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of The American Philosophical Association



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PHILOSOPHICAL ASSOCIATION

Pacific Division Program

The American Philosophical
Association
Pacific Division

Eighty-Second
Annual Meeting



Hilton Pasadena
Pasadena, CA

March 18 - 23, 2008

Proceedings and Addresses of The American Philosophical Association

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Proceedings and Addresses of The American Philosophical Association, the major publication of The American Philosophical Association, is published five times each academic year in the months of September, November, January, February, and May.

Each annual volume contains the programs for the meetings of the three Divisions; the membership list; Presidential Addresses; news of the Association, its Divisions and Committees, and announcements of interest to philosophers. Other items of interest to the community of philosophers may be included by decision of the Editor or the APA Board of Officers.

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All correspondence should be sent to the APA, 31 Amstel Avenue, University of Delaware, Newark, DE 19716, directed to the appropriate staff member as follows: Erin Shepherd for inquiries and publication copy concerning programs of the Divisional meetings, general issues of the *Proceedings*, announcements, awards to members and advertising; Janet Sample for membership information, address changes, and memorial minutes; and the Executive Director for letters to the editor.

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LETTER FROM THE SECRETARY-TREASURER

To All Members of the Association:

The Executive Committee of the Pacific Division of the American Philosophical Association cordially invites you to attend the 82nd annual meeting of the American Philosophical Association, Pacific Division. The meeting will be held at the Hilton Pasadena, Wednesday, March 19, through Sunday, March 23, 2008. Accommodations and meeting space also are provided by the Sheraton Pasadena.

1. MEETING LOCATION: SPECIAL ATTRACTIONS

Pasadena is a small city with well-preserved turn of the century architecture. More than 600 buildings are on the National Register of Historic Places. The weather in March should be warm and sunny. Our hotels are within walking distance of a very large number of outstanding restaurants, theaters, clubs, museums, and other cultural sites and events. (An extensive, informative restaurant list prepared by our local arrangements committee follows the program information.)

The Norton Simon Museum is a short ride on the free downtown Arts Shuttle Bus, and the Huntington Library and Gardens is a quick taxi ride away. There is a walking track within a mile and a jogging track within two miles. The rest of Southern California's attractions are easily reached. The thoroughbred racing season at Santa Anita will still be on in March. There is ice skating a block from the hotel. Skiing at Mountain High Resort is about an hour's drive away, or, to the west, there is beach and boating within 25 miles and scuba diving within 60. (A list of attractions within Pasadena, and in the larger area, follows the program information.)

2. OUR HOTELS: LOCATION, RESERVATIONS, PARKING

Our hotels are located at the intersect of the Old Pasadena District and the Playhouse District. Old Pasadena was the 19th-century center of the city. Over 200 19th-century buildings in this 22-block area are still in use. The Playhouse District fans out from the Pasadena Playhouse, is replete with historic architecture, and offers a mix of bookstores, restaurants, antique and specialty shops. Also within easy walking distance is South Lake Avenue, 10 blocks of restaurants and shops that run the span from Rodeo Drive type boutiques to excellent used book stores.

The Pasadena Hilton is an historic property now renovated as a boutique style hotel. Most rooms have views of either Old Pasadena or the San Gabriel Mountains. The hotel has an outdoor swimming pool, and an indoor pool table as well. The hotel's address is 168 South Los Robles Avenue, Pasadena, CA 91101. Telephone is (626) 577-1000. Fax is (626) 584-3148.

The Sheraton Pasadena is one block from the Hilton. It is across the street from the Paseo Colorado shopping center, with all its restaurants and an excellent wine bar. It has an outdoor pool and lighted tennis courts. The hotel's address is 303 East Cordova, Pasadena, CA 91101. Telephone is (626) 449-4000. Fax is (626) 796-6209.

Hotel Reservations: A hotel reservation form can be found at the back of this *Proceedings*, and on the APA homepage (Pacific Division page) on the web. You may make your reservations online at <http://www.pasadenacal.com/housing>. Both hotels comply with the standards of the Americans with Disabilities Act. For accessible, adaptive sleeping rooms, please reserve early and communicate any special requests to the Pasadena Convention Bureau Housing Office.

Parking: There is public parking at the Hilton. Parking lots serving the Pasadena Convention Center and Paseo Colorado Shopping Center are very nearby, and street parking is available.

3. TRAVEL INFORMATION: DRIVING, AIR, RAIL, BUSES, AND THE FREE PASADENA SHUTTLE

Driving -

The Pasadena Freeway (the 110) connects Pasadena to Los Angeles, and also to Long Beach and to the 405 to San Diego. The Foothill Freeway (the 210) goes north and east. The Ventura Freeway (the 134) leads to Ventura County on the coast, Santa Barbara, and Northern California.

Driving to the Hilton -

I-5 and 210 (this route from Burbank Airport, 15 - 20 minutes): Take the I-5 South to the 134 Freeway East to 210 East. Exit at Lake Avenue, go South one mile past Colorado Boulevard to Cordova. Turn right (west) to corner at Los Robles Avenue.

I-105 and 110 (this route from LAX, one hour): Take I-105 East to the 110 North. The 110 will end in Pasadena and become Arroyo Parkway. Continue one mile north to Cordova. Hotel is at the corner of Cordova and Los Robles.

Driving to the Sheraton -

From South: Take Interstate 110 North until it ends and turns into Arroyo Parkway. Continue on Arroyo Parkway until you come to Cordova Street. Turn right onto Cordova Street and the hotel will be located on the left-hand side.

From East: Take Interstate 210 West, and exit at Fair Oaks Avenue/Marengo Avenue. Turn left onto Marengo Avenue. Proceed to Cordova Street and turn left. The hotel is located on the left-hand side.

From West: Take Interstate 10 East until you come to Interstate 110 North. Travel on Interstate 110 North, which will become Arroyo Parkway. Continue on Arroyo Parkway and turn right onto Cordova Street. The hotel is located on the left-hand side.

From Altadena (North): Travel south to Colorado Boulevard. Take Colorado Boulevard west towards Marengo Avenue. Turn left onto Marengo Avenue and then turn left onto Cordova Street. The hotel is located on the left-hand side.

By Air -

Burbank Airport is served by many carriers. It is a small, pleasant airport only fifteen minutes from our hotels. Taxi is \$35, and limo service runs around \$70. (For airport shuttles, see below.) At the time of this writing, Burbank is serviced by Alaska, American, America West, Delta, Jetblue, United, and Southwest.

Los Angeles International Airport is one of the largest in the nation. It has both the conveniences and the disadvantages of a very large facility. It's only a little more than twice as far from our hotels as Burbank Airport, and in principle travel time is half an hour, but allow a full hour when there is traffic. Taxi is about \$40, and limo service runs about \$65. There are wheelchair accessible taxis in the taxi lines at LAX—if none is at the line outside your baggage area, the dispatcher can call one from the garage.

Airport Shuttles: There are three airport shuttle services that will take you to your hotel in Pasadena from Burbank or LAX. Super Shuttle is (818) 556-6600 or (800) 258-3826, with a website at www.supershuttle.com. Prime Time Shuttle is (800) 733-8267, with a website at www.primetimeshuttle.com. Xpress Shuttle is (800) 427-7483, with a website at www.xpressshuttle.com. Super Shuttle can arrange for wheelchair accessible transportation to and from either airport.

By Train -

You may take a train to Union Station in Los Angeles, and then take the light-rail Gold Line to Pasadena (see below).

Light-Rail -

The Gold Line runs from Pasadena into Los Angeles. There is a station on Del Mar Blvd. about four blocks from the Sheraton and five blocks from the Hilton. You also can use the Gold Line to travel to other parts of Pasadena. Light-rail is wheelchair accessible.

Bus Service -

The free Pasadena ARTS Buses shuttle visitors between the popular shopping/entertainment districts of Old Pasadena, South Lake Avenue, and the Pasadena Playhouse District. The ARTS Buses are easily recognizable by their decorations. Stops, which are designated by a pink triangle marked "ARTS," are found throughout the city. Check (626) 744-4055 or http://www.ci.pasadena.ca.us/trans/transit/trans_arts.asp for the schedule.

Foothill Transit Authority buses operate throughout the San Gabriel and Pomona Valleys. Check the schedule at (626) 967-3147 or www.foothilltransit.org.

LA MTA offers service throughout Los Angeles County. Check the schedule at (213) 626-4455 or www.mta.net.

Buses are wheelchair accessible. For more information, see websites given above.

4. CONVENTION REGISTRATION

The registration fee is \$10.00 for student members, \$50.00 for regular members, and \$60.00 for non-members of the APA who wish to attend more than a single session. Special tickets for \$10.00 will be available to non-members who wish to attend a single session or one of the receptions. Only those who are registered or have purchased the limited number of extra tickets may attend the scheduled sessions or receptions. Please be sure to wear your convention badge at all times to identify yourself as a registered participant.

A pre-registration form is included in the back of this issue of the *Proceedings*. People who are not now members of the APA may take advantage of the lower registration fee by becoming members. Membership forms are available from the National Office, online at www.apaonline.org, and also will be available at the Convention Registration desk.

Mini-conferences on Making Philosophy of Science More Socially Relevant and on Spinoza's Psychology, organized independently under the Pacific Division's mini-conference program, are included in this year's regular registration fee.

5. PLACEMENT SERVICE

Only APA members are eligible to use the Placement service. Appointing officers and applicants are urged to make preparations for their part in the placement operation in advance of the meeting.

6. PRESIDENTIAL ADDRESS

The Presidential Address will be delivered by Nicholas Smith at 6:30 p.m. on Friday, March 21. President Smith will be introduced by Vice President Nancy Cartwright.

7. RECEPTIONS AND SPECIAL EVENTS

There will be a reception for the Mini-conference on Making Philosophy of Science More Socially Relevant on Wednesday, March 19, 6:30-8:30 p.m.

Barry Stroud will deliver the Dewey Lecture on Thursday, March 20, 4:00-5:30 p.m. A reception will follow, 5:30-6:30 p.m.

The Association for Symbolic Logic will hold a reception on Thursday, March 20, 5:00-7:00 p.m.

The APA Board of Officers invites members to a reception honoring former Board Chair Karen Hanson on Thursday, March 20, 9:00-10:00 p.m.

The Annual Reception will be held from 10:00 p.m. to midnight on Thursday, March 20.

There will be a session in memory of Richard Rorty at 1:00 p.m. on Friday, March 21. A reception will follow, 4:00-5:30 p.m.

The Presidential Reception will be held from 7:30-9:00 p.m. on Friday, March 21, following the Presidential Address.

The Prometheus Prize Lecture will be delivered by Elliot Sober on Friday, March 21, 1:00-3:00 p.m. A reception hosted by Prometheus Press will follow the lecture, 3:00-4:30 p.m.

The APA Committee on Philosophy and Law will give a reception to honor Jeffrie Murphy on Saturday, March 22, 4:00-5:30 p.m., following the 1:00 p.m. session on the work of Jeffrie Murphy.

There will be a reception hosted by Springer Publishing welcoming the new journal *Neuroethics* on Saturday, March 22, 6:00-7:00 p.m.

Generally, receptions are for persons registered at the convention. Tickets for guests may be purchased at the door of receptions or the convention registration desk.

Please check with the convention registration desk for information about receptions: more events may be added to the schedule as the convention date nears.

8. MINI-CONFERENCES

A Mini-conference on Making Philosophy of Science More Socially Relevant will take place on Wednesday, March 19, and Thursday, March 20. A Mini-conference on Spinoza's Psychology will take place on Saturday, March 22, and Sunday morning, March 23.

9. ASSOCIATION FOR SYMBOLIC LOGIC

The Association for Symbolic Logic will meet jointly with the American Philosophical Association, Pacific Division, on Thursday, March 20, and Friday, March 21. The ASL sessions will commence at 1:00 p.m. on each of these days in the Sheraton Pasadena hotel.

10. BUSINESS MEETING AND VOTING MEMBERSHIP

The annual Business Meeting will be held at noon on Thursday, March 20. There will be reports from the Divisional and National Officers. According to the Association's By-Laws, regular membership is given by an act of the Executive Secretary on behalf of the Board of Officers. Each year the list of regular members that appears in the November *Proceedings* is used as the list of eligible voters for the three subsequent Divisional business meetings.

11. REPORT OF THE PACIFIC DIVISION NOMINATING COMMITTEE

Calvin Normore (Chair), Robert Pasnau, and James van Cleve served as the 2007 Nominating Committee. They have nominated the following APA Pacific Division members for terms beginning in July 2008:

For Vice-President: Michael Bratman, Terence Parsons, Michael Tooley

For Representative to the Board of Officers: Heather Battaly, Andrews Reath

For Executive Committee Member: Brad Armendt, Ned Markosian

12. 2008 PROGRAM COMMITTEE AND PROGRAM

The Program Committee which prepared this year's program consists of Mark Wrathall (Chair), Richard Arneson, Andrew Askland, Mohammad Azadpur, Kelly Becker, Craig Callender, Joseph Campbell, Rebecca Copenhaver, Branden Fitelson, Peter Graham, Patricia Hanna, Bruce Hunter, Paul Hurley, Eric Hutton, Sherry Irvin, Robin Jeshion, Bernard Kobes, Mark McPherran, Dana Nelkin, Phillip Nickel, Ryan Nichols, Jay Odenbaugh, Mary Rorty, Amy Schmitter, Fred Schueler, Charles Siewert, and Ian Thomson.

Principal papers in Colloquia and Symposia were selected after blind review of all submitted papers. Participants in Invited Paper, Invited Symposia, Author Meets Critics, and Workshop meetings were invited by the Program Committee. Participants in meetings arranged by APA Committees were selected by those Committees.

13. 2009 MEETING SITE AND PROGRAM

The 2009 Pacific Division Meeting will be held at the Westin Bayshore Hotel, Vancouver, British Columbia, Canada. The Program Committee for this 83rd Annual Meeting of the American Philosophical Association, Pacific Division, invites contributions for the 2009 meeting. The deadline for submission is September 1, 2008. Each author may make only one submission. Please indicate prominently that the paper is submitted for the 2009 Pacific Division Meeting. Because the Program Committee will blind-review all submissions, the names of the author and her/his institution should appear only on a separate cover page; they should not appear in the paper in any way that defeats the operation of blind-reviewing.

The 2009 Program Committee also welcomes suggestions for topics and/or speakers of invited sessions. Recommendations (including self-nominations) for commentators and session chairs also are encouraged. These all should be sent to the 2009 Program Chair, Paul Hurley, at Philosophy, Claremont McKenna College, 500 E 9th St., Claremont, CA 91711, or paul.hurley@cmc.edu.

When volunteering someone other than yourself, please be sure your nominee is willing to participate in the program. Nominations should reach the program committee by September 1, 2008, and should include a short account of the individual's areas of specialization and record of scholarship.

14. NOMINATIONS FOR THE 2009 PROGRAM COMMITTEE

Pacific Division members may make nominations or volunteer for membership on the Program Committee by emailing the Secretary-Treasurer, Anita Silvers, at asilvers@sfsu.edu, by March 14, 2008.

15. ACCOMMODATING MEMBERS WITH MULTIPLE CHEMICAL SENSITIVITIES

To provide a welcoming environment for members with multiple chemical sensitivities, all members are requested to refrain from wearing scented products.

On behalf of the Executive and Program Committees of the APA Pacific Division, I extend to every member of the American Philosophical Association a warm invitation to take part in our eighty-second Annual Meeting.

Cordially yours,

Anita Silvers, Secretary-Treasurer

for the Executive Committee

Pacific Division, The American Philosophical Association:

Joan MacGregor (Chair)

Nancy Cartwright

Stewart Cohen

Janet Levin

Calvin Normore

Nicholas Smith

Allen Wood

Mark Wrathall

PACIFIC DIVISION COMMITTEES, 2007-2008

EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE

Joan MacGregor (Chair)	Anita Silvers
Nancy Cartwright	Nicholas Smith
Stewart Cohen	Allen Wood
Janet Levin	Mark Wrathall
Calvin Normore	

PROGRAM COMMITTEE

Mark Wrathall (Chair)	Sherry Irvin
Richard Arneson	Robin Jeshion
Andrew Askland	Bernard Kobes
Mohammad Azadpur	Mark McPherran
Kelly Becker	Dana Nelkin
Craig Callender	Phillip Nickel
Joseph Campbell	Ryan Nichols
Rebecca Copenhagen	Jay Odenbaugh
Branden Fitelson	Mary Rorty
Peter Graham	Amy Schmitter
Patricia Hanna	Fred Schueler
Bruce Hunter	Charles Siewert
Paul Hurley	Ian Thomson
Eric Hutton	

NOMINATING COMMITTEE

Calvin Normore (Chair)
Robert Pasnau
James Van Cleve

THE AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL ASSOCIATION

PACIFIC DIVISION EIGHTY-SECOND ANNUAL MEETING PROGRAM

MARCH 19 - 23, 2008
PASADENA HILTON, PASADENA

MINI-CONFERENCES

WEDNESDAY, MARCH 19 THROUGH THURSDAY, MARCH 20

“Making Philosophy of Science More Socially Relevant”

SATURDAY, MARCH 22 THROUGH SUNDAY, MARCH 23

“Spinoza’s Psychology”

MINI-CONFERENCE ON **MAKING PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE MORE SOCIALY RELEVANT**

Organizing Committee: Nancy Cartwright, Sophia Efstathiou, Helen Longino, Katie Plaisance

WEDNESDAY, MARCH 19

9:00-9:15 a.m., Welcome

9:15-10:45 a.m., Environmental Science and Policy

Carl Cranor (University of California–Riverside)

“The Role of On-the-ground Scientific Judgments in the Philosophy of Environmental Health Protections”

Kevin Elliott (University of South Carolina)

“Philosophy of Science, Public Policy, and Pollution Research”

Nancy Tuana (Pennsylvania State University)

“Bridging Philosophy of Science and Science Policy”

11:00 a.m.-12:30 p.m., Feminist Perspectives On Science

Carla Fehr (Iowa State University)

“ISU ADVANCE: Promoting the Retention and Advancement of Women in Science and Engineering Careers”

Sarah Richardson (Stanford University)

“Beyond Bias: Modeling Gender in Science”

Lynn Hankinson Nelson (University of Washington)

“Upholding Epistemic Standards and Engaging in Socially Responsible Science: There Is No Tension Here”

2:00-3:30 p.m., The Use of Racial Categories in the Natural Sciences

Sophia Efstathiou (University of California–San Diego/
London School of Economics)

“Validating Race/Ethnicity Constructs as Categories for Genetic Research”

Michael Root (University of Minnesota)

“Stratifying By Race”

Lisa Gannett (Saint Mary’s University)

“Questions Asked and Unasked: How Philosophers of Science Might Better Contribute to Current Debates about Genetics and Race”

4:00-5:30 p.m., Values in Biomedical Research

Susan Hawthorne (University of Minnesota)

“Models of Mental Illness: Analysis of Hybrid Constructs”

Julian Reiss (Erasmus University)

“Neglected Diseases and Well-Ordered Science”

Eric Martin (University of California–San Diego)

“Evidence, Objectivity, and Public Policy: Methodological Perspectives on the Vaccine Controversy”

5:30-6:30 p.m., Teaching curricula for philosophy of science that facilitate engagement with social issues (panel discussion)**RECEPTION**

6:30-8:30 p.m.

THURSDAY, MARCH 20**9:00-11:00 a.m., Socially Relevant Roles for Philosophers of Science**

Heather Douglas (University of Tennessee)
 “Going Both Ways: Applied Philosophy of Science in Context”

Katie Plaisance (Leibniz University of Hannover)
 “Philosophers of Science as Liaisons between Science and Society”

Anita Silvers (San Francisco State University)
 “Sheltering the Public from Illusions of a Perfect Genomic Storm”

Janet Kourany (Notre Dame University)
 “Philosophers of Science as Public Intellectuals”

1:30-3:00 p.m., Building Trust between Science and Society

Robert Crease (State University of New York–Stony Brook)
 “Trust”

Naomi Scheman (University of Minnesota)
 “If You Believe in Truth, Fight for Justice: Ethical Responsibilities of Scientists for the Institutions in Which They Work”

Heidi Grasswick (Middlebury College)
 “Scientific Communities and the Responsibilities of Knowledge-Sharing: What We Can Learn from Whistleblowers”

3:00-5:00 p.m., Roundtable: What is the best way to make philosophy of science more socially relevant? What are the requirements for and limitations of such work?**MINI-CONFERENCE ON SPINOZA’S PSYCHOLOGY**

Organizing Committee: Eugene Marshall, Don Rutherford, Mike LeBuffe, Steven Nadler, Tammy Nyden-Bullock, Michael Della Rocca

SATURDAY, MARCH 22**Session 1 – Spinoza’s Psychology**

8:30-9:30 a.m.

Chair: Paul Hoffman (University of California–Riverside)

Speaker: Michael LeBuffe (Texas A&M University)
 “Projectivism in the Ethics: 3p9s and 3p39s”

Commentator: Matt Kisner (University of South Carolina)

9:30-10:30 a.m.

- Chair: John Carriero (University of California–Los Angeles)
 Speaker: Michael Della Rocca (Yale University)
 Commentator: Martin Lin (Rutgers University)

10:30-11:30 a.m.

- Chair: Nick Jolley (University of California–Irvine)
 Speaker: Don Garrett (New York University)
 “Representation and Misrepresentation in Spinoza’s Psychology”
 Commentator: Charlie Huenemann (Utah State University)

Session 2 – Psychology and Politics

1:00-4:00 p.m.

1:00-2:00 p.m.

- Chair: Ursula Goldenbaum (Emory University/Institute for Advanced Study, Princeton)
 Speaker: Tammy Nyden-Bullock (Grinnell College)
 “Spinoza’s Politics of Passion”
 Commentator: Donald Rutherford (University of California–San Diego)

2:00-3:00 p.m.

- Chair: Edwin Curley (University of Michigan)
 Speaker: Michael Rosenthal (University of Washington)
 “Wonder, Miracles and Politics”
 Commentator: Tom Cook (Rollins College)

3:00-4:00 p.m.

- Chair: Ron Sandler (Northeastern University)
 Speaker: Eugene Marshall (Dartmouth College)
 “Harmony and Discord in Spinoza’s Social Model of the Mind”
 Commentator: Minna Koivuniemi (Uppsala Universitet)

SUNDAY, MARCH 23

8:00 a.m.-Noon

Breakfast for Mini-conference Participants

8:00-9:00 a.m.

Roundtable Discussion

9:00 a.m.-Noon

- Moderators: Eugene Marshall (Dartmouth College)
 Donald Rutherford (University of California–San Diego)

MAIN PROGRAM

WEDNESDAY, MARCH 19

REGISTRATION

11:00 a.m.-8:00 p.m.

PLACEMENT INFORMATION

11:00 a.m.-8:00 p.m.

RECEPTION

6:30-8:30 p.m.

WEDNESDAY MORNING

MINI-CONFERENCE ON MAKING PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE MORE SOCIALLY RELEVANT, SESSION 1

9:00 a.m.-12:30 p.m.

9:00-9:15 a.m., Welcome

9:15-10:45 a.m., Environmental Science and Policy

Carl Cranor (University of California–Riverside)

“The Role of On-the-ground Scientific Judgments in the Philosophy of Environmental Health Protections”

Kevin Elliott (University of South Carolina)

“Philosophy of Science, Public Policy, and Pollution Research”

Nancy Tuana (Pennsylvania State University)

“Bridging Philosophy of Science and Science Policy”

11:00 a.m.-12:30 p.m., Feminist Perspectives On Science

Carla Fehr (Iowa State University)

“ISU ADVANCE: Promoting the Retention and Advancement of Women in Science and Engineering Careers”

Sarah Richardson (Stanford University)

“Beyond Bias: Modeling Gender in Science”

Lynn Hankinson Nelson (University of Washington)

“Upholding Epistemic Standards and Engaging in Socially Responsible Science: There Is No Tension Here”

WEDNESDAY AFTERNOON**SESSION I — 1:00-4:00 P.M.****I-A. Author-Meets-Critics: Cressida Heyes, *Self-Transformations: Foucault, Ethics, and Normalized Bodies****1:00-4:00 p.m.*

Chair: Laurie Shrage (California State Polytechnic University–Pomona)

Critics: Ellen Feder (American University)
Todd May (Clemson University)

Author: Cressida Heyes (University of Alberta)

I-B. Invited Symposium: Embodiment and Perception*1:00-4:00 p.m.*

Chair: Nicoletta Orlandi (Rice University)

Speakers: Mark Rowlands (University of Miami)
Evan Thompson (University of Toronto)
Michael Wheeler (University of Stirling)**I-C. Invited Symposium: Ethics, Moral Psychology, and Buddhism***1:00-4:00 p.m.*

Chair: Paul Kjellberg (Whittier College)

Speakers: Mark Siderits (Illinois State University)
“Buddhist Reductionism and Karmic Desert”Charles Goodman (State University of New York–
Binghamton)

“Ethics without Autonomy”

Christopher Gowans (Fordham University)

“Tranquility Philosophies in Buddhist and Hellenistic
Thought”**I-D. Invited Symposium: Wittgenstein and the Paradoxes of Consciousness***1:00-4:00 p.m.*

Chair: Jonathan Ellis (University of California–Santa Cruz)

Speakers: Alice Crary (New School University)

David G. Stern (University of Iowa)

Meredith Williams (Johns Hopkins University)

I-E. Colloquium: Art*1:00-4:00 p.m.**1:00-2:00 p.m.*

Chair: Herminia Reyes (San Diego State University)

Speaker: Nicholas Diehl (University of California–Davis)
“Imagining De Re and the Symmetry Thesis of
Narration”

Commentator: John Bender (Ohio University)

2:00-3:00 p.m.

Chair: Megs Gendreau (University of California–Riverside)

Speaker: Murray Skees (University of North Florida)
“The World Ought to Be Otherwise: Theodor
Adorno’s Theory of Aesthetic Autonomy and a New
Categorical Imperative”

Commentator: J.M. Fritzman (Lewis and Clark College)

3:00-4:00 p.m.

