

BOOK REVIEWS

Margaret Urban Walker: *Moral Understandings: A Feminist Study in Ethics*, 2nd ed.

REVIEWED BY CATHERINE VILLANUEVA GARDNER

Nancy J. Hirschmann and Kirstie M McClure, ed.: *Feminist Interpretations of John Locke*

REVIEWED BY DANIEL I. O'NEILL

Clare Chambers: *Sex, Culture, and Justice: The Limits of Choice*

REVIEWED BY LISA H. SCHWARTZMAN

Christine Battersby: *The Sublime, Terror, and Human Difference*

REVIEWED BY BAT-AMI BAR ON

CONTRIBUTORS

ANNOUNCEMENTS



FROM THE EDITOR

For this, my first issue as Newsletter editor, I seek to continue in the well-established tradition of the Committee on the Status of Women (CSW) to raise and reflect on issues of importance to women working in philosophy. In this issue, we consider status of women in the profession as measured by the number of women who have jobs as philosophers. Recent statistical assessments put this number in the range of 20-23% of professional, academically employed philosophers. That this number has been fairly static, hovering around 21%, over the past several years, may tell us something important about (i) the profession into which women seek not only entry, but constructive participation, and (ii) the women who succeed in this striving for entry and participation.

What follows is a series of articles reflecting on the participation rate of women in academic philosophy. We begin with a report compiled by Miriam Solomon and John Clarke. This report is the product of careful analysis of job market data gathered by the APA regarding the 2007-08 hiring season. Solomon and Clarke not only analyze the data, but make several important suggestions, most importantly that the APA continue to improve its ability to gather important data about our profession and membership. Demographic data, employment data, and other important measures of the profession, it has been argued since the Hanson Report (2000), is crucial if the APA is to become a truly professional organization, addressing the professional interests of its membership. We must have some basic information about our profession, information which is more than merely ad hoc or anecdotal. Enhanced opportunity for success in application for grants is merely one of the implications of such data gathering efforts. What is immediately apparent from this employment report is how much we do not know about hiring and how much we stand to learn. This very important ground-breaking work, begun by Solomon and Clarke under the auspices of the CSW, will be continued in future years by Cheshire Calhoun and the help of the APA National Office and Board of Directors. I look forward to continuing to publish these reports almost as much as I look forward to the provision of ever clearer, more accurate and relevant employment data and analyses.

Following the Solomon-Clarke Report, we have a contribution from Kathryn Norlock, who has been investigating and writing blogs about the professional status of women in philosophy for a number of years. Indeed, she is among the few philosophers at the cutting edge of assessing the available data, typically compiled by federal sources, about the educational status of philosophers and the women among them. Here, she makes a special contribution to this issue, reflecting on the implications of women's comprising only 21% of professional academically employed philosophers.

The balance of this Newsletter is devoted to publishing the results of a CSW panel on the status of women, from the Central Division APA meeting in 2007. We are very fortunate that the participants on this panel have agreed to prepare their original presentations for this issue. Janet Kourany provides a thorough introduction to the contributions of Elizabeth Minnich, Sharon Crasnow, and Abigail Stewart, an introduction which makes important contributions to the discussion. It is primarily through the dedicated, careful, and intelligent reflection of women such as these that the CSW not only thrives as a committee, but is able to effect change within the institutional structure of the APA, to advance our understanding of issues important to women in philosophy, and to seek to find ways to address them. Women of such intellect and vision are an invaluable resource for us all.

In this regard, I have been exceedingly fortunate to work with the many such women who have served on the CSW over the past six years. It is a great honor, therefore, to have their confidence in editing the Newsletter on Feminism and Philosophy. I only hope that I can meet their high standards of commitment and quality, and to come close to that established by the editors who precede me. To this end, I must extend a hearty thanks to Sally Scholz for handing me a Newsletter in excellent form and for her willingness to guide me through the nuts and bolts of good editorship. Needless to say, bringing this first issue to print has shown me that success as an editor is fully dependent upon being surrounded with exceptional authors, dedicated reviewers, supportive and encouraging board members (the CSW), and enthusiastic readers. I am confident that the Newsletter will continue to thrive. I look forward with excitement to the coming years of my editorship.

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**ABOUT THE NEWSLETTER ON
FEMINISM AND PHILOSOPHY**

The Newsletter on Feminism and Philosophy is sponsored by the APA Committee on the Status of Women (CSW). The Newsletter is designed to provide an introduction to recent philosophical work that addresses issues of gender. None of the varied philosophical views presented by authors of Newsletter articles necessarily reflect the views of any or all of the members of the Committee on the Status of Women, including the editor(s) of the Newsletter, nor does the committee advocate any particular type of feminist philosophy. We advocate only that serious philosophical attention be given to issues of gender and that claims of gender bias in philosophy receive full and fair consideration.

SUBMISSION GUIDELINES AND INFORMATION

1. Purpose: The purpose of the Newsletter is to publish information about the status of women in philosophy and to make the resources of feminist philosophy more widely available. The Newsletter contains discussions of recent developments in feminist philosophy and related work in other disciplines, literature overviews and book reviews, suggestions for eliminating gender bias in the traditional philosophy curriculum, and reflections on feminist pedagogy. It also informs the profession about the work of the APA Committee on the Status of Women. Articles submitted to the Newsletter should be limited to ten double-spaced pages and must follow the APA guidelines for gender-neutral language. Please submit essays electronically to the editor or send four copies of essays via regular mail. All manuscripts should be prepared for anonymous review. References should follow The Chicago Manual of Style.

2. Book Reviews and Reviewers: If you have published a book that is appropriate for review in the Newsletter, please have your publisher send us a copy of your book. We are always seeking new book reviewers. To volunteer to review books (or some particular book), please send the Editor a CV and letter of interest, including mention of your areas of research and teaching.

3. Where to Send Things: Please send all articles, comments, suggestions, books, and other communications to the Editor: Dr. Christina Bellon, Department of Philosophy, Sacramento State University, 6000 J Street, Sacramento, CA 95819-6033, bellon@csus.edu.

4. Submission Deadlines: Submissions for Spring issues are due by the preceding September 1st; submissions for Fall issues are due by the preceding February 1st.

NEWS FROM THE COMMITTEE ON THE STATUS OF WOMEN

I am very pleased to be able to write greetings for this Newsletter. This issue of the Newsletter marks the transition in the editorship of the Newsletter from Sally Scholz to Christina Bellon. While we continue to thank Sally for her tireless service and thoughtful contributions, we also welcome Christina to this very important role. If you have ideas for topics the Newsletter should cover, announcements of upcoming conferences, calls for papers, books to review, or reviews you would like to write, please contact Christina or any member of the CSW. Please share the work of this Newsletter with friends and colleagues and make sure they know that this is a good place to have their work reviewed and a good way to stay in touch with issues that concern us all.

I would also like to thank Christina Bellon for continuing to volunteer to maintain the list of Women and Feminist Friendly

Graduate Programs that can be found at <http://www.apaonline.org/governance/committees/women/index.aspx>. This list is a tool we can all use to get a snapshot of what is going on where by whom. We think this is a valuable tool for students comparing the merits of different philosophy programs. The list relies on the self-reporting of departments and makes no claims to be exhaustive or completely accurate—no list can. We do, however, believe it is a useful tool that helps balance some of the other ways departments are ranked and measured. Please take some time to look at this list. Contact Christina with any updates or changes. If you see a department you think should be there is missing please encourage someone in that department to send Christina the relevant information. This kind of reporting requires a community effort. We rely on all of you to help us keep it up to date and we rely on you to help us let people know this list exists. To serve its purpose well, people need to consult it.

As part of its service the CSW organizes sessions for the various APA meetings. With the Eastern APA this last December we launched an experiment. At that meeting was the first of three panels addressing the same topic—mid-career issues faced by women. By the time this Newsletter is out similar sessions will have occurred at the Central and Pacific meetings. I hope you can go to one or more of these sessions and hear the inspiring stories of your colleagues as they discuss the challenges and opportunities that have shaped their career paths. We have great wisdom to share and there is much we can learn. How do we negotiate the array of opportunities that emerge post-tenure? Do you take that administrative position? Do you make a lateral move to another university? Do you consider a position outside of the academy? I hope you will join us in these discussions.

Finally, with this Newsletter, I would like to take the opportunity to publicly thank Miriam Solomon for her tireless and determined efforts to push the APA to provide its membership with important and useful information. The CSW has been pushing on this front for many years. In the absence of such data from the National Office, individual members of the CSW and other concerned members of the APA have invested their own time and energy to construct ways of obtaining the information we need. You can see some of the fruits of such efforts on the CSW website. There you will see, for example, a 1994 Special Report and a 2006 Report on the Status of Women in the Profession. Other studies have been presented at sessions at various APA meetings and/or published in this Newsletter. With this Newsletter you find yet another one of these studies. This time, however, the National Office participated in the effort and the Inclusiveness Committee has committed to take up the work going forward. In this Newsletter you find the results of a pilot project to track the jobs advertised in Jobs for Philosophers to the hires made. This kind of information is important information for the profession as a whole. Here it is used to analyze the position of women in the profession. Please join me in thanking Miriam for her work on this project. Happy reading!

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ARTICLES

CSW Jobs for Philosophers Employment Study

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This is a report of faculty hires following Jobs for Philosophers (JFP) Volumes 175 and 176 (October and November 2007). The APA Committee on the Status of Women (CSW) requested in December 2006 that the APA office consistently follow up on the results of all positions advertised in JFP, so that this data will be continuously available for analysis. So far, the APA office has been unable to do this. Because the CSW judges that the matter is of importance and urgency to the profession, we undertook a one-time study of the central hires of the 2007-08 season. The APA paid for an hourly worker (Temple graduate student Qrescent Mali Mason) to collect some of the data, and the data was analyzed by Miriam Solomon (CSW), David Schrader (APA Executive Director), and John Clarke, MD. We thank Qrescent Mali Mason and David Schrader for their contributions and the APA for its financial support. We looked at the hires that resulted from the October and November 2007 Jobs for Philosophers, both print and online. We did this—omitting the later issues of JFP which are mostly taken up with temporary positions—because our resources were limited and because we wanted to focus our efforts on tenure-track junior hires. Data was collected by writing directly to advertising departments (Qrescent Mali Mason) and searching online blogs, departmental announcements of hires, and graduate department placement results (Miriam Solomon). We could not gather all the data of interest to us or to the APA membership as a whole (such as year of PhD, PhD granting institution, AOS/AOC, diversity data). We expect that the APA office, with its greater resources and its direct access to advertising data and placement candidates, can do a more thorough job in the future. We have listed recommendations for doing this in a separate document.

The vast majority of the data is for jobs in the USA or Canada, although we included international positions when they were advertised in JFP. Obviously, this does not give a full picture of the international employment situation for philosophers.

Most advertising departments were contacted by e-mail to inquire about the results of their JFP advertisements. They responded either “no hire” or with the name of the person(s) hired. When there was no response, we attempted to find out whether or not there was a hire by searching online (blogs reporting philosophy hires, departmental web pages announcing new hires, etc.). In some cases we found no information. These cases are marked in the database as “no information.” In a few cases, jobs filled with non-philosophers (these were typically humanities postdoctoral positions or humanities professorships advertised widely) and this was noted in the data.

The “no information” jobs are likely to be “no hire,” but unless we had strong evidence for no hire (such as an explicit statement from a member of the hiring department) we left it as “no information.” However, it should be noted that this means that up to 40% of advertised jobs did not fill. Reasons for not filling include search termination for financial reasons, not finding an appropriate candidate, or losing appropriate candidates to other positions.

Summary of the Data

Tables 1 and 2 at the end of this document aggregate the data. What follows is a textual summary of the data found on those tables.

- A total of 515 jobs were listed in JFP Volumes 175 and 176. Three hundred sixty-one were advertised in print only, 120 in print and on the web, and 34 only on the web. Jobs with the same description and more than one number, signifying more than one possible opening, were counted as one job. Thus, some jobs (only a few) filled with more than one candidate.
- Of the 515 jobs listed, 294 (57%) known hires resulted; for 139 (27%) no information could be found; 67 (13%) are known to have resulted in no hire; and 15 (3%) are known to have resulted in the hiring of candidates who are not philosophers. Of the 294 known hires, 84 (29%) were women and 210 (71%) were men.
- Of the 515 jobs listed, 447 were from United States (U.S.) institutions: 42 (9%) were for senior positions (presumably with tenure); 314 (70%) were tenure-track positions open to junior candidates; 82 (18%) were for positions that were not tenure-track and include post-docs and visiting lines; the tenure level could not be inferred from the listings or other information for 9 (2%). Another 68 were from other countries: 6 (9%) were for senior positions (presumably with tenure); 44 (65%) were tenure-track positions open to junior candidates; 16 (24%) were for positions that were not tenure-track; the tenure level could not be inferred from the listings or other information for 2 (3%).
- Of the 515 jobs listed, 48 (9%) were senior-only positions, presumably with tenure; 358 (70%) were tenure-track positions open to junior candidates; 98 (19%) were for positions that were not tenure track (usually post-docs or visiting lines); the tenure level could not be inferred from the listings or other information for 11 positions (2%).
- There were 358 tenure-track positions open to junior candidates. Two hundred twenty-five (63%) resulted in a known hire; for 84 (23%) no information could be found; 48 (13%) are known to have resulted in no hire; and 49 (14%) are known to have resulted in the hiring of candidates who are not philosophers. Of the 225 known hires, 61 (27%) were women and 164 (73%) were men. The numbers and percentages for each category, including non tenure-track hires, can be found in Table 1.
- Overall, women filled 66 of the 242 senior and tenure-track positions (27%) and 18 of the 49 positions that were not tenure-track (37%). The difference in hiring rate of women between tenure-track and non tenure-track positions is not statistically significant.
- Ninety jobs from Leiter-ranked U.S. departments of philosophy were identified. They were compared to 357 other U.S. positions (see Table 2). No differences between jobs offered or filled by Leiter-ranked U.S. departments of philosophy and other U.S. institutions were noted to be statistically significant. Use of the Leiter rankings does not imply endorsement from CSW or APA, although it acknowledges that these rankings offer information that is widely used in the profession.
- Focusing on the 60 tenure-track positions open to junior candidates in Leiter-ranked U.S. departments

of philosophy, 41 (68%) resulted in a known hire; for 12 (20%) no information could be found; 7 (12%) resulted in no hire. Of the 41 known hires, 14 (34%) were women and 27 (66%) were men.

- Focusing on the 71 senior (tenure) and tenure-track positions open to junior candidates in Leiter-ranked U.S. departments of philosophy, 45 (63%) resulted in a known hire; for 15 (21%) no information could be found; 11 (15%) resulted in no hire. Of the 45 known hires, 15 (33%) were women and 30 (67%) were men.
- We did not have enough information to reliably detect any discrepancies between advertised AOS/AOC and hired AOS/AOC, or to estimate the number of jobs in these areas, or to look at the gender information for these areas. Likewise, we could not detect positions that were filled at levels other than the levels advertised (e.g., assistant professors filled at the associate or full professor level, or assistant professors filled by a temporary person).

Results from other studies

The most recent data for PhD's granted in philosophy is from 2006 (National Opinion Research Center): 370 PhD's, 264 men and 106 women (i.e., 29% women). The percentage of women doctorates in philosophy has remained relatively static since at least 1997 (ranges from 25% to 33% each year, with no general pattern of growth). The most recent data on Bachelor's degrees in philosophy is 30.8% women in 2007 (U.S. National Center for Education Statistics).

The most recent gender data for philosophy professors is Kathryn Norlock's report to the CSW (on the APA website) showing, based on the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, that women are about 21% of professionally employed philosophers in the USA, Evelyn Brister's estimate of 21% women (Knowledge and Experience blog), and the NCEs 2004 result of 18.4% women in full time philosophy positions. Julie van Camp's 2008 data on 98 USA doctoral granting departments shows a mean and median of around 20% women faculty in these departments, with a wide range, from 0% to 54% (24 are below 15% and 10 are above 35%). Sally Haslanger's (2008) study of women employed in the top twenty Leiter-ranked departments gives a figure of around 19%.

