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ANNOUNCEMENTS
Now that we're all better informed about the state of women in philosophy—a mere 21 percent or slightly less of the professionally employed philosophers—we can turn to explore some means by which the situation can be improved. As with all reform movements, part of the challenge, perhaps the most important, is recognizing that there is a problem. This is the major task of reform. Knowing what the problem is, is but part of the challenge. We must, together, work out a remedy, or remedies, for it. This issue of the Newsletter focuses our professional attention on some of the ways in which we might undertake to correct the under-representation of women in professional philosophy.

This issue, as with my first, is based upon the prior work of the excellent and dedicated members of the Committee on the Status of Women, who have constructed panels on various professional concerns over the years. The panel on which this issue is built was entitled, “Strategizing Changes in the Culture and Ideology of Philosophy,” organized by Robin Dillon, and held at the Central APA meeting in the spring of 2008. With an introduction by Robin, and articles by Ann Garry, Sharon Crasnow, and Alice MacLachlan, they offer insight, clarity, and promise for change. The strategies they offer range from individual “take control where you can” empowerment to collective responsibility to build the profession from the ground up. As Sharon argues, we have to increase the number of women in undergraduate philosophy programs to increase the flow of excellent caliber women into graduate programs and into careers as philosophers if we stand a chance of changing the profession for the better.

On this same theme, but by way of suggestions for making your way from graduate school into a job as a feminist philosopher, Lisa Cassidy and Sophia Isako Wong offer the compiled wisdom of participants at a recent FEAST conference on the subject of survival strategies for feminist philosophers. Their article offers an eleven-step program for surviving grad school, getting a job, and keeping it. The more women and feminist philosophers who survive these turbulent career stages the greater likelihood the future of philosophy will be one in which women are closer to representative in number and in talent.

It is important to note, however, that this issue—the under-representation of women, and indeed of every other minority and marginalized group—should not be a concern only or exclusively of women. Though those negatively affected by their marginalization tend to be the most interested in eliminating it, there is reason for every philosopher to be concerned about how little the demographics of the profession reflect the demographic composition of the broader society. Presumably, philosophical talent, as every other sort of talent, can be found in anyone—that is to say, a talented philosopher can come from anywhere and can have been anyone. It should not be assumed that women simply don’t want to do philosophy or don’t want to become philosophers, as though this illusion of personal choice or preference excuses any effort to enhance the representation of women in philosophy.

We must ask, Why is it that women are more inclined to study theoretical physics than philosophy? To study history than to study philosophy? To become accountants than to become philosophers? To do calculus than philosophy? Each of these traditionally male disciplines has succeeded in recent years to enhance the presence of women among their ranks, not only at the level of undergraduate major selection, but also at the level of professional academics. With the exception of philosophy, women have made enormous and remarkable strides, with great effort and with strategic support. Women in philosophy have been striving, with great effort, but with limited or no strategic support. The numbers reflect it. It is easy to feel disempowered, disillusioned, and dejected when confronted with the challenge. But, we need not succumb to such feelings. We need to work together, supportively and in solidarity, with other like-minded colleagues who share a vision of philosophy that is inclusive, representative, and thriving—from the ground up. Read on, and find hope!
SUBMISSION GUIDELINES AND INFORMATION

1. Purpose: The purpose of the Newsletter is to publish information about the status of women in philosophy and to make the resources of feminist philosophy more widely available. The Newsletter contains discussions of recent developments in feminist philosophy and related work in other disciplines, literature overviews and book reviews, suggestions for eliminating gender bias in the traditional philosophy curriculum, and reflections on feminist pedagogy. It also informs the profession about the work of the APA Committee on the Status of Women. Articles submitted to the Newsletter should be limited to ten double-spaced pages and must follow the APA guidelines for gender-neutral language. Please submit essays electronically to the editor or send four copies of essays via regular mail. All manuscripts should be prepared for anonymous review. References should follow The Chicago Manual of Style.

2. Book Reviews and Reviewers: If you have published a book that is appropriate for review in the Newsletter, please have your publisher send us a copy of your book. We are always seeking new book reviewers. To volunteer to review books (or some particular book), please send the editor a CV and letter of interest, including mention of your areas of research and teaching.

3. Where to Send Things: Please send all articles, comments, suggestions, books, and other communications to the editor: Dr. Christina Bellon, Department of Philosophy, Sacramento State University, 6000 J Street, Sacramento, CA 95819-6033, bellon@csus.edu.

4. Submission Deadlines: Submissions for Spring issues are due by the preceding September 1st; submissions for Fall issues are due by the preceding February 1st.

NEWS FROM THE COMMITTEE ON THE STATUS OF WOMEN

We look forward to another exciting year of work as the CSW welcomed its new members on July 1st: Cynthia Coe (Central Washington University), Kathryn Norlock (St. Mary’s College Maryland), and Diane Michelfelder (Macalester College). We also welcomed a new Associate Chair—Peggy DesAutels (University of Dayton). These new members bring a wealth of experience and energy to our work. This means it is time to say goodbye to Miriam Solomon, Bat-Ami Bar On, and Robin Dillon. I would like to thank them for their work. I know they will continue to support the efforts of this committee and women in philosophy in general.

Last fall the CSW was up for review by the APA Board. I went to the Board meeting and discussed our past work and our concerns about the data available from the National Office. They continue to work to address this issue and understand it affects the work of all the committees.

We continue to be active putting together interesting sessions for the various divisions of the APA. So far this year we had a session on Mid-career Issues at the Central APA meeting and at the Pacific APA meeting. You can get a taste of the three panels we have had on mid-career issues in the next Newsletter.

At the 2009 Eastern APA meeting there will be a session on hiring and pre-tenure advice and one on gender issues connected to journal publications.

Handling the Hiring Process and Pre-tenure Life: This session will provide reflections and advice on the process of presenting oneself on paper, in an interview, at the receptions, and on campus. It will also discuss negotiating a contract, understanding tenure and promotion requirements, and strategies for balancing teaching, scholarship, and service in the pre-tenure years.

Examining Journals: This session will examine a variety of journals in philosophy. Following up on previous reporting about submission and acceptance rates, this discussion will look more deeply at several specific journals to see if there is any gender bias in what gets published and, if so, what the causes of such bias might be. We will also make suggestions for overcoming any such bias.

We welcome your ideas for future sessions.

We continue with our project with the National Office to gather membership and job placement information so that we can get more information on the status of women in the profession. Chesire Calhoun, as chair of the Inclusiveness Committee, is taking the lead this year.

I would also like to take this opportunity to congratulate Christina Bellon on a successful transition into the job of editing this Newsletter. We look forward to many more interesting issues.

The Committee will meet again at the Eastern APA meeting. Thank you to everyone on the Committee for all the work you have done. And thank you to everyone who supports the work we do.

Erin McKenna, Ph.D.
Professor of Philosophy, Pacific Lutheran University
Chair, APA Committee on the Status of Women

ARTICLES

Strategizing Changes in the Culture and Ideology of Philosophy: An Introduction

Robin S. Dillon
Lehigh University

One of the perks of serving on the APA’s Committee on the Status of Women, as I have done for the past several years, is the opportunity to organize sessions at the various APA meetings. In spring 2008 I organized a session at the Pacific APA meeting with the title “Strategizing Changes in the Culture and Ideology of Philosophy.” The session was co-sponsored by the Society for Analytic Philosophy and the Association for Feminist Ethics and Social Theory, organizations of which I am also a member.

The idea for the session came from the great flurry of responses generated by a CSW session at the 2007 Central APA meeting entitled, “Why are women only 21% of philosophy?” At that session, Sharon Crasnow, Elizabeth Minnich, Abigail Stewart, and Sally Haslanger addressed the continuing low number and low status of women in philosophy. Sally’s paper, “Changing the Culture and Ideology of Philosophy: Not by
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for otherwise isolated feminist philosophers. As she explains
an online network providing peer support regarding publishing
participating in the session after she announced the creation of
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that, as she says, "can be helpful both for the information they
tremendous service by identifying a raft of online resources
participation of women from receiving the Ph.D. to getting a job;
philosophy; what might account for the significant drop in the
issues that surfaced in addressing the pressing practical
concerns facing academic women in general and women
philosophers in particular. Ann, Sharon, and Alice agreed to
write up their session remarks after the fact; their essays follow
this introduction.

Ann Garry is a professor of philosophy at California State
University--Los Angeles, and a former director of the Center
for the Study of Gender and Sexuality. As one of the founders
of Pacific SWIP and of Hypatia and a member of an early
incarnation of the CSW, Ann has labored for a number of years to
hatch out and secure spaces for women in philosophy. I asked
to be on the panel after she participated in a discussion on the
FEAST listserv about the need for senior women philosophers
to be active in helping to increase the number of women at
all levels, fostering feminist women staying in philosophy,
and providing support for otherwise isolated feminist women
philosophers. Ann’s essay, like her session remarks, has two
parts. First, she summarizes many of the issues that surfaced in
the listserves and in our session, among which are: why women
philosophers care about increasing the numbers of currently
underrepresented populations in academic philosophy; how
to encourage women and members of under-represented
groups to participate in philosophy, particularly as majors in
philosophy; what might account for the significant drop in the
participation of women from receiving the Ph.D. to getting a job;
some of the needs employed women philosophers have; and
what senior faculty members can do to mentor younger women
philosophers. In the second part of her essay, Ann provides a
tremendous service by identifying a raft of online resources
that, as she says, “can be helpful both for the information they
contain and for decreasing someone’s sense of isolation.”
One of those online resources was established by Alice
MacLachlan, whose essay follows Ann’s. Alice, who is now in
her second year as an assistant professor of philosophy at York
University, did her graduate work in a department that had
no feminist philosophy courses, no professor specializing in
feminist philosophy, and only one tenured woman philosopher
professor at the time she was there. To ameliorate the lack
of support and feminist community, Alice established a
variety of feminist resources, including a reading group with
graduate students at local universities. I contacted her about
participating in the session after she announced the creation of
an online network providing peer support regarding publishing
for otherwise isolated feminist philosophers. As she explains
in her essay, the idea for the network was a simple one: “a
virtual meeting place that was easy to access, simple to use,
and could fulfill one simple function: if you had a paper and
wanted someone to read it, you could go to this venue, send
out a message and ask. In return, it was understood, we would
all occasionally volunteer to read other people’s papers, if and
when we could.” The network, “Feminist Philosophy Draft
Exchange,” which has been up and running since October 2007,
is accessible through Google Groups (http://groups.google.com/
group/feministdraftexchange) and on Facebook (http://www.
Her essay details the activity (as well as the frustrating lack
thereof) of the network.

