NEWSLETTER ON TEACHING PHILOSOPHY

FROM THE EDITORS, TZIPORAH KASACHKOFF & EUGENE KELLY

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ADDRESSES OF THE AUTHORS
Welcome to the Fall 2002 edition of the APA Newsletter on Teaching Philosophy. We are pleased to present three papers of interest to teachers of philosophy, and several reviews of books that can be used in the philosophy classroom.

Our first paper, “The Value of Paradox in Teaching Philosophy,” by Margaret A. Cuonzo, discusses the use of paradoxes in a course in logic, for which she supplies a syllabus. Paradoxes, if treated correctly, bring students into the process of philosophy in a compelling manner. Beginning with a brief analysis of the nature of paradox, Dr. Cuonzo argues that in contemplating a paradox our intuitions come in conflict, and this mental conflict has pedagogical value. Students are forced to reconsider the intuitions that are in conflict, and either resolve the paradox or abandon at least one of the intuitions in conflict. But such an effort is central to the philosophical process itself. It rests upon the Socratic realization that some of our deeply held beliefs may be false, and some concepts we thought quite clear may turn out to be unclear. Using as her starting point the mental state into which her students have been brought by a paradox, Dr. Cuonzo shows how teachers of logic can develop in their students habits of reflection and sophistication in conceptual analysis. She concludes the body of her paper with a discussion of how paradoxes can be resolved, what conceptual structures a student must possess to achieve these resolutions effectively, and what classroom techniques foster this process.

Keith Allen Korcz’s paper, “A Comparison of Classroom Editions of Hume’s First Enquiry,” offers a useful portrait of five currently available editions of Hume’s Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding. Korcz makes recommendations among them on the basis of such factors as cost, the quality of introductory essays, and other editorial paraphernalia such as additional materials by Hume or his contemporaries. Special consideration is given to the most recent edition, one by Tom Beauchamp at Oxford University Press. The article contains a table that sets forth and compares the key features of the five editions.

The third paper, “Let Them Eat (Barley) Cake,” by Lisa Keele and Rondo Keele, has as its premise the observation that students who encounter hedonism in J.S. Mill or Epicurus dismiss it as recommending a life that is merely crude and sensual. Yet Epicurus’s hedonism does not focus on strong physical pleasures; it suggests we give the body simple nourishments, which, to a person in want, offer the highest pleasures. One source of this idea in Epicurus is his Letter to Menoeceus, where he recommends eating barley cakes and drinking water. To make the point in class, the Keeles borrow an ancient recipe for barley cakes from Marcus Porcius Cato’s On Farming, which they prepare at home and serve to their students in class. The paper contains a step-by-step procedure for producing the cake. Our authors conclude with an examination of the source of the recipe, and attempt to support its authenticity. The blandness of the cake, and its ability to satisfy hunger in a way that frees the mind from the body for the pursuit of intellectual and spiritual pleasures, should convince students that Epicureanism does not deserve its association with hedonistic theories that recommend strong physical pleasure as the best way of life.

We always encourage our readers to suggest themselves as reviewers of books and other material that they think may be especially good for classroom use. The names of the other books and materials we have for review are listed in section IV of the Newsletter. Please remember again that our publication is devoted to pedagogy and not to theoretical discussions of philosophical issues, and that should also be borne in mind when reviewing material for our publication.

As always, we encourage our readers to write for our publication. We welcome papers that respond, comment on or take issue with any of the material that appears within our pages.

The following guidelines for submissions should be followed:

♦ The author’s name, the title of the paper and full mailing address should appear on a separate sheet of paper. Nothing that identifies the author or his or her institution should appear within the body or within the footnotes/endnotes of the paper. The title of the paper should appear on the top of the paper itself.
♦ Four complete copies of the paper should be sent.
♦ Authors should adhere to the production guidelines that are available from the APA and that are published in the present edition of the APA Newsletters.
♦ All material submitted to the Newsletter should be available on windows-readable computer disk, but don’t send the disk with the submitted paper. The editors will request the disk when the paper is ready to be published. In writing your paper to disk, please do not use your word processor’s footnote or endnote function; all notes should be added manually at the end of the paper.
Dr. Neil Rossman has stepped down from the review committee. The editors wish to thank him for the many years he contributed to the reviews and the discussions that shape the content of the APA Newsletter on Teaching Philosophy.

Contributions should be sent to:
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or to
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ARTICLES

The Value of Paradox in Teaching Philosophy
Margaret A. Cuonzo
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Introduction
Many of the reasons that lead professional philosophers to study philosophical paradoxes also motivate the use of philosophical paradoxes in the classroom. Paradoxes force those who study and attempt to solve them to confront strong, conflicting intuitions, discover ways in which intuitions can be misleading, and analyze ways in which our ordinary concepts are problematic. In addition, paradoxes require the adventurous souls who seek to understand and solve them to go beyond a noncommittal awareness of philosophical problems to an evaluation of solutions that are to varying degrees successful. And most importantly, students of paradoxes learn that, ironically, discovering a paradox leads to advances in our knowledge and not the reverse. As the scientist Niels Bohr once wrote, “How wonderful that we have met with a paradox. Now we have some hope of making progress.” In this paper, I will discuss the utility of discussing philosophical paradoxes in philosophy classes and explain some methods for doing so.

Part One: On the Definitions of “Paradox”
There are multiple definitions of “paradox” in the philosophical literature and some are better for instructional purposes than others. In one definition, Sainsbury’s, a “paradox” is “an unacceptable conclusion derived from seemingly true premises, using apparently valid reasoning.” The seeming truth of the premises and apparent correctness of the reasoning distinguish a merely unacceptable conclusion from a paradox. In another definition, Stephen Schiffer’s, a “paradox” is a set of mutually inconsistent propositions, each of which, taken individually, seems true. A set of mutually inconsistent propositions is not a paradox unless each proposition, taken individually, has strong intuitive force. In both definitions, it is a necessary condition for being a paradox that we have strong intuitions about the truth-values of the parts of the paradox. In fact, it would not be too far off the mark to define “paradox” as “a set of mutually inconsistent intuitions in which each intuption is individually very strong.” On this definition, it is neither the argument nor the set of mutually inconsistent propositions that is emphasized, but rather the intuitions. This third definition is more faithful to the etymological roots of the term paradoX, which comes from the Greek terms for “against” or “beyond” (para) and “expectation” or “opinion” (doxa). The Greek terms emphasize the counterintuitive nature of paradoxes, and not their unacceptable conclusions or sets of propositions.

I prefer Sainsbury’s definition for pedagogical reasons. Students who are beginning to study paradoxes are usually at a point in their philosophical education where they have been introduced to the idea of soundness, and have learned that an argument with true premises and valid reasoning must have a true conclusion. By putting the paradox in the form of an argument with seemingly true premises, seemingly valid reasoning, and a seemingly false conclusion, students encounter something that seemingly conflicts with what they have learned about soundness. This invites them to think more deeply about the premises, conclusion and reasoning in the paradox, and also to think about the nature of soundness and perhaps, the limits of logic.

For an example of a paradox, consider an instance of the sorites paradox:

1. A person with 0 hairs is bald.
2. For any number n, if a person with n hairs is bald, then a person with (n+1) hairs is bald.
3. Therefore, a person with 1,000,000 hairs is bald.

On the first definition, we have an unacceptable conclusion, with intuitively plausible premises, derived using apparently correct reasoning. On the second definition, the set of mutually inconsistent propositions includes the two premises, the proposition that the reasoning used is valid, and the denial of the conclusion of the argument (in this case that a person with a million hairs is bald). And on the third definition, we have a set of intuitions, each being individually very strong, but there is a conflict among the intuitions regarding the truth of the premises, the cogency of the reasoning, and the acceptability of the conclusion.

Part Two: Why Teach Paradoxes?
Those who study a philosophical paradox must confront intuitions regarding the parts of the paradox. Each part of a philosophical paradox has intuitive force. Yet, when taken collectively, the parts are inconsistent. This forces students of paradox to re-examine their intuitions and to explore ways in which they may be misled into believing false statements. One of the benefits of seeking to solve a paradox is that those who do so must confront very strong intuitions and background beliefs. This teaches students of paradoxes that some of their most dearly held beliefs may in fact be false. And it teaches them to evaluate their beliefs more closely and seriously than they did previously. In studying paradoxes students learn that, when looked at closely, some ordinary concepts turn out to be quite problematic. As Bertrand Russell once said, when we examine our ordinary concepts, it is possible to “start with something so simple as not to seem worth stating, and to end with something so paradoxical that no one will believe it.”

Moreover, by teaching philosophical paradoxes, it is possible to get around some typical unproductive stances that
students new to philosophy tend to adopt when confronted with important philosophical issues. The first attitude, a relativistic one, is used an excuse not to think deeply about a philosophical issue: What’s true for you may not be true for me. Why bother discussing this matter? A related, but distinct attitude is the claim that since no noticeable progress gets made in dealing with philosophical issues, they are not worth our time: Why bother trying to find a solution when there’s no progress to be made towards one anyway?

There is a quick way to counter each of these stances. In the case of relativism, the philosophical paradoxes can be framed as arising within the belief system of each individual. So the relativist response fails to shut down the philosophical discussion. For example, take the sorites paradox again,

1. A person with 0 hairs is bald.
2. For any number n, if a person with n hairs is bald, then a person with (n + 1) hairs is bald.
3. Therefore, a person with 1,000,000 hairs is bald.

