FROM THE EDITOR
Serena Parekh

ABOUT THE NEWSLETTER ON FEMINISM AND PHILOSOPHY

SUBMISSION GUIDELINES

NEWS FROM THE CSW

MUSINGS
Ásta

To Do Metaphysics as a Feminist: Reflections on Feminist Methodology in Light of the Hypatia Affair

BOOK REVIEWS

Erin C. Tarver and Shannon Sullivan: Feminist Interpretations of William James
Reviewed by Seth Vannatta

Laurie J. Shrage and Robert Scott Stewart: Philosophizing About Sex
Reviewed by F. Vera-Gray

Cheshire Calhoun: Moral Aims
Reviewed by Lisa Tessman

Shay Welch: Existential Eroticism. A Feminist Approach to Understanding Women’s Oppression-Perpetuating Choices
Reviewed by Mara Marin

Mariana Ortega: In-Between: Latina Feminist Phenomenology, Multiplicity, and the Self
Reviewed by Katrina England

Lauren Swayne Barthold: A Hermeneutic Approach to Gender and Other Social Identities
Reviewed by Tina Fernandes Botts

Johanna Oksala: Feminist Experiences
Reviewed by Chris Jingchao Ma

Kelly Oliver: Hunting Girls: Sexual Violence from the Hunger Games to Campus Rape
Reviewed by Summer Renault-Steele

Diana Tietjens Meyers: Poverty, Agency, and Human Rights
Reviewed by Lynda Lange

Martha Nussbaum: Anger and Forgiveness: Resentment, Generosity, Justice
Reviewed by Mechthild Nagel
FROM THE EDITOR

Serena Parekh  
NORTHEASTERN UNIVERSITY

This issue includes a new section entitled “Musings,” which includes a talk recently given by Ásta. It is her reflection on what’s come to be called the “Hypatia Affair” and seeks to shed light on what the Affair means for feminist methodologies going forward. Because the mission of this newsletter is to provide a space for thoughtful discussions of issues that are relevant to feminist philosophers, I’ve included it in this issue. About the Affair, she writes, “Note that we are not talking about freedom of speech here. At issue is not whether an author can argue for offensive claims or be insensitive in their argument. At issue is what academic excellence in feminist philosophy scholarship consists in.” This is certainly an issue of great importance to the feminist philosophy community.

In addition, the newsletter contains ten reviews of recent feminist scholarship. The books reviewed here reflect the diversity of approaches in contemporary feminist scholarship: Anglo-American/analytic, continental philosophy, history of philosophy, and non-Western philosophy among others. Many thanks to all those who submitted articles, reviewed books, and to those who acted as reviewers of submissions for this issue of the newsletter. Please consider submitting an article for publication in this newsletter and/or volunteering to review a book.

SUBMISSION GUIDELINES AND INFORMATION

1. Purpose: The purpose of the newsletter is to publish information about the status of women in philosophy and to make the resources of feminist philosophy more widely available. The newsletter contains discussions of recent developments in feminist philosophy and related work in other disciplines, literature overviews and book reviews, suggestions for eliminating gender bias in the traditional philosophy curriculum, and reflections on feminist pedagogy. It also informs the profession about the work of the APA Committee on the Status of Women. While articles published are usually around ten pages, we can also publish longer ones. All submissions must follow the APA guidelines for gender-neutral language. Please submit essays electronically to the editor at s.parekh@neu.edu. All manuscripts should be prepared for anonymous review. References should follow The Chicago Manual of Style.

2. Book Reviews and Reviewers: If you have published a book that is appropriate for review in the newsletter, please email the editor a flyer of your book and the name and contact information of your publisher. We are always seeking new book reviewers. To volunteer to review books (or some particular book), please send the editor a CV and letter of interest, including mention of your areas of research and teaching.

3. Where to Send Things: Please send all articles, comments, suggestions, books, and other communications to the editor: Dr. Serena Parekh, Northeastern University, s.parekh@neu.edu. Please also send any announcement or CFPs you would like to include in the newsletter.

4. Submission Deadlines: Submissions for spring issues are due by the preceding September 1; submissions for fall issues are due by the preceding February 1.

ABOUT THE NEWSLETTER ON FEMINISM AND PHILOSOPHY

The Newsletter on Feminism and Philosophy is sponsored by the APA Committee on the Status of Women (CSW). The newsletter is designed to provide an introduction to recent philosophical work that addresses issues of gender. None of the varied philosophical views presented by authors of newsletter articles necessarily reflect the views of any or all of the members of the Committee on the Status of Women, including the editor(s) of the newsletter, nor does the committee advocate any particular type of feminist philosophy. We advocate only that serious philosophical attention be given to issues of gender and that claims of gender bias in philosophy receive full and fair consideration.

NEWS FROM THE COMMITTEE ON THE STATUS OF WOMEN

COMMITTEE MEMBERS FOR 2017–2018
As of July 1, 2017, the CSW comprises Charlotte Witt (chair), Peggy DesAutels (ex officio), Serena Parekh (ex officio),
Margaret Atherton, Amy Baehr, Karen Detlefsen, Colleen Murphy, Sheryl Ross, Peter Railton, Michael Rea, Lisa Shapiro, and Yolanda Wilson.

NEW CSW POSTERS
We are delighted to announce that two new posters will be available for purchase soon on the CSW website. Each is a large photo montage of a different design, but both bear the title “Women of Philosophy.” The designs, by Chad Robinson, are a must buy for departments and offices.

CSW WEBSITE
The CSW website, at http://www.apaonlinecsw.org/, continues to offer posters featuring contemporary women in philosophy as well as news about women philosophers. Links to excellent resources include one to a database on teaching, with articles and readings; another to the crowd-sourced directory of women philosophers; and one to the APA Ombudsperson for Nondiscrimination, who will receive complaints of discrimination and, where possible, serve as a resource to APA members regarding such complaints.

SITE VISIT PROGRAM
The director and associate directors of the program led a day-long Site Visit Training Workshop on Saturday, April 15, during the 2017 Pacific Division meeting in Seattle WA.

CSW SESSIONS AT APA MEETINGS
The Eastern Division session sponsored by CSW was “Women Do History of Philosophy—Recent Scholarship,” with talks by Agnes Callard, Marta Jimenez, Chris Meyns, and Jessica Gordon-Roth. The CSW also co-sponsored (with the APA Committee on the Status of Black Philosophers) a session on “Women of Color Feminism,” with presentations by Naomi Zack, Joy James, Tommy J. Curry, and Celena Simpson.

At the Central Division meeting, the CSW sponsored “Celebrating Sandra Lee Bartky,” with talks by Samantha Brennan, Tom Digby, Linda Heldke, Jeanine Schroer, and Lynne Tirrell. Their talks are posted at http://www.apaonlinecsw.org.

At the Pacific Division meeting, the CSW sponsored a book symposium on Elizabeth Barnes’s The Minority Body, with speakers Leslie Pickering Francis, Dana Howard, and Eva Kittay. The CSW also co-sponsored several sessions: “Institutional and Attitudinal Barriers,” “Outreach and Issues of Recruitment/Retention,” and “Inclusiveness in Crisis: How Do We Address Social and Political Flashpoints in Philosophy Courses?”

MUSINGS
To Do Metaphysics as a Feminist: Reflections on Feminist Methodology in Light of the Hypatia Affair
Ásta
SAN FRANCISCO STATE UNIVERSITY, ASTA@SFSU.EDU

Thank you all for being here today. I thought I would give a different sort of talk today. I thought I would talk about doing metaphysics of the social world as a feminist. I would have talked about how most metaphysicians of the social world think our job is simply to describe our social world in a value-free way and how most metaphysicians of the social world focus on social phenomena such as institutions and notions such as joint intention, commitment, and attention, whereas if you are a feminist like me (or engaged in other liberatory projects), then you might be more interested in the part of the social world that isn’t about the intentional, or about explicit commitments.

But I’m not going to talk about that today. And the reason for that is that my views about how to do metaphysics as a feminist are undergoing a radical transformation, and chiefly because of the Hypatia affair.

A disclaimer is in order here. I’m on the Board of Associate Editors of Hypatia. But what I say here today are my personal reflections, not that of the board or the journal.

I’m going to allow myself to be a bit personal here. It is unusual for me. My talk is entitled “To Do Metaphysics as a Feminist.” And I am a metaphysician by training and temperament. My talk could just as well have been called “Confessions of an Analytic Philosopher” because my training was analytic, although I have for a long time considered myself a post-analytic philosopher.

What attracted me to analytic philosophy was the focus on clarity: What precisely is the claim? What is the argument? What is the conclusion? Whereas if you are a feminist like me (or engaged in other liberatory projects), then you might be more interested in the part of the social world that isn’t about the intentional, or about explicit commitments.

The violence of the knife imagery is intentional: I experience the practice of doing analytic metaphysics as brutal: we dissect arguments (perhaps like frogs? I don’t know about your background, but I have many friends in the US whose science education seems to have consisted mostly in dissecting frogs; we don’t have frogs in Iceland). Another image is slicing and dicing: we slice and dice up the conceptual space as the best sous chefs. And then...
the third violent image: when it comes to constructing arguments, we beat words and ideas into submission.

A friend of mine, who is a poet, once described our different relationship to language: I was like the classical ballerina beating my body into submission every day for the occasional performance in which I seemed to float around effortlessly in the most unnatural of poses.

She, on the other hand, didn’t think of herself as a master of words or body. She wasn’t trying to tame them or beat them into submission. It was a different sort of dance. Words were connected to the gut and the unconscious, and her aim was to bring to light what was hidden in the words, their histories, and their associations.

I am still attracted to the product of the brutal regimen. But there is no mercy in the production.

Another thing that attracted me to analytic philosophy in the beginning is related to this lack of mercy. It is the idea that it is the claim or argument that matters, not who makes it. This was particularly attractive to me, coming from Iceland, where there is a certain tendency to accept uncritically the word of authority figures.

Judy Thomson describes insightfully in an old interview how this commitment was woven into the way philosophy was practiced in the MIT philosophy department: You may give a good paper on Friday afternoon, but when you are back in the department on Monday there is no resting on the laurels received on Friday. Your Monday morning argument doesn’t get the halo effect of your triumph on Friday: it stands or falls on its own. You and your track record cannot ease its path to acceptance. (Even if you are Judith Jarvis Thomson, I might add).

I was, and am, attracted to this radical egalitarian potential of analytic philosophy. It isn’t practiced everywhere, of course, but I was lucky enough to be at some places where that is the norm.

I may be in the minority at this conference, but I think of analytic philosophy as having huge radical potential: no question is off the table, and it is claims and arguments that are evaluated, not people. Analytic philosophy has radically anti-authoritarian aspirations.

The question just is, who gets to sit at the table?

I’ve been a feminist for a long time, perhaps because I was often the only girl engaged in various activities like sports or math and physics competitions. I don’t know. But for a long time it wasn’t exactly clear how my feminist commitments were expressed in my work, apart from the choice of the subject matter itself, and it is only recently that I have started to articulate more clearly how my feminist commitments are reflected in my methodological commitments. Even as recently as January, I gave a talk where I characterized my book on social categories, *Categories We Live By*, as feminist, because it was motivated by feminist social justice concerns. How that was reflected in my methodology, as opposed to the subject matter, was unclear.

Then came the *Hypatia* affair.

I probably don’t have to provide much context here, so let me be very brief: a philosopher published a paper in *Hypatia*, the flagship feminist philosophy journal, in which she stated that arguments for the possibility of changing gender apply equally well for changing race, and that therefore people should be able to change race.

A month or so after the publication of the essay, a social media storm began. People were hurt and outraged for a myriad of reasons. Some people were offended by the question or the conclusion; some were offended that a seemingly white, heterosexual, cisgender person was tackling these questions. But there were also more substantive criticisms, including that the author ignored the trans and critical race theory literature on related topics.

I’m on the Board of Associate Editors at *Hypatia*, which is the board that advises on policy and selects editors, but isn’t responsible for the day-to-day running of the journal.

My first reaction to the publication was that this paper was an example of a certain way of doing philosophy that is very prevalent (and accepted) in the discipline of philosophy today. I may think that working on these topics without engaging the trans and critical race theory literature is doing bad philosophy, but I think similar thoughts about a lot of philosophy that doesn’t engage what I take to be relevant considerations (I think that way about a lot of current philosophy of language, for example).

This paper is a product of the kind of training most analytic philosophers in the US get, feminist or not (I am interested to hear what non-US-based philosophers think about the training in their countries). It isn’t a bad example of its kind, although I think its kind is bad for the reason that it doesn’t engage what I take to be relevant literature and considerations.

But we are a pluralist feminist philosophy journal. This paper was anonymously refereed by at least two expert colleagues of ours. I might not have accepted it myself, if I had been asked to review it, but that is the journal process.

So my first reaction was this: I don’t think the paper as it stands passes muster for being a good feminist philosophy paper, publishable in *Hypatia*, because it doesn’t engage the relevant literature. But we are a pluralist feminist journal and some colleagues of mine may apply different standards of excellence and find this a good paper, because it is the sort of paper, apart from its subject matter, that typically gets published in mainstream philosophy journals.

Note that we are not talking about freedom of speech here. At issue is not whether an author can argue for offensive claims or be insensitive in their argument. At issue is what academic excellence in feminist philosophy scholarship consists in.

But the emails and Facebook messages and phone calls continued. And I started to listen. What exactly is going on?
I am neither trans* nor a person of color. Some of the features I identify with are recognizable socially in the US or Germany, some not. For instance, I’m a lesbian (recognizable). I’m from a very small country (Iceland) that was a colony (the Danes were the lords for some centuries). We speak a minority language and have various minority practices (including naming practices)—none of that really registers.

I thought: OK, I’m missing something here. Perhaps it’s like when people write about the value of language without engaging work on minority languages. Or perhaps it is like when people liken homosexuality to pedophilia. Or, as Richard Swinburne did recently, argue that homosexuality is like disability (seemingly offending homosexuals, people with disabilities, and even those who care about both).

I get that those would be offensive and make me or others mad. But being mad isn’t the issue. People can be mad for all kinds of reasons, including, precisely, when someone who makes you mad is right. A case in point is when Rebecca Solnit wrote a piece in Harper’s magazine, published in 2008, about, among other things, how the Icelandic democracy wasn’t functioning. I was royally offended (I thought it worked much better than the American one, for example) and invited her to tea. We became fast friends and the Icelandic economy crashed a week later (largely because of the failure of our democracy).

People can be offended for all sorts of reasons. Hypatia as a journal is not an offense police. Our job is to produce excellent feminist philosophy scholarship, and our refereeing policies and procedures are to reflect that commitment.

But the response to the publication wasn’t all offense, or even hurt. Among all the offense, the hurt, and the outrage was something that I could recognize as having real critical bite: it was the sense of betrayal.

Amidst the turmoil Lori Gruen reminded me of a passage from an essay María Lugones and Elizabeth Spelman published together. It is in Lugones’ voice that they ask:

> What are the things we need to know about others, and about ourselves, in order to speak intelligently, intelligibly, sensitively, and helpfully about their lives? We can show respect, or lack of it, in writing theoretically about others no less than in talking directly with them . . .

> When we speak, write, and publish our theories, to whom do we think we are accountable?

There are two main questions here. The first question is how we should theorize about other people’s lives, and the second is the question to whom we are accountable in our theorizing. This second question is the same question as who gets to sit at the table of my radically egalitarian analytic philosopher.

> There is a limited number of seats at the table because of the physical limitations of the room, size of table, and so on. And there is a limit to how many communities of people one can hold oneself accountable to because of limited intellectual, emotional, linguistic, material, and temporal resources.

So who are we feminist philosophers, including feminist metaphysicians, accountable to?

Publishing the essay in Hypatia without engaging the trans* and critical race theory literature about passing, identity, and related topics sends the message that the author is not accountable to those communities. But what is worse, it sends the message that the journal is not accountable to those communities. And therein lies the betrayal.

