NEWSLETTER ON PHILOSOPHY AND THE BLACK EXPERIENCE

FROM THE EDITORS, JOHN MCCLENDON & GEORGE YANCY

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We would like to extend an invitation to those who are interested in the critical corpus of bell hooks' work. We will consider publishing articles dealing with hooks' critical pedagogy, her work on race, racism, and whiteness, feminist theory, her work on cultural studies, spirituality, love, and postmodernism. Please submit a copy of your article by email to both editors of the Newsletter, Dr. McClendon and Dr. Yancy. We will review your submission in a timely fashion. Those pieces accepted for publication will appear in the spring issue, 2009.

**ARTICLES**

**Bob Moses and the Algebra Project**

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**Abstract**

Civil rights activist Bob Moses argues that access to economic resources through appropriate training is just as much a matter of civic justice as access to political participation through voting was during the '50s and '60s. For Moses, success in a technological world requires fluency in mathematics, the language of science and technology. Mathematical literacy is thus a necessity for successful membership in contemporary American society.

Moses' mentor, W.V.O. Quine, suggests that the route to mathematics begins with ordinary language, regimented into systems of inference, and from there to systems of mathematics. Drawing on Quine, Moses' pedagogy emphasizes teaching students to "regiment ordinary language" by describing their experiences in the geometric and quantitative terms of an algebraic system. I suggest following Quine more literally by teaching students to use formal systems of logic to "regiment ordinary language."

Logic, conceived of as an "algebra with words," regulates ordinary language by focusing on inferential patterns in ordinary language that are presupposed in legal, mathematical, and scientific discourse. Because reasoning with words takes increasing levels of complexity, many problems require the use of techniques and procedures which are artifacts of extended historical evolution.

On this basis, I recommend that Bob Moses and the Algebra Project expand its conception of algebra beyond variables that take quantitative and geometrical values, to include algebras in which the variables are words and propositions. I suggest that philosophers exploit the resources of formal logic as ways of teaching conceptual skills that are central to mathematical literacy.
In *Radical Equations – Math Literacy and Civil Rights* (Boston: Beacon, 2001), noted civil rights activist Bob Moses argues that access to economic resources through appropriate training is just as much a matter of civic justice as access to political participation through voting was during the ’50s and ’60s. The civil rights of American citizens were clearly violated when they were not allowed to participate in the political process by voting in local, state, and national elections. In this era, civil rights are being denied American citizens by the failure of the education system to prepare them for access to economic resources in a society structured around information technology.

Moses argues that living in a technological world requires technological literacy, and technological literacy requires fluency in mathematics, the language of science and technology. One way people of color have been denied access to the benefits of technology is by being kept mathematically illiterate. They have not been empowered through education with the kinds of conceptual skills that allow them to participate competitively in a technological world. As a result, in both urban and rural communities, the black, Hispanic, and native American populations are overwhelmingly the most impoverished groups.

Moses points out that the kind of labor that black bodies were initially intended to provide is no longer needed in today’s economy. What is now needed are the kinds of cognitive skills modeled on those used in mathematics. But, Moses argues, failure is tolerated in math in a way that it is not tolerated in reading. One reason for this is that mathematics has been used as a filter to limit rather than as a pump to increase participation in science and technology. Mathematical illiteracy traps even educated members of minority groups and women at the bottom of the hierarchy. Moses considers algebra to be a requirement for citizenship in this era of information technology, and people who don’t have it are denied access.

I concur with Bob in regards to the importance of being able to think algebraically. But I wish to suggest that his view of algebra is overly restrictive, eliminating other options that might be useful and assessable tools for improving mathematical literacy. My challenge does not deny the importance of algebra is.

Bob Moses studied philosophy of mathematics at Harvard with Willard Van Orman Quine, and in a number of passages he cites with approval Quine’s view that all formal languages are “regimentations of ordinary discourse.” Quine’s article “Truth By Convention” argues that propositions in mathematics are true only as a result of accepting certain postulates as axiomatic. Given different axiomatic systems, a sentence true in one system may be false in another. To illustrate, the parallel postulate is true in Euclidean geometry but false in Riemanian geometry. When a convention has been maintained for centuries, it appears natural, indubitable, and inevitable. But, Quine argues, it is true by convention nonetheless.

In a similar way, many construe thinking skills as natural manifestations of innate human abilities. But, following Quine, we should not assume that there is one correct set of thinking skills, any more than that there is one correct system of geometry or algebra. The sequential thinking skills embedded within formal systems of inference make mathematics possible, but they are nonetheless the result of a particular cultural evolution, one that has made possible our current scientific and technological practices.

Many cognitive anthropologists have shown how the inferential patterns we take for granted have not always been the norm in other places and in other eras. The work of E.R. Luria, for instance, shows that prior to industrialization in Russia, peasants depended on functional rather than formal patterns of inference. Peasants resisted using purely formal inferential procedures. Thus, told that it is cold and dry in Britain and if it is cold and dry in a place, cotton will not grow, the peasants were asked whether cotton would grow in Britain. Most were not inclined to draw the conclusion that cotton would not grow in Britain, protesting that they had no personal acquaintance with Britain, and hence could not assert or deny any claims about what would grow in Britain. It did not occur to them that all the information necessary to answer the question was provided in the discourse they were given. For the peasants, using information in a purely formal manner was not a legitimate option.

Likewise, Jerome Bruner showed that children from lower class backgrounds tended to base their conclusions more on the affective properties of statements rather than on the formal relationships between statements. Such examples suggest that dispositions to process information in different ways is an important fact of cultural evolution.

Moses ascribes to the view that we learn best from our experiences, when those experiences have been reflected on, abstracted from, quantitatively described, and symbolically represented. Moses’ pedagogy emphasizes teaching students to “regiment their language” by describing their experiences in geometric and quantitative terms. He illustrates this using an experience familiar to most Boston school kids: taking a trip on the subway.

We took our first trip with Lynne’s Sixth-grade math class in the fall of 88. When the students returned we had them draw pictures, write stories, and talk with one another about their trip, mediums in which the students reflected on the event. We thought of all these mediums as the students’ “ordinary language descriptions” of the event and came to call all of it their “people talk.” Next we looked in their representations of their “people talk” for features of the event that we were going to mathematicize: the trip had a start (Central Square Station); it had a finish (Park Street Station); it went three stops and it traveled inbound.

