NEWSLETTER ON INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION

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INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE
PHILOSOPHICAL ENGAGEMENT:
DAVIDSON’S PHILOSOPHY
AND CHINESE PHILOSOPHY
From the Editor

As the editor of this Newsletter, starting with the Fall 2004 issue, I would like to welcome readers, old and new, to what I hope will be a useful and exciting venue for a number of philosophical interests that can be considered “international.” Our first task, as you will see from this issue, is to publish selected talks from conferences and panels sponsored by the APA’s Committee on International Cooperation. In some cases, particularly where conference proceedings will be going into publication in other forms, it will be more appropriate to provide here a summary of past CIC-sponsored events.

Accordingly, you will find in this issue a number of interesting talks from CIC-organized panels on reason and dialogue in the Middle East at the APA’s 2004 Central Division Meeting. (Please see the note from the past chair of the CIC, Alan Olson, for some background information about these panels.) In addition, there is a summary of a 2004 conference in Beijing on Davidson and Chinese philosophy, co-sponsored by the CIC.

Hopefully, we can supplement these kinds of publications with other materials in the future. For instance, I would urge readers who have given talks on international topics at APA or other philosophical conferences to submit them to the Newsletter for future publication. This is particularly appropriate if these talks deal with timely issues, as in the case of the discussions on the Middle East found in this issue. In addition, I hope that readers will send the Newsletter announcements of upcoming events that have an international focus, so that we can provide a central source of information on activities of interest to those who work on the international dimensions of philosophy.

Finally, a word about the word, “international.” As the new chair of the CIC, Ernest Lepore, indicates in his note, below, there is an ambiguity (hopefully, a productive one!) in prior uses of this term. On the one hand, “international” refers to all philosophical activities that cross “national” borders—such as the cooperative investigation of figures or issues (e.g., Hegel or cognitive science) by philosophers from different countries. On the other hand, the term also refers to the emerging field of international ethics, broadly construed. In this sense, it primarily concerns a variety of issues in political philosophy (international justice, just war, human rights, development ethics, and so on) that have a global dimension. I hope that this Newsletter will be a venue for interesting new work of both kinds and urge readers to submit materials and announcements of future events that touch on all aspects of philosophy and international cooperation. (All submissions should be sent to me at the address given.)

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From the New Chair

First of all, I would like to extend my thanks on behalf of the entire committee and the APA to Alan Olson for the outstanding job he has done during his tenure as chairman of the Committee on International Cooperation. I hope I can achieve something close to what he has done. Also, I believe it is important that one play to strength; I am much less knowledgeable and involved in political philosophy than many of the members of the committee have recently been. Though I look forward to learning from all current and past members, I know I can succeed if the focus at least initially is on establishing or renewing relations with various groups, including philosophers in Europe, Latin America, the Middle East, and Asia. Currently, there is considerable activity in Europe and Latin America of which I’m personally aware and I believe it would be a good thing for the APA to recognize it by sponsoring sessions that include people from abroad. I will seek to learn whether there is any funding to help people find a way to cover air travel, especially if the APA is able to cover some lodging costs. I will be checking with the Secretaries of the Divisions to see how much they can do to cover such costs for philosophers from abroad, especially from poorer countries, that we would like to invite for such sessions.

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FROM THE PAST CHAIR

The Committee for International Cooperation wishes to welcome a new chair, Professor Ernie Lepore of Rutgers University, and a new editor of the CIC Newsletter, Professor Omar Dahbour of Hunter College, City University of New York, both commencing their duties during the summer of 2004. We have great hopes that Omar will revive the CIC’s contribution to the Newsletters giving all due notice to the activities of the committee, which have been considerable during the past couple of years and which I will briefly enumerate below.

The international conference on “Philosophical Engagement: Davidson’s Philosophy and Chinese Philosophy,” organized by CIC member, Bo Mou (San Jose State University), was held June 8-10, 2004 in Beijing. The conference was sponsored by the International Society for Comparative Studies of Chinese and Western Philosophy (ISCWCP) and the Committee on International Cooperation of the American Philosophical Association (CIC), and was hosted by the Institute of Foreign Philosophy, Peking (Beijing) University. Initially scheduled for 2003, this conference was postponed because of the SARS epidemic, but was finally held in July 2004.

Other activities of the CIC during the past two years have reflected the geopolitical crisis that has engulfed the world since 9/11. The CIC, together with the Karl Jaspers Society of North America, developed a panel devoted to a retrospective analysis of Jaspers’s Die Atom Bomb und die Zukunft des Menschen: Politisches Bewusstsein unserer Zeit (1958) and its implications for today’s crisis at the Eastern Division meeting in Washington DC in 2003. Highly influential in the late 1950s and early 1960s, this book (published in English as The Future of Mankind) was largely devoted to an analysis of the United Nations and the prospects of international peace in the age of weapons of mass destruction. Christopher Thornhill (King’s College, University of London) gave the major paper, entitled “Humanism and Wars: Jaspers between Politics, Culture, and Law.”

The CIC also organized a six-hour panel at the Central Division meeting in Chicago in 2004 which brought together distinguished international scholars from the Middle East, Europe, and the United States to discuss the topic, “Can Reason be a Basis for Dialogue in the Middle East?” Co-sponsored with the Averroes and Enlightenment International Association (Cairo), these scholars included Mona Abousenna (Ain Shams University, Cairo), Bernard Henri-Levy (Paris), Bassam Tibi (University of Göttingen), Anat Belitzki (Tel Aviv University), Sari NFiseibe (Al Quds University, Jerusalem), Mourad Wahba (Ain Shams University, Cairo), Ovadia Ezra (Tel Aviv University), David Rasmussen (Boston College), Ruth Manor (Tel Aviv University), and a new committee member, Mohammad Ali Khalidi (American University, Beirut). Unfortunately, Professors Henri-Levy and Rasmussen could not, at the last moment, attend the Chicago meeting, but have promised to participate in a continuation of this program being organized for the Pacific Division meeting in San Francisco in 2005 on the related topic, “Philosophy, Religion, and Politics.”

This topic and program, developed in conjunction with a bequest from the Baumgardt Fund, and announced in a “Call for Papers” for the 2004-2005 meetings of the APA, attracted a large number of proposals. As a result, we have scheduled double three-hour sessions, co-sponsored with the Karl Jaspers Society of North America and the Hannah Arendt Circle, at all the forthcoming APA divisional meetings in Boston, San Francisco, and Chicago. At this writing, it is also likely that another panel of international scholars will gather in San Francisco to address specific issues relating to the continuing conflict in the Middle East, perhaps in conjunction with a program on “Global Justice” being organized by CIC member, Gillian Brock (University of Auckland, New Zealand), who organized a highly successful mini-conference on this topic at the APA Pacific Division Meeting in Pasadena in 2004.

It is important to note that the Middle Eastern focus of the CIC has continued conversations on intercultural philosophy which initially commenced at the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy in Boston in 1998, and also at a special session organized by Jaakko Hintikka and the CIC at the Atlanta meeting of APA in December 2001. The events of 9/11, however, made it impossible for our Palestinian scholars to attend, since they were unable to secure visas. Returning to the topic of “reason and dialogue” in Chicago in 2004, amidst the escalating violence since the commencement of the Iraq war and the Palestinian Intifada, prompted Ruth Manor (Tel Aviv) to observe that “rational dialogue now seems all but impossible.” She also mentioned the urgency of establishing something like “Doctors without Borders”; but the question arises as to what a “philosophers without borders” would do. One possibility, posed by Mona Abousenna and Mourad Wahba, of Cairo, and Bassam Tibi, of Göttingen, would be for philosophers to strive for the reform of education in Arab and Islamic countries by promoting the kind of critical and creative thinking necessary to combat the fundamentalist dogmatism that has so greatly fueled intolerance and conflict in this troubled part of the world.

Causal linkage between the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the unrest that characterizes the Islamic world generally was also a point of disagreement amongst panelists. Those nearest to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, namely, Anat Belitzki, Ovadia Ezra, Ruth Manor, Sari Nuseibeh, and Mohammad Ali Khaldi, viewed the successful resolution of the territorial and autonomy dispute between Israelis and Palestinians as utterly critical and in some sense the lynchpin for stabilizing the entire region. Others, such as Mona Abousenna, Mourad Wahba, and Bassam Tibi, believed otherwise, arguing that the phenomenon of Islamism is a global phenomenon driven by a host of issues other than the particulars of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. Bassam Tibi, who was a principal researcher in the Fundamentalism Project carried out by Martin Marty and Scott Appleby (and published by the University of Chicago Press), argued that Islamism and organizations such as Al-Qaeda have a world-historical agenda and must be understood accordingly.

It should also be mentioned that, following the Atlanta meeting, three international meetings were organized and held on related topics. Two were conducted in conjunction with a project designed to encourage dialogue by examining “Rationality as a Bridge between Arab-Islamic Cultures and the West.” These conferences were launched jointly by the Averroes and Enlightenment International Association and the Zayed International Center for Coordination and Follow-up in Abu Dhabi and held on the topics of “Terrorism and Reason” in January 2003 and “Rationality as a Bridge Between East and West” in June 2003. The proceedings of these two conferences were published by the Zayed Center in 2003. A third conference was held in conjunction with the Paideia Project at Boston University in March 2003 on the related topic, “Paideia and Religion: Educating for Democracy?” with principal focus on Russia, the Middle East, and the U.S. The proceedings of this conference, and a prior conference in 2002 at the Institut für Wissenschaften vom Menschen in Vienna, are published under the title: Educating for Democracy: Paideia in an Age of Uncertainty (Rowman & Littlefield, 2004).
SPECIAL SECTION: CAN REASON BE A BASIS FOR DIALOGUE IN THE MIDDLE EAST?

Can Reason be a Dialogueic Bridge for Peace in the Middle East?

Mourad Wahba
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At the outset, one has to define the three terms contained in the title of this paper, that is, reason, dialogue, and peace. Thus, let me begin with the concept of reason and ask: What is reason?

Reason does not perceive facts because there are no facts per se, but facts as perceived. Thus reason, from the beginning, interprets facts. But its interpretation is not confined only to the theoretical level, it is related also to practice due to my definition of creativity as “the ability of reason to establish new relations with the purpose of changing reality.” As evidence, human civilization began with the agricultural age and not with the hunting age, because in the hunting age the relation of man to the environment was horizontal and this meant that man accommodated himself to the environment. But in the agricultural age, this relation became vertical and this meant that man accommodated the environment to his perpetually new needs. Thus we can define reason as “the faculty of practico-transcendental interpretation.” This definition involves a substantial relation between reason and creativity to the extent that we could say that reason is creative by its very nature. This means that when reason stops being creative, it is no longer reason.

Now, the crucial question is: What prevents reason from being creative?

Cultural taboos prevent the human being from practicing critical thinking and transforming the status quo. In this respect, I would like to mention Kant’s famous statement that “the suggestions of David Hume were the very thing which, many years ago, first interrupted my dogmatic slumber and gave my investigation, in the field of speculative philosophy, quite a new direction.” By “a new direction,” I believe that Kant meant the foundation of critical philosophy implied in his three great works, Critique of Pure Reason, Critique of Practical Reason, and Critique of Judgment.

In this sense, creative reason, by its very nature, is critical and, therefore, non-dogmatic. And I think that it is this realm of reason that the Enlightenment was striving to establish. Consequently, one can assume that unreasonable, or strictly speaking, irrationalism, begins at the moment one falls into dogmatism and culminates in the moment of jumping into religious fundamentalism.

Now the question is: What is the relation between dogmatism and religious fundamentalism? Let me first define the two terms before identifying their relation. The term “dogma” means opinion and the plural serves to indicate the fundamental ideas that structure thinking and thereby guide and control the action of a person or group. So these ideas have to do more with practical obligations than with theoretical points. In this sense, dogmas are regarded as deriving more from the external authority than from any reasoning or conviction. This root of dogmatism was quite obvious to the Enlightenment and the pejorative sense of the adjective “dogmatic” comes from the external, heteronomous, origin of convictions.

