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Charles Leander Hill (1906–1956)

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Anthony Neal
Freedom Gaze: Explicating the African Freedom Aesthetic

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FROM THE EDITORS

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In this issue of the APA Newsletter on Philosophy and the Black Experience, we are excited to publish the third “Footnotes to History” on Charles Leander Hill (1906–1956). Hill was the first person to translate Anthony Wilhelm Amo’s work into English, and the first English-speaking scholar to write a philosophical commentary on Amo’s dissertation. He was also a scholar of Philip Melanchthon’s thought.

We are also excited to publish Anthony Neal’s article, “Freedom Gaze: Explicating the African Freedom Aesthetic.” In this article, Neal begins by discussing how some events shape our self-perceptions to such an extent that they create cultures. He then contends that the African Freedom Aesthetic among African Americans is one of the cultures formed from a people’s perception of their circumstances and place in the world. This aesthetic arises from an American context, particularly slavery and the aftermath of legalized segregation in the late nineteenth century and the first half of the twentieth century. Then, he explains why the African Freedom Aesthetic is foundational to any attempt to explicate what African American philosophy is. He ends by distinguishing between the African Freedom Aesthetic and the black aesthetic of Addison Gayle, Amiri Baraka, and Larry Neal.

SUBMISSION GUIDELINES AND INFORMATION

The APA Newsletter on Philosophy and the Black Experience is published by the committee on the status of Black philosophers. Authors are encouraged to submit original articles and book reviews on any topic in philosophy that makes a contribution to philosophy and the black experience broadly construed. The editors welcome submissions written from any philosophical tradition, as long as they make a contribution to philosophy and the black experience broadly construed. The editors especially welcome submissions dealing with philosophical issues and problems in African American and Africana philosophy.

All article submissions should be between 10 and 20 pages (double spaced) in length, and book reviews should be between 5 and 7 pages (double spaced) in length. All submissions must follow the APA guidelines for gender-neutral language and The Chicago Manual of Style formatting. All submissions should be accompanied by a short biography of the author. Please send submissions electronically to apa.pbe.newsletter@gmail.com.

DEADLINES

Fall issues: May 1  
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FORMATTING GUIDELINES

• The APA Newsletters adhere to The Chicago Manual of Style.

• Use as little formatting as possible. Details like page numbers, headers, footers, and columns will be added later. Use tabs instead of multiple spaces for indenting. Use italics instead of underlining. Use an “em dash” (—) instead of a double hyphen (––).

• Use endnotes instead of footnotes. Examples of proper endnote style:


FOOTNOTES TO HISTORY

Charles Leander Hill (1906–1956)

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Charles Leander Hill was born on July 26, 1906, in Urbana, Ohio. Hill was one of seven children born to David Leander and Karen (Andrews) Hill. He attended Urbana public schools and graduated magna cum laude from Wittenberg College in 1928. In the same year he was ordained a Deacon in the AME Church. He was conferred the Bachelor of Divinity degree by the Hamma Divinity School in 1931.
As a student at Hamma, he acquired mastery of several languages including Hebrew, both ancient and modern Greek, Latin, German, Spanish, French, and even Sanskrit.

He then studied in Germany (1931-1932) as an American-German exchange student at the University of Berlin. As John H. McClendon has observed, "The legacy of research and study in Germany, on the part of African American philosophers, is an under examined aspect in the history of African American philosophers. In addition to [W. E. B.] Du Bois (University of Berlin 1892–1894), those African American philosophers traveling to Germany to further their education in philosophy before Hill included: Gilbert Haven Jones at Universities of Göttingen, Leipzig, Hallé and Jena (1907-1909), Alain Locke at the University of Berlin (1910-11), and William Stuart Nelson at the University of Marburg and the University of Berlin (1926-27)." 1

During this year, he began his research on Philip Melanchthon (German co-reformer of the Protestant Reformation with Martin Luther). Also, during his time in Germany, Hill discovered the Ghanaian philosopher Anthony William Amo’s inaugural dissertation on apathy. Hill was the first person to translate Amo’s work from Latin into English; he additionally provided the first commentary on the philosophical substance of Amo’s thesis. Later, Hill decided to publish his translation and commentary as an article entitled "William Ladd, The Black Philosopher from Guinea: A Critical Analysis of His Dissertation on Apathy" to The AME Review, and it later appeared in the October/December issue of 1955.