Let me be perfectly clear: I am not blaming the author. I think it could have been an earlier version of myself. We have talked a lot about ideology these past couple of days. The author was badly served by our review process. The paper is a perfectly respectable piece of analytic philosophy in the sense that it is a product of the sort of training most Ph.D. students in the US get. I am also not blaming our editor. Our editor carried out our policies and procedures to a T. Those were the procedures we had at the time. They were shown to be inadequate. That’s why the Board of Associate Editors, which is the board responsible for policies and changes to them, issued an apology. Hypatia, the feminist journal, cannot publish essays specifically about the experiences and identities of people in its own community that ignore the scholarship on those very topics by that community.

Doing so is to say to those members of our community: You don’t get to sit at our table. We are not accountable to you. We treat you as mere objects of reflection, not as people, living and breathing, and not as theorists to engage with.

It is to enact epistemic marginalization. It is to enact epistemic harm.

The journal is not the offense police. But it is the have-you-engaged-the-relevant-literature police. And given our feminist commitments, we as a journal are in the make-sure-we-are-not-enacting-marginalization-of-our-own­community police. We failed.

The associate editors apologized to take responsibility for that failure and commit to doing better in the future. We did not express support for a retraction. I did not think that was an option at all: the paper went through our process.

I regret very much the harm the failure of our process caused our author, not to mention the subsequent attacks in the media on our author. She did not deserve any of this. I have no doubt that she had the best of intentions. She has my support, as does our editor.

I, for one, was trying to listen to and learn from members of our own feminist philosophical community who felt betrayed. But I know many other members of the Board of Associate Editors did not need to be similarly educated.
Struggles over who gets to sit at the table are not new in the feminist community. Not all that long ago lesbians weren’t allowed at the feminist theory table, for instance, or black women, or working-class women. The ideal of the feminist in the seventies was a middle class, educated, white, heterosexual woman. She was cisgender, of course, but no one would have even recognized that as one of her features.

A variation of this struggle is, to my mind, going on in feminist philosophy today. Feminist philosophers aren’t all white, middle class, het, cis, or even women. And, I’ll add, we aren’t all native speakers of English, based in North America, Christian, or trained in a certain way of doing philosophy.

The Hypatia affair brought all of this to light and showed the need for many difficult conversations in the feminist philosophy community. As feminist philosophy has become more mainstream, there are now pressures on our community to do the ongoing work to examine ourselves and our practices and have them truly reflect our feminist commitments.

Let me now step back a little.

I’ve described a transformation that I went through as a result of the Hypatia affair. It is a transformation regarding what it means to be accountable to a certain community. And I’ve described how I think such accountability should be reflected in the methodological commitments of a feminist philosophy journal like Hypatia.

But what about my own transformation? And how do I square my commitments to radically egalitarian analytic philosophy with my feminist commitments?

To approach that question I want to go back to the quote from the Lugones and Spelman essay. The essay, you may remember, is called “Have we got a theory for you!” The other question in that quote is how we are to theorize about other people. I actually think it also applies when we theorize about ourselves, but let’s not linger with that now. Their suggestion is that we should theorize with respect and take cue from how we talk with each other across difference, especially when much is at stake. We tread carefully. We listen. And we ask questions before we make statements. We are epistemically humble.

Can the analogy help us with how to theorize about other people? How are we to theorize in a respectful way? And, in particular, how are we to theorize when much is at stake for the people we are theorizing about?

I’m not advocating incorporating an analogous mainstreaming practice for theorists. But I think we need to think about whose lives are affected by our theorizing and take great care in engaging their own theoretical perspectives on the issues. These are the people with “skin in the game.” The idea of theorizing with respect by engaging people’s own theoretical perspectives, then, also has epistemological implications.

I’m not advocating that only people with skin in the game talk about a certain issue. I’m also not claiming that people with skin in the game have privileged epistemic access to certain issues in such a way that others cannot, in principle, understand them. That would be a strong interpretation of standpoint theory, and I do not subscribe to it. But I think that people with skin in the game often have perspectives on, and experience with, things that others don’t. This is soft standpoint theory, and it is compatible with radical analytic egalitarianism.

We need to listen and we need to engage. This means that analytic philosophers like me cannot continue to do theorizing about people as we have done until now.

I say "we" here, although there are a number of analytic philosophers who have long ago stopped doing philosophy in that way, and a high proportion of them is in this room.

What does this mean? This means that we have to read and engage with work in related scholarly fields more than we do. We should be very wary of the old “that’s not philosophy” trick to push someone off the table in a climate where the discipline of philosophy is extremely white, male, het, cis, and so on. There is gatekeeping going on in philosophy, masked by the ideology of philosophical talent and the associated philosophical genius. There are pressures that direct people who are philosophically inclined and address philosophical questions away from philosophy and to related fields. The reach of our reading, listening, and theoretical engagement needs to take account of that.

It’s not going to be easy. While a lot of feminists incorporate work in adjacent fields, including empirical work, philosophers doing metaphysics and related subjects generally do not, and it may require a balancing act to meet the sometimes competing standards of mainstream metaphysics and feminist philosophy.

What can I say? Philosophy is hard. Good philosophy is harder.

NOTES

1. This was a talk given under the title “To Do Metaphysics as a Feminist” at a conference on feminist philosophy and methodological commitments at Humboldt University in Berlin, July 13-14, 2017. The conference was organized by Mari Mikkola, Hilkie Hähel, and Johanna Müller (http://feminist-philosophy-berlin.weebly.com/). Of course, no one associated with the conference, or mentioned in the talk, is responsible for the views expressed herein.

2. I resigned from the Board of Associate Editors of the journal Hypatia, along with my colleagues, on July 22, 2017, after the Board of Directors of the non-profit entity Hypatia, which owns the journal Hypatia, had suspended the governance document for the journal.
BOOK REVIEWS

Feminist Interpretations of William James


Reviewed by Seth Vannatta
MORGAN STATE UNIVERSITY, SETH.VANNATTA@MORGAN.EDU

A central lesson gleaned from this admirable, multi-authored volume is that we need to be rigorously self-reflective about our own unarticulated cultural assumptions and prejudices. Even as we extol a methodology that should bring these presuppositions to the surface for examination, we often fail. William James, himself, offers a feminist-friendly philosophy of experience in moral reasoning, epistemology, and social philosophy, but falls well short of letting his methodology interrogate his own problematic assumptions about women’s lives and potential liberation from patriarchy. Most of us fall short as well, and the lessons of the chapters in this volume remind us to be more vigilant and thoroughgoing in our self-analysis. I will try to do so in my review of this work and, more importantly, in my life’s work.

With a feeling of warmth and at-home-ness I read and review this book, a most recent contribution to Penn State University Press’s series, Re-Reading the Canon, because I know most of the contributors through our interactions in professional philosophy and I happened to be at the session in the Summer Institute in American Philosophy in Eugene, Oregon, where some of the preliminary feminist interpretations of James were presented. Further, I regularly teach Charlene Seigfried’s Pragmatism and Feminism, from which the opening chapter is taken and reflected on by its author, nine years after its publication.1 But with its central lesson in mind, I must read and respond with fresh eyes, allow myself to experience perplexity in my reading, and dispassionately offer some helpful criticism.

Its editors, Erin Tarver and Shannon Sullivan, remind the readers in their introduction that for feminists (and all philosophers) a blank slate is not a profitable starting point. We must take the history of philosophy seriously, but balance our charitable readings of it with the criticisms it deserves. William James’s place in the history of philosophy deserves more than a modicum of charity, but as these authors unmistakably establish, he deserves the criticism they proffer. I begin with a summary of such criticisms. Seigfried shows readers that James defined women in relation to men and in relation to their ability to fulfill men’s needs (28). Jacob Goodson provides an alternative to Seigfried’s reading of James’s reviews of Bushnell’s natural law argument against women’s suffrage and Mill’s utilitarian and sentimentalist arguments for women’s equality. Goodson shows why James was critical of Mill’s reasoning and highlights the virtues of James’s relational and anti-rationalist moral reasoning, even while conceding that James missed the opportunity to declare support for women’s equality (68–69).

Erin McKenna furthers Seigfried’s critiques of James by reminding readers that James’s beliefs should be found in his habits of action, and when we investigate his habits of interacting with women, we find real problems in his professional, personal, and familial relationships—James regularly backgrounded women’s work and value, ignored their concrete desires for liberation from only domestic life and work, and was insensitive to the ways his words and actions hurt women, including his wife, Alice (81, 87). Further, much of the scholarly work on James has perpetuated this problem by ignoring his interactions with women, including Jane Addams, and the potential influence they had on his thinking (83). Tarver uses Simone de Beauvoir to unpack the sexist implications of James’s use of feminine metaphors to represent philosophies, including Lady Pragmatism, that “we” (men) might choose as the mistress mostly likely to serve our needs. The implications of this analysis and Tarver’s critique of James’s assertions about great men, philosophically inconsistent with his otherwise relational view of the self, are far reaching and exceedingly well written—Tarver takes James to task for the sexist damage his texts inflict but manages to do so “as a friend of James” (110).

The bulk of the text is devoted not only to critiques of James’s feminist shortcomings, but to a mining of the subversively feminine and feminist themes in his writing for appropriation. To these I now turn thematically. It is important to note that every author who engages in this “modern feminist philosophical appropriation” realizes and admits the difficulties and potential problems of looking past James’s gender biases (142). The authors in this volume do not traffic in the assumption that such biases are irrelevant. The first theme for which James’s philosophical tools are mined is care ethics. Susan Dieleman and Maurice Hammington rely appropriately on the primary and secondary resources of contemporary care ethics to elicit the themes in James’s work useful to the advancement of a non-essentialist project of an ethic of care, which emphasizes the plurality of emergent, contextual values and obligations in an ongoing effort to widen the scope of the circle of caring (128, 145). Both give useful and brief histories of care ethics and rely on James’s “On a Certain Blindness in Human Beings” and “The Moral Equivalent to War” to illustrate the role of relations, emotions, and habits in an ethic of care, which, like James’s moral philosophy, refuses both the abstract notion of the autonomous and independent moral agent as the center of moral decision-making and the process of applying universal principles to particular morally problematic situations.

I read the chapters in the volume’s third part on embodiment and emotion anticipating a big, feminist cash-value moment. Reflecting on my feeling that the chapters did not deliver in that way, it struck me that what constitutes a “feminist interpretation” varies widely. And in this section, Megan Craig, Shannon Sullivan, and Jeremy Carrette highlight that in...
James’s corpus, including reflections on ways to ameliorate the stresses of American life incrementally, the philosophy of emotion, and mystical experience, which much of mainstream American philosophy, although not feminist philosophy, has tended to marginalize. These chapters adeptly balance textual and historical analysis to make clearer to the reader central Jamesian insights regarding the cultivation of healthy habits, a philosophy of emotion that identifies emotion with the body, and an emphasis on James’s proto-feminist “more,” including its refusal of closure and its fluidity of forms (227). These chapters also offer unique strengths. Craig’s chapter is rare in that it delivers more relevant contemporary denotative references for James’s philosophy (something I wanted more of from the other chapters). This includes the application of her emphasis on openness and habit cultivation to ameliorate the stresses, some unique to women, of fast-paced, digital lives (175). Sullivan’s chapter is unique in its germane connection of contemporary research on the sociality of emotion and affective transmission to James’s philosophy of emotion (203). Carrette’s chapter convincingly shows that James’s use of women’s religious experience in the Varieties is caught up in the web of religious and scientific understandings of women’s bodies that underwrite patriarchal domination (226).

My strongest criticism of the volume is that several chapters give a nod to Elizabeth Spelman’s claim that too much feminist thought operates according to the “tidy and irrefutable” unstated assumption that “all women are women” and then proceeds to re-center the race-less, able-bodied, straight, middle-class woman in their discussion of feminism (125). However, the penultimate chapter by José Medina, and the last by Lorraine Code, helped assuage this concern. Medina builds on the scholarship of Cornel West, Harvey Cormier, and others to show how “the critical potential of James’s pragmatism became impaired by a bourgeois individualism” in ways that weakened its ability to tackle issues of injustice, privilege, and oppression (237). The chapter shows the ways in which James’s pragmatism and standpoint theory converge. However, using the work of Patricia Hill Collins and others, Medina uncovers what is lacking in James’s corpus to make each of these convergent points radical and critical enough to tackle patriarchal privilege and other epistemic injustices. On my reading, only Medina interrogates anything beyond the male as the assumed center. He writes, “We need to center the queer [. . .] by queering the center,” this a feature of his guerrilla pluralism, a strategy to develop tools of unknowing in response to James’s failure in epistemic responsibility (245).

Code reads James alongside Harriet Beecher Stowe’s Uncle Tom’s Cabin to give life to James’s claim that “novels of a deeper sort” must ally themselves with more traditional forays into ethics. Code contends that Stowe’s novel “opens an analogous conceptual space for connecting women’s feminist emancipatory issues with slavery/antiblack racism, and with the promise James evinces for acting “as if”—showing that “faith in a fact can help create the fact” (264–65). Stowe’s work makes evident the difference between propositional knowing (that S is P) and the imaginative, situated, and felt knowledge that can serve as epistemic resistance to oppression (273). Stowe’s novel fulfills the promise Code finds in James’s moral reasoning and insights concerning the will to believe.

Beyond the criticism registered above, somewhat appeased by Medina’s and Code’s contributions, the main shortcoming I felt after finishing the chapters concerns the difference the scholarship makes in our contemporary daily experiences. I began by articulating the central lesson of the volume—we need to realize failures to interrogate our own practices which may benefit from or participate in patriarchal privilege and habituate the practice of more rigorous self-analysis. For example, I have read much of James’s corpus, including his problematic gendered metaphors about Lady Pragmatism, with a certain blindness. This book will succeed in making me a more sensitive reader. But I anticipated more authors applying James’s feminist-friendly tools to experiences and practices including, for example, pedagogy or serving on hiring committees in ways that confront rather than reinforce patriarchy. With few exceptions, the authors’ laudatory flights into critical analysis and feminist appropriation, on my reading, failed to perch sufficiently on the realities of patriarchy and privilege in our daily work.

That said, the authors in this volume analyze James’s texts adroitly, eloquently, and sensitively. They make a meaningful contribution to the history of American philosophy, to our understanding of William James’s philosophy, American Pragmatism, and feminism. I recommend it without reservation to scholars of each and to other interested lines of research including womanism, religious studies, and psychology. Tarver and Sullivan managed a talented set of scholars in a way that paid tribute to James’s pluralism, but the book also serves as a warm and deserved acknowledgment of one of the pioneers in pragmatist feminism and William James scholarship. Seigfried’s chapters open and close the volume in a rich and satisfying way. Her charitable contributions of the first chapter and the afterword fashion the plural perspectives into an edifying unity.

ENDNOTES

BIBLIOGRAPHY
Philosophizing About Sex


Reviewed by F. Vera-Gray
DURHAM UNIVERSITY, FIONA.VERA-GRAY@DURHAM.AC.UK

In Philosophizing About Sex, Laurie J. Shrage and Robert Scott Stewart have set out on a valuable endeavor, offering a clearly written textbook covering current philosophical debates on human sexuality. With an inquisitive and conversational tone, the book covers such often polarized and polarizing questions as “Are we born gay or straight?” “Who should be allowed to marry?” “Is sex always harmful for children?” And “Can sex or porn be addictive?” The approach taken by the authors is one of philosophical curiosity, providing enough information about the various positions within the debates, and their philosophical backing, to generate both lively discussion among students and a desire to find out more. Given that both of these outcomes should form the intention of a textbook such as this, the authors successfully navigate what could be troublesome terrain.

