NEWSLETTER ON PHILOSOPHY AND THE BLACK EXPERIENCE

FROM THE EDITORS, JOHN MCCLENDON & GEORGE YANCY

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The editors would like to express their thanks for all of the positive feedback that they received on their first jointly edited volume of the *Newsletter on Philosophy and the Black Experience*. We will continue to provide critical and diverse philosophical thought within the continuum of Africana philosophical thought. In this issue we highlight the Pan-African scope of philosophy and the Black experience. This year (2003) is a landmark year for several important developments in the history of Africana philosophy. First, it is the tri-centennial of the birth of William Anthony Amo who was the first person of African descent to receive a doctorate in philosophy. Second, one hundred years ago W.E.B. Du Bois wrote his classic study, *The Souls of Black Folk* and Thomas Nelson Baker became the first African American to earn a Ph.D. in philosophy from an institution in the United States. For those interested in knowing about Baker, you should consult George Yancy’s pioneering article on Thomas Nelson Baker, which first appeared in this *Newsletter* in 1992 (Vol. 95, no. 2). Third, Everett Green a decade ago began his annual Philosophy Born of Struggle conferences. In this issue of the *Newsletter*, he provides us with a summary of its history and an announcement about its forthcoming tenth anniversary meeting. Green’s significant undertaking remains as the most consistent and sustained effort to institutionalize, in a national conference format, the ongoing discussion of Africana philosophy. We urge that you who are engaged in Africana philosophy, as well as all students and nonprofessional philosophers, participate in the upcoming conference.

We begin this issue with John McClendon’s Introduction to Drs. Anton Wilhelm Amo and Charles Leander Hill with select bibliographies, which are followed by Charles Leander Hill’s 1955 article on Amo, “William Ladd, The Black Philosopher from Guinea: A Critical Analysis of His Dissertation on Apathy” in *The A.M.E. Review* 72 (186). Hill’s article is the first English translation of Amo’s work. George Yancy offers another groundbreaking article on an early Black philosopher with an essay on Gilbert Haven Jones. Jones received his doctorate in philosophy in 1909. Yancy traces Jones’s life and provides a brief, though engaging, account of his life and philosophy, particularly his educational philosophy. Historians and cultural theorists James G. Spady and Giles R. Wright in “Jean Harvey Slappy’s Philosophy and The Tradition of Marcus Garvey and Thomas W. Harvey” present an engaging tribute to the fortitude and historical and cultural agency of Jean M. Harvey Slappy. In contextualizing her identity formation, Spady and Wright insightfully reveal Slappy’s Black internationalist consciousness, womanist sensibilities, Garveyite being-in-the-world, and the powerful influences of her great-grandmother and her father, Thomas W. Harvey. John McClendon’s article, “On Assessing the Ideological Impact of Garveyism on Nkrumahism: Political Symbolism Contra Theoretical Substance” explores the philosophical divergences between Nkrumah and Garvey’s respective philosophies of Pan-Africanism. Although Garvey’s influence on Nkrumah is quite apparent with respect to political symbolism, McClendon argues that there is a vast difference in their theories about African traditional culture, the function of diasporan leadership within the Pan-African movement and in their conceptions about the role of the political economy of imperialism in Africa. Next we have Stephen C. Ferguson, II’s article “C.L.R. James, Marxism and Political Freedom,” which explores Pan-Africanist James’s magnum opus, *Notes on Dialectics: Hegel-Marx-Lenin* (1948). James’s contribution to Marxist philosophy is the focus of Ferguson’s critical investigation. James’s long neglected work is one of the first Marxist philosophical texts written by a person of African descent. Ferguson employs an internal critique of James and delineates what are the problems attached to James’s conception of dialectics. Stephen C. Ferguson, II is now completing his doctoral dissertation in philosophy at the University of Kansas. Everett Green’s ‘Philosophy Born of Struggle Conference Series’ is an overview of the conference activities of the last decade and a call for the upcoming tenth conference, which will be held at Rutgers, Newark Campus, NJ on October 24 & 25, 2003. Prof. Green, a former student of the late African-American philosopher Roy D. Morrison, III, teaches philosophy at Rockland Community College and New School University.

In our first book review, political theorist Floyd Hayes, North Carolina State University, provides an informed and critical review of Clarence Shole Johnson’s groundbreaking work *Cornel West & Philosophy: The Quest for Social Justice*. In the second review, Dan Warner, who wrote his Honors Thesis at the University of Virginia on W.E.B. Du Bois and Arendt, is currently a graduate student at Duquesne University, explores the “tapestry of multiple philosophical voices” contained in George Yancy’s most recent edited book *The Philosophical i: Personal Reflections on Life in Philosophy*. Next, philosopher Naomi Zack, University of Oregon, provides an insightful overview of Rodney C. Roberts’s edited book *Injustice and Rectification*, which attempts to come to terms with such questions as “What is injustice, and what does justice require when injustice occurs?” Lastly, cultural theorist and historian James Spady, author of *Street Conscious Rap* and editor of 360 Degrees of Sonia Sanchez: Hip Hop, Narrativity, *Iqhawe* and *Public Spaces of Being*, philosophically explores issues of identity formation, consciousness, being and agency that emerge in the life of rapper DMX. Spady’s review of *E.A.R.L.: The Autobiography of DMX* rejects the “from ghetto to riches” scenario and provides us with DMX’s struggle to find meaning in human existence.
Please take note of the following erratum: In the previous issue of the Newsletter in George Yancy’s article on Jacquelyn Grant, on page 56, column 2, 3rd line from the bottom, the sentence should have read: “This does not mean that Grant is a prisoner of deep pessimism, and committed to a worldview where God is dead.”

We are requesting that all articles and reviews for the Fall 2003 issue of the Newsletter on Philosophy and the Black Experience be submitted by August 15, 2003. Articles should be sent to John H. McClendon, African American Studies/ American Cultural Studies, Bates College, 223 Pettengill Hall, Lewiston, ME 04240 or by electronic submission to jmcclend@bates.edu, and book reviews to George Yancy, 6324 Crombie Street, Pittsburgh, PA 15217 or by electronic submission to georgeandsusany@aol.com. Electronic submissions are strongly encouraged.

ARTICLES

Introduction to Drs. Anton Wilhelm Amo and Charles Leander Hill
John H. McClendon
Assoc. Prof. of African American and American Cultural Studies, Bates College

This year (2003) marks the tri-centennial of the birth of Anton Wilhelm Amo. The first person of African descent to receive a doctorate in philosophy, Amo’s extraordinary scholarly and intellectual accomplishments took place during the eighteenth century. All the more remarkable given the fact that the African slave trade was the basis for his sojourn to Europe. Captured as a slave, from what is today Ghana in West Africa, as a young child he was taken to Amsterdam and later went to Germany. Amo was a student at the University of Hallé, where he began his studies in 1727. Amo started his graduate studies in 1730 at the University of Wittenberg and submitted his inaugural dissertation to the faculty there in 1734. In addition to writing and speaking six European languages, Amo completed work in logic, metaphysics, astronomy, law, politics, theology, medicine and physiology. His teaching career involved serving on the faculties of Hallé and Jena (Bernile 2002).

Amo’s accomplishments as an intellectual in eighteenth century Germany stand as a stark challenge to the hegemonic and racist presumptions about Black intellectual inferiority. It is no surprise that abolitionists found in Amo’s experiences the ammunition to fight against the ideological justifications for slavery. Abolitionist Lydia Maria Child’s text, An Appeal in Favor of Americans Called Africans (1833), was one of the first works to cite Amo’s astonishing example as a refutation of white supremacist justifications for slavery.

Over the past two centuries, historians of African descent have not neglected the true meaning and measure of Amo’s life. For his life radiates not only as a source in the ideological battle against white supremacy but also as an affirmation of pride in African culture and history. After the demise of slavery, our pioneers in Africana history sustained the struggle against white domination. From William Simmons in 1887 (Simmons 1968), and Altoah Ahuma in 1905 (Ahuma 1905) to John Edward Bruce in 1910 (Bruce 1910), Black scholars continued to bring to the broader public the feats of Amo. For while the slave trade and slavery were now at an end, the ravages of capitalism and racism assumed the forms of colonialism and segregation at the turn from nineteenth to the twentieth century. In as much as colonialism and segregation were most alive and well in Africa and its diaspora, Amo’s example, throughout the African world, was a critical resource for the needed moral and intellectual fiber in the ongoing confrontation with imperialist assaults and brutality.

Later, we discover that in 1939 Dr. W.E.B. Du Bois summoned Amo’s exemplary scholarly contributions as a source of inspiration (Du Bois 1939) and Beatrice Fleming and Marion Pryde in 1946, under the auspices of Dr. Carter G. Woodson’s Associated Publishers, would also inform a new generation of post-World War II youth about the Amo legacy (Fleming and Pryde 1946). Cultural imperialism with its tentacles in Africa and its diaspora had its countervailing force in the cultural resistance of African peoples worldwide.

During this period (from the mid 1930s to the mid 1940s), Kwame Nkrumah, as a young philosophy student and later instructor, found in Amo not only a fellow Nzima, of the former Gold Coast, but also a symbol of how the African philosopher must be engaged in practical struggle for liberation. Amo’s “De Jure Maurorum in Europa” in 1729 was one of the first works to defend the Rights of Moors (Black People) in Europe. Nkrumah had hopes of translating and publishing Amo’s compilation of lectures, which he entitled Tractatus De arte sobrie accurate philosophandi (1738). Nkrumah was told that unfortunately, the work was destroyed in the Nazi bombing of the British Museum (Nkrumah 1971: 185).

The first English translation of Amo’s work had to await the efforts of the African American philosopher Dr. Charles Leander Hill (Hill 1955). While the earlier historians chronicled the context of Amo’s intellectual contributions, Hill provides us with the philosophical content of Amo’s inaugural dissertation, Dissertation de huminae mentis apatheia. Undoubtedly, the historical road to Hill’s philosophical studies was a very difficult one for African American philosophers. Academic racism remained as a not so subtle reality. This was especially the case with philosophy, as it became a professional and institutionalized discipline within the academy.

It was precisely 200 years after Amo’s birth that Thomas Nelson Baker received his doctorate in philosophy from Yale University, thus establishing Baker as the first African American to receive a Ph.D. in philosophy from an institution in the United States (Yancy 2001). Patrick Francis Healey beforehand earned his doctorate in philosophy from the University of Louvain in 1865 and went on to become the president of Georgetown University in 1874 (Davis 1990).

From 1865, when Healey followed Amo, to 1938, the year Hill received his doctorate in philosophy from The Ohio State University, few African Americans entered philosophy holding the Ph.D. degree. In fact, only Gilbert Haven Jones from the University of Jena in 1909, Alain Locke at Harvard in 1918, Albert M. Dunham from the University of Chicago in 1933, Marquis Lafayette Harris at The Ohio State University in 1933, and William T. Fontaine from the University of Pennsylvania in 1936, a total of seven, came before Hill.

However, I should point out that even though Lewis Baxter Moore’s doctorate from the University of Pennsylvania in 1896 was in classics, his training considerably engaged him in the philosophy curriculum. Subsequently, he established the philosophy department at Howard University of which Alain Locke developed into one of the premier departments in the country (Harris 1983: xii). In many ways, the year 1938 was a banner year for Black doctorate holders in philosophy. Along
with Hill, there were two other recipients of the doctorate that year, namely Marc Marion Moreland at the University of Toronto and Forest Oran Wiggins from the University of Wisconsin.

A native of Urbana, Ohio, Charles Leander Hill (1906-1956) graduated magna cum laude from Wittenberg College in Springfield, Ohio. After earning the B.D. and S.T.M. from Hamma Divinity School, he did graduate study at the University of Berlin from 1931-32. It was at this time that he discovered Amo’s inaugural dissertation. Consumed with his research on Philip Melanchthon, the co-reformer with Martin Luther, Hill not only wrote a dissertation on Melanchthon but also became an internationally renowned scholar of Melanchthon (Flack 1962; Hill 1944; Stokes 2000). Hill returned to his work on Amo during his presidency at Wilberforce University from 1947-1956 (Hill 1955: 20).

Hill was more than prepared to carry out the tasks of providing a critical commentary and translation of Amo. His work on Melanchthon was precisely that kind of undertaking, where Hill’s knowledge of Latin, Greek and German in combination with his extensive study of the history of philosophy proved to be immeasurable assets. In fact, Hill’s expertise in the history of modern Western philosophy had already resulted in the publication of a text in 1951. Unable to find a suitable text for classroom instruction, Dr. Hill produced A Short History of Modern Philosophy from the Renaissance to Hegel. With Hill’s publication of a book in the history of modern philosophy, he became the first African American philosopher to accomplish this feat (Hill 1951). A theologian as well as an ordained minister of the African Methodist Episcopal Church, Dr. Hill was widely known for his great oratorical skills and to accomplish this feat (Hill 1951). 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William Ladd, the Black Philosopher from Guinea: A Critical Analysis of His Dissertation on Apathy

By Charles Leander Hill

Foreword

There are many reasons why I have been led to a consideration of the life and works of Anthony William Amo. I shall mention only the most important ones here.

In the first instance, what follows may be considered as the culmination of a specific interest which I have had since my students days in the University of Berlin in the thirties. While ruminating through the University Library in search of manuscripts of the Reformers, which happened to be my chief area of research, I ran across a copy of Amo’s dissertation on Apathy. Not having the time to occupy myself with Amo then, I took notations of this exceptional man who rose from the status of an African slave to a free learned professor of philosophy in a great European university determined at some future date to put my hand to an elucidation of his philosophical system so far as the available sources would permit. Over 20 years have elapsed and I am just now finding time to devote to Amo. There is a joy of realization then that pervades every word of this short treatise about a scholar with whom I have racial affinities.

The notion of racial affinity then, may be put down as another motive for the desire to do something with Amo. Amo, it will be observed, came from Guinea on the West Coast of Africa. I am informed by the leading authorities on the history of the American Negro, that the majority of the slaves who were brought to the American shores, stemmed from the West Coast of Africa. In this treatise then, there is a sort of intellectual connecting link between our ancestors and original homeland which constituted the African background for the descendents of the original slaves brought from West Africa. There is a continuity of cultures then centering in Amo, who, although he was the product of an European culture and we the products of an American culture, yet we unite for the most part, in a common African setting before the Odyssey and Pilgrimage of our ancient forbears to strange lands.

Moreover the lofty cultural and intellectual heights unto which Amo, by his inherent genius and natural endowments and the marvelous academic opportunities afforded him by his European masters attained, would seem to necessitate that some scholar, who by the accidents of biology happens to be a black man, should feel an obligation to set forth and make known to the literate world, a scholar with whom he can take great pride by way of racial identification. This does not mean that every scholar who happens to be a Negro must devote to subjects of pure Negroana or Africana. This I do not mean at all. For pure scholarship would seem to be a means to transcend all racial considerations and enable scholars of all races to unite at top levels in mutual understanding and in intellectual sympathies. All that I insist upon is this: that while the scholar who is a Negro must devote to an objective, dispassionate search for truth like any other scholar, he would seem to me to be confronted with the additional responsibility of making known to the world of scholarship, any great mind that was lodged by the accident of birth in a black body. This special or additional responsibility I gladly accept, and the results of the assumption of this duty, you will read in the following pages.

There is an element of surprise in the fact that our own historians have been tardy in the process of uncovering great personalites such as Amo. During the onward march of world understanding it seems that more studies such as I have attempted in this short treatise, would do much to achieve a more genuine spirit of both amity and understanding among the people of the earth. The very floruit of Amo, the last decade of the 17th century, and the first half of the 18th century, is a brilliant commentary upon the ironical statements of many in Europe and America who were the classical detractors of black men so far as their humanity was concerned.

Both in Europe and America the leading thinkers of the majority race were skeptical of the fact that black persons were really human. And where they were generous enough to accept the humanity of the blacks, there were still doubtful of their abilities in an intellectual way ever to take on the culture and learning of the white man. Now for an African slave, during this age of scepticism towards black people, to tower above the majority of the whites of his age and win the coveted doctorate from one of the most reputable of the European Universities, was ironical to say the least. Nor was Amo unique in this respect. We have only to enumerate a few of the blacks who had been slaves but who, gaining their freedom, took laurels in various fields of learning and endeavor during the 17th and 18th century in Europe and in America. I call to mind only a few: the eloquent Belinda, a charming Negro lady from Africa and sold in America, who petitioned the legislature of Massachusetts in 1782; L’Islet Geoffroy, artillery officer in the French Army and named Correspondent of the Academy of Sciences in 1788; James Derham, a prepared or drugs, originally a slave at Philadelphia at 28 a most distinguished physician in New Orleans; Thomas Fuller of Alexandria, Virginia, a natural mathematician of great note. And what shall I say of Othello of Baltimore, who wrote an essay against the Slavery of Negroes? And of Benjamin Banneker of Maryland and Ottobah Cugoano from Fantin, and Capitein the great theologian and preacher of the Dutch Reformed Church who flourished at the same time as Amo lived? Time will only permit me to mention Francis Williams with his Latin odes and elegies, and Vassa, and Sancho, and Phyllis Wheatley, and many others in many places in America and in Europe.

A major reason why the majority of the European blacks who rose to places of eminence in academic and cultural circles are merely names, is due to the fact that in many instances, their works are buried in Latin, French, German, Dutch, and Spanish sources that are not accessible even to scholars. It is unfortunate that more of our historians are not equipped with the linguistic and philological tools by which to mine the gold. Enjoying a degree of facility in the use of languages, I have made bold to occupy myself with Amo and others whose works are in Latin, Dutch, and German, in the hope that some youthful scholar among us will have his appetite whetted to the degree that he may decide to labor assiduously to make known eminent blacks who are relatively obscure to our people and to the world of scholarship in general.
The secondary sources about Amo are few. Among the French writers I have been assisted by Gregoire’s monumental work: De La Litterature Des Negres (Chez Maradan, Libraire, A Paris, 1700 volume VIII). Also helpful was Chardel’s translation of Blumenbach’s fine work title De L’Unite du Genere humain. Among the English speaking peoples I have found short biographical notices in: Bruce, John Edward, Eminent Negro Men and Women; and Distinguished Negroes Abroad by Beatrice Fleming and Marion J. Pryde. Short references to Amo will be found in several other sources but since they contain nothing not found in the standard works quoted, it is useless to mention them. A classical but short sketch of Amo is contained in Cook: Le Noir, 1934, Pp. 16-17.

I propose to submit in this study, a short biographical sketch of the life of Amo and then I intend to give a critical analysis of his crowning work, the Dissertation on Apathy. This latter attempt will be a contribution to our knowledge of Amo and his work, since nowhere else, even among the French and German sources, do I know of any such work. I am, at present, in search of his work on the Law of the Moors (De Jure Maurorum). I have just been informed that this has been found for me and I hope in the future to release a treatise dealing with Amo as a philosopher of law. I have rejoiced also over the fact that in the British Museum there is a copy of another philosophical treatise by Amo: “Tractus de Arte Sobrie et Accurate Philosophandi,” published in Magdeburg in 1738. I have sent for micro-films of this work and I will then be able to bring together in one place a full evaluation of all of Amo’s extant works.

It is hoped sincerely that this short monograph will add somewhat to an appreciation of an eminent Negro whose life story should be an inspiration to all black peoples who are struggling still on the face of the earth for the full recognition of their human rights, and for the opportunity to participate in the full cultural and social ethos wherever they may be located.

I wish to express my gratitude to Dr. V. Schwartzkoppen, head Librarian of the Universitaets-Bibliothek of the Freie Universitaet Berlin, for having located for me the dissertation of Amo on Apathy and for having provided me with a photocopy of the same. Dr. V. Schwartzkoppen has also informed me of the existence of another work of Amo the “Tratatus de arte sobrie et accurate philosophandi” now in the British Museum, a photocopy of which will soon be in my hands.

Mr. Casper Leroy Jordan, M.S.-L.S., Head Librarian of Carnegie Library of Wilberforce University has been of immeasurable assistance in the actual securing of the photocopies and in other inter-library communications. My thanks are due also to my secretary, Mrs. Bertha Jackson for typing the manuscript and for seeing this short treatise through publication.

It goes without saying that I am indebted to my wife Rosalie for her constant encouragement of my scholarly researches, and for the multiplicity of “labors of love” during the search for materials and the actual writing of this short monograph.

I promise to follow this short work in time with a translation and an exposition of Amo’s classical work on the Art of Philosophizing, which is a brilliant presentation of proper methodology in philosophy.

Chapter I
The exact date of Amo’s birth is unknown. He was born in Guinea and his early boyhood home was in the city of Axim. At a very early age he was brought to Amsterdam and surrendered to the Duke of Brunswick-Wolfembutel who had purchased him in the slave traffic. Duke Anthony Williams turned him over to his son Augustus Williams. The Princess of Brunswick took immediate charge of his education in fundamental processes: “Amo, ne en Guinee, fut amen e tres jeune a Amsterdam, en 1707, et donne au duc de Brunswick-Wolfembutel. Antoine-Ulrie qui le ceda a son fils Auguste-Guillaume.”

The little boy was called by the first name of the Duke and the second name of the Duke’s son – Anthony William. The surname Amo was selected by the lad in later years. Amo was exceptionally fortunate in this early cultural environment. His lot from the very beginning was that of no ordinary slave. His master very early observed the lad’s precocity and he was given every opportunity under the soft and refined tutelage of the Princess to develop as fast as he was able. The enlightened company that frequently visited the Duke’s home, the learned conversations that were held daily, the intense training in the social amenities, called out of Amo all of the noble and proper reactions that were latent in his slumbering genius.

Fleming and Pryde record in their short treatise on Amo, that the latter overheard a conversation about the most interesting theme of the day to wit: Can a Negro learn like a white person? His master was loud in the praise of the mental capacities of his slave and stated that his belief in the ability of the Negro to imbibe the white man’s culture was so great that he intended to send Amo to college. This was the high point in Amo’s career.

Amo in time entered Halle University in Saxony where he studied periodigously (sic) and made an exceptional record. The most difficult and obtuse disciplines came easy for him. He made proficiency in Hebrew, Greek, Latin, French, Dutch, and German. On this point Gregoire says: “Amo eut voir dans l’astronomie et parfois le latin, le grec, l’hébreu, le français, le hollandais et l’allemand.” His abstract proclivities led him to a zealous application to the field of philosophy for which he is most noted. As a privat-docent he lectured on philosophy. After his studies at Halle he moved to the famous Wittenberg Academy that had been founded by Frederick the Wise. It was here that the great Reformer Luther had instigated the Protestant Revolution. It is no wonder then that surrounded by such an atmosphere, Amo gave himself to Lutherism (sic) Christianity and was a devout Christian all of his life.

In 1729 while at Halle Amo submitted a thesis under Chancellor Ludwig and published a dissertation titled De Jure Maurorum – The Law of the Moors. His inaugural dissertation in philosophy, submitted to the Wittenberg Faculty under the presidency of Dr. Martin Gotthelf Loescher, was on Apathy, the work which I am analyzing in this treatise. Wittenberg Academy at this time was free from prejudice and as a result Amo was called in 1734 to the chair of philosophy. Here he gained many honors and great note as a scholar. The Berlin Court gave him the title of “Councillor of State.” Gregoire’s words are “La cour de Berlin lui avort confere le titre de conseiller d’Etat.”

At the height of his success the untimely death of the Duke of Brunswick altered the whole course of Amo’s life. Grief stricken and disillusioned completely by being robbed of his beloved benefactor, Amo left Europe and returned to Axim on the Gold Coast which was his birthplace. He found his father and sister alive and his brother still a slave in Surinam. He spent the remainder of his life perhaps in Chama whither he had moved from Axim. Brooding alone in his philosophical meditations, it is unfortunate that he could not use his profound knowledge in his African environment and that he had to suspend his scholarly researches.
Chapter II
A Critical Analysis of Amo’s Dissertation on Apathy

Amo begins his treatise on Apathy of the human mind by a consideration of the ideas set forth with respect to the subject and predicate of his thesis. With respect to the subject he informs us that he will discuss the nature of spirit in general (Quid Spiritus in genere) and the nature of the human mind in particular (Quid mens humanae specie).

With respect to the predicate of his fundamental thesis (Which is a comparative study of the differences between the particular and predicate of his thesis) Amo submits a list of questions and theses which follow:

I. The nature of the contradictory of the predicate (Apathy) obviously, sensation and the faculty of sense perception: Quid sensio and Quid facultas sentiendi?

II. What is the nature of the predicate itself, that is, of apathy: Quid ipsum predicatum?

III. Finally what is the meaning of the proposition itself, that is, apathy itself of the human mind: Quid denique ipsa proposito, i.e., ipsa humanae mentis apathiea?

After having explained these aspects of the terminology Amo informs us that he will set forth the conditions of the question in terms of a series of theses: Status questionis et theses. He does this in the following manner.

I. First negative thesis: the human mind does not perceive material things: Mens humana non sentit res materials. To this he adds the proper proofs.

II. Second negative thesis: the faculty of perceiving with the senses does not belong to the mind: Nec sentiendi facultas menti competit.

III. Third affirmative thesis: it belongs to our organic living body: Sed corpori nostro organicum et vivo. To this he adds the proper proofs.

Chapter one contains declarations of the ideas contained in the thesis. In a preliminary rubric to the reader Amo defines clearly what we are to understand by the term Apathy. Apathy, as he uses the term, is the absence of sensation and of the faculty of sensation in the human mind: Absentiam sensionis et facultatis sentiendi in mente humana. He returns to a specific exposition of this definition in Chapter two, member one, paragraph I of his dissertation, pages 15-17.

The rubric referred to above is set forth in member I (used in sense of clauses of a sentence) and explains that because the human mind is the subject of this question or thesis, the very nature of the work demands him to set forth what he understands by the very term so that the whole argument may the more easily be followed by the use of clear and distinct ideas.

Already in the dissertation have appeared basic and fundamental ideas that remind us of the French philosopher Descartes and the British tradition of empiricism as represented in the systems of Locke, Berkley and Human (sic). When Amo says that the faculty of sensation does not belong to the mind but to the organic living body, he has cast his lot with the insistence of both Locke and Berkley that we know only ideas and that too through impressions that bombard the body from the external world.

Moreover, that Amo was greatly influenced by Cartesian dualism is brought out by his reference to the fact that the very nature of his work demands him to set forth the meaning of his terms so that we may follow him with clear and distinct ideas. For Descartes insists that our ideas must be clear and distinct, for when one accepts an indistinct or unclear idea, error arises in his whole thinking. The epistemological criteria of truth and error are predicated by Descartes and later by Amo, on the relative distinctness and clarity of our ideas. Such a conclusion is based on Descartes statement of method. It is perfected in Locke as a criterion of truth.

In paragraph one of Chapter One, Amo addresses himself to the task of determining the nature of spirit in general. He asserts that the human in general is spirit, and spirit is immaterial, in intelligent per se, acts intentionally of its own accord, and is conscious of ends: immaterialis, per se semper intelligens, suaque sponte ex intentione operans, propter sibi conscium finem. Amo holds that understanding and being self-conscious are synonymous: Intelligere et sibi alicujus rei fieri, sunt synonyma. We understand intentionally and spirit works toward definite ends. This operation of spirit by which anything is made known to itself is followed by the attainment of a predetermined end: Qua sibi aliquid notum facit, quo exercito finis consequatur. An end is what has been acquired and is now present when the spirit rests after ceasing from its original operation: spiritus a prestina sua operatio cessans adquisescit.

There follow some expositions of the preceding description of spirit. The first exposition sets forth the thesis that spirit it wholly active substance, which Amo says is the same as if you were to say that spirit admits of no passion in itself; spiritus nullam in se admittit passionem. Following Descartes, Spinoza and the other early modern philosophers, Amo uses the term substance in the sense of some core-like thing in which attributes or qualities actually inhere. He uses the term substance in the sense of some substratum that supports or upholds qualities in entities or in things. But very much like Kant was to do later, Amo insisted upon the fact that the mind is not a passive receptacle into which impressions or sensa are pitch-forked in a manner of total passivity. Amo would say that the mind is an active and dynamic (sic) faculty putting in order the wether of cross-currents from the chaotic realm of sense perception.

Amo holds that if you should admit that spirit feels or admits of passion in itself, it should mean that this would come about either by communication, or penetration, or finally by direct contact: hoc fieri debetur aut per communicacionem, aut penetrationem, aut denique per tactum. By communication he understand (sic) when the parts, properties, or effects of one being become present in an
analogue and apposite being by some meditative action: Quando partes, proprietates et effectus unius entis mediante acto quodam, praeentes flunt in alio ente analogo et apto. As an example of this we have only to study the relation of fire communicating its heat to red hot iron: Si ignis suum calorem ferre candenti. This is an example of communication. By penetration Amo understands the transition of one being through the parts of another being by means of some mediating action. The nature of contact is revealed to us by immediate sensation itself. Contact is when two surfaces mutually touch each other at some physical or sensible point.

Next Amo launches into a series of applications of the foregoing expositions. His first assertion on this point of application is that all spirit is without every type of passion whatsoever. Amo submits reasons for his assertion that spirit is without passion. He argues that no parts, properties and effects of another being, by some mediating action, can become present in spirit for then one spirit would contain in its essence and substances something other than it should contain. Likewise, to contain and to be contained are material conceptions and cannot be predicated truly of spirit: item, continere et contineri sunt conceptus materiales, nec cum veritate de spiritu praedicari possunt. Therefore spirit does not perceive or feel by means of communication, that is, in that manner in which the parts, properties and effects of a material being should be present in the same mediating action.

Moreover, no spirit of itself or accidentally receives any parts, properties, material and sensible effects, for it is a contradictory of any sensible being and in opposites no communication is sustained. That is, by definition spirit is the opposite of sensible. No doubt Amo has in mind the reflection of Descartes on the relation between body and mind. It is well known that Descartes attempted to solve the body-mind problem by the theory of psycho-physical parallelism. With his passion for geometrizing philosophy, Descartes regarded mind and body as two parallel lines drawn out to infinity which, according to the Euclidean geometry of his day, would never meet. In such a view Descartes does not account for the actual experience, the self-conscious experience which we have that mind influences body somehow just as body influences the mind. Descartes is thus evidently in the background of Amo’s thinking on this point. How true this statement is will be borne out later on when we come across quotations from Descartes (sic) works.