After returning from Germany, he received an S. T. M. from Wittenberg in 1933. In 1934, he became an Elder of the AME Church. During this time, he had already assumed the position of Dean of the Turner Theological Seminary of Morris Brown College, in Atlanta, Georgia, where he remained until 1944. During his time at Morris Brown, he taught philosophy and theology. Morris Brown College, founded in 1881, is an AME-affiliated institution and the only college in Georgia established by African Americans. The College is named after Bishop Morris Brown, the second elected and consecrated Bishop of the AME Church.

In 1938 he earned a PhD in philosophy from Ohio State University. His dissertation topic was titled "An Exposition and Critical Estimate of the Philosophy of Philip Melanchthon." Fluent in several languages, including Latin and German, Hill had begun research on this co-reformer of Martin Luther during his studies at Hamma Divinity School using primary documents in Latin and German. During his tenure at Turner Theological Seminary, he was an exchange professor at Atlanta University.

From 1944 to 1947, he taught sociology at Allen University in Columbia, South Carolina, and simultaneously was pastor of Bethel AME Church in Columbia. At the end of 1947, Hill was inaugurated as the thirteenth president of Wilberforce University (Wilberforce, Ohio).

Along with functioning at the helm at Wilberforce, Hill took on the responsibility of teaching classes in philosophy. In fact, unable to find a suitable text for classroom instruction, Hill wrote a history of modern Western philosophy that was published in 1951. With A Short History of Modern Philosophy from the Renaissance to Hegel, Hill became the first African American philosopher to publish a book on the history of modern philosophy.

Unfortunately, on December 8, 1956, Hill's brilliant career as an educator and philosopher came to a sudden end. Hill died after a stroke at the relatively early age of fifty years old.

As one of the leading scholars on Phillip Melanchthon, Hill belonged to several learned societies both in the United States and abroad, including the Royal Institute of Philosophy of Great Britain, American Philosophical Society, American Association for the Advancement of Science, and the American Academy of Social and Political Society.

The Charles Leander Hill Manuscript Collection is housed at Wilberforce University.

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ARTICLE

*Freedom Gaze: Explicating the African Freedom Aesthetic*

Anthony Neal

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First we must define the terms ‘noun’ and ‘verb,’ then the terms ‘denial’ and ‘affirmation,’ then ‘proposition’ and ‘sentence.’

Spoken words are the symbols of mental experience and written words are the symbols of spoken words. Just as all men have not the same writing, so all men have not the same speech sounds, but the mental experiences, which these directly symbolize, are the same for all, as also are those things of which our experiences are the images. This matter has, however, been discussed in my treatise about the soul, for it belongs to an investigation distinct from that which lies before us.¹

Signs, symbols, experiences, and frameworks, this is how humans perceive the world. Attempts to describe or express the meaning of a perceived moment of experience can be affected by many factors. The attempts to perceive something or the products of what is perceived are known as the aesthetic, or at least what gets perceived is perceived through the aesthetic. But what does it mean to perceive something, and why don’t we all perceive experiences the same? Beyond the nature of perception and what is perceived, what causes a change or shift in an aesthetic? In this paper, I will firstly define “perception” and secondly determine how some events shape human perception such that cultures are created. Finally, I will argue that there is an African Freedom Aesthetic among Africans in the diaspora that is demonstrable in creative productions. I regard African American culture as the foremost exemplar culture of this phenomenon and examine the African Freedom Aesthetic through an examination of the specific linguistic signs and symbols of this particular aesthetic. I will also show why I think this aesthetic to be foundational to any attempt to explicate what African American philosophy is.