The book is divided into 12 chapters, each taking a general topic for discussion, most often through a range of associated questions. The following topics are covered: Defining Sex; Sexual Attraction; Sexual Objectification and Autonomy; Sex and Violence; Sexual Perversion and Sodomy Laws; Sex and Marriage; Sex and Children; Sexual Speech and the Freedom of Expression; Sexual Privacy; Sex and Responsibility; The Scientific and Medical Study of Sex; and Sex and the Limits of Tolerance in Secular Democratic Societies. That the authors have managed to incorporate such a diverse range of topics necessarily limits the depth with which each can be explored. This means the philosophical problems thrown up by some of the questions raised are not always fully fleshed out in all their depth and complexity. Rather, they are to be better understood as a tasting plate, an excellent introductory resource to philosophizing about sex destined to inspire inquisitive minds to search further. The text itself is written in such a way that it includes many practical examples and US cultural reference points, such as various movies, case law, and examples such as comedian Daniel Tosh’s ill-advised defense of rape jokes in 2012 (167), or advice columnist Dan Savage’s position on the need to be “good, giving and game” (212) in relation to fulfilling a partner’s sexual desires. This approach will make not only for engaging reading, but also helps to ground the philosophical discussion in its everyday implications, ensuring we never stray too far into abstract, theoretical territory. This, together with its subject matter (it is a book on sex after all!), will inevitably help to spark—and maybe even keep—the interest of even the most easily distracted students.

Each chapter is followed by discussion questions and further reading, a useful combination of popular open-access articles such as those in the New York Times or Huffington Post, as well as more traditional academic journal articles. This combination makes the book a great resource for stand-alone lessons based on the chapter topic, both within and outside of philosophy. Indeed, the authors are to be commended for the gender balance in their further reading lists, something particularly necessary for redressing the historical imbalance in philosophy, though there is the occasional puzzling absence of in-text references to key figures in the debates under consideration. I’m thinking here of the discussion on intersectionality in Chapter 2, which does not cite Kimberlie Crenshaw (though it does reference an organization she leads), the discussion of rape as a weapon of war made without reference to Catharine MacKinnon, or the discussions of intersubjectivity and sex in Chapters 1 and 3, as well as the female orgasm in Chapter 11, made without reference to Simone de Beauvoir (though a secondary reference developing Beauvoir’s position of “erotic generosity” is included in further reading for Chapter 1). These absences, however, are a small price to pay for an ambitious text that tackles a large range of topics in such a compact and accessible manner.

There are some definite standout chapters and topics. Chapter 3 provides an important and timely exploration as to whether consent is a sufficient condition for moral sex. Chapter 5, on sexual perversions, sodomy laws, and masturbation, based on one of the author’s previously published papers, provides a detailed yet succinct historical account of the development of the “perversion” framework. This helps establish the background to the debates the chapter aims to spark, such as whether, for example, there should be laws against sodomy. Both the discussions on sexual harassment as wrongdoing (Chapter 4) and on the wrongness of “outing” someone’s sexuality (Chapter 9) are particularly well structured and demonstrate the skill of the authors in balancing competing arguments in such a way that neither are reduced or dismissed entirely. This is further evidenced in the discussion of abortion in Chapter 10, and the authors should be particularly proud of condensing extremely complex arguments here into a clearly written and easily digestible format. This skill in weighing the issues underpinning opposing perspectives equally is a core strength in the book at large, sure to spark many a heated classroom debate as well as to encourage readers to evaluate and form their own positions in relation to those presented.

It is in coming to the book with the sense of critical evaluation that is embedded in the text itself that I would suggest inform its pedagogical use with students. It is particularly important in a general overview such as that offered by the text to invite discussion about what is included/excluded, what is given more or less space, and what positions the students see are endorsed throughout the text—that is, to use the text itself to invite discussion challenging the notion of an objective or “general” overview. As evidenced across some of the topics mentioned above, in many places the authors give a balanced view of contesting and contested perspectives, leaving it up to the reader to inquire further. In others, the authors’ argument is made explicit, such as that made in Chapter 5, that intentionalist views of sex have resulted in its over-medicalization, or that in Chapter 6, which locates authors’ position as pointing out weaknesses in the opposition to equal marriage. In a small minority of
places, however, the discussion unduly simplifies complex arguments and empirical claims in order to prioritize one interpretation over another without explicitly stating this is an argument crafted by the authors. The one place I found this most distracting, given my own interests and location, was in the discussion on whether sex offender laws are just, given in Chapter 4.

Here, arguments for the negative position are overwhelmingly considered to the detriment of the balance presented across other, equally controversial, topics. It is striking that the notion of what is just or “justice” from the victim’s perspective, an area of investigation that finds elements of justice including retribution, punishment, and address through the criminal law, is absent here, when its inclusion could have significantly deepened the grounds for debate. In addition, while many of the questions posed in this section are useful, an interrogation of what is violent about sexual violence is absent. Had this been included in a similar way to the introductory discussion of privacy in Chapter 9, the term “non-violent” sexual offenses, used here presumably to refer to non-contact offenses, would have been more clearly problematized, or perhaps avoided completely. Empirical claims such as that the publication of sex offender records online “essentially [make] anyone on these a social pariah, subject to social ostracism and isolation” (50), are made without evidence and sit perhaps most uncomfortably in today’s context given the election of a US president accused of sexual assault during his candidacy. Accusations and convictions of sexual offenses simply do not have the suggested consequence of social ostracism, and it would be more within the spirit of the book to invite questions on, for instance, whether this is something they should do, rather than to uncritically reproduce a claim that is commonly held but rarely evidenced. Finally, laws on public registrations are critiqued as not providing support for victims living with offenders, and yet the use of the law to protect these same victims (such as non-contact or non-molestation orders or protection orders) are not mentioned here, only to be addressed in a later discussion about laws that need greater enforcement.

My argument here is not that sex offender laws are in fact just, nor that the discussion should (or could) be made “objectively.” It is simply that one of the competing positions is reduced to such a point as to erase the need for debate, a similar issue in the discussion of prostitution in Chapter 3, disappointing given Shrage’s previous work in this area. Fortunately, the tone of the book works well to encourage students to interrogate even seemingly balanced positions, and as such the limited places where the author’s positions are not made explicit and yet deeply inform the arguments presented can be used to invite further exploration. The question for students here would be not only where are you located in relation to the positions articulated, but where do you think the authors are located? What evidence is given more weight, literally more space in the text, and what does this mean for your response to the arguments presented? Rather than forming a weakness, then, such subtle positioning can form part of classroom discussions itself, along with the many varied and useful questions posed within the text.

Overall, Shrage and Stewart have created a well-written and accessible introduction to current issues in philosophizing about sex. Their book offers an invaluable tool for anyone looking to bring some of the many conversations about sexual violence and harassment on campus in general (and in philosophy in particular) into the learning environment, and as such should be a welcome addition to core reading lists across a range of courses.


**Moral Aims: Essays on the Importance of Getting It Right and Practicing Morality with Others**


Reviewed by Lisa Tessman

**BINGHAMTON UNIVERSITY, LtESSMAN@BINGHAMTON.EDU**

Because I have long been a fan of Cheshire Calhoun’s work, many of the essays published in Moral Aims were already familiar to me. I thought that reading the collection would be like visiting old friends. Instead, it came with many “ah-ha” moments of discovering new connections amongst what I had previously thought of as Calhoun’s distinct ideas. The collection fuses once-separate essays into what is essentially a wonderful new monograph. Meanwhile, each essay is still worth reading on its own; every single essay contains an important, original insight, and is carefully argued, extremely clear, thought provoking, and a pleasure to read. I can’t comment individually on every essay here, but I will focus on the overarching theme and make some remarks about a few of the essays.

The Introduction lays out the preoccupation of the book, which is also one of the main points of the lead essay, “Moral Failure.” Morality, Calhoun believes, can be conceived either, on the one hand, as the grasping of correct moral principles, or, on the other hand, as a set of actual (but often misguided) social norms and practices. The strong, organizing theme of the book is the importance of both and the tension between them. The essays tend to emphasize the second way of conceiving of morality—as a social practice—as if written for an audience that holds the first conception (morality as correct moral principles) and needs to be convinced not to dismiss the second conception (morality as a social practice). Personally, I hold something closer to the second conception, and Calhoun never fully convinced me that the difficulty faced by moral agents can be captured only if one accepts both conceptions, and in particular only if one accepts a premise of the
first conception, namely, that there are moral principles whose correctness must be ascertained through rational justification. It is in the introduction that Calhoun argues most explicitly for the importance of both conceptions; in “Moral Failure” she vividly portrays an instance of the tension between the two, which arises when someone who resists the moral norms of her community in the name of “getting it right” (i.e., grasping correct moral principles) nevertheless fails morally precisely because she fails to be able to practice her correct moral principles socially, which is the only way they can be practiced and thus the only way they can even be.

In arguing for the importance of the first conception, Calhoun focuses on what the moral theorist (or anyone who is critically reflective in the right way) does to access correct moral principles, part of which is “going hypothetical” in the sense of imagining, counterfactually, a context in which people endorsed only those moral norms that there is reason to endorse; in contrast to the moral practices that people actually require of each other in the real world, where their endorsement of moral requirements may be mistaken, “genuine moral requirements will have to be conceived as ones that are endorsable by all within a hypothetical social world populated by people who are capable of accessing the good reasons there are to endorse those requirements” (3).

We get a more specific sense of the form that this critical reflection should take in Part III of the book, which is on “conventionalized wrongdoing”; proper critical reflection must take place even (or especially) when wrongdoing has been conventionalized in social norms, for it has the potential to expose and correct such wrongdoing. This part of the book includes an especially brilliant chapter on “Kant and Compliance with Conventionalized Injustice,” in which Calhoun proposes an interpretation of Kantian universalization that involves a hypothetical world in which all parties to a cooperative scheme are, unlike actual people, self-respecting in such a way that their response to moral wrongs would be resistance rather than acquiescent cooperation; thus when one attempts universalization in such a world, a contradiction “results from free, equal, and rational beings’ response to the conditions created by universalizing an impermissible maxim” (178). The other chapter in this part of the book, “Responsibility and Reproach,” also takes the perspective of those, such as feminists, who, presumably through this kind of critical reflection, have come to reject dominant norms, and thus find themselves in an “abnormal moral context,” namely, a context “at the frontiers of moral knowledge when a subgroup of society . . . makes advances in moral knowledge faster than they can be disseminated to and assimilated by the general public. . . . As a result, the rightness or wrongness of some courses of action . . . is, for a time, transparent only to the knowledge-acquiring subgroup and is opaque to outsiders” (196). In such a context, the knowledgeable subgroup might both excuse and reproach those who have not caught up with the new moral knowledge—excuse because it is very difficult to be good in abnormal moral contexts, but reproach because it is not, after all, impossible, and because reproach helps to publicly disseminate the new knowledge.

But no matter how crucial it is to grasp correct moral principles, this first conception of morality, Calhoun insists, can’t stand alone as what morality “really” is, for there can be no moral requirements without actual people engaged in actual “requiring activities” (10); “there are no shared cooperative schemes, no treatments of others, no moral identities, no reactive attitudes that effectively hold people responsible—other than in actual social practices of morality . . . Absent a social practice, there is no morality, although there might be moral knowledge” (13). Persuaded of the soundness of the second conception of morality, one might think that all there is to morality is what we engage in as practitioners, “where our concern is with making what we are morally up to and who we morally are intelligible to others, reaching shared moral understandings, and communicating moral attitudes and demands to co-participants” (13). Those who are familiar with Margaret Urban Walker’s expressive-collaborative account of morality will recognize how strongly Calhoun has been influenced by her; this is evident both in Calhoun’s characterization of this view of morality and in her acknowledgment of the importance of it. But Calhoun departs from Walker: while for Walker the key point is that the authority of morality resides in actual practitioners’ well-placed confidence in it—and that there is nothing more to morality—for Calhoun there is something more: “getting it right.”

I want to interpret Calhoun as charitably as possible as I try to figure out exactly what “getting it right” amounts to. She never comes right out with what I would have to take to be a moral realist’s line—that there are (“mind-independent”) moral truths out there in the world that we might be able to access but that we certainly don’t construct through our own activities. Because I find moral realism to be extremely implausible, I don’t want to read Calhoun as taking this position; but it is also not totally clear to me that she rejects moral realism. What she does say about “getting it right” is that it is not a matter of constructing the “rightness” of moral norms by reaching social agreement about them. Instead, the rightness of a norm is found in its endorsement “in a hypothetical world of people who have access to the good reasons for endorsement . . . it is the goodness of the reasons, not the fact of actual agreement, that is doing the work” (5-6). Good reasons depend on the “correctness of the justificatory argument” (6). But because I believe that our judgments about the goodness of reasons or the correctness of justificatory arguments are dependent upon what we actually value, I don’t think that what Calhoun calls “getting it right” really is something beyond what we do as the actual, situated, socially engaged people that we are.

So while Calhoun doesn’t accept Walker’s contention that a morality that is socially constructed and practiced is all the morality that we’ve got, I stand with Walker on this one—and yet, in deep appreciation for what Calhoun has identified as the tension experienced by the critic of social norms, I don’t want to be left unable to recognize this tension as real. However, I believe that the tension can be fully accounted for without ever supposing that there is such a thing as “getting it right.” I continue to believe that all of morality is constructed by us—practitioners of morality—through our evaluative and critical activities. But these very activities take place socially and they are how practitioners
come to do not exactly what Calhoun calls “getting it right,” but rather what I would simply describe as arriving at better, but still socially constructed, moral understandings. In Neurathian fashion, to repair our ship while we are at sea, we must stand on one plank of the ship while critically assessing and fixing other planks. There is nowhere to stand off the ship to “get it right” or even to determine that one moral understanding is better than another, so we do this from our perspective on other planks of the ship: from the perspective of some of our other values. Nevertheless, when we (typically some subgroup, rather than a lone individual) lose confidence in our society’s moral practices and understandings, or become confident that something different is morally required of us, we run into the tension Calhoun describes: we can’t both do what we judge is morally required of us, and do so in the only way that may be possible—namely, socially—with others who do not, or at least do not yet, share our judgments.

Another reason that I question whether there is such a thing as “getting it right” is that I don’t think that there is a single right morality to get; along the lines of David Wong’s version of pluralistic relativism, I believe that values are not only plural but also, in many cases, conflicting and incommensurable. There will be a variety of ways of prioritizing irreducibly different values in the face of conflict, and no single standpoint from which to correctly determine that one priority ranking is better than another. Actual people, or communities, will have different priorities simply because of what they care about, or what they care about more. Given some features of evolved human nature, and given the sorts of problems that human social groups must solve in order to live cooperatively, there will be some contingently universal constraints on the moral practices that could possibly help us cooperate and live well, but within these constraints there will be more than one good moral scheme. Thus moralities that are constructed from what people actually value will be plural, and there will be no way to stand apart from this and grasp a single correct morality or “get it right.” Within the social group that is expressing, communicating, and negotiating shared practices, there will always be disagreement, and—again—nowhere off the Neurathian ship to stand and determine who has gotten it “right.”

The relativity of values, norms, and moral schemes brings me to another point, focused on Part II of the book, which contains three essays, each of which is about a virtue (civility, decency, and integrity) that is social in some particular way. For instance, “The Virtue of Civility” emphasizes the importance of the second conception of morality—morality as social practice—because civility requires that one conform to certain social norms just because they are norms. Civility is about communicating a moral attitude of “respect, tolerance, and considerateness” (79) rather than about being “genuinely” respectful, tolerant, or considerate, so all that really matters is mutual understanding of which behaviors communicate this. I agree with Calhoun’s characterization of this virtue. But its practice is more complicated than Calhoun acknowledges, in any multicultural context in which there is a lack of consensus about which behaviors communicate which moral attitudes. Consider this simple example: I (American) and my partner (Israeli) run into an (American) acquaintance whom we don’t like very much; the acquaintance, behaving according to American norms of civility, finishes our conversation by saying she’d love to get together sometime. I give the obligatory American response: “yes, I’d love that too.” While we both know perfectly well that we don’t actually want to get together, we have behaved according to shared norms of civility, communicating consideration for each other by abiding with a norm of not directly stating the reality that we’d rather not have to spend any time in each other’s company; according to our shared norm, stating this directly would communicate a desire to humiliate the other. My partner witnesses the interaction as violating norms of civility: the acquaintance and I have just flat out lied to each other! We have communicated an utter lack of respect! Neither of us is “right” (it has, of course, taken us many years to realize this) because it is not a matter of what “genuinely” constitutes considerateness or respect (even if there were such a thing, which Calhoun seems to think there is). Either norm could work because it is just a matter of convention to determine the behavior that is meant to signal a certain attitude. But the norms don’t work when they aren’t shared. As Calhoun emphasizes, these are norms that require consensus. But—and this is the point to which Calhoun doesn’t give enough weight—they are exactly the kinds of norms about which there is enormous cultural variance. Furthermore, it is not enough for us to know intellectually that someone who differs culturally from ourselves may be signaling respect differently from us, for much of this kind of communication takes place below the level of consciousness; whatever we know intellectually, the unfamiliar or unshared norm won’t feel right—it might even feel insulting—and can’t serve the purpose of a norm of civility. This isn’t an argument against Calhoun’s characterization of what kind of a virtue civility is; it is just a comment on how difficult it is to practice this virtue socially, in a diverse society.