Moses takes an event, analyzes it for properties that can be quantified or graphically described, and represents this information symbolically.

For Quine, the route to mathematics begins with language, regimented into systems of inference, and from there to systems of mathematics. But Quine’s insights are not fully represented in Moses’ pedagogy.

I suggest following Quine literally by teaching students to use formal systems of logic to regiment the inferential structure of ordinary language, independently of their using concepts to quantify or graphically represent their ordinary experiences.

Quine is famous for the claim “To exist is to be the value of a variable.” Variables are the place-holders in a formal system. I am suggesting that we not limit our conception of algebra to formal systems with variables that take geometric and arithmetic values. Instead, I suggest that we think of logic as a kind of algebra with words, and that we actively use categorical and propositional logic as ways of introducing the kinds of conceptual skills used in mathematical thinking. Logic, conceived of as an “algebra with words,” regiments ordinary language by focusing on the inferential patterns of ordinary language, and using these to develop patterns that extend into legal and scientific discourse.
But a stress on logic is itself no panacea. Moses observes that most math textbooks dis-empower students. I believe this is true of many logic textbooks as well. Most textbooks make the canons of Western thought the primary vehicles of good reasoning. But many who have been victimized by sexism and racism are inclined to see this as a capitulation to cultural imperialism. On the other hand, if it is shown that formal reasoning is already a constituent of ordinary discourse, logic can be seen not as the imposition of something alien but the distillation of something familiar. By portraying logic as a reglementation of what students already do, we can bypass the suspicion that logic will serve only to alienate them from their culture and cohorts.

We derive most of our knowledge, not from personal experience, but from information we get from and through others. By analyzing this information, we are able to make inferences that we otherwise might lack an experiential basis for. Thus, the temperature at the center of the sun is not something that we have direct experience of, but something we infer from information we gain through other sources. It is an inference based on information not all of which is derived from our personal experiences. By analyzing information using formal systems of inference, we are able to generate new information that extends knowledge beyond personal experience.

Whereas manual workers were needed for agricultural production and assembly line workers for manufacturing production, it is information processing workers that Moses considers needed in the contemporary economy. Knowledge workers earn 82 percent more than workers in other industries. Those most desired as workers are people with technical skills related to information technologies, and interpersonal skills that make possible effective communication. Moses wants to make such occupations available to those who have traditionally been left out and left behind.

I support Bob’s objectives, and offer my views as a supplement to his efforts. Computers are a principal tool in modern information processing technology. But computers are logic machines, and the basic logical operations of truth functional logic provide the conceptual infrastructure of computer operations. This is why so much of the inferential structure of natural languages can be replicated within the circuitry and instructions of computers. And it is why logic provides excellent training for information technology.

Formal reasoning is basic to academic and scientific problem solving. It requires being able to ignore the content of a statement and to classify it on the basis of its form. Thus, “All men are human” and “All dogs are cats” are different statements, but they both have the same form, namely, “All S are P.” Here, S and P are variables whose values are word categories. Likewise, “If X then Y” is a statement form in which X and Y are variables that take propositions as values. In neither case need we limit the relevant variables to those that take quantitative or geometrical values.

Complex reasoning problems, like complex mathematical problems, easily move beyond purely intuitive responses. To illustrate, most people can solve the problem “What is 2 times 2?” without reflection. But the question “What is 16 times 17?” requires reflection on the correct procedures for doing multiplication. Neither rote memory nor intuitive guesses are sufficient to enable people to produce correct answers to complex problems. Certainly, anyone who has not been trained in the procedures of multiplication is unlikely to get the answer to 16 times 17 correctly.

To evaluate the claim that 16 times 17 is 152 requires that we first distinguish the product from the multiplicands, something that seems intuitively obvious, but something we have learnt to do through training. Anyone who took 16 to be the product clearly does not know where to begin. Likewise, the evaluation of arguments and explanations requires that the propositions be distinguished into premises and conclusion. And someone who takes a premise to be a conclusion does not get off the ground. This problem is compounded when arguments involve propositions that are counter-factual or counter-intuitive.

In neither logic nor mathematics are correct responses the natural products of our brains, the way hair is a natural outgrowth from skin. The view that reasoning is natural, and therefore something we do not have to be taught, is a pernicious fallacy. Human beings have the natural ability to learn spoken languages, but natural languages are learnt, not produced as spontaneous products of individual development. No matter how much inborn mathematical talent a person may have, if that person has not been taught the historical legacy of the techniques of numerical calculation, that person will not be able to provide appropriate responses to complex arithmetical problems.

It is likewise with reasoning. The ability to learn a language is natural to human beings. But reasoning with words takes increasing levels of complexity, and many problems require the use of historically developed techniques and procedures which are artifacts of historical evolution rather than natural cognitive responses. Refutation by analogy, moods and figures, Venn diagrams, modus ponens, modus tollens, truth tables, and proof theory are reasoning techniques that embody varying levels of sophistication, developed over different eras by different individuals and groups. Likewise, common fallacies of reasoning, such as affirming the antecedent, denying the consequent, equivocation, post hoc ergo propter hoc, and many others have been identified and discussed for centuries. If an individual has not been exposed to such developments, we should not expect them to manifest naturally. No individual, irrespective of the level of innate potential, can expect to invent all this for him or her self. Rather, explicit exposure and training is necessary.

The inferential patterns articulated in logic are basic to legal, mathematical, and scientific discourse. I therefore recommend that the Algebra Project expand its conception of algebra beyond variables that take quantitative and geometrical values, to include an algebra in which the values of variables are words and propositions.

Endnotes
4. Ibid., 99.
5. Ibid., 8.

When King Compared His Person to Purdue: The UCC Sermons of 1958

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Abstract
The year 2008 marks the fiftieth anniversary of two important sermons delivered by Martin Luther King, Jr., at Purdue University. The collected sermons, which are still in print under
the title The Measure of Man, continue to preserve their reference to that vast, college-campus setting. Speaking to the first annual youth conference of the newly formed United Church of Christ, King used the figure of the Purdue campus to argue that there are unseen realities such as hope and love that must be lived out if individuals and communities are to enjoy complete lives. King argued for attention to these realities on the basis of a philosophical anthropology that was grounded in body and freedom, yet challenged by still unaffirmed choices of love and social justice. King gave these sermons often during his busy public career, applying their elegant concepts to intractable problems of Western colonialism and American racism. Unseen realities make a complete life possible, but only if they are chosen by free, embodied persons.

