NEWSLETTER ON TEACHING PHILOSOPHY

FROM THE EDITORS, TZIPORAH KASACHKOFF & EUGENE KELLY

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G. W. F. Hegel, edited and translated by Yirmiyahu Yovel: Hegel’s Preface to the Phenomenology of Spirit
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LETTER TO THE EDITOR

LIST OF BOOKS RECEIVED

LIST OF CONTRIBUTORS
Students are members of the Teaching Committee and have had much more experience with OA, and the Board seems to have thought that a new statement, one perhaps linked to web-based resources on OA, is desirable.

The editors of the Newsletter on Teaching Philosophy are members ex officio of the Teaching Committee and can use the Newsletter to funnel information between the Committee, whose current chairman is Randall Curren of the University of Rochester, and the APA Membership. We would be glad to publish in Letters to the Editor ideas from members derived from their experience with or research in Outcomes Assessment. Readers’ thoughts on the philosophy major are also very welcome.

We would also like to call attention to the Teaching Committee’s establishment of links to web-based materials on teaching. These are contained in the Committee’s space on the APA website. After logging in, members should click on “Committees,” and then on the Teaching Committee’s link. The address is http://www.apa.udel.edu/apagovernance/committees/teaching/. Members who have used these resources are encouraged to tell us about their experiences and to assess the use and usefulness of these resources.

We always encourage our readers to suggest themselves as reviewers of books and other material that they think may be especially good for classroom use. The names of books and other materials that we have received for review are listed in our Books Received section in each edition of the Newsletter. But reviewers are welcome to suggest material for review that they have used in the classroom and found useful. However, please remember that our publication is devoted to pedagogy and not to theoretical discussions of philosophical issues. This should be borne in mind not only when writing articles for our publication but also when reviewing material for our publication.

As always, we encourage our readers to write for our publication. We welcome papers that respond to, comment on, or take issue with any of the material that appears within our pages.

The following guidelines for submissions should be followed:

- The author’s name, the title of the paper, and full mailing address should appear on a separate sheet of paper.
paper or, if the paper is sent to the Editors electronically, on a note that will not print out within the text of paper itself. Nothing that identifies the author or his or her institution should appear within the body or within the foot-notes/endnotes of the paper. The title of the paper should appear on the top of the paper itself.

- Unless the paper is sent in electronic form, four complete copies of the paper should be sent.
- Authors should adhere to the production guidelines that are available from the APA. For example, in writing your paper to disk, please do not use your word processor’s footnote or endnote function; all notes must be added manually at the end of the paper.
- If you send an article by post rather than electronically, do not send the disk on which it was composed. The editors will request the disk when the paper is ready to be published.
- All articles submitted to the Newsletter are blind-reviewed by the members of the editorial committee.

They are:

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**ARTICLES**

**Making Philosophy of Science Accessible—and Useful—to Non-Majors: Five Innovations Worth Trying**

**Lawrence Adam Lengbeyer**  
**United States Naval Academy**

Philosophy of science is not ordinarily thought to be a suitable course for introducing curious potential philosophy majors to the discipline, or for providing non-majors with some exposure to philosophy. The standard set of ideas covered in the course, and the classic texts in the field, appear to be more demanding and less accessible than those that can be presented to undergraduates in, say, ethics. Moreover, the subject matter is rather specialized; understanding it depends somewhat upon conversance with substantive scientific fields, and it lacks obvious applicability to the practical life choices of college-aged students.

Yet there are greater possibilities here than might be apparent. Needing to teach philosophy of science to my students at the Naval Academy—none of them philosophy majors, and most of them being required to take this one philosophy course for their General Science major—I have sought to make a virtue of necessity by devising a curriculum that attempts to overcome the traditional limitations of the course and its lack of perceived accessibility and practical relevance.

After providing an overview of the situation confronting the philosophy of science teacher at my institution, I will spell out the five innovations with which I have experimented, supplementing this in an Appendix with an abridged version of the detailed course syllabus.

**Overview.** The Philosophy of Science course at the Naval Academy poses a special challenge to the instructor: most of the students taking it are required to, and are not happy about that requirement—most of these students would much prefer to avoid philosophy altogether. Many of them are drawn from among the less intellectually polished and well-prepared segments of the student body. Some of them are majoring in science in large part because of an aversion to the humanities or to any field whose focus is upon (imprecise, unsystematic, uncertain) language. Many of them possess underdeveloped verbal skills—precisely the skills needed for any philosophy course, but especially for philosophy of science, whose substance tends to be more conceptually difficult, less susceptible to simplification, and more cumulative than many other areas of philosophy. Some of them are aware of this deficit in themselves but want not to address it, claiming (falsely) that verbal skills are not relevant to their future lives. And whether aware of the deficit or not, their resulting struggles with challenging philosophical material often cause them frustration, which can easily turn outward into resentment toward the course and its teacher. On top of everything else, philosophy teachers at the Naval Academy encounter the widespread impression (due to some odd historical circumstances) that their courses are fluff—demanding little work and distributing high grades.

Rather than succumb to the temptation to water down the course in response to student complaints, I have instead thoroughly reworked it in a way that has actually elevated the rigor, work demands, and grading standards, while maintaining the focus upon classics of the literature (I use Janet Kourany’s *Scientific Knowledge* anthology as the central course text). But I have shifted the focus toward areas of greatest student need and interest, attempting to make it more relevant and understandable to those lacking strong backgrounds in the natural sciences. The changes described are specific to philosophy of science and can be implemented, if desired, along with general teaching enhancements (such as in-class discussions conducted in small groups) aimed at encouraging active learning on the parts of students.

- **Innovation 1.** First, I have shifted much of the course’s focus away from philosophical content and toward improving students’ crucial, and oft-neglected, skills of reading comprehension, logical thinking and writing, and clear oral expression of complicated ideas. At first, I tried requiring designated students to present prepared lectures on the readings, but this provided little motivation for the others to prepare conscientiously for class. So I rethought and revamped the entire incentive structure of the course.

  Students are now expected to highlight or otherwise mark their texts as they read them (with me examining their texts occasionally); to provide extemporaneous lectures on (parts of) the readings (not knowing who will be called upon, all are given several minutes to prepare—their text markings being invaluable for this task), and to offer “friendly amendments” to others’ lectures; and, most important, to submit a demanding four-part Daily Email for every reading assignment in the course. In it, the students must provide an accurate and reasonably comprehensive summary Recap of the day’s reading, Contrast the present reading with the prior one (by setting out points of

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Second, I have shifted the course’s substantive orientation: away from one exclusively devoted to the content of philosophy of science (the scientific method), which tends to be of little inherent interest or practical value to most of my students, and toward a more accessible and focused, yet more universal, examination of the nature of knowledge and belief-revision generally, using science as the comparison and model. The aim is to enlighten the students on both scientific and everyday belief systems—and the rational, and irrational, methods of revising these—by shifting back and forth between the two realms. I hope, too, that this heightens each student’s awareness of how s/he does—and ought to—oversee his or her own belief system.

This reorientation, in addition, allows more freedom for class discussions to roam into areas of belief and theory that the students find most interesting (e.g., socializing and dating; or supernatural phenomena—the topic of one of the course texts, How to Think about Weird Things). It also provides extra motivation for students to work at the difficult readings, and an additional angle of approach that helps illuminate the ideas in the text—“How do these practices of scientists compare to those that we use every day?”—because the fourth and final required part of the Daily Email assignment is an Everyday Analogue that examines everyday life (or some field of human knowledge outside of natural science, such as history, politics, journalism, carpentry, military affairs, the arts, basketball, religion, law/police/detective work, etc.) and asks how the two compare in their methods of knowledge acquisition and testing. (At the instructor’s option, the consideration of Everyday Analogues can be removed from the Daily Email assignments and shifted exclusively to classroom discussion. This permits a lightening of the homework load upon the students, even if the task is then replaced by, say, having students write out a specific text-provoked Confusion that they hope to have clarified.)