Beginning with the twentieth century, dogmatism took many shapes, such as Fascism, Hitlerism, and Stalinism. What concerns me here is religious fundamentalism. From its origin, fundamentalism was a religious movement that emerged among American Evangelical Christians during the 1920s. Thus, fundamentalism was a label for dogmatic thinking.

Now, we shift to the second concept, namely, “dialogue,” and we ask: What is the purpose of dialogue? The purpose of dialogue is not to win an argument because any argument assumes that its aim is to reach the truth, and truth is an illusory concept for the following reason: the concept of truth is a fundamental idea that structure thinking and thereby guide and control the action of a person or group. So these ideas have to do more with theoretical obligations than with practical points. And this is so, then, dialogue has nothing to do with grasping the truth, whether it is relative or absolute, but has to do with the purpose of changing reality. To reach this stage, that is, the new concept of truth, dialogue has to proceed without claiming any opinion or any idea as an absolute truth.

In this sense, dialogists explore the manner in which they become partners in a common project and not enemies in contradictory projects, for the simple reason of being involved together in surpassing the status quo for the sake of realizing the pro quo, that is, the common futuristic vision. Consequently, dialogical partners will shift from looking at the histories of the past to the histories of the future, and this shift copes with the cyberspace which is open for creating ideas, for example, computer scientists who perceive the potential of technology and try to envision what it may enable us to do. Norbert Wiener was one of the scientists to realize that computers were more than calculators and began to fret about the relationship humans would have with machines. Douglas Engelbart decided to devote his life to finding a way of using computers to augment human capabilities. Thus we can say that only where there is future, is there history. Within this context, we can state that the dialogists should be involved in making their own future.

Now, let us move to the third concept, that is, peace and ask: What is peace?
We have to distinguish between two meanings of peace. We say that a certain country is currently at peace with its neighbors. When we speak thus, we are using the word peace negatively to mean the absence of actual fighting. But in contrast to this negative meaning of the word peace, there is the positive one when we use it to say that peace exists among people living in civil society under civil government and that is called civil peace based not on the absolute but on the relative, not on dogmas but on civil laws.

With these concepts, let me comment on a vital dialogue, which took place at Tel-Aviv University on December 19, 1980, between Egyptian politicians and Israeli professors. The dialogists were: Haim Ben Shahar (President, Tel Aviv University); Shimon Shamir (Professor, History of the Middle East); Mustafa Khalil (Professor of Engineering); David Vital (Professor of Political Science); Evi Yavotz (Rector, Tel Aviv University); Sasson Somekh (Professor of Arabic Literature); and Boutros Ghali (Former Secretary General of the United Nations).

Let me show how the dialogue proceeded and then pick up the relevance of reason to the peace process. The first dialogist, Haim Ben Shahar, insisted on the priority of thinking about the future or, strictly speaking, about practicing creative thinking for the sake of changing the status quo in order to surpass the ups and downs of the political process and realize the perpetual peace.

The second dialogist, Shimon Shamir, followed the previous idea that we need to change the mental set to maintain a solid foundation for peace. He added that we need changes in perceptions and images for the sake of surpassing the past. But there is one defect in his vision and that is his stress on the historical interaction between Egypt and Israel for more than thirty-five centuries, and his argument was that looking at the past could benefit the peace process. But what is going on now in our area happens in spite of this historical interaction. So looking at the past does not help push things in the right direction.

The third dialogist, Mustafa Khalil, made a drastic statement that could hinder the positive results of the dialogue. At the outset of his comment, Khalil approved of what Shamir had stated regarding the ancient relations between Egypt and Israel. Then, he referred to a negative point concerning the Egyptian concept about Israel, which denies the Jews their national identity, and this denial is due to the Egyptian concept of religion being confined to a personal relation between man and his God. Consequently, there is a dogmatic gap that hinders mutual understanding. But Khalil as a negotiator tried to find a way to dedogmatize the gap through what President Sadat called the “psychological barrier.”

Now, three questions have to be raised:

1. Could the solution to the psychological gap lead to dedogmatization?
2. Who will help solve this problematic, the theologians or the psychologists or both?
3. Can one identify the theologians and the psychologists who could fit into the dialogue for peace?

David Vital, responding negatively to Khalil’s drastic statement, said that the state of Israel is legitimate and should not be a subject for discussion; otherwise, the conflict will become more fanatic and the peace process will not continue.

Now, the crucial question is whether Vital is right in excluding Khalil’s drastic statement from the dialogue. If so, then the legitimacy of the dialogue will be questioned, despite the fact that the new function of the dialogue is to dedogmatize what has been dogmatized. But this function cannot be practiced unless the dialogists have been trained how to dedogmatize the dogma. And this is the real responsibility of those who are involved in the peace process.

Evi Yavotz went back to Khalil’s drastic statement, which is full of dogs. He tried to dedogmatize it through dialoguing with the Palestinians to tell them to accept the right of Israel to exist as a religious nation. And while the dialogue is going on, national psychologists will be working to cure those who suffer from the psychological barrier about which Sadat has spoken. Otherwise, wars will continue.

Yovam Dinstein also went back to Khalil’s drastic statement denying the existence of a Jewish people and recognizing Jews only as members of a religious group. Dinstein argued that the paradox here is that in spite of that denial, a peace treaty was signed between Egypt and Israel in 1979. He then proposed that the intelligentsia of both countries should dialogue but away from the limelight of the mass media.

Now, the question is: What about the masses? They will not be included in the dialogue. But this is a drastic situation because the masses play a political role due to the emergence of the new mass media. So one cannot ignore them. In this case, the dialogue has to be practiced via TV.

Sasson Somekh referred to the negative phenomenon whereby cultural exchange with Israel is prohibited by the Egyptian authority. Books with anti-Jewish titles are exposed without bringing about any appropriate reaction and no effect is seen on the political establishment. In this case, dialogue is absolutely necessary and must be practiced by the intelligentsia.

Boutrous Ghali referred to a very important element, that is, extremism on both sides. But he argued that this is one element of the general situation. And Haim Ben Shahar stated that Israeli professors are open to dialogue whereas the Egyptians are not. Thus open dialogue is an absolute necessity, and if dialogue does not work, the peace process will fail and the responsibility for this failure will lie on the shoulders of the intellectuals and not the masses.

To conclude, we have to raise the following question: What hinders reason from playing its real role as the creative basis for dialogue in the peace process? To this question I would say: ignorance of Israeli society, its roots and identity, in the Arab world. Although Egypt and Israel have occupied a central place on the stage of universal history, they remain on bad terms with each other; in other words, they suffer a cultural gap to the extent that they have acquired a dogmatic pattern of thinking that hinders the establishment of a new pattern of dialogue for which I have argued.
The Limit of Reason (or Why Dignity Is Not Negotiable)

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It is often assumed that conflicts can be resolved if men will resort to reason, or that reason, in other words, is a sufficient condition for the success of negotiations. In particular, it is also assumed that the failure of the Israeli-Palestinian negotiations (for example, at the Camp David talks in 2000) is a direct result of the fact that reason did not dominate those negotiations. I argue here that, by itself, reason is not a sufficient condition for the success of negotiations. I conclude by suggesting that there are two conditions whose fulfillment is necessary for negotiations to succeed. The first is to interpret reason (as the negotiators’ term of reference) specifically in moral terms (as being anchored in a basic human value such as Kant’s dignity); the second is to generate faith among Israelis and Palestinians that only such an interpretation of reason can achieve peace.

But to reach this conclusion I introduce, first, a classic example of a failed negotiation (the famous Melian Dialogue) to show that, if different values (e.g., right and might) were to inform a negotiation between two parties, then those negotiations will inevitably fail. And I argue, second, that even if similar values were to be used, a point of reconciliation between the negotiating parties would still not be determinable (i.e., it cannot be determined in advance whether such a point is possible). I make use of the concept of warped space and what I call the “negotiators’ paradox” to explain this latter point. Hence I conclude that we should look beyond a neutral understanding of reason for a determining force that can bring about the success of negotiations.

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Most of us are acquainted with the failed Melos negotiations, as reported to us by the Athenian historian Thucydides. The Athenians were trying to bring all of the surrounding islands into alliance against Sparta. The Melians, truly believing themselves to be an island lying outside the orbit of the unfolding Peloponnesian War, argued fervently in favor of being left alone. The Melian argument based itself on universal human principles and on the notion of right. The Athenians, on the other hand, tried to instill some realism into the debate in as much as they turned that argument upside down. In real life, it is might that determines right, they argued. Later, and to prove their point physically after they failed to do so logically, they forcefully invaded Melos, putting their previous interlocutors to death and subjecting their island to their dominion.

It is hard to tell whether the Melians believed they would be left alone, that is, whether they believed, in fact, the Athenians would be persuaded by their logic. On the other hand, it is easy to surmise how they viewed the Athenian logic, namely, as a typical case of the fallacy of ad bellum. In any event, it would be interesting to answer the question of whether, had they known in advance how things would end up after the debate was through, they would still have held to their principle of sovereignty, or to the principle of being free to choose.

Tactical alliances or convenience agreements to avert worse evils are commonplace rational (and justifiable) acts. Even if advance knowledge is not available, the realistic calculation that a worse evil might befall one can still be claimed to justify such alliances or agreements. It could therefore be argued that, had the Melians applied pure reason to their situation, a justified compromise would have been reached. But is there never a line to be drawn? Had the Melians, cognizant of the inevitable massacre to follow, succumbed to the Athenians’ argument, is it impossible to bring a rational argument to show that they have crossed that line? Or would they simply have been undertaking a justifiable exchange between one condition (holding on to their principle but suffering deaths) and another (taking time out on that principle and saving lives)?

A classic approach to drawing a line between what to consider a rationally exchangeable item and what not so to consider is to measure such an exchange against the background of the alternative. But here we are asking the prior question as to the evaluation itself, since evaluations clearly differ. How could one find or draw such a line in the first place? In the case before us, we can distinguish between two kinds of approaches in answer to this question. From a (physical-life) utilitarian point of view, it could be argued that there is no “good” that is not replaceable, and therefore negotiable. Saving life, even if that life, or life in general, did not have a moral worth, nonetheless has more utilitarian value than holding on to a debatable, even a flimsy metaphysical principle, such as the right to choose. On this basis, and cognizant of the probable consequences, the Melians had only one justifiable course of action, which they foolishly resisted. Kant, on the other hand, might have viewed the matter differently. He argued that, ideally speaking, or in the Kingdom of Ends, everything has either value or dignity. Whatever has a value can be replaced by something else which is equivalent. It is, in other words, a good that is negotiable for something deemed to have the same value. Whatever, on the other hand, is above all value, and therefore admits of no equivalent (hence, presumably, cannot be negotiated), has a dignity. Dignity, Kant argued, does not merely have a relative worth as a means to an end other than itself; rather, it has an intrinsic worth as an end unto itself. Only in a moral framework can a rational being seek to be an end in himself, making morality, and humanity as capable of it, the sole possessors of dignity. For Kant, in other words, the limit of reason’s exchanges, and at the same time its highest achievement, is that ultimate morality of which humanity is capable. This is not exchangeable; it is not negotiable. Dignity is thus above value, not merely sentimentally, but ontically, logically, and, one might also add in this context, politically as well.

We might rationally assume then that a Kantian would have argued in precisely the same terms that Thucydides reports the Melians did (notwithstanding the Athenian charge that it is only the weak who seek to make up for the absence of means by resorting to lofty moral arguments). However, his position would have been based on the principle that human life has a moral content. Depriving it of its content is tantamount to its termination. In this sense, its moral death is more real, if death can be graded, than its physical death. Hence, although for both a Kantian and a utilitarian human life would seem to constitute a red line and to have primacy, each interprets “life” differently. Although human life may be reason’s limit of negotiations in the two perspectives, such reason is clearly informed by different values, and yields two genetically different “lines.”

Because of the fundamentally different meanings that may be adduced to human life, one should also expect there to be a crossroad of genetically different negotiation paths pursued in the employment of reason (defining different lines of what is deemed justifiable as an item of exchange). Using pure reason but proceeding along one direction or path from this crossroad, one could imagine a long line of tolerance of various levels of human degradation, eventually leading to a
justification of servility. Along this path, only when the added value to itself from a further act of submission or servility is zero would it cease to be rational (and hence, justifiable) to choose a course of action whose ultimate measure is the saving of life. Only at this point would the line of justifiability be deemed to have been crossed. Proceeding along the other path, dignity, or the moral content of life, defines the limit of justification differently. So long as an action upholds or further reinforces this dignity, even at the expense, in extreme cases, of physical life, it is to be viewed as rational (and hence justifiable).

