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FROM THE EDITOR

This issue of the Newsletter continues our on-going effort to publish information regarding various dimensions of women’s status in professional philosophy, this time with a focus on publishing in journals. Why publishing in philosophy journals? Well, perhaps in one regard, the answer is obvious. Increasing evidence supports the anecdotal experience of our women colleagues who express frustration, on the cusp of exasperation, with efforts to get their research published. Women seemed to be rejected at higher rates than men in seemingly anonymous peer review processes, though it is noticeable that women fare better under doubly anonymous review processes than under non-anonymous review processes. Is this phenomenon the result of simply poorer quality philosophical research on the part of women? Or, is it indicative of a conspiracy of predominantly male editors to preclude women from the public domain of philosophical research? Or, is it an indication of our mostly male peers’ biases against feminist or feminist inspired work in the discipline? Or, is it something else as yet indefinable? So long as we only have anecdotal information, supplemented by assessments made several removes from the publishing process, we can only give limited interpretation to our own experience.

In an effort to fill in some of the gaps in the story of journal publishing, we have collected a wonderfully insightful set of analyses of the policies and practices of several major journals in philosophy. Our contributors consist of editors of those journals as well as of women philosophers who have published in their pages, served on their editorial boards, contributed to the development of their policies and practices, and have done comparative analyses of them. The essays included in this issue originate from a CSW panel organized by Janet Kourany, who provides an introduction to the individual pieces collected here. It should be noted, however, that in the time between the Eastern Division meeting, where the panel was held, to the publication of this issue, much revision and elaboration was engaged in by the respective authors. The result is an enriched and thorough presentation of the challenges and successes of publishing both feminist philosophy, in particular, and the work of women philosophers, in general.

I have also elected to include the Women in Philosophy Task Force’s open letter petitioning the APA to conduct much needed regular data gathering and analysis of the membership, including data regarding important demographic variables. This, it is reasonably argued, is a central function of a professional academic organization. And, as indicated in the 1999 Hanson Report, would provide a vital mechanism for the profession to better understand itself in order to plan and move forward, to develop responsively to its membership, and to foster affiliations with relevant other professional organizations. Such self-reflective data would also allow those of us interested in such matters to fill in further the picture we currently have of the status of women, and all minorities, in this profession of ours. How we long for the day when our national professional association can tell us about ourselves and thereby to support the many important and progressive efforts of individuals, groups, and committees to advance philosophy and the scholarly and professional undertakings of those who practice it. As we come upon the end of this first decade of the 21st Century, it would be a wonderful thing indeed for our professional organization to muster the ability to satisfy this expectation for a fully professional organization. You can learn more about the efforts of the group, Women in Philosophy Task Force, by visiting their website at http://web.mit.edu/wphtf/Welcome.htm.

The content of this issue of the Newsletter should be both interesting and surprising, in some regards, not so surprising, in other regards. Enjoy.

Christina M. Bellon, Editor

ABOUT THE NEWSLETTER ON FEMINISM AND PHILOSOPHY

The Newsletter on Feminism and Philosophy is sponsored by the APA Committee on the Status of Women (CSW). The Newsletter is designed to provide an introduction to recent philosophical work that addresses issues of gender. None of the varied philosophical views presented by authors of Newsletter articles necessarily reflect the views of any or all of the members of the Committee on the Status of Women, including the editor(s) of the Newsletter, nor does the committee advocate any particular type of feminist philosophy. We advocate only that serious philosophical attention be given to issues of gender and that claims of gender bias in philosophy receive full and fair consideration.

SUBMISSION GUIDELINES AND INFORMATION

1. Purpose: The purpose of the Newsletter is to publish information about the status of women in philosophy and to make the resources of feminist philosophy more widely
available. The Newsletter contains discussions of recent developments in feminist philosophy and related work in other disciplines, literature overviews and book reviews, suggestions for eliminating gender bias in the traditional philosophy curriculum, and reflections on feminist pedagogy. It also informs the profession about the work of the APA Committee on the Status of Women. Articles submitted to the Newsletter should be limited to 10 double-spaced pages and must follow the APA guidelines for gender-neutral language. Please submit essays electronically to the editor or send four copies of essays via regular mail. All manuscripts should be prepared for anonymous review. References should follow The Chicago Manual of Style.

2. Book Reviews and Reviewers: If you have published a book that is appropriate for review in the Newsletter, please have your publisher send us a copy of your book. We are always seeking new book reviewers. To volunteer to review books (or some particular book), please send the editor a CV and letter of interest, including mention of your areas of research and teaching.

3. Where to Send Things: Please send all articles, comments, suggestions, books, and other communications to the editor: Dr. Christina Bellon, Department of Philosophy, Sacramento State University, 6000 J Street, Sacramento, CA 95819-6033, bellon@csus.edu.

4. Submission Deadlines: Submissions for Spring issues are due by the preceding September 1st; submissions for Fall issues are due by the preceding February 1st.

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**NEWS FROM THE COMMITTEE ON THE STATUS OF WOMEN**

This is the end of my term as Chair of the CSW. I would like to say that I thoroughly enjoyed the experience, but I am afraid I cannot. Rather than give you the usual report on the committee’s activities for the year (you can look for the annual report in the APA Proceedings for that), I would like to take this opportunity to explain my experience.

I joined the CSW under less than ideal conditions. I was not the nominee the committee itself put forward. While there are many things to complain about with regard to the APA committee system I believe it is important that committees not be able to hand pick each generation of committee members. This is just another version of the “old boys network” and almost inevitably results in the building of an insular clique. While I do not know the details of my nomination and selection (and intentionally chose not to inquire), I can say that I entered what felt like a hostile environment. In fact, at the first meeting of the CSW that I attended, much time was spent on discussion of how bad it was that the APA nominating committee had ignored the committee’s nominations. What a welcome.

This continued during my term as some members of the committee carried on committee discussions without including me and chose not to even consult me as they took actions on behalf of the CSW (including going to the Executive Director of the APA and members of the APA Board). While I appreciate all the work this committee has done, now and in the past, I am disappointed at the way it has chosen to operate. It has become an insular clique that dismisses the ideas of women (and men) on the outside. It continues to see the APA itself as its biggest enemy, despite some major changes in Board membership and Board positions over the years. It fails to see how the CSW, and other women in the profession, are choosing to replicate the very politics they set out to dismantle. This is my greatest disappointment.

The CSW will be taking on the issue of the climate for women in the profession. I am very happy about this endeavor and look forward to the panel at the 2010 meeting of the Eastern Division. However, we need to be sure this ongoing discussion includes a look at ourselves. Are we perpetuating the idea that the production of graduate students is the most important teaching we can do? Are we replicating the elitism of scholarship by considering only those who publish in certain journals as successful and so worthy of our attention? Are we buying into the politics we claim to want to dismantle as we select our friends to serve on committees with us or send our students only to certain graduate programs that we have deemed acceptable? I worry we are.

For instance, from the moment I joined the committee I voiced the opinion that if we were concerned about the low number of women in the profession we needed to work on increasing the number of women who choose to major in philosophy at the undergraduate level. I was repeatedly dismissed. As our own research showed us that indeed we retain women pretty well from graduate school to tenure track hiring, it became clearer that we need to increase the number of women who want to enter graduate programs in philosophy. The committee has now taken up this idea and I expect some very good work to be forthcoming. We have people ready to post advice on how to increase the number of women majors in various kinds of philosophy programs. We have others ready to start blogs that can be a place to encourage young women and offer advice. I admit I dropped the ball on helping these committee members complete these projects in the spring (though to be fair some of these members are just now becoming official CSW members). My disillusionment with the committee sapped the remaining energy I had to see these projects to conclusion. I have full faith that under the new leadership of Peggy DesAutels all of this, and more, will be accomplished.

Erin McKenna
Professor of Philosophy, Pacific Lutheran University
Chair, Committee on the Status of Women

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**ARTICLES**

**Women in Philosophy Task Force (WPHTF)**

FROM: The Women in Philosophy Task Force (WPHTF) Data Committee (Peggy DesAutels, Sally Haslanger, Linda Martín-Alcoff, Kate Norlock, Miriam Solomon), The APA Committee on the Status of Women (Chair: Peggy DesAutels), the APA Committee on Inclusiveness (Chair: Anita Silvers)

TO: The APA Executive Director (David Schrader) and the APA Board of Officers
We are writing to request **regular and systematic data collection** on the membership of the profession of philosophy in the USA by the National Office of the APA. The APA Committee on the Status of Women (CSW) has asked for this in the past, and the Women in Philosophy Task Force (WPHTF, established August 2009) identified this as a priority in its efforts to advance women in philosophy. Ongoing data on the demographics and employment of the APA membership is a prerequisite for identifying issues of concern and for assessing attempts to improve the status of women (such as the mentoring of junior scholars program that the WPHTF is beginning). Data collection is also vital for monitoring the status of other minority groups in philosophy, and we make our requests with these groups also in mind.

Most professional academic societies keep statistics on their membership (including humanities societies such as the Modern Language Association and the American Historical Association). These are of value for many professional initiatives and for the representation of the society’s interests. Although the APA Executive Director (David Schrader) agreed in principle to supplying this information several years ago, the APA office has been unable to produce much information. We have been told that the main obstacle has been computer software problems. There is also some concern that APA members will not supply the requested information during e.g. membership renewals or job searches. We are aware of the recent optional link to supply demographic information that appears on the membership page of the APA website. We think that this is unlikely to yield adequate data because it is not an integrated part of the membership renewal process. The only area in which there has been progress is in the tracking of hiring in philosophy, and here the data has been incomplete and mostly not reported to the profession. (Miriam Solomon from CSW collaborated with the APA to collect JFP employment data in 2007-8; this was published in *Proceedings* but no employment data has been officially disseminated since then.)

In order to assist the APA, we have a list of the **minimum** data that we would like to see collected on (1) the membership of the APA, annually, and (2) the job market, annually. We repeat this list (with a few modifications) below. We do not think that the obstacles to providing the data are weighty enough to justify delay. We ask that the Board of Officers direct the National Office to produce and disseminate this data regularly, granting the National Office any resources (staffing, tech support, statistical expertise) it may need to carry out this important work. We suggest October 1 as the annual date for receiving statistics (soon after membership renewals and well after the end of the job market for the previous year), beginning October 1, 2011.

Members should be clearly prompted to supply demographic and employment information before annual renewals. They can be informed that supplying the information is voluntary and that the information will be used only for the purpose of maintaining demographics on the profession. Suitable statements about data privacy are widely available (e.g., on the website of the American Sociological Association). We suggest that data collection be automated as much as possible. Demographic and educational information can be routinely requested of those registering for the job placement service. We also suggest not only contacting the advertising departments for follow up to *JFP* ads, but also checking on-line philosophy blogs which often post the outcome of searches. We ask that efforts begin right away so that any difficulties can be identified and addressed with time and experience.

1. Database of APA membership that includes, for each person (assigned a non-identifying number in the database):
   - **Year of PhD**
   - **Salary range** (from annual dues category)
   - **Tenure/tenure-track/full time temporary, part time temporary/unemployed/employed outside of philosophy/graduate student/retired**
   - **Rank** (adjunct, lecturer, assistant, associate, full, emeritus)
   - **Gender** (male, female, other)
   - **Race/ethnicity** (write-in)
   - **Disability** (yes/no)

We recommend that the database be supplied to the Chairs of all APA Diversity Committees (so that any further statistical computations can be automated). It is desirable that some basic statistical results (e.g., % of women and minorities, stratified by rank) be already calculated.

2. Full job seeking database to include
   - **For each job listed in JFP** (*Institution, Rank, tenure, tenure-track or temporary, AOS in ad and AOC in ad*)
   - **Name of person(s) hired OR statement “no hire resulted”**
   - **PhD granting institution of person hired**
   - **Date of PhD of person hired**
   - **Tenure, tenure-track or temporary**
   - **Rank of person hired**
   - **Gender of person hired**
   - **Race/ethnicity of person hired**
   - **Disability status of person hired**
   - **AOS of person hired**
   - **AOC of person hired**
   - **Number of applicants for the position and number of women and minority applicants**

   **Database of those registering for the job placement service, including year of PhD, gender, race/ethnicity, disability status**

   (minimal data is in **bold**, all data is requested)

Again, this data should be supplied to the Chairs of all APA Diversity Committees.

We would be happy to provide any assistance to the National Office that we can. Please let us know your response to this request.

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“How Do Women Fare in Philosophy Journals?”: An Introduction

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In the spring of 2007, the APA Committee on the Status of Women, in conjunction with the APA Committee on Inclusiveness, sponsored a session at the Central Division APA meeting on “Why Are Women Only 21% of Philosophy?” Among the more jaw-dropping details presented at that session were that philosophy, in terms of the percentage of women in the field, is lagging behind not only every other field of the humanities but even many of the sciences as well; that most people in philosophy seem to accept this state of affairs as normal and natural and not requiring significant change; and that the comparatively few women who do go into philosophy can expect to be, not treasured and fussed over, but mistreated instead, their achievements routinely overlooked, dismissed, or underrated by even their most well-meaning, equity-minded (female as well as male) colleagues (see Haslanger 2008, Crasnow 2009, Minnich 2009, and Stewart 2009 for all these details and more).

The scene regarding publication, however—that which determines whether one gets a job, gets tenure, gets grants, gets students, gets speaking invitations, etc., etc.—that scene formed an especially prodigious area of jaw-dropping details. Indeed, the data gathered for the panel by Sally Haslanger documented the underrepresentation of women both as authors and as editors in the very “top” philosophy journals, those journals that have the most power and confer the most prestige, even as women have managed to earn acceptance as students and as faculty in the very “top” research programs in philosophy in the country. Haslanger’s data also documented the virtual absence of feminist philosophy from those same journals. Still, as Haslanger emphasized, her data were incomplete: they did not include information about the submission rates of women to these journals or the details of the peer-review systems these journals use or information about the success of women in neighboring fields (such as linguistics for philosophy of language, or cognitive psychology or cognitive science more generally for philosophy of mind). So, a follow-up panel was clearly suggested. The December 2009 session on “How Do Women Fare in Philosophy Journals?” again sponsored by the Committee on the Status of Women—the session whose papers are reproduced below—was that panel.1 Happily, its presentations were lively and enlightening, and so was the discussion that followed. But, sadly, the conclusions we should draw were never entirely clear.

One problem was that only certain people showed up for the panel. Five editors of Haslanger’s top-7 journals, all of them slated to be at the December APA meeting for other reasons, were invited to serve on the two-hour panel, but all except one could not find the time to do so. The one who could was Henry Richardson (Georgetown University), the current editor of Ethics, the most female-friendly by far of Haslanger’s top-7 journals (19.30% of its papers published in the five years preceding Haslanger’s study were written by women, with two out of nine female associate editors). Even so, when Richardson took over the editorialship of Ethics in January 2009, he promptly added three more women to his associate editors group, including two whose expertise enable them to handle feminist contributions. Also on the panel was Thom Brooks (University of Newcastle, U.K.), the founder and editor of the Journal of Moral Philosophy, not one of Haslanger’s top-7 journals, but a very well-ranked journal nonetheless. And it was Brooks (together with Carol Gould, editor of the Journal of Social Philosophy, another very well-ranked, non-top-7 journal) who was reviving at that same 2009 APA meeting the Association of Philosophy Journal Editors (APJE) to help deal with important issues currently confronting philosophy journals, including the issue of women’s representation. Alison Wylie (University of Washington) was on the panel too, one of the two new editors of Hypatia: A Journal of Feminist Philosophy, a journal as female- and feminist-friendly as a journal can be. And, of course, Sally Haslanger (Massachusetts Institute of Technology) and Carole Lee (University of Washington) were there too, neither a journal editor herself but both currently engaged in empirical research to determine the problems of journal publishing and the ways to overcome them.

The panel’s membership, then, was rather lopsided. That was one problem. Another was the different kinds of empirical information the panelists brought to the discussion. On the one hand, there were the presentations of Haslanger and Lee, informed by surveys they had carried out. Right before the time of the December panel, Haslanger had conducted a survey of philosophers regarding journal publishing and she provided some of the preliminary results in her presentation. Those results indicated deep flaws in the way the current journal peer-review process works—that it takes way too long, is far from transparent in its mode of operation, is frequently very negative and discouraging for authors in its outcome, and is biased toward particular topics, approaches, and viewpoints. A particularly noteworthy result of Haslanger’s survey, however, was the marked difference of areas it disclosed between women and men. While the top areas for women turned out to be feminist philosophy, applied ethics, normative ethics, social philosophy/social theory, and political philosophy, in that order, the top areas for men turned out to be metaphysics, epistemology, philosophy of mind, normative ethics, and metaethics. And while the most frequent area for women turned out to be feminist philosophy, the least frequent area for men turned out to be feminist philosophy. This suggests, as Lee and coauthor Christian Schunn point out in their paper below, that even triple-anonymous reviewing practices (in which referees’ identities are withheld from authors, and authors’ identities are withheld from both editors and referees) will not solve the problem of the low rate of feminist philosophy publications in Haslanger’s top-7 philosophy journals.

Even so, triple-anonymous reviewing practices are far from the norm in journal publishing. At least, that is what Lee and Schunn found when they also conducted a survey in time for the December panel—this time of the evaluation practices of 25 general philosophy journals distributed across the range of prestige. While 90% of these journals withheld authors’ identities from referees, 81% of them failed to withhold authors’ identities from editors—whose rates of “desk rejections” (that is, rejections by editors alone, without the input of referees) sometimes go as high as 65%. And this practice immediately allows into the reviewing process the possibility of gender and other identity-related (for example, race-related and university-affiliation-related) biases. What’s more, Lee and Schunn found that, when papers are sent out to referees, frequently only a single referee is used, and frequently negative reviews have more weight than positive reviews in determining a manuscript’s fate. As a result, even when two or more referees are used, if one of the referees is biased against feminist philosophy, that bias can dominate the final decision.

These are only some of the problems in the current journal publishing scene that Haslanger and Lee pointed out in their panel presentations. But what should be done about these
problems? Both Haslanger and Lee called for further research regarding current journal practices to get a clearer idea of the issues that need attending to, and Schunn as well as Lee now also suggest the compiling of a set of best-practice standards for journals devised on the basis of such research. But all this might be a rather large and difficult undertaking, and very much in the future.

On the other hand, there were the presentations of Richardson, Brooks, and Wylie, presentations that provided a somewhat different kind of empirical input into the discussion. These were three different reports of journal practices by the editors of those journals, three different concrete models for how to run a journal successfully and fairly. More specifically, each journal editor offered an account of the particulars of that journal’s practice, each editor offered reasons for doing things in just that way, and each editor offered documentation for the excellence of the results. And each of those practices departed, either in whole or in part, from the ideal of triple-anonymous reviewing championed by Lee and Schunn. Each of them exemplified a very different sort of “best practice,” with lots of desk rejections or very few, lots of comments for even the weakest papers or none at all, lots of decision points and lots of deciders or very few, and so on. Nevertheless, all the procedures made sense in the context of each journal’s goals and the situation (number of submissions, etc.) in which each journal finds itself. Finally, the results were said to be more than adequate. The proportions of submissions from women, the proportions of outside reviewers who are women, and the proportions of acceptances to women all seemed generally to hover around 21%, the proportion of women in the field (or to go way beyond that in the special case of *Hypatia*). What’s more, the rejection rates were impressively high, the level of perfecting and polishing required of accepted papers was also high, and the readerships were large and international in scope. Some of the issues raised in the presentations of Haslanger and Lee regarding the length of time to publication and the potential for bias and the like thus seemed here in these presentations not quite as worrisome as they had initially appeared. But, of course, these were the presentations of Richardson, Brooks, and Wylie, who, like Haslanger and Lee, were those concerned enough and conscientious enough to show up for the panel.

Still, one question remained. If the proportion of women in philosophy, 21%, is absolutely unacceptable, a problem of embarrassing dimensions, then why should the measure of a journal’s practices be 21%? Why not a more proactive stance, one that ties anonymous review practices, rejection/acceptance rates, time to review, wait until publication, and common procedures made sense in the context of each journal’s goals and the situation (number of submissions, etc.) in which each journal finds itself. Finally, the results were said to be more than adequate. The proportions of submissions from women, the proportions of outside reviewers who are women, and the proportions of acceptances to women all seemed generally to hover around 21%, the proportion of women in the field (or to go way beyond that in the special case of *Hypatia*). What’s more, the rejection rates were impressively high, the level of perfecting and polishing required of accepted papers was also high, and the readerships were large and international in scope. Some of the issues raised in the presentations of Haslanger and Lee regarding the length of time to publication and the potential for bias and the like thus seemed here in these presentations not quite as worrisome as they had initially appeared. But, of course, these were the presentations of Richardson, Brooks, and Wylie, who, like Haslanger and Lee, were those concerned enough and conscientious enough to show up for the panel.

Still, one question remained. If the proportion of women in philosophy, 21%, is absolutely unacceptable, a problem of embarrassing dimensions, then why should the measure of a philosophy journal’s system of review be so tied to that same 21% figure? Why not a more proactive stance, one that ties the adequacy of reviewing procedures to the value a journal places on feminist philosophy—which is one measure of the value it places on women. Valuing feminist philosophy in philosophy journals—all philosophy journals—would surely not only serve to increase the representation of women in philosophy journals, it would also serve to increase the representation of women in philosophy.

So, what is the upshot? In what follows, all of the panel presentations are reproduced and here and there even further developed. It is hoped that they will inspire a more wide-ranging and vigorous discussion of the issues and a more female-friendly system of journal publishing as a result.

Endnotes

1. There was also a follow-up Committee on the Status of Women-sponsored panel on “Strategizing Changes in the Culture and Ideology of Philosophy” at the 2008 Pacific APA meeting. See the APA Newsletter on Feminism and Philosophy 8(1) (Fall 2009) for the papers from that panel.