The relativist’s easy response to this may be that bald is relative to different cultures, people, etc. What is bald for you, may not be bald for me. (For example, I think older people’s standards for being non-bald get more relaxed as they age.) Yet notice that this does not get around the paradox. Saying it’s all relative doesn’t avoid the paradox so long as each of the various relative notions of bald remains vague. For example, having enough hair for a substantial comb-over may be sufficient for being clearly non-bald-for-me but not sufficient for clearly non-bald-for-you. Yet, since each of the relativized notions is vague, they all encounter the sorites paradox.¹

The second stance can be countered by showing how philosophical paradoxes not only raise problems regarding seemingly unproblematic concepts, but lead to advances in our thinking about problematic concepts. Zeno’s paradoxes of space and motion, for example, have lead to improved ways of thinking about space. Similarly, Russell’s paradox has led to better ways of thinking about sets.

Of course, it is not possible to force students to take philosophical problems seriously, but if the standard ways of avoiding thinking about philosophical problems are not available to students, they will be more likely to think deeply about these issues.

Part Three: On Teaching Solutions

It is just as important to teach the solutions to paradoxes as it is to teach the paradoxes themselves. To do this, I like to use a distinction made by Charles Chihara about the different kinds of problems that paradoxes raise, and the different types of solution to each of these problems. In his article, “Semantic Paradoxes,” Chihara claims that there are two main problems that would-be solutions to paradoxes typically address. The first is called the “diagnostic problem,” which is to expose what it is about the relevant notion that causes the paradox to arise. The second problem is the “preventative” problem of constructing a logical system in which the paradox does not arise. For example, in the case of the sorites paradox, the diagnostic problem is that of showing what it is about vague terms that allows for the sorites paradox to be generated. Usually, the feature that is cited is that vague terms are “tolerant” to minor changes. The difference of one hair doesn’t warrant a shift in classification from being bald to non-bald, the difference of one penny won’t make or break anyone in terms of wealth, etc. The preventative problem raised by the sorites paradox is solved differently by different theories of vagueness.

Here, though, some deeper questions emerge as to what form solutions to paradoxes should take. Although I wouldn’t necessarily discuss this in a basic philosophy course, in an advanced elective such a discussion may be useful. For example, Stephen Schiffer has distinguished between two types of solutions to philosophical paradoxes, happy-face and unhappy-face. According to Stephen Schiffer, a happy-face solution to a paradox would do two things. First, it would identify the odd-guy-out, the seemingly true proposition that isn’t really true; and second, it would remove from this proposition the air of seeming truth so that we could clearly see it as the untruth it is (Schiffer, p. 20).

To remove the “air of seeming truth” from some part of the paradox, a happy-face solution would give a plausible account of the relevant part of the paradox such that the part in question is seen to be the “odd-guy-out.” The task of removing the seeming truth of a part of the paradox is the task of constructing a logical system that captures the nature of the relevant notion while at the same time indicating what part of the paradox is flawed. Happy-face solutions to paradoxes solve both the diagnostic and preventative problems discussed by Chihara.

Unlike happy-face solutions, unhappy-face solutions do not attempt to expose a seemingly true part of the paradox for the untruth that the part is. Instead, such solutions indicate how the relevant notion (in this case, vagueness) leads to paradox. In addition, such solutions may propose an alternative notion, one that does all that is needed of the original notion but does not lead to paradox. Sometimes the notion that leads to paradox is employed in a theory. Yet if the notion leads to paradox, there is a question about whether the theory that relies on the notion is successful. Take, for example, theories of knowledge. Some theories of knowledge employ the notion of truth. Yet, the ordinary language notion of truth leads to the liar paradox. So, if there is another notion that can help to explain knowledge, but does not lead to paradox, it does what is needed of the original notion, but avoids the problems associated with the paradox. For example, Tarski gave an unhappy-face solution to liar paradox. According to Tarski, the ordinary notion of truth is incoherent and leads to the liar paradox, but a new notion of truth could be devised that does not lead to paradox. Whereas happy-face solutions solve both the diagnostic and preventative problems raised by a paradox, unhappy-face solution solve only the diagnostic problem. Part of the solution to the diagnostic problem shows that there can be no successful solution to the preventative problem raised by the paradox.

Part Four: Paradoxes in Action

At the end of this article is a syllabus for a course that I taught in the Fall 2001 semester, “Special Seminar on Logic and Paradox.” As you will see, the course combines a brief course in formal logic and an introduction to philosophical paradoxes. A very basic grounding in logic, I believe, is necessary for the students to appreciate paradoxes fully. For example, students must know that an argument with true premises and valid reasoning must have a true conclusion. They must know what logical inconsistency is in order to know whether or not their individual beliefs are mutually consistent.

Moreover, there are logical concepts that students must understand fully if they are going to understand specific paradoxes. For example, students must understand logical equivalence in order to appreciate the raven paradox. They must know that “All ravens are black” is logically equivalent to “All non-black things are non-ravens.” And, they must understand the principle of bivalence and the law of excluded
middle if they are to understand the liar paradox. For these reasons, an introductory logic course nicely complements a course on philosophical paradoxes.

Although I am convinced that a course on philosophical paradoxes is quite an important part of the philosophical curriculum, philosophical paradoxes can be incorporated into the curriculum in a far more restricted way. There are as many paradoxes as there are philosophical topics, and the books listed in the bibliographic section of this article give ample information regarding them.

Part Five: Strategies for Teaching Specific Paradoxes

The Liar. There are some fun ways to introduce the liar paradox to students. For example, after beginning with the standard writing of the liar sentence “This sentence is false” and the strengthened liar sentence “This sentence is not true” on the blackboard, I then examine what it means for each of these sentences to be true, false, and not true. As I do this, I highlight the principle of bivalence and the law of excluded middle as they relate to the two sentences. Whereas an examination of “This sentence is false” raises questions about the applicability of the principle of bivalence (which claims, roughly, that all statements are true or false), an examination of the sentence “This sentence is not true” raises questions about the more basic principle of excluded middle (which claims that all statements are true or not true).

After the basic explication of the liar and strengthened liar sentences, though, the fun begins! I have my students rip out small strips of paper from their notebooks. Then I instruct them to write on the front of the paper, “The sentence on the other side of this paper is true.” Next, I have them write, “The sentence on the other side of this paper is false.” This is followed by a similar activity in which the strengthened liar sentence is used. Another section of paper is ripped out and this time the sentence on the front is “The sentence on the other side of this paper is true,” while the sentence on the back is “The sentence on the other side of this paper is not true.” When the students are asked to determine what the possible truth-values of the sentences are, the room is filled with sound of flipping paper. This is because if the sentence on the front of the paper (“the sentence on the other side of the paper is true”) is true, then sentence on the back of the paper (“the sentence on the other side of this paper is false”) must be true. But if the sentence on the back of the paper is true, then the sentence on the front of the paper must be false, and so on. The task of flipping the paper gives the students a visual embodiment of the circularity of the reasoning.

Next comes the analysis of the liar paradoxes. Strictly speaking, on the definition of “paradox” I favor (indeed, on any standard definition), the liar sentences are not paradoxes, being merely sets of sentences rather than arguments. However, paradoxes may be constructed out of an examination of the implications of the truth-values of the liar and strengthened liar sentences. For example, in the case of the liar sentence, the paradox can be put in the following way:

1) This sentence is false.
2) If (1) is true, then (1) is false.
3) If (1) is false, then (1) is true.
4) All sentences are true or false (bivalence).
5) Therefore, (1) is both true and false.

This is a paradox using my definition because it is an argument with seemingly true premises, using apparently correct reasoning, with a seemingly false conclusion. This sets the stage for the various solutions to the paradox to be addressed.

The Sorites Paradox. In the case of the sorites paradox, one classroom activity that I have found quite useful after the paradox has been introduced to students is to go through a sorites series. That is, we start out by examining something that is clearly within one category and then, through a gradual progression, wind up with something that is clearly within another. For example, I have a stack of cards that I sometimes use when I teach the sorites paradox. The first card in the stack is clearly red; the next card is almost indistinguishable from the first, but there is a slight difference, it is slightly more orange than the first card. The third card in the deck is slightly more orange than the second, but still red. Gradually the cards become more and more orange, until the last one is clearly orange. I show the students the cards individually, starting with the clearly red card and ask them to yell out the color of the card, but discourage them from saying “orangy red.” Instead they must say either “red” or “orange.” When the first “orange” is yelled, I stop and show the card preceding the “orange” card and ask the student if he or she sees a difference between the two cards. Usually the student will say “no,” leading to a discussion of what justifies shifts in classification like the one the student just made. Sometimes students say that the card “just looks different,” or that the decision to shift categories is arbitrary. The class can then analyze the students’ answers.

Another interesting way to go through the series is to examine the point in the series where the shift gets made relative to the first card that is shown. Usually, if the red card is shown first, more cards get classified as red, while if the orange card is shown first, more cards get classified as orange. This shows the students that there is a connection between the context in which something is presented and the way that that thing is categorized. Our brains work in such a way that they avoid shifting categories. Whatever category is seen first is the one to which more borderline cases are assigned. Also, because the same students will say that some borderline cases are red when the red card is shown first, and orange when the orange card is shown first, the task shows that there may be a difference between seeing something as red, and something being red.

I have found the above two methods for engaging students with paradoxes a successful way to engage them in philosophical reflections on and discussions of paradoxes. Admittedly part of this engagement may be due to a frustration caused by the difficulties raised by the paradoxes. However, frustration is an appropriate response as it indicates students’ awareness of the difficulties associated with philosophical paradoxes.