1. The Occasion

In August of 1958, when Martin Luther King, Jr., was still a freshly minted national hero, he traveled to Purdue University to address a national conference on Christian Education, organized by the newly founded United Church of Christ. On that occasion, King delivered two sermons—"What is Man?" and "The Three Dimensions of a Complete Life"—which were published in 1959 by the Christian Education Press of Philadelphia under the title The Measure of a Man.

"You walk around this vast campus," says King in the second Purdue sermon, "and you probably have a great esthetic experience as I have had walking about and looking at the beautiful buildings, and you think you see all" (Measure 31). But, says King, you can’t with your eyes see everything that matters to a campus. You can’t see all "the love and the faith and the hope" of a campus any more than you can see all the inner workings of the man you are looking at when you see Martin Luther King, Jr.

When The Measure of a Man was re-published by Pilgrim Press as a memorial to King in 1968, and reissued again by Fortress Press in 1988, the foreword to the 1959 edition was removed. Purdue University was no longer named as the setting for these sermons, yet King’s words about the experience of “this vast campus” remained.

King delivered his sermon on “The Three Dimensions” many times before and after Purdue, so there are published versions in other collections that do not rely upon the image of a college campus in order to bring out “the love and the faith and the hope” that cannot be seen in the physical world. For example, in 1960, when King addressed the Unitarian Church of Germantown, Pennsylvania, he spoke about “this beautiful church building” (Carson, Papers 5: 79). Or when he addressed the New Covenant Baptist Church of Chicago in 1967, he referred to “the skyscraping buildings of the Loop of Chicago” (Carson, Knock: 134).

Yet, as we celebrate the semi-centennial of that remarkable little book, The Measure of a Man, we can say that in the most persistently published version of “The Three Dimensions of a Complete Life,” it is upon the twinned figures of the Purdue campus and himself that Martin Luther King, Jr., draws that famous distinction between what is seen and unseen, illustrating why a complete life needs to reckon with a dimension that he calls divine.

2. The Purdue Sermons

In the two Purdue Sermons—"What is Man?" and “The Three Dimensions of a Complete Life”—King shares with his audience an outline of essential requirements for human redemption and social justice. In the first sermon, “What is Man?” we find a five-pointed outline of human nature in terms of body, spirit, reason, sin, and return. The body is not evil, but it is incomplete without spirit. And spirit is the capacity to reason, but this capacity cannot be understood apart from sin. In the Gospel parable of “The Prodigal Son,” King tells a well-known story of two choices: the choice to stray to a far country and the choice to return home. He applies that story to the prodigal behaviors of “Western Civilization” and “America” as he calls upon both to choose a kind of return. But to where should they "return"?

In “The Three Dimensions of a Complete Life” King talks about the essential qualities of a perfect city. St. John the Revelator records a vision of a golden city descending, equally proportioned in length, breadth, and height. King interprets the three dimensions of this perfect city along lines suggested by the published sermon of the nineteenth-century Boston Pastor Phillips Brooks. The length of the city is the length of life, or the push that life makes to extend itself. The breadth of the city is the breadth of life, or the concern that one life shows for others. And the height of the city is the vertical striving that life makes toward ideal existence.

As the first Purdue sermon speaks to the challenge of redemption from racism, the second sermon also alludes to white America’s moral shortcomings, this time with respect to its one-dimensional attention to self-direction. And even in cases when breadth is pursued through social reform, King warns that struggles will be incomplete without a vertical dimension. What completes the city is also what completes the struggle to make the city real.

These were simple sermons and King delivered them quite often as he kept up with demands of a schedule that sometimes called upon him to preach two or three times a day, sometimes in two or three cities and towns. They were among the sermons that he requested Coretta Scott to bring to him in Reidsville prison just prior to the 1960 presidential elections. Sen. John Kennedy’s role in having King summarily released from Reidsville is sometimes credited with swinging the Black vote toward Kennedy’s narrow victory.

3. The Context of Reformed Theology

The Purdue sermons have an interesting bibliographical history. After they were first published in 1959 as The Measure of a Man, King included them in the first edition of Strength to Love. (Incidentally, the list of sermons collected in Strength to Love was very similar to the list King requested during his brief stay at Reidsville Prison.) Following King’s assassination in 1968, The Measure of a Man was reissued by the United Church Press as a memorial, including a new foreword by the publisher, a tribute by Truman B. Douglass, ten photographs, and a “Parting” quote from King’s “Mountaintop” speech of April 3, 1968. The sermons were then excised from Strength to Love when the collection was reissued in 1981 by Fortress Press with a foreword by Coretta Scott King. In 1988, Fortress Press took over the publication of The Measure of a Man, inserting prayers after each sermon and placing between the sermons a section of fourteen Flip Schulke photographs. The Fortress edition retains the “Parting” section introduced in 1968, but cuts all the introductory materials.

Clayborne Carson has brought out additional versions of “The Three Dimensions.” Volume 6 of the King Papers presents two versions: (1) a rendition of the handwritten script that King used as his “trial sermon” at Dexter Avenue Baptist Church in January 1954, and (2) a transcript of King’s delivery at the Friendship Baptist Church of Pasadena, California, in February, 1960 (Carson 6:150–156, 395–405). In Volume 5 of the King Papers, Carson presents a transcript of the sermon as it was delivered to a Unitarian Church in Germantown, Pennsylvania, in December 1960, about one month after the Reidsville imprisonment and Kennedy election. And in A Knock at Midnight, the collection of sermons edited by Carson and Holloran, we find the sermon...
presented in audio format and transcription as it was delivered to the New Covenant Baptist Church of Chicago on April 9, 1967, five days after King’s famous anti-war speech.