Calhoun’s well-known essay, “Standing for Something,” completes Part II by insisting on the importance of the social for what seems to some other theorists to be a personal virtue related only to one’s own individual judgments: integrity. Individual judgment matters to integrity, Calhoun argues, precisely because “it is only within individual persons’ deliberative viewpoints, including one’s own, that what is worth our doing can be decided” (150). Integrity is the social virtue of contributing one’s own judgment to collective considerations and being willing to stand behind it. However, Calhoun rightly notes, “when what is worth doing is under dispute, concern to act with integrity . . . calls us simultaneously to stand behind our convictions and to take seriously others’ doubts about them” (152).

Part IV is more loosely connected to the rest of the book, but its two essays are well worth reading. The final essay, “Changing One’s Heart,” is a particularly beautiful and compelling call to understand other people sympathetically—even when they are morally culpable—by recognizing that their moral goodness is not all that matters about them. The fact that they cause moral harm is best understood when situated in the larger (auto)biographical story that they build to make sense of their lives. Switching to this perspective “assumes that what gets said by persons
through their actions is often something about themselves and their lives, not just about their moral views"; even when we have been morally wronged by someone, we might be able to forgive them if we take this perspective, which "charitably assumes that wrongdoing is less likely to be a blow directly aimed at us than to be shrapnel from something else more complicated and more interesting in the person's life" (242). With this I wholeheartedly agree, and find it, like much of what Calhoun says, to be wise advice not only for practicing morality with others, but for living socially with the richness of all of our values, moral and otherwise.

---

**Existential Eroticism. A Feminist Approach to Understanding Women's Oppression-Perpetuating Choices**


Reviewed by Mara Marin

UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO, CENTRE FOR ETHICS, MARA.MARIN@UTORONTO.CA

Shay Welch's new book is motivated by a familiar yet enduring problem in feminist theory: that of the biases of privilege. The problem is that feminist theorists, while claiming to speak on behalf of all women, are prevented to do so by their privileged position that limits their understanding of the experience of marginal women. While this problem is endemic to philosophy more generally, it is particularly embarrassing for feminist philosophers, who position themselves as critics of privilege and of its biases. In spite of these claims, Welch posits, feminist theorists continue to be restricted by their own racial and class privilege.

Welch's project aims “to fill at least one gap that exists in the space between lived oppression and theoretical analysis” by focusing “on feminist analyses of women’s oppression-perpetuating choices to draw out how such biases in theorizing can undermine liberation” (1-2). To do so, Welch moves away from the example of the middle-class, generally white woman who chooses between homemaking and work outside the home to the choices faced by Western women in the sex industry and in abusive relationships. These choices reveal “women’s oppression qua beauty and sexuality,” which Welch calls “existential eroticism” (2).

The focus on theories of oppression-perpetuating choices is not accidental. It is motivated by the second problem that motivates the book: the problem of anti-oppression solidarity between women of different class, race, ethnicity, and experience with violence. As Welch puts it in the first, introductory, chapter, her aim is “to draw out how such biases in theorizing can undermine liberation” (2). Mainstream accounts of blame and moral responsibility—and the feminist theories that rely on them—are inappropriate for the evaluation of women’s self-perpetuation of oppression (191), and thus become complicit in blaming women in the sex industry and women in abusive relationships for their situation, thus undermining the possibility of solidarity and common political action among women from different backgrounds and with different experiences. The ultimate aim of the theoretical analysis is, then, a practical, political one: healing the divide between women of different social positions.

To the end of understanding the experience of non-normative, under-class women, Welch offers a three-pronged methodology: narrative, articulation of new concepts, and critical assessment of particular feminist arguments and positions. Welch makes use of rich, detailed narratives (both her own and from the lives of others) in order to give us access to the perspective, voice, and experience of the women usually left out of feminist theories. In order to articulate theoretically these narratives, she argues, we need a new theoretical vocabulary, which she proceeds to offer. Finally, with the narrative accounts of marginal women’s experiences and the novel conceptual vocabulary that could capture them in place, Welch takes issue with particular feminist arguments and positions.

After a first introductory chapter, the book is organized in two parts. The first part, comprised of four chapters, “aims to articulate and explicate the non-normative lived experience through both theory and narrative” (21). In this way, Welch aims “to represent particular voices that are marginalized and that have either been ignored or misrepresented in feminist philosophy” (21). The second part, comprised of three chapters, aims to provide new theoretical language that can match the task of evaluating these silenced experiences. Moreover, throughout the book, Welch draws on, shows the limits of, and extends the analyses of feminist theories of domination (MacKinnon 1987, 1989), autonomy (Meyers 1989 and Friedman 2003), psychological oppression (Bartky 2001), oppression (Cudd 2006), adaptive preferences (Khader 2011, Nussbaum 2001), moral responsibility (Isaacs 1997, 2011, Walker 2006, 2007, Smiley 1992, Card 1996) and the connected issues of blame (Houston 1992; Superson 1995) and forgiveness (MacLachlan 2009).

Chapter Two, “Existential Eroticism and Autonomy,” provides a nuanced account of the relation between (heterosexual) women’s “existential eroticism” (“woman’s existence as beauty and sex object for men,” (36)) women’s choices, their agency and power, and their autonomy. Welch frames the discussion in MacKinnon’s terms of heterosexual sexuality as male dominance, but connects this account to one about women’s choices and their autonomy. She articulates several psychological mechanisms that explain how women are copped in their own oppression. Drawing on Cudd’s account of stereotypes, she argues that behind existential eroticism in general and the sex industry in particular lies women’s desire to be part of the “in-group” of women who are “successful at femininity,” “the group of beautiful and sexually desirable women” that is both constituted and rewarded by a woman’s relation to a man and by the attention he confers on her (40-41). Drawing on Bartky’s account of narcissism and the pleasures of feminine existence, she argues that women internalize...
not only the eroticization of violence, but also “women’s euphoric, rapturous, blissful infatuation with and mania over their beauty beyond false consciousness or rational material incentive” (43). In this way, by internalizing the male gaze, women become their own erotic object and achieve “profound erotic satisfaction” (43), a satisfaction that Cudd’s (2006) and Superson’s (1995) accounts lack the theoretical resources to capture. Welch concludes that existential eroticism severely hinders women’s autonomy because women’s own sexual desires are for male dominance.

But I think that this is the wrong conclusion to draw from this analysis. The evidence that Welch provides seems to me to point in a rather different direction. Rather than showing that under conditions of domination women’s autonomy is hindered, it shows that the notion of autonomy itself is inadequate to the task of illuminating the nature of women’s domination because of the close relation between autonomy and ideas of authenticity. Welch suggests precisely this when she asks, “If masculinist objectivity obtains as MacKinnon so clearly argues, and the male gaze is the ‘objective’ social perspective, is the male gaze not then actually constitutive of the erotic woman’s authentic self since, as feminists have argued, there is no metaphysical true self?” (52). Unfortunately, she does not answer her own question.

As part of the book’s project is to distinguish between individual moral responsibility for individuated acts and complicit, systemic contributions, Chapter Three, “Forms of Restrictions and Systemic Patriarchy,” aims to distinguish between systemic patriarchal and individual forms of restriction and to theorize their relationship to one another. It does so by offering an analysis of patriarchy as a system of coercion with different levels of restriction—duress, necessity, and coercion—that obtain in different contexts. This sort of analysis, Welch thinks, has two theoretical advantages. First, it allows feminists to “capture widely divergent phenomenological experiences of injustice” (56) among the oppressed while at the same time, I would add, continuing to speak of a common oppression. Secondly, by “parsing out context-specific tiers of restriction in terms of choice permitted and potential to do otherwise, feminists can then better parse the questions of blame and responsibility for women who choose oppression-perpetuating options” (56).

Chapter Four applies this analysis to existential eroticism by making ample use of narrative and examples of the varied type of restrictions that operate on women working in different parts of the sex industry. This is a rich, nuanced analysis. Welch shows how the restrictions literally operate through the psychology of the women that are faced with the choices available to them in an industry in which the satisfaction of male desire determines financial rewards.

Chapter Five, “Trauma as Desperation,” argues that trauma is a coercive condition because the psychological damage suffered by victims of trauma leaves them no exit options from their point of view. Although Welch does not say this explicitly, I read her argument to be that, given the psychological character of trauma, the idea of exiting the relationship is brought from outside by relatively privileged women, and used to make both moral judgments and judgments about the rationality of the abused women, who are seen, as a result, as both irrational and to blame for their own situation when they seem to refuse to leave the abusive situation.

To counter this narrative of the abused women as irrational and/or to blame for their situation, Chapter Six, “Desperate Rationality,” draws on rational choice and game theory to develop a notion of rationality appropriate for the context of traumatized subjects. On Welch’s account, desperate rationality is the rationality developed and deployed by those who inhabit a “globally desperate state of affairs” (130), a rationality that is responsible for women’s survival under these conditions (129). For women who have no choice but to comply, there are still a variety of “ways in which they can and do comply” (130), and this is the area where desperate rationality is exercised. Thus, the notion of desperate rationality enables Welch to separate rationality and moral responsibility and, as a result, to recognize women living under abusive conditions as rational agents without blaming them for their situation. In Welch’s words:

But if feminists can delve deeper into decision theory frameworks from a perspective of trauma they can discern that the subjectivity of interdependent rationality permits traumatized individual to make bargains and strategic maneuvers within objectively coercive, no-choice contexts without carrying the baggage that choice sans coercion generates. That is, the point becomes clear that such individuals truly have no choice other than submission but that there is considerable variation in the ways in which they can and do comply. . . . The absence of moral responsibility attaches to the coercive borders and the rationality attaches to the actions taken within the strictly coerced domain. It is because rational strategy can be utilized within the permeable bounds of desperation-based coercion that rationality and moral responsibility can be separated without reducing the actor to a defeated automaton. (130)

This is a nuanced, rich, and compelling argument. And it enables Welch to set up her view of the levels of moral responsibility (Chapter Seven) and, importantly for her aims, of the forgiveness among different groups of women that is essential for forging real and effective solidarity among women (Chapter Eight). I find the main claims of this argument compelling.

However, I am left wondering if the book fulfilled the promise it started with: the promise that, in considering the lives and experiences of marginal women, the book shows the conceptual biases and limits of feminists theories, thus proving them insufficient or unsatisfactory for analyzing the lives of marginal women. Not only does Welch’s analysis draw on established approaches in feminist theory, such as Ann Cudd’s (2006) analysis of stereotypes, her analysis of how women’s choices perpetuate the oppressive constraints they experience, or Khader’s (2011) analysis of adaptive preferences, it also leaves them
unchanged. In utilizing these theories to understand the situation of traumatized women or sex workers, one is left with the impression that they are capable to account for the complex situations Welch describes. It is true that Welch shows that these feminist theorists have not been developed in light of the examples she offers and that they have not directed their attention to understanding the experiences of the women she focuses on. She also shows that when we do so—when we focus our attention to understanding these silenced, invisible experiences—we gain surprising and important insights into the nature of human rationality and into the relation between rationality and moral responsibility, among others.

This is no small achievement. As I read the book, these insights are important because they apply more generally than just to the experience of marginal women. Take the notion of "desperate rationality." It shows, it seems to me, that it is always the case that even when we have no choice but compliance, we continue to act rationally. But it does not show what it promised, that the concepts that feminist theory provides to us are not able to capture the silenced experience of marginal women. Instead, I think it achieves something more remarkable, which is to show that reflecting on invisible, marginal lives illuminates the experience of the privileged.

BIBLIOGRAPHY


In-Between: Latina Feminist Phenomenology, Multiplicity, and the Self


Reviewed by Katrina England

BINGHAMTON UNIVERSITY, KENGLAND@BINGHAMTON.EDU

“1 am multiplicitous. Multiple and one. Psychic restlessness. Intimate terrorism. Cactus needles embedded in my skin and in my words. Latina, de las otras, daughter, sister, lover, student; teacher, philosopher. English. Spanish. Other languages, but not of words. Of worlds, many of them. IN—confusion, pain, paralysis, creation, transformation—BETWEEN” (49, epigraph to chapter 2, emphasis Ortega’s).

Mariana Ortega, thinking with Heideggerian existential phenomenology and Latina feminist phenomenology, offers an account of selfhood to provide consolation in explanatory power and modes of resistance for those who find themselves constantly in-between worlds. To fully articulate the lived experience of immigrants, exiles, and other inhabitants of borderlands, for Ortega, is to understand the experience of selves as both belonging and not belonging—a complex process that includes disclosure, memory, interpretation, and reinterpretation of everyday experiences (8).

Ortega’s book has multiple aims: to provide an account of selfhood that “does justice” to the lived experience of immigrants, exiles, and others who live life in-between worlds; to engage with a rich and underrecognized body of Latina feminist phenomenology, and invite others to follow; and to embody a hometactic, a “production of a sense of familiarity in the midst of an environment or world in which one cannot fully belong due to one’s multiple positions and instances of thin and thick not being-at-ease” in the field of philosophy that still privileges the work of white men and women (203).

What is Latina feminist phenomenology? Ortega’s primary interlocutors are Gloria Anzaldúa, María Lugones, and Linda Martín Alcoff. Ortega also engages a longer list of Latina feminists (a label Ortega uses cautiously knowing that many may not endorse it) including Norma Alarcón, Edwina Barvosa, Cristina Beltrán, Aimee Carrillo-Rowe, Jacqueline Martinez, Cherrie Moraga, Paula Moya, Juana María Rodriguez, Chela Sandoval, and Ofelia Schutte. While recognizing heterogeneity in Latina identities, Ortega posits six significant characteristics of Latina feminist phenomenology: *(1)* attention to the lived experience of Latinas/os in the United States, including those born here or in Latin America and the Caribbean; *(2)* emphasis on concrete, embodied everyday experience; *(3)* attention to the intersection or, as Lugones describes it, the intermeshedness of race, sex, gender, class, sexual orientation, ability, age, ethnicity, and so on; *(4)* disclosure of the way in which the gendered or racialized (mestizaje/ mulataje) aspect of Latina/o experience is covered up by traditional philosophical discussions that take white male
experience as the norm; (5) attunement to historical and cultural processes that recognize the heterogeneity of Latinas/os; and (6) critical deployment of experiential knowledge in order to contest or reimage established notions of Latinidad” (10).

In chapter one, Ortega reads Anzaldúa’s account of self—new mestiza and la nepantlera—as a precursor to her own: a mestizaje of both multiplicity (of a self with various social identities) and oneness (in the existential sense of being an ‘I’ with the potential for not just fragmentation but also healing and integration) (46). Shapeshifting and continually in flux, yet also deeply tied to the material conditions she finds herself within, Anzaldúa captures the experience of contradiction, ambiguity, and anxiety of being an outsider/border walker self—a self, Ortega says, that is multiple and one.