Conclusion

In sum, the reasons that make philosophical paradoxes important for philosophical discussion by professional philosophers also show that paradoxes are useful in philosophy classes. And since there are entertaining and useful ways to interest students in philosophical paradoxes, the analysis of paradoxes in the philosophy classroom is a productive use of class time.

Suggested Readings (*=Introductory Text)


**Endnote**

1. I would like to thank an anonymous referee for this example.

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**Special Seminar on Logic and Paradox**

**Philosophy 190**

**Fall 2001**

**Syllabus**

This course is (1) an introduction to formal logic and (2) an examination of logic’s application to philosophical paradoxes.

Formal logic is a subject that is both interesting and useful. In this course, you’ll learn how translating ideas into a formal language can clarify them and help you to evaluate them. The instructor will devote special attention to making the material clear to students who are intimidated by symbols and rules.

Once students have mastered the basics of formal logic, the course will apply these new techniques to the great philosophical paradoxes. A philosophical paradox is a logical argument that is puzzling because it seems like a good argument but has a very strange conclusion. In other words, a paradox is an argument with seemingly true premises, using apparently valid reasoning, with an apparently false conclusion. For example, the sentence “This sentence is false” is true if the sentence is false, but false if the sentence is true. So it seems like the sentence is BOTH true and false. Philosophical paradoxes address some of the biggest questions in philosophy, questions about truth, knowledge, meaning, belief, the nature of sets, motion, and others. In learning about paradoxes and how philosophers solve them, you’ll come to understand a great deal about philosophy in general.

**Required Texts**


**Course Outline**

**Week One:**

Introduction to the Course. What is logic? What is a paradox? How are they related? What are some of the main philosophical paradoxes?

Reading: Introduction to *Paradoxes.*

**Week Two:**


Reading: Chapter One: *The Logic Book.*


A Comparison of Classroom Editions of Hume’s First Enquiry†

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Books Reviewed


Consulting Books In Print, there are currently five editions of Hume’s Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding which appear intended for classroom use.† My aim is to compare these, with special emphasis on the most recent edition, edited by Tom Beauchamp, from Oxford University Press. The key features of each edition are summarized in a chart at the end of this review.

The Beauchamp edition is divided into three parts: the first contains introductory material, including a detailed discussion of the issues in Hume’s book and an extensive annotated bibliography. The second part contains the Enquiry itself. The third contains a set of annotations to the text, a glossary, a list of references and an index. I’ll begin with the first part.

The introduction is thorough (it is 54 pages long) and accessible even to those with little background in philosophy. Terms such as ‘epistemology,’ ‘begging the question,’ etc., are defined and explained. At the same time, the discussion is not superficial. Key points are discussed and explained in detail, and in a way which will help students understand the issues which arise when interpreting Hume.

I do have a couple of minor quibbles with the introduction. First, Hume’s comparison of testimony argument regarding miracles in Section 10, Part I is characterized by the editor as an argument that a belief that miracles have occurred is based on testimony, which provides only a probability of there being miracles, whereas the testimony for a law of nature amounts to a proof (p. 46). However, Hume clearly states in the first paragraph of Part II that the argument in Part I involves a comparison of proofs, and not a comparison of proofs and probabilities. Certainly Hume does not believe that the evidence in favor of miracles amounts to a proof, but he appears to be assuming this merely for the sake of argument in Part I.

The second quibble is with Beauchamp’s description of the Enquiry as moving as far as anyone before Hume to a naturalistic explanation of human and non-human minds (p. 33). However, it seems to me that Julien de La Mettrie’s slightly earlier Man A Machine went much further.

The bibliography is organized by topic, with a separate section corresponding to each section of the Enquiry. For each topic there is an introductory paragraph describing the particular strengths of the items listed. There is also a section on sources which may have influenced Hume, as well as sections on general works about Hume and a section on Hume’s own work. Students doing research on Hume will find it very helpful.

Also included are 47 pages of annotations to the text and a glossary which helps to translate Hume’s 18th century English. The paragraphs of the text are numbered for easy reference during class discussions.

Another feature of Beauchamp’s edition is that it includes several pages from section 3 which were left out of the 1777 edition of the Enquiry, but did appear in all editions from 1748 to 1772. None of this material appears in the other editions reviewed here. In this newly incorporated material, Hume discusses several examples of the association of ideas as they are found in various historical and literary works.

On the negative side, Beauchamp’s edition contains no secondary works by Hume. In addition, the annotations, while detailed, are at the back of the book, marked only by small daggers in the text. Hence, use of the annotations requires a good deal of page flipping. Overall, however, I would say this is an excellent edition for classroom use.

The primary strength of Antony Flew’s edition, published by Open Court, is the additional material by Hume. This material includes “An Abstract of A Treatise of Human Nature,” a short selection from the Treatise on “Why a Cause Is Always Necessary,” and some biographical information is provided by the inclusion of Hume’s “My Own Life,” the “Letter from Adam Smith to William Strahan,” written on the occasion of Hume’s death, and three letters by Hume himself which are absolutely priceless. The first letter, to Gilbert Elliot, explains the rationale behind the publication of the Enquiry. The second, to Benjamin Franklin, informs Franklin, tongue in cheek, that the Philosophical Society plans to claim Franklin’s invention of the lightning rod as its own. The third, to the Reverend George Campbell, thanks Campbell for the civility of their disagreement regarding miracles and recounts the origin of one of Hume’s arguments against miracles. While visiting the Jesuits’ College at La Fleche and talking with a Jesuit there, Hume was struck with the argument against miracles and presented it. Hume continues:

“...at last he observed to me, that it was impossible for that argument to have any solidity, because it operated equally against the Gospel as the Catholic miracles; — which observation I thought proper to admit as a sufficient answer. I believe you will allow, that the freedom at least of this reasoning makes it somewhat extraordinary to have been the produce of a convent of Jesuits, tho perhaps you may think the sophistry of it savours plainly of the place of its birth.”

Of all the editions reviewed here, I would rate Flew’s introduction as the least accessible to students with no background in philosophy. Key terms (e.g., ‘empiricist,’ ‘Cartesian,’ ‘psychological para-mechanics,’ ‘proposition,’ ‘impressions,’ etc.) and ideas are not explained at a level appropriate for such students. Its brief overview of the main points of each of the sections of the Enquiry will be helpful only to students with some previous background in philosophy.

The annotations and detailed index are both useful. However, the text does contain a number of minor typographical errors.

The Prometheus edition is a “no frills” edition in the extreme. It contains the text, a one-page introduction, and
nothing else. The paper quality is poor, and in the copy I examined the printing was frequently smeared. I could not recommend it.

The Hackett edition, edited by Eric Steinberg, begins with a brief, mostly biographical introduction. Additional material includes “A Letter from a Gentleman to His Friend in Edinburgh” and “An Abstract of A Treatise of Human Nature.” A bibliography and short but useful index are also included. One of the main (and not insignificant) advantages of the Hackett edition is its extremely low price.

The Selby-Bigge/Nidditch edition contains a number of unique features, including a table listing the corresponding sections of the Treatise and the Enquiries, section numbers in the margins added by the editor (each section corresponding to one or several paragraphs), and an index which frequently gives the context in which the indexed term or phrase occurs. The book also contains a detailed, if dated (having been written in 1893!), introduction comparing the Treatise and Enquiries, and annotations are at the end of the book. However, no bibliography is provided. This edition seems best suited for a course devoted to Hume in which both the Enquiries and Treatise will be read.

Some Other Editions of Hume’s Enquiry

A large-print edition of Hume’s Enquiry, not reviewed here, is also available. Edited by Ernest Shackleton, it is published by North Books in a library binding (ISBN: 0-939495-62-7). This is also available. Edited by Ernest Shackleton, it is published by North Books in a library binding (ISBN: 0-939495-62-7). This may be useful to those with minor visual impairments.

An on-line edition of Hume’s Enquiry is available at The Hume Archives (http://www.utm.edu:80/research/hume/hume.html#writings). It is edited by James Fieser and described as Fieser’s working draft. It is based on the 1910 Harvard Classics edition, and has been corrected by comparison with the 1777 edition and adapted for spelling, etc. Each of the twelve sections of the Enquiry is placed on a separate page, thus minimizing download times. The site includes “A Letter from a Gentleman to His Friend in Edinburgh” and “An Abstract of A Treatise of Human Nature.” This on-line edition contains a wealth of other material about Hume, including many of his other writings, early reviews and commentaries of Hume’s writings and early biographies of Hume.

Also available on-line is a concordance of Hume’s Enquiry which allows one to search for particular words in this and many other books. It is available at http://www.concordance.com. This will be very useful to scholars doing serious research on Hume’s work.

Recommendations At A Glance

For a course where secondary sources are unlikely to be consulted, and an inexpensive text is strongly desired, I would recommend the Hackett edition, edited by Eric Steinberg.

For a first-year or sophomore level course where the instructor wishes to highlight Hume’s character and wonderful sense of humor, I would recommend the Open Court edition, edited by Antony Flew, which is only slightly more expensive than the Hackett edition.

For a course where the instructor wishes to provide a detailed guide to the secondary literature and a detailed discussion of Hume’s views by the editor, or where the text will be frequently referred to in class and numbered paragraphs will be helpful, I would recommend the Oxford edition edited by Tom L. Beauchamp. Many instructors will conclude that these additional features justify the added expense of this edition.