Some question of non-scientific application is ordinarily included on the Final Exam for the course, and students are apprised of this fact (or of the question itself!) early in the semester, thus providing a further incentive for them, as we proceed through the term, to think through the course’s substantive issues with an eye to their broader implications.

• Innovation 3. Third, I have taken the unusual step of introducing into the course a lively book about birth order and receptivity to innovation (scientific and otherwise), Frank Sulloway’s Born to Rebel, in order to serve multiple purposes: the book presents a theory about the development of scientific knowledge that competes with others studied in the course; it is, itself, an example of a research report in (social) science, and a controversial one at that, and so offers an illustration of the scientific method in action that is illuminating in its own right but that also serves as a “test case” for some of the more abstract theories studied in the course; its liveliness and obvious applicability to the experience of every student provide another useful contrast (like the Weird Things text) to the denser, more abstract, more demanding classic readings in philosophy of science. And there is one further, important purpose that this book serves:

• Innovation 4. It forms the basis for the fourth major experimental aspect of the course: a hands-on, team-based, multi-stage Research Project that teaches the students about scientific practice from the inside. Students are to do original research that applies and tests Sulloway’s theory on some novel population, obtaining the data via interviews, questionnaires, and/or research in the library. Many students find this to be the most gratifying part of the course.

• Innovation 5. Finally, I send the students regular emails of enriching and entertaining Optional Readings about up-to-the-minute theoretical debates and practical applications in the world of science. Reading these alone could provide a not insubstantial education in the nature of scientific knowledge and scientific method. I also include my philosophy of science “alumni” on the mailing list for these Optional Readings (those who do not take up my offer to opt out) in order to provide a form of continuing education (and enjoyment!). Though I have not yet researched how often or how seriously the supplemental materials get read by the students overall, I know that some students do value these glimpses into the application of course ideas in the wider world.

Conclusion. A philosophy of science course thus restructured presents a serious challenge to the students who take it—the workload is a not uncommon source of complaints—but its educational value for them is substantially enriched. Most important, perhaps, is that the students can grasp this themselves, particularly if the teacher openly explains the pedagogic purposes (as I try to do in my syllabus, below). They can thus feel more actively in charge of their own learning, a result not often enough achieved but much to be desired.

APPENDIX: Philosophy of Science Course Syllabus (abridged)

How do we know what to believe about the ordinary, natural world we live in? Well, if we’re being rational, we collect evidence—directly, by trusting some of the “observations” made with our various senses, and indirectly, by trusting some of the oral and written “testimony” of other people—then apply the thinking tools that we have (in part) been taught and (in part) figured out for ourselves. Using these “facts” and “theories,” we formulate the additional beliefs that we commit ourselves to—beliefs we then assert and, more important, go on to use in figuring out further truths about the world, formulating our own judgments and evaluations, and reasoning about what we should do, feel, or want.

Some of the authorities on whom we rely for inputs into this process are scientists, of course. But how do scientists know what to believe? Are their techniques of belief-formation (which seem at least similar to the ones that we all use) so good that they make science a fully reliable source of truth?

More specifically: What exactly is it that scientists do, anyway? What’s the “scientific method”? Are scientists objective? Do their personal perspectives or cultural identities affect the positions they take? How do they discover—or construct—facts? How do they explain those facts? How do they test the theories they formulate, and choose among competing theories? Just what do their experiments accomplish? What happens during scientific “revolutions” that overturn established, authoritative views? Do the observable theoretical entities that scientists posit (like electrons) really exist, or are they just fictions, convenient ways of talking? Are we entitled to regard scientists as discoverers of truth and producers of knowledge? Does science make progress? Notice that the very same sorts of questions—Who are the researchers? How do they find/make their facts? How do they choose which theories to believe, and which ones deserve the special title of “knowledge”? ——arise
in social sciences, such as history, economics, and psychology, and even in literary studies and other humanities fields.

Practicing scientists themselves have views on these matters, of course. But, in general, they are so busy doing science, and so enmeshed in their disciplines’ methods and assumptions, that they are not the ones best positioned to answer these questions. For that, we turn to philosophers (and historians, and sociologists) of science. (Likewise, it’s the rare entrepreneur who can duplicate the economist’s insights, the unusual soldier who has the broad horizon needed to make a good military historian or analyst.)

So, will you be taught by your professor in this course about these topics? No. Or at least not primarily. You will find this to be an unusual course, in that you will be taught mostly by (i) the thinkers whose writings you will read; (ii) yourself, as you grapple to extract understanding from those writings and from others’ classroom remarks; and (iii) your classmates, who will be ready to assist you whenever they think you have fallen into a misunderstanding.

A few years after I began teaching, it occurred to me that being a teacher—not being a student—provides the best education. ‘To teach is to learn twice’ ...

—Joseph Epstein, The American Scholar, Spr ’87

We will thus function in NP340 as a quasi-scientific community, collectively seeking the truth (about the meanings of the articles that we’re reading) in a spirit of teamwork and mutual support, even—or especially!—when corrections and disagreements are being aired.

In place of the periodic pressures (and cramming) of quizzes and tests, you will be asked to put in serious day-to-day effort in carrying out a routine set of assignments. The pressure will be less, but it will be unrelenting; as in a math or language class, falling behind will be deadly.

The course is focused on reading comprehension and clear expression of complicated ideas—not on scientific concepts or creative thinking (though these come into play). You will be asked to work at mastering each reading assignment, in part by marking up the text as you go, in part by submitting an email in which you recap the text in your own words, contrast this reading to the preceding one, challenge or extend it with a critical question, and analogize what it says about scientific knowledge to some aspect of how we acquire or test knowledge in everyday, non-scientific life. Once in the classroom, we will attempt together to get clear about just what the reading says, utilizing students’ extemporaneous Lectures (and others’ subsequent Friendly Amendments), a variety of directed learning activities, and free-form exploratory discussion.

There will be more to the course, however, than learning what our authors have to say about the nature of the scientific enterprise. There will also be a creative component: a Research Project, done in teams (and in consultation with me), that will aim to apply and test one particular historian of science’s recent theory of birth order and personality. The hope is that this will bring the philosophy-of-science issues alive and be fascinating and even in literary studies and other humanities fields.

- Critical questioning and analysis of positions taken by oneself and by others, orally and in writing, in science and elsewhere; revision of one’s own beliefs.
- Clear, fluid, logically organized oral and written expression of ideas.
- Learning of content:
  - The methods and standards used in the scientific community to produce knowledge.
  - The standards of rational defensibility used for beliefs and theories, including in everyday life; how and why these beliefs and theories change over time.
  - The thinking that goes into doing a scientific research project, from design through analysis of data and write-up.

Course requirements

Readings. Our reading assignments are comparable to a tough and varied cross-country course. Some parts are level, with good footing; others are extremely demanding steep ascents over boulders and loose gravel; the rest fall somewhere in between. Everyone who runs the course—no matter how well or poorly—will be better off for doing so, better able to run this course and others in the future, even if you happen never to encounter such challenging terrain again. Analogously, you can expect to find some (maybe many) of our readings difficult, frustrating, even exhausting. But they’re not beyond the reach of normal college undergraduates. Force yourself to do them, however slowly, and you’ll become a stronger reader. Marking up the text (highlighting, underlining, marginal commentary) will help, and is therefore required of all students for all reading assignments. You should simply refuse to accept the possibility of graduating from college as an incompetent, or even mediocre, reader—no matter what your major.

Reading ability is just about the most fundamental skill that schooling provides, and it’s tightly linked to the ability to think and communicate in clear, logically organized fashion; if you can’t develop those skills while in college, you’ll live to feel regret and shame over the failure.