References


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**Philosophy Journal Practices and Opportunities for Bias**

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**Christian D. Schunn**  
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**Surveys of Journal Practice**

Philosophy journal practices have come under increased scrutiny recently. The 2009 Eastern APA meeting (New York, NY, December 2009) hosted two different meetings on journal practices. The APA Committee on the Status of Women organized a session with journal editors to discuss problems related to representing women and feminist perspectives in philosophy journals. This session was inspired by Sally Haslanger’s 2008 “Musings” piece for *Hypatia*, which presented data suggesting that women and feminist perspectives are underrepresented in top journals (Haslanger 2008). The Association of Philosophy Journal Editors (APJE), re-launched by Thom Brooks (editor, *Journal of Moral Philosophy*) and Carol Gould (editor, *Journal of Social Philosophy*), also hosted a session on journal practices. The panel included themselves, the editors for *Ethics, Public Affairs Quarterly*, and *Philosophical Review*, as well as the Reviews Editor for *Philosophical Review*.

Journal practices have also caught the attention of The American Philosophical Association. In November 2009, the APA Board agreed that the APA Committee on the Status and Future of the Profession should take the lead in forming a committee that would include members of their own committee, the Committee on Lectures, Publications, and Research, as well as journal editors to develop a “best practices” statement. This project has been endorsed by the APA Inclusiveness Committee as well as the Women in Philosophy Task Force.

The APA has not surveyed journal practices since the publication of *The Guidebook for Publishing in Philosophy*, written by Marcia Yudkin and Janice Moulton, in 1986 (Yudkin and Moulton 1986). Entry content was based on editor responses to questionnaires, informal interviews, and reviews of the contents by members of the *Guidebook*’s editorial board. These entries often, but not always, included information about anonymous review practices, acceptance rates, number of reviewers, time to review, wait until publication, and common reasons for rejection. The *International Directory of Philosophy and Philosophers* and *Directory of American Philosophers*, both biennial publications, also collect information from journal editors. Many entries include some subset of information about anonymous review practices, rejection/acceptance rates, time to review, and time to publication (Bahm and Stomback 2008; Kurtz and Varet 2009). Since the *Guidebook* and *Directory* entries are categorized by journal name, they do not directly lend themselves towards inter-journal comparison along dimensions that would be of interest to authors.

Philosophy blogs have also undertaken efforts to collect and compile information about journal practices. For example,
Andrew Cullison’s blog *Wide Scope* uses authors’ self-reported information to calculate the average time to review, time to publication, initial acceptance rate, overall acceptance rate, revise and resubmit acceptance rate, percentage of submissions that received comments, quality of received comments, and overall experience with editors at specific philosophy journals (Cullison 2010). The website gives readers access to the raw data, which includes author information about their professional rank/status, gender, and race/ethnicity. The number of completed surveys varies widely across journals. Jon Kvanvig’s blog *Certain Doubts* provides a comparative look at journal rejection rates (self-reported by editors) as well as their citation impact for years 1997-2007 (Kvanvig 2007). These figures are especially helpful since Thomas Reuters, which compiles “Journal Impact Factor” scores, does not calculate impact scores for general philosophy journals (these journals are not included in their database). In light of the difficulties in gathering data, which includes author information about their professional rank/status, gender, and race/ethnicity. The number of completed surveys varies widely across journals. Jon Kvanvig’s blog *Certain Doubts* provides a comparative look at journal rejection rates (self-reported by editors) as well as their citation impact for years 1997-2007 (Kvanvig 2007). These figures are especially helpful since Thomas Reuters, which compiles “Journal Impact Factor” scores, does not calculate impact scores for general philosophy journals (these journals are not included in their database). In light of the difficulties in gathering information about journal practices and impact, these websites do a wonderful job, though one must be mindful about how the content and self-selection of editors’ and authors’ self-reports might compromise the accuracy of such information.

**2009 Journal Practice Survey**

We conducted our own survey of journal practices in undertaking a research project on evaluation processes and bias in knowledge communities (Lee and Schunn). We sent a short survey to editors of 25 general philosophy journals, including: *American Philosophical Quarterly*, *Analysis*, *Australasian Journal of Philosophy*, *Canadian Journal of Philosophy*, *Continental Philosophy Review*, *European Journal of Philosophy*, *Inquiry*, *Journal of Philosophy*, *Mind*, *The Monist*, *Noûs*, *Pacific Philosophical Quarterly*, *Philosophers’ Imprint*, *Philosophia*, *Philosophical Perspectives*, *Philosophical Quarterly*, *Philosophical Topics*, *Philosophical Review*, *Philosophical Studies*, *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*, *Ratio*, *Review of Metaphysics*, *Southern Journal of Philosophy*, and *Theoria.* Of these 25 journals, we received 17 responses, with responses distributed across the range of prestige. In assessing whether editor responses were received from general philosophy journals across a range of “prestige,” we referred to the results of Brian Leiter’s recent poll (of more than 500 philosophers) on the perceived quality of a number of general philosophy journals (Leiter 2009). What follows is a textual summary of the data. Worrisome results are highlighted in Figure 1 and discussed in more depth in the sections that follow.

- **Anonymous Review**: Identities of authors are not made anonymous to editors for 81% of journals. 90% of editors reported making author identities anonymous to reviewers.
- **Desk Rejections**: 93% of philosophy journal editors “desk reject” papers: that is, they reject papers without sending the paper on to reviewers. Among these editors, the rate of desk rejection varies widely, from 2%-65%, with a mean desk rejection rate of 22%. For journals in which author identities were revealed to editors, desk rejection rates were slightly lower (mean of 20%, range 2%-65%) than for journals in which author identities were anonymous to editors (mean of 30%, range 10%-60%).
- **Number of Reviewers**: About 63% of editors reported sometimes making determinations on the basis of a single review. Approximately 25% of editors reported sometimes relying on three or more reviewers (though at least half of these editors remarked that this was not normally the case).
- **Basis for Choosing Reviewers**: 50% of editors reported relying on expertise alone. 50% reported giving some consideration to whether the reviewer(s) had published in the journal before. 50% reported giving some consideration to whether the reviewer(s) opposed the author’s viewpoint. 38% reported giving some consideration to choosing reviewers who had different viewpoints from each other.
- **Editorial Judgments versus Reviewer Judgments**: 80% of philosophy journal editors report exercising editorial judgment by making occasional recommendations that go against the recommendations of at least one reviewer. 40% of editors “never” or “rarely” accept a paper receiving even a single negative review (of these editors, 80.0% report sometimes relying on a single review). 20% of editors claim that they do not reject a paper that has received a single positive review (of these editors, all report sometimes relying on a single review).

**Figure 1.** Percentage of journals engaging in review practices vulnerable to bias.

To get more information, we sent follow-up questions to 17 journals that responded to the original survey. We received 11 responses and supplemented our figures with information available from journal websites.

- **Rejection Rates**: Philosophy rejection rates averaged about 92%, with reported rates ranging from 80% to 95%. In this calculation, “revise and resubmit” decisions were counted as rejections, except in unusual cases where nearly all revise and resubmit papers were accepted upon resubmission (these were counted as accepted papers).

Given the “cold call” nature of our survey requests, we were pleasantly surprised at the rate of response. However, it would, of course, have been preferable to have an even greater response rate. It would also have been preferable to have raw frequency figures instead of rounded percentages provided by most all editors.

**Number and Power of Reviews**

Reliance on a single review is worrisome for a number of reasons. If one thinks that community-wide valuation is what determines an article’s value, one might address this problem by increasing the number of reviewers since the larger the sample, the less likely the sample mean will differ from the population mean (Cole, Cole, and Simon 1981). The fewer the reviewers, the greater the noise, and the greater the reliance upon the editor’s judgment about how to interpret the review and/or whether to solicit further reviews. Indeed, social scientific research demonstrates that expert reviewer predictions about both the impact and quality of a manuscript are extremely poor across disciplines (Gottfredson 1978). Journal inter-reviewer reliability is sufficiently low to be considered poor by psychometric standards (Cicchetti 1991).
more internalist perspective on the function of reviews, then one might think that increasing the number of reviewers can expand the scope of reasons that support or undermine support for a paper— a move which is more likely to get at the "whole truth" about the merits and weaknesses of a manuscript.

However, increasing the number of reviewers for philosophy manuscripts would be no small feat. At the 2009 Eastern APA, some journal editors in the audience at the Association of Philosophy Journal Editors session discussed the difficulties they already face securing willing reviewers. This is not surprising, as the professional reward for writing careful, anonymous reviews is not always considered commensurate with the amount of time and attention required for the task. In response, some journals have adopted incentive programs in which reviewing work is rewarded with free journal issues. One can also imagine a system in which editors submit names of reviewers to the APA so that it can publish a compiled list of reviewers (stripped of information about the journal(s) for which they reviewed) as a way to recognize their professional contributions while protecting their identities from manuscript authors.4

Our data suggest that negative reviews have more power than positive reviews in determining a manuscript's outcome. About 40% of editors “never” or “rarely” accept a paper receiving even a single negative review (of these editors, 80.0% report sometimes relying on a single review). In contrast, only 20% of editors claim that they do not reject a paper that has received a single positive review (of these editors, all report sometimes relying on a single review). In light of empirical research about low inter-reviewer reliability (Gottfredson 1978), putting so much weight on a single negative review is fairly worrisome. Furthermore, if any one of the reviewers is negatively biased (against, for example, feminist content), then bias in one reviewer can dominate the final decision.

The power of negative reviews might be driven, in part, by the relatively high rejection rates at philosophy journals. Philosophy rejection rates averaged about 92%, with reported rates ranging from 80% to 95%. In contrast, top psychology journals enjoy a much lower rejection rate (mean of 78%, with a range from 68% to 86%, with no correlation between rejection rate and rank). The rate with which philosophy papers received revise and resubmit decisions as well as the percentage with which resubmitted papers were accepted did not make up for the difference in rejection rates between the two disciplines.2 In response to the perceived difficulty of publishing in philosophy, some have called for the APA to undertake an empirical study of the relative difficulty of publishing in philosophy in contrast to other disciplines (Cardwell 2006). Others have suggested the possibility of creating more publication space via online journals in the model of Philosophers’ Imprint (Leiter 2010).

Triple-Anonymous Review
In 1991, the Board of Officers of the APA affirmed “the importance of author-anonymous review of manuscripts submitted for journal publications or for presentation at scholarly meetings in assuring fairness and eliminating possible bias” (American Philosophical Association 1991). Anonymous review provides a procedural way to avoid forms of prestige-biased bias such as the Matthew effect (“For unto everyone that hath shall be given”) and the halo effect (where individuals gain prestige by association) (Cole 1992; Merton 1968). Cognitive schemas—schematic or abbreviated beliefs we hold about the main characteristics (and their relationships) of individuals, groups, and events— also provide a source for bias (Valian 1998). Cognitive schemas help evaluators quickly interpret, explain, and predict actions and events by foregrounding category-consistent features. As a result, schema-based inferences require more evidence to disconfirm stereotype-inconsistent traits (Biernat and Ma 2005; Trope and Thompson 1997).

Haslanger’s recent study of publication in eight top journals from 2002 to 2007 found that the overall rate with which women publish in these venues (12%) falls below the percentage with which women are represented in tenure-track positions in the top twenty American philosophy departments as ranked by the Leiter Report (19%) (Haslanger 2008). As she observes, this discrepancy gives reason to consider the possibility that subconscious cognitive schemas affect the peer-review process.

Consistent with the 1991 APA recommendation, our survey found that 90% of editors reported making author identities anonymous to reviewers. However, for 81% of journals, the identities of authors are not made anonymous to editors. Knowledge of an author’s identity allows for the possibility for cognitive schemas about prestige, gender, and/or ethnicity to play a biasing role in the desk rejection and final acceptance/rejection stages. For example, a classic study found that when articles already published in highly prestigious psychology journals were resubmitted to the same journals, but under fictitious names affiliated with low-prestige institutions, nearly 90% were rejected—a rejection rate higher than the 80% rejection rate of the journals in question (Peters and Ceci 1982). Psychological research demonstrates that women and minorities must meet higher standards to be perceived as meeting the same level of ability as their white and male peers (Biernat and Kobrynowicz 1997; Foschi 2000).

When multiple criteria of evaluation are involved, evaluators tend to prioritize criteria that favor the preferred social group. For example, when asked to hire a construction company manager—a position requiring both experience and a strong background in engineering—participants preferred the male candidate when he was more educated but less experienced than the female candidate; however, when the genders were reversed, only a minority of participants picked the more educated, but less experienced female candidate. Overwhelmingly, evaluators justified their choices by citing the qualification that favored the male candidate (Norton, Vandeloo, and Darley 2004). Ironically, this effect is more exaggerated for evaluators high in self-perceived objectivity (Uhlmann and Cohen 2005). To evaluate whether and to what extent cognitive schemas are at play in peer review, data should be collected and made public about the rates with which manuscripts by women and minorities are submitted and rejected (at different stages of review), as well as the number of reviewers brought to bear on those decisions.

Cognitive schemas are difficult to debias. Gender bias increases for evaluators primed with questions about how objective they perceive themselves to be, where self-perceptions of objectivity correlate with degree of bias (Uhlmann and Cohen 2007). And, the opportunity to publicly avow egalitarian beliefs can actually exaggerate these biases (Monin and Miller 2001). Because of these difficulties, a move towards triple-anonymous review (in which the author’s identity is stripped from editors and reviewers; and, reviewers’ identities are withheld from authors) is an attractive procedure.

Unfortunately, triple-anonymous review would not address Haslanger’s concerns about the low rate with which feminist work is published in top general philosophy journals. Additionally, such strategies would not directly shift the way that philosophy and its methods are gendered (Moulton 1993), though they might do so indirectly by increasing the representation of women in top journals.
Prestige
As Haslanger notes, the discrepancy between the rate at which women publish in top journals versus their rate of representation in top departments gives reason for serious concern about the participation of women in journals that distribute prestige. The criteria for a journal’s prestige and quality have come under increased scrutiny recently with the rise of bibliometric methods for measuring the impact of journals as well as indexes of journal rankings by the European Science Foundation and Australian Research Council. However, we have some reason to think that prima facie markers of prestige—including inter-subjective beliefs, citation measures, and rejection rates—track each other.

Take, for example, Brian Leiter’s 2009 poll, in which 500 philosophers ranked 29 journals to identify the “highest quality general philosophy journals in English” (Leiter 2009). If we compare the overlap of these compiled subjective rankings with h-index and g-index values and rejection rates reported on Jon Kvanvig’s Certain Doubts blog (Kvanvig 2007), we get the following matrix:

Table 1. Correlation matrix for Hirsh (h-index) values, Egghe (g-index) values, rejection rates, and quality rankings as reported on the philosophy blogs Certain Doubts and Leiter Reports.*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>h-Index Value</th>
<th>g-Index Value</th>
<th>Rejection Rate</th>
<th>Leiter Quality Ranking</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>h-Index</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>0.99</td>
<td>0.21</td>
<td>-0.83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Value</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>g-Index</td>
<td>0.99</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>0.21</td>
<td>-0.88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Value</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rejection</td>
<td>0.21</td>
<td>0.21</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>-0.66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rate</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The data suggest that philosophers’ subjective quality ranking of a journal (as reported from Leiter’s poll) correlate strongly with h-index and g-index values.* So, if women are underrepresented in what philosophers subjectively take to be more prestigious journals, then they are likely to have less impact on the field in the form of future citations. This correlation does not say anything about whether citations are driven by judged prestige or vice versa. Notice that, in this analysis, citation index values track philosophers’ subjective quality rankings better than rejection rates.

Unfortunately, these figures are only suggestive. As Kvanvig notes, the rejection rates on his website are self-reported, estimates (as suggested by the rounded figures such as 90%), with no standardization about what counts as a rejection (do rejections include, for example, revise-and-resubmit outcomes?) (Kvanvig 2007). And, in discussing the poll, Leiter grants that the list of journals was incomplete and includes journals that are not “generalist” in the sense that they publish across all sub-fields of philosophy. As such, we present our analysis in the spirit of trying to synthesize what information is publicly available while underscoring the methodological limitations of these efforts.

How Professional Associations Can Help
To think about how The American Philosophical Association can facilitate the improvement of peer review practices, it is helpful to think about the role professional associations play in other disciplines. The American Psychological Association’s bylaws state that part of its aims include the “increase and diffusion of psychological knowledge through meetings, professional contacts, reports, papers, discussions, and publications” (American Psychological Association 1985). To this end, the American Psychological Association began acquiring prominent, existing journals in the 1920s (Eichorn and VandenBos 1985). Over time, the association’s control over publishing expanded through the establishment of new journals, the acquisition of additional journals, and the splitting of American Psychological Association journals into multiple, more specialized journals. In 1997, the American Psychological Association published over 33,000 pages in 49 journals (Publications and Communications Board and Office of Publications and Databases 2007). In order to manage the publication operations, the organization created new sub-organizations and positions including, for example, a Publication and Communications Board and the Council of Editors. The Publication and Communications Board is responsible for establishing publication policy and appointing editors to all of the American Psychological Association’s journals except for the American Psychologist and Psychological Abstracts. As a result, editorial review processes are centrally determined and publicized (Calfee and Valencia 2001; Eichorn and VandenBos 1985). And, records about the number of manuscripts received, pending, rejected, accepted, and published, as well as the number of printed pages and time to publication, are compiled for each journal and publicized annually (American Psychological Association 2008).

Given the economics of publication, The American Philosophical Association might not be able to replicate the American Psychological Association’s move towards publication, with the exception, perhaps, of creating new online journals. However, in order to improve transparency and participation, it would be very helpful to authors if the American Philosophical Association designated a permanent committee—perhaps the Committee on the Status and Future of the Profession or the Committee on Lectures, Publications, and Research—with the responsibility of compiling and making public information about journal practices. By centralizing this work to a single committee, it is hoped that information about journal practices could be improved by providing:

- Information about journals that lend themselves towards meaningful inter-journal comparisons. This can be facilitated by using clear definitions for different categories of data. For example, in calculating rejection rates, a survey should be clear about what counts as a “rejection” (Does this category include revise-and-resubmits? Does this category refer to the first or final decision on a manuscript?). And, in calculating the number of referees, surveys should be clear about how to interpret the reviews provided by editors and associate editors.

- A presentation of the information that lends itself towards clear inter-journal comparison, such as the American Psychological Association’s annual report of journal operations, which presents summary information about rejection rates and time to publication in tabular form (American Psychological Association 2008).

By having a large and respected professional association take charge of this project, it is hoped that survey attempts would also be able to collect:

- A more complete survey of all critical dimensions across more journals.
- More accurate raw frequency totals computed from spreadsheets instead of rounded percentage estimates provided by editors.
- Sensitive information about submission, desk rejection, and final rejection rates for women and
minorities (compared to their white and male peers), as well as the number of reviewers.

Such a committee would be in the strongest position to be able to formulate and publicize:

- Best practice standards for peer review (something already planned by the Committee on the Status and Future of the Profession). These best practice standards could include recommended procedures for implementing endorsed policies (for example, ensure that author identities are made anonymous to editors via submission programs or editorial assistants, such that authors remain consistently anonymous throughout the review process).

And, such a committee would have the kind of insight needed to evaluate whether the APA should:

- Create online journals to address a perceived shortage in publication space.
- Publish lists of reviewers as a way to provide professional credit for their service.10

Endnotes

* The authors would like to thank the philosophy journal editors who generously responded to our surveys, Virginia Valian for recent references on cognitive schemas, Kathryn Norlock for online references about journal practices and prestige, Janice Moutlon for historical background on journal practices and the APA, and Bryce Huebner for helpful comments at the Eastern APA session in which we presented our results.


2. To protect anonymity, the authors promised not to discuss, in writing or conversation, the details of individual editors' responses or the identities of those who did or did not respond. Responses were collected from April through August of 2009.

3. In the spirit of increasing the likelihood that reviews will allow editors to make well-informed decisions, journals of the American Psychological Association moved from a two-reviewer system in the 1950s to a three to four reviewer system in the 1990s (Finke 1990).

4. Thanks to Janice Moutlon for this suggestion.


6. The European Science Foundation has created a European Reference Index for the Humanities which ranks journals into categories A-C, where: journals that “make the discipline” are categorized as A journals; those with international audiences, authors, and editorial boards were counted as B journals; and C journals include only European journals (Piccinni 2007). Philosophy’s rankings and methodology can be found on the European Science Foundation’s website (European Science Foundation). More discussion on these rankings can be found on Leiter’s blog (Leiter 2007). The European Science Foundation has since agreed to replace the A-C grades with written descriptors instead (Brooks 2009; Corby 2009).

7. The Australian Research Council includes an additional category of A*. Journal rankings and an explanation of the ranking categories can be found on their website (Australian Research Council).

8. Missing data include h-index, g-index, and rejection rates for Philosophers’ Imprint, Philosophical Perspectives, and Philosophical Topics. The Hirsh index was created to measure both impact (citation rates) and productivity (number of articles). A journal with an h-index of h has published h papers each of which has been cited at least h times. For example, Kvanvig calculates Journal of Philosophy has 23 articles with at least 23 citations each, while The Thomist has 2 articles with at least 2 citations each. Journal of Philosophy’s larger measure indicates its larger impact in the discipline. The Egghe index was designed to give greater weight to articles that are cited at a disproportionately high rate. If a journal has a g-index of g, then g is the greatest number such that your top g articles (ranked from most cited to least cited) received at least g citations. In general, the higher the h-index or g-index value, the higher its aggregate impact. The h-index and g-index values were generated by Harzing’s Publish or Perish Program (Harzing 2010).

9. The correlations of h, g, and rejection rate with ranking are negative because lower values are better for ranks, but higher values are better for the other three variables.

10. Further discussion can be found in recent blog posts (Boisvert et al. 2004; Leiter 2009) and letters to the Editor in the Proceedings and Addresses of The American Philosophical Association (Field 2004; Steinbock 2004; Corlett 2006).

References


Preliminary Report of the Survey on Publishing in Philosophy

Sally Haslanger
Massachusetts Institute of Technology

1. Background of the survey: Why do it?

- Apparent underrepresentation of women in certain “analytic” journals (as documented in Haslanger 2007). Need for more data to determine whether this appearance is supported by the facts, and if so, what explains it.
- Repeated concerns about whether “peer reviewed” journals in the profession are anonymously reviewed.
- Ongoing concerns about time to acceptance/rejection and time to publication.
  - NB: Schemas kick in when people are rushed. How does this affect the refereeing process? Does it matter for desk rejections, which may be quick and based on non-anonymized papers? Does it also affect referees? How?
- Repeated concerns about the tone and quality of comments on submissions.
- Concerns about whether referees being asked to review feminist work are qualified to do so.