4. Looking at the Message
In the introduction to the Carson chapter on “The Three Dimensions of a Complete Life,” Notre Dame President Fr. Theodore Hesburgh characterizes the sermon as “a real wedding of simplicity and eloquence, basic theological beliefs and deep theological purposes” (Knock, 119). Indeed, the plain-speaking concepts of the Purdue sermons enjoy dramatic functional positions in King’s philosophy of nonviolence. Moreover, the concepts of these sermons were ones that King felt comfortable sharing often with strangers, whether they were “PhDs” on the Harvard University campus or “No Ds” who gathered at union halls or churches.

The functional importance of these sermons should not be segregated from the remarkable venue of the Purdue gathering, which must have looked to King like one of the better hopes that Christianity could offer at the time. The United Church of Christ had only the year before been consolidated from two reformed churches who claimed theologians such as Reinhold Niebuhr and Paul Tillich. At Purdue the new church was convening its first youth conference. Among the new churches created by the movement would be the Trinity UCC of Chicago, to which Barack Obama belonged.

In “What is Man?” King centers the gravitas of sin that Niebuhr had developed in Moral Man and Immoral Society. In the real world, says King (indeed, in this country), the choice toward social sin is still pervasive and reversible. In “The Three Dimensions of a Complete Life” we find plain-spoken expression of truths echoed by Tillich’s conclusion in The Courage to Be that three dimensions of courage are needed. What King calls the first dimension of life, Tillich calls “the courage to be oneself.” What King calls the second dimension, Tillich calls “the courage to be as a part.” As King insists upon a third dimension evidenced by the unseen qualities of the Purdue campus, so does Tillich argue that “neither of these [previous] forms of the courage to be gives the final solution” (Courage to Be, 141). In the “Three Dimensions,” King is affirming with Tillich that “every courage to be has an open or hidden religious root. For religion is the state of being grasped by the power of being itself” (Tillich, 156).

King’s engagement with Tillich’s thought has been well noted by scholars. In 1953 King corresponded with Tillich in preparation for a dissertation that would focus heavily on Tillich’s concept of God. In 1954 King requested a meeting with Tillich, but the theologian was in Aberdeen, Scotland, delivering the Gifford Lectures. In 1960, the list of materials that King requested from Reidsville included Tillich’s Systematic Theology, Vols. 1 & 2 (Papers 5: 532). And when King treated the third dimension of life in the Chicago sermon of 1967, he said, “there was a man named Paul Tillich who called [God] being itself.”

5. King’s Voice
Yet, as King swiftly remarked to the Chicago Baptists of 1967, “We don’t need to know all of these high-sounding terms.” In fact, King’s references to Tillich practically disappear from his collected works soon after the dissertation is done. The simple structures of the Purdue sermons function upon plain-spoken terms and parables. In “What is Man?” King rinses the human body of filthy reputations in order to render an image of humanity that begins in the flesh. The problem of sin is not a disorder caused by the body, but a problem of self-misguiding spirit. The lesson is classically Augustinian. Evil is from the will alone. Our freedom is always with us. Like the prodigal son, we can come to our senses at any time. Western Civilization’s sins of colonialism or imperialism, like America’s sins of racism, are not to be mistaken for original sins of the flesh; they are willful misdirections that can be willfully turned around.

Although King was very likely conscious of Tillich’s shadow when he addressed his sermon to the UCC youth conference, “The Three Dimensions of a Complete Life” was not modeled upon Tillich, but upon a sermon by nineteenth-century preacher Phillips Brooks. And yet, the lessons applied to the text are King’s own. In King’s plain usage, the sermon demands three sorts of reforms. First, it demands that when we push forward in self interest that we have a proper sense of self love. Second, it demands that we treat each other as neighbors, and love our neighbors as ourselves. Third, it requires attention to basic truths about unseen realities that cannot be permanently overlooked.

Spinoza, in the Theological-Political Treatise, expresses sentiments that could have been echoed by King. In Chapter XIII, “On the Simplicity of Scripture,” Spinoza argues that “Scripture” intends the simple function of obedience:

Furthermore, as obedience to God consists solely in love to our neighbor—for whoever loveth his neighbor as a means of obeying God, hath, as St. Paul says (Rom. Xiii.8), fulfilled the law—it follows that no knowledge is commended in the Bible save that which is necessary to enabling all men to obey God in the manner stated, and without which they would become rebellious, or without the discipline of obedience. (176)

As King delivered the Purdue sermons time and again across the country to diverse audiences was he not affirming in practice that simple obedience to love and social justice always waits faithfully and ready to choose?

Works Cited
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Raced Recognition: Hegel, World History, and the Problem of Africa

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Abstract
In this article I argue that the concept of race, often marginalized in most philosophical discussions, can be an important hermeneutic tool in coming to grips with the history of philosophy. In particular, I engage in a reading of Hegel’s famous “struggle for recognition” in The Phenomenology of Spirit that also takes into account his comments on race and its relationship to reason in the Lectures on the Philosophy of World History. My argument is that Hegel presents us with a theory of race that finds its footing in his metaphysics of reason and history and not in anything such as inherited biological characteristics. Further, I attempt to demonstrate that this metaphysical notion of race...
bears significantly on his historically influential account of the development of self-consciousness—who can enter into and what the outcome might be. Finally, I argue that highlighting and teasing out implications from a thinker’s often overlooked views on race can be an interesting, not to mention revealing, dimension to his/her thought.

The history of philosophy, rather than repeating what a philosopher says, has to say what he must have taken for granted, what he didn’t say but is nonetheless present in what he did say.

—Gilles Deleuze¹

Questions surrounding the proper methodologies, intentions, and reconstructive liberties that can be taken when dealing with the history of philosophy are as complex as any particular philosophical question itself. When we attempt to interpret Lucretius or Nietzsche we make a host of assumptions and, it needs to be said, such assumptions say as much about what we wish they would have said as what they actually put down to paper. It also has deep implications for what we choose to categorize as “philosophically interesting” or as pertinent to a thinker’s position. Oftentimes when attempting a “philosophical reconstruction” of a theorist we leave certain arguments and concerns to the side, resurrect bits of texts that were once declared out of interpretive bounds, take side arguments to be the hidden key to understanding larger positions; generally speaking, then, a reconstructive effort is oftentimes a constructive one. This is not to say that we all write our own histories of philosophy but that our interpretive choices are rarely objective in any hard sense. As Deleuze points out in the above passage, if we were to merely repeat the history of philosophy objectively then we would just be reproducing philosophical texts rather than trying to make sense of them.