In a note on his second reason for saying that no spirit of itself or accidentally receives parts, properties or effects of another being is based on the fact that the absence of the one occasions the presence of the other, and the presence of the other occasions the absence of the prior. That is, if anything is immutable it follows that it can [not] be material: Si alicui est immaterialia sequitur quod materiale esse nequeat. Thus we see that by definition, Amo completely separates spirit and body and adheres to the strict dualism of the Cartesian system. Spirit and body are contrarily opposites for the predicate of immateriality excludes the predicate of materiality, because the presence of immateriality is the absence of materiality: Quia praesentia immaterialitatis est absentia materialitatis. For when spirituality is present in a given place materiality is absent, and vice versa.

The second assertion under the application is this: No spirit feels or is acted upon by the mode of penetration because penetration is the transition of one being through the parts of another being. But no spirit enjoys constructive parts, therefore, it is without passion insolar as passion if made by means of the mode of penetration or by transition through the parts of another being or entity.

Assertion three contends that no spirit senses or suffers passion by contact, for whatever touches or is touched is body: Nam quidquid tangit et tangitur corpus est. Amo’s source for this view is in his favorite Descartes: Letters, Part III, Epistle 14, paragraph 12, which begins as follows: verbiis: primo tibi dicam, etc. Contact is, as he has already defined it, whenever two surfaces mutually touch each other at some physical point. But no sensible point and no body can be predicated of pure spirit, therefore there can be no passion through contact: Nec punctum sensible, neque superficies de spiritu praedicari possunt, ergo neque passio.

Exposition II asserts that all spirit is always intelligible per se. That is, spirit is sui conscious, self-conscious, and is conscious of its own operations: Conscius est sibi sui, suarumque operationum. In a note on this exposition Amo states that although man is ignorant of the particular mode by which God and other beings or spirits who are without matter, actually understand themselves, their operations and other things, it seems probably true that they do not understand these things by means of ideas: Probabile tamen mihi non videtur eos intelligere per ideas. For this is the nature of an idea: it is an operation of the human mind by which the things that have been perceived beforehand by the senses and sense organs are represented to the mind by the mind and which the mind sets itself before as being present to consciousness. Since God and other spirits do not possess matter, body, senses and organic senses or an organic living body, it follows that this process of ideation cannot take place in a manner in which it takes place in man. God does not possess the faculty of representation for otherwise there would be given in God a representation of the future and of the past, both of which are absent things: In Deo non datur representatio, nam alias daretur in Deo repraesentatio futuri, praeretiti et rei absentiis. But in God’s mind there is given no knowledge of the future or of the past since all things are data of knowledge for God in an eternal present; therefore there is no representation in his mind, for representation presupposed the absence of the things to be represented. It follows then that God and other spirits understand themselves, other things and their own operations without any process of ideation, or ideas, or sensations, but man’s mind understands by means of ideas and our minds operate by means of ideas through some link or commerce with the body. For his authorities for this reasoning Amo quotes an eminent physiologist of his age de Berger by name, whose work on Physiology Book I, Chapter I, page 1, and also Descartes: Epistolarum III, 155, Part I, Epist. 29 and 36, he quotes.

This is indeed an interesting piece of speculation on the part of Amo to account for the question how God arrives at his knowledge. Although he does not so state, implied in his words is the theory that God obtains his knowledge by a timeless act of intuition. Having ruled out both the future and the past as things absent, therefore unreal, Amo views God as eternally in the process of intuition during which all finite differentiations are simultaneously brought together in a living present instant: Atqui in Deo non datur scientia praeretiti et futuri, nec non absentis; sed in cognitione ejus omina praesentia sunt. His statement that “Omina praesentia sunt”—all things are present, would seem to be an anticipation of Josiah Royce’s theory of the Totum simul nunc to account for the knowledge of the Absolute in a personal way. At any we can say that epistemologically speaking, Amo has room for a high regard for Scientia Intuitiva—intuitive knowledge—as it was described by both Descartes and Spinoza.

In Exposition three, Amo asserts that all spirit acts spontaneously—sua sponte—that is, it acts inwardly and
determines its own operations to follow through to an end which it has set for itself and is not forced to operate in any other way than what it has chosen: Suas operationes determinat ad finem consequendum, vec aliunde absolute cogitur ut operetur.

Now if spirit is forced by some source this would happen either by some spirit forcing it or by matter. If by some other spirit there would still remain an element of spontaneity or free faculty of acting and reacting. If by matter spirit is forced, this could not be done because spirit is always active but matter is always passive and receives the action of something acting upon itself.

In Exposition four Amo says that spirit operates intentionally, that is from a foreknowledge of the things that ought to be done and the end which it intends to follow by its own operation. The reason for this is clear: the nature of the operation consists in this, the operation of a being that is rational and that operates according to intelligence. From this proceed certain logical consequences.

Every efficient cause ought to understand itself, its own operations and the thing which it ought to become. Also every active being in which there is self-consciousness and a consciousness of its own operation and of other things is called spirit. Now spirit is immaterial, that is it possesses nothing material in its own essence and properties. Consequently what is contrarily opposite to something else cannot possess or contain that other things, because opposites that are contrary mutually exclude genus, species and the same denomination.

Amo in a very skillful manner has sought to safeguard the free activity of the spirit. Spirit for him, is free, unfettered self-consciousness that acts in an intelligible, spontaneous, creative manner, not tied to the body, but capable of transcending the states of the body and viewing itself in terms of timeless acts of the will. And after allowing that spirit is pure and free creativity of thought and purposive action, Amo is prepared now to discuss the human mind in particular.

Amo defines the human mind as wholly active substance that is immaterial, in which there is a communication with the living and organic body, and is intelligent and operating intentionally because of an end that is determined by and conscious to itself. The communication between the body and the mind consists in the fact that it uses the body for the subject in which it exists and as the instrument and means of its operation. Instrument and means differ in this respect: instrument is applied to an end practically whereas the means is applied to an end theoretically. The two essential parts of man are mind and body. Body is fabricated out of animal or natural organisms and is propagated by generation. This, of course, is the view of the famous physiologist Dr. Christian Vater in his Physiology, Sect. XII. C. III. De corpore humana Th.I.

From what has been previously said about the distinction between spirit and body, and what Amo has to say about the communication between the mind and body, it would seem that there lurks within his system a logical contradiction. This is due to the apparent contradiction that is inherent in psychophysical parallelism. By definition body and mind are contraries in a logical sense, hence there can be no interaction between them. But now, in view of conscious experience, we perceive that there is actually some relation, how is it possible for Amo to talk of a “commercium corporis et mentis?” For he definitely says this in his dissertation. The question was resolved by the disciples of Descartes who were known as Occasionalists, on the basis of the doctrine of “Esprits Annimeaux” or animal spirits. Briefly it is this: that when there is a series of bodily changes God occasions a series of mental changes to correspond with the former. We shall see how Amo decides this issue later on.

Paragraph four contains a discussion of the various names applied to spirit. Under the name of spirits are classified first matter and then spirit so-called. There are material spirits, natural spirits, vital spirits and animal spirits. Amo appeals to the authority of Senert who wrote a text on Natural Science, Book IX, Chap. II. On the Human Body, page 671. Spirit properly so-called is every immaterial intelligent being that operates intentionally according to a predetermined end that is known to itself. This seems to have been predicated on the Pneumatology of John Cleric, Sect. III. C. 3. Paragraph 14. Other denominations for these spirits are intelligences, minds, souls and the general term intelligent spirits. Intelligences and minds differ per accidentes and not per se. Minds are called the spirits of men that are still in their bodies or that survive and have been separated from them such as the minds of the blessed and of the damned. They are also called shades and souls. Moreover Amo states that soul is a third essential part of man according to some scholars and quotes from Teuber who wrote a Moderate Judgement on the theological question whether there are three parts in man. This is the old theological conception of the doctrine of the trichotomy.

Member two follows these matters about the subject of the thesis and member two contains declarations of the ideas with respect to the predicate and in particular on the opposites of the predicate sensation and the faculty of sensation. Amo here makes a distinction between affirmation “simpliciter” and affirmation “secundum quid.” An example of affirmation “secundum quid” is the proposition “ man is mortal,” so far as body is concerned but not as far as his mind is concerned. When the presence of the whole predicate is indicated in the subject it is affirmation “simpliciter”: every spirit understands. The whole matter is clarified by his discussion on the nature of sensation and the nature of the faculty of sensation which are the next two paragraphs of the dissertation.

Sensation in general is of things that are immediately present and material, with sensible properties that are in reality produced through the sensory organs. Sensation is to be considered either in a logical or physical manner. Logically every sensation is either mediate or immediate. They call this idea. Physically every sensation is pleasant or unpleasant, and is either internal or external. Internal sensations are passive impressions of the soul or are affections concerning which he refers to Descartes, Tractatus de passionibus animi. Amo makes sensation, sensuous and sensing synonymous.

The faculty of sense perception of Amo is such a disposition of our organic living body by whose mediate action an animal is affected by material and sensible things and those that are immediately present. This faculty the ancients called the sensitive soul that is entirely distinct from the rational and vegetative soul. Through Senert’s Épitome of Natural Science Book IX, Chapter I and the same author’s Essais de physique I. Partie, Chap. IX des sensations page. M. 103, Amo goes back to the traditional psychology of Aristotle. Senert’s view which Amo takes over is expressed in these words: “Les animaux sont donc composez de corps et d’ame sensitive qui est leur forme, mais aux hommes, cette ame sensitive est subordonne a l’ame immortelle et etant une substance moyenne entre le corps et cette ame immortelle, elle les unit parairement,” etc.

Member three contains a description of Apathy or the predicate of the thesis. Apathy is to be considered in relation to the faculty of feeling and of feeling itself. The predicate of this thesis is of two members because it contains a twofold idea. Apathy with respect to the faculty of feeling is the absence
of a disposition in a subject that is no apposite, by means of which a natural body should be affected by sensible things and material things that are immediately present. A subject that is not apposite is: a being or entity which does not admit in itself the parts, properties, and effects of another being, of those things of which it cannot be a participant. Such a subject is either spirit or matter. By the very nature of matter a distinction must be made between a living body and one that is deprived of life.

Apathy with respect to feeling is that whose force or power of feeling in a subject that is not opposite (non sentient entity) is absent such as, spirit or a stone. Now Apathy of the mind is the absence of the faculty of feeling and of immediate sensations or feelings in the human mind.

Chapter two contains applications of those things which Amo has deduced on the basis of the antecedents. He directs his attention to an examination of the status of the controversy. By comparison one may say that the first part of Amo’s dissertation is a logical examination of the terms and concepts of the subject with proper definitions, notations and illustrations. It has logical and existemological (sic) interests that are of vital consequence for the second half of the dissertation, which by contrast, is of a more controversial nature. For in the second chapter he ventures to state differences of opinions with Senert, Cleric, Descartes and the other scholars of his age whom he had used as authorities for certain declarations in Chapter one. Consequently he has a word to say at the very beginning of Chapter two about “status controversiae.”

Against Descartes Amo asserts that man senses material things or objects not so far as his mind is concerned but so far as the organic and living body is concerned: Homo res materiales snetit non quad mentem sed quad corpus vivum et organicum.” This statement, as I have said, is aimed against Descartes (Epistolae, part I. XXIX): “Haec disuntur et defenduntur contra Cartesium ejusque sententiam in Epistol XXIX.” The sense of Descartes in this passages seems to be this: there are two aspects of the human mind, on which, the whole knowledge which we can have of its nature depends, one of which is that it thinks; the other that by the whole body it can experience action and passion: Agere et pati. Amo differs with this view in one respect: while he conceives that the mind acts in a mutual union with the body, yet he denies that it suffers with the body.

Amo then proceeds to point out an inner logical contradiction in Descartes’ system. In the very same place quoted above (The Epistles) Amo says that Descartes contradicts himself: Sed ipsa sibi aperte contratrum dict,” Part I. Epistle 99. Descartes posits the nature of the soul in its faculty to think. But thinking is action, not passion. Therefore it cannot have as its attribute both action and passion. Therefore Descartes contradicts himself. This criticism by Amo is eminently correct for Descartes’ basic thesis in his metaphysics of substance is this: it manifests itself in two ways—in mind and in matter. These two modes have attributes: thought and extention. But the definition body and mind are as parallel lines drawn out to infinity, having nothing in common. Consequently soul or mind only manifest action, never any passion. Such a keen analytical mind as Amo possessed did not fail to notice the logical contradiction to which Descartes has fallen a victim.

In the next place Amo opposes the view of Senert in his Natural Science Box IX. C. I on the rational soul where Senert contends that it is the function of the soul to sense: “Sentire enim est opus animae.” But Amo detects a contradiction in Senerit in Book VII. C. I. P. m. 562 where Senerit is discussing the sentient soul. He sets himself at variance likewise with John Cleric who had published a learned treatise on Plants and Animals.

Cleric (Book IV, Paragraph 3, on Plants and Animals) had singled out three things to be distinguished: (1) Action of an object upon organs, (2) Passion of an organ, (3) When an organ is moved, the mind perceives that the body has been affected. Amo replies that if the mind should perceive, he ought to have said: the mind feels or perceives that it has been affected. For if the mind perceives that its body has been affected, it perceives or rather understands that it (the mind) has not been affected. Amo seems to think that Cleric has confused “Actum intelligendi” with “negotium sentiendi.” That is, it is the same as if he has said that the mind understand that its body has been affected. He likewise includes the work of Georg Daniel Coschwiz’s book on Organisms and Mechanisms S.I.V. VIII. Th. 3 as one with which he differs. Amo then proceeds to marsh up several great authorities who support his views. Aristotle, Book II on Generation and Corruption, Teichmeyer, Elements of Experimental and Natural Philosophy, Chapter 3 on Principles of Physics. P. M. 18, and Christofer Sturm, Hypoth. of Physics, Book I, Section I. C. II and in V. Epilogue. Also page III 232. These authorities follow the same view of Amo.

In member one of Chapter two, Amo submits the first negative thesis with a note and proofs of three theses with examples. Thesis one declares that the human mind is not affected by sensible objects of things: Mens humana non rebus sensibilibus afficitur.” While it is not affected by sensible objects yet it understands those sensations that arise in the body.

Logically speaking Amo says, we must not confound in man the terms mind, operation of the mind and idea and immediate perception—mens, mentis operatio, idea et sensio immediata. For mind and mental operation are purely immaterial. Idea is a composite entity. With this statement we are reminded of Locke’s distinction between simple ideas of sense and complex ideas of pure thought or of reflection. As a second proof of his negative thesis Amo gives us a fine example of his ability to argue in a subtle manner. He shows a complete mastery in the use of the Aristotelian logic and projects his arguments into the syllogistic method. It will be interesting to follow the series of deductions: whatever senses is living, whatever is living is nutured (sic), whatever is living and is nutured (sic) is increased, whatever is of this particular mode finally is resolved into its own primary elements, whatever is dissolved into its own primary elements has been derived, every derived thing has its own constitutive parts, whatever is of this particular mode is a divisible body and it, therefore, the human mind senses things, it follows that it is a divisible body. This of course cannot be because spirit is the contrary of body.

Proof two of the thesis states that no spirit feels or senses material things. The human mind is spirit. Therefore it does not feel material things. Amo has already proven the major premise of this syllogism in Chapter 1, member 1, paragraph 1, Exposition I, together with notes and applications. The minor premise admits of no contradiction.

In note one of proof II, Amo asserts that living and feeling—vivere et sentire—are inseparable predicates and he argues by inversion as follows: every living thing by necessity feels, and every feeling thing by necessity is a living thing: so that the presence of the one imports the necessary presence of the other: “Ita ut unius praesentia alterius necessarium importet praesentiam.”

Note II insists however that living and existing—vivere et existere—are not synonyms. In other words every living thing exists but not every existing thing is a living thing. Spirit and
stone exist but cannot be rightly said to live. Spirit exists and operates with intelligence, while matter exists and receives the action of an agent. But man and animal exist and act, live and feel.

Proof III of the thesis resorts to the authority of the Holy Scriptures for decisive support. This shows a characteristic of Amo for from all appearances he was a deeply religious person. We definitely know that he embraces Lutheran Christianity and became well-versed in a knowledge of the Scriptures, both the Septuagint and Dr. Luther’s German Bible, from which he quoted often in this dissertation and in his works.

In this proof he quotes Matthew 10:28 where our Lord says we shall not fear those who kill the body only and who cannot kill the soul. From this he deduces the notion that whatever is killed and can be killed is necessarily living: Quidquid occitur et occidi potest, illud vivere necesse est. To be killed is to be deprived of life through violence: Per violentiam vita privari. If body is killed or can be killed it necessarily follows that it lives, and if it lives it feels, and from this it follows that it enjoys the faculty of feeling or perception.

Thus living and feeling are perpetually joined in the same subject and element. He then has something to add from De Berger (Physiology Book I) and from Senet (Épitome of Natural Science Book IX, member 671) and from the before quoted Essais de Phystique I, and Des Sensations 5. P. 102) concerning secretions of the juices of the nerves and their motions. An example of the relation between body and mind is quoted from an observation made by Prince Frederick who had founded the Wittenberg Academy in which Amo taught. Frederick on his dying bed was asked how he felt. The reply was: “Corpus suos pati dolores sed mentem esse tranquillam”—“My body suffers its pain but my mind is peaceful.” The ease in which Amo handled the German language is seen from his German text: “Welcher auf dem tod-Bett gerragt wurde: wie er sich befand: Antwortete er: Der Geist ist ruhig aber der Leib lendet Schmerzen.” His source for this tradition is Brueckner’s Vita Frederici.

Paragraph II of Chapter II poses Thesis number two: There is no faculty of feeling in the mind—Nec facultas sentiendi menti inest. There follows his proof for this thesis. There are quotations from the texts of De Berger, Christian Vatern the Septuagint version of the Book of Job and passages from Luther’s German Bible. Passages in Genesis I: 4, 24. Genesis IX, Proverbs IV, Leviticus 17, are loci quoted by Amo to further demonstrate the validity of his thesis.

The closing paragraph of the dissertation posits thesis III: “Therefore feeling and the faculty of feeling are in the body.” The proof is in the form of one syllogism: Feeling and the faculty of feeling are apposite to the body, not to the mind. The minor premise and conclusion are left to be deduced on the basis of the proofs already given in I and II.

Thus ends a treatise that may be characterized as a contribution of Amo’s day to the science of physiological psychology. At points it is very much like some observations that have been made by the advocates of behavioral psychology of our day.

A word should be spoken about the aspect of scholasticism that is noticeable in Amo’s works. And if I should appear to be too severe in my criticism of Amo’s methodology, it must be remembered that his method was the accepted method of the University centers of his day which of course, he did not transcend.

The method followed by Amo was bequeathed to the scholars of his age by Medieval Scholasticism. It was the method of authoritarianism. It is best described epistemologically, as...
Gilbert Haven Jones as an Early Black Philosopher and Educator

George Yancy

“The exactions of a heartless world and the drive of a relentless nature will compel you to go on until the end.”
– Gilbert Haven Jones (1939)

The above epigraph speaks to the indomitable spirit of Black people. Gilbert Haven Jones was fully cognizant of the dynamic spirit that moved in the souls of Black folk. Living within a social polity where whiteness (and white supremacy) ruled, and continues to rule, Black people were forced to make a way out of no way, to overcome, to rise up (aufhebung) over circumstances that were historically and socially imposed upon them. The process of overcoming is a central existential motif in the African-American experience. Thematic cognates of overcoming – transcending, enduring and struggling – defined part of the crucible out of which Black people in America have forged a sense of identity. Defined as a problem, Black people have had to struggle against this white construction, to envision their lives in ways that constituted a counter-white episteme, a mode of knowing and being that was deconstructive, reconstructive, and transformative of what it meant to be Black. Black lives in America have been shaped through the media of the chain, the whip, and the cross. Enslaved, tethered like beasts of the field, beaten and battered, with blood stained bodies that bore witness to white inhumanity, Black people maintained and nurtured a powerful sense of freedom, salvation, and victory. Through all of the existential turmoil, the cross spoke to Black people of what existed on the other side of white hatred, broken backs, self-deprecation, low moments of profound dread, broken families, violated bodies, and violated rights. The cross signifies (and signified) the burden of remaining moral in the face of immorality, and the certainty that the future holds (and held) many positive possibilities yet to be seen.

Jones’s epigraph speaks to Black reality as a state of being between facticity and possibility. It is “the exactions of a heartless world” that constitutes our facticity. It is “the drive of a relentless nature” that speaks to who we are as a possibility. In “A Message to the Class of ’39,” from which the above epigraph is taken, Jones, who was then Dean of the College of Education and Industrial Arts at Wilberforce University, is very much aware that the graduating class of 1939 would face moments of “disillusionment, disappointment, remorse, and the possible breaking of your own spirit.” However, he goes on to say, “But, albeit, you will not be able to turn back. This will be impossible.” What is clear is that Jones is aware of the indefatigable spirit of Black people, a relentless courage that refuses to submit. However, he is also emphasizing the significance of a Wilberforce University education, that is, the solid training and acculturation that should enable Black students to endure the storms of white America and the slings and arrows of life, more generally. He writes:

What the world holds for you, good or evil, no one can tell now, but if you have caught the spirit of Wilberforce and absorbed its philosophy of life, in success and failure, in happiness and in remorse, your spirit will cling to, and your soul light up with the eternal traditions of the great souls of Wilberforce who lived and labored ahead of you that these blessings might be yours.

Jones, of course, also benefited from a Wilberforce University education and embodied the spirit of the A.M.E. Church. In short, he was a product of those Black folk who endured in the face of white racism, those who were determined to make a way out of no way. It is here that Richard Allen (1760-1831), a former enslaved Black, functions as both sign and symbol. Indeed, whites, at St. George’s Methodist Episcopal Church in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, where Allen had already established himself as a significant preacher and had quite a following, did not have the last word in terms of defining Allen and other Black Methodists as a problem, as a “plague.” Pulled from their feet in the very process of supplication, white ushers reminded Allen and the other Black Methodists (including Absalom Jones and William White) that no act is too holy when it comes to the power of Jim Crow. They were removed from the white section, a site of white “sacredom,” and told that they had to sit in their “natural” place of worship. In a spirit of independence, a keen sense of justice and righteous indignation, Allen was fueled with the fortitude and vision to see possibility over facticity, hope over despair, and self-respect over humiliation. It is precisely this sense of positive self-regard, and anti-white hegemonic praxis that led to the founding of the A.M.E. Church in 1816. It is this same fortitude and vision that is emblematic of the life and philosophy of Jones.

Gilbert Haven Jones was born on August 23, 1883, in Fort Mott, South Carolina. His father, Bishop Joshua H. Jones (born in Pine Plains, Lexington Co., S.C., June 15, 1856) was a former president of Wilberforce University (1900-8) and was a bishop of the African Methodist Episcopal Church from 1912. Indeed, Joshua H. Jones was a preacher of the A.M.E. Church as early as age 18. He was a pastor in South Carolina; Wheeling, West Virginia; Wilberforce, Ohio; Lynn, Mass.; Providence, R.I.; and, Columbus, Ohio. He was also presiding elder of the Columbus dist., 1894-9; and, a pastor in Zanesville, Ohio. Gilbert Haven Jones’s father was well educated. He received a B.A. from Claflin University, S.C., in 1887. He was a student at Howard University, Washington, D.C. He received both his B.D. (1887) and his D.D. (1893) from Wilberforce University. He was married to Elizabeth (Martin) Jones in 1875. Elizabeth or “Lizzie” was Gilbert Haven Jones’s biological mother. It is not clear why Bishop Jones married a second time, but his second wife’s name was Augusta E. Clark. He married her in 1888.

Gilbert Haven Jones was still a young boy when his parents decided to move from living in South Carolina to Providence, R.I. While living in Providence, R.I., Jones was educated in public schools. The family then moved to Columbus, Ohio, where he graduated from Central high school at the age of 15. He then attended Ohio State University (college of arts and sciences). He attended Ohio State University for three years and subsequently transferred to Wilberforce University where he received his A.B. in 1902. He also received his Bachelor of Science degree from Wilberforce just a year later in 1903. The reader will note that his father was president of Wilberforce University at this time. After his graduation, Jones was principal of Lincoln high school in Carlisle, Pennsylvania. At this time, he also was studying for a Bachelor of Philosophy degree at Dickinson College in Carlisle. It is unclear whether he received the degree in 1905 or 1906. In 1907, however, he received the Master of Arts degree. After accepting a new position as chair of classic languages at Langston University in Langston, Oklahoma, and working there for one year, Jones decided to complete his studies abroad. He studied at the University of Göttingen, in Berlin, the University of Leipzig, the University of Hallé, the University of Toulouse, and at the Sorbonne in Paris. In 1909, he received his Ph.D. in philosophy from the University.
of Jena, Germany. Jones's (inaugural) dissertation, to which I will return, was entitled “Lotze und Boume: Eine Vergleichung ihrer philosophischen Arbeit” (or “Lotze and Boume: A Comparison of their philosophical work”).

In my first book, *African-American Philosophers, 17 Conversations* (Routledge, 1998), I note that African-American philosophers Thomas Nelson Baker, Alain Locke, Forest Oran Wiggins, Cornelius Golightly, William Thomas Fontaine, Eugene Clay Homes, Albert Millard Dunham (brother of Black choreographer Katherine Dunham), Frances Hammon, and others, wrote their dissertations in the field of philosophy prior to the 1950s. To that list I would like to add Charles L. Hill who received his Ph.D. in philosophy in 1938 from Ohio State University. Hill also studied philosophy at the University of Berlin. Jones, of course, having received his Ph.D. as early as 1903 from Yale University. He was the *first* African-American male to receive his doctorate in philosophy in the United States. Actually, the first African-American male to receive his doctorate in philosophy, even before Baker, was Patrick Francis Healy as early as 1865 from the University of Louvain in Belgium. Interestingly enough, Healy, like Baker (born 1860), was born enslaved in February 1834. Unlike Baker, whose mother and father were both enslaved, Healy's father, Michael Morris Healy, who was actually his “slave master,” was an Irishman. Michael M. Healy took as his mistress an enslaved woman of light complexion. Her name was Mary Eliza. Healy and two of his brothers, James Augustine Healy and Alexander Sherwood Healy, were the first three Black priests in the United States. Patrick F. Healy taught philosophy at St. Joseph College in Philadelphia and at Holy Cross College in Worcester, Massachusetts, where he and his three other brothers had attended earlier. In 1866, Healy taught philosophy at Georgetown and in 1874 became president of the university. He died in 1910.

Jones received honorary degrees from Dickinson College (L.L.D.), Wilberforce University (L.L.D. and L.H.D.), and Howard University (L.L.D.). Clearly, Gilbert Haven Jones was under the influence of both his father's educational values, and the A.M.E. Church's sensibilities in terms of its emphasis upon educational excellence. The A.M.E. Church is historically known for its forward-looking vision and activist social gospel. Not only were A.M.E. pastors involved in bringing pressure to bear upon segregation in public schools in America during the 1950s, but the A.M.E. Church was involved early on in the assurance that Black people obtain a quality education. After all, as early as 1863, Bishop Daniel A. Payne was involved in the founding of Wilberforce University, which was one of many colleges founded by the A.M.E. Church. Both father and son were exposed to a rich classical education. Black schools such as Clark, Atlanta University, Fisk, Wilberforce, and Howard operated on the model of European universities (Germany, in particular). Each school emphasized Latin and Greek. As William M. Banks notes:

> W.E.B. Du Bois, after returning from graduate work at the prestigious University of Berlin, took a position teaching Latin at Wilberforce University, a small black normal school in Ohio, not because he had aspired to such work but because at that time it was the best job available to a black with a Ph.D. from Harvard.9

> This classical orientation, however, did not last given the labor demands of burgeoning corporations. American colleges began to develop programs of study “that prepared students for the emerging industrial order.”10

Jones married Rachel Gladys Coverdale on June 10, 1910. She was born in Germantown, Pennsylvania. They had four children, Gladys Havena, Gilbert Haven, Jr., Ruth Inez, and Donald Coverdale. Jones was not only a member of the A.M.E. Church, but was “Ohio state superintendent of the Allen Endeavor Society of that church.”11 And like his father, Jones served as president of Wilberforce University from 1924-1932. He was the University's fourth president. He also served as the university's vice-president. While president, Jones was described as “proud, brilliant, versatile, and of good appearance.”12 During Jones's first four years as president, his father was president of the board of trustees and shared many of the challenges his son faced with the administration of Wilberforce University. During the last four years, Jones's father was both a vice-president of the board and also a very active member of the executive committee. “Therefore, it is safe to say that the influence of the elder Jones was much in evidence in the policies of his son, although perhaps not to the disadvantage of the latter.”13 Gilbert Haven Jones accepted the position after having had a great deal of work experience in a university atmosphere. He was Dean of the College of Liberal Arts at Wilberforce University from 1914-24. So, he brought with him ten years of experience before accepting his new position as president. After assuming the role of Dean of the College of Liberal Arts, “Jones has modernized the procedure in that department, has expanded the work to include general biological research, securing for that department an admirably equipped laboratory, and has directed special summer-school work there.”14

As president, Jones's expended a great deal of energy to bring to fruition the standardization of the university. The Great Depression, as we know, hit Black people especially hard. The depression also negatively impacted his efforts for standardization. At Wilberforce University, the depression caused the reduction in the salaries of teachers, and a reduction of about 14% of the faculty personnel. In his Quadrennial Session in 1932, Jones notes, "this retrenchment program has kept us from furthering our program of entering the North Central Association of Colleges and Secondary Schools, the standardizing body for this area, but is not precluded the same next year."15 In the midst of this retrenchment, however, Jones adds:

> The buildings and grounds have been kept in much better condition. There are more books in the library and an assistant librarian has been employed. The laboratory equipment has been improved and increased and the health of the students has been improved. The adding of a Health and Physical Education Department has done much to contribute to this. The health program for the students is under the direction of a faculty committee and this program has done much to improve the general conditions.16

The student body at Wilberforce University, no doubt due to the missionary efforts of the A.M.E. Church, consisted of a diversity of Black students. They came to Wilberforce University not only from many places within the United States, but from places like South America, Canada, England, France, Panama, Bermuda, Honolulu, West Indies, South and North Africa, the interior of Africa, and so on. Despite the broad geographical distribution of the student body, Jones was aware of the troubles that Wilberforce University faced. He notes, "Wilberforce University, like all church schools, has been subjected to a falling off income, has in many instances, reached the point of danger and even destruction. Wilberforce
writes:

From the results it seems that the church cannot support the number of schools that it now has on the basis of the newly made financial demands upon it in this new program of standardization. Without standardization, no worthwhile schools; without worthwhile schools, no educational program; without an educational program, no promise for the future church through the education of its young, its own or Christian influence. The question of financing modern education is the big problem confronting us to-day. With that program solved the whole program will take care of itself.