The third contributor to the session and this forum is
Sharon Crasnow, who is an associate professor of philosophy
at Riverside Community College, president of the Society for
Analytic Feminism, and a former member of the CSW. Sharon
was one of the panelists in the 2007 Central CSW session
and also presented a paper in a 2005 Central CSW session
on strategies for responding to gender-based inequities in
philosophy, so she brought a special set of experiences and
insight to our session. Her remarks, which began by noting
some of the ways in which the experiences of women in other
academic disciplines are similar to and different from those of
professional women philosophers, focused on various activities,
especially by the CSW, to examine and increase the numbers of
women in philosophy. Her essay published here, written a year
after the 2008 session and reflecting, as she says, “the frustration
that so many of us feel that we are still talking about the issue
and still not seeing much difference,” addresses the issues
in a somewhat different way. Asking three questions—What
is the problem? Where is the problem? What should we do
about the problem?—Sharon focuses on the second. Although
the statistics she marshals make it clear that at each of the
stages through which a career in philosophy is built, there is
significantly lower participation of women, the most important
stage the undergraduate level, where only 30 percent of
philosophy majors are women. If the pipeline feeding women
into the upper ranks of professional philosophy is a leaky one,
then it is essential that more women enter the pipeline. Some
of the strategies Ann identifies in her essay focus on how to
recruit and members of other under-represented as
philosophy majors. But, arguing that inasmuch as the problem
of under-representation of women and other groups is not
just a problem for women philosophers but for philosophy
itself, Sharon concludes that a profession-wide conversation
about how to increase significantly the numbers of women as
undergraduate philosophy majors should be a “top priority
for the APA, but more importantly,...for any philosopher who
cares about the future of the profession.”

In the CSW session, the panelists’ opening remarks
identified a number of strategies for changing the culture
and ideology of philosophy. The ensuing discussion, which
involved members of the session audience (a surprisingly,
disappointingly small group), ranged from observations about
the current conditions for women at the speakers’ institutions
to general advice for those interested in advancing women in
philosophy (“build communities”) to warnings about burn-out
and co-optation to specific strategies that could be employed
personally or collectively and at various institutional levels to
worry about the frequent identification of “feminist” with
“women.” The latter worry took two forms: first, an expression
of anger on the part of women philosophers who do not identify
as feminist both at the permanent assumption, on the part of hiring
committees, colleagues, and students, that since all women
philosophers are feminist, they must be feminist philosophers
and at the tendency of discussions about women in philosophy
to assume that securing broad acceptance of feminist

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approaches to philosophizing adequately addresses any issues they might have as women in the profession, and, second, the noting of “a new exclusion of women from philosophy,” which involves including women on panels at professional meetings to talk about the subject, say epistemology, as a feminist, but not as an epistemologist, and “purifying” the main programs of such meetings by relegating the contributions of women philosophers to panels just about feminist this or that.

In addition to the strategies identified by the panelists, the following were also discussed:

- Philosophers should work to make the culture of philosophy education less combative and more inclusively interactive, by, for example, having or attending workshops that teach methods of increasing engagement of students and active learning strategies. Philosophers could encourage the faculty development offices of their institutions to develop such workshops and to make them a campus-wide project.

- Women should run for APA national and divisional committees and offices, especially national committees other than the Committee on the Status of Women and divisional program committees, “because the APA officers are constantly consulted by schools,” and because of opportunities to “control professional practice” and to increase the discipline’s exposure to philosophy by women.

- Women should become departmental directors of graduate and undergraduate education and of department curriculum committees.

- Faculty members should make clear to the upper administrations of their academic institutions a lesson that the business and legal professions have learned, that women are an under-valued resource that it is stupid to let go to waste, and should lobby administrators to put pressure on hiring committees to make sure that women are more actively recruited for jobs and to exercise more rigorous oversight of tenure and promotion committees to make sure that discrimination, whether blatant or subtle, is not inhibiting women’s career advancement. (One person suggested forming “SWAT teams” to engage in this lobbying; another advocated a “nice squad” approach to cultivate important relationships with folks who are currently hostile; a third recommended seeking or making use of allies across campus.)

- An oral history should be developed and published that speaks about the experiences of women in philosophy, in order to document problems encountered, strategies employed, and advances achieved.

- Departments and hiring committees should be encouraged not to assume that women job candidates or faculty members are teachers or scholars of feminist philosophy or to discount women philosophers who are not teachers or scholars of feminist philosophers, but to recognize that it is important that women and members of other underrepresented groups do and teach philosophy because it is important to philosophy that many different viewpoints, and not just feminist viewpoints, are incorporated into scholarship and teaching.

- It is important to fight for things that don’t look like projects that focus on increasing representation of women, such as spousal hires and graduate students voting on department hires.

- To avoid the “ghettoizing” of philosophy done by women, women philosophers, including but not exclusively feminist philosophers, should try to present and publish in venues other than those in which women or feminist philosophers are already a significant presence.

As one discussant noted, “the academic world is not rational,” and as Sally Haslanger noted in the essay that prompted this session, philosophy will not be changed by reason alone. It is hoped that the strategies identified in the essays here will prove both to be useful in themselves and to be catalysts for further thinking, discussing, and working to change the culture and ideology of philosophy in ways that not only improve the field for women but improve philosophy itself.

**Endnotes**

1. Editor’s Note: Three of these papers, by Crasnow, Minnich, and Stewart, were published in the *APA Newsletter on Feminism and Philosophy* 08:1 (Spring 2009).


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**What is on Women Philosophers’ Minds?**

**Ann Garry**

*California State University–Los Angeles*

Women philosophers at various stages in their careers have been discussing a number of thorny professional issues and concerns on feminist organizations’ list-serves, particularly SWIP-L (Society for Women in Philosophy) and FEAST-L (Feminist Ethics and Social Theory). This discussion was generated in part by panels sponsored by the APA Committee on the Status of Women starting in the spring of 2007. I will briefly sketch some of the issues raised on the list-serves and at the APA Pacific Division meeting in March 2008. interspersed with the views of others I include informal personal commentary.

**Issues**

The set of issues discussed on the list-serves encompasses ways to encourage and support women of all backgrounds and men of color at all stages in the profession of philosophy. So, while my focus here is on “women,” keep in mind that it is part of a broader concern with “under-represented people.” In the case of those who have already chosen academic philosophy as a career, there is little controversy about what needs to be done: we clearly need to support each other as graduate students, as potential colleagues, and as colleagues. On the other hand, there are issues to be raised about encouraging under-represented students (indeed, anyone) to go into academic philosophy. Those of us in the academy need to ask ourselves about our motivations. Do we encourage under-represented students in our own self-interest in order to have future colleagues who are more congenial to our values and our work? In order to change the demographics of the profession for reasons of equity or because we believe it will change the way philosophy is done? Is it a cognitive loss to philosophy that it is done predominantly by white men? Do we hope or expect that our students’ lives will be happier if they can do what they believe they will most enjoy? Or is it something I have not captured here at all?

Even if we do not have full answers to the questions I just posed, it is clear that if we are encouraging members of under-represented groups to become professional philosophers, we need to be very active in trying to change the hostile aspects of our professional environment. This hostile atmosphere has been
noted by many philosophers of color. For example, in 2007 at the first meeting of the Collegium of Black Women Philosophers, Anita Allen gave an address in which she spoke candidly about the hostile atmosphere in professional philosophy for women of color. In spite of a small increase in the number of women of color, she said, “philosophy still feels to me like an isolated profession.” There is much work to be done here.

If we are going to encourage women and members of other under-represented groups to become professional philosophers or even to major in philosophy as undergraduates, consider the suggestions below that were offered online. I am sure that other ideas can be found on list-serves on teaching philosophy and in APA Newsletter essays.

- Stop using elitist/classist/racist/misogynist examples in logic and essays that have these characteristics in other philosophy classes.
- Work with teaching assistants so that they do not discourage women or turn them off to philosophy.
- Send a letter in hard copy to everyone who got an A in an introductory philosophy class inviting them to consider being a philosophy major or minor.
- One undergraduate department significantly deemphasizes metaphysics and epistemology in favor of social philosophy and ethics. I confess that this bothers me, but one could at least create options in the major that include more social philosophy if women seem more interested in it.
- Point out the various kinds of graduate work and jobs for which philosophy is helpful.

Most of us believe from anecdotal evidence that there is attrition at every step as women philosophy students advance from undergraduate majors to graduate school, then to academic positions. However, Miriam Solomon and John Clarke, in their “CSW Jobs for Philosophers Employment Study,” found that there is “little, if any, attrition of women between undergraduate majors and Ph.D. graduates.” The U.S. National Center for Education Statistics shows that women receive 30.8% of Bachelor’s degrees in Philosophy in 2007; the National Opinion Research Center shows women receiving 25% to 33% of Ph.D.’s in Philosophy (without a growth pattern) from 1997-2006; in 2006 it was 29%. I found these data very surprising (Miriam Solomon assured me in an email message that she did as well).

In the step between obtaining a Ph.D. and securing an academic position in philosophy the numbers are mixed. Women hold approximately 21% of philosophy positions so are not represented at the same level as Ph.D. recipients. Solomon and Clarke point out that the attrition levels in philosophy and the physical sciences are comparable. However, in the 2006-2007 data on hiring in philosophy that Solomon and Clarke compiled, women received approximately one-third of the appointments. They note, and I would certainly concur, that more work needs to be done on the details. Nevertheless, at this point there is still attrition between receiving a Ph.D. and obtaining an academic position.

On the list-serves participants discussed the reasons that women sometimes do not apply for academic jobs (or for higher numbers of jobs) after they receive their Ph.D.s.

- Two groups should be thought of separately: feminist philosophers and women who do not specialize in feminist philosophy might have different (though overlapping) sets of issues.
- Some women have geographical limitations so apply for fewer positions.

- Some people maintained that women apply in smaller numbers to “AOS open” positions. Candidates believe that such positions are wired or that there will be too much competition. They also cited the cost of each application.
- In my own anecdotal experience on appointments committees, women are less likely than men to apply for positions for which their backgrounds are wildly unsuited. They also seem somewhat less likely to stretch their AOC’s into AOS’s.
- Participants offered their own departmental statistics: often the number of women applicants was very low, between 10%-15%.
- My own department recruited for two positions in 2007-2008. Candidates could apply to either or both positions: (1) AOS: ethics/social political philosophy, (2) AOS: open—with several disjunctive AOC’s: feminist theory, race theory, applied ethics, East Asian philosophy, or Latin American philosophy. Most women applied for both—29% of these applicants were women. Of those applying for only the ethics/social political position, 12.3% were women. Applicants seeking only the open position were 21.5% women.
- In 2008-2009 my department’s percentages were as follows: A position in Chinese philosophy drew 17.4% women, most with degrees in Asian Studies, not in Philosophy. Not surprisingly, our position listed as “AOS or strong AOC in feminist philosophy” drew 75% women applicants.