Sally Haslanger's recent study of publication in seven top, mostly non-specialized, philosophy journals from 2002-2007 (Haslanger 2008) gives reason for serious concern about the participation of both women and feminist approaches in the philosophy profession. (These journals are *Ethics*, *Journal of Philosophy*, *Mind*, *Nous*, *Philosophical Review*, *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, and *Philosophy and Public Affairs*.) The average number of articles by women was 12.36% and the average number of articles with feminist content was 2.36%. Interpretation of this data should take into account that several of these journals do not use an anonymous review process.

Comparison classes (from the National Opinion Research Center and the National Center for Education Statistics) for the percentage of women granted PhD's are: a humanities total of 5,576 PhD's, 2,749 male and 2,821 female (i.e., 51% women), a life sciences total of 9,683 PhD's, 4,657 men and 4,993 women (i.e., 52% women), a physical sciences total of 7,461 PhD's, 5,387 men and 2,062 women (i.e., 28% women). Figures for academically employed PhD's are humanities (44.3% women), life sciences (29.1% women), and physical sciences (17.2% women).

Key Conclusions

- Up to 40% of advertised positions in 2007-08 did not fill.
- There is little, if any, attrition of women between undergraduate majors and PhD graduates.
- Women were hired in all categories in proportion to their percentage of PhD's (this includes temporary positions and postdocs, tenure-track positions, and positions in Leiter-ranked departments).
- The percentage of women granted PhD's in philosophy has been static for at least ten years at around 28%.
- If women PhD's are regularly being hired in proportion to their numbers, and retained at the same rate as men, we should see a rise in their numbers in the profession to 28% (their numbers are around 21%). It would be helpful to obtain and maintain data about the percentage of women in philosophy by rank (assistant, associate, and full professor).
- The percentage of women in philosophy is at a noteworthy point. The number of women PhD's is above 25% (which is the "tipping point" for gender schemas, see Valian 1998) but the number of women employed in the profession is below 25%.
- The percentage of women with PhD's academically employed is significantly less than the percentage of PhD's granted to women in all fields. That is, there is more attrition of women than of men from the academy after the PhD. The situation of women in philosophy is comparable to the situation of women in the physical sciences (around 28% of PhD's and 20% of academic positions).

Recommendations to the APA for future data gathering and analysis

- In order to continue tracking employment data in philosophy, the APA needs to develop a more efficient and thorough database. It is recommended that advertisers fill out a standardized form, and complete this form after the hiring season is over. Specific suggestions for the elements of the form are in a separate document. It is also recommended that placement candidates fill out a data form. An important secondary benefit of such a database of job descriptions is the ability of those interested in jobs to search the positions for those that best match the criteria that they are looking for.
- We recommend that the APA consult with other professional academic organizations that have experience in data collection and analysis, such as the American Sociological Association and the Modern Language Association. Specific recommendations are in a separate document.

Table 1. Jobs for Philosophers Categorized by Tenure Level

Tenure Level	Number of Jobs		Philosophers hired		Male		Female		Hired, Not Philosopher		No Hire		No Information	
Senior Positions Only	48	9%	17	35%	12	71%	5	29%	2	4%	15	31%	14	29%
Tenure-Track Positions Open to Junior Candidates	358	70%	225	63%	164	73%	61	27%	1	0%	48	13%	84	23%
Positions That Are Not Tenure-Track	98	19%	49	50%	31	63%	18	37%	12	12%	3	3%	34	35%
Positions Where Tenure is Ambiguous	11	2%	3	27%	3	100%	0	0%	0	0%	1	9%	7	64%
Total	515	100%	294	57%	210	71%	84	29%	15	3%	67	13%	139	27%

Percentages for the number of jobs are percentages of the whole. Percentages of the male/female distribution are percentages of the jobs within a

Table 2. Jobs for Philosophers Within Leiter-ranked and Other United States Institutions, Categorized by Tenure Level

Position Category	Number of Jobs		Philosophers hired		Male		Female		Hired, Not Philosopher		No Hire		No Information	
Leiter-ranked U.S. Departments (Total)	90	100%	53	59%	36	68%	17	32%	4	4%	11	12%	22	24%
Senior Positions Only	11	12%	4	36%	3	75%	1	25%	0	0%	4	36%	3	27%
Tenure-track Positions Open to Junior Candidates	60	67%	41	68%	27	66%	14	34%	0	0%	7	12%	12	20%
Positions That Are Not Tenure-track	19	21%	8	42%	6	75%	2	25%	4	21%	0	0%	7	37%
Positions Where Tenure Is Ambiguous	0	0%	0	0%	0	0%	0	0%	0	0%	0	0%	0	0%
Other U.S. Positions (Total)	357	100%	204	57%	145	71%	59	29%	10	3%	48	13%	95	27%
Senior Positions Only	31	9%	12	39%	8	67%	4	33%	2	6%	9	29%	8	26%
Tenure-track Positions Open to Junior Candidates	254	71%	154	61%	114	74%	40	26%	1	0%	35	14%	64	25%
Positions That Are Not Tenure-track	63	18%	35	56%	20	57%	15	43%	7	11%	3	5%	18	29%
Positions Where Tenure Is Ambiguous	9	3%	3	33%	3	100%	0	0%	0	0%	1	11%	5	56%
Total U.S. Positions	447		257		181		76		14		59		117	
Positions In Other Countries	68		37		29		8		1		8		22	
Total	515		294		210		84		15		67		139	

Percentages for the number of jobs are percentages of the whole within that group. Percentages of the male/female distribution are percentages of the jobs within a group (total) or tenure level filled by named philosophers. All other percentages are percentages of the number of jobs within that group (total) or tenure level.

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Love to Count: Arguments for Inaccurately Measuring the Proportion of Philosophers Who Are Women

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The Count's main purpose is educating children on simple mathematical concepts, most notably counting. The Count has an obsessive love of counting (arithmomania); he will count anything and everything regardless of size, amount, or how much annoyance he is causing the other Muppets or human cast.¹

I trace my interest in determining accurate numbers of women in philosophy to the day a colleague, a former physics teacher and now an anthropologist of education, spoke to my gender studies class about the numbers of women in the sciences. She was knowledgeably rattling off truly fascinating statistics from a recent National Academy of Sciences report about women's presence in science departments in higher education. She abruptly twisted to face me. Before a score of students, she demanded, "How many women are philosophy professors?"

I stammered, blushed, and paused. My students looked at me expectantly. "We're a minority in the profession," I said, and spread my hands to indicate that no further information was forthcoming, that I wasn't hiding a report full of useful data behind my back.

My colleague assumed I had merely forgotten information that surely I had encountered in the past. "Well, what's the rough ratio, can't you recall?"

I hedged. "There's no current data on the rough ratio that I'm aware of, not in the ten years I've been studying philosophy."

An alert student raised his eyebrows. "There's no data, but you're sure you're a minority?" I liked that student, a good analytical head on his shoulders, but I was irked with him and his eyebrows, catching me making what could easily seem like contradictory claims.

Of course, these are not contradictory claims. Indeed, in that classroom three years ago, I was accurate both times. Women are a minority within the philosophy professoriate, and yet philosophers are such a small portion of higher education faculty—less than two percent—that no excellent governmental data analyzes the membership of our discipline.² When one's field is so small, the membership itself must bear the responsibility for knowing its demographics, that is, if such information is worth knowing.

Of its worth, I say more below, but it is important to note first that members of the profession do try. For several years, Julie van Camp has maintained an online listing of the proportions of women faculty at ninety-eight U.S. doctoral philosophy programs.³ Margaret Walker observed, in an article published the same month that I was caught flatfooted before my students, that the APA website's best information on women in philosophy was on doctoral recipients, not job holders, and dated from the mid-1990s; she estimated that women in philosophy may be approaching 30% (optimistically, she granted).⁴

The following year, Janet Kourany sent a general query to the Society of Women in Philosophy listserv, asking if anyone knew the current percentage of women currently practicing in the field.⁵ The question nagged at me, partly because the APA didn't know—efforts to collect such information in the past had met with limited success, and it would take resources to try again—and partly because it seemed impossible that the data couldn't be found. Someone must know, I thought, someone must count us. Surely we are not invisible.

I found the search for the answers unexpectedly rewarding and reported the results to the APA Committee on the Status of Women; correspondence with a statistician affiliated with the National Center for Education Statistics (NCES) yielded information based on federal payroll data from 2003 suggesting that the percentage of women employed in postsecondary education in philosophy was around 21%.⁶ To me, this was good news compared to the best existing data from the early 1990s, which had pegged the proportion of women in the field between 13% and 17%. It was less welcome information that the rough proportions being floated in conferences and articles of 25% or 30% were overly optimistic, but for some reason the discovery caused me more pleasure than pain. In my head, I heard Count von Count of Sesame Street, laughing maniacally at the sheer joy that counting gave him. Why was I so interested in the counting of women?

The question was raised more pointedly just a year ago, in one of many email exchanges of its kind on the SWIP listserv; philosophers were discussing the indefinite complexities of collecting data on the gender of the membership, in our typically excessive detail, when a respondent asked, "What exactly will collecting these figures, these numbers, do? To whom do you need to prove [attrition, etc.]?"⁷ This wasn't a question as to why underrepresentation might be a problem. This was a question challenging me to articulate why I would argue for statistical data as any sort of a solution.

I countered the question, but I recognized it as the question I asked myself when I pushed aside all other work to find the 21% number. Indeed, it had become a bit of an obsession, and like the Count I can pursue it to a tiresome extent. The end of a sabbatical easily busied me with other tasks, but forms of the question have recurred in other settings since, by men and women, by feminists, disinterested observers, and rare confrontational opponents. It demands an answer: Why ought we determine the population of philosophers, especially given that the quest is doomed to inexactitude, and who's "we"? What justifies the goodness of the inquiry? One could be flip and respond, "Why not?" Yet there are reasons why enumeration is not necessarily a top priority or, as stated in the first objection below, should be priorities for some and not others:

(1) Women do enough service already. Women in academia are already well aware that we have limited time and resources. Every pursuit is a diversion from other pursuits, and when women in philosophy make it our task to do the work of disciplinary demography, a service which, in other fields, would be accomplished by a national organization, we succeed in adding to the service labors which women already over-

perform. Women, especially in junior positions, tend to pursue service activities that compete with scholarship, prioritizing teaching and an open door overscreening calls and researching in solitude. This is exacerbated by the disproportionate burdens of house- and childcare on women as compared to men in academia.⁸ As Jean Grimshaw notes, “Women in particular are often prone to feelings of guilt if they try to seize a bit of space, time or privacy for themselves, away from other people”; the very impulse that motivates service can also motivate one’s sense that she is not doing enough from day to day.⁹ If being a minority in a profession is stressful enough, then adding the guilty sense that one ought to do more about precisely identifying the minority is not productive.

By itself, of course, this is an objection concerned with who should do the work of demography, not with the worth of determining our demographics, and the objection permits alternative possibilities. In the U.S., the best hope of gathering such data lies with the APA, which is, as it says on its website, “the main professional organization for philosophers in the United States.”¹⁰ The complexities of placing the job before the APA immediately present themselves: the APA does not collect the high dues of a STEM discipline, and therefore cannot be assumed to have the requisite resources for researching gender in the discipline. Not every employed philosopher is a member of the APA, and so merely polling the membership will reveal the gender of responding members, not the state of the profession. And responding is the operative word in that sentence; past efforts to determine the features of the membership have been both expensive and poorly executed, resulting in an almost uselessly low portion of respondents when this was attempted in the early 1990s.

Yet, such research has never been cheaper or easier with the increasing use of email and Internet communication. Free online surveying services like *surveymonkey.com* would reduce worries about the cost and labor involved in ascertaining members’ gender; and for additional fees such services can intentionally design surveys to yield better response rates. In its simplest form, a free online survey would at least yield an estimate of the gender of APA members, within a margin of error. Indeed, the job would not be finished there; knowledge of the wider profession would not be satisfied by knowledge of APA members. This would only be a start, but an exciting one, providing the APA and its committees with information helpful to assessing the current needs of its members, to evaluating the employment status and practices of members and of participating schools, and to allocate funds, implement, and evaluate conference sessions and programs that promote gender equity.

This is not to say that the APA does not already do the latter in some material and important ways, an observation which motivates the next objection.

(2) Equity is better achieved by other means. To the extent that we urge attention and monetary aid in the direction of surveys and demographics, we risk neglecting worthy ends for which it is not necessary to first pin down precise data. Individual mentoring programs, the Collegium of Black Women Philosophers (CBWP), Rutgers’ Summer Institute in Philosophy for Minority Students, and the Philosophy in an Inclusive Key Summer Institute have all been spearheaded by devoted and talented philosophers, and recognized as successful and deserving of concerted support in the absence of ongoing efforts to determine the gender or race of APA members.¹¹ As the U.S. Census Bureau says, the acquisition of data is justified in part by its utility for its intended users.¹² Even if gender data is useful, its utility may be less than that of valuable initiatives which make material difference in scholars’ lives.

This objection seems fundamentally correct to me. Contributing to the diversity of existing scholarship, enhancing the opportunities and the successes of new entrants in philosophy departments at the undergraduate and graduate levels, and carving out spaces in the discipline for social connection, intellectual exchange, and visible leadership all provide something more basic and pressing than does online data collection or statistical interpretation. Scholars who profess interest in gender equity can and should put their money where their mouths are and support such endeavors in active and concrete ways.

Yet, not all philosophers are equally interested in gender equity and, in the absence of numerical data, can fairly ask why such initiatives are necessary. Need their dues go to programs if the discipline is getting better; more inclusive, approaching proportionality to the society at large? In the face of skepticism, numbers help a great deal. The recent report of the Inclusiveness Committee arguing for long-term APA support of the CBWP cited the following compelling justification: “While there are currently only about 112 black philosophers in the United States, only 20 of them are women, so the CBWP is targeting a cohort very clearly in need of extra support and resources.”¹³ If anything, the number of black women in philosophy is ascertainable because the number is so very, very low.

Since our numbers justify our endeavors to those from whom we ask resources, I suggest that demography is key to the success of women and minorities in the field. Although the legwork of collecting statistics on gender is not, in itself, more productive of equity or diversity than is the work of initiating and carrying out mentorship and professional programs, data collection is a worthwhile support of those programs and should be seen as part of, not a competitor with, such expenditures of philosophers’ energies and funds. I argue this knowing that most of my reasons are centered on improving the prospects and the experiences of employed professionals and fortunate college students, however, which brings me to a compelling feminist objection.

(3) Feminist activists in particular, and philosophers in general, are or should be preoccupied by more important issues. Claudia Card, no slouch at feminist philosophy, has argued eloquently that protracted attention to narrow issues such as glass ceilings in white collar circles risks trivializing feminism and tends to draw attention away from the pressing concerns of feminist activism and engaged ethics.¹⁴ I resemble this remark; its force constrains me to consider the possibility that I dove into the issue of women’s representation in philosophy because it was something I could actually do, something comparatively easy, something with not just an answer, but a crisp numerical answer at that, measured by federal payroll surveys. I believe it is not a coincidence that I took up my statistical research at the same time that I was editing a collection of articles on Card’s account of evils, which she argues should be the priorities of philosophers and activists on both individual and collective levels. Confronted with the urgency of domestic violence, international torture, and global climate change, it is attractive to retreat to the familiar territory of debating finer points of meaning and iterating all the possible costs and nuances involved in interpreting data that have not even been collected.

Now, Card herself has argued that by prioritization she does not mean something either lexical or chronological, and has clarified at length that she is not proposing one cannot do anything about one priority until one is finished with another. Taken to its logical extreme, I understand Card to mean that chronological or lexical conceptions of orders of importance would leave one awash in dirty dishes and laundry (which are

arguably less morally important than voluntarily incurred job duties, or community service) and without hobbies or personal endeavors, which is unreasonable to expect or counter to happiness, depending on which life philosophy one prefers. Given my arguments for gender data above, I find it safe to state that counting the number of women in philosophy is more than just a hobby—though for some of us, it can be that as well (and is for me). Instead, I find myself thinking of the gender data the way I describe the importance of the laundry and the dishes, as an agenda item for the APA which may not top the list but which has been neglected for far too long. Housekeeping of the literal and the moral, metaphorical variety is neither an evil nor a crisis but requires ongoing attention and maintenance in order to make the rest of one's life more manageable and less stressful.¹⁵ And, like housework, studying the gender of philosophers is the sort of task that can get worse the longer one neglects it, so that it becomes associated with ongoing negative feelings and a sense that it's too big, too hard to tackle. The arguments ad infinitum that measurement is somewhat doomed to fail, that the number would never be definitive, and that the task of reaching it is so complex that it's hard to know where to start, may be a product of this frustrated feeling, and are the subject of the last objection.