2. Point of the survey

- This is a pilot study. Is an attempt to get preliminary ideas about what questions should be asked and what changes might be considered.


Harzing, Anne-Wil. 2010. Publish or Perish. Available at [http://www.harzing.com/pop.html]


• It is not an attempt to provide a thorough basis for policy changes—more work needs to be done on what the problems are and how they might be solved.

3. Basic demographics

(This is a first pass on data sorted by gender. More analysis needs to be done, especially by race, etc.)

• 2040 responded to the survey. 1609 made it past the first “gateway” question, which excluded graduate students and independent scholars who have never held a job in professional philosophy. Approx. 1450 completed the survey. This is really an astounding number and in itself suggests that there are many in the profession who want to help rethink how the publication process works (or doesn’t). It is also notable that respondents were very forthcoming in the open-ended questions, some of which received nearly 550 responses.

• Of those who completed it, roughly 34% say they are identified professionally as women (513/1454), 64% men, 2% other or refused to answer. This is a higher percentage of women than the numbers of women faculty/researchers in the profession. It is a strength of the survey that women are numerically well-represented in the data.

• On professional race/ethnic identity (the question is phrased in terms of how others in professional contexts interpret your race/ethnic identity), respondents had the option of choosing one or more boxes, including “other,” or skipping the question. 1399 answered as follows (not rounded):
  o 91% (1272) “White/Caucasian”
  o 3.6% (51) “Other”
  o 3.4% (47) “Asian, Asian-American Pacific Islander”
  o 2.5% (35) “Hispanic, Latino/a”
  o 1.3% (18) “Black, African-American, Afro-Caribbean”
  o .1% (2) “North American Indian, Native American/Canadian, Native Alaskan, Inuit, Aboriginal, Other Native”
  o Specifications under “other,” include: Mixed race, Jewish, Arab American, Gypsy/Roma, South Asian, Middle Eastern, Italian, Eastern European, Greek, Polish, Slavic, Egyptian, New Zealander, Muslim, I don’t know, It depends on context, Race is a construct.

• Breaking down race/ethnicity by gender:
  o 91.4% (458) of women and 90.7% (812) of men answered “White/Caucasian.”
  o 3.6% of women and 3.6% of men “Other”
  o 3.6% (18) of women and 3.2% (29) of men “Asian, Asian-American, Pacific Islander”
  o 1.8% (9) of women and 2.9% (26) of men “Hispanic, Latino/a”
  o 1.4% (7) of women and 1.2% (11) of men “Black, African-American, Afro-Caribbean”
  o 0% of women and .2% of men “North American Indian, Native American/Canadian, Native Alaskan, Inuit, Aboriginal, Other Native”

• Primarily Anglophone respondents (which is what we expected):
  o Mainly from U.S. (70% of women, 62% of men)
  o More women from Canada, more men from Europe and UK. Roughly equal for Australia+NZ.
  o Other regions include: Japan, Singapore, Turkey, Mexico, South Africa, Kenya, Israel, Hong Kong, Trinidad, South Korea, Taiwan, India, Indonesia, China.

• Respondents were disproportionately untenured faculty at research universities.
  o Roughly 1/3 of men and of women were untenured, tenure-track faculty.
  o Slightly higher percentage of men were full professors, of women associate professors.
  o Emeriti and “other” were roughly equivalent percentages of men and women.
  o Notable: higher percentage of men were non tenure-track, e.g., lecturers (13.5% v. 8%).
  o 59% women and 67% of men from Research U’s. Women make up the difference in liberal arts colleges and “other” universities.

• Distribution by areas (top and bottom, in order)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Top 5 areas for women:</th>
<th>Bottom 5 areas for women:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Feminist Philosophy</td>
<td>1. Chinese Philosophy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Applied Ethics</td>
<td>2. Indian Philosophy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Normative Ethics</td>
<td>3. Logic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Political Philosophy</td>
<td>5. Philosophy of Mathematics</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Top 5 areas for men:</th>
<th>Bottom 5 areas for men:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Metaphysics</td>
<td>1. Indian Philosophy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Epistemology</td>
<td>2. Chinese Philosophy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Philosophy of Mind</td>
<td>3. Philosophy of Education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Metaethics</td>
<td>5. Feminist Philosophy</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

• Areas (Difference)
  o Greatest difference between percentage of women and percentage of men in:
    • Feminist philosophy (38 point difference)
    • Metaphysics (15.5 point difference)
    • Epistemology (12 point difference)
  o Rough Equivalent percentage of women as percentage of men in:
    • Indian Philosophy
    • Philosophy of Art/Aesthetics
    • Normative Ethics
    • Political Philosophy
  o Higher percentage of women than percentage of men in:
    • Feminist Philosophy (38 points)
    • Social Philosophy/Social Theory (11 points)
    • Applied Ethics (9 points)
    • 20th c. Continental (6.5 points)
    • Philosophy of Race/Race Theory (4 points)
Existentialism and Phenomenology (2 points)

Philosophy of Education (1.5 points)

Areas in which the actual number of women exceeded the actual number of men:

- Feminist Philosophy
- Philosophy of Race/Race Theory
- Social Philosophy/Social Theory

Gender neutral names:

- 93.3% of women use gender-specific names
- 92.3% of men use gender-specific names

4. Notable “results”?

Re refereeing:

- To your knowledge, have you ever received a “desk rejection” (1107 replies):
  - Yes: 58%; No: 27%; Possibly, but not sure: 14%
- Gist of (549) comments: most think this is to be expected because journals must have some kind of screening process. Many, however, find the process mysterious and have no idea why their paper is rejected. This prompts all kinds of speculation.

- To your knowledge, have you had a paper rejected by referees who knew you to be the author? (1100 replies):
  - Yes: 16%; No: 61.5%; Possibly, not sure: 23%
- Gist of (roughly 200) comments:
  - It is very hard to anonymize papers, especially in a small sub-field where one’s work is known or when papers (or titles) are available online.
  - Journals anonymize in such a sloppy way it is easy to determine the author/referee (one can find authors’ names in the “properties” section on Word).
  - It is easier for women to determine whether the referee suspects who the author is because the report refers to the author as “she.”
  - Sometimes reports suggest that the author is someone other than the actual author. This is confusing and upsetting to the actual author.

- On having a paper refereed by “not minimally competent referees” (1094 replies):
  - Yes: 39.5%; No: 60.5%
- Gist of (332) comments:
  - Referee is not familiar with current literature.
  - Referee might be a competent philosopher, but was not well chosen for the paper in question due to lack of expertise in the particular sub-field, e.g., a generalist is asked to referee specialist material. Sometimes there is a basic lack of familiarity with notation, terminology, etc.
  - The paper is not read carefully, the comments are sloppy and confused or “make no sense.”

On papers that have never been accepted (1046 replies):

- Eventually published in edited collection:
  - Men: 2.5% Women: 3%
- Eventually published on departmental/college website:
  - Men: 1% Women: 1%
- Eventually published on personal website:
  - Men: 3% Women: 1%
- Working on revisions:
  - Men: 31.5% Women: 29%
- Given up on project:
  - Men: 23% Women: 17%
- Never had a paper not accepted somewhere:
  - Men: 26% Women: 31.5%
- Other:
  - Men: 14% Women: 17%

How was your most influential paper published (1072 replies)?

- Submitted to a peer-reviewed journal:
  - Men: 84.5% Women: 72.5%
- Submitted to anthology:
  - Men: 2.5% Women: 3.5%
- Invited to a peer-reviewed journal:
  - Men: 4% Women: 8.5%
- Invited to anthology:
  - Men: 5.5% Women: 8%
- Other:
  - Men: 3% Women: 8%

Where do people recommend a paper in analytic feminism be published? (982 replies, figures are not rounded)

Women:

1. Hypatia (36.1%)
2. Noûs (12.8%)
3. Canadian Journal of Philosophy (11.9%) – tied
4. Journal of Philosophy (11.9%) – tied
5. Australasian Journal of Philosophy (11.4%)

Men:

1. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research (19.6%)
2. Hypatia (19.5%)
3. Philosophical Studies (19.3%)
4. Journal of Philosophy (18.3%)
5. Philosophical Review (16.6%)

Mentoring: 236 Comments, those below are direct quotes.

Virtually all express frustration at lack of mentoring. Samples:

- The tenure track has been very isolated, and a self-education in the existence of journal rankings, journal prestige, the worth of peer-reviewed papers over non-, etc. God bless the internet, since without it I would still be in the dark as to the importance of publication.
- My colleagues appear to be too busy to bother helping younger faculty members. Indeed, some have been positively hostile to my research ambitions.
- Finding a mentor has been the most difficult challenge of my academic career. Because my work is interdisciplinary and ground-breaking (i.e., fewer than twenty professional philosophers in North America publish on this topic), I have had great difficulty placing my articles in philosophy journals. Several mentors outside of my area have made suggestions, all of which I followed, but very few were useful in the end. My most successful strategy has been to submit to special
conferences which then publish selected papers after undergoing the peer review process.

- Never mentored—this led to stupid strategies.
- People have mentors on the tenure-track?
- This is interesting. I don’t think I’ve ever had any one mentor. Although I have considered (and still do) publishing under my initials to hide my gender, no one has ever advised that this might be a good strategy. I often wonder if my institutional affiliation might hurt my chances more than my gender/ethnicity. But I don’t have enough data to even gather anecdotal evidence about my own case.

I am angry at the lack of mentoring I have received. In my experience, the men who I went to graduate school with, had lots (including co-authoring papers, co-editing volumes, late night discussions about philosophy that included strategies on publishing as well as research and teaching). My women friends in other disciplines often still work on research with their major professors, some of them until they are well into an associate rank.

However, some feel differently:
- My department is one in which people read each other’s papers and provide comments so the term “mentor” doesn’t quite capture the relationships, since I did the same for the people who read my papers as well. Still, when I was untenured my department was largely male and any input I got was from male faculty...
- Only an ignoramus in our profession would need a mentor to get them to realize the importance of publishing original work in the best peer-reviewed journals at which they can find acceptance!
- I haven’t felt the need for a mentor.

**OPEN-ENDED COMMENTS** (431 total comments): a small sample is provided below, all are direct quotes grouped for relevance; elisions added to protect anonymity or to condense point).

**Re referee’s comments:**
- I have received some incredibly nasty comments on some of my submissions. There are journals that I would be unlikely to submit to again for that reason.
- I find that when I do get a rejection, there is often an undertone (or even an overtone) that is very hostile—basically, you are doing something that is degenerate, and how dare you suggest that this work take up valuable page space in a journal. I know I am not alone here, as I compare notes with a lot of individuals who are at the same stage of career. Then the work gets accepted eventually at a first-tier journal. I don’t quite understand this, unless it’s a case of philosophers thinking they have a direct line to truth, and that anything that opposed what they take to be truth is deeply vicious.
- **Re length of time to publication** (many on this):
  - It sucks. Editors have little professional/management experience. Papers get lost or misplaced. Timetables are not adhered to, etc. It takes WAY TOO LONG to go through the process. All the troubles involved would not be nearly so exasperating if it didn’t take, for example, 12-15 months to learn that your paper is rejected. If we can’t get shorter decision times, then we at least need simultaneous submission. Editors often do unethical things: One example: send a paper for review, then later reject it for being too long, referring to word-count limitations that were not in effect at the time the paper was submitted. I’m sure you’ll get an earful in this survey. It is too difficult to get published in philosophy. And people are crazily narrow in their beliefs about what is a “good” journal. So, if you don’t get into one of the few they endorse, your work is considered weak, without even reading it. I don’t know how to fix things. There are just too many problems.

**Re lack of information:**
- Revise and resubmits can sometime be vague about what extent revision would in fact lead to publication.
- I do wish that I had somehow been given more information and insight about how refereeing in philosophy works when I was younger. First, it might have helped when I received refusals that I found devastating (mean-spirited and rather dumb, frankly). Second, I think that I was just thrown into refereeing myself at some point, and didn’t really know how it was supposed to work. I’ve wrestled my way to at least some sort of m.o., but I don’t know that I truly follow the “best practices”—of course, I’m not sure that anybody knows what the best practices are (other than the obvious things, like the importance of double-blind refereeing for most journal submissions)...
- Who gets invited to put things in collections like *Phil Perspectives*? The process seems to be opaque and unjust. I’ve had some terrible experiences (waiting more than 2 years; having a paper rejected and then the person I criticize respond to what I say anyway in a new book). Also, my lack of mentorship support significantly slowed down the process of learning the ropes. The entire process has been discouraging.
- Mainly I would say that trying to publish even things that will all eventually get published can be so disheartening. If I hadn’t been lucky enough to have a couple of mentors who made it clear to me that this wasn’t because I wasn’t good enough, then I might have falsely concluded that I couldn’t publish. Mentoring is key.

**Re lack of options:**
- I think if one works in an on-going discussion in contemporary philosophy, in particular in analytic philosophy, there are great options for publishing. I’ve also positively found the peer review process very helpful for revising my papers even though like many I’ve had bizarre, unprofessional, and often simply no review of papers I’ve submitted to peer-review papers. But I think if one works slightly or significantly outside traditional topics, it is difficult to find journals that “fit” one’s work. Part of this I imagine is because they don’t have reviewers to evaluate this kind of work.

**Re quality of evaluation, bias (or not):**
- I see no strong connection between the quality of my submissions and their acceptance rate. I find
publishing in philosophy to be, like everything in
the profession, a process that involves a very high
degree of chance or, if not chance, causal factors
unrelated to quality. My best work—by which
I mean most original and carefully structured,
presented, and argued—remains unpublished
or is published only after many submissions,
while work I find adequate but clearly not my
best is published and often quickly. This may
be a problem in my area of research, where my
impression is that publication is often based on
the cache of the topic or of the position taken in
the paper. Overall, despite a strong publishing
record I have absolutely no faith in the system.

- I'm very frustrated by the emphasis on "hot"
topics in publishing. I've repeatedly had the
experience that papers that I've presented at
specialty conferences with enthusiastic positive
feedback from the top people working in my
subfield (...) have been rejected out-of-hand at
top journals on the basis of referee reports from
referees whose comments indicate that either
(a) they have little knowledge of the subfield or
(b) they have their own commitments within that
subfield that are contrary to the ones on evidence
in my work. It seems to me that in the case of (b),
however, where those commitments speak not
to a failure in my reasoning or argumentation but
rather to a substantive disagreement between the
referee and me, such disagreements should not
be grounds for rejection of the paper. Indeed, they
would seem to point to the fact that the paper
is getting at something interesting that might be
of interest to others in the field. In other words,
the gatekeeping function of referees should be
limited to screening out from publication articles
of insufficient rigor, professionalism, or interest,
and not be extended to screening out positions
with which the referee disagrees.

- It is far easier to publish work that has no political
implications (whether feminist or in terms of
questions of race) than to publish work with
political import. When I have published on..., I
have gotten back comments that address my
work directly (even if those comments sometimes
showed that the reader was not an expert in
the field). When submitting work in race theory
and/or feminism that is critical or engages with
contemporary cultural and political situations,
comments often reflect readers' preconceived
opinions. This work is easier to publish in invited
anthologies (where the editor is already convinced
of the importance of the work), but difficult to
publish through peer-review in journals. It is also
more difficult to know where to submit such work
(whether "mainstream" journals will consider it
at all).

- I have had greater success publishing papers that
are not available online with my identity attached
to them. I also suspect that prestige effects have a
far greater impact on these things than do gender
or race. Philosophers are sometimes racists
and sexists, but more often than that they are
prestige-ists. The gender and race injustices you
are fishing for in this survey are certainly real, but
similar prestige-based injustices are equally real
and much more widespread.

- I find the process extremely challenging and
often infuriating, but I stick with it. I find that my
papers are no easier to publish now (as a full
professor) than they were as a graduate student.
At the same time, I recognize that it imposes
greater discipline upon me—the invited papers I
publish are usually not as good as the ones that I
get through a series of revise-and-resubmits with.
I sometimes lament the absence of high-volume
journals in philosophy. At the same time, I do a
lot of refereeing, and I reject almost everything
I get sent. So basically what I want is for it to be
easier for me to publish, but I also don't want
more junk in the journals. Which is of course
what everyone wants...because everyone thinks
their own stuff is great. One other thing: I find that
very few philosophers actually read much of what
get published. ...I've published in top journals in
philosophy (Mind, P&PA, P&PR, etc.) and I have
no evidence that more than five people have read
any of it. Finally, I should say that in 20 years, I've
always found the process to be squeaky clean.
I've never encountered anything resembling
corruption, bias, personal vendetta, etc.—just
a lot of philosophical cantankerousness. But if you
can't handle cantankerousness, you should be in
another line of work.

- **Disincentives**

  - I'm very very frustrated by the massive imbalance
  between the extensive amount of time, effort,
  and labor that I (as a TT asst professor at a major
teaching university) put in to constructing really
good referee reports when called to do so, and the
silly, short, thoughtless, and disengaged referee
reports that I have gotten in the past. It makes me
want to refuse to referee.

  - I am deeply concerned about the fact publishing
  companies are exploiting philosophers by
charging them for a service that is carried out
largely by members of the profession, and largely
without remuneration.

- **Suggestions?**

  - I wish that I could give a journal a deadline of
  about two months for a decision so that I could
  send my paper elsewhere without further delay.

  - I've had the most success by submitting unsolicited
  articles to specific special issues and calls for
  papers. I'm always so appreciative of journals that
are organized enough to set out cfp's for specific
issues—it's a wonderful way to motivate and
facilitate publishing by junior academics.

  - I suppose you know this, but another voice can't
hurt. There is great disparity between journals
in the speed with which they render decisions,
and the usefulness of comments they do, or
sometimes do not, provide. Ideally, journals
will return papers within a reasonable time
(4-6 months seems fair to me) and with some
explanation for the decision made, where this is
not acceptance. Failing this, journals should strive
for transparency about their editorial process, e.g.,
whether they give 'desk rejections' and in general
why, how long they typically give referees, and the rates of acceptance, r&r, etc.

- As an assistant professor, I have less information than I'd like about how best to go about submitting work to journals (which journals and why, how to frame work to make it more attractive to prestigious journals, how broadly or narrowly to focus work for publication, etc.). A compiled spreadsheet of each journal, and an honest statement about the kind of work published there (in terms of specialization and style), plus rejection/R&R rates and time-to-decision information, would make this a much more informed process.

- Allowing the referees to be anonymous may be unavoidable, but the system encourages lots of irresponsible conduct by referees—not only unreasonable delays, but careless, and sometimes bad tempered work, which the referee knows will have no consequences. …Maybe refereeing could be given more significance in our careers by have some aggregate APA statistics on how much each individual philosopher is doing? That might discourage both too much and too little refereeing.

- I strongly favor instituting a national or international system for expediting the peer-review process in philosophy. One example of such a system (many could work): after two months without a response from a reviewer who has agreed to review a paper, the journal should send the paper to another reviewer and note the delinquent reviewer’s identity in a database. Delinquent reviewers should be penalized with delays in reviewing their own papers. This sounds harsh, but nothing less will solve this collective action problem. BTW, I’m tenured at a major research university.

- The idea was floated a few months ago that article reviewer names should appear with published articles (perhaps in the footnotes at the bottom of the first page). This, I think, may be a good idea. It would have the effect of rewarding good reviewing and perhaps also of shaming those who let pass shoddy work.

- An updated edition of the “APA's Guidebook for Publishing Philosophy” would be useful, especially to younger philosophers, since the landscape is constantly shifting.

- One thing I find extremely frustrating is the amount of time some journals take just to acknowledge receipt of materials.

- There are journals, such as Perspectives in Science, that don’t blind papers. I have had some of the least charitable referee reports from such journals. Blinding does seem to help. As a referee, I think it is important to get feedback about one’s reports. Science and Education does this—all reports are available to all referees, so that you can see how others are responding to a piece of work. Such sharing might also mitigate the problem of irresponsible referees—if you know your reports will get shared, perhaps you will be more responsible in your report.

- It’s damned difficult! And has gotten more so. Not too long ago, a “revise and resubmit” would be sent back to the original referees, after revisions—one could reasonably expect that it would eventually be published. These days, the more competitive journals send revised versions of the papers to new referees, whose comments bear no relation to the original suggested revisions…

5. Questions suggested by the information
- Should further research be done, and who is going to do it? (Not me!)
- What questions are the most pressing?
- Should we explore refereeing practices in neighboring disciplines?
- NB: This survey focused primarily on publishing articles in peer-reviewed journals. More could be done to examine the process for publishing books and a comparison between book v. article sub-fields.
- Should the APA be involved in developing a set of “best practices” or even minimal standards for what count as “peer-reviewed” publications?
- How? Who?
- Is anonymous refereeing possible in this day and age? Is it desirable? How might it be achieved?
- What can be done to promote anonymous refereeing?
- Should referees be better “trained” for their job? Should guidelines be distributed? Should editors refuse to forward (or take into account) hostile or vindictive comments?
- How can the profession provide incentives for responsible refereeing?
- How can mentoring be improved? Should the APA (or someone else) update the Guidebook for Publishing?
- How can the profession promote creative work on a broad variety of topics? (Other professional organizations publish important journals in the field.) How can the profession support a structure that encourages the best philosophy is published?
- Should publication in peer-reviewed journals be expected throughout one’s career? If this doesn’t occur in philosophy, is that a problem? Should there be greater incentives for senior people to publish in journals? Of what kind?

6. Minimal recommendations:
- Journals should make clear their policies on desk rejections and refereeing and include these policies online and in the letters sent with rejections.
- If the paper is not considered suitable for the journal based on topic, some explanation should be given.
- Editorial decisions concerning which papers are sent to referees should be made on the basis of anonymized comments.

Endnotes
1. Numbers are rounded to nearest .5 unless otherwise noted.
2. Note that I have chosen not to break down race/ethnicity by the category of “other” gender. Due to the small numbers, I was concerned this might compromise the anonymity of the respondents.
The View from the Journal of Moral Philosophy

Thom Brooks
University of Newcastle / Editor and founder, Journal of Moral Philosophy

Introduction
Let me begin with my most sincere thanks to the APA Committee on the Status of Women for the kind invitation to speak on this important panel. While I believe that the Journal of Moral Philosophy (henceforth, JMP) has a welcome record, I seek only to offer some insight on certain matters pertaining to women and the JMP. I will also reveal some figures. My wider interest is in learning how this journal—and, indeed, all philosophy journals—might improve their practices.