On the other hand, Jones speaks positively not only about the actual progress of the church supported dimensions of the school, but expresses a more general sense of optimism. For example, he notes:

The educational program and training of the faculty have been improved so that our teachers on the pay roll have been getting their master’s degrees from one or two a year to six and eight a year. At the close of this school year, according to promise and prospect, there will not be a teacher employed by us here in the Church supported Branch, without his master’s degree, while several will be near their doctorate.

Jones goes on to note:

The support and cooperation between the church and the State is better and the rating of Wilberforce is better. The recognition of the president as an official radiates, ramifies and affects the school life as perhaps never before. The relationship of the church to the general educational program of the institution is as never before. The present standing of Wilberforce should bring pride to all Negroes and all churchmen should resolve to make it a university second to none.

As an administrator of Black educational institutions, Jones moved with great passion, vision, and fortitude. The reader will note that African-American philosopher Charles L. Hill also served as president of Wilberforce University (1947-1956). I am told that Hill not only functioned at the administrative level, but could be seen painting buildings, teaching courses, raising money, and so on. While Hill was president, Jones provided support to him in terms of helping to recruit new students. Jones also became head of the philosophy department. One wonders which philosophy courses Jones taught. What were some of the philosophical exchanges between Jones and Hill? Did either of them know Thomas Nelson Baker? Did they know of the existence of Healy? Perhaps there are letters yet to be found that will provide light on these and other questions.

Jones invested greatly in Wilberforce University. His father, Joshua, as was noted, also invested time and energy in the university. They were two A.M.E. Church warriors who stood for the education of Black people. In fact, Jones’s father was instrumental in erecting the Shorter Hall building, which contained one of the best auditoriums in the state. It was known as the “Jones Auditorium,” named after Joshua. Gilbert Haven Jones was well-known as a great administrator, an enthusiast for the maintenance of Black institutional power, and as a brilliant scholar. He appeared in “American Who’s Who in Colored America,” “International Who’s Who,” the “British Lauded Gentry,” and “Leaders in Education.” He was also a member of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, and a member of the Advisory Board, Northeastern Life Insurance Co., New York City. Lastly, he was ex-Treasurer and member of Kappa Alpha Psi. And besides his (inaugural) dissertation, Jones authored a number of magazine articles and other publications. He was also the author of Education in Theory and Practice, which was published as early as 1919.

It is my sense that Jones was the first Black to publish a treatise on the nature of education which contained 396 pages, and that dealt with such a broad range of both practical and theoretical issues in education. Before saying more about the actual content of Jones’s treatise on education, however, I would like to cash in on a promissory note made earlier. Let us say something about Jones’s dissertation. His dissertation, “Lotze and Bowne: A Comparison of Their Philosophical Work,” was written in German. To my knowledge, his dissertation has not been translated into English. However, the dissertation did manage to find its way into American universities. Apparently, copies of the dissertation had been requested from Jones so that it might be translated by the graduate school of Boston University’s philosophy department. The dissertation was to be used in certain philosophy courses once translated. Permission was given and a graduate student had begun the task of translating it under the tutelage of philosopher Edgar S. Brightman.

There are a few interesting links here. Brightman, under whom Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. studied while attending Boston University, was a personalist. One can understand Brightman’s interest in Jones’s dissertation. American philosopher Borden Parker Bowne (1847-1910), who Jones considers in his dissertation, can also be described as a personalist. In fact, Bowne was a prominent philosophical personalist in America. Bowne’s major philosophical work is entitled Personalism (1908). As one might expect, he was a critic of both naturalism and positivism. He postulated the existence of an Infinite Self.
in terms of which we, as individual thinking selves, are manifestations. The thinking self (and all other thinking individual selves), in other words, is part of the ontological structure of reality. The reader will note that Bowne taught philosophy at Boston University for many years. Hence, another common link to Brightman. Rudolf Hermann Lotze (1817-81), the other philosopher considered in Jones’s dissertation, was a German philosopher and physician. Lotze’s work apparently had impact on the development of experimental psychology. Given the idealist sentiments of Bowne’s philosophy, it seems natural that Jones might compare his views with those of Lotze. After all, Lotze was interested in the reconciliation of idealism with a mechanistic form of science. Starting from a non-personalist metaphysical framework, Lotze began with the thesis that all empirical phenomena consist of atoms. However, Lotze seems to have had an idealist strain in his thought as well. Perhaps this is why Bowne, although greatly influenced by George Berkeley (given Berkeley’s idealism and the importance for God in his system) and Immanuel Kant (given Kant’s Copernican revolution with its stress upon the constitutive aspects of the mind), embraced aspects of Lotzean philosophy. Lotze wrote such works as Allgemeine Physiologie des Korperlichen Lebens (or General Physiology of the Physical Way of Life) and Medizinische Psychologie oder Physiologie der Seele (or Medical Psychology or Physiology of the Soul). The texts were published in 1851 and 1852, respectively. It is interesting that Thomas N. Baker’s dissertation, “The Ethical Significance of the Connection Between Mind and Body,” also explored the relationship between mind and body. And like his forerunner Lotze, George T. Ladd, who taught at Yale while Baker was there, and who was on Baker’s dissertation committee, was interested in the biological substratum of mental reality. It is important to note that both Jones and Baker explore deep philosophical and psychological issues in their dissertations. Jones also draws heavily upon psychology in his treatise on education.

Given the relatively undefined field of psychology in America around the time that Jones received his dissertation, until, of course, the work of Wilhelm Wundt, it is fair to say that Jones was probably the first Black to teach psychology at a university as a species of philosophy. Robert V. Guthrie is more emphatic. He writes, “Jones was the first black person with an earned doctorate to teach psychology in the United States.”

It was Wundt who undercut the link between psychology and physiology. He envisioned an experimental psychology that was independent of physiology. Wundt is credited with having launched psychology as an independent science. The founding of his laboratory (in Leipzig) in 1879 also contributed to the autonomy of psychology. But what did Jones have to say about the mind? Was he an idealist or personalist in the tradition of Bowne? Or, did he emphasize more of the physiological basis of mind, resulting in some kind of epiphenomenalism? Because I have not been able to locate the dissertation (or know whether it has been translated) as of the writing of this article, it is difficult to say with any certainty. However, given the philosophical aspects and scope of Jones’s book Education in Theory and Practice, which he dedicated to his father for having led him to the love of study, it is possible to discern philosophical claims in that text that may point to his earlier thoughts about the mind-body relation, perhaps a philosophical position wedged safely between the Scylla of idealism and the Charybdis of materialism.

Jones’s Education in Theory and Practice is a variegated text. He explores issues in the area of discipline in the school, the importance of the field of psychology to education, the use of playgrounds, issues of hygiene, body comportment, manners, dress, social development, heredity, mnemonics, means of teaching patriotism, religion, habit, interest and attention, teachers and the community, length of school hours, rewards used in school, dynamics of the physical and social environmental aspects of the school and classroom, lighting, equipment, heating, intellectual, cultural and practical education, arts and sciences, and so on. Most importantly, however, the text is undergirded by a dynamic conception of what education entails. It involves a theory of the self as dynamic and capable of growth, movement, progress, and change. It is the nurturing process that is inherent in the process of a good education that Jones finds very important. He writes:

From the author’s view point, Education is a process [my emphasis] through which individuals go, or are taken (more often the latter) which is intended to fit them for social efficiency, i.e. for an active aggressive life of service among their fellows. It aims to remove from the individual defects with which they are born or through any cause have acquired, and supplant them with the capacity to live harmoniously with their fellows and to share equitably with them the duties and responsibilities as well as the material goods of this life. Its purpose or end is to create for mankind social advantages and opportunities in life by nurture [my emphasis] which they could never hope to attain by nature.

Given the above, Bowne’s idealism is far too abstract for Jones. The self as grounded within and fundamentally linked to circumstances seems far too this-worldly for Bowne. The theory that only thinking persons are real undermines the very concrete reality that involves the “material” conditions that make who we are as thinking persons even possible. On Bowne’s view, our relation to the material world, to other embodied persons in social and “material” relations, takes a metaphysical backseat, as it were, to our dependent relationship on the Supreme Person. However, a thoroughgoing materialism can also undercut the open dynamism operative in Jones’s conception of education and who and what we are. If we were nothing more than our “material” circumstances, then education would do very little in terms of stimulating growth from within the “interiority” of who we are as persons. The very process of nurturing suggests an ability-to-be more than we are vis-à-vis our “material” circumstances. What is also interesting about Jones’s theory of education is that he recognizes education as a living process, a process that takes place during the entire narrative journey of a person’s life. For example, he maintains:

Looked at from this viewpoint [that is, from a broad perspective] the educational process begins with the earliest prenatal evidences of life and continues till the last signs of conscious life disappears in death. It is a process co-extensive with life itself, and, in the process, the regular routine of school plays as small a part as is the actual fractional portion of life that is spent in the schoolroom. In the broad sense of education the world is the school, mankind the teacher, and life itself the school period.

Concerning the issue of mind, Jones allows that the mind is in certain limited respects independent of the body. Again, however, this is not an idealist position. In the matter of education, however, Jones argues, “mind is apparently almost completely dependent upon the body and its relation to other bodies.” Again, however, this is not a crude reductionism of the mind to the body. After all, knowledge itself is not spatial. “It is not restricted within spatial limits.” Jones writes:
Though the brain and body which contain the mind and furnish it with media for gaining knowledge are spatial as well as temporal the mind itself is not by all so regarded, and hence cannot necessarily be said to be limited in this way.25

My sense is that Jones assumes that we do indeed have a mental life, but that that mental life is situated; hence, he seems to suggest that there is a “dialectical” relationship between mental life and our “material” situatedness. This, after all, is the context of the lived body. Jones is interested in the intimate reciprocity of our mind-body unity for the purpose of offering a radical educational theory that will provide maximal growth and achievement within the lives of all people. For Jones:

The study of education proper will involve, therefore, a two-fold aspect, one, the psychological which considers the general mental nature and temperament of the individual, the other the physiological which considers the physical organism, its nature and its general adaptability to its environment during the period of the educative process.31

My sense is that more is at stake here than just an abstract discussion of metaphysics. I submit that Jones is doing metaphysics and “philosophical psychology” in the service of Black political freedom. What do I mean by this? To argue that the mind is completely separate from the body and “material” circumstances, it would be easy, no matter how fallacious, for one to argue that certain minds are ontologically inferior to other minds. Certain minds are inferior to other minds because, as the racist would argue, it is true a priori that Black people are inferior. Indeed, so the argument would continue, they are inferior through an inferior “spiritual substance” out of which their minds are composed. With no significant connection to “material conditions,” one could not argue that depleted, inferior, and poor “material conditions” make for inferior minds. By implication, of course, other minds, which are superior a priori (that is, white minds), are superior due to a superior “spiritual substance.” The conclusion would be that white minds are not “superior” because they have been generally exposed to the most beneficial “material” conditions, but that they are ontologically superior due to the superior “spiritual substance” which constitutes their very being. Jones nicely anticipates the weakness of this possible argument where he argues:

But is there “a divinity in some of us that makes us great whether we will it or no” which the others of us do not possess? If there is such a divinity there it certainly does not do much for us apart from opportunity and circumstance.35

It is interesting that throughout Education in Theory and Practice, Jones uses the word “Negro” only a few times. In a text of this size, authored by a Black philosopher, and published in 1919, one would expect references to the Negro to appear on every other page. However, this is not the case. Why? After all, Jones is acutely aware of the political weakness, and existential and socio-economic plight of Black people during the early 1900s. It was by no means easy, though, for Black scholars to find (white) publishers to consider their work for publication. The reader can imagine how caustic Jones’s written words could have been against white racism. However, he conceals his critique of white hegemony while still critiquing whiteness, but one has to look closely. This was not the adopted strategy of a coward, but the enactment of a skilled thinker and writer. This strategy, by the way, of critiquing those in power to their face without their being the wiser is an old technique used by Blacks under conditions of white dominance. Keep in mind that Jones is arguing for a perspective on education that “looks to the uplift of humanity.”36 What are the deeper implications here? The idea is that education is not just for a few only. How could Jones, who was imbued with the spirit of the A.M.E. Church, argue otherwise? The aim of education, for Jones, is “to equalize the opportunity of all in their access to the accumulated knowledge of the race and to give to one and all alike equal opportunity to acquire skill in the use of its material achievement.”37 The point here is that through education the possibility for equalizing the opportunity of all to have access to the intellectual and material accumulations of the race will be achieved, and people will gain greater control over their circumstances. In more “race-sensitive” language, if one allows Black people to gain an equal quality education then one also opens up possibilities for them to gain greater control over their circumstances. Jones is certainly aware of how higher education was once in the hands of the privileged, those who had special political opportunities “and maintained themselves in it by rigid caste rulings and regulations and a strong spirit of clannishness.”38 How could his text not have been a sub-textual critique of the political privileges, educational hoarding, and clannishness of white people in 1919 and earlier? Again, using race-sensitive language, Jones, although aware that different people have different intellectual proclivities, is aware that whites must maintain the illusion of their superiority. He writes:

The principal reason for the argument of the difference in the capacity of individuals is that there is present in such minds a tacit knowledge that the equal opportunity which education gives will rob them of their advantage and prevent the further exploitation of the ignorant by the intelligent, of the socially low by the socially high.39

Embedded within his theory of education is a fundamental critique of power. He is fully aware of the fact that many of those who have economic power have acquired this power through “extortion, robbery and ‘graft,’ unscrupulous and unprincipled plunder of the public goods and utilities.”40 One might argue that Jones is not only putting forth a critique of white power, but also a critique of white power as specifically manifested within a capitalist, socio-economic context. Hence, his theory of education is structured by a critical hermeneutic analysis of both race and class. Concerning the latter in reference to aesthetic education, he argues that it “has been and still is confined chiefly to the leisure class.”41 Jones delineates a radically democratic conception of education, a theory of education that challenges vast economic disparities, socially imposed, and, racist epistemologically engineered, conceptions of who is inferior vis-à-vis who is superior, and the biological determinist view that we are who we are by nature. According to Jones, “Great minds, ‘men of genius,’ are not so much born so (by nature) as they are made so (by nurture).”42 It is important to impress upon the reader the significance of the political weight of Jones’s views here. He was one of those early Black thinkers who saw through the socially constructed, and interest laden, status of whiteness, and refused to yield to the ideology and mythology of so-called “white superiority.”

Central to Jones’s conception of knowledge and education is that both be used to make a difference in the lives of ordinary people. There is an interesting “pragmatist” and practical dimension to Jones’s educational theory. Intellectual activity (and knowledge), according to Jones, ought to make a
difference in how we live. In this sense, knowledge should never be completely removed from the relationships and activities that obtain within the sphere of everyday social life. He argues:

Nothing has any value for its own unrelated sake, not even knowledge. In other words take away knowledge from its relation to human activities, its effectiveness and power in human affairs and make it of no use or value except for knowledge and it can be of no use or value to man.53

This can be interpreted rather liberally. Jones is committed to the thesis that knowledge should make a "material" difference in the lives of ordinary folk. He understands that there should be a relationship between the equitable distribution of education qua knowledge and the equitable distribution of material goods, aesthetic goods, goods "for the body," and the maximization of a happy and productive life (through good health, nutrition, decent living conditions, etc.). Of course, the moral element is also central to Jones's conception of knowledge acquisition. In a "Message to the Class of '47," Jones observes:

The whole concentration in the past has been on knowledge-getting without regard to who did what, and how. The new concentration is going to be on knowledge-doing. By that I mean knowing the right and doing the right. Only by facing these values can we realize our hopes for the future.44

In my most recent book, The Philosophical i: Personal Reflections on Life in Philosophy (Rowman & Littlefield, 2002), I argue for precisely this distinction. Philosophy has lost its sense of social and deep personal existential accountability. Philosophers are often merely engaged in the process of knowledge-getting, not knowledge-doing. And yet, knowledge-doing is so essential to philosophy as a process of critical, meta-reflection upon what we do. It is important that philosophers shift their attention in the direction of self-critique. It is within the space of deeds, and not simply within the space of philosophical abstractions, that we must strive for excellence. Jones is aware, though, of how we have learned to look in the wrong direction. "Man has been a wonderful being and achieved wonders. Most of it has been outside of himself and often on forms and elements other than himself.54 What is this but the Socratic injunction to live the examined life. Hence, Jones’s philosophy of education (educare – "to lead out") places a deep social and personal demand upon how we ought to live, and it calls for a radical understanding of democracy and a radical exploration of new forms of praxes, and the adoption of radically new educational values, for the sake of a better world. Jones: “Men [Women] afraid of opposition and criticism never turn the world upside down by their ‘doughty deeds’.55 Like James Meredith, Kwame Toure (formerly known as Stokely Carmichael), Martin Luther King, Jr., and millions of other Black people, Jones knew what it meant to march against fear; moreover, he knew the challenges involved in attempting to turn the world upside down.

I would like to thank Dr. Dennis C. Dickerson, historian and editor of the A.M.E Church Review, for initially asking and encouraging me to write an article on African-American philosopher and educator Gilbert Haven Jones. He is also to be thanked for permission to republish the article from the A.M.E Church Review (October-December 2002). He is also to be thanked for providing me with a number of helpful primary documents. Dickerson, through his efforts as editor of the Review, is performing a wonderful and indispensable service in terms of keeping the critical, intellectual spirit of the A.M.E. Church alive. I would also like to thank the staff at Wilberforce University Archives and Special Collections for providing me with important information on Gilbert Haven Jones. Lastly, I would like to thank African-American philosopher John McClendon for his historical and philosophical insights.

Endnotes
1. For an elaboration on the idea that we exist between facticity and possibility, see my new book The Philosophical i: Personal Reflections on Life in Philosophy, Rowman & Littlefield, 2002, particularly my introduction, "Philosophy and the Situated Narrative Self," and my chapter, “Between Facticity and Possibility.” In the former, I work through the passive and active dimensions of what it means for us to exist as homo narrans (how we narrate our life-stories and inhabit pre-existing spaces of fluid narrative streams) and homo significans (how we sign for ourselves and how we are “signified” through a field of pre-existing signs and symbols). In the latter, I explore my own sense of how I personally exist (as a Black male) between facticity and possibility, and how the dynamic of facticity and possibility is a salient and rich theme in the lives of African-Americans in America, more generally.
2. See Jones file at Wilberforce University’s Archives and Special Collection at Rembert E. Stokes LRC Library under “A Message to the Class of ’39.” Copied from Wilberforce University’s yearbook class of 1939.
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid.
5. See History of Greene County, Ohio, Broadstone, Vol. 2, R. 977.174, page 953 +. Or see Who’s Who in Colored America, 1933 to 1937, ARC: E 185.96 W6, p. 297 (Received photocopy from Wilberforce University’s Archives and Special Collection at Rembert E. Stokes LRC Library, hereafter ASC).
6. History of Greene County, Ohio, page 953.
8. I would like to thank African-American philosopher John McClendon for bringing to my attention the existence of Patrick Francis Healy. McClendon also brought to my attention Cyprian Davis’ The History of Black Catholics in the United States, New York, NY: The Crossroad Publishing Company, 1990. For information on Healy see pp. 146, 148, 151, and 152 in the above book.
10. Ibid., p.45.
11. History of Greene County, Ohio, p. 954.
12. F.A McGinnis, A History and an Interpretation of Wilberforce University, p. 72 (copy from ASC).
13. Ibid.
14. History of Greene County, Ohio, page 954.
15. See Journal of the Twenty-Ninth Quadrennial Session, General Conference, of the A.M.E Church (May 2-16, 1932, Cleveland, Ohio), p. 382.
16. Ibid., 382-383.
17. Ibid., 382.
18. Ibid.
19. Ibid., 181.
20. Ibid., 383.
21. Ibid., 384.
22. John McClendon is to be thanked for providing me with this personal account of Hill. It is also to be thanked for bringing Hill to my attention. McClendon believes, as do I, in the importance of documenting the early path created by African-American philosophers. It is within such a historical framework, one that is true to the philosophical reflections and social, cultural and political lived context of the philosopher, that we can better understand our current historical moment as contemporary African-American philosophers.
Jean Harvey Slappy’s Philosophy and the Tradition of Marcus Garvey and Thomas W. Harvey

James G. Spady and Giles R. Wright

Jean Marie Harvey Slappy (1930–2002) was a most extraordinary and remarkable woman. Born in North Philadelphia, she doted on her birth and rearing in that part of the city of Brotherly Love. She believed that being a product of “North Philly” helped prepare her to confront and interpret the world beyond. It simultaneously toughened her and made her sufficiently sophisticated to understand the complexities and nuances essential to navigating the roadway of life. It made her “hip,” a cosmopolitan orientation manifested in the flair and verve that characterized her stylish tastes in clothing and dress, as well as being attuned to the black music so distinctive to the 20th century. That much of this music was associated with jazz artists linked to Philadelphia, such as John Coltrane, Lee Morgan, and the Heath Brothers, as well as such Philadelphia popular music stars as Teddy Pendergrass and Patti LaBelle, only endeared her birthplace that much more to her heart.

Intelligent, articulate, well-informed, honest—a person of integrity, one who had fondness for laughter and humor, Jean graduated in 1948 from the Philadelphia High School for Girls. This was no small achievement, for the school was the premier secondary academic institution for girls at the time, a training ground for young ladies who would go on to distinguish themselves in various fields of endeavor. While most of her peers at Girls High were from families of the Philadelphia elite, both black and white, that she was from a working-class black family made her graduation from Girls High all the more impressive. She was indeed the daughter of not-so-distinguished southern migrants, those who had moved to the North during what has been termed the Great Migration—that unprecedented massive trek of black southerners to northern urban centers.

Of her parents, her mother—Lou Ella Berrian Harvey, had the better formal education, one that enabled her to teach elementary school in rural Georgia prior to her relocation to Philadelphia. It appears that her mother contributed greatly to Jean’s academic success; she credits her mother with imparting the notion that education was paramount, that “education enhances and elevates the mind.” Her father, on the other hand, as we shall see, had very little formal educational training. Yet it was he who would have the more profound impact on her philosophical thought and sensibilities.

Married in 1950, and the mother of two daughters from this union, Jean spent virtually all of her work career in the employment of the School District of Philadelphia, from which she retired in 1993. Although working full-time, she found time to attend Temple University in pursuit of a degree in Business Administration.

Jean was also an active member of the Second Antioch Baptist Church. Her involvement in this church reflected her strong Christian faith, a component of her philosophy that is to be discussed below.

For the last [thirty-five] years, Jean devoted a goodly portion of her considerable energies to the work and advancement of the Universal Negro Improvement Association (UNIA), the organization founded in 1914 by Marcus Mosiah Garvey, the dynamic Jamaican, perhaps the most important voice of Pan-African and black nationalist thought to emerge.
in the 20th century. It is thus this organization and its founder that must occupy a central place in any attempt to discuss Jean in terms of her philosophical views.

We believe that this essay, which attempts to illuminate the philosophy of a Garvey follower, is rather unique. It is perhaps the first time that a Garveyite’s philosophical views have been traced over generational lines, through two layers of philosophical thought. Also earlier treatments of UNIA members—Garveyites—have been of persons who came into adulthood during the 1920s and 1930s; they joined the Garvey movement while Garvey was still alive; they were old enough to comprehend the significance of his death in 1940. And oral history interviews of such persons have chronicled more of their UNIA activities and experiences, rather than attempting to offer insight into their worldview, their cosmology. Examples of such Garveyites can be found in a slender volume by Jeannette Smith-Irvin titled, Marcus Garvey’s Footsoldiers of the Universal Negro Improvement Association.

Our understanding of Jean’s philosophy is derived from several sources. First of all, we knew her personally; she was a very dear friend of ours. If we had to total the years between us that we knew her, it would come to over fifty years. We were all joined by our common interest in Marcus Garvey as revealed in our membership in both the UNIA and the Marcus Garvey Memorial Foundation, Inc. We spent countless hours together, discussing topics that ranged from such weighty issues as poverty in America, legalization of drugs, and the Arab-Israeli conflict, to such mundane matters as the success of Philadelphia’s various sports teams (e.g., 76ers in basketball, Eagles in football, and the Phillies in baseball), Bebop and Hip Hop music.

Many of those conversations grew out of planning sessions for events sponsored by the Marcus Garvey Memorial Foundation: a spectacular concert performed by David Murray and Dave Burrell at the Annenberg Communication Center at the University of Pennsylvania; we planned and executed the first International Conference on Marcus Garvey and the UNIA, held at Glassboro State College [now Rowan University]; Law and Public Policy Conference at Columbia University Law School; and a tribute to Sterling Brown, Larry Neal, and Duke Ellington, at Howard University.

A second source of information concerning Jean’s philosophy was a brief memoir she prepared for a book we planned to co-author. Titled “Growing Up in a Garvey Household,” it documents an exposure to the UNIA that began during her childhood through her father’s UNIA work and activities.

Finally, Jean’s philosophy must be filtered through two sets of lens. First, through those of the particular set of circumstances that marked her lifetime; her view of the world was a function in part of the particular point in time that she existed. She was indeed a quintessential child of the 20th century, shaped by its events, developments, and people—its mood and tempo. That she witnessed the nation’s Great Depression as a youth, for example, seemingly sensitized her to the vast economic disparities found among Americans, inequities she lamented and criticized throughout her adult life.

The second set of lens involves the two men whose intellectual thought influenced her most: Marcus Garvey and her father Thomas Watson Harvey. It is to the philosophy of the two men that we now turn in attempting to provide a framework and context for examining Jean’s own philosophical perspective.

Marcus Mosiah Garvey

In order to more fully comprehend Jean Slappy’s philosophy and life work, it is necessary to know more about Marcus Mosiah Garvey, Thomas W. Harvey and the Universal Negro Improvement Association. This twentieth century mass movement was started by Marcus Garvey who was born in the Caribbean over one hundred years ago. One of Garvey’s most important contributions was the founding of the UNIA in 1914.

This organization was a universal confraternity among Africans worldwide. The aims and objectives of the organization were to develop viable means for economic development, cultural exchange and enrichment, the development of ethnic pride and love, self-esteem, self-respect and worldwide cooperation.

Two years after founding the organization in Jamaica, Garvey arrived in Harlem fully prepared to build an anti-colonial black social and political movement capable of making its existence known throughout the world. One of Garvey’s unique contributions was to develop a coherent and cohesive ideology around “Africa for the Africans. Those At Home and Those Abroad.” In 1918, he launched the Negro World [a weekly newspaper that became the most widely read periodical in the Black World.] There was a period when sections of the paper were printed in Spanish or French for Blacks under colonial domination. So influential was the Negro World that it was banned by colonial officials because of its ability to energize and mobilize the masses. Even after the paper was banned in Africa, Garvey skillfully used African American merchant seamen to secretly carry the paper into places like South Africa, Senegal and Nigeria. The message was always the same, “Africa Must Be Free from the Cape to Cairo.”

Do For Self Philosophy

In North and South America, the UNIA engaged in numerous economic ventures. Perhaps the best known such venture was The Black Star Steamship Line and the Black Cross Navigation and Trading Company. This project was capitalized by the large number of stock certificates purchased by Africans worldwide. An investment in the Black Star was perceived to be an investment in strengthening commercial ties between West Indians, Continental Africans and African Americans. There was also a prestige value attached to this enterprise. The assertion that Black people invested in the Black Star Line so that they could make a wholesale return to their native land is without evidence. An examination of the stock certificates issued indicated that investors were appropriately apprised of their investments. They knowingly took risks as investors. The publicity given to the launching of the Black owned shipping was converted to increased membership. Other business enterprises included: Negro Factories Corporation, The Black Eagle Flying Corporation, dress and millinery shops, a publishing company and painting plant, a photography shop, restaurants, laundries, a doll factory, Royal African Motor Corps (a fleet of moving vans). These achievements were duly noted by Black people all over the world, and they became a source of pride.

“Marching Up and Down Like They Were Somebody”

The presence of the African Legion (the UNIA's security and protection component) attracted many young Black men who had recently returned home from World War I only to find that the rights they fought for were denied to them. Thomas W. Harvey, the father of Jean Harvey Slappy, is one such person. He vividly recalls going out to hear Marcus Garvey address a huge audience at the Olympia Theatre in Philadelphia. Harvey
states, “The place was packed to the rafters. People all in uniform, parading up and down like they were somebody. Garvey delivered his message entitled ‘The World Can Not Disarm.’ I was pretty much sold on Garvey and the UNIA after that... I started attending the meetings and joined the uniformed ranks. I was made a lieutenant because of my previous army service and was a legionnaire from then on until 1930.” Harvey became Vice President of the Philadelphia Division of the UNIA in 1930, the same year his daughter, Jean Marie, was born.

It is significant to point out that Jean’s great-grandmother replaced the typical bedtime stories with her memories of slavery and how she and others survived. These oral narratives constituted a key component of her identity as a Black woman in America. Jean often told us about the important role her maternal great-grandmother played in her life. Mrs. Priscilla Boatwright was born in slavery on December 23, 1846 in Jefferson County, Georgia. She had a vivid recall of the tragedies of being enslaved in the American south. She passed on to her great-granddaughter a legacy of resistance to wrong. I remember Jean saying, “Grandma Boatwright was the most honest and pious person I’ve ever known.” Jean admired her strength and determination to live a good life in a bad world. Mrs. Boatwright carried Jean to her church on occasion where she heard Bishop Ida Robinson and other African American women preach the gospel.

Jean’s philosophy was also greatly molded by her father; she idolized him. This can be deduced from the following reminiscence of hers of him in the uniform of the UNIA’s African Legion:

As a youngster growing up, I can remember Dad getting dressed up in uniform to go to the Sunday mass meeting. He wore his uniform with pride and dignity. I remember how handsome he looked in his uniform. It is safe to say he cut quite a dashing figure and caused quite a few heads to turn.

As she matured she became more aware and appreciative of her father’s involvement with Garvey and the UNIA, which began in 1921 and ended with his death in 1978. That he, along with Elinor White, Secretary, Division 168 in Chicago, and later commissioner of Illinois, was one of two persons closest to Garvey by the time of his death in 1940 had an enormous impact on her. He described this relationship with Garvey in the following manner, one that crystallized between the 1934 International Convention in Kingston, Jamaica, and the 1937 Regional Conference in Toronto, at which he was one of twelve, including White, who took the School of African Philosophy Course under Garvey’s tutelage:

I think Mr. Garvey gave me a going over. Somehow I won his favor. I was pretty close to him in the last days. One other person Elinor White... we were the closest two people to Mr. Garvey... The only two people he actually confided in... We knew everybody that Mr. Garvey still had any faith in. And those he didn’t have any faith in, we knew who they were.