Also discussed were various other hiring concerns:
- Ways to make job searches easier, fairer, and less expensive for candidates. For example, drop APA interviews in favor of interviews using Skype or its competitors; use completely electronic applications (or, at a minimum, electronic writing samples).
- If you specialize in feminist x (e.g., feminist philosophy of science) will you be taken seriously for an “AOS: x” position? Negative answers were common.
- Contract negotiations before accepting a job: What to demand, how to find out what to demand? (My quick view: you have the most power with respect to your dean before accepting a position. Your base salary carries over to many future raises. Don’t compromise easily on salary in exchange for a higher one-time payment for travel or moving.)
- There is a strong desire among women on the job market to network in a systematic way with others who can be mentors. Through FEAST and other organizations a few (but very few) volunteers have come forward. To my knowledge, there is no good structure in place for mentoring.
- From the side of the hiring faculty members: How do you best talk to your colleagues about the importance of hiring women, people of color, or other underrepresented groups? Should your strategies vary depending on whether you are the only woman? Should you give your colleagues essays to read as background?

Once women find positions they want information and mentoring on many topics. Here are some examples.
- How do you balance teaching, research, and extra-work life? What can you expect to improve after your first year? Can you get research done during your first
year of teaching? If you have children, what does that do to the balance? (Suggestions here included are strategies I have certainly never managed to adopt, for example, to write a few hours every morning before you do anything else and systematically cut down the time you spend preparing for class.)

- Joint-appointments: How do you navigate tenure and dual sets of demands? Even if you have a clear set of expectations laid out when you begin teaching, are expectations likely to creep up as years pass?
- How do you deal with difficult male, sexist students who show disrespect for you, especially when your colleagues tell you that these students aren’t really sexist?
- Just as for job candidates, new faculty members need a structured system of mentoring. There have been some good panels at professional meetings such as FEAST that led to a few volunteer mentors, but to date there is still no structure.

As a senior faculty member you are not finished. For example,

- You need to socialize younger colleagues who might or might not be initially sympathetic with your goals. Even if you have younger feminist colleagues, do not place the entire burden on them to do it. Your voice carries more weight than you probably believe it does.
- You should be willing to write tenure and promotion letters for other feminists and women.
- You probably will need to take on way too many tasks and serve on too many committees until you have other people with good values to do these things.
- You should serve in visible positions, for example, be involved with the APA or other professional organizations, be willing to act as an external reviewer for program review or on panels such as for the Leiter Report (this last is controversial because of its structure and method as well as the uses made of it).

Of course, other issues were raised concerning a range of inequities and biases, for example,

- Many philosophy journals still do not practice anonymous review. The APA Committee on the Status of Women was tackling this problem in 1975-1980 when I first served on the committee. It, along with childcare at professional meetings, seems to be one of the enduring problems of philosophy.
- Many criticisms were raised concerning the ways in which the Leiter Report biases a variety of facets of professional philosophy.

**Online resources**

Finally, many sources are available to us online. They can be helpful both for the information they contain and for decreasing someone’s sense of isolation. The list below contains examples of several types of web resources. Most of the sites contain links to further resources.

**Websites that speak to the status of women or gender equity projects more broadly than philosophy:**

- Virginia Valian’s gender equity project: www.hunter.cuny.edu/genderequity/equitymaterials.html
- Barnard study, *Women, Work and the Academy Report*, that Alison Wylie co-authored, which can be found on two different sites:
  - [Barnard study](http://www.barnard.edu/brcw/womenandwork/description.htm)
  - [Barnard study](http://www.barnard.edu/brcw/womenandwork/description.htm)

**Websites focused on status of women or related issues in philosophy:**

- APA Committee on the Status of Women. There are many different “resource” links on the site: [www.apaonline.org/governance/committees/women/index.aspx](http://www.apaonline.org/governance/committees/women/index.aspx)
- Noelle McAfee’s Wiki on which data is to be posted and issues discussed. Email noelle_mcafee@mac.com to join it in order to contribute: [http://philosophydata.wikispaces.com](http://philosophydata.wikispaces.com)

**Websites of philosophy organizations for women or feminists:**

- Society for Women in Philosophy: [www.uh.edu/~cfreelan/SWIP/index.html](http://www.uh.edu/~cfreelan/SWIP/index.html)
- Collegium of Black Women Philosophers: [www.vanderbilt.edu/cbwp/](http://www.vanderbilt.edu/cbwp/)
- Feminist Ethics and Social Theory (FEAST): [www.afeast.org](http://www.afeast.org)

**Websites of philosophers that contain many links and helpful information:**

- Sally Haslanger’s website lists many links to feminist sites including blogs: [http://web.mac.com/shaslang/Sally_Haslanger/Links_,etc..html](http://web.mac.com/shaslang/Sally_Haslanger/Links_,etc..html)
- including links to the Symposium on Gender, Race, and Philosophy [http://web.mac.com/shaslang/SGRP/Welcome.html](http://web.mac.com/shaslang/SGRP/Welcome.html)
- and to her own paper that kicked off much of this discussion, “Changing the Ideology and Culture of Philosophy: Not by Reason Alone,” *Hypatia*
Elizabeth Anderson's Race, Gender and Affirmative Action Resource Page for Teaching and Study (contains a very long bibliography): www-personal.umich.edu/~eandersn/biblio.htm

Other sites of relevance:
- Feminist Philosophy Draft Exchange (a Google group that can be joined): http://groups.google.com/group/feministdraftexchange/
- Philosophy in an Inclusive Key Summer Institute (PIKSI) for under-represented undergraduates: http://rocketethics.psu.edu/education/piksi

A Few Blogs:
- Knowledge and Experience: http://knowledgeandexperience.blogspot.com. Of special note here (among the many facets of the site) is Evelyn Brister’s material on women's undergraduate degrees using data from http://nces.ed.gov/programs/digest/d06/tables/xds/tabn258.xls
- Feminist Philosophers: http://feministphilosophers.wordpress.com
- Noelle McAfee’s blog: http://gonepublic.wordpress.com
- Lemmings (contains much feminist discussion as well as other topics): http://lemmingsblog.blogspot.com

Endnotes
3. Cited by Solomon and Clarke, 11.
4. Soloman and Clarke, 12.

Drafting Peer Support: The Promise and Perils of an Online Draft Exchange
Alice MacLachlan
York University

The Internet has been good to feminist philosophy and to feminist philosophers. Through blogs, websites, and active email list-serves, we have struck up conversations, networks, and professional friendships with others we may know only as a name on the screen. For women just starting out in academia, especially, this online contact can have a demystifying and comforting effect: it reminds us that beyond the walls of our offices and our departments, others are grappling with similar questions, issues, and confrontations. Thus, it was not surprising that during a workshop titled “Sharing Strategies for Succeeding as a Feminist Philosopher,” held at the 2007 FEAST conference in Clearwater Beach, online networks were mentioned multiple times as potentially valuable resources for isolated feminist philosophers looking for mentoring, editing, and other forms of peer support.

The idea for an Online Draft Exchange emerged during a casual conversation shortly after that workshop. Four or five of us—all junior scholars—returned to themes of isolation, shyness, and a degree of unease in approaching departmental colleagues for publishing support and criticism, especially for women in departments where they are the only—perhaps “token”—feminist philosopher. Even those of us lucky enough to have feminist colleagues liked the idea of an online forum: a designated “safe space” whose sole purpose was to encourage friendly, respectful criticism of works-in-progress. Initially, we thought we would limit this space to junior scholars who feel pressured to publish, but almost immediately, several senior faculty members let us know that they would love to help and would be interested in making use of such a resource themselves. All of us, it appeared, were looking for friendly and critical eyes.

The concept of the draft exchange was simple. We needed a virtual meeting place that was easy to access, simple to use, and could fulfill one simple function: if you had a paper and wanted someone to read it, you could go to this venue, send out a message, and ask. In return, it was understood, we would all occasionally volunteer to read other people’s papers, if and when we could. While the draft exchange was feminist in origin and approach, it would not be limited to papers in feminist theory: we envisioned a lively exchange among struggling metaphysicians, ethicists, queer theorists, deep ecologists, scholars of Chinese philosophy, and logicians. Someone suggested the Google group format; as well as being public, relatively easy to set up, and free, Google allows members to participate in online discussions, receive discussions via email, post items, create “pages,” and use Google docs to edit one another’s work online, rather than sending files back and forth. And so, in October 2007, I found myself the moderator of a Google group titled “Online Feminist Philosophy Draft Exchange.” I now share moderating privileges with three feminist colleagues: Alexis Shotwell (Laurentian), Ada Jaarsma (Sonoma State), and Sophia Wong (Long Island University).

Currently (spring 2009) there are 120 members of the Feminist Draft Exchange Google group, and eighty-two members of the related Facebook group. Since the decision to disclose personal information is voluntary on both Google and Facebook, I have only the sketchiest of statistics on our membership, but I can report that we have members from at least the following four countries: Australia, Canada, UK, and USA. The majority of members either self-identify as women, or have female-coded user names, but there are at least ten members who self-identify as men. Many, though not all, of our members are associated with academic philosophy departments: we have a mixture of junior, senior, adjunct, independent, and student scholars, including at least two undergraduate students. Of these, students are most likely to indicate their current background and level. Participants work in all major traditions of philosophy, though there is perhaps a higher number of analytic scholars involved than any other stream.

In its current manifestations, the draft exchange offers the following resources to feminist scholars: a list of feminist or feminist-friendly publishing venues; statistics on how “feminist friendly” top journals in the profession are; calls for papers for upcoming conferences, special issues, publications, and events; and a page listing standard areas of research specialization, with individuals willing to read papers in those areas listed below each. Also, some people have posted draft syllabi as well as draft papers online.

