NEWSLETTER ON FEMINISM AND PHILOSOPHY

FROM THE EDITOR, SALLY J. SCHOLZ

NEWS FROM THE COMMITTEE ON THE STATUS OF WOMEN, ROSEMARIE TONG

ARTICLES

Marilyn Fischer
“Feminism and the Art of Interpretation: Or, Reading the First Wave to Think about the Second and Third Waves”

Jennifer Purvis
“A ‘Time’ for Change: Negotiating the Space of a Third Wave Political Moment”

Laurie Calhoun
“Feminism is a Humanism”

Louise Antony
“When is Philosophy Feminist?”

Ann Ferguson
“Is Feminist Philosophy Still Philosophy?”

Ofelia Schutte
“Feminist Ethics and Transnational Injustice: Two Methodological Suggestions”

Jeffrey A. Gauthier
“Feminism and Philosophy: Getting It and Getting It Right”

Sara Beardsworth
“A French Feminism”
BOOK REVIEWS

Robin Fiore and Hilde Lindemann Nelson: Recognition, Responsibility, and Rights: Feminist Ethics and Social Theory
REVIEWED BY CHRISTINE M. KOGGEL

Diana Tietjens Meyers: Being Yourself: Essays on Identity, Action, and Social Life
REVIEWED BY CHERYL L. HUGHES

Beth Kiyoko Jamieson: Real Choices: Feminism, Freedom, and the Limits of the Law
REVIEWED BY ZAHRA MEGHANI

Alan Soble: The Philosophy of Sex: Contemporary Readings
REVIEWED BY KATHRYN J. NORLOCK

Penny Florence: Sexed Universals in Contemporary Art
REVIEWED BY TANYA M. LOUGHEAD

CONTRIBUTORS

ANNOUNCEMENTS
FROM THE EDITOR

Feminism, like philosophy, can be done in a variety of different ways, for a variety of different ends, and can utilize a variety of different methodologies. The articles in this issue, originally presented in two panels sponsored by the APA Committee on the Status of Women (CSW) at the 2004 Eastern Division meeting, not only demonstrate this claim, they also address, question, contest, and problematize it. “Feminism across Generations” and “The Different Meanings of ‘Feminist Philosophy’, the two CSW APA panels, brought together diverse ideas about our relationships to each other as feminists, our relationship to the field of philosophy, and our responsibilities within feminist theories. The authors consented to publish their pieces here in an effort to continue the fruitful dialogues begun at those meetings. Also included on those panels were Sally Haslanger and Carmella Epright.

The issue begins with an article by Marilyn Fischer, who uses Jane Addams, a first wave feminist, to call for some intergenerational interpretation within the academy between second and third wave feminists. In a similar vein, Jennifer Purvis uses Singing in the Fire: a provocative collection of reminiscences from some very influential feminists, to call for intrafeminist dialogue. In particular, Purvis is concerned that feminists maintain a critical stance that interrogates our own positions of power while we engage the feminist scholarship of others.

Laurie Calhoun takes a slightly different turn in her article “Feminism is a Humanism.” Using Sartre’s well-known essay, she compares feminism to existentialism to suggest the relative value of a variety of feminist academic pursuits.

Louise Antony and Ann Ferguson face the issue head on by seeking a definition of feminist philosophy. Antony uses an analytic approach to discuss the different combinations, meanings, and permutations of feminism and philosophy. Ferguson offers a classification system, with numerous examples, to help understand the wide variety of projects that go under the banner “feminist philosophy.”

Ofelia Schutte turns our attention to the global scene and highlights some of the challenges of globalization and neoliberalism for a feminist ethics and proposes two strategies for responding. Importantly, her second strategy entails an awareness of how “our” knowledge is incomplete without subaltern knowledges.

Jeff Gauthier and Sara Beardsworth tackle a similar problem within feminist ethics from decidedly different perspectives: feminist encounters with ethical objectivity and universality. While Gauthier examines Barbara Herman’s The Practice of Moral Judgment in order to assess the possibility of objective claims, Beardsworth demonstrates Kristeva’s “maternal feminine” as “an experience that binds experience to experience” and refuses to be “turned into an abstraction.” Both reconfigure the ground of moral theory by highlighting the cultural bias or particularity encompassed in claims of objectivity or universality.

Punctuating the issues raised in these provocative articles, five book reviews assess new research in feminist and gender theory. The books, as well as the reviewers, demonstrate both the problem and potentiality of creating easy categories for feminist philosophy. Readers will enjoy these candid summaries and reviews and will likely find something that sparks further interest.

The Spring 2006 issue of the Newsletter is slated to include a collection of articles, guest edited by Jessica Miller, on feminist bioethics consulting. As always, we welcome your submissions and suggestions for subsequent Newsletters.

About the Newsletter on Feminism and Philosophy

The Newsletter on Feminism and Philosophy is sponsored by the APA Committee on the Status of Women (CSW). The Newsletter is designed to provide an introduction to recent philosophical work that addresses issues of gender. None of the varied philosophical views presented by authors of Newsletter articles necessarily reflect the views of any or all of the members of the Committee on the Status of Women, including the Editor(s) of the Newsletter, nor does the committee advocate any particular type of feminist philosophy. We advocate only that serious philosophical attention be given to issues of gender and that claims of gender bias in philosophy receive full and fair consideration.

Submission Guidelines and Information

1. Purpose: The purpose of the Newsletter is to publish information about the status of women in philosophy and to make the resources of feminist philosophy more widely available. The Newsletter contains discussions of recent developments in feminist philosophy and related work in other disciplines, literature overviews and book reviews, suggestions for eliminating gender bias in the traditional philosophy curriculum, and reflections on feminist pedagogy. It also informs the profession about the work of the APA Committee on the Status of Women. Articles submitted to the Newsletter should be limited to ten double-spaced pages and must follow the APA guidelines for gender-neutral language. Please submit four copies of essays, prepared for anonymous review. References should follow The Chicago Manual of Style.

2. Book Reviews and Reviewers: If you have published a book that is appropriate for review in the Newsletter, please have your publisher send us a copy of your book. We are always in need of book reviewers. To volunteer to review books (or some particular book), please send the Editor a CV and letter of interest including mention of your areas of research and teaching.
3. Where to Send Things: Please send all articles, comments, suggestions, books, and other communications to the Editor: Dr. Sally J. Scholz, Department of Philosophy, Villanova University, 800 Lancaster Avenue, Villanova, PA 19085-1699, sally.scholz@villanova.edu

4. Submission Deadlines: Submissions for Spring issues are due by the preceding September 1st; submissions for Fall issues are due by the preceding February 1st.

---

**NEWS FROM THE COMMITTEE ON THE STATUS OF WOMEN**

Dear Everyone:

No doubt each of you is as busy as we are with the intersecting activities of daily life—personal, professional, and public. Nonetheless, we hope you get a few minutes to read this letter so that we can keep in good communication with you. Over the past year, the CSW continued to urge the leadership of the APA in general, and the chairs and members of the diversity committees in particular, to publicly discuss whether the time has come to think of the APA not as “a loose confederation of divisions,” the primary purpose of which is to promote opportunities for members to meet regionally and exchange ideas but as a “centrally coherent and unified organization that actively promotes its members’ professional interests in addition to those of organized scholarly exchanges.” Although we think these two views of the APA are, in principle, complementary and compatible, we also think that, at present and in practice, the traditional “loose-confederation” view of the APA intermittently interferes with the full development of the “coherent-and-unified” view. We urge you to get involved in APA “politics” to reflect on the APA’s principles, policies, and practices and, most importantly, to voice both your satisfactions and dissatisfactions with the services, benefits, and intellectual stimulation the APA affords you.

Below is a list of our major initiatives and accomplishments, excluding the six panels we organized and presented. They will be reported in our Annual Report to the National Office. The list is as long and robust as it is thanks to the individual members of the CSW, each of whom has gone over and beyond the call of duty in order to increase and enrich the status of women in the profession.

1. **CSW Business Meetings**

The CSW met at each of the Division meetings. At the Eastern Division meeting, we focused on the relationship between the CSW and the Committee on Inclusiveness as well as issues related to the structure of the APA. We also continued work on our CSW web-projects, all of which we have now completed and posted at http://www.apa.udel.edu/apa/governance/committees/women/. At the Pacific Division meeting, we were preoccupied by the controversy about the best way for the members and leadership of the APA, particularly the leadership of the Pacific Division, to respond to a union strike against the chain of hotels to which the Westin St. Francis (the site of the San Francisco APA meeting) belongs. Although individual members of the CSW decided the degree to which they would or would not participate in events at the Westin, as a group the CSW decided to hold its panels at the University of San Francisco. Because one of the panelists on one of the panels disagreed with the CSW’s decision, he presented his paper at the Westin. In addition to discussing the strike and its spill-over effects, we also discussed the APA Executive Director’s decision to resign from his office, and how his leaving might affect CSW projects that had just managed to gain momentum. More than one member of the CSW expressed the opinion that Michael Kelly had enabled not only the CSW but all the diversity committees to forward projects central to their mission. Finally, at the Central Division meeting, the CSW focused on upcoming panels, future issues of the Newsletter, and its ever-evolving webpage. We also pondered the future of the CSW and the APA as it enters yet another transitional period. Among the questions we asked ourselves is why the National Office seems unable to retain its Executive Director for any length of time. The rapid turnover of Executive Directors suggests that there may be some systemic and structural problems for the APA to resolve.

2. **CSW Proposal on Childcare**

The CSW asked member Sally Scholz to research the CSW archives about discussions related to childcare at APA meetings so that we could make a recommendation about childcare to the Executive Board at their November 2005 meeting. She also did a study of seven other major academic annual conferences to determine what provisions for childcare were offered. Most of these academic conferences are three to four times the size of our Eastern Division meeting. Scholz compiled an abbreviated history of childcare offered by the APA, focusing on the work Alison Jaggar did in the 1980s. After a discussion with the CSW at the Eastern Division meeting and the Central Division meeting, the CSW submitted a four-part proposal to the APA Executive Board for inclusion on their November 2005 agenda. The proposal, posted on the CSW webpage, is as follows:

1. The American Philosophical Association Committee on the Status of Women strongly urges colleges and departments to include an allowance for childcare provisions in all travel allocations to scholarly conferences.

2. Local organizers for divisional meetings should be required either to (a) negotiate some childcare arrangements with organizing hotels, or (b) provide a list of approved childcare facilities that have agreed to offer conference contracts and that are within walking distance from the hotel.

3. Should the APA change to a single annual meeting, childcare should be provided on-site at a supplemented rate using KiddieCorps or relatively similar high-quality provider.

4. A small fund for childcare grants for APA presenters ought to be made available on a competitive basis much like funding for graduate student travel to the APA.

3. **CSW Mentoring for Diversity Project**

Beginning in 2004, the CSW undertook to distill, write up, and post on the website the advice given in papers for the “Mentoring for Diversity” workshops held at APA Divisional meetings in 2001 and 2002. The workshops, spearheaded by Nancy Tuana, were sponsored by the CSW and several of the diversity committees. Working with the papers sent in response to her request to the speakers on those panels, CSW member Elizabeth Minnich prepared the report. It discusses what is at stake in mentoring women: the profession; mentoring as a social practice; informal and formal ways of mentoring; and the pros and cons of “friendship,” “modeling,” and “advisor” paradigms of mentoring. Special thanks to Ofelia Schutte and Claudia Card for contributing their excellent papers as background for the report. Please contact Elizabeth Minnich at sally.scholz@villanova.edu
at elizamin@aol.com if you wish to add insights to the ongoing project.

4. CSW Graduate School Project
Thanks to the efforts of CSW member Christina Bellon, we have posted on the CSW webpage a partial and provisional list of graduate schools that aim to bolster, in one way or another, the status of women in the profession. The schools listed view themselves either as having some depth in feminist philosophy and/or as particularly attentive to gender-related issues and concerns. The CSW urges graduate schools that are not on the list but that wish to be placed on it to contact Chris Bellon at bellon@saclink.csus.edu. Self-reporting has been the primary criterion for inclusion on the list.

5. CSW Resource Page Project
Thanks to the initiative of CSW member Sharon Crasnow, there is now a CSW Resource Page posted on the CSW webpage. It includes items of particular interest to women in the profession such as feminist/women’s studies journals, organizations, and services. The CSW urges members of the APA to add data to the preliminary list. Please contact Sharon Crasnow at scrasnow@earthlink.net.

6. CSW Archive Project
Thanks to the collective work of the CSW and the assistance of APA staff members, the CSW’s paper archives are now electronic archives. The CSW electronic archive will likely grow rapidly since so much APA work is now done electronically.

Although the past year was a challenging one for the APA, the CSW remains optimistic and united in our resolve to increase the status of women in the profession. We are glad that our work is increasingly intersecting with the work of the other diversity committees and the Committee on Inclusiveness. The CSW wants to help the APA forward the work of a wide variety of philosophers, particularly those women philosophers who label their work as “interdisciplinary,” “multicultural,” “global,” “attentive to difference,” “breaking-new-ground,” “deepening/rethinking the tradition,” and/or “feminist.” In addition, we want to help philosophy be more visible and audible in the public arena, shaping policies and practices with rational argument and a vision of what speaks to the minds, hearts, and imaginations of people; namely, the good(s), the true(s), and the beautiful(s).

Just so you all know, Lorraine Code, Marleen Rozemond, and Cynthia Stark are rotating off the CSW. Each of them has done more than their fair share of the CSW’s work. The panels they organized were particularly excellent, and they were, without exception, always responsive to requests for help. The incoming CSW members are Janet Kourany, Christine Koggel, and Ruth Groenhout. Like their predecessors, they are outstanding women in the profession who are passionate about serving the best interests of women in the profession.

Best to one and all,
Rosie

Rosemarie Tong, Chair of the CSW
Distinguished Professor in Health Care Ethics
Director, Center for Professional and Applied Ethics
Department of Philosophy
The University of North Carolina at Charlotte

ARTICLES

Feminism and the Art of Interpretation: Or, Reading the First Wave to Think about the Second and Third Waves

Marilyn Fischer
University of Dayton

Cory, my daughter, accuses me of having no thoughts of my own. I was talking with Jeremy [“Cory, what do you call him? partner? significant other? boyfriend?” “Mom, I just call him Jeremy.” Alright, then.] Jeremy asked why I was an almost pacifist. Without even breathing, I launched into Addams’s arguments for pacifism, fully attributed to her, of course. That’s when Cory accused me of having no thoughts of my own. So, if I have no thoughts of my own, inhabiting Addams’s thoughts is not a bad substitute.

Remembering how Addams viewed much of her work as interpreting American institutions to immigrants, and interpreting the immigrant poor to middle-class Americans, I thought about a former colleague who often came to me for interpretive advice. She had been born and educated outside the United States and found Midwestern youth culture particularly baffling. One day she exploded, “Those students who slouch in the back of the classroom, baseball caps pulled over their eyes, they are so disrespectful! Are they insulting me because I am a woman of color?” How to answer this? All of the following statements are true: yes, they are insulting you in the sense that they are defying you to interest them in philosophy. But, don’t take it personally. And, yes, the fact that you are a woman of color no doubt enters into it. But then, White male colleagues report finding similar back rows in their classrooms. My advice was to rearrange the chairs into circles, squares, nested rectangles, or any configuration that eliminates back rows.

Feminists in the university need to do interpretive work and need to have interpretive work done on their behalf. Newer faculty need to have the institution interpreted to them; the university needs to have newer feminists interpreted to it.

Before launching into some observations and perplexities about interpretation, first a word about vocabulary. I started drafting this paper using the terms, “younger faculty” and “older faculty.” Then I remembered. The first woman the University of Dayton Philosophy Department hired came straight out of graduate school. She was forty-five. I started my tenure-track job at age forty-two and received tenure just shy of fifty. We were already old when we were young. Scratch an older woman faculty member, and you get a story. So, instead of “younger” and “older,” I’ll use the slightly unwieldy terms, “younger colleagues” and “older colleagues.” In an attempt to preserve confidentiality, I’ve silently elided colleagues from my department, other departments on campus, and other universities.

I. Interpreting the University to Newer Colleagues
Describing early efforts at Hull House, Addams writes,
acts between the various institutions of the city and the people for whose benefit these institutions were erected.¹

Newer colleagues need for us to function as information and interpretation bureaus. I wish we could experience academia through an organic process where we grow in rhythms and seasons that encourage study, experimentation, and reflection in their own good time. Instead, our profession is structured around that great divide between the tenured and the tenure-tracked, "a fact so solid...that it cast(s) a shadow over the entire landscape," to borrow a phrase from Virginia Woolf.² If this were a longer paper, or a different paper, I would talk about the great concentrations of women faculty in the ranks of the nontenurable—the lecturers and the adjuncts. But one cannot say everything at once.³

Much of our interpreting, while ostensibly about cultivating the mind and developing pedagogical skills, is most urgently and obsessively about getting tenured. Unless your institution is fortunate to have an old-girls network (I’ve tasted one: a very well-established colleague once revealed to a committee we served on that she and I had discussed committee business in the locker-room—did that ever get a “rise” from the guys?), newer colleagues need a lot of informal, and sometimes formal, information laid out for them: why it is important to keep a record of every single thing one does; how to organize materials for tenure review. Every institution is idiosyncratic, so we must do this locally and repeatedly. A more established colleague told me how feminist mentors had suggested conferences to attend and scholars at other institutions who could help her with her work. Not only are the contacts and the information vital, but this kind of attention tells us that our work is worthwhile.

When I asked a newer colleague what advice she had for her more established counterparts, she replied, “Tell them just to tell the truth.” Don’t be “nice” or “polite” (not only feminine but deeply inbred Midwestern tendencies as well). “Just tell the truth.” Some questions calling for interpretation are harder to answer, their truths harder to find. One colleague asks, “If I engage in explicit, pro-choice activism on this conservative, Catholic campus, will that hurt my chances for tenure?” Other colleagues ask advice about having a child, or a second child, before tenure. The answer, of course, is “at your peril.” The tenure system was not devised with a female body in mind, yet we must figure out how to shoehorn major life decisions within its rigid constraints. Still, it seems to me that women should have a few years’ cushion between getting married and having children. When I asked a newer colleague what advice she had for her second child, before tenure, she replied, “Tell them just to tell the truth.”

The institutional landscape shifts. The institution I faced through the tenure process is not the one my newer colleagues face. The institutional landscape I now face is not the same one they now face because of the way I and my more established feminist colleagues are embedded within it. We earned a lot of baggage coming through. Sometimes we carry it for too long; accustomed to its weight, we do not feel it dragging behind us. A newer colleague says she sometimes finds the tenured women in her department a barrier to her success. She has to work with these men; the long-standing antagonisms make those collaborations all the more difficult. Another colleague gave me her history of anti-mentors, women who felt their own power and exceptionalism threatened by her success.

Here, Addams’s ability to sort through flawed humanity comforts me and sometimes inspires. Addams finds Tolstoy “more logical than life warrants.” Yet, reflecting on his life reminds her that “antagonism (is) a foolish and unwarrantable expenditure of energy.”²⁴ Writing the Second Twenty Years at age seventy, Addams reflects on “the self-righteousness which so persistently dog the feet of the sober middle-aged and the elderly and which has always wrought its share of havoc.”²⁵ I find her capacity for continual self-reflection inspiring: I find her ability for continual self-doubt a more productive pattern for living than the quest for certainty. I continue to try to tell the truth, aware all the while that truth, too, is an ever-evolving project.

II. Interpreting Newer Colleagues to the University

Presenting immigrants as intelligible and intelligent to those outside the neighborhood was one of Hull House’s many functions. Addams writes, “Whatever other services the settlement may have endeavored to perform for its community, there is not doubt that it has come to regard interpreting the foreign colonies to the rest of the city in the light of professional obligation.”⁶

Interpreting the newer colleagues to the university is tricky; in some ways they have it easier than I and my peers did, in some ways harder. Newer colleagues tell me that it is easier now because feminist philosophy is more recognized and considered more legitimate than, say, two decades ago. They can present papers at feminist conferences, publish in feminist journals, seek suggestions on SWIP and FEAST listservs. My department is feminist friendly to a fair extent. In reviewing job candidates for an ethics position, I look through each writing sample, graduate transcript, and syllabus. If I see nothing to indicate awareness and use of feminist ethics perspectives, I tell the hiring committee that this person does not indicate knowledge of a vital part of the field, and my colleagues agree that that is a problem.

Feminist activism has been around long enough that sometimes to interpret newer colleagues to the university, we do not have to rely on institutional virtues such as equality, fairness, or respect for human dignity but can appeal to plain old self-interest. We can tell the university it is downright embarrassing that we do not have an adequate parental leave policy in place. It is one of the things job candidates ask about in job interviews, vocally and quickly. We are losing good candidates because of it.