Accepting life as such a defining line or limit, but cognizant of the two inconsistent and perhaps irreconcilable ways in which it is drawn, and the two distinct negotiation paths, should one assume therefore that one could proceed further to identify two distinct and logically incongruous sets of upper and lower limits for each path such that a negotiation between them is predestined to be futile? Or should one assume that, though they be informed by different sets of upper and lower limits or lines, one could suppose that the paths somehow manage to cross one another, making contact or a point of common understanding possible? Is there perhaps, and notwithstanding the incongruity of values, a common baseline below which life, on either interpretation, ceases to have primacy, and could thus become exchangeable? Is there, analogously, a maximum above which its non-replaceability ceases to be justifiable? Generally, and whatever the answer, the existence of such limits or parameters, and the specific forms which they are imagined or assumed to have by the various interlocutors, is a determining condition in the negotiation postures and dispositions of these various interlocutors, regardless of how articulated the consciousness of them is. For example, the Athenian insistence that the Melians give up their neutrality would not necessarily have been conceived as a negotiation demand overstepping the upper limit of justifiability, even though, or because, as the Athenians explicitly argued, it was a demand reinforcing the natural law of inequality, that the weak should succumb to the strong. The Melian insistence, on the other hand, that their political decision must be informed at all costs by their own free choice, basically reflected the belief that free choice is the minimum limit below which negotiations cease to make sense or to be acceptable. From the Athenian perspective, the upper limit of justified demands in negotiations was not being overstepped. From the Melian perspective, the baseline or lower limit of justified intransigence was properly being held on to. In other words, the negotiation path used by each side was different. The approach of each side to the interchange was informed by a different measure, and the upper and lower limits defining these measures were distinct from one another. Their respective worldviews on life were different. The Athenian upper limit and the Melian baseline were each defined in accordance with its own separate measure. Adopting different measures, or negotiating along different paths, it is arguable that a common point would thus have been unlikely, indeed, perhaps altogether a logical impossibility. The Melian dialogue was doomed to be an example of a failed negotiation from the outset, because one path was informed by right and the other by might.

Generally, negotiation theory distinguishes between the (outer-layer) positions/demands and the (real) concerns/needs (or interests) of two parties interlocked in negotiations, and argues in favor of a non-zero-sum, or a win-win formula allowing room for the fulfillment of the two sides’ concerns. A successful negotiation on this view is always possible if one were to properly apply the correct techniques and procedures (and if a specific conclusion to a negotiation is calculated to have better advantages than dropping the option of negotiation altogether). Even so, however, it would seem to be implicitly assumed that the fixed upper and lower limits in such models of negotiation are identical and therefore define the same measures in use by the interlocutors, determining their respective negotiation postures and dispositions. For example, in negotiating a wage increase at a factory both parties would be negotiating over a good which is defined, to all intents and purposes, in the same terms, which each side wishes to possess more of. Each side thus faces the other along the same path, and both operate within the same parameters. The underlying relationship between employer and employed is fixed, and it is not itself, typically, open to negotiations. The language between them is common, in that each side appreciates the worth of the good being negotiated, as well as the generically similar appreciation of it by the other side. It is arguably only within those limits that reconciliation, or the effort to provide a formula addressing concerns, is possible. But what if two generically different measures and different upper and lower limits are in use? Can we still cut through positions, and reconcile between concerns?

Arafat and Barak reportedly clashed at Camp David over how to address the Noble or Holy Sanctuary in Jerusalem (the Dome of the Rock area for the Moslems, and the Temple Mount Area for the Jews). Is it all to be under Moslem (or Palestinian) sovereignty, or is it to have a horizontally two-tiered or layered divided sovereignty? The Clinton formula (a two-layered approach), cutting through stated positions, sought to address the presumed concerns of both sides: the Jewish concern for history, as well as the Moslem concern for existing reality. Nonetheless the clash occurred, and the two leaders walked out of Camp David feeling outraged (Barak and Clinton at Arafat’s apparently irrational intransigence, and Arafat at Clinton’s making what seemed nothing less than a deeply derogatory offer.) Does one conclude that Clinton’s formula, while informed by the right reconciliation principle, nonetheless failed as a successful example of it? Or does one conclude that, while it was a perfect paradigm, it failed because of irrational (i.e., unjustifiable) intransigence? Observers tend to oscillate in their appraisals between these two different explanations. But the problem, I am suggesting, might lie somewhere else, namely, in the obliviousness of the approach to the generically different negotiation measures in use by the interlocutors, and the generically different upper and lower negotiation limits associated with those different measures. The reason for the failure of the Clinton effort, in other words, might well have been that it was a classic example of trying to mix apples with oranges, or that it was a reenactment of the doomed Melian model.

We have more than one knot to unravel here. First: Is it always possible to identify distinctly separate pairs of upper and lower limits for the two negotiation measures or standards referred to, such that, for any reconciliation effort across those two measures, it is always impossible to fuse the different parties’ concerns into one non-zero-sum agreement? Or are we, as we consider the different paths leading away from the crossroad, rather dealing with non-Euclidean (or warped) space where lines keep bending and crossing over one another, such that, for any point of intersection of generically different measures is it still always logically possible to identify a point of non-zero-sum agreement? Our second knot is this: To what extent can we be confident, as we formally distinguish between those two negotiation measures, that we fully understand and agree upon what constitutes the moral as opposed to the utilitarian measure? For example, what has undivided vertical sovereignty over a geographic location to do with dignity, or the moral life, or with free choice? Is there
no mixing of apples and oranges here? Might one not regard
the identification of an inexchangeable good, such as
sovereignty over a holy area, merely as an irrational obsession
rather than as a moral good which can be viewed as a source of
justification?

Our first knot (we may call it “the negotiators’ paradox”) may be such as to defy an answer or a solution altogether; indeed, it may even be such as to disturb whatever solution we may already have. The implicit assumption there is that whereas a point of agreement is logically possible when the same parameters are in use by two interlocutors, the same is not true (i.e., it is not necessarily true that this possibility exists) when two distinct sets of parameters are in use by those interlocutors. When two distinct sets of parameters are used, the effort at reconciling concerns would have to be made one case at a time, such that for any specific new case the question would remain open (i.e., it would be indeterminable) whether a reconciliation is logically possible or not. So far, and assuming a Euclidean negotiation space, we do not have a major problem. However, admitting this but arguing from a non-Euclidean perspective, it will not be possible to predetermine, for any such new case, whether it lies at a potential intersection point of the generically different paths. If it turns out that it does lie at such a point, then it would not be an open question (i.e., it would not be indeterminable) whether reconciliation is logically possible, because such a point has already been determined by us to admit of such a possibility. Here, then, we come across the first problem, which is a paradox that favors pessimists, in that a point we posited as indeterminable comes out as being determinable. Since, however, the question of whether it is more valid to use a Euclidean or a non-Euclidean perspective is itself indeterminable, it becomes equally indeterminable with regard to any specific point, given different negotiation measures, whether it is a point of intersection, and hence, determinable, i.e., can admit of reconciliation. But now the following further step, leading to a paradox that favors pessimists, can be taken: since we are talking specifically about possible intersection points, our conclusion concerning indeterminability comes to apply to points that lie in or along either one of the two paths, indifferently. In other words, we find ourselves confronted with the paradox that, with regard to any specific point even along one path or in accordance with one measure, it is indeterminable whether that point is determinately reconcilable, although our starting assumption was that it is.

All of the above amply explains why reason is not a sufficient condition for a successful negotiation, as well as why negotiators often end up with headaches but not with solutions. The second knot’s complexity is altogether different. An item or a good might have a special worth or value for a person, sometimes outweighing the worth or value that person considers their (or somebody else’s) life to have. But do all such items or goods belong in the same basket of justification, and is there a clear standard by which we can lighten the basket’s weight by throwing out false items? A young lawyer from Jenin blew herself up over Pesach last year in a partly Arab-owned restaurant which was full of Jewish women, children, and Holocaust survivors, killing over twenty-six people, including herself. For her, the meaning of physical life had expired, and she saw the one last act of her intrinsic self as consisting of nothing other than, in an expression of anger and protest, the termination of this life and those of others belonging to “the enemy.” Hers was neither a religious nor a political cause. It was not an act of negotiation. But the devastating impact of the failure of negotiations had reached her, depriving her of those matters in life, such as her loved ones, which she considered as constituting her own sense of self-worth, or for which her own life had meaning. It was not so much that physical life had become exchangeable. It had become altogether expendable. The expendability of physical life, whether limited to one’s own or spread out to include specified or even unspecified human individuals or groups; and whether for existentialist causes with a small “c” or for grander tribal, social, political, or religious Causes (with a capital “C”); and whether in proactive or defensive contexts—all of these cannot simply fit into one category, making all of them equivalently a source of justification, for no reason but that the definition of life for their actors is not utilitarian but has a moral content. Indeed, most of human history’s bestial acts have been committed in the name and under the cover of the so-called grander causes of life, such as the so-called “family honor,” the racial or national imperative, or God’s supposed calling.

This odd mixture of so-called grander causes should not make us despair of a rational order altogether; it stands clearly in need of being sorted out by a single defining principle which is at once context-free and above passion, which Kant’s dignity and the moral imperative might help provide. Once sorted out in accordance with that principle one might better appreciate the weakness of the utilitarian approach. Because, on the one hand and even from a (physical/life) utilitarian point of view, prizing physical life above all else would seem to be subject to a diminishing margin of utility: at some point along the path of human degradation, it ceases to be clear from the point of view of the underdog why human physical life should be regarded as being more sacrosanct than that of a beetle. And if the underdog in the degrading relationship has reached the point where their physical life comes to be viewed as being equivalent to that of a beetle, it would by no means be irrational for them to suppose that, by the same token, the physical life of their tormentor becomes similarly equivalent, and therefore as expendable as the next beetle but oneself. This is the argument that while an act of terrorism is not justifiable by itself, and is indeed morally repugnant from a human point of view, the only possible source for its justification is the act of dehumanization, admitted under utilitarian grounds, which led logically to it, making it morally part of an inter-beetle affair. We cannot, under utilitarian grounds, justifiably assume that a dehumanized individual or group must nonetheless maintain respect for the life or lives of others, least of all for the lives of those who have shared and continue to share in the perpetration of their dehumanization. Even moral repugnancy ceases to have any meaning in this context, except insofar as it is an outsider’s humane sentiment describing revulsion at the moral contortion of which humanity is capable.

On the other hand, and besides moral contortion, Kant tells us that humanity is capable of something else, namely, dignity. One major feature about dignity is its rational and, therefore, human universality. Insofar as they are rational, human beings partake of it equally. Hence, on its account not a single step of degradation or dehumanization is justified, least of all any such step that may constitute a source of legitimization for the taking of life. If a dehumanizing step (like occupation) were nonetheless to be taken, it would itself be illegitimate, and resistance to it would be justifiable. However, it would be justifiable only insofar as it does not undermine or blemish the principle from whose source it received its justification in the first place, namely, the safekeeping of human dignity. In such circumstances, however, the only life that becomes justifiably expendable is one’s own, in defense of one’s dignity, or, arguably—in such cases as euthanasia—another’s, in defense of theirs. Therefore, it would seem that, for reason to be a mechanism for a successful negotiation, it is a necessary condition that such reason as
used by the respective negotiators be informed by the same human or moral value.

We therefore return full circle to the Melian dialogue with which we started, where the dignity of free agency was not up for exchange, even for the preservation of physical life. In preparation for my concluding remarks concerning the Israeli-Palestinian case, let me quickly indicate why I believe the Melian model to be informed by a Kantian perspective (to show this definitively would require more time and space): free choice, or autonomy of the will as Kant described it, is precisely the instrument by which a rational being chooses or legislates a maxim belonging to a universal law to which he at the same time submits himself. This autonomy (or freedom) is the basis, Kant claims, of the dignity of human beings and indeed of every rational creature. The Athenians, in their negotiating posture, were denying it to the Melians, or were so suffused by the drunkenness of their might as to be entirely oblivious to it; while the Melians, perhaps because of the absence of the means of drunkenness, as the Athenians charged, were not blinded to its worth as an end in itself, as Kant calls it.