For a junior, senior or graduate level course making extensive use of secondary sources with references to this edition, I would suggest the Oxford edition edited by Selby-Bigge/Nidditch.

For advanced students for whom the ability to word search the text would be valuable, I would recommend providing the URL addresses of the on-line edition or concordance described above.

Footnotes

1. I would like to thank the three anonymous reviewers of the APA Newsletter on Teaching Philosophy for their helpful comments on an earlier draft of this review.


Table of Key Features of Reviewed Works

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— 207 —
Let Them Eat (Barley) Cake: An Epicurean Recipe to Share with Your Students

Lisa Keele and Rondo Keele
Indiana University

I

Anyone who has had an occasion to teach the hedonism of J. S. Mill, or of his remote ancestor Epicurus, knows that students are often quick to judge these theories crude and merely sensual, since they themselves are often quick to think of pleasure in crude and sensual terms. And anyone who has really read Mill or Epicurus with care knows that their theories of pleasure advocate neither crude nor merely sensual pleasures as the best sorts of pleasures. Mill has a delightful remark about this systematic misunderstanding of hedonism in his Utilitarianism:

Now such a theory of life excites in many minds... invertebrate dislike. To suppose that life has (as they express it) no higher end than pleasure — no better and nobler object of desire and pursuit — that designate as utterly mean and grovelling... When thus attacked, the Epicureans have always answered, that it is not they, but their accusers, who represent human nature in a degrading light; since the accusation supposes human beings to be capable of no pleasures except those of which swine are capable.¹

As Mill indicates, Epicurus, who has had the ironic historical misfortune of becoming eponymous with the extravagant, sensual enjoyment of fine food and drink, railed against this very form of excess as irrational, and advocated instead the enjoyment of simpler pleasures, such as barley cakes and friendship. Here we read in the Letter to Menoeceus:

And we believe that self-sufficiency is a great good, not in order that we might make do with few things under all circumstances, but so that if we do not have a lot we can make do with few, being genuinely convinced that those who need least extravagance enjoy it most; and that everything natural is easy to obtain and whatever is groundless is hard to obtain; and that simple flavours provide a pleasure equal to that of an extravagant life-style when all pain from want is removed, and barley cakes and water provide the highest pleasure when someone in want takes them.²

Epicurus, in The Principal Doctrines, similarly praises the simple pleasure in friendship. “Barley cakes and friendship” is in fact an excellent teaching slogan for the hedonism of Epicurus, and captures well his refined and moderate view of pleasure.

Whether one teaches Epicurus in his own right, or only as propaedeutic to other pleasure theorists such as Mill, and whether one adopts the suggested teaching slogan or not, one might well wonder — what exactly are these “barley cakes” all about? Epicurus’ reference to them is quite striking, and forms a natural place to focus class discussion, ensuring that students do not misread Epicurus as an advocate of the pursuit of base pleasures. Barley cakes in fact stand almost as a physical symbol for a moderate, rational hedonism, such as advocated by Epicurus himself. Thus, pointing out this passage to students can be a very helpful corrective for the unfair interpretation of hedonism referred to above, whether the hedonism under discussion is that of Epicurus, Bentham, Mill, etc.

However, for all the pedagogical usefulness of this passage in Letter to Menoeceus, the situation would be better by far if we had actual barley cakes to show our students. Of course, barley cakes cannot be found in a supermarket or bakery, nor are they something Epicurus himself describes in detail in the passage in question; they must have been a very common staple of his time, which he felt no compunction to elaborate on. Again, by merely reading, we can glean from the passage that this food item is simple, both in flavor and in preparation — but simply telling your students this about barley cakes is not as effective as showing them, surely.

For these reasons, we have researched and tested, from the kitchen to the classroom, the making of a reasonably authentic barley cake in the mode of Epicurus’ Greece. Our suggestion is that you attempt the (as predicted) simple and easy recipe below, and serve small slices of the barley cake in class on the day you discuss the appropriate topics. Section II of this paper contains a modern recipe for this simple confection, together with ingredients, instructions, serving ideas, nutrition information, and some suggestions about what to tell your students when serving the cakes. Section III contains a detailed discussion of how our recipe was derived, and grounds for thinking that it is reasonably authentic.

II

Here is the recipe:³

Ingredients ¹

- 2 pounds (or four cups) plain cream cheese
- 1/2 pound (or two cups) barley flour
- 1 egg
- a good quantity of dry bay leaves (say, 10 or more)

Yield

Small (1/2 oz.) slices for about 60-75 people; however, see the note on portions below.

Procedure

Place the cheese in a clean mixing bowl. With your hands, knead the cheese somewhat to soften it. Add the flour; work it in with your hands until well mixed. Then add the egg; knead it in well too. When all is mixed, the dough should resemble the texture of wet potter's clay; mold it into a loaf shape (a long oval), and place it in a casserole dish, the bottom of which is lined with dry bay leaves. The bay leaves insure the cake will not stick to the pan. (The loaf will rise in the oven, so make sure your casserole dish is larger than your cake loaf.) For aesthetic effect, you may wish to smooth the top of the loaf with your hands. Place the lid on the casserole; bake in a pre-heated 350°F oven. The cake is done when it is golden-brown and the top has cracked. This takes approximately an hour. Remove the cake from the casserole; peel the bay leaves from the bottom and discard; serve immediately or store for later use.

Nutritional information:⁵

Assuming 15 servings per cake (the small sample servings for your students will be smaller than this, or course):

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<td>Protein: 5.5 g</td>
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<td>Vitamin A: 13.2%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Fat: 21 g</td>
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<td>Carbohydrate: 5 g</td>
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The cakes also include small amounts of fiber, iron, calcium, thiamine, riboflavin, niacin, and vitamin B-6.
The cake is excellent served right out of the oven, sliced, with a bit of honey dribbled on top of each serving (honey was a favorite sweetener in ancient Greece). To store the cake for class the next day, let it cool on the kitchen counter until almost room temperature, wrap it in aluminum foil, and refrigerate. A cold cake is easier to slice, and it warms up nicely in a microwave if you want a warm snack the next day, but is perfectly edible when cold.

One note on portions: this recipe makes a large amount. It is twice what you would need to serve samples of barley cake to a class of 30 students; it is twice what you need to serve dessert to a family of five. It should be just enough for a class of 75 students to sample. If you need a smaller amount than this, you can cut the recipe in half (use one pound of cheese, one cup or 1/4 pound of flour, and to halve the egg, crack it into a separate bowl, beat it lightly, and pour half of it into the dough at the appropriate time); however, the cheese has a leavening effect, and we have found that in smaller amounts such as this, the cake does not rise quite as well as it does with the full two pounds of cheese, etc. If you are adventurous enough to make twice as much barley cake, say, for a class as large as 150 students, or if you wish to serve it as dessert at a Thanksgiving or other large feast, you can double the recipe, but you should make two normal loaves instead of one big one. If you have two covered casseroles, you may bake them at the same time; if you only have one, refrigerate half the dough until the first loaf is done, replace the bay leaves, and bake the second loaf. The second loaf may take slightly longer to bake, having been refrigerated.

A knife and some paper plates are all you need to serve the cake to students; cut fairly modest portions, as each student will need only a taste to get the full effect. Do not serve with honey. There is no evidence Epicurus sweetened his barley cakes and, in any case, the point of the classroom exercise is to demonstrate the wholesome blandness of the cakes, not to impress them with how absolutely delicious even simple recipes can be if sweeteners are added to them.

We include three points you may wish to consider making as you serve the cakes, in conjunction with the topic of Epicurean moderation. First, the food will provide a great deal of energy and nutrients. A few slices of this cake will sustain the body admirably, and so free the soul for philosophy and other higher enjoyments. A simple diet leads to a richer life. There is no better refutation of the classical misreading of Epicurean philosophy than this. Second, the recipe itself is simple. You can attest to this yourself, as the cook, or give them a copy of the recipe from this article, or even summarize the procedure — mix cheese, flour, and egg; shape; and bake in a casserole. The point is that Epicurus praised this food in part due to the fact that (so long as flour is available), it is not painful or troublesome to prepare. Thus, on Epicurus’ account, simply prepared, nourishing food is superior, even from the point of view of pleasure, to the regular intake of difficult or expensive dishes. Third, these cakes are bland. You won’t need to make this point too strongly; they can taste for themselves! The significance of this blandness is worth discussing, along the same lines as the second point; just as strong, spicy food and strong drink charge us a certain price in pain for the pleasure they offer, so bland foods give us less immediate gratification, perhaps, but they also cost the body little pain. This concept is key in the Epicurean theory of moderation and pleasure. Similarly, the notion of moderation of physical pleasures is also key to Mill’s philosophy, which focuses us instead on “higher,” intellectual pleasures — better Socrates dissatisfied (doing philosophy and dining on simple barley cakes), than a fool satisfied (doing nothing but dining on triple chocolate torte).6

The previous two sections provide all the information you need to incorporate a serving of barley cakes into a lesson about Epicurus, Mill, or any other pleasure theorist of like mind. The third section will detail how we derived the recipe, for the sake of the curious, and justify its authenticity, for the sake of the skeptical. As stated above, Letter to Menoeceus does not provide us with a recipe for barley cakes, and while other Greeks from this era wrote cookbooks of a sort, few complete cookbooks survive to the present day.7 Thus, the above derivation of a truly Epicurean recipe for barley cakes was no trivial matter.