Daughter of Garvey’s Confidante
Jean was also immensely proud of her father’s UNIA work after Garvey’s death, work crucial to the UNIA’s survival to the present day. From 1943 to 1950 he served as Vice Chairman of the UNIA’s Rehabilitating Committee; he served as President General [between 1950 and 1954]; he served a second stint as President General [between 1958 to his death in 1978]. And Jean’s involvement with the Marcus Garvey Memorial Foundation, Inc. was anchored in her father’s association with this body; he was one of nine Garveyite stalwarts who founded it in 1960 to aid financially African students undergoing college training in the United States.

Before examining the Garvey-derived philosophy of Jean’s father as a precursor to treating her own philosophical outlook, it is instructive to discuss briefly Jean’s admiration of her father, his sterling qualities that in turn made her susceptible to internalizing the Garvey message that he preached. In other words, we are suggesting that Jean has to first love, admire, and respect her father before she could be influenced to embrace his thinking that was so rooted in Garveyism.

Perhaps what impressed Jean most about her father was his dedication to his family. In the manner of the traditional black family of his era, he perceived himself as the head of his family—its chief provider. He was a man of strong character, conviction, and principle. For example, faced with financial difficulties during the Great Depression, he rejected the lure of illegal and illicit activities. While a disciplinarian, his children were not victims of abuse, neither was his spouse for that matter. Jean’s admiration for her father was also greatly influenced by his being a man of ideas, a man even given to writing poetry. This is all the more impressive given that he was essentially a self-educated man. He had in fact reached his twenty-second birthday before he became literate. He described his journey to literacy, one that was realized while serving in the army during World War I, in the following manner:

When I was twenty-two, I had never read a line... And I went into the army. And the members of my church said I should let them know where I was stationed so they could send me things... And when I got to Camp Lee, Virginia, they wrote to me. So I got a soldier to read it... Soon, I had all of these letters sitting up in my jacket pocket. Suddenly I said to myself, I said, “Today, I’m going to begin to break this thing up... I got a sheet of paper and a pencil... and I started to draw—the best I could: A, B, C... And I got another soldier to help me...’ I spent most of my spare time writing something, drawing something. Finally, I was able to scribble out a letter. I read my first line while I was in the army.

Unbridled Optimism
Several key tenets of Garveyism were at the core of Jean’s father’s adherence to this philosophy. Certainly one strand in his “Garvey fabric” was the whole notion of Africa’s redemption, the belief that Africa would one day be restored to its former position of power and glory as seen in the civilizations of ancient Egypt, Ethiopia, Meroe, and Zimbabwe. This unbridled optimism—an optimism shared by Jean Harvey Slappy—was the certainty that African people would come to embrace his thinking that was so rooted in Garveyism.

...If tomorrow the Negro race rightens itself, stands up on its feet, tall men walking tall and free in the world. And if I could remember, even gone to join my ancestors, I know that I’d feel proud. That would be as much heaven as I wanted because the Negro came out of this thing. And he will come out. Just as sure as we are sitting here, the Negro is going to come out of this thing... Tomorrow is going to be another day.

Two Generations of Pan-Africanists
Jean’s father was also a Pan-Africanist; he subscribed to both interpretations of the term. He therefore believed in its original meaning that emerged in the 19th century—the need for
persons of African descent throughout the world to unite and fight against an oppression grounded in the trans-Atlantic slave trade—an oppression linked to the notion that their enslavement confirmed their intellectual inferiority to the remainder of humankind. Harvey also followed the direction that Pan-Africanism took in the 20th century: the idea of a politically free and unified African continent, one divested of all traces of Europe's political, economic, social, and psychological domination. Consider the following comment:

I'm going to venture to make one prediction. When Africa rights herself, come into her own, Africa will in turn claim every black man, woman, and child in the world. She'll do it. I won't be around to see it. Many of us won't be around, but it will come... Africa will claim everyone of us. And this old lie about we don't want to go to Africa, the African doesn't want us over there and all; it's nothing but a bare faced lie. All of it will be done away with. Africa will claim this Negro. And Africa will eventually discipline him. It'll do it. Africa is going to be the continent of tomorrow, with its wealth and its potential; Africa is great. Great in resources. Great in manpower... It takes time... But she'll come back.

Harvey also subscribed to that facet of Garvey's thought that stressed self-reliance and the related belief in Social Darwinism. He thus stated:

The Negro... is just trusting and God is supposed to do everything. Well, God doesn't do everything... God is not going to do it. It's you. If you don't do something to preserve yourself and take care of yourself, to perpetuate yourself—if you don't do it, it won't get done... God made you a human being. He gave you the same thing he gave everybody else. If you sit down and don't do anything, the other fellow takes everything, it's your fault, not God's.

Still further, viewing life through the prism of race, racial pride was a key component of Harvey's interpretation of Garveyism. He admonished blacks for their lack of racial pride as seen in the following statement:

It's an old story of the Negro running away from himself... His lack of vision, courage and manhood dumps him into this kind of thing. Until he can come out of that, it's not going to mean a thing. That's why you find so many Negroes in this, in that. All he's trying to do, he's trying to run away from himself. Instead of deciding he's going to be a man and stand up and do the thing that he ought to do. Make himself independent of other folks. Stop riding on other people's backs. Just don't be a squatter. Just do something to make ourselves, establish ourselves as a race. Independent. We are not beggars. We are hoeing our own row. We are doing our own thing. That's the kind of mind we need.

Finally, emigration was an aspect of Garvey's thought that was embraced with great fervor by Jean's father. His work served as the key UNIA contact for mobilizing support for the repatriation legislation introduced in 1939 by Mississippi Senator Billbo—the Greater Liberia Act. On one occasion he noted:

The very idea of repatriation, I've taken it in. Because I favored this kind of thing. I felt that this was the only escape. I don't think a Negro could ever stand up and be a man until he's forced to do it by throwing him on his own. As long as he's around the white man, denied, pitied, feared, clothed, favored... he isn't going to be a man.

Asked about his personal desire to relocate to Africa, he replied: "If age wasn't against me now, I'd still try it."

Although Jean's father never set foot on African soil, Jean did; she traveled to Ghana. But, unlike her father, she had no great desire to emigrate to Africa, marking a slight way in which Jean's philosophy departs from that of her father. In a recent interview, her daughter Gail provides the following insight:

My grandfather always wanted to go to Africa, to the Motherland really. When my mother went to Africa the first time, she was fulfilling my grandfather's dream. It is not that she did not want to go, because she did. But my grandfather never did and Mr. Garvey never went to Africa. I want to go to Africa, too. And I'm going to go there. I would like to go to Ghana and Senegal. See Goree Island. I would like to see that.

At the core of Jean's belief system was a commitment to the ideal of a confraternity of people of African descent and the freedom and unification of the African continent. Her sincere love of black people did not preclude criticism of them when their thoughts and deeds were judged inimical to their interests and well-being.

Jean was a strong advocate of self-reliance; she was wary of efforts to help black people that emanated from those liberal-minded persons outside the black race, feeling that their initiatives often retarded black expressions for self-improvement and racial uplift.

Jean's racial pride was instilled at an early age. Recalling that Garvey had pioneered in calling publicly for black girls to play with black dolls, she recounted an incident in her childhood that addressed the issue of self-image:

I remember one Christmas season when Christmas preparations were in high gear... My mother was quite concerned that there were no provisions for making Santa Claus for my brother and me. We had a cousin on my mother's side of the family who worked for a wealthy white family as a nursemaid for their children. Cousin Mattie Goodall was highly regarded by her employers who would bend over backwards to aid her in any way they could... When my mother explained the situation she was faced with, Cousin Matt told her not to worry... Cousin Matt got for me a Rattan baby buggy and a large white porcelain doll complete with dress, slip, and matching bonnet and fancy shoes... My father ordered my mother to give the doll back. He stated in a very strong voice that no daughter of his would play with a white doll. Dad brought me a black doll that he bought from the organization. From that point on, any doll that I ever owned and played with was a black doll that was bought for me by my father. I believe that I am... among a small number in my age bracket who never owned or played with white dolls.

Jean wedded her belief in Garveyism to a strong Christian faith, one that endowed her with a pronounced spirituality. She left this world believing in the eternal salvation of the soul as a reward for moral behavior during one's earthly existence. While she shared this belief with most other Christians, she—somewhat traditional in her preference for church services—was critical of some of the gospel music being offered today. She felt it too connected with the world of popular entertainment; she found it spiritually vapid.
Philosophy Born of Struggle

Jean Harvey Slappy believed, as did Amy Jacaues Garvey (wife of the esteemed leader), that “we are all merely human beings, what we do to others, not only affects them, but ourselves...our dispositions, our actions, which all leave their impress, that history records.” When thinking about the philosophy that guided Jean’s life, we are reminded of the title of Leonard Harris’ book, Philosophy Born of Struggle. In many ways, Jean’s philosophy was born of struggle. In commenting on her early background she once said, “Selective friendship was important in our household as was a stress on education. There was also that sense of dignity, that sense of your own presence, of having confidence in yourself, to be something or carry yourself in a manner that you command respect without even asking for it.”

One of the most graphic examples of Jean Slappy’s commanding respect without ever asking for it was when she was standing in the lobby of the grand Pegasus Hotel in the New Kingston section of the country of Jamaica. She was the chief strategist and planner of the Centenary of Marcus Garvey’s birth in 1987 under the auspices of the Universal Negro Improvement Association and African Communities League. Although we knew Jean had tremendous diplomatic skill in the United States, it was in Jamaica that we watched her interact with Ambassadors from Korea, Japan, China, Singapore, Tanzania, Ghana, and elsewhere. At the same event she also worked with such well-known musicians as Michael Ibo Cooper of the group Third World, Dennis Brown, Half Pint, Rita Marley, Big Youth, all of whom she had in attendance at the UNIA convention. During another tribute to Garvey at St. Ann’s Bay, Jean sat on stage with Coretta Scott King and other dignitaries. Wherever Jean Slappy was she had a presence that commanded respect.

What was it about her philosophy of Garveyism that enabled her to provide much needed leadership in the UNIA for thirty years? Jean had a keen mind, and an urban and urbane style, and unquenchable thirst for knowledge. Her generosity of spirit was evident. She lived her life concernedly. She drew inspiration from her own father’s example, and that of the Honorable Marcus Garvey. Jean Slappy had a vision of the future and she saw Africans and African Americans in conversation working toward a common goal. She saw them as diverse, but yet united. Her travels in Africa, Canada, and the Caribbean and West Indies, served to reinforce her firm belief that the philosophy of Garveyism was useful in a postcolonial era. She believed that Garveyism would enable Blacks to function as a Whole People.

Finally, Jean Slappy was a courageous warrior in an ongoing struggle for human rights. She brought to this protracted struggle a Black Woman’s perspective. She would often remind her male colleagues. When the conversation turned to some accomplishment by African American women, Jean would smile and say two words: Black Woman! Building upon the foundation established by such UNIA women as Madam DeMeana, Ethel Collins, Alma Golden, Elinor White, Henrietta Vinton Davis and others, Jean Slappy was the first black woman leader in the UNIA with a BeBop sensibility. She often spoke of herself as a child of the Bop cultural Revolution, and it was that cultural perspective that enabled her to be open to subsequent cultural developments, including Hip Hop culture. Jean Slappy understood that African American culture is a cohesive force and that is precisely what keeps people together.

The Universal Negro Improvement Association was an excellent vehicle for Jean Slappy to carry out the dream of Marcus Garvey and her father, Thomas W. Harvey. Their sense of dedication was one she wished to emulate. Jean said, “My feelings about the organization are a bit different in that I have not yet been able to separate the organization from the people who were the stalwarts of the UNIA, who sacrificed and gave their all to hold on to the legacy left by Mr. Garvey.”

On Assessing the Ideological Impact of Garveyism on Nkrumaism: Political Symbolism Contra Theoretical Substance

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I concentrated on finding a formula by which the whole colonial question might be and could be solved. I read Hegel, Karl Marx, Engels, Lenin, and Mazzini. The writings of these men did much to influence me in my revolutionary ideas and activities, and Karl Marx and Lenin particularly impressed me and I felt that their philosophy was capable of solving these problems. But I think that of all the literature that I studied the book that did more than any other to fire my enthusiasm was Philosophy and Opinions of Marcus Garvey.

Africa for the Africans! Africa for the Africans, but not the kind of philosophy that Marcus Garvey preached! No! We are bringing another Africa for the Africans with a different concept and that concept is what? ...A free and independent state in Africa.

The first epigram is from Dr. Kwame Nkrumah’s autobiography, which he entitled Ghana. Arguably this statement is the most widely cited passage from that text, if not from his entire corpus. This passage has, over the years, firmly established, in the minds of many scholars and pundits, the preeminence of Marcus Garvey’s ideological influence on Nkrumah. The second epigram is also from Nkrumah’s autobiography. However, it is rarely cited or mentioned in what is the vast secondary literature on Nkrumah’s political philosophy. The question before us is why has the former statement gained so much popularity and not the latter? I contend that each citation sheds light on the reality of Garveyism’s impact and influence on Nkrumah and Nkrumaism.

The purpose of this article is to assess the nature of Garvey’s ideological influence and impact on Nkrumah and Nkrumaism. The context of my assessment starts with the development of Nkrumah’s philosophical perspective. This inquiry into Nkrumah’s philosophical formation first begins at the ontological realm and then moves on to the domain of socio-political philosophy. This format allows us to observe how Garveyism is incorporated into Nkrumah’s socio-political philosophy of African nationalism and Pan-Africanism and the inherent ontological problems with Garvey’s “Black” nationalism.

My thesis is that Garvey’s brand of Pan-Africanism constitutes a Eurocentric conception of African traditionalism. Garvey envisions an African diasporan leadership paving the
way to the redemption of Africa, advancing the continent out of cultural backwardness to Western (bourgeois) modernity. Garvey’s Pan-Africanism under the command of diasporan leadership and its ancillary notion of African redemptionism are antithetical to Nkrumah’s Pan-Africanism, i.e., the affirmative view of African traditionalism and political reaffirmation of indigenous African leadership. I contend this antithesis culminates in Nkrumah’s critical and selective adoption of Garveyism. Nkrumah separates the chaff from the wheat by not committing to Garveyism in its theoretical substance, but rather to its political symbolism. Additionally, it is Marxism-Leninism, which becomes the theoretical substance of Nkrumah’s thought as Nkrualism.

Nkrumah’s Ontological Development: African Traditionalism and Western Culture

There are two trends of thought present in Nkrumah’s philosophical gestation, which compels him to study abroad and also prevails as instrumental in directing the course of his studies. For it is African nationalism, which grounds Nkrumah’s affirmation of traditional African values and Christianity on which the institutional affiliation of his choice of schools is established. Nkrumah finds that Catholicism, the Christian denomination associated with his education in Ghana, proves more constraining than Presbyterianism, which he encounters in the United States.

Nkrumah’s experience with Protestantism at Lincoln University, a historically Black institution, apparently offers more intellectual space for Nkrumah’s development of his African traditionalism. William T. Fontaine, the esteemed African American philosopher and Nkrumah’s mentor at Lincoln, observes, “We might take Protestant Christianity—there maybe, within Protestant Christianity, much more freedom...than we find in the Catholic conception...”6

In a general sense, Fontaine’s observation ought to be taken as true. However, in Nkrumah’s case, it fails to highlight the persistent contradiction that all forms of Christianity have with African traditionalism. Take note of the fact that Nkrumah’s decision to go into seminary study, after undergraduate study, is not in fact his first choice. Nkrumah initially wanted to study at the Columbia University School of Journalism but he lacks the necessary financial resources. Through the aid of a professor at Lincoln, he is admitted to the seminary and given a teaching post. In a letter to his benefactor Dr. Johnson, Nkrumah expresses his appreciation by stating: “I take the opportunity to thank you very sincerely for bringing the suggestion [to attend seminary] to my notice. Perhaps it is the hand of God directing.”62 Clearly this providential expression indicates an abiding commitment to religious idealism.

Initially on the ontological plane, Nkrumah holds a religious (idealist) worldview. This religious worldview is an amalgam of African traditionalism and Christianity, wherein African traditionalism and Christianity are symbiotically joined. This symbiosis, nevertheless, for Nkrumah, ignites a great degree of internal friction and value conflict. This friction and conflict, nonetheless, is not simply a matter of Nkrumah’s personal idiosyncrasies. Better yet, it derives from how African traditionalism and Christianity are erected on different socio-cultural paradigms and are expressed in the mode of the personal confrontation Nkrumah faces in forging his ontological perspective.

In spite of his increased involvement in preaching and ordainment as a minister, the friction persists within his symbiosis of African traditionalism and Christianity. It becomes most notable in 1943, after Nkrumah receives his Bachelor of Sacred Theology from Lincoln Theological Seminary. Nkrumah is a key participant in memorial services for his mentor, Dr. Aggrey. This memorial service assumes the form of an African ceremonial ritual that includes the pouring of libations. Nkrumah not only participates but he, in fact, leads the ritual. From Dr. George Johnson’s perspective, Nkrumah’s benefactor and dean at the seminary, the report of Nkrumah’s actions is cause for grave concern. Johnson believes such non-Christian (heathen) practices are especially unacceptable for Nkrumah. Dr. Johnson thinks that, as an ordained Christian minister, Nkrumah should be above the transgression of sacred Christian boundaries, and that African traditional rituals such as pouring libations constitute such an act. In a letter of reply to Dr. Johnson, Nkrumah responds:

May I say, however, that to meet Christ, on the highway of Christian ethics and principles by way of Christian salvation, and turn back, is a spiritual impossibility. The burden of my life is to live in such a way that I may become a living symbol of all that is best both in Christianity and in the laws, customs and beliefs of my people. I am a Christian and will ever remain so, but never a blind Christian.4

Nkrumah’s conception of “blind Christianity” is precisely the kind of Christianity in which an African holds in absolute allegiance while simultaneously remaining detached from African traditional values and practices. We will shortly see that in his philosophy of education, Nkrumah argues for a dialectical joining of “the best in Western civilization with the best in African culture.” This of course is merely the extension of his prior argument that the “best both in Christianity and in the laws, customs and beliefs” of African traditionalism should be dialectically joined.5

Nkrumah’s engagement with Christianity becomes an evolutionary transition. First Nkrumah leaves Roman Catholicism for Presbyterianism and eventually he goes from Presbyterianism to nondenominational Christianity. The catalyst for his evolution emerges from how doctrinaire Christianity ultimately circumscribes and distorts the intrinsic value of African traditionalism. Nkrumah states in his autobiography, “not that I became any less religious, but rather that I sought freedom in the worship of and communion with my God, for my God is a very personal God and can only be reached direct.”6 Nkrumah’s personalism mandates that God be anchored in African traditionalism. Moreover, no form of Christianity, in its symbiosis with African traditionalism, can dislodge God from this foundation. At this stage, African traditionalism is ontologically foundational to Nkrumah’s philosophical outlook.

Doctrinaire Christianity, as the cultural expression of Western imperialism, insists on not only conferring the religious judgment that African traditionalism is a form of animistic paganism but also levies the imperialist (cultural) judgment that African traditionalism is primitive. The cultural imperatives inscribed in the Christian missionary movement works hand in glove with the political economic aims of Western imperialism. The common aim continues, for both the Christian missionary and the colonial mercenary, in terms of absolute rule over Africa. Thus colonial domination includes spiritual, cultural and above all political, economic control. In light of these contradictions, Nkrumah, as a formally educated (or Western trained) African, attempts to find suitable philosophical resolution wherein the affirmation of African identity is on African rather than Western terms.

There is one commonality linking African traditionalism and Christianity, situated at the ontological locus. For despite their differences in socio-cultural paradigmatic presuppositions,
ontologically, we discover, African traditionalism and Christianity share a common denominator. They are each species of idealism. Nkrumah's resolution of this contradiction, at this ontological plane, centers on adapting Christianity to African traditionalism. So we observe a constant movement, on Nkrumah's part, to find the form of Christianity that will best fit African traditionalism. Nkrumah's dialectic sustains African traditionalism as an invariable component and Christianity is, in turn, a variable one.

Although Nkrumah penultimately adopts nondenominational Christianity, it does not resolve what becomes, in intellectual terms, an intense friction between African traditionalism and Christianity. Nondenominational Christianity, however, considerably eases the tension. This nondenominational stance, with respect to African traditionalism, affords Nkrumah greater doctrinal flexibility. Nondenominational Christianity effectively terminates the burden of church dogma and ritual from Nkrumah's shoulders.

The import of Nkrumah's sustaining of African traditionalism resides in its function as the basis of African humanity. The very nature of being human is mediated through the particularity of African traditional culture. Universality, on these terms, cannot be abstracted from particularity. The particular is always an instance of the universal for Nkrumah. Kwesi Dickson argues, "From one end of the continent to the other the African affirms his conviction that the human being is superior to all else in existence. Man is the supreme and irreducible reality; the divinity itself enters his affairs in the same way as do other beings which [man] is close to and uses."

Though Nkrumah explains this humanist aspect of African traditionalism later in Consciencism; as we shall see, it is an integral part of his worldview from his start as a student in Ghana. Nkrumah states in Consciencism,

The traditional face of Africa includes an attitude towards man which can only be described, in its social manifestation, as being socialist. This arises from the fact that man is regarded in Africa primarily as a spiritual being, a being endowed originally with a certain inward dignity, integrity and value. It stands refreshingly opposed to the Christian idea of the original sin and the degradation of man.

African religion as an anti-imperialist ideological force is not limited to Africa. In fact, through out Africa and the African diaspora, the humanism of African traditionalism often proves to be anti-imperialist in character. Walterio Carbonell remarks, "The religious organizations of Africans in Cuba were not only the most effective instruments for preserving the cultural traditions of the blacks; they also functioned as political organizations against slavery. The clandestine, religious nature of these organizations concealed their real political roles."

This symbiosis of African traditionalism and Christianity, as earlier discussed, has as its point of intersection in an ontological commonality viz., idealism. Both African traditionalism and Christianity are forms of idealism and herein were the sources of the idealism that characterizes Nkrumah's philosophy prior to Consciencism. So Nkrumah, before Consciencism, continually searches within Christianity for the resolution of its contradictory relationship with African traditionalism. African traditionalism, on the other hand, endures as the foundation of his philosophy. Nkrumah's theoretical imperative becomes finding a way to adapt Christianity to African traditionalism.

However, by virtue of adapting Christianity to African traditionalism then we return to my thesis that Nkrumah's continually attempts to find a resolution to the contradiction of conflicting socio-cultural paradigms. For example, Nkrumah selects for his valedictorian address at Lincoln's Seminary, “Ethiopia shall stretch forth her hands unto God.” Wilson J. Moses astutely notes the Pan-African nationalist roots of the title and text of Nkrumah's address. Moses states:

Among black writers it [Ethiopia shall stretch forth her hands unto God] made repeated appearances during the nineteenth century and by World War I, Ethiopiaism had become not only a trans-Atlantic political movement, but a literary movement well known among all black people from the Congo Basin to the mountains of Jamaica to the sidewalks of New York.

So we must ask, what is Ethiopiaism? Moreover, why would Nkrumah resort to Ethiopiaism? Ethiopiaism, as a distinctive view of Africa, contains a complex of philosophical, religious, and cultural ideas, along with a theory of history. They are all rooted in the New World African cultural experience and even extend back to the ante-bellum period. Ethiopiaism encompasses such notions as New World African emigration, Pan-Africanism between continental and diasporan Africans and, in turn, all of these notions combine with the political idea of African nationhood. This composite encompasses the central elements of Ethiopiaism.

However, Moses notes “Traditional black nationalist was generally contemptuous of African ‘tribal’ culture and institutions. Their attitude toward Africa has come to be known as ‘redemptionism.’” Of course, redemptionism adversely challenges Nkrumah's conception of African traditionalism. The Africana scholar St. Clair Drake argues that redemptionism was often affixed to Ethiopiaism. Drake argues,

The belief that Africa had a golden past and that the people of the Diaspora were destined to help ‘redeem’ it and ‘regenerate’ it lent powerful impetus to the missionary movement of the Negro Methodist and Baptist churches and the Back-to-Africa movements...The people involved believed that they were helping to speed the day when ‘Princes shall come out of Egypt and Ethiopia shall soon stretch forth her hand unto God.’ But this combination of Ethiopiaism with the doctrine of Providential Design also stereotyped Africa as ‘heathen,’ ‘dark,’ and ‘benighted.’

A number of noted people of African descent held firmly to this redemptionist aspect of Ethiopiaism. From Western educated Africans such as Jacobus Capitien and Olaudah Equiano to militant Black abolitionists like David Walker and Maria Stewart, even up to the twentieth century with Black nationalist, Marcus Garvey, the theme of Africa’s redemption persisted. Moses states,

‘Ethiopianism,’ [was] a teleological approach based on the biblical verse, ‘Princes shall come out of Egypt; Ethiopia shall stretch forth her hands unto God’ (Psalms 68:31). The passage was given a prophetic interpretation and became the basis for a progressive theory of history. The eventual triumph of Africa over paganism and primitivism was an inevitable part of a Divine Plan.

Drake’s further comments capture Nkrumah's position on Ethiopiaism. Drakes argues,

The logical end of Ethiopianist thinking is the position that Africans, themselves, are thoroughly competent
to chart their own course of development and to manage their own affairs. When shorn of Christian beliefs about ‘degeneration’ and ‘redemption’ through conversion to Christ, Ethiopianian thinking leads to a belief that the forces latent within Africa itself to ‘redeem’ it.14

Nkrumah’s utilization of Ethiopianism is antithetical to ‘degeneration’ and ‘redemption’ and upholds the ideals that ‘Africans, themselves, are thoroughly competent to chart their own course of development and to manage their own affairs.’ It is precisely on this point about ‘degeneration’ and ‘redemption’ where Nkrumah stands apart from Garvey. We have already observed, via the second epigram, that Nkrumah declares his vision of Pan-Africanism is not that of Marcus Garvey.

Nkrumah’s disavowal of any allegiance to Marcus Garvey’s notion of “Africa for the African” is at root due to Nkrumah’s Ethiopianism being ‘shorn of redemption.’ This contradiction with Garvey’s idea issues forth from Nkrumah’s conceptual distinction between “Black” vis-à-vis “African” nationalism. From Nkrumah’s perspective, the latter, in its substance, is grounded in African traditionalism while the former is attached to redemptionism. We will address this distinction in just a moment.

What are key for Nkrumah’s Ethiopianism, are the political elements of Pan-Africanism, where there is a free African state on the continent of Africa. Until his death, these elements remained central to and constant in Nkrumah’s political philosophy or Nkrumaism. Hence, the Christian aspect of Ethiopianism qua redemptionism becomes an excised component. This is a prime requirement of Nkrumah’s Ethiopianism, especially in light of its political implications, a free African state, and his affirmative evaluation of African traditionalism. So we will now move from the ontological dimension of Nkrumah’s philosophy to his conception of African nationalism.

Nkrumah and the Dialectics of African Nationalism: African Traditionalism and Western Thought

Nkrumah’s early socio-political philosophy is African nationalism. This initial period, (1927-35) his student/teacher years in Ghana, principally revolves around Nkrumah’s accentuation of African traditionalism as the substance of his African nationalism. Yet, this recognition of the substantive role of African traditionalism ought not lead us to reduce his nationalism to its substance. African traditionalism is Nkrumah’s point of departure and not the limits of his conception of African nationalism.

The dialectic of substance and scope expresses the contradiction inherent in the cultural crisis from which a new African civilization must evolve. This expansion of the theoretical scope of African nationalism is due to Nkrumah’s keen observation that African traditionalism possesses critical limitations in light of the struggle against colonialism. Therefore, substance has to be supplemented with a new theoretical form (framework). What Nkrumah refers to as “the best of Western civilization with the best in African culture” is precisely the meeting of substance (African traditional culture) with a new theoretical form (Western civilization).

On this account, African nationalism cannot merely reside at the plane of traditionalism it must become a modern nationalism capable of eradicating colonialism. Nkrumah aptly expresses this connection between his study of philosophy and forging a philosophy of national liberation. In his autobiography, Ghana, Nkrumah, as our epigram indicates, insightfully reflects, I concentrated on finding a formula by which the whole colonial question might be and could be solved. I read Hegel, Karl Marx, Engels, Lenin, and Mazzini. The writings of these men did much to influence me in my revolutionary ideas and activities, and Karl Marx and Lenin particularly impressed me and I felt that their philosophy was capable of solving these problems. But I think that of all the literature that I studied the book that did more than any other to fire my enthusiasm was Philosophy and Opinions of Marcus Garvey…15

Garveyism serves as buttress for Nkrumah’s assault on cultural imperialism and, in turn, Marxism-Leninism provides a theory of anti-imperialism. Together they expand his nationalism beyond African traditionalism because they engender an appropriately suited nationalism i.e. a modern nationalism capable of confronting and combating national oppression and colonialism. Therefore, the content of Nkrumah’s socio-political philosophy is fashioned by a dialectical relationship between his African nationalism (at substance African traditionalism) with the critical infusion of Garveyism and Marxism-Leninism.

An important conceptual adjunct to this dialectic of African nationalism and Marxism-Leninism is Nkrumah’s formulation of a socialist perspective. Where, on the one hand, Marxism-Leninism is the catalyst for his anti-imperialism, hence an anti-capitalist posture, on the other hand, African nationalism is the philosophical grounds that serve as the theoretical architecture for African socialism. Thus African socialism is an ancillary component of Nkrumah’s African nationalism. Later Nkrumah, in his philosophical evolution, discards African socialism for scientific socialism.

In any evaluation of Nkrumah’s philosophical evolution, the student years in the United States are a critical component. Though England was the favored choice of most English-speaking African (colonial) students for study abroad, Nkrumah decides to take a different turn. Nkrumah’s nationalist proclivities compel him to study in the United States. Nkrumah explains:

Recoiling from this [colonial] straitjacketing, a number of us tried to study at centers outside of the metropolis of our administering power. This is how America came to appeal to me as a western country, which stood refreshingly untainted by territorial colonialism in Africa.16

The United States, nevertheless, was/is not untainted of racism. Academic and intellectual racism is most manifest in the de jure segregation of higher education. Lincoln, during Nkrumah’s student years, is after all such an institution. Founded in 1854, Lincoln’s explicit purpose is Black education. Yet Lincoln’s “Black education” is one wherein there persists an exclusionary policy with respect to hiring Black faculty and administrators. While some graduate students manage to hold instructor positions (Nkrumah is so appointed) it is not until 1931, that Lincoln appoints its first permanent Black faculty. Furthermore, it is in the year 1945, over ninety years after its founding, that Lincoln inaugurates its first Black president. Horace Mann Bond, the nationally renowned educator and scholar, and father of civil rights activist Julian Bond, becomes Lincoln’s first African American president. Bond elevates Lincoln’s stature and it acquires the status as one of the country’s top Historically Black Colleges and Universities (HBCU).17

Facing institutional racism in education and buttressed by both African and Afro-American intellectual culture, Nkrumah...
approached the study of philosophy with a critical nationalist eye. He retrospectively remarks in *Conscientism*:

A colonial student does not by origin belong to the intellectual history in which the university philosophers are such impressive landmarks. The colonial student can be seduced by these attempts to give a philosophical account of the universe, that he surrenders his whole personality.