Since the draft exchange began very modestly, in a casual conversation, I think its initial successes are worth celebrating. I was astonished by the number of people who signed up almost immediately, and it is gratifying to see that our numbers continue to grow. There was also an encouraging amount of support, publicity, and enthusiasm from other feminist websites, newsletters, and list-serves. Many people have suggested, too, that we broaden our mandate: focusing on teaching and curriculum support as well as draft exchange for research papers.
Despite this enthusiastic response, however, activity levels in the draft exchange remain low. To my knowledge, there have only been a handful of actual draft exchanges (though it is possible others are taking place offline or by email, once initial contact has been made). Most members remain relatively inactive. There is a familiar paradox here: everyone agrees that the draft exchange is a much-needed resource, but almost no one is prepared to take advantage of it...at least, not yet. Some of this reticence may be logistical; it turns out that Google is not as user-friendly a forum as I had hoped. Also, there has been ongoing confusion over whether individuals with drafts actually need to post those drafts online (where they could be read by upwards of 100 people) or simply need to announce that they have a draft, and request a reader. The latter option is much less intimidating, and I hope that as people realize this is perfectly acceptable, fear of posting will lessen.

I have also wondered about the name: Does calling it a feminist draft exchange discourage feminist-friendly scholars writing in non-feminist areas of philosophy? Indeed, this question was raised at the APA panel, “Strategizing Changes in the Culture and Ideology of Philosophy.” Since feminist philosophical approaches continue to be disparaged by much of mainstream philosophy, the temptation is to create safe spaces for specifically feminist philosophy. But there is a risk that creating more and more feminist spaces heightens the isolation faced by women who work in traditionally non-feminist specializations like logic and metaphysics.

Finally, it may be that we need to reorient the draft exchange and other peer-support initiatives around the axis of our real need. It seems clear that the culture of mainstream academic philosophy continues to leave members of under-represented groups feeling isolated and often stranded, and—furthermore—that women philosophers generally, and feminist philosophers in particular, continue to be under-represented in philosophy. Furthermore, recent work by Sally Haslanger, Kathryn Norlock, and others suggests that many publishing and tenure practices continue to put feminist philosophers at a distinct disadvantage. But it may also be the case that a virtual group dedicated solely to this kind of publishing support is not the most useful avenue for fighting that disadvantage. Indeed, in considering strategies for expanding and revitalizing the draft exchange, I remain optimistically open to the possibility it will transform itself altogether, or that its online existence will be regularly supplemented by local “offline” events and forums, meet-ups, and meetings. In the meantime, I continue to explore ways to involve more people in the organization and management of the group, and to respond to the expressed needs of those who have signed onto it. And I very much look forward to the feedback I will receive when I post the first paper of my own, later this month.

You can join the Online Feminist Philosophy Draft Exchange at Google Groups (http://groups.google.com/group/feministdraftexchange) and on Facebook (http://www.facebook.com/home.php?#!/group.php?gid=59919861835).

Endnotes
1. Unfortunately, there are limited options for gender-identification on both Google and Facebook.
2. Thanks go to Kathryn J. Norlock for putting together and posting both of these valuable resources.

Women in the Profession: The Persistence of Absence

Sharon Crasnow
Riverside Community College, Norco Campus

I was a participant in both the “Why Are Women Only 21% of Philosophy?” panel at the Central APA meeting in spring 2007 and the “Strategizing Changes in the Culture and Ideology of Philosophy” panel at the Pacific APA meeting in spring 2008. Since that second panel, I have had further thoughts on the subject, in part brought on by the frustration that so many of us feel that we are still talking about the issue and still not seeing much difference. My reflections fall into three categories that I identify with three questions: What is the problem? Where is the problem? What should we do about the problem?

First, I take it for granted that there is a problem; it is not a good thing that women are under-represented in philosophy. Some might argue that this is not really a problem, however. Perhaps not as many women as men want to study philosophy and under-representation of women is a simple issue of self-selection. But this begs the question of why fewer women want to study philosophy than men. In fact, there has been little effort among the members of the profession to understand what it is that keeps the percentage of women who enter the profession so low and even fewer steps have been identified to correct those circumstances. Self-selection arguments appear to relieve the members of the profession of responsibility for the under-representation of women. They also provide an excuse to maintain the status quo. If women are self-selecting out of philosophy, it may be worthwhile to investigate why that is and not just dismiss it as something that the profession need not worry about because it is rooted in personal choice. However, we should not dive into that investigation until we are sure that the lower percentage of women in philosophy has been perceived as a problem for the field and steps have been taken to try and resolve the problem.

It is important to note that women are not only under-represented in philosophy relative to the general population but relative to their representation in other professions as well. The latter under-representation is particularly interesting because it persists in philosophy in a way that it does not seem to have in other fields.1 There was a time when women were scarce everywhere in the academy. By way of orientation, consider the following data from 1965-1969. During that period, of the 58,699 doctorates awarded in all fields, only 6,358 were awarded to women, or 11%. Compare this with the figures for 1995-1999 when 210,535 doctorates were awarded and 85,980 went to women, or 41%. (National Science Foundation, Division of Science Resource Statistics, U.S. Doctorates in the 20th Century, www.nsf.gov/statistics/nsf06319/refs.cfm). Women’s share of all Ph.D.’s nearly tripled, and was approaching parity.

If we look just at philosophy during roughly the same period we see that women made up about 12% of philosophy Ph.D.’s for 1969-1970, roughly the same share of total Ph.D.’s for 1965-69. However, women were averaging about 27% of all philosophy Ph.D.’s thirty years later (APA website, Data on the Profession 1991-1996, www.apaonline.org/profession/Ph.D.gre.aspx). Moreover, there has been very little change in the percentage of women receiving philosophy Ph.D.’s over the past ten years (between 25% -30%). In sum, it is not simply that there are fewer women in philosophy than men, but the under-representation of women in the field persists to a greater extent than in other fields.
This brings me to the second question: Where is the problem? At what point in the process of studying philosophy or becoming a philosopher do women who might otherwise be interested in philosophy either get turned away or walk away? We can get some ideas about this from looking at the data on undergraduate majors, graduates, and employment in the profession. In 2008, 30.8% of baccalaureate degrees in philosophy were earned by women. This figure has been around 30% for the last fifteen years. Turning to graduate degrees, the most recent data is from 2006 and in that year, 27.1% of the doctorates awarded in philosophy were conferred on women. This number is right in line with the average for the last ten years, 27% (with a range from a low of 24.8% in 1999 to a high of 33.3% in 2004; National Opinion Research Center www.norc.org/projects/Survey+of+Earned+Doctorates.htm).

Finally at the level of jobs, we see, though the title of the 2007 CSW panel posed the question “Why are women only 21%?” that 21% of professionally employed philosophers are women might be an optimistic assessment. Julie van Camp’s most recent update (April 14, 2009) puts women at 19.8% at the top fifty-four Leiter-ranked institutions. It is pretty clear that one place that women lose ground is on the job market.

The most important data that we need on this front would be from Ph.D.’s to first hires, since that would tell us at what rate we might hope to see women gaining ground in the profession. Miriam Solomon has produced a report for the Committee on the Status of Women (in The APA Newsletter on Feminism and Philosophy 08:2 (Spring 2009)) in which the data from the 2008 philosophy job search were analyzed. She notes that women lose ground throughout the “pipeline” and so we have a situation that is analogous to other professions that fail to recruit and keep women in their ranks, such as the physical sciences, but the clearest gap occurs from Ph.D. to job. So the answer to the question “where” is that each of the stages through which a career in philosophy is built reflects the lower participation of women in the field. But the “where” that I suggest we should focus on is at the undergraduate level, where only 30% of philosophy majors are women. Since we, women philosophers, have been the ones worrying about this issue, we have focused primarily on jobs and the fact that we see so few women around us in our own jobs. As a consequence, we have failed to pay attention to the startlingly low percentage of majors who are women. For the remainder this discussion I will take the “where” of the problem to be at the undergraduate level, or, shall we say, right at the beginning. If low numbers of female undergraduate philosophy majors is at least one, very relevant, source of the problem as I have defined it, then it suggests strategies for addressing the problem are very long run in nature. Please note, though, that I am not claiming that this is the only source we need to look at. However, examining the issue of undergraduate majors might be where we need to start in order to understand one important aspect of the under-representation of women in the profession as a whole.

So we arrive at the final question. What should we do? But first, who are “we”? In most conversations that I have had about this issue, the “we” has been taken to be “women philosophers.” It is we women in philosophy who continually feel the lack of other women in the field: at meetings where we are in the minority, when we read journals where most of the articles are by men, in our graduate school cohorts, and in our departments. Again, the numbers I have already mentioned confirm that the majority of women in philosophy will experience themselves as a minority. So experientially, this may seem to be a women’s problem. By focusing on undergraduate education and the low percentage of female baccalaureate degrees (30%), however, I intend to reframe the problem as a problem for philosophy as a whole and not just for female philosophers.

In January 2008, Evelyn Brister posted the following comparison of philosophy BA earners with baccalaureates in other disciplines on her blog Knowledge and Experience:

- Biology & Biomedical Sciences 62%
- Chemistry 51%
- Economics 32%
- English 68%
- Foreign Language & Literature 71%
- History 41%
- Mathematics & Statistics 45%
- Philosophy 30%
- Political Science 47%
- Psychology 78%

Brister notes that there are fields, most notably the sciences, where the issue of low numbers of female majors has been addressed and an increase in women majors has occurred. This is, in part, due to the National Science Foundation having been able to sustain a well-funded, national effort to increase the participation of historically under-represented groups in the sciences. Philosophy, as a very much smaller field, has neither the funding nor the organizational structure to mount such a campaign. As a small major and a relatively small profession, it is unlikely that funding either from individual colleges or universities would be available or that there would be discipline-based organization funding (presumably from the APA). Still, the effort to address this issue in the sciences was due to the perception that the health of these fields required that they be able to attract the best and the brightest from the entire population. Surely this principle applies for all disciplines which hope to maintain their viability and intellectual vitality.

A recent article in the New York Times ("In a New Generation of College Students, Many Opt for the Life Examined," April 6, 2008) might suggest that I am sounding a false alarm. A snapshot of the data from the Digest of Education Statistics, National Center for Education Statistics for 1995-96 compared with 2005-06, shows that indeed philosophy majors have increased by about 50% between the two periods. The total increase for all baccalaureate degrees has been 28%; philosophy has indeed grown faster than many other disciplines, albeit from a low base as we will see below. However, the percentage of female majors has remained steadily around 30%. By contrast, other majors that were historically male majority have seen women make gains, and in some cases quite spectacular ones. For instance, the physical sciences have seen an increase of nearly eight percentage points in women majors, from 34% in 1995-96 to 41.7% in 2005-06. History went from 38% to 41% women majors. In the biological sciences, already a field with a majority of female majors, the percentage of female majors increased from 52% to 61%. It should also be noted that these changes all took place during a period in which female baccalaureate earners, already a majority, increased from 55% to 57% of all baccalaureates.