(4) Any measurement of women in philosophy will be inaccurate. The objection above is entirely true, and I suspect it constitutes the bulk of objections to gathering gender data. I intend it to capture a host of related difficulties. The APA is not a coextensive set with every philosophy PhD holder with a job somewhere, and APA membership over-represents those employed at four-year and graduate programs. The federal payroll data made available by the NCES does not clearly distinguish between full- and part-time employed philosophers, and there is some reason to believe women are a greater proportion of part-timers and adjuncts, a meaningful dimension of measurement. Payroll data also only seems to count those listed in postsecondary education in philosophy departments and not in other departments. The data set changes and any numbers we amass will in some sense be dated as soon as we release them. And the practical obstacles to the process of polling the membership and counting women abound, to an extent which is so daunting as to paralyze some into inaction.

In the face of such a proliferation of confounding and pragmatic factors, why bother with the demographic enterprise? Why not just agree that the existing, if vague, evidence I've offered, that women are 21% of philosophers employed in postsecondary institutions, is instructive and dismal enough to allow us to conclude that philosophy remains the most male-dominated discipline in the humanities, and direct our efforts to improving that state of affairs by diversifying the discipline, recruiting more women to philosophy, and attending better to the voices of the 21%? Why must we also devote our resources to precisely and continuously self-measuring our profession?

These are great questions, based on good evidence that no data will be perfect. It reminds me of those times when my own students are overwhelmed with the amount of factors that must go into utilitarian analysis or policy-making based on best-guess predictions. At such times, I sympathize with my students but urge them to consider whether they are stating objections in principle or objections in practice. Objections in principle are usually more powerful reasons to abandon a line of inquiry; if there are principled reasons why disciplinary gender data should not be gathered at all, except on the ad hoc basis of individual hobbyists' efforts, then it may be wrong to waste further energy on counting women. However, I've met very few philosophers who profess principled objections; those who do usually advance arguments for the absolute irrelevance of

gender to a good or fair society, and I am not considering those objections here. That gender matters is well-covered territory in this Newsletter, and most of the philosophers I've met who groan at the prospect of statistical research cite pragmatic obstacles, not opposition, to whole aspects of identity.

Objections on the basis of the practical can, when the practical difficulties are insurmountable, amount to an objection in principle: an impossible endeavor is a bad endeavor, unworthy of our efforts. I agree, and yet I return to the example of the toppling housework in order to visit what we mean by insurmountable or impossible endeavors. Some pursuits are useful even if they are never comprehensive or complete. Maintaining an ongoing minimal standard of cleanliness in a household, maintaining a good library by culling old selections and incorporating new materials, and maintaining a well-informed and just organization all require somewhat open-ended commitments to return one's attention to the health and well-being of the whole on a recurring basis. When that attention has been turned away for too long, renewing one's efforts takes more time and effort than if one had diligently upheld requisite practices, and this means one may need considerable help or patience.

Therefore, I close with arguments for enabling the practices by suggesting APA officers and members seek out help with the work and cultivate profession-wide patience with the process. Online surveying services may ease short-term requests for information and the stresses on staff. Grant applications to state and federal sources may enable longer-term studies and provide compensation to scholars, students, and staff who participate in data gathering. And cultivating a climate of willingness, a collective commitment to the importance of knowing how our members are faring, could possibly decrease the reluctant bad feelings that accompany rounds of surveys and statistical research. If the practices we currently employ seem destined to create awful work for those involved, then improving the practices seems preferable to not gathering the information. Once established, regularly maintained information-gathering habits would be easier over time instead of a source of dread.

I have argued for counting the women in philosophy on the grounds that the information gives us good grounds for pursuing intellectual and employment programs which enhance the diversity of the discipline and the lives of women in philosophy. I have neglected arguments for improving the status of women as an underrepresented group by recruiting graduate and undergraduate students to go into the field because I have long-held reservations about recruiting students to aspire to the professoriate; for me, academic philosopher remains a mixed choice, and the profession, itself, gives me pause. Still, I find it question-begging when objectors (usually men) offer the following objection to ascertaining our numbers: that perhaps fewer women than men want to go into the profession. I cannot help noticing that in a profession to which so many are called and so few are chosen, literally thousands of philosophers, whatever the gender, line up to enter it, and yet it remains outstandingly male-dominated. We are not suffering from a lack of highly motivated applicants.

Margaret Walker says, "The presence of concerns, texts, and images that acknowledge women within undergraduate classrooms, graduate training, and professional media allow women students to feel that a discipline, literally, comprehends them, that it is a space that they are free to enter and expected to enter."¹⁶ Until we better know the state of our own discipline, and devote ourselves to establishing that women in philosophy have been counted and count as valuable members, we are best off cultivating efforts to mentoring women who love philosophy,

acting as advocates, and materially assisting their genuine desire to stay. Whether or not recruiting new students to the profession is unequivocally good, I suggest the APA and its members can do a lot to increase the numbers and the well-being of women in philosophy. I add only that articulating our presence positions us all to make the lives of women in philosophy better whether it raises membership or not. Regardless of whether or not we ever achieve gender parity, a secondary question to what I argue for here, it is outrageous and shocking to belong to a profession with no clue as to the features of its membership.

Endnotes

1. Wikipedia contributors. "Count von Count." Wikipedia, The Free Encyclopedia. Available at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Count_von_Count. Accessed November 26, 2008.
2. Our proportion of postsecondary educators is, in fact, closer to one percent than two, as I observe elsewhere; see my citation of data from the National Center for Education Statistics (NCES) in my report to the APA Committee on the Status of Women, *Status of Women in the Profession, 2006*. Available at <http://www.apaonline.org/documents/governance/committees/Women%20in%20the%20Profession%20CSW.pdf>.
3. Julie van Camp. *Tenured/tenure-track Faculty Women at 98 U.S. Doctoral Programs in Philosophy*. Available at http://www.csulb.edu/~jvancamp/doctoral_2004.html/. Updated 4/14/08, accessed November 28, 2008.
4. Margaret Urban Walker. "Diotima's Ghost: The Uncertain Place of Feminist Philosophy in Professional Philosophy." *Hypatia* 20.3 (2005): 158.
5. Janet Kourany. Email to SWIP-L, June 20, 2006. Archived at <http://listserv.uh.edu/archives/swip-l.html/>.
6. This statistic and the statistics that immediately follow are drawn from *Status of Women in the Profession, 2006*.
7. D. R. Alphonso. Email to SWIP-L, December 3, 2007. Archived at <http://listserv.uh.edu/archives/swip-l.html/>.
8. M.A. Mason and M. Goulden. "Marriage and Baby Blues: Redefining Gender Equity in the Academy." *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 596 (2003): 86-103.
9. J. Grimshaw. *Philosophy and Feminist Thinking* (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 1986).
10. See the APA website, <http://www.apaonline.org/>.
11. See "Proposal for Long-Term APA Support of Diversity Initiatives," *Proceedings and Addresses of the APA* 81:5 (May 2008). Available at https://member.apaonline.org/2008appendix_diversity.aspx/.
12. Here's a fun fact! The U.S. has asked for gender as part of its census data since 1790. 1790! U.S. Census Bureau, *Definition of Data Quality, Version 1.3*. Issued June 14, 2006. Available at http://www.census.gov/quality/PO1-0_v1.3_Definition_of_Quality.pdf/.
13. "Proposal for Long-Term APA Support of Diversity Initiatives."
14. Claudia Card. *The Atrocity Paradigm* (Oxford University Press, 2002), 98-99.
15. Rumsey uses the metaphor of "moral housekeeping" which, she says, "has great value in managing the blunders and offenses in our daily lives, preventing their escalation to serious harms and making our lives more peaceful." Kathryn J. Norlock and Jean P. Rumsey, "The Limits of Forgiveness," *Hypatia* 24, 1 (2009). Special Issue: Oppression and Agency: Claudia Card's Feminist Philosophy.
16. Walker, "Diotima's Ghost," 156.

Why Are Women Only 21% of Philosophy?: Introduction to the Panel Presentations

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Historical research over the last few decades shows that there have been women philosophers throughout the history of Western civilization, and probably in other cultures as well, representing every subspecialty of philosophy save for the history of philosophy (at least prior to this century).¹ Historical research also shows, however, that many of these women philosophers faced serious obstacles to being philosophers, obstacles quite unknown to the men. It should be no surprise, then, that the number of women philosophers flourishing in the past is far smaller than the number of men. What is a surprise is that today, when the obvious barriers to women's accomplishments have disappeared and the number of women in the humanities is moving toward parity with the men, the number of women philosophers still falls far behind. According to the best recent estimate for the United States, for example, women now constitute only 21% of philosophers. Why is that?

Feminists have already provided some answers. Feminist research into the history of philosophy, for example, discloses that many of the greatest philosophers have held deeply misogynist views of women, views that shaped some of the most important parts of their philosophies. Thus, women have been characterized as rationally deficient (Aristotle), incapable of emotional self-control (Plato) or principled behavior (Kant), and more susceptible to sin (Aquinas), whose only function is to bear robust children (Nietzsche). And the concepts of justice (Plato) and moral worth (Kant) and the good life (Aristotle) have been modeled not on them but on what is held to be their opposite—men. There is much in the philosophic canon, therefore, that might alienate would-be women philosophers.² What's more, feminists point out that the major areas of philosophy have tended to ignore women's experiences and needs and accomplishments. Ethics and political philosophy and aesthetics, for example, have traditionally focused on the so-called public world of men, ignoring in the process the ("private") world of the home and family and the cognitive/emotional/artistic activities and responsibilities central to it. And this tendency to ignore women might also alienate women from philosophy.³ Finally, feminists draw attention to the dominant way in which contemporary philosophic enquiry is conducted—the aggressive way in which "opponents" "attack" each other's positions and "defend" their own positions, the way in which competitiveness and the aim of "winning" rather than gaining insight and understanding shape such enquiry. This combative "adversary method" of doing philosophy as well as the value-neutral goal that is claimed to be its motivation might also alienate women from philosophy.⁴ Perhaps, then, what would be needed to attract women to philosophy rather than turn them away is a very different kind of philosophy, a far more female-friendly kind of philosophy, one in which women's concerns and a commitment to women's equality play a central role. But we already have that kind of philosophy—feminist philosophy—have had it for at least three decades now, and still women constitute only 21% of philosophy today. So, again, why is that?

In 2007 The American Philosophical Association's Committee on the Status of Women sponsored a panel at the Central Division meeting in Chicago on just this question. The panel consisted of philosophers Sharon Crasnow (Riverside

Community College, Norco), Sally Haslanger (Massachusetts Institute of Technology), and Elizabeth Minnich (Association of American Colleges and Universities), as well as psychologist Abigail Stewart (University of Michigan). Philosopher Kathryn Norlock (St. Mary's College of Maryland), who has been gathering data on women in philosophy for a number of years now, was also invited to be on the panel but was unable to attend. She has, however, written a paper included in this issue of the Newsletter. All the papers presented on the panel appear in what follows, save for Haslanger's, which *Hypatia* published late in 2008.⁵ One goal of the panel, of course, was to bring the magnitude and significance of women's under-representation in philosophy to the attention of the philosophical community. Thus, for example, Crasnow pointed out that philosophy lags behind not only the humanities (which were estimated to be 41% female by the U.S. Department of Education in 2004), but many of the sciences as well. Indeed, in 2005 (the latest year for which figures are available), when 51% of the new PhDs in the life sciences went to women and 55% in the social sciences went to women, only 25% went to women in philosophy—worse even than physics and astronomy, where 26% went to women. Meanwhile, Minnich put these figures in perspective: "If fields that claim to concern humankind, in whatever specified way, actually do not include womankind (and some 'kinds' of males), then how do they justify their claims to generality, to unbiased soundness?" But whereas few in philosophy seem to notice and/or care about the lack of representation of women and minority men, this is noticed in other fields. In the sciences and engineering for example, Stewart pointed out, "there is widespread consensus...that full participation of all kinds of people...is important to the health and wellbeing of the disciplines." So why not in philosophy?

A second goal of the panel was to gain some understanding of causes and cures. Minnich, who for years has emphasized the exclusions and devaluations of women in the subject matter of traditional philosophy, outlined their consequences: such exclusions and devaluations have not deterred women from studying or professionally engaging in philosophy so much as they have underwritten the inhospitable treatment women still receive when they do so. Stewart explained the psychological mechanism involved—how the "gender schemas" underwritten by traditional philosophy and the culture at large can, in the absence of a "critical mass" of women in philosophy, lead even well-meaning, equity-minded (female as well as male) philosophers to overlook and dismiss or underrate the credentials of women philosophers. Feminist philosophy, of course, can form an antidote to the working of such a mechanism but, emphasized Haslanger and Minnich, feminist philosophy has been accorded the same inhospitable treatment as women philosophers. The response suggested by this mode of analysis is to work both to disrupt the offending schemas and to bring about the necessary critical mass of women—generally agreed to be roughly 30% of a group. Haslanger, in her contribution to the panel as well as her follow-up *Hypatia* article, spent a good deal of time developing and justifying this mode of analysis as it applies to philosophy. And Crasnow and Stewart as well as Haslanger offered concrete strategies for change that fit in with this analysis, particularly strategies that have proven useful in the sciences.

Importantly, all the strategies offered by the panelists underline the need to gather data—to document the problems facing women in philosophy, to evaluate strategies for change, and to assess progress in making the change. This is where Norlock's contribution comes in. Philosophers have been notoriously remiss in this area and notoriously reluctant to make amends. Norlock patiently explains both the need to gather various kinds of data and some of the ways to do it. It is not,

she argues, the horrendously difficult and expensive venture it is usually made out to be, especially if it is done regularly. At any rate, gathering data on the number and treatment of women in philosophy is the only way to hold our field accountable.

What is the upshot? The sciences have made progress in addressing their problem of women's under-representation, but that is only because, said Stewart, "we convinced ourselves and each other that there is a problem, and that it must be addressed proactively." The overriding goal of the 2007 panel on "Why Are Women Only 21% of Philosophy?" was to start that process in philosophy. Now, with the papers from that panel generally available to the whole philosophical community, it is to be hoped that we can all join together to continue that process.

Endnotes

1. See, e.g., Linda Lopez McAlister's "Some Remarks on Exploring the History of Women in Philosophy" and Mary Ellen Waithe's "On Not Teaching the History of Philosophy," in *Hypatia's Special Issue: The History of Women in Philosophy 4* (1989). See, as well, the most recent contribution to this now very mass of historical research, Karen J. Warren's *An Unconventional History of Western Philosophy: Conversations between Men and Women Philosophers* (Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield, 2008).
2. See, for this line of argument, Janet A. Kourany, "Philosophy in a Different Voice," *The Journal of Philosophy* 83 (1991): 557-67.
3. See, for more details, the essays in Janet A. Kourany (ed.), *Philosophy in a Feminist Voice: Critiques and Reconstructions* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1997).
4. Janice Moulton, "A Paradigm of Philosophy: The Adversary Method," and Susan Sherwin, "Philosophical Methodology and Feminist Methodology: Are They Compatible?" in *Women, Knowledge, and Reality: Explorations in Feminist Philosophy*, edited by Ann Garry and Marilyn Pearsall (Boston: Unwin Hyman, 1989), 5-20 and 21-35.
5. Sally Haslanger: "Changing the Ideology and Culture of Philosophy: Not by Reason (Alone)." *Hypatia* 23 (2008): 210-23.

Women in Philosophy: 21% of What?