Ortega posits a conception of selfhood in chapter two woven from threads of Anzaldúa’s mestizaje, Lugones’s account of world-traveling, and Heidegger’s Dasein. As in her 2001 essay, “‘New Mestizas,’ ‘World-Travelers,’ and ‘Dasein’: Phenomenology and the Multi-Voiced, Multi-Cultural Self,” Ortega draws similarities between Latina feminist phenomenological accounts and Heideggerian concepts of a self always in the making, “thrownness,” the mood of anxiety, rejecting the subject/object dichotomy, concepts of a self always in the making, “thrownness,” the mood of anxiety, rejecting the subject/object dichotomy, temporality, and the hermeneutic dimension of the self. What Heidegger and other existential phenomenologists fail to account for, however, are selves like the new mestiza who constantly experience ruptures in the fabric of daily life that prevent them from inhabiting the world in a nonfictional or nonreflective way. Drawing from Lugones’s concept of ease, Ortega describes this phenomenon as “not being-at-ease.” Selves can experience not being-at-ease in thick senses (ruptures in everyday norms, practices, and experiences that lead to existential crises regarding identity) and thin senses (ruptures of everyday norms and practices that “are usually transparent and taken for granted by those familiar within the culture and the environment”) (63). Ortega favors a self of multiplicity (one self with different aspects “highlighted” in different material contexts) over plurality. Her multiplicitous self is characterized as being-in-worlds and being-between-worlds: the former characterizing the capability of inhabiting and accessing various worlds, and having a sense of how oneself fares in these worlds, and the latter describing the self “in various worlds while, at the same time, traveling from world to world” (66–67).

Different multiplicitous selves can occupy the same spaces and, because of their different social identities, these multiplicitous selves will fare differently in those spaces depending on the dominant norms, practices, and relations of power present.

Unlike Lugones’s view of world-traveling, which Ortega critiques for its appeal to ontological pluralism to describe the shift of self in different worlds, Ortega posits an existential pluralist view of world-traveling in chapter three. Ortega adopts Lugones’s conception of worlds as neither worldviews, cultures, utopias, nor possible worlds, but intertwined material spaces that overlap and stand in relations of power to each other (92). One of the issues Ortega sees with Lugones’s account of world-traveling, however, is Lugones’s basis for envisioning resistance in oppressive worlds: an appeal to memories of oneself in other worlds having different resistant possibilities in oppressive worlds (97). Although Lugones’s conception relies heavily on memory, it does not say enough about memory for Ortega. “What does it mean to say that the ‘I’ in [Lugones’s] first-person perspective is noninferential and at the same time holds these first-person claims as being significant in remembering and self-understanding?” Rather than attempt to answer this and other puzzles, Ortega posits the multiplicitous self that can access openings or apertures to different worlds. Existential pluralism can describe world-traveling as an opening for the self to different worlds in which the self experiences different aspects being highlighted or animated depending on the power relations to which it is exposed. Further, Ortega’s multiplicitous self recognizes the way in which the self fares or is in different worlds. Ortega’s existential pluralism is satisfying but for as closely as she cleaves to Lugones’s theory elsewhere, Ortega’s criticism of what she calls Lugones’s self-traveling left me hungry for further work in Latina feminist phenomenology.

Chapter four is where Ortega elucidates the risks of world-traveling and argues for a critical world-traveling characterized by the world traveler’s vigilance to her practice. To explain her conception of critical world-traveling, Ortega draws from Heidegger’s public and the authentic self that overcomes the leveling practices of the former, and Lugones’s playful world traveling as liberatory practice. Ortega emphasizes the seriousness of world traveling in the sense of life-or-death and survival that she says is missed by Lugones’s “playfulness.” Ortega also discusses contemporary feminists’ interpretations of world traveling as methodology for members of dominant groups. She cautions contemporary feminists against instrumentalizing world traveling as a mere methodology for scholarly work nor cultural tourism. Here Ortega engages Sandra Bartky (whose 1970 text marks the first explicit feminist engagement with Heidegger’s thought) to point out that world-traveling is not a neutral activity, for “one always travels with baggage” (137). For a member of a dominant group to effectively use world traveling as a tool against domination, the self must be aware of the baggage—the “presuppositions”—we bring along, and aware “of the way in which what is learned in world-traveling can be used to change worlds” (137). For Ortega, critical world traveling offers resistance in reflective moments when a world traveler, between worlds, sees where these perspectives overlap and can interpret each world differently. Ortega also imagines further self-reflection for the critical world traveler, more specifically, a vigilance about “what we bring into [the practice of world traveling], what we derive from it, and what we can reimagine and refresh with it” (142).

In chapter five, Ortega confronts issues of the self and identity as she thinks through coalition-building based on identities with Martin Alcoff’s account of identity as interpretive horizon. For Ortega, multiplicitous selves have multiple horizons that highlight the intersubjective aspects of the self. With multiple horizons, the multiplicitous self has multiple shared social meanings. Identity understood as interpretive horizon includes positionality
APA NEWSLETTER | FEMINISM AND PHILOSOPHY

I found Ortega’s book keenly attuned to the textures of everyday experience and deeply aware of itself as both a contribution to feminist philosophical conceptions of self and a call to critical engagement with Latina feminist theory. It is this invitation—to take seriously and advance interventions in the study of selfhood and identity by Latina feminists—that I felt on each page.

A Hermeneutic Approach to Gender and Other Social Identities


Reviewed by Tina Fernandes Botts
CALIFORNIA STATE UNIVERSITY, FRESNO, tbotts@csufresno.edu

In Lauren Swayne Barthold’s subtle and satisfying new book, the author develops a hermeneutic account of social identity that she distinguishes from both Linda Martín Alcoff’s “horizontal” account and Georgia Warnke’s “coherence” account to advocate instead what the author sees as her own, more purely Gadamerian, “dialogical” account of social identity. According to Barthold, while Linda Martín Alcoff’s account of social identity is in line with Gadamer’s hermeneutics to the extent that she maintains that social identities are like horizons, Alcoff parts ways with Gadamer to the extent that Alcoff accepts an objective account of gender that Barthold calls “identity realism.” Similarly, for Barthold, while Georgia Warnke is in line with Gadamer’s hermeneutics to the extent that Warnke analogizes the identities of persons to the interpretation of texts, Warnke’s hermeneutic account of social identity is nonetheless out of step with Gadamer’s hermeneutics, and also flawed, according to Barthold, in three specific ways. First, Warnke’s account does not adequately account for how we can and should understand the integration and interaction among our various identities. Second, Warnke’s account downplays the role of first-person perspective in forging identities, and third, Warnke’s account does not provide a way for us to critically evaluate social identities so as to avoid relativism and work for social change. Barthold sees her own, “dialogical” account of social identity as an improvement over both Alcoff’s and Warnke’s, not only because the “dialogical” account is more true to Gadamer’s own hermeneutics, but also because the “dialogical” account serves as a workable means of creating meaningful and vibrant communities. In this way, Barthold contends, her own account of social identity defends hermeneutics itself, and hermeneutic accounts of social identity, against charges of both political irrelevance and anti-feminism.

IDENTITY REALISM: BARTHOLD ON ALCOFF

Barthold is on board with Linda Martín Alcoff’s utilization of Gadamer’s concept of horizon to defend the epistemic and social viability of identities. In brief, Alcoff argues that identities are socio-historically situated, epistemically salient, and (problematically for Barthold) ontologically real. The reality of certain identities, specifically “visible” identities like gender and race, for Alcoff, often comes...
from the fact that these identities are visibly marked on
the body. Owing to this visibility, such identities are rooted
in embodied existence. Although rooted in embodied
existence, however, identities are neither essential nor
natural for Alcoff. Instead, the body is a dynamic and real
site of meaning-making. As Barthold describes Alcoff's
account, "identities emerge out of the fluid and circular
process of how others (as well as ourselves) conceive of
our bodies" (12). This does not mean that identities are
socially constructed (as this terminology is commonly
understood), however, for Alcoff. It is more accurate to say
that identities are socially emergent. Identities, on Alcoff's
view (according to Barthold), serve as "dynamic conditions
of knowing that require activity on the part of the subject
and thus provide a positive epistemic orientation to the
world" (12).

These ideas gel well with Gadamer's concept of horizon
for Barthold. For Gadamer, the concept of horizon captures
the view that all knowledge is situated. In contrast to
the Cartesian idea that true knowledge emerges from
an unembodied, Archimedean point in the void, true
knowledge is inescapably tethered to location. In addition,
the concept of horizon entails the idea that knowing is
productive, "fecund," as Barthold calls it, in virtue of the
limits of the horizon(s) from which it springs (14).

In more basic terms, a Gadamerian horizon is simply a
context. The idea is that nothing can be seen except from a
point of view. There is no such thing as a-positional seeing
(sometimes called the "view from nowhere") for Gadamer.
We never just see things, full stop. Instead, we see things
as things. Barthold explains, "It is the horizon that makes
this possible by delimiting the context" (14). For Alcoff,
identities are like Gadamerian horizons. They provide the
necessary perspective from which to see and experience
and know. In addition, and in a very Gadamerian way,
Alcoffian identities-as-horizons result from our social
interactions. These include both the feedback others
provide (how they see us) and our responses to that
feedback. For Alcoff, then, identities are, in an important
sense, embedded. They are neither only that which is
given to us from outside (purely socially constructed) nor
inherent within us (essential, "natural"). Instead, identities
function as mediation points between self and others. An
identity I call "mine" (personal) is also "ours" (collective).
With all of this Barthold agrees.

Where Alcoff veers off track, however, for Barthold, is
in her insistence that identities-as-horizons are "real." Alcoff's
motivation for defending the reality of identities-as-horizons,
according to Barthold, is political. Without "real" identities, for Alcoff and many feminist thinkers, we
cannot account for the way people in the world utilize and
respond to social identities, and if we cannot do this, we
cannot effect social change. Without the ability to establish
sexed identities as objective and materially real, on this
view, there can be no legitimate basis for overcoming sex-
based oppression. But Alcoff provides not only a political
but also a philosophical basis for accepting social identities
as real. First, we can salvage the reality of gender by
understanding that it is not necessary to equate appeals
to nature with appeals to objectivity or metaphysics. In
other words, we can salvage the objectivity of gender,
for Alcoff, while leaving behind that it is "natural." The
objectivity of gender can be retained, on this view, by
both acknowledging the ubiquity of (social) mediation and
recognizing that this acknowledgment need not entail that
nothing is independent of human beings.

Barthold's response to Alcoff is that even if there were
a reality that is independent of human beings, this fact
would be "epistemically and politically uninteresting and
irrelevant" for feminists (25). Realism, for Barthold, in other
words, is completely useless if we understand meaning
and not "reality" as the criterion for truth. In other words,
whether or not there is a human-independent reality, the
ubiquity of linguistic mediation is still with us. Accordingly,
if we have no direct access to reality, which Alcoff concedes,
then "reality" is meaningless and useless. "Reality," says Barthold, "is a concept that is used emphatically
to designate what our best practices indicate as true; as a
derivatively applied concept it can never hold any
argumentative force on its own" (31). As a consequence,
"[w]e need more than ‘reality’ to win arguments," Barthold
concludes. What feminists interested in socially trenchant
critiques need instead is "coherence of interpretations"
(31). Enter Georgia Warnke.

IDENTITY PLURALISM: BARTHOLD ON WARNKE
Fortunately for feminist accounts of hermeneutic social
identity, according to Barthold, Georgia Warnke provides
us with a version of Gadamerian-based social identity that
focuses on coherence. For Warnke, our identities are like
texts in that they are situated, purposeful, and partial.
Accordingly, just as there are multiple interpretations of a
text, whose degrees of legitimacy are a function of context,
similarly, each of us has multiple identities whose degrees
of legitimacy are a function of the different situations or
contexts in which we find ourselves, and the degrees to
which those situations or contexts coherently incorporate
those identities. So, rather than one identity, each of us
has multiple identities. And importantly, these identities
are ascribed from without (by others). A given identity
is legitimated by its ability to cohere within a situation.
Because Warnke's account entails multiple identities, as
opposed to just one, Barthold calls Warnke's approach to
social identity identity pluralism. For Barthold, one
reason Warnke's coherence-based identity pluralism is an
improvement over Alcoff's horizon-based identity realism is
that it better explains the nature of oppression. If identities
are interpretations of who we are, and if what makes an
identity viable is its coherence with a given context, then
phenomena such as "driving while black," for example,
become intelligible as sites of oppression. Within the
driving context, someone driving is a "driver" but, owing
to racial oppression, such a person becomes "black" rather
than a driver. Warnke's account of social identity is a third-
person account and has the added advantage, for Barthold,
of not relying on realism.

But, for Barthold, although Warnke's identity pluralism
is an improvement over Alcoff's identity realism in terms
of identity pluralism's potential for achieving feminist
(anti-oppressive) objectives, Warnke's account of social
identity is still lacking in three ways. First, Warnke's
account does not adequately address the integration of
and interaction among our multiple identities. Second, identity pluralism problematically downplays the role of the first-person perspective in forging identities. And third, identity pluralism’s advancement of coherence as the main criterion for judging the adequacy of a given identity does not provide a way to critically evaluate social identities. Barthold’s response is to retain Warnke’s emphasis on coherence in forging social identities and to add the importance of dialogue, ritual, and, particularly, festival in forging what Barthold calls “true” identities, or identities that cohere with and strengthen healthy, vibrant communities.

**DIALOGICAL IDENTITY: BARTHOLD’S THEORY**

As mentioned above, offered as an improvement over both Alcoff’s and Warnke’s (hermeneutic) accounts of social identity, Barthold’s account is, in her view, more firmly based in Gadamerian dialogue, and therefore more authentically hermeneutic (in the Gadamerian sense). For Barthold, while Warnke’s identity pluralism has the advantages of (i) accounting for the fact that social identities are situated, purposeful, and partial, and (ii) not being based in metaphysical realism, identity pluralism has the disadvantage of being susceptible to charges of “identity incommensurability—a type of metaphysical ‘disassociated identity disorder.’” (67). Identity pluralism, in other words, for Barthold, problematically provides us with no way to integrate our multiple identities. To combat this “disorder,” Barthold suggests that we think of our identities as integratable dialogically. The starting point for the development of this dialogical approach to integrated identity is recognizing that “there is no single overarching identity” (67). The next step is to place our various identities into dialogue with each other.

Toward this end, Barthold develops three key components of a good identity-productive dialogue: (i) openness, (ii) attention to questions, and (iii) listening. The criterion of openness is a moral imperative to allow that which is to be interpreted or understood to be or say that which it will. The criterion of attention to questions requires us to understand identities as answers to specific questions posed contextually, rather than as essences attaching to nature or so-called reality (77). And, finally, the criterion of listening calls our attention to the requirement of not allowing voices to be silenced in advance of the dialogue by sustaining a preemptive and proactive willingness to listen to the plurality of voices. In summary, for Barthold, dialogue premised on openness, a plurality of questions, and listening “encourages not only a recognition of the way in which we are co-creators of our identities but also an awareness of the fact that we can never predict in advance what our identities will turn out to be” (91). The result, according to Barthold, is that a dialogical model of identities is crucial “if we are to refuse both the ideal of a single, unified identity [à la Alcoff] and identity incommensurability [à la Warnke]” in order to accurately map how integrated personal identities are generated.

In addition to providing an explanation of how integrated personal identities are generated, however, Barthold’s dialogical theory of identity contains two more crucial components: (1) a discussion of the role of application and play in identity production, and (2) a mechanism for assessing the adequacy of a given identity, namely, through the utilization of a “socio-politically relevant” account of intersubjectively-generated agency based in ritual and, ultimately, “festival.” Affirmative acknowledgement of the role of play in identity formation, for Barthold, is central to an authentic account of hermeneutic social identity because it affirms the circular nature of identity and suggests that identities are formed at the “rotary” of one’s psychic desires and one’s socio-historical traditions (that is, in a “playful” dialogue between these two). The process of identity formation, in other words, borrowing from Gadamer’s notion of play, is co-constitutive. After all, for Gadamer, all interpretation (all meaning, really) is applicatory, which means that all interpreters (all of those in search of identity) must proactively render the contextual meaning of who they are in their own words within the confines a given context.