Before we find yet another reason to continue in our complacency, we should note that though a 50% increase in philosophy majors is fairly dramatic, this translates to a very small increase of the share of philosophy majors to all majors, from 0.6% to 0.45% percent. It is hard to be clear about just what conclusions to draw from these comparisons about the health of the profession at least as far as its role in undergraduate education goes.

Why worry about undergraduates as a measure of the health of philosophy in any case? There are several reasons. The first is simply a straightforward financial reason. Undergraduate education is the backbone of funding for most institutions and...
so a discipline with good undergraduate participation will be secure in the academy. But there is the more specific worry about the profession’s intellectual health. First, if the issue is a leaky pipeline, then we need to start with more women in the philosophy pipeline to begin with if we hope to achieve any improvement in the representation of women throughout the profession. Second, if there is something in the way philosophy is taught or the way women are treated in philosophy that turns off female undergraduates then we should be able to see that most clearly if we actually focus on undergraduates. If we are focused on increasing the participation of women, we will work to address it. Third, if we are indeed concerned about the improvement of the profession then focusing on attracting undergraduate women increases the pool from which we are likely to attract the best people from philosophy.

In order for a profession to do well and remain vigorous, one might say “healthy,” it needs to be able to attract the best students. Presumably, since half of the population is female, one would hope that the pool from which philosophy is drawing would include the best and the brightest of that half of the population. At the moment, it does not. Unless we think that the best and the brightest of those who are potential philosophers are men. This is what is so disconcerting about the long-term absence of women and our (philosophers) failure to address it. By accepting the status quo, we have been endorsing a claim about women and philosophy. We are indeed supporting the idea that women do not belong in philosophy. We have not adopted a strategy of denying this message and openly recruiting women. The subtext remains “Philosophers are men.” Even the New York Times article which heralds a new optimism about philosophy picked up this message. It finishes with the following: “Jenna Schaal-O’Connor, a 20-year-old sophomore who is majoring in cognitive science and linguistics, said philosophy had other perks. She said she found many male philosophy majors interesting and sensitive. “That whole deep existential torment,” she said, “is good for getting girlfriends.” The philosophers are males and the women in philosophy classes are cruising for them, not serious about philosophy themselves.

So the strategy I propose is to start with a focus on undergraduate education if we are to correct the problem of the persistence of female under-representation in philosophy. This means recognizing that there is a problem with the under-representation of women as undergraduate majors and recognizing that, unless we address it as a problem, we allow the subtext that philosophers are males to persist and we perpetuate the status quo. It should be obvious that we want more women in philosophy and that what we are doing has not been working to increase their participation. Unfortunately, we have been doing very little consciously to accomplish that.

The first step in this strategy should be that we earnestly begin a profession-wide conversation on how to do so. I believe that such a conversation will not only be about the under-representation of women but the under-representation of all historically under-represented groups. We need to acknowledge that if we do not actively engage in this first step, we continue to say, albeit silently, though clearly, that women and minorities do not really belong in philosophy. This should be a top priority for the APA, but more importantly, it should be a top priority for any philosopher who cares about the future of the profession.1

Endnotes

1. There are some others that are similar to philosophy in this way, for instance, economics and physics.

2. I am using the following sources: Evelyn Brister’s numbers from the series of posts at her blog Knowledge and

Sharing Strategies for Succeeding as a Feminist Philosopher

Sophia Isako Wong
Long Island University

Lisa Cassidy
Ramapo College of New Jersey

To undergraduate students, the life of a philosophy professor might seem distinguished and alluring. However, as every philosophy graduate student and new professor quickly learns, academic philosophy does not fulfill undergraduate fantasy. The standard advice for succeeding as an academic might include (a) teaching well, or as well as your department demands, (b) becoming prominently recognized in your field, (c) avoiding imprudent political alliances, and, of course, that old chestnut, (d-z) publish or perish. Yet this advice is insufficient for many of us, especially women doing feminist philosophy.

First, it has been demonstrated that women, young women in particular, are evaluated more harshly by male students (Basow 1998). Second, men and women doing feminist philosophy will face difficulties because feminist philosophy is still regarded in many quarters as aberrant, second-tier philosophy. Having a commitment to this area of study may itself be deemed imprudent, since feminist philosophy is frequently
Feminist philosophers at different career-stages therefore need advice that speaks to their particular experiences and challenges. We use the concept of “feminist philosopher” in the title to include both men and women doing feminist philosophy per se, as well as women in other philosophical sub-fields. When appropriate, we distinguish between these two constituencies within the following text. What follows is a list of eleven tips that reflect a panel discussion entitled “Sharing Strategies for Success as Feminist Philosopher” at the 2007 meeting of the Association for Feminist Ethics and Social Theory (FEAST). The list begins with advice for graduate students on the job market and continues through the academic life cycle.

Eleven Tips on Succeeding as a Feminist Philosopher:

1. Choosing a Workable Dissertation Topic and Finding the First Job

Given the unbearably tight job market, where a college or university might receive four hundred applications for a single position, choosing a workable dissertation topic and area of specialization is the most rational course of action. Note that there are very few jobs at elite universities with philosophy graduate programs; in 2005-2006 there were only three hundred twenty four programs that offered masters or doctoral degrees in Philosophy or Philosophy and Religious Studies (U.S. Department of Education, 2006). The vast majority of job openings are at institutions offering two-year and four-year undergraduate degrees. And at these schools some areas of specialization are perennially in demand: history, ethics, and logic. A specialization in feminist theory, like a specialization in contemporary philosophy of mind, will by simple market forces have fewer advertisements in Jobs for Philosophers.

Feminist graduate students entering the dissertation phase should compare the titles and topics of their department’s recently defended dissertations with the resulting job placement. If you are lucky, your program may have seasoned students doing feminist philosophy: talk to them, go to their dissertation defenses, look at their curriculum vitae, and ask them how they framed their work for the job search. You can also e-mail recent graduates (even if they are strangers) who wrote feminist dissertations to ask for advice. Mention that you are from their graduate institution, are also writing a feminist topic, and are seeking their help as you prepare for the job market. If there are no other feminist graduate students affiliated with your program, find them somewhere else: at FEAST, SWIP, online, or at neighboring institutions. Find out how others have framed their work so as to meet their (emotional, intellectual, and financial) needs, and learn from their examples.

It is good advice for any candidate to tailor her C.V. and job application materials to meet each college’s or university’s needs. For example, a job in ethics is still appropriate for a feminist ethicist, but it’s fine to state your AOS as Ethics and Feminist Ethics rather than the reverse. Hiding feminist credentials is hiding who you are, but devising a dissertation topic that speaks to many constituencies and tailoring job application materials just makes good sense.

Expect non-feminists to ask you questions during interviews that might range from the genuinely curious (“Can you give me some background on your research?”) to the downright hostile (“Well, who on earth would care about this? This isn’t really philosophy, is it? This sounds like you are doing advocacy, not philosophy.”) Getting flustered or unleashing feminist fury are sure ways not to get the on-campus invitation. Prepare a smooth answer to such objections, one that makes explicit connections to “the canon,” and defends your chosen topic.

Advocating for yourself may be particularly important advice for women job applicants in all philosophical sub-fields. Have confidence that your work is valuable and take care to show that in your demeanor. In cut-throat, “masculinist” cultures, such as The American Philosophical Association’s job fairs, and at the infamous “smoker” receptions, confidently assertive communication will be prized by the (mostly male) interviewing teams (Tannen 1996).

2. ABD Students, Beware! Career Adjuncts, Woe!

This general advice applies to any academic, but is especially important for women: it is preferable to finish the dissertation in graduate school, not during your first job (should you be lucky enough to be hired without your Ph.D. in hand), because finishing the dissertation becomes exponentially more difficult while working at a new job, with all of the demands of moving, learning the ways of a new institution, and preparing to teach a set of new courses. That first job may be too tempting to pass up; after all, you may not get another offer, or you may have few alternatives for paying your bills, as many graduate programs cut off funding after a certain number of years in the program. If you do take a job while ABD (All But Dissertation) the first and most important step is to set a defense date and not permit yourself or anyone else to reschedule or delay it. After a defense date is confirmed the most important (and sadly, least interesting) advice is to write the dissertation as if your career depended on it. Indeed, it does.

A related topic is working part time as an adjunct while finishing the dissertation. Part-time work can be helpful because of the valuable, marketable teaching experience it brings. However, if your teaching load is so onerous as to interfere with completing the dissertation it may be advisable to reduce that load, even with the financial sacrifices it brings, for the sake of completing the dissertation.

The number of adjunct faculty teaching courses at American colleges and universities is skyrocketing. The Chronicle of Higher Education reports that, according to the American Association of University Professors, “Since the 1970s, the proportion of tenured and tenure-track faculty members in the American professoriate has dwindled from about 57 percent to about 35 percent, while the proportion of full- and part-timers working off the tenure track has grown from about 43 percent to 65 percent. Moreover, the proportion of professors in line for tenure has shrunk faster than the proportion of those who already enjoy tenure” (Gravois 2006). Particularly important for women academics is the American Federation of Teachers’ finding: “Women are also more likely than men to be in full-time non-tenure-track positions. However, the rate at which women are filling the full-time non-tenure-track faculty positions is greater than the rate at which they are filling part-time/adjunct positions” (JBL Associates 2008; note that this report does not break down contingent employment rates by discipline, so there is no data on women adjunct philosophers per se).

Perhaps the most difficult position within the academic world is that of an adjunct patching together classes at different institutions, just making ends meet. In fact, it is exceptional for an adjunct or one-year visiting professor to parlay her work experience at a particular department into a tenure-track line there. Often, one-year appointments are made to replace a tenured faculty member who is on research leave, so there is no real possibility that the department could create a new

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position in that area. Feminist philosophers would undoubtedly find this to be the case if the department is actively hostile to a feminist research agenda and merely tolerates a feminist within its ranks to fill an emergency teaching need.

Unlike adjunct instruction, visiting professors are expected to participate in the life of the department, which means you are supposed to show yourself to be a good citizen in the department even though you aren’t likely to be granted citizenship. Ideally, you would sign on for tasks that will make the current department think well of you while improving your C.V. and furthering your research. For example, you could give a paper in your department and submit it to a journal, or participate in planning the departmental speaker series.