Knotty perplexities remain. In light of what criteria do we interpret our newer colleagues to the institution? Coming through the tenure track process, I was advised to “write my Rawls paper,” if only to show that I could. I did write my Rawls paper, along with my business ethics papers on accounting fraud. I suspect that made my Addams work more tolerable, as I had proven that I could do “real” philosophy. So, now, some years later, do I encourage my newer colleagues to write their metaphorical Rawls papers? It is “realistic” in light of current criteria to do so. I worry about squelching my newer colleagues’ verve, their creativity, their determination to cultivate their own voices and styles, which, God knows, we desperately need. I worry about perpetuating criteria that need revision. Unreviewed, these standards embody methodologies and sensibilities of men, such as those Annette Baier so memorably described in the field of ethics as “a collection of clerics, misogynists and puritan bachelors,” men who had had “minimal adult dealings with women.”²⁷ One’s philosophizing is informed by one’s imagination, one’s imagination by life experiences.

This struggle is most intense during promotion, tenure review, and hiring meetings. That is when people cannot hide...
their perceptions and prejudices about what philosophy is, what counts as good or bad scholarship, what counts as innovative versus irresponsible teaching. Often I hear, “That’s interesting, but is it philosophy?” a perennial question that is debated in every generation and changes with every generation. When I started working on Addams, I did not let myself ask that question, figuring that as long as I found her intriguing, I would not worry about it. Several others unknown to me were similarly intrigued, and I am mightily grateful to Charlene Haddock Seigfried, an undisputedly legitimate philosopher, for championing Addams and encouraging me.

Feminist scholarship that stretches the meaning and methods of philosophy frightens the keepers of the standards. In 1974, Karen Warren began her dissertation on ascribing legal right to natural objects. She reports that to her department, “It was crowning evidence that my commitment to philosophy was seriously lacking and that my future as a philosopher was bleak.” Would that all of us had careers as bleak as Karen, now a leading scholar of environmental ethics and ecofeminism. Recently, a newer scholar included an essay on breast reduction surgery (her own) in her tenure review materials. Her committee could not even name the topic out loud, much less assess the essay’s philosophical significance. The struggle continues on.

First wave feminists tell us what is at stake. In her typical fashion of using others’ voices to convey her own point of view, Addams tells of a judge trying to apply common law to labor disputes. She describes his concern that “it must be interpreted, not so much in relation to precedents established under a judicial order which belongs to the past, but in reference to that newer sense of justice which this generation is seeking to embody in industrial relations.” We owe it to our newer colleagues to embody “that newer sense of justice” into academic standards.

Virginia Woolf is more direct. In Three Guineas, Woolf asks, on what terms will the daughters of educated men enter the professions?

We are here to consider facts. And the facts which we have just extracted from biography (of professional men) seem to prove that the professions have a certain undeniable effect upon the professors. They make the people who practice them possessive, jealous of any infringement of their rights, and highly combative if anyone dares dispute them. Are we not right then in thinking that if we enter the same professions we shall acquire the same qualities? And do not such qualities lead to war? In another century or so if we practise the professions in the same way, shall we not be just as possessive, just as jealous, just as pugnacious, just as positive as to the verdict of God, nature, Law and Property as these gentlemen are now?

The lives of all of us are at stake.

And sometimes we lose. As I tired of the pre-divorce stage of bending myself into a pretzel so as to meet his objections to my ways of being, thinking, and sensing, I suddenly realized that no matter what I did, I would lose. I could not make myself acceptable to him. At that point, I was free. It came as a great relief to know that I would lose; I was then free to make my own way. In times like these, the options switch. Instead of winning or losing, one can either be outrageous or fade. Both options have their points; both make sense at different times.

Addams’s reflections console. Near the end of her chapter on the bumpy path toward labor legislation reform, she writes, “Perhaps that sort of suffering and the attempt to interpret opposing forces to each other will long remain a function of the Settlement, unsatisfactory and difficult as the role often becomes.” When my protests seem in vain, the call for a fairer justice unheard, even then, at least I am at the table; I bear witness. They know that what is said must be said in my presence.

III. Interpretation as Action

In an early piece, Addams writes that one of her motives for founding Hull House was “the desire to interpret democracy in social terms.” For Addams, democracy is far more than a form of political machinery, it is a matter of how we live in families, neighborhoods, and workplaces. Her desire to interpret democracy in social terms was a desire to live out democracy in concrete, everyday experience. This is interpretation as action. Through working on shared projects, we not only accomplish concrete tasks, we also build solidarity and come to appreciate and compensate for each others’ peculiarities. The process itself is educative and creates knowledge.

I sat down and made a list of what our mutual projects are:

to enable us all to lead flourishing lives;
to transform the curriculum;
to transform institutions;
to transform knowledge;
to transform the world.

Admittedly, a daunting task. I was still dizzy when I opened the fundraising appeal from the American Friends Service Committee. (Just for the sake of keeping things tidy, note that Addams collaborated with the group frequently.) Right near the top, before “Dear Friend,” was a quote from the Talmud. “Look ahead. You are not expected to complete the task. Neither are you permitted to lay it down.” There it is. Understanding and responsibility placed right next to each other.

To establish herself as a credible interpreter, Addams lived among the immigrants as a neighbor, not as a charity worker. She stressed that if she lived with them in good times, then she would understand them and could help when times were tough. Pat Johnson, my wise, established colleague at the University of Dayton for over twenty-five years, told me much the same thing. You need to be political, she said, in the sense of knowing how to maneuver within one’s institution in a way that serves women’s needs. You need to sense when to push, when to lay back. You need to work with non feminists collegially on their projects to show them that their concerns have value. You need to acquire intimate knowledge of how your own, idiosyncratic institution works, and to build relations of trust. This will give you the credibility and the ability to interpret newer colleagues’ needs and strengths to nonfeminist colleagues and, with them, make the institution more responsive. Because Pat is there for the duration, she has seen, if not conversions, then at least some turning of the curves over the long term, as some male colleagues came to believe that hiring more women faculty is a genuine priority, that a women’s center would be a serviceable thing.

Pat also observed that we, the more established ones, need to sense when to back off, when to let others take over projects that are dear to us, even when we think we can do them better. In Second Twenty Years, Addams notes, “There is always a chance that the garnered wisdom of the old may turn out to be no wisdom at all.” In “Unplanned Obsolescence,”
A “Time” for Change: Negotiating the Space of a Third Wave Political Moment

Jennifer Purvis
University of Alabama

Intergenerational Issues in Feminist Spaces

By the strict categories of linear chronology that have dominated intergenerational feminist controversy, I am part of the third wave of U.S. feminism. Born after 1960, I came of age in the 1980s and became a part of feminism in the 1990s. Though I ultimately contest this schematic, as its very conceptual apparatus stands in the way of intergenerational dialogue, clarifying its constitution presents us with an opportunity for critical intervention. Within it, the first wave of feminist activity begins in the mid-nineteenth century and ends with the passage of suffrage in 1920. The second wave includes the women’s liberation movement of the 1960s and 1970s and culminates with a perceived, or media-invented, political retreat in the Reagan-Bush years. The first two phases of this model are viewed as primarily egalitarian, while the third, which comes about in the 1990s, is often cast as individualistic and apolitical—the result of young women having grown up with feminist parents, teachers, and media messages who subsequently feel entitled and personally empowered by the axiom: “girls can do anything boys can do.”

Purportedly, third wave feminists embrace an “anything goes” attitude, intent on undermining the work of previous feminists through a politics of multiplicity, plurality, and multivocality. They are said to lack a uniting cause or commitment to organized collective politics, preferring instead to tear down unifying claims of solidarity. Though even a brief examination of feminist theory reveals the paucity of claims made about “women,” the third wave is said to defy logical consistency and meaningful politics by questioning the coherence of such identity categories.

“Straw feminist critiques” abound on both sides of an artificial dividing line between the second and third waves of feminism. Each wave has created a straw feminist designed to bear the burden of the anxieties and tensions surrounding the status quo and the future of feminism. This straw feminist is then critiqued, rejected, and summarily dismissed. While the third wave is often conflated with Generation X or the “13th Generation,” the second wave straw feminist against which the third wave is often conflated with Generation X or the “13th Generation,” the second wave straw feminist against which the third wave often positions itself is a rigid, monolithic, racist, and tyrannical mother figure who excludes as much as she includes, since she labels and categorizes according to a clearly defined set of feminist principles. Her feminism reflects the narrow interests of White, middle-class feminism—primarily assimilation. As Alison Jaggar suggests, many feminists of the second wave strongly disagree:

[W]hite feminists of the Second Wave are often portrayed as having been concerned exclusively with securing abortion rights and women’s access to the professions. However, many of us desired not to equality (with straight, white professional men) but instead to a radically new social order. We imagined that this would include the abolition of gender, race, and class, which in turn would require the disestablishment of the traditional nuclear family, referred to disparagingly as the “nuk e.”

Different strands of political activity and agendas exist simultaneously within each of these artificially constructed waves. Not all first and second wave feminists embrace simplistic politics or single-minded agendas, as their detractors suggest. Second wave efforts extend beyond assimilation, as Jaggar attests, just as third wave feminists are not simply concerned with individual empowerment, fashion, or posturing at the expense of effective politics.

Imprecise and ridiculing critiques are counterproductive to feminist aims. Particularly harmful are those efforts of established second wave feminists to disparage the efforts of their less well-situated colleagues based on straw feminist images of their own making. Rather than engaging with ideas, some second wave thinkers have admonished those of the third wave without taking the time to analyze the content of their claims. Coming from a position of relative power and authority, this is not an equivalent reactive political gesture. Moreover, the spirit of “third wave rebellion” should be welcomed; after all, in order to succeed, feminisms must...
remain unruly and dynamic, not obliging or ossified in the past. Yet, instead of vibrant, informed, and cooperative dialogue about internal differences, there seems to be a great deal of misrecognition, anger, and exclusion within feminist debate.

Elsewhere, I argue that rather than placing blame on others within feminism for the persistence of prevailing conditions, an activity which often interprets feminist controversy in terms of a family feud, feminists are better served by eradicating masculinist logics from intrafeminist dialogue and working together for change. This involves interrogating political and theoretical ideas as such without allowing them to be clouded by the terms of belonging and affect imported by familial constructions of the generational; leaving aside the issues of ownership and debt intrinsic to masculinist models of intellectual inheritance; recognizing the ideas that remain useful—i.e., knowing our history—as well as allowing new ideas to enter into the realm of inquiry and praxis, especially where they are responsive to changing conditions; casting aside notions of the generational that enforce heteronormative principles, putative age brackets, and the concept of linear, chronological time within feminist inquiry, and, instead, embracing aspects of the generational that are “genealogical,” in a Foucauldian sense, and “generative” rather than destructive.

By allowing points of contention to mobilize rather than paralyze feminist critical practices, we begin the labor of breaking down boundaries and employing all of the strategies of feminism that are effective at a given moment: egalitarian, radical, deconstructive, visionary. Argument and dissent are necessary to adequate political theorizing and organizing, but productive dialogue demands that feminists acknowledge the subtleties of various positions, steer clear of annihilating dynamics, and form coalitions based on effective strategies, regardless of who came up with them and when. Age-stratification and models of history or progress based on conquest and domination/sublation are not conducive to such feminist intergenerational dialogue.

Kristeva’s notion of political time, derived from her essay “Women’s Time” may be used to formulate a feminist discourse of both discord and collaboration. Because feminist aims will not be achieved through a single-issue movement or a one-time revolution, we must imagine a new political moment where a reinvigorated political consciousness and greater degree of ongoing critical engagement are possible. Every political enterprise should critique its own inconsistencies, blind spots, and flaws, but feminisms should not be limited to critique, intrafeminist or otherwise. Feminist practices should also be creative, dynamic, and responsive to new conditions and new possibilities. A third wave political moment allows heterogeneity and dissensus to foster difference and community within feminism.

Intrafeminist Dialogue, for Better and for Worse
Linda Alcoff’s Singing in the Fire: Stories of Women in Philosophy is one text that contributes significantly to intrafeminist dialogue. The collection undermines polarized discourses as those who paved the way for academic feminist philosophy reveal personal and professional struggles and, in doing so, initiate meaningful dialogue among feminists. Reading their stories is beneficial and momentous. The contributors engage in the vital exercise of testimonial, an essential component of feminist and other liberatory enterprises, and an intrinsic element of both third wave feminist practices and the consciousness-raising efforts of the second wave. Ofelia Schutte comments: “This narrative is only the beginning of a testimonio (or witnessing) regarding the insights my life has allowed me to bring to philosophy, the prejudices I have faced and overcome, and the principles to which I have dedicated my work so that others may benefit in the future.” Bringing women’s voices to the fore in this manner clarifies the stakes of feminist struggles and highlights the complex power dynamics at work so that future feminists will not have to assess persistent conditions anew or repeatedly engage in the very same struggles. By situating themselves within feminism and within the field, the contributors illuminate various affiliations and tensions between feminist positionalities as well as those between feminisms and broader philosophical and academic arenas. They describe how they fit or misfit within particular departments and institutions and reveal the grave injustices they endured, yet they convey a persistent hope that their continued efforts will help transform institutional settings so that future feminists may realize more of their aims.

Learning of the experiences of my feminist predecessors has enhanced my own sense of feminist consciousness, a phenomenon aptly described by Sandra Bartky as a simultaneous awareness of victimization and empowerment. These women have struggled against formidable obstacles and yet exhibit tremendous courage in telling their stories, as unseemly as they may appear to the “great men” who have determined what is palatable and what is not. The humorous and open, collaborative and insightful narratives in this volume are nothing short of inspiring. However, it should be noted that these voices are contingent upon a certain degree of institutional power and status. The stories of professional feminists who have not “made it” go unheard, and those whose positions in the academy remain insecure are unable to publicly share their experiences of sexual harassment or professional hazing—at least until they make it through the “fire” themselves. Lacking at several junctures was a critical consciousness about such power differentials between women in professional relationships and the persistent conditions of feminisms working in the male-dominated field of philosophy. For example, though Virginia Held proclaims the importance of the affirmation of one’s work by an “established philosopher,” and she points out her own lack of a feminist support system throughout her formative years, she states, “If young women today think that they no longer need [a feminist support system], and if they are right, it is enormous progress indeed.” On the surface, this comment seems to cast feminism as expedient, perhaps as a means of gaining access, rather than a relevant set of pursuits that actively seek to challenge and transform a culture and a profession still in need of tremendous change. Enhanced channels of communication among feminists at different stages in their careers would help to alleviate this problem.

Many of us newer to the profession have faced injustices similar to those described in Singing in the Fire and desire cultural and institutional changes that seem slow to arrive. Often, we have culled our training in feminist theory and philosophy from an exceptional mentor or through work in other disciplines, independent study, or peer mentoring. While there are increasing numbers of collaborative and cooperative feminists in the profession, there is still a dearth of women and feminists teaching in philosophy. Feminist philosophy today is still often viewed as inessential, peripheral, trivial, or weak—a problem addressed by many of the contributors to Singing in the Fire. Given this, the political value and continued necessity of a feminist support system must not be overlooked. Within it, we must not only open lines of communication but also refrain from (mis)representing other women and feminists in the form of castigating and dismissive arguments. As Held suggests, “We certainly do not want to turn into the arrogant, aggressive, disdainful, and self-important male philosophers.
we have all too often encountered..."11 Frequently, however, feminists in philosophy engage in the tactics of those who have tried to exclude feminist concerns, including the familiar “this is just not philosophy” approach.

In her contribution to Singing in the Fire, Martha Nussbaum condemns feminist impulses when they are “dictatorial” about fashion or “correct values.”12 This is a common critique of second wave feminism by the third wave, which illustrates that the rejection of a perceived feminist status quo is not particular to the third wave. She remarks on how SWIP “at one time” held the view that “women could do philosophy differently from the way men did it, more cooperatively and less destructively” but could be “extremely destructive” itself.13 To illustrate, Nussbaum cites an occasion upon which her friend was denounced at a SWIP meeting for co-teaching a course on the philosophy of sex roles with a male colleague, an event she believes precipitated her friend’s suicide. Yet Nussbaum engages in the very destructiveness she critiques in “The Professor of Parody,” in which she castigates Judith Butler on the grounds of obscurity and other charges, such as long sentences, a presupposition of prior knowledge of philosophy, a lack of “real world” or prescriptive solutions to the problems of oppression, and a politics comprised solely of “fancy words on paper.”14 This stands in contrast to the generous and collaborative tone of Singing in the Fire, or that of other texts that promote intrafeminist or intergenerational dialogue.15

Butler articulates vital points related to some of the issues Nussbaum raises. She notes in the preface to her tenth-anniversary edition of Gender Trouble her gratification that her text is so widely read and “continues to move outside the academy to this day”16 and the surprise of some “to find a book that is not easily consumed to be ‘popular’ according to academic standards.”17 She states,

The surprise over this is perhaps attributable to the way we underestimate the reading public, its capacity and desire for reading complicated and challenging texts, when the complication is not gratuitous, when the challenge is in the service of calling taken-for-granted truths into question, when the taken for grantedness of those truths is, indeed, oppressive.18

Butler’s political engagements compelled her to revise or expand some of her positions; however, her aim was never to prescribe a political solution19 but “to open up the field of possibility for gender without dictating which kinds of possibilities ought to be realized. One might wonder what use ‘opening up possibilities’ finally is,” she queries, “but no one who has understood what it is to live in the social world as what is ‘impossible’, illegible, unrealizable, unreal, and illegitimate is likely to pose that question.”20 Given the experiences they describe, the women of Singing in the Fire, often viewed as interlopers in spaces dominated by men and masculinist thought (when they are recognized at all), should find this evocative.

As feminist philosophers, we have an obligation to use all of the resources available to us, to engage with complex arguments, and to welcome the plurality of feminisms—especially those that question the foundational assumptions we find so comfortable but that no longer serve our interests or fit our worlds. Though securing equal representation and obtaining rights remain crucial components of feminist efforts, history has proven that change within prevailing frameworks will have only partial results. Incisive questions about legitimate knowledge, citizenship, agency, and power will necessarily unsettle all manner of thinking, including entrenched historical schematics, and complicate forms of subjectivity dependent upon a privileged White male center. It may provoke anxiety to disrupt these foundations, but this is a vital and potentially productive endeavor. It is important to move beyond dichotomous politics, to leave aside narratives of discursive obliteration, and to examine diverse feminisms, and even masculinist philosophies, for both resources and points of contention, through which we may interrogate reigning narratives within philosophy—or, more broadly, matrices of knowledge production and dominant power—and open up spaces for new ideas and collaborations.

**Rethinking the Generational, Outside of Time**

The third wave grapples with the lived contradictions of late modernity. Efforts include extensive textual production (i.e., in the form of personal accounts and academic texts widely variable in terms of sophistication and political coherence), as well as other innovative modes of inquiry, debate, and action (e.g., the maintenance of Web spaces for cyber-communities and the use of information technologies for activism), which both draw on and depart from previous strategies. The powerful and savvy cultural practices of the third wave (e.g., riot grrl music, performance art/activism, and assorted zines) reveal uncanny insights but remain relatively unseen in mainstream culture, since the dominant media, as always, fails to acquaint us with any but the most commodified and ineffective forms of feminism. Access to these texts and practices may be gained through the burgeoning scholarship of third wave feminism, which highlights varieties of emerging, yet overlapping, feminisms. Alongside third wave feminist activity, political and academic feminists have been actively engaging in dialogue about and across generational differences, calling into question the dividing lines between second and third wave from both sides of this bifurcation. What sets these inquiries apart from straw feminism is their level of critical engagement.

In a time of extreme feminist backlash and political conservatism, feminist theory and philosophy are presented the task of developing adequate political and theoretical strategies that account for our interrelation, intersectionality, and hybridity, with all of the challenges and opportunities entailed therein. Ours is “an era of profound political disorientation,” in the words of Wendy Brown.21 The erosion of the left’s longstanding bases for political solidarity, the increasing technologization of culture and politics, the advancement of global capital, and the destabilization of identities and identity-based political formations have created conditions that feel unfamiliar and often result in anxieties and tensions. When we address these conditions and strive to formulate responsive and effective liberatory strategies without the comforts of familiar structural narratives, we must ask, as Brown suggests, “If the modality of political transformation in modernity was revolution, what lies beyond it?”22 A temporal paradigm shift suggests a renewed sense of revolution. Though many are caught in a web of nostalgia for teleological notions of progress, time, and history; or for simpler, dualistic constructions of oppression, the promise of revolution entailed in Enlightenment narratives no longer exists. Lisa Adkins suggests that narratives about the “passing of feminism” reflect this persistent nostalgia—for a given social formation or way of understanding the world that makes certain forms of action possible.23 This excessive attachment can be explained by the fact that feminism is a locus of identity: personal, political, intellectual, and professional. Entrenched social and political formations are constitutive components of this identity.