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Prologue

There is nothing 'merely academic' about how we think and what we think we know. We are creatures and creators of meaning. Among the many meanings that interweave our varied worlds, the meanings of human being are central. They can sustain us in peaceful, caring, just relation with others and with the earth we share. They can divide and rank us within systems of dominance. They can open us to love, friendship, respect, justice, nurture. They can enable us to enslave, exploit, rape, kill those who have been defined as less than fully human. We are called by inspiring and by disturbing meanings of human being to keep thinking to hold horizons open. We, who are conscious creatures and creators of meaning remain responsible.

Four basic kinds of errors derive from and lock in the root problem of turning distinctions among groupings of particular people into abstract, hierarchical divisions by "kind" such that a particular few emerge as the

imperially inclusive “kind” or term, the norm, and the ideal for all. They are: 1. Faulty generalizations and universalization; 2. Circular reasoning; 3. Mystified concepts, which feed and result from faulty generalizations/universalization and circular reasoning; and, 4. Partial knowledge that serves the dominant order and is produced and perpetuated by the previous three kinds of errors.

If it is an intellectual, moral, and political error to think that a highly partial construction of Man has been, is, and should be the representative “kind” of human, then we must rethink not only the bases of all systems predicated on those errors, but also all knowledges that derive from, legitimate, and perpetuate them.

—(Transforming Knowledge, 2nd Edition)

When I ask, “21% of What?” in a paper on the status of women philosophers in academia, I really mean that “What?” What is it to which we are still trying to add ourselves that does not seem to be abiding us very well? I begin with the above quotes from my own book (awkward as that may be) because this is a question I have been pursuing since feminism-inspired studies of women began emerging again, to fierce resistance, in the 1970s. Together, the studies and the resistance hooked me on an obvious question: If fields that claim to concern humankind, in whatever specified way, actually do not include womankind (and some “kinds” of males), then how do they justify their claims to generality, to unbiased soundness? Should they not be called, for example, “Men’s Philosophy,” or “Masculinist Philosophy”? The evident, albeit unmarked, near-absence of women from philosophy in all roles and most other fields as well, then led to the startled realization that, in a sex/gender obsessed culture, I had not noticed. That struck me then, and lastingly, as a philosophical puzzle of the first order. I had to ask, What is going on when the majority of humankind (women alone being 51%) are not included as subject, as issue, as author, as actor in what passes for knowledge? What is going on when no one—inside or outside of academe: these cannot solely be academic matters—noticed? What is going on when the most common reaction finally to noting significant absences is outrage not at an evident failure of mind as of equity, but at those who pointed it out? And, right behind such questions, some daunting ones that could not be ignored (that were regularly implied, often enough outright stated): Could it be that the majority, in all its many sorts of differences, really should not matter to honest scholar/teachers because none of “those people” had made individual or collective contributions worthy of being passed on through education? As a philosopher and a feminist, at least I knew enough then also to ask: What kind of selection criteria were at work in the judgments made through centuries that continued the old exclusions, the devaluations, made—I also came to realize—not only by the virulently prejudiced, by misogynists and racists and their ilk, but by the most dispassionate, fair-minded, and revered of scholars and educators who shaped curricula and scholarly agendas in their times, and were continuing to do so in ours?

I happily part of a growing group of curriculum transformation agitators, was not willing simply to accept what was proffered in defense of scholarly and professional exclusions—that because of nature, nurture, or historical prejudices there were no women philosophers (mathematicians—whatever) at all, or if there were, they were necessarily no good, so none could, however regretfully, be included: You wouldn’t want me to include a woman as a philosopher just because she’s female, would you? As I traveled to hundreds of colleges, universities, schools to talk with faculty in interdisciplinary groups first about whether, and

then about how, to rethink their courses, their own scholarship, their professional judgments, I increasingly realized that there must be errors so deeply worked through what passed for knowledge and relevant principles of evaluation that largely good-hearted, open- and equity-minded faculty (women and men) could not—without great difficulty—simultaneously think as they had learned to within their discipline, and think well and freshly about women.

Animated by a growing realization of how mutually implicated are quests for truth and for justice, asking why and how we were all thinking within and about our fields then became my own subject of philosophical fieldwork (as I came to call it). However philosophical such work, which took valuably differing forms among philosophizing feminists then, it is relevant to understanding why women are still only about 21% of the academic profession to observe that philosophy departments were anything but central to the curriculum transformation movement that prepared the way for feminist scholarship within standing disciplines as well as the then-aborning women’s studies. Philosophy departments have taken longer to change than many others (such as literature, history, anthropology, film studies). Karen J. Warren, for example, writing in the Preface of her 2008 anthology titled *An Unconventional History of Western Philosophy: Conversations Between Men and Women Philosophers*, tells us she realizes now that “I could not have written this book very much earlier in my career: Nothing in my graduate training as an analytic philosopher; my initial years as a philosopher teaching as and what she had been taught, or my early beginnings as a feminist philosopher prompted me to ever think to ask the most obvious question, Who are the women philosophers in the history of Western philosophy?” (p. xvii) Warren, too—one of the founders of ecofeminist philosophy—had not noticed.

It should hardly be a surprise that a field that has been firmly among the more resistant to self-critique (ironic as that assuredly is) remains less than fully hospitable to women as professors. If philosophy itself no longer harbored the old errors that do the work of misinterpreting, devaluing, mis-categorizing the long-excluded (such that even the willing can continue to find it hard to include women), evaluating women philosophers in all roles appropriately would be less of an issue. It is all too easy to judge a woman’s work less sound, significant, valuable than is required for hiring tenure, promotion, publication while not only are women philosophers experienced as anomalous, but whole areas of human lives and abilities for so long prescribed for and associated with females remain minimally philosophized. Feminist philosophers have done and are doing stunning work along these lines, and still philosophy as a discipline resists in many senses transformatively incorporating it.

Along with ongoing work to achieve access and equal opportunity for women, as well as for the philosophical sub-field in which feminist philosophy can be fully supported (and, by those who resist it, contained), there is, I fear, also work still needed on the subject we stubbornly love, and that work needs to be internal, not just externally additive. Warren further observes, “Canonical philosophy’s long-standing comfort with such illusions [‘of gender-neutrality’] comes at a high price. The discipline of philosophy is in serious jeopardy if its practitioners choose not to confront its illusions” (p. 3). Experientially, emotionally as well as conceptually, we need to become fully, unselfconsciously able to work with, and as, women philosophizing. Everything I have said thus far stubbornly leads, however, to the realization that women cannot simply be added on to philosophy as it has been constructed (complex as those ways are)—not as subject matter, not as meanings, not as practitioners. This has been changing of course, or there would

not even be 21% of us, or an exciting sub-field called feminist philosophy. Nonetheless, increasing the number of women working as philosophers and moving up professorial ranks equitably continues to ask more of all of us than (also crucial) efforts to increase access, to monitor procedures, to counter the occasional blatant sexism that appears and/or the latent assumptions and feelings that sometimes still tilt preferences against women among search and promotion committee members, among editors of journals and other gate-keepers. It takes more than also teaching women philosophers and feminist philosophy as a sub-field—more, even, than teaching philosophers, among whom many are, utterly unremarkably, females.

An additive approach remains inadequate in key part because, not so long ago, not only were no women's works taught and almost no women taught philosophy, but also—another startling realization of the unnoticed obvious with which my philosophical fieldwork confronted me—women were not just overlooked. Women, and all that was prescribed, described, enforced as appropriate to our “kind,” were excluded. While hierarchical, invidious sexism prevailed (and that past tense is not yet quite safe, is it?), that which most definitionally pertained to woman, to women, to the feminine was maintained not just as different, certainly not as the same or even similar; but in contradistinction to all that pertained to (the small group of self-defined as the “kind” of) man/men/masculine. Women cannot be added on to men's worlds because, in large part, on a deep level, men's worlds were constructed precisely as not-feminine and, simultaneously—and this is the kicker, the move that kept so many from noticing what was going on—as human, as the inclusive term, the norm, and the ideal. There is obviously a great deal more to say here, but for now, simply this reminder: some aspects and effects of the troubling old errors that constructed some few males as humanity itself remain efficacious from behind the scenes.

We can step way outside of philosophy departments for an example of how powerful the effects of that mild-sounding sort of thing—conceptual errors—still are. When, in 2000, Hillary Clinton proclaimed from Beijing in tones heard round the world, that women's rights are human rights, we knew that needed to be said. Establishing women's rights as human rights has huge legal, ethical, political, cultural, economic implications. We must do it, literally, to save lives. But pause to think about Clinton's ringing phrase for a minute: it is actually also a conceptual absurdity. It is one of those absurdities that I learned to take very seriously as markers of still-potent skews in dominant meaning systems. What on earth, if not human, would women's rights be? (Penguins'? I always want to say: Minerals'? Gods'?) No one need say that men's rights are human rights—unless the males in question are of a “kind” the dominant few also defined out of their supposedly generic category. Civil rights marchers sometimes carried signs reading “I Am A Man,” and this, too, needed to be said. But note well: no woman could have carried such a sign and have it read in the same ways either by the marchers or by any of the onlookers. How that is so reminds us that, as long as lives, qualities, rights, responsibilities prescribed for and ascribed to dominant men are taken to define human, we cannot just add the definitionally excluded, any more than you can add the idea that the world is round to the idea that the world is flat.

Knowledge, to be additive, must derive from the same informing assumptions, emerge from similar conversations over time, follow compatible logics as that to which it is to be conjoined. While the flat earth premise prevails (other than as a faddish trope) among powerful, educated groups and classes, roundness as definitional premise must be squashed

as erroneous; rendered harmless as irrelevantly and irreverently kooky; suppressed as dangerous to all right-thinking people and prevailing systems. Not only books have been burned.

So, while definitions of human being and other culture-defining notions are, of course, epistemological issues, they are also social, political, professional issues. Systems of knowledge, and systems of justice, politics, economics, morality informed, sometimes deformed, by definitions and categorizations, can and historically have defined women, with all our differences, and some “kinds” of men, not only as not-the-same, but as unequal, and—far more deadly—as unequalizable (e.g., because naturally inferior; aberrant, of the wrong “kind”). Such hierarchies, legitimated, often enough also by philosophy, as god-given, as scientific, as commonsense, resist additions just as theories and bodies of knowledge do. It took a long hard time for women to win the vote, and a lot longer for women to be viable candidates for elective office. It did not take so long because there was never a female adequate to exercising the franchise, never a single woman capable of representing a district or governing a state or a nation. It took so long because there were and are definitional, conceptual, emotional, habitual, socially legitimated ways of thinking that work along with laws, rules, regulations, and flat-out force evidently used to exclude. Philosophy has not been, nor is it now, internally free of such pervasive meanings.

Nonetheless, philosophy ought to be, and evidently can be, a discipline that helps us locate and dissolve the errors, the absurdities, the tortuous reasoning that mark the spot where injustices skew thinking, reasoning, judging. When it fails in that evidently appropriate task, we learn something that matters greatly, and that is directly related to its failures as a profession. Even with the superb work of some feminist philosophers we now have, it remains the case that defining notions of humankind remain minimally transformed and so still resistant to additions at all levels, from the most abstract (where old prejudices may be efficacious but do not show as such anymore) on out to practice (where effects of deeply rooted old errors ought to be evident—when we are able to notice).

Consider a key example hardly irrelevant to ongoing philosophical difficulties with women as well as with woman: while mortality is of significant philosophical concern, natality is not. How odd that is (oddity, that clue to the old errors). If there were no natality—if humans were not born—there would soon be no one left to die. And why focus so much more on dying, endings, loss, extinction of individuals, without remembering beginnings, increase, renewal, continuities of life?

We can, if we will, now know that our notions of what it means to be human transform when we remember—with feminist scholars in several fields—that we are conceived and gestated in union, born into radical dependency, and only slowly achieve a degree of independence. It has been at cost that philosophy as a field was created and long developed by people for many of whom Man is mortal was a defining statement, while Man, who is of woman born reminded of the supposed shame of “man's” beginnings. Thus was philosophizing about relational, plural, constantly renewing humanity narrowed to that lonely figure, Mortal (and individual, combatively, selfishly Rational) Man (who, it is hard not to note, can then only wait in impotent frustration for Godot, who, in such a play, cannot come).

This is all a matter of philosophy as well as of who is and can be judged rightly to be doing it. There are established male philosophers who remembered natality: consider John Dewey, who paid real attention to children as well as women, and Hans Jonas, more recently. Jonas—a refugee from the

Holocaust—sought to turn philosophy away from death and toward life, toward organic being. Jonas, too, remembers children. It is also the case that Hannah Arendt, who gave us the notion of natality (cf. *The Human Condition*), was suspicious of the feminism of her time and place. We may then note that having more people identified as female inside the academic profession of philosophy matters on grounds of equity, but it does not suffice for equality, for truth, for justice, for just plain better thinking, for job security. Having feminists inside can go further; since critique is what we need to rid ourselves of old judgment-skewing errors. But even including feminists, and/or feminist philosophy as a subfield, is no guarantee that the whole field will continue to transform, nor is it a guarantee that no transformative work will be done.

Again and again, there is this lesson to be considered by movements for justice, for truth, for meaning: getting in to the very systems that both perpetrated and justified, legitimated invidious exclusions hardly suffices. How can newcomers be safe within systems long premised on their misconstruction, their devaluation, as well as exclusion? Inclusive practices tacked on for legal or even moral reasons may not work well or last while they still run counter to ways of thinking that go on constructing our worlds, our meanings, our truths for us. Nor is equity adequately served if only those acceptable to and accepting of untransformed systems get in or persist.

Twenty-one percent indicates sex-gender desegregation but hardly full integration, and full integration into the very same systems that legitimated millennia of invidious exclusions of “kinds” of humans hardly indicates transformations. Nonetheless, as both the specialized and the dominant fields of knowledge and inquiry continue to challenge and be challenged by broad movements for justice and associated shifts in culture-wide ways of thinking about meanings of human being, philosophical meanings and practices will also go on transforming. Not all at once. Not in only one direction. Not at all unanimously. The point is not that we should all agree: that would be as boring as it would be terrifying. The point is to undo the blocks to good thinking, the deep roots of prejudice and injustice, that have long persisted so that we can all think better; and so also evaluate, judge, choose, act—including hiring, retaining, promoting people—both more wisely and more equitably.

It is as if I had been looking at a fishbowl—the glide and flick of the golden scales...the barely disturbed water, the flecks of waste and feed, the tranquil bubbles traveling to the surface—and suddenly I saw the bowl, the structure that transparently (and invisibly) permits the ordered life it contains to exist in the larger world.

—Toni Morrison

In philosophizing we may not terminate a disease of thought...slow cure is all important.

—Ludwig Wittgenstein

What Do the Numbers Mean?