Now, to my concluding remarks. I have already stated that the Melian dialogue model is doomed to failure and, even worse, that a reconciliation between negotiators adopting even the same standard or measure is indeterminable, thus making moral reason, though necessary as I have already shown, still not sufficient for a successful negotiation. So long as Israel’s negotiating posture is informed by might alone, it is bound to destroy whatever negotiation effort it engages in. On the other hand, so long as the Palestinians’ negotiating posture is informed by whatever cause that falls short of the Kantian principle of the universality of autonomy and human dignity, then any negotiation effort on their part is bound also to falter. However, assuming mutual respect of humanity’s dignity, a point of reconciliation, though indeterminable, can nonetheless be brought about. Its political form may be expressed by a model of equal citizenship in one state, or in a confederation of states. It may also be embodied in the form of distinct citizenships in two neighboring states. Imperatives less than dignity, and informed by national or religious passions, may help articulate the precise form of that point of reconciliation. The two peoples might feel better off being apart from each other, separated by a border, as solid and as forbidding as any border that can be imagined. However, the underlying principle of such a reconciliation point, however logical or rational as a moral mean, being indeterminable, does not unfold or come into being mechanically or unilaterally. It requires human agency—huge efforts by both sides to translate it into reality. To activate such agency, a belief has to come to exist in the validity of this principle as a moral mean, and therefore, as a negotiation imperative. Paradoxically, therefore, belief, or, even more strongly, faith among the two peoples has to be generated in this call of reason, of sufficient power to be used as a political instrument or lever in order that a point, indeterminable in itself as we saw, comes to be determined by the peoples themselves.

Endnotes
3. See, for example, the various works by Roger Fisher on the subject, including, with Bill Ury, Getting to Yes (Penguin, 1991).

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Generalization and Consistency: Keys to Mutual Recognition

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To assess to what extent reason can be a basis for dialogue in the Middle East, we have to concentrate on the word, “basis,” in the announced title. And if we want to be more careful (or one may say “realistic”), we should concentrate on the foundational conditions that permit the existence of such a dialogue. That is because the situation in the Middle East has become chaotic, saturated with blood, mutual hostility, and mistrust. Any attempt to start a dialogue—such as the Geneva Initiative or that of Sari Nusseibeh and Ami Ayalon—encounters waves of objections and opposition on both sides, mainly from extreme groups (and in Israel even from the government, which itself comprises parties from the extreme right), who wish to cut such attempts off in their prime. To start a dialogue in the Middle East—at least between Israelis and Palestinians—we need, first, to establish a mutual recognition of both parties as free and equal entities. Mutual recognition means that for both sides, the freedom and equality of the other will not only be acknowledged but also be fully respected. This respect requires that the initial difference in power and wealth between the parties should not affect or determine the weight and consideration to be given to the others’ needs or desires. In other words, a sincere and honest dialogue between equals should not include any paternalism or prejudice, but must insist on complete impartiality.

Here, I want to give two examples of how the acceptance of widely acknowledged presumptions of ethical and political discussions can give principal guidelines for mutual recognition. The first example is taken from Locke’s theory, and can establish the fundamental prohibitions on one’s actions that result from mutual recognition—that is, what things should not be allowed to both sides or should not be done by each side. The second example is taken from Alan Gewirth’s theory, and can establish the elementary requirements from one’s treatment of the other—that is, how should one treat the other, when one recognizes the other as an equal.

When Locke characterizes “the state of nature” in The Second Treatise of Government, he describes the state all men are naturally in as “a state of perfect freedom to order their action...without asking leave or depending upon the will of any other man.” Besides freedom, this state is also characterized by equality “wherein all the power and jurisdiction is reciprocal, no one having more than another; there is nothing more evident than that creatures of the same species and rank, promiscuously born to all the same advantages of nature and the use of the same faculties, should also be equal one amongst another without subordination or subjection.” However, the state of liberty is not a state of license: “though man in that state have uncontrollable liberty to dispose of his person or possessions, yet he has no liberty to destroy himself.” Locke reminds us that even “the state of nature has a law of nature to govern it, which obliges every one; and reason which is that law, teaches all mankind who will but consult it that, no one ought to harm another in his life, health, liberty or possession.”

Here we see that the acceptance of equality and freedom by everyone who possesses some reason does not allow that person to harm any other person, exactly as reason does not allow that person to harm him/herself. However, Locke goes much further. Led by reason, which is the law of nature, and
accepting the presumptions of freedom and equality between all, Locke believes that the conjunction of these presumptions, when one follows reason, also includes components of distributive justice. According to his concept of property, when one makes something his own property, by mixing his labor with natural resources, one has to make sure that “there is enough and as good left in common for others.” A person is not allowed to keep for him/herself more than that he/she can use to any advantage of life, before it spoils. “Whatever is beyond this is more than his share and belongs to others.”

According to Locke, reason requires that equal creatures, even when free, will have more or less the same ability and chances to enjoy common resources, and no one should possess or enjoy anything by dispossessing the other. One should not exploit or deprive the other of something that they both, as equals, should enjoy. Locke’s “Proviso,” which results from reason, does not allow the differentiation between people who live together, and this provision does not allow subjection, subordination, or exploitation of any person by others.

Up to here I have showed how the use of reason, when people accept the presumption of freedom and equality of all, could guide them to mutual recognition, instruct them in what to avoid, and prevent them from evil or malicious actions. Now I want to give another example of using reason to guide people in what to do and instruct them how to treat others, when they accept the presumptions of freedom and equality. While the previous example was taken from an empiricist, Locke, I will now use part of a Kantian rationalist theory, taken from Gewirth.

The main goal of Gewirth’s interest in his right-based theory is to set up a supreme moral principle. His concept of a right is derived from some moral assumptions regarding human actions and their generic features. There, he believes, the necessary content of morality is to be found. According to Gewirth, a human “action” has, in the strict sense relevant to moral precepts, two generic features: voluntariness or freedom, and purposiveness or intentionality. The first feature means that the performance of the action is under the agent’s control, in the sense that she unforcedly chooses to act the way she does. The second feature means that the agent acts for some ends or purposes, which constitute her reason for acting.

The Establishment of the Principle

Considering freedom as the procedural generic feature of action, and welfare as the substantive feature (in the sense of having the general abilities and conditions needed for achieving one’s purposes), Gewirth establishes two main theses. The first is that every agent must accept that he has rights to freedom and well-being. The second is much more crucial: that every agent must accept that all other agents have the same rights he claims for himself, and this means that the existence of universal and equal moral rights must be accepted, within the whole context of action.

The argument for the first thesis is as follows: Every agent must regard freedom and well-being as necessary goods for himself (since they are necessary conditions for actions in general, and without them he is not able to act for his purposes). This forces him to accept:

1. “I must have freedom and well-being” (where “must” has a practical-prescriptive sense). Accepting this obliges him to accept:

2. “I have rights to freedom and well-being.” The agent has to accept this, because rejecting this would require him to reject:

3. “All other persons ought at least to refrain from removing or interfering with my freedom and well-being.” Rejecting (3) requires him to accept:

4. “Other persons may (i.e., it is permissible that other persons) remove or interfere with my freedom and well-being.” By accepting (4) the agent has to accept:

5. “I may not (i.e., it is permissible that I not) have freedom and well-being.”

But (5) contradicts (1).

Gewirth says that since every agent must accept (1), he has to reject (5). And since (5) follows from the denial of (2), every agent must reject that denial, so that he must accept (2): “I have rights to freedom and well-being.” This is the first thesis Gewirth wants to establish. Its main point is that every human action is necessarily connected with the concept of rights. It follows from the assumption that every agent must accept that he has rights, that there are necessary conditions of action.

The argument for the second thesis, the generalization that every agent must accept that all other agents have the same generic rights that he has, is based on the principle of universalizability. Briefly, this principle says that if some predicate P belongs to some subject S, because he has some quality Q (as a sufficient condition), then P logically must belong to all other subjects who have the quality Q. Accordingly, if an agent holds that he has generic rights because he is a prospective purposive agent, then this agent logically must also hold that every other agent has the same generic rights.

According to the previous paragraphs, and following the conclusion of (1) to (5), every agent has to accept:

6. “I have rights to freedom and well-being, because I am a prospective purposive agent.” And considering the principle of universalizability, every agent is forced to generalize his claim, and hence to accept:

7. “All prospective purposive agents have rights to freedom and well-being.”

Here Gewirth turns to the prescriptive aspect of his analysis. He argues that universalized judgments set prescriptive requirements for actions, made by those who maintain them. According to these requirements, every agent must consider the status of others, who might be affected by his actions. Considering them as prospective purposive agents leads the agent to accept a moral principle, formulated as follows:

8. “Act in accord with the generic rights of your recipients, as well as yourself.”

Gewirth calls this the “principle of generic consistency” because it combines the formal considerations of consistency with the material considerations of the generic features and rights of action. He considers this a principle of human rights, since it forces every agent to accept that all other agents have rights equal to his own.

In Gewirth’s theory, as was the case before in Locke’s theory, being rational and accepting the presumption of equality between people, requires the recognition of the other as an agent and hence the acknowledgment of the other’s rights. This requires us to respect others’ rights, desires, welfare, and freedom.

What we have seen so far is that using reason as the source for our actions obliges us to treat others who we consider to be equal to us in the same way we expect them to treat us. If we would accept Locke’s presumptions and recognize each other as free and equal, reason would require that we restrain our actions whenever they strike at the others’ welfare, generic rights, and freedom. Hence many actions done by both sides in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict would have been considered
immoral, and hence should be prohibited. The Palestinians would have stopped the indiscriminate killing of the civilian population in Israel, and Israel would respect, at the very least, the basic rights of the Palestinians to freedom and welfare. This means, as a preliminary step, the dismantling of the barriers inside the occupied territories, dismantling the parts of the wall which are inside the occupied territories, stopping the “pin-point” killing of Palestinians (that kill, together with the targets selected, many innocent bystanders), etc.

If we accept Gewirth’s principle of generic consistency, this will impose more obligations on the Israeli side which concern the basic welfare and basic material needs of the Palestinians. This means, again as preliminary steps, that Israel should provide water, food, and medicines to the needy Palestinians, and enable them to work in Israel, due to the absolute dependence of the Palestinian economy on Israel’s economy which was created during decades of occupation. Definitely to be avoided is a situation where people in Palestinian cities—living under an occupation—will suffer from scarcity of drinking water, while a few miles away Israelis will enjoy a swimming pool in a Jewish settlement in an occupied area.

Of course, after these preliminary steps, both sides should go further toward the final solution, by the mutual recognition and acknowledgement of the right to self-determination of both sides, and establish two states.

This sounds utopian at this moment. One may ask: If mutual recognition is so simple, how come the vast majority on both sides does not understand this? The presumption of freedom, or at least free will, of both sides, is already evident after so many years of violence. Each side knows that the other side has its aspirations to freedom and self-determination and will not abandon the attempts to achieve them. So at least the ambition to realize the natural right to freedom on each side can already be presumed by the other. The same is the case with the presumption of equality. We have learned from Hobbes that “Nature hath made men so equal, in the faculties of body, and mind; that though there be found one man sometimes manifestly stronger in body, or of quicker mind than another; yet when all is reckoned together, the difference between man, and man, is not so considerable, as that one man can thereupon claim to himself any benefit, to which another may not pretend, as well as he. For as to the strength of body, the weakest has strength enough to kill the strongest.”10 At least in the Hobbesian sense, that since each side can in certain situations kill the other, both sides are convinced that they are equally vulnerable. Years of killing and bloodshed enable each side to recognize the other’s potential to kill and, at least in Hobbesian terms, as equal to his potential to kill. What, then, prevents people from understanding the trivial conclusions from the conjunction of both presumptions, which are so clear to Locke and Gewirth? Why do people keep on killing each other with no hope or future?