Chair: Alison Niedbalski (Western Michigan University)

Speaker: Jonathan A. Neufeld (Vanderbilt University)
“Critical Performance: Meditations on a Lark”

Commentator: William Day (Le Moyne College)

I-F. Colloquium: Kinds*1:00-4:00 p.m.**1:00-2:00 p.m.*

Chair: Jennifer Matey (Florida International University)

Speaker: Mark B. Couch (Seton Hall University)
“Multiple Realization in Comparative Perspective”

Commentator: Cory Wright (University of California–San Diego)

2:00-3:00 p.m.

Chair: Beau Branson (University of Notre Dame)

Speaker: James C. Klage (Virginia Tech)
“Supervenience: From Synchronic to Diachronic”

Commentator: Stavroula Glezakos (Wake Forest University)

3:00-4:00 p.m.

Chair: Andrew Wayne (University of Guelph)

Speaker: Matthew Slater (University of Idaho)
“Is Homeostasis Too Much to Ask of Natural Kinds?”

Commentator: Chris Jenson (University of Utah)

I-G. Colloquium: Liberalism*1:00-4:00 p.m.**1:00-2:00 p.m.*

Chair: Melissa Yates (Northwestern University)

Speaker: Robert Talisse (Vanderbilt University)

"Does Value Pluralism Entail Liberalism?"

Commentator: Danny Scoccia (New Mexico State University)

2:00-3:00 p.m.

Chair: Simon Cabulea May (Virginia Tech)

Speakers: Christie Hartley (Georgia State University) and Lori
Watson (University of San Diego)

"A Defense of Exclusive Public Reason"

Commentator: David Cummiskey (Bates College)

3:00-4:00 p.m.

Chair: Daniel Haybron (St. Louis University)

Speaker: Christopher Stewart King (University of Tennessee)

"Practical Reason, Commensurability, and Political
Legitimacy"Commentator: Clair Morrissey (University of North Carolina–Chapel
Hill)**I-H. Colloquium: Plato***1:00-4:00 p.m.**1:00-2:00 p.m.*Chair: Gareth Matthews (University of Massachusetts–
Amherst)

Speaker: Mason Marshall (Vanderbilt University)

"The Possibility Requirement in Plato's *Republic*"

Commentator: Catherine McKeen (Williams College)

2:00-3:00 p.m.

Chair: Keith McPartland (Williams College)

Speaker: Ayca Boylu (University of Virginia)

"*Republic V*: What Our Cognitive Powers Cannot Be"

Commentator: Emily Austin (Washington University in St. Louis)

3:00-4:00 p.m.

Chair: Michael Ferejohn (Duke University)

Speaker: David J. Yount (Mesa Community College)

"Is the One of Parmenides' First Hypothesis Best
Interpreted as the Form of the Good?"

Commentator: Russell Jones (University of Oklahoma)

I-I. Colloquium: Reasons for Acting*1:00-4:00 p.m.**1:00-2:00 p.m.*

Chair: Jason Sheley (University of California–Irvine)

Speaker: Danielle Bromwich (University of Toronto)
“Belief and Motivation”

Commentator: Mark Van Roojen (University of Nebraska–Lincoln)

2:00-3:00 p.m.

Chair: Robert Paul (Reed College)

Speaker: Jonathan Way (University of California–Santa Barbara)
“Defending the Wide-Scope Account of Instrumental Reason”

Commentator: Alastair Norcross (University of Colorado)

3:00-4:00 p.m.

Chair: Parker Crutchfield (Arizona State University)

Speaker: Anne Jacobson (University of Houston)
“Empathy and Instinct: A Challenge to Philosophical Conceptions of Folk Psychology”

Commentator: Aaron Zimmerman (University of California–Santa Barbara)

I-J. Colloquium: Skepticism*1:00-4:00 p.m.**1:00-2:00 p.m.*

Chair: Sanford Goldberg (Northwestern University)

Speaker: Giovanni Mion (University of Cincinnati)
“Skepticism and Objective Contexts: A Critique of DeRose”

Commentator: Richard Greene (Weber State University)

2:00-3:00 p.m.

Chair: Helmut Wautischer (Sonoma State University)

Speaker: Daniel M. Johnson (Baylor University)
“Can Moore’s Proof Rationally Persuade without Transmitting Warrant?”

Commentator: Tim Black (California State University–Northridge)

3:00-4:00 p.m.

Chair: Diana Palmieri (University of Western Ontario)

Speaker: Nathan Ballantyne (University of Arizona)
“Variability and Skepticism”

Commentator: Peter Murphy (University of Indianapolis)

**I-K. Special Session Arranged by the APA Committee on
Philosophy and Computers**

1:00-4:00 p.m.

**Topic: Pedagogical Developments in Philosophy and
Computers**

Chair: Peter Boltuc (University of Illinois–Springfield)

Speakers: Patrick Suppes (Stanford University)

“Introducing Gifted Elementary-School Students to
Formal Proofs”

Peter Boltuc (University of Illinois–Springfield)

“Teaching Philosophy Online: Beyond Logic”

Marvin Croy (University of North Carolina–Charlotte)

“Using Educational Data Mining to Provide Hints for
Proof Construction”

**I-L. Special Session Arranged by the APA Committee on
Philosophy and Medicine**

1:00-4:00 p.m.

Topic: Persons, Human Organisms, and Bioethics

Chair: John P. Lizza (Kutztown University of Pennsylvania)

Speakers: David Hershenov (University at Buffalo)

Marya Schechtman (University of Illinois–Chicago)

David Shoemaker (Bowling Green State University)

Mary Anne Warren (Independent Scholar)

Commentator: John P. Lizza (Kutztown University of Pennsylvania)

**I-M. Mini-conference on Making Philosophy of Science More
Socially Relevant, Session 2**

2:00-3:30 p.m.

The Use of Racial Categories in the Natural Sciences

Sophia Efstathiou (University of California–San Diego/
London School of Economics)

“Validating Race/Ethnicity Constructs as Categories
for Genetics Research”

Michael Root (University of Minnesota)

“Stratifying By Race”

Lisa Gannett (Saint Mary’s University)

“Questions Asked and Unasked: How Philosophers of
Science Might Better Contribute to Current Debates
about Genetics and Race”

WEDNESDAY EARLY EVENING**SESSION II — 4:00-6:00 P.M.****II-A. Author-Meets-Critics: Jennifer Lackey, *Learning from Words****4:00-6:00 p.m.*

Chair: Peter Graham (University of California–Riverside)

Critics: Jonathan Kvanvig (Baylor University)

Matthew Weiner (University of Vermont)

Author: Jennifer Lackey (Northwestern University)

II-B. Author-Meets-Critics: Dan Zahavi, *Subjectivity and Selfhood**4:00-6:00 p.m.*

Chair: Michael Shim (California State University–Los Angeles)

Critics: Miri Albahari (University of Western Australia)

Joseph Shear (California Polytechnic State University–San Luis Obispo)

Author: Dan Zahavi (University of Copenhagen)

II-C. Invited Symposium: The Ethical Status of Aesthetic Goods*4:00-6:00 p.m.*

Chair: Jeff Dean (Wiley-Blackwell)

Speakers: Garrett Cullity (University of Adelaide)

Eileen John (Warwick University)

Commentator: Anne Eaton (University of Illinois–Chicago)

II-D. Colloquium: Agent-Relative Values*4:00-6:00 p.m.**4:00-5:00 p.m.*

Chair: Dale Murray (University of Wisconsin–Baraboo/Sauk County and University of Wisconsin–Richland)

Speaker: Avram Hiller (Wake Forest University)

“Agent-Relative Teleology and the Doing/Allowing Distinction”

Commentator: Mark Greene (University of Delaware)

5:00-6:00 p.m.

Chair: Brandon Johns (University of Southern California)

Speaker: Kenneth E. Shockley (University at Buffalo)

“The Agent Relativity of Directed Reasons”

Commentator: Rivka Weinberg (Scripps College)

II-E. Colloquium: Color

4:00-6:00 p.m.

4:00-5:00 p.m.

Chair: Ta Lun (Linus) Huang (University of California–Riverside)

Speaker: Dimitria Electra Gatzia (Syracuse University)
“The Individual Variability Problem”

Commentator: Peter Ross (California State Polytechnic University–Pomona)

5:00-6:00 p.m.

Chair: Heinrik Hellwig (University of California–Riverside)

Speaker: Charlie Kurth (University of California–San Diego)
“A Deflationary Account of the Unity of Color”

Commentator: Joseph Moore (Amherst College)

II-F. Colloquium: Empiricism

4:00-6:00 p.m.

4:00-5:00 p.m.

Chair: Samantha Matherne (University of California–Riverside)

Speaker: D. Kenneth Brown (California Polytechnic State University–San Luis Obispo)
“Decompounded Complexity in Locke Abstract Ideas”

Commentator: Charles Young (Claremont Graduate University)

5:00-6:00 p.m.

Chair: Lijun Yuan (Texas State University–San Marcos)

Speaker: Annemarie Butler (Iowa State University)
“Hume’s Causal Reconstruction of the Perceptual Relativity Argument in *Treatise* 1.4.4”

Commentator: Lex Newman (University of Utah)

II-G. Colloquium: Epistemic Virtues

4:00-6:00 p.m.

4:00-5:00 p.m.

Chair: Gregory Trianosky (California State University–Northridge)

Speaker: Sarah A. Wright (University of Georgia)
“The Proper Structure of the Epistemic Virtues”

Commentator: Chris Lepock (University of Alberta)

5:00-6:00 p.m.

Chair: Marc Bobro (Santa Barbara City College)

Speaker: Rico Vitz (University of North Florida)
 “Doxastic Virtues as Moral Virtues in Hume’s
 Epistemology”

Commentator: Peter Loptson (University of Guelph)

II-H. Colloquium: Philosophy of Race

4:00-6:00 p.m.

4:00-5:00 p.m.

Chair: Brad Elliott Stone (Loyola Marymount University)

Speaker: Brian Thomas (University of California–Riverside)
 “Misgivings about the Nominalist Conception of
 Racial Identity”

Commentator: Robert Hanna (University of Colorado–Boulder)

5:00-6:00 p.m.

Chair: James Rocha (California State Polytechnic
 University–Pomona)

Speaker: Robert D. Murray (Ryerson University)
 “Moral History, Racial Rumors, and Rational
 Reconstruction”

Commentator: Brian Yazzie Burkhart (Pitzer College)

II-I. Colloquium: Reproductive Technologies

4:00-6:00 p.m.

4:00-5:00 p.m.

Chair: Joan McGregor (Arizona State University)

Speaker: Yvette Pearson (Old Dominion University)
 “The Real Flaws in the Stem Cell Research
 Enhancement Act”

Commentator: Sandra Dreisbach (University of California–Santa
 Cruz)

5:00-6:00 p.m.

Chair: Paul Swift (Bryant University)

Speaker: William P. Kabasenche (Washington State University)
 “Reproductive Technologies, the Parental Love
 Objection, and Moral Development”

Commentator: Diana Buccafurni (Sam Houston State University)

II-J. Symposium: Imperative Logic

4:00-6:00 p.m.

Chair: Robin Wang (Loyola Marymount University)

Speaker: Peter B.M. Vranas (University of Wisconsin–Madison)
 “New Foundations for Imperative Logic II: Pure
 Imperative Inference”

Commentators: Jacob Ross (University of Southern California)
Eric Pacuit (Stanford University)

II-K. Symposium: Supererogation

4:00-6:00 p.m.

Chair: John Ward (University of Utah)

Speaker: Jean-Paul Vessel (New Mexico State University)
"Supererogation for Utilitarianism"

Commentators: Allen Coates (East Tennessee State University)
Björn Eriksson (Stockholms Universitet)

II-L. Mini-conference on Making Philosophy of Science More Socially Relevant, Session 3

4:00-6:30 p.m.

4:00-5:30 p.m. Values in Biomedical Research

Susan Hawthorne (University of Minnesota)
"Models of Mental Illness: Analysis of Hybrid Constructs"

Julian Reiss (Erasmus University) "Neglected Diseases and Well-Ordered Science"

Eric Martin (University of California-San Diego)
"Evidence, Objectivity, and Public Policy: Methodological Perspectives on the Vaccine Controversy"

5:30-6:30 p.m. Teaching curricula for philosophy of science that facilitate engagement with social issues (panel discussion)

RECEPTION

6:30-8:30 p.m.

GROUP MEETINGS, 6:30-8:30 P.M.

(See Group Meeting Program for details)

American Association of Philosophy Teachers

Concerned Philosophers for Peace

Josiah Royce Society

Society for Analytical Feminism

Society for Asian and Comparative Philosophy, Session 1

Society for the Study of Process Philosophy

GROUP MEETINGS, 6:30-9:30 P.M.

(See Group Meeting Program for details)

American Society for Philosophy, Counseling, and Psychotherapy, Session 1

Association for Chinese Philosophers in America, Session 1
 Society for German Idealism, Session 1
 Society for the Advancement of American Philosophy
 Society for the Philosophy of History, Session 1
 Society of Indian Philosophy and Religion
 North American Wittgenstein Society

THURSDAY, MARCH 20

PLACEMENT INFORMATION

8:30 a.m.-8:00 p.m.

PLACEMENT INTERVIEWING

8:00 a.m.-6:00 p.m.

REGISTRATION

8:30 a.m.-8:00 p.m.

BOOK DISPLAYS

11:00 a.m.-5:30 p.m.

ANNUAL BUSINESS MEETING

Noon-1:00 p.m.

DEWEY LECTURE

4:00-5:30 p.m.

DEWEY LECTURE RECEPTION

5:30-6:30 p.m.

ASSOCIATION FOR SYMBOLIC LOGIC RECEPTION

5:00-7:00 p.m.

RECEPTION HONORING FORMER BOARD CHAIR KAREN HANSON

9:00-10:00 p.m.

ANNUAL RECEPTION

10:00 p.m.-Midnight

THURSDAY MORNING, MARCH 20

SESSION III — 9:00 A.M.-NOON

III-A. Author-Meets-Critics: Charles Griswold, *Forgiveness: A Philosophical Exploration*

9:00 a.m.-Noon

Chair: Alice MacLachlan (York University)

Critics: Michele Moody-Adams (Cornell University)

Adam Morton (University of Alberta)

Howard Wettstein (University of California–Riverside)

Author: Charles Griswold (Boston University)

III-B. Invited Symposium: Four Views on Free Will

9:00 a.m.-Noon

Chair: Joseph Keim Campbell (Washington State University)

Speakers: Michael McKenna (Florida State University)

“Compatibilism”

Derk Pereboom (Cornell University)

“Hard Incompatibilism”

Robert Kane (University of Texas–Austin)

“Libertarianism”

Manuel Vargas (University of San Francisco)

“Revisionism”

III-C. Invited Symposium: New Thoughts about Mary

9:00 a.m.-Noon

Chair: Adam Pautz (University of Texas–Austin)

Speakers: Alex Byrne (Massachusetts Institute of Technology)

Michael Tye (University of Texas–Austin)

Commentator: David Chalmers (Australian National University)

III-D. Invited Symposium: Philosophy of Law: What Determines the Content of Law

9:00 a.m.-Noon

Chair: Deirdre Golash (American University)

Speakers: Mark Greenberg (University of California–Los Angeles)

“Foundations of Law: Moral Facts or Social Facts”

Lawrence Solum (University of Illinois–Urbana-Champaign)

“The Content of Nomoi”

Scott Shapiro (University of Michigan–Ann Arbor)

“The Planning Theory of Law”

III-E. Colloquium: Aristotle*9:00 a.m.-Noon**9:00-10:00 a.m.*

Chair: Zeev Perelmuter (University of Toronto)

Speaker: John Francis Bowin (University of California–Santa Cruz)

“Aristotle on Identity and Persistence”

Commentator: Yitian Li (Tsinghua University)

10:00-11:00 a.m.

Chair: Martha Woodruff (Middlebury College)

Speaker: Marjolein Oele (University of San Francisco)

“Aristotle on Pathos: From Qualitative Change to Emotion”

Commentator: Stephen Leighton (Queen’s University)

11:00 a.m.-Noon

Chair: Sean McAleer (University of Wisconsin–Eau Claire)

Speaker: Noell Birondo (Pomona College)

“Aristotle and the ‘Virtues of Will Power’”

Commentator: Robert Roberts (Baylor University)

III-F. Colloquium: Consequentialism*9:00 a.m.-Noon**9:00-10:00 a.m.*

Chair: Margaret Battin (University of Utah)

Speaker: Walter E. Schaller (Texas Tech University)

“The Pond, the Envelope, and the Vintage Sedan: Taking Global Poverty Seriously”

Commentator: Nicole Hassoun (Carnegie Mellon University)

10:00-11:00 a.m.

Chair: Michael Hodges (Vanderbilt University)

Speakers: Ben Eggleston (University of Kansas) and Dale Miller (Old Dominion University)

“Mill’s Misleading Moral Mathematics”

Commentator: Matt Stichter (Washington State University)

11:00 a.m.-Noon

Chair: Erin Frykholm (University of California–San Diego)

Speaker: Edmund Wall (East Carolina University)

“Problems with Hooker’s Rule Consequentialism”

Commentator: Matthew Talbert (West Virginia University)

III-G. Colloquium: Moral Responsibilities*9:00-Noon**9:00-10:00 a.m.*

Chair: Paul Hughes (University of Michigan–Dearborn)

Speaker: Gillian Brock (University of Auckland)

“Compatriot Priority, Health in Developing Countries,
and Our Global Responsibilities”

Commentator: Kristen Hessler (State University of New York–Albany)

*10:00-11:00 a.m.*Chair: Richard N. Fox (California State University–Long
Beach)Speaker: Joseph R. Millum (National Institutes of Health)
“Filial Duties of Care”

Commentator: Claudia Mills (University of Colorado–Boulder)

11:00 a.m.-Noon

Chair: Mary V. Rorty (Stanford University)

Speaker: Inmaculada De Melo-Martin (Cornell University)
“On a Putative Moral Duty to Participate in
Biomedical Research”Commentator: Rosamond Rhodes (Mount Sinai School of Medicine
and City University of New York–Graduate Center)**III-H. Colloquium: Perception***9:00 a.m.-Noon**9:00-10:00 a.m.*

Chair: John Ramsey (University of California–Riverside)

Speaker: Robert E. Briscoe (Loyola University–New Orleans)
“Perspectival Properties and the Perceptual Priority of
Depth”Commentator: Andrew Egan (University of Michigan–Ann Arbor and
Australian National University)*10:00-11:00 a.m.*

Chair: Sean Hermanson (Florida International University)

Speaker: Jason Ford (University of Minnesota–Duluth)
“Saving Time: How Attention Explains the Utility of
Supposedly Superfluous Representations”Commentator: Anastasia Panagopoulos (University of Minnesota–
Twin Cities)*11:00 a.m.-Noon*

Chair: Orlin Vakarelov (University of Arizona)

- Speaker: Malte Willer (University of Texas–Austin)
 “Visual Perceptions: A Plea for Simple Contents”
 Commentator: James Genone (University of California–Berkeley)

III-I. Colloquium: Philosophy of Language

9:00 a.m.–Noon

9:00–10:00 a.m.

- Chair: Edward N. Zalta (Stanford University)
 Speaker: Angel Pinillos (Arizona State University)
 “Coreference and Transitivity”
 Commentator: Michael Nelson (University of California–Riverside)

10:00–11:00 a.m.

- Chair: Kisor Chakrabarti (Bethany College of West Virginia)
 Speaker: Fabrizio Cariani (University of California–Berkeley)
 “Disjunctive Obligations and Implicature”
 Commentator: Mitchell Green (University of Virginia)

11:00 a.m.–Noon

- Chair: Geoff Georgi (University of Southern California)
 Speaker: Mark Timothy Phelan (University of North Carolina–Chapel Hill)
 “Dirty Cheap Contextualism”
 Commentator: Timothy Sundell (University of Michigan–Ann Arbor)

III-J. Colloquium: Plato, Kierkegaard, Nietzsche

9:00 a.m.–Noon

9:00–10:00 a.m.

- Chair: Charles Merward (Claremont Graduate University)
 Speaker: S. Pierre Lamarche (Utah Valley State College)
 “A Rather Deliberate Misunderstanding: On Nietzsche’s Resentment of Pyrrho”
 Commentator: Babette Babich (Fordham University)

10:00–11:00 a.m.

- Chair: Robert Sanchez (University of California–Riverside)
 Speaker: Mark A. Tietjen (University of Georgia)
 “Does Kierkegaard Have a Point of View?”
 Commentator: Rick Anthony Furtak (Colorado College)

11:00 a.m.–Noon

- Chair: Gale Justin (California State University–Sacramento)
 Speaker: Elaine Landry (University of Calgary)
 “Recollection in Plato’s *Meno*: Method, Myth, or Necessary Hypothesis?”
 Commentator: Suzanne Obdrzalek (Claremont McKenna College)

III-K. Colloquium: Truth*9:00 a.m.-Noon**9:00-10:00 a.m.*

Chair: Theodore Guleserian (Arizona State University)

Speaker: Onyoung Oh (City University of New York–Graduate Center)

“Supervenience, Deflationism, and the Success Argument”

Commentator: Gerald Vision (Temple University)

10:00-11:00 a.m.

Chair: Michael Rieppel (University of California–Berkeley)

Speaker: Lionel S. Shapiro (University of Connecticut)

“Revenge and Expression”

Commentator: Kenny Easwaran (University of California–Berkeley)

11:00 a.m.-Noon

Chair: Joshua Armstrong (Rutgers University)

Speaker: Christopher Evan Franklin (University of California–Riverside)

“Truth at a World for Modal Propositions”

Commentator: Christopher Menzel (Texas A&M University)

III-L. Special Session Arranged by the APA Committee on Philosophy in Two-Year Colleges*9:00 a.m.-Noon***Topic: So You Want to Apply for a Job at a Community College?**

Chair: Geoffrey Frasz (College of Southern Nevada)

Speakers: Robert Boyd (Fresno City College)

Geoffrey Frasz (College of Southern Nevada)

Chris Kuchuris (Community College of Southern Nevada)

Mark Rauls (College of Southern Nevada)

III-M. Special Session Arranged by the APA Committee on the Status of Asian and Asian-American Philosophers and Philosophies*9:00 a.m.-Noon***Topic: Author-Meets-Critics: David Wong, *Natural Moralities: A Defense of Pluralistic Relativism***

Chair: Yang Xiao (Kenyon College)

Commentators: Lawrence Blum (University of Massachusetts–Boston)

Chad Hansen (University of Hong Kong)

Yong Huang (Kutztown University of Pennsylvania)

Author: David Wong (Duke University)

III-N. Mini-conference on Making Philosophy of Science More Socially Relevant, Session 4

9:00-11:00 a.m.

Socially Relevant Roles for Philosophers of Science

Heather Douglas (University of Tennessee)

“Going Both Ways: Applied Philosophy of Science in Context”

Katie Plaisance (Leibniz University of Hannover)

“Philosophers of Science as Liaisons between Science and Society”

Anita Silvers (San Francisco State University)

“Sheltering the Public from Illusions of a Perfect Genomic Storm”

Janet Kourany (Notre Dame University)

“Philosophers of Science as Public Intellectuals”

ANNUAL BUSINESS MEETING

Noon-1:00 p.m.

THURSDAY AFTERNOON, MARCH 20

SESSION IV — 1:00-4:00 P.M.

IV-A. Author-Meets-Critics: David Wolfsdorf, *Trials of Reason*

1:00-4:00 p.m.

Chair: Georgios Anagnostopoulos (University of California–San Diego)

Critics: Rachel Barney (University of Toronto)
Zina Giannopoulou (University of California–Irvine)
Debra Nails (Michigan State University)

Author: David Wolfsdorf (Temple University)

IV-B. Invited Symposium: New Work on Contextualism

1:00-4:00 p.m.

Chair: Kelly Becker (University of New Mexico)

Speakers: Peter Ludlow (University of Michigan–Ann Arbor)
“Cheap Contextualism”

Jonathan M. Schaffer (University of Massachusetts–Amherst)

“Knowledge in the Image of Assertion”

Ram Neta (University of North Carolina–Chapel Hill)

“Why It’s Good to Have a Context-sensitive Epistemic Operator”

Commentator: Patrick W. Rysiew (University of Victoria)

IV-C. Invited Symposium: The Intersection between Race and Class: Beyond the Marxist Reduction

1:00-4:00 p.m.

Chair: Nathan Placencia (University of California–Riverside)

Speakers: Steve Martinot (San Francisco State University)

“The Racialization of U.S. Class Relations: How Not to Write White Labor History”

Emily S. Lee (California State University–Fullerton)

“If Class Is Mobile and Race Is Not Mobile, What Is the Meaning of Their Intersection?”

Mario Sáenz (Le Moyne College)

“Mestizaje and Class”

Commentators: Maria D. Davidson (University of Oklahoma)

Eduardo Mendieta (State University of New York–Stony Brook)

IV-D. Invited Symposium: The Problem of Evil

1:00-4:00 p.m.

Chair: Thomas M. Crisp (Biola University)

Speakers: John Bishop (University of Auckland)

Ken Perszyk (Victoria University of Wellington)

“The Normatively Relativised Logical Argument from Evil”

Hugh McCann (Texas A&M University)

“On Grace and Free Will”

Michael Tooley (University of Colorado–Boulder)

“The Probability That God Exists”

IV-E. Colloquium: Concept Acquisition

1:00-4:00 p.m.

1:00-2:00 p.m.

Chair: Alan Moore (University of California–Riverside)

Speaker: William Dylan Sabo (University of North Carolina–Chapel Hill)

“Concept Acquisition without Representation”

Commentator: Nathan Westbrook (University of California–Riverside)

2:00-3:00 p.m.

Chair: Joseph Grcic (Indiana State University)

Speaker: Par Sundstrom (Umeå Universitet)

“The Missing Shade of Blue and the Prospects of Concept Empiricism”

Commentator: Simon Evnine (University of Miami)

3:00-4:00 p.m.

Chair: Jeff Johnson (College of St. Catherine)

Speaker: Benedicte Veillet (University of Maryland–College Park)

“Concept Acquisition and Partial Conceptualism”

Commentator: Casey O’Callaghan (Bates College)

IV-F. Colloquium: Heidegger

1:00-4:00 p.m.

1:00-2:00 p.m.

Chair: Elisabeth Silverstein (University of California–Riverside)

Speaker: Chad A. Engelland (John Carroll University)

“Refuting Skepticism with Heidegger and Searle”

Commentator: David Cerbone (West Virginia University)

2:00-3:00 p.m.