Your responsibilities in this area during the semester will be to
- study the readings carefully enough to comprehend them (reading >1 time if needed);
- mark up each reading, so you can better recall its content and your observations on it; and
- come to class ready to discuss and debate the readings’ meanings.

Daily Emails.

Lectures & Friendly Amendments. Some classes will feature at least one student Lecture that aims to summarize and explain all or part of the reading. When Lecturing, none of the content is to consist of your own ideas or commentary; make believe you are the author, trying to convey the central ideas of “your” article. You may use only your own notes/outline + your marked-up text. (You’ll have only a minute or two to review the text before being called on to Lecture, so it’ll really pay off if your markings on the text are careful enough that they let you quickly recall its main arguments and overall organization.) Do NOT quote or read from the text, or rely upon the author’s phraseology.

As with Recaps, your goal is a Lecture that is accurate, clear, and comprehensive. Following the Lecture, the floor will be thrown open for Friendly Amendments that attempt to enhance the accuracy, clarity, or comprehensiveness of the
ideas presented. As Lecturer, you may defend or elaborate your statements, with the entire class participating in the discussion.

**Research Project, Report, & Presentation.** Early on, we will read a substantial portion of Frank Sulloway’s *Born to Rebel*, which presents a theory about the relationship between birth order and personality (in particular, openness to new ideas). You will have the opportunity, working in a two-person team, to do original research that applies and tests Sulloway’s theory. You will plan out your research in detail, revise the plan in response to comments, gather the data (keeping careful records of how you do so), analyze it, offer your own theoretical explanations for it, and assess its relevance for Sulloway’s theory. Your Project will be assessed (by your peers, and by me) for (i) its novelty/creativity; (ii) the cleverness and ambition of its design and execution; (iii) its logic (whether it in fact puts Sulloway’s theory to the test, whether the right sorts of evidence are gathered, whether the evidence is accurately and insightfully analyzed); and (iv) the clarity of presentation.

Note that while you will design your Project and collect data as a team, you **will write up your own individual 8-20-page Research Report**, **without collaborating on this with your teammate (or anyone else)**. Finally, our last class meetings will see us share our results via **10-15-minute presentations in class.**

**Research Project stages**
1. **individual Research Project Concept** (format to be supplied)
2. **individual Peer Reviews** of RPCs
3. formation of teams —> team submission of **Revised RPC**, now including draft Research Instrument
4. **team oral presentation of Revised RPC** for feedback
5. team submission of **RPC Modifications** (simple email list of revisions made to Research Project plans in light of feedback received)
6. team execution of the study: obtaining data, analyzing data
7. **individual** (collaboration forbidden) write-up of **Research Project Report** (format to be supplied)
8. **team oral presentation of Research Project** and findings to class (informal is fine, but visual aids—e.g., diagrams, graphs, charts—are required)

**Format for Research Project Concept (“RPC” and “Revised RPC”):**
1. Population to be studied:
2. **Purpose:** The goal of this study is to see whether _____, or whether instead _____ [or _____, or ...].
   - **Rationale:** (How connects to Sulloway theory? Supply extensive description of the theory as it applies to your RP’s hypothesis, + citing specific page #s from the text):
3. Data to be gathered (what information will be sought?):
   - **Rationale:**
4. Method(s) for data gathering:
   - **Rationale:**
5. Hypothesis/Prediction (results expected):
   - **Rationale:** (in light of Sulloway theory, again with specific page #s):
6. Alternative Explanations (other than functional birth rank) for Possible Results:
7. Measures to Be Taken to Isolate Birth-Rank Explanation from Other Possible Explanations:
8. **[for Revised RPC only]** Research Instrument (detailed list of specific questions for survey, interviews, or library research): **Very Important**
9. **[for Revised RPC only]** What if the results are unexpected? (Imagine how exactly they might surprise you, what Sulloway would say about such results, and what other data you might then wish you had)

**Format for Research Report**

1. Introduction
2. Method
3. Results (quantitative/numerical AND qualitative/ descriptive; graphs, charts, etc. are often helpful, as long as they’re done in careful, non-misleading ways)
4. Analysis
5. Conclusions
6. Directions for Further Research
   - a. To improve this study
   - b. To supplement with further studies
7. Bibliography (if needed) (not on separate sheet)
8. Appendices
   - a. Research Instrument (e.g., survey questions)
   - b. Data (if needed)

**Texts**

**Schedule**

- **THE SOCIAL CONTEXT IN WHICH SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE (?) IS PRODUCED**
- **Believing Weird Things** (SV 3 (top)-4, 6-13, ix-x, 15-30)

- **Kourany, section intro** (K 5-8)

- **Gerald Holton, “On the Psychology of Scientists, & Their Social Concerns”** (K 9-24)

- **Richard C. Lewontin, “Dishonesty in Science”** (handout/email) [object of your Daily Email]


- browse http://timlambert.org/category/MaryRosh/
class 7 Popper, on ideological vs. non-ideological revolutions in science (K 294-95)
Birth Order & Revolutionary Personality I (S 3-54)
class 8 Birth Order & Revolutionary Personality II; All in the Family I (S 55-79) [object of your Daily Email]; 83-86, 95-96, 98-99, 112-13, 118)
class 9 All in the Family II (S 119-47; 170-71)
class 10 Sulloway’s Scientific Claims; Birth Order & Political Attitudes (S 195-97, 202, 203-05, 211 bottom-214, 363-65, 366-68, 217, 284-305)
- THE EMPIRICAL BASIS OF SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE -
class 11 Kourany, section intro (K 65-67; (68-74))
Norwood Russell Hanson, “Observation” (K 81-99) [object of your Daily Email]
class 12 Trusting Our Senses & Our Reasonings (SV 35-60 middle, 62 sidebar, 63-67, 76-81)
class 13 Karl Popper, “The Problem of the Empirical Basis” (K 75-80)
class 14 Steve Shapin, “Pump & Circumstance: Robert Boyle’s Literary Technology” (K 100-16)
class 15 Knowledge, Belief, & Evidence (SV 114-35, 142-49; incl. pp. 121, 123 sidebars)
class 16 Ann Oakley, “Interviewing Women: A Contradiction in Terms” (K 117-34)
- THE VALIDATION OF SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE -
class 17 Kourany, section intro (K 153-54; (155-63))
Rudolph Carnap, “The Confirmation of Laws and Theories” (K 164-75) [object of your Daily Email]
class 18 Karl Popper, “Science: Conjectures and Refutations” (K 176-86)
class 19 Pierre Duhem: “Physical Theory and Experiment” (K 187-94)
class 20 Forming & Testing Hypotheses (SV 176[bottom para], 178-82, 164-65, 182-97)
class 21 Imre Lakatos, “Falsification & the Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes” part 1 (K 195-201[top para,])
class 22 Lakatos, part 2 (K 201[“I should like ...”]-211)
class 23 Thomas Kuhn, “Objectivity, Value Judgment, and Theory Choice” (K 212-24)
class 24 Ruth Hubbard, “Have Only Men Evolved?” (K 225-42)
- THE HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE -
class 25 Kourany, section intro (K 253-56; (257-60))
Thomas Kuhn, “The Function of Dogma in Scientific Research” (K 301-15) [object of your Daily Email]
class 26 Thomas Kuhn, “The Nature and Necessity of Scientific Revolutions” (K 316-26)
class 27 Frank Sulloway, Synthesis (S 329-51 [object of your Daily Email], reread 18; 352-57, 361-63, 365)
class 28 Debate on Intelligent Design (research on your own)
class 29 <Research Project presentations, wrap-up, review>
class 30 <Research Project presentations, wrap-up, review>

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An Issue I Would Die For
John Chaffee
LaGuardia Community College, City University of New York

Friedrich Nietzsche once characterized philosophers as “artists with concepts,” and I believe that this is particularly true in the case of teaching philosophy. Certainly the teaching of philosophy involves exposing students to the core issues and central figures that constitute the rich history of philosophy. But the greatest challenge to teaching philosophy is also its most crucial: teaching students to “think philosophically,” to engage in the rigorous analysis, reasoned discourse, and clear articulation of ideas that are the hallmarks of philosophers.