In addition, Barthold’s account of social identity formation entails a mechanism for assessing the adequacy of a given identity through a new account of agency. “We need an answer [to the question of how we can adequately assess the truth of identities] that construes identities as neither freely chosen by an autonomous individual nor dogmatically assigned by others (or ‘nature’)” (127). Citing Wendy Brown, Barthold writes that “the modern tendency to conceive of identities as grounded in an autonomous ‘I’ . . . results in political impotency” (127). For Barthold, following Brown, we can think of agency from the standpoint of the “we” instead of the “I.” We can deploy “identity democracy” rather than “identity aristocracy,” and we can do this by replacing the universal norms of modernity with postmodern, Gadamerian judgments. Political change and good political judgment do not require, as much of feminist politics seems to indicate, according to Barthold, truth with a capital T or knowledge with a capital K (about identities or anything else). Instead, all that is required is what Gadamer calls practical philosophy, or *phronesis*, “that is, the ability to make good judgments in light of the ever-changing particulars of the situation at hand” (131). Conversation with others, on this model, is privileged over a procedure internal to one’s own mind, “a procedure that may guarantee one’s own existence yet fails to do justice to communal existence” (131). “In other words,” writes Barthold, “the proposal is to cease understanding identity as attaching to some core essence or nature of an individual and instead take it as an *interpretive relation between self and other* that promotes solidarity” (emphasis added) (134).

To conceive of social identity in this way is to move “from choice to ritual,” according to Barthold (136). By this, she means that one way of understanding how identities can create meaningful connections with others is to conceive of them ritualistically. Identities ritualistically construed, for Barthold, have the potential for contributing to community creation. Construing identities in terms of their “ritualistic potential” allows us to see the positive potential of identities construed as communal and, perhaps more importantly, to “account for the possibility of social change without relying on a full-blown subject” (136). The way this works is as follows. First, action is seen as emanating from the
intersubjective attempts to order experience that occur as part of a ritual (a given practical context). So, for example, a woman’s attempt to make sense of a given gender norm for herself involves her in ritualizing that norm, that is, participating in the not-fully-cognized gender ritual in such a way that creates meaning not only for herself but also for others (137). The “anti-subjective emphasis” contained within ritual, on this view, replaces the “Cartesian obsession with certainty, and its resulting inward turn” (138).

According to Barthold, rituals help us to confront the “chaos and fragmentation of existence” with a coming together with others to create something entirely new. What constitutes society, on this view, is a “mutual illusion of the sort that all rituals create” (138). Still, ritualized identity formation does not mean that a guaranteed harmony is generated that “vanquishes difference, ambiguity, and chaos once and for all” (143). Instead, identities ritualistically created “do not constitute any ‘real’ part of ourselves” but just make possible our interaction with the world, “creating a subjunctive world, a world as we would like it to be” (143). Barthold explains that claims like “this is how things have always been done and they’ve worked pretty well so far” create a “hermeneutically sealed space with no possibility of change. Leaving no room for improvisation, creativity, and a multiplicity of voices, they have no place in vibrant ritual” (143). The upshot of thinking of social identity as a product of ritual rather than choice, for Barthold, is that identity formation depends not on individual willful efforts but on communal repetition. “The point,” says Barthold, “is to challenge the status quo that assumes that the only way to bring about change is to offer a critique born of an autonomous subject” (146). Instead, the “truth of an identity,” for Barthold, “can be ascertained in so far as it fosters belongingness” (149).

The specific Gadamerian ritual of “festival,” according to Barthold, is particularly informative on the topic of how true or legitimate (social) identities are formed. Gadamerian festivals, according to Barthold, (1) allow no separation between one person and another, (2) are a communal experiences, and (3) are meant for everyone. Gadamerian festivals are intersubjective social encounters that, while directed toward some end (like a harvest), have their true value in the experience of intersubjective communication that they foster and embody. Once begun, a festival has a kind of mind of its own that is generated inadvertently by the sincere and wholehearted, collective participation of the festival attendees. Festivals thus defined, for Barthold, entail and embody what Barthold calls “inclusive play” that, for her, provides a criterion of adequacy for social identities that neither Alcoff’s nor Warnke’s accounts provide. Writes Barthold, “The truth of an identity can be ascertained in so far as it fosters belongingness” (149). While the “successful” festival is going on, Barthold seems to be saying, that is, while groups of people are playfully and “buoyantly” interacting with each other in a kind of non-self-conscious way during the course of some collective activity, true social identities emerge. Importantly, true social identities are not chosen. Rather, they emerge from genuine and playful interactions among persons. Even more importantly, however, the festival operates as a means of discerning more “adequate” identities from less “adequate” identities. The extent to which an identity is “adequate” (Barthold’s term for legitimate or true) is a function of the degree to which the collective deems it so, and the degree to which the identity reinforces community. Where an identity fosters connections between people and is a product of robust play, it is a more adequate identity. Where an identity undermines connections between people and is a product of oppression, power dynamics, or will, it is a less adequate identity.

**CONCLUDING REFLECTIONS**

Barthold’s book is subtle because it caringly and responsibly articulates what is good and right about current feminist thinking in the hermeneutic vein on the topic of social identity, while at the same time gently highlighting the ways in which this thinking diverges from Gadamer’s own thinking. The book is satisfying because it then goes a long way toward filling in the holes of current feminist thinking on the hermeneutics of social identity, such that the existing good work already done can be salvaged and used more productively to accomplish feminist projects. The result is an account of the hermeneutics of social identity that is simultaneously true to Gadamerian hermeneutics, an enhancement of current feminist thinking on the topic, and useful for achieving feminist goals. Along the way, Barthold’s robust grasp of Gadamerian hermeneutics is vividly displayed through her lucid and clear articulation of key hermeneutic concepts (dialogue, ritual, play, festival), and in this way her book operates as a kind of instruction manual for those interested in knowing more about hermeneutics.

Getting into specifics, Barthold’s identification of those aspects of Alcoff’s and Warnke’s takes on hermeneutic social identity that gel best with Gadamer’s own take on social identity is outstanding. In particular, Barthold’s firm grasp on Gadamer on his own terms is evident in her careful comparison of Alcoff’s horizon and Warnke’s coherence to Gadamer’s own take on these concepts. Barthold is correct that Alcoff’s horizontal account is out of step with Gadamer to the extent that it embraces identity realism, and Barthold is also correct that Warnke’s coherence account is out of step with Gadamer to the extent that it fails to provide us with a way to integrate our multiple identities. After all, the task of Gadamerian hermeneutics is not to defend objectivity, nor to defend a multiplicity of equally viable interpretations. Instead, Gadamer’s task is to develop an account of how a legitimate interpretation (of a given phenomenon) can be ascertained within a given interpretive moment. Accordingly, Barthold deftly identifies that a hermeneutic approach to social identity that more closely maps Gadamer’s own interpretive enterprise will both eschew identity realism and provide a way to either integrate our multiple identities or at least to coherently prioritize one (or more) identity (or identities) over others.

Toward the end of providing a methodology with which to integrate or prioritize our multiple identities, Barthold rightly begins with Gadamerian dialogue, which is the heart of Gadamerian hermeneutics. The goal of Gadamerian dialogue is an “understanding” that is a product of all participants in the dialogue being open to their dialogical partner(s), paying careful attention to the “question” that
arises from the dialogue, and active listening. Placing our multiple identities in dialogue with each other, Barthold is saying, will result in a "personal identity integration" that is both genuine and satisfying. The key is that the dialogue should be fair (free of power dynamics) and engaged in with an open mind. Notably, however, the dialogue that produces integrated social identities is not just between each of our multiple identities, but between ourselves and others with whom we are involved in various rituals and "festivals" (or common projects). That a given interpretation (in this case, the determination of social identity) involves both subjective and objective pieces is a key aspect of Gadamerian hermeneutics. Within this framework, a given social identity is a pragmatic product of intersubjective meaning determination. Importantly, and as Barthold emphasizes, such a social identity (one generated from robust, intersubjective, Gadamerian dialogue) has more ontological heft than a social identity thought to emerge from "social construction."

One challenge faced by the book is its failure to explicitly identify that different social identities will be generated by different dialogues, by different rituals, different "festivals." While Barthold is careful not to present her theory of how true social identities are created through any one particular social identity (e.g., gender), since there is no explicit acknowledgment that gendered social identity will necessarily follow a different dialogical trajectory than, say, racial social identity, the reader is left to conclude that these trajectories might be the same or similar in Barthold’s eyes. Nonetheless, a strength of the book is that it provides a methodology (i.e., a call to understand true identities as products of "festival" rather than as chosen by individuals in isolation) with which to process and understand intersectional identities. Through acknowledging that we each have multiple social identities, and through simultaneously identifying the need to integrate these identities, Barthold implicitly supports a key theme in Gadamerian hermeneutics. Within this framework, a given social identity is a pragmatic product of intersubjective meaning determination. Importantly, and as Barthold emphasizes, such a social identity (one generated from robust, intersubjective, Gadamerian dialogue) has more ontological heft than a social identity thought to emerge from "social construction."

The final chapter of the book, “Truth and Festival,” is a brave attempt to use the Gadamerian concepts of play, ritual, and festival to argue that true identities elicit possibilities for new and vital communities. However, the chapter is more descriptive than analytic or explanatory. Barthold is here trying to integrate the positive aspects of Gadamerian festival with authentic identity formation. And if we lived in a world where people entered into communal enterprises with open minds, with a desire to listen, and with a reckless abandon that would allow them to let the festival at hand in a given context overpower their own personal agendas and desires, the possibility for true identity formation within such contexts would seem viable. However, as long as we live in a world where ego, individuality, choice, and personal desire are likely components of communal enterprises, the possibility of true social identity formation, as Barthold envisions it, remains more a hopeful dream than an accurate depiction of the way things occur.

Nonetheless, Barthold’s optimism and her vision of the way in which true social identity formation would take place in a perfect world are both admirable. Moreover, Barthold’s account of hermeneutic social identity formation is a responsible reply to both Alcoff and Warnke. Her account is also true to Gadamer’s own philosophical hermeneutics. In achieving these objectives, Barthold is convincing on the point that her theory defends hermeneutics itself. As far as defending hermeneutics against political irrelevance and anti-feminism, Barthold’s theory is well on its way to achieving these objectives. The theory points us to a way of conceiving of self that necessarily entails others, and focuses on communal and collective enterprises over individual ones. These are the seeds of a relevant and effective feminist politics by any standards.

---

**Feminist Experiences Foucauldian and Phenomenological Investigations**


Reviewed by Chris Jingchao Ma
VILLANOVA UNIVERSITY, Jingchao.Ma@Villanova.EDU

In her new book *Feminist Experiences: Foucauldian and Phenomenological Investigations* (2016), Johanna Oksala offers an examination of the relation between language and experience and an insightful discussion of feminist political subjectivity. Oksala’s project can be read as a rejoinder for some of the much debated topics in our current feminist political discussion: if we emphasize the discursive construction of gender and gendered experience, does it discredit our lived experience and undermine our collective political agency? If post-structuralism, especially the work of Michel Foucault, insists that subject is constructed in the power relations, does that mean that the constructed subject is not capable of understanding itself without or beyond the power relations, not to mention change the power relations? Oksala addresses these concerns about post-structuralist theories within feminist politics and suggests that the discursive analysis of the power structure and the construction of subjectivity in our neoliberal society is theoretically important and politically relevant.

To begin with, Oksala asks whether feminist philosophy and feminist metaphysics are feasible projects. If feminism is understood to be a political stance, while philosophy is understood to be a discipline of critical inquiries, then it seems that they might jeopardize each other. Oksala argues that metaphysical schemas "organize both our experience of reality and the empirical sciences that produce facts about it” (4). Feminist philosophy and feminist metaphysics are possible and critical in that they make transcendent inquiry into conditions of our experience. If we understand ontology in a Foucauldian sense as a historical ontology or ontology of the present, we should seek “a series of limited, historically specific analyses of contingent practices” that makes the structure of reality possible, where possible subjects and objects of practices emerge (29).

Oksala identifies the linguistic turn in philosophy in the twentieth century and argues that after the linguistic turn of
metaphysics, our contemporary discussion is often, if not always, caught up in this binary distinction of experience and language. Foucault and other poststructuralist theorists contend that our experience is discursively constructed and mediated, while phenomenologists insist that through phenomenological bracketing, we are able to analyze our lived experience without objectification. One example here would be women’s narratives of sexual violence. Poststructuralist theorists would argue that women’s experiences of sexual violence and their narratives are inevitably constructed by social norms about sexuality, and an unmediated experience of sexuality and violence is unreachable, if not impossible, for human beings, while phenomenologists would contend that their lived experience could not be reduced to discourse analysis. Oksala refers to Joan Scott’s essay “The Evidence of Experience” for the former position and to Linda Martin Alcoff’s critique of Foucault for the latter. Scott is concerned that feminist politics seems to rely on the “female experience” not only because of its exclusivity as an identity category, but also because the experience in the dominant discourse cannot challenge the dominant discourse. She hence calls for a turn from experiences stemming from fixed and naturalized identities to examination of discourse and their political effects. Oksala argues that we are constantly negotiating with the existent conceptual schema as well as using it to articulate our experience, and by referring to our experience, we can problematize the normalized conceptual schema. Alcoff accuses Foucault for ignoring bodily experience of survivors of sexual assault and reducing it to an example for the dominant medical discourse of sexuality. Oksala acknowledges that Foucault’s writing is often male and European centered, but she argues that Foucault’s contribution is to show us that sexuality has no a priori bodily meaning. Rather, “one has to analyze a field of experience in which subjects and objects form and transform” (58). This does not imply that subjective reflection is impossible, and we are all merely products of the dominant discourse: on the contrary, Oksala insists that a self-reflexive subject does not contradict the Foucauldian ontology and is rather necessary for Foucault’s critical project to be possible.

To study experience carefully, Oksala turns to phenomenology in the second part of the book. She suggests that we should use a modified phenomenological method, or as she calls it, a post-phenomenological method. Instead of understanding phenomenology as a unique method that allows us to access the pre-discursive experience, Oksala examines Edmund Husserl and Martin Heidegger’s phenomenology of language and argues that phenomenology can be a study of meaning constitution. According to Heidegger and Dan Zahavi, life experience is not a chaos waiting for consciousness to give it meaning, nor is it distorted by linguistic representation. Rather, life experience is already imbued with meaning. Furthermore, Oksala suggests that feminist phenomenology can and should do more for phenomenology than offering complementary materials and becoming a subgenre. She discusses birth and gender in phenomenology to show how feminism can challenge phenomenology as a method. By taking into account the event of one’s own birth as constitutive to the world constitution (91), Oksala argues, we will be pushed to see the prerequisite of procreation, i.e., “sexual difference as a transcendental, constitutive difference” that underlies any phenomenological investigation (93). As to gender, Oksala is concerned that phenomenological investigation of feminine corporeal experience may risk essentialism “if any first-person description by a woman is understood as a phenomenological account and then generalized by thrusting it into a description of eidetic female embodiment” (99). Oksala suggests that the phenomenological method should be modified and that we consider epoché to be endless and always partial so that we can examine the specific historical and social construction of gender as concepts.

The third part, “Feminist Politics,” examines the social and historical construction of subjectivity in terms of contemporary feminist politics. Oksala inspects and responds to some contested discussion. How do we conceive the dilemma between social discipline and individual subjectivity? Does cultural politics ignore economic structure? And how do we take up history of oppression and suffering? Oksala offers Foucault as an important resource for us to think through these questions, and she points out that Foucault’s biggest contribution to feminist politics would be his theory of the formation of the subject in power relations: subjects are “materially constructed through concrete and detailed disciplinary habits” (111).

Following Sandra Bartky’s analysis of the discipline of feminine subjects, Oksala points to disciplinary habits and the docile feminine subjectivity, and she notes that “disciplinary power does not mutilate or coerce its target, but through detailed training reconstructs the body to produce new kinds of gestures, habits, and skills" (113). While some feminists claim that women are emancipated from social discipline if they pursue their own interest, Oksala points out the risk of such a reading of neoliberal free choice discourse. As Foucault has shown, neoliberalism does not mean the free market is completely without governmentality; rather, it is another form of governmentality. Individuals are a product of this new mode of governmentality, and their pursuit of their “own interests” does not make them unruly, but rather makes them predictable. Oksala further argues that we cannot easily assume the distinction between free market choice and socially constructed subjectivity. Following Foucault, she suggests that we should pursue the genealogy of governmentality that establishes economics as a realm of science and a locus of truth. Therefore, the line between an economic matter and a cultural matter is not natural or neutral, but a politically contested distinction and calls for careful examination. Finally, Oksala turns to the problem of history and poses Wendy Brown’s question: If feminism defines itself by sharing the inheritance of a history of injury, how can it avoid being a politics of passive or reactive resentment? Drawing from Walter Benjamin’s theory of history and Jacques Derrida’s theory of living with the ghost, Oksala urges us to think of history as non-monolithic and heterogeneous; in the same manner of a Foucauldian genealogy, “feminist politics must acknowledge the radical heterogeneity of the tradition from which it emerges” (157). We can cultivate a connection with our history of injury as
a remembrance and as incomplete so that we can connect the inheritance of the past to our political actions in the present.