Though we will not be able to resuscitate revolution in its traditional form, third wave and other feminist philosophers
have the potential to generate a revolutionary mode—a critical approach based in heterogeneity and irresolution (in keeping with a Kristevan concept of revolution). Our political moment provides an opportunity to forge alliances based on the recognition of distinct, yet mutually informing, contributions. An invigorated form of intergenerational dialogue must entail an interrogation of the conceptual apparatus surrounding second versus third wave feminist debate, including prevailing modes of periodization and generational rhetoric. When we leave behind straw feminist debate and call into question the nature of our so-called generational differences, which are not based on age criteria or reproductive relationships but political, theoretical, and methodological differences, we may begin to formulate effective approaches to issues. As Lisa Maria Hogeland argues, political differences should be viewed as such.25

In a Kristevan reformulation, the first “generation” or political “moment” involves necessary egalitarian reform; the second generation or political moment centers on the revaluation of that which has been degraded or relegated to the margins; and the third, our political moment, entails the blending of different strategies and positionalities in a manner conducive to interdisciplinarity, cross-“generational” dialogue, and intellectual collaboration.26 These generations, or moments, are efforts, phases, spaces, strategies, or techniques, always overlapping and mutually informing. They are linked to, but not exclusive of, certain historical periods, conventionally conceived; ultimately, they are outside of linear, chronological time. While these strands of activity have never occurred discretely, the third moment begins to effectively integrate them. It is a signifying space, or a mode of feminist practices, committed to theorizing feminism after the deconstruction of rigid gender binarisms and other reified oppositions. It is a convergence and a synthesis, but with no aim towards achieving uniformity, consensus, or “oneness.”

“Generation,” here, functions as a point of contest, a concept to be interrogated, rather than a paradigm that entails age brackets or other constructions of difference that exclude. As we shift from the third wave feminist generation (as it has been formulated) to a Kristevan third wave political generation or moment, we invigorate the practices of feminist philosophy by partaking in a dialogue of critical engagement.

Second versus third wave controversy has demonstrated that it is common and perhaps understandable for feminists confronted with ideas that question or seem to displace the frameworks within which they live and work to find themselves threatened, anxious, or inclined to respond with contempt. However, as Robyn Wiegman asserts, anxiety can be a productive starting point for feminist debate.27 If feminism is to thrive within existing conditions, it must negotiate differences; it must leave behind the concept of revolution as “overthrow,” in relation to other feminisms and to dominant power. Feminist philosophy must embrace a new form of “revolution”—not one of violent conquest that imitates or harnesses dominant power, but one of engagement within a relation of dialectical oscillation and contest. Consensus can be more violent than conflict. Our task is to recognize difference, to mutually influence without ceding to an ideal of uniformity and consistency. Feminism can be “unstable” in a positive sense: when its shifting alliances remain open and responsive, dynamic, multiple, adaptable, innovative, and collective.

Endnotes

1. Many thanks to Sally Scholz and my colleagues in the Interdisciplinary and Interpretive Research Writing Seminar at the University of Alabama—especially Aaron Greer, Carmen Mayer-Robin, Micki McElya, and Utz McKnight—for their critical responses.


9. Virginia Held has since explained that her remark represents the views expressed to her by young women who claim that they do not need a feminist support system. On the one hand, Held takes such claims at face value, which is encouraging. However, not all young women feel uniformly entitled, empowered, and emboldened by feminist advances. Furthermore, there is an important distinction to be made between feeling empowered and being empowered. See Amber Kinser, “Negotiating Spaces For/Through Third-Wave Feminism,” NWSA Journal, 16 (2004): 143.

10. Women represent less than 20% of professional philosophers in the United States (Alcoff, Singing, 1).

11. Held, Singing, 53.


13. Ibid.


17. Ibid., xviii.

18. Ibid.

19. Ibid., xxi.

20. Ibid., viii.


Feminism is a Humanism

Laurie Calhoun
Harvard University

“Feminism” is an umbrella term covering all waves of academic and historical feminism, many vernacular uses, and countless connotations. It is, therefore, not entirely safe to apply this term to oneself in the company of strangers. To say to one person that “I am a feminist” is to pronounce a platitude along the lines of, “I believe that women are intelligent human beings.” The danger in such a statement lies not in its banality but in the fact that the speaker may be interpreted as insinuating that the listener might actually disagree. To another person, the statement, “I am a feminist” conjures up images of bra-less women marching through the streets. Whether this picture is pleasing or disturbing is a function of the listener’s own beliefs. Still another person may interpret, “I am a feminist” to indicate a deep hostility toward men, a suspiciousness of all institutions of power up to and including the heterosexual family unit.

The various wavelets of academic feminism have by now charted most of logical space, ranging from the straightforward affirmation of women’s humanity by even some in the dead White male tradition, most notably John Stuart Mill,1 to those who deny the very possibility of uncoerced heterosexual relations. The categorical rejection of all that has been touched or tampered with by men is what one dead White male philosopher (Friedrich Nietzsche) would have characterized as a “slave morality,” being entirely reactive as opposed to creative. Another dead White male philosopher (Immanuel Kant) might have objected that such a maxim cannot coherently be universalized and, therefore, cannot be willed for oneself.

While the criticisms of dead White men can hold little interest for radical feminists themselves, there are other possible responses to the rejection of everything having anything to do with men, and these can be, and sometimes are, formulated by women. One such criticism is simply that rejecting heterosexual relations tout court is tantamount to making the conditions for my own existence an “original sin” along the lines of the classic Christian myth. This is not a moral but an aesthetic objection, the force of which (as always...) depends upon one’s values.

Today, the pendulum has swung back somewhat to the point where more and more women and men seem to be moving toward the view that feminism is, or should be, at bottom, a humanism. My interest here is not in claiming possession of the term “feminism” but in attempting to understand the guiding meta-idea reflected in all of the various manifestations of feminism, not only in academia but also in society more generally.

Rather than stipulate a definition of humanism, I would like to propose an alternate route to the conclusion that feminism is, or should be, a humanism, following the cues of yet another dead White male philosopher (Jean-Paul Sartre), who, some decades ago, gave a lecture, “Existentialisme est un humanisme,” in which he defused a variety of objections to his theory.2 I shall simply assume that Sartre’s apology was successful and explain how the feminism presupposed by academic feminists, though their accounts diverge in details, is in some sense a version of existentialism and, therefore, ultimately a humanism.

Sartre took himself to have made a monumental discovery (though some would claim that others had made it long before him), viz., that man is radically free. By “man” Sartre meant “human being,” though he was no doubt aware that the conditions of freedom enjoyed by men were somewhat different from those of women. In any case, the fundamental notion of existentialism is liberty. Each person is free to make of his life what he will, to become what he will become, and to produce what, if anything, he will produce.

Sartre’s idea is that a human being is fully responsible for his actions—there may be explanations, but there are no excuses. This seemed obvious to Sartre, a White male (now dead) who was indeed free to become the philosopher and public figure that he became. His partner, Simone de Beauvoir, is considered by many to be one of the mothers of feminism, for she did what few women before her had done. She wrote books, gave lectures, did not have children, and never took any man’s name. Although historical accounts differ in details, overall, the case of Simone de Beauvoir suggests that women have recently achieved the conditions of liberty needed to do many of the things that White males have done for millennia. Simone de Beauvoir may have been a rare exception in her day, but she served as an example to generations of women after her of what they, too, could do, if only they had the will, the requisite material conditions, and a reasonable amount of free time.

Without broaching the question of Sartre’s views about women, we can understand the guiding vision of feminists, in general, as similar in many ways to that of the existentialists. The most obvious analogy here would be that just as Sartre rejected God as the source of all value, denying that man was created in His image, feminists, too, reject Man (men) as the source of all value and deny that women were created in the image of Man from one of his ribs. Each person should be free to make of her life what she will, to become what she will become, and to produce what, if anything, she will produce.

Although, in theory, it may seem that the conditions necessary for the intellectual flourishing of women have already been achieved, in fact, in considering the history of philosophy, even in the late twentieth century, the appearance and influence of women has been rather limited. Still today, in the twenty-first century, one finds respected philosophy departments with few or no tenured women faculty. During my years at Princeton (1989-1993), there was one female tenured faculty member in the Department of Philosophy, and her position was entirely nonthreatening. She was the resident expert on early modern philosophy, who spent much of her professional time alone with the dusty tomes of Descartes, Leibniz, and friends, who, being dead, could not possibly have been offended by anything she said. To my knowledge, there have been two other tenured female faculty in philosophy at Princeton (also historians), but today there are none. I am not interpreting but merely stating this fact.

As we all know, such facts are invariably dismissed as fortuitous when they suggest even the possibility of institutional

References:
25. Purvis, “Grrrls.”

— AP A Newsletter, Fall 2005, Volume 05, Number 1 —
sexism. It is also true that particular facts are always explicable, in some satisfying sense, by a variety of disparate sociological hypotheses, so one is never forced to accept the least savour of possible stories, and those concerned to defend the integrity of their own institutions certainly never do.

While a disproportionately high percentage of successful female philosophers have been historians of philosophy, this does not imply that all women who become historians do so because they regard it as safe. There can be other very good reasons for becoming historians of philosophy. For example, people with literary sensibilities are sometimes drawn to history, preferring to focus their energies upon works which, having stood the test of time, tend to be far more aesthetic in texture than most of what has been published under the banner of analytic philosophy. Philosophical skeptics, too, who have no interest in weaving elaborate fantasies and converting others to their views, can find a position in professional philosophy by doing history, reading, teaching, and commenting upon works that they themselves may regard as cleverly crafted and sometimes splendidly written works of fiction.

Most professionally successful female philosophers in the twentieth century were either historians (thus exhibiting reverence toward dead White men, whether due to considerations of prudence or aesthetics, and in some cases both), or the followers of successful White males (usually their mentors). In recent years, another viable option has opened up for women, for an entirely new area of specialization, “feminist philosophy,” has emerged, one of the primary roles models for which was, of course, Simone de Beauvoir. While this relatively new discipline has indeed provided women with another place in which to exercise their philosophical acumen, feminist philosophy seems unfortunately to have suffered from a type of ghettoization, in the sense that it is quite unclear that men or women in other areas of professional philosophy pay any attention whatsoever to self-proclaimed feminists. To use the term “ghettoization” is not to disparage the quality of what is done in the ghetto but only to observe that the walls of the ghetto rather effectively shelter the rest of the world from what goes on there. This is ironic, for the raison d’être of the area of specialization known as “feminist philosophy” is arguably to address problems that exist outside of the space occupied by feminist philosophers themselves. Among the widely recognized academic specializations, feminist philosophy is unique, for it did not arise out of the values of the dead White male philosophical tradition but, rather, in spite of them.

The ghettoization of feminist philosophy may be more a consequence of the structure of academia and the requisite degree of specialization needed to achieve professional success than anything else. After all, historians of ancient philosophy occupy their own ghetto, as do those who specialize in other areas of professional philosophy. There is, by now, an enormous body of feminist literature, and so, as in all other areas of specialization, feminist philosophers tend to engage in dialogue with other members of their own group.

More generally, professional philosophy itself forms a higher-order ghetto within academia. People in other disciplines generally pay no attention whatsoever to what White male philosophers do and say, except in extremely rare cases such as Thomas Kuhn and Richard Rorty. Many professional philosophers, in their characteristic arrogance, are not bothered in the least by such marginalization within the larger world of academia, for they have no difficulty attributing it to what they take to be their own intellectual superiority.

Feminist philosophers, in contrast, do interact with fellow feminists in other departments such as literature and women’s studies, and it is not uncommon to find joint appointments, which naturally facilitate cross-fertilization. Furthermore, feminist philosophers exhibit an admirable tendency toward self-reflection, as evidenced by the titles of some of the panel talks listed on the program of this conference: “Exclamations and...hesitations: Cautiously Presented Reflections of an Untutored Female Philosopher,” “Embracing the ‘F’ Word: Young Women, Feminism, and Fear,” and, most dramatically of all: “Is Feminist Philosophy Philosophy?” While I find these sorts of metaphilosophical investigations both refreshing and salubrious, it seems safe to say that few, if any, analytic philosophers harbor, or would seriously entertain, analogous doubts about their own area of specialization. Far from it, some have delighted in considering the question whether anything but analytic philosophy might really be philosophy and have gone even so far as to claim that real philosophers do not do history. (Note here the deductive inference involved in the two ideas that (1) “real” philosophers do not do history, and (2) women often do do history.)

Accordingly, because of the relative newness of feminist thought in the history of philosophy, feminist philosophers, already sequestered within the world of professional philosophy, inadvertently diminish themselves in the eyes of those already predisposed to do so by raising critical questions about the very validity of their own enterprise. And feminist philosophers have contributed to their own ghettoization, within the meta-ghetto of professional philosophy, in other ways as well.

When female philosophers publish feminist interpretations of Marx, Nietzsche, Hegel, Kant, Aristotle, and others, they have implicitly accepted the dead White male tradition, docilely agreeing to read the works singled out by men for men to read. One of the purposes of producing such interpretations is to reveal how gender-biased the “Great Minds” of history have been. But if these works are read primarily by feminists themselves, since everyone else is busy doing whatever it is that people in their area of specialization do, then how can these new interpretations have any discernible effect upon the institution of professional philosophy more generally? In other words, because of the narrow specialization characteristic of successful professionals, feminist philosophers end up talking to each other, not to the very people who need them the most.

Similarly, feminists have largely accepted the White male instituted paradigm for academically acceptable work. So, for example, to publish in a “respectable” feminist journal, one must make reference to feminist literature, of which there is, by now, an enormous volume. Consequently, those who specialize primarily in feminist philosophy are effectively kept off the streets, so to speak, of the larger world of professional philosophy. But from where did this idea derive, that one must pay deference to “the experts,” if not from the tradition against which feminism arose in response? Bear in mind that the entire model of the accretion of philosophical truth in tiny incremental steps over time blithely accepts all that led up to the present moment, despite the fact that until very recently women were altogether absent from the story.

All of this suggests that, in order to have a greater effect upon the institution of professional philosophy, young female philosophers really ought to be creating their own theories, or raising critical questions from a feminist perspective outside the field of feminist philosophy proper. In other words, by accepting the expert-acolyte schema according to which burgeoning philosophers must produce work that responds
directly to and builds upon their mentors’ theories, female philosophers may ironically be postponing their significant entry into the history of philosophy as individual and innovative thinkers.

Note, for example, that though Simone de Beauvoir published more than fifty years ago, it is rare still today to find the writings of women in philosophical anthologies and introductory textbooks, except in chapters on feminism. I am suggesting that this may be in part because the old institution has simply been writ small, in the microcosm of the larger world of professional philosophy that feminist philosophy currently occupies. Perhaps a better metaphor than “ghetto” would be a satellite moving in orbit but in tandem with the larger, more imposing (both literally and figuratively) planet, which professional philosophy as a whole represents.

There is no way or compelling reason to scrap the entire history of Western civilization any more than there is any way to scrap the entire paradigm of heterosexual relations. It would be an overreaction to presume that because an institution was constructed by White males it is, for that reason alone, invalid. (To make such a claim would be to violate another dead White male philosopher’s distinction between the context of discovery and the context of justification.) One glimmer of hope here would seem to be the convention of blind peer-reviewing for publication in scholarly journals, which makes it possible for even untitled and unknown women to air their ideas in a public forum.

This is not, however, to deny the overall conservative nature of institutions in general, and academic philosophy in particular, which is especially striking due to the fact that the values of currently successful philosophers exhaustively determine not only the topics deemed fit for discussion and the suitable terms in which to debate them but also the evaluative criteria of competence and excellence, including the forms that academically acceptable work may take. Because every issue in philosophy is about values (whether overtly or covertly), one can and should raise critical questions about the willingness of some feminist philosophers to accept the canon, and merely reinterpret it, rather than replace it. Why, after all, should women spend their time reading the works of men and interpreting them in the terms of a feminist framework that was itself formed in reaction to what White males have had to say? Why shouldn’t women, instead, tell the world what they think about the world? Why should a female philosopher’s theory of reality be less valuable than that of the men who have preceded her? Note in this connection also that, within the field of history itself, when men publish interpretations of their predecessors in the dead White male tradition, they do not entitle their books, “Another White male’s reading of Plato,” and so the question must be posed: Why do women publish “feminist readings,” speaking for women rather than for themselves?

There are two problems with this practice, beyond its most obvious practical consequence, viz., its postponement of the significant entry of women into the history of philosophy as individual thinkers (rather than as interpreters of the ideas of men). First, when a woman philosopher publishes a so-called feminist perspective on or interpretation of a classic text, she claims to be speaking for a whole class of people who may or may not agree with what the author takes to be the feminist interpretation of X. In other words, such authors repeat the very mistakes of the men who have claimed throughout history to be revealing to us (the mute women at home) the nature of reality. The very idea that a canon needs to be reinterpreted presupposes that the received reading is wrong, but also that the truth is nonetheless somewhere there to be found. From the perspective of a feminist re-reading, the wrongness of the received view must inhere in its erroneous rejection of those views supposedly superseded by what the received view has offered as “the truth.” But even according to the most charitable reading of the mistake, an author who puts forth a book modestly entitled “A Feminist Interpretation of X,” leaving open the possibility for alternative perspectives, is still supposing that she speaks for women. In fact, she is speaking for herself. What else could she or anyone else do?

In considering the distinction between what people do and what they take themselves to be doing, Sartre pointed out that when someone claims that he must abide by the dictates of a certain morality (The Ten Commandments, The Categorical Imperative, or whatever it may be), he is self-deceptively denying his own decisive role in interpreting the dictates of the morality that he himself has freely selected. By drawing parallels between existentialism and feminism, I do not mean to suggest that women are somehow condemned to be existentiaists, though Sartre himself claimed that we are all condemned to be free. Rather, feminism, in my view, ought to foster the conditions that make it possible for women to freely decide to do whatever it is that they in the end do, up to and including their rejection (or acceptance) of theories, including existentialism. According to this picture, some versions of radical feminism may simply be too contentful, excluding a priori some possibilities, which women, if truly free, ought to be able to choose, even if their choices might be offensive to other women. In other words, being a woman does not, or should not, dictate that one do anything in particular any more than being a man dictates that one choose any particular path or, as Sartre would say, project. Still, by affirming at the meta-level that “Feminism is a humanism,” along the lines of Sartre’s nearly contentless existentialism, one must leave open the possibility that some philosophers may freely choose to embrace radical feminism or to reject existentialism. Every theory is permitted to truly free thinkers.

Until very recently, the only safe route to professional success for women in philosophy was to pay deference to men, either living or dead. Because of a few pioneers who created out of nothing the field of feminist philosophy, women now have another option. But there should also be a third way, and, for this to happen, feminist philosophers must not lose sight of the fact that their area of specialization is not merely academic. The conditions of liberty essential to the flourishing of women as thinkers will have been achieved only when women are no longer constrained by fear of ridicule and rejection in a male-dominated field, the standards of competence of which ultimately derive from the values of the longstanding White male tradition. (I have argued elsewhere that the relevant range of values was decisively narrowed during the reign of the logical positivists, resulting in a radical homogenization of Anglo-American professional philosophy, with consequences that continue through to the present day.) Women philosophers there are and have always been, but they have not often found themselves in circumstances conducive to the publication and dissemination of their own ideas, as opposed to their interpretations of the views of men.

While I am acutely aware of the dangers of criticizing live White male philosophers, I dream of a day when female philosophers no longer feel the need to become feminist philosophers, for I think of the feminist movement as analogous to the abolitionist movement. It had to exist in order for the institution of slavery to be overthrown, but once slavery had been abolished, abolitionists were free to move on. Or perhaps I might invoke here a dead White male philosopher’s metaphor
(Ludwig Wittgenstein’s), that of a ladder that must be climbed up before it can be kicked away.

We are still on the lower rungs of that ladder, but perhaps one day in the distant future women will no longer be restrained by the rigid values imposed upon them directly and indirectly, in both obvious and more subtle and insidious ways, by the male-constructed institutions that, today, permit women to work, provided that they agree to conform. If feminism has done much to facilitate the entry of women into the respected world of letters, it will only have triumphed when the word “feminism” itself holds merely historical interest. That women should be free to flourish intellectually and to make their own original contributions to philosophy is a goal toward which all waves of feminism have, in one way or another, strived. This goal will have been reached when women, no less than men, are able to achieve professional success in philosophy simply through being themselves.

Endnotes

1. J. S. Mill. The Subjection of Women (London: Dover, 1997 [1869]). Plato (Republic) also numbers among those historical figures who regarded women as the intellectual equals of men and therefore equally capable of becoming “philosopher-kings.”

When is Philosophy Feminist?

Louise Antony
Ohio State University

In developing my answer to the question, “what is feminist philosophy?” I’m going to adopt what Sally Haslanger calls an “analytical” approach to definition. That is, I will focus on “the pragmatics of our talk employing the [term] in question.” Eventually, therefore, I will need to say something about the point of having such a designation as “feminist philosophy,” and I will. But a little ground clearing can be done in advance.

Here are two perfectly natural ways of construing the phrase, “feminist philosophy”:

1) Philosophy done by feminists
2) Philosophy done in a feminist way

But I don’t recommend either one.

The first gloss is simply pointless. There are many philosophers who are also feminists and who see their feminism as a moral and political commitment that does not bear, or does not bear equally, on all the philosophical issues they find interesting. (I once attended a lecture by Noam Chomsky at which he was asked how his work in linguistics “was connected to” his political work. “I don’t understand,” he responded. “You seem to be assuming that a person can’t be interested in more than one thing.”)

