES

1. The co-editor of this newsletter, Tziporah Kasachkoff, asked me to share with readers of this publication my rather idiosyncratic manner of teaching. Though it occurred to me that my method of teaching might be too idiosyncratic to be useful to others, Professor Kasachkoff, a good friend of mine to whom I cannot really say *no*, thought otherwise. So I agreed to her request. You, the reader, will be the judge.

Many thanks to Tziporah for her wise advice, most helpful comments, and excellent suggestions.

2. Moodle is an online learning management system which enables one to create a private website for one's courses. (All universities in Israel—as well as, I think, many universities elsewhere in the world—use it.)

REVIEW ESSAY

Aristotle, De Anima

Translated, with Notes by C. D. C. Reeve (Hackett Publishing Company, 2017). xlv+ 227 pp. \$22 paperback/\$64 cloth.

Reviewed by Rosemary Twomey

QUEENS COLLEGE, CITY UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK

Over the past several years, Hackett has published a host of C.D.C. Reeve translations of Aristotle under the series title “The New Hackett Aristotle.” *De Anima* [DA] joins *Metaphysics*, *Nicomachean Ethics*, *Politics*, *Physics*, *Rhetoric*—and *Topics* and *Sophistical Refutations*, which is forthcoming. While the present edition is not explicitly oriented towards teaching and speaks only generically of readers’ interests, the Introduction starts with basic biographical detail of Aristotle’s life, suggesting students are among the intended audience. This is an ambitious project, and one for which there is some need: since W.D. Ross in the early twentieth century there has not been a systematic effort to render all or most of Aristotle’s surviving works in one translator’s voice. Still, Aristotle’s language is fairly technical, so translations do not show their age as quickly as they might otherwise. (Among decades-old editions of *DA*, in addition to Ross’s later [1961] edition, Hicks’s excellent 1907 translation is still a viable option for classroom use.) Nonetheless, those who teach Aristotle in the twenty-first century often use more modern translations such as that of Hamlyn [1968, repr. 2002] or Shields [2016], or anthologies such as the excellent one of Irwin and Fine.¹ Reeve’s translation is a good addition to this list, especially if one is also teaching another text translated by Reeve so that there is consistency in terminology. It is important to keep in mind that translators render critical terms differently: *nous* can be rendered as “understanding,” “mind,” “intellect,” “thought,” or even “reason”;² *aisthêsis* as (either) “perception” or “sensation”; and so on with important terms including *phronêsis*, *kath’ hautô*, *kata sumbebêkos*, and *epistêmê*. Because of this variation, reading multiple texts with different translators may have the effect of obscuring clear connections. Of course, Aristotle is not himself always consistent at keeping his technical terminology uniform, a fact of which Reeve is mindful. For example, in *DA* I.2 Reeve translates *phronêsis* as “wisdom” rather than as “practical wisdom” (as he does in his edition of *NE*) because Reeve (rightly) thinks that Aristotle does not have his doctrine of practical reasoning in mind here (84n38). Still, Reeve rarely varies his terminology, which allows readers who do not know Greek to draw parallels among Aristotle’s works more easily.

The Reeve translation is readable and clear. It is worth noting that Reeve’s commentary takes up twice as much space as the text itself. This is to be expected as Aristotle’s writing is frequently elliptical and assumes knowledge of technical terms that Aristotle defines elsewhere. But whereas other popular editions³ divide the text into digestible chunks with long expository commentaries, Reeve chooses to use frequent endnotes—448 in all and often one per sentence.