Toward this end, choosing whether or not one sees race as a category in the history of philosophy deserving of some theoretical weight says a lot about how one views philosophy more generally. That is, if we view a philosopher’s comments on race as having little effect upon their overall philosophical position then it seems to imply we consider race an issue worthy of little in the way of philosophical articulation; as something that is of interest to social scientists, political activists, and artists, but not as something that rises to the level of philosophy. To lay my cards on the table from the outset, it is precisely this view of the relationship of philosophy and race that I reject. Moreover, in this discussion I will be arguing for an alternative position that wishes understand a thinker’s concept of race to be rich with insight into philosophical views that might seem unrelated. With the possible exception of the concepts of sex, gender, and class there is perhaps no concept in the history of philosophy that has provided a site of exemption to the traditional metaphysical, epistemological, ethical, and political ideals that are often touted as characteristic of the inherent rationality of the philosophical process. This seems especially apparent in the context of Modern philosophy, which professes the egalitarian nature of its own enterprise while at the same time turning a blind eye to its many racist points of exclusion.

My own approach is much closer to something like Deleuze’s as highlighted above. That when Modern philosophers speak of the equality of all humanity, they “take it for granted” that by humanity we know they mean something more like European white men.² However, this is not a matter of simply calling out the figures of Modern philosophy as racist. Rather, what I am interested in doing is exploring the concept of race as it functions in and informs the philosophical systems of Modernity. To say that Kant is a racist is just to make a statement about the character of a man; to say that Kant’s philosophy proceeds with a subterranean concept of race is to say something much more interesting. The often subterranean nature of race in Modern thought (although it is not all subterranean) means that we must make implicit concepts explicit, that we must, as Deleuze says, unearth “what he [the philosopher] must have taken for granted, what he didn’t say but is nonetheless present in what he did say.” All of this is to say, we must redraw our maps of the history of philosophy to include race (among other marginalized categories) and its multiplicity of landmarks.

Such a view of the history of philosophy, though, is better demonstrated in practice than simply spoken of in abstraction. So, in this discussion I propose not only to argue that race is an important concept in the history of philosophy, but to illustrate its importance with a bit of philosophical reconstruction. In particular, I am interested in talking about the function of race within Hegel’s famous theory of recognition. Of course, I am by no means alone in taking a hard look at Hegel’s comments on race. Robert Bernasconi, for instance, has done much to make the argument that Hegel’s view of progressive historical spirit offers us deep (and sometimes disturbing) insights into his view of race.³

I am less interested in talking about Hegel’s grand claims on progress, which already have a heaping amount of suspicion piled on them, than I am on how race functions with respect to Hegel’s influential account of self-consciousness in the Phenomenology of Spirit.¹ However, the Phenomenology is relatively silent on the notion of race—although it becomes obvious that Hegel is deeply suspicious of many nineteenth-century attempts to reduce behavior to some sort of biological trait.⁴ So, in order to do justice to the complexities of Hegel’s own view, we need to turn to a text in which Hegel gives us something like a theory of race—the famous Lectures on the Philosophy of World History.⁵ In the Lectures Hegel attempts to not only present a narrative of major world events—world-historical events—but to demonstrate how such events showcase the inexorable march of rationalization. The major problem Hegel sees in his own triumphalist account, though, is that Africa seems to be utterly removed from the civilizing force of reason. It is precisely in the section on Africa in the Lectures that we find a complex Hegelian theory of race. So, to bring the outline of this argument full circle, if we take Hegel’s comments on Africa and Africans seriously in his Lectures on the Philosophy of World History, then I want to say that Africans would have problems even entering something like the struggle for recognition as it is found in the Phenomenology.⁶ Perhaps more interestingly, even if Africans could enter into the struggle for recognition they could never possibly emerge as the Master.

In the Lectures on the Philosophy of World History Hegel distinguishes between three sorts of history: Original, Reflective, and Philosophical. Original history is simply the recording of events as they happen; an account of a battle from a soldier or a reporter who observed it, a chronicle from inside the White House during a policy debate, or an eye witness report to a police officer are all examples of original histories. Reflective histories, on the other hand, are written after the events transpired by persons not immediately connected by either time or place. Moreover, reflective histories aim for more than a simple factual recitation of events. Rather, the goal of reflective history is to offer an interpretation of historical events—to make sense out of the apparent randomness of historical contingency. So, someone wishing to write a three-book analysis of the American Civil War through the lens of nineteenth-century economic concepts would be operating at the level of reflective history. Hegel, however, obviously privileges the notion of philosophical history. A philosophical history takes place well after the events it is concerned with, but in distinction to a reflective history
it offers more than an analysis and interpretation of such occurrences. Upon Hegel’s account the goal of a philosophical history is nothing less than an a priori reading of history itself, a reading that will show the embedded rational necessity in the unfolding of the historical process. As Hegel states quite clearly, “Just like Mercury, the guide of departed souls, the Idea is truly the leader of nations and of the world; and it is the spirit, with its rational and necessary will, which has directed and will continue to direct the events of world history.” So, when we have finally achieved the stage of thinking the history of the world philosophically we will see not a broken and mindless succession of events, but the necessity and interconnection of the historical process itself.

This distinction becomes vital within the pages of the Lectures, as Hegel will attempt to trace the necessity of historical events as they emerge from geographical locations or, as he calls them, “national spirit.” If we understand Geist or Spirit as meaning something close to social reason or the ever-developing rational transparency of social practices, then Hegel’s move to geography here is natural. Among people that share common customs and traditions a common Spirit will prevail but, in turn, this notion of spirit will distance them from other peoples at other times and, finally, at other places. As Hegel argues, “The particular spirits which we have to consider in their simultaneous and successive existence are particular, because each of them has its own determinate principle; each world-historical nation has the function of a distinct principle allotted to it.” However, we must be careful in interpreting Hegel here—he does not mean “nations” in any contemporary sense. The combination of geography, language, religion, shared customs, and other seemingly contingent factors create a “nation” in Hegel’s sense. The upshot of the philosophical approach to history, Hegel tells us, is that it allows us to think the quasi-teleological arch in the development of different world-historical nations. In this way we might finally be able to comprehend the way in which the struggles of a given “nation” reflect the underlying principle(s) that founds their particular spirit.