The second gloss is one that is commonly intended, but I think it is ultimately divisive of philosopher feminists. It is true enough that many feminist theorists believe that there is, in philosophy if not in every academic field, a distinctively feminist methodology, one which can or ought to inform philosophical inquiry across the board. But this is a substantive theoretical assumption, and to build it into the definition of “feminist philosophy” is to exclude a great deal of philosophical work by feminists on feminist topics that utilize traditional philosophical methods (and this includes methods traditional in the continental as well as in the analytic tradition). I am not persuaded that there is such a thing as a “feminist method” in philosophy; even if there is one, I would argue that it ought to supplement, rather than replace, the others.

This is not to deny that there are elements of philosophical practice that can be more or less consistent with feminist principles. It is feminist to be sensitive to differences in intellectual and rhetorical styles, and it is feminist to eschew combative interactions. (Although, here, I would like to register a caveat: there is value to vigorous philosophical arguing. It can be fun, for one thing, if everyone involved has the right aims and the right frame of mind, and it can be productive in a way that more cooperative exchanges may not be. I would like to see feminist transformation of the adversarial method, rather than outright abandonment.) But these and similar rules of thumb do not add up to a feminist methodology.

Bottom line: the question whether there is a feminist method in philosophy ought to be left open by our definition of “feminist philosophy.”

Another reading that may be given to the phrase is this:

3) Philosophical theories or positions that incorporate substantive feminist theses

This reading is not wholly inappropriate, I think, in those areas of philosophy, like political philosophy, in which there is something approaching a feminist consensus. This reading would make “feminist philosophy” analogous to “Christian philosophy” or “positivist philosophy.” But, even in political philosophy, a serious student of feminism would be hard pressed to identify the actual components of a feminist consensus, and once we leave the area of political philosophy, the problem gets much, much worse. Not only is there no feminist consensus in such areas as epistemology and the philosophy of mind, I am prepared to argue that there ought not to be. It is fine to argue, as many philosopher feminists do, that, for example, individualism in the philosophy of mind is a masculinist position, but it ought not be assumed that any such thing has been established to the satisfaction of all feminists. Among philosopher feminists working in the philosophy of mind, individualism is contested, and as long as that is true, no one should try to claim, for their own position, the feminist ground.

Furthermore, I think that, as a matter of intellectual and political prudence, one’s default stance should be skepticism about the possibility of deriving substantive epistemological and metaphysical conclusions from feminist assumptions. It is wise to keep one’s moral and political commitments as spare as possible—do any of us really want feminism to be subject to refutation by, say, arguments against semantic holism? Of course, things might work out that such logical connections exist, and then we will have to deal with them. But we should certainly hope that no such entanglements ensue.

Here is a fourth try at defining “feminist philosophy”:

4) Philosophy put at the disposal of feminist projects

I have advocated this sort of gloss myself, in connection with “feminist epistemology”—following others, I have suggested that feminist epistemology be understood as epistemology put at the service of feminist practice; philosophical inquiry directed at those questions about knowledge that arise in the course of trying to understand, or in actively opposing gender oppression.

On this way of understanding the term, it would be inapt to apply it to anyone who does not endorse feminism. This
means that (4) shares with (3) the analogy with “Christian philosophy.” “Christian philosophy” is different from “philosophy of Christianity,” which is a sub-area of the philosophy of religion. An atheist or Jew might be fascinated with Augustine or Aquinas, but would not therefore count—or be counted—as a “Christian philosopher.” Similarly, on this construal, a philosopher interested in the writings of Catherine MacKinnon or Lorraine Code would not automatically count as doing “feminist philosophy.”

This way of understanding “feminist philosophy” has the following selling point: it accurately captures almost (if not absolutely) all of the work to which the term is currently applied. This is certainly a good thing, particularly if we want to signal relevant theoretical work in ways that foster connections among feminists across the boundaries of academia. But the definition has a serious drawback as well. If we understand “feminist philosophy” in a way that implies the endorsement of feminism, then we cannot legitimately use the term to describe an area of philosophical expertise for such purposes as job descriptions or curricular reform. It is one thing to advertise for a philosopher who can competently teach philosophical issues raised by feminism and quite another to require the person who teaches them to hold particular views about feminism.

Compare: advertising for someone with an AOS in the philosophy of religion versus advertising for a Christian philosopher. I am wholly in favor of teaching the philosophy of religion, and this cannot be done competently if the teacher cannot present all the relevant views with charity, nuance, and perhaps even a little sympathy. But I would be very opposed to any requirement that the course be taught by a theist.

Now, I will not pretend that I am not disturbed by the idea of an anti-feminist teaching a feminism course. But that is not a feeling I am entitled to, given my commitment to academic freedom. In any case, it is not clear that there is any serious risk of such a thing happening. Just as general scholarly and pedagogical standards suffice to keep Holocaust deniers out of history departments and New Age cryologists out of geology departments (or psychology, or wherever they would otherwise get put), they will make it very difficult for someone to take up a position in feminist philosophy just because they have an axe to grind. I have a hard time imagining an anti-feminist fulfilling even the minimal conditions of competence cited above. If there really are right-wingers out there prepared to read and digest everything that feminists have had to say, and to present charitably to impressionable young minds a host of views they, the right-wingers, do not agree with, then fine, let them teach feminist philosophy.

This all just raises another question, though. If an anti-feminist teaching “feminist philosophy” is required to give charitable renderings of pro-feminist arguments, must a feminist teaching feminist philosophy be required to give charitable renderings of anti-feminist arguments? This question takes us to the heart of the current controversy about “liberal bias” in the classroom. According to right-wing ideologues like David Horowitz and Daniel Pipes, left-wingers have commandeered the American academy and transformed it into one giant re-education camp. They allege that the academic freedom of conservative faculty and students is being abridged, and their proposed solution is to restore “balance” in the classroom by purging it of liberals. This campaign is cynical in the extreme since it is, in fact, mere cover for a deadly serious campaign to silence critics of administration policy in one of the few remaining arenas in which such criticism is being voiced. The “balance” advocated by Horowitz and his minions is an impossibly formal one, a “balance” that, if taken seriously, would mandate a hearing for every loony theory that comes down the pike. We all know that the human lifespan is too short for us to accord equal attention to “every side” of every issue, and it would be an abrogation of our professional responsibilities as scholars and teachers to pretend to eschew selection and evaluation. If we do not know what is worth studying, who does?

So, I am not advocating a faux “balance.” I am advocating an honest commitment to the norms of scholarship, norms which bid us take account of the socially constructed “range of reasonable opinion.” We must teach the conflicts. Feminism, like it or not—and I do not—is not a consensus position, and we do our students a grave disservice if we try to disguise that fact. I do not say that we must be utterly bound by this socially determined range—as a feminist (and an atheist, and a pinko, and...), I’m committed to changing that range—but by expansion, not by exclusion. And my position does not imply that we must grant legitimacy to any misogynistic drivel that makes its way into print. I may be held responsible only to responsible criticism of feminist work—if the critics want to be taught, they had better produce stuff that is worth teaching.

So how, finally, should we define “feminist philosophy”? Here is my last proposal:

5) Philosophy that gets called by its authors “feminist philosophy”

This maximally inclusive and wholly uninformative definition is, I think, the most useful. It simply directs us to the growing body of literature produced by scholars who, for one reason or another, see their work as feminist. Particular assumptions behind such views—that this thesis is feminist, or that this work will facilitate feminist struggle—are left open to disputation, but the claim that one is doing “feminist philosophy” cannot, on this definition, be denied. “Feminist,” on this construal, is connected with no necessary and sufficient conditions. Nor is it an honorific to be bestowed by a set of authorized individuals. But it is not completely empty—it does generate obligations. If you wish to enter the debate, if you want to teach the class, you must have arguments and evidence. And you must engage the existing literature. This means no ignorant assumptions about what “those feminists” say, no malicious caricatures. You must treat feminist philosophy like—well, like it is serious philosophy.

This definition points, in my view, to the best way to integrate feminist insight into the academy—through the same principles that ought to govern all of our professional life.

Endnotes


2. From here on, I’ll abbreviate this phrase to “philosopher feminists.”

Is Feminist Philosophy Still Philosophy?

Ann Ferguson

University of Massachusetts at Amherst

Of course, the answer to the question depends on how one defines “feminist philosophy” and how one defines “philosophy.” Obviously, also, if one answers no, then one must assume that “philosophy” when modified by “feminist” changes its meaning, or becomes a different genre, or somehow has become not “real” philosophy.
This is what the majority of my colleagues in my department felt when I became a feminist philosopher, that I was no longer playing the same academic game as they were. The most charitable of them assumed that I had somehow changed genres, rather like changing disciplines, while the most hostile regularly advised students not to take my courses—Problems of Social Thought, Marxism, Feminist Theory, a course named in the University catalog Philosophy of Woman (and that I call now Philosophy of Gender and Sexuality, a seminar on Foucault)—because they are not “real” philosophy.

One could put this confusion down to the more general schism in my department between the analytic philosophers and the minority of us who were interested in continental philosophy and social and political philosophy. But this would ignore the fact that I was trained as an analytic philosopher, so the exclusive dichotomy between the two camps is dubious. Indeed, I only became interested in Marxism and continental philosophy after I got my degree and started teaching in my department. Did I somehow at that point lose my ability to do philosophy?

The hostility could have come from the general tension between the majority, either liberals or conservatives, and the minority, four colleagues and myself, who were Marxist or otherwise on the left. But how would this relate to feminism as such? One thing that might have been involved was that none of my analytic colleagues were actively political, and all of them felt that one should not mix politics with one’s academic philosophy, while, for me, discovering as a feminist that the personal is the political involved me also in discovering that my work as an academic is political too, and, hence, that I needed to examine my pedagogy, the texts and aims I had in teaching, and the political effects of my teaching in order to judge my worth as a feminist philosopher. This refusal to make the positive move to separate factual and philosophical claims from moral and political values is certainly one mark of feminist philosophy, and one thing that makes it suspicious as “real” philosophy by those who believe in the ability to separate values from facts and philosophical claims.

Another implication of the political commitments of feminist philosophy for many has been a move toward interdisciplinary thinking of the sort that traditional twentieth-century philosophers, whether continental or analytic, have resisted to various degrees: the analytic philosophers more than the continental. In a 1994 article in *Hypatia*, I argued that U.S. feminist philosophy had developed through three phases or foci since its beginning in second wave feminism in the 1970s, each of which continues to this day.¹ These are, first, the compensatory focus of adding new forgotten women thinkers to the history of philosophy; second, the difference focus, which concentrates on women’s differences from men in their psychological, epistemological, and ethical perspectives on the world; and third, the focus on the differences between women of race, class, sexuality, and nationality, coinciding with the postmodernist and postcolonial approach.

Today I would add a fourth focus, more or less contemporary with the first focus, which was the development of paradigms of feminist theory to analyze and explain the origins, nature, and persistence of male dominance. Except for the compensatory feminist history of philosophy, all of these other foci developed the field of feminist philosophy in ways that required research into other disciplines that had hitherto been thought not to be the purview of philosophers, such as history (including the history of science), literature, art, sociology, anthropology, and psychoanalysis, as well as linguistics, law, and political theory. Although some of these disciplines might be accepted as relevant by those with certain specialties in philosophy, such as the philosophy of history and science, literature, and art, many feminist philosophers of my generation found ourselves with a project—the study of male domination and its concepts—that seemed to require us to revisit the whole of our liberal education in order to learn how feminists in other disciplines were re-visioning the data and claims in our fields in order to make ourselves useful to this interdisciplinary project as feminist philosophers.

But, clearly, in some sense, the project is too big, too unmanageable, for any one thinker to achieve, or to “master,” in that questionable metaphor from hierarchical understandings of teaching and learning. This is why feminist philosophy cannot really be a “field” in the traditional sense. More and more, one finds feminist philosophers providing a perspective in one of the traditional fields of philosophy: ethics, epistemology, metaphysics, history of philosophy; or investigating the philosophical foundations of one other discipline, such as psychoanalysis, economics, art, history, sociology, and science studies in general. Those of us who teach feminist theory have a nearly impossible task to keep up with the social theory and analysis produced not only by theorists within philosophy but also those in the humanities and social sciences, and particularly in cultural studies.

Indeed, why should I draw the line here? Feminist science studies, closely allied to some subjects in feminist epistemology, touches on questions in the natural sciences as well, particularly biology. The distinction between sex and gender, made in the early years of the second wave of the Women’s Movement, was a good strategic move at the time to head off the socio-biologists who use biological claims about evolution and women’s natural roles and abilities to defend the sexual division of labor, gender dualism, and even the inevitability of male supremacy.²

More recently, of course, the sex/gender distinction has been challenged by postmodern and poststructuralist feminist philosophers and social theorists like Judith Butler, Emily Martin, and Bernice Hausman, who argue that the concept of biological “sex” itself has undergone historical modifications and is, in this sense, socially constructed.³ Hence, sex cannot so easily be separated from gender by defining the first as given and the second as socially constructed. Even Simone de Beauvoir in *The Second Sex* felt she had to devote nearly all of chapter one to rehearsing the biological theories of sexual difference prevalent at the time in order to defend the claim, “One is not born, but becomes a woman!”¹ Most feminist philosophers feel we need to have read biologists Anne Fausto-Sterling or Ruth Hubbard’s defense of feminist readings of the sexed body in order to avoid the conservative socio-biological interpretations.³ Those casting suspicion on mainstream scientific interpretations of sex differences can also benefit from the kind of cultural studies work that feminist biologist and cultural critic Bari Subramanian does in comparing the invasive plant metaphor in biology with the racist concerns about immigrants of color as invasively undermining our local (read: Anglo) culture.⁴ There is also the approach of feminist epistemologist Sharyn Clough, who uses her pragmatist Quinean approach to argue that feminist epistemologists should be correcting the masculinist bias of science by a case by case approach, for example, feminist alternative readings of menstruation.⁵ But surely no one person, even if she is a feminist philosopher, can possibly be on top of all the relevant material connected to theories and norms of male dominance that researchers in the other branches of knowledge have developed.
What, then, is to be done? Should we just become more narrow and focus on one small specialty with a feminist perspective, attempting an individual instantiation of “feminist philosopher” at work; in the meantime, doing philosophy as usual in our mainstream philosophical specialties to show that we are still capable of doing philosophy? Or should we give up on philosophy in the narrow sense, and the legitimacy battle with philosophical critics, and devote our whole research to an interdisciplinary study of male dominance, perhaps doing this in teams of interdisciplinary researchers?

Of course, part of this definition game of what counts as “philosophy” is very problematic, for most of the original philosophers of the past have been those who stepped outside of the traditional questions that were being asked in the academies of philosophy in their day and dared to raise new questions that were unthinkable from the old canon. Hobbes and Locke defied Scholastic tradition, Descartes as well. Hegel dared to historicize philosophical ideas, thus seemingly detaching the universal questions of philosophy from an essential reality hitherto assumed timeless. Nietzsche, in his genealogical approach, also challenged traditional philosophy with a peculiar kind of deconstructive history, as did Foucault. We all know that Marx, Freud, Lacan, Sartre, and Beauvoir have been rejected by analytic philosophers as not “really” philosophers. In their opinion, speculative philosophy and imaginative theory construction are not what philosophers should be doing. Instead, we should be getting clear about concepts with arguments that can be shown to logically follow from premises that we outline. Example and counterexample, conceived of as thought experiments taking no real empirical investigations, should be our method of persuasion for our own premises and our way to attack those views with which we disagree. But, surely, those who draw the “big picture” in a speculative way, an approach that uses comparison, metaphor, and maybe even empirical research as methods of persuasion, should be considered important to the philosophical enterprise. And given the interesting speculations of those excluded by many analytic philosophers from the “real” philosophy table, perhaps we should just consider ourselves in good company and eat in the kitchen with those whose philosophical canon is not so narrow!

This leads me to a related question: What should feminist philosophers be teaching our students in terms of how to understand what the discipline of philosophy is? Are we just teaching form, that is, the ability to make and distinguish valid and sound arguments, and the ability to give counterexamples, or, if we are teaching content, what content is relevant? When I teach a graduate seminar in feminist theory, it is loaded with readings by those in disciplines other than philosophy, and when I teach an undergraduate class in the philosophy of woman, gender, and sexuality, the same thing is true: we are reading feminist philosophers such as Harding, Frye, Bartky, Butler, Fraser, Young, Lugones, Bordo, Alcoff, Narayan, and Jaggar, but we are also reading Freud, Chodorow, Foucault, Engels, Patricia Williams, Patricia Hill Collins, Kimberly Crenshaw, Gloria Anzaldua, Leslie Feinberg, and bell hooks. Is this why some of my colleagues in the Philosophy Department advise philosophy majors not to take my courses, because they are not “really” philosophy, or are not “core” philosophy? Should we be taking part in this turf battle of what counts as philosophy in order to get stuff we are interested in included, or should we ignore their concerns and continue our interdisciplinary studies of male dominance, gender, and sexuality, plus related issues of social class, race and ethnicity, nationality, imperialism, and disability?

The question itself is problematic since it assumes we should all be doing some one thing rather than some other thing. But the systematic challenge to the practices and understandings of philosophy that are constructed in a patriarchal fashion need not be an all or nothing endeavor. If we think of feminist philosophy as part of the social movement that is feminism, it is possible to judge that we need a war on many fronts. In other words, there are those of us who see ourselves as primarily philosophers, and secondarily feminists, in our academic work; those of us who see ourselves as primarily feminist thinkers and secondarily philosophers; and those who think we have melded together a concept “feminist-philosophers,” which is a new kind of endeavor—not an additive concept.

It is always risky to create categories and then slot people into them, for fear they will not agree and will be offended. Just remember that I am not inventing these categories for the purpose of showing that one self-identification is a better political project than the others. Rather, I maintain there is something valuable and important with each one of them. That said, let me suggest a loose analogy of these three positions with the classic feminist paradigms of liberal feminism, radical feminism, and some mixed-position, like socialist-feminism, multi-systems, or integrative feminism (e.g., antiracist, anticapitalist feminism). Let me hasten to add that a thinker who is classified into one of these positions because of her academic research may adopt another position in her political work apart from academic research.

On the first self-identification, a person is primarily a philosopher and secondarily a feminist. In this group, we could put the liberal feminist reform of the canon to make women thinkers visible, for example, Eileen O’Neill’s work translating and collecting forgotten women philosophers of the early modern period, and Bat Ami Bar On and others’ resurrection of Hannah Arendt. Another important approach that could also be classified as liberal, in that it is making feminist issues visible but in an accepted philosophical style, are the endeavors of analytic philosophers like Sally Haslanger or Louise Antony, who are offering feminist analyses of issues in metaphysics, epistemology, and the philosophy of mind.

The second self-identification is a person who is primarily a feminist and secondarily a philosopher. Here we might put Sarah Hoagland, with her radical feminist critique of the practices involved in male-stream ethics from a Nietzsche-type perspective, and her own lesbian ethical alternative. Other radical feminists who might see themselves in this camp are Janice Raymond, Mary Daly, and others who are doing feminist theology. Such a thinker is not concerned with philosophy as a discipline at all but is trying to create a holistic feminist approach to metaphysics, ethics, or spirituality outside of the traditional disciplines. There are also those in legal studies, like Catharine MacKinnon and Patricia Williams, who are doing legal philosophy but with a distinctively feminist interdisciplinary and radical flair.

The third self-identification—the “feminist-philosopher”—is attempting to create a new approach to the discipline and to knowledge production by such a combination. There are those who give original applications of methods of traditional philosophers but quite changed because of the feminist spin, such as Sara Ruddick’s Aristotelian feminist analysis of mothering, Naomi Scheman’s Wittgensteinian feminism, Sandra Bartky’s phenomenological approach to gender, original paradigms of justice, such as those of Nancy Fraser and Iris Young, feminist ethics like Claudia Card and Alison Jaggar, or the wonderful counterexample techniques of Vicky Spelman, which she uses to expose conceptual confusions in the assumption that there is an essential womanhood that all women share, while race, class, sexuality,
etc. are mere accidental properties that differentiate us.21 Maria Lugones gives us new metaphors, like “world traveling,” with which to envision antiracist solidarity work, and challenges metaphors like “purity” and “separation” to help us critique identity politics in such work.22 There are those who debunk altogether the pretensions of philosophy and social theory to produce ahistorical and universal meta-narratives, such as Linda Nicholson and Nancy Fraser.23

Also in this category are those who critique traditional philosophy as a disciplinary power/knowledge and attempt to broaden the discipline of philosophy to create feminist expansions of Marxist, Foucauldian, and/or psychoanalytic perspectives on male and social domination, gender, and the social construction of gender. These include such thinkers as Monique Wittig, Judith Butler, Luce Irigaray, Nancy Hartsock, and Sandra Harding, among others.24

This last group is where I would put my own work as a feminist-philosopher. I am trying to use the insights of Marx, Freud, and Foucault to come up with an original theory of sexuality and its social construction into gender and sexual orientation that is also connected to a theory of the centrality of human organizations of work that will support a historical theory of male dominance.25 Is this philosophy or social theory? I am no longer clear myself: maybe I should just pull a Wittgenstein move and say it is because I am a feminist philosopher, and feminist philosophy is what feminist philosophers do!