Our recipe search led us to a near-contemporary and neighbor of Epicurus, Marcus Porcius Cato.8 Cato was a Roman politician, born 234 BCE in Tusculum, fifteen miles south of Rome. His father was a farmer, but Cato rose through political ranks, earning himself the title “Cato the Censor,” and introducing a moralizing tone to the politics of his day. Many of his writings and speeches circulated in ancient Rome, but today we have only one complete work: De agricultura, or On Farming, as it is often translated. On Farming, the oldest surviving work of Latin prose, is a practical manual of how a citizen might earn his living through agriculture and stock-keeping while he busies himself in town with politics. In addition to helpful information on buying and developing land, a complete inventory of a farm (down to the rugs, jars, and slop-pails), and several interesting uses for cabbages, Cato provides many recipes.

The recipe we have based our barley cake on is Cato’s libum. His recipe is quoted here in full:

Libum to be made as follows: 2 lb. of cheese well crushed in a mixing bowl; when it is well crushed, add in a libra of bread-wheat flour or, if you want it to be lighter, just a half a libra of durum wheat flour, to be mixed well with the cheese; add one egg and mix all together well; make a loaf of this, with bay leaves under it, and cook slowly in a hot fire under a crock.9

We believe Cato’s libum is a fair approximation, with barley flour substituted for wheat flour, to the barley cakes Epicurus would have dined on. Our reasons for believing this are as follows.

First, the cake known as libum does not bear a Latin name, but rather, as is true of all Cato’s baked goods with only one exception, it bears a Greek name transliterated into the Latin alphabet.11 The ancient Greeks were in their time, as the French are today, the undisputed masters of baking breads, cakes and pastries. In baking, as in other aspects of culture, the Romans borrowed from Greek achievements. Thus, names of baked goods were derived from the Greek language (as “crepe suzette” and other tasty dishes today retain their French names). Similarly, baked goods themselves, not only the names, were frequently derived from Greek recipes. That Cato keeps the Greek name of his cake is some evidence that it was derived, if not directly copied, from a Greek recipe.12 The close temporal connection between Cato and Epicurus (Cato was born approximately 40 years after Epicurus died) suggests they may well indeed have used similar recipes for their cakes.

Also, libum is the most basic of Cato’s cakes. It includes the essentials used in other cakes and pastries named in his On Farming — namely, grain, fat, and a binder — but without any of the frills. Some of Cato’s confections are rather elaborate, adding sweeteners, fancy shapes, layers, fruits, and complicated procedures. It is highly unlikely that Epicurus, in
advocating a simple dish for simple living, would have called upon one to subsist on a pastry requiring elaborate preparation and many varied ingredients. Cato, in his *libum*, gives us a recipe for a simple cake, easily constructed with ingredients common to baking in both Greece and Rome at the time — flour, cheese, an egg.

There is one more reason to believe Cato’s recipe resembled the Epicurean barley cakes. Cato’s *libum* is an offertory or sacrificial cake; a cake to be shared with the gods. It is possible that Cato’s sacrificial cake was derived from a Greek sacrificial cake.

True, Cato calls specifically for wheat flour rather than barley; however, Greeks tended to use barley in baking, whereas wheat was more common for the Romans. Thus it is plausible that we have here a Greek recipe that has been altered to use a more common Roman grain.

Finally, we should say a word or two about our substitutions of modern ingredients and methods for ancient ingredients and methods. Barley flour hasn’t changed over the millennia; neither have eggs. The main difference between our ingredients and Cato’s is located in the cheese. Roman butter was not used for cooking purposes; the fats in baked goods came instead from cheese. While Cato’s *libum* recipe leaves the type of cheese unspecified, sheep cheese was preferred to cow and goat cheese in baking, due to its higher fat content. In order to add enough fat for baking purposes, quite a lot of cheese is necessary; as the moisture in this cheese evaporates in the oven, it has the effect of helping the breads and cakes to rise.

Sheep’s cheese is not readily available in modern American markets, but cream cheese is a decent substitute. Cream cheese, it is true, is still cow’s cheese, and hence it does not contain significantly more fat than many other forms of soft cow’s cheese; however, its relatively higher moisture content as compared to, say, cheddar, makes it easy to knead into the flour, and has the requisite moisture to promote rising.

One last note on our modern adaptation. Neither Cato nor Epicurus had electric ovens, of course — baking at the time was done in a fire. Baked goods were often cooked on an open hearth in tightly covered earthenware dishes — similar to Dutch ovens today. For maximum authenticity with this barley cake recipe, one could build a fire and place the barley cakes in a Dutch oven, covering it with hot ashes and coals. A more convenient urban substitute is the covered casserole dish in an electric oven; it makes use of the heat source most common today, and provides a good approximation of the atmosphere in which barley cakes baked.

The opportunity to present food in our philosophy classes is fairly rare, and is an occasion that students certainly welcome. The exercise we suggest here, based on our reconstructed recipe for barley cake, has several beneficial results: it breaks up the classroom routine, it demonstrates very clearly an important point in Epicurean (or any other sophisticated) hedonism, and does so utilizing rather novel (for philosophy teaching) sense modalities — those of taste and smell. And, of course, it is a fine way to make a connection with students, and have some fun in class.

Endnotes


3. Our recipe closely follows E. F. Leon’s presentation of an ancient Roman recipe. We will discuss the derivation of our recipe more fully in section III.

4. Note on the ingredients: Barley flour, if not available at your normal grocery store, should be found easily at a health food store. Do not substitute low fat, softened, or flavored cream cheeses; plain, whole cream cheese is what the recipe requires. Do not substitute fresh bay leaves for dried. In case you are wondering — “why cheese?” — ancient Greeks and Romans, while using butter as a salve for burns, had not yet added it to their baking. Cheese adds the necessary fats in baking, and it acts as a leavening agent, helping breads, cakes, and pastries to rise. It also adds flavor, of course. Sheep’s cheese was commonly used for such purposes; if you have access to sheep’s cheese, try using it instead, and please, let us know your results! If you live in a modern urban area, as we do, cream cheese is a reasonable substitute. On bay leaves: you may not be accustomed to their flavoring in cakes, preferring them perhaps in soups and stews, but they are a fabulous non-fattening way of keeping your dish from sticking to the pan, and their subtle flavor is rather remarkable.

5. Nutritional information is derived from the informational panels on the ingredients used. Note that we used modern ingredients; thus, practices of enrichment and other processing differences are likely to change the exact nutritional information from the original product.

6. The authors do not presume to slander chocolate here, nor do we claim to prefer barley cakes to torte; we only wish to make the point of view of moderate hedonism as sharp as possible through the example.


8. All bibliographical information on Cato was taken from Dalby’s introduction to *On Farming*.

9. Note that in Dalby’s translation “lb.” abbreviates *libra*, and is not to be construed as an abbreviation for the English word “pound” (see note 34 on weights and measures, on page 30 of Dalby’s introduction to *On Farming*). Despite Dalby’s warning not to construe an lb. as a pound, a *libra* is about 13 oz. (.36 kilo), very close to our modern pound. For this reason, and for ease of preparation, we follow Leon (217) in preparing the *libum* with two pounds (viz., 32 oz.) of cheese, etc.

10. Dalby, 155. Cato’s original Latin is given in the same volume, on 154 — “Libum hoc modo facito: casei p. II bene disterat in mortario; ubi bene distriuerit, farinae siligineae libram aut, si uoles tenerius esse, selibrum similagnis solum eodem indito permiscetocum caeso bene; ooum unum addito et una permiscete bene; inde panem facito, folia subdito, in foco caldo sub testu coquito leniter.” The reader who knows Latin may wish to investigate some entries in the *Oxford Latin Dictionary*, several of which cite passages of Cato’s *On Farming* as sources. Some useful entries we suggest are: “farina, farinace” — p. 676; “libum, libi” — p. 1027; “testus, testus OR testum, testil” — p. 1933; and “panis, panis” — p. 1290.


12. Dalby, 155, n. 179; Leon, 217.

13. Bober, 93.


16. See endnote 3, above.


18. Leon, 220.


20. Creative teachers will surely derive other applications of this recipe for use in other exercises on the same topic of pleasure; for example, one could allow student volunteers to make barley cakes at home, individually or as a group. The entire class could then taste the various creations, judging whose cake is most bland, etc.
Reviews

John F. Kavanaugh and Donna J. Werner, eds. What’s Ethics Got to Do with It? The Role of Ethics in Undergraduate, Graduate, and Professional Education at St. Louis University. (St. Louis University Press, 2000) 128 pp., $12.95.

Reviewed by James Flynn
Caldwell College

Over the last few decades, many Liberal Arts colleges have explored various “Across the Curriculum” programs to strengthen academic understanding and skills that are also addressed in specific courses in their general core curriculums. For example, some colleges began “Writing Across the Curriculum” programs so the skills learned in composition courses actually can be put to use and practiced in other courses. “Ethics Across the Curriculum” programs typically share the goal of showing students that ethics is not confined to philosophy or theology courses, but these programs also have the goal of encouraging faculty from different disciplines to converse among themselves about ethical concerns. The ethical musings of someone not trained in academic philosophy, but well trained in some academic discipline, can be very refreshing and enlightening.

This book contains a collection of essays given at a conference on “Ethics Across the Curriculum” at St. Louis University in 1999. The authors are all SLU faculty and represent a diverse and impressive range of specialties and interests, including medical ethics, business ethics, legal ethics, public service ethics, and biological research ethics. None of the essays presuppose much previous knowledge in these areas, and all are well written and accessible to a general audience. All of the essays take as their starting point the role of ethics in the various undergraduate, graduate, and professional programs at SLU, but there is no discussion of the essays among the participants.