Much of the Lectures, then, is an elucidation of the central idea(s) that govern the spirit of particular nations and how we can expect such nations to develop—given their animating principles, of course. However, before Hegel can proceed to the future of history, so to speak, he is forced to deal with the land spirit forgot: Africa. If, like Hegel, we wish to view history philosophically, as possessing a primal reason that guides and rationalizes subsequent development, then Hegel contends we have to view Africa as an essentially history-less nation. In Hegel’s account:

Anyone who wishes to study the most terrible manifestations of human nature will find them in Africa. The earliest reports concerning this continent tell us precisely the same, and it has no history in the true sense of the word. We shall therefore leave Africa at this point, and it need not be mentioned again. For it is an unhistorical continent, with no movement or development of its own. [My italics]

This is not to say that events have not occurred in Africa, but nothing of necessity has occurred there. Therefore, a history in the philosophical sense of Africa remains impossible—and as Hegel will argue there is no underlying rational necessity to the ways of life Africans practice.

At this juncture, though, we need to be precise in defining what it is exactly we mean by Africa. On Hegel’s account, Africa can be divided into three regions. First, there is North Africa, which Hegel understands as basically being an extension of Spain and, in an attempt to bolster such an interpretation, approvingly cites “the French writer and politician de Pradt’s” contention that Spain is essentially a part of North Africa (or that North Africa is a part of Spain). Secondly, there is Egypt, a region that Hegel understands as “destined” to be a home for a coming “great culture.” Finally, we come to what Hegel refers to as “Africa Proper.” Why Hegel chooses to designate this portion of the African continent as “the real Africa” is mysterious in the text, but we might venture the hypothesis that it bears the least amount of influence from Europe (Hegel admits that both North Africa and Egypt historically have close ties to Europe) and has remained resistant to adopting European culture. Whatever the reason, though, it is clear that Africa proper is a place that “has no historical interest of its own, for we may find its inhabitants living in barbarism and savagery in a land which has not furnished them with any integral ingredient of culture.”

The people that inhabit the historical void of Africa, then, cannot even hope to constitute a rational historical space.

As Hegel makes abundantly clear, Africans are obviously devoid of the sort of representational or abstracted thought that characterizes the whole of Europe, as well as many of the Asiatic and American nations. Africa is so devoid of spirit that “man as we find him in Africa has not progressed beyond his immediate existence.” What Hegel means to convey here is that while Africans have made the necessary distinction between themselves and nature, they have progressed no further. Through a series of metaphors that will become popular both among readers and non-readers of Hegel, he contends that Africans exist in a “land of childhood, removed from the light of self-conscious history and wrapped in the dark mantle of night.”

While humans are capable of abstractly representing things—such as a God or reason—outside of themselves in order to bring order and necessity into a chaotic world, Africans are unable to perform such feats. Thus, it is only natural that Africans should practice sorcery as a religion since, as Hegel understands it, such sorcery places the individual in the structural position that ought to be occupied by God or reason. More interesting to the purposes of this discussion, though, are Hegel’s various comments on Africans, slavery, and cannibalism.

Africans lack a kind of abstracting or representational capacity or what we might contemporarily call a theory of mind. In large part, this is why an African can accept a form of religion only if she—the individual—takes the structure space of power, as that which brings necessity upon things. That is to say, an African for Hegel simply lacks the cognitive talent which would allow her to see herself as member of a community in any large sense (such as a member of humanity writ large). Such a lack, though, has an impact on the level of intersubjectivity. Specifically, Hegel says, “that he [the African] has no respect for himself or for others; for such a respect would touch on a higher or absolute value peculiar to man.” For the African there can be no genuine recognition of the other as an-other-like-me. Or, to put it in a slightly different way, for the African the other is always tout autre, or someone who is entirely other. Such an otherness even toward family members, though, means that Africans have little problem even with the ideas of slavery or cannibalism. As Hegel notes, “Since human beings are valued so cheaply, it is easily explained why slavery is the basic legal relationship in Africa.” Since Africans simply lack the abstracting capacity, even to the point of not recognizing another as someone similar to me, they have little problem owning or selling other humans into servitude. However, Hegel’s claim is stronger than even that. Hegel’s claim is that all other “official” relationships in Africa find their logic in the relationship of slavery, that every governmental or tribal structure is fed off of the notion that the ownership and exploitation of other persons is natural. In the same fashion, Hegel makes the case for cannibalism among
the Africans. If it is impossible to feel sympathy or empathy for an other since I cannot abstractly place myself in the position of the other, then it becomes easy to see how I could regard other persons just as animals—on the same moral playing field as a cow or a boar. A little recognition of the other goes a long way, apparently.

To sum things up a bit here, for Hegel Africa is a land before philosophical history and, therefore, a land whose inhabitants never rise to the level of spirit, but always remain on the verge of succumbing to their a-rational animal natures. Africans, as a race of quasi-persons within a proto-nation, then, are simply inferior to both their more Europeanized neighbors in North Africa and Egypt as well as continental Europeans themselves. Hegel’s concept of race in this instant centers around the notion of spirit or social reason—those in Europe and nearby have it and those far, far away do not. As Sandra Bonetto points out, though, we should be careful not to conflate notions of racism and xenophobia. For Bonetto, Hegel is guilty of the latter and not the former. In Bonetto’s construal, “While Hegel employs the concept of race in the anthropological sense as a classification of (large) human populations, primarily on the basis of physical characteristics, it remains to be seen whether he elaborates causal relationships between biological and cultural attributes….” Bonetto’s assumption is that the concept of race must always be understood against a background of biological traits—that is, race is perhaps only skin deep. If Hegel cannot be found guilty of reducing some sort of cultural phenomenon into a biological trait and then placing it onto a scale in which different “races” are fixed hierarchically then he is not a racist, but simply a xenophobe. That is to say, Hegel’s problem is not with race, but simply with persons that come from non-European cultures. As I have stated earlier, I too find a biological theory of race hard to tease out of Hegel’s writings, but I also do not think that notions of race must necessarily be limited to certain biological traits. And, moreover, it seems as if Hegel understands race as something that goes beyond any casual connections between biological and cultural traits—it is tied to the very relationship between a people and Reason.