3. Negotiating Salary and Benefits

Economists Linda Babcock and Sara Laschever (2007) have compiled years of studies demonstrating that women are less likely than men to try to negotiate salaries before accepting job offers. They find that boys are socialized to become men who are aggressive in their pursuit of opportunity, while girls are taught to become women who are grateful for whatever they are given. These socialization patterns disadvantage women philosophers. You can negotiate salary, signing bonuses, moving expenses, and even performance bonuses. Usually salary is based on what faculty at a given rank make at comparable institutions, plus previous employment experience, so do some research and find out the going rate. The Chronicle of Higher Education has a searchable database of faculty salaries on its website, and is a must-check for anyone negotiating a new job (see Chronicle 2009). Maximizing your base salary should be the primary aim of negotiations, although other one-time perks (moving costs, bonuses) should also be on the table. Include the time spent teaching as a graduate student or adjunct to enhance your level of experience.

4. Converting Your Dissertation into a Book

This scenario applies to academics across the board: after getting hired to teach, publishing becomes all-important. Feminist philosophers face additional challenges in getting published, as many journals do not publish feminist work. The best place to begin is by converting the dissertation into a book or into a series of articles. Which track is the best one to take? It depends on whether the dissertation may be easily broken up into smaller parts (i.e., articles) or if it works best as a whole. In addition, some departments may have an implicit or explicit preference for one or the other—one book or several articles—when it comes to granting tenure. Try to ascertain where your college or university sits on that question as soon as you can.

If pursuing a book-length project, you should carefully research publishing houses to find feminist-friendly ones that already have track records of publishing topics similar to your own. There are good books on how to turn your dissertation into a book (see, for example, Germano 2005; Luey 2007). While some publishers don’t like to consider a book that has been multiply submitted, this is still an acceptable practice (for books only, not for articles). Don’t do it if you know that the publisher you’re interested in will be annoyed, but remember, the no-multiple-submission rule benefits publishers but is a distinct disadvantage to authors, and it needs to be resisted (Lindemann 2006).

Even while turning the dissertation into a book, you should still pursue other publishing opportunities. The book may not come to fruition as one hopes, so continue to publish articles. The best plan is to send chapters and parts of chapters to journals for publication while working on the book.

5. Choosing Publishing Venues for Articles and Getting Published

Feminist scholars should be especially careful to clarify just how many articles or books are sufficient for tenure, whether conference presentations count for tenure, whether work “outside the discipline” counts for tenure, and whether articles that appear to be more practical than theoretical (such as the APA Newsletter on Feminism and Philosophy) count toward tenure. Be aware that some administrators may be confused by titles of feminist articles and may question whether you are publishing “legitimate” philosophy, especially if your work has practical implications. Find out what the college’s or university’s requirements are during the interview process, or during your first day on the job.

Imagine you have done some work on a piece of philosophy. What’s next? A good first step is to get feedback at a friendly conference. Another possibility is to share one’s draft on an electronic forum, such as the Feminist Philosophy Draft Exchange group on Google.1 Although being included in an edited volume is an honor and may provide good exposure for your work, be aware of the potential problems with edited books. The editors may encounter unforeseen delays, the editors might have a very limited vision as to which articles they will include, the book’s publisher may back out, and any number of other contingencies might interfere with publication.

Thus, it is safer to try to publish in a peer-reviewed journal, but this also requires caution. Find a journal that (a) will be accepted as scholarship at your college or university for tenure, (b) makes a nice fit with your topic, (c) has a reasonable response time—expect three to six months or more, and (d) has a solid reputation. A journal should be anonymously reviewed by peers, though an institution may put other limits on which journals are acceptable. A high rejection rate is another marker of a prestigious journal.

A feminist philosopher should take care to note prominently the acceptance rates of journals where you have published in your tenure dossier. This way, even if no one at your workplace is familiar with feminist philosophy journals, it will be recognized that publishing in Signs or Hypatia is a real accomplishment.

Women philosophers and all of those committed to gender equity in the profession should be outraged by Sally Haslanger’s findings that women simply are not getting published in (or editing) the most prestigious journals (Haslanger 2008). To combat a culture of institutional sexism caused by gender schemas and perceiving minorities as threats (see Valian 1999), Haslanger urges women philosophers to be bold and submit their work, even feminist-oriented work, to top journals.

6. Explaining and Defending Feminist Pedagogy

Some feminist scholars have experienced complaints about their teaching from students or colleagues. Such complaints may adversely affect us when we come up for reappointment, promotion, and tenure. Using feminist methods in the classroom can affect our student evaluations and peer observations negatively, if our students and peers do not understand why we teach the way we do. For example, having students sit in a circle and leading a student-centered discussion may be perceived as a lack of leadership to an observer who is accustomed to philosophy courses taught lecture-style in front of stadium-style seating. We need to explain the theoretical bases for our pedagogy explicitly in our teaching philosophy statements, and when talking to those who observe our teaching for purposes of promotion and tenure. Explaining to our own students the feminist methods we use and why we use them may result in more positive teaching evaluations.
7. Balancing Life and Work

Time management is the key, though this likely is more of an issue for women philosophers than for men, given that women tend to do more child care and housework. For some people, time management might mean drawing up a very detailed schedule that pinpoints exactly how much time will be allotted for a task (for example, "Tuesday 12:00-1:15, edit article; 1:15-1:40 pick up Nina from school"). Less meticulous people might benefit from simply making a list of what must be accomplished by the end of the week, remembering to prioritize oneself and one's career among all those other commitments. Another key is to modify one's expectations of what counts as "good" teaching, "good" motherhood, "good" romantic partnership, and so on because sometimes good enough is good enough. For example, if grading a single student essay takes thirty minutes, you might get out a stopwatch and try to cut down the grading-minutes-per-essay to fifteen.

A final, absolutely crucial strategy for everyone is to make the commitment to write philosophy every day, even if it is only for a half hour. Writing must become part of a daily routine—five or six days a week, no excuses. Perhaps as undergraduate or graduate students we could afford the luxury of waiting for the muses to visit. When you have a professional career (either as tenure track, temporary, or adjunct faculty) there simply is too much at stake for anything less than consistent philosophical productivity.

8. Encounters with Harassment

Remember that harassment can take many forms, and just one form is sexually suggestive comments, offers, or gestures from colleagues. Another form is having to work in an environment disparaging of women, that holds women to a traditionally masculinist standard, or in which one seems to be systematically marginalized because one is a woman. Many published resources for resisting harassment are available. In addition, one should seek out local resources, including institutional union, Affirmative Action, or Human Resources offices.

It's important to seek solace and solidarity from others who have experienced similar treatment. It may be politically unwise to find these others at the institution where the abuse is taking place. Connecting with supportive colleagues on the SWIP List, on the FEAST List, or at conferences can be very useful (FEAST 2009, SWIP 2009). Often the list-manager will post a comment or question anonymously if one fears going public with the concern.

Perhaps more common than outright harassment or a totally inhospitable working environment is the subtle disparagement that feminist philosophers may experience in the workplace (Card 2008). Not all mistreatment amounts to a legal violation. Sometimes we have work experiences that are occasionally hurtful, confusing, or unfair, for example, jokes, put-downs, exclusions, unwelcome comments about one's appearance, lifestyle, or values. A well-timed zinger that "good-naturedly" shoots fire right back at the offender can do the trick well, provided one is blessed with the brassy wit to pull it off. You might also ignore such comments, glossing over them as beneath reply. Another approach altogether is to take refuge in supportive friends and family, but bunker down for attacks when on departmental premises.

9. Being a Member of a College or University Faculty

Finding a new mentor at the new employer institution is imperative. Some universities and colleges have formal mentoring programs in place, while others do not. If possible, it is best to choose a mentor; ideally the mentoring relationship will grow organically out of shared interests. Yet, if no prospective mentor happens along, some initiative is required. Perhaps you can make a connection with someone outside the department, if no one inside it is suitable, for example, an associate dean or a professor from Women's Studies. Similarly, it is vital to forge bonds with other incoming or recent faculty.

The teaching load for full-time faculty varies widely. At some elite institutions very little teaching is required, while community colleges usually require five courses per semester. Likewise, at some institutions new faculty are spared committee assignments, while others are handed heady ones from the outset. Research release time, such as a pre-tenure sabbatical, might be in abundance or non-existent. An in-house good mentor or network of peers will help steer the course by giving insider advice regarding which accomplishments will be rewarded with recognition and which will be underrated.

10. You Earned Tenure; Now What?

First of all, accomplishing tenure is worth celebrating! After the champagne has been drunk or gone flat, however, it is a good time to take stock. Some people feel an overwhelming sense of relief and treat themselves to some rest-time from writing. Others feel (perhaps for the first time) that they are free to write what they please. Some may use tenure as an occasion to re-enter the job market and face the next challenge, although a better time for that is in the year just before you go up for tenure. Remember, it's easier to move at the assistant professor level.

If you are contemplating returning to the job market, you may be able to negotiate an early tenure consideration at the second job, but in most cases changing jobs means at best a lateral move. (This surely does not apply to the few who become “hot commodities” on the academic job scene. Alas, there is no list of eleven tips for becoming one of those.)

11. Never Apologize, Never Explain

Finally, we believe that as feminist academics we should proudly own our research interests and our life circumstances. What we do is legitimate, meaningful, and has import on the lives of actual people. By doing what we love, we can write on the embodied lives of women, teach using feminist pedagogy, teach seminars on feminist epistemology, go out on a limb and even spend some time with activism. Furthermore, never apologize; never explain the "non-professional" parts of your life to your students, peers, graduate advisors, departmental colleagues, chairs, or supervisors. Sometimes we need to leave a meeting early to breastfeed (or possibly even bring one's nursing infant to the faculty meeting). Sometimes we may not be able to volunteer for another committee assignment because it conflicts with Junior’s dance lessons or our own writing time. If our lives do not fit the norm somehow (our partner is the same sex, we or our family members have disabilities, or our children are “too” young, “too” old, or the “wrong” race) we need not conceal or downplay important parts of who we are. If we do not get tenured or promoted at our current institutions, then we may have to leave and find another place that respects our values. This may entail economic hardships but it will bring the reward of living in alignment with our beliefs.

Plenty of philosophers do not respect feminist philosophy or feminists. It can be difficult to hold your head up high when such Chihuahuas are nipping at your ankles. Yet the other way—to conceal your identity, to compromise your values, to accede to your own marginalization—is unacceptable and a sure way to not be taken seriously. This means not apologizing for who you are and what you write, and not explaining away your genuine interests, accomplishments, or your life.
Endnotes
1. Joining the Feminist Philosophy Draft Exchange Google group is easy. In order to join, you need a Gmail account, which is available free of charge. Instructions for joining the Draft Exchange are on the website at http://groups.google.com/group/feministdraftexchange.
2. A philosophical resource on this issue is Crouch 2000; legal information can be found at the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission’s website (2008).