Chair: David Woodruff Smith (University of California–Irvine)

Speaker: Leslie MacAvoy (East Tennessee State University)

“The Problems of Judgment and the Categories: Heidegger’s Thinking about Transcendental Logic”

Commentator: Benjamin Crowe (University of Utah)

3:00-4:00 p.m.

Chair: William Bracken (University of California–Riverside)

Speaker: Mark Ralkowski (University of New Mexico)

“How Heidegger Should Have Read Plato”

Commentator: Sheridan Hough (College of Charleston)

IV-G. Colloquium: Issues in Environmentalism

1:00-4:00 p.m.

1:00-2:00 p.m.

Chair: Michelle Switzer (Whittier College)

Speaker: Walter J. Riker (Vanderbilt University)

“Protecting the Environment from the Law? Why Humphrey’s Irreversibility Defense of Direct Action Fails”

Commentator: Mark Woods (University of San Diego)

2:00-3:00 p.m.

Chair: Jonathan Kaplan (Oregon State University)

Speaker: Idil Boran (York University)

“The Ethical Basis of a Market for Carbon”

Commentator: Dale Jamieson (New York University)

3:00-4:00 p.m.

Chair: Tanya Rodriguez (City University of New York–City College)

Speaker: Shelley Wilcox (San Francisco State University/ Temple University)

“Is Civic Environmentalism a Satisfactory Urban Environmental Ethic?”

Commentator: James Sheppard (University of Missouri–Kansas City)

IV-H. Colloquium: Metaphysics and Time

1:00-4:00 p.m.

1:00-2:00 p.m.

Chair: Peter A. Graham (University of Massachusetts–Amherst)

Speaker: Pablo Rychter (LOGOS Barcelona)
“Stage Theory and Proper Names”

Commentator: Timothy Lewis (University of California–Santa Barbara)

2:00-3:00 p.m.

Chair: James Harrington (Loyola University of Chicago)

Speaker: John W. Carroll (North Carolina State University)
“Self Visitation and Traveler Time”

Commentator: Majid Amini (Virginia State University)

3:00-4:00 p.m.

Chair: Joanne Waugh (University of South Florida)

Speaker: Yuri Balashov (University of Georgia)
“Pegs, Boards, and Relativistic Perdurantism”

Commentator: Bana Bashour (City University of New York–Graduate School)

IV-I. Colloquium: Values

1:00-4:00 p.m.

1:00-2:00 p.m.

Chair: Patricia Easton (Claremont Graduate University)

Speaker: Andrew Youpa (Southern Illinois University–Carbondale)

“Spinoza’s Theories of Value”

Commentator: Michael Rosenthal (University of Washington)

2:00-3:00 p.m.

Chair: Daniel Campana (University of La Verne)

Speaker: Jason Raibley (California State University–Long Beach)
“Natural Rightness”

Commentator: Darryl Wright (Harvey Mudd College)

3:00-4:00 p.m.

Chair: Erick Ramirez (University of California–San Diego)

Speaker: Stan Husi (Rice University)

“Desire Accounts of Value: Actual Versus Informed”

Commentator: Andrew Eshleman (University of Arkansas–Little Rock)

IV-J. Special Session Arranged by the APA Committee on Pre-College Instruction in Philosophy

1:00-4:00 p.m.

Topic: Writing Philosophy for Youth and Teens

Chair: David Boersema (Pacific University)

Speakers: Sharon Kaye (John Carroll University)

Claudia Mills (University of Colorado–Boulder)

Michael Pritchard (Western Michigan University)

David A. Shapiro (Cascadia Community College)

IV-K. Special Session Arranged by the APA Committee on the Status of Women

1:00-4:00 p.m.

Topic: Strategizing Changes in the Culture and Ideology of Philosophy

Chair: Robin S. Dillon (Lehigh University)

Speakers: Ann Garry (California State University–Los Angeles)

Eva Kittay (State University of New York–Stony Brook)

Alice MacLachlan (York University)

Lindsay Thompson (Johns Hopkins University)

Rosemarie Tong (University of North Carolina–Charlotte)

IV-L. Special Session Arranged by the Association of Symbolic Logic

1:00-5:00 p.m.

1:00-4:00 p.m. Symposium: Quantifiers in Logic and Language

Chair: Michael Glanzberg (University of California–Davis)

1:00-2:00 p.m.

Speaker: Chris Barker (New York University)

“Reasoning about Scope-Taking in a Substructural Logic”

2:00-3:00 p.m.

Speaker: Ed Keenan (University of California–Los Angeles)

“Non-Classical Quantification in Natural Language”

3:00-4:00 p.m.

Speaker: Dag Westerstahl (Goteborg University)
 “Some Issues about Compositionality and
 Quantification, in Particular Possessive
 Quantification”

4:00-5:00 p.m. Contributed Talks Session

Chair: Gila Sher (University of California–San Diego)

4:00-4:20 p.m.

Speaker: Jesse Alama (Stanford University)
 “A Formal Proof of Euler’s Polyhedron Formula”

4:30-4:50 p.m.

Speaker: Erez Shochat (St. Francis College)
 “Automorphisms of Countable Short Recursively
 Saturated Models of Arithmetic”

RECEPTION HOSTED BY ASSOCIATION FOR SYMBOLIC LOGIC

5:00-7:00 p.m.

**IV-M. Mini-conference on Making Philosophy of Science More
 Socially Relevant, Session 5**

1:30-5:00 p.m.

1:30-3:00 p.m. **Building Trust between Science and Society**

Robert Crease (State University of New York–Stony
 Brook)
 “Trust”

Naomi Scheman (University of Minnesota)
 “If You Believe in Truth, Fight for Justice: Ethical
 Responsibilities of Scientists for the Institutions in
 Which They Work”

Heidi Grasswick (Middlebury College)
 “Scientific Communities and the Responsibilities
 of Knowledge-Sharing: What We Can Learn from
 Whistleblowers”

3:00-5:00 p.m. **Roundtable: What is the best way to make
 philosophy of science more socially relevant? What are the
 requirements for and limitations of such work?**

THURSDAY EARLY EVENING, MARCH 20

SESSION V — 4:00-6:00 P.M.

V-A. Author-Meets-Critics: Bryan W. Van Norden, *Virtue Ethics and Consequentialism in Early Chinese Philosophy*

4:00-6:00 p.m.

Chair: Xinyan Jiang (University of Redlands)

Critics: Stephen Angle (Wesleyan University)

Michael Slote (University of Miami)

Author: Bryan W. Van Norden (Vassar College)

V-B. Invited Paper: Mill

4:00-6:00 p.m.

Chair: Philip Nickel (University of California–Irvine)

Speaker: Sharon Lloyd (University of Southern California)
“Mill’s Realistic Utopia: Politics Before Ethics”

Commentators: Peter de Marneffe (Arizona State University)
Wendy Donner (Carleton University)

V-C. Invited Paper: Moral Dilemmas

4:00-6:00 p.m.

Chair: Alex Rajczi (Claremont McKenna College)

Speaker: Geoff Sayre-McCord (University of North Carolina–
Chapel Hill)

“A Moral Argument Against Moral Dilemmas”

Commentators: David Brink (University of California–San Diego)
Sarah Buss (University of Michigan–Ann Arbor)

V-D. Invited Paper: Phenomenal Concepts

4:00-6:00 p.m.

Speaker: Martine Nida-Rumelin (Université de Fribourg)

Commentators: Amy Kind (Claremont McKenna College)
Joseph Levine (University of Massachusetts–
Amherst)

V-E. Invited Paper: The Unity of Political Values

4:00-6:00 p.m.

Chair: Jorah Dannenberg (University of California–Los
Angeles)

Speaker: A.J. Julius (University of California–Los Angeles)
“Solve Jointly for Liberty, Equality, and Democracy”

Commentators: George Sher (Rice University)

V-F. Invited Symposium: Reid on Perception, Mind, and Science*4:00-6:00 p.m.*

Chair: Shoshana Brassfield (Colgate University)

Speakers: Robert Callergård (Stockholms Universitet)

“On Reid’s Conception of Physics: ‘The Last
Newtonian Theist’ or the First Modern Empiricist?”

Lorne Falkenstein (University of Western Ontario)

“Reid and Hume on Memory”

Commentators: Giovanni Grandi (Auburn University)

René Van Woudenberg (University of Notre Dame)

V-G. Colloquium: Explanation*4:00-6:00 p.m.**4:00-5:00 p.m.*

Chair: Ioan Muntean (University of California–San Diego)

Speaker: Robert Northcott (University of Missouri–Saint Louis)

“Apportioning Explanatory Responsibility”

Commentator: Marion Ledwig (Stockholms Universitet)

5:00-6:00 p.m.

Chair: Sharon Crasnow (Riverside Community College)

Speaker: Gordon L. Pettit (Western Illinois University)

“Mundane or Incredible?”

Commentator: Gregory Novack (Wayne State University)

V-H. Colloquium: Identity and Difference*4:00-6:00 p.m.**4:00-5:00 p.m.*

Chair: Antonio Chu (Metropolitan State College of Denver)

Speaker: Josh Blander (University of California–Los Angeles)

“Duns Scotus on Formal Distinction, Identity, and
Material Constitution”

Commentator: Martin Tweedale (University of Alberta)

5:00-6:00 p.m.

Chair: Jeremy Kirby (Albion College)

Speaker: Paul Audi (University of Nebraska–Omaha)

“Toward a New Criterion of Identity for Properties”

Commentator: Raul Saucedo (Cornell University)

V-I. Colloquium: Pornography*4:00-6:00 p.m.**4:00-5:00 p.m.*

Chair: Marcia Homiak (Occidental College)

Speaker: Jorn Sonderholm (Georgetown University)

"What Is It to Be Pornographic?"

Commentator: Todd Weber (Monterey Peninsula College)

5:00-6:00 p.m.

Chair: Joseph Ulatowski (University of Utah)

Speaker: Nicole Wyatt (University of Calgary)

"Conventions for Illocutionary Silencing"

Commentator: Ramona Ilea (Pacific University)

V-J. Symposium: Plato on Knowledge*4:00-6:00 p.m.*

Chair: Vishwa Adluri (Drew University)

Speaker: Naomi Reshotko (University of Denver)

"Knowledge Never Makes a Mistake: The
Incompatibility of False Belief and Knowledge in
Plato's *Theaetetus*"Commentators: Maria Paleologou (California State University–
Bakersfield)

William Uzgalis (Oregon State University)

V-K. Special Session Arranged by the APA Committee on Black Philosophers*4:00-6:00 p.m.***Topic: Aesthetics and Race**

Chair: Pamela Hood (San Francisco State University)

Speakers: Darrell Moore (DePaul University)

"In Freedom's Wake: Spike Lee, Aesthetics, Critique"

Monique Roelofs (Hampshire College)

"Modes of Radical Address"

Paul Taylor (Temple University)

"Kaffir Boy, Starring Tom Cruise"

V-L. Dewey Lecture*4:00-5:30 p.m.*

Chair: John Campbell (University of California–Berkeley)

Speaker: Barry Stroud (University of California–Berkeley)

"Human Understanding and Philosophical
Satisfaction"

DEWEY LECTURE RECEPTION*5:30-6:30 p.m.*

Convention attendees are cordially invited to a reception sponsored by the Dewey Foundation in honor of the Dewey Lecturer.

THE APA BOARD OF OFFICERS CORDIALLY INVITES MEMBERS TO A RECEPTION HONORING FORMER BOARD CHAIR KAREN HANSON*9:00-10:00 p.m.***ANNUAL RECEPTION***10:00 p.m.-Midnight***GROUP MEETINGS, 6:30-8:30 P.M.**

(See Group Meeting Program for details)

American Society for Aesthetics

International Society for Environmental Ethics, Session 1

Society for Lesbian and Gay Philosophy and the APA Committee on the Status of Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and Transgendered People in the Profession

Society for Phenomenology and Analytic Philosophy

Society for Skeptical Studies

Society for Student Philosophers, Session 1

GROUP MEETINGS, 6:30-9:30 P.M.

(See Group Meeting Program for details)

American Society for Philosophy, Counseling, and Psychotherapy, Session 2

International Hobbes Association, Session 1

International Society for Chinese Philosophy and Association of Chinese Philosophers in America

North American Spinoza Society

Philosophy of Religion Group

Philosophy of Time Society

Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy

Society for Philosophy in the Contemporary World, Session 1

GROUP MEETINGS, 8:30-10:30 P.M.

(See Group Meeting Program for details)

North American Kant Society, Session 1

Society for German Idealism, Session 2

Society for the Philosophy of History, Session 2

FRIDAY, MARCH 21**PLACEMENT INFORMATION***8:30 a.m.-5:00 p.m.***PLACEMENT INTERVIEWING***TBA***BOOK DISPLAYS***8:30 a.m.-6:00 p.m.***REGISTRATION***8:30 a.m.-6:30 p.m.***PROGRAM COMMITTEE BREAKFAST***7:30-9:00 a.m.***LUNCH, APA BOARD OF OFFICERS***Noon***RECEPTION, TO CELEBRATE THE PROMETHEUS PRIZE LECTURE (HOSTED BY PROMETHEUS PUBLISHING)***3:00-4:30 p.m.***RECEPTION, RORTY MEMORIAL SESSION***4:00-5:30 p.m.***PRESIDENTIAL ADDRESS***6:30-7:30 p.m.***PRESIDENTIAL RECEPTION***7:30-9:00 p.m.***FRIDAY MORNING, MARCH 21****SESSION VI — 9:00 A.M.-NOON****VI-A. Author-Meets-Critics: Ernest Sosa, *A Virtue Epistemology****9:00 a.m.-Noon*

Chair: Keith Lehrer (University of Arizona)

Critics: Paul Boghossian (New York University)

Stewart Cohen (Arizona State University)

Hilary Kornblith (University of Massachusetts–Amherst)

Author: Ernest Sosa (Rutgers University)

VI-B. Author-Meets-Critics: Lloyd P. Gerson, *Aristotle and Other Platonists**9:00 a.m.-Noon*

Chair: Joel Martinez (Lewis and Clark College)

Critics: Richard McKirahan (Pomona College)

Fred D. Miller, Jr. (Bowling Green State University)

Christine Thomas (Dartmouth College)

Author: Lloyd P. Gerson (University of Toronto)

VI-C. Author-Meets-Critics: John Martin Fischer, *My Way: Essays on Moral Responsibility**9:00 a.m.-Noon*

Chair: Michael Tiboris (University of California–San Diego)

Critics: Randolph Clarke (Florida State University)

Calvin Normore (University of California–Los Angeles)

Gideon Yaffe (University of Southern California)

Author: John Martin Fischer (University of California–Riverside)

VI-D. Author-Meets-Critics: Scott Sehon, *Teleological Realism**9:00 a.m.-Noon*

Chair: Fred Schueler (University of Delaware)

Critics: Gilbert Harman (Princeton University)

Timothy O'Connor (Indiana University–Bloomington)

Fred Stoutland (Uppsala Universitet)

Author: Scott Sehon (Bowdoin College)

VI-E. Invited Symposium: Becoming Heidegger*9:00 a.m.-Noon*

Chair: Iain Thomson (University of New Mexico)

Speakers: Theodore Kisiel (Northern Illinois University)

“On the Operative Sense of Occasionality and
Situational Context in Heidegger’s Works”

Thomas Sheehan (Stanford University)

“What Heidegger Became: Early Traces of His Later
Thought”

Commentator: Steven Crowell (Rice University)

VI-F. Invited Symposium: Environmental Ethics: Where It’s Been, Where It Is, Where It Ought to Go*9:00 a.m.-Noon*

Chair: Andrew Askland (Arizona State University)

Speakers: Katie McShane (North Carolina State University)

“Environmental Ethics: Problems and Prospects”

- Holmes Rolston III (Colorado State University)
 “The Future of Environmental Ethics”
 Phil Cafaro (Colorado State University)
 “The Way Forward for Environmental Ethics”
 Commentators: Jennifer Everett (DePauw University)
 Marion Hourdequin (Colorado College)
 Paul Moriarty (Southern Illinois University–
 Edwardsville)

VI-G. Invited Symposium: Philosophy of Physics

9:00 a.m.–Noon

- Chair: Lawrence Sklar (University of Michigan–Ann Arbor)
 Speakers: Kevin Davey (University of Chicago)
 Arthur Fine (University of Washington)
 Isabel Guerra (Universidad Complutense de Madrid)
 Sheldon Smith (University of California–Los Angeles)
 Commentator: Amit Hagar (Indiana University–Bloomington)

VI-H. Invited Symposium: The Aesthetics of Film

9:00 a.m.–Noon

- Chair: Paul C. Santilli (Siena College)
 Speakers: Amy Coplan (California State University–Fullerton)
 “Arousing Affect: How Film Engages the Body”
 Jesse Prinz (University of North Carolina–Chapel Hill)
 “Thumbs Up, Thumbs Down: Evaluating Films”
 David Davies (McGill University)
 “What Type of ‘Type’ Is a Film?”
 Commentator: Christopher Grau (Clemson University)

VI-I. Colloquium: Lying and Bad Faith

9:00 a.m.–Noon

9:00–10:00 a.m.

- Chair: Jeffrey Roland (Louisiana State University)
 Speaker: Don Fallis (University of Arizona)
 “What Is Lying?”
 Commentator: Marc Moffett (University of Wyoming)

10:00–11:00 a.m.

- Chair: Mohammad Azadpur (San Francisco State University)
 Speaker: Donald Wilson (Kansas State University)
 “Truth and Deception in Kantian Ethics”
 Commentator: Lauren Freeman (Boston University)

11:00 a.m.-Noon

Chair: Adam D. Pave (Claremont Graduate University)

Speakers: Simon Feldman (Connecticut College)

Allan Hazlett (Fordham University)

“What’s Bad about Bad Faith?”

Commentator: Kim Diaz (Texas A&M University)

VI-J. Colloquium: Perception

9:00 a.m.-Noon

9:00-10:00 a.m.

Chair: Matthew Lockard (University of California–Los Angeles)

Speaker: Emily Esch (College of St. Benedict and St. John’s University)

“The Ineffability of Visual Experience”

Commentator: Brendan O’Sullivan (Rhodes College)

10:00-11:00 a.m.

Chair: Felipe Leon (University of California–Riverside)

Speaker: John T. Bengson (University of Texas–Austin)

“Is Intuition a Form of Perception?”

Commentator: Michael Huemer (University of Colorado–Boulder)

11:00 a.m.-Noon

Chair: Ori Simchen (University of British Columbia)

Speaker: Mitchell Herschbach (University of California–San Diego)

“Folk Psychological and Phenomenological Accounts of Social Perception”

Commentator: Adam Arico (University of Arizona)

VI-K. Colloquium: Public Policies and Individual Rights

9:00 a.m.-Noon

9:00-10:00 a.m.

Chair: Anita Ho (University of British Columbia)

Speakers: Paul Baker (Georgia Institute of Technology)

Andrew C. Ward (University of Minnesota–Division of Health Policy and Management)

“How Philosophy Can Inform the Creation of Public Policy for Workplace Accommodations: An Essay in Applied Philosophy”

Commentator: Leslie Francis (University of Utah)

10:00-11:00 a.m.

Chair: Richard Galvin (Texas Christian University)

Speaker: Thomas W. Peard (Baker University)

“Sexual Harassment in the Classroom: Exploring the Limits of Free Speech”

Commentator: Judy Miles (Cal Poly Pomona)

11:00 a.m.-Noon

Chair: Susan Wolf (University of North Carolina–Chapel Hill)

Speaker: Robert F. Card (State University of New York–Oswego)

“Conscientious Objection, Emergency Contraception, and Public Policy”

Commentator: Christopher Meyers (California State University–Bakersfield)

VI-L. Special Session Arranged by the APA Committee on International Cooperation

9:00 a.m.-Noon

Topic: The Influence of American Philosophy in Scandinavia

Chair: Richard Creath (Arizona State University)

Speakers: Dagfinn Føllesdal (Stanford University)

“Bridging the Gap”

Bjørn Ramberg (Universitetet i Oslo)

“From Metaphysics to Politics: Pragmatism as Research Strategy in Current Norwegian Philosophy”

Matti Eklund (Cornell University)

“The American Influence on Swedish Philosophy”

Henrik Lagerlund (University of Western Ontario)

“The Uppsala School and Analytical Philosophy: Why 20th Century Anglo-American Philosophy was Nothing New in Sweden”

VI-M. Special Session Arranged by the APA Committee on Philosophy in Two-Year Colleges

9:00 a.m.-Noon

Topic: The Promise and Perils of Teaching Philosophy Online at Two Year Schools

Chair: Geoffrey Frasz (College of Southern Nevada)

Speakers: Geoffrey Frasz (College of Southern Nevada)

Melisa McCormick (Community College of Southern Nevada)

Mark Rauls (College of Southern Nevada)

Wendell Stephenson (Fresno City College)

FRIDAY AFTERNOON, MARCH 21**SESSION VII — 1:00-4:00 P.M.****VII-A. Author-Meets-Critics: Sergio Tenenbaum, *Appearances of the Good****1:00-4:00 p.m.*

Chair: Kai Draper (University of Delaware)

Critics: Donald Hubin (Ohio State University)

Andrews Reath (University of California–Riverside)

Sarah Stroud (McGill University)

Author: Sergio Tenenbaum (University of Toronto)

VII-B. Special Memorial Session: In Memory of Richard Rorty*1:00-4:00 p.m.*

Chair: Neil Gross (Harvard University)

Speakers: Richard Bernstein (New School University)

Robert Brandom (University of Pittsburgh)

Hubert Dreyfus (University of California–Berkeley)

Douglas MacLean (University of North Carolina–
Chapel Hill)

Bjørn Ramberg (Universitetet i Oslo)

Carlin Romano (Philadelphia *Inquirer*/University of
Pennsylvania)

Michael Williams (Johns Hopkins University)

*All meeting attendees are invited to the Reception that will follow this program. 4:00-5:30 p.m.***VII-C. Invited Symposium: Justice and International Relations***1:00-4:00 p.m.*

Chair: Kory Schaff (Occidental College)

Speakers: Andrew Altman (Georgia State University)

Christopher Heath Wellman (Washington University
in St. Louis)“International Violence and Human Rights:
From Humanitarian Intervention to Political
Assassination”

Michael Blake (University of Washington)

“Liberal Internationalism and the Burdens of
Judgment”

Commentator: Debra Satz (Stanford University)

VII-D. Invited Symposium: The Philosophy of Mary Astell*1:00-4:00 p.m.*

Chair: Lisa Shapiro (Simon Fraser University)

Speakers: Karen Detlefsen (University of Pennsylvania)
Eileen O'Neill (University of Massachusetts–Amherst)
Alice Sowaal (San Francisco State University)**VII-E. Invited Symposium: Thick and Thin Concepts***1:00-4:00 p.m.*

Chair: Jason Baehr (Loyola Marymount University)

Speakers: Heather Battaly (California State University–Fullerton)
“Intellectual Virtue Through Thick and Thin”Catherine Elgin (Harvard University)
“Reasons”Peter Goldie (University of Manchester)
“Thick Concepts and Emotions”

Commentator: Guy Axtell (University of Nevada–Reno)

VII-F. Colloquium: Epistemology*1:00-4:00 p.m.**1:00-2:00 p.m.*

Chair: Adam Swenson (California State University–Northridge)

Speaker: James Bednar (Vanderbilt University)
“Prudent Inquiry and Non-Evidential Considerations”

Commentator: Jeremy Fantl (University of Calgary)

2:00-3:00 p.m.

Chair: Bradley J. Rettler (Biola University)

Speaker: Torin Alter (University of Alabama–Tuscaloosa)
“Ignorance Is Not Enough: Why the Ignorance Hypothesis Fails to Undermine the Conceivability and Knowledge Arguments”

Commentator: Joseph Shieber (Lafayette College)

3:00-4:00 p.m.

Chair: Lewis Powell (University of Southern California)

Speaker: Joel Pust (University of Delaware)
“Sleeping Beauty, Conditionalization, and Knowledge De Praesenti”

Commentator: Susan Vineberg (Wayne State University)

VII-G. Colloquium: Identity and Subjectivity*1:00-4:00 p.m.**1:00-2:00 p.m.*

Chair: Travis Hreno (University of Akron)

Speaker: Lisa Damm (University of California–San Diego)
“The Metaphysics of Love”

Commentator: Richard Reilly (St. Bonaventure University)

2:00-3:00 p.m.

Chair: Cecilea Mun (Arizona State University)

Speaker: Joseph Neisser (Sam Houston State University)
“Can Narrative Provide an Account of Subjectivity?”

Commentator: Charles Wallis (California State University–Long Beach)

3:00-4:00 p.m.

Chair: Andrew Hsu (University of California–Los Angeles)

Speaker: Anthony Rudd (St. Olaf College)
“An Expressive Model of the Self”

Commentator: Thomas Bittner (Claremont McKenna College)

VII-H. Colloquium: Metaphysical Methods*1:00-4:00 p.m.**1:00-2:00 p.m.*

Chair: Karl Ameriks (University of Notre Dame)

Speaker: Robert A. Stecker (Central Michigan University)
“Epistemic Questions about the Ontology of Music”

Commentator: Julie C. Van Camp (California State University–Long Beach)

2:00-3:00 p.m.

Chair: Roger Florka (Ursinus College)

Speaker: Deborah J. Brown (University of Queensland)
“The Duck’s Leg: Descartes’s Distinction of Reason”

Commentator: Paul Hoffman (University of California–Riverside)

3:00-4:00 p.m.

Chair: Daniel Considine (University of Southern California)

Speaker: Paul Frederick Symington (University of San Francisco)
“Categories, Predication, and Metaphysics in Aquinas”

Commentator: Justin Skirry (Nebraska Wesleyan University)

VII-I. Colloquium: Phenomenal Consciousness*1:00-4:00 p.m.**1:00-2:00 p.m.*

Chair: Aaron Schiller (University of California–San Diego)

Speaker: Cara Spencer (Howard University)

“Indexical Knowledge and Phenomenal Knowledge”

Commentator: David Pitt (California State University–Los Angeles)

2:00-3:00 p.m.