In the unit of the Introduction to Philosophy course that focuses on Socrates, I seek to engage students in the process of philosophical thinking by having them compose a Socratic Dialogue involving an issue that they would be willing to die for. The guidelines are as follows:

Throughout history people of high moral character have faced punishment, imprisonment, and even death rather than forsake their guiding principles. In Socrates’ case, he was unwilling to renounce his commitment to searching for wisdom, examining himself and others, and exhorting others to live virtuously and attend to their souls. Other people have been unwilling to:

- Renounce their religious beliefs
- Surrender their commitment to personal and political freedom
- Behave in a way that they considered to be immoral

Think about your deepest convictions and identify an issue for which you would be willing to face imprisonment or death. Imagine yourself in a court setting, similar to Socrates, in which you have one final chance to persuade your accusers that you do not deserve to die, even though you are unwilling to renounce your beliefs. Then compose a Socratic dialogue between you and your accusers in which you use penetrating questioning and compelling logic to make your case. Members of the class will act as your jury.

To help students prepare for this assignment, I distribute excerpts from dialogues written by former students in response to the assignment. Student volunteers read the dialogues aloud, and we discuss the structure and salient features of these examples. The class then brainstorms potential topics, a discussion fueled by subjects previous students have selected. As a next step, students bring in rough drafts of their dialogues (suggested length is five double-spaced pages), and they have an opportunity to share at least part of their dialogue with other class members in small groups for the purpose of receiving suggestions. (I circulate among the groups, serving as a resource as well.) On the day that the final dialogues are due, students take turns reading their dialogues aloud with a partner they have selected. Following each presentation, class members take a few minutes to identify the key points and core arguments, and suggest ideas that would strengthen their defense. Following their presentations, students hand in their dialogues to be reviewed and graded. As a final part of the unit, I collect clean copies of the dialogues and have them copied and bound as a "publication" with a copy of the Jacques-Louis David painting “The Death of Socrates” on the cover.

Students compose their dialogues on a wide variety of topics, and as LaGuardia has such a large international student population, their topics are international in scope, often involving issues of war, revolution, persecution, and human
rights that are as current as today’s headlines. For example:

- Political repression in North Korea
- Pleas of an Iraqi citizen
- Perils of free expression in Bangladesh
- Women’s rights in Afghanistan
- A revolution in progress in Venezuela
- Democracy in Haiti
- Freedom of religion in China
- Human rights in Burma
- “Modern Slavery” (exploitation of undocumented immigrants)
- A refusal to be drafted

The results of this activity have been consistently gratifying. Rather than simply trying to follow Socrates’ line of reasoning in the Apology as outside observers, students are being placed in a situation in which they have to use a Socratic approach to defend their passionately held beliefs. And in so doing, they are experiencing firsthand the power of Socrates’ contribution to human thought. For Socrates, human thought was alive, a dynamic method of inquiry for confronting and clarifying the most profound questions that define our lives, individually and collectively. Socrates sought to erase the line between thought and action: we are obligated to act on the conclusions to which enlightened reflection leads us. Of all of the many gifts that Socrates has given to the world, it is recognizing the essential nature of rational inquiry in human affairs that is most profound and lasting. As the philosopher Richard Robinson observes:

Socrates impresses us, more than any other figure in literature, with the supreme importance of thinking as well as possible and making our actions conform to our thoughts. To this end he preaches the knowledge of one’s own starting-points, the hypothetical entertainment of opinions, the exploration of their consequences and connections, the willingness to follow the argument where it leads, the public confession of one’s thoughts, the invitation to others to criticize, the readiness to reconsider, and at the same time firm action in accordance with one’s present beliefs.

The questions that we and our students encounter today are no less significant and crucial than those facing the ancient Athenians: questions of war and peace, politics and ethics, truth and reality, life and death. Socrates was in deadly earnest when he made his startling challenge, “The unexamined life is not worth living,” and it is a message that is at least as pertinent today for our students, as revealed in the following excerpts from two student dialogues. It should be noted that these student examples, by Gina Szeto and Elini-Melina Petratos, are entirely the students’ own work without any subsequent editing.

The first excerpt is from a dialogue in which a former student of mine imaginatively recreates her father’s experience as a victim of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution in China in 1968, a radical political movement led by Mao Zedong that closed schools and virtually severed China’s relations with the outside world. Most of the books in China were prohibited at the time, so her father formed associations with people who smuggled books in and out of closed libraries. As a result of these actions, he was accused of being a traitor to Red China, a crime punishable by death, and he was brought before The Court of Justice for trial. In this excerpt Gina explores the nature and implications of political freedom in a culturally repressive society.

Political Repression in China
Gina Szeto

Gina: Two years ago, before the Cultural Revolution began, I was studying in the university. Since then my days have been filled with persecution, beatings, and public humiliations by the Red Guard. I am here today to ask whether a blind adherence to party policies could be more detrimental to China than cultivating human minds. How just is it to be incarcerated and put to death for thinking, reading, and learning?

Court: These are questions of a Western mind.

Gina: Too much attention is spent discarding ideas based on criteria that has no relationship to the ideas’ content. More time needs to be devoted to determining whether the idea is true, if it is applicable, and, if so, how it can be put to use. Don’t you agree?

Court: In conceiving a Western idea, the assumption is that it will be applied in a Western society, a society that is politically and culturally very different than ours.

Gina: I am not implying that we should adopt all political, economic, and social policies endorsed by the West. I am asking if an idea happens to be Western in origin, should it be discarded simply because it is Western? What criteria are used to determine the value of an idea?

Court: Mao is the leader of China. His policies and authority should never be questioned. When his authority is questioned, China is questioned, and if this happens our society will fall into chaos. This is done for the well being of everyone.

Gina: Isn’t it somewhat naïve to assume that despite countless failed and evolving attempts over man’s history to develop absolute and certain knowledge, that only Mao has the answer? Is Mao not also a human, like you and me? Hasn’t he, despite his best intentions, experienced failure nonetheless?

Court: Yes, I suppose that’s accurate.

Gina: Isn’t it therefore more productive to acknowledge the frailty of the human condition, the uncertainty of our notion of truth, and in so doing, keep our minds, and therefore theories and policies in the public sector, open to progress, flexible in the face of adversity and change? Or is it more productive to construct absolute and rigid policies, which are themselves a product of the political and social climate of the time, at the expense of truth, at the expense of our people?

Court: I don’t know.

Gina: Is it more likely that a generation of enlightened thinkers educated in history, science, and logic will detect and ultimately rectify unsound economic and social policies, or a generation of illiterate farmers?

Court: Of course enlightened thinking is necessary, and Mao will do the thinking for all.

Gina: And all other ideas are useless? Mao is the brain, and we are merely his limbs?

Court: It is for the welfare of all.

Gina: If my purpose is simply to exist, to breathe, and not utilize my inherent ability to think, rationalize, or question, then I would rather not live. A sentiment, as you know, shared by the thousands who have committed suicide over the past decade. If this is Mao’s purpose for the People’s Republic, he...
would do no worse if more resources were allocated toward building machines and robots because they will not rebel, they will not fight for the right to be free, because they, unlike us, are inherently not capable of free thought and action.

This next excerpt is also from a dialogue written by a former student, and is based on her experience with her dying father. In her introduction, Melina (who immigrated from Greece) notes that as it stands today neither the United States nor the New York State constitution grants individuals a right to suicide assistance or euthanasia. The courts have distinguished the right to refuse treatment from the right to get assistance in euthanasia, although the right to refuse life-sustaining treatment is constitutionally guaranteed. Suicide assistance generally constitutes a form of second-degree murder under New York law, regardless of whether the person consents to being assisted in ending their life. This is how Melina describes the circumstances that led to the criminal charge against her as she explores the relationship between the rights of the individual and the rights of the state when confronting the issue of assisted suicide.