To truly philosophize in earnest, by my understanding, is to create separation, which simply means to identify a thing or phenomenon. Next, the entity must be interpreted, and then it is represented to or communicated in the phenomenal world. We do this first through conception, next through the releasing of air in order to make noises we call verbal symbols or words, and lastly through markings or written symbols. All of this is contingent upon spatial-temporal dynamics such as where and when one perceives a thing or phenomenon and is always contextual. It is also contingent on the appetites and aversions of the ones who perceive the world. This filtering of phenomena through time and space, as well as through our appetites and aversions, is the origin of perception. So, as the Greek word ἀναθέσσω means sensation, consciousness, knowledge, or perception, then aesthetics is the science or study of perception.² Since all philosophers base their philosophizing on some foundational assumptions, I believe that it is good to make that assumption known and not keep it hidden from your audience. This paper, as well as my previous philosophical research, is grounded in the basic assumption that to separate, interpret, and represent an experience or phenomena to others with the greatest amount of clarity, it is necessary to begin with the study of the aesthetic. This is because, as suggested earlier, the world is seen very differently in different spaces, under different conditions, and among different people.

Blackness in the American context is one such condition. To truly communicate its meaning to others, we must tease out its differences from other cultures, creating the ability to discuss it as a particular, rather than attempting an understanding of Blackness in general. Some use a Marxist epistemological framework to form their analysis of what is Blackness; however, this type of analysis does not capture the full scope of Blackness.³ While narrowly focused on the metaphysics of the conditions African Americans find themselves, this type of analysis seems to miss the phenomenon of Blackness and therefore fails to give an accurate account of the subjective actions and reactions of African Americans to the American experiential moment.⁴ In order to get at the variegated nature of Blackness, some attempt to separate it from other cultures must occur. This separation is performed by categorizing or defining exactly what is meant by Blackness in the American context. Of course, Blackness in this respect is understood to mean African American, but has in the past been referred to as Negro and by the pejorative nigger. Its defining characteristics have sometimes been arbitrarily ascribed, to say the least, but they can range from skin color and hair type to having one Black relative, regardless of how distant. The meaning of Blackness has been permanently and ironically predicated as Black in the negative connotation of Black, which can be understood as not white and therefore not deserving of whatever is considered normative treatment to humans. This description may seem illogical, but it is meant to demonstrate a clear vision of Black existence in the American moment. Representations of Blackness by
others, whether in the arts or letters, has mainly to do with the accentuation of differences to ensure the separation between ethnic groups, which has historically meant placing Blacks in an illogical and precarious status that ensures their devaluation.\(^3\)

Blackness, as constructed in this way of being, in this experiential/aesthetic moment has formed the perceptions for those beings, which can be considered to inhabit such an existence. This is to say, Blackness is at once a sign of death, a symbol of depravity, an experience of oppression, and a framework for struggle, while also acting as a veil behind which exists a multiplicity of accurate expressions of life. As humans, our epistemological foundation for all knowledge is always subjected to our perception and moment of existence. "Moment," although usually connected to time only, is in this paper referring to the relationship of space and time in the creation of culture and culture's relationship to the general thought process of a people, which is significant in the shaping of those people's perceptions. A person's ability to be conscious, the degree to which they are conscious, and whatever the aim of their consciousness are direct reflections of, and are dependent upon, when and where they occur.\(^5\)

I will call this phenomenon "the experiential moment." A working definition of experiential moment arises from the concept of the lived experience, which I take to mean a phenomenological account of an individual's or group's reality. The experiential moment deepens this description of lived experience by attempting to account for those significant experiences which have charted or changed an individual's or group's experience in a substantial way such that their consciousness is also affected, i.e., the experiences of being racialized, slavery, and war.

Consciousness always means conscious of a particular phenomenon.\(^7\) In this sense, consciousness always has an aim. In my earlier work, I define "consciousness" as awareness intentionally focused on a physical object or mental creation that is subjectively understood.\(^8\) The phrase "subjectively understood" is pivotal in that it gives credence to the more thorough meaning of perception. This definition of consciousness highlights a level of contingency inherent in the concept of consciousness. It is a contingency based upon the perception of the subject as the subject participates in a subject-object relationship. In this way, the perception, or gaze, one has of the world now becomes a type of dialectic relationship, in that the cognition of what is perceived depends on the perceiver as well as that which is being perceived in this experiential moment. To put it plainly, as it pertains to Black people, Black people see white people, and they see how white people respond to seeing Black people. Black people see the structures or institutions in this society and the responsiveness of the institutions towards Black people. The African Freedom Aesthetic is a direct response to this dialectical relationship of this experiential moment. It is when this dialectical relationship is trivialized or ignored that mischaracterizations of it occur. These mischaracterizations are grounded in wrongful historical idealizations and thwart any enterprise concerned with a true understanding of a particular people within a particular experiential moment, in this case African Americans.