One may be tempted to push the phenomenological project a little further along the lines of Oksala’s inquiry into the conditions of social reality. When we take birth into consideration as an integral part of the world-constitution, instead of attributing birth immediately to procreation and then sexual difference, perhaps we should further ask, what ontology underlies this taken-for-granted knowledge of procreation or sexual difference? Just as Oksala contends that women and feminine experience should not be an afterthought or a compliment to phenomenology, trans and queer experience are not exceptions, but rather reveal the social and historical construction of gender and sexual difference per se, as Gayle Salamon brilliantly demonstrates in her Assuming A Body: Transgender and Rhetorics of Materiality. Furthermore, Oksala reads Sonia Kruks and Iris Marion Young as appealing to their individual corporeal experience as the lived experience of women, without addressing the social, historical, or contextual conditions. However, other readers of Kruks and Young might contend that they have not overlooked these conditions; rather, here lies precisely the distinction between the “lived” body in phenomenology and the ahistorical anatomic understanding of bodily experience. Following Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Young contends that the feminine corporeal subjectivity is a production of its specific social and historical becoming. In other words, many feminist phenomenologists are aware of the risk of essentialism, and their work examines the condition and production of gender and sexual difference, as Oksala also calls into question in this book.

Oksala has published extensively on Foucault’s theory and political philosophy. In this book, she makes a unique contribution in contemporary feminist political discussions by locating their theoretical and conceptual framework and offers her theoretical intervention, following the theory of genealogy, critical ontology, and subjectification of Foucault. She offers these discussions with tremendous clarity and insight, and she has shown that Foucault and post-structuralism are indispensable for today’s feminist politics. Readers of feminist political philosophy and readers who are concerned with contemporary feminist politics would find in this book a clear and nuanced discussion of many contested topics, and readers of Foucault, post-structuralism, and phenomenology would find out how these theories make a unique contribution to contemporary feminism.

Hunting Girls: Sexual Violence from the Hunger Games to Campus Rape


Reviewed by Summer Renault-Steele

GEORGE WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY, SRENAU01@GWU.EDU

Kelly Oliver’s Hunting Girls interrogates the link between representations of girls in popular film and the scourge of sexual violence against young women that reaches its peak on the American college campus. Oliver’s book is designed to speak to the very audience it discusses: undergraduate students and consumers of popular culture. She accomplishes this through concise prose and topical references supplemented with stills from the films she analyzes. In this way Oliver effectively invites readers of all levels to consider the urgent aesthetic-political problem of how entertainment and misogynist violence are entwined. And yet despite the book’s accessibility, the arguments at its heart remain both sophisticated and compelling for scholars of feminist philosophy, film, and media theory. These arguments include an exploration of the relationship between the aesthetic experience of mass spectatorship and rape culture; the role of medium in that relationship; a critique of the liberal notion of consent-as-contract that governs campus sexual assault policy; and a new theorization of consent, conceived through what Oliver calls “response ethics.”

The book begins with the conundrum evoked by the dual meanings of its title: Hunting Girls can refer to the act of preying upon a girl, but it can also refer to a girl herself who shoots for the kill. In her discussion of the former, Oliver points to multiple studies revealing the enormity of sexual violence that occurs on American campuses. For example, a 2009 study from the Journal of Applied Communication Research suggests, “Every two minutes in the United States, someone is raped, and the chances of being that victim are four times greater for a college female student than for any other age group” (Oliver 13). A 2014 estimate from the National Center for Injury Prevention and Control suggests, “one in five women are raped in college” (Oliver 13). Yet, despite the book’s accessibility, the arguments at its heart remain both sophisticated and compelling for scholars of feminist philosophy, film, and media theory.

In an odd contrast to these horrifying circumstances, Oliver notes that contemporary popular film features an explosion of strong, young female icons that wield weapons and kill to survive. Specifically, she describes the proliferation of what she calls “Artemis characters,” who brandish bow and arrow and are not to be messed with. Characters such as Turiel in The Hobbit: The Desolation of Smaug (2013), Katness Everdeen in The Hunger Games (2012), Neytiri in Avatar (2009), and Guinevere in King Arthur (2004) all meet the Artemis archetype on Oliver’s account (15–17). These young women are hardly reduced to prey; they...
are instead hunters themselves. “So,” Oliver asks simply, “What gives?” (18). In other words, what accounts for this apparent paradox between a culture that is plagued by sexual violence against young women but also consumes images of young women as formidable combatants?

Oliver resolves this contradiction early on by claiming that “One thing is certain, images of teenage girls being repeatedly beaten and battered on screen normalizes violence toward girls and women, including sexual violence. While these films feature tough girls who can fight off their attackers and protect themselves, they also contribute to our acceptance of sexual assault” (18). Oliver contends the spectacle of girls engaged in combat serves to endorse violence against women, or at least habituate audiences to the sight of young women bloodied and battered. At the heart of this resolution is an assertion about the relationship between the aesthetic experience of spectatorship and how that translates to a politics of gender. Oliver claims that “life imitates art, and vice versa [. . .] art often revolves around the objectification and assault of girls and women.” Thus, while recognizing the strength of Artemis characters, Oliver ultimately locates them in a long legacy of misogynist imagery—from classical Western fairy tales and media creepshot communities on Tumblr and Metareddit, she is drugged and literally unconscious. In these cases, a photograph or video of a nude or semi-naked woman who serves to endorse violence against women, or at least habituate audiences to the sight of young women bloodied and battered. At the heart of this resolution is an assertion about the relationship between the aesthetic experience of spectatorship and how that translates to a politics of gender. Oliver claims that “life imitates art, and vice versa [. . .] art often revolves around the objectification and assault of girls and women.” Thus, while recognizing the strength of Artemis characters, Oliver ultimately locates them in a long legacy of misogynist imagery—from classical Western fairy tales and perceiving the agreement of the other [. . .] a journey together, with thinking as much as feeling” (Oliver 157). To consent is therefore to participate in a process of continued violation and humiliation of the victim. It therefore becomes almost impossible to determine if life is imitating misogynist imagery here; for in the case of the creepshot, looking itself collapses the distinction between violent image and violent act.

The creepshot is an example of a kind of sexual assault that is only possible because of social media. This insight adds another layer to Oliver’s critique of Artemis characters in popular film. In The Hunger Games, for example, Oliver notes, “the Capitol watches as Katniss fights for her life and hidden cameras film her first kiss. Her every move is under surveillance” (112). New media is worked into the story like a panopticon: the heroine experiences it as a source of remote exploitation and coercion. However, as Oliver notes, it is also Katniss’ own manipulation of the medium that “turns the tide” in The Hunger Games (Oliver 113). Katniss uses her access to the ubiquitous communication network to spark a revolution against the Capitol (Oliver 113). This Artemis figure therefore uses more than her bow and arrow to go to battle. This seems like an appropriate lesson for female audiences today. Skill with bow and arrow might not make a lot of sense for young women who need to protect themselves in the twenty-first century, but a savvy awareness of weaponized social media seems crucial.

Turning back to the college campus, Oliver discusses how we might begin to rethink consent in a time of rampant campus rape and the creepshot. She acknowledges the recent administrative shift on many campuses to require affirmative consent from both parties to ensure sexual activity is desired (Oliver 68). This is understood to be especially important in judging cases of campus party rape, where there may be drugs or alcohol and incapacitated or unconscious women cannot say “no” to sexual advances (Oliver 68). Although this measure is an improvement, Oliver contends, it is not enough: “While there are advantages to requiring affirmative consent over mere negative consent in the form of resistance, we must be skeptical of affirmative consent policies that turn sex in a contract and consent into a single discreet moment” (74). This is because—unlike a contract for services—sex is an ongoing negotiation. Therefore, consent must be continually given as the sexual activity takes place. Oliver’s adroit insight is that consent is not a moment, but a process (74).

In order to begin reconceiving consent as a process contiguous with sexual activity itself, Oliver returns to the Latin roots of the word. Con means “together,” while sent comes from sentire meaning “feel,” but also “perception” or “knowledge” (157). Consent is thus an agreement of feelings, perception, and knowledge. Further, the root of sentire is sentio, meaning to go, to head for, as in a path, a way, or a journey (Oliver 157). The full meaning of consent, then, is “being sensitive to one another, sensing and perceiving the agreement of the other [. . .] a journey together, with thinking as much as feeling” (Oliver 157). To consent is therefore to participate in a process of continued communication, whereby each partner is necessarily responsive to the other. Oliver calls this response ethics (161).
At the very end of her book, Oliver concludes that taking responsibility for sexual assault in terms of response ethics entails considering the ways in which our culture encourages the assault of girls and women: from fairy tales, to Hollywood Blockbusters, to creepshots and rape on the college campus. That is, doing response ethics means taking account of the ways that popular imagery, mass media, campus culture, and policy foreclose consent or impoverish our understanding of consent. Thus, beyond serving as an introduction to feminist philosophy, film, and media theory, Hunting Girls is also a model for ethical critique: a guide for how we might begin doing response ethics ourselves.

**Poverty, Agency, and Human Rights**


Reviewed by Lynda Lange

**UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO, LANGE@UTSC.UTORONTO.CA**

Feminist thought about gender justice in a global context is a relatively new field. This book is a welcome addition. It responds to the change of tone in discussion of global poverty away from the focus on purely economic development to a realization that human rights and empowerment will have to be part of any sustainable solution to poverty. The United Nations 2015 Sustainable Development Goal to “empower all women and girls” exemplifies this change. This collection of essays, edited by feminist philosopher Diana Meyers, tackles the question of poverty from the point of view of both epistemology and ethics. We assume that poverty is a bad thing, but just what are the harms done by poverty? Of equal importance, given the vast literature on how poverty reduction and aid schemes have gone wrong, how can knowledge about poverty and its relief best be gained?

The focus of this book is global poverty. However, it begins with a terrific essay by the late Claudia Card, based on poverty in the United States, reflecting on the various meanings of poverty to those who suffer it, and a nuanced analysis of what it may mean to survive it. At many points, Card notes how domestic poverty can be both similar to and different from extreme global poverty.

In point of fact, greater and greater inequality within countries of the West/North (especially the U.S.) has developed at the same time as the development of global inequality and the persistence, and even increase, of extreme poverty in the global South. One can only imagine how this fact may impact on opinions in wealthy countries about development aid. If citizens feel poor themselves, in spite of being better off than the global poor, how sympathetic are they going to be to increasing aid for global poverty?

For those with a taste for the big epistemological picture, David Ingram offers a theory-laden but incisive analysis of approaches to “poverty knowledge” that have emerged since the mid twentieth century in the North/West. In a committed dialectical manner, Ingram elucidates the common roots in rational choice theory and methodological individualism of Rawlsian welfarism and Nozickean libertarianism. These approaches may blind us to what has been called “background injustice,” that is, the effects of social and economic structures that in effect coerce “rational” choices, either by obscuring possibilities or by literally limiting the options that face individuals. This is why poor people with little power may make what appear to others (for lack of understanding of how the situation looks from inside it) to be choices not in their own best interests. Since experts in poverty knowledge are seldom poor themselves, it is easy to see how focus on the behavior of individual poor people from the perspective of rational choice theory has generated paternalism and condescension. Ingram outlines the history of the social science movement away from economic and social structural analysis of poverty to analysis of the alleged “culture of poverty,” i.e., how the “war on poverty” became the war on the poor. Although Ingram does not discuss this, it has mostly been in the service of neo-liberal policies of reducing government spending.

Ingram advocates for a better approach regarding solutions to poverty that is dialogical, and is inspired by early work of Habermas on social epistemology and critical social science, an approach meant actively to engage the poor. However, his method for finding out what might actually empower the poor arguably returns us to the behavior of the poor in the sense that the goal still seems to be understanding (albeit more thoroughly and empathetically) how things appear to the poor. Presumably this would illuminate the presence of forms of coercion behind suboptimal choices by the poor. According to Ingram, there should be a balancing of novice and expert viewpoints, through first person narratives, for example, while experts can offer “more comprehensive explanations” to poor interlocutors. The goal is “empathetic understanding,” which seems to be a fine goal in itself, but which is saddled unnecessarily, in this reviewer’s opinion, with Hegelianism and psychoanalysis. Actual solidarity and interdependence as the basis of social epistemology seems to be presumed, although since this is generally unrecognized (for reasons Ingram himself has made very clear) it must be advocated for. It is unclear if it is the poor or the rich or the poverty experts who might need therapeutic intervention for their beliefs about poverty, but regardless who needs it, who would provide it?

The section on “ethical responses to poverty” is very strong, including essays by Elizabeth Ashford, Gillian Brock, and Alison Jaggar, all of whom have track records of publication in this area. Each of these authors takes the arguments of Thomas Pogge’s World Poverty and Human Rights (2008), which Ashford correctly terms “an immensely important argument” (p. 98), as a starting point, and each offers either further development of some aspects of it, or some modification or expansion of aspects of it. These essays make the volume very useful as a textbook for senior students or as an introductory volume for those unfamiliar with the field. This section perhaps should have been the first section.
Ashford does what philosophers in particular can do well, that is, she spells out clearly the argumentative steps that lead, ponderously it may seem, but inexorably, to a striking conclusion. From unobjectionable premises we arrive at the conclusion that placing the profit of oursevles, the company we own or work for, or our country above any consideration of the effects of our behavior on others is morally wrong. It may be objected that we already know that. But do we? Ashford points out that this behavior, widely taken for granted as rational and legitimate, actually has no more moral standing than that of a social norm. As such, conformity to it causes no embarrassment. However, when one examines the actual processes that produce and perpetuate global poverty—from consumer choices, to the actions of national governments, to the policies of global financial institutions—it appears that at every turn there are choices made which are not determined simply by what is reasonable or putatively normal seeking of profit. We are actually able, virtually always without the risk of ruining ourselves, to make choices that lessen the suffering of poverty by taking less for ourselves so that more can be available to others, including distant others. The other essays in this section examine quite a range of what these choices might be and as such are very informative.

There are several essays on the topic of aiding development without undermining the agency of the people affected, and these are a rich mine of discussion possibilities. Ann Cudd offers, rather surprisingly, a defense of globalizing free trade. Studies by Narayan, Okin, and others have found that what the poor find the worst about their situations is their sense of powerlessness, when there is little they can do to better their lot, at the same time as others can do many things that affect them, whether for better or for worse, or in other words, their lack of agency. Cudd argues that the poor can have agency if they can engage in “free and fair” trade, including joint ventures with the non-poor. She offers some moral arguments why the non-poor would want to be bothered with this, which she admits are weak, alluding to the arguments of Pogge and Brock for duties to the poor as stronger, but also offers some “instrumental” harms of poverty to the non-poor. Acknowledging that the non-poor would have to put up resources for any joint ventures, she argues that not doing so “deprives the non-poor of opportunities for mutually beneficial interaction.” Cudd offers an excellent discussion of the kind of harms that the poor can experience through development aid and gifts, even when well intended, making it clear why she recommends commercial enterprise as the best option for enhancing agency. However, one wonders if she is aware that her general arguments for “free trade” pretty much echo the neo-liberal thinking that has so shaped globalization since the early 1980s, and has so failed to bring prosperity in many parts of the world. Unfortunately, free and fair trade is just what has not happened in much of the global South, and if there were really “mutually beneficial” ventures to be undertaken between the poor and transnational corporations, it seems likely that the ever-hungry world of investment would already be doing it. Nonetheless, her argument should not be discounted, for why should the poor not seek to better themselves through enterprise, if they possibly can? There is so much room for the “rules of the game” to be made more free and fair.