I can see many uses for this book. First, most undergraduate ethics courses are taught to non-philosophy majors. The challenge of such courses is often connecting ethical theory to the lives of such students. Reading about ethical issues involved in undergraduate biology courses or education courses can give the ethics instructor fertile ideas for classroom discussion or paper topics. Second, I think that colleges that have such programs will find in this book some interesting examples of faculty participation models.

What would have been interesting to see was some sort of discussion among the various speakers and their audience about the specific issues raised in the talks. While this undoubtedly occurred at the conference, its lack in the book is unfortunate. Furthermore, although these essays are readily accessible to undergraduates, I cannot see using this as an undergraduate text for an ethics course. The range of topics is too broad for that, and there is insufficient discussion of shared ethical theory needed in such courses. The main value of the book is the assistance it offers to college teachers who take seriously the universality of ethics for human life and the life of the school. For them this book will prove an affirmation of the central role of ethics in at least one academic community.


Reviewed by Carrie Figdor
CUNY Graduate Center

You enter a Philosophy 101 class filled to brimming with students who are there because they registered at the last minute and yours was the only open class that fit their schedules and if they don’t take a fourth course they’ll lose their financial aid. Their heads are filled to brimming with momentous questions of pressing concern: Will I get a good job? Will I get lucky tonight? Am I fat? There is perhaps no greater pedagogical problem to be solved than this one — namely, how to focus untrained, distracted minds on abstract ideas. Faced with this overwhelming reality, you take attendance.

What you might do next is to hand out a syllabus that, among other things, requires students to buy Robert C. Solomon’s kind-hearted introductory text. Solomon’s book is designed to give philosophical novices a gentle push towards some awareness of what they believe and of what reasons, if any, they can give for believing what they do. As such, the book is ideally suited to the wayward student to whom life happens largely by accident. It is also useful for instructors who prefer to use primary texts as (1) a rich source of prompts for in-class discussion, journal entries or informal writing assignments; (2) a helpful summary of basic positions; and (3) last but not least, a reminder of where many beginning students are coming from.

The book opens with some introductory material on the importance of articulating a position and arguing for it, and an obligatory mini-introduction to deductive logical forms and inductive fallacies. (Two appendices supplement what is introduced here). This is followed by two chapters of questions and discussion that ease the student’s entry into the subject by personalizing it: What is the purpose of your life? Do you believe in God? If you only had a few minutes to live, what would you do with them? Setting aside the brief introductory material on logic, to this point Solomon ventures no further than the territory staked out by, say, the School of Practical Philosophy in New York, which offers courses on love and self and what really matters for living a happy, contented, and useful life. Solomon, however, is just warming up.

The real work begins in Chapter Three, “God,” which discusses various Western conceptions of a supreme deity, the problem of evil and arguments for the existence of such a being. The chapter exemplifies the pattern followed by all of them. It begins with an opening set of questions designed to prompt the student to state, however inchoately, her pretheoretical beliefs about a topic. This is followed by a discussion of the main issues falling under that topic and the presentation of paradigmatic philosophical positions on them. The chapter winds down with a second set of questions that, with a little luck, encourage the student to make use of the philosophical ideas introduced in the chapter. It closes with a short list of suggested readings.

For example, the opening question, “Why do you believe in God? Or why don’t you?” is followed by presentations of the argument from design, the cosmological argument, Pascal’s wager, and other key ideas related to the topic of (the Western concept of) God. These lead into the closing question, “If you
don't believe in God, what would convince you that he does exist? If you do believe in God, what would convince you that he does not exist? Beliefs about God tend to be highly inelastic, so in this particular example the generally effective pedagogical method of bringing someone to a new understanding by starting from her old one may not go very far. But the remaining chapters — The Nature of Reality; The Search for Truth; Self, Freedom; Morality and the Good Life; Justice and the Good Society; Philosophy, Sex, Race and Culture; and (new to this edition) Beauty — introduce ideas that may change what students think. The end of the book contains an appendix on writing philosophy, an index, and a useful glossary that includes page numbers referring to places in the text where the entry is discussed.

This edition is also sprinkled with highlighted text boxes of various sorts that enliven the pages and illustrate the discussion. These include primary-source quotations of varying lengths; biographical snippets; diagrams, pictorial illustrations or summaries of viewpoints; and “links between philosophical theory and its application to societies worldwide.” This last category is a sort of quotation grab-bag, my favorite being a box in the epistemology chapter that cites Muhammad Ali: “Facts are only shadows of truth.” If anyone should know, it’s Muhammad Ali, who rarely let dry, colorless facts get in the way of truth. (Of course, whether a freshman would get the joke is another story).

Although I have characterized Solomon’s textbook as being aimed at the underprepared, it is not without ambitions. In addition to the usual introductory-level range of philosophers, Solomon provides glimpses of Hegel, Schopenhauer, Lao-Tse and Carol Gilligan, among many others. The Philosophy, Sex, Race and Culture chapter, expanded from the previous edition, does a credible job of introducing a variety of non-(Dead White Male) viewpoints, although it is up to the instructor to integrate the contents of this chapter with the rest of the book. For example, the chapter on God is fairly traditional, and it is mainly in this later chapter that alternative theologies are introduced. But it is a welcome development that Solomon makes such ideas available and accessible in an introductory course.

One main drawback of the book is that all-but inevitable feature of a textbook to present philosophy in the form of a summary of views divorced from a context of persuasive argument and a distinctive philosophical voice. Some of the simplifications seem wrong (did the ancient Greeks really have no concept of mind?) or misleading (the bare quote “Religion is our ultimate concern” hardly expresses Tillich’s concept of ultimate concern). Some primary-source quotations are not well-integrated: for example, a box containing part of the “Madman” section from Nietzsche’s The Gay Science appears on a page several chapters prior to the discussion of Nietzsche’s rejection of traditional morality. Other boxes don’t seem helpful: an illustration of correspondence, coherence and pragmatic theories of truth, for example, doesn’t seem to enhance the explanations given in the text.

The other main drawback is that many of the “closing” questions are far too open-ended or complex for the students for whom this book seems designed; they are likely to generate text-regurgitation, unorganized revisiting of pretheoretical views, “kitchen sink” answers, or confusion-induced inertia. It may be helpful to edit or rework some of these questions to promote better answers. For example, one closing question goes like this: “In your opinion, what is the single most important feature of justice? Is it serving the needs of the worst off? Ensuring that people are paid fairly for what they do? Ensuring that people may keep what they earn? Protecting people’s rights? Making sure that everyone is treated equally?” A more focused question might ask the student to respond to a letter to the editor (or a chatroom posting) urging that in a truly just system everything would be distributed by lottery: salaries, jobs, lovers, property, educational opportunities, caregivers. If “closing questions” are designed so as to provide students with an audience, a form and a specific thesis to respond to, the written results are likely to be more satisfying to the student and instructor alike.

In short, what is needed is symmetry between the way students are engaged in the “opening questions” with the way they are asked to respond in the “closing questions.” The students for whom this text is designed probably need to be eased into the practice of critical writing just as Solomon eases them into the practice of critical thinking. The form of the “closing questions” should address this need. It can take a whole semester of practice — not just a brief glance at basic logic and fallacies — for many students to grasp the concept of a statement being a reason for a belief. And it certainly takes more than a recommendation to “organize your thoughts before you begin to write” to produce organized prose — I couldn’t do that if I tried. Wouldn’t it be better to encourage drafts and rewriting, which is what we really do?


Reviewed by Samir Chopra
University of New South Wales, Australia

This book-length introduction to the life and works of Gottlob Frege will be a welcome addition to philosophy reading lists this year. The treatment is accessible, sympathetic and yet, non-hagiographic. The book follows a chronological sequence, tracing the development of Frege’s thought in a fashion accessible to readers with little or no background in formal philosophy and logic. The feeling of systematically stepping through Frege’s works is done so as to make one want to read the original pieces themselves. On finishing this book, one is left with a keen sense of Frege’s contributions to philosophy and his importance as a thinker.

Kenny begins with a biographical introduction to Frege, followed by two chapters each on the Begriffsschrift (Concept Script) and Foundations of Arithmetic. This is followed by chapter-length treatments of Sinn und Bedeutung (Sense and Reference) and the essays “Function and Concept” and “Concept and Object,” after which there are two chapters each on the Grundgesetze der Arithmetik, and on the essays “Thoughts,” “Negation” and “Compound Thoughts.” The book concludes with a summation on Frege’s overall contribution to Philosophy and Mathematics.

Frege’s contributions are still staggering to note: the first systematic axiomatization of propositional logic; the invention of quantification theory; foundational contributions to the theory of meaning via the sense-reference distinction; the initiation of the programme to reduce arithmetic to logic; and the separation of logic from psychology, to mention only some. Kenny points out the poignancy of Frege’s passing away with little idea of the status that later philosophical work was to accord him.