Clarity can be gained on this matter by connecting the concept of the gaze found in the works of Laura Mulvey (803–816) and bell hooks (115–131) to this present work, with an aim towards distinguishing between their use of the concept and how I use it here. Mulvey and hooks contend that the gaze involves three entities, each of which enters into the moment of the gaze with a different level of awareness and has a status that is determined by the manner in which they enter the gaze moment. The gaze moment is crucial, because it is the point of interaction between the entities. It is also the moment that the power differential between the entities becomes apparent, and the entity with least power becomes objectified. The gaze moment sets the stage for all other subsequent activity and conceptualizations of the ones who gaze or who are the ones being gazed at. There is either a rejection of the moment or a reluctant acquiescence, but there is a reaction to the moment by all entities who participate in the gaze moment.

Although there is no necessary order to the listing, the first entity is the creator of the gaze moment. Here, I am describing the gaze moment in its film application. The creator of the gaze moment is the entity responsible for the creation of the movie or film. Their status is active owing to their having created the space upon which to have the gaze moment. It is their bias that creates a positive or negative gaze. Mulvey and hooks only discussed the negative gaze in their writings on it. The other two entities are the female and the male. Mulvey and hooks focus upon the power dynamic that exists between male and female, with female being viewed as less powerful and hence subordinate to male. Of course, they each utilize three entities—the creator of the gaze moment and the two entities being gazed at, the male and the female. However, in this work there exists only two entities (Black and white). The shift in focus from gender to race is important, because I essentially flatten the conceptualization of the moment as non-sexed, but race-determined. I do this intentionally to demonstrate that I believe the nexus of racial oppression (the conceptual level) is at the genus level while the actual experience may be more specific. It is at the genus level that Blackness becomes the DuBoisian veil.

In this experiential moment, even when Blackness is not viewed as a type of depraved existence, it is mostly viewed as other even by Blacks themselves. This is to say Blackness is viewed as the antithesis of the human. Black people exist in an illogical state in which whenever they try to gain an understanding of themselves as selves in a world where they are viewed as abnormal or other. Over the centuries, this continuous illogical state has been a factor in the creation of a differing aesthetic. However, I think it necessary to state that it is not the Black body that is the origin of this aesthetic, for that body has historically been conceived as an object that cannot be a subject of its own experiences. I also think that it is necessary to state that Black existence is neither logical nor illogical; Black existence, at least as a manifestation of being itself, simply is. We can only classify our perceptions, conceptions, and descriptions of phenomena as logical or illogical.
As far as being is concerned, if it can be accepted that being is not static, but is always in transition, and this transition is affected by experience, then experiential moments become crucial to the understanding of being. This means that in order to give a proximally accurate depiction of being in a given experiential moment, then the particular being along with all of its available experiences must be considered. This is necessarily true of the individual as a particular member of a group, and it is also necessarily true of the group, as the group becomes an individual when under observation.

Plessy v. Ferguson (1896) is an example of a significant experiential moment that changed the lived experience for African Americans in a substantial way and affected their consciousness, for this is the court decision that legalized the concept of separate but equal. This decision went beyond affecting class in an economic sense; it had such a broad ranging effect on Black people as to determine everything from your birthplace to where you could be buried. It determined nutritional intake, genetic makeup (based upon procreation partners), religious practices, intellectual pursuits, the scope of ethical behavior. It also determined Black people’s access to life, liberty, and the very pursuit of happiness. Whites could define the limits of life, liberty, and happiness for themselves and for everyone else, usually reserving the most restrictive definitions of these terms for those with African ancestry. It was in this experiential moment that the Black perception of Blackness was formed. It was a perception formed of a distant African past, the rejection of a not-so-distant past in captivity, and an immediate present defined by a struggle to teach the meaning of humanity through the development of a human community, in spite of being denied its benefits.