My answer to these questions is very pessimistic. Many people on both sides have chosen not to be rational. They reject Locke’s law of nature, which is reason, or Gewirth’s principle of generic consistency, which is derived from reason. They do not want to accept the conclusions that seem evident to every rational or reasoned person, not even the Hobbesian conclusion that they must reduce mutual threat and violence. Once we presume both sides to be free, we inter alia presume their free choice and their full autonomy and authority to choose what seems to be against their interests, or even what seems to us as irrational or being opposed to reason. And many people, motivated by deep religious or national feelings, choose the uncompromising and irreconcilable options, and are ready to pay the terrible price for their free and conscious choice. A typical example to this irrational choice is the recent referendum made in Israel among the members of the Likud party (which is the biggest party in Israel, and constitutes the major part of the Israeli government). They decided (in a vast majority) that Israel should not withdraw from the Gaza Strip. Right after this referendum there were many victims among the Israeli army and the civilian Palestinian population.

Even though those people on both sides are not the majority, they create an impregnable front against any reconciliation or compromise. The rest of the people, being desperate or apathetic, are either dragged by, or surrender to the extremist minorities, and let them determine the political agenda, and in fact, the future of the coming generations (considering the current generation to be hopeless and futureless). On the Palestinian side, where there are many who feel that they have nothing to loose, the escalation of the situation empowers and intensifies religious and national tendencies. On the Israeli side, too, where there is a lot to loose but so much that has already been lost, the escalation of the situation empowers and intensifies the desire for revenge. In both cases, rationality and reason are significantly weakened, if not absolutely wiped out.

The above description looks like an endless vicious circle, since to be able to be convinced by rational arguments one must be rational and think reasonably in the first place. The option of a rational dialogue presumes rationality as a necessary condition, without which no dialogue can exist. When people choose to deny or ignore rational arguments, there is no way to convince them even to consider the option of peace or reconciliation. If they had chosen to act rationally in the first place, there would have been no need to convince them to prefer the options of peace, reconciliation, and cooperation, since these are the “natural” preferences. Sorrowful as it may be, so long as a significant part of both sides have given up rationality and reason, Kant’s reason, Hegel’s spirit, and even Descartes’s rationality will sorrowfully keep silent. And if this sounds pessimistic, my answer to the questions when and how all this could be changed is even more pessimistic: when both sides will be exhausted to death. Then, both sides, not because of rational choice, but due to the lack of ability to kill each other, will hopefully consider other ways of interaction or other solutions. As far as I can see for the present, at least on the Israeli side, there is enough energy and desire to keep fighting to last for a long time, and there is no sign of people being exhausted. This guarantees at least a few more years of mutual killing before mutual recognition will even be considered. However, there is nothing that I would like more than to be proved wrong in this sorrowful prediction.

Endnotes

2. Ibid.
3. Ibid., 5, § 6.
4. Ibid., my emphasis.
5. Ibid., 17, § 27.
6. Ibid., 19, § 31.
9. Ibid., 138.
Relevant (and Unreasonable) Goals and Strategies, and the Hope for Peace in the Middle East

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I will address the question of reason and dialogue in two directions. One is based on a rather superficial observation and considers the rationality of actions. This lays the groundwork for the second direction, which addresses the issue of rationality and dialogue through the question of language. I claim that in their fight against the Palestinians, Israel has caused the bankruptcy of language, and thus it contributes to the impossibility of dialogue. At the end, I will make a practical suggestion.

Consider first the view that the circle of violence in the Middle East (and I will restrict my discussion to the Israeli/Palestinian conflict) is fired or enhanced emotionally because of cultural differences of beliefs and values between us, the Israelis, and them, the Palestinians. Reason is thus seen as removed from the conflict and this diminishes or maybe eliminates the possibility of dialogue. In this picture the Palestinians, instead of fighting for freedom by “Western-acceptable” means (what some philosophers may call a “just war”), resort to the extreme and unreasonable use of suicide bombs targeting civilians. The Israelis, instead of limiting their activities to preventing and protecting the population against terror attacks, also use extreme measures, such as targeted killings.

This picture accuses both sides of degrees of unreasonableness and allows one to use the lack of reason as an explanation of the actions and strategies of both parties. So the possibility of dialogue and peace seems to rest on somehow calming down the parties and introducing reason to enable reasonable dialogue.

Thus, for instance, much of the debate about the targeted assassination of the Hamas spiritual leader, Sheikh Yassin, centered around the question whether his killing would decrease the Hamas’s violence or not (and whether it is morally justified). The assumption seems to be that Sharon’s goals are the same as Israel’s goals, and that we all want a cease fire and the reduction of terror, and Sharon rather stupidly employs the wrong means that fail to achieve these goals.

This picture is wrong. I will not go into the details why it is unfounded to think that Sharon (and the Hammas) consistently make these strategic mistakes. The point is methodological: that an explanation of the actions of the parties here as unreasonable is a last-resort explanation. Any explanation that (ceteris paribus) presents Sharon as not stupid is preferred.

I believe Sharon’s strategy toward the Palestinians is rational and consistent, in the sense that he is acting efficiently to achieve his goals. His goal is to win more and more land for Israel and to remove the Palestinians from the land. He doesn’t mind this low-level war we now have. Its casualties are less than those from traffic accidents. People live well in Israel. He himself is a military man, with a formidable reputation as a daring, and maybe irresponsible, officer and he likes wars. His goal is to continue fighting the Palestinians, to gain more and more land, and to make as many of them as possible leave the area before Israel is forced to settle down for a ceasefire. Given this goal, Sharon’s strategy seems to work well.

Are his goals, one may ask, reasonable? From a practical point of view, they are. Western history is full of examples of people who took over land and threw out the natives in some way or other. But for the Western world to tolerate such acts today, this strategy has to be delivered wrapped in the appropriate rhetoric. Give the media a good enough story and the Western world will hesitate for enough years so that Sharon can complete the job. So the goals are reasonable in the sense that they are within Sharon’s interests, and they are not unattainable. Yet, through a Kantian move, we may state that the goals are reasonable only if they are moral, and Sharon’s goals outlined above are not moral. The systematic oppression of a people to annex their land, cannot be moral.

Can we convince Sharon and the extreme right in Israel via reason to engage in dialogue? Can we make him change his goals, by appeal to Palestinian rights and morality? I do not think so. The only way to convince him is to cause him to change his strategy by showing that it will not work, that his goals are unattainable. And since the Israeli population does not seem to want to stop him and Palestinian actions are unsuccessful, the responsibility lies on outside powers. The only way this vicious war will cease, I believe, is if the outside world will make it clear that it will not tolerate it any longer. (I will return to this last point later on). This completes the outline of the first picture, which has to do with the surface of actions and their simple or oversimplified explanation.

The second picture is more complex and related to the fact that the progress of the war depends heavily on popular opinion. Let me outline the general argument. Israeli leaders need to preserve their popular support within, and they need to gain also the support or neutrality of the international community. Thus, the war involves extreme public relations efforts that are designed to justify Israeli actions and discredit Palestinian ones. These efforts involve a constant flow of background rhetorical noise, whose short range effects are to succeed in getting Bush to declare something or to prevent the U.N. from making a certain decision or getting the Israeli public to approve of this or that measure. Yet its constant and long-range result involves the elimination of language. Language becomes bankrupt—not in the sense that we cannot say a lot, and even mean what we say, but in the sense that our intended audience is deaf to whatever we say. It is immune to whatever arguments we employ. In this sense, the war between Israel and the Palestinians does not only produce a lack of peace talks. It is itself a battle against dialogue. It eliminates the possibility of future dialogue.

In this situation, reason cannot lead to the initiation of dialogue. Like an intimate couple who has lost mutual trust and respect, they may be stuck in a vicious battle that cannot be stopped from within. Society recognizes this situation and places the responsibility on some outside mediators, like the courts, to force the sides to accept some agreement to protect the kids. So again I get to the point that dialogue in the Middle East is possible, but probably only with the pressure of international powers. This is roughly the outline of the second line of thinking. Let us now go a bit further in examining some examples of how the language that is necessary for dialogue becomes bankrupt.

I will start with a personal note. I wish to share my deep frustration, even despair, that not only are we stuck in vicious circles of extreme violence and extreme rhetoric, but also nothing that anyone says seems to matter. Israel is perpetuating a brutal occupation, with its killings, destruction, and humiliation, that is topped by the deadly dance of suicide bombers and targeted killings. The facts are known. Everyone talks all the time. Yet they only hear themselves. We hear only ourselves.

Two and a half years ago at our first Atlanta meeting, I thought that publicizing the facts could make a difference.
Surely, I thought, when the world learns about some of the realities of the occupation, it will not tolerate them and will do something. At least, I hoped, the Western world could make a clear stand, place economic sanctions, insist on international observers, or some other action. Anything. But now the facts are basically known, both in Israel and outside. The occupation is brutal and morally repulsive. The world, not just we in Israel, knows that and makes apparent gestures: world leaders meet, discuss, deny, affirm, threaten, place conditions, bring decisions to a vote and to a veto, and so on and on. A lot is said all the time—and nothing makes any difference. Language, in the Middle East and about it, has become bankrupt.

Though the news reports in Israel are repetitive and predictable, they are always extreme and full of action. They are never boring, like a third-rate Hollywood action movie (except we haven’t gotten to the happy ending). It has all those vicious terrorists, and civilian victims, some villains, and some virtuous, innocent bystanders. There are various plots where civilians or demonstrators or soldiers or occasionally politicians get killed or wounded. The curfews, the demonstrations, or the wall, are the routine stories. The front pages’ top stories are always a new suicide bomb or a targeted killing; but nothing is surprising. The plots are all very predictable. I wonder why people buy daily papers at all.

The factual reports are juiced up by waves of rhetorical noise, equally predictable. On all sides everyone is busy justifying us and discrediting them. Both sides present themselves as morally justified in their actions, acting in self-defense. The Palestinians are fighting against this lengthy and cruel occupation. Their fighters are freedom fighters. In general, the Western democratic tradition admires freedom fighters. The fact that freedom fighters use violence is accepted by our culture. It is conditioned on moral grounds and often on practical grounds as well. The freedom fighters have no other choice. In the case of the Palestinian population, they used much less violent attacks than now for the first twenty years of the occupation (through the first Intifada in 1988) and it got them nowhere closer to protecting their basic human rights. So their move to violence is understandable. Moreover, as history shows, violence may be the only means that actually works in gaining freedom. It worked for the Israelis in their fight against the British Mandate.

But this apparently gentlemanly picture of wars that we like to draw about past wars (whose atrocities we happily forget) does not quite fit the current conflict. So while freedom fighters are normally accepted by our Western moral culture, this particular fight somehow is not. I wonder why the West is so deaf to Palestinian suffering. One may claim that it is not the cultural or religious difference of Palestinians, who are Arabs and mostly Muslims, from Western people, but their actions, that makes a difference here. What makes their fight an immoral freedom fight, one may argue, is the fact that they we think build bombs, or design them, or even those who we think build bombs, or design them, or even those who we believe aid or enable such a design. Moreover, the killing of the target’s bystander victims is also accepted. In particular, the strategy employing suicide bombers targeting civilians is unacceptable.

Strangely enough, it is the Palestinians’ extreme measures that provide the basis for Israeli public relations in its attempt to morally justify the extreme oppression of the Palestinian population. Thus, for Israel, all our operations—the road blocks, the killings, the house demolitions, and the uprooting of fields—are claimed to be actions of self defense: for one has to fight terrorism.

“What other alternatives do we have?!” people often ask. For us on the Israeli Left, the answer is clear—start some dialogue. Peace talks. Surely we’ll succeed because we need peace and the elimination of the violence. “There’s nobody to negotiate with” is the usual response. Years ago, the argument used to be that they, the Palestinians, are different from us. “You don’t know their mentality,” I would be told. “You are a naive philosopher; but I know, I grew up in an Arab country. They are out to kill us.” Now I don’t hear this type of response much and not because Israelis are less prejudiced, but because our government has supplied us with other terms to say the same thing. Arafat in particular and the Palestinian leadership were declared by Sharon to be irrelevant.