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In the fall of 2006, a brief and disturbing report compiled by Kathryn Norlock was posted on the Committee on the Status of Women page of The American Philosophical Association website.¹ The report presents evidence supporting what is

clear to most women in philosophy: there are noticeably fewer women in the profession than there are men. In fact, though precise numbers are difficult to determine, it looks as though only about 21% of those employed as philosophers are women. The report makes a good case for this number through the convergence of statistical evidence from a variety of sources (*Women in the Labor Force: A Databook, 2004 Annual Averages*, U.S. Department of Labor; Bureau of Labor Statistics, February 2004, Report 973; U.S. Department of Education, National Center for Education Statistics, 2004 National Study of Postsecondary Faculty (NSOPF:04)).²

Norlock's report also makes reference to a less formal source that many of you may know. For several years now, Julie van Camp at Long Beach State has been collecting data through an unscientific and informal hand count of tenured and tenure-track female faculty from the department web pages of the top 54 departments with graduate programs as identified by the Leiter Report. Her January 2007 count indicated that 18.5% of philosophers employed at these institutions are women.³ In an email to the Committee on the Status of Women, van Camp suggested that the difference between her and Norlock's figures may be due to the fact that the data that Norlock used includes those who are employed part-time and van Camp was looking only at the tenured and tenure-track faculty at the “top 54” departments, but in any case there is not terribly much difference in the numbers. At any rate, we have at least a rough number to indicate what percentage of currently employed philosophers are women, but without some context it is difficult to know what we ought to be saying about it. If we look at the issue in its broadest context, roughly half the population is female and so women in philosophy are clearly underrepresented by that standard. If this is where we focus it is not so clear that we are finding out anything very special about philosophy since women are underrepresented in many other arenas as well. In hopes of providing a meaningful context, I am going to ask and answer the three questions that first occurred to me when I heard about women being 21%: 1) How does this compare to the past? 2) How does this compare to the number of women employed in other disciplines? and 3) How does it compare to the number of women coming out of graduate school in philosophy? Norlock does address some of these questions in her report and so let me start there.⁴

The answer to the first question is not surprising given the tremendous changes in opportunities for women in the last few decades and I suppose this is where the good news is. There are more women employed in philosophy than there used to be. Norlock reports between 13% and 18% of philosophers were women in 1992. But our gains have not been as great as in most of the other humanities disciplines, which were estimated at 41% female by the U.S. Department of Education in 2004. This brings us to the third question. How many women are receiving PhDs in philosophy? While the percentage of PhDs in philosophy granted to women has increased as it has in other disciplines, the rate of increase lags compared to most, with less than a third of PhDs going to women. The average has been roughly 27% since some time in the early 90s, spiking up to 33% in 2004, but back down to 25% in 2005; the spike may be signaling an upcoming change, but just as well may be an anomaly.⁵ For all fields about 45% of PhDs are awarded to women. This is an increase of over 14% since 1995 and the “tenth consecutive year in which the representation of female doctorate recipients has surpassed 40 percent” (SED 2005, Survey of Earned Degrees). Among the disciplines that look worse than philosophy we find physics and astronomy at about 26%, but not all the sciences look equally bad. Fifty-one percent of the PhD's awarded in the life science in 2005 went to women. Another humanities discipline that had been lagging was history with 37% in 1995,

but the figures for 2006 were excitedly reported on the American Historical Association web page, which indicates that last year 41% of the PhD's in history were awarded to women.⁶ So history may be on its way to addressing its gender inequity, at least as far as degrees awarded go. In the social sciences, economics (30%) and political science (39%) also lag, but the social sciences overall are at 55%, primarily due to psychology (68%) and sociology (62%).⁷

One obvious conclusion to draw from these comparisons is that since there are so many fewer women qualified for full-time academic appointment in philosophy given the lower number of PhD's, it may not be surprising that philosophy departments are more than two-thirds male. One might protest that the gap between the 27% PhD's to 21% employed is still disturbing, but this may not be specific to philosophy. Even in fields where the number of PhD's approaches parity, there are still significant disparities when it comes to employment. Take sociology as an example: though sociology degrees awarded to women have been about 50% since the mid-80s, in 2001 only 38% of faculty in sociology were women. So the gap between degrees and employment in philosophy is actually smaller than in some other fields. Part of the explanation may be that there are other things that one can do with degrees in other fields outside of the academy, but it is clear that there are other factors at work as well. Most significantly, there seems to be pretty strong evidence that the academic workplace is less family friendly than one might have imagined, and that this does have a significant effect on the success and persistence of women in the academy in all disciplines.⁸ Presumably these issues affect woman philosophers as well.

The important thing to note here is that gender parity in the pool does not necessarily translate into gender parity in the academy. This point goes beyond the obvious fact that it takes time for an increase of women PhD's to result in an increase of women faculty. Again, sociology is a good example. The pool has been around parity for some time and expected, or even predicted, increases in women in tenured and tenure-track positions have not occurred to the degree anticipated.

So there are really two connected issues that need to be investigated here: the issue of why there are fewer women entering the pool in philosophy (women PhD's) than in most other fields, particularly in the humanities, and why there is a gap between those entering the pool and those employed. This second concern affects all women academics, whereas the first seems to be specifically about philosophy, though it is ultimately hard to disentangle the issues when discussing women in philosophy.

To address philosophy specifically, I am going to speculate and in doing so I want to make it clear that I am hoping to provoke discussion rather than offer what I think is the correct and only explanation. In that spirit, here are some ideas. First, I will begin with what seems obvious to me. With so few women in philosophy, the likelihood that a female student will encounter a female philosophy instructor is clearly lower than in other fields. As a personal aside, I wonder if I would be a philosopher today if my undergraduate experience had been different. I was at Barnard in the early 70s when Mary Mothersill and Onora O'Neill were there. I certainly had male philosophy instructors as well, but it literally never crossed my mind that philosophy was not an appropriate field of study for a woman. However, I spent my senior year at Boston University and found the environment there was very different. Though I did not experience any overt sexism, I do remember sitting in a class on the Pre-Socratics and wondering why on earth I was never called on and feeling intensely frustrated. The class was predominantly male as was the instructor. The voices heard were all male. If that had been

my first experience with philosophy would I still have chosen philosophy as my major?

While I do not think that there is any magical connection between having a woman philosophy professor and a woman finding philosophy interesting or worth pursuing, I think it is likely that there is some effect, even if it is small. To be able to project yourself into a role, it helps to be able to see that there is "someone like you" who has that role. Of course, that someone is a woman does not guarantee that I will see her as someone like me but given the dominance of gender in providing us with a sense of who we are, it may be an important relevant factor. So, for instance, that 38% of sociology faculty members are women probably plays some role in supporting the persistence of women in sociology through to the PhD. To further investigate the extent to which the absence of women in the philosophy professoriate is likely to be part of the explanation for the low numbers of women in philosophy there are some other things that we would need to know. For instance, do introductory philosophy classes typically have roughly equal numbers of male and female students at the outset, are philosophy majors predominately male, and are applicants to graduate schools predominately male?⁹ Still, it seems unlikely that the contact with female professors could be the whole story. After all, since only slightly more than a third of sociology professors are women, there are probably plenty of female sociology students who have minimal contact with female sociology professors.

It is tempting to think that there is something about the subject matter of philosophy that is the issue. But this is tricky and though there has been quite a bit written on androcentrism and philosophy, some of it compelling, I urge a focus on other aspects of the question. I think it is significant that androcentrism in the subject matter of science has not been a target of the work that the National Science Foundation has sponsored on increasing the participation of women in science and engineering. Even if it were true that fewer women find subjects like physics, economics, and philosophy interesting, we would still want to reach those who are or might be interested. Focusing on suspected androcentrism might not be appealing to me for personal reasons, however, so perhaps I have an unwarranted bias about where we should be looking for an explanation. After all, I am a woman, a philosopher, and someone who thinks that philosophy is completely compatible with the ways that I identify as a woman.

If there are features of philosophy that make it less appealing to women than to men (though we might note here that philosophy seems not to be terribly appealing to either sex given the relatively low numbers of philosophers), I would argue that these features should be treated as contingent and not as part of the nature of either women or philosophy. With this caveat, it might work to say something along these lines: "The issues that philosophy addresses seem to many women to be removed from their lives and those things with which they are concerned." Again, it is probably true for the general population that philosophy is seen as removed from daily life and concerns, but perhaps it is fair to claim that more women find it so than men, at least in this historical period and culture. Again, comparing philosophy with sociology, there are many areas in sociology that are directly related to women and women's lives. Sociology has been transformed in the last twenty years not just by the inclusion of women, but also by shifts in the categories through which the social world is studied and understood that have coincided with more women in the field. It isn't just that sociology deals with subjects that are generally of interest to women, but it does so in a way that fully acknowledges the importance of gender to the study of society. Sociologists have also carried on an active dialogue about the

use of different methodologies and their role in investigating the lives of women as well as concerns about the failure of some standard methodologies to successfully do so.¹⁰ To return to philosophy, perhaps the areas in which we see greater numbers of women, like ethics, are areas where we might see similar changes occurring. It does seem to be the case that feminist ethics has made a greater impact on traditional ethics than feminist epistemology has had on traditional epistemology or philosophy of science, for instance.¹¹

These speculations bring us back to the first issue, the number of women employed in philosophy. The roughly 30% of PhD's in philosophy seems to be a plateau. The same sort of plateau appears in other fields, history, for example, and briefly in sociology in the late 70s and early 80s. Philosophy seems to be struggling with a particularly intransigent plateau. Let us try to imagine beyond that plateau using what we know about what seems to happen with disciplines that have passed beyond it. To use sociology as an example again, once the 30% mark was breached, women quickly went to 40% of PhD's, and then above, to 50% (with some dips in some years). Sociology PhD's have been in the high 50% to low 60% in the last five to seven years. And sociology is not unique in that regard. After 30%, there seems to be a bit of a swell that takes place in other disciplines as well. Though, again, I want to caution that this does not automatically translate into gender parity in employment. I will return to that concern in a moment.

What might the dynamics be here? Again, I am speculating but there are at least three possible factors that come to mind. The first is women faculty. Though the number of women faculty remains low, it is also in the 30% range around the time that PhD's get there. So having role models may finally be having a measurable effect at this point. Second, there is a networking. As graduate students move out into the work force and have connections with a larger cohort of female faculty there is a greater possibility for networking, both informally and formally. In the case of sociology formal networking was particularly striking. Women in sociology organized relatively early (late 70s, early 80s, significantly around the time they hit the 30% mark in PhD's). Not only did they organize, but also they saw clearly that their organization needed to be linked to the political structure of the organizations in the field, and they worked towards political power in the field.¹² These two elements seem to me to be particularly important in getting beyond the plateau. Contrasting sociology with history makes the case for the importance of an active role in the political structure of the dominant professional association a little stronger. Women in history also organized fairly early, but did not emphasize the role of women in the governance of the American Historical Association. As I noted above, history was lagging behind the other social sciences and humanities until recently.

It could be argued that women in philosophy also organized relatively early. The Society for Women in Philosophy (SWIP) started in the mid-70s. But the role of this organization has not been particularly political, at least not within philosophical societies. SWIP's emphasis has been on providing a venue for feminist work. So the purpose of the organization may be relevant to the role that such organizations play in increasing the female presence in the field. Not all women philosophers feel an affiliation with SWIP, since it is perceived as aligned with feminist philosophy and not just supportive of women in philosophy whatever their interests may be, whether this perception is accurate or not.

This analysis proposes at least these three factors: numbers, organization, and political power are the ingredients needed to shift the numbers, though I am making no claim that these are the only factors nor that there is some special way in which

these all need to fit together. But even if all of these factors are in place and women approach parity in numbers of PhD's, they are faced with another sort of plateau for women in the academy. Even with the dramatic increase in the percentage of women PhD's in all disciplines, women reached 38% of academically employed PhD's and have remained there for some time. It looks from comprehensive data collection funded by the NSF and other similar organizations (NIH, NEA, NEH) that a plausible case can be made that this plateau is linked to families, women's roles in them, and the attitude of academic institutions in relation to the pull of the personal in a way that has a disproportionate effect on women because of the first two factors. But that too is another paper.

Finally, let me finish by suggesting that a first step is to see that women being only 21% of tenured and tenure-track philosophers is something to be concerned about. The awareness that this is a problem is less than universal. As Evelyn Brister noted in a blog post on this topic, "The gender disparity thus raises another question: why don't more philosophers care?"¹³ Some might simply shrug their shoulders and mumble about the choices that women as individuals make. For many, something like this seems to be just a quirk of personal preference and not in need of any further explanation. But as a woman who is a philosopher I find it hard to believe that there is not something in need of explanation here. As I have tried to suggest, the one question, why are only 21% of tenured and tenure-track philosophers women? leads me to ask many others. Asking the question is a first and necessary step towards addressing it. Addressing it begins with finding out much more information than we currently have, but finding that information starts with taking seriously the category of woman in philosophy, for only then can we collect appropriate data. It would seem that we have some metaphysics to do.

Endnotes

1. The report is still available on that website at <http://www.apaonline.org/governance/committees/women/index.aspx/>.
2. Available at <http://nces.ed.gov/surveys/nsopf/>.
3. A more recent check of her website, http://www.csulb.edu/~jvancamp/doctoral_2004.html, last updated 4/14/2008, indicates 19.61%, which is a slight improvement. These figures provide, as she puts it, a "snapshot" of the departments at any given moment.
4. There are other questions that could be asked as well. For instance, What percentage of philosophy undergraduates are women? I hope to address some of these other questions in another article.
5. In fact, it does appear that this was an anomaly. The 2006 numbers are available from the National Research Council's Study of Earned Doctorates (<http://www.norc.org/projects/Survey+of+Earned+Doctorates.htm>) and they indicate 28.6% for 2006.
6. A 2005 report on the status of women in history is available at the American Historical Association website, <http://www.historians.org/resources/women.cfm/>.
7. As of November 2008, the 2005 figures are still the most currently available.
8. What I mean by this is that there is a perception that academic life is more flexible in terms of schedule and so this might allow for flexibility with child rearing. Though this may be true, it appears that this advantage may be offset by other difficulties that women confront in the academy.
9. Since this paper was presented, there has been some investigation into these questions. For instance, Evelyn Brister has some of this information available on her blog, Knowledge and Experience, <http://knowledgeandexperience.blogspot.com/2007/11/bachelors-degrees-in-philosophy->

by-sex.html and <http://knowledgeandexperience.blogspot.com/2008/01/bachelors-degrees-in-philosophy.html/>.

10. I am thinking about a substantial body of work on feminist methodologies, including the work of Dorothy Smith on standpoint.
11. Anecdotally there seem to be more women in ethics than in these other areas of philosophy, but determining whether what seems to be the case is actually the case remains to be done.
12. Remarks by Beth E. Schneider; Sociologists for Women in Society, at a panel sponsored by the Women's Caucus for Modern Languages at the December 2003 MLA meeting in San Diego.
13. <http://knowledgeandexperience.blogspot.com/2007/12/why-arent-there-more-women-in.html/>

What Might Be Learned from Recent Efforts in the Natural Sciences?¹

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Can philosophy benefit from the experiences gained in the past few years in the natural science disciplines? In 2001 the National Science Foundation (NSF) announced a new initiative, ADVANCE, designed to improve three things for women in science and engineering fields: (1) the institutional climate for tenured and tenure-track women faculty in science and engineering; (2) recruitment, retention, and promotion of tenured and tenure-track women faculty in science and engineering; and (3) the visibility and authority of women scientists and engineers in leadership positions.

This new program reflected two very important features of the role of the National Science Foundation and the science and engineering community more broadly; these features may or may not be applicable to philosophy. First, there is widespread consensus in the science and engineering community that full participation of all kinds of people in the enterprise of science and engineering is important to the health and well-being of the disciplines; second, there is recognition that thirty years of programmatic effort to increase women's participation in science and engineering has had an enormous payoff at the undergraduate level and virtually none at the level of faculty in research universities. As a result of their own internal analysis, NSF concluded that either some or the entire problem with the "pipeline" of women in science and engineering resided at the end of the pipeline rather than at the beginning. That is, at the very least, at the end of the pipeline, at the level of academic tenured faculty positions, women remain much more underrepresented than they are at other points. In addition, that underrepresentation, and the perceived climate for women's contributions to science, might account for earlier leakage from the pipeline as younger women and girls make decisions that lead them away from science and engineering.

As a result of this analysis, by 2006 NSF had sponsored major efforts at "institutional transformation" at over thirty institutions aimed at making a difference at the tenured faculty end of the pipeline. In doing this, they did not stop or lessen the clearly effective activities they have been engaging in at the beginning and other stages of the pipeline; but beginning in 2001 they focused new effort on addressing the leakage of well-trained women scientists and engineers away from academic science and engineering careers at all levels—in college, graduate school, postdoctoral trainee positions, and before and after tenure in faculty appointments.

I describe this history to make an important point: to the extent that we are now making headway at addressing the problem of women's underrepresentation in science and engineering nationally and at the University of Michigan (UM), it is because we convinced ourselves and each other that there is a problem, and that it must be addressed proactively. We convinced ourselves of this at Michigan by doing two things: we confirmed that we, like most research universities, employ fewer women on the faculty in most science and engineering fields than are qualified for those positions. In an effort to understand why that might be the case, we also assessed the climate for women scientists and engineers at Michigan. We compared women scientists and engineers with two other groups: men scientists and engineers, and women social scientists. The research design allowed ADVANCE to assess whether differences in perception and satisfaction were attributable to gender; or to factors more generally relevant to the science and engineering context, or to factors affecting women in science and engineering only. The study² revealed that women scientists and engineers were least satisfied with their positions at the UM, and that many aspects of academic life that were somewhat negative for all women faculty were substantially worse for women in science and engineering.