It can be said that this particular use of experiential moment here can be confused with a concept of epoch or milieu. For this reason, one needs to consider the horizontal temporal-spatial existence of Black people during this historical period, while offering a phenomenological and even processual interpretation of this historical period as part of the analysis of the experiences had by Black people living during this historical period. To this end, any analysis of Blackness must, of course, be emic in nature, bearing in mind that the experience of Blackness in the American moment is particular. However, the interpretation and representation of this experience must also consider the African Freedom Aesthetic. From a phenomenological perspective, African Americans must not be taken as object, but instead as subject with a particular intentionality just as other groups are. As such, and giving consideration to the African Freedom Aesthetic, the realization of the difference between Blackness and Black people should be viewed in a similar manner as the distinction between a thing as seen or as it appears and what it is. Sometimes the two are simultaneously aimed at when studying the experiences of Black people, but in most cases, they are not the same phenomenon and they should never be taken as being identical. An example of this can be found in the well-known poem, “We Wear the Mask,” by Paul Lawrence Dunbar:

We wear the mask that grins and lies,
It hides our cheeks and shades our eyes,—
This debt we pay to human guile;
With torn and bleeding hearts we smile,
And mouth with myriad subtleties.

Why should the world be over-wise,
In counting all our tears and sighs?
Nay, let them only see us, while
We wear the mask.

We smile, but, O great Christ, our cries
To thee from tortured souls arise.
We sing, but oh the clay is vile
Beneath our feet, and long the mile;
But let the world dream otherwise,
We wear the mask!13

The African American Freedom Aesthetic is also affected by the fusion of horizons of many peoples’ experiences. Black people in the American moment cannot exist wholly apart from others; they are affected by being culturally immersed in their times. In this American moment, Black people have developed music, literature, and systems of spiritual formation. However, all of these developments were influenced to some degree by surrounding cultures. To be sure, even under tremendously adverse conditions, African Americans were able to prehend positive experiences useful to their aim such that they participated in their own development or auto-poiesis. The many rebellions, attempts at revolution, and engagements in wars go a long ways towards demonstrating that regardless of the plight, African Americans did not see themselves as a determined or predestined people for the oppression they encountered.14

So what makes it necessary to put forth this description of the aesthetics of Black people in this moment? Most of my work is enveloped in the philosophical quest to understand Blackness in the American context for the purpose of determining just what can be called an African American philosophy. As such, I am concerned with the methods of just how such a study should be performed. Since I am not the first to make this attempt, I have given large amounts of time considering the work of others who have also made this journey. For the sake of time and space, I will certainly not outline all of the attempts to create an African American philosophy, but I will discuss the attempt I find to be most problematic. Before doing so, I would like to identify three schools of thought pertaining to African American philosophy and their problems:15

1. African Americans doing philosophy is African American philosophy.

2. Any philosopher of race focusing on the nature of the Black experience, whether analytic or continental in method, with the aim of offering correctives to bring about eudaimonia. It is mostly political in nature.

3. Constructive or corrective philosophy, which rejects Eurocentric schools of thought as normative and focuses on what would be African American philosophy if not for slavery.
It is the third school, which I find to be most problematic, especially as far as my research is concerned. This group is most problematic because it is necessary for this group’s philosophy to put forth a theory of what is the meaning of Blackness in the context of America. Within this group are those Afrocentric theorists whose foundational assumption is based on what is called Location Theory, and they also maintain that there is an essential nature to being Black. 16 Without explicating the details of this theoretical framework, it suffices to say that if it is maintained that there is an essential nature to being Black, then any understanding of African Americans’ Blackness as being historically and spatially conditioned is not a viable option.