Any attempt to broaden what counts as philosophy from such an empirical study of what feminist philosophers do, however, shades into the question of interdisciplinarity. As a thinker and professor, my work these days is forever tainted with my interdisciplinary work with women’s studies, which includes a graduate seminar that I teach called Issues in Feminist Research. This seminar requires me to get my hands dirty in the empirical sciences, with questions such as the value of quantitative versus qualitative research (Is the former too “positivist”? What’s wrong with positivism?), participatory action research (What makes it “participatory”? When might it be co-opted?), poststructuralist critiques of enterprises based on the discourses of Development (questions here are both epistemic and ethical: Does postmodern skepticism leave us no alternative understanding of how to act in the face of a hideous gap between rich and poor countries?), and hands-on questions of how to deal with the epistemic and ethical questions of human subjects research, particularly in ethnography, when one has power over the lives and narratives of one’s subjects as the agent, knower, and constructor of knowledge conveyed in one’s research.26

I would like to end these ramblings by concluding that there is such an academic endeavor as feminist philosophy, and that it can be seen, like Wittgenstein’s analysis of the concept of Game, as one that has no core definition but in which instances are recognized like family resemblances are. In other words, feminist philosophy is what those self-identified as feminist philosophers do, and it is important, and alive and well!

Endnotes


19. Fraser, op. cit. and Young, op. cit.


22. Lugones, op. cit.


——— APA Newsletter, Fall 2005, Volume 05, Number 1 ———

**Feminist Ethics and Transnational Injustice: Two Methodological Suggestions**

**Ofelia Schutte**  
*University of South Florida*

Among the motivations for doing feminist philosophy is applying knowledge to transform the world and the current set of conditions affecting women’s lives. We know that many of these conditions at home and abroad are not only oppressive but needlessly so, if only society would be organized according to more just and caring principles—for example, if only the mental and physical health of individuals and a balanced relationship with the biological environment and the nonhuman life that surrounds and sustains us could be achieved, rather than the current exploitative relation to nature much of the West takes for granted. These goals are both idealistic and difficult to achieve, but if they were absent from feminist philosophy I, for one, would find it difficult, if not impossible, to identify as a feminist philosopher. In today’s world, and given our role as intellectuals or teachers located by residence in the world’s only superpower—whose enormous military force and actual implementation of power around the world some characterize under the term “empire”—it is important that we reach awareness of the transnational contexts, implications, and responsibilities of feminist philosophy.

I will limit myself to two main points, both of which I believe are very important in the practice of feminist ethics. The first point is that feminists in the United States need to understand fully the nature of the economic and political order through which the world is currently ruled, known as “neoliberalism.” This term does not refer to “liberalism” as this word functions in the mainstream national political vocabulary. “Neoliberalism” is an ideology whose goal is to reduce the function of the state as much as possible to the facilitation of (capitalist) trade or business interests. In our time, this means corporate capitalism, whether domestic or transnational. Combined with the current state of capitalist development in a globalized economy, in effect, neoliberalism privileges corporate power (or corporations) as beneficiaries of social wealth. This creates an enormous imbalance in the democratic process within and across nations, as corporate entities and their mega-conglomerates manipulate public policy in national and transnational contexts to achieve their private and profit-oriented aims. One very important effect of corporate power is the control of the media, especially the mainstream sources and providers of public information. This means that people in the United States—and elsewhere in the world, to the degree that they are affected by these economic, political, and cultural arrangements—are very often, if not generally, uninformed or misinformed about the detrimental and even brutal effects of the neoliberal capitalist economic policy not only on our lives in the United States but more dramatically in the lives of people, particularly vulnerable women and children, in the “global South.”

In contrast to “neoliberalism,” “liberalism” is usually understood to refer to the political philosophy that supports civil liberties and equal rights for women and minorities, as well as state supported and assisted public programs in education, health, social welfare, and so on. In recent times, liberalism has been put on the defensive in the United States, with neoliberalism taking the offensive, making every other political philosophy to the left of it—from liberalism to socialism and beyond—seem completely outdated. This rhetoric of neoliberalism’s inevitability is aggressively pursued through government pronouncements and the mainstream media, without much room for questioning and analysis. How often do we hear that there is simply not enough money available to fund public education or the future of social security, while at the same time the nation is indebted by billions of dollars pursuing expensive wars abroad? The logic of capitalism does seem coherent—if not inevitable—in that it is never satisfied with the status quo and always seeks to exploit ever-larger markets. What is not inevitable is that people should subsume their wills and desires under the mechanical logic of capital. This is why the empire invests so much money to dress up its logic of the insatiable exploitation of wealth from all corners of the world for the profit of a small percentage of the world’s inhabitants with the idealism of words such as “freedom,” “justice,” and “democracy” (words with which no one can quarrel), the meanings of which are then skewed to support the neoliberal ideology.
Religious fundamentalisms make this matter worse. They do not free our minds to assess the damage undergone by the structures of democracy when too much power concentrates on the hands of the wealthy—democratic structures that, in any case, have never been absolute and are, in fact, subject both to evolution and devolution. Instead of freeing our minds, religious fundamentalisms instill guilt and fear into people’s consciousnesses, all too often about harmless things involving freely-consented adult sexuality. Religious fundamentalisms adhere to past dogmas and promote separatist behaviors toward anything they consider deviant from their core beliefs. When they act as representatives of society’s moral conscience, they censor, ostracize, and prohibit anything that deviates from their rigid beliefs—a problem for any democratic society and for the freedom of information and public opinion expected of a free and democratic way of life, since the repression of nondogmatic and nonconformist views on religion will sooner or later lead to the promotion of widespread ignorance across the body politic.

The transnational context of feminist philosophy constitutes an antidote to these forces of reaction and ignorance. While women in the United States make roughly only eighty cents compared to the dollar that men earn in comparable occupations—and this means that our labor’s value is being extracted from us for someone’s or some corporation’s profit—the overall extraction of value from women’s labor in the capitalist-dependent economies of peripheral countries is far worse. Most of us in the North live materially-privileged lives as a result of this global extraction of wealth and resources from those who are poorest. It is a paradoxical matter that the global rich rob from the global poor. What is there to steal from those who are poorest. It is a paradoxical matter that the global rich rob from the global poor. What is there to steal from those who are poorest. It is a paradoxical matter that the global rich rob from the global poor.

The critique of racism, which, thanks in large part to the insistence of U.S. women of color, is now considered to be fundamental to feminist ethics, is insufficient to address the problems of transnational injustice. Clearly, racism has been and continues to be a major component of colonialism and its sequel. We must not let up our guard against racism. Transnational injustice, however, targets the poor of whatever color and creates a hierarchy among people of color, some of whom are richly rewarded to become members of the global and transnational elite, directing and profiting from the very policies that disenfranchise the great majorities. Therefore, we need methods specifically suited to address the problems of transnational injustice and—I would add—to do so without entering into old or new dogmatisms, given the fact that a very large component of unmasking transnational injustice deals with the critique of global corporate capitalism.

Let me suggest two methodological approaches that we can take in response to the challenge of transnational injustice in a neoliberal capitalist age. One is the more usual way of writing global South or transnational narratives into the principles of justice and care already accepted by a feminist ethics based in the North. If we follow this route, what we will do is expand the borders of our concerns when we reason about justice. Philosophy can and does engage in this task, often in alliance with the social sciences, leading to increased international pressure to improve the conditions of those who are marginalized and oppressed. There is nothing wrong with this approach, and, in fact, it is very much needed. But, despite its importance, it seems to me that doing this is not enough. The reason is that we will continue to ground our ethical discourse in the conceptual frameworks prevalent in the societies that are generally benefiting from all the exploitation abroad. This practice may keep us from providing conceptual space for radical differences (those that cannot simply be assimilated into the prevailing or ruling systems of thought). The challenge is not simply to theorize about decolonization but also to decolonize the conceptual apparatus through which the theory is produced. Or, more simply stated, the language of power in which our ethical discourse is grounded is not necessarily the language in which the subaltern project and communicate their needs. To approximate an understanding of the latter, we need to suspend, at least temporarily, the mechanism of the former.

A more radical methodological approach to a feminist ethics critical of transnational injustice is to impart the awareness that “our” way of thinking is incomplete without the acknowledgment of subaltern perspectives and knowledges—subaltern precisely because they defy or cannot be easily subsumed by its standard categories of knowledge or taste. This route is much more difficult for philosophers to accept because, for philosophers, “knowledge” is basically a product of Western culture and science, most often based on European Enlightenment notions of rationality. Under this kind of conceptual framework, the epistemic requirements validating the concept of knowledge are grounded in certain ideological conditions that may not make equivalent sense to others whose language and cultural traditions differ from ours. I am not making a case here on behalf of cultural relativism. That is not what my observation is about. The case I am making is for the acknowledgment of nontransparency in our conceptual frameworks, and what in an earlier essay I referred to as the sense of incommensurability present in the acknowledgment of cultural alterity. My point is only that without the sense of the incompleteness of our ethical discourse not in terms of empirical missing pieces but as a system of knowledge, it will not be possible to do justice to the very people around the world in whose name we wish to erect theories of justice in our part of the world.

Taking this point further, I hold that without acknowledging this sense of the incommensurability of subaltern differences we would not even be doing justice to ourselves. The latter requires acknowledging the “otherness within” ourselves that is also incommensurable with the notion of a transparent or unified psyche. The poststructuralist continental feminist tradition has been arguing this position for some time now as a necessary condition for doing feminism and/or ethics. For my part (using the vocabulary of the West), I assume that, as aspiring subjects, the wealth of drives, memories, and desires making a person a “me” is beyond anyone’s full comprehension. Inattentive to this situation, we go about fulfilling our daily tasks and planning for our futures without conceding the importance of those aspects of the self not represented in such day-to-day activities and plans. Occasionally, a stinging memory, a strange or puzzling sensation, or a sequence of dream images may remind us of that which may have lain dormant, in silence, within us. Some forms of aesthetic experience may also elicit the irritation of this subaltern part of the self. Such forms of awareness may directly or indirectly strengthen our sense of resistance toward economic and political violence.

This leads me to the second major observation I want to make about the transnational contexts of feminist ethics. Globalization is not just about corporate capitalism and the North viciously seizing the rest of the world for its narrow
interests, co-opting as many local elites as possible into their agents and instruments, and extracting wealth (or its complement, debt) from all sources it can muster. It is all that, but, also, paradoxically, the same processes serve to import the “other” (the “uncivilized” or “exotic” foreigner, heretofore the “barbarian” or the “primitive”) into the West as long as the “other” is marketable. In these transactions, there is often a symbolic excess that cannot be regulated, for the excess is part and parcel of the marketable product that otherwise submits to the quantitative laws of consumption and consumer demand. This aesthetic and/or symbolic excess can act as a trigger or conduit to sustain and energize our ethical resistance to global exploitation.

Actually, one major effect of globalization is the spilling over or overflow not only of population (migrants, legal or illegal, to the North) but of all kinds of cultural products as the conditions of the global South traverse or “invade” the former relative security and complacency of Northern societies. Whether we receive testimony of the misery or the talents and successes of individuals whose lives or work cross over to the North, what globalization means is that we are no longer cut off from each other. When it is the product of misery, the spilling over effect, as the desperate (illegal) migration shows, can have a destabilizing effect on the North—although the current response is to erect higher walls, tougher laws, and greater law enforcement to police the U.S. borders (with Mexico, for example). At the same time, and in contrast to the more vulnerable migrants, we also get the brain drain from these poorer countries. Often these are highly skilled and trained individuals who migrate north in large part due to the economic incentives offered under capitalism. This population uses its consumer power to lobby for more efficient economic and political representation within the United States, its politics ranging from socially progressive to highly conservative.

Earlier, I mentioned that it is important to avoid dogmatisms as we confront the new forms of transnational injustice brought about by the current neoliberal political and economic global regime. This means that it is important to keep an eye open for cracks in the system or even some positive outcomes. In this regard, one interesting area of overflow is found in literature, the arts, music, and film. Here, some goods that are marketable across borders circulate globally, reversing the former flow of “culture” from North to South. I agree with those feminist analyses that assess this flow of aesthetic products into the North as a democratizing factor (to the North) forming part of the processes of globalization and, in a sense, countering the previous marginalization or orientalization (if you will) of non-Western or global South cultures. But, even here, the process is highly selective, and its impact may have ambiguous effects on the receiving end. For example, the effect can easily be to reinforce corporate capitalism’s hegemony by “consumerizing difference,” instead of letting difference truly transform us. The impact of this aesthetic overflow is unpredictable, but, in my opinion, for that very reason, among others, we should seek more of it. For example, this is one way that we learn of women writers and narrators in the Caribbean, Latin America, Africa, or Asia. Very often, the work of these women writers may transform us, just as this happened with regard to Chicana, Latina, African American, and other voices of “minority” women or women of color in the United States.

Summarizing what I have said, I suggest that we approach the meaning of feminism and feminist ethics in a transnational, globalized age in both a critical and open-minded manner with a double strategy: on the one hand, by implementing a critique of globalization in its corporate capital neoliberal and imperialistic constitutive processes, while also making room for the process of thinking through a whole gamut of subaltern differences, and, on the other hand, by celebrating and nourishing the potentially revolutionary postcolonial effects of the aesthetic overflow, not just for its own ends but for its transformative effects on our sensibilities and reasoning.

Endnotes

1. This paper was presented at the fifth Feminist Ethics and Social Theory Association national conference (FEAST 2005) in Clearwater Beach, Florida, October 2005. It is a substantial revision of my paper, “Feminist Philosophy in Interdisciplinary and Transnational Contexts,” presented at the Special Session Arranged by the APA Committee on the Status of Women, Eastern Division meeting, Boston, MA, December 2004.


Feminism and Philosophy: Getting It and Getting It Right

Jeffrey A. Gauthier
University of Portland

For all of the success of feminists in criticizing and otherwise engaging the canon of Western philosophy, the term “feminist philosophy” remains tendentious. Even among philosophers who grant that feminism has made an important contribution to our understanding of the social and political world, to preface philosophy with so politically partisan a modifier as “feminist” may well appear to violate the universal spirit of that inquiry. In one of her recent critiques of feminist epistemology, Susan Haack challenges the legitimacy of any politically partisan point of view belonging attached to a theory of knowledge as follows: “There would be a genuinely feminist epistemology if the idea
could be legitimated that feminist values should determine what theories are accepted." She contends that such an idea will surely be anathema to philosophers inasmuch as it places a political value over that of truth seeking.

Although a number of feminist epistemologists and philosophers of science, including Louise Antony and Helen Longino, have already offered strong responses to this line of criticism, I shall turn to a similar belief implicit in much contemporary moral and political philosophy. Although most ethicists and political philosophers would certainly grant the moral and political significance of feminist social criticism, there remains considerable doubt that this significance extends to debates in ethical theory. In their influential and otherwise broadly inclusive description of the major debates in fin de siècle ethics published in 1991, for example, Stephen Darwall, Alan Gibbard, and Peter Railton did not place feminist ethics among those major players. I suspect that the reason for this exclusion reflects a common belief among some ethicists that while feminism has had a salutary effect in raising our awareness on such things as women's moral psychology, double standards in mainstream moral and legal thinking, a masculine bias in the selection of examples in ethical theory, and the like, none of this has any obvious implications for the acceptance of ethical theories. To understand why, it is useful to borrow the scientific distinction between the context of discovery and the context of justification. While feminist theory aids in discovering instances of injustice, the judgment that such instances are, in fact, unjust relies upon theories of moral and political justification that are themselves independent of the values of feminism or any other political movement. Given this distinction, it is illegitimate for feminism to determine which moral theories are acceptable.

I argue that the strong distinction between the context of discovery and the context of justification that would warrant "ethics unmodified" is not so easy to maintain as some ethicists have assumed. To show this, I turn to Barbara Herman's defense of Kantian ethics as a theory that is well suited for feminist concerns. In her paper "The Practice of Moral Judgment," Herman grants the point raised by feminist critics (among others) that procedural moral tests such as the categorical imperative test must rely upon "preprocedural" moral content in the form of "rules of moral salience" in order to arrive at concrete judgments. Because of this, Herman argues that sexist and racist assumptions—"concepts that institutionalized inequality"—have sometimes become embodied in these rules so that an agent correctly employing the test of the categorical imperative might be subject to moral error. Unlike feminist critics of Kant, however, Herman argues that the inclusion of preprocedural assumptions in Kant's test need not diminish the scope of a Kantian theory of moral judgment.

Despite Herman's resourceful defense of Kant, I argue that her fallibilist interpretation of Kantianism as a theory of moral discovery has negative implications for its success as a theory of moral justification. By exploring some of these implications, I suggest how a political bias such as feminism can play a legitimate role in theory-acceptance in moral and political philosophy.

**Universality and Rules of Moral Salience (RMS)**

Herman's defense of Kantian moral philosophy rests on her analysis of its procedure. Because the categorical imperative is a principle for assessing an agent's own principle for action, there is a need for existing rules or conventions to govern the application of the meta-principle. Among other things, a moral agent must rely upon certain nonmoral "rules of relevance" in deciding which features of an action need to be a part of its maxim. Even more important as concerns feminist objections to Kantian universalism is Herman's acknowledgement that an agent must already possess certain kinds of background moral knowledge if she is to use the categorical imperative test. To subject any proposed action to moral assessment, the agent must be able to pick out the features of the action that are "morally salient." The reasons for this are twofold. First, the agent has to know which of her actions are the proper objects of moral judgment. Being able to grasp why tying a noose around my neck raises moral questions that tying my shoes does not, for example, is a necessary condition for any further moral inquiry. Secondly, moral knowledge is necessary for an agent to describe a proposed action in such a way that its principle or maxim can accurately be assessed. As Herman remarks, "An agent who came to the CI procedure with no knowledge of the moral characteristics of actions would be very unlikely to describe his action in a morally appropriate way." This points to the need for moral understanding that is independent of the judgments rendered by means of the test of the categorical imperative.

According to Herman, RMS provide such an understanding, functioning as "proprocedural intuition[s] or convention[s]" that alert the agent to situations of moral risk and thereby permit her to arrive at descriptions of a proposed action that are suitable for moral assessment. Although RMS do not specify rules or duties in the manner of a formal procedure, by structuring the agent's moral sensitivity or perception so that some acts, and not others, stand out as in need of moral attention, they serve to make the agent aware of the moral dimensions of various situations. While RMS do not arise as a result of any formal moral judgment, because they shape the structure of moral perception RMS exercise an influence on procedural moral judgments. Herman contends that issues such as "who is a moral agent or end-in-himself," the conditions of agency for moral agents and what can interfere with those conditions, and the "marks of reasonable claims and constraints," are all decided preprocedurally on the basis of RMS.

Although RMS arise in the context of culturally specific norms and mores, it does not follow that such rules are immune from the universal constraints of the moral law. Kant's moral law is a "fact of reason," influencing the decision structure of all rational agents regardless of whether or not they are aware of the procedural tests of the categorical imperative. Herman argues that RMS "express the same fundamental concept (the Moral Law) that the CI procedure represents for purposes of judgment." The moral basis of RMS derives from the rationally irresistible "conception of oneself as a moral agent among others." That conception in turn places a demand on any society for a provisional solution to the problem of how persons are to interact as moral agents, one that finds expression in the RMS: "The RMS are to be viewed as a set of rules that encode a defeasible solution to questions about the nature of moral agents, the appropriate descriptive terms that capture morally salient features of our situations, our decisions, and so on." Although the need for RMS derives from the necessity of the moral law itself, any particular set of rules represents a merely provisional and contingent reply to this demand—a "hypothesis" as it were—subject to continuing moral scrutiny.

Despite this relation to the moral law, because RMS develop preprocedurally in the institutions and practices of a particular cultural order, they can be a prime repository for deep-seated cultural prejudices. Moreover, because they govern our capacity to perceive the moral significance of persons and events prior to making conscious moral judgments, RMS permit "errors of moral judgment that will not be caught by the CI procedure." This does not mean, however, that RMS are impervious to moral criticism. Because the defective RMS expressed a hypothetical solution to a problem that was
grounds in our awareness of the demands of the moral law, like-grounded moral concepts that criticize existing social structures, such as those in criticisms of racism or sexism, they afford a means for exposing those defects. Herman writes:

I do not know (historically) what prompted such notions as “racist” or “sexist” to emerge in contemporary western culture and become moral notions (terms of moral criticism). One way of understanding what happened when they did, when they came to shape a part of our sense of a moral ideal, is to see these categories as having been incorporated in the prevailing RMS. Existing rules of salience bearing on racial and sexual matters were found to be insufficient—to encode concepts that institutionalized inequality. . . .Deeply held views about the nature of blacks or women had to be unmasked and corrected, prejudices and fears overcome, so that their full moral status could be acknowledged and seen...constituting a practical adjustment in the concept of “person as an end-in-himself.” . . . The terms of criticism are based in the same moral conception of persons that supports the rules and categories needing revision.

Because RMS are only provisional and have their basis in the same “moral law” that grounds critical categories such as sexism or racism, RMS remain subject to political critique regardless of their cultural standing.