Specific issues uncovered included the following:

- Male and female scientists' household structures differed. Women scientists and engineers are more likely than men to either not be partnered (and therefore have no one at home to provide assistance, even if they have no dependents), or to have a partner who works full time (and therefore operate in a two-career household). As a result, they are more burdened by household responsibilities than their male counterparts, more than half of whom have a partner who has no paid employment or part-time paid employment.
- Women served on more department, school, and university committees than men but were not more likely to chair them—a situation in which greater amounts of service were not rewarded with commensurate opportunities for leadership.
- Male assistant professors in science and engineering reported that they had more mentors and that they received advice in more areas of professional life than did comparable females.
- Female scientists and engineers were less satisfied than either their male counterparts or the female social scientists with their positions at the UM.
- Forty percent of the women faculty in science and engineering reported experiencing gender discrimination within the last five years.
- Twenty percent reported experiences of unwanted sexual attention during the same period.
- On many separate measures of organizational climate women scientists and engineers rated their work environment as more negative and less positive than did either men scientists and engineers or women social scientists.

In designing programs to address these findings, ADVANCE drew on systems theory,³ as well as social movement theory and other conceptual tools from the social sciences, to make gender visible to scientists and engineers. Because scientists and engineers prize objectivity and empiricism so highly, they often imagine that their disciplines and departments do not suffer from gender bias. However, they find data and experimental

results very persuasive. Thus, discussion of the existence of “gender schemas,” as demonstrated in many studies in experimental psychology summarized by Virginia Valian in *Why So Slow? The Advancement of Women* (published by MIT Press in 1999), has played a key role in persuading scientists that gender bias exists. Valian stresses that gender schemas are hypotheses, not consciously held, about what men and women are like. They are beliefs that have a basis in statistical realities—more women are stay-home parents than men, for example, and more men are engineers than women—and that shape our expectations of other people. Both men and women employ gender schemas, and to similar degrees.


Gender schemas particularly disadvantage women working in fields that primarily employ men. Considerable evidence shows that both men and women undervalue the performance of women and overvalue the performance of men in “masculine” jobs, even when they intend to be fair and objective in their evaluations. Reliance on gender schemas (and therefore evaluation bias) is particularly likely in situations in which women are tokens or minorities. When one woman or very few women work in a typically masculine environment, they register constantly as gender outliers on their colleagues’ radars, even when those colleagues are not consciously aware that this is the case. As more women enter the environment, the salience of gender and reliance on gender schemas decreases. When women constitute approximately 30% of the workplace, “critical mass” has been reached. At this point, the salience of gender is minimized (although not absent) and the presence and proportion of women in the pool is likely to remain stable. Recruitment and retention remain a constant battle in the absence of critical mass, with women continuing to “leak” from the workplace more rapidly than men.

Evaluation bias and the relevance of critical mass are empirically verifiable; another of Valian’s concepts—“accumulation of disadvantage”—is easily modeled and is consistent with the salary and other career patterns of women in academic science and engineering. For example, a computer simulation of a promotion process within an eight-tiered hierarchy in which the first level is staffed by equal numbers of men and women, and in which a mere 1% of the variability in selections for promotion at each level is accounted for by a bias in favor of men, produces a top tier that is 65% male. Similarly, inequities as small as 1%, recurring and accumulating over a period of twenty or more years, can result in substantial salary disparities among senior faculty. Disadvantages can accumulate in other realms as well, such as publishing and occupying leadership roles. Those without leadership experience lack the credentials to move up an administrative ladder; however, leadership roles are typically assigned rather than chosen and, given gender schemas, are more likely to be assigned to men than women.

If we put these concepts together into a single model (see Figure 1), we can see how they work together to create and maintain unequal gender representation, without any negative intentions on any individual’s part. Equally, establishing a critical mass of women in these fields has the potential to reduce the salience of gender schemas, decrease evaluation bias, and slow the accumulation of disadvantage, not only for women faculty, but also for female students. This general model has guided the efforts of UMs ADVANCE program in several areas, beginning with faculty recruitment.

Building on an approach innovated at Harvard, ADVANCE established a faculty committee whose purpose is to help department chairs and hiring committees develop successful strategies for recruiting and hiring women faculty. This committee, called Strategies and Tactics for Recruiting to

Figure 1. Accumulation of Disadvantage: A Feedback



Improve Diversity and Excellence (STRIDE), has nine members—six men and three women—all of whom are distinguished senior faculty in science and engineering fields, and none of whom knew anything about gender schemas, evaluation bias, or critical mass prior to their involvement with ADVANCE. Their status as scientists and engineers is crucial to their role in educating others, granting them the legitimacy that is not immediately available to social scientists when presenting social science theory and research to scientists and engineers. In order to be able to address recruitment issues for others, STRIDE members undertook a self-education process (studying social science literature on gender) that equipped them well to speak to colleagues whom we might think of as standing on the other side of an epistemological divide that STRIDE members themselves have only recently crossed.

During the first year of its existence, STRIDE developed a presentation designed to clarify the demographic situations in various fields, to alert department chairs and committees to university policies and tools (like the dual career placement office and university funds available to aid in placing spouses and partners of new hires) that could help with recruiting, and to explain the nature of gender schemas and evaluation bias. On the most obvious and pragmatic level, teaching those responsible for recruiting and hiring about gender schemas and evaluation bias can help them avoid overlooking candidates whom they might otherwise dismiss, thereby improving the immediate hiring process. However, STRIDE also hopes that the effects of this knowledge will radiate beyond the hiring process, and into the everyday practices of evaluation that affect retention and climate as well. The model above is an illustration that STRIDE uses in its presentation. Getting others to understand (and believe in the existence of) the feedback loop depicted here should in itself interrupt the dynamic depicted, at least in a small way. Note also, though, the role of “lack of critical mass” (generally agreed to be anything below one-third representation in a group) in stimulating reliance on gender schemas in the lower right corner of Figure 1. If recruitment could be improved to a degree that would establish critical mass, even without changing anyone’s understanding of gender schemas and evaluation bias, the loop—the system—would also be disrupted.

We believe that STRIDE has been effective in both of these ways. First, STRIDE now offers several two-hour workshops every fall to those heading and serving on search committees. In addition to the presentation itself, all participants are provided with their own copies of key articles presenting relevant research, as well as other resource materials. They are

also given practice in problem-solving dilemmas that arise in search committees in small groups. Thus, the number of faculty members in science and engineering (and beyond—STRIDE has begun to address faculty in other fields as well) who have a solid understanding of the ways in which women scientists and engineers (like racial-ethnic and sexual minorities) are disadvantaged, grows slowly larger. Second, there has been a clear increase in the number of women faculty hired since STRIDE began its activities, as is illustrated in Table 1.

Table 1. Men and Women Hired in Natural Science and Engineering Departments in Three University of Michigan Colleges.

College	AY2001-2002		AY2003-2006	
	Men	Women	Men	Women
Medical School (Basic Sciences)	2	2	21	11
College of Engineering	33	3	50	23
College of LSA (Natural Sciences)	28	5	40	23
Total % Women		14%		34%

This table shows the proportion of men and women hired in each of the three colleges that employ the largest number of scientists and engineers at the University of Michigan. Note the marked, and statistically significant, increase in the proportion of women hired, comparing the two “pre-STRIDE” years with the four “post-STRIDE” years ($\chi^2 = 10.54, p = .01$).

A very different program uses interactive theater presentations about mentoring, recruitment, and tenure reviews to raise the same kinds of issues in a much less didactic form. We collaborated with an on-campus interactive theater troupe to create three sketches that raised the same kinds of issues about reliance on gender schemas and evaluation bias in the context of faculty interactions depicted for audiences composed of faculty. The sketches have proven to be powerful tools for increased awareness among many faculty, who report that they notice connections between what they see in the sketches and what they see in their departments, and that they also pay attention to new things after the performances. Moreover, the theater troupe encourages faculty audiences not only to develop new insights into what may sometimes happen in their departments, but also to develop new strategies for interacting with their colleagues. For example, following the presentation of a sketch depicting a discussion of a tenure case in which a number of evaluation biases are on display, senior faculty are invited to step into the discussion at a key point to “replay” and redirect it. The actors and audience then talk about how and why that faculty member’s choices either did or did not improve the situation. This sketch is shown early in the tenure season to both department-level and college-level participants in the tenure evaluation process, in order to get them thinking ahead about ways of preventing and responding to varieties of evaluation bias they may encounter during upcoming tenure reviews.

A crucial audience that needed to be reached in our efforts was women scientists and engineers themselves, who were quite skeptical about ADVANCE in the beginning. According to social theorist Erika Apfelbaum,⁴ relations of domination and subordination entail a process in which a subordinate group is first “marked” in some way that sets it apart from the dominant group—thereby rendering it ineligible for the rights and privileges to which the dominant are entitled—and is then “degroupped,” so that its members, separated from one another, have no basis

for organizing. In order to maintain the illusion that subordinated groups—and, therefore, subordination—do not exist, a mythical standard of “universality” is created, which “everyone” is imagined to be capable of meeting, although members of the subordinated group in fact lack access to resources they would need to meet that standard, such as education or hiring credentials. Illusions of true universality and social mobility are maintained by integrating tokens into the dominant group. Questioning the apparently “universal” values of the dominant group is understood as trouble making, deviance, or a request for special privileges. In order to challenge the “universal” system that guarantees their continuing subordination, those who have been degroupped have to be able to regroup, or articulate a positive collective identity for themselves.

Women in academic science and engineering often find themselves token members of their departments. In the absence of specific institutional support, they have little incentive to identify as “women” in ways that would challenge the idea that academic science “universally” and neutrally accepts all qualified scientists. For them, to point out bias in the system is to invite stigmatization—to render their gender explicitly salient. Many women scientists and engineers at UM were initially wary of the ADVANCE project and reluctant to participate in the networking opportunities it provided, because they perceived such networking as an opportunity to invite stigma. For many of them, making their way through the pipeline had required embracing the belief that the system really was neutral and universal. Identifying with women colleagues looked like a way of taking a step backwards through proclaiming their own weakness.

Like their male counterparts, women scientists are most easily persuaded by data. They were the first group to whom the results of the ADVANCE climate survey were presented, and their interpretations of the findings were solicited. Being provided with the evidence first gave them the opportunity to have their own private experience validated as not so different from other women’s. Moreover, in giving them the news first, the project tried to ensure that they would not be surprised or “blindsided” by their colleagues’ reactions to the data. Finally, the fact that the research team consulted the women themselves throughout the process of collecting and interpreting the data created greater confidence in the data, and a sense that there was a serious effort being made to minimize the likelihood of the data being “used against them.” Since that time, we have created a formal “network,” which meets socially and about consensually important issues, including mentoring and leadership. Now seven years old, the Network to Advance Women Scientists and Engineers is a vital organization, with many activities.

One other area of activity is worth mentioning: review of institutional policies. The President and Provost charged three committees, chaired by deans and with a combined membership of twenty-one senior faculty (twelve men and nine women), drawn from six colleges and thirteen departments, to “examine and evaluate institutional policies and practices that might differentially impact the progress of women faculty in science and engineering fields.” The three committees focused on Recruitment, Retention, and Leadership; Family Friendly Policies and Faculty Tracks; and Faculty Evaluation and Development. They discussed a wide range of policies and practices, which were then debated on campus more generally. Taken together the three committees made over fifty recommendations for policy changes. A number of institutional policies or practices, including mentoring, dual career partner policies, child care and parental care policies, were altered immediately.

Perhaps the most radical recommendation that emerged from the committees related to tenure—the most sacred of all academic cows. Here, the committees noted that the rigidity of the tenure clock did not suit women faculty's lives and careers well, and advised that efforts be made to create some greater flexibility to accommodate women's lives. The campus is still debating this policy change. Whether or not the changes are adopted, the fact that the current policy and practice is being recognized as one that was adopted at a particular point in history, to accomplish particular goals for a particular constituency, is something new and significant. This changes the climate, with or without the policy change.

Changing policies is important, in part because policies enable some practices and prevent others. But changing policies is also important because policies both reflect and shape the way we think—about careers, about “merit,” about what counts as success. Open discussion of the disparate impact of these policies on women and men is often uncomfortable because it always reopens the possibility that difference will—again—be identified as deficit. However, it also opens up other possibilities—for differences to be recognized and accommodated in new ways. When that happens, the climate actually improves.

To conclude, we have found that the social sciences have theoretical and practical resources that can help us understand how underrepresentation of women can continue in the absence of individual intent, as well as how to intervene in the vicious cycle. While there are many problems to address, the natural sciences and engineering offer a remarkable example of commitment to full participation in the work of science, as well as openness to evidence of their own problems and to data about solutions. It is important to note that the issues associated with the underrepresentation of racial-ethnic minorities are no less important than underrepresentation of women in science and engineering. The early stages of the pipeline are still a serious problem in a way they are not for women, but the rest of the analysis fits quite well and that clearly suggests particular difficulties for women of color: At Michigan, all aspects of our ADVANCE program are now aimed at addressing the similar and different issues that face individuals from all groups that are underrepresented in the academic science enterprise.

Endnotes

1. Initially prepared for a panel at The American Philosophical Association meeting on Why Are Women only 21% of Philosophy? April 20, 2007.
2. The final report on this climate survey is available online at <http://www.umich.edu/~advproj/climate-report.pdf>.
3. Several chapters in this volume describe the efforts at Michigan and at other Institutional Transformation-grant supported institutions: Abigail J. Stewart, Janet E. Malley, and Danielle LaVaque-Manty, eds., *Transforming Science and Engineering: Advancing Academic Women* (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 2008).
4. Erika Apfelbaum. “Relations of Domination and Movements for Liberation: An Analysis of Power between Groups.” In *The Social Psychology of Intergroup Relations*, edited by W.G. Austin and S. Worchel (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth, 1985), 188-204. An abridged version of this paper appeared in *Feminism & Psychology* 9 (1999): 267-72.

BOOK REVIEWS

Moral Understandings: A Feminist Study in Ethics, 2nd ed.

Margaret Urban Walker (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007). 328 pages. \$29.95 (paperback). ISBN: 978-0-19-531540-0

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Margaret Urban Walker's *Moral Understandings* was first published just over ten years ago. For those who read the original edition, the first thing that will strike them on reading this second edition is just how much Walker's ideas helped drive the development of contemporary feminist ethics. These readers should also take the time to reread the preface to the first edition to remember just how groundbreaking Walker's work was and still is.

Walker's central contribution to the development of feminist ethics in *Moral Understandings* is the identification (and critique) of what she calls the theoretical-judicial model of morality, and her introduction of an alternative model: an “expressive-collaborative” model. The theoretical-judicial model is not a theory in itself, but rather it sets out how morality “is” and how moral philosophy should go about its business: “It prescribes the representation of morality as a compact, propositionally codifiable, impersonally action-guiding code within an agent, or as a compact set of law-like propositions that ‘explain’ the moral behavior of a well-formed moral agent” (8). On this picture the moral agent is the judge, the manager, or the bureaucrat making decisions from an impartial position. Historically, however, judges, managers, and bureaucrats have been men and their supposed positions of impartiality have been little more than positions of social privilege. Thus, the theoretical-judicial model is a model of morality that theorizes about the thinking and lives of only some of us.

Walker's alternative expressive-collaborative model, in contrast, “looks at moral life as a continuing negotiation among people, a practice of mutually allotting, assuming or deflecting responsibilities of important kinds, and understanding the implications of doing so” (67). Unlike the theoretical-judicial model, this is an interpersonal, social model. We can no longer hide our moral practices behind justifications of “ideal agents” or impersonal guides for individual actions. Instead, we must recognize that we are situated beings, that we hold different social positions, identities, and responsibilities, that we are accountable to one another, and that not all of “us” within the moral community have the same privileges and powers of negotiation. In offering this model Walker is not just offering an alternative to the theoretical-judicial model, she is also offering an alternative to feminist ethics as care ethics.

The new edition of *Moral Understandings* contains an addition to chapter one, “Postscript 2007,” in which Walker looks at what has changed in (Anglo-American) moral philosophy and what has not, an epilogue in which she responds to questions and critiques of her work from the intervening years, and a new chapter on the telling of truth and the relatively new institution of truth commissions.