Chair: Thomas C. Ryckman (Lawrence University)

Speaker: Kevin McCain (University of Rochester)

“Tye, Introspection, and Phantom Limbs”

Commentator: Daniel Z. Korman (University of Texas–Austin)

3:00-4:00 p.m.

Chair: Scott Hendricks (Clark University)

Speaker: Brian Fiala (University of Arizona)

“Materialism and the Psychology of Explanation”

Commentator: Brad Thompson (Southern Methodist University)

VII-J. Colloquium: Philosophy of Science*1:00-4:00 p.m.**1:00-2:00 p.m.*

Chair: Sharyn Clough (Oregon State University)

Speaker: K. Brad Wray (State University of New York–Oswego)

“The Argument from Underconsideration”

Commentator: Mark Newman (University of Minnesota–Duluth)

2:00-3:00 p.m.

Chair: Carolyn Brighthouse (Occidental College)

Speaker: Bradford Skow (University of Massachusetts–Amherst)

“Local and Global Relativity Principles”

Commentator: Christian Wüthrich (University of California–San Diego)

3:00-4:00 p.m.

Chair: Alexandre V. Korolev (University of British Columbia)

Speaker: S.H. Vollmer (University of Alabama–Birmingham)

“The Daltonian Atom: Defining a Theoretical Term”

Commentator: Eric Scerri (University of California–Los Angeles)

VII-K. Colloquium: The Existence and Nature of God*1:00-4:00 p.m.**1:00-2:00 p.m.*

Chair: Kenneth Faber (Vanderbilt University)

Speaker: Marcy Lascano (California State University–Long Beach)

“The Genesis of Emilie du Chatelet’s Cosmological Argument”

Commentator: David Cunning (University of Iowa)

2:00-3:00 p.m.

Chair: Charles Hughes (Chapman University)

Speaker: Andrei A. Buckareff (Marist College)

“The Ontology of Action and Divine Agency”

Commentator: James Taylor (Westmont College)

3:00-4:00 p.m.

Chair: Beata Bujalska (Tufts University)

Speaker: Jeffrey Alan Snapper (Northern Illinois University)

“God, Evil, and Closure”

Commentator: Klaas Kraay (Ryerson University)

VII-L. Special Session Arranged by the APA Committee on Lectures, Publications and Research*1:00-3:00 p.m.***Topic: Prometheus Prize Lecture**

Chair: Branden Fitelson

Speaker: Elliott Sober (University of Wisconsin–Madison)

“Evolution Without Metaphysics?”

Commentator: Denis Walsh (University of Toronto)

A reception hosted by Prometheus Press celebrating the Prometheus Prize Lecture will begin at the close of this program and continue until 4:30 p.m.

VII-M. Special Session Arranged by the APA Committee on the Teaching of Philosophy*1:00-4:00 p.m.***Topic: Teaching Philosophy Through Science Fiction**

Chair: Ryan Nichols (California State University–Fullerton)

Speakers: Amy Kind (Claremont McKenna College)

“From Vulcan to Caprica: Philosophy Amidst the Worlds of Science Fiction”

Michael Baumer (Cleveland State University)
 “Kepler’s Somnium, the Copernican Revolution, and
 Early Modern Philosophy”

Michael Huemer (University of Colorado–Boulder)
 “Moral and Political Issues in Science Fiction”

Richard Hanley (University of Delaware)
 “Teaching Time Travel”

Christopher Grau (Clemson University)
 “Using Science Fiction Film to Teach Personal
 Identity”

VII-N. Special Session Arranged by the Association for Symbolic Logic

1:00-4:00 p.m.

Invited Speakers Session: Foundational and Historical Perspectives on Logic and Mathematics

Chair: Gila Sher (University of California–San Diego)

1:00-2:00 p.m.

Speaker: Edward Zalta (Stanford University)
 “Reflections on Logical Foundations for Mathematics”

2:00-3:00 p.m.

Speaker: Geoffrey Hellman (University of Minnesota)
 “What Can We Expect of a Foundational Framework
 for Mathematics?”

3:00-4:00 p.m.

Speaker: Jamie Tappenden (University of Michigan)
 “Function, Thought, and Fruitfulness in Nineteenth
 Century Logic and Mathematics”

FRIDAY EARLY EVENING, MARCH 21

SESSION VIII — 4:00-6:00 P.M.

VIII-A. Invited Paper: Law and Consent

4:00-6:00 p.m.

Chair: Paul Hurley (Claremont McKenna College)

Speaker: Arthur Ripstein (University of Toronto)
 “Consent”

Commentators: Stephen Darwall (University of Michigan–Ann Arbor)
 Seana Shiffrin (University of California–Los Angeles)

VIII-B. Invited Symposium: Environmental Aesthetics*4:00-6:00 p.m.*

Chair: Donald Crawford (University of California–Santa Barbara)

Speakers: Glenn Parsons (Ryerson University)

“A Scientific Sort of Sublime”

Emily Brady (University of Edinburgh)

“The Sublime and Tragedy”

Commentator: John Fisher (University of Colorado–Boulder)

VIII-C. Invited Symposium: Epistemic Bootstrapping*4:00-6:00 p.m.*

Chair: Garrett Pendergraft (University of California–Riverside)

Speakers: James Van Cleve (University of Southern California)

Jonathan Vogel (Amherst College)

Commentator: Richard Fumerton (University of Iowa)

VIII-D. Invited Symposium: Shared Intention*4:00-6:00 p.m.*

Chair: Matthew Noah Smith (Yale University)

Speakers: Michael Bratman (Stanford University)

Margaret Gilbert (University of California–Irvine)

Commentator: Abraham Roth (Ohio State University)

VIII-E. Invited Symposium: The A Priori*4:00-6:00 p.m.*

Chair: Baron Reed (Northwestern University)

Speakers: Phil Hanson (Simon Fraser University)

“A Priori Methods and the Concrete World”

Albert Casullo (University of Nebraska–Lincoln)

“Analyzing A Priori Knowledge”

Commentators: Jonathan Adler (Brooklyn College/The Graduate Center–City University of New York)

Lisa Warenski (Union College)

VIII-F. Colloquium: Husserl*4:00-6:00 p.m.**4:00-5:00 p.m.*

Chair: S. West Gurley (University of South Florida)

Speaker: Andreas Elpidorou (Boston University)

“Chasing (Away) the Trace of Dogma: Reconsidering the Role of Presence Through Husserl’s Inner Time-Consciousness and Derrida’s Speech and Phenomena”

Commentator: Carlos Sanchez (San Jose State University)

5:00-6:00 p.m.

Chair: Christian Coseru (College of Charleston)

Speaker: John Kurth O'Connor (Fordham University)
 "An Unlikely Pedigree: Husserlian Influences on
 Ryle's Concern with Category Mistakes"

Commentator: Michael Strawser (University of Central Florida)

VIII-G. Colloquium: Issues in Evolutionary Theory

4:00-6:00 p.m.

4:00-5:00 p.m.

Chair: Rory Smead (University of California–Irvine)

Speaker: Armin Schulz (University of Wisconsin–Madison)
 "It Takes Two: Sexual Strategies and Game Theory"

Commentator: Karthik Panchanathan (University of California–Los Angeles)

5:00-6:00 p.m.

Chair: Jay Odenbaugh (Lewis and Clark College)

Speaker: Bence Nanay (Syracuse University)
 "Replication without Replicators: Rediscovering an
 Unfashionable Model of Selection"

Commentator: Christopher Pearson (Southern Illinois University–Edwardsville)

VIII-H. Colloquium: Modality

4:00-6:00 p.m.

4:00-5:00 p.m.

Chair: John Woods (University of Minnesota–Twin Cities)

Speaker: Allan Bäck (Kutztown University of Pennsylvania)
 "The Reality of Possible Worlds"

Commentator: Thomas Blackson (Arizona State University)

5:00-6:00 p.m.

Chair: Nathan Salmon (University of California–Santa Barbara)

Speaker: Michael William McGlone (University at Buffalo)
 "The Inadequacy of Lewis's Response to the
 Humphrey Objection"

Commentator: Teresa Robertson (University of Kansas)

VIII-I. Colloquium: Price Gouging

4:00-6:00 p.m.

4:00-5:00 p.m.

Chair: Theresa Chandler (California State University–Long Beach)

Speaker: Matt Zwolinski (University of San Diego)
 “The Ethics of Price Gouging”

Commentator: Waheed Hussain (University of Pennsylvania)

5:00-6:00 p.m.

Chair: Erin Chrisman (University of California–Irvine)

Speaker: Jeremy Snyder (Simon Fraser University)
 “What’s the Matter with Price Gouging?”

Commentator: Julian Lamont (University of Queensland)

VIII-J. Symposium: Perception

4:00-6:00 p.m.

Chair: Rebecca Copenhaver (Lewis and Clark College)

Speaker: Susanna Schellenberg (Australian National University)
 “Perceptual Content, Representations, and Relations”

Commentators: John Campbell (University of California–Berkeley)
 Terry Horgan (University of Arizona)

VIII-K. Colloquium: Terror and Torture

4:00-6:00 p.m.

4:00-5:00 p.m.

Chair: Wanda Teays (Mount St. Mary’s College)

Speaker: Steven Patterson (Marygrove College)
 “Torture, Necessity, and Moral Integrity”

Commentator: Mohammed Abed (University of Wisconsin–Madison)

5:00-6:00 p.m.

Chair: Nicholas Baiamonte (De Anza College)

Speaker: Stephen L. Nathanson (Northeastern University)
 “Rights Theories, Utilitarianism, and the Killing of
 Civilians”

Commentator: James L. Nelson (Michigan State University)

VIII-L. Special Session Arranged by the APA Committee on Philosophy and Computers

4:00-6:00 p.m.

Topic: Barwise Prize Lecture

Chair: Michael Byron (Kent State University)

Speaker: David Chalmers (Australian National University)

PRESIDENTIAL ADDRESS

6:30-7:30 p.m.

Introduction: Nancy Cartwright (London School of Economics)

Speaker: Nicholas D. Smith (Lewis and Clark College)
 “Modesty: A Contextual Account”

PRESIDENTIAL RECEPTION*7:30-9:00 p.m.***GROUP MEETINGS, 8:00-10:00 P.M.**

(See Group Meeting Program for details)

Association for Informal Logic and Critical Thinking, Session 1

Radical Philosophy Association, Session 1

Society for Asian and Comparative Philosophy, Session 2

GROUP MEETINGS, 8:00-11:00 P.M.

(See Group Meeting Program for details)

Association for Chinese Philosophers in America, Session 2

Hume Society

Karl Jaspers Society, Session 1

North American Kant Society, Session 2

North American Nietzsche Society

North American Society for Social Philosophy and the Society for
Philosophy and Public Affairs

Society for Empirical Ethics

Society for Philosophy in the Contemporary World, Session 2

Society for the Philosophic Study of the Contemporary Visual Arts

Society for the Study of Philosophy and the Martial Arts

SATURDAY, MARCH 22**BOOK DISPLAYS***8:00 a.m.-1:00 p.m.***PLACEMENT INFORMATION***8:30 a.m.-1:00 p.m.***PLACEMENT INTERVIEWING***8:30 a.m.-5:00 p.m.***REGISTRATION***8:30 a.m.-1:00 p.m.***RECEPTION IN HONOR OF JEFFRIE G. MURPHY (APA COMMITTEE ON
PHILOSOPHY AND LAW)***4:00-5:30 p.m.*

**RECEPTION TO WELCOME THE NEW JOURNAL *NEUROETHICS* (HOSTED BY
SPRINGER PUBLISHING)**

6:00-7:00 p.m.

SATURDAY MORNING, MARCH 22

SESSION IX — 9:00 A.M.-NOON

IX-A. Author-Meets-Critics: Michael Krausz, *Interpretation and Transformation: Explorations in Art and the Self*

9:00 a.m.-Noon

Chair: Patricia Hanna (University of Utah)

Critics: John Gibson (University of Louisville)

Andreea Ritivoi (Carnegie Mellon University)

Crispin Sartwell (Dickinson College)

Author: Michael Krausz (Bryn Mawr College)

IX-B. Author-Meets-Critics: Michael Gill, *The British Moralists on Human Nature and the Birth of Secular Ethics*

9:00 a.m.-Noon

Chair: Aaron Garrett (Boston University)

Critics: Donald Ainslie (University of Toronto)

Rachel Cohon (State University of New York–Albany)

Jerome Schneewind (Johns Hopkins University)

Author: Michael Gill (University of Arizona)

IX-C. Colloquium: A Priori

9:00 a.m.-Noon

9:00-10:00 a.m.

Chair: Jacquelyn Ann K. Kegley (California State University–Bakersfield)

Speaker: Nathaniel Goldberg (Ohio University)

“Historicism, Informalism, and the Constitutive-Empirical Distinction”

Commentator: Gerald D. Doppelt (University of California–San Diego)

10:00-11:00 a.m.

Chair: Matthew Davidson (California State University–San Bernardino)

Speaker: Jeff Speaks (University of Notre Dame)

“Epistemic Two-dimensionalism and the Epistemic Argument”

Commentator: Ali Kazmi (University of Calgary)

11:00 a.m.-Noon

Chair: Nikolaj Jang Pedersen (University of California–Los Angeles)

Speaker: Yuval Avnur (New York University)
“Hawthorne on the Deeply Contingent A Priori”

Commentator: John Collins (East Carolina University)

IX-D. Colloquium: Belief, Hope, and Passions

9:00 a.m.-Noon

9:00-10:00 a.m.

Chair: James Royse (San Francisco State University)

Speaker: Thomas Olshewsky (University of Kentucky)
“The Irony of the Double Impulse”

Commentator: Angela Coventry (Portland State University)

10:00-11:00 a.m.

Chair: Henry West (Macalester College)

Speaker: David Hunter (Ryerson University)
“Belief, Alienation, and Intention”

Commentator: Bennett Barr (University of Washington)

11:00 a.m.-Noon

Chair: Julie Tannenbaum (California State University–Northridge)

Speaker: Adrienne Martin (University of Pennsylvania)
“Hope, Fantasy, and Motivation”

Commentator: Cheshire Calhoun (Arizona State University)

IX-E. Colloquium: Causation

9:00 a.m.-Noon

9:00-10:00 a.m.

Chair: Asta Sveinsdottir (San Francisco State University)

Speaker: L.A. Paul (University of Arizona)
“Understanding Trumping”

Commentator: Eric Hiddleston (Wayne State University)

10:00-11:00 a.m.

Chair: Sara Bernstein (University of Arizona)

Speaker: Christopher Kane (Tulane University of New Orleans)
“On the Supposed Advantage of Individualism about Overdetermination”

Commentator: Tarun Menon (University of California–San Diego)

11:00 a.m.-Noon

Chair: Nancy Cartwright (London School of Economics/
University of California–San Diego)

Speaker: Jonathan Matheson (University of Rochester)
“Fragile Events and the Causal Relation”

Commentator: Andrew Cullison (State University of New York–
Fredonia)

IX-F. Colloquium: Goods

9:00 a.m.-Noon

9:00-10:00 a.m.

Chair: Todd Gullion (San Francisco State University)

Speaker: Jussi Suikkanen (University of Reading)
“Expressivism Is Subjectivist After All”

Commentator: Patrick Fleming (James Madison University)

10:00-11:00 a.m.

Chair: Michael Green (Pomona College)

Speaker: Rebecca Lynn Stangl (University of Virginia)
“The Greatness of Virtue and Its Implications for
Action”

Commentator: Dan Farnham (University of Georgia)

11:00 a.m.-Noon

Chair: Matthew Brown (University of California–San Diego)

Speaker: H.E. Baber (University of San Diego)
“Life-Adjustment and Life-Improvement”

Commentator: Allen Thompson (Clemson University)

IX-G. Colloquium: Justice

9:00 a.m.-Noon

9:00-10:00 a.m.

Chair: Richard Amesbury (Claremont Graduate University)

Speaker: Joseph Quinton Adams (Georgia State University)
“The Inconsistency of Morally Required
Diminishment”

Commentator: Michael Cholbi (California State Polytechnic
University–Pomona)

10:00-11:00 a.m.

Chair: David Theo Goldberg (University of California–Irvine)

Speaker: Lucy Allais (University of the Witwatersrand)
“Restorative Justice, Retributive Justice, and the South
African Truth and Reconciliation Commission”

Commentator: Simon Keller (Boston University)

11:00 a.m.-Noon

Chair: David DeMoss (Pacific University)

Speaker: Benjamin Vilhauer (William Paterson University)
 “Free Will and Reasonable Doubt”

Commentator: Joshua Spencer (University of Rochester)

IX-H. Colloquium: Knowledge: Closure, Evidentialism, Dogmatism

9:00 a.m.-Noon

9:00-10:00 a.m.

Chair: Peter Amato (Drexel University)

Speaker: Stephen Wykstra (Calvin College)
 “Cornea, Closure, and Contextualism: Of Flat Planets,
 Painted Donkeys, and the By/On Distinction”

Commentator: Josh Bright (University of California–Riverside)

10:00-11:00 a.m.

Chair: James Beebe (State University at Buffalo)

Speaker: David Jehle (Cornell University)
 “Epistemic Closure and Bayesian Evidentialism”

Commentator: Roger White (Massachusetts Institute of Technology)

11:00 a.m.-Noon

Chair: Dominic McIver Lopes (University of British
 Columbia)

Speaker: Peter Kung (Pomona College)
 “On Having No Reason: Dogmatism and Bayesian
 Confirmation”

Commentator: Matthew Kotzen (New York University)

IX-I. Colloquium: Philosophy of Language

9:00 a.m.-Noon

9:00-10:00 a.m.

Chair: Sam Cumming (University of California–Los Angeles)

Speaker: Hanna Kim (Washington and Jefferson College)
 “Context, Compositionality, and Metaphor”

Commentator: Marga Reimer (University of Arizona)

10:00-11:00 a.m.

Chair: Adam Sennet (University of California–Davis)

Speaker: Richard Brown (City University of New York–
 LaGuardia College)

“Language, Thought, Logic, and Existence”

Commentator: Imogen Dickie (University of Toronto)

11:00 a.m.-Noon

Chair: Xianduan Shi (University of Utah)

Speaker: Nellie Wieland (California State University–Long Beach)

“Hearing the ‘Voice of Competence’”

Commentator: Douglas Cannon (University of Puget Sound)

IX-J. Colloquium: States and Citizens

9:00 a.m.-Noon

9:00-10:00 a.m.

Chair: Malek Khazaee (California State University–Long Beach)

Speaker: Victoria Costa (Florida State University)

“State Domination and the Problem of Indeterminacy”

Commentator: Adam Moore (University of Washington)

10:00-11:00 a.m.

Chair: Richard Arneson (University of California–San Diego)

Speaker: Edward H.K. Song (Louisiana State University)

“Legitimacy as Affirmation”

Commentator: Bruce Landesman (University of Utah)

11:00 a.m.-Noon

Chair: Doran Smolkin (Kwantlen University College)

Speaker: Alan Tomhave (University of Missouri–Columbia)

“Does a Monopoly on Force a State Make? Is it Necessary?”

Commentator: Fritz Allhoff (Western Michigan University)

IX-K. Special Session Arranged by the APA Committee on Hispanics

9:00 a.m.-Noon

Topic: Pyrrhonism in Latin America

Speakers: Robert Fogelin (Dartmouth College)

“Inapprehensibility”

Otávio Bueno (University of Miami)

“Pyrrhonism: Old and New”

Michael Williams (Johns Hopkins University)

“Two Forms of Skepticism”

IX-L. Special Session Arranged by the APA Committee on International Cooperation

9:00 a.m.-Noon

Topic: Artificial Intelligence: East to West

Chair: Hubert Dreyfus (University of California–Berkeley)

Speakers: Michael Wheeler (University of Stirling)

“Context and Artificial Intelligence, or Why the Frame Problem Hasn’t Gone Away (Yet)”

Shunsuke Kadowaki (University of Tokyo)

“Ontology and Technology of the Invisible”

Daniel Andler (Université de Paris and Institut Universitaire de France)

“The Return of the Grand AI”

Commentator: Hubert Dreyfus (University of California–Berkeley)

IX-M. Special Session Arranged by the APA Committee on the Status of American Indians in Philosophy

9:00 a.m.-Noon

Topic: Author-Meets-Readers: Dale Turner, *This Is Not a Peace Pipe: Towards a Critical Indigenous Philosophy*

Chair: Thomas M. Norton-Smith (Kent State University–Stark)

Speaker: Dale Turner (Dartmouth College)

Commentators: Adam Arola (University of Oregon)

Brian Yazzie Burkhart (Pitzer College)

Shawn Burns (Stanford University)

Gordon Christie (University of British Columbia)

IX-N. Special Session Arranged by the APA Committee on the Status of Women, the Society for Analytic Feminism and the Association for Feminist Ethics and Social Theory

9:00 a.m.-Noon

Topic: Feminist Perspectives on Vice

Chair: Robin S. Dillon (Lehigh University)

Speakers: Nancy E. Snow (Marquette University)

“Is Humility a Feminist Virtue or Vice?”

Lisa Tessman (State University of New York–Binghamton)

“Moral Disrepair”

Anita Superson (University of Kentucky)

“Privilege and Forgiveness”

Robin S. Dillon (Lehigh University)

“Towards a Feminist Perspective on Vice”

IX-O. Mini-conference on Spinoza's Psychology*7:30-11:30 a.m.**7:30-8:30 a.m.* Continental Breakfast*8:30-11:30 a.m.* **Session 1-Spinoza's Psychology***8:30-9:30 a.m.*

Chair: Paul Hoffman (University of California–Riverside)

Speaker: Michael LeBuffe (Texas A&M University)

"Projectivism in the Ethics: 3p9s and 3p39s"

Commentator: Matt Kisner (University of South Carolina)

9:30-10:30 a.m.

Chair: John Carriero (University of California–Los Angeles)

Speaker: Michael Della Rocca (Yale University)

Commentator: Martin Lin (Rutgers University)

10:30-11:30 a.m.

Chair: Nick Jolley (University of California–Irvine)

Speaker: Don Garrett (New York University)

"Representation and Misrepresentation in Spinoza's Psychology"

Commentator: Charlie Huenemann (Utah State University)

SATURDAY AFTERNOON, MARCH 22**SESSION X — 1:00-4:00 P.M.****X-A. Author-Meets-Critics: Tim Maudlin, *The Metaphysics Within Physics****1:00-4:00 p.m.*

Chair: Craig Callender (University of California–San Diego)

Critics: Jeffrey Barrett (University of California–Irvine)

Richard Healey (University of Arizona)

Christopher Hitchcock (California Institute of Technology)

Author: Tim Maudlin (Rutgers University)

X-B. Invited Symposium: Nietzsche on Autonomy and Freedom of the Will*1:00-4:00 p.m.*

Chair: Mark Wrathall (University of California–Riverside)

Speakers: Ken Gemes (University of Southampton)

Peter Poellner (Warwick University)

Bernard Reginster (Brown University)

Commentator: Brian Leiter (University of Texas–Austin)

X-C. Invited Symposium: Self-Reference and Self-Thought*1:00-4:00 p.m.*

Chair: Robin Jeshion (University of California–Riverside)

Speakers: Manuel Garcia-Carpintero (LOGOS Barcelona)
John Perry (Stanford University)
Francois Recanati (École Normale Supérieure)**X-D. Invited Symposium: Women and Islam***1:00-4:00 p.m.*

Chair: Jennifer Warriner (University of Utah)

Speakers: Raja Bahlul (United Arab Emirates University)
“Segregation as Collective Veiling”Ann Scholl (United Arab Emirates University)
“Feminism and Gender Segregated Classrooms”Afaf Bataineh (American University of Kuwait)
“Gender Segregation, Islamic Tradition and Politics in Kuwait”Juliet Dinkha (American University of Kuwait)
“Psychological Effects of Gender Segregation”**X-E. Invited Symposium: Xenophon’s Socrates***1:00-4:00 p.m.*

Chair: Anthony A. Long (University of California–Berkeley)

Speakers: Louis-André Dorion (Université de Montréal)
David O’Connor (University of Notre Dame)Commentators: David Johnson (Southern Illinois University–Carbondale)
Donald Morrison (Rice University)**X-F. Colloquium: Frankfurt Cases***1:00-4:00 p.m.**1:00-2:00 p.m.*

Chair: Kenneth Lucey (University of Nevada–Reno)

Speaker: Roger Clarke (University of British Columbia)
“How to Manipulate an Incompatibilistically Free Agent”

Commentator: Todd R. Long (California Polytechnic State University–San Luis Obispo)

2:00-3:00 p.m.

Chair: Neal A. Tognazzini (University of California–Riverside)

Speaker: David Palmer (University of Texas–Austin)
“Pereboom on the Frankfurt Cases”

Commentator: Daniel Speak (Loyola Marymount University)

3:00-4:00 p.m.

Chair: Justin Coates (University of California–Riverside)

Speaker: Charles Hermes (University of Texas–Arlington)
“Counterfactual Reasoning in Frankfurt Cases”

Commentator: David Robb (Davidson College)

X-G. Colloquium: Justification

1:00-4:00 p.m.

1:00-2:00 p.m.

Chair: Hollibert Phillips (Whitman College)

Speaker: Ted Poston (University of South Alabama)
“Similarity and Acquaintance: A Dilemma”

Commentator: Evan Fales (University of Iowa)

2:00-3:00 p.m.

Chair: Brian Glenney (University of Southern California)

Speaker: Michael Pace (Chapman University)
“The Problem of the Speckled Hen and Acquaintance”

Commentator: Derek Brown (Brandon University)

3:00-4:00 p.m.

Chair: Bruce Hunter (University of Alberta)

Speaker: Aaron Rizzieri (Arizona State University)
“Timothy Williamson on Knowledge and Evidence: A Critique”

Commentator: E.J. Coffman (University of Tennessee)

X-H. Colloquium: Kant

1:00-4:00 p.m.

1:00-2:00 p.m.

Chair: William Peck (Reed College)

Speaker: Lara Ostaric (St. Michael’s College)
“Reflective Judgment’s Principle of Nature’s Purposiveness and Its ‘Subjective’ and ‘Merely Subjective’ Applications”

Commentator: Allan Casebier (University of Miami)

2:00-3:00 p.m.