Indeed, if one attends to all of the notes, reading the text may prove to be a disorienting experience. Furthermore, not all of the endnotes will be of relevance to all students as many of the endnotes, especially in the later parts of Book I, provide reference information. Reeve includes a note every time Aristotle refers back to something which he has previously said in another place. While the notes can sometimes be helpful in pointing us to other texts, oftentimes the note refers us back to an obvious place just a few lines earlier (e.g., notes 245 & 280). Other sorts of notes that Reeve provides will be more helpful for students: whenever technical terms are introduced Reeve takes care to provide in his endnotes some context for those terms—though sometimes the supplied context comes in the form of an unelaborated-upon quotation from another work. (For example, in II.4 Aristotle says that the soul is the cause of the body “in three of the ways distinguished.” Aristotle is here referring to his four causes, most fully explicated in *Physics*. In his note, Reeve quotes without comment a summary of the four causes from *Metaphysics*. Students unfamiliar with the general doctrine of the four causes will not get much elucidation from this rather dense quotation.) In general, I had the impression that the notes would be more helpful to Aristotle scholars than to beginning or intermediate students.

Reeve has many interesting interpretations, especially in the later parts of Book III. But because he does not survey the literature—an editorial decision he mentions in the preface (ix)—students will not get a sense of interpretive controversies by attending to the notes.

Reeve provides a wide-ranging and thought-provoking introduction, but, like the notes, it will be of variable interest to students. The discussion of Aristotelian science and methodology will help students understand what Aristotle is trying to accomplish in *DA*. I agree with Reeve that *DA* should be understood as an attempt to provide the indemonstrable first principles upon which the rest of psychology would (or must) rely. In the introduction and notes, Reeve does an excellent job of presenting Aristotle’s view of the structure of science and the role both of first principles and of the demonstrations that rely on them (though he could also have appealed to some evidence from within the text itself rather than referring exclusively to other Aristotelian treatises (e.g., I.1 402a7-10 & II.2 413a11-16)). But the Introduction misses chances to outline basic concepts that students will need to have while making their way through the text. For example, Reeve does not explain the range of uses of the term *psuchê* (soul), and his commitment throughout the introduction to the separability of intellect from body (a controversial interpretive claim) could, understandably, lead students to interpret Aristotle’s interest in soul as part and parcel of a more general dualism. It would have been helpful had Reeve indicated to readers that while there is no perfect English translation of the term, *psuchê* refers to whatever it is that distinguishes living things from non-living ones. Reference to “souls” is compatible with a wide range of views about their underlying nature and the connection that obtains between them and corporeal bodies. There is also no explanation of basic Aristotelian concepts such as form and matter and potentiality and actuality. While these

concepts are touched upon in the notes when they occur in the text, it would have been helpful if Reeve had explained these concepts *before* the student encounters them in the text itself.

Other parts of the Introduction bear a less obvious relation to the text. For instance, Reeve discusses *pneuma* at some length even though (arguably) it does not feature in *DA*. Though elsewhere in his oeuvre Aristotle employs a technical notion of *pneuma* (especially in his biology and his account of the living body), in *DA* the word and its cognates only occur three times (420b20 & 24; 421b15), and each time it refers to breath. Though Reeve disagrees with Abraham Bos's specific claim that *pneuma* (rather than the visible human body) is, according to Aristotle, the body to the soul's form (xxiv), he apparently embraces Bos's general position on the importance of *pneuma* in Aristotle's psychology: Bos's *The Soul and Its Instrumental Body* is among the few secondary sources mentioned in the "Further Reading" section at the end of the book. But Reeve doesn't do enough to defend his very controversial reading of *pneuma* in his Introduction, nor does he even indicate that it is controversial. Reeve does claim that *pneuma* is implicitly appealed to in explaining transparency in media such as air and water as well as in the transmission of intellect to the fetus, but Reeve's argument here is hasty and has little textual support, and in any event it will not be clear to the novice that this reading is idiosyncratic. But more fundamentally, while *pneuma* as a general concept will be foreign to many students, Reeve assumes students' familiarity with its meaning. Students would have benefited had Reeve proceeded more slowly and included some of the history of the term and its connections with the concept of breath.