For the Love of Life
Eleni-Melina Petratsos

Two years ago my father was diagnosed with cancer and within four months of his diagnosis—and after repeated treatments of radiation and chemotherapy, the standard treatment for all cancer patients—his condition kept deteriorating and finally the cancer metastasized to his bones. The metastasis resulted in excruciating and constant pain that was not alleviated by any pain killers provided by his doctors. In the ensuing months of my father’s Golgotha I was faced with a myriad of moral, legal, and economic decisions, but none was more important than his wish and will to have a dignified end to an honorable life. Thus my decision to assist my father with euthanasia resulted in a charge of second-degree murder and brought me before this court.

Melina: Standing here before you in this austere room and in the grim reality that surrounds me takes me back to another room and another reality of which the anguish and consequences I wish upon no one in this room. The deadly silence in that hospital room was interrupted only by my father’s moans and gasps of pain, and the sterility of the whiteness of the room was colored only by the red fluidity of blood from my father’s body. Hours and eternity indiscernible, pain and agony his sole companions, and his implorations not as father to a daughter anymore, but as a human being to another, compelling and justified. To deny my father a good death was equivalent to dishonoring his life. Ask yourselves this unyielding question: Is life which is completely depleted of the smallest joy and fraught only with anguish and pain worth living?

Court: This court feels deep compassion for patients in those rare cases when pain cannot be alleviated even with aggressive palliative care. As a society, however, we have better ways to give people greater control and relief from suffering than by legalizing assisted suicide and euthanasia.

Melina: The society you speak of gives greater control to alleviate pain to those fortunate enough to afford the best possible health care and leaves the rest to grapple with debilitating illnesses with little hope of relief from pain. Isn’t it true that when society tries to rule the will of a person they inevitably interfere with the intrinsic moral values those individuals rightly so deserve?

Court: As you stated, if it is the right of each individual to decide to take his or her life under these circumstances—something this court disagrees with—that negates your right to do it for them.

Melina: You allow him the right to decide and yet knowing the debilitating effects of his illness and his inability to carry out the action, you negate him his right to ask for assistance in that right thus to arrive at the desired result of his choice.

Court: Your father could have gone on living for months with the care he was provided, and we have cases of many patients who have surpassed that time frame and went on to live for almost a year.

Melina: You speak of him as a statistical entity, as a means not as an end when he was a vibrant, robust man, one who valued life for the opportunities afforded to him. He believed the dictum “Healthy mind, healthy body” as well as the corollary that when one is severed the other is but a useless vehicle with no purpose or destination.

Court: If everyone’s belief became a law the outcome would be anarchy at best.
Melina: You have your laws and you speak with convincing arguments regarding the legalities of the matter, and yet you disregard a universal law, one that entails human dignity and the right to a life that is conducted in the most productive, and fulfilling way. I stand here before you, charged with a heinous crime, amidst my pain and sorrow of losing a loved one, and I have neither the wisdom nor the courage to tell you that what I did was noble or that it was carried out with the utmost certainty. No, esteemed court, I’m standing here and I tell you I have suffered and I have struggled with this decision.

I will accept the punishment that your laws define for my action. I will not, however, be judged or sentenced on the morality of my action because it confers with it the undisputable right of each human being to choose a life that is suffused with quality, creativity, human dignity, and the appreciation of these meanings.

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**BOOK REVIEWS**

**Quintessence: Basic Readings from the Philosophy of W. V. Quine.**


Reviewed by Isaac Nevo

Ben Gurion University of the Negev

This new collection of published essays by Willard van Orman Quine (1908-2000) is presented by its editor, Roger F. Gibson (following a suggestion of Nelson Goodman’s), as a “meta-anthology” or “anthology of anthologies,” that is to say, an anthology of previously anthologized material. It contains twenty-five original essays by Quine that were published, in various venues, over a span of over sixty years in Quine’s career. The editor says he had the ambition to produce a collection useful to the “Quine-specialist” as well as the “Quine-novice.” It is questionable, however, whether both these purposes can be served within a single volume. The expert will find the collection lacking in certain important selections, for example, Quine’s chapter on the “Flight from Intension,” where Quine famously deconstructs Brentano’s thesis regarding the irreducibility of the mental. And some articles (for example, “Truth by Convention”) are included that no beginner should attempt by way of an introduction to Quine’s philosophy and, as it appears as the first essay of the anthology, could well be responsible for many a novice simply giving up on the rest of the volume.

However, a novice who skips the first essay and moves straight to the second and third or, even better, straight to the fifth or the eighth essays could be in for the intellectual ride of her life. Quine’s sharpness and lucidity, the depth of his confrontation with the empiricist tradition, as well as the strength of his alternative (physicalist and extensionalist) form of empiricism, come across very clearly. Indeed, with some additions—such as short introductions that explain the aims, background, basic terminology, and the theses or arguments of the volume’s essays—the book could well serve as the basis for a class on Quine’s epistemology and philosophy of language to the benefit of many beginners. The volume contains some of the most challenging articles in Analytic Philosophy, but given that these articles sometimes presuppose a fair amount of knowledge in logic or the history of philosophy (or both), the untutored beginner would have benefited from having explanatory introductions accompanying each of these essays. Short introductions to Quine’s historic essays by Roger F. Gibson, the editor of this volume and author of two books on Quine, would have made the work of reading through this book easier and more rewarding. In this respect, this book is a missed opportunity as a comprehensive introduction to Quine’s thought. The failure to include short introductions to each of the essays may be seen as another consequence of the desire to serve two very disparate audiences in a single collection.

A heart-warming feature of this collection (one which is likely to help the beginner) is the coupling of some of the classical essays of Quine with all their polemical sharpness, to retrospective essays in which a much older (and kinder) Quine reflects on his past accomplishments, sometimes modifying the sharp edges of his polemical arguments, sometimes taking back excessive formulations, and often acknowledging the strength of his one-time opponents’ views or offering words of self-criticism. The difference between these two “voices” of Quine is most clearly seen in the transition from “Two Dogmas of Empiricism” (1951) to “Five Milestones of Empiricism” (1975), where one finds essentially the same argument for epistemological holism and against the “dogmas” of reductionism and analyticity, though the argument is critical and negative in the former case and positive and charitable in the latter. Similarly, in “Progress on Two Fronts” (1996), Quine goes back to his notion of “stumbling meaning” as a basis for translating observation sentences and modifies it in light of criticism leveled at him by such luminaries as Davidson, Drehen, and Follesdal. The criticism of Quine’s “social view” of observation sentences (whereby a sentence is taken to be observational just in case all speakers of a linguistic community, upon having the same stimulations, either assent to or dissent from that sentence) was that sameness of stimulation is not merely a highly theoretical construction but one that cannot do justice to the variety of intra-personal stimulation patterns that can be compatible with “seeing the same thing.” This criticism prompted Quine to offer an alternative view (which he dubs “pre-established harmony”) that seeks to explain inter-personal observation sentences in terms of intra-personal ones, the latter being accounted for in terms of intra-personal similarity of stimulation patterns, the former being accounted for in terms of natural selection favoring certain innate standards of similarity (thereby creating harmony among different speakers). Such a self-correction shows Quine at his self-critical best: balanced, scientifically-oriented, and conciliatory, but only where the core of his philosophical views can be advanced or, at the least, where they are not seriously threatened.