But this unhappy term was soon replaced by a much more successful one: we are told that they are not peace partners. What the Palestinians are accused of here is not clear. But the upshot of such a claim is clear: that (as much as we want) we still cannot have a dialogue with the Palestinian leadership. The failure of the “irrelevant” attribute and the success of the “no peace-partner” attribute in convincing the public that dialogue is now impossible, is rather amazing. And not only the Israeli public have bought this term, but the U.S. leadership and some European countries did as well. Of course, there are countries, even non-Arab countries in the world that are more critical of the Israeli occupation. There are attempts to condemn Israeli actions in the U.N. and maybe institute sanctions against Israel to force it to bring the occupation to a halt. These attempts are effectively countered by Israeli rhetoric: the countries are accused of anti-Semitism.

Do not get me wrong. If Arafat is no peace partner because he is corrupt and not trustworthy, so is Sharon. Yet peace negotiations are normally held between sides who mistrust each other, and dialogue may still be possible. Similarly, I do not argue that some countries suffer from the rise of anti-Semitism, yet the criticism of Israeli actions by critics who are anti-Semites may still be true. The main effect of accusing some countries of anti-Semitism in this context is to cause them to hesitate in taking any actions against Israel. The public in Israel, normally attentive to what the Western World says about it, may in advance discard any such view now, for they are anti-Semites.

To this list of rhetorical weapons let us add the philosophers’ voices. An Israeli philosopher, Kasher, designed the Israeli military Ethical Code. This Code was created after the first Intifada to respond to the growing “Refusenik” movements, those who refuse to serve in the West Bank and Gaza in preserving the occupation. Kasher in interviews declared the Code was carefully thought out by the experts, so the soldiers need not trouble with complicated moral issues regarding their actions. By following the Code, they can be sure they will be doing the professionally and ethically right thing.

I will give just one example relevant to the present topic. Kasher prides himself in including human life as a value, stating that it is the highest value. However, in outlining its practical application, the Code specifies that the soldier should spare human life except when it conflicts with the success of the military mission at hand (i.e., the “highest” value is subordinate to the success of the military mission).

Currently, Kasher (with the Israeli Defense Force - IDF) is designing an addendum, the Ethical Code for the war against terrorism. This code follows the publication (REF) of a paper justifying Israel’s targeted killing strategy, the assassination of those who we think build bombs, or design them, or even those who we believe aid or enable such a design. Moreover, the killing of the target’s bystander victims is also accepted. Though it is regretted, of course, their death is claimed to be unavoidable and the blame for it lies on the targets themselves, for they are terrorists.

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The published paper tries to convince the Israeli public of the morality of the IDF’s actions, thus raising the question for public discussion. But the main use of the IDF’s Ethical Code is quite different. The Ethical Code is presented to the soldiers as an order. Its main effect is to make any moral objections to military activities both illegitimate and unethical. Its main effect is thus also to silence criticism. This time, to silence any moral criticism soldiers may have of the orders they are given. Thus we see that some philosophers may use applied philosophy to contribute to the silencing of moral criticism.3

Let’s summarize. I believe that the present Israeli leaders do not want dialogue and do not want to settle for peace. Rather, they want the present kind of war to go on until its bitter end. Hence the military effort to preserve and tighten the occupation is accompanied by a rhetorical attack whose main effect is to prevent the possibility of dialogue. And it is very effective. Even the recent Geneva agreement, based on dialogue between important and reputable politicians on both sides (supported presumably by around 50% of the population) — did nothing to change Israel’s move toward a dialogue.

We are stuck. Language is bankrupt, for it has lost its power to convince and commit. It became more a game of public relations, the sophist’s weapon of relativism, to make all voices equal. The true, the false, and the ugly all become equal and indistinguishable. The outside powers have to mediate and pressure both sides to end the occupation and cease fire. This responsibility rests on the international community and especially on the U.S. The U.S. has supported the Israeli occupation and even the extreme and immoral measures it has been using. It has the responsibility to stop supporting Israel. Israel is so dependent on the U.S. for its daily existence that the U.S. is capable of pressuring Israel with relatively simple means, like sanctions. As a moral agent, the U.S. has a responsibility to pressure Israel to end the occupation and respect the human rights of the Palestinians.

Moreover, the responsibility to act to end the occupation also rests on philosophers, qua philosophers. It is rather surprising, I think, that the recent flourish of applied philosophy enabled the army of occupation to enlist this expertise in aid of its public relations efforts; yet it did not get philosophers to organize in an effort to end this immoral and endless occupation. How come we don’t have a “philosophers without borders” or “philosophers for human rights” organization that will take a public stand and attempt to influence international public opinion? Maybe it is time for us, here and now, not to limit our efforts to an occasional lecture at a philosophy conference, but to organize “philosophers for dialogue in the Middle East,” and make a much more public stand.

Endnotes

1. These are not the only extreme measures, but it seems that the other measures, like endless curfews, road blocks, incidental and not so incidental killing, house demolition, destruction of fields—all these seem to be more “normal,” and thus “accepted,” measures used in Western wars.

2. The English translation of the Code can be found on the net at http://www.us-israel.org/isource/Society_&_Culture/IDF_ethics.html

3. There are other clear examples that show that Israel acts to silence moral criticism: The Palestinian Peace Movement is completely ignored by the Israelis. The shooting of non-violent demonstrators, e.g., against the wall; punishing excessively the small group of conscientious objectors, while allowing others to quietly sneak through the system, so that the general impression is that this is a very small group, etc.

4. Israel should have been established.

Therefore, the Palestinians should have been expelled.

By contrast, those who think that the creation of Israel led to an injustice to the Palestinians would turn this instance of modus tollens around, converting it into an instance of modus ponens:

If the Palestinians hadn’t been expelled, Israel would not have been established.

Therefore, Israel should not have been established.

Both arguments fit the canons of instrumental rationality, but they are clearly diametrically opposed.
If instrumental rationality is not the point, then it is tempting to think that a more substantive form of rationality is what is at issue, and that the kind of reason we should be concerned with is that which supplies us with the premises themselves. A look at one of the thorniest disputes in the conflict may help test this hunch. Nothing about the conflict seems to excite greater passions than the question of the Palestinian right to return to their homeland. Many Israelis even refuse to use the expression “right of return,” fearing that acknowledging it as a right may commit them to its legitimacy, and the New York Times is equally wary, preferring to put it in scare quotes in its editorials. It has also been seen as a major stumbling block to the peace talks or rounds of negotiations that have been held so far.6 Consider the arguments on both sides.

The Palestinians say that many, if not most, of the 750,000 Palestinians who left their homes in 1948 were driven out in a campaign of mass expulsion, of the type that came to be known, in the latter part of the twentieth century, as “ethnic cleansing.” They were resettled against their will in other parts of historic Palestine or in the neighboring states, principally, Jordan, Syria, and Lebanon. Thus, they claim that they should have a right to return to their places of origin and resume their lives, or those of their parents or grandparents, as though the nakbah (“catastrophe”) that befell them had never occurred. They base this on several principles derived from morality and international law. The first is a principle that disallows the use of force as a way of changing the circumstances of people’s lives against their will. Such uses of force generate a right to restore the status quo ante—at least until a just resolution can be found. Second, they say that in expelling them, Palestinians were effectively denied the right to determine their own fate in their historic homeland, a denial of the right of self-determination. Finally, they add that the events of 1948 deprived many Palestinians of their rights to property and livelihood, which should be restored to them directly by repatriating them in their homes, shops, orchards, and farmlands.7

Most Israelis see matters differently. For them, the war of 1948 was not characterized by a campaign of ethnic cleansing; rather, it was a matter of several Arab armies invading the fledgling state. There was no concerted effort to expel the Palestinians; those who left either did so of their own accord and on the orders of their leaders, or were made to leave in a defensive action by the Israeli armed forces or the Jewish militias that predated the establishment of the state.8 Second, many Israelis do not accept that the Palestinians are the indigenous inhabitants of the land, and that what is now Israel and the occupied territories was the historic homeland of the Palestinians. They therefore reject the claim of self-determination in that land. As for Palestinian property claims, they are met with a number of arguments on the Israeli side. Sometimes, they are simply dismissed as illegitimate since they applied under a legal order that no longer exists. At other times, they are met with the claim that they should be traded against the property claims of Arab Jews who emigrated to Israel, leaving their possessions behind in places like Yemen and Morocco.9 At yet other times, some will concede that Palestinians may receive compensation as part of a final settlement, but not by returning their original property to them, but rather by means of funds provided by the international community. Finally, to clinch the matter, it is said that any return of Palestinians to the towns and villages in which they and their forebears once resided would “destroy the Jewish state,” which means that it would cease to be a state with a sizeable Jewish majority.

Within this tight knot of arguments and this flurry of claims and counterclaims, one can detect three main types of disagreement. The first is broadly factual in character and can in principle be settled by empirical investigations of a historical nature. In this case, reason may have a small role to play in evaluating the validity of the claims; but it cannot really settle the matter by itself—historical research is needed. As the remarks I quoted from Morris reveal, one of the leading Israeli historians of 1948—regardless of his current ideological or moral stance—now acknowledges that what happened during that year amounts to a campaign of ethnic cleansing. A second type of disagreement has to do with the relative moral priority of certain incompatible courses of action. Here again the Morris argument is of relevance, since it raises the question of which should take precedence—establishment of a state for the Jewish people or not expelling the Palestinian people from their homes. A type of practical reasoning is involved in settling this dispute, which would weigh the urgency of establishing a homeland for the Jews against the need not to cause long-term suffering to others. The third type of dispute involved in this aspect of the conflict entails assessing the legitimacy of some moral principles themselves—for example, the sanctity of private property, the imperative of preserving the national character of a certain state, the permissibility of the use of force to change facts on the ground, and the statute of limitations on ownership rights. These are just some of the moral principles whose very legitimacy are in dispute among the two parties to the conflict.

It would take too long to try to say what the outcome of such a process of practical reasoning might be, but it is safe to say that it would not be a complete denial of the right of return of the Palestinians. It seems fairly certain that substantive reason would dictate at least a qualified right of return. However, the mainstream Israeli position, as expressed by successive Israeli governments and as promulgated in the official literature of the Israeli Foreign Ministry, is simply that there is no merit at all in the Palestinian right of return. It is not clear how reason can serve to break this deadlock, given that the positions are so far apart, and that one side does not seem to allow that there is something to talk about.

If we conclude that substantive reason (including morality) dictates positions that are radically different from those adopted by Israeli officials concerning the right of return, and we are committed to a negotiated settlement to the conflict, then means-ends rationality returns to the picture, in the following guise. The question that arises for the Palestinians is: Why insist on a position on the grounds of moral principle when it is clear that there is no chance that this position will be accepted, now or in the foreseeable future, by the other party? To pose the question more generally: How rational is it to adhere to standards of morality when it is clear that those standards are not likely to be met given the prevailing power balance? Again: At what point does it become positively irrational to advocate just claims when the stronger party, backed by the world’s only superpower, declares them to be “unrealistic”—as U.S. President Bush recently did with respect to the right of return?10

This is one way of characterizing a standard debate on the Palestinian side, whereby hardliners insist on moral principle and the justice of their cause, while moderates say that politics is the art of the attainable and an insistence on morality in the face of overwhelming power is harmful to the rational self-interest of the Palestinian people. Palestinians frequently see themselves as torn between morality and rationality on the issue of the right of return and other aspects of the conflict, or perhaps between instrumental rationality and substantive rationality. But matters are somewhat more complicated, since
The point is not that what seems irrational in the short-term might be rational in the long-term. This raises a kind of paradox of long-term rationality: what may be a rational strategy to adopt in the long-term. Rather, it may sometimes be clear from our present perspective that it would be rational in the current political climate to insist on moral principle and wait for external circumstances and the balance of power to change, as opposed to settling for something that delivers something less than optimal justice. Unfortunately for the prospects for dialogue, it is difficult to come up with a counter-argument to this position.