Micro-credit has been controversial in feminist thinking about women’s poverty for some time. Serene Khader addresses the paradox that some research has uncovered, that a successful woman borrower, rather than gaining more social equality, may retrench the practices that signify her subordination, particularly by assuming purdah, or female seclusion. A woman can do this if she can use her micro loan for some sort of business that she can do from her home, and not be compelled to go out to work, which in her social milieu may be considered shameful, something a good woman would avoid if she possibly can. I was reminded of one of the themes of Simone de Beauvoir in The Second Sex, which was one of the things that earned her a bad reputation with the “second wave.” Beauvoir held that middle- and upper-class women are partly responsible for their own subordination because by conforming to male expectations they could have easier lives with more material advantages than if they struck out on their own and/or refused to conform. It was the idea of non-victimized responsibility that offended some back then, for are women not oppressed in their feminine roles? More fodder for lively debate.

Like Khader’s essay, several others discuss the permutations of coercion and agency and the difficulty of knowing what really improves people’s lives with respect to their ability to choose. As John Christman explains in his discussion of trafficking, even implementation of rights, without attention to the narratives of the individuals affected, can compel outcomes that are problematic rather than liberating.

Just as there is much room for analysis of the meaning of poverty, there is a huge literature on the meaning of development, which we may presume has the goal of alleviating or even eradicating poverty. But what is development? Amy Allen’s lucid discussion of the history of debates around the United Nations declaration of the Right to Development is packed with information and references on the global politics of rights and development since the second world war.

**Anger and Forgiveness: Resentment, Generosity, Justice**


Reviewed by Mechthild Nagel

**SUNY CORTLAND, MECKE.NAGEL@CORTLAND.EDU**

World renowned public philosopher Martha Nussbaum’s new book grew out of her presentations at the John Locke Lectures at Oxford University in 2014. The ethico-political explorations focus mainly on the topic of anger and what she calls transition-anger. The book reads a bit as an homage to Auerbach’s *Mimesis* given her skillful use of classic literary texts. Nussbaum opens with a discussion of Aeschylus’ _Oresteia_ to discuss the archaic Greek world embroiled in blood feuds and revenge killings encouraged by fateful Furies, ancient goddesses of revenge, and
The first part of the book discusses the various functions of anger and forgiveness, while the remaining chapters focus on stoicism and the political realm of justice, including the value of generosity and apology. Finally, there is an appendix section where she revisits claims from her earlier book, *Upheavals of Thought* (2001), on emotion theory and presents a more nuanced view on anger in conjunction with blame. For her new book, Nussbaum notes (178, note 37) that she no longer defends the “blame game” that is part of the liability notion of justice, thanks to Iris Young’s posthumous book *Responsibility for Justice* (2011).

The chapter on anger also shows Nussbaum reversing her earlier support of (Aristotelian) just and justified anger. The mainstream tradition focuses on the retaliatory nature of anger, and in her case study scenario, a victim’s friend’s rage directed at her rapist, Nussbaumboldly asserts that anger creates fantasy of payback and compensation for pain and is unproductive (23–40). The stranger-rape case’s various scenarios should be of interest to feminist readers who might take issue with Nussbaum’s analysis that anger is a sign for demanding down-ranking of the wrongdoer. Furthermore, a common scenario of helplessness and anger against a heteropatriarchal and racist criminal justice system or an on-campus judicial system that seems to bypass (5). A kindly predisposed lawmaker will avoid anger, steadfastly refusing “magical thinking” about the rewards of payback and deserts, since it would lead to more violence. Spiteful punishment cannot undo the harm committed by the wrongdoer, and shaming is a strategy to “down-rank” their status and elevate the victim’s status. Such angry sentiments are mired in the pre-law society of the Oresteia, and Nussbaum shows cogently why they have no place in a decent society.

In her chapter on conflicts in intimate relationships between couples and parents and children, her analysis takes again a surprising turn. She notes again that anger is only favored as Transition-Anger and instead of forgiveness, one might turn to empathy and playfulness as life-affirming values, which completely lack in the “dance of anger” (109). The following chapter on “the middle realm” explores a qualified stoicism, in the sense of down-playing self-interrogation, and instead engages in more humor (147). Seneca’s philosophy is preoccupied with anger in everyday (Roman) life, and Nussbaum’s chapter sorts out the irritating behavior of others and coping strategies employing Transition-Anger to help us to “mourn and move on” (141).

In the chapter on everyday justice, Nussbaum deftly critiques both leading scholars who defend retribution and even on the other side of the punishment spectrum a notable restorative justice pioneer, John Braithwaite, carefully noting how he addresses objections to his invention of reintegrative shame (203). However, his model cannot address feminist critiques that suggest it “privatizes” domestic violence (204). I agree with Nussbaum that Braithwaite’s term, a tempered version of shame practices, is a misnomer and does not serve his restorative justice model well. Nussbaum’s critique of shaming approaches to punishment is very helpful in responding to the recent contributions to the shame literature which vigorously defend it. Another notable exception to the trend is Bonnie Mann’s book *Sovereign Masculinity: Gender Lessons from the War on Terror* (2014). Nussbaum presents a welcome contribution to justice theories that critique current prison regimes and struggles thoughtfully with effective approaches to forward-looking practices. As a public philosopher, Nussbaum emphasizes the role of empirical studies while normatively engaging with justice paradigms. Still one gets a sense that while the prison system of the U.S. is quite ghastly, there is really no alternative to it. Nussbaum favors public procedural justice, not family conferencing practices à la Braithwaite, which she calls privatized solutions. (He also concedes that those who plead not guilty will have to go through the regular court system and the due process it promises.)

In the remainder of the review, I pose a few questions that seem worthy of being addressed in a book that centers on anger in the context of justice. What if the ideal of the abstract rights individual nor equal dignity for all are not serving all defendants equally? What can philosophers learn from the *Movement for Black Lives* that has questioned the core of the criminal justice systems and its systematic failure to consider Black life on par with white life? Nussbaum does mention hate crimes and problematic legal responses, but she is silent on how to deal with unintended consequences of hate crime legislation. I have in mind the proliferation of cases where Black individuals have been punished for the propagation of anti-white language.

Furthermore, the focus is mostly on individual “deviance” and a trust in “the law.” Almost cheerfully, Nussbaum suggests
that in the case of non-intimate relationships, one should "turn matters over to the law" because "[l]aw can deal with the idea that something must be done about the offender, thus rendering garden variety anger redundant" (140–41). She faults the ancient Greeks for not having a public prosecutor, even for murder cases (281, note 6). While there is no need to note the power of the American prosecutor, a cursory discussion on flagrantly biased, and, indeed, partial, procedural (in)justice, often resulting in death penalty convictions where the culpability is in grave doubt, would have been appropriate. Have we really progressed all that well, specifically in American jurisprudence, since the Civil Rights era beyond the fateful judgment imposed on Socrates by a jury of his peers? A public prosecutor who has no conflict of interest with the victim’s family nevertheless can be engaged in payback emotions, and an appeal to impartial procedural justice does not respond to the messiness of a non-ideal contemporary prison-industrial complex. However, Nussbaum might retort that the book is not really about punishment (cf. 183), but it is noteworthy that two of the eight chapters deal with the topic of everyday justice and revolutionary justice in the political realm and other chapters point to public adjudication of crimes in order to avoid payback scheming by grieving victims or victims’ families. Furthermore, in the chapter on intimate relationships, she laments the fact that the law in family relationships escapes enforcement mechanisms (135).

Nussbaum showcases South Africa’s apartheid regime and the necessary rewriting of its constitution in her chapter on revolutionary justice. Undoubtedly, it is to the credit of charismatic leader Nelson Mandela that South Africa did not spiral into a civil war and setting up a Truth and Reconciliation Commission was a notable achievement to deal with aspects of state violence. The key political figures chosen all have renounced anger in favor of the forward-looking ideal of unconditional generosity. To be sure, all the movement leaders mentioned in the book, Gandhi, Mandela, King, have iconic status as peacebuilders and mobilizing millions for principled opposition to state injustice. However, it would be good to show them in their complexity. Gandhi has been in the news in recent years for a controversy that has been overlooked for a century. How do we account for his overt (and angry!) anti-Black racism, not only during his time in South Africa but also as an elder in India? Nussbaum foregrounds Gandhi’s movement’s decisive rejection of caste status and thus praises Gandhi for confronting the British, not with angry preoccupation with status, but with sympathy (223). None of that really mattered to status-preoccupied Gandhi in South Africa, when he demanded that Indians be better treated than Africans whom he referred to in spiteful and degrading terms (Desai and Vahed, 2015). Social protests demanding the toppling of Gandhi statues have occurred in South Africa and on a campus in Legon, Ghana.

With respect to the need for revolutionary justice, how might we feel about the post-1865 convict lease system and Jim Crow injustice in the U.S.? Nussbaum notes that the Civil Rights Movement made possible important legal reform, and a complete overhaul of the Constitution was not necessary (unlike in the other settler colonial states, India, and South Africa). Space constraints don’t permit me to contest this assessment. Just briefly, since Nussbaum defends a welfarist (or consequentialist) approach to political justice, dignityplays an important role in “knitting together” economic goods and basic rights and liberties, in short, her famous capabilities theory (173), and U.S. citizens enjoy constitutional protection of equal dignity (200). However, where is dignity addressed in the U.S. Constitution? Dignity shows up implicitly and only in the negative, namely, in the Eighth Amendment prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment. It would stand to reason that this clause is still mired in pre-law society of the Furies, which she disputes (177), rather than in the explicitly dignitarian philosophy of the United Nations. And her treatise is silent on the defense of capital punishment, a sanctioned practice by the courts on the basis of the Eighth Amendment. However, Nussbaum notes that the Eighth Amendment does not apply to prisoners asserting their right to equal dignity. It is true that the courts have not favored prisoners’ petitions for relief from sexual assault and other forms of torture, although beginning with Estelle v. Gamble (1976), they barred “unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain” in prisons and Farmer vs. Brennan (1994) clarified the “deliberate indifference” standard as being similar to criminal recklessness (Robertson 2016, 374).

I failed to see any attentiveness to corporate criminality or state violence. She notes that violent offenders should be incapacitated, “we can all agree on that” (190). What about state actors who are violent offenders and go free on a regular basis? Black Lives Matter took off precisely because the state had to be put on notice for hardly ever indicting its police officers (or prison guards) for violent murder, and, recently, Justice Sotomayor took issue with such “benign neglect” of prosecution and proper judicial review in a provocative dissent (Utah v. Strieff, 2016). But I appreciate Nussbaum’s critique of mainstream philosophy’s treatment of punishment in narrow terms; her careful defense of welfarist concerns that deal with prevention strategies, including in early childhood; and her condemnation of racism (180–83). Overall, Nussbaum’s book is a welcome addition to the philosophical literature on emotion theory and justice paradigms and will also appeal to a diverse audience of readers and experts in the fields of critical justice studies and in restorative justice.

REFERENCES


CONTRIBUTORS

Ásta
Ásta is associate professor of philosophy at San Francisco State University, where she teaches courses and seminars in metaphysics and epistemology, philosophy of language, social philosophy, and feminist philosophy. Recent work includes a monograph, Categories We Live By, in which she offers a metaphysics of social categories (under contract with Oxford University Press). http://astaphilosophy.com

Seth Vannatta
Seth Vannatta is associate professor and chair of the Department of Philosophy and Religious Studies at Morgan State University in Baltimore, MD. Seth writes in the areas of American Pragmatism, philosophy of law, philosophy of education, and popular culture. He is the author of Conservatism and Pragmatism in Law, Politics, and Ethics (Palgrave Macmillan, 2014). His most recent journal article is “A Fallibilist Conservatism,” Anamnesis 6 (March 2017). He is currently working on an edited volume, The Pragmatism and Prejudice of Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. with Lexington Books.

F. Vera-Gray
F. Vera-Gray is a research fellow in the Law School at Durham University, UK, interested in drawing together feminist phenomenological conceptual approaches and empirical research on violence against women and girls. Her first book, Men’s Intrusion, Women’s Embodiment: A Critical Analysis of Street Harassment, was shortlisted for the BSA Philip Abrams Memorial Prize, and her current project, www.womenonporn.org, looks to be the largest ever study of women’s views and experiences of online pornography in the UK. She is currently working on a new book on women’s embodiment and safety work entitled The Right Amount of Panic.

Lisa Tessman
Lisa Tessman is professor of philosophy at Binghamton University. She teaches and does research in ethics, moral psychology, feminist philosophy, and related areas. She is the author of When Doing the Right Thing Is Impossible (Oxford University Press, 2017), Moral Failure: On the Impossible Demands of Morality (Oxford University Press, 2015), and Burdened Virtues: Virtue Ethics for Liberatory Struggles (Oxford University Press, 2005). She has recently begun a monthly blog for Psychology Today called “I’m Only Human: Ethics for Real People” (https://www.psychologytoday.com/blog/im-only-human).

Mara Marin
Mara Marin, a postdoctoral associate at the University of Toronto’s Centre for Ethics, is a political theorist with interests in feminist theory, critical, social theory, and legal theory. Her work focuses on issues of structural injustice, oppression, and domination as they relate to the organization of care, work, and the law. Her book, Connected by Commitment, is forthcoming.

Katrina England
Katrina England is a doctoral student in the Department of Philosophy at Binghamton University. She teaches and assists courses in the Philosophy, Politics, and Law program. She is also the founder and director of the Critical Thinking Lab. Her research focuses on social, political, ethical, and legal philosophy.

Tina Fernandes Botts
Tina Fernandes Botts is assistant professor of philosophy at California State University, Fresno. Her research areas are philosophy of law, philosophy of race, feminist philosophy, and hermeneutics. Her most recent publications are “Boylan’s Agency Based Justification for Natural Human Rights and Group Rights” in the Journal of Applied Ethics and Philosophy and “The Genealogy and Viability of the Concept of Intersectionality” in The Routledge Companion to Feminist Philosophy, published in 2017 by Taylor and Francis. Her edited collection, Philosophy and the Mixed Race Experience, was published by Lexington Books in 2016 and was recently reviewed in Hypatia Reviews Online. She is also the author of a forthcoming monograph, The Concept of Race, Aristotle’s Proportional Equality, and the Equal Protection Clause, and is the co-author, with Rosemarie Tong, of the fifth edition of Westview’s Feminist Thought (July 2017).

Chris Jingchao Ma
Chris Jingchao Ma is a doctoral student in the Department of Philosophy at Villanova University. Her research interests include feminist philosophy, queer theory, and contemporary continental philosophy. Her dissertation draws from psychoanalysis and phenomenology to examine the social formation of the gendered and racialized self.

Summer Renault-Steele

Lynda Lange
Lynda Lange is professor emerita at University of Toronto at Scarborough. Her teaching has been in courses in feminist philosophy, political philosophy, and postcolonial studies in philosophy. Recent work has been volunteer research on global poverty with Alberto Cimadamore of the University of Bergen, The Global Poverty Consensus Report (2015).

Mechthild Nagel
Mechthild Nagel is professor of philosophy, director of the Center for Gender and Intercultural Studies (CGIS) at the State University of New York, College at Cortland. Dr. Nagel is also a visiting professor at Fulda University of Applied Sciences, Germany. She is author of seven books: Masking the Abject: A Genealogy of Play (Lexington, 2002), co-editor of Race, Class, and Community Identity (Humanities, 2000), The Hydropolitics of Africa: A Contemporary Challenge (Cambridge Scholars Press, 2007), Prisons and Punishment: Reconsidering Global Penality (Africa World Press, 2007), Dancing with Iris: The Philosophy of Iris Marion Young (Oxford University Press, 2010), and The End of Prisons: Voices from the Decarceration Movement (Rodopi, 2013). Her recent coedited book is titled Diversity, Social Justice, and Inclusive Excellence: Transdisciplinary and Global Perspectives (SUNY Press, 2014). Dr. Nagel is founder and editor-in-chief of the online feminist journal Wagadu: A Journal of Transnational Women’s and Gender Studies (wagadu.org).