Like his other translations, Reeve's rendering of *De Anima* is accurate and (for Aristotle) quite readable. Students should find the wording familiar. For the most part his translation does not make choices that render his favored interpretations all but inevitable. This is as it should be since a good teacher should be able to use the text as written in outlining controversies and presenting alternative interpretations of that text. One exception to this salutary practice occurs in Reeve's discussion of Aristotle's attitude towards the idea of the "parts of soul." Aristotle is reluctant to acknowledge "parts of the soul" as having the same sense that Plato gives it in the *Republic*—that is, as distinct, separable, agents within the soul. Aristotle expresses this reluctance by twice explicitly doubting whether it is *apropos* to use the word for "part" (*morion*) in discussing the capacities of soul (413b13-32 & 432a22-b8). However, when trying to refer neutrally to that which performs the soul's various functions, Aristotle does freely use a construction combining the activity in question with the neuter article and the ending *-ikon*. Translators have traditionally rendered these as references to faculties: to *aisthêtikon*—usually translated as "the perceptual faculty." Such a reading is in some ways quite loaded since it suggests a faculty psychology (a very plausible suggestion, but a charged one nonetheless). David Hamlyn instead translates *aisthêtikon* neutrally but awkwardly as "that which can perceive." Reeve, on the other hand, translates the word as "perceptual part," which makes Aristotle's reluctance to

use the word "part" elsewhere look rather puzzling, most strikingly in in II.2, where Aristotle asks whether we should think of the primary functions of the soul as being "parts" of souls (413b13-15). He does not appear to settle this issue, yet just a few lines later, Reeve has him speaking freely of the perceptual "part" and the believing "part" (413b29-32). Aristotle returns to the issue in III.9, where he again struggles to decide whether or not to refer to "parts" of soul (432a22-23) even though, in Reeve's translation, Aristotle appears to have been referring to "parts" of the soul throughout the text.

The book includes a brief collection of Further Readings consisting of: a few biographies of Aristotle, the ancient commentaries which have been translated into English, and a highly selective list of recent sources.

The book has a very thorough index covering not just the text but also the notes, and this will prove useful to students and scholars alike.

In my judgment Reeve's translation is a good and a well-organized resource, though I prefer the notes in other recent editions—especially Shields⁴—as they cover more controversy and so give students a better sense of the diversity of positions. The Reeve-translated text itself is to be recommended, but students who want exposure to the range of interpretations will need to supplement Reeve's edition with one or more of the others.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

Thanks to Iakovos Vasiliou for comments on an earlier draft.

NOTES

1. Irwin and Fine, *Aristotle: Selections*. For other recent editions, see Miller, *Aristotle: On the Soul and Other Psychological Works*; and Polansky, *Aristotle: De Anima*.
2. In Shields, *Aristotle: De Anima*.
3. Such as Hamlyn, *Aristotle: De Anima*; Hicks, *Aristotle, De Anima*; Polansky, *Aristotle: De Anima*; Ross, *Aristotle: De Anima*; and Shields, *Aristotle: De Anima*.
4. Shields, *Aristotle: De Anima*.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Bos, A. *The Soul and Its Instrumental Body*. Brill, 2003.
- Hamlyn, D. W. *Aristotle: De Anima*, Clarendon Press, 1968, repr. 2002.
- Hicks, R. D. *Aristotle: De Anima*. 1907.
- Irwin, T. And G. Fine. *Aristotle: Selections*. Hackett, 1995.
- Miller, F. *Aristotle: On the Soul and Other Psychological Works*. Oxford University Press, 2018.
- Polansky, R. *Aristotle: De Anima*. Cambridge University Press, 2010.
- Ross, W. D. *Aristotle: De Anima*. Clarendon Press, 1961.
- Shields, C. *Aristotle: De Anima*. Oxford University Press, 2016.

POEMS

To Teachers Who Hope to Inspire Their Students

Felicia Nimue Ackerman
BROWN UNIVERSITY

This poem first appeared in *Daily Nous*.

I never had a teacher more inspiring than Ms. Burr.
She led me to resolve that I would never be like her.

To Those Who Think the Unexamined Life Is Not Worth Living

Felicia Nimue Ackerman
BROWN UNIVERSITY

This poem first appeared in *Daily Nous*.