References
Schultz, Vicki. 1998. Sex is the least of it: Let’s focus harassment law on work, not sex. The Nation. May 25.

Book Reviews

Political Solidarity
Reviewed By E. Regina Helfrich
Emory University, gina.helfrich@gmail.com

To what social relation are we referring when we use the term “solidarity”? The growing philosophical literature on solidarity has until now failed to reach consensus on its precise meaning. In Political Solidarity, Sally Scholz provides a thorough, useful, and needed history of the concept and proposes a system of classification of distinct forms of solidarity. Scholz defines solidarity as “some form of unity (however tenuously the individuals might be united) that mediates between the individual and the community and entails positive moral duties” (5). By analyzing past uses of the term, Scholz arrives at a classification of solidarity into three distinct types: social solidarity, civic solidarity, and political solidarity.

Scholz explains that the “meta-concept” of solidarity is characterized by three features that distinguish it from other moral relations. First, “solidarity mediates between the community and the individual. That is, solidarity is neither individualism nor communalism but blends elements of both” (18). This theme recurs throughout the book and helps to position the philosophical conversation on solidarity with respect to conversations in, for example, liberal individualism and communitarianism. Second, solidarity is “a form of unity” that “binds people together” (19). The particular features that motivate or sustain solidarity differ, however, both across and within each of the three forms of solidarity: social, civic, and political. Third, and finally, solidarity “entails positive moral obligations,” a point which Scholz views as one of the main reasons that solidarity warrants philosophical attention (19). Perhaps ironically, she identifies the specification of positive moral duties as one reason that solidarity may have received less attention in political philosophy, since political philosophers have traditionally occupied themselves “with articulating rights and privileges of citizens or describing negative duties” (19).

Scholz develops a classification system that identifies three main types of solidarity: social, civic, and political. Social solidarity is “a measure of the interdependence among individuals within a group; primarily descriptive and secondarily normative, social solidarity pertains to group cohesiveness” (21). Social solidarities demarcate the relationships that we form as members of social groups. In a social group like a
family, social solidarity may be high, as indicated by a great deal of interdependence and group cohesion. On the other hand, social solidarity may be present, but only to a low degree, in social groups that are loosely united, such as the group formed by passengers on a bus. The moral obligations that accompany social solidarity can be imposed rather than chosen insofar as group affiliation may not be voluntary.

Civic solidarity “refers to the relationship between citizens within a political state” and mediates between citizens and the state as well as between fellow citizens (27). The aim of civic solidarity is “to utilize social policy to decrease the vulnerabilities of all individuals” so that all are able to participate in public life (27). Compared to social and political solidarity, Scholz gives civic solidarity significantly less attention. The discussion of civic solidarity is most compelling when joined with a consideration of human rights in the final chapter. Like social solidarity, civic solidarity entails moral duties that are imposed—in this case as a result of citizenship.

Political solidarity, in contrast, is a chosen affiliation carrying moral obligations which are voluntarily assumed by participants. Political solidarity is a “unity based on shared commitment to a cause” in response to “a situation of injustice or oppression” (34). The solidary group formed by political solidarity may be long-lasting or short-lived, and may exist at local, national, or international levels. Individuals in political solidarity need not know or know of one another in order to be mutual participants in a solidary group. The only requirement for membership is a personal commitment to the cause or goal and a willingness to be transformed in the pursuit of it. The causal chain of moral duties and social bonds is reversed in political solidarity. Whereas for social and civic solidarity, social bonds produce moral duties, in political solidarity the commitment to a liberatory goal entails moral duties which subsequently shape social bonds. One of the most significant characteristics of political solidarity as Scholz describes it is that it is inherently oppositional—political solidarity opposes injustice or oppression that is the result of human action, rather than natural disaster, disease, or accident. The oppositional aspect of political solidarity becomes a key point in her discussion of human solidarity in the final chapter.

Scholz devotes the bulk of the book to explicating a theory of political solidarity, including the moral relations and obligations of solidaristic agents, the makeup of the solidary collective, a discussion of the difficulties and benefits of the participation of the privileged, and the role of social justice in determining the ends of political solidarity. The aspect of Scholz’s work I found most insightful and valuable was her careful distinction between social and political solidarity with regard to whether a solidary group is composed solely of individuals who have experienced oppression.

Scholz deftly argues that it may be proper to say that the oppressed share a social solidarity that is formed by their common experience of oppression, but it would be a mistake to limit participation in political solidarity solely to oppressed individuals. That is, when identifying and analyzing solidary social relations that aim at the alleviation of oppression, we should be careful not to confuse the solidary group identity with the group of oppressed people on whose behalf or in support of whom political solidarity is undertaken. “Equating oppressed group identity (and the social solidarity that may arise because of it) with the solidary group of political solidarity cannot explain why all oppressed peoples do not join in solidarity, why some privileged and oppressor peoples do join in, and how subjective activity for liberation is even possible” (128). As I read her, Scholz’s argument implies that, as political solidarity defined on the basis of group identity, it would be better described as a form of identity politics rather than a unique moral relation. Without distinguishing between social and political solidarity when identifying groups that work against oppression, “it would be impossible for a member of the oppressor class or caste to throw off that status and join with those who struggle against oppression” (131).

On my view, the main value of developing a concept of political solidarity is precisely in explaining the means by which individuals can unite in opposition to injustice and oppression across differences in identity and social standpoint. Scholz addresses this point directly in the fifth chapter, “The Paradox of the Participation of the Privileged.” There she argues that despite the many risks involved, participation of privileged peoples in political solidarity is possible, desirable, and potentially even necessary, depending on the situation. Their participation is possible because it is based on common commitment to the liberatory cause rather than shared experience. It is desirable because a diversity of voices is a boon to solidary projects and privileged peoples may be able to leverage their social position for the benefit of the solidary group. Finally, participation of the privileged may be necessary when the solidary project aims at some goal that requires the transformation of society as a whole, including (formerly) privileged peoples. Scholz addresses the epistemological requirements necessary for the authentic participation of non-oppressed people in political solidarity, drawing in particular upon the history of feminist approaches to epistemology, including standpoint theory, the care model, and the dialogic model. I think the discussion could have benefitted from some exploration of the role of “epistemological humility” or “de-centering” of the self as described by Judith Butler and other postmodern scholars, as well as a consideration of the role of the virtues in supporting solidary agents.

Scholz devotes the final chapter to a discussion of the controversial topic of whether human solidarity is possible. She concludes that human solidarity must be a form of either social or civic solidarity, because it would be based primarily on our common membership in the human community. Human solidarity could not be a form of political solidarity, however, largely because (as best I understand) the nature of political solidarity as in opposition to some human-created injustice or oppression would render a human political solidarity logically contradictory. For Scholz, “[t]here is no inherent duty to join in political solidarity itself” (254). Despite her explanation of the nature of political solidarity as a chosen (and therefore supererogatory) moral relation, I am troubled by the claim that there is no duty to struggle in human unity against oppression and injustice. It seems to me that the emphasis on participation in political solidarity as voluntary risks excusing individuals from their responsibilities to act in support of the basic minimum of human flourishing for others. Given the controversial nature of “human solidarity,” however, it is perhaps unsurprising that Scholz’s contribution should stir up strong emotions in the reader.

Political Solidarity is a welcome addition to the growing scholarship on solidarity and should prove valuable to social and political philosophers, feminists, and ethicists.
Gender, Class, and Freedom in Modern Political Theory


Reviewed by Sally J. Scholz
Villanova University, sally.scholz@villanova.edu

While all but the most recalcitrant will readily admit to the transformative impact of feminism on political theory and practice, Nancy J. Hirschmann challenges us to take a further step. She argues that making gender central to the analysis of conceptions of freedom found in early modern political theory reveals much more nuanced accounts of freedom than are usually presented.

Hirschmann examines the political theories of Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau, Kant, and Mill. Most readings of these five theorists (with the possible exception of Rousseau) champion their role in developing what Isaiah Berlin famously called “negative liberty”: the liberty to be left alone, free from interference by the state or others. “Positive liberty,” on the other hand, with its emphasis on fulfilling certain obligations, appears almost antithetical to the liberalism of these five modern political thinkers. But Hirschmann gives us reasons to reject such a simplistic reading of each of the five theorists as well as grounds for discarding the easy division between positive and negative liberty to begin with.

Gender, Class, and Freedom in Modern Political Theory builds in important ways on Hirschmann’s earlier work, The Subject of Liberty. Newcomers to Hirschmann’s ideas, however, will not be left behind if they have not yet read the 2002 book in which she develops her conception of social construction. Hirschmann offers an overview of liberty and social construction in the introductory chapter of this current book. She argues that social construction falls along three lines or layers: ideology, materialization, and discourse (13-15). The interesting thing about these three layers of social construction is the way they interact. Seemingly gender neutral concepts like freedom and equality are in fact infused with gendered norms. By attending to the statements or positions on gender and class within political theory, Hirschmann illustrates this point. By “ideology,” Hirschmann means “a system of knowledge claims or beliefs about a category of people, such as women, that supposedly represents ‘truth’ but often in fact elides it” (14). With “materialization” she identifies a less recognizable form of social construction. As she explains, “The idea of materialization is that ideology provides a rationale for structuring social relations, practices, and institutions in ways that ensure that the ideology is sustained” (14). Finally, “discourse” as social construction refers to “the way in which language develops to explain, describe, and account for this material reality and its underlying ideology” (15). Although I cannot hope to do justice to Hirschmann’s analysis here, a brief glance at each theorist reveals some of her project’s richness.

Uncovering Hobbes’ social constructivism reveals, according to Hirschmann, that “what Hobbes does to women, he would like to do to all men, namely, subordinate them so thoroughly, and bind them so effectively to that subordination through their free choice, that the sovereign need make active use of force only infrequently” (76). In other words, Hobbes’ concept of liberty is not just the negative liberty that it is often made out to be. Rather, there are significant elements of shaping of subjects’ desires within civil society. That shaping of desires echoes in Locke as well.