On the whole, the additions to the second edition of *Moral Understandings* are valuable. In “Postscript 2007,” Walker aims

to demonstrate that there have been changes in approaches to moral theorizing, but that her main argument for a socially situated morality remains morally and philosophically relevant. The addition of the Postscript performs a valuable function in that it justifies the existence of a second, revised edition of *Moral Understandings*. It is clear that Walker's work is still significant and has also, directly or indirectly, influenced how moral philosophy (feminist or otherwise) is being done. It is also clear that—for feminist ethics—there is still much to do. However, as Walker herself points out, there is a lot of material to cover and this section of the book tends towards becoming a dense rehearsal of literature. It will probably be of use to the professional academic returning to Walker's work, but is less likely to be of use to the more casual reader or a student on her/his first encounter with Walker.

Walker's normal elegance in writing returns with the other new additions to *Moral Understandings*. The epilogue is a valuable addition. Here, among other things, Walker responds to claims that her model of morality is relativist and that it undercuts what we normally think of as the "authority" of morality. Certainly, Walker does not accept the standard "opposite" of a relativist position: there are objective and universal moral truths. However, this does not commit her to a relativist position in the problematic sense that we cannot critique other moral systems or indeed even "our" own. For example, we may find that a set of supposedly shared moral understandings among our community has been misrepresented as such. Walker also shows us that concerns we may have that her model of morality lacks "authority" are remnants of the abstract and impersonal theoretical-judicial model. In order for these concerns to be articulated meaningfully we must be able to transcend in some way our moral situatedness. Yet, Walker has shown us that this is precisely what we cannot and should not do. In reflecting on our moral views we must be transparent; we must recognize that we are reflecting from a particular moral-social place.

The new chapter, "The Politics of Transparency and the Moral Work of Truth" (chapter nine) is a fascinating addition to the book. In this chapter Walker is particularly interested in the work of the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission. What is significant for Walker about this commission is that it recognized that truth was not just about establishing facts and hearing personal testimony, it was also important that the truth was established through a process of discussion and debate: a shared understanding. Furthermore, truth was recognized as being healing for the victims. The public acknowledgement of someone's pain can be transformative, especially for the victim.

In previous chapters Walker has argued for the importance of transparency. She now wants to ask questions about "the moral functions of truths and tellings in contexts of serious wrongs" (215). In Walker's consideration of these questions we can see how her expressive-collaborative model of morality allows for perspectives on truth telling that can explain its moral and social importance, on both a general political level and an individual level, that would be missed on other accounts. Walker focuses on the issues of public acknowledgement of truth and having the "voice" to speak the truth. Walker shows us how victims of political repression or mass violence may not be able to make sense of the violence they suffered. Moreover, they often feel that they are not able to rely on their memories, as it is sometimes hard to believe, even for them, that they suffered in this way. Public acknowledgement of the suffering of these victims—which is what truth commissions are created to do—is the collection, arrangement, official sanctioning, and public dissemination of the truth of this suffering. Within the framework of the expressive-collaborative model, we

can see why this public acknowledgement of truth succeeds, as it provides a shared foundation of understandings which can provide the foundation for a society to begin to move forward and allows for the possibility of rebuilding trust within a community.

Walker is also able to show us that establishing the truth is not simply about recognition of and reparation for wrongs or the designation of responsibility, it is also about the victims being able to speak for themselves—to be considered possible bearers of truth—and being entitled to be listened to as such by others. This having of a "voice" is connected to (moral) dignity: to having "a standing that represents full membership in a moral community that truly co-constructs its self-understanding and the terms under which its members hold each other responsible" (232). Again, it is within the framework of the expressive-collaborative model that we can see how truth telling can be transformative and healing for the victims of gross injustice.

Overall, those who have already read *Moral Understandings* will be pleased with these additions to the second edition, especially the chapter on truth, while those who have not will benefit especially from the addition of the epilogue.

Feminist Interpretations of John Locke

Edited by Nancy J. Hirschmann and Kirstie M. McClure (University Park, PA: Penn State University Press, 2007).

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The editors of this new collection of essays on John Locke, Nancy Hirschmann and Kirstie McClure, begin by noting that his "ambiguity has provided fertile ground for feminist analysis, debate, contention, and interpretation, and ensured the centrality of Locke's work to feminist efforts to reread the canon" (2). Feminists all agree that Locke is a profoundly important thinker for understanding political modernity, but they are in fundamental conflict concerning the upshot of his arguments. Was Locke a liberal feminist *avant la lettre*? Or, even if he wasn't a feminist himself, is it the case that the inevitable logic of his arguments, like those of liberalism, ultimately proves conducive to the realization of feminist ends? Conversely, is Locke instead a wolf in sheep's clothing who created a new and powerful form of patriarchy under the pretense of overthrowing it? And if this is true of Locke, is it also true of liberalism and contract theory, writ large? Alternatively, what do we learn about Locke and modern political thought by asking a very different set of questions informed by poststructuralism, questions concerning the meaning and political salience of gender and, indeed, of feminism, itself? These are just a few of the many important issues raised by this wonderfully provocative volume.

The book opens with three essays, by Mary Lyndon Shanley, Teresa Brennan and Carole Pateman, and Melissa Butler, which collectively constitute something of a new feminist "canon" of Locke scholarship, themselves. Each of these essays from the late 1970s is then "re-read" by its original authors in the light of subsequent shifts in the political and theoretical landscape roughly thirty years hence. In the fourth chapter, Gordon Schochet ruminates upon Locke's relationship to the tradition of patriarchy in political thought, which he had first influentially investigated in 1975.

Butler, Shanley, and Schochet made the initial case for Locke as a thinker hospitable to at least some aspects of feminism. The central points in this brief include: Locke's suggestion, at points, that women are fully capable of rationality and therefore entitled to the same educational opportunities as men; his description of women and men as equals within the family; and his willingness to grant women the rights to engage in and negotiate the terms of marriage contracts with respect to such fundamental issues as childcare, custody, and divorce (after the children have been raised). Locke also acknowledges that women have some property rights, including (possibly) inheritance rights; and he insists that children owe equal respect and obedience to mothers, as well as fathers (3).

In a different vein, Brennan and Pateman read Locke as a thinker who inaugurated a new tradition of modern patriarchy, in which men basically ruled as a brotherhood of equals. Central to this interpretation are passages in the *Two Treatises* in which Locke insists that a wife's subjection to her husband has "a foundation in nature," where he stresses that in matters of common concern the husband's will wins out over the wife's, as he is the "abler and stronger;" and where he restricts property and inheritance rights. Finally, Pateman and Brennan argue there is no doubt that "The 'individuals' who enter Locke's social contract and establish the liberal state are the fathers of families" (64).

It is fascinating to see how these scholars reflect upon their earlier work. Pateman points out that she went on to build on her essay with Brennan to argue, in *The Sexual Contract*, that Locke's distinction between paternal and political power is also a distinction between private and public that creates a new "conjugal power that is the political fulcrum of [men's] 'right' to govern women within other major civil institutions." Thus, "the freedom of women (wives) is necessarily at the same time denied and affirmed. It is affirmed because women must be seen as free if they are to enter into the marriage contract, a contract which denies their natural freedom" (80). This sleight of hand plays a key role in divesting married women in particular of the fruits of their labor, or what Brennan calls "rights[s] of the flesh" (86).

Such arguments seem to have had an important influence on Shanley, who writes in a very thoughtful and reflective essay that she "now find[s] the idea of the contract as a model for the marriage relationship problematic" (39). Thus, while she describes herself as "still a liberal" with respect to her commitments to equality and freedom, and her belief in liberalism and social contract theory's ability to help us "develop an understanding of the human individual that recognizes sexual difference without endorsing gender roles and inequalities," she also believes that "Locke was able to have sameness and difference, along with human equality and gender hierarchy, only by embedding a contradiction in the center of his depiction of both the marriage contract and the social contract: women and men were equals, and women were men's subordinates. Contemporary feminists cannot accept this contradiction; it is theoretically incoherent and practically an affront to equality" (44-45). For her part, Butler does not budge at all from her earlier position. For example, she maintains that Locke's passages about a foundation in nature for women's subordination are "tentative, variable, and contingent." However, while she cites scholarship to argue that "men's strength provided a natural advantage over women in earning power and as a result, in the negotiation of the marriage contract" (127), Butler does not explain to her readers how Locke's identification of a particular "natural" difference (strength) is supposed to counter a general claim that he relied on arguments from nature to justify male domination. If anything it just clarifies what Locke took to

be natural. Notwithstanding such difficulties, and despite her admission that "the public/private split provided a powerful tool for delaying the integration of women into political life," Butler nonetheless concludes that "whether intentionally or not, other Lockean ideas loosed on the world—natural equality, freedom, individualism—carried with them a compelling logic of their own... Ultimately, the liberation of women was not liberalism's failure, but its flowering" (129).

Roughly similar points as Butler's are made by Schochet, and also by Jeremy Waldron in his essay for this volume. On the one hand Schochet maintains, with Pateman and contra Butler, that Locke was "not an egalitarian on any grounds, hardly least among them, sexual" (149). Thus, while Locke was not explicit about women's exclusion from politics, his silence "left no place for women in the public life of his polity," and consequently the parties to the social contract were "invariably men" (132). Yet, while Locke restricted the status of "political person" to men (149), on the other hand Schochet believes that Locke's logic enabled the disenfranchised to argue from the "perspective of social justice denied—on what grounds can we justify the fact that one person or class of people is deprived of what someone else has?" (149). Waldron, however, wants to go much further than Schochet, and perhaps past Butler. For Waldron, Locke was an "equality radical" (242). Locke admittedly "flinched" (243) in the face of the implications of his egalitarianism as a result of "personal struggle," but for Waldron, "there is little doubt where Locke's most fundamental premises were leading him" even if he did not succeed "to the satisfaction of modern feminists" (245). Waldron accuses Pateman of wanting to fit Locke into the consistent, procrustean, patriarchal mold of Sir Robert Filmer, rather than let him alone with his messy inconsistencies. But, Pateman's argument is not that Locke's brand of patriarchy was the same as Filmer's, but that it was fundamentally different in crucial respects, and in fact required a measure of freedom in order to create a new form of subjection. That Waldron is in danger of missing this is clear at a number of points. For example, he argues that Locke saw Eve's subjection to Adam as a "contingency," an "optional extra," as "a prediction rather than a prescription." But what Locke writes in the famous passage from the *First Treatise*, which Waldron quotes, is that God "only foretels what should be the Womans Lot, how by his Providence he would order it so" (I, 47; 249). However, for a fundamentally Christian thinker like Locke to say that God not only predicts women's subordination, but that He would order it so, is surely about as prescriptive and normative as it gets. Women's subordination is exactly what God wants! Similarly, Waldron states that "Butler is right... about Locke's argument that a husband's authority has nothing to do with political power" (255). But, this is clearly to take as given precisely what is at issue; namely, whether we want to accept uncritically Locke's distinction between what does and does not constitute political power. If we don't buy this distinction, then men's power over women in marriage, which extends to male will "naturally" winning out or "covering" female will when they disagree (about public sphere politics, for example), does indeed look like the instantiation of a new form of patriarchy. It is also in accord with the roughly three hundred years of history which followed and relied on Locke, in which lofty theoretical universals were consistently violated in practice, whether Locke intended this or not.

Hirschmann makes a very different argument in her terrific essay on "intersectionality" in Locke, in particular the nexus between class and gender in his texts, by focusing on Locke's "Essay on the Poor Law" (1699). Hirschmann's argument follows C.B. Macpherson's *Political Theory of Possessive Individualism*, which she believes "provided a sort of template for feminist analysis" (157). Hirschmann's reading of Locke on

the poor law brings to the fore his inegalitarian tendencies and readers will find it hard not to agree with her analogy between certain of Locke's positions and the horrors of *Oliver Twist* (163). Hirschmann accepts Macpherson's thesis that Locke believed in a differential rationality that was sorted by class, and also that it is "safe to say that he believes that women have less rationality than men." In a highly intriguing move, however, she argues against both Macpherson, and most feminists, "that this difference is not natural, but rather artificially constructed through the social relations of labor and the sexual division of labor" (169). This is a bold move which enables Hirschmann to argue that connecting both vectors—gender and class—is required to understand Locke's exclusionism. Gender matters because we cannot account for Locke's exclusion of bourgeois women without it; but class matters too for understanding the exclusion of both sexes of the laboring poor. But, in neither case is this "natural," she argues; rather, it is a function of their being explicitly denied the opportunity to develop their rational capacities. Yet, one wonders if Hirschmann would have drawn quite the same conclusion if she had grappled with the scholarship which challenges Macpherson's arguments about class in basic ways (most notably that of Richard Ashcraft and James Tully). Her failure to do so perhaps unduly collapses the basic distinction between men and women. Contrary to Macpherson, it has been argued that Locke did not theoretically exclude any men from taking part in the social contract on the basis of their class position, notwithstanding the lack of opportunity to develop their potential for rationality in any depth, whereas he did exclude all women, regardless of class, on the basis of their gender. That is to say, in the case of this particular intersection between gender and class, it might be argued that the former trumps the latter as a mode of subordination. This view is bolstered by Joanne Wright's essay, which excavates the political meaning of Locke's notes on midwifery. Wright shows that Locke's notes demonstrate his commitment to the use of wet nurses, which facilitated the "brood mare" ideal of annual pregnancy, and was connected to the political goals of producing male heirs for property transfer, augmenting population, and increasing national wealth (228). Her conclusion is that Locke "presupposes in his writings a traditionally hierarchical, aristocratic familial configuration founded upon the assumption of natural differences between the sexes" (234). If we put quotation marks around the term "natural" in the previous sentence, Wright's conclusions would seem to bolster Hirschmann's thesis as applied to gender.

The final triad of essays under consideration, by Terrell Carver, Carol Pech, and Linda Zerilli, are deeply informed by broadly post-structural sensibilities and theoretical investments. In a delightfully counterintuitive essay, Carver argues that while it is obviously true that Locke's texts "exclude and devalue women," it is also the case that they are simultaneously "hierarchically validating with respect to some kinds of men, in terms of some kinds of masculinities." In other words, "they are normative constructs requiring deconstruction" (188). On Carver's account, there are basically three kinds of "dominant masculinities" in Locke's *Two Treatises* which help to structure its narrative, and the subsequent power relations within society that flow from it: "One is related to the rational/bureaucratic masculinity of modern commerce, which he endorsed, and another is related to concepts of masculine tenderness and solicitude, of which he also approved. The third is related to the warrior mode of absolutism, conquest, and tyranny, which he deeply opposed." The benefit of reading Locke's texts through the gender lens of masculinity "is that it shows how he reconciled a residual patriarchy with his egalitarian principles of equality, legitimacy, and consent. He did this by drawing a strong contrast between an absolutist and irrational masculinity,

on the one hand, and a dual masculinity not just of competitive individuality but of fatherly care, on the other" (191).

But Pech's psychoanalytic reading of Locke's writings on money shows that he was perhaps not wholly capable of controlling the symbolic order of masculinity, as it were. Pech focuses on the widespread late seventeenth-century practice of coin shaving, or the "clipping controversy," which occurred hand in hand with the rise of a new view of money that she contends threatened Locke's narrative of masculinity. To combat it, she suggests, Locke turned to the "rhetorical attributes historically associated with the feminine—namely, a figurative language of fluidity and its attendant trope, metonymy." As such, Locke deployed traditionally feminine symbolism to fetishize money as silver in an attempt to "disavow the political and epistemological anxieties brought on by an increasingly abstract system of exchange" (270).