By acknowledging that the ideological distortion associated with institutionalized injustice may be generated in the underlying assumptions upon which moral agents rely, Herman provides an explanation for why sexist and racist practices can escape the moral scrutiny of an otherwise competent moral agent. To the extent that a racist or sexist ideology is “encoded” into RMS that govern the application of the categorical imperative, the test will remain insensitive to certain injustices. This may be because the RMS fail to pick out a practice or feature of an action as morally salient (e.g., when it does not occur to a moral agent to subject acts of sexual harassment or rape within marriage to moral scrutiny), or because the harm that comes to individuals or groups as a result of an action or practice is not recognized as a harm. In either case, however, the benighted moral agent is not entirely without recourse. Once made aware that errors in RMS can involve deeply-rooted political ideology, Kantian moral agents have a duty to develop mechanisms suitable for reducing the possibility of these errors. Herman suggests, for example, that “It would be reasonable to attend to claims made by and on behalf of those omitted from equal consideration, to consider who benefits from their exclusion, and so on.” Moreover, once they are aware that the rules governing moral perception are only defeasible solutions to a problem posed by the moral law, “agents will be able to consider whether the moral categories they use are in fact compatible with the respect owed toward persons.”

It is noteworthy that Herman limits her consideration to explanations of what happens after the discovery of defects in the background rules governing the categorical imperative test and, thus, sets aside the question of how agents came to discover that certain rules were racist or sexist. Critically, she claims ignorance as to the historical conditions that caused racism and sexism to rise to the level of salient moral concerns. The sociopolitical upheavals that alter our understanding of RMS, however, do not occur as accidents of nature nor are they independent of people’s moral self-understanding. Moreover, while agnosticism as regards the context of moral discovery might be acceptable for a purely teleological moral theory (in which only the consequences and not the motives of action take on moral significance), it is not so easy for a “clearly and distinctively Kantian” analysis to brush this issue aside. As Herman herself has emphasized in other writings, Kant’s moral theory is distinguished not only by the primacy of the moral law in its conception of ethical justification but by the supreme importance that it assigns to the motive of duty: “[T]he motive of duty must be by itself sufficient to bring about all that is morally required.” The right act just is that action that would be motivated by the good will. If RMS have a rational basis in the moral law, as Herman claims that they do, then the motive of duty ought to be sufficient for correcting mistakes in those rules. Likewise, if treating all persons as ends-in-themselves is morally required, and if ideologically grounded defects to RMS systematically impede our capacity to perceive whole classes of persons as ends-in-themselves, then the motive of duty must be sufficient to induce what is necessary to correct those defects. In short, not only are moral agents not without recourse with regard to deficient RMS, they should have all that they need to discover that their assumptions are wrong.

When we consider the actual conditions that led to the emergence of racism, sexism, and other injustices as moral concerns, however, it is far from clear that the impartiality of the motive of duty was effective in moving either the oppressed or their oppressors to this new awareness. In the first place, the moral rights of racial and sexual minorities have most often emerged as a result of the unabashed partisanship of members of the oppressed groups in demanding social claims as moral rights, this often to the astonishment and irritation of the ruling classes. Moreover, when the prevalent interpretation of the moral point of view does not fully recognize the moral agency of a class of persons, it may take an extraordinary effort even for a member of an oppressed group to recognize the limitations imposed upon her as an injustice. Coming to the awareness that her needs as a member of that class count as “rights” requires actions that are unlikely to pass any formal tests of rightness given RMS that encode oppression. Because of this, the most morally-significant action that such an agent can perform is frequently subject to being publicly perceived as merely crazy or selfish, what Susan Babbitt has aptly termed an “ethical and epistemological gamble.” The rebellion of the oppressed may become righteous only as a result of revolutionary changes to RMS that the rebellion brought about. Under these conditions, governing one’s actions or judgments of others’ acts by means of the categorical imperative would have been counterproductive in advancing moral knowledge.

Acting from the motive of duty may seriously compromise the capacity of members of privileged classes to overcome defective assumptions as well. Absent the ethical gambles of political activism, the powerful will have little motivation for questioning potentially-immoral assumptions that govern their moral reasoning. Indeed, even the most perceptive Kantians (beginning with Kant himself) have proven unable to extricate themselves from profoundly sexist assumptions. Although Kant claims that “[I]t indicates a man with a broadened way of thinking if he overrides the subjective conditions of his judgment, into which so many others are locked, as it were, and reflects on his own judgment from a universal standpoint,” identifying the capacity to perceive ideological distortion with that ability to free oneself from subjective biases misplaces the problem. As Louise Antony succinctly puts the point in a related context, “The epistemic problem with ruling class people is not that they are closed-minded; it’s that they hold too much power.” Systems of power prevent the disenfranchised from articulating a moral concern for the...
powerful to perceive. One of the features of systems of oppression such as racism and sexism that makes them so difficult to change is the fact that even thoughtful and perceptive moral agents can perpetuate these systems without consciously willing any racist or sexist principles at all. One who takes the good will to be the sole criterion of the right, and who takes the test of the categorical imperative to be the best criterion for judging her motives, will be unlikely to assign great moral significance to concerns that escape the net of that procedure.

Conclusion
In failing to accommodate the conditions for the discovery of defective RMS, Kant’s formal procedure ends up failing as a criterion of justification as well. The motive of duty does not bring about all that is required according to its own criteria of rightness because, under the influence of defective RMS, it may permit the treatment of a member of a class of oppressed persons as less than an end in herself. By warranting this kind of treatment, a commitment to universalizing one’s principles may serve to impede political action that is the necessary condition for the full moral agency of members of an oppressed class to find expression in society. This is because members of both the oppressed and the oppressor class will find no moral reason to accept biases (such as feminism) that would enable them to come to an awareness of the injustice of the oppression.

This provides a good reason for feminists to reject strict Kantian proceduralism as an ethical theory. Pace Haack, however, this is not simply because feminists are biased toward the interests of women. Rather, a feminist bias enables us to see that Kant’s procedure fails on its own grounds. Any theory that sets the respect for persons as ends in themselves as its goal, while holding, at the same time, that action from a motive of duty is sufficient for achieving that end, cannot succeed even by its own lights. To grant that even a formal procedural account of the right must rely upon unexamined and biased assumptions in its application is also to grant that certain biases may be useful in examining those assumptions. This justifies favoring those political biases that have proven to be successful in the construction of our moral knowledge. Biases such as feminism that have enabled us to “get it” when it comes to oppressive conditions are necessary for us to “get it right” from the moral point of view.

Endnotes
6. Ibid., 75.
9. Ibid., 84.
10. Ibid., 86.
11. Ibid., 85.
12. Ibid., 87.
13. Ibid.
14. Ibid., 89.
15. Ibid.
16. Ibid., 88.
17. Ibid., 90.
18. Ibid., 32.
19. Consider, for example, The “Principles” of the radical feminist Redstockings: “We take the woman’s side in everything. We ask not if something is ‘reformist’, ‘radical’, ‘revolutionary’, or ‘moral’. We ask, is it good for women or bad for women?” Robin Morgan, ed. Sisterhood is Powerful: An Anthology of Readings from the Women’s Liberation Movement (New York: Bantam 1970), 583.

A French Feminism

Sara Beardsworth

Southern Illinois University–Carbondale

Feminism, in its French form, has taken up a strong relationship to psychoanalytic theory. One problem affecting the reception of the French thinkers is the view that psychoanalytic theory cuts the psyche off from the social process, or that its attention to the individual, narrowly conceived, works on the alienated psyche and cannot, therefore, offer to feminism a thought that is socially and politically significant. Yet it is not this dehistoricized being uprooted from social context that is the object-domain of psychoanalysis. Its object-domain is, rather, the limit of the ties between the social and the individual. It can be asked why this limit might be of equal or greater interest than those ties themselves, as these might be investigated by a social thought with a direct political pay-off. The answer is because the exploration of this limit reveals the failings and inadequacies of those ties as they are experienced by members of the culture. A major issue, here, is whether or not it is possible to make this limit itself, let alone those experiences, politically intelligible, especially given that those experiences turn up as forms of pathology—symptoms. As Jacqueline Rose has underlined, symptomatic distress and political struggle are not to be confused with one another. There is no possibility of direct politicization of the unconscious. However, this is not to deny the psychoanalytic effort to make what turns up at the limit of the ties between the social and the individual intelligible and to articulate the indirect political meaning of the unconscious. In French feminism, this attempt has also become the effort to make the “feminine” intelligible beyond.
the notion of the feminine, whose meaning has been deemed by feminist thought, beginning with Beauvoir, to be shaped to meet the needs of men. Beauvoir’s statement that “one is not born a woman, but rather, becomes one” is long familiar. The statement belongs to a critique of the historical process in which women became the Other of men. As autonomy came to be seen as requiring a denial of embodiment, men projected onto women all their embodiment and conceived of women, generally, as enacting embodiment (birth and death), and so nature, for them. Denied and projected embodiment becomes “mere” nature.

What, then, are the chances for articulating the feminine otherwise? The investigation and writing of embodiment in French feminism does not rest on the idea that there is a direct relation to an untrammeled feminine body from which a woman’s writing can be expressed. It rests on the idea that when psychoanalysis goes to the limit of the ties between the social and the individual it encounters the claim—in however distorted a voice—of what is other than the representations belonging to the historical process x-rayed by Beauvoir: their “remnant,” as it were. On this view, there simply is no straightforward way either of opposing or of unraveling the tangled web of politics, embodiment, and the meaning of the feminine. The indirect way of psychoanalysis is an important one because the exploration of psychic life is the exploration both of the cultural fate of psyche’s embodiment and of the claims made—clinically, in the distorted and persistent voice of symptoms—for what propositional knowledge cannot say and what is other than our rationalizations and reflective practices. The writing of French feminism is an attempt to say what is other than those practices without any comforting naivety about what is faced in the task.

Let me turn now to the question of the meaning of just one of these efforts, that of Julia Kristeva. It is fairly widely known that Kristeva’s thought includes the project of drawing the feminine out of Freud’s “dark continent,” which he likened to the Minoan-Mycenean civilization buried beneath the classical Greek one. Kristeva attempts to name and articulate what Freud left in the shadows. She names it the “maternal feminine” on the psychoanalytic ground of an inquiry into the relationship of preverbal infant and early mother. This relationship was neglected by the classical Freudian rendering of the Oedipus complex as the center and sine qua non of the child’s development into social and moral being. It was also discounted in the Lacanian thought on the primacy of the symbolic order that is upheld by the Phallus or signifier of lack. The notion of lack ties human finitude to Freud’s oedipal structure, and the imperative to “accept one’s lack” therefore appears to be a paternal law hinging at the foundation of culture and underpinning all things human. Neither the classically Freudian position nor the Lacanian one allows for a maternal role in acculturation. One might think, then, that Kristeva’s articulation of the maternal feminine would be welcomed as a valuable contribution to feminist thought. Yet, it has been a source of anxiety. The worry is in part over the fact that her emphasis on the maternal body risks repeating the very identification of “woman” and “nature” that has been a prominent object of criticism in feminist theory. This is the worry that her notion of the maternal body is essentialist in the sense that she treats its “naturalness” as a fact and as a domain set apart from “culture.” However, recalling Beauvoir’s problematic, Kristeva is well aware that the fact of the maternal body as a stand-in for nature is a social fact, that is to say, a fact of the sociohistorical process in which nature was reduced to “mere” nature and embodiment projected onto women in order to safeguard the autonomy of “the subject.” Kristeva’s attention to the maternal body simply takes this historical projection at its word. She goes to the maternal body for the claim of “lost nature,” that is to say, the lost past that Freud called the dark continent.

A prominent essay on this issue is “Stabat Mater.” This work deploys the device of writing in two columns in order to juxtapose, on the one hand, a theoretical exploration of the meanings and failings of the only “consecrated” image of woman in Western culture (the Virgin Mary) and, on the other, a more poetic rendering of the experience of pregnancy and childbirth. This division into two columns reminds us of the fundamental categorial distinction in Kristeva’s thought between the “semiotic” and “symbolic” dimensions of subjectivity and meaning. Typologically, this is a distinction in which strictly symbolic functioning encompasses everything to do with communicative discourse, especially utterances with propositional content that say something (to someone) and so cover the field of the meaningful object, that is to say, a representation, idea, or thing. Semiotic functioning, on the other hand, is the nondiscursive aspect of Kristeva’s expanded conception of language and embraces the less visible role in meaning and subjectivity of tone, gesture, and rhythm. This is what Western cultures tend to rule out for the sake of the meaningful object that can be “had” by the supposed subject of meaning: what is apparently under the control, and usable for the purposes, of a subject who masters meaning. The notion of semiotic in contrast to strictly symbolic functioning invokes voice and gesture as embodied elements of meaning-production lying at the threshold of the biological. Although the semiotic and symbolic can be typologically distinguished from the standpoint of theory, the semiotic does not exist in isolation from but works through symbolic discourses, especially psychoanalytic and poetic ones, for Kristeva. Nonetheless, there is an irreconcilable alterity between the semiotic, on the one hand, and strictly symbolic functioning or propositional discourse, on the other. In her terms, the semiotic and the symbolic are “heterogeneous” elements that underlie the nonidentity of both meaning and the subject, illuminating their instability and renewability.

The division of “Stabat Mater” into two columns allows our reading of Kristeva’s thought on the maternal feminine to oscillate between a writing in which the symbolic dominates and one in which the semiotic dominates. The first is a theoretical treatment of Marianite discourse understood as a religious discourse that accommodates the feminine in the form of a maternal body, yet ultimately purifies that image (of sex and death). That is to say, the right-hand column presents, inter alia, the posture of feminine purity in Marianite discourse (“alone of all her sex”), acknowledging that it is an impossible image with respect to a woman’s speech or desire. The left-hand column presents the more poetical writing on a woman’s experience of pregnancy and childbirth. The essay as a whole unfolds in relation to the late-modern context and so presumes the historical process, analyzed by Beauvoir, in which woman is not purified of nature but, instead, is a “mere” nature that carries embodiment for all. Kristeva, therefore, goes to the maternal body because it is the privileged figure of Beauvoir’s story in the double sense that “figure” can have. First, the maternal body is the very image of the fate of embodiment in Western cultures, an image encountered in both classically Freudian and Lacanian psychoanalysis where the maternal disappears into a precultural realm. This image is the object of the feminist challenge to the (male) identification of “woman” and “nature.” Second, the maternal body in Kristeva is the experience of the fate of embodiment in Western cultures. That is to say, it is where the projection of embodiment onto women is actually undergone instead of being routinely repeated. To undergo this projection is to undergo the cultural
lie that the maternal body is “mere” nature, for maternal experience goes to the threshold where the symbolic tips over into the nonverbal experience, close to biology, that Kristeva embraces in her notion of the “semiotic.” This is a hazardous experience, no doubt, because of the silence that weighs upon it. Nonetheless, Kristeva finds that the mother is a “fold” that changes culture into nature and which invokes—and must repeat, for the mother and the child—the change from nature to culture.

From the perspective of the maturation of the individual, the change from nature to culture is not the Lacanian entrance into the symbolic order, which cuts the speaking being off from nature. Rather, it encompasses the vital process in which not mere nature but the semiotic or nonverbal experience close to the biological is carried into the symbolic. That is to say, what has been and can no longer be—the preverbal affective and corporeal life of infantile attachment to and detachment from the mother’s body—is surpassed but not simply cut off by the life of signs, provided that the nonverbal modes of attachment and detachment (drives and affects) take on some kind of symbolic form. In Kristeva, this process is a condition of adequate separateness and connections with others since, without the passage of the semiotic into the symbolic, we are doomed to a merely linguistic universe where the experience of meaning and value is lacking. Her conception of the symbolic does not only stress the necessity of the entrance into language, where preverbal life is definitively left behind (“the word kills the thing”), but also underlines the need of symbolization, understood as a process that takes place in a series of stages and which must encompass the transposition of the semiotic traces of corporeal and affective life (the drives and affects) into the life of signs. This process, which has symbolization accommodate affective separateness and connectedness, allows for the production of meaning in the subject (only by producing it) for another subject. That is to say, the vital importance of the symbolic order, for Kristeva, cannot be had without the affective and meaning-producing binding with others. In sum, Kristeva’s developmental account of the change from nature to culture accomplishes two things. First, it articulates the maternal role in acculturation. Second, it shows how acculturation might be relieved of its Western fate, that is to say, the abstractedness it falls into once autonomy is thought to require disembodiment or symbolic life is thought to be guaranteed only through its opposition to a world of nature.

Nevertheless, the notion that the symbolic realm lacks meaning and value if it fails to accommodate and symbolize the nonverbal elements of being with others itself remains somewhat abstract unless we can bring it into relation to more specific considerations. Indeed, if we approach Kristeva’s thought on the maternal body on the ground of ethical considerations, we come much closer to answering the question as to the meaning of her thought on the maternal feminine. For her own objective in directing our thoughts to the radical tension of the early mother as a fold of nature and culture is, indeed, to get us to think of its ethical meaning and what kind of ethical meaning this is. The exploration of the maternal feminine in “Stabat Mater” comes to offer a concrete image of a non-Platonic ethics, which is to say an articulation of the ethical where the latter is not derived from a priori principle or moral law but is a relationship to otherness that can, in and of itself, display normativity. This is a remarkable assertion to make on this ground and would seem to be doomed to failure if the maternal feminine only named an experience that is closed to men and embraces some women more than others. The idea must, therefore, be communicated in its two stages.

First, the maternal body in Kristeva is said to bear a mark of alterity. Some have worried that what she means by alterity, here, is some identity of the maternal body that is cut off from and opposed to culture. This is not so. Rather, the maternal body in Kristeva bears the mark of alterity insofar as there is in the experience of childbirth and early mothering, and especially in parturition, an encounter with unassimilable and unobjectifiable otherness. Kristeva gives the experience a first-person voice in “Stabat Mater.” “I confront the abyss between what was mine and is henceforth but irreparably alien. Trying to think through that abyss: staggering vertigo.” The ethical moment, here, is the confrontation with irreconcilable, even unthinkable, alterity because alterity arises here without it being fully intelligible where and how, exactly, “one” and “two” do turn up. It appears that Kristeva’s maternal feminine is able to show that it displays a normativity insofar as maternal experience can encompass ethical relationship because it is so bound up, as an experience, with unassimilable and unobjectifiable otherness. What is more, this notion of the maternal feminine is counterposed to the abstractedness and leveling of modern ethical theory insofar as it is far removed from either disembodied autonomy or the “person” as the a priori and impersonal bearer of ethical value. Kristeva’s maternal feminine is an experience that bends experience to experience, that is to say, does not allow it to be divorced from itself and turned into an abstraction once more. That said, one could justifiably think that such a triumph over abstract universality has a familiar cost. It would seem that Kristeva’s maternal feminine is confined, as an experience, to a particular in the sense that it is open only to the empirical maternal body: a mother’s possible experience in respect of parturition. However, there is a second stage in Kristeva’s idea, which shows how her particular—the “maternal body”—gains an inscription in the universal. This reveals that it is the conception of the maternal feminine that is the significantly ethical one.

Ewa Ziarek has articulated the second stage as follows: “the mark of alterity points to the subject’s indebtedness to the other, to a forgotten maternal gift, which enables our ethical orientation in the world.” That is to say, the unthinkable alterity that is without “one” and “two,” out of which “one” and “an other” nevertheless arise, is carried forward to shape an indebtedness that neither overwhelms the subject nor gets paid off to the supposed benefit of a disembodied autonomy. For the speaking being that each and every one of us is, is a separated being and is such—is separate or independent—only in and through a dependence or connectedness, together with the immemorial separating of a body from another body, and this is a process that leaves uniquely semiotic—in this case nonverbal, psychic—traces. This past is a forgotten maternal gift. The form of indebtedness to the other invoked by Ziarek is a relation to the past as past because, on condition of the loss of the mother’s body, there falls to every speaking being an embodied memory of the strange dependence, connectedness, and alterity that is undergone before there is any settling into “one” and an “other.” The idea of the maternal feminine is an ethical one, then, insofar as it stands for a negotiation, rather than disavowal, of dependence on an other who is nonetheless (and must be) lost as essential other. On this ground, the denial that dependence and embodiment are a condition of separateness and autonomy might be undermined, and this would be a gain at the level of the ethical.

Beyond this, however, Kristeva also finds that the embodied memory of the maternal body is endowed with an ethical character because that memory is where “the speaking being may find refuge when his/her symbolic shell cracks and a crest emerges where speech causes biology to show through:
I am thinking of the time of illness, of sexual-intellectual-physical passion, of death...” Inventing the term “l’hérétique” (“heretics”) to capture this thought, Kristeva specifies that this ethical moment is “perhaps no more than that which in life makes bonds, thoughts, and therefore the thought of death, bearable: heretics is undead, love [a-mort, amour]...” Her “recovery” of the maternal feminine is therefore much more than a setting to rights of the psychoanalytic view of acculturation. This achievement may well be enough if one shares the view that the classical psychoanalytic attribution of all the power of acculturation to the paternal instance, leaving the figure of the mother as a threat to autonomy only, reflects and represents a huge cultural problem in the West. Beyond this, however, Kristeva’s recovery of the maternal body shows that a recovery of living nature is possible for a world that not only tends toward a merely linguistic universe emptied of meaning and value but is also increasingly unaware that it has lost a world of nature. Kristeva’s exploration of the maternal body has shown that nature is discontinuous from the start and must have a history if it is to be living nature and if, therefore, we are to have a world of nature. That history would be the repeated re-symbolizations of the semiotic. Kristeva herself has given us such a symbolization of the semiotic in her notion of l’hérétique. What this turns out to mean is that we are not confined to the alternatives of a maternal feminine that is the posture of purity in religious discourse or a maternal body that is mere nature in modern, secular discourse, together with the determined feminist effort, on these grounds, to detach the feminine from the maternal. Rather, there is a maternal feminine that can be lived out by us as “undeath, love...”