He continues:

The colonized African student, whose roots in his own society are systematically starved of sustenance, is introduced to Greek and Roman history, the cradle history of modern Europe and he is encouraged to treat this portion of the story of man together with the subsequent history of Europe as the only worthwhile portion. This history is anointed with a universalist flavour which titillates the palate of certain African intellectuals so agreeably that they become alienated from their own immediate society.18

It is Nkrumah’s nationalism that obliges him to “recoil from the strait-jacketing” of Western education and its Greek mystique. The omission and distortion of the African (and the African American) experience propels a number of Black intellectuals to carry out research on the history and culture of people of African descent. One such Black intellectual is Lincoln’s William T. Fontaine. Fontaine’s philosophical work includes publications on both African and African American issues. Fontaine serves as a mentor to Nkrumah at Lincoln University. Given the fact that even today only one percent of professional philosophers are Black, this opportunity for Nkrumah, no doubt, is a significant one.19

Nkrumah recounts:

The ten years in the United States of America represents a crucial period in the development of my philosophical conscience. It was at the Universities of Lincoln and Pennsylvania that this conscience was first awakened… I was introduced to Plato, Aristotle, Desecrates, Kant, Hegel, Schopenhauer, Marx and other immortals, to whom I should like to refer as the university philosophers. But these titans were expounded in such a way that a student from a colony could easily find his breast agitated by conflicting attitudes.20

Therefore, Nkrumah’s scholarly investigation of Western philosophy and its classical canon, is consequently supplemented by research in African and Afro-American Studies. Perhaps what most likely facilitated Nkrumah’s efforts to link philosophy to the Africana experience was the opportunity of studying philosophy with a professor of similar academic interests. Furthermore, Nkrumah attends the classes of William Leo Hansberry, the pioneering African historian, and consults with Ralph E. Bunche, both of whom during this time are at Howard University. Bunche not only engages in research on Africa, but also serves as mentor for a number of Pan-African activists such as Nnamdi Azikiwe and George Padmore. Additionally, Bunche is a prominent leader among the leftist faculty at Howard University. Nkrumah’s forging of his Africana Weltanschauung is not restricted to studies at the academy. Nkrumah actively joins African American (Harlem-based) study groups on Africa. John H. Clarke remarks, “Black Americans were becoming more Africa conscious... A number of study groups showed interest in African history. The best known of these groups was the Blyden Society… (I personally remember Kwame Nkrumah attending several meetings of this society.)”21

Among Nkrumah’s research program on African topics includes: “The Significance of African Art,” “The History of Religion in a Critique of West African Fetishism,” “Primitive Education in West Africa” and “Labour Problems in Africa.” Though Nkrumah never publishes these papers, Miles Mark Fisher, historian and cultural philosopher, consults them for his seminal study, *Negro Slave Songs in the United States*. Nkrumah publishes three articles on Black history during 1938 in *The Lincolnian*. In the debates over the retention of Africanisms in African American culture, Nkrumah sides with Melvin Herskovits, a proponent of retention, against the claims of Howard University sociologist E. Franklin Frazier. Nkrumah also writes an unpublished paper on this controversy, “African background on the mind and thought of the New World Negro.”22

Nkrumah’s study of philosophy is molded by his nationalism and is considerably enhanced by his research in Africana Studies. It is in the United States where Nkrumah learns much about African American history and culture and furthers his study of Africa’s place in world cultural heritage. Following in the shadow of Du Bois’s *The Philadelphia Negro*, Nkrumah conducts an extensive study of the socio-religious perspectives of African-Americans covering over 600 homes in Philadelphia and the surrounding communities.23

Nkrumah begins the African Studies program at the University of Pennsylvania, where he is a Fanti Language informant. (Fanti is an indigenous language of Ghana.) And it is at this time he discovers the Ghanaian philosopher, Anthony William Amo, which Nkrumah spells “Amoo” in his autobiography. Amo is not only from Nkrumah’s native country but also from the same ethnic group, the Nzima. Amo publishes several philosophical works in Germany during the 18th century, along with teaching at the Universities of Halle, Jena and Wittenberg.24

Nkrumah’s desire to formulate a philosophy of revolutionary nationalism means he has a particular attraction to the history of revolutionary philosophical currents. A fellow Ghanaian and classmate at Lincoln, Professor K.A.B. Jones-Quartey, states:

His [Nkrumah’s] experience in America sharpened his distress and while we talked, he laid his plans. All of his later foreign policies—Anti-Americanism, friendships with the East, the moving of Ghana towards scientific socialism—have their origins in his decade in America.25

The conglomorate activities of research, study and teaching at the seminary in addition to graduate work molds the context for his pursuance of the study of philosophy. His nationalism thrusts him into the examination of education’s role in the African experience. In addition to “*Primitive Education and West Africa*” he publishes two articles, “Education and Nationalism in Africa” and “Educational Trends and Potentialities in West Africa.” Just as African traditionalism, for Nkrumah, symbiotically coexists with Christianity so does Western education coexist with traditional African culture. He argues:

The problem now is how to educate and then initiate the African into modern life without uprooting him from his home and tribal life... This calls for the correlation between African culture and that of the Western world... When two cultures meet, there is
bound to be a crisis — a crisis which often results in the cultural dialectic synthesis of the two. Development is but the result of internal and external conflict relations. This struggle of opposites which causes development leads, at a certain point, to a revolutionary break, and to the emergence of a new thing — a new culture, a new education, or a new national life.

He continues:

This new class of Africans [correctly educated Africans] should demand the powers of self-determination, to determine the progress and advancement of its own culture. It must combine the best in western civilization with the best in African culture. Only on this ground can Africa create a new and distinct civilization in the process of world advancement...²⁶

Here we find the seminal stirrings of Nkrumah’s dialectical theory of cultural crisis and synthesis. This theory will come into full gestation as a philosophical principle, over twenty years later in Consciencism. My thesis that Nkrumah’s nationalism is in substance African traditionalism is not to claim that his nationalism is reducible to traditionalism. Nkrumah in dialectically incorporating Western culture into African traditionalism recognizes therein the omnipresence of cultural crisis. Nonetheless, the task of forging a modern nationalism can only come by virtue of this crisis, the necessary birth pains for a new African civilization. Where as under imperialism the concepts of ‘Western’ and ‘civilization’ are thought to be synonymous, Nkrumah, standing on the rock of African traditionalism, rejects such an identity yet aims to enlarge and expand African traditionalism’s horizons. Education and culture express a homologous relationship, wherein there is the dialectical contradiction of African traditionalism and Western civilization.

The earlier contradiction holding between African traditionalism and Christianity, though ostensibly cast in a religious form, is, in fact, a particular instance of African traditional culture in its dialectical relationship to western thought. Nkrumah’s dialectical method does not merely reject outright Western culture and education for Africa but instead is critical and selective in approaching them. He dialectically appropriates those elements of Western culture and education that can advance African traditionalism and hence, the African masses to liberation. Nkrumah seeks neither to reject Western ideas nor to become completely assimilated into Western culture by means of formal (Western) education. When we compare the above quotations to the following from Consciencism, the line of continuity is most evident. He states:

[Consciencism] is the map in intellectual terms of the disposition of forces which will enable African society to digest the Western and the Islamic and the Euro-Christian elements in Africa, and develop them in such a way that they fit into the African personality. The African personality is itself defined by the cluster of humanist principles which underlie the traditional African society.²⁷

Nkrumah does not abrogate the necessity for a formal (Western) education nor for that matter does he hesitate to incorporate Western philosophy into his own African philosophy. Nkrumah’s overriding principle for the critical selection of Western education and philosophy is that it must be of relevance and value to African nationalist aspirations. African traditionalism embodies the substratum of Nkrumah’s nationalism. And in contravention, he thinks the substance of cultural imperialism rests in the erosion of these traditional values and their displacement by and replacement with Western values.

In Nkrumah’s estimation, the alienation of the African traditional worldview looms large as an immanent danger to African development and decolonization. Therein, philosophy’s crucial pivot resides in the defense against cultural imperialism’s hegemonic alienation. The traditional African in Nkrumah’s perspective has “more culture, public spirit, spiritual and moral wealth than had been discovered among the so-called educated Africans who had been uprooted, detribalized and divorced from their native tradition.”²⁸

Nkrumah’s philosophy of education, established on the basis of African traditionalism, aspires to assimilate Western education and aims to occlude the inverse where Africans became assimilated into Western culture, i.e., Westernized. This dialectic is at the heart of Nkrumah’s methodology for the study of philosophy and his philosophical practice. This is the hallmark of his philosophy, the dialectical synthesis of external cultural influences into the African traditional realm.

Not all that knew Nkrumah, at that time, could fully appreciate the dialectical synthesis of African traditionalism as substance and Western thought as form to be assimilated into the traditionalist content. John H. Clarke, an African-American historian, who had known Nkrumah during the “American Years,” makes the charge:

Kwame Nkrumah, who had been away from Africa well over ten years in schools in the United States and London, seemed to have forgotten these [African] traditions, if he ever took them seriously in the first place. Some of his values and much of his political ideology was [sic] European-based.²⁹

What Clarke fails to see is that even though Nkrumah did not completely reject the need for Western philosophical currents and indeed sought to expand the theoretical scope of African nationalism via Western currents, throughout this dialectical process, African traditionalism endures as Nkrumah’s conceptual core and theoretical substance (base). The crux of Clarke’s puzzlement fixes on his identification of a putative ‘pristine’ African traditionalism, jettisoned from all Western influences, wherein this pristine culture is the substance of an “authentic” African nationalism. Clarke’s critique derives from the standpoint of an African metaphysical exclusivism and such a distinctive African metaphysics is mutually exclusive of all forms of European thought. It would appear, from Clarke’s point of view, that Nkrumah takes the path away from African traditionalism. On the contrary, as I have shown, when Nkrumah faces the charge, by seminary superiors, of abandoning his Christian commitment, Nkrumah in turn, challenges such presuppositions. Nkrumah’s justification mandates the modification of Christianity, i.e. he discards a purely western conception of (“blind”) Christianity because it is not anchored in African traditionalism.

In fact, Nkrumah’s dialectical approach to Western thought is predicated on the presupposition that African traditionalism is ontologically primary. Western philosophy offers possibilities to expand African traditionalism, as the substance, of African nationalism but this incorporation of Western philosophy cannot occlude African traditionalism as foundational to African nationalism. Nkrumah’s dialectical approach allows therefore the expansion of African nationalism’s scope, though, African traditionalism as substance dictates that it shall be treated as foundational.
On Assessing the Ideological Impact of Garveyism on Nkrumahism: Political Symbolism Contra Theoretical Substance

Marcus Garvey (1887-1940) was a Jamaican who, after his arrival in the United States, organized the largest mass movement in Afro-American history. His Universal Negro Improvement Association (UNIA) propagated a “Back-to-Africa” movement for those of African descent in the diaspora. Nkrumah’s ties to Garveyism, in fact, extend beyond his autobiographical comment, “I think that of all the literature that I studied the book that did more than any other to fire my enthusiasm was Philosophy and Opinions of Marcus Garvey.” Nkrumah is connected to Garveyism by his direct involvement with Garveyites. Nkrumah attends UNIA meetings, principally in Harlem, and, moreover, James Spady reports that Nkrumah was a member of the UNIA’s 21st Division in Philadelphia. Spady also remarks that Thomas W. Harvey, the UNIA branch president, often had African students speak at the UNIA branch meetings. Harvey secured employment for Nkrumah at the Sun Ship Yard along with providing Nkrumah with a place to stay. (Also see James G. Spady and Giles R. Wright, “Jean Harvey Slappy’s Philosophy and The Tradition of Marcus Garvey and Thomas W. Harvey” in this issue of the Newsletter).30

Garvey is instrumental in popularizing Pan-African nationalism among people of African descent both in Africa and the diaspora. His promotion of African nationalism is deemed dangerous by colonial authorities in Africa and by the United States federal government. He is jailed and later deported for mail fraud, a trumped up charge, by the state to destroy his movement. Garvey died in England in 1940. The widespread influence of Garvey and Garveyism was (and still lingers) as a key force in the African nationalist struggle against cultural imperialism.31

It is, indeed, a rather emphatic expression, when Nkrumah declares, “I think that of all the literature that I studied the book that did more than any other to fire my enthusiasm was Philosophy and Opinions of Marcus Garvey.” Yet we do not know how Garveyism proved to be instrumental in Nkrumah’s social philosophy. After my reviewing Nkrumah’s thoughts on Garvey and Garveyism it seems that the influence Garveyism asserts on Nkrumah’s thinking is, for the most part, more affective and symbolic than analytical and intellectually substantive. Nkrumah’s comment, “fire my enthusiasm” connotes an affective appeal. And when compared to Nkrumah’s observations in Towards Colonial Freedom that “The most searching and penetrating analysis of economic imperialism has been given by Marx and Lenin,” it becomes manifest that Marxism-Leninism provides a theoretical form to the substance of his African nationalism. Given what is Marxism-Leninism’s critical analysis of imperialism, Nkrumah appropriates from Garveyism those elements that animate his nationalist sensibilities and aspirations.32 One scholar astutely observes, “In contrast to the Marxist influence, the Garveyist influence on Nkrumah was largely inspirational.”33

Arguably, among African diasporan leadership, Garvey was the foremost master of nationalist symbolism. And Nkrumah’s borrowing of political symbols from Garvey is quite evident. Afari Gyan remarks, in his Political Ideas of Kwame Nkrumah, “Garvey surrounded himself with an elaborate structure of regal symbolism...” Gyan goes on to show that Nkrumah adopts Garvey’s symbol of the Black Star “as the lodestar of dignity and grandeur for Black people.” Nkrumah, following Garvey, uses the name “The Black Star Line” for Ghana’s shipping line, the same title Garvey gave to his U.N.I.A. shipping venture in the 1920s. Nkrumah has the Black star as the crest of Ghana’s national flag. And the national square in Accra, Ghana’s capital, is named, “The Black Star Square” and was adorned with that marking.34

Amy Jacques Garvey, the second wife of Garvey, reports that during her stay in Ghana, she observed a state visit by Haile Selassie, Emperor of Ethiopia. In the protocol exchanges, Selassie, “conferred on Dr. Nkrumah, the Exalted Order of the Queen of Sheba; Dr. Nkrumah in turn conferred on the Emperor, the Exalted Order of the Star of Africa — the Black star.” She also mentions Nkrumah’s address to the All-African People’s Conference, held in Ghana in 1958, where special recognition is given to Garvey’s contribution to Pan-Africanism. In fact, Nkrumah’s speech to the All-African People’s Conference in Accra in 1958 recognizes both Garvey as well as his Pan-Africanist arch antagonist, Dr. W.E.B. DuBois. Nkrumah proclaims:

Many of them [African Americans] have made no small contribution to the cause of African freedom. Names which spring immediately to mind in this connection are those of Marcus Garvey and W.E.B. Du Bois. Long before many of us were even conscious of our own degradation, these men [stood] for African national and racial equality.35

Despite Nkrumah’s garnishment of Garvey’s symbolism and slogans such as “Africa for the African,” and even given his respect for Garvey’s contributions to Pan-Africanism, Nkrumah both declines and criticizes Garvey’s nationalist philosophy. Why is it that Nkrumah captures Garveyist symbolism yet criticizes Garveyism in its theoretical substance? What is at stake, for Nkrumah, in the symbol/substance contradiction of Garveyism?

The earlier contradiction between African traditionalism and Christianity and African traditional culture and Western culture is saliently present in the diasporan notion of Ethiopianism and its ancillary redemptionism. Therefore the conflict over the locus of African traditionalism is not resolved in Garvey’s nationalism. In his summation of the Fifth Pan-African Conference in Manchester, Nkrumah states,

As the preponderance of members attending the conference were African, its ideology became African nationalism—a revolt against colonialism, racialism, and imperialism in Africa—and it adopted Marxist socialism as its philosophy...Like Garveyism, the first four conferences were not born of indigenous African consciousness. Garvey’s ideology was concerned with black nationalism as opposed to African nationalism. And it was this Fifth Pan-African Congress that provided the outlet for African nationalism and brought about the awakening of African political consciousness. It became, in fact, a mass movement of Africa for the Africans.36

The history of the Pan-African movement reveals that before the Fifth Congress in 1945 (where Nkrumah is Joint Secretary of Organization) leadership is primarily in the hands of Afro-Americans. In addition, many are intellectuals of petty bourgeois origins. The ideology they espouse, in most cases, though nationalist, is reformist and presumes the necessity of an Afro-American leadership over continental Africans. This presumption of leadership emerges from the Afro-Americans’ low estimation of African traditional culture and the superiority of Western culture. Imbued with a sense of manifest destiny, the diasporan Africans via intimate contact with and assimilation of Western culture and values thus thinks he/she...
stands more suited and most qualified for leadership on the African continent. This assumption has its roots in 19th-century Black nationalism. Alexander Crummell in his *The Relation and Duties of the Free Colored Men in America to Africa* (1862) argues:

The Kings and tradesmen of Africa having the demonstrations of Negro capacity before them, would hail the presence of their black kinsmen from America and would be stimulated by a generous emulation...To the farthest interior, leagues and combinations would be formed with men of commerce, and this civilization, enlightenment and Christianity would be carried to every state, town, and village of interior Africa.

The substance of Crummell's Black nationalism is embedded in its greater proximity with Western cultural tradition and stands in juxtaposition to African traditionalism. The connection of Ethiopia nationalism and redemptionism is the operative root principle. This is particularly true of Garveyism as a determinate form of Black nationalism. Wilson J. Moses' research clearly establishes Garveyism's historical anchor in 19th-century Black nationalist ideology. He states, "Garvey, like the old black nationalist before World War I, focused on the civilization and Christianization of Africa as the first steps toward universal emancipation of the African race." 20

Nkrumah's contrast between "Black" and "African" nationalism signals Nkrumah's departure from certain aspects of the diasporan origins of Pan-Africanist thought. This demarcation is necessary because while Black nationalism seeks the "redemption" of Africa, it does so on the basis of a conception of culture and civilization which is thoroughly Western. On the one hand, Nkrumah's African nationalism, while open to Western thought and culture, could not abrogate its roots in African traditionalism. On the other hand, Black nationalism's redemptionism mandates Africa's complete acculturation into Western culture. 41

For Nkrumah, nationalism or Pan-Africanism, as political philosophy, is not in essence racially derived, better yet it is cultural. African nationalism/Pan-Africanism draws on the well-springs of African traditionalism for its sustenance and vitality. African identity is not a matter of genetics, instead it is the manifestation of a shared culture, a way of living embodied in traditions. This Western bias of African-American (diasporan) nationalists means that African traditionalism can only be understood in terms of its putative backward and "uncivilized" character. African traditionalism is something to discard and ought be replace by Western civilization in Black face.

The cultural paradigm of an African nationalism can only start from Africa's indigenous culture. Nkrumah's conception is, in fact, a dialectical relationship between African traditionalism and Western cultural influences, hence he does not and cannot abdicate the centrality and primacy of African traditionalism. For what it denotes is that indigenous African consciousness is intrinsic to African traditionalism. African nationalism is a cultural and not a racial concept in Nkrumah's thought.

Garvey stipulates in the organizational objectives of his Universal Negro Improvement Association the need for "civilizing the backward tribes of Africa" and of having "to promote a conscientious Christian worship among the native tribes of Africa." The latter objective is later revised to read "spiritual worship" though the intent and prevailing assumption that traditional Africans were in need of spiritual uplift remains. 42 With regard to "civilizing the backward tribes of Africa," Garvey further states,

One day all Negroes hope to look to Africa as the land of their vine and fig tree. It is necessary, therefore, to help the tribes who live in Africa to advance to a higher state of civilization...[Italics Added]. It is the Negro [read Afro-American] who must help the Negro [read continental African]. To help the African Negro to civilization is to prepare him for his place in a new African state that will be the home of all Negroes. 43

It is clear such views, regarding African traditionalism, are completely in discord with Nkrumah's African nationalism. For Nkrumah's African nationalism is in substance traditionally grounded. The same friction that was evident in the symbiosis of African traditionalism and Christianity and as well in the case of African traditionalism and Western education is at the core of Nkrumah's distinction between his African nationalism and Garveyist Black nationalism. Nkrumah cannot adopt, in a wholesale manner, Garvey's nationalism because it is preeminently Western in orientation and thus derogatory in its estimations of African traditionalism. One scholar of the Pan-Africanist movement, in fact, describes Garvey's Pan-Africanism as "Imperial Pan-Africanism." While Garvey popularizes the slogan "Africa for the African" it is generally thought by many scholars of Black Nationalism that the slogan originates in Martin R. Delany's political thought. 44

Delany was a very close colleague of Alexander Crummell and shared the same ideology of civilization, Christianization and capitalism for native Africans via the Afro-American elite leadership. This was their formula for African redemption and uplift. Delany met with Crummell in Liberia during 1859 and supported the Afro-American settler's dominance over the indigenous Liberians. The slogan "Africa for the African" as propagated by Garvey is genealogically linked to Delany's Afro-American chauvinism. Nell Irvin Painter aptly remarks, "When Delany called for Africa for the African race and black men to rule them," he did not imagine that Africans would rule themselves. This was a paternalistic, not a democratic scheme." 44

Garvey's adoption of the slogan entails both the symbolic form and substantive content of Delany's Afro-American chauvinism. Nkrumah rejects outright the substantive content of the slogan while embracing its symbolic form. In 1953, Nkrumah, in a state visit to Liberia, presents a speech where he exclaims:

Africa for the Africans! Africa for the Africans, but not the kind of philosophy that Marcus Garvey preached.

No! We are bringing another Africa for the Africans with a different concept and that concept is what?...A free and independent state in Africa. 45

So now we return to our second epigram. Nkrumah's criticism of "the kind of philosophy that Marcus Garvey preached" is directed at Garvey's compromising stance with imperialist powers in Africa. Garvey gave a compromise speech in London at the Royal Albert Hall in 1928. A biographer of Garvey reports, "Instead of demanding a completely free Africa, he merely requested various colonial governments agree to relinquish certain areas under their control to Negro rule. Garvey even intimated that he would even accept the less desirable parts of Africa where the white man found it difficult to live. Another scholar acutely notes, "The language of Garveyism was racial, its ideology was bourgeois..." 46 In September of the same year, Garvey presents a petition to the League of Nations. Stein reports:
An exhaustive and occasionally eloquent catalog of white injustice, the petition repeated some of the proposed solutions of the war [World War I] period: placing South Africa’s mandate in Southwest Africa in the hands of Westernized blacks and creating an independent black state in West Africa… [T]his one [petition] was signed by Garvey alone… 47

These actions, no doubt, are what Nkrumah is referring to when he calls for a different “Africa for the African” than Garvey’s. Nkrumah cannot accept Garvey’s compromise with colonialism and the assumption of Afro-American leadership. Garvey’s nationalism is not anti-capitalist and it does not view imperialism as a stage of capitalist development. He merely wants to exchange white imperialist symbolism with Black imperialist nationalism. Garvey argues: “Capitalism is necessary to the progress of the world, and those who unreasonably and wantonly oppose it or fight against it are enemies to human advancement.” Garvey’s ‘Imperial’ Pan-Africanism ultimately led him to view himself and his movement as fascist. Garvey proclaims, “We were the first fascists … the black masses saw that in this extreme nationalism lay their only hope and readily supported it. Mussolini copied fascism from me but the Negro reactionaries sabotaged it.” 48

It is quite paradoxical that Garvey, the self proclaimed pioneer of fascism, can find it suitable to reference the opponents of his fascism as reactionary. Garvey’s Pan-Africanism calls for reformed capitalism and Black neo-imperialism i.e., Black capitalism under fascist diasporan leadership.

Now I want to return to the issue of Nkrumah’s distinction between cultural and racial Pan-Africanism, i.e., African and Black nationalism. The Ghanaian philosopher Kwame Anthony Appiah argues:

Pan-Africanism inherited Crummell’s intrinsic racism. We cannot say it inherited it from Crummell since in his day it was the common intellectual property of the West. We can see Crummell as emblematic of this influence of this racism on black intellectuals, an influence that is profoundly etched in the rhetoric of postwar African nationalism. It is striking how much of Crummell or Blyden we can hear, for example, in Ghana’s first prime minister, Kwame Nkrumah… 49

Before I embark on an analysis of how Appiah situates Nkrumah into what he deems the racist heritage of Pan-Africanism, I first want to explore his definition of intrinsic racism. Appiah claims:

For an intrinsic racist, no amount of evidence that a member of another race is capable of great moral, intellectual or cultural achievements, or has characteristics that, in members of one’s own race, would make them admirable or attractive, offers any ground for treating that person as she would treat similarly endowed members of her own race. 50

The import of this definition for Pan Africanism he explains as:

Though race is indeed at the heart of the Pan-Africanist’s nationalism, however, it seems that it is the fact of a shared race, not the fact of a shared racial character, that provides the basis for solidarity. Where racism is implicated in the basis for national solidarity, it is intrinsic, not extrinsic. It is this that makes the idea of fraternity one that is naturally applied in nationalist discourse. 51

I quoted Appiah extensively so we can clearly understand the meaning of intrinsic racism and its connection to Pan-Africanism. In summary, what Appiah seems to argue is that intrinsic racism is a moral viewpoint which gives moral privilege to all those considered members of the race. Moral privilege by race imposes moral duties of kind, which rest on each member by virtue of race rather than any consideration of moral character. Such a criterion imposes an imperative that is not derived from strictly ethical but instead racial standards. Such a racial, rather than ethical, overriding principle is at the very least racist, albeit an intrinsic rather than extrinsic one. (Appiah views extrinsic racism as seeking to harm those outside the race).

Let us not contend with Appiah’s definition of intrinsic racism. If we grant him his definition, then we are still confronted with whether or not it is applicable to Nkrumah’s conception of Pan-Africanism. I earlier argued that Nkrumah’s African nationalism (Pan-Africanism) was cultural rather than racial. Appiah agrees that Nkrumah’s notion of African nationalism differs from Crummell’s regarding African traditional culture. 52

Yet Appiah fails to recognize the import of Nkrumah’s distinction regarding Black and African nationalism. This distinction constitutes Nkrumah’s line of demarcation separating race and culturally based Pan-Africanism. It is instructive that Appiah refers to the same speech Nkrumah makes in Liberia on which our second epigram is constituted. Although he incorrectly cites the date of the speech as presented in 1952 rather than 1953, Appiah finds evidence for his charge against Nkrumah of fostering an intrinsic Pan-Africanist racism. When we review the citation given by Appiah, it is most apparent he includes a part of the speech that has a providential stamp. Nkrumah states:

I pointed out that it was providence that has preserved the Negroes during their years of exile in the United States of America and the West Indies; that it was the same providence which took care of Moses and the Israelites in Egypt centuries before. ‘A greater exodus is coming in Africa today,’ I declared ‘and that exodus will be established where there is a united free and independent West Africa.’ 53

Now if we dislodge this statement from its context viz., a speech in Liberia where the return of African Americans is the very basis for the establishment of Liberia as a state, then it can be read as a kind of racial telos immanent in the historical process. When, however, we study the next paragraph, contextually, we find that while Nkrumah supports the slogan, “Africa for the African,” however, he immediately makes a differentiation between his meaning (content) of the phrase and Garvey’s. The question before us is why is this important to our discussion? When we review Appiah’s citation he deletes the criticism of Garvey. We are instead offered:

‘Africa for the African’s I cried…A free and independent state in Africa. We want to be able to govern ourselves in this country of ours without outside interference. African traditionalism.’ 54

This deletion is crucial for it removes the very heart of the contrast between an African and Black nationalism i.e., between a cultural and racial Pan-Africanism. The accent on African traditionalism as the substance of African nationalism is an emphasis on culture rather than race. And since Nkrumah at this juncture recognizes African culture as rooted in but not limited to, African traditional culture, his conception of culture is diachronic i.e., open to transformation and expansion.
Nkrumah’s conception of Pan-Africanism derives from the standpoint of culture and not race. It is not restricted to so-called Black Africa, as in the case of Negritude, but includes Africa north of the Sahara.

Nkrumah’s Pan-Africanism, therefore, is cultural in content and continental in scope. In Nkrumah’s *Consciencism*, we discern the reconciliation of three cultural paradigms in the African context viz., traditional, Islamic and Euro-Christian influences. This indicates Nkrumah recognizes Africa’s cultural diversity. However, this diversity also entails the need for strong political and economic unity among Africans, hence Nkrumah’s Pan-Africanist aims.

Appiah’s claim cannot be supported if we fully examine the text and context of Nkrumah’s speech. The break with Garveyism points to Nkrumah’s break with the racial Pan-Africanism, the 19th century variety of Black nationalism. Nkrumah’s break with the kind of Black nationalism by which Crummell and Delany, acting as its progenitors, bequeath to Garvey, their most prominent heir. Consequently, when we assess the ideological impact of Garveyism on Nkrumaism, what results is political symbolism contra theoretical substance. The contrast between our two epigrams brings into bold relief why Nkrumah and thus Nkrumaism is not theoretically an augmentation on Garveyism. Consequently, the influence of Garvey’s political symbolism ought not be conflated with the theoretical substance of Nkrumah’s philosophy.

Endnotes


17. Raymond Wolters, *The New Negro on Campus* (Princeton: University Press, 1975), pp. 278-92. Of special note, Langston Hughes, when a student at Lincoln, during the 1920s, conducted a survey concerned with the absence of Black faculty. Most of the junior and senior class (over two thirds) did not want Black Professors or courses in Black Studies. See Langston Hughes, “Cowards from the College,”


24. In his autobiography, Nkrumah says “In America I discovered Amoo...had written a thesis Tractatus de arte sobrie et accurate philosophandi published at Hallé in 1738. Consult Ghana, p. 185.


35. Amy Jacques Garvey, *Garvey and Garveyism* (New York: Collier Books, 1970), p. 302. This excerpt from the speech can be found in V. Thompson, *Africa*, p. 39. Additionally Nkrumah had worked with Garvey’s first wife, Amy Ashwood Garvey at the Fifth Pan-African Conference in Manchester in 1945 and at a conference on Africa held in Harlem earlier that year. Both Nkrumah and Amy Ashwood...
Garvey were members of the Council on African Affairs. See Penny V. Eschen, Race Against Empire, p. 76.