Chair: Paul Pistone (Talbot School of Theology)

Speaker: Jeanine Grenberg (St. Olaf College)
“The Value of Feeling-Centered, First Personal Phenomenological Experiences in Kant’s Practical Philosophy”

Commentator: Aaron Bunch (Washington State University)

3:00-4:00 p.m.

Chair: J. Jeremy Wisnewski (Hartwick College)

Speaker: Tamra Frei (Michigan State University)

“Kant and the Principle of Instrumental Rationality: Is There More Than One Categorical Imperative?”

Commentator: Claus Dierksmeier (Stonehill College)

X-I. Colloquium: Metaphysics

1:00-4:00 p.m.

1:00-2:00 p.m.

Chair: Gemma Celestino (University of British Columbia)

Speaker: Noa Latham (University of Calgary)

“Fundamental Laws and Properties”

Commentator: Robert Rupert (University of Colorado–Boulder)

2:00-3:00 p.m.

Chair: Kristana Arp (Long Island University)

Speaker: Patrick Toner (Wake Forest University)

“Many Monisms?”

Commentator: Dana Lynne Goswick (University of California–Davis)

3:00-4:00 p.m.

Chair: Angie Harris (University of Utah)

Speakers: Ben Caplan (Ohio State University) and David Sanson (Ohio State University)

“Locality and Necessity”

Commentator: Chris Tennberg (University of California–Santa Barbara)

X-J. Colloquium: Philosophy of Mind

1:00-4:00 p.m.

1:00-2:00 p.m.

Chair: Kirk Ludwig (University of Florida)

Speaker: Jared G. Bates (Hanover College)

“A Problem with Kim’s Qualia-epiphenomenalism”

Commentator: Robert Howell (Southern Methodist University)

2:00-3:00 p.m.

Chair: Bernard W. Kobes (Arizona State University)

Speaker: JeeLoo Liu (California State University–Fullerton)

“From Realizer Functionalism to Nonreductive Physicalism”

Commentator: Janet Levin (University of Southern California)

3:00-4:00 p.m.

Chair: Jessica Pepp (University of California–Los Angeles)

Speaker: Thomas Bontly (University of Connecticut)
 “Psychological Explanation without Mental Quasation”

Commentator: Bradley Weslake (University of Rochester)

X-K. Special Session Arranged by the APA Committee on Philosophy and Law

1:00-4:00 p.m.

Topic: The Work of Jeffrie G. Murphy

Chair: Judith Wagner DeCew (Clark University)

Speakers: Jeffrie G. Murphy (College of Law, Arizona State University)

Jerome Neu (University of California–Santa Cruz)

Carol Steiker (Harvard University)

Benjamin Zipursky (Fordham University)

RECEPTION IN HONOR OF JEFFRIE G. MURPHY

4:00-5:30 p.m.

X-L. Mini-conference on Spinoza’s Psychology

Session 2 – Psychology and Politics

1:00-4:00 p.m.

1:00-2:00 p.m.

Chair: Ursula Goldenbaum (Emory University/Institute for Advanced Study, Princeton)

Speaker: Tammy Nyden-Bullock (Grinnell College)
 “Spinoza’s Politics of Passion”

Commentator: Donald Rutherford (University of California–San Diego)

2:00-3:00 p.m.

Chair: Edwin Curley (University of Michigan)

Speaker: Michael Rosenthal (University of Washington)
 “Wonder, Miracles and Politics”

Commentator: Tom Cook (Rollins College)

3:00-4:00 p.m.

Chair: Ron Sandler (Northeastern University)

Speaker: Eugene Marshall (Dartmouth College)
 “Harmony and Discord in Spinoza’s Social Model of the Mind”

Commentator: Minna Koivuniemi (Uppsala Universitet)

SATURDAY EARLY EVENING, MARCH 22
SESSION XI — 4:00-6:00 P.M.**XI-A. Author-Meets-Critics: James Nickel, *Making Sense of Human Rights****4:00-6:00 p.m.*

Chair: Lori Gruen (Wesleyan University)

Critics: Carol C. Gould (Temple University)

Cindy Holder (University of Victoria)

Aaron James (University of California–Irvine)

Author: James Nickel (Arizona State University)

XI-B. Author-Meets-Critics: Jonathan Lear, *Radical Hope: Ethics in the Face of Cultural Devastation**4:00-6:00 p.m.*

Chair: Anatole Anton (San Francisco State University)

Critics: Hubert Dreyfus (University of California–Berkeley)

Nancy Sherman (Georgetown University)

Author: Jonathan Lear (University of Chicago)

XI-C. Author-Meets-Critics: Penelope Maddy, *Second Philosophy: A Naturalistic Method**4:00-6:00 p.m.*

Chair: David Malament (University of California–Irvine)

Critics: Barry Stroud (University of California–Berkeley)

Mark Wilson (University of Pittsburgh)

Author: Penelope Maddy (University of California–Irvine)

XI-D. Author-Meets-Critics: Peter Kivy, *The Performance of Reading**4:00-6:00 p.m.*

Chair: James Shelley (Auburn University)

Critics: Stein Haugom Olsen (Universitetet i Bergen)

Anna Christina Ribeiro (Texas Tech University)

Author: Peter Kivy (Rutgers University)

XI-E. Invited Paper: Imagination*4:00-6:00 p.m.*

Chair: Amy Schmitter (University of Alberta)

Speaker: Amélie Rorty (National Humanities Center)

“Ambivalence and Imaginative Practical Reason”

Commentators: Jennifer Church (Vassar College)

Ronald De Sousa (University of Toronto)

XI-F. Invited Symposium: Moral Cognition and the Sciences of the Mind

4:00-6:00 p.m.

Chair: Neil Levy (University of Melbourne)

Speakers: Jeanette Kennett (Australian National University)

S. Matthew Liao (Oxford University)

Adina Roskies (Dartmouth College and University of Sydney)

A reception hosted by Springer to welcome the new journal *Neuroethics*, edited by Neil Levy, will follow this session.

6:00-7:00 p.m.

XI-G. Invited Symposium: New Directions in Classical Liberal Political Theory

4:00-6:00 p.m.

Chair: Ken Rogerson (Florida International University)

Speakers: Jerry Gaus (University of Arizona)

David Schmitz (University of Arizona)

Commentator: Peter Vallentyne (University of Missouri–Columbia)

XI-H. Invited Symposium: Plato and the Good Life

4:00-6:00 p.m.

Chair: Mary Amschel (University of California–Riverside)

Speakers: Thomas Tuozzo (University of Kansas)

“Why Is Thinking about Pleasure Pleasant? Non-restorative Pleasures in Plato’s *Philebus*”

Richard Patterson (Emory University)

“Why Lead A Good Life? Myth, Argument, and the Answer of *Laws X*”

Commentators: Toby De Marco (Bergen Community College)

Cathal Woods (Virginia Wesleyan College)

XI-I. Symposium: Normative Inquiry

4:00-6:00 p.m.

Chair: Masahiro Yamada (Claremont Graduate University)

Speaker: David Glenn Tester (Oxford University)

“A Neglected Role for Descriptive Premises in Normative Inquiry”

Commentators: Matthew Bedke (University of Arizona)

Dale Dorsey (University of Alberta)

XI-J. Special Session Arranged by the APA Committee on the Status of American Indians in Philosophy

4:00-6:00 p.m.

Topic: Author-Meets-Readers: Lorraine Mayer, *Cries from a Metis Heart*

Chair: Thomas M. Norton-Smith (Kent State University–Stark)

Speaker: Lorraine Mayer (Brandon University)

Commentators: Lee Hester (University of Science and Arts of Oklahoma)

Scott L. Pratt (University of Oregon)

Sandra Tomsons (University of Winnipeg)

GROUP MEETINGS, 6:30-8:30 P.M.

(See Group Meeting Program for details)

Association for Informal Logic and Critical Thinking, Session 2

Society for Philosophy and Public Affairs

Society for the Advancement of American Philosophy, Graduate Student Section

Society for Women in Philosophy

Society of Christian Philosophers

GROUP MEETINGS, 6:30-9:30 P.M.

(See Group Meeting Program for details)

Ayn Rand Society

International Hobbes Association, Session 2

International Society for Comparative Studies of Chinese and Western Philosophy

International Society for Environmental Ethics, Session 2

Karl Jaspers Society, Session 2

Radical Philosophy Association, Session 2

Society for Arab, Persian, and Islamic Philosophy

Society for the Philosophy of History, Session 3

Western Phenomenology Conference

GROUP MEETINGS, 8:30-10:30 P.M.

(See Group Meeting Program for details)

Society for Student Philosophers, Session 2

Society for the Philosophical Study of Marxism

SUNDAY, MARCH 23**SUNDAY MORNING, MARCH 23****SESSION XII — 8:00 A.M.-NOON****XII-A. Mini-conference on Spinoza's Psychology, Session 3**

8:00 a.m.-Noon

8:00-9:00 a.m.

Breakfast for mini-conference participants.

9:00 a.m.-Noon

Roundtable Discussion

Moderators: Eugene Marshall (Dartmouth College)
Donald Rutherford (University of California–San Diego)

GROUP PROGRAM

WEDNESDAY EVENING, MARCH 19

GROUP SESSION GI — 6:30-8:30 P.M.

GI-A. American Association of Philosophy Teachers

6:30-8:30 p.m.

Topic: Non-traditional Assessment in Philosophy Courses

Chair: Betsy Decyk (California State University–Long Beach)

Speakers: Stephen Finn (Seattle University)

“Embedding a University Writing Assessment in a
Philosophy Course”

Mason Cole (Texas A&M University)

Debby Hutchins (Gonzaga University)

“Learning by Constructing: Logic Art as Pedagogy”

Paul Green (Mount St. Mary’s College)

“The GRASPS Task: A Temple for Performance Tasks”

GI-B. Concerned Philosophers for Peace

6:30-8:30 p.m.

Topic: Remembrance and Reconciliation

Speakers: Jean-Marie Makang (Frostburg State University)

“Justice, Community, and Hope in Martin Luther King’s
Nonviolent Struggle”

Ron Hirschbein (Walden University)

“Those Who Can’t Forget the Past Are Condemned to
Repeat It”

Lee Walker (California State University–Chico)

“To Forget Is to Make Peace”

GI-C. Josiah Royce Society

6:30-8:30 p.m.

Topic: Josiah Royce and the Origins of Modern Logic

Chair: Jacquelyn Ann K. Kegley (California State University–
Bakersfield)

Speakers: Scott L. Pratt (University of Oregon)

“On the Politics of Disjunction”

J. Brent Crouch (San Diego City College)
 “Royce and the Origins of Logicism”

Commentator: Robert Burch (Texas A&M University)

GI-D. Society for Analytical Feminism

6:30-8:30 p.m.

Topic: The End of Feminist Aesthetics

Speakers: Karen Hanson (Indiana University)
 Jennifer Ingle (Frostburg State University)
 Joanne Waugh (University of South Florida)

GI-E. Society for Asian and Comparative Philosophy, Session 1

6:30-8:30 p.m.

Chair: Ann Pang-White (University of Scranton)
 Speakers: Ann Pang-White (University of Scranton)
 “How to Be Like the Woodcarver Ching: A Daoist
 Solution to a Kantian Environmental Dilemma”
 Lara Mitias (University of Hawaii–Manoa)
 “Lao-tzu’s Logic: Marking the Patterns of Dao”
 Myeong-seok Kim (University of Michigan–Ann Arbor)
 “Is There No Distinction between Reason and
 Emotion in Mengzi?”

GI-F. Society for the Study of Process Philosophy

6:30-8:30 p.m.

**Topic: Process Thought and the New Atheism (Harris,
 Dawkins, Dennett, Hitchens)**

Speakers: John Quiring (Victor Valley College)
 Randy Ramal (Claremont Graduate University)
 Adam Scarfe (California State University–Bakersfield)
 Donald Viney (Pittsburg State University)

GROUP SESSION GII — 6:30-9:30 P.M.

**GII-A. American Society for Philosophy, Counseling, and
 Psychotherapy, Session 1**

6:30-9:30 p.m.

Topic: Models of Philosophical Practice

Chair: Jim Tuedio (California State University–Stanislaus)
 Speakers: Greg Tropea (California State University–Chico)
 “Justifiable Faith”
 Finn Thorbjørn Hansen (University of Aarhus)
 “Philosophical Counselling as a Spiritual Exercise
 in Being Present: A Kierkegaardian View on the

Difference between the Therapeutic Relation and the Wonder Relation”

Ora Gruengard (Shenkar College of Engineering and Design)

“The Contrinution of the Philosopher’s Ignorance to Philosophical Counseling”

George T. Hole (Buffalo State College)

“The Logic of Logical Disputation in REBT”

GII-B. Association for Chinese Philosophers in America, Session 1

6:30-9:30 p.m.

Topic: Language and Logic in Chinese Philosophy

Chair: Weimin Sun (California State University–Northridge)

Speaker: Manyul Im (Fairfield University)

“Term-Guidance, Disputation (bian), and Normative Categorization in Early China”

Commentator: Xiaomei Yang (Southern Connecticut State University)

Speaker: Jung-Yeup Kim (University of Hawaii–Manoa)

“An Investigation of Difference and Continuity in Zhang Zai’s Understanding of Qi”

Commentator: Robin Wang (Loyola Marymount University)

Speaker: Weimin Sun (California State University–Northridge)

“Deductive Logic, Theoretical Sciences, and Chinese Sciences”

Commentator: Zijiang Ding (California State Polytechnic University–Pomona)

GII-C. North American Wittgenstein Society

6:30-9:30 p.m.

Chair: Jeff Johnson (The College of St. Catherine)

Speaker: Janette Dinishak (University of Toronto)

“The Place of the Concept ‘Noticing and Aspect’”

Commentator: Joshua Kortbein (University of Minnesota)

Speaker: Kevin Cahill (University of Bergen)

“Wittgenstein and the Fate of Metaphysics”

Commentator: John Woods (Princeton University)

Speaker: Newton Garver (State University of New York–Buffalo)

“Grammar and Silence”

Commentator: John Powell (Humboldt State University)

GII-D. Society for German Idealism, Session 1*6:30-9:30 p.m.*

- Chair: J.M. Fritzman (Lewis and Clark College)
 Speaker: G. Anthony Bruno (Washington State University)
 “Post-Kantian Responses to the Transcendental Story”
 Commentator: Aaron Bunch (Washington State University)
 Speaker: Timothy Brownlee (Xavier University)
 “Conscience and Religion in Hegel’s Mature Political Thought”
 Commentator: Marcos Bisticas-Cocoves (Morgan State University)
 Speaker: Waheed Hussain (University of Pennsylvania)
 “Hegel’s Theory of Political Representation”
 Commentator: David Duquette (St. Norbert College)

GII-E. Society for the Advancement of American Philosophy*6:30-9:30 p.m.***Topic: Author-Meets-Critics: Robert Talisse, *A Pragmatist Philosophy of Democracy***

- Chair: Brendan Hogan (Pacific Lutheran University)
 Author: Robert Talisse (Vanderbilt University)
 Critics: Rosa Mayorga (Virginia Tech)
 Melvin Rogers (University of Virginia)
 Mark Van Hollebeke (Seattle University)

GII-F. Society for the Philosophy of History, Session 1*6:30-9:30 p.m.***Topic: Contextualism and Intellectual History**

- Chair: Kirstie McClure (University of California–Los Angeles)
 Speakers: Robert Lamb (University of Exeter)
 “Recent Developments in the Thought of Quentin Skinner”
 Al Martinich (University of Texas–Austin)
 “Skinner on Meaning and Understanding”
 Mark Bevir (University of California–Berkeley)
 “The Contextualist Approach: Past, Present, and Future”
 Commentator: Kinch Hoekstra (University of California–Berkeley)

GII-G. Society of Indian Philosophy and Religion*6:30-9:30 p.m.***Topic: Induction and Hypothesis: East and West**

- Chair: Chandana Chakrabarti (Bethany College of West Virginia)

- Speakers: Chandana Chakrabarti (Bethany College of West Virginia)
 “Abduction, Hypothesis, and Arthapatti”
 Horace B. Fairlamb (University of Houston)
 “Evolutionary Hypotheses: An East-West Convergence”
 Craig Matarrese (Minnesota State University–Mankato)
 “Explanation and Hypothesis in Hegel’s Philosophy of Nature”
 Gordon Haist (University of South Carolina–Beaufort)
 “Induction and the Presumption of Ignorance”
 Kisor K. Chakrabarti (Bethany College of West Virginia)
 “Revisiting the Grue”

THURSDAY EVENING, MARCH 20

GROUP SESSION GIII — 6:30-8:30 P.M.

GIII-A. American Society for Aesthetics

6:30-8:30 p.m.

Chair: Christopher Williams (University of Nevada–Reno)

- Speakers: James Shelley (Auburn University)
 “Hume and the Value of the Beautiful”
 Emily Brady (University of Edinburgh)
 “Ugliness and Nature”

Commentator: Joshua Johnston (University of British Columbia)

GIII-B. International Society for Environmental Ethics, Session 1

6:30-8:30 p.m.

Topic: The Interface between Environmental Ethics and Bioethics

Chair: Geoffrey Frasz (College of Southern Nevada)

- Speakers: Dale Jamieson (New York University)
 “Broadening Bioethics”
 William Ruddick (New York University)
 “Can Anything Be Red and Green All Over? Can Medical and Environmental Ethicists Find Happiness Together?”
 Ramona Ilea (Pacific University)
 “The Relationship between Poverty, Health, and Environmental Problems and the Spread of Factory Farms to Developing Countries”

GIII-C. Society for Lesbian and Gay Philosophy and the APA Committee on the Status of Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and Transgendered People in the Profession

6:30-8:30 p.m.

Chair: James Stramel (Santa Monica College)

Speakers: James A. Martell (Colorado State University)
"Kant, Dignity, and Homosexuality"

Carol Quinn (Metropolitan State College of Denver)
"Mill, Dignity, and Homosexuality"

Commentator: Sean McAleer (University of Wisconsin–Eau Claire)

GIII-D. Society for Phenomenology and Analytic Philosophy

6:30-8:30 p.m.

Topic: Language and Constitution

Chair: David Woodruff Smith (University of California–Irvine)

Speakers: Dagfinn Føllesdal (Stanford University)
Martin Schwab (University of California–Irvine)

GIII-E. Society for Skeptical Studies

6:30-8:30 p.m.

Chair: Rachel Robison (University of Massachusetts–Amherst)

Speakers: James R. Beebe (University at Buffalo)
"Skeptical Challenges"

Joe Ulatowski (Weber State University)
"Skeptical Vertigo"

Otávio Bueno (University of Miami)
"Skepticism, Externalism, and Dreams"

Richard Greene (Weber State University)
"Variantism and Skepticism"

GIII-F. Society for Student Philosophers, Session 1

6:30-8:30 p.m.

Topic: Topics in Mind and Language

Chair: Beata Bujalska (Tufts University)

Speakers: Ryan Pflum (Western Michigan University)
"Butler's Account of Self-Deception and Some Problems it Poses for Motivationism"

Erik Sorem (University College, Dublin)
"Conceiving the Irreducibility of Consciousness from Longergan's Metaphysical Perspective"

- Beata Bujalska (Tufts University)
 “Mindreading and Autism: An Argument for the
 Scientific Theory Theory”
- Michael Martin (Ohio State University)
 “The Method to Wittgenstein’s Madness in the
Tractatus”

GROUP SESSION GIV — 6:30-9:30 P.M.

**GIV-A. American Society for Philosophy, Counseling, and
 Psychotherapy, Session 2**

6:30-9:30 p.m.

Topic: Philosophical Applications (Case Studies)

- Chair: Jim Tuedio (California State University–Stanislaus)
- Speakers: Regina L. Uliana (Independent Scholar)
 “Philosophical Midwifery as a Way to Understand
 Fantasies in Adolescent Sex Offenders”
- Megan Laverty (Columbia University)
 “Reciprocal Recognition as a Basis for Promoting
 Tolerance in Children”
- Maria daVenza Tillmans and Wilfredo daVenza
 Crespo (University of California–San Diego), and
 Drew Leder (Loyola College of Maryland)
 “Socratic Dialogue with Inmates”
- J. Michael Russell (California State University–
 Fullerton)
 “Techniques for Improving the Philosophical Yield of
 Philosophical Practice”

GIV-B. International Hobbes Association, Session 1

6:30-9:30 p.m.

- Chair: Martin A. Bertman (Independent Scholar)
- Speaker: Bernard Gert (Dartmouth College)
 “Hobbes’s Moral Theory”
- Commentator: Don Habibi (University of North Carolina–
 Wilmington)
- Speakers: Timo Airaksinen (University of Helsinki)
 “Kant on Hobbes’s Politics”
- Daniel Eggers (RWTH Aachen University)
 “Liberty and Contractual Obligation in Hobbes”
- Matt James (Washington University in St. Louis)
 “The Obligations of a Leviathan”

GIV-C. International Society for Chinese Philosophy and Association of Chinese Philosophers in America

6:30-9:30 p.m.

Topic: New Work by Philosophers from Hong Kong on Confucian Ethics

- Chair: JeeLoo Liu (California State University–Fullerton)
 Speaker: Yiu-Ming Fung (University of Hong Kong)
 “Disposition or Imposition? Some Remarks on Fingarette’s Interpretation of the *Analects*”
 Commentator: Chan Lee (University of Hawaii–Manoa)
 Speaker: Siu-Fu Tang (Chinese University of Hong Kong)
 “The Heart-Mind’s Apporval (ke) and Second-Order Desires”
 Commentator: JeeLoo Liu (California State University–Fullerton)
 Speaker: Wai-ying Wong (Lingnan University)
 “The Unity of Heaven and Man: A New Interpretation”
 Commentator: Stephen Angle (Wesleyan University)

GIV-D. North American Spinoza Society

6:30-9:30 p.m.

- Chair: Debra Nails (Michigan State University)
 Speakers: Michael Strawser (University of Central Florida)
 “On the Specter of Speciesism in Spinoza”
 Jacob Adler (University of Arkansas–Medical Sciences)
 “Spinoza and Medical Epistemology”
 Rachel Heller (Independent Scholar)
 “Spinoza’s Ethics and a Possible View of Homosexuality and Outing”

GIV-E. Philosophy of Religion Group

6:30-9:30 p.m.

- Chair: Matthew Roberts (Whitworth College)
 Speakers: Kevin Wong (Biola University)
 “Christian Materialism, Dualism, and the Problem of the Incarnation”
 W.B. Wethington (Biola University)
 “The Privative View and Evil as the Willful Misplacement of One’s Ontological Predicates”
 Tim Mosteller (California Baptist University)
 “The Transcendentals and Analytic Philosophy of Religion”

GIV-F. Philosophy of Time Society*6:30-9:30 p.m.*

Chair: James Harrington (Loyola University of Chicago)

Speakers: Noa Latham (University of Calgary)

“Fundamental Laws, Initial Conditions, and the Direction of Time”

Kenneth Faber (Vanderbilt University)

“The Basis for the Directionality of Time”

Chair: Noa Latham (University of Calgary)

Speaker: James Harrington (Loyola University of Chicago)

“Presentism and Eternalism in Historical Perspective”

GIV-G. Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy*6:30-9:30 p.m.***Topic: Aristotelian Puzzles**

Chair: Richard McKirahan (Pomona College)

Speakers: Alan Bäck (Kutztown University of Pennsylvania)

“Aristotle’s Abstract Ontology”

Martha Woodruff (Middlebury College)

“Katharsis Revisited: Aristotle on the Significance of the Tragic Emotions”

John F. Bowin (University of California–Santa Cruz)

“Plato and Aristotle on the Instant of Change—A Dilemma”

GIV-H. Society for Philosophy in the Contemporary World, Session 1*6:30-9:30 p.m.***Topic: Terrorism, Torture, and the Uses of Violence 1**

Chair: J. Jeremy Wisnewski (Hartwick College)

Speakers: J. Jeremy Wisnewski (Hartwick College)

“It’s About Time: Defusing the Ticking Bomb”

Aaron Lercher (Louisiana State University)

“Torture and Moral Knowledge”

Dillon Emerick (Palomar College)

“Torture and Talk: The Communicative Ethics of Interrogation”

GROUP SESSION GV — 8:30-10:30 P.M.**GV-A. North American Kant Society, Session 1***8:30-10:30 p.m.*

Chair: Peter Thielke (Pomona College)

Speakers: Melissa Zinkin (State University of New York–
Binghamton)

“Kant on Secrets and Lies”

Corey Dyck (University of Western Ontario)

“The Original Sources of Cognition: The A Edition
Subjective Deduction”Commentators: Pierre Keller (University of California–Riverside)
Lori Watson (University of San Diego)**GV-B. Society for German Idealism, Session 2***8:30-10:30 p.m.*

Chair: Aaron Bunch (Washington State University)

Speaker: Lara Ostaric (St. Michael’s College)

“Schelling’s Account of Creative Production in His
Commentary on the *Timaeus* (1794)”

Commentator: Gerard Kuperus (University of San Francisco)

Speaker: Dean Moyar (Johns Hopkins University)

“Hegel and Agent-Relative Reasons”

Commentator: Jeffrey Kinlaw (McMurry University)

GV-C. Society for the Philosophy of History, Session 2*8:30-10:30 p.m.***Topic: Historical Interpretation**

Chair: Mark Bevir (University of California–Berkeley)

Speakers: Karsten Stueber (College of the Holy Cross)

“Empathy and the Problem of Intentional Realism”

Toby Reiner (University of California–Berkeley)

“Sincerity and Performativity in Historical Interpretation”

Commentator: Robert Lamb (University of Exeter)

FRIDAY EVENING, MARCH 21**GROUP SESSION GVI — 8:00-10:00 P.M.****GVI-A. Association for Informal Logic and Critical Thinking,
Session 1***8:00-10:00 p.m.***Topic: Critical Thinking: Testing and Evaluation**

Chair: Wanda Teays (Mount St. Mary’s College)

Speakers: Robert H. Ennis (University of Illinois–Urbana-Champaign)

“A Summary and Discussion of ‘Nationwide Testing of Critical Thinking for Higher Education: Vigilance Required’”

Michael Scriven (Claremont Graduate University)

“The Logic of Evaluation”

GVI-B. Radical Philosophy Association, Session 1

8:00-10:00 p.m.