Endnotes

1. I am grateful to my colleagues Bashshar Haydar and Gregg Osborne for very helpful discussions concerning the topic of this paper.
2. Sahar Tabaja, 8 March 2004, online discussion board.
3. The same student went on to say: “I am not sure dialogues are about attaining the truth anyway, it’s more like different groups want to get a larger stake in the final outcome, and in that regard reason is only one tool among many.” Loubna El-Amine, 11 March 2004, online discussion board.
4. The modal and deontic operators make this a more complicated argument than a simple matter of, “If P then Q, not Q, therefore not P,” but I think the broader point about rationality remains.
5. Morris puts it thus: “Ben-Gurion was right. If he had not done what he did, a state would not have come into being. That has to be clear. It is impossible to evade it. Without the uprooting of the Palestinians, a Jewish state would not have arisen here.” Haaretz, 9 January 2004.
6. I would argue that the right of return should be understood both as a collective and an individual right. It is in reality a collection of rights, partly political, partly social, and partly pertaining to individual property rights. It comprises: the right of individuals and groups not to be expelled from their homes, the right of a people to determine its own destiny in its homeland, and the right of individuals to reclaim property that has been lost or stolen.
7. I understand territorial rights in terms of individual title deeds as well as the collective rights of groups of people to reside on and make use of plots of land. Around 6% of the whole land of Palestine was in Jewish hands at the time of the U.N. partition resolution in November 1947.
8. This claim is contradicted by historical research which shows that Zionist forces deliberately emptied the land conquered in 1948 of its Palestinian population and actively prevented the return of refugees by destroying 92% of the 421 villages depopulated in 1948, either wholly or extensively. A new school of prominent Israeli historians (including Benny Morris and others) now endorses this version of events, long denied by official Zionist historiography.
9. There is no direct link between the forced expulsion of the Palestinians in 1948 and the emigration of Jews from Arab countries. Indeed, the latter was partly organized and funded by Israel after the creation of the state, and was in some instances actively encouraged by acts of intimidation carried out by agents of Israeli intelligence.

Reason vs. Rhetoric – Who Is To Be Master?
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Situated in a session named “Can Reason Be the Basis for Dialogue in the Middle East?”, I will attempt to view a political context philosophically. Indeed, a few years ago some of the speakers assembled here today participated in another APA meeting, in another session, titled “The Possibility of Dialogue in the Middle East.” At that time, we wryly remarked that perhaps it should have been called “The Impossibility of Dialogue in the Middle East”; or, at the very least, it should have ended with a question mark. Subsequently, I will admittedly be pointing here to the soon-to-be realized impossibility of dialogue in the Middle East. But I will be pointing away from reason—or lack thereof—as the cause of this impossibility. In other words, in a certain sense I will be challenging all—or most—of the presuppositions of this session.

First, let us begin with and identify some truisms—philosophical, political, and local truisms. Perhaps some of these truisms are not truisms at all, since they are not trivial, neither are they uncontested. Still, though not truisms, these propositions are popular slogans, clichés, and mantras, often heard, often acquiesced to, and not often submitted to critique.

Philosophical truisms abound in the discussions of reason. First among them is that of reason versus emotion: reason and emotion are two different aspects of the human experience. Reason—brother to rationality and logic—is objective and universal, whereas emotion—sister to passion and affect—is subjective and particular. Reason and emotion are opposed in a very certain sense—objective reason is optimally emotionless and strong emotions are not rationality-bound. Then there is the second pair: reason versus rhetoric. Going back to Plato, the hyperrationalist, and his famous feud with the Sophists, the local rhetoricians, one can, instead of looking at the difference between reason and emotion, talk about the split between Philosophy (with a capital P) and Rhetoric. For it is there that an important tradition starts: the tradition that puts philosophy and rhetoric on two different sides of a fence with several “natural allies” on each side. Thus, philosophy is grouped with logic, with rational method, with universalism, with objectivism, with validity, and with truth. Rhetoric’s family includes emotion, relativism, subjectivism, persuasion, and opinion. Philosophy is viewed as rational conceptual analysis; rhetoric appeals to our irrational passionate affinities. Not surprisingly then, philosophy is housed in the same general area as science (and knowledge in general), while rhetoric is given a place in public human contexts like politics (and law). Finally, when reason and rationality are grouped together, a natural contender on the “other side” is religion. So we get the third philosophical cliché: reason versus religion.

Political truisms are more local and more parochial; indeed, they are dependent on the political culture in which they abide. Still, if we facilely recognize a certain Western, liberal cultural context we can ascertain the current slogans pointing, first, at the West versus East pair, and then the rationality versus fundamentalism couple. Both of these categorizations are now popularly housed in the “clash of civilizations” ideology. And even when that superstructure is questioned, it is rarely problematized in essence. That is to say, gradations and complexities are recognized within the ideology. Consequently, variations on the clash-of-civilizations truism take the East to be more nuanced, and make place for
enlightened, modernistic, progressive Islam versus fundamentalist Islam.

And the truisms on Israel-Palestine: the “conflict” (a word I will have more to say on shortly) in this area of the Middle East is construed as a war of religions and as a war of fundamentalist extremists. These are both, I will argue, misconceived mantras.

About the philosophical truisms one can argue philosophically. Especially in postmodernist times, one encounters familiar attacks on reason and rationality as themselves being context-dependent and no less suspicious than any other social construct. About the political slogans one can argue by giving counter-examples. The presentation of such counter-examples, while easy on the Popperian mindset, sometimes adopt a demagogic manner. We are reminded of the progressive, rationalistic enlightened aspects and phenomena of Islam, or about the decadent, evil, or reactionary aspects and phenomena of the West.

I will address, henceforth, neither the philosophical statements adumbrated above, nor the political basics so easily accepted at large. Instead, I will engage with the personally significant—personally for those of us who hail from those parts—argument about Israel-Palestine. I submit that this is neither a war of religions nor a conflict between extremists. More so, saying it is not a war of religions does not, as might be expected, pit it as a war of secularism or rationality against religious fundamentalism—with the first being based on the Israeli side and the latter on the Palestinian side. It is, rather, a war over land, a war with colonial roots, being fought with two sorts of weapons—material arms and words.

In both wars—the war of arms and the war of words—Israel is winning. The fact that it is winning the armed conflict is not to be wondered at—Israel has the fourth most powerful army in the world, including, as we all now know, nuclear power. The fact that it is winning the war of words is our concern here, for words buttress both reason and rhetoric. In contrast to the war-of-religions scenario, or even to the religion-versus-rationality formation, we prefer to describe this as a war between two sides who are both rational and reasonable; but Israel is using words, reasonably, to win this war. One might—if one chooses to locate terrorism only on the Palestinian side—say that the Palestinians, some Palestinians, are using force to win this war. But this is also rational. Terrorists, in this sense, are rational—they are using force to win this war.

Let me elaborate on this point for a moment. Our democratization here concerns the far-too-easy dichotomization which results in reason and words on one side of the fence with irrationality and violence, sometimes termed terrorism, on the other. Indeed, Israeli discourse has recently taken to talking about making the Palestinians “internalize” their place. Is such internalization not a case of violence (not to mention the use of force and power, by the state, to target innocent civilians)? Is this not a case of state terrorism? On the other hand (the other side of the divide?), is not the purpose of terrorism to strike terror into the heart of the other? If this purpose is well-defined (and well-executed), is this not a case of rational action rather than what it is usually taken to be—irrational fanaticism?

Where does dialogue come in? Before addressing this question, the question of our session, let me clarify the position from which these things are being suggested. These are not the words of an antirationalist; on the contrary, I do indeed perceive of rationality as a necessary condition—but not the only one—which must be maintained if we are to ground any sort of human intercourse. But as already alluded to, it is not (lack of) reason which is to blame for the breakdown of dialogical politics in the Middle East, between Israel and Palestine. There is reason here to inquire about reason from several different angles. First there is “reason” as belonging to only one of the sides of the dialogue; as I’ve said, I decry this facile dichotomization of the world. Then, there is reason, belonging to both sides of the dialogue, which might serve as the basis of dialogue. That, I submit, is abundantly there but it cannot be turned to as a possible band-aid. Finally, there is the metaquestion: why is dialogue based on reason not our salve?

When and where does dialogue really exist? More concretely, when have Israelis and Palestinians talked? When have we witnessed real dialogue? Yes, one can point to the venerable icons of such dialogue: the Oslo agreements, the Geneva agreements, the Nusseibeh-Ayalon talks (of which hero, Sari Nusseibeh, is here with us), not to mention the innumerable forums and venues of “people to people”, “students to students”, “teachers to teachers”, etc. (One sometimes gets the impression that this is what the world wants to see us, “the locals” do, and this is, therefore, what the world is willing to finance. …)

But can this be deemed dialogue, true dialogue? Given the inherent and all-pervading asymmetry of the “partners,” can this be termed dialogue in any real sense of the word? Is there, ultimately, any sense to be made of dialogue between master and slave? Is there any sense to be made of dialogue between victim and victimizer? When there are presuppositions of facts on the ground—is this to be called dialogue? And most important, when the language of dialogue itself assumes the master’s, in this case the occupier’s, language—is this to be called dialogue?

This can be made more concrete and, paradoxically, more ironic. Another current mantra now with us is that peace can only be achieved through negotiations (aka dialogue), not unilaterally. This claim has become so ingrained, so consensually accepted by moderates and “peaceniks,” that now, when Sharon is (supposedly) instigating a unilateral disengagement and withdrawal from Gaza, there are some on the Israeli left (and specifically, the Geneva contingency) who are voicing arguments against the plan—since it does not demand negotiations first, it eschews negotiations and dialogue. But the negotiations which have, with time, become a magic catchword are not, and never have been, a fair and decent procedure between equal partners. They have instead become a fig leaf—that which the Israeli peace camp insists on in order to pinpoint the essence of the requirement for making peace.

So these magic words—in particular “negotiations” and “dialogue”—like many other words, terms, and concepts on our political stage, are no more than rhetoric. Indeed, the conflict itself has become a conflict in rhetoric. At the risk of being facetious I point to even the word “conflict” as a rhetorical tool (since conflicts, almost by definition, involve two basically equal partners; the “Israeli-Palestinian” conflict immediately pits these partners on two apparently equal sides). Our use of words must be addressed before we are to make headway in conducting any real dialogue. Examples are numerous: “conflict,” “war,” “security,” “emergency,” “non-combatant,” “victim,” and now especially “terrorism.”

There are two consequences of this cynical and rhetorical use of words. First, let me reiterate what I began with: there is no lack of reason in the Middle East in general and our problem in Israel-Palestine in particular has nothing to do with rationality. The problem, in metaphysical terms, is evil, pure and simple evil. And if metaphysics is to be banned from politics, then the problem in political terms is power, pure and simple power. It is not rationality which is lacking as the bridge between Islam
Finally, talking about dialogue, not to mention reason, is either very naive or very cynical. It is naïve in the sense that those talking about rational dialogue do believe, bona fide, that such dialogue can be achieved. It is cynical in the sense that, when we say “it is incumbent for philosophers to develop the foundations of rationality,” we should not accept, uncritically, the thought that (lack of) rationality is to blame for (lack of) dialogue. “It is incumbent for philosophers to develop the foundations of rationality” means that we must be critical of these mantras, for they are rhetoric in the mouth of the victimizers and occupiers. Philosophers must not be in the service of the powers that be, whether those powers be Israel or the U.S. (who have both adopted the rhetoric of reason versus terror); they must not renge on their philosophical commitment.

Reason and Peace in the Middle East
Mona Abousenna
Ain Shams University–Cairo

The pivotal question here is: Are reason and peace, in the Middle East, complementary or contradictory? The history of the Arab-Israeli conflict, in the past fifty years, indicates that the relation between reason and peace is problematic. A problematic, by definition, entails a contradiction. The next question, then, is: where is the contradiction between reason and peace in the history of the Arab-Israeli conflict?

In my view, this contradiction is implied in the image of the “self” and the “other” each of the conflicting parties have developed over the years. However, this image implies another one, namely, that of the “perceived.” In this case, we could say that what is perceived is not necessarily the attitude that is being deployed. It follows, then, that the attitudes of individuals and nations arise out of the interpretations that are made by each party involved in the conflict. For instance, a defensive gesture by a person who thinks he may be attacked is apt to be interpreted by others as a preparation for an attack on them, thus leading them to act defensively, or even to attack. Thus, man is aggressive, or acts aggressively as a result of the belief that the other is aggressive.