In “Two Dogmas of Empiricism” Quine’s distinctive philosophical voice first came into a clear expression. This article was an empiricist refutation of two cardinal tenets of traditional and “logical” empiricism. In that article, Quine concluded that both the distinction between analytic and synthetic sentences as well as the belief in “reductionism” were themselves unempirical “dogmas.” Quine argued that the bases upon which Hume had dismissed induction and the causal nexus, and the logical positivists had undermined metaphysical claims in general, were, from an empiricist point of view, equally dogmatic. Quine called for a more comprehensive empiricism, accepting only “the whole of science” as the minimal unit of empirical significance within which any sentence could be held “come what may” and wherein no sentence is immune to revision. A more succinct refutation of the doctrines of traditional and positivist empiricism (including those defining the life-work of Quine’s teacher Rudolph Carnap) is hard to imagine. The development of an alternative empiricism, shorn
of the two dogmas, was to become Quine’s philosophical task in the decades that followed.

In contrast to logical positivism, Quine’s later version of empiricism was based on a rejection of all intensional claims (that is, claims involving meanings, propositions, modal operators, or propositional attitudes) as non-cognitive, while allowing ontology and even an ontology of abstract entities (sets) as a legitimate scientific tool. In Quine’s hands, empiricism became physicalism, intensions were eradicated from the language of science, ontology was streamlined (a streamlining that he summed up with the claim that “to be is to be the value of a bound variable”), and epistemology became separated from foundational pretensions and “naturalized” as itself part of the scientific endeavor. In this naturalized epistemology the link between the “meager input” and the “torrential output” of science—traditionally the concern of skeptics and foundational epistemologists—was to be studied within science itself. The basis for scientific knowledge was no longer to be thought of as firmer than science itself.

Forty years later, Quine’s voice is no longer that of the brash revolutionary hoisting his philosophical mentors on their own petard. “Two Dogmas in Retrospect” offers a “moderate” holism, in place of “the whole of science,” while still rejecting the two dogmas. Moderate holism breaks “the whole of science” into various “chunks,” and these are analyzed in terms of clusters of theoretical sentences that have “critical semantic mass.” The latter metaphor is analyzed in terms of sufficiency for implying “observation categoricals,” that is, sentences of the form: “whenever this, that!” where the two sub-clauses are to be replaced by observation sentences. With this picture, science need not be seen as a unified theoretical whole, and room is left for a more historical perspective on the development of science as a combination of “clusters” of such “critical semantic mass.” Even Thomas Kuhn—the father of “theory laden observations”—is spoken favorably of (Essay No. 8).

Another significant change upon which Quine elaborates in the late essays concerns a reorientation within logic such that it is no longer conceived as part of revisable science but rather as constitutive of “moderate” holism (and translation practice). The principles of “minimal mutilation” (in the body of theory) and of charity (in translation), defeasible though they are, ensure that logic will not be revised except for very good reasons (for example, pressure from quantum physics), and within certain bounds that build logic into our basic understanding of the logical particles and into translation practice. The two previously conflicting perspectives on logic are thus brought closer together.

In sum, although this collection contains materials that are already well anthologized and collected, its distinctiveness and value lies in its bringing together two distinct voices of Quine’s. In so doing it enriches our perspective on one of the most impressive philosophical oeuvres of the twentieth century.

Endnotes

1. Quine’s “Truth by Convention” was written in 1935 and published for the first time a year later. The latest article in his collection, “Confessions of a Confirmed Extensionalist,” was published (posthumously) in 2001, sixty-six years later. It should be noted that this prolific period of philosophical work is not co-extensive with Quine’s whole career, which started earlier and contains much work in logic and set theory. Quine’s work in those fields is not anthologized in this volume.


4. In intensional claims, the substitution of co-referential terms does not preserve truth value.

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**Hegel’s Preface to the Phenomenology of Spirit**


**Reviewed by Ido Geiger**

**Ben Gurion University of the Negev**

This very welcome new addition to the works of Hegel in English comprises three parts: a substantial introduction to Hegel’s philosophy; a new translation of the Preface to his Phenomenology of Spirit; and a running commentary on this text.

The introductory essay describes in broad strokes the historical and philosophical background of Hegel’s philosophy and its aim. Yovel explains the decisive influence on Hegel of Spinoza and Kant, as well as Hegel’s response to his more immediate contemporaries, viz., Fichte, Schelling, and Hölderlin. Hegel is still often associated with the latter and charged with being a romantic critic of the Enlightenment and as an origin (indeed, the origin) of irrationalism in contemporary philosophy. This common prejudice is contested by Yovel by presenting in detail (in the commentary as well as the introductory essay) Hegel’s criticism of the notion of faith and of an immediate intellectual intuition of the absolute. Hegel is a stalwart defender of Kantian conceptual and reflective rationality. Like Spinoza, Hegel views God, which he thinks of as Spirit or Reason, as immanent in the world and identical with its totality, but for Hegel, God is not substance. Like Kant, Hegel places the subject center-stage: The world is the world of theoretical and practical rational subjects. The famous aphorism that “everything depends on comprehending the true not as substance, but equally also as subject” (95) sets this synthesis between Kant and Spinoza as the end of philosophy (16ff.).

But in contrast to Kant, for Hegel reason is not essentially limited, and the union between subjects and their world can be attained. Reason develops in history, i.e., in the process of the development of the theoretical and practical rational thought, of actual theoretical and social-political shared forms of life, and of their discordant relations. Only at the end of this process do subjects find themselves in a rational world wholly their own to know as well as to shape in action.

The true is the whole. Yet the whole is but the essence which brings itself to fulfillment through its development. Of the absolute it must be said that it is essentially a result, that only at the end is the absolute what it is in truth; and herein consists its nature B to be actual, subject, or becoming-its-own-itself. (102; for the discussion of the passage see, 31ff.)

To be sure, this is all very abstract. But abstraction is the notorious and acknowledged fault of the Preface. It seems to me important to be on guard against a misunderstanding of the position of the introductory essay and its relation to the extant interpretative literature. Yovel begins by suggesting that we “view Hegel in his own context and his variety of aspects, without suppressing elements of his thought...
that were crucial to him only because they can no longer be so to us” (1). Yovel’s example of such piecemeal reading is the “social Hegel” B distinguished from his own ontological reading. He does not name his foils. The annotated bibliography, however, suggests that they are not those who simply choose Hegel’s social or political thought as the focus of their research, nor even Wood’s bold assertion, in Hegel’s Ethical Thought, that “Speculative logic is dead; but Hegel’s thought is not” (see 8). The “social Hegel” seems to be Pinkard’s Hegel’s Phenomenology: The Sociality of Reason (209). Yovel’s criticism is not, however, directed against Pinkard’s thesis of the sociality of reason, namely, the view that giving reasons for knowledge claims and actions is a social practice. To endorse the thesis that the games of asking for and giving reasons are always played within social forms of life is not to interpret Hegel’s “ontology as social philosophy” (1; see also, 6-7). Reason is not taken to be merely a social phenomenon but, rather, as having an essential social dimension. Yovel himself quite clearly subscribes to this thesis. His shorthand answer to the ontological question of what it takes actually to be is: “It takes living and being involved in a society, one that, despite inevitable regressions, eventually leads to freedom and mutual recognition” (9; see also, 25-26 and passim). Yovel seems to direct his criticism against Pinkard’s reading because in “detaching itself from Hegel’s running text and several core ideas (with their ontological import), it constructs a revised Phenomenology, which the author thinks fit for our time” (209). Pinkard’s text is rich indeed with details of the social conceptions and practices of reason the Phenomenology describes, and it highlights the modern standpoint of reason. But Pinkard says explicitly that Hegel does not take the present (or any) standpoint of reason to be merely a social-historical given. It is the logic that grounds Hegel’s project by showing thought itself to be self-grounding.6

Furthermore, the term “ontology” might on first hearing suggest that Yovel takes Hegel to be constructing the sort of dogmatic metaphysical edifice Kant criticized. This remains a very common misreading and a pit into which students almost inevitably fall when, with trepidation or enthusiasm, they first approach Spirit. Yovel, however, emphatically distinguishes his reading from the dogmatic metaphysical readings that take God or World-History or the Logic of the Concept to be an agency driving the progress of reason (10-13, 52, 58): there are in Hegel’s history and phenomenology only empirical, human agents (11). Hegel aims to answer Kant’s question, “How is metaphysics possible as science?” He takes on the task of continuing and transforming the ontological project which Kant’s notion of metaphysics implies: “Kant’s system of a priori categories and principles sets the conditions for thinking actual entities in nature (= the world of experience); it is thereby a logic of being derived from the structure of the subject B in other words, it is a subject-like ontology” (52). Yovel’s ontological reading affirms the sociality of reason and disavows dogmatic metaphysics. It places at the center of attention the relationship of Hegel’s practical philosophy to his logic. The highly influential works on Hegel’s practical philosophy of the last fifteen years or so all recognize the centrality of this relationship for Hegel, but their focus is not on this relationship but on the practical philosophy itself. The difference is a difference of emphasis.