Lloyd always acts without thinking.
Reflection is hardly for him.
Lillian's mind has been shrinking.
Dementia is making her dim.

Both find enjoyment in living.
So don't be so ready to scoff.
Why are you so unforgiving?
How harsh to be writing them off.

*To Cynthia Ozick**

Felicia Nimue Ackerman
BROWN UNIVERSITY

This poem first appeared in *Daily Nous*.

Aesthetics and logic,
Injustice and war:
Philosophers ponder
These topics and more.

We needn't relinquish
This varying focus.
Our field would be meager
With only one locus.

*The novelist and essayist Cynthia Ozick says, "Novelists, poets, philosophers and theologians agree: Mortality, that relentless law of universal carnage, is the sole worthy human preoccupation."

In Praise of Campus Culture Wars

Felicia Nimue Ackerman
BROWN UNIVERSITY

A slightly different version of this poem appeared in *The Wall Street Journal*, October 11, 2018.

A campus that is truly free
Has denizens who disagree.
There isn't any culture war
In Orwell's *Nineteen Eighty-Four*.

Philosophy Rap

Alexandru Manafu

YORK UNIVERSITY

This poem was read on the first day of an Introduction to Philosophy class. For most students in attendance this was their first day of university.

Great minds like Stephen Hawking said:
"Philosophy is dead!"
But I'm here to prove him wrong
Philosophy's still strong!

For as long as there will be people
There will be big questions too
Like: Who am I?, What's right or wrong?
What do I have to do?

Is there a God? What's truth?
What can I truly know?
What's love and what is beauty?
What's the transcendent, yo!?

But this course is no joke
Philosophy is hard
You'll have to read some Plato,
And Nietzsche, and Descartes

You'll have to write some essays
And argue, go to bed at 3
Philosophy's not easy
And I'm philosophy, you see?

But stick around, because
In this course you will find
Philosophy is good for you
It feeds your soul, your mind

And with these words I close my sketch
And throw this in the bin
This poem is now ending
Let our first lecture begin!

BOOKS RECEIVED

*Books marked with an asterisk will be reviewed in one of our forthcoming issues.

(Readers are welcome to suggest themselves as reviewers of one of the books listed.)

BROADVIEW PRESS

Cahn, Steven M., *Philosophical Adventures**

HACKETT PUBLISHING COMPANY

Aristotle. *Rhetoric*, Translated with Introduction and Notes, by C. D. C. Reeve.

Forcehimes, Andrew T. and Semrau, Luke. *Thinking Through Utilitarianism: A Guide to Contemporary Arguments*.

Perry, John. *Dialogue on Consciousness: Minds, Brains, and Zombies*.

Plato. *Charmides*, Translated with Introduction, Notes and Analysis by Christopher Moore and Christopher Raymond.

Ariew, Roger & Watkins, Eric., eds., *Modern Philosophy: An Anthology of Primary sources*, 3rd edition.

OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS

Cahn, Steven M., *Exploring Ethics: An Introductory Anthology*, 5th edition.

PRINCETON UNIVERSITY PRESS

Singer, Peter. *82 Brief Essays on Things that Matter.** (with new afterward by the author)

ADDRESSES OF CONTRIBUTORS

Dr. Felicia Nimue Ackerman

Brown University
Department of Philosophy
Box 1918
Providence, RI 02912
Email address: felicia_ackerman@brown.edu

Dr. Yakir Levin

Ben Gurion University of the Negev
Department of Philosophy
P.O. Box 653
Beer Sheva 84105
ISRAEL
Email address: yakirl@bgu.ac.il

Dr. Alexandru Manafu

York University
Department of Philosophy
S414A Ross Building
4700 Keele Street
Toronto, Ontario
Canada M3J 1P3
Email address: alexman@yorku.ca

Dr. Rosemary Twomey

Queens College, City University of New York
Department of Philosophy
65-30 Kissena Blvd
Flushing, New York 11367
Email address: rosemary.twomey@gmail.com