Bonetto’s defense of Hegel on this issue is novel, but I think ultimately unworkable. First, we might wish to inquire further into whether one can be both xenophobic and racist since Bonetto herself takes the categories to be mutually exclusive. More interestingly, I think, we might inquire as to whether Hegel’s problem is really with non-Europeans or with select groups of non-Europeans. In the first volume of his epic History of Philosophy, for instance, Hegel begins his account of philosophy not with the Greeks, but with the Chinese. While this does not make Hegel into a cosmopolitan thinker by any means, it points to a serious scholarly interest in non-European culture as well as an active engagement with at least some of their traditions. The Lectures on the Philosophy of World History may itself provide us with evidence that Hegel’s philosophical depictions of Africa have more to do with his special notion of race than with his fear of non-Europeans. Remember that Hegel spoke of the naturality of slavery to Africans, that, in fact, “slavery has awakened more humanity among the negroes,” The institution of slavery itself, then, actually helps to de-animalize Africans. If Hegel were merely xenophobic it seems as if this notion of slavery as a humanizing activity would be something desirable for all non-Europeans; that slavery would become the greatest weapon in the arsenal of Europeanization (or rationalization) of the world soul. However, this is not the case.

When speaking of the “New World” of the Americas Hegel laments the enslavement of the people of South America, while at the same time celebrating their resiliency. As Hegel emphasizes, “We should also note that a larger native populace has survived in South America, despite the fact that the natives there have been subjected to far greater violence, and employed in grueling labors to which their strength was scarcely equal. The local populace is subjected to every kind of degradation.” While “negroes” in Africa are slaves by nature, so-called Indians in South America must be “subjected” to forced labor. More to the point, Hegel later condemns slavery more generally, arguing that the essence of humanness is freedom and slavery is the antithesis of this. It is no mistake, then, that Hegel regrets the enslavement of the “Indians” of South America, yet praises the enslavement of “negroes” in Africa: “Indians” are still within the circle of personhood, “negroes” sit half-in, half-out. This is not, I want to argue, merely holding a group of others at arm’s length because they partake in strange cultural practices. I may at least recognize such others as fellow humans, just a particularly strange variety of persons. Rather, this is a declaration that a group does not belong to the sphere of mutual recognition at all. By Hegel’s reading the “negroes” of Africa are wholly different from Europeans, South American “Indians,” and even persons in China. Such groups can all still be counted within the historico-human community—“negroes” from Africa can be counted as human only in the broadest sense of the term. It is not that Hegel simply fears difference, but that he fears a particular kind of difference he understands as emerging from a certain group. Again, this sounds like race talk to me, but race talk with a metaphysical foundation.

II

This becomes more apparent if we bring Hegel’s official story of recognition from the Phenomenology of Spirit into play. Hegel tells us that while we may all start out as isolated consciousness that are made restless in our attempts to know objects in the world, we certainly do not end this way. In order to be able to enter the realm of spirit we must pass from our isolated state of consciousness to the social realm of self-consciousness. For Hegel, I am only truly myself when I come to encounter myself through another or, as he says, “Self-consciousness exists in and for itself when, and by the fact that, it so exists for another; that is, it exists only in being acknowledged.” Only through an encounter with another do I realize my own position as a free being submerged in spirit or become self-conscious of myself as a consciousness. Such an encounter, though, is perhaps best understood as a struggle, or, as Hegel says, “They [two-consciousnesses] must engage in this struggle, for they must raise their certainty of being for themselves to truth, both in the case of the other and in their own case.” When two consciousnesses encounter each other, then, there is a moment of existential dread, that they might just be an object for this other consciousness and not themselves free autonomous beings—remember that in the Lectures Hegel has already told us that freedom is the essence of the human.

When I engage in the struggle to be recognized by the other as a free, autonomous consciousness one of two things can take place: 1) I manage to subdue the other and become the Master or the Lordship of the relationship, or 2) I am subdued and take the structural position of the slave or bondsman. If I become the master in Hegel’s account then I am recognized by the other as being a free, autonomous being; I am able to set normative standards through my freedom. If I become the slave, though, I am forced to recognize the master as a freely acting being, but do not myself receive recognition. In other words, I am forced to toil under the master who through winning the struggle also wins the right to direct my labor. However, and this is the great dialectical reversal of Hegel’s theory of recognition, the slave eventually achieves something like recognition through her own work, “Through this rediscovery of himself by himself, the
bondsman realizes that it is precisely in his work wherein he seemed to have only an alienated existence that he acquires a mind of his own.27 The slave (or bondsman) crystallizes herself in her own work, shows that she is a being that expresses herself in the essential creative freedom of work, and thus manages to achieve her own level of recognition. The master (or lordship), on the other hand, is wholly dependent upon the slave’s labor and constant recognition in order to continually reassert her essential freedom. Thus, we find that the power relationship has been reversed: the slave can now assert her being for herself through her own activity while the master must always assert her being for herself through the medium of one already suborned to her. Finally, for Hegel the slave has achieved a state of freedom and recognition beyond the master’s grasp.28

If we take into account what Hegel has previously said about the Africans, it is obvious that they could never in principle experience anything like recognition from another—they lack the cognitive capacity to abstract from themselves. That is to say, since the African cannot truly recognize an other as anything more than just another object in the world he could never rise to the level of self-consciousness. This is the African for whom Hegel asserts, “to the sensuous negro, human flesh is purely an object of the senses, like all other flesh,”29 after all. If the African is able to engage in cannibalism precisely because he cannot see the other as a for-itself or a fellow person with consciousness and, therefore, freedom, then it would seem a bit absurd to think he might engage in a struggle for recognition.

Perhaps more interestingly, though, even if the African could somehow enter into this struggle for recognition she could never possibly win. It seems unlikely she might rise to the level of master since this would require her to recognize herself through another and this recognition would first require her to see the other as one like her—a form of abstraction Hegel has already forbidden. As a slave, though, it seems as if she would be unable to make the necessary abstracting gesture that would allow her to realize that the product of her labor is actually a creative act that posits her own freedom in the object. If she cannot understand the product of her labor as a crystallization of herself, then she will never be able to understand herself as a free, autonomous being possessing self-consciousness. It seems for Hegel, then, that either the African fails to engage in a struggle for recognition and therefore never rises to the level of full humanity in the first place or engages in the struggle but then finds out that enslavement is at the heart of her very nature. And, moreover, a slave who escapes into self-consciousness is denied by her own metaphysical shortcomings. It is not a right it seems as if Hegel would deny South American Indians or persons from China or India (another “nation” he discusses with some obvious appreciation); it is a process that seems closed only to “negroes” from Africa. It seems to me at least that Hegel is less guilty of fearing exotic non-Europeans than of singling out “negroes” as a race—a nation draw together by a common divorce from Reason—incapable of rising to the level of self-consciousness. And perhaps unable even to leap to the basic human level of abstract recognition.