Endnotes

3. For example, Judith Butler expresses this concern about Kristeva’s notion of the maternal body in both Gender Trouble (New York: Routledge, 1990) and Bodies That Matter (New York: Routledge, 1993). Another worry that has been expressed about Kristeva’s maternal feminine is that this notion of alterity repeats the cultural objectification of “every woman’s body” as a maternal one. This is not so. Kristeva is clear that she is investigating a level of female subjectivity whose recovery and rethinking has ethical potential, not positing a univocal meaning of the feminine.
7. Ibid., 263.

BOOK REVIEWS

Recognition, Responsibility, and Rights: Feminist Ethics and Social Theory


Reviewed by Christine M. Koggel
Bryn Mawr College, ckoggel@brynmawr.edu

A key strategy in feminist theory is to provide critiques of core concepts in traditional moral, social, and political theory by making an analysis of gender central to the revision of them. Recognition, Responsibility, and Rights focuses on these three concepts and bills itself as showcasing “the best work in feminist theory” emerging from biennial conferences of Feminist Ethics and Social Theory, “a professional organization dedicated to promoting feminist ethical perspectives in philosophy; moral, social, and political life; law; and public policy” (233). As is the case with many edited collections from conferences, its strength is not in how the whole coheres but in the individual chapters, each of which makes a new and interesting contribution. This new series is off to a good start in tracking some of the best and most recent feminist contributions in ethics and social theory.

In the brief Introduction, Robin Fiore explains that she will not provide comprehensive analyses of the three concepts but will instead let the authors speak for themselves on these topics in the separate chapters. If we are to ask why these concepts are selected, or what connects them, the answer may lie in Fiore’s comment that “modern Western philosophical efforts tend to focus on distinguishing core concepts and are apt to overlook conceptual interdependence” (viii). While Fiore does not draw out these interdependencies in the Introduction, some of the contributors do and in ways that reveal features common to feminist conceptual analysis: the need to describe social contexts, structures, and institutions in which people are situated and the importance of examining relationships at the local, group, national, and global levels that impact on people’s lives.

Young opens the collection and Part I on the concept of recognition by using Toril Moi’s concept of the “lived body” to capture the idea that individuals are shaped by culture, expectations, and interaction with others at the same time as each person interprets and acts in relation to these unchosen facts in his own way. However, Young warns that attention to individual experience, identity, and subjectivity should not supplant the continued importance of feminist work that identifies the harms and injustices perpetuated by social institutions and relations and advocates strategies for changing them. Young defends a “reconstituted concept of gender” and points to the gendered division of labor and normative heterosexuality as institutions that continue to impact on the “lived body” in all its concreteness and diversity.

Thus far, the message is that an account of the possibilities for recognition and of the harms of misrecognition needs an account of gender norms entrenched in social institutions and structures. But how can women achieve recognition or be autonomous if their lives are shaped by institutions and social relations in ways that limit their choices? Answers to this sort
of question are explored in the next three chapters. Diana Meyers asks whether autonomy is possible in a context in which “American culture currently embeds dependency work in a coercive gender system” (24). Meyers argues that while dependency work in and of itself need not be incompatible with autonomy, autonomy is indeed diminished by the entrance, allocation, and exit options for women currently engaged in this work. She identifies challenges by lesbians, gays, and collective families to the heterosexual nuclear family as holding promise for the degendering and redistribution of default dependency work.

Misha Strauss is critical of the “heroic” or atomistic liberal self, a self that can single handedly construct his or her own identity and assert self-understanding free from the influence of others. Strauss argues that a relational conception of the self can better explain why recognition by others of one’s personhood and agency is central to self-understanding and being able to assert one’s identity and what harms can result from a lack of recognition by others. The notion of asserting one’s identity is further explored in Cressida Heyes’s critique of a politics of recognition that links visibility and self-esteem to the realization of an authentic self, whether abstracted from social contexts or constituted by them. Heyes defends an intersubjective, dialogical account of selves as always working-in-progress. Such an account, she argues, avoids the problems of selves asserting an identity out of nowhere, or claiming an already fixed and recognizable identity as a member of a group.

Part I ends with Kate Parson applying feminist insights about social contexts and institutions to anorexia. Parsons argues with feminists who shift the focus from thinking of anorexia as the perceptual failings of the individual (the subjective sense of reasonable to the perceiver) to the idea that responsibility for perceptions and self-perceptions rests with a society that promotes thinness as a norm and goal (the objective sense of reasonable to any other person in the same circumstances). Yet the objective sense raises questions about autonomy and responsibility. Parson favors a third sense of reasonable, one that explains that it is reasonable for the anorectic to be affected by norms of thinness but unreasonable for her to accept and endorse those norms when they threaten her health and very survival.

Part II on responsibility opens with Heidi Grasswick exploring how responsibility can be possible in an imperfect world of social pressures and limited choices. Grasswick calls for an account of epistemic responsibility that connects questions of how we come to know the world with the impact this has on our ability to know and live well. By showing that contexts and practices of oppression are relevant to who knows and what can be known, Grasswick not only rejects traditional accounts of knowledge but defends an account that puts the focus on agents who can transform and improve knowledge-seeking practices. Abby Wilkerson extends the discussion of knowing well in her examination of how genres such as illness and coming out narratives need to be understood as emerging from a broader social context of oppression. Wilkerson argues that while these genres can work to unsettle unjust norms of the healthy body and of heterosexuality that perpetuate relations of power and oppression, we need to be aware of how they can also exclude narratives by those who experience serious discrimination, poverty, and trauma.

Cheryl Hughes and Norah Martin test standard accounts of responsibility by discussing timely issues of an aging population, increased numbers of chronic and degenerative diseases, and end of life decisions. Hughes argues that on Ronald Dworkin’s account of integrity as maintaining a coherent life story, a meaningful life ends with the onset of degenerative disease or disability. On Hughes’s account, integrity involves living lives in relation to others and being prepared to have one’s life story changed in the face of vulnerabilities and dependencies. Acting with integrity means “learning how to live well together through chronic illness, disability, dependence, and decline” (127). But what of the decision to end one’s life in the face of suffering or incurable disease? Martin questions feminists who reject physician-assisted suicide based on arguments that gender norms that shape self-sacrificing tendencies in women make it more likely that they will request and be granted physician-assisted suicide than will men. While Martin does not deny that gender norms may affect end-of-life decisions for women, she worries that these arguments have the effect of either denying that women can make these decisions or advocating that women forego the decision to choose to die in favor of supporting the feminist goal of fighting women’s oppression.

In the final reading in Part II, Bonnie Mann rereads Judith Butler’s postmodern account of the body through a discussion of the current threat of environmental destruction. Mann argues that the threat to the very existence of the planet forces the postmodern body back on earth by illustrating the “stubborn fact of the existence of matter” outside of text and discourse. The body is never wholly claimed or contained by language and needs to engage with the living earth on which it depends. Such an account, Mann argues, can also avoid the essentialism in radical feminist accounts of the body.

Part III on rights turns to the global context. Margaret Walker discusses the right to truth as developed through truth commissions that call for the right to have the truth sought and to be told the truth. Yet, throughout the world, there are impediments to the exercise of this right for women: truths are often left unspoken because of fear or the need to preserve life, because the tellers are discredited or declared irrational, or because the language for expressing those truths is not yet available. Walker calls for greater access to public roles and spaces so that women can develop the capacities for self-understanding, self-accountability, and choice involved in civil, social, moral, and political activity.

Maria Pia Lara calls for a new global public sphere that makes use of literary works, culture, diasporic spaces, and narratives of colonialism to envision new identities, new ways for self-understanding, self-accountability, and choice involved in civil, social, moral, and political activity.
Being Yourself: Essays on Identity, Action, and Social Life


Reviewed by Cheryl L. Hughes
Wabash College, hughesc@wabash.edu

This rich collection of essays focuses on the many ways that gender-biased cultures, institutions, and social practices facilitate or interfere with the individual agency, autonomy, and self-determination of women. The volume is divided into three parts dealing with the autonomous agent, moral reflection, and agency in hostile social contexts. Although most of the essays are reprinted from journals and other anthologies, this collection shows the depth and development of Meyers's work on autonomy and includes several new essays on embodied agency, the impact of socialization on moral autonomy, and innovative feminist strategies for social change. Throughout this volume, Meyers integrates interdisciplinary feminist scholarship, personal testimony, and data from social scientific studies with careful philosophical argument and analysis.

The essays in Part I, focused on autonomy, agency, and identity, are perhaps the most theoretically complex and challenging. “Personal Autonomy and the Paradox of Feminine Socialization” aims to defend a notion of the autonomous self as an authentic, or “true,” self that develops over time through the exercise of what Meyers labels “autonomy competency.” Meyers considers opposing views of feminine socialization: the view that strongly directive traditional socialization suppresses personal autonomy, and the competing view that socialization leads to positive and valuable feminine styles of agency. She explores the limits of each to arrive at two important insights regarding autonomy: (1) autonomy may be episodic or partial in any life, no matter how directive the socialization; and (2) one develops and maintains autonomy by exercising introspective, imaginative, reasoning, and volitional skills, which constitute autonomy competency. A program for change would then aim to overhaul socialization practices that interfere with the development or exercise of these autonomy competency skills.

Chapter two continues the effort to explain how autonomy is possible under structures of domination and subordination. Meyers focuses on the concept of “intersectional identity”—the idea that every individual internalizes ascriptions of gender, sexual orientation, race, class, and ethnicity and that these ascriptions interact to create compound effects and inner conflicts. Whether one is assigned to privileged or subordinate groups (or, more commonly, a mix of these), intersectional identities influence what one believes, how one deliberates, and how one conducts one’s life. Meyers argues that candid self-knowledge is an essential first step to authenticity for intersectional subjects. She suggests that personal integration and development of an authentic self is a lifelong project—a process of active self-discovery and self-definition that depends on learning and exercising the skills of autonomy competency: introspection, imagination, memory, communication, analytical and reasoning skills, volitional skills, and interpersonal skills.

Chapter three, “Decentralizing Autonomy: Five Faces of Selves,” offers another way to extend our understanding of autonomous agency. Against the narrow ascription of autonomy to the unitary and rational self, Meyers argues that we should attend to four other aspects of the self that can both contribute to and threaten autonomy. Thus, the socialized and enculturated social self, the interpersonally-bonded relational self, the divided self of conscious self-awareness and unconscious desires, and the embodied self are all complex and overlapping dimensions of what it means to be a subject. Each of these dimensions of the self can threaten autonomy. For example, the relational self may respond to others’ needs to the exclusion of one’s own goals and projects, or the unconscious drives of the divided self may unduly shape one’s choices or distort self-knowledge. But these dimensions of the self also contribute distinctive and neglected “agentic skills.” For example, the self as social gains collective skills for coping with repressive stereotypes or for social dissent; and friendship can jump-start or support autonomous choices. To counter the objection that this view fragments autonomous subjectivity, Meyers develops an account of “retrospective autonomy”—that is, we critically reflect on past conduct and validate it “after the fact” in a process of self-discovery (62). Meyers concludes that such self-discovery is a neglected but important element in the development of autonomous agency.

The final chapter in Part I focuses in greater detail on the embodied self and defends the notions of “psycho-corporeal” identity and agency as useful concepts for understanding the relationships between female embodiment, personal identity, and emancipatory agency. The body is a medium for storing knowledge, memories, and value commitments and for communicating meaning; and such embodied meanings constitute psycho-corporeal identity. For example, we can uncover a split or ambivalent identity in women who consciously believe in equality but embody their own inequality through conventional feminine posture, gestures, and other feminine body norms. Similarly, we can see psycho-corporeal agency at work in the rape victim’s use of self-defense classes to retrain her body and enhance her own independence and self-confidence. Meyers suggests a range of practical ways that we might alter social rituals and body rituals to purger the body of pernicious meanings and to retrain women to live in and trust their bodies.

The four essays in Part II focus on particular problems of the self and agency in the context of morality. Chapter five uses Carol Gilligan’s research on moral development along with various psychological studies to explore the correlation between gender and moral perspective. Meyers argues that both the morality of rights and the care perspective are expressions of moral competency. Against the claim that the care perspective compromises autonomy with emotional attachments and subordinates the self to the needs of others, Meyers suggests that mature use of the care perspective requires a kind of “responsibility reasoning,” where one must always ask whether you can avow responsibility for an act while maintaining self-respect. Meyers concludes that Kantian impartial reason is one form of moral autonomy and responsibility reasoning is another, equal expression of self-governing moral competency.

Chapter six expands moral reflection to consider “empathic and dissident capacities” as essential elements in any convincing account of moral agency (113). Meyers tests this claim by looking carefully at two major objections to John Rawls’s theory of justice and showing that these objections could be answered if we include empathy and dissident challenges as essential to moral reflection. Empathy is a learned ability to reconstruct others’ feelings, to be concerned about their well-being, and to respond to their needs. Dissident speech challenges received cultural norms and thereby expands moral reflection to avoid prejudices. Including both
empathic and dissident capacities along with impartial reason makes moral reflection “messier,” but it also increases the prospects for moral reform.

Chapter seven explores the role of emotion in moral perception. Insightful moral perception—how one sees other people and one’s relations to them—is essential for good judgment and action, and emotional attunement is an important part of perceiving well. Meyers focuses on heterodox moral perception that allows one to see suffering, harm, injustice, or beauty in ways that challenge orthodox cultural values and norms. She uses moral psychology to explore the possible role that rancorous or “outlaw” emotions, such as excessive anger or bitterness, may play in politically-effective heterodox moral perception.

Since most of these essays were originally published elsewhere, there is some repetition and redundancy in the volume. Chapter eight on “Narrative and Moral Life,” for example, develops the five-dimensional subjectivity worked out in chapter three and revisits the idea of autonomy competency from chapter one as these apply to a narrative view of moral agency. This repetition and reworking of concepts is actually a strength of the essays in Part III, however, where Meyers considers concrete social and political issues. For each of these essays, Meyers is careful to provide abbreviated explanations of concepts that are worked out in detail elsewhere in the volume, thus creating conceptual tools that can be applied to important social problems. In a chapter on gendered work, for example, her concise definition of autonomy is sufficient to understand the ways that caregiving and dependency work can limit and constrain women’s autonomy; this conceptual tool also informs the remedies that Meyers suggests might redress injustice by expanding autonomy. The essays in Part III are accessible and provocative and suggest innovative approaches to intractable contemporary problems in feminist theory and politics. In these essays, Meyers offers new ways to think about respect for cultural diversity, she provides a careful analysis of the contested status of “female genital cutting,” she considers the problem of campus hate speech, and she concludes with a new essay on strategies of feminist resistance to malign cultural stereotypes. These essays exemplify Meyers’s use of “nonideal ethical theory and realistic action theory” as the best way to appreciate the complexity of women’s experiences and to propose realistic remedies for problems of personal autonomy.

Real Choices: Feminism, Freedom, and the Limits of the Law


Reviewed by Zahra Meghani
Michigan State University, meghanthiz@msu.edu

Beth Kiyoko Jamieson’s goal is to begin the work of formulating a feminist theory of liberty. She envisions a theory that would recognize that liberty and equality are harmonious, related values. It would also incorporate and reconcile positive, negative, liberal, idealistic, and republican conceptions of liberty. Furthermore, it would be committed to respecting human dignity, fostering a pluralist society, and enabling individuals to engage in self-definition. Moreover, such a theory would recognize that the application of political and legal principles ought to be contextual and contingent, rather than universalistic.

Jamieson’s fledgling theory rests on three pillars—the principles of Identity, Privacy, and Agency. Using legal cases about discrimination based on sexual orientation, she formulates The Identity Principle. It asserts that individuals ought not to have identities imposed on them by others. Rather, they should be able to fashion and re-fashion their own identity as individuals and as members of multiple groups (115). In the interest of limiting false or outrageous claims about identity, Jamieson introduces the qualifier that though individuals may engage in self-definition as they see fit, others are not obligated to unquestioningly accept their claims. By analyzing cases involving surrogacy and sperm donation, Jamieson derives The Privacy Principle. She contends respect for liberty means acknowledging that the state ought not to force individuals to act against their wishes, such that their human dignity is compromised (11). With regards to surrogacy, this principle means that gestational surrogates who change their mind should not be required to fulfill their contractual obligations, as doing that would amount to coercing them to act in a manner that undermines their dignity.

The Agency Principle is the product of Jamieson’s analysis of the narrative of a victim of domestic violence. She claims that respect for liberty means that individuals must be recognized as being capable of making significant ethical decisions, and their right to make those choices ought to be respected. Furthermore, they should be able to make those decisions without being undermined by the threat of social reprobation (219). She notes that this principle entails respecting the decision of victims of domestic violence to remain or leave the abuser, but it cannot be used to justify abusive behavior.

Jamieson makes a fairly compelling case for each of the above-mentioned three principles. She does so by narrowly defining a certain issue (say, gestational surrogacy) such that she is able to generate an argument justifying the formulation of a specific principle of her theory of liberty (in this case, The Privacy Principle). As much as that is a strength of her approach, it is also a weakness. It does not encourage a nuanced and complex reading of the cases at issue that recognizes that more than one principle might be at stake in those situations. For instance, it could be argued that not just The Principle of Privacy is at stake in cases involving gestational surrogates who change their mind about fulfilling their contractual obligations but also The Principle of Agency. However, in Jamieson’s defense it must be acknowledged that she does not claim to have constructed a full-fledged theory. Her aim is much more modest—to lay down the groundwork of a feminist theory of liberty (234).

Jamieson takes on that task because she believes feminists have failed to appropriately address the issue of liberty (by virtue of their preoccupation with equality). She writes, Feminist responses to liberty can be organized into three categories: (1) disregarding [of]...the concept [of liberty]; (2) treating liberty as synonymous with caricatures of liberalism; and (3) focusing on reproductive rights or the problem of pornography, which unacceptably narrows women’s liberty interests to those that coincide with issues of procreation or commercial sexual expression. (17)

Given the seriousness of these charges, one would expect Jamieson to provide a careful, detailed critique of the arguments of at least some of the feminist theorists that she faults.
Unfortunately, she makes minimal effort to engage with any of them. Her analysis of Dorothy Roberts’s work is telling in that respect. In chapter one, in a section entitled “Feminist (Dis)Engagement with Liberty,” Jamieson classifies Roberts as a theorist who uses a caricature of liberalism to render suspect any and all liberal notions of liberty for feminism (30). She writes,

Much of her [Roberts’s] audience will probably accept her characterization of liberal liberty as true—nodding in agreement as visions of atomistic, bourgeois individuals and disembodied wills dance in their heads. Roberts continues: “Not only does this concept of liberty leave inequality intact, but it overlooks and sometimes precludes efforts to eradicate inequality” (Roberts 297). This simplifies the situation. There is no foundational definition of liberty that requires injustice. Roberts again has caricatured the liberal definition of liberty in order to make her argument for a related kind of liberty (specifically, reproductive liberty for black women) stronger. She makes it sound like something both unnecessary and undesirable for feminism. (30)

Jamieson’s comments do not do justice to Roberts. In the section of Killing the Black Body that Jamieson references, Roberts is critiquing the Supreme Court’s interpretation of “reproductive liberty as a negative right against state interference” because it does not guarantee the reproductive rights of members of oppressed and marginalized groups. Elaborating on the motivation behind her criticism, Roberts writes, “I see the main effect of a social justice approach as promoting liberty rather than restricting it. My objective is not to deny wealthy people options because others do not have them. Rather, my vision of liberty seeks to ensure that dispossessed and disempowered groups share the means to make their argument for a related kind of liberty (specifically, reproductive liberty for black women) stronger. She makes it sound like something both unnecessary and undesirable for feminism. (30)

In his preface to the fourth edition of Philosophy of Sex: Contemporary Readings, Alan Soble states that, to avoid a monistic collection, he includes essays “critical and supportive” of sexual behaviors, “which makes the book unlike a large number of recent collections in sex and gender studies that are merely platforms for partisan views” (xii). Whether or not other collections are mere platforms is debatable, but it is certainly true that Soble has assembled a uniquely varied and accessible collection of articles on sexual attitudes and ethics. The fourth edition is greatly enhanced with the addition of a bibliography of suggested readings and Soble’s own introductory essay, “The Fundamentals of the Philosophy of Sex.” The latter would stand alone fairly well even if taken out of the context of this collection and could be used by anyone trying, as Soble does successfully, to “ease students into, and provoke them about, the subject matter” (xii).

The volume nicely serves the interests of those students who are “attempting to learn about the philosophy of sex,” which is an imposing job; the selection of introductory material is tricky, and a course on the going arguments for and against sexual policies and ethics can only be a rough beginning (xii).