The question, now, is: What determines this interpretation? In my opinion, it is the embedded enemy image. In his work, Perpetual Peace, Kant says: “Peace means an end to all hostilities that is an end to the enemy image.” However, up till now, peace is temporary and not perpetual. This means that it is pseudo-peace due to the secret presence of the enemy image or, as Kant says, “because the contracting parties have their secret mental reservations with a view to reviving their old pretensions of the past.” This statement implies, first, that war is a mental attitude and, second, that the future is a repetition of the past. In a nutshell, one could epitomize Kant’s statement in two concepts, namely, reason and time.

By “reason,” I specifically mean the faculty that can transcend reality for the sake of changing it. And change is impossible without a future vision or a pro quo that can change the status quo. This pro quo denotes that we have to move from the future and not from the past. Within this context, peace cannot be incarnated if the contracting parties insist on preserving the past value system that implies the enemy image. Now, the question is: What is the origin of the enemy image? It originates in the concept of the “absolute truth” when threatened by another absolute truth that denies it. In this case, this threatening absolute truth becomes the enemy who should be absolutized either mentally or physically, or both. Thus to analyze the enemy image, we have to criticize the concept of the absolute inherent in the mentalities of the contracting parties which have been inherited and perpetuated in their respective cultures.

In his insightful book, The Jewish Mind (1977), Raphael Patai considers “the Jewish mind as a product of Jewish culture, and Jewish culture as a product of the Jewish mind,” and he concludes that “Jewish religion—unquestionably the most important element in Jewish culture—is likewise considered as a product of the Jewish mind.” In his twin book, The Arab Mind (1983), Patai almost equates both mentalities, the Jewish and the Moslem, through one core trait that characterizes each, namely, the belief that each possesses one fundamental trait that sets them apart from any other and that is the divine nature of their national identity. Within the Jewish context, this absolute truth consists in the belief that the Jews are God’s chosen people, whereas the Moslems consider themselves to be the best nation ever created by Allah. These two mutually exclusive images, or absolute truths, are the root cause of the enemy image that is responsible for the ongoing Arab-Israeli and Palestinian-Israeli conflict. It is the uncritical preservation of this belief that has radically changed the nature of the conflict by allowing Jewish and Moslem religious fundamentalisms to change the nature of the conflict from a secular one over territorial borders into a religious one having to do with the right to exist, and from a conflict for land into a holy Jihadist war.

The question is: How can we transform this enemy image? This can be accomplished, I argue, first, by criticizing the concept of the absolute and, second by secularizing the concepts of absolute truth underlying both Jewish and Moslem cultures regarding their national identity. By “secularization” I mean relativization, that is, by tackling issues of conflict in a relative and not in an absolute way. In this sense, a solution could be offered that attempts to remove the boundaries between the two cultures caused by cultural taboos. The final question has to do with how this can be implemented. First, the philosophical community should be occupied with clarifying the concept of truth and exposing its inherent contradictions and providing philosophical solutions. Second, a new global system of education, based on creativity, should be developed. However, the concept of creativity should not be tackled on a psychological basis, as traditionally has been the case, but rather on epistemological and civilizational grounds. It is precisely in this sense that philosophers, and not merely educators, must undertake the critical task of defining creativity in terms of critical thinking.

To conclude, I would briefly clarify the relation between epistemology and civilization in the sense that reason is the creator of civilization. Within the concept of civilization, we could reformulate the concept of reason as creative, that is, as capable of changing reality. In this case, we would have to analyze “reason-in-the-world” in the Heideggerian sense rather than as we have it, for example, in Locke’s theory of knowledge. This could be regarded as an epistemological shift that could be one of the concerns of philosophers and, especially, within the American Philosophical Association. Such an effort could go far toward eliminating the image of the other as an enemy or as an absolute evil, and in forging a new image based on partnership and not on enmity.
Summary of a C.I.C.-Cosponsored Conference

Philosophical Engagement: Davidson’s Philosophy and Chinese Philosophy

Bo Mou
San Jose State University

Beijing, China, June 2004

The CIC cosponsored an international conference in Beijing during June 2004 on “Philosophical Engagement: Davidson’s Philosophy and Chinese Philosophy.” It was organized by the International Society for Comparative Studies of Chinese and Western Philosophy (ISCWP) and was also cosponsored by the Institute of Philosophy, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS), which hosted the conference.

1. Background, theme, and preparation

As different cultural communities and ideological traditions have become closer than ever, the issue of how to bridge the gap between different philosophical traditions, through constructive engagement, has become a significant concern in philosophical circles. Among others, it is especially philosophically interesting and challenging to investigate whether, and if so, how, to bridge a seemingly wide gap between Chinese philosophy and Western mainstream philosophy in the analytic tradition. The two philosophical traditions have been considered by some to be remote, or alien, or even opposed to each other; some in each tradition have taken philosophical practice in the other tradition to have merely marginal value. However, more and more philosophers who are familiar with both Chinese and Western philosophies have now realized that some traditional stereotypical understandings of the two major philosophical traditions are mistaken or at least seriously misleading and that they have resulted either from one party’s ignorance of the other party’s philosophy or from one’s failure to recognize the genuine nature of one’s own tradition. They have agreed that Chinese philosophy (or the philosophical dimension of Chinese thought) and Western philosophy (including its analytic tradition) are not essentially alien to one another. They have common concerns with a series of fundamental issues and have taken their characteristic approaches to them. Thus they could learn from each other and jointly contribute to the common philosophical enterprise through constructive dialogue and engagement. It is noted that the key term, “constructive engagement,” in this context means how different forms of philosophical inquiry, via reflective criticism and self-criticism, could learn from each other and make joint contributions to a common philosophical enterprise.

In view of the need for constructive dialogue and engagement between Chinese and Western philosophy, the ISCWP decided to focus on one philosophically significant figure, in this case, Donald Davidson, in terms of how his thought was comparable to ideas from the Chinese philosophical tradition. Accordingly, a conference specifically devoted to this topic was originally planned for July 2003 in Beijing, to be hosted by the Institute of Foreign Philosophy, Peking University. However, due to the SARS crisis in China in early 2003, the conference had to be postponed. And, more unfortunately, Professor Donald Davidson passed away in August 2003. Despite these unexpected difficulties, after a careful evaluation of the whole situation, and with firm support from all the speakers as well as from the co-sponsoring parties, the ISCWP was determined to continue with this project. The new conference host for the postponed conference, which was to be held in June 2004, was the Institute of Philosophy, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences.

2. Results

The conference was held June 8-9, 2004. Many participants subsequently indicated that the conference was highly successful. A formal version of the conference program is enclosed below as an Appendix. In view of the CIC mission on promoting international exchange and cooperation between U.S. and other philosophical circles, it is also worth mentioning that, after the conference, at the invitation of the Institute of Philosophy, CASS, four U.S. philosophers who were conference speakers, Michael Krausz, A. P. Martinich, Samuel Wheeler, and David Wong, gave separate lectures at the Institute on their areas of expertise.

3. Significance and implications

This conference was the first of its kind to investigate in-depth how a major figure in analytic philosophy and some aspects of Chinese philosophy could jointly contribute to a common philosophical enterprise. It also involved the exploration of some fundamental issues and concerns in philosophy from distinct comparative approaches. Through this constructive engagement, the conference showed how Chinese and analytic philosophy are not essentially alien to one another; they have common concerns with a series of fundamental issues.

4. Future plans

At the invitation of the Chinese journal, World Philosophy, I have prepared a special column on the conference for the journal, which includes abstracts of all sixteen papers presented. It will appear in the September 2004 issue. An anthology of the same title as the conference is now in preparation. While it is not equivalent to conference proceedings, it will be closely related. To fulfill its mission, the ISCWP plans to organize similar international conferences in the future and based on their mutual interests and shared goals, the ISCWP may seek further cooperation with the CIC. Finally, again, on the behalf of the ISCWP board, I would like to express our appreciation for the CIC’s valuable support and co-sponsorship of the international conference.
International Conference Philosophical Engagement: Davidson’s Philosophy and Chinese Philosophy

Initiator and Academic Organizer: International Society for Comparative Studies of Chinese and Western Philosophy

Co-sponsor and Conference Host: Institute of Philosophy, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences

Co-sponsor: Committee on International Cooperation of the American Philosophical Association

Beijing, China
June 8-9, 2004

PROGRAM

TUESDAY, JUNE 8

09:00-09:30 Opening Session

WELCOME ADDRESS
Ru, Xin (Vice Chair of the Committee on Academic Affairs, CASS, China)
Xie, Dikun (Assistant Director of the Institute of Philosophy, CASS, China)
Representatives of Conference Host

BRIEF REMARKS ON CONFERENCE THEME
Mou, Bo (San Jose State University, USA)
Representative of Academic Organizer

SESSION I: CROSS-CULTURAL UNDERSTANDING AND CONCEPTUAL SCHEMES
Chair: Li, He (Institute of Philosophy, CASS, China)

09:30-10:20
Krausz, Michael (Bryn Mawr College, USA)
“Relativism and Its Schemes”

10:20-11:10
Tanaka, Koji (Macquarie University, Australia)
“Davidson and Chinese Conceptual Scheme”

11:10-12:00
Angle, Stephen (Wesleyan University, USA)
“Making Room for Comparative Philosophy: Davidson, Brandom, and Conceptual Distance”

12:00-12:50
Zheng, Yujian (Lingnan University, Hong Kong)
“Davidsonian Approach to Normativity and Limits of Cross-cultural Interpretation”

Discussant: Audience
13:00-14:00 Lunch Break

SESSION II: MEANING AND INTERPRETATION

Chair: Luo, Xiwen (Institute of Philosophy, CASS, China)

14:00-14:50
Martinich, A. P. (University of Texas at Austin, USA)
“On Two Kinds of Meaning and Interpretation”

14:50-15:40
Chong, Kim-chong (Hong Kong University of Science and Technology, Hong Kong)
“Zhuangzi and Davidson on the Use of Metaphor”

15:40-16:30
Chen, Bo (Peking University, China)
“Debate on Language Meaning and the Skeptic Argument about Meaning: A Case in Comparative Study of Chinese and Western Philosophies”

Discussant: Audience
18:00-19:30 Dinner

WEDNESDAY, JUNE 9

SESSION III: PRINCIPLE OF CHARITY AND CHINESE PHILOSOPHY

Chair: Cheng, Lian (Peking University, China)

09:00-09:50
David Wong (Duke University, USA)
“Where Charity Begins”

09:50-10:40
Fung, Yiu-ming (Hong Kong University of Science and Technology, Hong Kong)
“Davidson’s Charity in the Context of Chinese Philosophy”

10:40-11:30
Ye, Chuang (Peking University, China)
“The Limit of Charity and Agreement”

Discussant: Audience
11:40-13:00 Lunch Break

SESSION IV: RATIONALITY, PRACTICAL RATIONALITY, IRRATIONALITY

Chair: Li, Jian (Institute of Philosophy, CASS, China)

13:00-13:50
Wheeler, Samuel C. (University of Connecticut, USA)
“Davidsonian Rationality and Ethical Disagreement between Cultures”

13:50-14:40
Fang, Wan-Chuan (Institute of European and American Studies, Academia Sinica, Taipei, ROC [Taiwan])
“Ways of Uniting Knowledge and Action”
14:40-15:30
Jiang, Yi (Institute of Philosophy, CASS, China)
“Irrationality in Practical Reason from the Perspective of Chinese Philosophy”
Discussant: Audience

15:30-15:40 Break

SESSION V: TRUTH AND DAO
Chair: Fung, Yiu-ming (Hong Kong University of Science and Technology, Hong Kong)

15:40-16:30
Cheng, Chung-ying (University of Hawaii at Manoa, USA)
“Truth and Meaning in Chinese Philosophy and Davidson’s Philosophy of Language”

16:30-17:20
Mou, Bo (San Jose State University, USA)
“Davidson’s Thesis of Truth Centrality and the Dao—Pursuing Tradition of Philosophical Daoism”
Discussant: Audience

18:00-19:30 Farewell Dinner