The two chapters on the Begriffsschrift are essential reading for philosophy undergraduates keen to understand the foundations of modern logic, for it is here that the issues raised
later in Frege’s work (such as the problem of identity) are anticipated. For students that have already taken an introductory class in logic, these two chapters provide an opportunity to witness, as it were, the creation of the formal systems to which they will have been exposed in the classroom. The contrast between that treatment and the opportunity to witness, as it were, the creation of the formal introductory class in logic, these two chapters provide an anticipated. For students that have already taken an later in Frege’s work (such as the problem of identity) are anticipated. For students that have already taken an introductory class in logic, these two chapters provide an opportunity to witness, as it were, the creation of the formal systems to which they will have been exposed in the classroom. The contrast between that treatment and the opportunity to witness, as it were, the creation of the formal introductory class in logic, these two chapters provide an anticipated. For students that have already taken an

In the chapters on the Foundations of Arithmetic, Kenny details Frege’s arguments for the nature of arithmetic and numbers and the various misunderstandings of it. Frege argued that (I) logic should be separated from psychology; (II) the meaning of words cannot be asked for in isolation; and (III) concept must be separated from object. In describing Frege’s criticisms of the views of others, Kenny concentrates on three central theses: the nature of mathematical propositions, the concept of number, and the nature of One or Unity. The Fregean critique of Mill is described in some detail, though that of Kant is dismissed quickly. Kenny discusses Frege’s view of number and his attacks on the views a) that number is a property of things, b) that it is a subjective creation and c) that it is a set of things. Kenny’s discussion of Frege’s arguments emphasizes the plausibility of Frege’s position on each of these issues.

In the second chapter on the Foundations, Kenny moves on to Frege’s positive theory on these subjects. The concept of number is developed and a definition offered: that of number being a self-subsistent object belonging to a concept. Along with the definition of zero, and of the successor in a series, it is shown how the set of natural numbers can be generated. All of Frege’s three principles above (I-III) are used to define numbers as being self-subsistent objects. I particularly enjoyed the discussion in this chapter. Undergraduate students should find this discussion useful for understanding the foundations of mathematics.

In the chapter on Sense and Reference (a seminal essay known to any students of philosophy of language), Kenny develops a variety of topics: Frege’s theory of meaning; the distinction between sense and reference for words and sentences; the notion of a mode of presentation; and the reference of subordinate clauses of sentences and their non-truth-functional behaviour. Kenny does both the subject and its originator justice in his description and analysis of this topic.

In the chapters on the Grundgesetze der Arithmetik, Kenny details the ambitious nature of the logicist program of reducing arithmetic to logic, its weaknesses, and finally, its downfall after the (in)famous letter from Russell to Frege. Kenny presents Frege’s development of the notions of class, of definitions, and of cardinal numbers, making it clear how these notions resonate with, and also depart from, Frege’s earlier work in the *Begriffsschrift*, in the Foundations, and in his essays on function, concept and object.

Kenny concludes with a chapter on Frege’s essays “Thoughts,” “Negation,” and “Compound Thoughts,” essays that concern the philosophy of mind and epistemology and whose points are developed by Frege through a continuation of his attacks on psychologism, and on idealism (admittedly inadequate) and through an examination of the theory of the content of sentences.

There is judicious use of direct quotations throughout the text, with no lapsing into the irritating style of quoting a paragraph and then paraphrasing it. Instead, Kenny inserts quotations from Frege into his own exegesis of Frege, thereby allowing Frege himself to have center-stage. There are few footnotes (always a good thing) but other than references to the primary sources themselves, there are very few references to other secondary sources. This is only a minor weakness, however, because Kenny’s treatment is sufficiently comprehensive to serve as a quick introduction to any of Frege’s major works. As a bonus, Kenny includes an appendix on Frege’s original notation for the *Begriffsschrift* that is revealing in many ways.

Since the reading and discussion in this book is relatively easy going, I would recommend that the book be used for a variety of undergraduate courses. It could be used as part of a reading list for an introduction to analytical philosophy, for an historical treatment favouring the Vienna circle and logical positivism, in a class on Frege himself (along with original works), as part of a class on the foundations of mathematics and logic, or as part of a class on the philosophy of language.

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**Reviewed by Carrie Figdor**

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Niche marketing is alive and well in the land of introductory logic. These five introductory textbooks cover much of the same basic material — how could they not? — but due to differences in emphasis they aren’t really competing directly against each other. In fact, if you aren’t already using one of these texts, or if you are dissatisfied with the text you do use, two simple diagnostic questions can suffice to identify the book that is most apt for your course:

1. Your typical students are:
   (a) Very well-prepared for college-level study
   (b) Fairly well prepared for college
   (c) Not well prepared for college

2. Your course tends to emphasize:
   (a) Formal / Deductive logic
   (b) Informal / Inductive logic
   (c) Critical Thinking
Based on your answers, it might be worth your while to take a look at:

- Hurley, if you chose (1a) and (2a).
- Salmon, if you chose (1a) and (2b).
- Herrick, if you chose (1b or 1c) and (2a or 2b).
- Johnson, if you chose (1b or 1c) and (2c).

This initial classification, which will be nuanced significantly below, assumes that instructors of, say, MIT-qualified students prefer to push them, and that all instructors prefer not to lose a large portion of the class. It also leaves out one book. I'll explain below why Stanley's text does not fit easily into this categorization.

Here's a comparative overview before I discuss each of the four books separately. Salmon, Johnson, Hurley and Herrick all cover, to some extent, traditional and modern formal deductive logic, informal fallacies and induction. Hurley and Herrick provide the most extensive treatment of deductive logic, Salmon's strength is induction, and Johnson emphasizes evaluating natural-language arguments. For example, in sentential or propositional logic, all discuss connectives, translations, truth-table tests and basic inferential rules. Johnson, Hurley and Herrick add natural deduction proofs, including rules of replacement; Hurley and Herrick go on to include conditional and indirect proofs and first-order predicate or quantification logic with identity; and only Herrick introduces modal logic (S5). In traditional categorical (Aristotelian, syllogistic) logic, all discuss traditional and modern squares of opposition, valid syllogistc forms and Venn diagrams, but Hurley and Herrick treat these topics most thoroughly.

In the sections on informal logic, all cover language and definitions, informal fallacies, and induction, including analogical, enumerative, statistical and causal or scientific reasoning (such as Mill's Methods and the hypothetico-deductive method). But Hurley and Salmon also introduce probability theory, including Bayes's theorem, and Salmon's discussion of causal reasoning is by far the most extensive. Johnson, on the other hand, focuses on applications of the forms of reasoning to the critical analysis of everyday arguments in terms of their structure and strength.

Other common features include answers to selected exercises, indexes and glossaries. Hurley and Salmon also have helpful chapter summaries. In appendices, Herrick covers truth trees and Salmon discusses the proof-tree method. Hurley's text comes with a CD-ROM supplement containing material on truth trees, informal fallacies and essays for critical thinking exercises, as well as further logic problems.

In short, all the textbooks under review contain enough material for an introductory logic or critical thinking course. But differences in detail make choosing from among them not all that difficult. I'll discuss each book in turn.

Herrick comes closest to providing a one-size-fits-all text appropriate for the broadest range of levels of student preparedness and for logic courses that may differ in emphasis from semester to semester (or year to year). His text has exceptionally clear explanations and engaging examples throughout. It has the additional charm of being the only logic book with a Pacific Northwest (i.e., Seattle-area) karma, but even if you don't get the references to the Seahawks and Green Lake, it doesn't matter. Herrick deftly presents the material in a way that virtually any student can easily grasp. For example, here's part of his explanation of "Tu Quoque" (chosen at random):

The fallacy known as the tu quoque (pronounced too-KWOH-kway) is one variation of abusive ad hominem. Imagine a parent lecturing her teenage son on the dangers of drugs, and the son says, "Why should I listen to you; you drink booze and that's a drug." The implication is that the mother's reasoning is no good for even she doesn't live up to it... The tu quoque attempts to discredit a person's argument by charging the person with hypocrisy or inconsistency. The tu quoque sometimes appears as, "Look who's talking." (p. 244)

It would be very difficult to make logic more accessible. In addition, Herrick often gives beyond saying that something is the case to explaining why it is. For example, he explains why a substitution instance of a valid argument form must be valid; why we bother with replacement rules (such as DeMorgan's laws), even though they can be confusing; why the standardized format of categorical sentences is handy; and why "Some S are P" doesn't imply "Some S are not P." He also provides friendly advice on how to think about logic problems, and the pages are easy on the eye with boxes that emphasize important concepts and rules or feature relevant quotations by figures such as Bacon and Leibniz.

Herrick's text is short on the analysis of natural-language arguments, so it is less appropriate for critical thinking courses without supplementation. The informal logic and critical thinking material is in fact new to this edition. Another drawback is that there are relatively few exercises that are answered at the back of the book — one of three problems or even one of five, which may not be enough for an under-confident student. Also, glossaries are at the end of each chapter, which is good for review purposes but can make a term difficult to find if, later on, you don't remember which chapter introduced it and it's not in the index.

Herrick covers much same ground as Herrick, but in a more military style. Herrick thinks logic is good for you because it will help develop abstract and critical thinking skills. For Hurley, it's nothing less than "a fundamental defense against the prejudiced and uncivilized attitudes that threaten the foundations of our democratic society." It's a demanding task to arm recruits with the rigor of rationality, but Hurley is up to it. The student who will learn best from this book, however, is not the mental equivalent of a couch potato.

For example, while Hurley and Herrick both provide problems that combine quantifiers and conditional proofs, Herrick's don't go beyond 14 lines; Hurley has proofs of up to 45 lines. Also, it is no mean feat for an undergraduate to knock off an 8-10 page essay on the plausibility of one of a list of scientific (or scientific-wannabee) hypotheses, as one of Hurley's new exercises casually requires. There is an implicit assumption of background knowledge that is not invariably satisfied.