Background
I signed the contract that founded the JMP in April 2003. The JMP is an international journal of moral, political, and legal philosophy. Our abstract is:

The Journal of Moral Philosophy is a peer-reviewed journal of moral, political, and legal philosophy with an international focus. It publishes articles in all areas of normative philosophy, including pure and applied ethics, as well as moral, legal, and political theory. Articles exploring non-Western traditions are also welcome. The Journal seeks to promote lively discussions and debates for established academics and the wider community, by publishing articles that avoid unnecessary jargon without sacrificing academic rigour. It encourages contributions from newer members of the philosophical community. One issue per year is devoted to a particular theme and each issue will contain articles, discussion pieces, review essays, and book reviews.

The journal launched one year later. It has become a quarterly journal of philosophy since 2007. Women on our editorial board include Elizabeth Ashford, Julia Driver, Frances Kamm, Martha Nussbaum, and Seana Shiffrin.

The JMP receives between 120-135 submissions each year. We received our highest total of 178 in 2009. Our acceptance rate is 10%. All submitted papers are read initially by me: I would know the identities of all authors. Virtually all papers would be sent to referees with only a small number desk rejected. All papers that were refereed would be read by two referees in a double-anonymous process: the authors would not know the identity of the referees nor the referees the identity of the authors. In some cases, three referees are used. The review process is fairly swift: 92% of submissions are reviewed in less than two months and 98% are reviewed in less than three months.

Some data
My purpose now is to offer some data. In her outstanding article, Sally Haslanger rightfully notes that we often know no more than the proportion of women to men who have published work in a journal (Haslanger 2008). I will seek to correct this in providing some data on submissions, published articles, and reviewers.

Table A. Journal of Moral Philosophy submissions.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total sub’s</th>
<th>Male #</th>
<th>Female #</th>
<th>Female %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>31%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>124</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>112</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>25%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>129</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>21%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>116</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>16%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>137</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>29%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009*</td>
<td>158</td>
<td>127</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average</td>
<td>121</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>23%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Note: 2009 figures are of 15th December 2009. The JMP was begun in 2003 with the first issue appearing in 2004.

What should we make of these numbers? Haslanger notes that “19% of faculty in the top 20 graduate departments are women” (2008: 215). Does this mean that any journal that receives less than 19% of its submissions has a genuine problem? I will let others more knowledgeable in statistics handle such questions. For my small part, I was pleased to find that women represent about 23% of all submissions on average. Some years have been better than others: I have no idea why the figure was so low in 2007, but then nearly doubled the following year.

Table B. Journal of Moral Philosophy published articles and review articles.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Articles</th>
<th>Male #</th>
<th>Female #</th>
<th>Review articles: female/total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0/3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3/3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0/3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1/2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0/4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>4 (22%)</td>
<td>1/3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Note: 2009 figures are of 15th December 2009.

Again, with 19% in mind, I was also pleased to see that 22% of all published articles have been written by women although this number could improve. This includes nearly half of our papers published in our first volume. Women also represent one-third of all review articles, although review articles were largely by invitation from our reviews editor. The names of JMP authors can be found on our website (JMP website).

Table C. Journal of Moral Philosophy reviewer data.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total reviewers</th>
<th>Male #</th>
<th>Female #</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>12</td>
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<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009*</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>14 (21%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Note: 2009 figures are of 15th December 2009. *Total reviewers* does not include members of the advisory committee nor editorial board.
We find that women represent 21% of all reviewers for manuscripts. The names of reviewers are published in the last issue of each volume.

Where do we go from here?

While I am proud of what the JMP has been able to accomplish in general, I am by no means complacent. One reason why I agreed to take part in this panel is that I recognize the importance of the problem at hand. A second reason is my interest in seeing how journals, such as the JMP, might better improve their practices.

Indeed, my interest in such matters runs deep. This past year Carol Gould (editor, Journal of Social Philosophy) and I held a re-launch of the Association of Philosophy Journal Editors (APJE). Our shared interest in this project is to bring editors together—for the benefit of authors, referees, and editors alike—to help us learn from each other and improve our craft. Of course, there are a great many outstanding journal editors. One concern is that they lacked a special forum within which they could share ideas. The APJE seeks to address concerns such as this. Furthermore, APJE might be an additional space within which discussions may be had on addressing the problems that women have faced in publishing in philosophy journals.

Finally, I hope others will join in these discussions. I believe the Committee on the Status of Women panel helped raise some important issues that I (and many others) must consider more deeply. My thanks again to the Committee for the opportunity to take part: I learned much even if I have much more to learn.

References


The Triply Anonymous Review Process at Ethics

Henry S. Richardson
Georgetown University, and Editor of Ethics

As Sally Haslanger’s report in this issue of the Newsletter suggests, many philosophers feel that journals are insufficiently transparent about their procedures. In the hopes of helping respond to this issue, I set out here in some detail how the review process works at Ethics. This effort here repeats in some degree a recent statement of these in the journal (Richardson 2009); but here I attempt to focus more especially on the kinds of issues highlighted by Haslanger’s report and by the very instructive panel discussion organized last December by the Committee on the Status of Women in the Profession.

For the purposes of the present symposium, the most important aspect of the review process at Ethics is surely the journal’s commitment to triply anonymized review. That is, we see to it that not only are the submitting authors and the reviewers kept from knowing each others’ identities (as is standard doubly-anonymized procedure) but also, at all crucial points of decision when editors initially react to submissions, that the editors are kept from knowing the submitters’ identities (their names, addresses, affiliations). The triply anonymized process is somewhat more cumbersome than a doubly anonymized one would be. At least, this is so given the commercially available online manuscript management system used by our publisher, the University of Chicago Press. This system, Editorial Manager®—like, I believe, a lot of its competitors—has been designed in a way that presumes that the editors will always know the identities of the submitters. Maintaining our triply anonymized procedures when adapting to Editorial Manager® required some complex work-arounds, ones that depend on our having a managing editor who can make these possible. We felt that carrying on this commitment to triply anonymity was worth it, however, on account of the obvious benefits of fairness that triple anonymity affords.

The way I stated our commitment to triply anonymity in the last paragraph was carefully qualified; and it is true that our commitment to triple anonymity is not total. There are top-flight philosophy journals, such as Mind, that implement triple anonymity more thoroughly than we do, with the editors never learning the identities of the authors until after final decisions are reached. Over the years, however, Ethics has evolved a complex and multi-tiered process for reviewing submissions. We believe that, within this process, there is some benefit of allowing the editors to learn the submitters’ identities after an initial decision has been entered. We also think that the final stage of the process (for the bulk of our submissions)—a vote of the editors—mitigates any risks involved in allowing the handling editor to learn a submitter’s identity because it is carried out in a largely triply anonymized way. Our reasons for this qualified stance may be of interest to readers of this Newsletter. I will set these reasons out first, adding some remarks specifically about gender balance at the end.

Before I can get to the different tiers of our principal review process, however, I need to characterize the different types of piece that we publish, as not all of them go through the same process. Ethics is a quarterly that publishes articles, discussion pieces on articles that appeared in the journal, symposia consisting of three or more essays, review essays, and book reviews. The review essays and book reviews are all solicited by the book review editor. I will not treat them further here. Articles and discussions are each subjected to some version of triply anonymous review. Proposed symposia are the one type of submission we handle simply in a doubly-anonymized way. We publish approximately two dozen submitted pieces a year. Our acceptance rate for submitted pieces has lately hovered around 4%.

Review Process for Submitted Articles

Our core review process, which applies to the vast majority of our submissions, is the one for articles. This process, which has four tiers, involves a level of complexity and rigor that had already been thought necessary decades ago, even before the recent surge in submissions rates. At current submission rates (almost 400 articles in 2009 and on a pace to reach about 500 in 2010), we crucially depend on these multiple tiers in order to winnow down the submissions without over-taxing our already heavily burdened volunteer editors and referees. When a submission comes in to us, an editorial assistant first checks that the manuscript has been properly anonymized. This includes checking to see that the author has not thanked named persons in the footnotes, has not cited his or her own work, and the like. If there are anonymization faults, the manuscript is sent back to the author for correction. In the first tier of proper review, anonymized manuscripts come to me as the editor for a first screening. I reject somewhat over half of all submitted articles at this first stage. Each remaining paper I assign to one or another of our (currently) thirteen associate editors, who will serve as the handling editor for that paper henceforward. Before finalizing my assignment of a paper to an editor, I check the authors’ identities to avert any conflict of interest, such as might arise in assigning an editor a paper by a departmental colleague. (Checking the authors’ identities requires me to log into a different part of Editorial Manager®.)
The first task of an associate editor acting as the handling editor of an assigned paper is to screen it once more to determine whether it should be sent out for review. The associate editors are each assigned about fifteen or twenty papers a year for screening. Because we are lucky enough to be able to draw on the volunteer work of more than a dozen associate editors, it is typically possible to secure for each submission a quite expert reading at this stage. The associate editors make their decisions while still ignorant of the authors’ identities, including drawing up a list of potential outside reviewers if their decision is in favor of sending the paper for review. Acting still within the veil of anonymity, then, the associate editors carry out an additional layer of desk rejection—rejection without comments or outside review—before anything gets sent out for review. Once having made their decisions, the handling editors then check to see who the authors are so as to avoid recommending reviewers who would have a conflict of interest. A paper that goes forward in the review process an associate editor must continue to handle, in ways I will detail in a moment, in his or her capacity as the handling editor.

Given all this work the editors are called upon to do, it is not reasonable to expect them to generate useful, constructive comments for the author when they screen papers out. We do, however, have a number of different standard letters that we use in many cases to try to convey some basic information about the reason for the desk rejection, such as that we found the paper unsuitable for the journal and suggest that the authors try a journal more devoted to [fill in the blank]; that the paper was too limited to the exposition or criticism of a particular philosopher’s views to be of interest to us; or that, in light of the large literature devoted to the paper’s topic, it was insufficiently innovative. If, however, the judgment was simply that the paper was of insufficient quality to pursue, we do not try to convey our reasons for desk rejection. One can be quite clear what is wrong with a paper without having anything polite or useful to say to the author about it; and even if one did, still the time constraints make attempting this unreasonable.

Authors whose papers I reject in the initial tier of screening get a very quick decision. Those whose papers are rejected by an associate editor in the second tier of screening hear within a month or two of submission in almost all cases. A great majority of our rejection decisions are communicated in less than two months. It is when papers go out for review that significant delay can be encountered. We, like other journals, have been encountering increasing difficulty in lining up reviewers for papers. It appears that the pool of potential reviewers is being over-stressed. We ask associate editors to suggest at least five potential reviewers for every paper they designate for review. We continue to handle, in ways I will detail in a moment, in his or her capacity as the handling editor.

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The first significant point at which a decision is made with knowledge of authors’ identities comes when the outside reviews come back on a submission. If both reviewers recommend rejection, then rejection is the automatic result. In all other cases, the handling editor, who will have checked the authors’ identities before finalizing his or her list of proposed reviewers, makes a decision about how to proceed based on the outside reviews and his or her reading of the paper. We do expect substantial comments from the outside reviewers and do almost always receive them. Although we offer instructions to the reviewers, these insinuate that detailed comments are expected rather than demanding them. We ask reviewers to rate the submissions numerically in various ways in addition to offering comments. We do try to avoid re-using reviewers who fail to offer detailed, constructive comments. We only very rarely receive uncivil comments—possibly because experienced Ethics reviewers know that their reports will ultimately go to the other reviewer, albeit without their name attached. These comments considerably guide the handling editors in their decisions; still, the handling editors have considerable discretion. In a paper’s first go-round, the choice is almost always between outright rejection and rejection with an invitation to revise and resubmit: it is very rare that we consider accepting a paper without asking for revision and resubmission. When a paper comes back in for reconsideration, we automatically ask the same reviewers who reviewed it the first time to take a look at it. Our reason for this is to guard the authors against new lines of objection being raised. As you will see in a moment, the authors of papers we publish never lack for detailed comments.

Before I discuss further this significant, non-anonymized stage of decision, I should describe the fourth tier of our review process for submitted articles, which is quite unusual. Suppose a submitted article has reached a stage in which the handling editor feels that it is in excellent shape, or at least in very good shape and will not benefit from any further round of revision. At that point, the handling editor will put the paper up for an up-or-down vote by the whole body of editors (so, the thirteen associate editors and the editor). We use a numerical voting system that registers a range of conviction while still requiring a broad basis of support among those voting for any paper to pass. This vote, in which the editor’s voice is just one among many, results in the final determination of acceptance or rejection. With the group of editors at its current size, the voting quorum is six. Two of those voting—myself, as the editor, and the handling editor—are aware of the authors’ identity (or, in my case, at least saw it at one point at the initial stage). The other four or more editors voting, however—and typically we have been exceeding the quorum—vote in ignorance of the authors’ identities. The votes are informed by a cover note from the handling editor, the whole set of outside reviews (usually, two rounds thereof), and by an anonymized version of the correspondence between the handling editor and the authors, including any additional comments and suggestions that the handling editor has made and any of the authors’ replies to the comments. The voting is non-deliberative and non-dialogic: each editor simply sends in his or her own numerical vote and any comments for the author. The vote thus often yields six or more sets of comments for the author. This voting process is somewhat cumbersome, but seems needed in order to select, among those papers that receive strong support from the outside referees, which ones we will publish in the space available.

Returning, now, to the issue of the handling editor’s non-anonymized decision when the reviews come back, you will see that this is not—as it is in most journals—the point of ultimate decision. The handling editor cannot decide to accept a paper. The most favorable decision he or she can make is to forward a paper for a vote, coupled with a positive vote from the handling editor. It is true that the handling editor has the discretion to reject papers with quite strong reviewer support. It would not be a violation of our rules for a handling editor to reject a paper with “accept” recommendations from both outside reviewers. I am not aware, however, of this ever having happened. Much more commonly, the handling editor will reach a decision in the face of a split verdict from the outside reviewers (one “accept” and one “reject,” say) or with two middling verdicts (two “revise and resubmit” recommendations). Whether in responding to a first set of reviews or to a set of reviews of a revision, the handling editor must often make a judgment call as to the likelihood that a further round of revision would significantly improve the paper. Not infrequently, the handling editor will offer the
authors the option of a third round of revision, just to make sure that the paper is in optimal shape before the vote. We feel that it is valuable for the handling editors to know the authors’ identities in making these decisions so that they can have as full as possible an informational basis for judging whether this effort would lead to success or would waste the authors’ time. In addition, of course, the initial point at which the handling editors learned the authors’ identities was earlier in checking their lists of proposed reviewers for potential conflicts of interest. While this checking could, as in some other journals, be delegated to the managing editor, we feel that there is some gain in having an editor with some expertise make this check, since an editor is more likely to know of lineages of student-teacher relationships, seeding schools of thought, and the like, which might introduce undue bias. The disadvantages of breaching triple anonymity after the initial decision to send a paper out for review and before reaching a decision on the resulting reviews would be more worrisome if this were the ultimate stage of acceptance or rejection. As I have explained, however, it is not. Our ultimate up-or-down stage is the vote, which is predominantly conducted by editors who remain ignorant of the authors’ identities.

**Review of Discussion Pieces and Symposia**

Discussion pieces and proposed symposia that we have indicated some collective willingness to review we handle by something more like the double-anonymous process that is like the process standard in many other journals, except that in these cases we generally rely on the associate editors to act as the doubly anonymized reviewers. This alternative process we have long called “expedited” review. It is simpler in that it dispenses with the vote. I do screen discussion pieces in ignorance of the authors’ identities. Then, if I want to send them for review, I pick two editors to serve as the reviewers and a third (often myself) to serve as the decider. The reasons for using associate editors as reviewers derive from the fact that the only discussion pieces we are willing to consider are discussions of articles that have appeared in our pages. Our editors know the material that has appeared in our pages and have a good sense of what would constitute a fruitful exchange therein. My reason for typically assigning myself to be the decider, despite my knowledge of the authors’ names, is that our associate editors are overburdened as it is. (I, at least, am compensated for my work by a teaching reduction.)

For symposia, the process is superficially similar to the one for discussion pieces, although the rationale is somewhat different. What typically happens is that someone who has organized a workshop or otherwise gathered a collection of polished papers will contact us to see if we would be interested in considering publishing them as a symposium. I will poll the associate editors, asking if they are interested. If there is a sufficient expression of interest, we will declare our willingness to process the symposium submission. We always insist on the right to publish any proper subset of the submitted symposium papers, or all of them, or none of them. Papers submitted for a proposed symposium are anonymized and then sent to two readers—almost always associate editors. Our reason for typically using associate editors as the readers in these cases is that it is very hard to convince anyone else to read and provide detailed reports on five or seven article-length papers in a timely fashion. Assuming that the readers are associate editors, the anonymization of the papers will be qualified, in that the associate editors will typically have seen a list of all of the symposium’s authors at the earlier stage when the symposium proposal was vetted. At the stage of review, however, the editor-as-reviewer will not know whose paper is whose.

Once the reviews are in on a discussion piece or on symposium decisions, I, as the editor, or the associate editor who has been appointed to act as the decider in the case, simply make the final decision informed by the reports.

**Gender Balance**

Against this background, I come finally to issues of gender balance. Recent figures show that the proportion of submissions we have been receiving from women is approximately the same as the proportion of women in philosophy (21%; Table A), while the proportion of reviewers we have been using who are women is just slightly lower (18%; Table B). Since there is reason to believe that the women in philosophy are more drawn to ethics than to other sub-fields, however, we should not take too much comfort in these facts. We need to continue to keep our eye on this issue. We are pleased to have three prominent women among our associate editors and would be pleased to have more.

When it comes to the accepted papers (articles, discussions, and symposium pieces), the two most recent volumes, which appeared mainly in 2008 and 2009, show some falling off from the level of representation of women authors—in 19%—that Sally Haslanger (2008, 220) had calculated for *Ethics* for the period 2002-2007. As Table C shows, the percentage of female authors in these two volumes is closer to 16%.

Reflecting on the admittedly small sample afforded by these two recent volumes of *Ethics*—and I am leery of over-reading variations in small numbers, here—I conclude that we have some reason to rethink our treatment of symposia. In these volumes, only one of the nine symposium-article authors was a woman. If we set the symposia aside, the proportion of female authors in these two volumes goes from 8/49 (16%) to 7/36 (20%). Although I do not have a way of breaking out the data on this, I suspect that in the case of symposia the submitting authors are more heavily male than in the case of our submitters in general. I hence suspect that it is not so much our review process that needs to be addressed here as the process by which symposia get proposed to us. The present article should at least serve to provide some notice, to those who may not have known it, that we are open to considering proposals for symposia. I hope that some readers of this *Newsletter* may be moved to send us symposium proposals.

### Table A. *Ethics* submissions, 2008-2009*:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total sub’s</th>
<th># from males</th>
<th># from females</th>
<th># from unclassified</th>
<th>Female %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>825</td>
<td>631</td>
<td>177</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>21%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*These figures include book reviews, which are solicited; however, the number of book reviews is small in relation to the totals.

### Table B. *Ethics* year-by-year reviewer data.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total reviewers</th>
<th>Male #</th>
<th>Female #</th>
<th>Percentage female</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>131</td>
<td>113</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>14%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>23%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>236</td>
<td>196</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>17%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average*</td>
<td>154</td>
<td>128</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>18%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*In the case of the percentage of female reviewers, the average is the average of the annual percentages, not the restatement, in percentage terms, of the average numbers.
Hypatia: A Journal of Her Own

Alison Wylie
University of Washington and Co-editor of Hypatia, A Journal of Feminist Philosophy

This year, 2010, sees the publication of Volume 25 of *Hypatia, A Journal of Feminist Philosophy*—a major achievement for the journal and, indeed, for the extended community that brought *Hypatia* into being in the early 1980s and have since built it into a major force in philosophy. In the process of organizing a conference to honor this quarter century of publication, we learned a great deal about the history of the journal; past editors and members of the founding editorial board dug into their files and circulated minutes of SWIP meetings, planning memos, and editorial proposals going back to the origins of the journal in the mid-1970s. So I begin with some background on the formation of the journal and its editorial practices, then give an overview of our current review practice and publication profile as this bears on the question of how women fare publishing in philosophy journals.

I. *Hypatia* History: Mandate and Editorial Policies

*Hypatia* is, in fact, several years older than the publication of Volume 25 suggests. It was originally published as a series of three special issues of *Women's Studies International Forum (WSIF)* between 1983 to1985, under the editorship of Azizah al-Hibri. These *Hypatia* special issues of WSIF were the culmination of plans that had been taking shape for a decade: the impetus to create a journal of feminist philosophy came from discussions at regional meetings of the Society for Women in Philosophy (SWIP) dating to the early 1970s. The minutes from a Midwest SWIP business meeting in February 1976 summarize arguments for supporting the proposal for a “Journal of the Society for Women in Philosophy” that had been circulated by members of the Pacific APA. Chief among them was concern that women in philosophy were finding it difficult to gain access to “standard” avenues of publication, especially if their work was feminist. Regular regional SWIP meetings, well established by 1976, were generating “a large amount of material” for which there was growing demand given the number of courses then being created and offered in feminist philosophy. In short, SWIP members felt a pressing need for a “forum for publication” (Midwest SWIP 1976).

There was debate at the time about the focus and orientation of this new SWIP journal. Was it to serve primarily as a venue for publishing philosophical work by women (whatever the area), or should it be an explicitly feminist journal? If the latter, should it be a broad spectrum feminist journal, with a mandate to publish feminist philosophy alongside other genres of feminist theory and writing, or should it be, more specifically, a disciplinary feminist philosophy journal? These last options mark a distinction that figures in retrospective accounts of the process by which feminist scholars carved out academic niches for themselves in the 1960s and 1970s (McDermott 1994, 1-3, 189). Several expansively interdisciplinary feminist and women’s studies journals had been founded in the 1970s at the time plans for a SWIP journal were taking shape (e.g., *Feminist Studies* in 1972, *Signs and Frontiers* in 1975), but *Hypatia* was one of a number of journals founded in the 1980s, in fields like history, law, literary studies, and politics, that served discipline-specific constituencies of feminist scholars.