Locke’s discussion of property and property requirements for full rights of citizenship have been a focal point for theorists interested in class and gender bias in political theory. Hirschmann gives compelling reason to look at his account of toleration as well. As she explains, the concept of individuality found in his discussion of religious toleration is socially constructed. It reveals the shaping of desires in order to yield a particular type of person for Locke’s state. Hirschmann offers an interpretation of his theory of education complete with a class and gender analysis, and demonstrates that Locke’s understanding of “right reason,” moral freedom, and liberal values all contribute to the shaping of character in order to promote a particular vision of society. These reasons, Hirschmann concludes, “suggest a substantive political purpose behind Locke’s views on toleration, rather than a liberal negative liberty defense of freedom of the mind and conscience from governmental interference; what we are to be tolerant of specifically is Protestantism, because only this faith is consonant with liberal principles, and indeed with Locke’s own blueprint for government” (112). In the end, Locke is neither the “classically liberal negative libertarian” as he is often portrayed, nor the “authoritarian in the worst sense of positive liberty” (115). Hirschmann argues that there is an inherent tension in Locke between the negative liberty of the individual and the positive liberty desire to create and protect individuals who have certain approved, or “disciplined,” liberal desires.

Rousseau is both vilified as totalitarian and celebrated as egalitarian democrat. Hirschmann shows how both interpretations only acknowledge part of the story. She begins by carefully presenting three different notions of freedom for Rousseau: natural freedom, civil freedom, and moral freedom. The Social Contract, with its grounding in freedom, demonstrates the possibility for natural freedom developed into moral and civil freedom. But as Hirschmann shows, women’s virtue as described in the Emile and in Julie, does not conduce to the moral freedom required in civil society. The social constructs of gender, like those of class, are deeply entrenched and belie the too easy categories of positive and negative liberty. The double bind facing women, according to Hirschmann, is that “if women violate Rousseau’s prescription, they are morally unfree because the general will cannot be realized; but if they follow his prescription, they are morally unfree because they are unable to participate in determining that will” (166).

Immanuel Kant’s moral philosophy is also subject to re-evaluation in light of gender and class considerations. Kant famously distinguishes the types of moral decisions he thinks within women’s capabilities in Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and Sublime. But Hirschmann goes much deeper into his thought to divulge the social construction of Kant’s notion of autonomy. Autonomy is based on reason but reason, as Kant presents it, is a function of certain economic, emotional, and intellectual characteristics. The education of children, then, aims at cultivating those characteristics. Hirschmann shows that “Kant not only recognizes women’s natural reasoning abilities, but fears them, and wishes to curtail them. He thus develops an account of gender that does not describe but rather prescribes women’s irrationality” (196). These, and similar revelations about social construction in Kant, reveal that freedom is far from the transcendental concept he claimed it to be.

John Stuart Mill is frequently presented as a staunch proponent of negative liberty. Hirschmann argues not only that this view is incorrect but that his views on class and gender require positive liberty, or the fostering of “considerable substantive values.” Moreover, the individualism that is so often
touted as the centerpiece of his theory, hides a relatively rich picture of social goods. This is particularly interesting because, as Hirschmann suggests, the alternate route in the historical development of the concept of freedom is from Rousseau to Hegel and Marx. In the traditional approach using the framework of positive and negative liberty, Marx would stand for positive liberty and Mill would stand for negative liberty. Hirschmann argues that that approach fails to capture Mill’s project accurately. Mill was an outspoken advocate for women’s rights—especially the right to vote and the right to obtain birth control. He also worked to end domestic violence, and Hirschmann devotes a considerable discussion to illustrating how those efforts disclose Mill’s recognition that both internal and external barriers obstruct women’s enjoyment of equal liberty. Mill, perhaps more clearly and self-consciously than the other theorists according to Hirschmann, employs the three layers of social construction. By changing laws and social customs, he shapes ideology; by advocating for provisions for equality in education (among other things), he challenges the material conditions of women’s oppression; and by writing, he shapes discourse. Nevertheless, Hirschmann also shows how he is still entrenched in class bias.

In the end, Hirschmann has shown that freedom is itself a social construction ensuing from various social biases and resulting in social and political theory that often functions to further entrench those biases unless, like Mill, social construction is self-consciously employed for social justice ends.

Gender, Class, and Freedom in Modern Political Theory is a very impressive scholarly accomplishment. Hirschmann’s thorough analysis of primary texts and dialogue with secondary sources provides an invaluable resource for political theorists—feminist or not—as they wrestle with the issues of freedom and representation. En route, her study carefully presents the relationship between morality or virtue and politics, especially in Rousseau, Kant, and Mill; appropriately chronicles the role of education in developing civil order, principally for Locke, Rousseau, and Mill; and the various forms of power, force, and class or epistemological bias shaping society, as is so evident in all five of the modern political theorists of freedom. This book is a “must read” for political theorists and feminists interested in the history of the ideas of freedom and social construction.

**Contributors**

Lisa Cassidy teaches philosophy at Ramapo College of New Jersey. Her research focuses on the family, personal responsibility, and embodiment, but also includes writing on pedagogy. She has published articles on who should have children, what charitable obligations exist between strangers, and why undergraduates learn philosophy from cartoons. She lives in New Jersey with Mark, her husband, and Honey, their irrepressible shelter-dog.

Sharon Crasnow is an associate professor of philosophy in the Department of Arts, Humanities, and World Languages at Riverside Community College, Norco Campus. She has published in Hypatia and Philosophy of Science. Her current research includes work on standpoint theory, objectivity, and epistemological issues surrounding the use of case studies in the social sciences. She has also written and blogged about the under-representation of women in philosophy, something that has disturbed and puzzled her throughout her thirty years in the profession.

Robin S. Dillon is the William Wilson Selfridge Professor of Philosophy at Lehigh University. She is a member of the executive board of the Society for Analytic Feminism and recently rotated off the APA’s Committee on Status of Women. Her engagement in the project of changing the culture and ideology of philosophy began, in one way, with her introduction in graduate school to feminist philosophy and to the curious phenomenon of its being both marked officially as a desirable sub-discipline and marginalized in practice, and, in another way, with her long tenure directing the Women’s Studies Program at Lehigh, where issues of recruitment and retention of undergraduate, graduate, and faculty women, especially in the liberal arts and social sciences, at an institution that was historically an all-male engineering college, was (and continues to be) a frustratingly persistent challenge.

Ann Garry has taught philosophy at California State University—Los Angeles since almost the beginning of time. So long, in fact, that in the early days student course evaluations included comments such as “I didn’t know that women could teach logic until I took this course,” and “I hated it when the weather turned colder because she stopped wearing miniskirts.” One of her recent favorite adventures was teaching feminist philosophy at the University of Tokyo on a Fulbright Fellowship. Her writing in philosophy ranges from feminist issues in bioethics and philosophy of law to analytic feminist epistemology and philosophical method. Recently she has been working on the intersections of race, sexuality, and gender. Since the 1970s she has been active in founding and maintaining the institutions of feminist philosophy, including SWIP, Hypatia, and service on the APA Committee on the Status of Women that started this Newsletter.

Alice MacLachlan is an assistant professor of philosophy at York University (Toronto, Canada), and a moderator for the Online Feminist Draft Exchange, which she founded in 2007. When not envisioning utopian feminist online communities of mutual support and inspiration, she writes on forgiveness, reconciliation, political reparations, and apologies, and also has interests in the politics of sexuality.

Sophia Isako Wong received her Ph.D. in philosophy from Columbia University and is now assistant professor at Long Island University in Brooklyn, New York. She has written on the philosophy of cognitive disability, reproductive autonomy and pre-implantation genetic diagnosis, moral personhood, and distributive justice. She is currently writing a book about siblings as caregivers to people with intellectual disabilities.

**Announcements**

**Conferences**

FEAST: The Association for Feminist Ethics and Social Theory, Fall 2009 Conference

Clearwater Beach, Florida; September 24-27, 2009

For more information on FEAST or to see the program, go to: http://www.afeast.org/

Contact: Lisa Schwartzman at lhschwar@msu.edu
Hypatia Turns Twenty-five!

25th Anniversary Conference: Feminist Legacies / Feminist Futures

Simpson Center for the Humanities, University of Washington, Seattle; October 22-24, 2009.

http://depts.washington.edu/hypatia/anniversary_conference.shtml

Contact: conf25@u.washington.edu.

Pacific SWIP Annual Fall Meeting 2009

Held in conjunction with the Hypatia Anniversary Conference. Simpson Center for the Humanities, University of Washington, Seattle; October 24, 2009.

For more information visit http://www.csus.edu/org/pswip/

Contact: Emily Lee, P-SWIP Executive Secretary, at elee@fullerton.edu

Midwest SWIP Fall Conference 2009

The Midwest Division of the Society for Women in Philosophy will be meeting at Michigan State University, East Lansing, Michigan; November 6-8, 2009.

Contact: Jennifer Benson at jbenson2@washcoll.edu, or Allison Wolf at wolf@simpson.edu

Succeeding as Women in Higher Education


Contact: http://www2.cortland.edu/centers/CGIS/swhe/

Adoption: Secret Histories, Public Policies


MIT, April 29-May 2, 2010.


Feminism, Science, and Values

The University of Western Ontario, London, Ontario, Canada; June 25-28, 2010

Contact: iaph2010@uwo.ca

http://www.iaph-philo.org/index2.php?lang=1

Eighth International Conference on New Directions in the Humanities

University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA), USA; 29 June-2 July 2010.

http://www.HumanitiesConference.com/

Calls for Papers/Submissions/Abstracts

International Legal Ethics Conference IV

Stanford University, Palo Alto, California; July 15-17, 2010

Call for Papers and Panels for the International Legal Ethics Conference, “Legal Ethics in Times of Turbulence.” Proposals should be submitted to Stanford’s Center on the Legal Profession no later than October 1, 2009.

Contact: legalprofession@law.stanford.edu

Contemporary Feminist Pragmatism

An interdisciplinary collection of original chapters that explores the present implications of feminism and pragmatism for theory, policy, and action. Submissions from all fields are invited. For inquiries please contact Celia Bardwell-Jones at cbardwelljones@towson.edu or Maurice Hamington at mhamingt@mscd.edu. The editors request that 300-word abstracts be sent electronically by October 1, 2009, to Maurice Hamington at mhamingt@mscd.edu.

Wagadu, Journal of Transnational Women’s and Gender Studies

Special Issue 2010, Sexual Violence and Armed Conflict: Gender, Society, and the State

Edited by Tonia St.Germain, Coordinator, Gender Studies Program, Eastern Oregon University

Completed papers submission date is December 15, 2009.

Contact: Tonia St.Germain, tstgerma@eou.edu

Submit to http://appweb.cortland.edu/ojs/index.php/Wagadu/user/register

Special Issue of WORK: A Journal of Prevention, Assessment and Rehabilitation (IOS Press) which will focus exclusively on the topic of Care Work.


Please address questions and submit articles to guest editor: Robin L. Stadnyk, PhD, OT(C), RegNS, at rstadnyk@dal.ca