For example, hurley explains a metalanguage as "a higher-level language used to discuss linguistic entities such as words, terms, propositions and so forth." Herrick says: "When we use one language to talk about a second language, the first language is called the metalanguage and the language being talked about is called the object language. Thus, in Spanish 101, if the teacher speaks in English about a Spanish sentence, in that context English is the metalanguage and Spanish is the object language." Cold showers or cappuccino: differences like these are what make Hurley's text more appropriate for (1a)-type undergraduates or graduate students taking their first logic course. The 45-line proofs and 10-page essays can be avoided, but the nonlogical knowledge that the text takes for granted can't be.
This is not to say that Hurley’s explanations are inaccessible. In fact, a valuable feature unique to this text is the way Hurley illustrates many informal fallacies by means of imaginary dialogues that students might really hear and may even have participated in themselves. He also provides nice discussions of why people knowingly or unknowingly commit fallacies and how the different types of logic are related. Tables, text boxes and diagrams illustrate and highlight fallacies and logical concepts and forms, and each chapter ends with a summary. As with the other texts, exercise sets are presented in increasing levels of difficulty, but as just noted the exercises can get very difficult indeed.

Hurley’s CD-ROM, written with Joseph P. DeMarco, provides further support with truth trees, Venn diagrams and delightful cartoon dialogues on several informal fallacies. It also includes essays that can be used for the analysis of arguments in natural language. For example, it includes an essay by Anna Quindlen on political correctness and free speech on campus. Links to the CD-ROM are indicated in the text. New to this edition is a section on science and superstition, and various parts of the text have been rewritten (such as the explanations of begging the question, red herring and Mill’s methods). Like Hurley, Herrick provides every third answer to the problems in the exercise sets, although not all exercise sets are included, so the actual average is somewhat less.

As noted, the choice between Hurley’s and Herrick’s texts ultimately comes down to whether you consider Hurley’s additional degrees of difficulty desirable for your course or not. Salmon’s book is like Hurley’s in that it too is suitable for a (1a)-level (or graduate) student. If it is indeed for the student “with no prior training” in logic, the rider must be that the student has prior, and strong, academic training in general. To an even greater extent than Hurley, however, Salmon’s text fills what might be called the deadly serious niche. Her book is all text, all the time: no boxes, no quotes, no highlighted illustrations, one chart. Perhaps such purely visual features are dispensable. But it is no secret that unrelieved grey text is a poor way to keep someone’s attention. Even The Wall St. Journal has wised up without dumbing down.

Salmon’s book stands out from all the texts under review, of course, in her treatment of induction, which is addressed first and very much foremost. The book has sophisticated treatments of causal arguments, Hume’s analysis of causation, conditional probability theory, decision theory (including prisoner’s dilemma) and the logic of confirmation, inter alia. It is clear that Salmon’s ideal student is either studying or thinking of studying philosophy of science — perhaps at the University of Pittsburgh. For example, one exercise instructs students to find a prediction made by a pseudoscientific theory and explain why the prediction does or does not support the theory.

Salmon’s discussions of informal fallacies are also sophisticated. For example, in the discussion of hasty generalizations, Salmon cites psychological studies by Nisbett and Ross, who among others have found that certain fallacious (or even “irrational”, relative to a Bayesian standard) patterns of thinking are pervasive. She also presents good argument patterns alongside the fallacies that resemble them, such as arguments from analogy and the slippery slope fallacy. Oddly, there is no reference to the fallacy of begging the question, only to circular reasoning. The other texts treat circular reasoning as a form of begging the question.

Just one-fourth of the text (about 100 pages) briskly covers the basics of deductive formal logic. Summaries are helpfully provided at the end of each chapter, and one of every two problems in the exercises sets is answered. (One fun detail: Salmon manages to slip in a few problems from the Port-Royal Logic). Appendices contain an index of informal fallacies and a proof-tree method (but not truth trees) for truth-functional logic.

Johnson’s text is similar to Salmon’s in that it emphasizes informal rather than formal deductive logic, but otherwise it differs markedly. It is designed for a critical thinking class that will use logical tools to deconstruct everyday arguments, such as those found in letters to the editor (which provide a rich source of examples). Consequently, it aims to introduce enough deductive and inductive logic to do a thorough job of argument analysis: finding conclusions and premises, diagraming arguments, identifying fallacies, judging inductive strength, testing for deductive validity. Like Salmon, Johnson provides plenty of arguments drawn from books and newspapers, although Johnson’s tend to be more proletarian: the Jutland Herald and Rush Limbaugh, as opposed to Nietzsche and Scientific American. Johnson also freely engages a wry sense of humor (“Some Dachshunds are dogs with back problems”) in his examples and exercises, and presents the material in a clear and straightforward style.

The book contains few boxes or other illustrative visual aids, although the text is broken into small sections marked by bold-face headings. Answers to one of every third exercise are provided. Johnson also suggests assignments in which students are instructed to analyze articles found via INFOTRAC, the online academic search engine. (The publisher offers free access to INFOTRAC college edition along with the text). While this is a smart way to supplement what’s in the textbook, any of these logic books can be augmented in this way as long as the course is being given at a college whose library already licenses some version of INFOTRAC.

Each of the four books discussed above distinguishes itself either in its content or intended market or both. Stanley’s book reflects an innovative approach to teaching logic and so differs in its form. The text is organized like an introduction to ethics textbook that treads lightly on moral theory and focuses on current ethical issues. Here too the emphasis is on contemporary issues — such as the death penalty, suicide, and AIDS — as discussed in editorials and other commentaries, with just enough logic introduced in order to analyze them.

This approach has merit, particularly if you choose (1c) and (2c) above. Unfortunately, I don’t think Stanley quite pulls it off (keeping in mind that this is the only first edition among the five books under review). The basic problem is that Johnson’s text already occupies this niche, albeit using a more traditional format, and Stanley’s does not dislodge it. Stanley covers informal fallacies, categorical logic, sentential and predicate logic (including quantifiers), and induction, but his treatment is cursory. His text is equally quick in applying the formal tools to everyday arguments, and it does not always provide simple explanations of logical concepts. It therefore risks confusing students in the target market for the book.

For example, Stanley introduces quantificational logic in a few short pages and provides just three exercise sets for translating sentences using quantifiers, doing simple proofs and proving invalidity via the short truth-table method. Students are then shown two editorials with quantitative deductive proofs (one of which has 21 steps) drawn from them and are instructed to do their own analysis and proof. Johnson, in contrast, takes great pains to identify the various roles played by sentences in an editorial — premises, conclusions, irrelevant rhetoric — before the logical tools are applied to its analysis. Similarly, Stanley provides a rather long-winded discussion of “statement” that winds around to the subject of
platonic universals, while Johnson says simply, “A statement is an assertion that something is or is not the case.” It is also unclear how students can possibly follow Stanley’s explanation of how everything follows from an inconsistency before they are introduced to “or” or disjunctive syllogism.

One final problem is that Stanley’s book — like the introduction to ethics text on which it seems modeled — contains many current-event editorials as examples and exercises. It culminates in eight full essays or editorials on “issues of our time” that the student can analyze. The problem is that editorials, unlike philosophy articles, have a very short shelf-life. While the death penalty may last a while, Bosnia and Ross Perot are very unlikely to register at all, and the Gingrich-Clinton battles are long over. This means updating the book every year. (Johnson skirks the obsolescence problem via the link to INFOTRAC and a selection of interesting but not dated examples). There are several suggested websites to investigate in relation to certain current events, but this is also risky, since websites can disappear quickly. The one I checked at random, at an address within the U.S. Department of Justice’s website, was no longer accessible.

Stanley’s text has a glossary/index and appendices on debates and logical puzzles. Answers to approximately one of five problems (often one in ten) are also provided.

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**BOOKS RECEIVED**

Books marked with an * have already been sent out for review.

**Hackett Publishers**
Williams, Thomas (trans.) *Anselm: Three Philosophical Dialogues*

**Harcourt Press**

**Harvard University Press**
Hadot, Pierre. *What is Ancient Philosophy?*
Posner, Richard, A. *The Problematics of Moral and Legal Theory*

**Humanities Books**
Primoratz, Igor (ed.) *Patriotism*

**McGraw Hill**
Pojman, Louis P. *Political Philosophy: Classic and Contemporary Readings*

**Oxford University Press**
Cahn, Steven M. (ed.) *Classics of Political and Moral Philosophy*
Porter, Burton F. *The Voice of Reason: Fundamentals of Critical Thinking*
Wright, Larry. *Critical Thinking. An Introduction to Analytical Reading and Reasoning*

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**Princeton University Press**
Abby, Ruth. *Charles Taylor*
Bird, Alexander. *Thomas Kuhn*
Fotion, Nick. *John Searle*
*Lacey, A. R. Robert Nozick*
*Orenstein, Alex. W. V. Quine*

**Routledge**
Inwood, M. J. *Hegel*
*Rosenberg, Alex. Philosophy of Science: A Contemporary Introduction*
Rosenberg, Alex. *Philosophy of Science: Contemporary Readings*

**Wadsworth**
*Devine, Philip E and Wolf-Devine, Celia (eds.) Sex and Gender: A Spectrum of Views*
Hallman, Max O. *Traversing Philosophical Boundaries*. 2nd edition
Woodhouse, Mark B. *A Preface to Philosophy*. 7th edition

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