41. See Cronon, Black Moses, p. 17. It is important to note that Tony Martin in his chapter on religion cites the same source as Cronon and even notes “Garvey’s correspondence to Booker T. Washington had referred to the promoting of Christian worship. This gave way in revised versions to ‘spiritual worship.’” Yet Martin fails to mention or quote the full text to indicate promoting religion among Africanists hence Martin jettisons the missionary character of Garvey’s stance. See Martin, Race First, pp. 74-75.


C. L. R. James, Marxism and Political Freedom

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Introduction
The work of the late Marxist scholar/activist of West Indian heritage, Cyril Lionel Robert James (1901-1989), has begun to enjoy a revival which promises to spread his influence more widely in the present and future than was the case at any time during his life. This resurgence has resulted not only in the publication of his previous works, but also articles, monographs, manuscripts and anthologies which examine James’ life, political practice and theoretical contributions to Pan-Africanism and Marxism.

While a vast number of scholars and activists have written on the corpus of C. L. R. James, there exists a lacuna in the amount of scholarship which critically examines James as a Marxist philosopher. At present, there exist no published works whose focus of inquiry is James’ philosophical magnum opus Notes on Dialectics: Hegel-Marx-Lenin (1948). One can arguably claim that James’ lasting contribution to the Marxist philosophical and theoretical tradition is Notes — a dialectical guide to political practice and organization in the period of World War II and its aftermath. 1

This work has been neglected even though James viewed it as his most important work. 2 This essay focuses on James’ Notes as a philosophical work in the tradition of Marxism-Leninism. My examination is based on an internal critique. By internal critique, I mean an examination which accepts a work on its own terms in order to determine whether its claims and assumptions are consistent within a particular philosophical
dialectical logic, James argues in fighting against capitalist exploitation. Guided by Hegel's freedom and its relation to objective necessity.

Since 1848, when Marx and Engels issued the *Communist Manifesto*, Marxists have sought, and continue, to seek, to link the socialist intellectual tradition with the working class political and economic movement. James' work as a Marxist philosopher stands in this tradition because he was not simply concerned with discussing arid abstractions. For him, philosophy was an instrument in the proletariat's struggle for scientific socialism. Primarily concerned with what is necessary for the proletariat to become free from the dictatorship of capital, James sought to address the age-old question of freedom and its relation to objective necessity.

The discussion of freedom, for James, centers on a particular issue. Taking center stage is the question of what should be the organizational form that the proletariat adopts in fighting against capitalist exploitation. Guided by Hegel's dialectical logic, James argues in *Notes* that the previous forms of political organization for the proletariat (such as Lenin's theory of the vanguard party) and political organizational structures (such as the First International Workingmen's Association) are obsolete with regard to the attainment of their freedom, that is, socialism. James suggests that the dialectic of history demonstrates that these organizational structures were negated by new forms of organization because the self-movement of the proletariat demanded it. James concludes that the emancipation of the proletariat rests not in the formation of new political organizations and political organizational structures but in the spontaneous activity of the proletariat. Hence, for James, the self-determination (freedom) of the proletariat is not dependent on external political (objective) forces. By external political forces, James means specifically Lenin's theory of the vanguard party. Although James is not explicitly denying the necessity of economic crises as a pivotal factor in historical development, he is rejecting the necessity of political leadership and organizational structures similar to the Third (or Communist) International.

My central argument is that James and Marx are fundamentally at odds in their respective conceptions of dialectics and freedom. What I mean by fundamentally at odds is not to be taken as asserting that either James or Marx failed to see the importance of a dialectical analysis of material reality or the need to eradicate capitalism.

Firstly, both James and Marx assigned great value to Hegel's dialectical method. They nevertheless – I argue – view Hegel’s import from diametrically opposed philosophical perspectives. James assumes that Hegel's idealist dialectical method is identical with a materialist dialectical method. This mistaken assumption leads James to conclude that Hegel's *Logic* can be interpreted in a political manner whereby Hegel's philosophical categories are directly translatable into a Marxist analysis of the proletarian movement and its struggle for socialism. The Hegelian dialectical method of categorical (philosophical) motion, James thought, was identical to the concrete (empirically grounded) historical movement of the international proletariat, that is, its political practice. James' approach suggests that Hegelian concepts such as World-Spirit and the Absolute can be simply replaced by a more concrete category such as the proletariat.

While Marx considered a dialectical analysis of great value for his scientific critique of capitalism, the method of Hegel had its own limitations. Marx thought that its value could only be uncovered by a materialist critique of its speculative, idealist foundations. Marx states that Hegel was "the first to present its general form of working in a comprehensive and conscious manner. With him it is standing on its head. It must be turned right side up again, if you would discover the rational kernel within the mystical shell." This materialist critique of Hegel's philosophy as a whole and reconstruction of his dialectical method, for Marx, did not involve the mere substitution of a material category (e.g. material production) for an idealist one (e.g. Absolute consciousness). Rather than accept Hegel's *a priori* method of inquiry, Marx gave a new content to his dialectical method on the basis of historical science and political economy.

Although both James and Marx are dialecticians, I want to demonstrate that they approach the question of freedom and its relation to objective necessity fundamentally differently. Both James and Marx recognize that inequalities exist under capitalist production and such inequalities are rooted in the exploitation of labor during the productive process by capital, however they hold to diametrically opposed perspectives concerning what material conditions are necessary for the eradication of bourgeois society. For Marx, a social revolution is contingent upon the contradiction between the productive forces and relations of production.

An action is free, for James, only insofar as there is no antecedent cause. Thus only spontaneous acts can be said to be free. Thus, James identifies spontaneous activity, upsurges and rebellions as the necessary and sufficient condition for a social revolution. James' view of freedom is isomorphic to Kant's incompatibilist position and specifically his notion of negative freedom. James offers an incompatibilist conception of freedom with the net result being voluntarism. By voluntarism, I mean one's actions are independent of, that is, not the result of, an antecedent cause, nor constrained by material conditions. This conclusion stands in stark contrast to Marx's thesis that the contradiction between social production (by the proletariat) and private appropriation (by the bourgeoisie) is the material basis for all political change and social revolutions. The espousal of incompatibilism also contradicts James' adoption of a dialectical philosophical outlook. From the standpoint of the dialecticians Hegel and Marx, freedom is the recognition of objective necessity. Hence, freedom is compatible with necessity. By rejecting what Marx and Lenin would deem as an objective necessity for social revolution, James adopts a conception of freedom grounded in subjectivism, that is, voluntarism. Voluntarism is antithetical to the materialist conception of freedom offered by Marx, Engels and Lenin.

This essay will focus on how successful James is in his application of dialectics to the question of freedom. James' philosophical examination of Hegel's dialectical logic is foundational to his conception of freedom. For James, there can be no proletarian (social) revolution without a mastery of dialectics as a philosophic method. Hegel's dialectical logic is a necessary tool in bringing about the liberation of the proletariat. Armed with Hegel's *Science of Logic* as well as Lenin's *Philosophical Notebooks*, James sought to demonstrate how the freedom of the proletariat rests in their own hands and not any political party such as the Leninist vanguard party.

In the first section, ‘Jamesian Spontaneity and Kantian Freedom,’ I demonstrate that James' conceptions of freedom...
is structurally similar to Kant’s incompatibilist position. The next section, “Marx on Freedom,” briefly outlines Marx’s views on freedom. The last section, “James, Marxism and Political Organization,” contrasts James’s conception of freedom with that of Marx and Lenin.

**Jamesian Spontaneity and Kantian Freedom**

What, for James, is the catalyst for historical change? James posits the subject (in the form of the proletariat) as the primary determinant which creates the possibility for historical change and social revolution. The spontaneous activity of the proletariat is seen as a self-generating, internal contradiction which gives rise to its own freedom. James sees proletarian activity as free of any antecedent causes. Hence, for him, spontaneous, proletarian agency is self-caused and independent of objective (material) conditions. This “celebration of spontaneity,” by James, accents the self-determination of the proletariat as the determining factor in historical development and change. Spontaneous rebellions and periodic revolutionary upsurges, therefore, become the basis for historical development and change. For James, the emancipation of the proletariat can only be attained through the independent activity of the working-class. Any attempt to deprive the working-class movement of its self-determination (autonomy) must be seen, from James’ perspective, as the subordination of the working-class to heteronomous forces. Freedom cannot be accomplished by the political organizational structures and political organizations which originate outside of the proletarian movement. As he explains,

It is not one International that tries a certain form, and when this fails, tries another form, when this fails, tries another form (not the same people of course, but the same organization). No. We could not draw any conclusions from that. The First International is one entity. It collapses. A new one is formed, and this shows us the Ground of these formations. It has the same aim and purpose as the first, though now enriched, developed, concretised. That collapses. A new one is formed. Thus whatever form it [that is, proletarian political organizations — SCF] may accidentally take (contingency) we can see that it posits something fundamental to it, i.e., shows that this something will appear in the course of negation of the finite.5

James concludes that the “self-generating, spontaneous activity” of the proletariat is what grounds the proletarian movement. The emancipation of the proletariat, as James sees it, is possible only to the extent that spontaneity is the fundamental principle of the working-class movement. James states

Organization has been the backbone of the proletarian movement. Every new stage has meant a more advanced type of organization which almost at once reflects the pressure of capitalism inside the proletariat. We have insisted upon the fact that the proletariat always breaks up the old organization by impulse, a leap: remember that. But there comes a stage when organization and the maintenance of the organization become ends in themselves in the most direct conflict with the essential movement of the proletariat [emphasis added, SCF]… Organization, as we have known it, has served its purpose. It was a purpose reflecting the proletariat in bourgeois society. The new organization, the new organism, will begin with spontaneity, i.e., free creative activity, as its necessity.

He continues

It is now clear to all except those blinded by ideological spectacles that organization is the obstacle, the opposite, the mountain, the error, which truth has to blast out of its way to find itself. If the communist parties are to endure, then the free activity of the proletariat must be destroyed. If the free activity of the proletariat is to emerge, it can emerge only by destroying the communist parties. It can destroy these parties only by free activity. Free activity means not only the end of the communist parties. It means the end of capitalism.6

Only the spontaneous activity of the proletariat independent of any external conditions or hindrances such as Lenin’s vanguard party, James believes, will bring about the emancipation of the proletariat.

James drew on the Paris Commune, the Russian Soviets, the Committee for Industrial Organizations (CIO) and much later the Workers Councils (which were a product of increased working class agitation in Hungary in 1956) as examples of spontaneous “proletarian impulses” and autonomous proletarian political formations. For James, the “dialectical progression” from the Paris Commune (1871) to the Russian Revolution (1917) to the Spanish Revolution to the Hungarian Revolution are “stages of the struggle of the proletariat to organize itself independently. These are … dialectical because the achievements of each period are absorbed and surpassed in the period following.”7 These historical examples demonstrate for James that the proletariat must spontaneously develop a consciousness of the necessity for socialism. Any effort at bringing socialist consciousness to the proletariat, in James’ mind, is a failure to recognize the self-determination of the proletariat.

The emancipation of the working-class, James argues, is ultimately unconditioned by external, objective forces. As James states:

What matters, events, things, personalities are historically observable? If we are analyzing society we will note certain mass impulses, instinctive actions, spontaneous movements, the emergence of personalities, the incalculable activities which constitute society. At a certain stage these apparently indeterminate activities coalesce into a hard knot ‘which are foci of arrest and direction in mental life and consciousness.’ That knot constitutes the basis of new Substance.8

This quotation is important because it implies that historical development is not dependent on material (social) relations of production, but rather on what James terms “indeterminate activities” such as spontaneous movements, rebellions and other incalculable activities. What is significant for our analysis is that, for James, the proletariat as subject and other “indeterminate activities” are seen as the starting-point for social revolution. James was convinced that anything which was external to the spontaneous proletarian movement, such as Lenin’s vanguard party, was an instrument of class oppression and, ultimately, deprived the proletariat of its freedom.

Although James proclaims himself to be a dialectician in the tradition of Hegel and Marx, we can see from the foregoing that his approach to the question of freedom and its relation to determinism is undialectical. Implicit in his position is the rejection of objective necessity as the condition for free, spontaneous actions. Here spontaneous action is free from structural determination and political organizations. The only
escape from the dominance of structural determinates such as objective social laws, for James, is in the direction of voluntarism. In structural terms, James' position is identical to Kant's incompatibilist position.

Let us turn briefly to Kant. In the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant addresses the question of the relation of freedom (as it relates to the will) to the mechanistic causality of nature in the Third Antinomy of Pure Reason. Both sides of the Third Antinomy share a common presupposition, namely, that for every event there is an antecedent cause. For Kant, this assumption, which was proven in the Transcendental Analytic, is not subject to debate. The point of contention, however, is whether it is also permissible to argue for the existence of transcendental freedom understood as “the power of spontaneously beginning a series of successive things or states.”9 The Thesis contends that not only is there causality in accordance with the laws of nature, but in addition there is transcendental freedom or what Kant terms the causality of freedom. The Antithesis, on the other hand, denies the existence of transcendental freedom and asserts that only the mechanistic causation of nature exists. Kant insists that the key to the resolution of the antinomies, and in this case the Third Antinomy, rests in his Critical philosophy.

Kant’s resolution of the Third Antinomy is closely tied to the question of moral freedom and rational agency. Kant suggests that we may have grounds for attributing both an empirical and intelligible character to rational agency. Considered with respect to its empirical character and as occurrences in the phenomenal world, human actions are causally determined. However, with respect to its intelligible character, human actions are a part of the noumenal realm and subject to the “causality of reason,” that is, to practical reason. Practical reason, in contradistinction to Theoretical Reason, is not empirically determined (or constrained). Practical reason, in the form of the autonomous will, produces moral imperatives and causes moral freedom. Freedom, therefore, belongs not to the realm of nature (the empirical), but rather to the moral realm (the intelligible) to which categories like causality do not apply. In other words, people can be thought of as phenomenally determined, yet noumenally free. Kant states that “the demand to regard oneself qua subject of freedom as a noumenon, and at the same time from the point of view of physical nature as a phenomenon in one’s own empirical consciousness” is paradoxical.10 However, Kant believes that the conceptual distinction between the intelligible and empirical demonstrates not the “possibility of freedom,” but rather “that causality through freedom is at least not incompatible with nature.”11 While we may be able to admit of the logical possibility of freedom, for Kant, this does not amount to the existence of freedom. Freedom, for Kant, is a transcendental idea that falls outside the realm of experience, but it can nonetheless be thought of.

In the Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals, Kant introduces a distinction between negative and positive freedom. Kant begins by giving an account of the will as “a kind of causality belonging to living beings so far as they are rational.” Rational agency requires, for Kant, an act of spontaneity rather than being subject to the mechanistic causation of nature. The spontaneity of the will, as Henry Allison explains,

is the practical analogue of the spontaneity of the understanding, [and] may be characterized provisionally as the capacity to determine oneself to act on the basis of objective (intersubjectively valid) rational norms and, in light of these norms, to take (or reject) inclinations or desires as sufficient reasons for action.12

Thereafter, Kant claims that freedom, in its negative aspect, is the capacity of the will “to work independently of determination by alien causes.” However, for Kant, freedom is more than the absence of determination. Kant identifies freedom (of the will) understood positively with autonomy and defines the autonomy of the will as “the property the will has of being a law to itself (independently of every property belonging to the objects of volition).”13 Here autonomy is understood as the capacity for self-legislation. As Henry Allison has noted, autonomy of the will is the capacity to act independent of a rational agent’s needs as a sensuous being.14 Kant contrasts this sense of autonomy with heteronomy, according to which “the will does not give itself the law, but the object does so in virtue of its relation to the will.”15 Thus the defining characteristic of heteronomy is the subjection of the will to desire, inclination or interest. The distinction between autonomy and heteronomy has a crucial impact on the question of rational agency for Kant—and as we shall see later for James also. Either agency is self-determined and, therefore, we have autonomy, or it is determined by external forces and can be classified as heteronomous. For Kant, the categorical imperative derives its obligatory status from being self-imposed by the rational agent. In addition, the categorical imperative as a regulative principle not only applies universally and unconditionally to all rational agents, but it is independent of their desires, inclinations or interests.

For Kant, the will is free when it is self-determined, that is, not determined at all by alien influences. As we saw above, freedom in its practical dimension, from Kant’s standpoint, rests in the autonomy of the will — an autonomy, as we saw, independent of empirical constraints such as desires and the like. Similarly, for Kant, the freedom of theoretical reason rests in “absolute spontaneity,” that is, in self-determining reason which is not regulated by empirical constraints. For Kant, in both theoretical and practical reason, the spontaneity of reason involves the ability to spontaneously and independently subsume representations under reason. The theoretical faculty of reason, Kant claims, subsumes representations under concepts and categories. Under the exercise of practical reason, on the other hand, a person has certain empirical representations impinging on their senses, and moral behavior requires them to subsume those empirical representations spontaneously under the categorical imperative, an imperative or law which is generated by the self-generating power of reason.

The commonality which James shares with Kant is quite evident. Spontaneity, for James, is a conception of freedom as self-activity which we saw above with Kant. In our earlier discussion of Kant, we saw that Kant defined (negative) freedom in terms of “being able to work independently of determination by alien causes.”16 Kant identifies autonomy as the property of the free will with the positive conception of freedom and states that it is deduced from the negative conception. By linking autonomy to practical spontaneity, Kant establishes that freedom is the capacity for self-legislation or self-determination independent of causal determinism. This represents an interesting parallel between James’ concept of spontaneity and Kant’s notion of autonomy. However, I should note that there is no direct textual evidence to support my claim that James adopts Kant’s notion of autonomy. In fact, James held Kant’s philosophical architectonic in the utmost contempt. However, James’ formulation of the concept of spontaneity does suggest a structural similarity to Kant’s notion of autonomy. If my argument is sound, then James is an
Marx continues:

the preface to his

sets down what he sees as the material basis for freedom. In
classes altogether and, hence, exploitation.
exploitation because it is the material basis for the abolition of
which people are obligated to follow. Freedom, Marx argues,
Marx does not understand freedom in terms of abstract rights
principle which was to serve as the criteria for our actions.
Marx does not understand freedom in terms of abstract rights
which people are obligated to follow. Freedom, Marx argues,
can only be realized with the eradication of capitalist
exploitation because it is the material basis for the abolition of
classes altogether and, hence, exploitation.

When considering the question of freedom, Marx was not
concerned with a certain state of being, that is, a set of
dispositions and character traits which a person must possess
in order to be free. Nor did Marx see freedom as a normative
principle which was to serve as the criteria for our actions.
Marx was not a moral philosopher. Nonetheless, implicit in his critique of capitalism
was a conception of freedom.

At the outset it should be clear that I do not want to argue that
Marx explicitly formulated a theory of freedom comparable to
the moral theories which past or present moral philosophers
have articulated. Marx did not write a treatise, pamphlet or
essay on freedom, ethics or morality. Marx was not a moral
philosopher. Nonetheless, implicit in his critique of capitalism
was a conception of freedom.

Rather than offer a normative account of freedom, Marx
sets down what he sees as the material basis for freedom.
In the preface to his Contribution to the Critique of Political
Economy (1859) Marx states:

In the social production of their existence, men
inevitably enter into definite relations, which are
independent of their will, namely relations of
production appropriate to a given stage in the
development of their material forces of production.
The totality of these relations of production
constitutes the economic structure of society, the real
foundation, on which arises a legal and political
superstructure and to which correspond definite
forms of social consciousness. The mode of
production of material life conditions the general
process of social, political and intellectual life. It is
not the consciousness of men that determines their
existence, but their social existence that determines
their consciousness.

Marx continues:

At a certain stage of development, the material
productive forces of society come into conflict with
the existing relations of production or - this merely
expresses the same thing in legal terms - with the
property relations within the framework of which
they have operated hitherto. From forms of
development of the productive forces these relations
turn into their fetters. Then begins an era of social
revolution. With the change in the economic
foundation the entire immense superstructure is more
or less rapidly transformed.

Here Marx argues that social revolutions are fought in
the name of social, political and intellectual principles, but the
task is set, and the outcome is determined by the 'mode
of production of material life.' As the productive forces develop,
the established relations of production prevent the full
productive capacity of the productive forces. Therefore, in
order for the full capacity of the productive forces to be utilized
for society as a whole, a social revolution must take place. A
social revolution, for Marx, is the result of the contradiction
between the social relations of production and the productive
forces.

Marx conceptualizes capitalism as a determinate mode
of production whereby internal contradictions abound, i.e., class
exploitation. The laws of capitalist development, for Marx,
pointed in the direction of necessarily eradicating all class
antagonisms because socialism results from the contradictions
inherent in capitalism. Given the internal contradictions of
private appropriation (by the bourgeoisie) and social
production (by the proletariat) and the resultant social conflict
manifested in the proletarian class struggle, the resolution of
capitalist contradictions derives from the material
contradictions of capitalism and not the utopian appeal to moral
ideals or categorical imperatives of the Kantian sort. The
internal motion of capitalism, class struggle, is the catalyst for
its ascendancy over feudalism and its demise into socialism.

Why can't the proletariat find freedom in bourgeois society? Freedom of the proletariat, for Marx, must be tied to
the eradication of capitalism and building of communism. Any
given conception of freedom arises out of a particular stage in
the development of the productive forces and relations and,
therefore, it reflects a particular mode of production and
particular class interests. For example, in bourgeois society,
notions such as freedom, equality and liberty serve, from Marx's
perspective, as ideological justification for racism, national
oppression and class exploitation. Thus declarations of equality
and justice are, for Marx, representative of "so many bourgeois
prejudices, behind which lurk in ambush just as many bourgeois
interests." By this Marx means, bourgeois relations of
production masks the exploitation and inequality faced by the
working class people. It is in this sense that Marx spoke of the
two-fold nature of the "freedom" of the working class. First,
the laborer is encumbered by relations of legal ownership
(as in slavery) or obligation (as in serfdom) to an individual
capitalist and is therefore free to sell his labor power. Secondly,
given that the working class is freed from and unable to own
the means of production, they must sell their labor power as a
commodity in order to live. As the African-American political
economist Donald Harris astutely points out,

It is worth noting also that, though being a free agent
in the specific sense indicated, there is nevertheless
an element of necessity, one might say coercion, in
the social relation which the labor occupies. This is so
insofar as the laborer has no alternative to obtain
means of subsistence at the required level for
reproduction of himself and family and must therefore
sell himself into wage employment. [emphasis added,
SCF] 22

Marx's point is simply that the appearance of freedom
and equal exchange between bourgeoisie and the proletariat
conceals the exploitation which is an essential aspect to
bourgeois society. Under bourgeois democracy, the proletariat
is not only freed from the yoke of feudal customary
subordination, but consequently acquires the political status
of equality before the law. However, for Marx, this juridical equality is a facade which veils the material inequality rooted in the private ownership of the means of production.

Given the aforementioned as a philosophical assumption, the point of departure for Marx concerning the question of freedom is the specific form in which exploitation takes under capitalist production relations and institutions. The genesis of capitalism, in Marx’s estimation, was rooted in class antagonism. The social position of the proletariat is objectively grounded in a relationship of exploitation with the adverse effect being the increased wealth of the bourgeoisie. Marx demonstrated that bourgeois class relations are grounded in the exploitation of labor during the productive process. The appropriation of surplus value by the bourgeoisie is the result of the removal of the proletariat from ownership of the means of production. As a result of their objective, social relation in bourgeois society, the proletariat can only survive by selling their labor power, i.e., their capacity to work. The worker sells labor-power to the capitalist at its value and the capitalist then uses it in the production of a commodity that becomes the property of the capitalist. The use of labor-power in the production of a commodity produces more value than is paid to the laborer in the form of wages. This surplus above the value of the worker’s labor power is what Marx considers surplus value. In this surplus value lies the essence of capitalist exploitation and wealth. As Frederick Engels stated,

Marx ... discovered the special law of motion governing the present-day capitalist mode of production and the bourgeois society that this mode of production has created. The discovery of surplus value suddenly threw light on the problem, in trying to solve which all previous investigations, of both bourgeois economists and socialist critics, had been groping in the dark. 23

Engels further explains,

... the appropriation of unpaid labour is the basis of the capitalist mode of production and of the exploitation of the worker that occurs under it; that even if the capitalist buys the labour power of his labourer at its full value as a commodity on the market, he yet extracts more value from it than he paid for; and that in the ultimate analysis this surplus value forms those sums of value from which are heaped up the constantly increasing masses of capital in the hands of the possessing classes. 24

The exploitation of the proletariat by the bourgeoisie is based on the effort to appropriate surplus value. This surplus value becomes the property of the capitalists and not the proletariat because the bourgeoisie owns the means of production. Here then lies the basis for Marx of capitalist exploitation. 25

In this section, I have briefly summarized what Marx deems as the material basis for social revolution, that is, the contradiction between the productive forces and relations of production. Ancillary to Marx’s theory of social revolution is the need to unveil the objective grounds for oppression and exploitation in determinate social relations, that is, bourgeois social relations.

James, Marxism and Political Organization

In light of Marx’s analysis of what conditions are necessary for a social revolution, it is often claimed that he neglected the importance of political organization, ideology, consciousness and, most importantly, human agency in determining the fate of a social revolution. For example, Anthony Giddens comments that the “Hegelian inheritance in Marx, with its connotation of active consciousness and the coming-to-itself of the subject in history, mingles uneasily and in an unresolved way in Marx’s works with an allegiance to a deterministic theory in which actors are propelled by historical laws.” 26

Owing to material circumstances specifically the undeveloped state of the working-class movement, Marx never wrote a work specifically addressing the question of the formation of an independent political party which would advance the objective interests of the proletariat. Marx’s political activity was essentially devoted to laying the foundations for independent workers’ parties. “Against the collective power of the propertied classes,” Marx argued, “the working class cannot act, as a class, except by constituting itself into a political party, distinct from, and opposed to, all old parties formed by the propertied classes.” On the basis of his experiences with the formation of the Communist League in 1847 and the International Working Men’s Association in 1864 Marx drew the conclusion that the “constitution of the working class into a political party is indispensable in order to ensure the triumph of the social revolution and its ultimate end — the abolition of classes.” 27

After Marx’s death in 1883, the rising tide of the international working-class movement compelled many workers, socialist intellectuals and activists to confront the theoretical, political and organizational problems involved with making a socialist revolution. One of the key figures in the international proletariat movement to give thought to this question was the Russian Marxist, V.I. Lenin.

One of the issues Lenin addressed was the question of whether the proletariat will automatically or spontaneously seize the means of production and advance to socialism. In Lenin’s magnum opus on political organization and strategy, What Is To Be Done?, he explains that spontaneous rebellions and other forms of resistance by the proletariat represent an embryonic stage in the recognition of their objective interest, that is, the eradication of capitalism. Lenin applauded the spontaneous awakening of the proletariat because it represented a quantitative advance in the struggle for socialism. These moments in the political struggle of the proletariat are signs that the proletariat has lost “their age-old faith in the permanence of the system which oppressed them and began ... I shall not say to understand, but to sense the necessity for collective resistance, definitely abandoning their slavish submission to the authorities.” 28 However, Lenin also found it necessary to warn against what he terms, “bowing to spontaneity.” According to a view which privileges spontaneity, the proletariat does not need political ideology nor the conscious intervention of socialist intellectuals or organizers in order to become conscious of the possibility and necessity for socialism. But Lenin rejects this view. Against the arguments of Russian “Economists” such as Vladimir Akimov and Alexander Martynov, Lenin wrote, for example:

all worship of the spontaneity of the working-class movement, all belittling of the role of “the conscious element,” of the role of [Marxist ideology], means, quite independently of whether he who belittles that role desires it or not, a strengthening of the influence of bourgeois ideology upon the workers. 29

Given the hegemony of bourgeois ideology, a reliance purely on the spontaneous development of the proletariat movement will lead to the proletariat’s subordination to bourgeois ideology. Although we may witness resistance to and rebellion against the ‘dictatorship of the bourgeoisie,’ more
often than not, Lenin contends, it takes the form of trade-unionism. Trade-unionism concentrates on the immediate working conditions of the proletariat. The spontaneous consciousness of the proletariat in general is limited to the immediate apprehension of reality, e.g., a fight against hazardous working conditions, for the reduction of working hours, for wage increases, for social security and so on. In a nutshell, Lenin argues, the spontaneous working-class movement from which springs spontaneous consciousness will only be concerned with immediate working conditions, not with abolishing the subjection of labor to capital.

Lenin, from a materialist standpoint, argues that scientific (socialist) consciousness, i.e., the cognitive grasp of concrete reality in all of its many determinate and interrelated complexities, is a necessary instrument in the resolution of the social contradiction between capital and labor. The need to transform the objective (material) conditions of the proletariat, for Lenin and Marx, is closely tied to transforming the consciousness of workers from a class-in-itself to a class-for-itself, from trade unionist consciousness (economism) to revolutionary socialist consciousness. Lenin argues, that when the spontaneous working-class movement is mediated by the vanguard party, the possibility exists for the transformation of the proletariat from a class-in-itself to a class-for-itself.

Although Marxism as a scientific analysis and critique of capitalism arose independently of the spontaneous working-class movement, it provides the ground for the revolutionary transformation of society, viz. capitalism, in the interest of working-class people. Given this fact, Lenin explains, the proletarian movement must be won over to Marxism not only through their own political and economic struggles, but also through the conscious intervention of socialist intellectuals and organizers. The task of raising the class-consciousness of the working class is the responsibility of the vanguard party. According to Lenin, the proletariat party as a tightly structured organization yields to democratic centralism and acts as the advanced detachment (or vanguard) of the working-class whose principal aim is to bring socialist theory (Marxism) to bear on the class struggle. The vanguard party is necessary for a socialist revolution. In Lenin’s view, the eradication of class exploitation is the sole condition for the elimination of the vanguard party. As we shall see, James has much to say against this last point.

What are the political implications of Jamesian spontaneity with respect to Marxist political organizations such as Lenin’s theory of the vanguard party? James argues that political leadership and organizations such as Lenin’s vanguard party are an obstacle to the freedom of the proletariat. James saw the vanguard party as hampering the revolutionary impulse of the proletariat. As James comments on Lenin’s theory of the vanguard party, it ‘led to the conclusion that the organization was the true subject; that is to say, the motivating force of history. And if the organization was the subject of history, the proletariat was the object … This conception of the organization is inherent in the extreme views that Lenin expounded in What Is To Be Done?’