The introductory essay seems best suited to advanced students. It requires considerable knowledge of the history of philosophy and considerable philosophical refinement. It should be emphasized that the essay is not an introduction to the Phenomenology but to Hegel’s philosophy in general. The Preface may well be the text most often used to introduce Hegel’s philosophy in the classroom. Thus, the present volume is particularly well suited for this very purpose. A word of caution is due here. Hegel’s criticism of abstraction is central to his own end in philosophy and a very important idea of the Preface. Hegel clearly expresses this idea; and the introductory essay and commentary conscientiously underscore it. However, there is only one remedy for the feeling that Hegel’s philosophy is itself often suffocating in its abstraction B and the Preface is a paradigmatic example. The Preface is best read with one of Hegel’s detailed and concrete analyses. The purpose of introducing Hegel as the concrete thinker he in fact is might best be served by reading the conclusion of his lectures on the philosophy of history B the discussion of the Reformation, the Enlightenment, and the French Revolution. Revised not long before his untimely death in 1831, it reveals how Hegel views his historical-political times and complements the very famous phrase of the Preface, viz., “our time is a time of birth” (82), and his expectation of “the rising day which, in a flash, outlines the features of the new world” (84).

Yovel’s excellent running commentary on the Preface does not proceed by singling out and attempting to define the main technical terms of Hegel’s language, which are very often too abstract and flexible to be explicated in such a manner. Considerably longer than the text, Yovel’s commentary explains Hegel’s ideas clearly and in a conversational manner with the main ideas patientely presented several times, in different ways and with different emphases. Yovel speaks with the voice of a seasoned teacher who has been reading and teaching Hegel for many years. Indeed, if the conversation of the commentary has a fault, it is simply that it is written, with no opportunity for classroom elaboration.

The Preface contains many important arguments against (amongst others) Spinoza, Kant, Romantic metaphysics, Fichte, and Schelling, though Hegel usually does not name the targets of his criticism or explicitly identify their doctrines. Here Yovel’s commentary is invaluable. Other particularly illuminating entries discuss the notion of a method in philosophy (155ff.), the criticism of mathematics as a model for philosophy (156ff.), the “cunning of reason” (170-171, 176) and the speculative proposition (182ff.).

This volume is an invaluable introduction to Hegel’s philosophy. The introductory essay presents well its central ideas and their background. The reader should note though that Yovel decidedly emphasizes Hegel’s system and his logic. The translation is precise and eminently readable and the commentary is indispensable for those setting out on their own into the Hegelian thicket. Though very detailed, it invites further discussion and will also prove an excellent aid in the seminar room.

Endnotes

1. All references in the body of the text are to Hegel’s Preface to the Phenomenology of Spirit.
4. Ibid., 3-17.
The Reasons of Love
110 pp., $19.95 hardback.
Reviewed by Bruce B. Suttle
Parkland College

Despite its elusive nature, most writers on love concentrate on one or more of four issues: 1) the object of love and whether loved objects are one sort of thing, or diverse (which includes the possible difference between specific and general love); 2) the type of state love is—whether love is a sensation or feeling, an attitude, an emotion, a belief, a volition, a desire, or some combination of these (which could require a distinction between loving and feeling love); 3) the relation between love and desire (which may be answered in the workings out of the previous issue); 4) the relation between love and volition (which has the central question of whether we love something because we value it, or value it because we love it). Of course, then there are the extended issues, such as love and community, love and friendship, the pathologies of love, etc. Furthermore, while most philosophers labor over what the reasons for love might be, they disagree as to whether that quality is a non-relational feature of a person or a thing, something about the object of love in its own right. Finally, we have the likes of Harry Frankfurt, who denies that there are reasons for love. On the contrary, he contends that love is a structure of desires for states of affairs involving the object of one’s love, a particular mode of caring that is not a response to some antecedent reason. And the best and purest form of love is self-love, which Frankfurt distinguishes from selfishness or self-indulgence.

Frankfurt’s *The Reasons of Love* is, in one sense, the culmination of his three decades of reflections on love, while, in another sense, it is not an adequate substitute for the careful studying of his earlier papers.

Frankfurt rejects the traditional moral question of “How should I live?” as most fundamental, for morality provides, “at most only a severely limited and insufficient answer to the question” (7); and, contrary to what is widely presumed, “moral considerations are not necessarily overriding” (8). He replaces the “How should...” question with the non-moral question of “What do I desire?” And the answer “requires us simply to understand what it is that we ourselves really care about, and to be decisively and robustly confident in caring about it” (28).

By its very nature, loving entails both that we regard its objects as valuable in themselves and that we have no choice but to adopt those objects as our final ends. Insofar as love is the creator both of inherent or terminal value and of importance, then, it is the ultimate ground of practical rationality (56).

By stripping the fundamental question of its moral moorings, Frankfurt is able to deny any problems with wholeheartedly loving horrendously bad things, as well as opening the possibility of one being a loving person while “being dreadfully and irredeemably wicked” (98).

Even though Frankfurt considers what people want or desire the fundamental issue, such a ubiquitous notion he judges “heavily overburdened and a bit limp” (10). To correct this deficiency is one of Frankfurt’s central projects. He sets out to achieve this by articulating three additional notions: “What we care about, what is important to us, and what we love” (11), each warranting distinct consideration. Frankfurt’s explication of these three notions allows him to conclude that there are four necessary conceptual features of love in general. First, what we love is not a set of qualities or a class of things, but a particular object—be it concrete or abstract—that is not merely an instantiation of some universal type. Unlike impersonal caring that is exhibited in one’s charitable concerns where any person in need qualifies, love is personal, specific, and not capable of substitution. Second, our love is disinterested in the sense that we care for our beloved for its own sake, instead of as a means to some ulterior end. The specific beloved becomes important to us because we love it, rather than we love it because it is important to us. Third, when one loves, one identifies with the beloved, not only with what promotes the interests of the beloved, but with the interests themselves. Accordingly, one benefits or suffers depending upon whether those interests are adequately served. Fourth, whether or what one loves is not a matter of one’s beliefs or feelings, but with the configuration of the will that concerns itself with what is good for the beloved. This involuntary commitment to the beloved is something over which one has no control, and is possible even if one dislikes the beloved, even if one has very good reasons not to care for the beloved.

Given these four defining features of love, Frankfurt maintains that “it is apparent that self-love—notwithstanding its questionable reputation—is in a certain way the purest of all modes of love” (80). This is because self-love is “most likely to be unequivocal and unalloyed...(and accordingly) there is a particularly snug fit between self-love and the conceptually indispensable conditions by which the nature of love is defined” (80). Specifically, 1) the love one has for oneself cannot coherently be considered transferable to an equivalent substitute; 2) self-love is nearly always disinterested, in that it is motivated by no interests other than those of the beloved; 3) with self-love one’s interests and those of one’s beloved are identical; 4) not only is self-love outside of our immediate voluntary control, it is the most natural of all forms of love. Unique to self-love, “there can be no discrepancy between the interests of the self-lover and those of the person to whom his self-love is devoted” (82). Yet, “the most rudimentary form of self-love...consists in nothing more than the desire of a person to love” (90).