Topic: Marx on the Labor of Fire

Chair: Peter Amato (Drexel University)

Speaker: Bruno Gulli (Long Island University)

“Marx and the Labor of Fire”

Commentators: Tom Jeannot (Gonzaga University)

Anne Pomeroy (Richard Stockton College of New Jersey)

GVI-C. Society for Asian and Comparative Philosophy, Session 2

8:00-10:00 p.m.

Chair: John Spackman (Middlebury College)

Speakers: John Spackman (Middlebury College)

“Between Nihilism and Anti-Essentialism: A Conceptualist Interpretation of Nagarjuna”

Amjot Shrestha (University of Hawaii–Manoa)

“Comparison Versus Sense Perception: On Knowing Instantiated Universals”

Ethan Mills (University of New Mexico)

“Is Epistemology Possible? Jayarasi and the Buddhist Logicians on the Very Idea of Pramana”

GROUP SESSION GVII — 8:00-11:00 P.M.

GVII-A. Association for Chinese Philosophers in America, Session 2

8:00-11:00 p.m.

Topic: Confucianism, Women, and Care Ethics

Chair: JeeLoo Liu (California State University–Fullerton)

Speaker: Xinyan Jiang (University of Redlands)

“Confucianism, Women, and Context”

Commentator: Xianduan Shi (University of Utah)

Speaker: Lijun Yuan (Texas State University–San Marcos)

“Confucian and Feminist Notions of Relational Self and Reciprocity: A Comparative Study”

Commentator: Ann Pang-White (University of Scranton)

Speaker: Ann Pang-White (University of Scranton)
 “Confucian Care Ethics and Some Practical Applications”

Commentator: Deborah Sommer (Gettysburg College)

GVII-B. Hume Society

8:00-11:00 p.m.

Chair: Saul Traiger (Occidental College)

Speakers: Graciela De Pierris (Stanford University)
 “Hume, Locke, and Newton”

Donald Ainslie (University of Toronto)
 “Reflection in Locke and Hume”

GVII-C. Karl Jaspers Society, Session 1

8:00-11:00 p.m.

Topic: Philosophy, Psychology, and Psychopathology

Chair: Craig Nichols (University of Rhode Island)

Speakers: Helmut Wautischer (Sonoma State University)
 “The Healing Dimension of Grenzerfahrung in Trauma Recovery”

Malek Khazae (California State University–Long Beach)
 “Jaspers’s Psychobiography of Nietzsche’s Madness”

Elena Bezzubova (University of California–Irvine)
 “Psychoanalytic Comments on Karl Jaspers’s
Philosophical Autobiography”

Brigitte Essl (Private Practice)

GVII-D. North American Kant Society, Session 2

8:00-11:00 p.m.

Topic: Author-Meets-Critics: Jane Kneller, *Kant and the Power of Imagination*

Chair: Rachel Zuckert (Northwestern University)

Author: Jane Kneller (Colorado State University)

Critics: Michelle Grier (University of San Diego)
 Rudolf Makkreel (Emory University)

GVII-E. North American Nietzsche Society

8:00-11:00 p.m.

Topic: Living with Robert Solomon

Chair: Lanier Anderson (Stanford University)

Speakers: Jessica N. Berry (Georgia State University)
 Daniel Conway (Texas A&M University)
 Paul S. Loeb (University of Puget Sound)

Bernd Magnus (University of California–Riverside)
 Shari Starrett (California State University–Fullerton)
 Tracy Strong (University of California–San Diego)
 Commentator: Kathleen Higgins (University of Texas–Austin)

GVII-F. North American Society for Social Philosophy and the Society for Philosophy and Public Affairs

8:00-11:00 p.m.

Topic: Author-Meets-Critics: Tommie Shelby, *We Who Are Dark*

Chair: Carol C. Gould (Temple University)
 Author: Tommie Shelby (Harvard University)
 Critics: Linda Martín Alcoff (Syracuse University)
 Lucius T. Outlaw, Jr. (Vanderbilt University)
 Ronald Robles Sundstrom (University of San Francisco)

GVII-G. Society for Empirical Ethics

8:00-11:00 p.m.

Chairs: William A. Rottschaefer (Lewis and Clark College)
 Jennifer Wright (University of Wyoming)
 Speakers: Jennifer Wright (University of Wyoming)
 “A Model of Moral Development”
 Kevin Brosnan (Cambridge University)
 “Evaluating the Reliability of Moral Intuitions”
 Marion Hourdequin (Colorado College)
 “Moral Learning and Moral Motivation”
 Joel Martinez (Lewis and Clark College)
 “Virtue and Moral Learning”

GVII-H. Society for Philosophy in the Contemporary World, Session 2

8:00-11:00 p.m.

Topic: Terrorism, Torture, and the Uses of Violence 2

Chair: J. Jeremy Wisnewski (Hartwick College)
 Speakers: Robert L. Muhlnickel (University of Wisconsin–Eau Claire)
 “Just War Theory and Selective Conscientious Objection”
 Anita Ho (University of British Columbia)
 “Military Violence as a Response to Calamities: The Case of Humanitarian Intervention”
 Mohammed Abed (University of Wisconsin–Madison)
 “Suicide Bombing and Collective Terrorism”

GVII-I. Society for the Philosophic Study of the Contemporary Visual Arts

8:00-11:00 p.m.

Chair: Jason Raibley (California State University–Long Beach)

Speakers: Paul C. Santilli (Siena College)

“Art and Death in Frankenheimer’s *The Train*”

Christopher Grau (Clemson University)

“Identity, Attachment, and *Solaris*”

Sherri Irvin (University of Oklahoma)

“Interpretation and Ignorance”

Richard N. Fox (California State University–Long Beach)

“Krausz, Multiplism, and Identity: A Practice-Centered View of Interpretation”

Elisa Segnini (University of Toronto)

“Pain and the Problem of Representation: An Analysis of Kahlo’s Works”

GVII-J. Society for the Study of Philosophy and the Martial Arts

8:00-11:00 p.m.

Chair: Joseph Lynch (California Polytechnic State University–San Luis Obispo)

Speakers: Tonya Warren (San Diego State University)

“From Mimicry to Mastery: Applying Daoist Principles in the Martial Arts”

Paul A. Swift (Bryant University)

“Schopenhauer and Teaching from the Inside Out: Is Mushin Knowledge?”

Alan Bäck (Kutztown University of Pennsylvania)

“The Moral Status of Modern Martial Arts”

Sonia Turanski (Eastern Maine Community College)

“What Ghandi Could Learn from Aikido: Dynamic Love and the Future of Non-Violent Conflict Resolution”

SATURDAY EVENING, MARCH 22

GROUP SESSION GVIII — 6:30-8:30 P.M.

GVIII-A. Association for Informal Logic and Critical Thinking, Session 2

6:30-8:30 p.m.

Topic: **Critical Thinking and Contemporary Critiques of Religion**

Chair: Darin Dockstader (College of Southern Nevada)

Speakers: Jerry Cederblom (University of Nebraska–Omaha)
“Critical Reasoning, Belief, and Religious Faith”

Donald L. Hatcher (Baker University)

“Critical Thinking and Religion: The Ethics of Belief Revisited”

GVIII-B. Society for Philosophy and Public Affairs

6:30-8:30 p.m.

Chair: Carol C. Gould (Temple University)

Speakers: Darrel Moellendorf (San Diego State University)
“An Equal Atmospheric Rights Approach to Climate Change”

Nicole Hassoun (Carnegie Mellon University)

“Free Trade, Poverty, and the Environment”

Commentator: Luc Bovens (London School of Economics)

GVIII-C. Society for the Advancement of American Philosophy, Graduate Student Section

6:30-8:30 p.m.

Topic: **Expanding the Scope of “American” Philosophy: The Intersection of American and Latin American Traditions**

Chair: Jose Jorge Mendoza (University of Oregon)

Speakers: Alejandro Strong (Southern Illinois University–Carbondale)

“A Cuban Transcendentalism: José Martí and the Influence of Ralph Waldo Emerson”

Kim Diaz (Texas A&M University)

“Dewey and Freire’s Pedagogy of Recognition: A Critique of Subtractive Schooling”

Grant Silva (University of Oregon)

“Patterns of Racial Thought in America: Alain Locke and José Vasconcelos on Race, Social Progress, and Creativity”

GVIII-D. Society for Women in Philosophy*6:30-8:30 p.m.***Topic: Feminist Aesthetics**

Chair: Amy Coplan (California State University–Fullerton)

Speakers: Joshua Shaw (Pennsylvania State University)

“Pre-Feminist Lessons for Post-Feminist Art”

Anne Eaton (University of Illinois–Chicago)

“Standpoint Aesthetics”

Tobyn De Marco (Bergen Community College)

“What Feminism Can Contribute to the Philosophy of Music”

GVIII-E. Society of Christian Philosophers*6:30-8:30 p.m.*

Chair: Daniel Speak (Loyola Marymount University)

Speakers: Steven L. Porter (Biola University)

“Contentment as a Christian Virtue”

Robert Roberts (Baylor University)

“Gratitude and Generosity”

GROUP SESSION GIX — 6:30-9:30 P.M.**GIX-A. Ayn Rand Society***6:30-9:30 p.m.***Topic: Egoistic Virtue in Nietzsche and Ayn Rand**

Chair: Allan Gotthelf (University of Pittsburgh)

Speakers: Christine Swanton (University of Auckland)

“Virtuous Egoism in Nietzsche and Rand”

Darryl Wright (Harvey Mudd College)

“Virtue and Egoism: Swanton, Nietzsche and Rand”

GIX-B. International Hobbes Association, Session 2*6:30-9:30 p.m.*

Chair: Martin A. Bertman (Independent Scholar)

Speaker: Gary Herbert (Loyola University–New Orleans)

“The Non-Normative Nature of Hobbesian Natural Law”

Commentator: Kinch Hoekstra (University of California–Berkeley)

Speakers: Juahana Lemetti (University of Helsinki)

“Hobbes’s Epistemic Turn”

Rosamond Rhodes (Mount Sinai School of Medicine and City University of New York–Graduate Center)

“Hobbes’s Fifth Law of Nature”

GIX-C. International Society for Comparative Studies of Chinese and Western Philosophy

6:30-9:30 p.m.

Topic: Motivation in Xunzi: Desire, Assent, and Commitment

Chair: Stephen Angle (Wesleyan University)

Speakers: Kurtis Hagen (State University of New York–Plattsburgh)

Eric Hutton (University of Utah)

Dan Robins (Richard Stockton College of New Jersey)

Aaron Stalnaker (Indiana University–Bloomington)

GIX-D. International Society for Environmental Ethics, Session 2

6:30-9:30 p.m.

Chair: Mark Woods (University of San Diego)

Speaker: Kenneth Shockley (University at Buffalo)

“The Pragmatic Value of Intrinsic Value”

Commentator: Paul Moriarty (Southern Illinois University–Edwardsville)

Speaker: Mark Mysak (University of North Texas)

“Evolving Ecological Ethics”

Commentator: Geoffrey Frasz (College of Southern Nevada)

Speaker: Phil Cafaro (Colorado State University)

“There Is No Right to Immigrate Into the United States”

Commentator: Peter Gratton (University of San Diego)

GIX-E. Karl Jaspers Society, Session 2

6:30-9:30 p.m.

Topic: Philosophy, Psychology, and Psychopathology

Chair: Joseph Prabhu (California State University–Los Angeles)

Speakers: Raymond Langley (Manhattanville College)

“Jaspers on Marx and Freud”

Alan M. Olson (Boston University)

“Jaspers’s Concept of Metaphysical Guilt”

Tomoko Iwasawa (Kogakuin University)

“Jaspers’s *Schuldfrage* and Hiroshima”

GIX-F. Radical Philosophy Association, Session 2

6:30-9:30 p.m.

Topic: The Concept of Torture

Chair: Anatole Anton (San Francisco State University)

Speaker: Kurt Nutting (San Francisco State University)

“Torture as Mental Pain: The Torture Convention, the U.S. Reservations, and the Problem of Other Minds”

Commentators: Douglas Kellner (University of California–Los Angeles)
 Richard Peterson (Michigan State University)
 Laurie Shrage (California State Polytechnic
 University–Pomona)
 Naomi Zack (University of Oregon)

GIX-G. Society for Arab, Persian, and Islamic Philosophy

6:30-9:30 p.m.

Topic: Perspectives on Arab and Islamic Aesthetics

Chair: Mohammed Abed (University of Wisconsin–Madison)
 Speakers: Bassam Romaya (Temple University)
 Mavis Biss (University of Wisconsin–Madison)
 Nada Shabout (University of North Texas)
 Shams Inati (Villanova University)

GIX-H. Society for the Philosophy of History, Session 3

6:30-9:30 p.m.

Topic: Genealogy

Chair: Stephen Watson (University of Notre Dame)
 Speakers: Colin Koopman (University of California–Santa Cruz)
 “Adding Genealogy to Archaeology”
 Thomas Biebricher (University of Florida)
 “Genealogy and Governmentality”
 Tyler Krupp (University of California–Berkeley)
 “Genealogy as Critique?”
 Martin Saar (Universität Frankfurt)
 “Understanding Genealogy: History, Power, and the
 Self”

GIX-I. Western Phenomenology Conference

6:30-9:30 p.m.

Topic: Dangerous Emotion: Affect in Philosophy

Chair: Jason Winfree (California State University–Stanislaus)
 Speakers: Darren Hutchinson (California State University–
 Stanislaus)
 “Legion: Affect Beyond Heidegger”
 Alphonso Lingis (Pennsylvania State University)
 “Violence and Splendor”

GROUP SESSION GX — 8:00-10:00 P.M.**GX-A. Society for Student Philosophers, Session 2***8:30-10:30 p.m.***Topic: Freedom, Reason, and Normativity**

Chair: Jackie Rohel (University of Alberta)

Speakers: Matt Congdon (New School University)

“If They Lived According to the Guidance of Reason...’: Spinoza on Imagination, Reason, and the Mob”

Jackie Rohel (University of Alberta)

“Is Cartesian Generosity an Intellectual Virtue?”

Benjamin Mitchell-Yellin (University of California–Riverside)

“Disambiguating All-Things-Considered-‘Ought’-Statements”

Benjamin Mitchell-Yellin (University of California–Riverside)

Chad Vance (University of Colorado–Boulder)

“The Eternal Moment’s View: A Solution to the Problem of Human Freedom and Divine Foreknowledge”

GX-B. Society for the Philosophical Study of Marxism*8:30-10:30 p.m.*

Chair: Tom Jeannot (Gonzaga University)

Speakers: Patrick Murray (Creighton University)

“Foundations for a Marxian Theory of Capitalist Modernity”

Jeanne A. Schuler (Creighton University)

“Why Wealth Is a Poor Concept”

Commentator: Tom Jeannot (Gonzaga University)

MAIN, GROUP, AND MINI-CONFERENCE PROGRAM PARTICIPANTS

(Group sessions begin with “G.” All others are main sessions.)

A

- Abed, Mohammed (University of Wisconsin–Madison)
..... VIII-K Fri PM, GVII-H Fri PM, GIX-G Sat PM
- Adams, Joseph Quinton (Georgia State University)..... IX-G Sat AM
- Adler, Jacob (University of Arkansas–Medical Sciences)..... GIV-D Thu PM
- Adler, Jonathan (City University of New York–Brooklyn
College/City University of New York–Graduate Center)..... VIII-E Fri PM
- Adluri, Vishwa (Drew University)..... V-J Thu PM
- Alama, Jesse (Stanford University)IV-M Thu PM
- Ainslie, Donald (University of Toronto)GVII-B Fri PM, IX-B Sat AM
- Airaksinen, Timo (University of Helsinki).....GIV-B Thu PM
- Albahari, Miri (University of Western Australia) II-B Wed PM
- Alcoff, Linda Martín (Syracuse University) GVII-F Fri PM
- Allais, Lucy (University of the Witwatersrand) IX-G Sat AM
- Allhoff, Fritz (Western Michigan University)IX-J Sat AM
- Alter, Torin (University of Alabama–Tuscaloosa)..... VII-F Fri PM
- Altman, Andrew (Georgia State University)VII-C Fri PM
- Amato, Peter (Drexel University).....GVI-B Fri PM, IX-H Sat AM
- Ameriks, Karl (University of Notre Dame) VII-H Fri PM
- Amesbury, Richard (Claremont Graduate University)..... IX-G Sat AM
- Amini, Majid (Virginia State University)..... IV-H Thu PM
- Amschel, Mary (University of California–Riverside)XI-H Sat PM
- Anagnostopoulos, Georgios (University of
California–San Diego) IV-A Thu PM
- Anderson, R. Lanier (Stanford University) GVII-E Fri PM
- Andler, Daniel (Université de Paris and Institut Universitaire
de France)IX-L Sat AM
- Angle, Stephen (Wesleyan University)
..... V-A Thu PM, GIV-C Thu PM, GIX-C Sat PM
- Anton, Anatole (San Francisco State University)... XI-B Sat PM, GIX-F Sat PM
- Arico, Adam (University of Arizona)VI-J Fri AM
- Armstrong, Joshua (Rutgers University)..... III-K Thu AM
- Arneson, Richard (University of California–San Diego).....IX-J Sat AM
-

Arola, Adam (University of Oregon)	IX-M Sat AM
Arp, Kristana (Long Island University).....	X-I Sat PM
Askland, Andrew (Arizona State University).....	VI-F Fri AM
Audi, Paul (University of Nebraska–Omaha)	V-H Thu PM
Austin, Emily (Washington University in St. Louis)	I-H Wed PM
Avnur, Yuval (New York University).....	IX-C Sat AM
Axtell, Guy (University of Nevada–Reno)	VII-E Fri PM
Azadpur, Mohammad (San Francisco State University)	VI-I Fri AM

B

Baber, H.E. (University of San Diego)	IX-F Sat AM
Babich, Babette (Fordham University)	III-J Thu AM
Baehr, Jason (Loyola Marymount University)	VII-E Fri PM
Bahlul, Raja (United Arab Emirates University).....	X-D Sat PM
Baiamonte, Nicholas (De Anza College).....	VIII-K Fri PM
Baker, Paul (Georgia Institute of Technology)	VI-K Fri AM
Balashov, Yuri (University of Georgia)	IV-H Thu PM
Ballantyne, Nathan (University of Arizona)	I-J Wed PM
Barker, Chris (New York University)	IV-M Thu PM
Barney, Rachel (University of Toronto).....	IV-A Thu PM
Barr, Bennett (University of Washington).....	IX-D Sat AM
Barrett, Jeffrey (University of California–Irvine)	X-A Sat PM
Bashour, Bana (City University of New York–Graduate School)	
.....	IV-H Thu PM
Bataineh, Afaf (American University of Kuwait)	X-D Sat PM
Bates, Jared G. (Hanover College).....	X-J Sat PM
Battaly, Heather (California State University–Fullerton)	VII-E Fri PM
Battin, Margaret (University of Utah)	III-F Thu AM
Baumer, Michael (Cleveland State University)	VII-M Fri PM
Becker, Kelly (University of New Mexico).....	IV-B Thu PM
Bedke, Matthew (University of Arizona)	XI-I Sat PM
Bednar, James (Vanderbilt University)	VII-F Fri PM
Beebe, James R. (University at Buffalo).....	GIV-I Thu PM, IX-H Sat AM
Bender, John (Ohio University)	I-E Wed PM
Bengson, John T. (University of Texas–Austin)	VI-J Fri AM
Bernstein, Richard (New School University)	VII-B Fri PM
Bernstein, Sara (University of Arizona).....	IX-E Sat AM
Berry, Jessica N. (Georgia State University).....	GVII-E Fri PM
Bertman, Martin A. (Independent Scholar)	GIV-B Thu PM, GIX-B Sat PM
Bevir, Mark (University of California–Berkeley)	
.....	GII-F Wed PM, GV-C Thu PM
Bezzubova, Elena (University of California–Irvine).....	GVII-C Fri PM

Biebricher, Thomas (University of Florida).....	GIX-H Sat PM
Birondo, Noell (Pomona College).....	III-E Thu AM
Bishop, John (University of Auckland).....	IV-D Thu PM
Biss, Mavis (University of Wisconsin–Madison).....	GIX-G Sat PM
Bisticas-Cocoves, Marcos (Morgan State University).....	GII-D Wed PM
Bittner, Thomas (Claremont McKenna College).....	VII-G Fri PM
Black, Tim (California State University–Northridge).....	I-J Wed PM
Blackson, Thomas (Arizona State University).....	VIII-H Fri PM
Blake, Michael (University of Washington).....	VII-C Fri PM
Blander, Josh (University of California–Los Angeles).....	V-H Thu PM
Blum, Lawrence (University of Massachusetts–Boston).....	III-M Thu AM
Bobro, Marc (Santa Barbara City College).....	II-G Wed PM
Boersema, David (Pacific University).....	IV-J Thu PM
Boghossian, Paul (New York University).....	VI-A Fri AM
Boltuc, Peter (University of Illinois–Springfield).....	I-K Wed PM
Bontly, Thomas (University of Connecticut).....	X-J Sat PM
Boran, Idil (York University).....	IV-G Thu PM
Bovens, Luc (London School of Economics).....	GVIII-B Sat PM
Bowin, John Francis (University of California–Santa Cruz)	
.....	III-E Thu AM, GIV-G Thu PM
Boyd, Robert (Fresno City College).....	III-L Thu AM
Boylu, Ayca (University of Virginia).....	I-H Wed PM
Bracken, William (University of California–Riverside).....	IV-F Thu PM
Brady, Emily (University of Edinburgh).....	GIII-A Thu PM, VIII-B Fri PM
Brandom, Robert (University of Pittsburgh).....	VII-B Fri PM
Branson, Beau (University of Notre Dame).....	I-F Wed PM
Brassfield, Shoshana (Colgate University).....	V-F Thu PM
Bratman, Michael (Stanford University).....	VIII-D Fri PM
Brighthouse, Carolyn (Occidental College).....	VII-J Fri PM
Bright, Josh (University of California–Riverside).....	IX-H Sat AM
Brink, David (University of California–San Diego).....	V-C Thu PM
Briscoe, Robert E. (Loyola University–New Orleans).....	III-H Thu AM
Brock, Gillian (University of Auckland).....	III-G Thu AM
Bromwich, Danielle (University of Toronto).....	I-I Wed PM
Brosnan, Kevin (University of Cambridge).....	GVII-G Fri PM
Brown, D. Kenneth (California Polytechnic State	
University–San Luis Obispo).....	II-F Wed PM
Brown, Deborah J. (University of Queensland).....	VII-H Fri PM
Brown, Derek (Brandon University).....	X-G Sat PM
Brown, Matthew (University of California–San Diego).....	IX-F Sat AM

Brown, Richard (City University of New York–LaGuardia College)	IX-I Sat AM
Brownlee, Timothy (Xavier University)	GII-D Wed PM
Bruno, G. Anthony (University of Toronto)	GII-D Wed PM
Buccafurni, Diana (Sam Houston State University)	II-I Wed PM
Buckareff, Andrei A. (Marist College)	VII-K Fri PM
Bueno, Otávio (University of Miami)	GIV-I Thu PM, IX-K Sat AM
Bujalska, Beata (Tufts University)	GIII-E Thu PM, VII-K Fri PM
Bunch, Aaron (Washington State University)	GII-D Wed PM, GV-B Thu PM, X-H Sat PM
Burch, Robert (Texas A&M University)	GI-C Wed PM
Burkhart, Brian Yazzie (Pitzer College)	II-H Wed PM, IX-M Sat AM
Burns, Shawn (Stanford University)	IX-M Sat AM
Buss, Sarah (University of Michigan–Ann Arbor)	V-C Thu PM
Butler, Annemarie (Iowa State University)	II-F Wed PM
Byrne, Alex (Massachusetts Institute of Technology)	III-C Thu AM
Byron, Michael (Kent State University)	VIII-L Fri PM
Bäck, Allan (Kutztown University of Pennsylvania)	GIV-G Thu PM, VIII-H Fri PM, GVII-J Fri PM

C

Cafaro, Phil (Colorado State University)	VI-F Fri AM, GIX-D Sat PM
Cahill, Kevin (Universitetet i Bergen)	GII-C Wed PM
Calhoun, Cheshire (Arizona State University)	IX-D Sat AM
Callender, Craig (University of California–San Diego)	X-A Sat PM
Callergård, Robert (Stockholms Universitet)	V-F Thu PM
Campana, Daniel (University of La Verne)	IV-I Thu PM
Campbell, John (University of California–Berkeley)	V-L Thu PM, VIII-J Fri PM
Campbell, Joseph Keim (Washington State University)	III-B Thu AM
Cannon, Douglas (University of Puget Sound)	IX-I Sat AM
Caplan, Ben (Ohio State University)	X-I Sat PM
Card, Robert F. (State University of New York–Oswego)	VI-K Fri AM
Cariani, Fabrizio (University of California–Berkeley)	III-I Thu AM
Carriero, John (University of California–Los Angeles)	X-0 Sat AM
Carroll, John W. (North Carolina State University)	IV-H Thu PM
Cartwright, Nancy (London School of Economics)	Fri PM, IX-E Sat AM
Casebier, Allan (University of Miami)	X-H Sat PM
Casullo, Albert (University of Nebraska–Lincoln)	VIII-E Fri PM
Cederblom, Jerry (University of Nebraska–Omaha)	GVIII-A Sat PM
Celestino, Gemma (University of British Columbia)	X-I Sat PM
Cerbone, David (West Virginia University)	IV-F Thu PM