I find that his anthology does not succeed at another of his aspirations, doing “justice to the richness of sexual philosophy,” but I do not intend this necessarily as a great criticism of Soble’s work (xii). In my experience, searching for the best text to use in my own upper-level undergraduate courses, no single anthology can achieve this aim. Philosophy of Sex is successful as a survey for an introductory or upper-level undergraduate course.

Having said that, a few words about three limitations of the book are in order. First, as in previous editions, this anthology exclusively attends to Western European and (mostly) American policies and attitudes; a multicultural, comparative reader this is not. Few anthologies on philosophies of sex are. On a related note, Soble may be interested in avoiding partisanship, but his selections tend to favor, if not an ideology, at least an analytic and liberal approach. This is not to say other philosophical methods are not represented, but they do not have the representatives one might expect. Radical, lesbian, and second-wave feminists are not present in large numbers; Cheshire Calhoun at least cites Claudia Card, but no selections by Card, Andrea Dworkin, or Catherine MacKinnon are included. Postmodern and continental philosophers are likewise in the minority; Laurie Shrage quotes Nancy Hartsock, but Judith Butler, for example, is not cited by anyone, let alone present. Much of the time, one may feel this anthology runs a more limited gamut from Harriet Baber to Martha Nussbaum. If one wishes to give one’s students a sense of the current debates in philosophy of sex, this text could not alone convey the sense of the excitingly different philosophical systems within which to consider sexuality.

This is also not a collection that attends to the ways sexuality has been represented in the history of philosophy; the readings are almost all contemporary, which some may find a strength rather than a limit. A notable and extremely

---

### The Philosophy of Sex: Contemporary Readings


**Reviewed by Kathryn J. Norlock**

*St. Mary’s College of Maryland, kjnorlock@smcm.edu*

---

In his preface to the fourth edition of Philosophy of Sex: Contemporary Readings, Alan Soble states that, to avoid a monistic collection, he includes essays “critical and supportive” of sexual behaviors, “which makes the book unlike a large number of recent collections in sex and gender studies that are merely platforms for partisan views” (xii). Whether or not other collections are mere platforms is debatable, but it is certainly true that Soble has assembled a uniquely varied and accessible collection of articles on sexual attitudes and ethics. The fourth edition is greatly enhanced with the addition of a bibliography of suggested readings and Soble’s own introductory essay, “The Fundamentals of the Philosophy of Sex.” The latter would stand alone fairly well even if taken out of the context of this collection and could be used by anyone trying, as Soble does successfully, to “ease students into, and provoke them about, the subject matter” (xii).

The volume nicely serves the interests of those students who are “attempting to learn about the philosophy of sex,” which is an imposing job; the selection of introductory material is tricky, and a course on the going arguments for and against sexual policies and ethics can only be a rough beginning (xii).

I find that his anthology does not succeed at another of his aspirations, doing “justice to the richness of sexual philosophy,” but I do not intend this necessarily as a great criticism of Soble’s work (xii). In my experience, searching for the best text to use in my own upper-level undergraduate courses, no single anthology can achieve this aim. Philosophy of Sex is successful as a survey for an introductory or upper-level undergraduate course.

Having said that, a few words about three limitations of the book are in order. First, as in previous editions, this anthology exclusively attends to Western European and (mostly) American policies and attitudes; a multicultural, comparative reader this is not. Few anthologies on philosophies of sex are. On a related note, Soble may be interested in avoiding partisanship, but his selections tend to favor, if not an ideology, at least an analytic and liberal approach. This is not to say other philosophical methods are not represented, but they do not have the representatives one might expect. Radical, lesbian, and second-wave feminists are not present in large numbers; Cheshire Calhoun at least cites Claudia Card, but no selections by Card, Andrea Dworkin, or Catherine MacKinnon are included. Postmodern and continental philosophers are likewise in the minority; Laurie Shrage quotes Nancy Hartsock, but Judith Butler, for example, is not cited by anyone, let alone present. Much of the time, one may feel this anthology runs a more limited gamut from Harriet Baber to Martha Nussbaum. If one wishes to give one’s students a sense of the current debates in philosophy of sex, this text could not alone convey the sense of the excitingly different philosophical systems within which to consider sexuality.

This is also not a collection that attends to the ways sexuality has been represented in the history of philosophy; the readings are almost all contemporary, which some may find a strength rather than a limit. A notable and extremely

---

### Endnotes

1. In a footnote, she cites feminist theorizing about autonomy but makes no attempt to engage with any of that work (18n).
3. Ibid., 312.
enjoyable exception is the inclusion in this edition of Immanuel Kant’s “Duties Toward the Body in Respect of Sexual Impulse,” long a favorite for many of us for use in the classroom. Soble has also retained what he considers “the core theoretical and historically important essays that are central to contemporary philosophy of sex... Thomas Nagel’s ‘Sexual Perversion,’ Robert Solomon’s ‘Sexual Paradigms,’ Janice Moulton’s ‘Sexual Behavior: Another Position,’ Robert Gray’s ‘Sex and Sexual Perversion,’ and Alan Goldman’s ‘Plain Sex’” (xii). Since the average age of these five classic essays is twenty-nine years, one could argue that fully a fifth of the book is no longer contemporary! Maybe it is time to change the subtitle, but all six noncontemporary readings are important inclusions that students of philosophies of sex should read.

For philosophers not familiar with previous editions, this anthology is fairly focused on conceptual analyses and moral evaluations of sexual behaviors and sexual practices, such as homosexuality, pornography, and prostitution. Philosophy of Sex does not include readings on the nature of gender itself, or on the ways in which we construct sexualities. As Soble notes, the bulk of the fourth edition is concerned with applied ethics, so for those of us who require more meta-analysis of notions of gender and sexuality in our introductory gender studies courses, this book does not do that job.

Soble notes that the fourth edition “is the largest Philosophy of Sex ever published...providing, in the resulting mixture, more substance and variety for students studying the philosophy of sexuality and for researchers working in the field” (xii). In this instance, bigger really does seem to be better; this edition contains thirty-one selections, including his new introductory chapter. Those who have come to rely on using Philosophy of Sex in their courses will be relieved to find that this edition, as Soble says, is the least different from previous editions (and therefore the least disruptive to old syllabi). The greatest single change is the elimination of Part 4: Sadomasochism; as a result, all four authors from this part of the third edition have been cut: Jean Grimshaw, Patrick D. Hopkins, Natalie Shainess, and Melinda Vadas. Six new authors have been added, three of them in the new Part 4, on Kant and Sex: Kant, Thomas Mappes, and Irving Singer. (One result, by the way, is slightly less gender balance of contributors; the third edition included contributions by thirteen men and twelve women, whereas this edition is authored by sixteen men and eleven women.) Alan Soble’s own recent article, “Sexual Use and What to Do about It,” appears here too. The last is an especially welcome revision of Soble’s article, previously only available online.

Other new authors’ contributions include Cheshire Calhoun’s “Defending Marriage,” Alan Wertheimer’s “Consent and Sexual Relations,” and Pat Califia’s “Whoring in Utopia.” Calhoun’s and Wertheimer’s contributions were initially published in 2000 and 1996, respectively, and are pleasingly recent additions to the collection. Calhoun’s piece has the added benefit of bringing young readers up to speed on the details of the Defense of Marriage Act, so that her reading is not only contemporary, it is timely. Discussion of gay marriage figured centrally in the recent presidential elections, whether for good results or ill, and students of debates about such policies are well served to have a reading informing them of the legal genesis as well as the moral reasonings behind the issue. The article by Calhoun, which is supportive of marriage rights for same-sex couples, is perhaps not well balanced by other selections in the section on homosexuality, depending on what you think an argument critical of her view would be. No contribution appears here arguing in support of homosexuality but in criticism of marriage, although Calhoun does address, for example, Claudia Card’s arguments against marriage in a sufficiently self-contained way.

One will find, however, an updated contribution by Michael Levin, whose widely reprinted “Why Homosexuality is Abnormal” appeared in the third edition. In this edition, his “Against Homosexual Liberation,” reprinted from his 1999 book with Laurence Thomas, argues in more detail against marriage rights for homosexuals.3 His article no longer includes an argument that homosexuality is not genetic; however, his arguments that homosexuality is abnormal and that homosexuals are comparatively more promiscuous are still available in this rendition. Levin’s article is, if anything, more energetically argued than ever, but I do not find this portion of Levin’s article to be an adequate alternative account of gay marriage. In this respect only, I could not help feeling that in trying to do so much, Soble’s collection does too little. Providing one-and-a-third articles on gay marriage in an anthology of contemporary readings on applied philosophy of sex left me dissatisfied; even with thirty-one selections, I’ll still have to provide supplementary readings. However, I do not want to diminish Calhoun’s excellent work; if Soble was only going to include one article about gay marriage, he certainly chose an excellent and provoking piece.

Instructors who have used previous editions of Philosophy of Sex for courses in applied ethics or gender studies will find that Soble succeeds in the stated goal of providing variety, especially for introductory students. For those unfamiliar with past editions, and depending on how one defines sexuality and what one’s pedagogical or research goals are, the selections collected here may not be useful to everyone “in the field.”

Endnotes


2. See Essays in Philosophy, 2 (June 2001), at www.humboldt.edu/~essays/


Sexed Universals in Contemporary Art


Reviewed by Tanya M. Loughead

Canisius College, tanyaloughead@lemoncurry.com

As Bill Beckley, artist and editor of the series of which this book is a part, Aesthetics Today, points out in his forward to this provocative book by Penny Florence, it seems that, these days, it has become universal to doubt the existence of universals. Beckley calls this “universality of non-universality” the “assumed” of “Western academe,” where “everything is relative to cultural context and circumstance,” and this allows the universals to be left to the “dictates of those presently in power” (xi). If for that reason alone, then, it is very philosophical of Florence to again call our attention to the question in order to unearth our assumptions. Florence’s question and her response to it in Sexed Universals in Contemporary Art is welcome and timely. She rearticulates
the universal to be not only sexed but to be fluid, open to discussion, interrogative, and crossing lines of embodied sex. In fact, Florence writes at one point that she would hope to get beyond the notion that there are only two sexes: “Classical geometry cannot account for the ways in which the sexed human mind and its sexed embodiment both is and is not alike within, across and between the sexes. (For the sake of simplicity I write as if there were only two, but my aim is to think in such a way as to allow for more)” (134). The emphasis on fluidity is established when she writes that feminism must “continue to change until it is no longer necessary, and we are not there yet” (3), and in her reaction to Derrida’s “erasure” of women, where she acknowledges that we might reach that “somewhere over the rainbow” (96). In nuce, she attempts “sexing meaning without recourse to essentialism” (37).

A problem with non-sexed universality is that it ends up being masculine universality alone. Even when some kind of attempt has been made, as when Nietzsche credits the two sources of Apollo and Dionysus as the inspirations of art, “the female is (yet again, and still) nowhere to be seen” (65). Perhaps only perhaps Nietzsche can be forgiven but Camille Paglia certainly cannot. Florence clarifies this through art history, writing that even when women did appear (in paintings, for example), it was according to a male universal:

The vocabularies at the disposal of European painters before the mid-nineteenth century accorded very much more specific and restricted space to women, regardless of how many female figures appeared, and of course women were never the intended audience of the major genres. … They could not address women, femaleness, the feminine, as concepts, abstractions or semiotic elements, directly at all. (88)

While most would readily accept this, Florence makes the further point that art has allowed and will allow more and quicker change on this front than language has. She writes that it is in language where “the skein of meaning is tightest,” that is, language is “the most difficult to change at this fundamental level” (89).

Florence admits that the “idea of a sexed universal is clearly contradictory” (1) and that it “seems that sex and universals, which must surely stand in some relationship, are oil and water in contemporary thought” (34). The universal is, well, universal—it is supposed to be the same for everyone. But to show how this conception is flawed, Florence gives the example of the word “maternal.” “The maternal as a universal form, it is “a denial of the existence of nakedness under the clothes” (77). If dandyism is about the fetishization of the image, then why can’t women play this game too? Florence answers, “there is no exclusivity, there is nothing that is solely male or female” (78). Or, as she puts it in Lacanian terms, “clothing and the body are regarded as interchangeable” (77), and the “common factor is not primarily sex. It is the sexual ambivalence of the transformative” (76). It is play, high play. Play is again evoked when discussing the sculpture of Lizz Lerner. Florence writes of her sculpture that “it creates a space for the mind to play between dimensions and their representations” (141).

One flaw of this book is that Florence makes a lot of fleeting references. As she rarely takes the time and space to explain her sometimes arcane references, one might have to possess her exact bookcase and history to grasp them all. This despite the fact that she writes, “Of course I am interested in speaking to an audience who share my values and with whom I have a ready dialogue…[But, I do not] want to speak only to a predetermined section of the possible audience” (63). However, I fear that she has indeed fallen into the latter of these problems. And, this is a shame since I think that, at the center of this book, there is an idea, a theory, which deserves much broader attention than it may get. Here is an example of the type of thing I mean: in one fairly typical and normalized paragraph (four sentences), Florence mentions eight names (and not as a part of a “list” either): Frank Stella, Heidegger, Mallarmé, Gaugin, Lynne Lapointe, Gilbert-Rolfe, Huntington, and Irigaray (113). That is too many directions for thought to travel—too much information, and too fast. This would have been a better book if it were about thirty pages longer, with patient explanations of the theories to which she off-handedly refers, instead of the cursory name and phrase-dropping that all too often occurs.

This flaw is gotten past at the end of the book, where Florence tends to speak in broad, cultural terms. In my opinion, it is in the last chapter, “a valeudication: nationalism and melancholia; sex, war and modernism,” where the reader finds her real treat (this is coming from the perspective of one steeped more in the background of philosophy than in contemporary art). Therein, Florence acknowledges the great breadth that her theories suggest. She refers to our current “war on terrorism.” She makes particular reference to the Afghan Taliban movement and their destruction of the Bamiyu statues of Buddha that were carved into the side of a mountain. These concluding remarks stir up “the relationship between terror and aesthetics” (168). For her, “terror is related to the inability to play; understood as a kind of anti-aesthetics,” and this is because, at its core, it is about “control” (168, my emphasis). It is key that “one of the first things that the Taliban
did on taking power was to burn schools and to exclude women from universities" (168). Few would doubt that there is a complex relationship, in whatever way, between politics and art. Florence believes that the Taliban (and as she says, a certain narrow vision of what is “masculine,” to be “violent and anti-social”) put politics first—above and before all art (170). This is why the Buddha statues had to be destroyed, to serve the very seriousness of their goals. Destroying the statues was a way of saying, “our political and ethical values are above everything else. We will destroy anything, even ourselves, to serve such goals.” This relates chiefly to Freud’s notion of melancholia, or, more exactly, a melancholia that is also a mania. For Freud, melancholia “behaves like an open wound,” which empties “the ego until it is totally impoverished” (175). Florence contends that terrorists, having “lost their family, their country, their masculinity, their femininity—in my terms, their sexed identities,” may begin to treat themselves as objects (perhaps destroying their own culture in the name of staving off the West, as with the case of destroying the Buddha statues) and even destroying themselves (perhaps through suicide bombing). For Florence, such actions are not surprising given the lack of identity, lack of ego. Her warning: We must ask ourselves the question of sexed meanings, or we end up lacking a “strategy for survival, for life” (176).

---

**CONTRIBUTORS**

Louise Antony is Professor of Philosophy at Ohio State University, where she specializes in Philosophy of Language, Philosophic Issues in Cognitive Science, Philosophy of Mind, Feminist Theory. Her books include *A Mind of One’s Own: Feminist Essays on Reason and Objectivity*, edited and introduced with Charlotte Witt (1993), and *Chomsky and His Critics*, edited and introduced with Norbert Hornstein (forthcoming). antony.3@osu.edu

Sara Beardsworth is Assistant Professor in the Philosophy Department at Southern Illinois University–Carbondale. She is author of *Julia Kristeva: Psychoanalysis and Modernity* and articles in continental thought. Her research is in nineteenth- and twentieth-century European philosophy, feminism, and psychoanalysis. beardsworth@siu.edu

Laurie Calhoun is the author of *Philosophy Unmasked: A Skeptic’s Critique* (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 1997). She works at the W. E. B. DuBois Institute at Harvard University. calhoun@fas.harvard.edu

Ann Ferguson is a Professor of Philosophy and Women’s Studies at the University of Massachusetts at Amherst. She is the graduate program director for the Advanced Feminist Studies graduate certificate from Women’s Studies at UMass/Amherst. Her authored books are: *Blood at the Root: Motherhood, Sexuality and Male Dominance* (1989) and *Sexual Democracy: Women, Oppression and Revolution* (1991). She also coedited a book in feminist ethics with Bat Ami Bar On: *Daring to be Good: Feminist Essays in Ethico-Politics* (1998). ferguson@philos.umass.edu

Marilyn Fischer is Professor of Philosophy at the University of Dayton. Her books include *On Addams* (2004); *Jane Addams’s Writings on Peace*, four volumes coedited with Judy D. Whippes (2003); and *Ethical Decision Making in Fund Raising* (2000). Currently, she is coediting *Women’s Experiences Shaping Theory*, a multi-disciplinary volume of essays on Jane Addams. Fischer also plays the violin with the Dayton Philharmonic Orchestra and the fiddle with the Back Porch Jam, a bluegrass band. fischer@udayton.edu

Jeffrey Gauthier is Associate Professor of Philosophy at the University of Portland, where he teaches sociopolitical philosophy and feminist philosophy. He received his Ph.D. at the University of Michigan, is the author of *Hegel and Feminist Social Criticism* (1997), and has published on various topics in ethics and social philosophy. gauthier@up.edu.

Jennifer Purvis is Assistant Professor of Women’s Studies at the University of Alabama. She has a joint Ph.D. in Philosophy and English from Purdue University, where she also earned a graduate minor in Women’s Studies. She has authored articles on Hegel and Beauvoir and on Third Wave Feminism. She has most recently published “Grrrls and Women Together in the Third Wave” in the fall 2004 issue of the *NWSA Journal*. She is currently working on a book on the intersections of nineteenth century philosophy and the generations of French Feminist Theory. jpurvis@bama.ua.edu

Ofelia Schutte is Professor of Philosophy at the University of South Florida. She is the author of *Beyond Nihilism: Nietzsche without Masks and Cultural Identity and Social Liberation in Latin American Thought* as well as many other publications on feminism, Latin American philosophy, Nietzsche, and European continental philosophy. Her current interests include feminist philosophy in Latin America, recent fiction by Cuban women writers, and postcolonial feminisms with a focus on Latin America. oschutte@cas.usf.edu

---

**ANNOUNCEMENTS**

**Books**

Announcing the release of two new books on Beauvoir: *Simone de Beauvoir: Philosophical Writings* (University of Illinois Press, January 2005). Edited by Margaret A. Simons with Marybeth Timmermann and Mary Beth Mader, foreword by Sylvie Le Bon de Beauvoir.


Have you published a new book in feminist philosophy? Send your announcement and please ask your publisher to send a copy of the book for review in the *Newsletter*. All books and correspondence may be sent to the Editor.

**Call for Papers:** *Papers, Testimonials, Reflections, and Calls to Action for a Special Issue of the APA Newsletter on Feminism and Philosophy On Contemporary Feminist Activism*. This is an issue you will want to share with your students.

The American Philosophical Association Newsletter on Feminism and Philosophy invites all feminist philosopher-activists to submit articles, testimonials, reflections, commentaries, calls-to-action, and notes on contemporary feminist activism. This special issue aims to identify the myriad forms of contemporary feminist activism and to offer philosophical reflections on the life and times of the activist and the feminist movement. Submissions that address intersections between social movements are encouraged and welcomed. Submissions should be in Chicago style and range from 250 words to 3,000 words.
Call for Papers: The Ethics of Embryo Adoption.

Philosophical, theological, and interdisciplinary examinations that seriously engage Christian, especially Catholic, arguments and resources are sought for a new volume on embryo adoption. This volume comprises a valuable contribution to the moral debate on this timely, contested matter.

Essays treating any ethical aspect of embryo adoption are welcome. Possible topics include but are not limited to: embryo adoption in relation to other forms of reproductive technology; embryo adoption and the law; feminist perspectives on embryo adoption; embryo adoption and respect for life; embryo adoption and the character of gestational motherhood; who may or may not adopt frozen embryos; how embryo adoptions should be conducted; and ethical issues that arise after embryo adoption.

Essays of approximately 7,500 words are due by March 1, 2006. Please address all queries and submissions to Sarah-Vaughan Brakman (sarah.vaughan.brakman@villanova.edu) and Darlene F. Weaver (darlene.weaver@villanova.edu).

Publishing Notes in the Newsletter

Please send information about conferences, workshops, lecture series, and other events of interest to be held in 2006 to the Editor at sally.scholz@villanova.edu. The Newsletter happily will publicize news that might interest our readers. Also, please note that the CSW and the Newsletter is committed to publishing conference notes on feminist conferences in the Newsletter. If there is a conference you attend that you think might interest others who work in feminism and philosophy, please contact the Editor.