The 1976 proposal for a SWIP journal settled these questions of scope and mandate in favor of a disciplinary feminist journal. The “main body of the journal” was to be made up of articles in feminist philosophy, organized thematically where appropriate (by “area or field of philosophy or topic”), and the early editors’ introductions (e.g., Simons 1986, 1) make it clear that *Hypatia* was understood from the start to be inclusive of feminist work in all areas, subfields, and traditions of philosophy. Although its audience was expected to include feminist and women’s studies scholars, it was only in connection with reviews that the journal’s content was described as extending beyond philosophy; reviews were to include “both philosophy books and books thought to be important contributions to feminist theory” (Proposed editorial policy, 1976). This resolutely philosophical and pluralist orientation is reflected in the mission statement that appeared in the front matter of the journal when *Hypatia* was first published as an autonomous journal in 1986.

*Hypatia* has its roots in the Society for Women in Philosophy, many of whose members have for years envisioned a regular publication devoted to feminist philosophy. *Hypatia* is the realization of that vision; it is intended to encourage and communicate many different kinds of feminist philosophizing (Hypatia 1986, front matter).

The “Statement of Policy” included in the 1976 proposal makes it clear that *Hypatia’s* founders envisioned a highly systematic and rigorous review process; it calls for anonymous review of each submission by two referees, with provision for a tie-breaking third review when referees diverge in their recommendations. But at the same time, manuscript review was not solely a matter of gatekeeping. It was to be a constructive process, aimed at fostering the intellectual development of feminist philosophy: “reviewers will be committed to provide critical comments on papers received, particularly if publication is not recommended” (Statement of Policy 1976). In the “Acknowledgements” with which al-Hibri opens the first *Hypatia* special issue of WSIF she notes that, in implementing these policies, it was clear that the SWIP members who reviewed submissions for this issue had “a special commitment to the journal and...high expectations concerning its quality and standard of excellence”; she reports “a very high rejection rate,” but satisfaction that the result was well worth the process (al-Hibri 1983, vii).

These policies continue to be the framework within which *Hypatia* operates. All content is refereed with the exception of invited book reviews, occasional review essays, and “Musings.” We decline very few manuscripts without review, and only when both co-editors concur that a submission is significantly out of area or underdeveloped; and we ask referees not only to recommend decisions on the manuscripts they review (to publish, to request revisions, to decline), but also to provide authors with “helpful and supportive feedback,” even (indeed, especially) when they do not recommend publication. Our goal now, as when the 1976 “Statement of Policy” was circulated, is to encourage the kind of dynamic community of discourse necessary to sustain both the quality and the creativity of...
feminist scholarship in philosophy in the long term. Our current mission statement acknowledges the interdisciplinary reach of the journal, but emphasizes the founding commitment to pluralist breadth within feminist philosophy.\footnote{5}

\section*{II. Hypatia Today}

Close to thirty years later Hypatia is thriving. Our circulation is robust and is showing rapid growth in electronic subscriptions and downloads. Combining reports from Wiley-Blackwell and JSTOR, there were over 1,000 views and downloads of Hypatia articles a month in 2009, with 250 downloads for the most frequently accessed articles published that year and over 1,000 “unique prints” for each of the most frequently downloaded articles in the three years that Hypatia back content has been available through JSTOR.\footnote{6} Hypatia continues to be a disciplinary journal of feminist philosophy with an international editorial board and readership. A regional analysis of article downloads for 2009 shows that over half our online readership is in Europe, Australia/New Zealand, and Asia, and a third of our institutional subscriptions are to libraries outside North America. Hypatia also continues to be expansively pluralist. Although distinctions by area and tradition are difficult to draw with precision, the distribution of submissions across sub-fields and traditions has been fairly stable in the last two years:\footnote{7} roughly half the manuscripts we receive are on topics in value theory (ethics, social/political philosophy, aesthetics); just over a quarter are in epistemology, philosophy of science, metaphysics; and a quarter represent various areas of continental philosophy, with history of philosophy manuscripts cross-cutting these categories.

Hypatia has a tradition of publishing two thematic issues a year going back to a special issue on Simone de Beauvoir that appeared as the third of the initial WSIF Hypatia issues (edited by Simons; 1985). Although all submissions are subject to the same review process—double-anonymous review by two referees—the timetable on which refereeing is carried out is much more regimented for thematic special issues as compared to open issues, and acceptance rates for special issues vary depending on the volume of submissions. What follows is a profile of the Hypatia review process for 2009 (for both open and special issues), focusing on factors that figure prominently in recent rankings of philosophy journals and in online discussions of journal practice.

We received just under 100 manuscripts for open submission issues in 2009 and, as indicated, we reviewed all but a few of these; our desk rejection rate is less than 5%. We accepted for publication 14\% of the open submission manuscripts that were under review in this period, virtually all after they had undergone one or another level of revision.\footnote{8} The initial decision for the majority of submissions was to reject (just under 70\% of manuscripts reviewed), although in 40\% of these cases we encouraged the authors to resubmit if they were willing to substantially rewrite their manuscript along lines recommended by the referees.\footnote{9} Referees are asked to provide us their reports in 6-8 weeks and most return reviews within this timeframe, although with wide variance. Our average time to initial decision for open submission manuscripts was 13 weeks, and the time to decision for revised manuscripts was 9 weeks.

Special issue themes are selected on the basis of a review of formal proposals by the Board of Associate Editors in consultation with the editors, and a vote by the Associate Editors.\footnote{10} In the last two years we have received six formal proposals for special issues, two of which have been accepted and are scheduled for 2011 and 2012. The three special issues whose deadlines fell in late 2008 or 2009 drew altogether 50 submissions and, on average, the guest editors accepted just over a third of these manuscripts. Given the tight timeline on which special issue contents are reviewed, guest editors typically redirect manuscripts to open issue review if they require major revisions, or if referees recommend a decision to reject and resubmit. Although the distribution of manuscripts across decision categories varies by special issue, all the guest editors made an initial decision to redirect manuscripts or reject them (with or without the option of resubmission) in over half, and usually two-thirds, of the submissions they reviewed. The time to initial decision for special issue submissions was the same as for open issue submissions (9 to 13 weeks), but longer and with wider variance for final decisions (4 to 17 weeks). This last reflects the fact that guest editors typically defer final decisions until all revised (conditionally accepted) manuscripts are in hand and they are in a position to finalize the contents for the issue as a whole.

In online discussion of journal practice generated by posts on the blogs PEA Soup (“The Ethical Obligations of Journals”: 29 June 2004) and Leiter Reports (“Philosophy Journals: Which Ones are Responsible, Which Ones Not”: 29 November 2004), perhaps the sharpest point of contention was the length of time it takes journal editors to provide authors with a response. One highly regarded mainstream journal was described as promising a 12-week turnaround but routinely taking up to a year to provide authors with a response, while other journals were commended for providing an initial decision to reject within 6 to 8 weeks. Timely response is described in several posts as 3 to 4 months,\footnote{11} so Hypatia’s average time to initial decision is within the range of expectation for philosophy journals identified as “well run” in these discussions. In addition, however, a second focus of concern in these discussions is the quality of the feedback: whether journals provide authors with reviews of their manuscripts and how substantive these are. One especially striking post registers frustration that, in an intensely competitive publishing environment, journals “no longer see themselves as able to fulfill [a] duty, or as even having such a duty...[as] to further the professional development of those who submit manuscripts by providing extensive, constructive feedback that responds not only to the paper’s weakness but also to its strengths” (Cholbi on Leiter: 29 November 2004). The quality of feedback provided by Hypatia referees has impressed all of us, not least the many authors who make a point of telling us how much they appreciate the rigorous detail of the comments we include with our decision letters. While we have not undertaken a systematic content assessment (e.g., of the kind reported by Carole Lee and Christian Schunn in this issue of the APA Newsletter), the vast majority of referees’ reports we see reflect a very close reading of the manuscripts under review, and a commitment not just to ensure that Hypatia publishes top quality philosophy, but to foster the professional development of individual scholars, as mandated by the 1976 “Statement” on editorial policy.

Another issue of timeliness that has drawn attention in online discussions of journal practice is how long it takes for an article accepted by a journal to appear in print. Contributors to Hypatia know when articles accepted for a special issue will appear from the time the call for papers has been circulated; the process of review, revision, and production takes roughly a year and a half, and special issues are typically scheduled and advertised a year in advance of their submission deadlines. Although articles accepted for publication in an open issue may not appear in print for a year or more, Wiley-Blackwell has recently implemented EarlyView: a system which makes it possible to publish articles online as soon as proofs are approved. Combined with a new small batch production system, this means that open issue manuscripts can be published in citable form electronically within six months of
acceptance, often well before they have been assigned to a specific issue.

Finally, the list of “Ethical Obligations of Journals to Authors” posted on the PEA Soup blog puts particular emphasis on transparency of the review process, a principle that has been endorsed by Hypatia’s founders and editors from the time editorial policy for the journal was first drafted in the mid-1970s. Our current review policies and practices, our submission guidelines, and our acceptance rates and average review time for open issues are posted on our website. In addition, since December 2008 when we moved to an electronic submission and review system (Manuscript Central), authors have been able to check online to see where their manuscript is in the review process at any point after it has been submitted.

In short, feminist philosophy is now an established field, and Hypatia is a mature journal by any measure. Perhaps more to the point, from the outset Hypatia has instituted and maintained many of the key recommendations now endorsed as responsible journal practices. To reiterate: we review the vast majority of submissions in a double anonymous referee process; we have a commitment to provide authors with detailed feedback; we balance the demands of securing substantive, well-informed reviews against the imperative of timely response, and maintain a 3 to 4 month turn-around time for initial decisions; our policies and practices are publicly documented.

III. The Implications for Women Publishing in Philosophy

Consider, first, the question of what difference it makes that journals implement the kinds of policies adopted by Hypatia in the early 1980s and now widely recommended in discussions of responsible journal practice. Reflecting on this I am reminded of an observation made by Virginia Valian when asked what she had learned from consulting widely on gender equity issues. Her response was that when administrators recognize that they have a “gender problem” or a “race/ethnicity problem,” it is almost always entangled with (and exacerbated by) deeper, more widespread forms of institutional dysfunctionality. What she described in this connection is well documented by studies of the impact of inhospitable workplace environments: women and minorities are especially disadvantaged when policies and procedures are not transparent, when success depends heavily on integration into informal communication networks from which they are all too often excluded, and when there is a lack of accountability for the fairness of outcomes. The corollary is the conventional wisdom, arising from decades of work on equity issues in a range of fields: that fair, transparent practices can make a real difference for women and minority scholars, mitigating the effects of cognitive schemas that inculcate patterns of misrecognition of the kind described in the empirical literature on evaluation bias and recently, in a philosophical context, by Miranda Fricker as forms of testimonial injustice (2007). Given the concerns that impelled SWIP members to launch a journal in the 1970s, it is not surprising that the 1976 “Statement on Policy” should make it a priority to establish rigorously fair, systematic, and constructive review practices.

That said, leveling the playing field is by no means all that’s needed. Making the rules of the game explicit, while beneficial for its enhanced transparency, leaves intact the conventions that structure publishing practices in philosophy, and these may themselves be unjust in subtle (and not-so-subtle) ways. They may incorporate various forms of evaluation bias (often unrecognized, unintended) that put women and minority scholars at a disadvantage, not least because the onus is on them to accommodate to disciplinary norms they had little part in shaping that we should be prepared to critically scrutinize. Hypatia was intended to create, and has succeeded in fostering, an intellectual and professional space in which innovative feminist work in philosophy can flourish. In this it has served to counteract patterns of hermeneutical injustice that have marginalized philosophical work on a range of issues and perspectives that particularly concern women and feminists (to draw on Fricker’s terminology again; 2007). One might expect that, 30 years later, conditions would have changed. But sadly, as Sally Haslanger demonstrates in her recent Hypatia Musing (2008), feminist scholarship is still not getting uptake in many mainstream philosophy journals. This is especially striking given the number of areas of philosophy in which cutting edge developments resonate with, or were anticipated by, lines of inquiry pioneered by feminist philosophers. Consider, for example, the recent, rapid growth of social epistemology predicated on the insight, forcefully argued by contributors to early issues of Hypatia, that epistemic agency must be understood in social terms, or the arguments for reconceptualizing the nature of moral and political agency in ways that take account of moral psychology, relational qualities, and structural inequalities which were the point of departure for the research in feminist ethics and political philosophy that has flourished since the 1970s.

Nowhere are these issues more clearly marked than in recent debate about journal ratings. The reputational rankings of philosophy journals published online by Leiter and by Colyvan are aimed at general rather than specialist journals so they do not include Hypatia. However, Hypatia does appear in the more comprehensive journal ratings developed by the Australian Research Council (ARC) and the European Science Foundation, where it is listed as an A* journal on the Australian list and as a B journal in the European Reference Index for the Humanities (ERIH). This discrepancy is puzzling because the Australasian rating system was evidently the template for the ERIH system, and both are intended not to rank journals reputationally, but to assign them to broad categories defined, for example, by their publishing standards (e.g., peer review, timely and regular publication), their international reach (in readership and board membership), the degree to which they are discriminating (as evident in acceptance rates): all measures on which Hypatia has an exemplary record.

The response to these discrepant ratings for Hypatia was immediate. In a discussion thread on the Feminist Philosophers blog (“Philosophy Journal Rankings” 2007), a number of contributors observe that the ERIH rating of Hypatia as a B journal is enormously consequential, given the role these ratings play in research assessments, and in appointments and funding decisions. One notes that “it is very difficult to publish feminist philosophy in other journals,” and it can be “difficult to get publications in Hypatia taken seriously by one’s department” (Jender 2007), so that a B rating for Hypatia reinforces the marginalization of feminist philosophy in the field as a whole. Leiter’s comments on the Australasian rating of Hypatia as an A* journal powerfully illustrate the problem:

The A* list isn’t bad, apart from dubious inclusions (probably meant to pander to this-or-that interest group) like Hypatia, Political Theory, and Philosophy East and West. (The best work in feminist philosophy, for example, has surely appeared in many of the other A* journals, not in Hypatia...) (Leiter, Leiter Reports, 29 September 2008)

The firestorm of commentary that these remarks generated on the Feminist Philosophers blog provoked a policy change. Most of the discussion has been deleted but the original post is
still online under the title, “Brian Leiter reveals vast knowledge of feminist philosophy”:

Surely the best work in feminist philosophy is published in top mainstream journals all the time! Surely! Mere introspection reveals this. Sadly, however, very little feminist philosophy makes it into mainstream journals....Seeking confirmation? Check out Sally Haslanger’s paper. (Jender, Feminist Philosophy; 29 September 2008).

Much more work is required to document and — more to the point — to counteract the patterns of marginalization of feminist scholarship in philosophy, and of women publishing in philosophy more generally, that were identified by Haslanger in 2008 and that are reflected in contributions to the two special issues on women in philosophy recently published by the APA Newsletter on Feminism and Philosophy. But it would seem that, as much as things have changed for the better — feminist philosophy is clearly flourishing and Hypatia is now a well established, highly successful journal — the concerns that mobilized SWIP members to found Hypatia in the 1970s have by no means disappeared.

Endnotes
1. The 25th Anniversary conference, “Feminist Legacies/ Feminist Futures,” was hosted by the Simpson Center for the Humanities at the University of Washington in October 2009. Details are available on the Hypatia editorial office website. This URL and others cited in what follows are included in the “online sources” section of the references.
2. Hypatia founders and editors reflected on this history in an opening keynote panel and in an interview recorded for the oral history project, “Feminist Philosophers: In Their Own Words” (Callahan and Tuana). Videos of both the interview and the keynote panel are available through the Hypatia editorial office website (linked to Hypatia Online), and audio podcasts of the keynote panels are posted on the Wiley-Blackwell Hypatia website.
3. Azizah al-Hibri provides an account of this history in the “Acknowledgements” published as a preface to the first of the three Hypatia special issues of WSIF (al-Hibri 1983).
4. Joyce Trebilcot (1983, 1990) describes the process by which SWIP took shape, beginning with an initial meeting in 1970 as the APA Women’s Caucus at the Eastern Division APA, and taking the name “Society for Women in Philosophy” the following spring at a meeting of the Western Division APA (Trebilcot 1983, vi; 1990, ix). By the mid-1970s regional SWIPs were organized across the U.S. and in Canada, with counterparts in Europe and Mexico (1983, vi). Trebilcot recalls that “almost as soon as SWIP was formed, members began to discuss the idea of a journal” (1990, ix).
5. This proposal, entitled “Proposed Editorial Policy for a Journal of the Society for Women in Philosophy,” was discussed at a meeting of the Committee on the Status of Women at the Pacific Division meeting in March 1976. The membership of the founding Editorial Board was announced in May 1977 (Garry and Thomason), and Azizah al-Hibri was appointed the founding editor in the spring of 1979 (Trebilcot 1990, x). Minutes of an Editorial Board meeting the following spring record the decision to name the journal “Hypatia: A Journal of Feminist Philosophy” (March 28, 1980, San Francisco).
6. The details of Hypatia’s “Review Policy and Practice” are posted online, on the Hypatia editorial office website under the tab “for contributors.”
7. This mission statement is printed on the inside cover of each issue and is posted on the Hypatia homepage of editorial office and Wiley-Blackwell websites.
8. Hypatia’s current content is only available online through Wiley-Blackwell (all back issues area available on the Wiley-Blackwell website as well); JSTOR has offered electronic access to back issues of Hypatia, with a five-year moving wall, since April 2007.
9. These figures reflect a tabulation of submissions under review or received since July 2008 when our editorial term began.
10. Our decision categories for manuscripts are: accept (as it stands); accept with minor revisions (subject to review by the editors); accept on condition that the author makes major revisions (subject to review by the editors and one external referee); reject but with encouragement to resubmit if substantially rewritten (if resubmitted, the manuscript will go through full review by two external referees); reject (the manuscript will not be considered again). The 14% acceptance rate cited here includes all manuscripts accepted for publication without further external review (as they stand or with minor revisions). A decision of “major revision” was assigned to 17% of manuscripts reviewed; if revised they will require a second round of external review.
11. That is to say, just under 70% of manuscripts were assigned to the two “reject” categories cited in Note #10, the majority without the option of resubmission.
12. The guidelines for preparing special issue proposals and a governance document that sets out the role of the editors and associate editors are available on the Hypatia editorial office website.
13. Several of the survey responses reported by Haslanger in this issue of the APA Newsletter also include recommendations of deadlines for journal decisions: 2 months in one case and 4-6 months in another. And Henry Richardson notes that the response time for Ethics is under 2 months for first tier decisions to reject manuscripts without external review.
14. This was one focus of discussion at a conference on "Women, Work, and the Academy" convened at Barnard College, 9-10 December 2004. The conference website includes links to a video of the keynote panel presentations that precipitated this discussion.
15. See, for example, Valian’s overview of the impact of gender schemas (1995) and the range of studies on workplace environment issues summarized in Wylie, Jakobsen, Fosado (2007).
16. A further question that warrants attention is what counts as a “specialist” journal, and how these fare in the ERIH journal rating. A number of commentators who responded to posts on the Leiter and Brooks blogs (June 2007) objected that there is a general problem with the rating of specialist journals on the ERIH system: few rise above a B rating; there is no differentiation between journals within specialist fields; and those that are more specialized tend to do less well (e.g., Millstein, Leiter: 26 June 2007). The editors of close to 30 history of science, technology and medicine journals issued a collective condemnation of the ERIH ratings as “defective in conception and execution” (Ariew et al. 2009, 2). It may also be significant that, for a journal to receive an A rating on the ERIH index it must not only meet the criteria set out for this category, but representatives of at least two EU countries must assign it an A rating and there must be no dissenting voices (see the ERIH website for details). For the outcome of these debates, see Thom Brooks’ most recent post on the ERIH ratings (23 January 2009).
17. Hypatia is also included in a 2004 “Journals Survey,” published on the blog Thoughts Arguments Rants (Weatherston, TAR: 17 August 2004), and in an application to philosophy journals of the Hirsch Index (a citation-based impact rating), the results of which are available on the blog Certain Doubts (Kvanvig: 24 April 2008). A contributor to the Feminist Philosophers blog notes that, on the Hirsch system, Hypatia comes in 26th [of the 75 journals listed], and ahead of half a dozen journals that the European Science Foundation ranked higher (Telbort, Feminist Philosophers: 12 January 2008). On a reputational survey reported by Weatherston, Hypatia receives an average score of 4.0 (median of 4.1) on a 10-point scale; the highest score assigned to the 86 journals surveyed is 8.9, and the
lowest score is 2.7. The six journals that share Hypatia’s average score were all assigned a B rating on ERIH, while on the ARC ratings they include one other A*, two A, and a B rating. What distinguishes Hypatia is the standard deviation recorded for its score: at 2.56 points it is the largest spread for any but one other journal included in this survey.

Acknowledgements

I am most grateful to my co-editor, Lori Gruen, for her help conceptualizing this contribution to the APA Newsletter, and to those on the Hypatia Board of Associate Editors and Advisory Board, as well as the Women in Philosophy Task Force, who provided me background on the history of Hypatia and invaluable feedback on an initial draft. I also thank Gwynne Taraska (2008-2009 Managing Editor) and Karen Emmener (2009-2010 Editorial Assistant) for assembling information about our submission and review data, and the editorial staff at Wiley-Blackwell for providing much useful detail on Hypatia’s distribution and readership. (Any errors or misperceptions should, of course, be attributed to me.) Most important, I hope I have done justice to the work and the inspiration of all those who have made Hypatia such a vibrant journal.

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3 May 1977. “Minutes of a meeting of the Board of Editors (San Francisco).”
**Ideal Embodiment: Kant’s Theory of Sensibility**


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This book is a must-read for serious researchers in philosophy of embodiment, although it does suppose a good acquaintance with Kant. It argues that “the core thesis of transcendental idealism is the basis for the idea that self-consciousness reveals us to ourselves as fundamentally embodied subjects” (317). Accordingly, the universality of human experience is not a function of abstract reason but is based in “feelings that are universal...a common predicament of mortality, suffering, and vulnerability that characterizes the human condition” a priori (319). This is a timely thesis, with a genuinely fresh and intellectually challenging perspective that takes the reader beyond the reach of the tired debates of dualism.