James argues that Lenin’s theory of the vanguard party is no longer applicable to the international working-class struggle. His argument is historicist in form and relativist in content. By historicist, I mean that for James all ideas, theories and ideologies are subject to historical contingencies, revision and modification. The essentials of James’ argument can be restated as follows:

1. Philosophical cognition (consciousness) is identical to political practice (material reality).
2. Material reality is in constant motion, change and development.
3. If consciousness corresponds to material reality, then the flux of history subjects all forms of social consciousness such as ideas, theories and ideologies to change and revision.
4. Not only is social consciousness subject to change and revision, but is relative to specific conditions, time, place and historical contingencies.
5. Therefore, ideologies, theories and ideas are not objective nor universally significant.
6. Lenin’s theory of the vanguard party is specific to Russian conditions.
7. Hence, there is no objective basis nor universal significance for Lenin’s theory of the vanguard party.

While James’ argument places emphasis on the dialectical nature of cognition, he rejects any notion of an objective basis or universal significance for any theory, ideas or ideology. What becomes problematic is that James’ accent on the relative nature of history and quite puzzling denial of the objective basis for theories, ideas and ideologies leads him into the murky waters of a relativism which is grounded in subjectivism.

James’ argument against the vanguard party also commits a genetic fallacy, i.e., conflates the sociology of knowledge with epistemology. The conflation of the sociology of knowledge with epistemology results from the identification of the genesis of a given idea with its validity and veracity. Because the vanguard party originates from outside the spontaneous proletariat movement, James concludes that the vanguard party does not constitute a valid form of proletariat organization. However, James fails to understand that the validity and justification for Lenin’s theory of the vanguard party rests not in its origins, that is Russia, but rather in the material conditions which give rise to the wretched conditions of the proletariat, namely, class struggle. Only in examining the material context for Lenin’s formulation of the vanguard party can we determine its objective need or lack of need for the present. As Lenin astutely explains,

We have said there could have not been Social-Democratic consciousness among the workers. It would have to be brought to them from without. The history of all countries [emphasis added, SCF] shows that the working class, exclusively by its own efforts, is able to develop only trade union consciousness … The theory of socialism, however, grew out of the philosophic, historical and economic theories elaborated by educated representatives of the properties classes, by intellectuals. By their social status, the founders of modern scientific socialism, Marx and Engels, themselves belonged to the bourgeois intellectuals.31

From Lenin’s standpoint, the eradication of class exploitation is the necessary condition for the elimination of the vanguard party. As in the above quotation states, Lenin did not see his proposition as limited to Russia. James failed to grasp the point that economism and the problems associated with bowing to spontaneity extends beyond particular national boundaries.

The dialectical character of the historical process becomes, for James, a sufficient grounds for the rejection of Lenin’s theory of the vanguard party. According to James, the notion of the vanguard party was historically valid for Russia because the circumstances of autocracy demanded it. He fervently exclaims:
The specific organizational theory of Leninism, the theory of the Vanguard Party... was a particular theory, designed to suit a specific stage of development of society and a specific stage of working class development. That state of society is now past. The theory, and the practice that went with it, are now an anachronism, and if persisted in, lead to one form or another of the counter-revolution.

The first thing we must do is purge ourselves of it. 32

According to James, only an organization based on spontaneity, that is, the proletariat’s ability to organize independently of the socialist intelligentsia, can advance the proletarian class struggle. As Anthony Bogus explains, James envisioned this kind of organization as fundamentally different from the Leninist vanguard party because “he redefined proletarian organisation as those created by the mass self-activity of the proletariat at specific historical moments. All this was as a result of the central theme of James’s political project—comprehending the modalities of the self-emancipation of the working class.” 33 The accent on spontaneity, for James, is an attempt to “leap” from what he sees as the constraints of political leadership and, more importantly, the vanguard party as formulated by Lenin. The only obstacle holding back the proletariat in its struggle for socialism, as James presents it, is not capitalism but the vanguard party.

As I explained earlier, Lenin saw the proletariat party as a tightly structured organization which operates under the principle of democratic centralism. In addition to functioning as the advanced detachment (or vanguard) of the working-class, the vanguard party functions to bring socialist theory (Marxism) to bear on the class struggle. The vanguard party has the responsibility of raising the class-consciousness of the working class from a spontaneous apprehension to a scientific vision. The proletariat will find its method of proletarian organization. The task today is to call for, to teach, to illustrate, to develop spontaneity — the free creative activity of the proletariat.

Lenin continues:

The proletariat will find its method of proletarian organization. And, contradiction par excellence, at this stage the vanguard can only organize itself on the basis of the destruction of the stranglehold that the existing organizations have on the proletariat by means of which it is suffering such ghastly defeats. 34

Ultimately, a revolutionary organization, from James’s standpoint, must follow the workers in order to be able to lead, that is, to bow to spontaneity. At its core, James’s concept of spontaneity sees the vanguard party as a party of intellectuals alienated from the proletarian movement, that is, an external influence. The vanguard party is an external influence because it originates from outside the proletarian movement and consists of people outside the proletarian class. James argues that it is wrong to think that “there must be a body of sharply differentiated individuals who must separate themselves from the working class and so form a permanent organization which is more conscious, more militant, more coherent in its actions than the great mass of the workers. This is pure and simple delirium.” 35 The basic day-to-day perceptions embodied in working-class life experiences, for James, is enough for workers to understand that they are exploited by capital. The misery produced by capitalist exploitation arouses their revolutionary instincts and propels them to rebel against their subjugation to capital. The revolutionary instincts of the proletariat rather than the vanguard party are the living soul of the proletarian movement. Only the revolutionary instinct of the proletariat, the self-movement of the proletariat can advance the struggle for socialism. James argued that because of the bureaucratic nature of the vanguard party, the leaders are far less radical in terms of basic revolutionary perceptions and insights than the masses of workers. Therefore, James concludes that the vanguard party and socialist intellectuals associated with it impede the “free creative activity of the proletariat.”

By emphasizing spontaneity as the main (internal) contradiction which gives rise to the self-emancipation of the proletariat, James consequently throws what would be considered by Marx as essential, objective factors (e.g., the contradiction between socialized production and private appropriation and political organization) to the wind. James’s philosophical analysis in Notes fails to account for the material basis for class antagonism and exploitation. However, the primary contradiction within the capitalist mode of production for Marx is the contradiction between private appropriation (by the bourgeoisie) and social production (by the proletariat). This is the material basis for the social conflict between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie which is manifested in the class struggle. This contradiction, from Marx’s perspective, is the starting-point for social revolution, and, thus, freedom. Marx’s approach to the question of motive forces in the historical process does not render the subject of history and the agent of social transformation as insignificant. Subjective activity, although necessary, is seen as contingent on concrete objective conditions. While Marx did not dismiss the necessity of proletariat activity for the abolition of capitalism, it is by no means sufficient. To ascertain the driving causes for political struggles which result in great historical transformation, Engels astutely states:

depends not upon [one’s] will but upon the degree of antagonism between the various classes, and upon the level of development of the material means of existence, of the conditions of production and commerce upon which class contradictions always repose. 36

Engels continues:

Men make their history themselves, but not as yet with a collective will according to a collective plan or even in a definite, delimited given society. Their aspirations clash, and for that very reason all such societies are governed by necessity, the complement and form of appearance which is accident. The necessity which here asserts itself aghast all accident is again ultimately economic necessity. 37

The reliance on subjective activity without consideration for material (objective) conditions leads James to adopt voluntarism.

Here James departs from the materialist path of Marx, Engels and Lenin. In contrast to the materialist view of social change and political struggle, James posits the subject (in the form of the proletariat) as the only determinate which creates the possibility for historical change and social development.
The revolutionary struggle for socialism is seen as dependent exclusively on the self-movement of the proletariat. As James states, paraphrasing Hegel, everything depends on grasping the truth not as Substance, but as Subject as well. In other words, for James and Hegel, the activity of the subject was emphasized, and seen as giving rise to material reality (substance). In political terms, for James, this position amounts to the assertion that the spontaneous activity of the proletariat by way of spontaneous rebellions and periodic revolutionary upsurges, apart from objective (material) conditions, political organization and leadership, is the basis for their freedom. For James, spontaneity (mass agency) is divorced from material (structural) factors and constraints. James’s philosophical analysis leads in the direction of dismissing the sum-total of social relations and internally contradictory tendencies which give rise to spontaneous activity on the part of the proletariat. Marx and Lenin, contrary to James’s perspective, argued that spontaneous rebellions and upsurges must be seen as expressions of the internal (antagonistic) contradictions of the capitalist mode of production. These contradictions are to be located in the tendency of the prevailing social relations of production to become letters on the further expansion of the productive forces and in the class struggle which develops, within the framework of this conflict, between exploiters and exploited. The contradictions between the forces and relations of production and between classes are the driving forces of social transformation. As we found in Marx and Lenin, the freedom to act (agency) in a scientific (objective) manner comes in the recognition of the material basis for capitalist exploitation. The notion of absolute spontaneity which we find in James is an idealist view that freedom stands in abstraction from objective necessity.

For Marx and Lenin, then, the proletariat cannot be looked at independent of the material conditions which gave rise to their existence, that is, the capitalist production process. By seeing freedom only in terms of spontaneity (or self-activity), James as a Marxist philosopher fails to capture how freedom is limited or determined by material forces such as social relations of production and bourgeois ideological hegemony. By not situating the question of agency, practice and subjective activity in the realm of objective, material conditions, what we get, from James, is ultimately voluntarism. The stumbling block for James is the dismissal of the material contradiction which gave rise to spontaneous rebellions and upsurges. What James’ failure rests in is an inability to apprehend the dialectical unity of immediacy and mediation. Spontaneous rebellions are mediated by, grounded in, objective, antagonistic social relations. Although spontaneous rebellions immediately appear as spontaneously generated, the appearance of spontaneous moments are an essential reflection of objective material conditions, for example, racism, national oppression and capitalist exploitation.

While James’s analysis appears valid, it is ultimately implausible. From the standpoint of Marxism-Leninism, James is wrong to see spontaneity as a necessary and sufficient condition for the eradication of capitalist exploitation. To exclude those things such as Lenin’s vanguard party on the grounds that they do not directly arise from the immediate experiences of the working-class is problematic. Is Marxist theory not helpful since it did not immediately or directly arise out of the spontaneous proletarian movement?

As Lenin astutely observed, Marxism did not spontaneously originate from the working class movement. Rather its beginnings rest in the theoretical work of petit bourgeois intellectuals such as Marx and Engels. The separation of socialist theory from the working class struggle finds its material basis in the division between mental and manual labor. The separation between mental and manual labor is a phenomenon which coincides with the division of society in classes. With the development from slavery to feudalism to capitalism, the production of ideas broke away from the productive process, resulting in the relative independence of theoretical knowledge from material practice. In this manner, the division of labor in production gives rise to the view that ideas, thoughts and theoretical knowledge have an independent existence, independent of material practice. That is to say, the division between intellectual and manual labor has fostered the idealist semblance that ideas and intellectual activity are self-propelled entities which are unrelated to material, objective conditions — a view James implicitly accepts. The apparent divorce of theoretical practice from material practice, from the standpoint of Marxism-Leninism, necessitates that revolutionary theory (Marxism) be brought from the outside to the day-to-day struggle of the working masses. As Lenin aptly stated, "Without revolutionary theory there can be no revolutionary movement." If we accept James’s position, however, Marxist (socialist) theory itself could only be a hindrance to the proletarian movement, to the “free creative activity of the proletariat.” This results because Marxist (socialist) theory does not originate in the proletarian movement, but is rather a theoretical reflection on the proletarian movement and of the objective interests of the proletariat.

Recall from above that Lenin argued that without scientific theory, that is, Marxism, the proletariat would only be focused on its immediate interests. To focus on the immediate interests of the proletariat, for Lenin, amounted to economism. From Lenin’s standpoint, James’ philosophical notion of spontaneity and the call for the liquidation of the vanguard party in its political implications represents a form of economism. Why? Because James would have the proletariat in its struggle against the dictatorship of capital depend exclusively on its immediate, day-to-day perceptions rather than bring anything external to the proletarian movement such as theory or organizational structures. According to Lenin, economism argues that the proletariat does not need political ideology or the conscious intervention of socialist intellectuals or organizers in order to become conscious of the possibility and necessity for socialism. Although economism is traditionally seen as reformism and reducing the proletarian struggle to only an economic struggle, i.e., economic reductionism, Lenin observes, economism represents the failure to understand the political and ideological limitations of the proletarian movement, that is to say, the importance of Marxist (socialist) theory. Understood in this sense, James is guilty of economism. By “bowing to spontaneity,” James fails to recognize the distinction between spontaneous and scientific consciousness. The spontaneous consciousness of the proletariat in general is limited to the immediate apprehension of reality. Consequently, the spontaneous consciousness of the proletariat is reflected in the following political practices: fighting against hazardous working conditions in addition to struggling for the reduction of working hours, for wage increases, for social security and so on. The political struggle of the proletariat is greatly enriched and advances beyond reformism with Marxist theory as a guide to action. Scientific consciousness, therefore, advances the necessity for the eradication of capitalism and the fight for socialism.

James wants to uphold the view that the spontaneous consciousness of the proletariat which finds its expression in spontaneous rebellions and upsurges is sufficient for revolutionary proletarian consciousness, i.e., that it offers a
critical comprehension of capitalist political economy. James, however, does not take into account the division of labor between mental and manual labor and the role it plays in class struggle. As Joseph Dietzgen, a materialist philosopher of working-class origins, argues:

Manual laborers do not sufficiently appreciate the real value of mental labor. Their healthy distrust of the leading scribblers of bourgeois society leads them too far. They see how much goes on under the cloak of intellectual work and are therefore inclined to undervalue mental labor. The emancipation of the working classes requires that they should hold on the science of the century.39

As Dietzgen points out, the division between intellectual and manual labor gives rise to the discounting the importance of theory to the working-class struggle by the proletariat. From the standpoint of Marx and Lenin, theory is seen as a necessary (intellectual) instrument in the process of transforming the consciousness of workers from a class-in-itself to a class-for-itself, from trade unionist consciousness (economism) to revolutionary socialist consciousness. Spontaneous (social) consciousness which arises from our immediate experiences is not sufficient for a theory (of knowledge), i.e., a theoretical analysis of reality. Only when the proletariat acquires a scientific understanding of the material conditions which give rise to their exploitation and recognize its objective class interest will the proletariat cease to be a class-in-itself and become a class-for-itself.

Conclusion

C.L.R. James is generally acknowledged as one of the most original and significant — if not creative — Marxist thinkers in the twentieth century. In the same tradition of Georg Lukacs, Herbert Marcuse and others, C.L.R. James broke new ground for the appreciation of the place of Hegel as a theoretical source of Marxism. I am in agreement with Grace Lee Boggs who noted that James' significance rests in his “celebration of spontaneous rebellion and [his] insistence that the main role of socialist revolutionaries is to recognize and record the rebellions of ordinary working people.”40 As I have demonstrated, James' philosophical notion of spontaneity and its attendant political thesis — the liquidation of the vanguard party — is an essential aspect of his political philosophy.

James' enthusiastic embracing of spontaneity is premised on the mistaken assumption that the materialist dialectic of Marx, Engels and Lenin corresponds to Hegel's dialectical logic. In applying his philosophical theses to the proletarian movement, James isolates spontaneous rebellions and upsurges from what Marx considered as the fundamental contradictions of capitalism, that is, the opposition between the productive forces and the relations of production. In effect, James identifies spontaneous activity and change as necessary and sufficient for the fundamental, qualitative change of capitalism. While spontaneity in terms of the spontaneous working-class movement and spontaneous rebellions is a significant (subjective) determinant of social revolution, it must be seen as grounded in (and, hence, dependent on) the material contradictions of capitalism, i.e., social production and private appropriation. James' notion of spontaneity is abstracted from material (social) relations.

Despite his best efforts, James' attempt to bring Hegel's dialectical logic to bear on the nitty gritty "concreteness" of proletarian politics failed to offer a political analysis grounded in dialectical materialism. In the end, James' political philosophy consists of two contradictory aspects, and this contradiction gives rise to a nagging tension in his political analysis. On the one hand, James upholds a idealist philosophical method, that is, Hegel's dialectical method. On the other hand, James' conception of freedom is incompatibilist. This internal inconsistency is not consistent with classical Marxism as formulated by Marx, Engels and Lenin. Consequently, James' Notes stands as the negation of his aim — a new political philosophy and practice anchored in the materialist dialectic of Marx, Engels and Lenin.

Endnotes


5. C.L.R. James, Notes, 95-96.

6. Ibid., 117-118.

7. C.L.R. James, Facing Reality, 90.

8. C.L.R. James, Notes, 9.


11. Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, 479.


15. Immanuel Kant, Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals, 108.

16. Ibid., 114.


Philosophy Born of Struggle Conference Series 1993-2003

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During the fall of 1993, I decided to bring some African American Philosophers to the Campus of Rockland Community College to expose students and faculty to what was then a rarity in the neighborhood. My first choice was Roy D. Morrison, III, then Professor of Black Philosophy of Culture and Scientific Method at Wesley Theological Seminary. Morrison is without doubt one of the greatest analytical minds of the twentieth century. At the end of 1993, I decided to add two more philosophers to the roster. Professors Leonard Harris and Frank Kirkland were included as part of our Black History Month Celebration.

Unfortunately, because of financial constraints, Leonard Harris could not be brought on campus. Morrison, who was very ill with cancer, could not board the plane, so only Frank Kirkland attended. I introduced the topic “The Search for Alternatives: African-American Perspectives on The Human Situation” on Thursday, February 17, 1994 at 12:30 PM.

The questions I asked Frank to address were: Are there philosophical models that can lead to the transformation of African peoples? Can these models be extrapolated from traditional African belief systems or from the mythologies of the west?

Both of us spent two hours discussing these questions. The discussion generated great interest on campus so that my decision to have a full day conference was greeted with much enthusiasm. With financial support from the school and permission from Leonard Harris to use the title of his book “Philosophy Born of Struggle,” the Series was born and the first one was held on October 21, 1994. Many teachers took groups of students and the proceedings became an extended classroom with very positive results. The most remarkable event at the first conference was the presentation by the late Shanara Gilbert, Professor of Law at Queens College CUNY. Her address “Owning the Self in a Disowned World” was intellectually exhilarating and emotionally wrenching. Her tragic death in South Africa less than two years later added a new dimension to her presentation.

With full participation from the college community, the second conference was even more successful, with more than two hundred college and high school students in attendance. There was also a large contingent of women philosophers present, primarily attracted by the presentations of Patricia Williams, Dorothy Roberts and Peggy Davis.

The third conference, which highlighted the philosophy of Alain Leroy Locke under the title “The Harlem Renaissance and the Black Enlightenment,” drew a national audience. It became evident that to sustain both national and international interest we would have to find a more central location. Consequently, I wrote to the provost at the New School and to Richard Bernstein who was then chair of the graduate Faculty, requesting their support. Both generously consented to host the next conference. As a result the Fourth Philosophy Born of Struggle Conference entitled “The Black Enlightenment and The Future of the Race,” was held at the University’s Swaydudt Auditorium on October 17 & 18, 1997 with unparalleled success. In an attempt to address issues of both national and international concern, the fifth conference theme was “The Family and the Intellectual Life,” and the sixth “Civil Liberties in the New Millennium.” The conference of 2000 assembled...
academics, community activists, educators and civic organizations to reflect on slavery and Reparations. The 2001 conference (Race, Reparations and Restoration) was moved to Brown University by the kind invitation of Lewis Gordon, Chair of Africana Studies. We are particularly grateful to the President of Brown, Ruth Simmons, for being so generous with her time during this conference. The next conference on Race and the United States Constitution was also held at Brown University under the sponsorship of the Africana Studies Department and, once again, Lewis was unsparing in ensuring that the event was successful in every possible way.

I would like to express profound gratitude to colleagues, friends and organizations that have supported this effort over the years, especially members of the “Society for the Study of Africana Philosophy.” Special recognition must be given to Leonard Harris for his support in the realization of this project.

We have now reached an important juncture in the life of the conference in that we will be celebrating our 10th Anniversary in 2003 and will use this opportunity not only to review our activities of the past ten years, but what is more important, to reflect on what is involved in being an intellectual engaged in struggle within and without academe. Consequently we will examine the Black intellectual tradition from which a Philosophy Born of Struggle has emerged and explore ways in which resistance is and can be operational in the contemporary world.

Thanks to Anna Stubblefield and her colleagues at Rutgers University for hosting the Tenth Anniversary Celebration. This event will take place at Rutgers, Newark Campus on October 24 & 25, 2003. Please join us in our exploration of the resistance tradition. For more information see: http://www.ocf.berkeley.edu/~marto/pbs/10thconf.htm.

BOOK REVIEWS


Floyd W. Hayes, III
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In the last ten years, Cornel West has become a major presence on the public intellectual stage. His brilliance and ability in articulating the complex lived experience of Black people in America—their despair and their joy—make him one of the most influential scholars, teachers, and activists of our time. West’s classroom lectures, public speeches, and television interviews always are occasions when he challenges his audience to think critically about some of the most burning and perplexing issues characterizing the human condition today. West is not a cloistered philosopher, satisfied merely with producing ideas and writing books that only are consumed by monastic academic elites or that gather dust on library shelves. Rather, he has renewed and reinvigorated the ancient discipline of philosophy and taken it beyond the confining walls of the university—to the people. Indeed, he has placed philosophy in the service of political change and social justice.

The book reviewed here makes a significant contribution to the systematic examination of the broad body of Cornel West’s philosophical work. Clarence Shole Johnson, Professor of Philosophy at Middle Tennessee State University, has produced a fascinating and learned exploration into the main ingredients of West’s theoretical framework—existentialism, Black prophetic Christianity, Marxism, and pragmatism—that focuses on social justice as the philosopher’s central theme. Significantly, Cornet West & Philosophy is the first investigation of West’s scholarship that centers solely on the issue of social justice. An early and decisive encounter with Kierkegaard’s philosophy of existence later provided West with the language and perspective to characterize the existential dread and despair of being a Black American in the United States. Relatedly, it was the Black church that also laid the groundwork for West’s intellectual development and for his desire to understand the meaning of Black suffering. For West, to know is to act. West’s concern to speak and act on behalf of those silenced masses of dispossessed Blacks and other oppressed people exemplifies his pursuit of social justice, which is in the main energized by West’s synthesis and reconfiguration of John Dewey’s pragmatism. Through the integration of Christian theology, pragmatism, and Marxism, West constructed what he has referred to as prophetic pragmatism. Finally, West’s analysis of the exploitative political economy of capitalism has been shaped by the Marxian philosophical outlook, which he employs to advance the cause of social justice.

In the first chapter, “Pragmatism and Existentialism,” Johnson investigates West’s reworking of the synthesis of pragmatism and existentialism. He points out that for West the Dewey-inspired tradition of philosophical pragmatism is a form of instrumental thinking in which knowledge is employed for the purpose of cultural criticism and social change. Johnson notes that in West’s view, Dewey’s dynamic conception of pragmatism addressed the socioeconomic crises of his time, and Dewey himself allied with influential middle-class humanitarian organizations that sought to Americanize the dispossessed immigrant groups. It appears, of course, that Dewey engaged in social activism or social reform only to the extent that it did not actually threaten his professional career.

Johnson then probes the character of West’s prophetic pragmatism. He locates West squarely in the Deweyan tradition of employing philosophy in order to handle concrete social problems that ordinary people face everyday. Moreover, because of West’s emphasis on the Christian ethic of love, Johnson declares unequivocally that West’s pragmatism is “prophetic.” Johnson then moves to a well-reasoned and penetrating interrogation of West’s well-known and much discussed thesis on Black nihilism in America. He probes West’s application of existentialist pragmatism, that is to say prophetic pragmatism, in analyzing the causes, consequences, and solutions to this nihilist threat. West argues that the contemporary nihilist threat derives from the breakdown of traditional social institutions in Black communities and the concomitant growth of hopelessness, lovelessness, and meaninglessness among the Black urban dispossessed. West also argues that Black nihilism results from the absence of effective Black political and intellectual leadership. Therefore, unwanted and leaderless, members of the so-called urban underclass become morally degenerate and engage in antisocial behavior, according to West. According to West, neither race-effacing (so-called deracialized) leaders nor race-identifying (Black nationalist) leaders are up to the task of pushing back the nihilist threat. To overcome this existential crisis, West calls for the emergence of Black leaders who are race-transcending and prophetic, leaders who embrace the Christian love ethic—perhaps as he perceives himself to do. In West’s view, this is the kind of leadership that would build
coalitions with various racial groups, in particular liberal or progressive whites.

Johnson provides a thought-provoking critique of West’s argument for coalition politics. Johnson correctly asserts that the most effective coalitions require equal partners. However, because of vast socioeconomic differences, Blacks would be subordinate and less powerful coalition members. Hence, Johnson argues persuasively that such power imbalance in coalition politics would render this kind of organizational dynamic ineffective in dismantling the economic sources of nihilism among Black urban dispossessed populations. Johnson’s critique of coalition politics is significant in view of the re-emergence of white conservative and virulent white supremacy in the Reagan regime of the 1980s. A concomitant decline of progressive and liberal whites since that time has made the idea of coalition politics even less likely to succeed in the current historical moment. Additionally, Johnson argues, as West has asserted, that the Black nihilist problem is distinct from socioeconomic difficulties that confront “underclass” populations in general. In Johnson’s view, this is another reason why coalition politics might very well prove ineffective. Finally, because Black socioeconomic development and political advancement historically have been dependent upon governmental goodwill, Johnson takes West to task for failing to suggest that middle-class Blacks need to become more economically entrepreneurial and politically independent as a strategy for destroying the economic roots of Black nihilism.

In the second chapter, “Humanistic Scholarship and Praxis,” Johnson examines Cornel West’s transdisciplinary intellectual engagements in his effort to fashion himself as a humanistic scholar. For Johnson, humanism is a philosophical position that lays stress on the importance of individual human life and human worth as an end. The humanistic scholar, then, is an intellectual who is concerned about and promotes issues related to social justice. The humanist is one who lives by the ethics of justice and, therefore, challenges social institutions that engage in tyranny, alienation, dehumanization, and terrorism.

In order to examine West’s brand of humanism, Johnson probes the philosopher’s essay, “The New Cultural Politics of Difference.” He finds that West brings to bear his prophetic pragmatism in a critique of the manner in which dominant capitalist institutions wield power that results in social injustice. As Johnson shows, West’s prophetic pragmatism also contains a positive worldview that offers hope and optimism in the face of the Black existential crisis of despair and meaninglessness.

A central theme of “The New Cultural Politics of Difference” is that cultural critics emerge to critique the social difficulties of their time. For West, the most important crisis of contemporary society is what he calls “the misrepresentation and marginalization of the Other by powerful social institutions.” In a “white supremacist capitalist patriarchy,” to use bell hooks’ term (see 1994) for the interlocking structures of domination in America, unwanted individuals and groups can find themselves oppressed and excluded from the power, profits, privileges, and pleasures that white, wealthy, and straight men enjoy. For West, this is the new cultural politics of difference that should challenge and dismantle these new forms of cultural domination. West argues that in their effort to universalize, homogenize, or essentialize Black humanity, post-World War II Black cultural critics betrayed Black people by accepting prevailing white norms in their defense of Black humanity. To Johnson, West is unfair and wrong-headed. In the face of powerful white denial of Black humanity, early Black critics, Johnson asserts, were confronted with having to defend the reality that Black people were members of the human species, as such. Indeed, these early Black cultural critics were confronted with powerful and systematic white strategies designed literally to undermine Black self-esteem, ability, and potential. Early Black cultural critics fought to be psychologically free of their white oppressors. For Johnson, West’s condemnation of early Black cultural critics misses this point completely.

Additionally, West argues that Black intellectuals and their activities are largely useless to Black communities. According to West, this is due to Black integration into contemporary postindustrial white universities and the absence of creative imagination among Black scholars. Johnson counters that if Black intellectuals are irrelevant to Black communities, this is due not to the failure of Black intellectuals, but to the absence of institutional arrangements and organizational leadership needed to develop and maintain the intellectual enterprise in Black communities.

In Chapter 3, “Black Prophetic Christianity and Marxist Social Thought,” Johnson focuses on the subject of social justice and West’s thesis that liberation of Blacks and other people of color from socioeconomic oppression can only occur through a synthesis of Black prophetic Christianity and Marxist social theory. As Johnson points out, the chief objective of Black American critical thought has been to set forth the tragic sense of Black life in America and what can be done to liberate Black people from this existential absurdity. In order to accomplish this, West proposes that Black critical thought needs the assistance of the Black church and American pragmatism. For West, the Black church and its leaders have given meaning and expression to Black suffering and despair while also providing penetrating critiques of the systematic political and economic oppression of Black people. Relatedly, West asserts that the Black demand for social justice has rested on the principles of an existentialist pragmatism that has emphasized human agency, existential freedom, and democratic norms. Hence, prophetic Christianity contains within its pantheon of principles the lived reality of despair, the struggle for liberation, and the spirit of hope. A third component of West’s liberation theology is refashioned progressive Marxist thought that emphasizes the collective ownership of the means of societal production and a counter-hegemonic battle with capitalism.

In a thoroughgoing analysis and powerful critique of West’s liberation theology, Johnson argues persuasively that white supremacy and anti-Black racism constitute the most malignant forms of oppression. Still caught within the crucible of modernist intellectual thought, West asks whether race or class determine the social oppression. Johnson says that although West knows how poisonous anti-Black racism is, the philosopher answers that class rules. In opposition to what he calls West’s crypto-Marxist or proto-Marxist thought, Johnson argues that in America white supremacy and anti-Black racism trump class. Concomitantly, Johnson criticizes West’s assertion that counter-hegemonic activities cannot be achieved successfully under American capitalism. Invoking DuBois and other Marxist critics, Johnson argues that Black and other oppressed people should struggle for social justice within a reformed capitalist system.

Although I am not sure what a reformed capitalist system would entail, it can be argued that at least since the early 1960s, America has moved beyond the old capitalist economy of money and manufacturing as the sole sources of power. What has been taking place for several decades is a rising postindustrial-managerial network of economic and political power based upon knowledge, high technology, and the management of people. This developing American Leviathan,
with its highly militarized urban police forces and growing prison-garrison state institutional arrangements, especially now that the ruling Bush regime is dragging America into a tragic war against the Muslim East, may very well make discussions about the reform of capitalism obsolete.