Finally, Zerilli closes the book with an outstanding essay that gives the lie to Locke's attempt to denigrate rhetorical writing as "perversion" (297), by showing that what Locke referred to as the "gaudy dress" of rhetoric was ultimately foundational, unquestioned, beyond reason, and necessary (298-99). By stressing the affective roots of Locke's associational epistemology, in particular, Zerilli counters widespread attempts, like Waldron's, to sever the putatively "rational choice structure" of the social contract story Locke tells—which is said to pack all the normative punch of his argument—from the quasi-anthropological tale of consent to kingship which he describes as taking place in the state of nature. Rather, Zerilli argues, "the problem for Locke as a political thinker is not to eliminate the affective basis of political association but to bind affect to a form or figure (the social contract) that symbolizes human freedom" (300). To do this, Locke relies heavily on the rhetorical structure of the anthropological narrative in an attempt to get his intended audience to "remember" the consensual roots of their polity. In reality, however, what Locke was actually doing with this story was forging a new association of ideas, to bind people affectively to a new creation myth of contract and consent to replace Filmer's, one which would be plausible to his readers beyond all questioning.

This is an incredibly rich and rewarding collection, one which unfolds like an ongoing argument and a standing invitation to its readers, beckoning them to roll up their sleeves and enter the fray. As is perhaps evident from this review, it is a temptation that is almost impossible to resist. All of these essays are first-rate, and undoubtedly capable of being read in a variety of different ways, just like Locke's texts. The volume is, in fact, a testament to the theoretical virtues of ambiguity. However, of one thing I am certain: anybody who cares at all about the history of modern political thought and philosophy should read this book.

Sex, Culture, and Justice: The Limits of Choice

Clare Chambers (University Park, Pennsylvania: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 2008). 304 pp. \$55.00 U.S. (cloth). ISBN: 978-0-271-03301-3

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When a person chooses to do something that harms or disadvantages her, of what significance is the fact that she chose to engage in the harmful practice? Must the state

respect her choice or does it have a responsibility to intervene? Such questions arise in discussions of female genital cutting, polygamous marriage, various forms of elective cosmetic surgery, and many other contemporary issues. While feminists often object to practices that harm women or reinforce sexist social structures, some contemporary liberal theorists argue that choice is politically significant and that it provides a reason to prohibit state intervention. In her clear and highly engaging book, Clare Chambers brings feminist attention to these pressing political questions. Emphasizing the significance of social construction, she argues that choice does not function as a “normative transformer,” making acceptable practices that would otherwise be unjust. Through careful examination of specific cases and critical analysis of contemporary liberal theory, Chambers works to construct an alternative liberal approach that acknowledges the deep-seated effects of social construction without forgoing universal normative principles.

In Part One of *Sex, Culture, and Justice*, Chambers draws on Michel Foucault and Pierre Bourdieu to argue that social construction is deeper and more wide-ranging than many liberals acknowledge. Because power creates and shapes persons, disciplining their bodies and structuring their desires, wanting to engage in a harmful practice is not a simple matter of “false” consciousness or “deformed” desires. Offering an example, she explains, “It would be impossible to say that a woman’s desire for breast implants were independent of patriarchal norms unless she lived in a nonpatriarchal society” (39). Employing Foucault’s concept of “genealogy” and Bourdieu’s concept of “habitus,” Chambers argues for heightened attention to socio-historical processes and greater awareness of how choices are developed, learned, and propagated through the body.

While Foucault and Bourdieu assist Chambers in developing an account of social construction, neither provides her with adequate normative resources for social critique. To criticize processes of social construction, feminists must appeal to principles that are universal, not themselves the product of patriarchal society. Thus, Chambers turns to feminists such as Catharine MacKinnon, Nancy Hirschmann, Nancy Fraser, and Iris Marion Young to explore how universal normative principles might be combined with a deep and critical understanding of social construction. After a quick assessment of these feminist approaches, Chambers outlines the critiques of universality offered by John Rawls, Joseph Raz, Will Kymlicka, and Richard Rorty. Ultimately, she concludes that, since it is “in the nature of liberal equality that it cannot be denied to people on the basis of characteristics such as gender, race, or culture,” a commitment to equality requires a commitment to universal principles (97). Thus, she defends a “comprehensive” version of liberalism in which equality and autonomy are not to be restricted to already liberal societies. Responding to feminist and multicultural worries about essentialism, Chambers explains that her account does not ground universal reality in objective features of humanity, or in essentialist accounts of gender, but rather in universal normative principles (91–92). Cultural practices must be limited by concerns of justice but, contrary to some critics’ worries, this does not entail the imposition of homogeneity or the overlooking of cultural differences (111–12).

In Part Two, Chambers fleshes out some of the details of her positive account, offers an analysis of autonomy, and responds to worries about paternalism and perfectionism. She begins by articulating two conditions—which she calls “disadvantage” and “influence”—that together suffice to render an individual’s choice unjust: (i) the chooser is harmed and disadvantaged in relation to those who choose differently; and (ii) the choosing group is pressured to make this choice, often influenced by

another group who chooses differently (120). Although liberals typically worry about state intervention into “private” matters of culture, Chambers argues that the state has a responsibility to combat disadvantageous social norms. Explaining how a state might implement her approach, she proposes an “equality tribunal” modeled after practices in employment discrimination law. Women suffering from sexist discrimination could bring evidence before the tribunal; thus, the government would intervene in the private lives of individuals, but only when requested by the disadvantaged parties. For example, a woman denied a divorce by her Muslim or Orthodox Jewish tradition could decide whether to appeal to the tribunal for justice.

In the final three chapters, Chambers introduces and employs a new distinction between types of autonomy: second-order autonomy consists in the freedom to choose and pursue one’s own conception of the good, and it is the type most valued by political liberals, such as John Rawls and Martha Nussbaum. In contrast, first-order autonomy involves critically examining and following everyday rules and norms. For example, in choosing to live as a nun, one may exhibit second-order autonomy while simultaneously forgoing a great deal of first-order autonomy. To political liberals, as long as a person has chosen to live in accordance with a specific way of life, sacrificing daily freedoms associated with this way of life is acceptable. Chambers disagrees; lack of first-order autonomy may be the first indication of oppression or social injustice, and thus is worthy of political attention. Under her more “comprehensive” version of liberalism, having the ability to choose and pursue a “conception of the good” does not suffice to make one free: questions of disadvantage and influence (the factors described above) must always be considered. Thus, she argues that female genital mutilation (FGM) and many elective cosmetic surgeries—such as breast augmentation—are unjust, since they meet the criteria of “disadvantage” and “influence,” even when chosen in accordance with one’s life plan. Although political liberals such as Nussbaum also object to some such practices (FGM, for example), Chambers argues that their emphasis on second-order autonomy is inadequate to ground their objections.

In the end, Chambers seems willingly to concede that her approach might be considered paternalistic. She accepts this consequence because liberalism does not simply aim to maximize autonomy at all costs; other values such as equality and well-being must also be considered (229). And while she shares with liberal perfectionists the desire to use the state to protect and enhance autonomy, she distances herself from some versions of perfectionism that justify “restrictive culturally defined ways of life” as compatible with autonomy (233). Using Joseph Raz as an example, she suggests that liberal perfectionists share with political liberals the view that only second-order autonomy is politically significant: as long as one has freely chosen a certain way of life (such as living as a nun), other restrictions on one’s everyday liberties can be sacrificed without a politically significant loss. Reiterating her position, Chambers rejects this view and contends that the acceptability of autonomy restrictions depends on the specific meanings of the restrictions and whether they are oppressive.

In short, *Sex, Culture, and Justice* offers a powerful critique of how appeals to choice can justify various social practices that subordinate women. Through an extended discussion of several examples, Chambers demonstrates clearly just what is at stake in these theoretical debates. Moreover, her examples do not focus exclusively on the choices of women in “other” cultures or on the choices of Western women. Thus, she manages to avoid much of the imperialism and ethnocentrism associated with some previous feminist accounts of culture and

choice. Nonetheless, while her discussion of specific issues is illuminating, there are times when she seems to move too quickly in outlining the various theories she criticizes. Although this may frustrate some readers, those already familiar with these debates are likely to find her overviews helpful and her description of others' theories accurate. Another minor weakness with the book is that Chambers' one specific proposal, that the state establish equality tribunals, raises a host of unanswered questions: Why would women who are disadvantaged by a culture, tradition, or way of life that they have chosen decide to appeal to the tribunal in the first place? And who would sit on these tribunals—members of that particular culture, or others from outside that culture? Although an extended discussion of specific policies would be outside the scope of this book, it would be helpful if she addressed these questions in greater detail. In short, Chambers does an excellent job of exploring the difficulties that liberal theorists face in reconciling their commitment to choice with a feminist account of social construction. While she provides no easy answers to the questions she raises, she clarifies what is at stake, identifies the theoretical challenges, and begins the difficult work of addressing these tensions.

The Sublime, Terror, and Human Difference

Christine Battersby (London and New York: Routledge, 2007). 226 pp. \$120 U.S. (cloth); \$35.95 U.S. (paper). ISBN: 9780415148108 (cloth); ISBN: 9780415148115 (paper).

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In *The Sublime, Terror, and Human Difference*, Christine Battersby offers nuanced readings of conceptions of the sublime that begin with the coinage of the term via a sixteenth-century Latin translation of a Greek text on rhetoric that is attributed to Longinus, who lived sometime in the first through third century. As this tracing shows, Battersby's knowledge of the history of interest in the sublime is detailed, and Battersby uses her ability to maneuver among the historical details in her development of a careful argument about the masculinity and eurocentricity of the idea of the sublime that is intended as a redeeming critique; namely, a critique that, while calling attention to the limitations of the concept of the sublime, aims to transcend these limitations by refurbishing the concept for the present and the future.

The present and the future weigh heavily on *The Sublime, Terror, and Human Difference*. Battersby is writing with a sense of urgency that follows for her from the events of September 11, 2001, and the entry of terrorism onto a stage quite different from the one it occupied prior to the spectacular Al Qaeda attacks on the twin towers of the World Trade Center and the Pentagon. Battersby begins the second chapter of her book with a discussion of comments made about the Al Qaeda attacks by Karlheinz Stockhausen, the avant-garde composer who immediately after the attacks of September 11, 2001, claimed that they constituted "the biggest work of art anywhere" (21). Battersby suggests that the claim draws on Friedrich Schiller's account of sublime art, according to which the experience of a sublime work of art leads from terror to spirituality. She turns to contrast this account with a close reading of Immanuel Kant that she believes has affinities with Jean-François Lyotard's reading of Kant. Schiller, though familiar with and indebted to Kant, nonetheless seems to be closer to Edmund Burke of

the 1757/1759 *A Philosophical Enquiry into the Origin of Our Ideas of the Sublime and Beautiful*, where Burke argues that secondhand terror (though not a firsthand experience of it) is the source of the sublime.

According to Battersby, who devotes several chapters of the book to her reading of Kant, Kant develops the concept of the sublime with reference not to works of art but to nature. According to her reading of Kant, Kant believes that the experience of the sublime involves a "negative pleasure" (29) that arises from a double movement that happens because both the empirical object to which one responds and reason which is mobilized by the experience of the empirical object impact on the imagination, with the empirical object pulling toward particularity and reason toward universality. It is the experience of this double movement that terrifies due to the inability of the person undergoing it to resolve the tension between the two opposed movements.

Battersby suggests that for Kant the feelings that are part of the experience of the sublime—such as the sense of wonder, reverence, astonishment, and fear—are, in principle, communicable to everyone. In actuality, though, this is not so since Kant does not believe that everyone can experience the sublime. As Battersby shows in chapters three and four, Kant's sexism and orientalism result in the exclusion of women and members of different oriental cultures, including Jews and Muslims, from a full experience of the sublime and, as a result, its communication. Unable to experience the sublime fully or at all, women and "orientals" have nothing to communicate about the sublime and are also incapable of understanding someone else's experience of the sublime.

In an interesting response to Kant's sexism Battersby presents a kind of empirical evidence for the contrary position, namely, the works of women who are aware of the masculinity of the Western notion of the sublime and attempt to rework it in their art. Battersby does not do the same for orientalism, and, indeed, while one of the strengths of *The Sublime, Terror, and Human Difference* is its analysis of the orientalism of the Western notion of the sublime, one of its weaknesses is that much more of Battersby's attention is on Western sexism with respect to the sublime and the damage that this form of sexism causes women. One is left to guess whether "orientals" suffer a similar damage and about the intersectional or any other amalgam of identities' experience of exclusion from the sublime. Even so, because her work is so careful, one can imagine what kind of analyses are needed in order to respond to Kant's and other orientalisms in works on the sublime.

Not only in this respect but also others, the strengths of *The Sublime, Terror, and Human Difference* outweigh the book's few weaknesses. The argument that Battersby develops for a notion of the sublime that builds on Kant rather than Burke is a bit indirect. But her detours into discussions of Kant's detractors (such as Friedrich Hegel and the German romantics), their detractors (such as Friedrich Nietzsche), and Kant's critical supporters (such as Lyotard), because they map carefully the rather complex temporal topography of the concept of the sublime, are quite persuasive with respect to the possibilities that are contained in Kant's ideas about the sublime, exactly because they begin with a rejection of the Burkean connection of terror and sublimity.

But if terror is not necessarily linked to the experience of the sublime and the aestheticization of terror is properly suspect, aesthetics may seem to lack any useful tools for thinking about terror. This is not so, according to Battersby, who toward the end of *The Sublime, Terror, and Human Difference* turns to the work of Hannah Arendt because Arendt politicizes Kant's ideas about aesthetic judgment. Arendt's resulting account of

the procedures for political judgment, Battersby suggests, is crucial and productive for a future-looking present for which the central event is “the rise of terrorism” (204) due to its centering of the “human judge,” who is always located in the intersection of “anticipation and remembrance” (205), or, more precisely, anticipations and remembrances, and their multiple narrations, navigating through tensions without freezing the past and the future and thereby alienating human action, making it impossible to understand it and to change.

For Battersby, it is Arendt that facilitates her own theorization of the sublime in the present. Battersby describes herself as tempted to set aside thinking about the sublime after the events of September 11, 2001, and not doing so having learned from Arendt to connect the aesthetic and the political. Her investigation into the blind-spots that can be found in the history of the sublime are, according to her, a concrete connection of this sort, which she hopes contributes to current debates about intolerance and justice.

Battersby might seem to be forcing relations when she hooks the aesthetic and the political via Arendt’s work. I, however, find her book refreshing and suggestive even as I wish that she spent more of *The Sublime, Terror, and Human Difference* drawing clearer connections among all three major terms of the title. It is the lack of clearer articulations of this sort that has left me at times thinking that Battersby remains within the realm of aesthetic theory more than she might actually like.

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ANNOUNCEMENTS

Shifting the Geography of Reason: Migrations and Diasporas

August 12-15, 2009. Miami, Florida, United States

Proposals aim to “shift the geography of reason” by exploring critical, theoretical, and creative questions about or relating to the Caribbean, its Diaspora, and the “global south” more generally, including the South in the North. Organized by: Caribbean Philosophical Association

Website: <http://www.temple.edu/isrst/events/CPA.asp>. Contact Nelson Maldonado-Torres

Society for Ethical Theory and Political Philosophy, Third Annual Conference

April 23-25, 2009. Northwestern University

For more information, contact Jon Garthoff garthoff@northwestern.edu or visit the conference website: <http://www.philosophy.northwestern.edu/conferences/moralpolitical/>

PIKSI 09 FEAST/APA

Philosophy in an Inclusive Key: A Summer Institute for Undergraduates

July 26-August 2, 2009. Rock Ethics Institute, The Pennsylvania State University

Applications due: April 15, 2009 • For more details see <http://rockethics.psu.edu/piksi>

Human Rights in the USA: A Conference at the University of Connecticut

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FEAST: The Association for Feminist Ethics And Social Theory

Fall 2009 conference

September 24-27, 2009. Clearwater Beach, Florida. For more information visit <http://www.afeast.org/> Questions may be directed to Lisa Schwartzman: lhschwar@msu.edu

Philosophical Inquiry into Pregnancy, Childbirth, and Mothering Conference

May 14-16, 2009. University of Oregon. For additional information please visit <http://philosophy.uoregon.edu/events.html>

National Women's Studies Association Conference: Difficult Dialogues

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For more information visit Hypatia editorial office: hypatia@u.washington.edu and the Hypatia website: <http://depts.washington.edu/hypatia/>

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International Association for the Study of Environment, Space, and Place

For further information contact John Murungi, IASESP, jmurungi@towson.edu and visit www.towson.edu/iasesp