This book constitutes a sustained and nuanced argument that Kant’s entire critical project is underpinned, and indeed unified, by the idea of the transcendental body, the understanding of which displaces reason from its pre-eminence in intellectual life. It is a breath-taking endeavor: “the claim is made that pure reason owes the capacity of establishing itself and that it is not an empty idealization, construction or fantasy” (5). In making her case, Nuzzo demonstrates and defends Kant’s insight that sensibility “is not co-extensive with the sphere of the material and the empirical,” but has a sphere and an activity of its own, which is revealed through the transcendental body. The transcendental body is the “invisible” body, the body as a priori condition of possibility of human experience, and made visible through transcendental investigation (8).

The idea that sensibility, for Kant, is an activity is a signal that conventional “wisdom” is about to be set on its head. Throughout, Nuzzo systematically disassembles conventional assumptions, prejudices, and interpretations of Kant’s various works that attempt to locate his ideas within the frameworks of either empiricism or metaphysics. She provides fascinating insights into Kant’s thinking about sensibility through a careful exegesis, beginning with the wonderfully titled essays “Dreams of A Spirit-Seer, Elucidated by the Dreams of Metaphysics” and “On the Ultimate Ground of the Differentiation of Regions in Space,” through the Dissertatio, the three Critiques, and the Prolegomena, and the moral philosophy. With an unwavering focus, Nuzzo repeatedly brings the reader back to the transcendental method, to show how it exceeds the frameworks of dualism. Importantly, Nuzzo achieves the impressive feat of showing how Kant’s philosophy, even in its most lofty abstractions, resists the temptations of metaphysics and materialism, and maintains its fidelity to phenomenal experience and its sublime attachment to the natural world.

Nuzzo’s overall argument is constructed through a series of smaller arguments, each of which are significant achievements in themselves. They are, in summary:

- articulation of the concept of the body as transcendental;
- demonstration of the contribution of the idea of the transcendental body to Kant’s epistemology in the Critique of Pure Reason;
- exposition of the nature and role of pure practical reason, and a demonstration of its grounding in the transcendental body, in the Critique of Practical Reason;
- re-interpretation and defense of Kant’s concept of freedom that demonstrates the roles of affect, emotions, and character in moral action through an exposition of the a priori relationship between sensibility and cognition in the embodied subject;
- exposition and defense of the Critique of Judgment as a critical analysis of sensible cognition that is a culmination of Kant’s earlier writings, and crowns his life’s work in a work about the nature of life.

Chapter One gets straight down to business with an exposition of the significance of incongruent counterparts for Kant’s entire philosophy. Nuzzo argues that orientation to left or right, up or down, etc. is neither a visible property of space (i.e., perceptual) nor constructed conceptually. It is, in fact, an a priori function of embodiment. Here we find the first instance of the transcendental body. The idea that transcendental embodiment underpins a priori structures of sensibility is taken up and demonstrated in every subsequent chapter.

Next Nuzzo considers the soul as a candidate for self-knowledge, in order to show how Kant systematically rejected the idea, and explains why he was right to do so. So begins the lengthy and detailed exegesis of the three Critiques which occupies the remainder of the book, and establishes the a priori status of the transcendental body in the pure and practical philosophies. Nuzzo argues that by 1770 Kant has abandoned his attempts to establish a reality that could be comprehended by rational concepts alone, and, instead, takes the philosophical bull by the horns in embracing the idea that the “soul” can only be known in reciprocal relations with external objects and is always mediated by the body (52-3). It is the body that delimits inner and outer sense. This raises the question of how that which we know empirically can also be transcendental without reducing to a science. Nuzzo’s answer is to show that the body is “space incarnated”: a form of receptivity and the condition of affection.

Nuzzo next takes on the difficult issue of the relationship between Kant’s critical project and metaphysics in the context of his account of the ideas of reason. She excavates and analyzes the presuppositions that animate Kant’s work over time, to trace the development of Kant’s thinking concerning traditional metaphysics and the sensible/intellectual distinction. She argues that the phenomena/noumena distinction does not refer to two subject-independent realms. Rather, the distinction operates within cognition to refer to two types of knowledge, both of which have a representational character: “What is represented, in both cases, is not the object as such (the way in which it is or the way in which it appears), but the relation between the object and the mind on the basis of the activity or passivity (receptivity) of the mind itself” (75-6).

This argument is perhaps the most complex and difficult, especially for the non-specialist reader, but it is essential to Nuzzo’s overall position, and, particularly, the later claims concerning the causality of reason in human freedom, which underpins the possibility of moral action. Students of the Habermasian school will recognize the moral implications of the critical and regulative role given to reason in the practical
sphere. Nuzzo argues that the ideas of reason are not concerned with intellectual intuitions, nor do they have a synthetic use. Rather, they concern "laws which...holding a priori, also concern our existence" (90). The manner in which they concern our existence is by providing the condition for self-legislation.

Nuzzo goes on to describe the shift in Kant’s thinking from a concern with speculative reason to practical reason, which brings us into the realm of action and, therefore, of moral agency. Nuzzo argues that Kant moves from a concern with representing the "I think" as an object of thought, to a concern with a subject that lives and acts in the world. The practical employment of reason rests on the possibility of representing the subject as a subject of a distinctive causality in the world of nature. Nuzzo takes as her cue a curious "transfiguration" of Kant’s thought following the "Paralogisms" and the "Antinomies of Reason": the self who knows its existence as practical and phenomenal does not know itself according to the laws of nature, but by analogy with them. This way of knowing oneself characterizes the peculiar domain of practical reason. Such a domain, beyond the empirical, is confirmed not by rational psychology but by moral agency. Free action, argues Nuzzo, requires "intelligible causality acting through the physical body, though this causality is never determined by it" (98). This involves a reformulation of the relationship between spontaneity and receptivity. What follows is a detailed exposition of the nature of pure practical reason as the a priori form of human sensibility. Crucial to Nuzzo’s argument is the insight that, for Kant, spontaneity does not mean merely self-produced. Rather, it means to “begin a series of events entirely of itself” (115). Spontaneity, therefore, can belong to both sensibility and understanding, but, in either case, has as a condition of its application or use, embodiment.

There follows a detailed account of the way in which the human will is determinable by both intellectual and sensible motives. But motive does not automatically lead to action, so the connection has to be made between rational motive and moral action via human sensibility, i.e., transcendental embodiment.

Nuzzo is at pains to avoid a dualist reading of “intelligible.” “Intelligible” does not refer to a property of the acting subject taken in abstraction from its sensible existence. Nor is it the character of a pure mind. Rather, it is a particular way in which a sensible embodied being can be the cause that produces effects in the world without itself being a phenomenally determined or conditioned cause (116). The intelligible causality of the will cannot be observed empirically, nor does it emanate from some alternative metaphysical realm. Rather, it is that rule or principle exhibited in action, which serves as a subjective ground of the will’s action. It is through an analysis of practical reason that the relation between the empirical and the intelligible emerges, because it is there, in principled action, that they intersect.

Nuzzo’s account of this intersection constitutes perhaps the most far-reaching claims of the book. Certainly all that follows turns on these arguments, which emerge from an analysis and interpretation of Kant’s Critique of Practical Reason. In Kantian style, Nuzzo engineers a reversal of our intuitions about action, feeling, and human reality to argue that “practical freedom is a human reality and yet is radically independent of human nature. ...It is the nature of practical freedom that first defines our human reality, it is not an alleged human nature that determines what human freedom is” (126).

In explaining this reversal of philosophical habit, Nuzzo returns to the transcendental body and its importance in orienting us to the world. The space of reason opens the space of action because it gives us the ability to choose whether or not to do something. Consciousness of the moral law provides the sense of orientation within the space of practical reason. Just as embodiment orient us in time and space, creating order within the natural world, so consciousness of the moral law orient us to, and creates order within, the world of agency. Practical reason articulates our existence in an ordered world, a world of ends. Being in a world of ends means being oriented to the world in terms of “doing something.”

Agency—the effect of sensibility and rationality, which are features of transcendental embodiment—precedes and motivates human nature (which is empirical), and not the other way around. These transcendental conditions produce our sense of our own existence, our awareness of desires, and the experiences of human reality. Practical reason can motivate the will to action through sensibility by orienting us to, and ordering the relationships between, reasons, feelings, desires, and objects. In this way, what we determine ourselves to do—how we use our freedom—determines how our desires connect to feelings and action, and to our existence as a whole. In this way, freedom determines our moral sentiments, and not the other way around. This is important, Nuzzo argues, not simply to refute Hume, but because human freedom drives and can determine the qualities of human reality.

Finally, Nuzzo pulls all the threads together in an analysis of Kant’s Critique of Judgment that claims that reflective judgment provides its own kind of orientation, this time between the sensible and the “supersensible” realms, which is effected through the transcendental body. Reflective judgment has a mediating function that gives reason’s ideas concrete reality. Taste, she writes, is “the capacity to judge the way in which reason’s ideas are made sensible” and “aesthetic and teleological judgement articulates the different modalities in which the supersensible is rendered sensible in the world of living nature” (272). By clarifying the a priori role of embodiment Nuzzo makes another important contribution by elucidating the connection between Kant’s transcendental method and Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology of lived embodiment.

As is to be expected, such a comprehensive and ambitious thesis opens up many new questions and avenues of investigation. For example, it offers a new framework for considering the moral development of children, the nature and significance of autonomy, recent work in cognitive science, such as dual aspect cognition, and the complexities of transfigured identities.

While the book does not address relations between subjects, it is nevertheless highly compatible with much recent feminist philosophy concerned with the relational nature of human subjectivity and agency, practical identity, and with moral philosophies concerned with the capabilities approach and vulnerability. It offers nothing less than a framework of humanity.

Nature Ethics: An Ecofeminist Perspective


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I think of myself as reasonably well versed in ecofeminist philosophical literature. It is deeply pleasing, therefore, to read Marti Kheel’s Nature Ethics and be persistently prodded to consider new information, and think carefully about how I
conduct my life with respect to individual others. Kheel offers a perspective which is both personal and vast in scope, as she shapes an ethos of ecofeminist and vegan living based on care, empathy, and relationality between distinct beings. Kheel draws the reader’s attention to the fact of particular lives as she challenges one to consider what obstacles prevent any of us from apprehending the realities of “other-than-humans” (6). The majority of her book reveals ways that four influential thinkers, in particular, have contributed to the difficulty of doing so, via masculinist commitments, even as they helpfully articulate valuable aspects of more holistic approaches to nature.

I do not always agree with her analyses of the four figures who receive detailed treatment in individual chapters: Theodore Roosevelt, Aldo Leopold, Holmes Rolston, and Warwick Fox. However, the room for debate available in the cases she builds for stating that masculinist traditions are fundamental to each man’s core views cause me to be all the more engaged with her overall work. I find myself thinking about her arguments for hours after walking away from them, and cannot resist considering using this work in my own upper-level undergraduate classes on feminist and environmental philosophy. Kheel’s work is accessible and challenging, careful and provoking. It consolidates years of Kheel’s thinking which is otherwise available only in scattered places. Most importantly, this book advances ecofeminist philosophy by subverting the current predomination of holistic approaches which are under-critically endorsed (1).

Neither Kheel in her book, nor I in a short review, can summarize all the reasons that holism tends to be the prevailing perspective in environmental ethics today. I imagine that the emphasis in environmental ethics and policy circles on the impact of global climate change over the past ten years in particular is just one of many reasons that attention to individuals’ lives has diminished in the literature. Of course, Kheel argues effectively that there are also long-standing reasons in American and wider intellectual traditions for believing that one is justified in dominating individual other-than-humans. She argues in her ambitious, sometimes sprawling, but highly informative second chapter that, given her overview of gender concepts and histories, masculine identities including “the heroic warrior, the transcendent perceiver and the sacrificer” all endorse a view of moral maturity in which “the transformation of female, animal nature into a superior, rational, cultural construct” is required (58).

A more specifically American cultural critique is persuasively advanced in her third chapter, “Origins of the Conservation Movement,” an intensely interesting picture of early conservation and hunting as intertwined and often mutually justifying pursuits, influenced by and influencing perceptions of manly virtues, imperialism, and industrialization. The chapter includes some treatment of the rise of the Societies for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals, and the involvement of women in the characteristically feminine labor of advocating sympathy and compassion, coincident with the popularity of the alleged “Nature Fakers,” that is, wildlife storytellers who appeal to children’s senses of sympathy with animals in order to hold their attention to individual creatures and attempt to see things from the creature’s point of view (93-96). This chapter should be, in itself, required reading for students of environmental studies, especially in the United States where students are taught that President Theodore Roosevelt is owed a debt of gratitude for conservation. Neither Kheel nor I suggest he is not so owed, but his personal involvement in the debate as to whether wildlife storytellers are true to the facts of natural science, and his abhorrence of sympathy for individual other-than-humans, are fascinating and incredible. Roosevelt’s public condemnation of feeling is interestingly reminiscent of the recent postured horror, on the part of opponents of Justice Sonia Sotomayor’s nomination to the Supreme Court, of “empathy” as a desirable quality, suggesting the persistence of the detrimental traditions which Kheel identifies.

In Chapter 4, “Thinking like a Mountain or Thinking Like a ‘Man?’” Kheel advances what seems to me to be her least persuasive argument, although it is justified with such robust evidence that my disagreements are limited to what she concludes from that evidence. Kheel argues that Aldo Leopold’s land ethic was not “a substantive break with the earlier ideas of the conservation movement,” but instead “merely a different manifestation of the masculinist orientation” (110). She further argues “that Leopold’s lifelong love of hunting, with its masculine allure, was not incidental to his philosophy, but rather foundational to it” (110). As I argue elsewhere, Kheel is persuasive that Leopold’s valuing of hunting was central to his notions of masculine identity, but whether his hunting or his conception of manhood was foundational to his philosophy depends on how one interprets what his philosophy was, once he had one.1 He spoke more often of an ethic than a philosophy, not being a philosopher himself. I find that what is most central to and ethically imperative in his work is not something to which his love of the hunt is foundational. More fundamentally, Leopold’s view seems to be reflected best by his statement that perception “requires much living in and with” (Leopold 180).

At times, it seems that Kheel is more intent on proving a point, than she is keen on working out what Leopold’s most sophisticated philosophical commitments are, as they come to fruition in the last decade of his life. For instance, I feel a false-choice coming on when she says that for Leopold, “Moral conduct toward nature emerged not from personal experience but from a conceptual understanding of one’s environmental origins” (116). You really can’t have one without the other, for Leopold. The living man would not have said you can eschew personal experience, as evinced from the very experientially based Part One of his Sand County Almanac. As he wrote in the year before he died, “The ecological conscience, then, is an affair of the mind as well as the heart” (June 27, 1947, qtd. in Meine 499).

Interestingly, Kheel mentions the editors of the Almanac who moved Leopold’s Land Ethic “preaching” to the end of the book, but she does not mention that as a result, his descriptive nature-writing (Part One) comes first; it is noticeable the extent to which Kheel doesn’t engage with it at all, especially after selectively quoting Leopold’s pro-hunting jingoism from his early works (116). For example, in the first essay (“January”) Leopold imagines the point of view of a skunk whose track he follows curiously, a meadow mouse, and a rough-legged hawk. (He writes of the skunk, “I wonder what he has on his mind; what got him out of bed?” (Leopold 5).) By the time he mourns the death of an old tree in the essay “Good Oak,” and sees its rings as the “chronology of a lifetime” (10), it is difficult to place him in Kheel’s frame. “An oak is no respecter of persons,” perhaps, but this person is a respecter of that oak (10). Last, her implication that the tentative title of the essay “Great Possessions,” suggests he shapes an ethos of ecofeminist and vegan living based on a conception of a central other-than-human, is difficult to place him in Kheel’s frame. “An oak is no respecter of persons,” perhaps, but this person is a respecter of that oak (10). Last, her implication that the tentative title of the essay “Great Possessions,” suggests he shapes an ethos of ecofeminist and vegan living based on a conception of a central other-than-human, is difficult to place him in Kheel’s frame. “An oak is no respecter of persons,” perhaps, but this person is a respecter of that oak (10).
Kheel’s representations of Leopold move me to suggest that her book may not best serve students who have not previously read the authors she studies in her otherwise excellent depth; newcomers may best read the original works of all four men in tandem with her critical analyses in order to decide for themselves whether or not she succeeds in making the case that (1) masculinism is present in all their works and (2) foundational to their philosophies. I suggest that attentive readers will find Kheel accomplishes the first outstandingly, and provides compelling reasons to consider the second carefully, with more success in the cases of Roosevelt, Rolston, and Fox. Kheel consistently pulls our attention to that which has been ignored by those of us who tend to overlook the conflicting and problematic aspects of philosophical theories we otherwise endorse. More importantly, she emphasizes not just that masculinist aspects are downplayed by philosophers, but that in addition, such aspects tend to replicate metaphors and assumptions of anthropocentric and masculine privilege, in ways that impede future possibilities for empathy and awareness of individuation.

The last chapter, “Ecofeminist Holist Philosophy,” outlines “an alternative understanding of holist philosophy that incorporates care and respect for individual beings…using the model of holistic health” to investigate the factors that promote “development of empathy and care” (207). Although she speaks her chapter with the observation that she does not aspire to offer a comprehensive ethic, I find this chapter so satisfyingly thorough in its contextualization of theories of care, particular sufferings, and ethical practices, that I imagine using it as a stand-alone reading in an environmental ethics course as an overview of motivating reasons to be ecofeminist. I almost wish it was the second chapter instead of the current Chapter Two, “Masculine Identity,” and here I find myself inwardly wrestling with the reason so many of us devote whole chapters to re-establishing the problem with masculinist philosophical constructs, as “Masculine Identity” does. It is a chapter written for a different audience than that which tends to read the APA Newsletter on Feminism. I imagine that it serves to bring up to speed those philosophers who are well-intentioned, environmentally aware, and receptive to articulations of Ecofeminism, but who are unfamiliar with the extents to which past constructions of masculine identities inform our most basic philosophical systems. As exquisitely written as “Masculine Identity” is, I find myself hoping for the day when feminist authors do not feel we have to offer detailed explanations of the established biases in philosophies born of patriarchy, freeing us up to instead embed those points in other chapters. This is speculative on my part, and may reflect my own feelings more than Kheel’s. For now, the second chapter must remain, and in concert with the rest of her work, contributes a distinctive voice to Nature Ethics.

References


Endnotes


Embodiment and Agency


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Early in the Introduction to Embodiment and Agency, Letitia Meynell, one of the collection’s editors, explains the justification for the collection in her observation that “the mind-body distinction has had a crucial role in dividing theories of successful agency from considerations of embodiment” (5). Because agency has for so long been considered an exertion of will and thus a feature of mental life, we have managed to keep considerations of agency separate from considerations of embodiment (2). This subtle yet crucial distinction—between agency as a property of consciousness and agency as necessarily embodied—provides the justification and sets the tone for this excellent volume. And yet, the essays in the book do not simply locate agency in the brute body, nor do they essentialize agency as a feature common to all bodies. Embodiment may be a necessary feature of agency, but the depth of inquiry this collection performs makes it clear that embodiment is hardly sufficient for agency to obtain. The collection’s twelve essays take up a wide range of richly heterogeneous modes of embodiment and scenes of agency to explore the linkages between the two. Thus, while this book grounds agency in the body (and emotion), it holds back from making other normative pronouncements about precisely what agency is and is not. Instead, it explores how vastly different bodies and contexts allow for profoundly different possibilities for agency.

While the essays reflect a diversity of topics and approaches, the collection is successful as a coherent whole in part due to the essays’ shared commitment to two key points, as reflected in the organization of the book. First, the essays all posit that agents are fundamentally relational beings, such that, in the words of Christine Koggel, one of the contributors, “agency approaches need to be contextual, relational, and responsive to changing conditions and circumstances” (251). Unlike the idealized agent of liberal political theory, whose agency has historically been understood as self-contained and self-evident, the relational agent’s resources for embodied agency are, importantly, neither universal nor purely internal. Rather, precisely because agents—and their bodies—exert and/or struggle for agency in such heterogeneous relational settings, inquiry is needed into how agency is differently experienced, enabled, and constrained. The essays in Part I, “Becoming Embodied Subjects,” all speak powerfully to agency’s relational character.

Such inquiry into embodied agency’s possibilities necessarily leads to the second premise shared by all the essays in the collection: that agency has a fundamentally ethical dimension. Through numerous vivid and memorable examples, the essays demonstrate that exertions (or attempted exertions) of agency reveal the value and meaning that agents attach to action. In other words, by theorizing agency as relational, embodied, and thus highly variable, one must also theorize subjects’ agency as inherently consequential for—as well as requiring—others. Thus, the essays in Part II, “Embodied Relations, Political Contexts,” build productively on the insights offered by the essays in Part I by locating and analyzing agency as it is enacted and constrained through individual and collective practices in complex ethical and
politic networks. An emphasis on relational agency does not
preclude an investment in autonomy, however, as nearly all
the contributors take up questions of autonomy, carefully not
conflicting it with agency but rather exploring and complicating
its relation to it.

Another way in which the collection achieves coherence is
through multiple explorations of repeated themes that cluster
together across chapters. Such themes include narrative
agency; collective memory and the moral imagination;
agency under conditions of oppression; practices of care in
preserving and terminating lives; and bodies as ambiguously
experienced as both subject and object, inner and outer. This
thematic clustering is a main strength of the collection, as it
allows for a sustained engagement with a theme from multiple
perspectives. Thus, this is an ideal text for teaching, as essays
with related themes can be paired well together, highlighting
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and hail from Australia, Canada, and the U.S.

There is something to recommend in each essay, which is
a notable achievement given the challenges of (co-) editing
a collection on a broad topic like embodied agency into a
cogent, balanced whole instead of simply an eclectic mix. Some
essays deserve special mention for breaking new theoretical
ground or making particularly innovative use of scholarship not
always represented in philosophical accounts of embodiment
and agency. Kym Maclaren’s “Emotional Metamorphoses:
The Role of Others in Becoming a Subject” provides an
exciting phenomenological account of emotional tensions that
can lead subjects to frustrated immobility and, through
their resolution, into resourceful agency. Using psychologist
Françoise Dolto-Marette’s research into sibling rivalry in a
larger phenomenological framework in which lived bodies
find themselves in competing, emotionally-infected realities,
Maclaren skillfully argues for a theory of agency that posits
subjects as emotionally laboring to understand their place(s)
in the world. Against a “moralist” (25) and “absolute” (37)
approach to agency that assumes emotional transformations
to be deviations from rationality, Maclaren’s theory rethinks
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essay, and I found myself recommending it to numerous students
who craved a deeper understanding of phenomenology.