Chapter 4, “Black-Jewish Conflict and Dialogue,” takes up West’s assessment of the problem of Black anti-Semitism and Jewish anti-Black racism that is based largely upon a debate between West and the liberal Jewish intellectual Michael Lerner. West seems to argue that the cause of the rift between Blacks and Jews in America springs from mutual misperception of each other. According to West, Blacks fail to recognize the historic struggle for Jewish group survival—from ancient times to the present. Rather, says West, Blacks hold to conventional myths about Jews—as Christ-killers, callous, selfish, and greedy. West says that Blacks overlook the impact of the European expulsion of Jews on the latter group’s concern about self-help and collective survival. What underlies Black anti-Semitism, according to West, is that Blacks view Jews as white; they envy and resent Jewish political and economic power; and they think that Jewish moral indifference to Black suffering represents Jewish selfishness. Alternatively, Lerner laments that because Blacks did not appreciate Jewish involvement in the Civil Rights movement, Jewish anti-Black racism emerged. Moreover, he states that Jews hold the same racist perceptions of Black people as other whites. Johnson notes that West does not offer a clear assessment of Jewish misperceptions of Blacks comparable to his discussion of Black anti-Semitism, or even comparable to Lerner’s honesty. West rejects as myth the view that Jews have well-financed and powerful organizations that plot to dominate and control powerful American institutions. This when the power of the Jewish lobby is well documented (for example, see Finley 1985; O’Brien 1986; Tivnan 1987). Although Johnson does not do so, one could make the argument that West seems very close to being an apologist for the Jews regarding their serious breach with Blacks.

In an effort to heal the wound between Blacks and Jews, West calls for dialogue among progressive sectors of their leadership. In an effective discussion of dialogue as a transformative agent, Johnson concludes that West’s proposed solution to the Black-Jewish impasse is doomed to failure. Mere dialogue will not overcome this serious rift. Johnson launches a severe critique of West’s proposed solution. Johnson questions the selection criteria for “progressive” leaders on both sides. Even if such “progressive” leaders could be selected, reasons Johnson, there would scarcely be any disagreement among them. Finally, Johnson criticizes West “proto-Marxian” (actually Leninist) vanguard conception of the progressive leadership as elitist. To be sure, Johnson sees no democratic principle of accountability associated with this vanguard leadership conception. In short, Johnson holds that there is no authentic transformative value in West’s call for dialogue. After all, Johnson asserts, Jewish anti-Black racism is a byproduct of white supremacy.

In a way, the fifth chapter, “Affirmative Action and Proto-Marxism,” is a continuation of Chapter 4, because the early assault on affirmative action policies and programs came with liberal Jewish sociologist Nathan Glazer’s mischievously entitled book, Affirmative Discrimination (1975). Initiating the Jewish onslaught on affirmative action, Glazer’s ideas came to represent the dominant white characterization of and argument against affirmative action as quotas, preferences, or set-aside programs for undeserving Blacks. Unfortunately, Johnson does not mention this pivotal or antecedent event in his otherwise superb critique of West’s distorted conception of affirmative action and his class-based solution to anti-Black racist discrimination. Invoking a DuBoisian socio-psychological framework, Johnson argues that the lived reality of Black Americans is unique. For DuBois, white supremacy and anti-Black racism transformed Blacks not into a people with problems, but into a problem people. From the beginning of America, whites enjoyed the power, profits, privileges, and pleasures derived from their dehumanization and exploitation of captured Africans and their American descendants. Johnson refers to Thomas Jefferson’s white supremacist commentary about the supposed ontological differences between Blacks and whites, which he used to legitimize social institutions that systematically dehumanized Black people, denying them socioeconomic advancement and political self-determination. Johnson argues that affirmative action policies represent white American society’s recognition of its absolute denial of all opportunities to Black people. Johnson makes a similar argument with respect to the oppression of women, pointing out, as Black feminists have asserted, that Black women have experienced both racist and sexism oppression.

To West’s call for affirmative action based upon social class as the solution to racism and sexism, Johnson argues that the unique existential experiences of Blacks and women demand not class-based policies, but policies that address the unique and specific oppression of Blacks and women. Johnson does acknowledge that current affirmative action policies largely have benefited a rising Black middle class. What has become clear over the last several decades is the growing socioeconomic gap between the Black professional-managerial elites and the so-called permanent Black urban underclass (for a critique of this term, see Reed [1999]) in America’s evolving postindustrial-managerial society. Johnson argues that it is precisely due to their race that the so-called Black underclass has been denied educational and economic opportunities necessary for living productively in the new social order. Hence, Johnson defends race- and gender-based affirmative action policies in order to achieve social justice in America’s white supremacist, patriarchal society.

In Chapter 6, “Modernity, Philosophy, and Race(ism),” Johnson interrogates the anti-Black racist philosophical anthropology of modern Western Europe’s eighteenth-century Enlightenment thinkers. This subject is significant, Johnson remarks, because West’s commentary on the humanistic ethics of social justice is a rejoinder to the theory and practice of white supremacy and anti-Black racism that have their origin in the Age of Reason and philosophical discussions of race, racism, and personhood. Major modern Western European philosophers and their discourse are fundamental to Cornel West’s own philosophical project. Johnson points out, however, that West fails to provide an incisive analysis of the manner in which such Enlightenment philosophers as John Locke, David Hume, Immanuel Kant, and Georg Wilhelm Frederich Hegel fashioned the content and contours of modern white supremacist thinking and conduct. Hence, Johnson’s intent is to expand West’s consideration of modernity by examining how a few important Enlightenment philosophers discussed the question of race and the related oppression of nonwhite people.

In their quest for certain knowledge, Enlightenment philosophers argued that reason or rationality was paramount. Johnson asserts that the ideology of raciology emerged during the Age of Enlightenment as the systematic examination, characterization, and categorization of European man. Although its practitioners considered it a science, Johnson asserts that raciology actually was an ideology because its practitioners made value and aesthetic judgment about the
supposed correlation between physical characteristics of people and their psychological makeup. Moreover, as distinctions became apparent between Europeans and non-Europeans, raciology gave way to white supremacy. In this regard, Johnson interrogaes the philosophical anthropology of Locke, Hume, Kant, and Hegel. He demonstrates clearly that Locke characterized Africans as subpersons, and that Hume, Kant, and Hegel represented Africans as inferior to the whites of Western Europe. Declaring that Africans and other nonwhites lacked rational self-consciousness, Enlightenment philosophers arrogantly denied Africans the moral status of being human; they represented Africans as a different species. In the view of these Enlightenment thinkers, Africans and other people of color were savages who could not live in civil societies. Because Africans and other people of color were not subject to the rules of civil society, Europeans brutalized and dehumanized them. Hence, Locke and other Enlightenment philosophers consented to the vicious trade in and enslavement of captured African flesh. In the final analysis, the Age of Enlightenment witnessed the hegemony of white supremacy and anti-Black racism in theory and practice.

Johnson’s interrogation of this historical moment is important because we continue to live in the twilight of the Enlightenment, the discourse of which remains central to West’s philosophical project of social justice. Indeed, it is against the edifice of white supremacy and anti-Black racism, whose existence can be traced back to the legacy of raciology, that Cornel West himself uses philosophy as a weapon of struggle.

Johnson ends his fascinating book with a postscript, entitled “West, Public Intellectualism, and the Harvard Controversy.” It examines the conflict between West and Harvard University President Lawrence Summers that emerged as a result of Summers’ criticism of West’s scholarship and political commitments outside of the university. As Johnson astutely observes, this was a battle between Summers’ traditional and West’s insurgent politics of scholarship. The events transpired so rapidly that by the time Johnson’s book was published, West already had left Harvard and had returned to his alma mater Princeton University. For Johnson, it goes without saying that West is a public intellectual who uses his ideas in the service of social transformation. His entrance into the political arena in support of electoral political candidates, contemporary social movements, and burning social issues is emblematic of West’s public intellectualism. Perhaps more disconcerting for Summers was West’s hip hop CD, Sketches of My Culture, which was a series of academic lectures that West recorded over smooth rap music. Johnson notes that West sees himself as a teacher-scholar whose aim is to reach a wider audience outside of the classroom, including Black youth, in order to influence social change. Since West’s public intellectual pursuits have been central to his self-perception as a change agent in the struggle for social justice, Johnson points out that Summer’s attack on West challenged the essence of West’s conception of his vocation as a scholar-activist. From West’s standpoint as a pragmatic, insurgent intellectual, the purpose of scholarship must be to transform the oppressive social order. Johnson concludes by observing that West’s extensive scholarship—both traditional and non-traditional—places West in the pantheon of contemporary America’s most respected intellectuals.

Cornel West & Philosophy: The Quest for Social Justice is a formidable work of scholarship. As a philosophical scholar, Johnson has produced a readily text that captures the readers attention from beginning to end. This book will be of enormous value not only to those scholars who are familiar with Cornel West’s philosophical project, but also to those who would be encountering this philosopher’s thinking for the first time. Because of his lucid writing style, Johnson’s book is usable to the beginning student who wants to learn how to think and write as a philosopher. Finally, Cornel West & Philosophy would prove to be valuable reading as a central text in an Africana philosophy course or in a contemporary social philosophy course. I think highly of this text and expect it to be widely read and discussed in the years to come.

Works Cited


Dan Warner
Duquesne University

African-American Philosopher George Yancy’s newest book, The Philosophical i: Personal Reflections on Life in Philosophy, is a fascinating collection of autobiographies by important philosophers in the United States and Canadian academy. Yancy has brought together philosophers of different ethnicities, sexes, temperaments, nationalities, and various career stages to discuss those experiences that have shaped them and their lives in philosophy. While many of the contributors do share a penchant for pragmatism, even this similarity takes on an idiosyncratic form for each philosopher. What emerges in this work, then, is a subtle tapestry of multiple philosophical voices: Each philosopher tells his or her own story, and through the combination of these stories we attain a unique perspective on the changing landscape of United States and Canadian academic philosophy of the last 50 years.

“The project here,” Yancy says in his introduction, “is to get philosophers to uncover and explore their own specific negotiations toward becoming the philosophers that they have become, to provide an ‘account of the relationship among self-relevant events across time.’” This is especially valuable since most of the contributors purport pragmatist leanings and believe that all truth is contextual, thus Yancy encourages them to make their own truths contextual. The Philosophical I is essential reading for anyone studying the work of Linda Martin Alcoff, Bat-Ami Bar On, Lorraine Code, Sandra Harding, Douglas Kellner, John Lachs, Joseph Margolis, Charles W. Mills, Nancey Murphy, Nicholas Rescher, Richard Shusterman, John J. Stuhr, Paul C. Taylor, Nancy Tuana, Thomas E. Wartenberg, or the editor, George Yancy. Each philosopher traces his/her own understanding of what it means to be a philosopher and to do

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philosophy. Many interesting consonances and dissonances arise in this process. For example, while Harding and Stuhr both express that prolific writing itself has been one of the fundamental joys of their profession, Bar On’s beautifully composed reflections describe writing as a slow, “loitering” process. Not surprisingly, what philosophy ‘is’ also a point of contention. For example, while Harding opines that philosophy is “always already political work whether or not I could recognize its politics,” Nicholas Rescher feels his political involvement is limited to the “voting booth.”

Through this cacophony of opinions and reflections, The Philosophical I emerges as a work perhaps more interesting than any one individual part. Yancy has given us more than just a space where a few well-respected academic philosophers reflect on their careers, but a multivocal history of academic philosophy in the United States and Canada over the last 50 years. In The Philosophical I, we actually get to hear the stories of those who have made this history, thus it is not just retold, but demonstrated.

One of the most salient points that comes across after reading a few of the narratives in The Philosophical I is that the addition of women and minorities to the historically all-white and male philosophical academy has not been an easy endeavor for either the institution or for those trying to join the club. Each author has their own take on this struggle and change, and I could never hope to distill it all here, but again and again the theme of mentorship and its importance in developing one’s philosophical identity is discussed. For example, while the white men often unproblematically discuss those “great men” in their lives who guided them in their career, the women do not tell their narratives in a linear fashion as the result of the influence of a few “great men”; rather, they see philosophy as one significant component within a multi-influenced narrative tale. Further, the African-American contributors not only express this same lack of suitable mentors, but cite surprising and untraditional inspirational philosopher-icons such as Malcom X, J. Krishnamurti, Walter Rodney, or Lucius Outlaw – certainly not to be found on the platter of a traditional analytic philosopher!

The presence of narratives from three different African-American philosophers is one of the most exciting attributes of The Philosophical I. Due to their stark minority status in most North American Philosophy departments, Mills, Taylor, and Yancy give us a rare public glimpse of skin color’s relevance in the discipline of the mind. Mills’s tale, in particular, details the travails of academic racism. British born, but raised in Jamaica, Mills at first thought that Black Americans were “obessed” with race. However, his academic career in the United States disabused him of this notion as he faced racially charged mockery by colleagues, and department turf wars all over the color of his skin. “Maybe those Black Americans had not been “obessed” with race after all;” Mills says with his classic self-deprecating wit, “maybe all along they had simply had an accurate theoretical perception of what was really central to the nation.”

George Yancy’s essay comes unequivocally out of the Black American experience, and is thus not the story of learning to be Black, but of how he has learned to think through his Blackness. Yancy challenges the “Boys in the Hood” fantasy that pathologizes Black urban culture and imagines that only the occasional exception can rise above its deadly grasp to the safe plateau of white America. He shows that the “existentially shitty” conditions of his youth spent in the Philadelphia projects are his home, his facticity, and thus intimately tied into his possibility. “After all, these contexts are just as real and important as the institutional academic contexts, suburban spaces, and academic conferences” which ostensibly shape philosophers of all stripes.

While these stories are ostensibly tales of individuals, institutions often play a pivotal role in the development of their various philosophical careers and on the landscape of philosophy in general. Consider the importance that many of the women writers expressed in the creation of the Society for Women in Philosophy which, as Lorraine Code says, “introduced me to a philosophical community that became crucially important to my professional life.” Or Nancy Tuana’s edited series of books, Re-Reading the Canon, which “emerged in response to the statement I heard only too frequently from supposedly well-meaning colleagues that they would be happy to include a feminist perspective in their course on Hegel (or Kant, or Hume, or Plato, etc.) if only (alas) there were any available.” And, importantly, Paul C. Taylor’s introduction to philosophy in Morehouse College demonstrates the influence that the Historically Black Colleges and Universities have had in shaping Black intellectuals, and the United States academy as a whole. In each of these instances (and many more presented throughout the book in many different forms and guises) we see how new books, scholarships, interdisciplinary programs, government programs, and more make possible individual achievements, and how individual achievements go on to further change the institutions. There are many other questions that The Philosophical I does not necessarily help us answer, but gives us ample material to explore, not least of which is the way philosophers and the institution of philosophy were affected by the numerous political events that have dotted the last half century: from WWII, to Elvis’s death, to 9/11.

“Many ‘genteel’ philosophers will say ‘Yancy is doing politics, not philosophy,’” Yancy predicts in the book’s introduction, “But what could be more ‘philosophical’ than questions of identity, meaning, and second-order reflection on what we ought to do as philosophers?” This question rings true throughout the narratives in The Philosophical I. And as we have come to expect of philosophical reflection, less is cleared up than obscured, and the best work provides innovative perspectives on standing problems, instead of “answers.”

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What is injustice? What does justice require when injustice occurs? Rodney Roberts aims to answer these questions in his edited collection, Injustice and Rectification. While the questions may require many more voices and volumes before they are put to rest (if they will ever be), Roberts succeeds admirably in framing the relevant issues which pertain to contemporary discussion about reparations for race-based injustice, and in offering both canonical and radical texts that address his guiding questions. The result of this diverse anthology of traditional moral and political philosophy and specifically liberatory philosophy is that the reader can consider how present arguments about reparations for African Americans and Native Americans are helped or hindered by the more general analytic concerns of traditional philosophers about injustice and rectification, from the early 1970s through the 1990s.
Roberts frames the pertinent issues by locating them within a taxonomy in his chapter “Justice and Rectification: A Taxonomy of Justice.” He accepts Aristotle’s restriction of justice to dealings with others, but argues that Aristotle’s identification of justice with distribution is incomplete because the pivotal concept is not equality but equity, so that rights and duties, rather than equal shares, may be fairly distributed. Roberts argues that rectificatory justice is a second distinctive branch of justice and that in addition to restoration, compensation may be due in senses other than just distribution. He proposes a Package Conception of Compensation that allows for the replacement of loss and the provision of additional value for what is still missing after replacement of loss. Roberts also argues that an apology is required. The correction of injustice involves relations with others and cannot require a state of regret, although it may require acknowledgment of wrongdoing. Full rectification requires forgiveness but the wrongdoer, although responsible for complete rectification, does not have the power to bring about forgiveness. Punishment is a form of rectification insofar as it is retributive, but insofar as it is undertaken as a deterrent, it falls under distributive justice.

Roberts’s chapter, “Justice and Rectification: A Taxonomy of Justice,” is justifiably Part I of the entire book because it reads as a self-sufficient treatise about that part of moral and political theory upon which any discussion of reparations and the rectification of historical oppression or injustice would need to be grounded. Either this raises the bar for subsequent anthologists seeking to relate special liberatory concerns to philosophy broadly understood, or it is a promissory note on Roberts’s forthcoming monograph on injustice and rectification—probably both.

Hovering over Roberts’s taxonomy is his observation in the Introduction (p.1) that the Rawlsian focus on ideal justice ignores the concerns of those who are systematically oppressed. Indeed, in the chapters by more traditional writers, even though the subject may be injustice or rectification, the focus of the discourse seems far removed from reparation or rectification in any race-specific sense. Both writers in Part Two, Injustice, and half of the writers in Part Three, Rectification, while occasionally using racial discrimination as examples, pursue philosophical examinations of conceptual relations in the standard analytic tradition. I will very briefly summarize these analytic accounts, beginning with Part Two. In “Injustice,” Anthony D. Wooldley insists on a distinction between criteria for, and analyses of, justice. While duties of justice have correlative rights in other parties, there is a difference between how we can expect people to behave given their past behavior, and what we have a right to expect from them. Injustice, as in discrimination against women and blacks, consists in not treating someone as he can expect to be treated, as a right. Phillip Montague in “The Laborers in the Vineyard’ and Other Stories,” claims that people have the right to be treated the same if they have the same rights. One can act unreasonably by treating people without rights in a specific situation, unequally, for instance by giving one beggar more money than another, or one child more candy than another, but this is not the same as acting unjustly.

Part Three, Rectification, begins with “Corrective Justice and Property Rights,” by Jules L. Coleman. Coleman supposes that an initial distribution of property may be unjust, but tries to show that it does not follow from this that individuals have the right to effect distributive justice. Only the state has the right to systematically correct distributive injustice. Judith J. Thomson takes up Joel Feinberg’s story of a stranded backpacker who breaks into a cabin, consumes food and burns furniture. After considering how it can be possible both that the owner has a right that his furniture not be burned and that the back-packer may burn the furniture, she concludes that it is compatible for me to have a claim that you not do something to me, and for it to be morally permissible for you to do it, with the understanding that you will owe me compensation for the violation of my claim. Phillip Montague is not content with this paradox and in “Rights and Compensation,” he develops the position that one has a prima facie duty not to violate another’s prima facie rights, but that on balance it may be permissible to do so, and that if it is permissible to do so, no compensation is necessary. Gerald F. Gaus, begins “Does Compensation Restore Equality?” with an argument that distributive redress for natural inequalities interferes with the liberal principle that people may privately reward such inequalities. He then reasons that a transfer of resources does not restore equality if rights were unjustifiably violated. To violate others’ rights is to disrespectfully interfere with their autonomy. Thus, Gaus would seem to hold that respect for autonomy can form the guiding principle for both distributive and compensatory justice. Louis F. Kort in “What is an Apology?” distinguishes apologies from self-condemnation and requests for forgiveness. On Kort’s view, an apology requires saying that one is sorry and expressing regret for something in a way that accepts responsibility for wrongdoing and acknowledges having offended someone, with a gesture of respect to that person.

The philosophical air is less thin in the remaining articles of Part Three, by Kathleen A. Gill and Bernard R. Boxill, Hugo Adam Bedau and J. Angelo Corlett, because these writers are directly and explicitly concerned with rectificatory justice as applied to oppressed groups in the United States. Thus, Gill, in “The Moral Functions of An Apology,” adds to Kort’s requirements a moral dimension of remorse and the expression of an intention to refrain in the future from the past wrongdoing. Gill also emphasizes that apologies are part of efforts to restore victims to their pre-offended condition and that public and official apologies to members of oppressed groups can change authorized historical pictures of these groups. Boxill’s famous article, “The Morality of Reparations,” is reprinted to pertinent effect because it remains the most lucid expression of an intention to refrain in the future from the past wrongdoing and acknowledges having offended someone, with a gesture of respect to that person.

In reading these articles, one might wish for dialogue between Boxill, Bedau and Corlett on the one hand, and Phillip
Montagu and others who have in effect argued against the correction of originally unjust acquisitions that have become part of a stable system of legal possession and transfers. It would also be interesting to know how Roberts, who claims that justice involves only external actions, would reply to Gill who insists that rectification requires genuine remorse in the hearts and minds of wrongdoers. Some discussion of the practical and legal problems involved in race-based reparations in the United States would also be required to advance the arguments presented by Boxill, Bedau and Corlett. Nevertheless, Rodney Roberts has given us an important range of theoretical underpinnings for current discussions about reparations. *Injustice and Rectification* is an important contribution to scholarly work on race and moral and political philosophy, for intermediate to advanced students, as well as scholars and researchers on all levels.


**James G. Spady**

**Dreams, Memories and X-Ray Stars in 2003: The Distinctive Role of DMX in The Poetics of African American Identity**

Places that I have been, things that I have seen
What you call a nightmare are what I have as dreams
DMX travels rapidly between memories, dreams and x-ray stars. X-ray astronomy enables us more clearly to track the cultural movements of the artist known as DMX. The very name Dark Man X speaks to multiple issues of identity in very powerful ways. X-ray astronomy is that area of scientific inquiry where one studies a celestial object resembling a star but emitting a major portion of its radiation in the form of x-rays. X appears to be a star but he’s a different kind of star.

I wanna break bread with the cats that I stand with
Wanna hit the malls with the same dogs I rob with
Wanna be able to laugh with the Nigga that I cried with
When it’s over, be like, these is the Niggas that I died with
Life for DMX, as it is for so many African Americans, is an attempt to stay in motion, over historical time and not just to stay in motion but to find meaning in existence. X puts it more succinctly: “To live is to suffer. But to survive, well, that’s to stay in motion but to find meaning in existence.” A close reading of *E.A.R.L.: The Autobiography of DMX* (as told to Smokey D. Fontaine), N.Y.: Harper Entertainment, 2002, reveals a marvelous, formidable search for wholeness. How can X reconcile that intense angst of identity rooted in abandonment, unbelievable pain and search for wholeness. How can X reconcile that intense angst that justice involves only external actions, would reply to Gill who insists that rectification requires genuine remorse in the hearts and minds of wrongdoers. Some discussion of the practical and legal problems involved in race-based reparations in the United States would also be required to advance the arguments presented by Boxill, Bedau and Corlett. Nevertheless, Rodney Roberts has given us an important range of theoretical underpinnings for current discussions about reparations. *Injustice and Rectification* is an important contribution to scholarly work on race and moral and political philosophy, for intermediate to advanced students, as well as scholars and researchers on all levels.

**A Blessed Birth: We Each Have A Star**

X takes the mic: “My name is Earl Simmons. I was born December 18, 1970 in Mount Vernon, New York, the first and only child of Arnett Simmons and Joe Barker. I’ve always hated my first name because it always sounded so corny to me, and no, I don’t have any middle name. Why my mother couldn’t give me the names of some of the other men she dated, I don’t know. There were certainly enough of them around.” Calculating thickness of air.

Take it for what it’s worth, my birth was a blessing
Sent to live and die, on earth as a lesson
When you turn your back, some cats’ll try to shoot ya.

Family history prologue: “My mother sang. People used to say she sounded like Chaka. At one point she tried to start a singing career and joined this group. It was her, this woman Eileen, and these two other guys. They rehearsed at a club called Brownstones right down the street from the Roker. When my mother couldn’t afford a baby sitter she used to bring my sister and me with her and we would just sit up on the speakers.”

X remembers those early days, sitting on the speaker as his mother performed ritual acts of self-representation and self-realization through dance, music and straight movement. (“Hey pretty lady. What’s happening? My mother never answered them. She never even looked their way.”)

**X’s Childhood in The Roker**

Waybackmemories: “We lived in a small, dark, one bedroom apartment in a building called the Roker. My mother was on public assistance and it was really hard for her to take care of us and pay all the bills and the rent at the same time. I was also sick a lot as a child. I inherited a bunch of allergies from her and bronchial asthma from my father. My shit used to be real bad. I remember many scary nights waking up, not being able to breathe. My mother used to have to take me to the emergency room and they would often end up keeping me overnight. Sometimes my asthma got so bad they would keep me for a whole week and they never would find the right thing to do. One night I had to go back to the hospital three different times because the drugs they were sending me home with kept making me sick.”

**“Philly Has Become The Seeing Place For Me”**

Somebody’s knockin, should I let em in?
Lord we’re just starting, but where will it end?

4 A.M. Memories from within: “I wouldn’t change a thing about my whole life, Dog… It’s like I wouldn’t be where I’m at. It’s like I’m going to see my father again. He still lives with his family in Philadelphia and art is still his passion. He actually painted a picture of me one time when I went to his studio. Philly has become the seeing place for me, the knowing place and out there I learned that in terms of how the situation went down, my father wasn’t the bad guy for leaving me. It was more just some circumstantial shit… My mother wasn’t the bad guy in my life, either. I love her. She just wasn’t ready for what she had, and life with her, for whatever it’s worth, made me a little deeper.”

— Philosophy and the Black Experience —
**The Great Depression Is Not A Game in 2003**

Deep. Deeper. Deeply deep days. States of being in this rapidly evolving postmodern African American world. DMX’s autobiographical narrative provides an illuminating, deep look into “The Great Depression” in 2003 and beyond. Flashback: “I remember my third grade teacher, Mrs. Smith, one of those black no-nonsense types. She was short, kept her hair in a bun, and wore the tight face that said no bullshit. She would always pull me and some of the older kids aside, and be like, ‘Listen boys, you got it harder cause you black and I’m not going to let you make a fool of yourselves in front of this class!’ You could tell she cared about you by those talks. ‘Earl, I know your mamma raised you better than that,’ she would tell me when I was messing around. She was the only teacher I ever had that did that and I always did good in her class.”

Earl still recalls those spelling bees Mrs. Smith had every Tuesday. Vocab building for a word warrior. He recalls, “Because I spent all week studying and knew all of the words by heart, week after week, none of the other kids could beat me. ‘Momma, I can spell, ‘Empire State Building.’ She’d stop whatever she was talking about for a second but never really turned her head all the way. ‘Oh, that’s nice baby. Now go to your room, okay, because grown folks are talking.’ “But Momma, I can sp——,” ‘Go to your room Earl!” What happens to a dream deferred?

Soon thereafter things changed in DMX’s life: “After I started throwing erasers, it wasn’t long before I quickly became the wildest nigga in school. I used to just zap out, do the thing that make other kids say, ‘Oh shit’ when they wasn’t supposed to say, ‘Oh shit.’ Then I would stab them with a pencil. That really made them curse.”

Seasons changed. The young black boy who was a spelling nut became the wildest nigga in school. Raised by a mother trying to make it in a world colliding with history, X turns to those alluring, hyperactivated streets where Mad Dogs barked loudest. The other life came to dominate his childhood and young adulthood. WF: “Born in Yonkers, N.Y. to a father who abandoned him and a mother ill equipped to raise her only boy, Earl Simmons grew to hate and distrust the world around him. But a passionate talent to rhyme gave him a dream, while a lifelong companionship with stray dogs gave him the strength to go on. His journey of self-discovery began with beatings, robbery and group homes, lead to jails, car chases, gun battles, and rap wars, and culminated in commitment, love, fame and fortune.”

The Philosopher Francois Lyotard argues that postmodern knowledge refines our sensitivity to difference and reinforces our ability to tolerate the incommensurate. What can we learn from **E.A.R.L.: The Autobiography of DMX**? What is it that enabled him to explore self-agency as a means of negotiating identity and regulating street consciousness? In other words how did this street conscious rhymer activate interventions, generate new ideas, new kinds of knowledge, find a viable way of seeking his own identity in this postmodern world of extremes? Memories, dreams and that Africanamericanized notion of being “someone’s baby,” enabled DMX to establish an unprecedented career as an artist and led him on a road toward self-knowledge.

**One Nation Under God Church and His Grandmother’s Stored Up Prayers**

Black grandmothers have been storing up prayers to help their children and grandchildren get through the American maze. In a recent conversation, DMX provides the following specific insight into the crucible moments of his past: “I think every individual, no matter how broken they are, how hard core they are, how bad they may be, needs, at some point in their life, to be someone’s baby. You know what I’m saying? It’s a very important part of this life. It’s a very important part of growth; to be cared about and loved at some point, you know? And ah, I was my grandmother’s baby. She had eleven kids. I was the first grandkid. She treated me better than all of them. She used to play her gospel music on Sundays. And she used to say, ‘The Lord may not come when you call him but he’s always on time.’ I didn’t wanna hear all of that. I didn’t say that!!! I listened. But you don’t want to hear that then. And now, I see what it means.”

**Prayer 1**

DMX’s prayer became a major feature in secular Hip Hop poetics. They reveal his connections to the sacred world. X: “I was in jail. Woke up in the middle of the night. Sweating. And it was freezing. That was a 23 hour lock in. Ah, I woke up with tears and what I saw, I wrote. I didn’t even know it was a prayer. That’s what it turned out to be, you know?”

**It’s Not A Game**

Millions of X lovers around the world wait anxiously for his album to drop. *It’s Not A Game*, scheduled for release on his birthday, December 18th, has been indefinitely delayed: “But when I come back, dogg. Respect my slot.” X moves back and forward into the yesterfuture. His groundation is in the streets and it is there that we locate his sites of cognition and recognition. When asked what he feels he was put here for, DMX responds, “I think I was put here to preach. I mean I ain’t gonna lie. I can’t see myself being a forty some year old rapper. I mean not that I know what the future holds but I can’t see myself as a forty some year old rapper. People do it but that’s not just me. DMX moves closer to his destiny. **E.A.R.L: The Autobiography of DMX** moves African American literature closer toward a place where language, geography, history and literature are not divorced from the urban cityscapes of our historical reality. Smokey D. Fontaine and DMX have produced a faithful autobiographical narrative text that should be read alongside **Their Eyes Were Watching God, The Autobiography of Malcolm X and 87 Years Behind The Black Curtain.**