Chakrabarti, Chandana (Bethany College of West Virginia)..	GII-G Wed PM
Chakrabarti, Kisor K. (Bethany College of West Virginia)	
.....	GII-G Wed PM, III-I Thu AM
Chalmers, David (Australian National University)	
.....	III-C Thu AM, VIII-L Fri PM
Chandler, Theresa (California State University–Long Beach)	VIII-I Fri PM
Cholbi, Michael (California State Polytechnic University–Pomona)	
.....	IX-G Sat AM
Chrisman, Erin (University of California–Irvine).....	VIII-I Fri PM
Christie, Gordon (University of British Columbia).....	IX-M Sat AM
Chu, Antonio (Metropolitan State College of Denver)	V-H Thu PM
Church, Jennifer (Vassar College).....	XI-E Sat PM
Clarke, Randolph (Florida State University).....	VI-C Fri AM
Clarke, Roger (University of British Columbia)	X-F Sat PM
Clough, Sharyn (Oregon State University)	VII-J Fri PM
Coates, Allen (East Tennessee State University)	II-K Wed PM
Coates, Justin (University of California–Riverside)	X-F Sat PM
Coffman, E.J. (University of Tennessee).....	X-G Sat PM
Cohen, Stewart (Arizona State University).....	VI-A Fri AM
Cohon, Rachel (State University of New York–Albany)	IX-B Sat AM
Cole, Mason (Texas A&M University).....	GI-A Wed PM
Collins, John (East Carolina University)	IX-C Sat AM
Congdon, Matt (New School University)	GX-A Sat PM
Considine, Daniel (University of Southern California).....	VII-H Fri PM
Conway, Daniel (Texas A&M University)	GVII-E Fri PM
Cook, Tom (Rollins College).....	X-H Sat PM
Copenhaver, Rebecca (Lewis and Clark College).....	VIII-J Fri PM
Coplan, Amy (California State University–Fullerton)	
.....	VI-H Fri AM, GVIII-D Sat PM
Coseru, Christian (College of Charleston)	VIII-F Fri PM
Costa, Victoria (Florida State University).....	IX-J Sat AM
Couch, Mark B. (Seton Hall University)	I-F Wed PM
Coventry, Angela (Portland State University)	IX-D Sat AM
Cranor, Carl (University of California–Riverside)	M-I Wed AM
Crary, Alice (New School University).....	I-D Wed PM
Crasnow, Sharon (Riverside Community College)	V-G Thu PM
Crawford, Donald (University of California–Santa Barbara)	VIII-B Fri PM
Crease, Robert (State University of New York–Stony Brook)	IV-N Thu PM
Creath, Richard (Arizona State University)	VI-L Fri AM
Crisp, Thomas M. (Biola University)	IV-D Thu PM
Crouch, J. Brent (San Diego City College)	GI-C Wed PM

Crowe, Benjamin (University of Utah)	IV-F Thu PM
Crowell, Steven (Rice University)	VI-E Fri AM
Croy, Marvin (University of North Carolina–Charlotte)	I-K Wed PM
Crutchfield, Parker (Arizona State University)	I-I Wed PM
Cullison, Andrew (State University of New York–Fredonia).....	IX-E Sat AM
Cullity, Garrett (University of Adelaide)	II-C Wed PM
Cumming, Sam (University of California–Los Angeles)	IX-I Sat AM
Cummiskey, David (Bates College)	I-G Wed PM
Cunning, David (University of Iowa).....	VII-K Fri PM
Curley, Edwin (University of Michigan)	X-H Sat PM

D

Damm, Lisa (University of California–San Diego)	VII-G Fri PM
Dannenberg, Jorah (University of California–Los Angeles)	V-E Thu PM
Darwall, Stephen (University of Michigan–Ann Arbor).....	VIII-A Fri PM
Davey, Kevin (University of Chicago).....	VI-G Fri AM
Davidson, Maria D. (University of Oklahoma)	IV-C Thu PM
Davidson, Matthew (California State University–San Bernadino)	IX-C Sat AM
Davies, David (McGill University)	VI-H Fri AM
Day, William (Le Moyne College)	I-E Wed PM
De Marco, Toby (Bergen Community College)	XI-H Sat PM, GVIII-D Sat PM
de Marneffe, Peter (Arizona State University).....	V-B Thu PM
De Melo-Martin, Inmaculada (Cornell University)	III-G Thu AM
De Pierris, Graciela (Stanford University)	GVII-B Fri PM
De Sousa, Ronald (University of Toronto)	XI-E Sat PM
Dean, Jeff (Wiley-Blackwell).....	II-C Wed PM
DeCew, Judith Wagner (Clark University).....	X-K Sat PM
Decyk, Betsy (California State University–Long Beach)	GI-A Wed PM
Della Rocca, Michael (Yale University).....	X-0 Sat AM
DeMoss, David (Pacific University)	IX-G Sat AM
Detlefsen, Karen (University of Pennsylvania)	VII-D Fri PM
Diaz, Kim (Texas A&M University).....	VI-I Fri AM, GVIII-C Sat PM
Dickie, Imogen (University of Toronto)	IX-I Sat AM
Diehl, Nicholas (University of California–Davis).....	I-E Wed PM
Dierksmeier, Claus (Stonehill College)	X-H Sat PM
Dillon, Robin S. (Lehigh University).....	IV-K Thu PM, IX-N Sat AM
Ding, Zijiang (California State Polytechnic University–Pomona)	GII-B Wed PM
Dinishak, Janette (University of Toronto)	GII-C Wed PM
Dinkha, Juliet (American University of Kuwait)	X-D Sat PM

Dockstader, Darin (College of Southern Nevada).....	GVIII-A Sat PM
Donner, Wendy (Carleton University).....	V-B Thu PM
Doppelt, Gerald D. (University of California–San Diego).....	IX-C Sat AM
Dorion, Louis-André (Université de Montréal)	X-E Sat PM
Dorsey, Dale (University of Alberta).....	XI-I Sat PM
Douglas, Heather (University of Tennessee).....	III-N Thu AM
Draper, Kai (University of Delaware).....	VII-A Fri PM
Dreisbach, Sandra (University of California–Santa Cruz).....	II-I Wed PM
Dreyfus, Hubert (University of California–Berkeley)	VII-B Fri PM, IX-L Sat AM, XI-B Sat PM
Duquette, David (St. Norbert College).....	GII-D Wed PM
Dyck, Corey (University of Western Ontario).....	GV-A Thu PM

E

Easton, Patricia (Claremont Graduate University)	IV-I Thu PM
Easwaran, Kenny (University of California–Berkeley).....	III-K Thu AM
Eaton, Anne (University of Illinois–Chicago) ...	II-C Wed PM, GVIII-D Sat PM
Efstathiou, Sophia (University of California–San Diego/London School of Economics).....	I-M Wed PM
Egan, Andrew (University of Michigan–Ann Arbor/Australian National University).....	III-H Thu AM
Eggers, Daniel (RWTH Aachen University)	GIV-B Thu PM
Eggleston, Ben (University of Kansas).....	III-F Thu AM
Eklund, Matti (Cornell University)	VI-L Fri AM
Elgin, Catherine (Harvard University).....	VII-E Fri PM
Elliott, Kevin (University of South Carolina).....	M-I Wed AM
Ellis, Jonathan (University of California–Santa Cruz).....	I-D Wed PM
Elpidorou, Andreas (Boston University)	VIII-F Fri PM
Emerick, Dillon (Palomar College)	GIV-H Thu PM
Engelland, Chad A. (John Carroll University)	IV-F Thu PM
Ennis, Robert H. (University of Illinois–Urbana-Champaign)....	GVI-A Fri PM
Eriksson, Björn (Stockholms Universitet)	II-K Wed PM
Esch, Emily (College of St. Benedict and St. John’s University) ...	VI-J Fri AM
Eshleman, Andrew (University of Arkansas–Little Rock).....	IV-I Thu PM
Essl, Brigitte (Private Practice).....	GVII-C Fri PM
Everett, Jennifer (DePauw University).....	VI-F Fri AM
Evnine, Simon (University of Miami)	IV-E Thu PM

F

Faber, Kenneth (Vanderbilt University).....	GIV-F Thu PM, VII-K Fri PM
Fairlamb, Horace B. (University of Houston)	GII-G Wed PM
Fales, Evan (University of Iowa)	X-G Sat PM

Falkenstein, Lorne (University of Western Ontario)	V-F Thu PM
Fallis, Don (University of Arizona)	VI-I Fri AM
Fantl, Jeremy (University of Calgary)	VII-F Fri PM
Farnham, Dan (University of Georgia)	IX-F Sat AM
Feder, Ellen (American University)	I-A Wed PM
Fehr, Carla (Iowa State University)	M-1 Wed AM
Feldman, Simon (Connecticut College)	VI-I Fri AM
Ferejohn, Michael (Duke University)	I-H Wed PM
Fiala, Brian (University of Arizona)	VII-I Fri PM
Fine, Arthur (University of Washington)	VI-G Fri AM
Finn, Stephen (Seattle University)	GI-A Wed PM
Fisher, John (University of Colorado–Boulder)	VIII-B Fri PM
Fitelson, Branden (University of California–Berkeley)	VII-L Fri PM
Fleming, Patrick (James Madison University)	IX-F Sat AM
Florka, Roger (Ursinus College)	VII-H Fri PM
Fogelin, Robert (Dartmouth College)	IX-K Sat AM
Ford, Jason (University of Minnesota–Duluth)	III-H Thu AM
Fox, Richard N. (California State University–Long Beach)	III-G Thu AM, GVII-I Fri PM
Francis, Leslie (University of Utah)	VI-K Fri AM
Franklin, Christopher Evan (University of California–Riverside)	III-K Thu AM
Frasz, Geoffrey (College of Southern Nevada)	III-L Thu AM, GIII-B Thu PM, VI-M Fri AM, GIX-D Sat PM
Freeman, Lauren (Boston University)	VI-I Fri AM
Frei, Tamra (Michigan State University)	X-H Sat PM
Fritzman, J.M. (Lewis and Clark College)	I-E Wed PM, GII-D Wed PM
Frykholm, Erin (University of California–San Diego)	III-F Thu AM
Fumerton, Richard (University of Iowa)	VIII-C Fri PM
Fung, Yiu-Ming (University of Hong Kong)	GIV-C Thu PM
Furtak, Rick Anthony (Colorado College)	III-J Thu AM
Føllesdal, Dagfinn (Stanford University)	GIII-D Thu PM, VI-L Fri AM

G

Galvin, Richard (Texas Christian University)	VI-K Fri AM
Gannett, Lisa (Saint Mary's University)	I-M Wed PM
Garcia-Carpintero, Manuel (LOGOS Barcelona)	X-C Sat PM
Garrett, Aaron (Boston University)	IX-B Sat AM
Garrett, Don (New York University)	X-0 Sat AM
Garry, Ann (California State University–Los Angeles)	IV-K Thu PM
Garver, Newton (University at Buffalo)	GII-C Wed PM
Gatzia, Dimitria Electra (Syracuse University)	II-E Wed PM

Gaus, Jerry (University of Arizona)	XI-G Sat PM
Gemes, Ken (University of Southampton)	X-B Sat PM
Gendreau, Megs (University of California–Riverside).....	I-E Wed PM
Genone, James (University of California–Berkeley)	III-H Thu AM
Georgi, Geoff (University of Southern California)	III-I Thu AM
Gerson, Lloyd P. (University of Toronto)	VI-B Fri AM
Gert, Bernard (Dartmouth College)	GIV-B Thu PM
Giannopoulou, Zina (University of California–Irvine)	IV-A Thu PM
Gibson, John (University of Louisville).....	IX-A Sat AM
Gilbert, Margaret (University of California–Irvine)	VIII-D Fri PM
Gill, Michael (University of Arizona)	IX-B Sat AM
Glanzberg, Michael (University of California–Davis).....	IV-M Thu PM
Glennay, Brian (University of Southern California)	X-G Sat PM
Glezakos, Stavroula (Wake Forest University)	I-F Wed PM
Golash, Deirdre (American University)	III-D Thu AM
Goldberg, David Theo (University of California–Irvine)	IX-G Sat AM
Goldberg, Nathaniel (Ohio University)	IX-C Sat AM
Goldberg, Sanford (Northwestern University)	I-J Wed PM
Goldenbaum, Ursula (Emory University and Institute for Advanced Study)	X-H Sat PM
Goldie, Peter (University of Manchester)	VII-E Fri PM
Goodman, Charles (State University of New York–Binghamton)	I-C Wed PM
Goswick, Dana Lynne (University of California–Davis)	X-I Sat PM
Gotthelf, Allan (University of Pittsburgh)	GIX-A Sat PM
Gould, Carol C. (Temple University)	GVII-F Fri PM, XI-A Sat PM, GVIII-B Sat PM
Gowans, Christopher (Fordham University)	I-C Wed PM
Graham, Peter (University of California–Riverside)	II-A Wed PM
Graham, Peter A. (University of Massachusetts–Amherst).....	IV-H Thu PM
Grandi, Giovanni (Auburn University)	V-F Thu PM
Grasswick, Heidi (Middlebury College)	IV-N Thu PM
Gratton, Peter (University of San Diego).....	GIX-D Sat PM
Grau, Christopher (Clemson University)	VI-H Fri AM, VII-M Fri PM, GVII-I Fri PM
Grcic, Joseph (Indiana State University)	IV-E Thu PM
Green, Michael (Pomona College)	IX-F Sat AM
Green, Mitchell (University of Virginia)	III-I Thu AM
Green, Paul (Mount St. Mary’s College)	GI-A Wed PM
Greenberg, Mark (University of California–Los Angeles)	III-D Thu AM
Greene, Mark (University of Delaware).....	II-D Wed PM

Greene, Richard (Weber State University)..... I-J Wed PM, GIV-I Thu PM
 Grenberg, Jeanine (St. Olaf College)X-H Sat PM
 Grier, Michelle (University of San Diego)GVII-D Fri PM
 Griswold, Charles (Boston University)III-A Thu AM
 Gross, Neil (Harvard University).....VII-B Fri PM
 Gruen, Lori (Wesleyan University).....XI-A Sat PM
 Gruengard, Ora (Shenkar College of Engineering and Design)
GII-A Wed PM
 Guerra, Isabel (Universidad Complutense de Madrid) VI-G Fri AM
 Guleserian, Theodore (Arizona State University)..... III-K Thu AM
 Gulli, Bruno (Long Island University) GVI-B Fri PM
 Gullion, Todd (San Francisco State University) IX-F Sat AM
 Gurley, S. West (University of South Florida).....VIII-F Fri PM

H

Habibi, Don (University of North Carolina–Wilmington).....GIV-B Thu PM
 Hagar, Amit (Indiana University–Bloomington)..... VI-G Fri AM
 Hagen, Kurtis (State University of New York–Plattsburgh)..... GIX-C Sat PM
 Haist, Gordon (University of South Carolina–Beaufort)..... GII-G Wed PM
 Hanley, Richard (University of Delaware)..... VII-M Fri PM
 Hanna, Patricia (University of Utah).....IX-A Sat AM
 Hanna, Robert (University of Colorado–Boulder) II-H Wed PM
 Hansen, Chad (University of Hong Kong) III-M Thu AM
 Hanson, Karen (Indiana University–Bloomington)GI-D Wed PM
 Hanson, Phil (Simon Fraser University).....VIII-E Fri PM
 Harman, Gilbert (Princeton University).....VI-D Fri AM
 Harrington, James (Loyola University of Chicago)
 IV-H Thu PM, GIV-F Thu PM
 Harris, Angie (University of Utah)..... X-I Sat PM
 Hartley, Christie (Georgia State University)..... I-G Wed PM
 Hassoun, Nicole (Carnegie Mellon University)
III-F Thu AM, GVIII-B Sat PM
 Hatcher, Donald L. (Baker University).....GVIII-A Sat PM
 Hawthorne, Susan (University of Minnesota)II-L Wed PM
 Haybron, Daniel (St. Louis University)..... I-G Wed PM
 Hazlett, Allan (Fordham University) VI-I Fri AM
 Healey, Richard (University of Arizona).....X-A Sat PM
 Heller, Rachel (Independent Scholar)..... GIV-D Thu PM
 Hellman, Geoffrey (University of Minnesota) VII-N Fri PM
 Hellwig, Heinrik (University of California–Riverside)II-E Wed PM
 Hendricks, Scott (Clark University)..... VII-I Fri PM
 Herbert, Gary (Loyola University–New Orleans)..... GIX-B Sat PM

Hermanson, Sean (Florida International University)	III-H Thu AM
Hermes, Charles (University of Texas–Arlington).....	X-F Sat PM
Herschbach, Mitchell (University of California–San Diego)	VI-J Fri AM
Hershenov, David (University at Buffalo)	I-L Wed PM
Hessler, Kristen (State University of New York–Albany)	III-G Thu AM
Hester, Lee (University of Science and Arts of Oklahoma).....	XI-J Sat PM
Heyes, Cressida (University of Alberta)	I-A Wed PM
Hiddleston, Eric (Wayne State University)	IX-E Sat AM
Higgins, Kathleen (University of Texas–Austin).....	GVII-E Fri PM
Hiller, Avram (Wake Forest University).....	II-D Wed PM
Hirschbein, Ron (Walden University)	GI-B Wed PM
Hitchcock, Christopher (California Institute of Technology)	X-A Sat PM
Ho, Anita (University of British Columbia)	VI-K Fri AM, GVII-H Fri PM
Hodges, Michael (Vanderbilt University)	III-F Thu AM
Hoekstra, Kinch (University of California–Berkeley)	GII-F Wed PM, GIX-B Sat PM
Hoffman, Paul (University of California–Riverside)	VII-H Fri PM, X-0 Sat AM
Hogan, Brendan (Pacific Lutheran University)	GII-E Wed PM
Holder, Cindy (University of Victoria)	XI-A Sat PM
Hole, George T. (Buffalo State College).....	GII-A Wed PM
Homiak, Marcia (Occidental College).....	V-I Thu PM
Hood, Pamela (San Francisco State University)	V-K Thu PM
Horgan, Terry (University of Arizona)	VIII-J Fri PM
Hough, Sheridan (College of Charleston)	IV-F Thu PM
Hourdequin, Marion (Colorado College)	VI-F Fri AM, GVII-G Fri PM
Howell, Robert (Southern Methodist University)	X-J Sat PM
Hreno, Travis (University of Akron).....	VII-G Fri PM
Hsu, Andrew (University of California–Los Angeles).....	VII-G Fri PM
Huang, Ta Lun (Linus) (University of California–Riverside).....	II-E Wed PM
Huang, Yong (Kutztown University of Pennsylvania)	III-M Thu AM
Hubin, Donald (Ohio State University)	VII-A Fri PM
Huemer, Michael (University of Colorado–Boulder)	VI-J Fri AM, VII-M Fri PM
Huenemann, Charlie (Utah State University)	X-0 Sat AM
Hughes, Charles (Chapman University)	VII-K Fri PM
Hughes, Paul (University of Michigan–Dearborn)	III-G Thu AM
Hunter, Bruce (University of Alberta)	X-G Sat PM
Hunter, David (Ryerson University).....	IX-D Sat AM
Hurley, Paul (Claremont McKenna College).....	VIII-A Fri PM
Husi, Stan (Rice University)	IV-I Thu PM

Hussain, Waheed (University of Pennsylvania)	GII-D Wed PM, VIII-I Fri PM
Hutchins, Debby (Gonzaga University)	GI-A Wed PM
Hutchinson, Darren (California State University–Stanislaus)	GIX-I Sat PM
Hutton, Eric (University of Utah)	GIX-C Sat PM

I

Ilea, Ramona (Pacific University)	V-I Thu PM, GIII-B Thu PM
Im, Manyul (Fairfield University)	GII-B Wed PM
Inati, Shams (Villanova University)	GIX-G Sat PM
Ingle, Jennifer (Frostburg State University)	GI-D Wed PM
Irvin, Sherri (University of Oklahoma)	GVII-I Fri PM
Iwasawa, Tomoko (Kogakuin University)	GIX-E Sat PM

J

Jacobson, Anne (University of Houston)	I-I Wed PM
James, Aaron (University of California–Irvine)	XI-A Sat PM
James, Matt (Washington University in St. Louis)	GIV-B Thu PM
Jamieson, Dale (New York University)	IV-G Thu PM, GIII-B Thu PM
Jeannot, Tom (Gonzaga University)	GVI-B Fri PM, GX-B Sat PM
Jehle, David (Cornell University)	IX-H Sat AM
Jenson, Chris (University of Utah)	I-F Wed PM
Jeshion, Robin (University of California–Riverside)	X-C Sat PM
Jiang, Xinyan (University of Redlands)	V-A Thu PM, GVII-A Fri PM
John, Eileen (Warwick University)	II-C Wed PM
Johns, Brandon (University of Southern California)	II-D Wed PM
Johnson, Daniel M. (Baylor University)	I-J Wed PM
Johnson, David (Southern Illinois University–Carbondale)	X-E Sat PM
Johnson, Jeff (College of St. Catherine)	GII-C Wed PM, IV-E Thu PM
Johnston, Joshua (University of British Columbia)	GIII-A Thu PM
Jolley, Nick (University of California–Irvine)	X-0 Sat AM
Jones, Russell (University of Oklahoma)	I-H Wed PM
Julius, A.J. (University of California–Los Angeles)	V-E Thu PM
Justin, Gale (California State University–Sacramento)	III-J Thu AM

K

Kabasenche, William P. (Washington State University)	II-I Wed PM
Kadowaki, Shunsuke (University of Tokyo)	IX-L Sat AM
Kane, Christopher (Tulane University of New Orleans)	IX-E Sat AM
Kane, Robert (University of Texas–Austin)	III-B Thu AM
Kaplan, Jonathan (Oregon State University)	IV-G Thu PM
Kaye, Sharon (John Carroll University)	IV-J Thu PM

Kazmi, Ali (University of Calgary)	IX-C Sat AM
Keenan, Ed (University of California–Los Angeles)	IV-M Thu PM
Kegley, Jacquelyn Ann K. (California State University–Bakersfield)	GI-C Wed PM, IX-C Sat AM
Keller, Pierre (University of California–Riverside).....	GV-A Thu PM
Keller, Simon (Boston University)	IX-G Sat AM
Kellner, Douglas (University of California–Los Angeles)	GIX-F Sat PM
Kennett, Jeanette (Australian National University)	XI-F Sat PM
Khzaee, Malek (California State University–Long Beach)	GVII-C Fri PM, IX-J Sat AM
Kim, Hanna (Washington and Jefferson College).....	IX-I Sat AM
Kim, Jung-Yeup (University of Hawaii–Manoa)	GII-B Wed PM
Kim, Myeong-seok (University of Michigan–Ann Arbor)	GI-E Wed PM
Kind, Amy (Claremont McKenna College).....	V-D Thu PM, VII-M Fri PM
King, Christopher Stewart (University of Tennessee)	I-G Wed PM
Kinlaw, Jeffery (McMurry University)	GV-B Thu PM
Kirby, Jeremy (Albion College).....	V-H Thu PM
Kisiel, Theodore (Northern Illinois University)	VI-E Fri AM
Kisner, Matt (University of South Carolina)	X-0 Sat AM
Kittay, Eva (State University of New York–Stony Brook)	IV-K Thu PM
Kivy, Peter (Rutgers University)	XI-D Sat PM
Kjellberg, Paul (Whittier College)	I-C Wed PM
Klagge, James C. (Virginia Tech)	I-F Wed PM
Kneller, Jane (Colorado State University)	GVII-D Fri PM
Kobes, Bernard W. (Arizona State University)	X-J Sat PM
Koivuniemi, Minna (Uppsala Universitet)	X-H Sat PM
Koopman, Colin (University of California–Santa Cruz)	GIX-H Sat PM
Korman, Daniel Z. (University of Texas–Austin)	VII-I Fri PM
Kornblith, Hilary (University of Massachusetts–Amherst).....	VI-A Fri AM
Korolev, Alexandre V. (University of British Columbia)	VII-J Fri PM
Kortbein, Joshua (University of Minnesota–Twin Cities)	GII-C Wed PM
Kotzen, Matthew (New York University)	IX-H Sat AM
Kourany, Janet (Notre Dame University).....	III-N Thu AM
Kraay, Klaas (Ryerson University)	VII-K Fri PM
Krausz, Michael (Bryn Mawr College)	IX-A Sat AM
Krupp, Tyler (University of California–Berkeley)	GIX-H Sat PM
Kuchuris, Chris (Community College of Southern Nevada)	III-L Thu AM
Kung, Peter (Pomona College)	IX-H Sat AM
Kuperus, Gerard (University of San Francisco)	GV-B Thu PM
Kurth, Charlie (University of California–San Diego).....	II-E Wed PM
Kvanvig, Jonathan (Baylor University).....	II-A Wed PM

L

Lackey, Jennifer (Northwestern University)	II-A Wed PM
Lagerlund, Henrik (University of Western Ontario)	VI-L Fri AM
Lamarche, S. Pierre (Utah Valley State College)	III-J Thu AM
Lamb, Robert (University of Exeter)	GII-F Wed PM, GV-C Thu PM
Lamont, Julian (University of Queensland)	VIII-I Fri PM
Landesman, Bruce (University of Utah)	IX-J Sat AM
Landry, Elaine (University of Calgary)	III-J Thu AM
Langley, Raymond (Manhattanville College)	GIX-E Sat PM
Lascano, Marcy (California State University–Long Beach)	VII-K Fri PM
Latham, Noa (University of Calgary)	GIV-F Thu PM, X-I Sat PM
Laverty, Megan (Columbia University)	GIV-A Thu PM
Lear, Jonathan (University of Chicago)	XI-B Sat PM
LeBuffe, Michael (Texas A&M University)	X-0 Sat AM
Ledwig, Marion (Stockholms Universitet)	V-G Thu PM
Lee, Chan (University of Hawaii–Manoa)	GIV-C Thu PM
Lee, Emily S. (California State University–Fullerton)	IV-C Thu PM
Lehrer, Keith (University of Arizona)	VI-A Fri AM
Leighton, Stephen (Queen’s University)	III-E Thu AM
Leiter, Brian (University of Texas–Austin)	X-B Sat PM
Lemetti, Juahana (University of Helsinki)	GIX-B Sat PM
Leon, Felipe (University of California–Riverside)	VI-J Fri AM
Lepock, Chris (University of Alberta)	II-G Wed PM
Lercher, Aaron (Louisiana State University)	GIV-H Thu PM
Levin, Janet (University of Southern California)	X-J Sat PM
Levine, Joseph (University of Massachusetts–Amherst)	V-D Thu PM
Levy, Neil (University of Melbourne)	XI-F Sat PM
Lewis, Timothy (University of California–Santa Barbara)	IV-H Thu PM
Li, Yitian (Tsinghua University)	III-E Thu AM
Liao, S. Matthew (Oxford University)	XI-F Sat PM
Lin, Martin (Rutgers University)	X-0 Sat AM
Lingis, Alphonso (Pennsylvania State University)	GIX-I Sat PM
Liu, JeeLoo (California State University–Fullerton)	GIV-C Thu PM, GVII-A Fri PM, X-J Sat PM
Lizza, John P. (Kutztown University of Pennsylvania)	I-L Wed PM
Lloyd, Sharon (University of Southern California)	V-B Thu PM
Lockard, Matthew (University of California–Los Angeles)	VI-J Fri AM
Loeb, Paul S. (University of Puget Sound)	GVII-E Fri PM
Long, Anthony A. (University of California–Berkeley)	X-E Sat PM
Long, Todd R. (California Polytechnic State University–San Luis Obispo)	X-F Sat PM