Sylvia Burrow’s chapter, “Bodily Limits to Autonomy:
Emotion, Attitude, and Self-Defense,” theorizes the body as
a resource for agency through self-defense training. Burrow
argues that subjects may experience oppression not only
through direct force, but also through “bodily encoded limits
to autonomy” (126) that train bodies in docility. While this
insight is familiar to feminists (especially those working in
the Foucauldian tradition), Burrow’s careful attention to the
phenomenon of self-trust in this context is a welcome addition
to the discussion. In her analysis of self-defense training as
a resource to enhance bodily autonomy in resistance to enforced
docility, Burrow highlights Trudy Govier’s concept of self-trust
as an essential consideration in theories of embodied agency.
In Burrow’s description, the agent who learns how to physically
defend her body through specific embodied self-defense
strategies also learns to defend her life in an emotional, psychic
sense; she comes to believe that her life is worth protecting. This
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Another way in which the collection achieves coherence is
through multiple explorations of repeated themes that cluster
together across chapters. Such themes include narrative
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Susan E. Babbitt’s “Collective Memory or Knowledge of the
Past: ‘Covering Reality with Flowers’” is a beautifully written,
provocative essay which develops a theory of collective agency
that encourages an ambivalent relationship to history. Against
theories of collective agency that insist on the repeated “retelling
of histories” (235) as a resource for greater freedom in the
present and future, Babbitt argues for subordinating history
to action, such that we understand history as not prior to the
present but instead as that which is narratively organized and
ethically mobilized in the present to serve specific interests.
Babbitt makes this argument by way of several examples, one
of which provides the subtitle for the chapter: author Mourid
Barghoutt’s claim in his book I Saw Ramallah that media
narratives of Palestinian lives fail to accurately represent
Palestinian reality, preferring instead to “cover reality with
flowers” (qtd. in Babbitt 234). In this example, a recognizable
picture of the present grounded in a stable collective history
is preferable to a messy, ambiguous present that potentially
affords collective and individual subjects with greater agency
than they would have as inheritors of a fixed narrative. For
instance, a story of the past that serves the goal of punishment
is going to differ substantially from a story of the present that
serves the goal of peace. One story would privilege victims and
neat divisions of good and evil; the other, mutually respecting
agents who must all account for their actions. Therefore,
Babbitt concludes that by explaining the present as the obvious
outcome of a particular narrative of the past, we in fact fail to
“take[e] responsibility for the present” (236).

Babbitt does not argue that agents simply reject the past; nor
does she insist that all agents exist in a field of ethical relativism.
The picture of embodied agency that Babbitt develops is in fact
more rigorously ethically engaged, for it requires a fearless,
capacious, active awareness of the complexity of the present
that is often reduced, simplified, or elided in collective memory.
Babbitt locates the resources for such counter-memory in
“experiential understanding,” an embodied understanding
“that becomes possible only as a result of a certain way of
being situated in the world, and of awareness of that state of
being so situated” (241). Experiential understanding works to
correct the effects of alienation, which, according to Babbitt,
include “becom[ing] detached from our reality” (243), making
it easier to consume knowledge of the past that does not serve
one’s present interests and goals. By linking “experiential
understanding” with the resolution of alienation, Babbitt
describes the process of developing skepticism toward received
history in largely liberatory terms. That is, she risks conflating
freedom from past history as freedom qua freedom. For this
reason, this is the most ethically challenging essay in the book.
In positing that “freedom must make one a stranger to the past”
(247), Babbitt raises important ethical and political questions
regarding agency for victims of histories that justice requires
us to remember. She is hopeful, however, that such subjects
will attain their due justice more effectively through the more
radical, embodied “experiential understanding” of history
and the contingent present than they would through the over-
determined paths generated by “inherited, often unexamined,
values” and narratives (245).

Embodiment and Agency is a wonderful contribution to
the field(s) of feminist philosophy, bringing ambitious
analysis to pressing contemporary topics in feminist ethics,
relational subjectivity, and body studies. If the collection has a
weakness, it would be that race and sexuality deserve greater
attention throughout the essays, given that all subjects exert
their embodied agency through such categories. To be sure,
such issues are thoughtfully addressed in essays in which the
specific focus is racial and sexual difference, such as Angela
Failler’s moving “Racial Grief and Melancholic Agency,” Sue
Campbell’s “Inside the Frame of the Past: Memory, Diversity,
and Solidarity,” and Alexis Shotwell’s “A Knowing that Resided in My

— Feminism and Philosophy —
Subjectivity, politics, and agency have been theorized closely with regards to identity and women’s experience. Agency has been conceptualized as being intricately part of the subjective experience: when the personal, mundane aspects of a woman’s everyday/everynight experience become politically meaningful. Women’s identities can then shift from being a passive and specifically located definitive to becoming a creative active process that is both fluid and ongoing.

May Friedman and Shana L. Calixte have brought together a collection of essays that focus on the mommyblog in an overarching consideration of the possibilities of the subjective experience. Friedman and Calixte have entitled this collection *Mothering and Blogging: The Radical Act of the Mommyblog*. The term “radical” seems to be referring to a political nature. I reflect upon Hannah Arendt’s discussion of politics, with her postulation that the politics we currently live in and with cannot be actually referred to as politics with their primary objective of market management. Arendt argues that real politics only occur when there is subjectivity, or what she refers to as unique experience, and, most importantly, when that subjectivity is exposed. The mommyblog promises a politics that is just this: an exposed subjectivity. It has the potential to become radical simply because of its subjectivity, and because of the ability of the subjective to resist the subjected experience, whose function is to serve market-centered (and, therefore, according to Arendt, anti-political) ends. The collection of essays in Friedman and Calixte’s book is a shared conversation in which the mommyblog is interrogated as a radical act.

The authors begin the “conversation” with a contributed foreword. The purpose of this foreword, they state in their introduction, is to provide the readers with an “orientation to blogsphere” (31). Many of the issues presented in the foreword are taken up and explored further by other contributors later in the book. These issues range from the motivations for, exclusionary nature, relational quality, and empowering possibilities of the mommyblog. These are very important aspects of the mommyblog in particular, and cyberspace in general. The mommyblog clearly demonstrates how the personal is political, and the contributors interrogate this political potential by looking at the exclusive nature of cyberspace and the momosphere, by looking at the market-centrism of cyberspace, and the power dynamics of the relationships between the mommyblogger and the mommyblog audience. These are fascinating discussions, made more so by Friedman and Calixte’s decision to include essays that range from philosophical to theoretical to non-academic, written by bloggers as well as by women who constitute the audience of mommyblogs. From more distanced and theoretical discussions, we move to the personal narrative of a mommyblogger, who begins her essay with a description of her everyday/everynight experience: “I am sitting at my desk, sipping hot tea and checking my email, when my seven-year-old peers over my shoulder to see what I’m working on. My younger kids are napping…” (151). There are also essays that portray the unique experiences of the women as they venture into cyberspace to find connections with a motherhood experience that is not biological, straight, or filled with bliss. Alternatively, we read essays that are explorations of the mommyblog that consider how “we establish and negotiate shared meaning of the concepts and ideas that hold our communities together—justice, rights, citizenship” (51) or how women in Russia and Eastern Europe use a blog to “construct and respect their own identities without any barriers of repressive censorship and state-mediated representation” (158).

The great strength of Friedman and Calixte’s project, I believe, is the consciously attained variety of voices. The project becomes an intelligent reflection of the plurality of mommybloggers’ existence in cyberspace. The essays portray the struggle that exists in the attempt to understand what is happening in cyberspace: Is this indeed an alternative space where democracy, equity, and unconstructed identity can truly occur….or is it doomed, by its beginnings and real life participants, to become merely a mirror image of our non-virtual world that is shaped by a market-centered (non-politics of) constructed identities, oppression, marginalization, and elitism? There is no consensus reached among the essayists. Rather, the contributors expose the struggle to understand cyberspace, and discuss the ways that the mommyblog is both a subjective, liberating activity and a subjected, exploited experience. While mommyblogs allow for an interconnection that alters the narratives of mothers with unforeseen inclusions (for example, when an openly adopting mother is able to re-consider the biological mother’s experience) or non-linear, unfixed identities and relationships, they also can become deconstructions of identities and reconstructions of alternative identities (for example, when a woman encounters the constructions of “mother” in mommyblogs, and uses this as the place from which to reconstruct an identity of “woman” for her own life). While blogging assists one mother to experience a belonging and to feel part of a community of mothers with similar struggles, other mothers describe their conscious resistance to the marginalization that does occur in cyberspace. While the subjective experience that is valued as it is portrayed in the mommyblog is described as empowering, it is alternatively re-assessed for its vulnerability with regards to market-driven exploits on-line.

There is one fascinating observation made in the foreword that does not get taken up by any of the other contributors. In describing the form of the blog, the author describes a template that is fixed, a template that “obligates readers to start at the end of the story every time they visit a blog” (7). An atemporality is imposed upon the mother narratives that constitute the mommyblog. Martin Amos has written a novel in reverse. In doing so, he explored the way in which memory can be erased—his was a story about a man who had performed great...
horrors in his early 20s. The only way in which this character could have a life that was not marked by regret and horror was to reverse his tale, and, thereby, obliterate his past. The mommyblog tale, in its reverse order, also loses its past, so that we, as the mommyblog witnesses/audience, encounter a series of snapshots rather than a temporal tale rich in context. I question the power of the voice that gets diminished in this way. I question the dominating nature of a template that would rupture narrative in this manner. It brings to the forefront an intriguing question about the power that is lost in the act of mommyblogging.

In their exploration of the mommyblog, Friedman and Calixte have carefully gathered together a collection of essays. The collection portrays an on-going negotiation, what Lois McNay would describe as the agency that can only occur when we acknowledge the subject and subjective interplay that is identity. Cyberspace becomes the “habitus” of Pierre Bourdieu, a playing field where the subjecting efforts of the elite are absorbed but not totally, and where the subjective efforts of the individual alter the norm that has been created in support of the elite. Friedman and Calixte have brought together a plural conversation in their examination of the mommyblog as a radical act. The conclusion that is reached when listening to all of these voices is that the mommyblog is indeed a radical act, but only tenuously so. And so it should be. Only in its tenuousness does it become a continuously negotiated process, one that calls upon consciousness and creativity. As an ongoing process, the mommyblog carries great potential to bring about unforeseen transformation that is integral to the subject/subjective experience. This project constitutes a study about women’s issues, social justice, and oppression, as well as the theoretical/philosophical considerations about identity.

Endnotes
1. See Dorothy Smith, Writing the Social: Critique, Theory, and Investigations (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1999).

Neither Victim Nor Survivor: Thinking Towards a New Humanity
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I have found Marilyn Nissim-Sabat’s Neither Victim Nor Survivor: Thinking towards a New Humanity a welcome, even if unintended, intervention into one of the most pressing debates within feminist theory: the “victim question.” For some, feminism has become a discourse about victims, victimization, victimizers, victim blaming, etc. The criticism is that generalizations and essentialisms—those pernicious philosophical statues that academic feminists fought long and hard to dismantle—have been reinscribed such that woman and victim have become synonymous. In Dead in Feminism, Elisabeth Badinter writes,

For the last thirty years, male domination has been tirelessly tracked down. It is being spotted everywhere: in institutions, in private or professional everyday life, in sexual relations or in the unconscious. Androcentrism is everywhere: all the more fearsome since it goes forth in disguise. It can mutate, just like certain viruses. As soon as you think you are done with it, it replicates itself in a different way. (27)

The problem with tracking down and tracing patterns of male domination is that we’ve begun to see the world through the lens of the “victim problem,” perhaps finding victims where there aren’t any, or identifying victimizers where there is no personal responsibility to be had. But the problem runs deeper than this. We must ask, What does “victim feminism” say about women, women’s agency and the chance for hope? To be sure, victim feminism has a tendency to paint a picture of women as passive, helpless victims vis-à-vis the powerfulness of men, and women’s agency under oppression is null at worst and ineffectual at best. Many of us refuse the label of victim feminism while succumbing to at least some mild version of “victim ideology” because the risks of denying experiences of victimization or blinding ourselves to forms that oppression may take are too great.

Besides dividing the cause, the victim question in feminism has left an indelible mark on our philosophical vocabulary, a mark that victim and anti-victim feminists alike regret. We are left with the logic and language of the victim-survivor binary that Nissim-Sabat argues (Chapter 8) doesn’t seem to fit experiences of either victimization or survival, that assumes that the response to victimization is mere survival, and which attempts to capture pictures of human agency in moments of pure vulnerability (the victim) or pure independence (the survivor).

The argumentative thread in this collection of essays begins by aligning the project with Marx’s own project to exonerate the victims towards a “revolutionary, socialist-humanist consciousness” (3). Here, I will illuminate what I take to be the significant steps towards this new human consciousness in this book.

The first chapter (“What is a Victim?”) finds that most ways of talking about victims suffer from naïve empiricism. The first way of talking about victims is as victims of unforeseeable natural disasters. Victims in this sense (V1) are victims through no fault of their own, and are thus not held responsible for harm or injury they suffer. The second way of talking about victims is in terms of some sort of deficiency in the victim who refuses to or cannot “get beyond” a traumatic event. Victims in this sense (V2) are subjected to victim blaming and self-blame because they fail to address and alter their “victim mentality.” The third way of talking about victims (V3) asserts that anyone could be a victim in oppressive societies, and that this results from no particular deficiency in the victim.

V3 runs the risk of collapsing into V1, which morally and politically neutralizes the circumstances that produce victims. V1 suffers from naïve empiricism, argues Nissim-Sabat, because it cloaks economic and political forces that push poor and otherwise marginalized peoples into disaster prone areas, and the ways that the distribution of resources in the aftermath of natural disasters determines the survival and rebuilding rates of those afflicted. V2 is also naïvely empirical because it assumes as fact that one can choose to change one’s circumstances, even when we know that traumatic events can impair judgment and volition. And all of these ways of talking about victims accept traumatic events at face value, and assume that the subject is externally, passively constructed by such events.

Nissim-Sabat proposes that to truly exonerate the victims, we need not give up on “victims” as such, but rather we need a V4, an alternative way of thinking about victims. For Nissim-Sabat, to exonerate the victims, we need to focus on human psycho-social development, not traumatic events (12). In this
As a student of phenomenology and social philosophy, I find the philosophical pay-off of Nissim-Sabat’s book in Chapter 7. There, she describes the way that the individual and community are a single phenomena, each requiring the one necessarily. She uses Sophocles’ Antigone to show that there is no inherent conflict between the self and the other, the individual and community, and finally between autonomy and empathy. Nissim-Sabat addresses a particular interpretation of Antigone in which Antigone’s decision to bury her brother, against the dictates of her community, are taken as her refusal to empathize with them. Rather, Antigone exemplifies individuality and autonomy at the price of empathy. However, we see in Antigone’s refusal to let her sister Ismene conduct her brother’s burial with her that what is at stake for Antigone is not motivated by her own concern with saving Ismene from death (149) but with Ismene’s own psychic development. Nissim-Sabat writes on this, “[Antigone’s] empathy for Ismene is a directedness towards the autonomy of the other, toward the grown and transcendence of the other, which is at the same time a directedness toward stimulating the empathic capacity of the other” (150). Empathy and autonomy, just like the individual and community, are grasped in the phenomenological field as mutually necessitating phenomena, that is, that our concern for autonomy is empathetic, and empathy requires recognizing the autonomy of the other. In this light, Antigone’s choice was not between her own desires and the desires of her community, but it was a choice for “the community of souls that comprise transcendent intersubjectivity, autonomous in their empathy, empathetic in their autonomy” (150). What this shows us is that human freedom, however our theories try to isolate it, is not bound up either in the push towards individuality nor in the push towards community, but rather, “humanity” and the ethical/political impulses derived from our conception of it is neither and both. This is the picture of V4, a new way of thinking about victims that Nissim-Sabat is after in Chapter 1.

Back to the problem that sparked my interest in this book: the “victim question” in feminism. Nissim-Sabat’s goal was to exonerate the victim by providing a path for rethinking the human situation such that the victim-survivor dichotomy no longer appeared as a dichotomy that polarized human agency from the ways that who we are is always in relation to others and a social world. I believe that the problem diagnosed in this way requires the methodological intervention that Nissim-Sabat’s work can inform. The next step in a project such as this is to take these methodological cues and the insights they provide about victimization to areas of academic discourse where the battle over victims is being waged: academic psychology, sociology, legal theory, and moral theory, among others. The psychoanalytic approach preferred by Nissim-Sabat can surely inform the way that psychologists address issues of shame, blame, and powerlessness in trauma survivors, but what insights can the phenomenological method, or the political project that informs Nissim-Sabat’s work offer practicing psychologists? Can the resources she pulls together inform a new model for policymaking or legal claims? And, finally, what does the phenomenological method show us about moral psychology? How are our actions motivated, our desires and beliefs formed, and how is it that we form values to structure our lives? I suspect that we can also find new avenues for theorizing about individual and collective responsibility, moral harm and moral repair, and the relationship between morality and politics more generally.
Making the Social World: The Structure of Human Civilization


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If you are seeking clarity on issues of social ontology, look to John Searle’s latest book Making the Social World: The Structure of Human Civilization. The book is an expansion upon his earlier The Construction of Social Reality (1995), but provides enough new and improved material to be worthwhile. Here Searle reviews, synthesizes, and applies many of his leading theories in philosophy of language and philosophy of mind. Briefly, Searle argues that all the institutional facts which constitute our social world (e.g., money, marriage, universities, etc.) are created by a particular linguistic structure, the Status Function Declaration, and by our collective recognition of such Declarations. Searle builds his account by describing the roles played by and the connections between intentionality, language, society, and what he calls “deontic powers” (8). His explicit goal is to provide an account of social ontology that is consistent with the natural sciences but which also acknowledges the reality of institutional facts. In my estimation, Searle makes a compelling case and reveals a promising potential alliance between the core analytic tradition and feminist perspectives on power.

Writing in his signature blunt and confident style, Searle begins with a naturalistic view of mind as his foundation. First, he asserts that the mind is realized in the brain. He assumes that thoughts are realized in neurons, synaptic activity, etc. The existence of institutional facts (Searle’s ultimate concern) is at least partly dependent upon individual minds and thoughts, which are themselves physically realized. For example, a university is physically realized as buildings, grounds, people, books, and equipment. However, for this group of physical things engaged in physical processes to count as a university, it must be recognized as having the status of “university,” making it mind dependent or “intentionality-relative” in Searle’s terminology (17). Thus, institutional facts are not ontologically suspicious entities even though they are ontologically dependent entities. Second, Searle explains the connection between mind and language. The structure of the mind is such that our intentional thoughts (i.e., thoughts which are about or are directed at something) have particular logical qualities which language then inherits. For example, the belief “Obama is President of the United States” has specific truth conditions; namely, the belief must match the way the world actually is in order to be true. Searle calls this the “mind-to-world direction of fit” (28). In contrast, a desire has the “world-to-mind direction of fit” (28). The desire “I want ice cream” seeks to make the world fit the notion in my mind. The desire has conditions of satisfaction that may or may not be met. When it comes to thoughts, belief and desire are types of “psychological mode” (27). When it comes to language, utterances of belief or desire are said to have, following J.L. Austin,7 different types of “illocutionary force” (28).

Declarations, the marvelous things that make institutions possible, are linguistic structures that mark their own type of illocutionary force and that have special conditions of satisfaction. Declarations “make something the case by explicitly saying that it is the case” (12). According to Searle, Declarations simultaneously have “both directions of fit” (12). They “change the world by declaring that a state of affairs exists and thus bringing that state of affairs into existence” (12). So, for example, children playing soccer in a backyard can declare that “the two old oaks are the goalposts,” simultaneously fitting the world to their utterances and fitting their utterances to the world. The conditions of satisfaction are that everyone involved must agree to recognize that the oaks are the goalposts for the duration of the game; they must recognize that “X counts as Y in C” (14). This particular example counts as a Status Function Declaration which seeks to “impose functions on objects and people” by giving them a “collectively recognized status” (7). This status then enables them to do things they otherwise could not. Thus, the old oaks will function as goalposts for the duration of the game although typically they are just shade trees. Money, marriage, universities, governments, and all other institutional facts are created in just this manner according to Searle. We simply declare that something will be the case, nearly everyone agrees, and thus we have an institutional fact.

Searle does not insist that explicit speech acts be performed in order for institutional facts to be established. Instead, he states that “all of human institutional reality is created and maintained in existence by (representations that have the same logical form as) Status Function Declarations, including the cases that are not speech acts in the explicit form of Declarations” (13). For Searle, the most important thing is that language provides the logical model for Status Function Declarations which then enable us to create vast and intricate institutions. Indeed, Searle maintains that without language social institutions would not exist (62).

All Status Function Declarations generate “deontic powers”—rights, duties, obligations, authorizations, and the like (9). Where “X counts as Y in C,” the Y variable will name the status and the significance of the status will be spelled out in terms of deontic powers. Paper counts as money in economic transactions because the status of being “money” carries with it certain rights and authorizations, such as the right to count as legal tender for all debts. A ceremony and license count as a marriage in the U.S. where “marriage” carries with it the right to spousal social security benefits, the presumed obligation of fidelity, etc. To establish and maintain the institutions of money and marriage, collective recognition of those statuses and their accompanying deontic powers must be achieved.

Collective recognition is one variety of collective intentionality. For Searle, collective recognition indicates that the mental content held by participants takes the form “we believe” X instead of “I believe” X (47). The participants share “certain attitudes together with mutual belief” (60). For example, we all know that we all accept that special papers count as money, and so the economy functions. Again, institutional facts cannot obtain and remain unless collective recognition is achieved. Searle suggests that collective recognition is often easily achieved and maintained because many institutional facts can work to everyone’s benefit. However, he also notes that even if an institutional fact is detrimental it may appear to be part of the “natural order of things,” and people may believe it cannot be altered (107).