For Frankfurt, wholehearted love is love without any reverberating subjective uncertainties—solid, secure, and resolute, with clarity of purpose and direction. Self-love that is wholehearted offers the best chance of flourishing, of thriving as persons who are free from perturbation in their caring. To be fortunate enough to love in this confident manner liberates one from the debilitating uncertainty as to how to live, freeing oneself of the fear of floundering in one’s own ambivalence (65). And, although rare, one can love oneself without loving anything else. This form of self-love is simply a desire to love, which no one can help having. Humans are so constituted to love loving (90).

Frankfurt ends his book with words of solace for those few who are unable to love themselves. In view of the requirements for self-love as Frankfurt conceives it, perhaps Iago’s observation would have been a more fitting ending:

> Oh, villainous! I have looked upon the world for four times seven years, and since I could distinguish betwixt a benefit and an injury, I never found man that knew how to love himself. (Othello)

While nicely written and seemingly clear, some readers might be put off, if not bewildered, by Frankfurt’s triadic faculty model of self (mind/feelings/will), especially when the will is reified and described as being in opposition to or unified with the person (45f, 91ff). Others might be disengaged once
they realize that Frankfurt neither acknowledges nor criticizes alternative views of love (save Kant in one respect and Augustine in another), and, rather than offering arguments, he makes claims, gives what pass for examples, and leaves it up to the reader to recognize the obvious.

No doubt anyone interested in philosophical psychology or in love particularly will find Frankfurt’s thoughts generally clear, accessible, and enlightening as well as challenging in many respects. But such is not sufficient to warrant the book’s adoption as a text. This has less to do with possible faults in it than to its admitted limited scope (32), given the wide, diverse, and contentious nature of the topic. There is neither an index nor a bibliography.

Endnotes


2. Frankfurt’s earlier thoughts on love can be found among the essays in The Importance of What We Care About (1988), Necessity, Volition and Love (1999), and “Some Mysteries of Love,” Lindley Lectures (2001).

3. However, a careful reader is likely to notice that on other occasions Frankfurt cites with approval the Christian prescription to love our neighbors as we love ourselves (77), which clearly implies morally admirable qualities of loving.

4. Again, a careful reader will likely be jolted by Frankfurt’s warning that “it is important that we be careful to whom and to what we give our love” (63), given his characterizing love as “not under our direct and immediate voluntary control” (44).

Lessons of the Masters


Reviewed by Rick Heckendorn
Manhattanville College

In Lessons of the Masters, George Steiner looks at the relationships between the master teacher and his disciples through centuries past, beginning with the Greeks, touching upon the Far East, and bringing the relationship to the present. He notes the impact of computer technology, new spiritual movements, women’s increased roles in teaching, and the strong American egalitarianism that contradicts the master teacher’s desire to focus primarily on the gifted disciples among their students. This new sort of master teacher as spiritual motivator, community builder, and role model is a noble challenge to set before contemporary teachers and students today.

How did these master teachers achieve their success among their students? This is the hook for every teacher in the classroom today. And what lessons does this narrative hold for today’s teachers in public schools? Each teacher that Steiner cites was totally committed to continued learning and living the life of the mind he had chosen. Each lived and taught through example. Each countered students face to face, something that Plato deemed indispensable (p. 33). They generated trust among their students, and even admiration and love: again, the presence and power of eros in teaching. Each master teacher devoted himself totally to the message he valued. Each took responsibility for the internal consistency of his teaching and for the consistency of his teaching with his way of acting. Each master teacher built a community of followers, even wondering at times how they did it: Rabbi Jacob Yitzkah is quoted as saying: “They come to me because I am astonished that they come” (p. 156).

There were also examples cited where disappointments resulted from the master-disciple relationship. Although Husserl was Heidegger’s mentor and friend during the early years of Weimar Germany, Heidegger turned against his former teacher as the disciple surpassed the master. Later in his life, Heidegger’s disciple and lover, Arensd, deserted him to work with another professor until she had to escape the Third Reich, but after World War II she returned to Heidegger and was of great assistance to him. Even as Steiner calls upon all of us to read and reread the masters like Plato, Aristotle, Montaigne, Descartes, and others, he asks us to treat them with great respect at first but then to engage in doubt and possibly rejection. The masters are there to assist us in our own growth as we strive to grasp and go beyond their lessons.

This richly detailed examination of master teachers through the ages offers much to contemporary teachers. It is filled with a deep respect and value of a spirituality that recognizes the worth of individuals who go beyond reasonable expectations to ask more of themselves and their charges as they demonstrate the possibilities of living a life exalted by wisdom. Master teachers do not call for a kind of religious orthodoxy or adherence to any favored dogma, such as religions tend to propagate and require. Instead, Steiner advocates the need for teachers to discover their potential to inspire an awakening among students, similar to the Far East practice of Zen. This new sort of master teacher as spiritual motivator, community builder, and role model is a noble challenge to set before contemporary educators, who could begin to counteract what Steiner refers to as the “emptiness in modernity” that pervades our culture and times (p. 157).

Although Steiner sets before us several different examples of master teachers, he does not advocate a relativist stance. In fact, he sees value in memorizing important texts by heart, anathema to many ardent and free-spirited educators. He would have teachers ask questions as Socrates did, creating a critical
spirit in students while also encouraging a spirit of community among them as they strive for deeper understanding. Teachers would be well advised to listen to this advice. This book traces a rich history of the craft of teaching through the many masters whose lives it narrates and comments upon. Steiner’s countless examples attest to his thoughtful analysis of dedicated master teachers, each different, each motivating his students by the force of his person and by his wisdom.

LETTER TO THE EDITOR

In response to a question from one of the editors concerning his thoughts on teaching, Manfred S. Frings, emeritus professor at DePaul University, sent us the following reflections on his long career as a teacher and teacher-trainer in philosophy.

To the Editors:

Your request reminded me of some rules from way back, coming from the boot-camp of my teachers’ training college in Germany. 1) I was strongly admonished to speak very slowly during the first class while introducing my subject to them, 2) told to ask students repeatedly whether they understand what I was saying (I encouraged them also not to be bashful—to ask questions whenever they think they need to), 3) asked to tell students to summarize what I had said after half of the class time was over and to check their notes, 4) told to dictate at the end of each class a summary of what had been covered that day so that they would have material about it at home to review, and 5) told to start each class with a review given by a student (selecting one when none of them volunteers). My practice was to tell them in the first class that a review by them counts heavily toward making a good final grade, but if the review had not been good enough, it would not count against their final grade.

Here are a few additional hints. 1) Always wear respectable attire. 2) During the first class, if possible, tell an interesting story, one not necessarily related to subject of class. It may be drawn from sports, for instance. This will raise the level of attention. 3) Encourage students to participate in class and always ask questions for them to answer. Give each once in a while a good grade, and keep a record of the good answers a student has given on the class sheet. 4) By keeping such a record, good students will be encouraged to set an example for the others, but always keep close contact with the not-so-fortunate students: give them advice after class, tell them where they stand, and sometimes let them do some extra work if needed to improve their grade levels. 5) Never treat students as though they were qualitatively all alike or the same. It kills the incentive to form their own educational goals and to pay attention in class.

It always took me some time to realize that undergraduate students appreciated such methods. But they are always slow and nervous at the beginning, as I am sure you know, when they have a new teacher.

Cordially,

Manfred S. Frings
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LIST OF BOOKS RECEIVED

Cambridge

Hackett
Kupperman, Joel J. *Six Myths about the Good Life: Thinking about What Has Value*, 2006.

Oxford

Rowman & Littlefield

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