Lopes, Dominic McIver (University of British Columbia).....	IX-H Sat AM
Loptson, Peter (University of Guelph)	II-G Wed PM
Lucey, Kenneth (University of Nevada–Reno).....	X-F Sat PM
Ludlow, Peter (University of Michigan–Ann Arbor).....	IV-B Thu PM
Ludwig, Kirk (University of Florida).....	X-J Sat PM
Lynch, Joseph (California Polytechnic State University–San Luis Obispo).....	GVII-J Fri PM

M

MacAvoy, Leslie (East Tennessee State University)	IV-F Thu PM
MacLachlan, Alice (York University).....	III-A Thu AM, IV-K Thu PM
MacLean, Douglas (University of North Carolina–Chapel Hill)...	VII-B Fri PM
Maddy, Penelope (University of California–Irvine).....	XI-C Sat PM
Magnus, Bernd (University of California–Riverside)	GVII-E Fri PM
Makang, Jean-Marie (Frostburg State University).....	GI-B Wed PM
Makkreel, Rudolf (Emory University)	GVII-D Fri PM
Malament, David (University of California–Irvine).....	XI-C Sat PM
Marshall, Eugene (Dartmouth College).....	X-H Sat PM, XII-A Sun AM
Marshall, Mason (Vanderbilt University).....	I-H Wed PM
Martell, James A. (Colorado State University)	GIII-C Thu PM
Martin, Eric (University of California–San Diego)	[???
Martin Fischer, John (University of California–Riverside)	VI-C Fri AM
Martin, Adrienne (University of Pennsylvania).....	IX-D Sat AM
Martin, Michael (Ohio State University).....	GIII-E Thu PM
Martinez, Joel (Lewis and Clark College)	VI-B Fri AM, GVII-G Fri PM
Martinich, Al (University of Texas–Austin).....	GII-F Wed PM
Martinot, Steve (San Francisco State University).....	IV-C Thu PM
Matarrese, Craig (Minnesota State University–Mankato)	GII-G Wed PM
Matey, Jennifer (Florida International University).....	I-F Wed PM
Matherne, Samantha (University of California–Riverside).....	II-F Wed PM
Matheson, Jonathan (University of Rochester)	IX-E Sat AM
Matthews, Gareth (University of Massachusetts–Amherst)	I-H Wed PM
Maudlin, Tim (Rutgers University).....	X-A Sat PM
May, Simon Cabulea (Virginia Tech).....	I-G Wed PM
May, Todd (Clemson University)	I-A Wed PM
Mayer, Lorraine (Brandon University)	XI-J Sat PM
Mayorga, Rosa (Virginia Tech).....	GII-E Wed PM
McAleer, Sean (University of Wisconsin–Eau Claire)	III-E Thu AM, GIII-C Thu PM
McCain, Kevin (University of Rochester)	VII-I Fri PM
McCann, Hugh (Texas A&M University).....	IV-D Thu PM
McClure, Kirstie (University of California–Los Angeles).....	GII-F Wed PM

McCormick, Melisa (Community College of Southern Nevada).....	VI-M Fri AM
McGlone, Michael William (University at Buffalo).....	VIII-H Fri PM
McGregor, Joan (Arizona State University)	II-I Wed PM
McKeen, Catherine (Williams College).....	I-H Wed PM
McKenna, Michael (Florida State University)	III-B Thu AM
McKirahan, Richard (Pomona College).....	VI-B Fri AM
McPartland, Keith (Williams College)	I-H Wed PM
McShane, Katie (North Carolina State University)	VI-F Fri AM
Mendieta, Eduardo (State University of New York–Stony Brook) IV-C Thu PM
Mendoza, Jose Jorge (University of Oregon).....	GVIII-C Sat PM
Menon, Tarun (University of California–San Diego).....	IX-E Sat AM
Menzel, Christopher (Texas A&M University)	III-K Thu AM
Merward, Charles (Claremont Graduate University)	III-J Thu AM
Meyers, Christopher (California State University–Bakersfield)....	VI-K Fri AM
Miles, Judy (California State Polytechnic University–Pomona)....	VI-K Fri AM
Miller, Dale (Old Dominion University).....	III-F Thu AM
Miller, Fred D. Jr. (Bowling Green State University)	VI-B Fri AM
Mills, Claudia (University of Colorado–Boulder) III-G Thu AM, IV-J Thu PM
Mills, Ethan (University of New Mexico)	GVI-C Fri PM
Millum, Joseph R. (National Institutes of Health).....	III-G Thu AM
Mion, Giovanni (University of Cincinnati)	I-J Wed PM
Mitchell-Yellin, Benjamin (University of California–Riverside) .	GX-A Sat PM
Mitias, Lara (University of Hawaii–Manoa)	GI-E Wed PM
Modrak, Deborah (University of Rochester)	GIV-G Thu PM
Moellendorf, Darrel (San Diego State University)	GVIII-B Sat PM
Moffett, Marc (University of Wyoming)	VI-I Fri AM
Moody-Adams, Michele (Cornell University).....	III-A Thu AM
Moore, Adam (University of Washington).....	IX-J Sat AM
Moore, Alan (University of California–Riverside)	IV-E Thu PM
Moore, Darrell (DePaul University)	V-K Thu PM
Moore, Joseph (Amherst College)	II-E Wed PM
Moriarty, Paul (Southern Illinois University–Edwardsville) VI-F Fri AM, GIX-D Sat PM
Morrison, Donald (Rice University).....	X-E Sat PM
Morrissey, Clair (University of North Carolina–Chapel Hill)	I-G Wed PM
Morton, Adam (University of Alberta).....	III-A Thu AM
Mosteller, Tim (California Baptist University)	GIV-E Thu PM
Moyar, Dean (Johns Hopkins University)	GV-B Thu PM
Muhlnickel, Robert L. (University of Wisconsin–Eau Claire)...	GVII-H Fri PM

Mun, Cecilia (Arizona State University).....	VII-G Fri PM
Muntean, Ioan (University of California–San Diego).....	V-G Thu PM
Murphy, Jeffrie G. (College of Law, Arizona State University)	X-K Sat PM
Murphy, Peter (University of Indianapolis).....	I-J Wed PM
Murray, Dale (University of Wisconsin–Baraboo/Sauk County and University of Wisconsin–Richland).....	II-D Wed PM
Murray, Patrick (Creighton University).....	GX-B Sat PM
Murray, Robert D. (Ryerson University)	II-H Wed PM
Mysak, Mark (University of North Texas).....	GIX-D Sat PM

N

Nails, Debra (Michigan State University).....	IV-A Thu PM, GIV-D Thu PM
Nanay, Bence (Syracuse University).....	VIII-G Fri PM
Nathanson, Stephen L. (Northeastern University)	VIII-K Fri PM
Neisser, Joseph (Sam Houston State University)	VII-G Fri PM
Nelson, James L. (Michigan State University)	VIII-K Fri PM
Nelson, Lynn Hankinson (University of Washington)	M-1 Wed AM
Nelson, Michael (University of California–Riverside)	III-I Thu AM
Neta, Ram (University of North Carolina–Chapel Hill)	IV-B Thu PM
Neu, Jerome (University of California–Santa Cruz)	X-K Sat PM
Neufeld, Jonathan A. (Vanderbilt University).....	I-E Wed PM
Newman, Lex (University of Utah)	II-F Wed PM
Newman, Mark (University of Minnesota–Duluth).....	VII-J Fri PM
Nichols, Craig (University of Rhode Island)	GVII-C Fri PM
Nichols, Ryan (California State University–Fullerton).....	VII-M Fri PM
Nickel, James (Arizona State University)	XI-A Sat PM
Nickel, Philip (University of California–Irvine)	V-B Thu PM
Nida-Rumelin, Martine (Université de Fribourg).....	V-D Thu PM
Niedbalski, Alison (Western Michigan University).....	I-E Wed PM
Norcross, Alastair (University of Colorado).....	I-H Wed PM
Normore, Calvin (University of California–Los Angeles).....	VI-C Fri AM
Northcott, Robert (University of Missouri–Saint Louis)	V-G Thu PM
Norton-Smith, Thomas M. (Kent State University–Stark)	IX-M Sat AM, XI-J Sat PM
Novack, Gregory (Wayne State University).....	V-G Thu PM
Nutting, Kurt (San Francisco State University).....	GIX-F Sat PM
Nyden-Bullock, Tammy (Grinnell College).....	X-H Sat PM

O

O’Callaghan, Casey (Bates College).....	IV-E Thu PM
O’Connor, David (University of Notre Dame)	X-E Sat PM
O’Connor, John Kurth (Fordham University).....	VIII-F Fri PM

O'Connor, Timothy (Indiana University–Bloomington)	VI-D Fri AM
O'Neill, Eileen (University of Massachusetts–Amherst)	VII-D Fri PM
O'Sullivan, Brendan (Rhodes College).....	VI-J Fri AM
Obdrzalek, Suzanne (Claremont McKenna College).....	III-J Thu AM
Odenbaugh, Jay (Lewis and Clark College)	VIII-G Fri PM
Oele, Marjolein (University of San Francisco)	III-E Thu AM
Oh, Onyoung (City University of New York–Graduate Center)	III-K Thu AM
Olsen, Stein Haugom (Universitetet i Bergen)	XI-D Sat PM
Olshewsky, Thomas (University of Kentucky).....	IX-D Sat AM
Olson, Alan M. (Boston University)	GIX-E Sat PM
Orlandi, Nicoletta (Rice University)	I-B Wed PM
Ostaric, Lara (St. Michael's College)	GV-B Thu PM, X-H Sat PM
Outlaw, Jr., Lucius T. (Vanderbilt University)	GVII-F Fri PM

P

Pace, Michael (Chapman University)	X-G Sat PM
Pacuit, Eric (Stanford University)	II-J Wed PM
Paleologou, Maria (California State University–Bakersfield).....	V-J Thu PM
Palmer, David (University of Texas–Austin)	X-F Sat PM
Palmieri, Diana (University of Western Ontario)	I-J Wed PM
Panagopoulos, Anastasia (University of Minnesota–Twin Cities)	III-H Thu AM
Panchanathan, Karthik (University of California–Los Angeles)	VIII-G Fri PM
Pang-White, Ann (University of Scranton)	GI-E Wed PM, GVII-A Fri PM
Parsons, Glenn (Ryerson University)	VIII-B Fri PM
Patterson, Richard (Emory University)	XI-H Sat PM
Patterson, Steven (Marygrove College)	VIII-K Fri PM
Paul, L.A. (University of Arizona).....	IX-E Sat AM
Paul, Robert (Reed College)	I-I Wed PM
Pautz, Adam (University of Texas–Austin).....	III-C Thu AM
Pave, Adam D. (Claremont Graduate University).....	VI-I Fri AM
Peard, Thomas W. (Baker University).....	VI-K Fri AM
Pearson, Christopher (Southern Illinois University–Edwardsville)	VIII-G Fri PM
Pearson, Yvette (Old Dominion University)	II-I Wed PM
Peck, William (Reed College)	X-H Sat PM
Pedersen, Nikolaj Jang (University of California–Los Angeles)	IX-C Sat AM
Pendergraft, Garrett (University of California–Riverside)	VIII-C Fri PM
Pepp, Jessica (University of California–Los Angeles)	X-J Sat PM
Pereboom, Derk (Cornell University)	III-B Thu AM

Perelmuter, Zeev (University of Toronto)	III-E Thu AM
Perry, John (Stanford University).....	X-C Sat PM
Perszyk, Ken (Victoria University of Wellington).....	IV-D Thu PM
Peterson, Richard (Michigan State University)	GIX-F Sat PM
Pettit, Gordon L. (Western Illinois University)	V-G Thu PM
Pflum, Ryan (Western Michigan University).....	GIII-E Thu PM
Phelan, Mark Timothy (University of North Carolina–Chapel Hill)	III-I Thu AM
Phillips, Hollibert (Whitman College)	X-G Sat PM
Pinillos, Angel (Arizona State University)	III-I Thu AM
Pistone, Paul (Talbot School of Theology)	X-H Sat PM
Pitt, David (California State University–Los Angeles).....	VII-I Fri PM
Placencia, Nathan (University of California–Riverside).....	IV-C Thu PM
Plaisance, Katie (Leibniz University of Hannover)	III-N Thu AM
Poellner, Peter (Warwick University).....	X-B Sat PM
Pomeroy, Anne (Richard Stockton College of New Jersey).....	GVI-B Fri PM
Porter, Steven L. (Biola University).....	GVIII-E Sat PM
Poston, Ted (University of South Alabama)	X-G Sat PM
Powell, John W. (Humboldt State University).....	GII-C Wed PM
Powell, Lewis (University of Southern California)	VII-F Fri PM
Prabhu, Joseph (California State University–Los Angeles)	GIX-E Sat PM
Pratt, Scott L. (University of Oregon)	GI-C Wed PM, XI-J Sat PM
Prinz, Jesse (University of North Carolina–Chapel Hill).....	VI-H Fri AM
Pritchard, Michael (Western Michigan University).....	IV-J Thu PM
Pust, Joel (University of Delaware)	VII-F Fri PM

Q

Quinn, Carol (Metropolitan State College of Denver).....	GIII-C Thu PM
Quiring, John (Victor Valley College).....	GI-F Wed PM

R

Raibley, Jason (California State University–Long Beach)	IV-I Thu PM, GVII-I Fri PM
Rajczi, Alex (Claremont McKenna College)	V-C Thu PM
Ralkowski, Mark (University of New Mexico).....	IV-F Thu PM
Ramal, Randy (Claremont Graduate University).....	GI-F Wed PM
Ramberg, Bjørn (Universitetet i Oslo)	VI-L Fri AM, VII-B Fri PM
Ramirez, Erick (University of California–San Diego)	IV-I Thu PM
Ramsey, John (University of California–Riverside)	III-H Thu AM
Rauls, Mark (College of Southern Nevada).....	III-L Thu AM, VI-M Fri AM
Reath, Andrews (University of California–Riverside).....	VII-A Fri PM
Recanati, Francois (École Normale Supérieure)	X-C Sat PM

Reed, Baron (Northwestern University)	VIII-E Fri PM
Reginster, Bernard (Brown University).....	X-B Sat PM
Reilly, Richard (St. Bonaventure University)	VII-G Fri PM
Reimer, Marga (University of Arizona).....	IX-I Sat AM
Reiner, Toby (University of California–Berkeley).....	GV-C Thu PM
Reiss, Julian (Erasmus University)	II-L Wed PM
Reshotko, Naomi (University of Denver).....	V-J Thu PM
Rettler, Bradley J. (Biola University)	VII-F Fri PM
Reyes, Herminia (San Diego State University).....	I-E Wed PM
Rhodes, Rosamond (Mount Sinai School of Medicine and City University of New York–Graduate Center)	III-G Thu AM, GIX-B Sat PM
Ribeiro, Anna Christina (Texas Tech University)	XI-D Sat PM
Richardson, Sarah (Stanford University)	M-1 Wed AM
Rieppel, Michael (University of California–Berkeley)	III-K Thu AM
Riker, Walter J. (Vanderbilt University)	IV-G Thu PM
Ripstein, Arthur (University of Toronto).....	VIII-A Fri PM
Ritivoi, Andreea (Carnegie Mellon University)	IX-A Sat AM
Rizzieri, Aaron (Arizona State University).....	X-G Sat PM
Robb, David (Davidson College)	X-F Sat PM
Roberts, Matthew (Whitworth College)	GIV-E Thu PM
Roberts, Robert (Baylor University)	III-E Thu AM, GVIII-E Sat PM
Robertson, Teresa (University of Kansas)	VIII-H Fri PM
Robins, Dan (Richard Stockton College of New Jersey)	GIX-C Sat PM
Robison, Rachel (University of Massachusetts–Amherst).....	GIV-I Thu PM
Rocha, James (California State Polytechnic University–Pomona)	II-H Wed PM
Rodriguez, Tanya (City University of New York–City College).....	IV-G Thu PM
Roelofs, Monique (Hampshire College).....	V-K Thu PM
Rogers, Melvin (University of Virginia)	GII-E Wed PM
Rogerson, Ken (Florida International University).....	XI-G Sat PM
Rohel, Jackie (University of Alberta)	GX-A Sat PM
Roland, Jeffrey (Louisiana State University)	VI-I Fri AM
Rolston III, Holmes (Colorado State University).....	VI-F Fri AM
Romano, Carlin (Philadelphia <i>Inquirer</i> /University of Pennsylvania)	VII-B Fri PM
Romaya, Bassam (Temple University)	GIX-G Sat PM
Root, Michael (University of Minnesota)	I-M Wed PM
Rorty, Amélie (National Humanities Center)	XI-E Sat PM
Rorty, Mary V. (Stanford University)	III-G Thu AM
Rosenthal, Michael (University of Washington)	IV-I Thu PM, X-H Sat PM
Roskies, Adina (Dartmouth College and University of Sydney)	XI-F Sat PM

Ross, Jacob (University of Southern California)	II-J Wed PM
Ross, Peter (California State Polytechnic University–Pomona)	
.....	II-E Wed PM
Roth, Abraham (Ohio State University)	VIII-D Fri PM
Rottschaefter, William A. (Lewis and Clark College)	GVII-G Fri PM
Rowlands, Mark (University of Miami)	I-B Wed PM
Royse, James (San Francisco State University)	IX-D Sat AM
Rudd, Anthony (St. Olaf College)	VII-G Fri PM
Ruddick, William (New York University).....	GIII-B Thu PM
Rupert, Robert (University of Colorado–Boulder)	X-I Sat PM
Russell, J. Michael (California State University–Fullerton)	GIV-A Thu PM
Rutherford, Donald (University of California–San Diego)	
.....	X-H Sat PM, XII-A Sun AM
Rychter, Pablo (LOGOS Barcelona)	IV-H Thu PM
Ryckman, Thomas C. (Lawrence University).....	VII-I Fri PM
Rysiew, Patrick W. (University of Victoria)	IV-B Thu PM
S	
Saar, Martin (Universität Frankfurt)	GIX-H Sat PM
Sabo, William Dylan (University of North Carolina–Chapel Hill)	
.....	IV-E Thu PM
Salmon, Nathan (University of California–Santa Barbara)	VIII-H Fri PM
Sanchez, Carlos (San Jose State University)	VIII-F Fri PM
Sanchez, Robert (University of California–Riverside)	III-J Thu AM
Sandler, Ron (Northeastern University).....	X-H Sat PM
Sanson, David (Ohio State University).....	X-I Sat PM
Santilli, Paul C. (Siena College)	VI-H Fri AM, GVII-I Fri PM
Sartwell, Crispin (Dickinson College).....	IX-A Sat AM
Satz, Debra (Stanford University)	VII-C Fri PM
Saucedo, Raul (Cornell University).....	V-H Thu PM
Sawicki, Jana (Williams College)	I-A Wed PM
Sayre-McCord, Geoff (University of North Carolina–Chapel Hill)	
.....	V-C Thu PM
Scarfe, Adam (California State University–Bakersfield)	GI-F Wed PM
Scerri, Eric (University of California–Los Angeles)	VII-J Fri PM
Schaff, Kory (Occidental College)	VII-C Fri PM
Schaffer, Jonathan M. (University of Massachusetts–Amherst)	
.....	IV-B Thu PM
Schaller, Walter E. (Texas Tech University)	III-F Thu AM
Schear, Joseph (California Polytechnic State University–San Luis Obispo).....	II-B Wed PM
Schechtman, Marya (University of Illinois–Chicago).....	I-L Wed PM

Schellenberg, Susanna (Australian National University).....	VIII-J Fri PM
Scheman, Naomi (University of Minnesota).....	IV-N Thu PM
Schiller, Aaron Allen (University of California–San Diego).....	VII-I Fri PM
Schmidtz, David (University of Arizona).....	XI-G Sat PM
Schmitter, Amy (University of Alberta).....	XI-E Sat PM
Schneewind, Jerome (Johns Hopkins University)	VII-B Fri PM, IX-B Sat AM
Scholl, Ann (United Arab Emirates University).....	X-D Sat PM
Schueler, Fred (University of Delaware).....	VI-D Fri AM
Schuler, Jeanne A. (Creighton University).....	GX-B Sat PM
Schulz, Armin (University of Wisconsin–Madison).....	VIII-G Fri PM
Schwab, Martin (University of California–Irvine).....	GIII-D Thu PM
Scoccia, Danny (New Mexico State University).....	I-G Wed PM
Scriven, Michael (Claremont Graduate University).....	GVI-A Fri PM
Segnini, Elisa (University of Toronto).....	GVII-I Fri PM
Sehon, Scott (Bowdoin College).....	VI-D Fri AM
Sennet, Adam (University of California–Davis).....	IX-I Sat AM
Shabout, Nada (University of North Texas).....	GIX-G Sat PM
Shapiro, David A. (Cascadia Community College).....	IV-J Thu PM
Shapiro, Lionel S. (University of Connecticut).....	III-K Thu AM
Shapiro, Lisa (Simon Fraser University).....	VII-D Fri PM
Shapiro, Scott (University of Michigan–Ann Arbor).....	III-D Thu AM
Shaw, Joshua (Pennsylvania State University).....	GVIII-D Sat PM
Sheehan, Thomas (Stanford University).....	VI-E Fri AM
Shelby, Tommie (Harvard University).....	GVII-F Fri PM
Sheley, Jason (University of California–Irvine).....	I-I Wed PM
Shelley, James (Auburn University).....	GIII-A Thu PM, XI-D Sat PM
Sheppard, James (University of Missouri–Kansas City).....	IV-G Thu PM
Sher, George (Rice University).....	V-E Thu PM
Sher, Gila (University of California–San Diego) ...	IV-M Thu PM, VII-N Fri PM
Sherman, Nancy (Georgetown University).....	XI-B Sat PM
Shi, Xianduan (University of Utah).....	GVII-A Fri PM, IX-I Sat AM
Shieber, Joseph (Lafayette College).....	VII-F Fri PM
Shiffrin, Seana (University of California–Los Angeles).....	VIII-A Fri PM
Shim, Michael (California State University–Los Angeles).....	II-B Wed PM
Shochat, Erez (St. Francis College).....	IV-M Thu PM
Shockley, Kenneth E. (University at Buffalo).....	II-D Wed PM, GIX-D Sat PM
Shoemaker, David (Bowling Green State University).....	I-L Wed PM
Shrage, Laurie (California State Polytechnic University–Pomona)	I-A Wed PM, GIX-F Sat PM
Shrestha, Amjot (University of Hawaii–Manoa).....	GVI-C Fri PM

Siderits, Mark (Illinois State University)	I-C Wed PM
Siewert, Charles (University of California–Riverside)	V-D Thu PM
Silva, Grant (University of Oregon)	GVIII-C Sat PM
Silvers, Anita (San Francisco State University)	III-N Thu AM
Silverstein, Elizabeth (University of California–Riverside)	IV-F Thu PM
Simchen, Ori (University of British Columbia)	VI-J Fri AM
Skees, Murray (University of North Florida)	I-E Wed PM
Skirry, Justin (Nebraska Wesleyan University)	VII-H Fri PM
Sklar, Lawrence (University of Michigan–Ann Arbor)	VI-G Fri AM
Skow, Bradford (University of Massachusetts–Amherst)	VII-J Fri PM
Slater, Matthew (University of Idaho)	I-F Wed PM
Slote, Michael (University of Miami)	V-A Thu PM
Smead, Rory (University of California–Irvine)	VIII-G Fri PM
Smith, David Woodruff (University of California–Irvine)	IV-F Thu PM, GIII-D Thu PM
Smith, Matthew Noah (Yale University)	VIII-D Fri PM
Smith, Nicholas D. (Lewis and Clark College)	Fri PM
Smith, Sheldon (University of California–Los Angeles)	VI-G Fri AM
Smolkin, Doran (Kwantlen University College)	IX-J Sat AM
Snapper, Jeffrey Alan (Northern Illinois University)	VII-K Fri PM
Snow, Nancy E. (Marquette University)	IX-N Sat AM
Snyder, Jeremy (Simon Fraser University)	VIII-I Fri PM
Sober, Elliott (University of Wisconsin–Madison)	VII-L Fri PM
Solum, Lawrence (University of Illinois–Urbana-Champaign)	III-D Thu AM
Sommer, Deborah (Gettysburg College)	GVII-A Fri PM
Sonderholm, Jorn (Georgetown University)	V-I Thu PM
Song, Edward H.K. (Louisiana State University)	IX-J Sat AM
Sorem, Erik (University College, Dublin)	GIII-E Thu PM
Sosa, Ernest (Rutgers University)	VI-A Fri AM
Sowaal, Alice (San Francisco State University)	VII-D Fri PM
Spackman, John (Middlebury College)	GVI-C Fri PM
Speak, Daniel (Loyola Marymount University) ...	X-F Sat PM, GVIII-E Sat PM
Speaks, Jeff (University of Notre Dame)	IX-C Sat AM
Spencer, Cara (Howard University)	VII-I Fri PM
Spencer, Joshua (University of Rochester)	IX-G Sat AM
Stalnaker, Aaron (Indiana University–Bloomington)	GIX-C Sat PM
Stangl, Rebecca Lynn (University of Virginia)	IX-F Sat AM
Starrett, Shari (California State University–Fullerton)	GVII-E Fri PM
Stecker, Robert A. (Central Michigan University)	VII-H Fri PM
Steiker, Carol (Harvard University)	X-K Sat PM

Stephenson, Wendell (Fresno City College)	VI-M Fri AM
Stern, David G. (University of Iowa).....	I-D Wed PM
Stichter, Matt (Washington State University).....	III-F Thu AM
Stone, Brad Elliott (Loyola Marymount University).....	II-H Wed PM
Stoutland, Fred (Uppsala Universitet)	VI-D Fri AM
Stramel, James (Santa Monica College)	GIII-C Thu PM
Strawser, