ERRATA

I-G  C: Mental States
Ray Rennard (University of the Pacific) will chair the paper by Andreas Elpidorou

II-B  IP: Feminism and Capitalism
J. S. Swindell (Baylor College) will chair

III-B  B: Kriegel, Subjective Consciousness
Berit Brogaard (University of Missouri–St. Louis) is replacing Joseph Levine as critic

IV-A  B: Koslicki, The Structure of Objects
Andrew McGonigal’s affiliation is the University of Leeds

VI-H  C: Justification and Understanding
Masahiro Yamada (Claremont Graduate University) will comment on
Steven Reynold’s paper

VII-G  C: Intervention, Obligation, and Sovereignty
Clair Morrissey (University of North Carolina–Chapel Hill) will comment and
Andrew Fiala (California State University–Fresno) will chair the paper by David Lefkowitz

VII-I  C: Phenomenal Concepts and Phenomenal Character
Cecilia Tilli (Princeton University) will chair Vincent Picciuto’s paper

VII-J  C: The Ethics of Numbers and Consciousness
Tyler Doggett (University of Vermont) will chair the paper by Matthew Liao

VIII-G  C: Governments, Agents, and Property
Matt Bedke (University of British Columbia) will chair Helga Varden’s paper

IX-A  B: Bernecker, Memory
Rebecca Copenhaver (Lewis and Clark College) will chair

IX-D  IS: Exploitation
David Schier (Washington State University) will chair, Allen Wood is not speaking, Robert Mayer (Loyola University Chicago) will present a paper on “Sweatshop Exploitation and the Benefit Paradox”

IX-G  C: Ethical Constructivism
Darrel Moellendorf (San Diego State University) will chair Lee Shepski’s paper

X-B  B: Thompson, Life and Action
Anselm Winfried Mueller will not be speaking

X-F  C: Aristotle
Richard Mohr will chair Philip Corkum’s paper
Kant on Supererogation: Four Views, Ernesto V. Garcia, University of Massachusetts

There are three standard views about Kant on supererogation: either that Kant’s moral theory does not have room for supererogatory actions, and (1) so much the worse [Urmson/Eisenberg/Guevara] or (2) so much the better [Baron/Timmerman] for his views, or that Kant’s moral theory does have room for supererogatory acts (3) in the qualified sense that they fulfill wide imperfect duties of beneficence [Hill/Heyd]. In this paper, I defend a fourth approach, arguing that (4) while Kant has no distinctive place for supererogatory actions in his moral theory, he does in his overall value theory or axiology. What is crucial to recognize here is that for Kant, not all value is moral value. I show how Kant can acknowledge that some supererogatory actions do have moral worth in one important sense, but that their special value derives from the fact that they are notable expressions of the non-moral value of love.