As he expounds upon his general account of social ontology, Searle makes a number of related observations. He answers criticisms levied at his earlier (1995) account, he gives a non-reductionist account of collective intentionality, he discusses the assumption of free will in institutional reality, he addresses the operation of institutional power, and he uses his account to argue against the existence of universal human rights.

A great strength of the book is its potential usefulness to those who work in social and political philosophy and feminism. The obvious point of intersection is in his discussion of power. Searle rightly acknowledges that “the point of creating and
maintaining institutional facts is power” (103). Deontic powers either prompt people to do something or exclude people from doing something “without using force” (147). For example, to declare that “Obama is President” or “Locke is the property owner” is to acknowledge their rights and obligations in those roles, to prompt them to fulfill those roles, and to exclude others from exercising the powers that accompany those roles. Feminists have long been interested in institutional terms like “husband” and “wife,” perhaps in part because of the deontic powers that tend to accompany each. Feminists have also been interested in the phenomenon of collective recognition in the sense that acceptance and internalization of some social norms has hindered personal development. For example, if one accepted the traditional conception of “wife” with all of its deontic “powers,” one would be disinclined to go to college, pursue a career in film-making or drag racing, etc. Although Searle describes the social world and institutional facts from a broadly analytic perspective, and although many feminists are rooted in the continental tradition, his account reinforces feminist concerns with vocabulary as an instrument of power. His account is also remarkably empowering. It reaffirms the notion that current power structures can be dismantled if enough people choose to stop believing in, or choose to create new, institutions.

Searle’s layered argument, moving from mind and intentionality to language and society, is at once technical and full of common sense. Those who are not terribly familiar with Searle are likely to get the most from this text. Those who have been following Searle’s ongoing discussion of social ontology may not be surprised by much of what he offers here. One might allege that Searle’s account is too tidy and comprehensive, relying on the single linguistic construct of the Status Function Declaration to ground out and explain the entirety of human civilization. Nonetheless, Searle presents a solid point of departure for further questions about social ontology and civilization. His account also fits into the larger picture of contemporary feminist philosophers, highlighting those aspects that may be of particular interest to feminist theorists, which are taken up by contributors to the volume: the positive role of the imagination in Spinoza’s philosophy (Gatens, Lloyd, Grassi); Spinoza’s rejection of dualism (Gatens, Lloyd, Ravven, Strong, West, Donovan); Spinoza’s naturalistic but non-reductionist theory of the affects (Gatens, Ravven, Rorty, Matheron); Spinoza’s conception of relational freedom and the social self (Strong, Rorty, Lloyd, Ravven). Focusing particularly on aspects of Spinoza’s work that are neglected by mainstream scholarship, the articles collected here offer new and exciting interpretations of each. Amelie Rorty’s classic piece on Spinoza’s passions examines Spinoza’s understanding of how the passions can be reformed without thereby exciting them, thus differentiating Spinoza from those who thought freedom involved being free of emotions. Rorty deftly performs spinozism by teaching us about love as first a passive and then an active affect through her example of the development of Ariadne’s love for Echo. Ariadne learns of the forces which caused her love for Echo, and learns what Echo is beyond her passionate love; thus, she is able to finally and actively love Echo not just as the object of her affection, but as a genuine individual, a singular part of nature.

Although Gatens admits that some Spinoza scholars may be surprised at what feminists can contribute to Spinoza scholarship, the bigger surprise may be that Spinoza has anything to offer contemporary feminists. How could Spinoza—an unapologetic metaphysician, a determinant, a rationalist, and a student of Hobbes’ political philosophy—have anything to say to the issues that matter to contemporary feminist philosophy? Alexandre Matheron, with his usual humor and facility with Spinoza’s texts, shows how Spinoza’s sole norm, “to understand,” can still lead us to radically rethink our present social conditions. Aurelia Strong proposes that Spinoza’s conception of the individual offers a way of capturing the insights both of liberalism and communitarianism without the drawbacks of either. Strong argues that Spinoza’s work thus offers a better framework for understanding the reciprocal relations between individuals and the social world, which provides the philosophical foundations for a notion of relational autonomy. Heidi Ravven and Genevieve Lloyd explore the ways in which Spinoza’s sometimes difficult philosophy sheds light on the extent to which feminist theorists’ own concepts and preconceptions work against them and contain traces of dualisms and religious traditions which feminists constantly critique.

One of the few new pieces for the collection, Ravven’s historical article argues that those feminists who reject determinism rely on a “magical” conception of the human person derived from Christianity. Ravven proposes that Spinoza’s understanding of individuals’ beliefs and desires as caused derives from a Judeo-Arabic tradition whereby individuals are understood as part of Nature, not outside of it. Ravven argues that Spinoza’s alternative conception of human nature enables us to see the way in which our conception of social reform is tied to a false picture of human freedom. Social reform does not require a “magical conception of the human persons” but rather requires understanding the actual forces, social, affective, and otherwise, that impinge upon each individual, causing their desires and shaping their self-conceptions. Reiterating the spinozist dictum to understand, Ravven proposes that Spinoza’s

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**Feminist Interpretations of Benedict Spinoza**


**Reviewed by Ericka Tucker**

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“More Feminist Spinozists Thinking More”

The purpose of this volume, according to the editor Moira Gatens, is to show that “Feminist scholarship can offer new interpretative insights into the notoriously difficult philosophy of Benedict Spinoza” (1). This book successfully achieves this aim, and more. The articles in this volume show us that viewing Spinoza’s work with a feminist lens reveals neglected aspects of Spinoza’s philosophy; further, focusing on these neglected aspects of Spinoza’s philosophy exposes unexamined dualisms in feminist philosophers’ own practices and presuppositions.

That is not to say that there is a unitary feminist lens. One of the strengths of this collection is the variety of backgrounds and methods of the contributors and the debates to which their commentaries belong. Liberal feminists, feminists from the psychoanalytic tradition, Marxist feminists, and those whose work bridges schools and traditions, all find in Spinoza’s work productive ideas with something to offer to the classic problems of feminist theory: the nature of social categories, sexuality, the fate of the passions and the imagination in philosophy.

Gatens’ introduction provides a good overview of Spinoza’s philosophy, highlighting those aspects that may be of particular interest to feminist theorists, which are taken up by contributors to the volume: the positive role of the imagination in Spinoza’s philosophy (Gatens, Lloyd, Grassi); Spinoza’s rejection of dualism (Gatens, Lloyd, Ravven, Strong, West, Donovan); Spinoza’s naturalistic but non-reductionist theory of the affects (Gatens, Ravven, Rorty, Matheron); Spinoza’s conceptualization of relational freedom and the self (Strong, Rorty, Lloyd, Ravven). Focusing particularly on aspects of Spinoza’s work that are neglected by mainstream scholarship, the articles collected here offer new and exciting interpretations of each. Amelie Rorty’s classic piece on Spinoza’s passions examines Spinoza’s understanding of how the passions can be reformed without thereby exciting them, thus differentiating Spinoza from those who thought freedom involved being free of emotions. Rorty deftly performs spinozism by teaching us about love as first a passive and then an active affect through her example of the development of Ariadne’s love for Echo. Ariadne learns of the forces which caused her love for Echo, and learns what Echo is beyond her passionate love; thus, she is able to finally and actively love Echo not just as the object of her affection, but as a genuine individual, a singular part of nature.

Although Gatens admits that some Spinoza scholars may be surprised at what feminists can contribute to Spinoza scholarship, the bigger surprise may be that Spinoza has anything to offer contemporary feminists. How could Spinoza—an unapologetic metaphysician, a determinant, a rationalist, and a student of Hobbes’ political philosophy—have anything to say to the issues that matter to contemporary feminist philosophy? Alexandre Matheron, with his usual humor and facility with Spinoza’s texts, shows how Spinoza’s sole norm, “to understand,” can still lead us to radically rethink our present social conditions. Aurelia Strong proposes that Spinoza’s conception of the individual offers a way of capturing the insights both of liberalism and communitarianism without the drawbacks of either. Strong argues that Spinoza’s work thus offers a better framework for understanding the reciprocal relations between individuals and the social world, which provides the philosophical foundations for a notion of relational autonomy. Heidi Ravven and Genevieve Lloyd explore the ways in which Spinoza’s sometimes difficult philosophy sheds light on the extent to which feminist theorists’ own concepts and preconceptions work against them and contain traces of dualisms and religious traditions which feminists constantly critique.
method provides a route toward a mature non-moralistic ethics, one that would focus on what we are before telling us what we ought to do and be. Genevieve Lloyd, in a piece from her book *Part of Nature*, similarly shows that by focusing on Spinoza's genuine alternative to Cartesian dualism, we can see that feminists' critiques of dualism have been undermined by their adherence to the sex/gender distinction, which repeats the dualism of the sexed body and the gendered mind, the latter a “social construction” which, because not biological we are magically free to change.

**Reservations**

This is an essential book for any research library, and the best collection yet showing both what feminists have to say about Spinoza and what Spinoza has to offer contemporary feminism. While there is much to commend this volume, as someone familiar with the series and with the research area, I found it somewhat disappointing. First of all, and immediately recognizable to anyone who has ever handled the books in this series: it’s a bit light. Weighing in at a mere 239 pages, *Feminist Interpretations of Benedict Spinoza* has 119 pages less than the average for the series (358 pages) with some of the larger volumes near 500 pages. Is there half as much to say about feminism and Spinoza as there is about feminism and Ayn Rand? (432 pages) Is there less to say about Spinoza than Rousseau, one who took so much from Spinoza while publically offering him only insult? (480 pages) Is there less to say about Spinoza than Descartes, whose dualism Spinoza rejected so completely? (348 pages) While portability is an asset, I found myself wanting more.

Further, more than half of the articles in the book have been publically available for nearly 20 years. The paperback edition contains eleven articles, seven of which have been published elsewhere, most in the early-mid nineties. The impression this slight book gives is that there were once some philosophers writing about the intersections of feminism and Spinoza, but that this project is now over. As such the volume’s diversity seems to suggest that the work on Spinoza and feminism is haphazard and disconnected, rather than as indicators of the vibrant and growing research program I believe it to be. Although I am indebted to Gatens’ work philosophically, I am disappointed with this edited volume. Its brevity is evidence of a missed opportunity to showcase the brilliant work done by feminist spinozists in the last 15 years.

These articles, in their original forms, inspired a research program in spinozistic feminism, which offered a new way to approach the reality and power of bodies, a new way to understand how the path to reason can be approached only through understanding the affects, and a new way to understand the self as social. This new work on Spinoza and feminism, which was inspired by Gatens, Lloyd, Ravven, and Rorty, needs its own volume indicating the current and flourishing state of international work on Spinoza. Hasana Sharp ends her review of this book with the hope that it will be the progenomen for work yet to come. I’d like to second her suggestion with the caveat that perhaps the material conditions for such a volume need to come first: a conference, a society, or both for the burgeoning field of Spinoza studies taking seriously the dualism of the sexed body and the gendered mind, the latter a “social construction” which, because not biological we are magically free to change.

Spinoza did not think that the sage, alone and separate from the rest of humanity, was the ideal or most powerful state for humans. Even the freest individual was weak when considered alone, disconnected from others; one’s power was miniscule when compared to the whole of nature. Only through joining with others can the free individual increase his or her power. This is helpful advice for the as yet to be called into being society of feminist spinozists, existing as we do in the often inhospitable universe of academic philosophy. So, I don’t blame or excoriate Gatens for having disappointed specialists. The geographic distance and the linguistic and academic differences that separate feminist philosophers working on Spinoza today is daunting. Overcoming these obstacles requires the work of more than just one individual.

**Conclusion**

*Feminist Interpretations of Benedict Spinoza* offers us a glimpse of the possibilities of the intersections of Spinoza’s philosophy and feminist theory; but only a glimpse. Readers looking for an introduction to the feminist interpretation of Spinoza should look to Lloyd and Gatens’ previous work, *Collective Imaginings*, for a systematic elaboration of their ideas, including their view of the usefulness of Spinoza’s conception of responsibility. For those feminist theorists who have already recognized the value of Spinoza’s philosophy, this review is a call to action. Feminist spinozism is an extremely promising area of philosophical research. However, the brevity of this collection and the age of many of its articles tell us that those feminists working on Spinoza’s philosophy today are not working together, and are not communicating their work to one another well enough. We need something that might link those feminist luminaries with young scholars, which might bring together the strands of Spinoza scholars with feminist inclinations from their varied locations around the globe. If there were such a group, such communication, this book would have been different, heftier at least. In conclusion: this is a good start, but we need more feminist spinozists thinking more!

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**Canon Fodder: Historical Women Political Thinkers**


**Reviewed by Kristin Waters**

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Think of the chapters of Penny A. Weiss’s slim book, *Canon Fodder: Historical Women Political Thinkers*, as a philosophical *dim sum* or *tapas*: small, varied, and intensely flavored morsels that can be consumed in any order, savored, and contemplated. Most of the chapters are independently satisfying, and each leaves one wondering where a more extensive treatment might lead. The book itself extends an invitation—even a demand—for philosophers to continue enriching the field by engaging with the contributions of historical women writers.

Weiss’s essays address several authors stretching over one thousand years: Sei Shônagon, Christine de Pizan, Mary Astell, Mary Wollstonecraft, Anna Julia Cooper, Emma Goldman, and the authors of the *Declaration of Sentiments*. The framing principle is a desire to reshape radically the landscape of political theory, and this eclectic list possesses a kind of internal logic; each writer explores central but neglected concepts that could contribute significantly to transforming political philosophy. The concepts include a creative methodology for comprehending the world, musings on the politics of inclusion, marriage, and the state of nature, community and friendship, equality of gender within the polity, community and harmony, and children. Considering this list (lists are important in this book) the cluster of ideas could be loosely formed into a partial
image of concerns for feminist, or as Weiss would strongly contend, for any political theory and yet what emerges is something much more amorphous than structured.

Some of the essays could be quite useful for the researcher and/or for the teacher. For example, the chapter comparatively analyzing the Declaration of Independence and the Declaration of Sentiments (with document appended) would be perfect for any number of classes within and outside the discipline (Critical Thinking, Social and Political Issues, American Literature, United States History). Weiss persuasively argues that contrary to its colossal reputation, Independence is little concerned with equality and more with statecraft and the creation a new polity:

Unlike Pauline Davis and Sentiments, Jefferson’s resolution indeed describes the goal as separation and the establishment of a new, independent state, and in defining the various powers of a new state it emphasizes that which continues to dominate politics in the United States: war and peace, international relations, and commerce. By contrast, Sentiments ends with eleven resolutions that lay out a different goal—happiness for women as well as men. (103)

Sentiments returns to the topic of equality in its many forms over and over again, warming to it, exploring various angles and approaches including equality of moral character and obligation, equal educational opportunity, equal employment opportunity, equal opportunity to participate in religious institutions, and more. Given her goal of bringing women philosophers out of obscurity, it is puzzling that Weiss does not openly attribute the Declaration of Sentiments to Elizabeth Cady Stanton and Lucretia Mott, who are commonly thought to have been the chief authors. She does make a compelling case that the document deserves widespread recognition as philosophical writing, and her essay is a marvelous example of critical analysis; one that would be quite accessible to students.

In contrast, the essay on Mary Astell and Thomas Hobbes is designed for the serious researcher. Delving into this piece, my initial reaction was alarm at the seeming wrongness of pairing the late seventeenth-century contemporary critic of Locke with the earlier writer, Hobbes. Astell directed her work at Locke’s theories quite deliberately. But Weiss persuaded me of the rightness of her choice as she paints a picture of turmoil in the Hobbesian state of nature, overlaying it with the turmoil of what she construes as Astell’s state of nature: marriage. For Hobbes, life in the state of nature produces “a miserable condition”; for Astell:

To be yok’d for Life to a disagreeable Person and Temper; to have Folly and Ignorance tyrannize over Wit and Sense; to be contradicted in every thing one does or says, and born down not by Reason but Authority; to be denied one’s most innocent desires, for no other cause but the Will and Pleasure of an absolute Lord and Master...is a misery none can have a just Idea of, but those who have felt it. (146)

And this is from someone who herself had not experienced marriage first hand. Disagreeing on much else, these two monarchists agreed that providing security and stability were the chief aims of the state, even when accomplished in heavy-handed ways. But where Hobbes narrowly delineates political power, like many feminists, Astell defines it more broadly, outlining the features of the “masculine empire” that often relies on poor arguments as excuses for exercising arbitrary power. For Astell, we can bring moral disapprobation to bear, pressuring authorities about the disagreeable actions of the heads of state, and likewise we may abhor the cruelties of an unjust husband, but once we are tied to the authority of monarchs and husbands, we may not sever those ties. Husbands and monarchs derive their authority in part from the divinely ordained institutions they inhabit. Within this framework Weiss articulates Astell’s lengthy critique of marriage but leaves out Astell’s important recommendation to women for escaping these ills: refuse to marry.

The essay on community considers the writings of both Mary Wollstonecraft and Anna Julia Cooper, and over the years Weiss has contributed significantly to feminist understandings of this concept. In this essay, she challenges the common identification of Mary Wollstonecraft with liberal individualism, focusing instead on the centrality of socialist communal values in her writing. Weiss wisely suggests that rather than trying to force Wollstonecraft’s philosophy into our current individualist paradigm of liberalism, her work should be treated as a “competing vision” (90). She argues that the contemporary caricature of liberal feminism does not square with valuing social virtues and community as extensively described and argued for by Wollstonecraft. The African American author of numerous philosophical essays, Anna Julia Cooper, also makes extensive use of a concept of community. She develops an idea of difference-as-harmony to be used in constructing a productive society. Race and gender difference may be thought of as musical notes, components of a chord, strung together with other chords that are emblematic of our interconnectedness in strong and mutually beneficial communities. Weiss contributes to the small but growing recognition of Cooper’s significant philosophical contributions. Attention to Cooper’s work is very well-deserved and rewarding; philosophers have no excuse for ignoring the political writings of historical black women writers such as Cooper, Frances E. W. Harper, María W. Stewart, and others.

Among the book’s early chapters, the first is an essay on the various reasons provided by authors and editors for excluding women writers from “canonical” collections or treatments, reasons that include a posted lack of originality, insufficient secondary literature, too little or too much breadth, insufficient influence, and so on. Weiss notes, for example, that taking “influence” as a criterion for inclusion in philosophical surveys will necessarily restrict the inclusion of women authors and feed into the vicious cycle of male authors citing each other’s work to the exclusion of women philosophers, and then using those citations as reasons for more inclusion and exclusion.

The least successful essay in the collection, one on the politics of ignorance, takes aim at “contemporary feminist ignorance of historical women political thinkers” (34). Several problems arise from this claim. First, I’m still puzzling over why Weiss has chosen to chastise feminist writers for not going far enough in transforming the canon, instead of placing the blame on the stubborn refusal of many who are more centrally and powerfully positioned in the discipline to bring about meaningful change. Among the humanities and social sciences, philosophy seems worse than others, maintaining gender-segregated and tokenistic approaches to the discipline, with many mainstream journals doggedly avoiding feminist topics, many classrooms absenting women’s voices and feminist concepts, and many textbooks omissiong or ghettoizing women’s contributions. Weiss is clearly disturbed about this, and she—and we all—should be. But instead of focusing on disciplinary hegemonic practices, or even on feminist writers of the last decade, Weiss takes aim at some of the most innovative feminist philosophers of the 1980s and 90s. Among those singled out for criticism are Genevieve Lloyd, Carole Pateman, Nancy Tuana, Nancy Hirschman, and Christine Di Stefano, whose ground-breaking analyses of
gendered problems within traditional political theory formed the foundation for current feminist writing on the topic. There is a logic to the movement’s progression: the critical work of these publications created a space in which the work of rediscovery could take place. In many cases the critical projects have helped to clear the way for the reclamation projects. So Weiss’s chronology seems confused. Lloyd’s *Man of Reason: “Male” and “Female” in Western Philosophy* was published in 1984, Pateman’s *The Sexual Contract* was published in 1988, and Tuana’s *Woman and the History of Philosophy* came out in 1992. In contrast, among the philosophers Weiss treats in her book, Mary Helen Washington’s edited collection of Anna Julia Cooper’s *A Voice of the South* first appeared in 1988 and was not widely known until well after that, and Patricia Springborg’s *Astell: Political Writings* did not appear until 1996. While she is correct in claiming that the writings of Jane Addams, Hannah Arendt, Emma Goldman, and Wollstonecraft might well have been incorporated into these texts, the work of many “reclaimed” women philosophers was simply not available at the time. Further, the intent of these works was critique, not reclamation. Weiss admits her uneasiness:

> It is actually unpleasant to provide the evidence to support my rather broad charge that sadly, if in some ways unsurprisingly, even feminist theorists ignore our female predecessors.

Instead of taking to task some of our great feminist philosophers for their shortcomings, I would have preferred that she outs the journals, publishing houses, and universities that have vigilantly guarded against feminist influence. Weiss would also be justified in calling to task more recent work by feminist philosophers that ignores historical women political thinkers. My concern is that in challenging the earlier work that was less-well-positioned to take account of historical women writers, her justified criticisms may be dismissed, diverting attention from the critical need for contemporary philosophers of all stripes to give historical women philosophers their due respect and attention. Remember, this is a book about honoring predecessors and affirming the feminist values of friendship and community.

Weiss’s general point is vital, that women in the history of philosophy have made contributions not just worthy of philosophical study, but central to shifting our understanding of political theory in ways that more fully reflect political experience. Failure to transform the landscape of political thought in light of women’s and feminist contributions is just bad philosophy. Excellent scholarly work and teaching will incorporate the thought of historical women writers and allow the new conceptual treatments to work their transformational magic.

**References**


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Kristin Waters is the editor of Women and Men Political Theorists: Enlightened Conversations, a collection of writings from the seventeenth to nineteenth century, and, with Carol B. Conaway, of Black Women’s Intellectual Traditions: Speaking Their Minds, a collection of historical philosophical writings that was awarded the Letitia Woods Brown Memorial Prize by the Association of Black Women Historians. She is a resident scholar at the Brandeis University Women’s Studies Research Center and professor of philosophy at Worcester State College, both in Massachusetts.

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