Why does this matter? Its importance is rooted conceptually in the foundational questions of African American philosophy, beginning with the question, “What does it mean to be Black?” This question loses significance if at any time a group of Black people appears in history we can simply refer to them as African. To do so would allow us to make certain assumptions about what it means to be African and that the term “African” provides a basic understanding of the culture of the group to which it is applied, regardless of where they are located and when they were or are alive. This is simply not so. Since this is not so, then the basic question must be revised so that one can ask what does it mean to be Black in America? This question acknowledges that being Black in America and being African or being Black in Africa are not the same, or better even there is no transcendent essential nature to being Black. Blackness in the American context is different in significant ways from Blackness in the African context. Although I would admit that there are significant similarities, to speak of them as if there are no significant differences between the two ways of being Black reduces any claims of the effects of slavery and oppression on both groups.

This is why I must refer to the American moment. It was the American moment that created a particular consciousness, the African Freedom Aesthetic, which is the main lens of African American philosophy. African American philosophy is distinguished from other genres of philosophy by society’s objectification of its main subject of discourse, which is the Black body. In other words, African American philosophy is necessarily humanistic in its discourse and as a field of inquiry because of the requisite goal of reclaiming the human status for Black bodies. In many ways African American philosophy was set in motion, just as Greek philosophy, in its rejection of the previous worldview and/or perceptual frameworks. The relevance of African American philosophy is derived from the context of enslavement. While other groups certainly were enslaved in the Americas in addition to Africans, it was the freedom struggle of those people of African descent that in many ways shaped the freedoms that all Americans enjoy through a prolonged social movement. Not all Africans, but particularly those in the American diaspora.

How then does one do African American philosophy? In other words, who can and is doing African American philosophy? This is simple! Anyone can do African American philosophy, but there should be some distinction made between studying African American philosophy (i.e., the writings of any African American philosopher) and doing African American philosophy. However, this is a major bone of contention among philosophers who are drawn to this discourse. I am contending that African American philosophy must have as a central concern the conflict between the lived experience of oppression and the desired experience of freedom. African American philosophy must toll with the variance between normative experience being equated with humanity, which would be the same as equating it with whiteness in the American context, and the Black experience, which was thought to be insignificant. It must be suspicious of blind patriotism just as it should be suspicious of any type of blind faith. The questions and issues of African American philosophy are not limited to these. Nor are these questions limited to African American philosophy, but these questions and issues in conjunction with an attempt to understand the experience of Blackness must be central and not peripheral to African American philosophy. In short, African American philosophy begins by rejecting the definition of the Black body as a tool defined by the institution of slavery by defining Black bodies as human and also free, and by expressing the experience of Blackness in a phenomenological manner (which simply means expressing this experience based on the perception of the expresser). Particularly when studying American political thought, since much of this thought was shaped either in contention or in conjunction with the African American freedom movement and African American philosophy, it would seem that the full picture of American political thought cannot be had without a firm understanding of African American philosophy which is bolstered by understanding the African Freedom Aesthetic.

I would like to end this paper by briefly distinguishing the African Freedom Aesthetic from “the Black aesthetic.” The Black aesthetic is time locked as a product of the Black arts movement beginning in 1965 and is mostly the creation of Addison Gayle, Amiri Baraka, and Larry Neal. 17 It was not meant to explain as much as it was meant to be a creative impetus for a particular kind of protest literature and artistic creations. The name “African Freedom Aesthetic” serves more of a descriptive function for a particular meta-philosophical framework and cultural memory, which has shaped a group of people, namely, African Americans. This shaping began instantaneously when Africans arrived in America, but it reached its zenith in 1896 with the Plessy vs. Ferguson decision, bringing the question of what is Blackness front and center. 18 While developing the African Freedom Aesthetic, African Americans became a discreet people, immersed in many cultures, adverting some while also intentionally subsuming others, all with the aim of becoming free.

NOTES
1. Aristotle et al., The Categories on Interpretation, 115.
3. Ferguson, Philosophy of African American Studies, 7.
5. Davis, Darkest Hollywood, 12.
7. Ibid.
10. Ibid., 10.
11. Scott, Crimes Against Humanity in the Land of the Free, 75.
17. Johnson, Being and Race, 22.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

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