Whether we accept such conclusions, though, is a matter of whether or not we understand Hegel’s remarks on Africa to be philosophically interesting. Philosophers such as Bonetto want to place Hegel’s comments on “negroes” outside of his philosophical sphere, as the ranting and raving of the man and not the philosopher. As I have already argued, a literal reconstruction of a figure in the history of philosophy would amount to simply republishing his books—there does not seem to be an escape from interpretation when presenting a thinker’s views. Bonetto’s interpretative choice, then, is to insert a wedge between Hegel’s “official” philosophy and the remarks on Africa that appear in the Lectures. This seems to me to be a disingenuous move, though. Hegel’s view of Africans is obviously driven, in part at least, by his thought; the notion of a philosophical history, of “nations” that are “in” spirit and whose practices are expressions of certain primordial ideas are concepts that are absolutely vital to the Hegelian project. Such weighty philosophical notions also inform and shape Hegel’s view(s) on race.

It is simply not the case I want to argue that Hegel’s philosophy is one thing and his views on race are another. However, I do not want to argue that Hegel’s theory of recognition, world history, or spirit are somehow inherently racist—I do not believe them to be—or cannot be detached from the use he puts them from. Like all thinkers in the history of philosophy Hegel is many things, and one of those “things” is a toolbox; we can make of his ideas what we wish.

More to the point, though, my argument here is not that Hegel is a racist. My argument is that Hegel’s view of race is informed by his “Official” philosophy and that his view of race, in turn, informs his greater philosophical project. Calling Hegel a racist is beside the point: what I think we should really be interested in is giving a philosophical account of Hegel’s view of race and, moreover, understanding how it fits conceptually with the greater whole of his thought. What I want to deny, though, is that Hegel’s view of race is merely incidental to his thought or that it is philosophically uninteresting. As I hope to have shown here, Hegel’s concept of race is grounded in his philosophy and has implications for how we read him (and perhaps how he read himself). Finally, to hearken back to Deleuze, my project here has been to properly think about a few of the assumptions Hegel makes and draw some conclusions for his greater project from them. The concept of race is one of the most powerful, if most overlooked, assumptions in the history of philosophy and one that is well deserving of our critical attention.

Endnotes


2. Of course, we must not forget that even reducing the concept of humanity to “European White Men” is probably too generous for some philosophers of the Enlightenment—they might also be required to own property, be heterosexual, Christian, or meet a plethora of other specific qualifications. Again, though, this is not to indict the humanism of the Enlightenment, but to point out some interesting limitations and blind spots. Indeed, a more radical modernity may, I think, provide us with just the sorts of conceptual tools to envision a more egalitarian world.


5. See Hegel’s famous critique of phrenology in Phenomenology of Spirit, p. 18.


7. I take Hegel to be largely in line with the eighteenth- and nineteenth-century German understanding of philosophy as “science” or Wissenschaft. That is to say, along with Kant, Fichte, and Schelling. Hegel thinks it important that any philosophy—in order to be qualified as philosophy proper—be wholly systematic. It is an early view that underlies his early publication The Difference between Fichte’s and Schelling’s System of Philosophy and receives further attention in subsequent writings. Therefore, it seems to me, if we are to take Hegel’s commitment to system
10. This interpretation of spirit certainly could be disputed. However, what has to be agreed in order to render some of Hegel’s texts coherent with one another, is that whatever spirit is it is deeply tied to the particular social traditions of a people at a given time and place. To think of spirit in decidedly theological terms—as British Idealists such as Coleridge tended to do—is to render Hegel a dime store Spinoza. So, in my interpretation of Hegel I largely follow a number of Hegel’s more astute English commentators. See Robert Pippin, Hegel’s Idealism: The Satisfactions of Self-Consciousness (Cambridge, United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press, 1989) for an excellent example of such scholarship.

11. Remember, though, Hegel is not thinking in terms of “nation-states,” but rather in terms of a common culture or guide principle. Nevertheless, there are many interesting things to make from this passage. In a more exhaustive study on Hegel and race, it would be necessary to lay out the connection between the “land” and the historical character of a people. Here, though, it will have to regrettably be a loose end. However, its absence should not be taken as a comment on its importance: it may be possible that for Hegel the evils of Africa actually emerged, in a sense, from its soil.

12. There are many interesting things to make from this passage. The notion that “Africans” are somehow always in a childlike state was once a defense of the practice of slavery itself, a kind of benevolent paternalism done precisely for the benefit of the perpetual children. Also interesting is Hegel’s use of darkness and night as symbols of ignorance and light as a symbol of self-recognition. Again, there are more things to be said about this passage, but unfortunately I will have to leave them to the side in this discussion.

13. See Hegel’s passage on pp. 182-83: “Along with this [absence of sympathy] goes the belief that it is quite normal and permissible to eat human flesh.”


15. The influence of this famous passage on Marx should be obvious now. For Marx capital is precisely the system that removes the freedom of the slave from herself by taking away her creations that, as you will remember, are crystallized bits of her own self. So, if we keep Hegel in mind here, the capitalist literally takes a part of you by taking the products of your labor.


17. Greg Moses is author of Revolution of Conscience: Martin Luther King, Jr., and the Philosophy of Nonviolence. He serves as editor of the Newsletter for the Concerned Philosophers for Peace (peacephilosophy.org). Chapters by Moses have appeared in recent collections such as White on White / Black on Black (Rowman & Littlefield) and Prisons and Punishment (Africa World Press). His research focuses on peace philosophy, especially as it has been developed in the USA, with recent interest in the works of Anthony Benezet and J. Leonard Farmer, Sr. He teaches philosophy and general education courses at Austin, Texas.

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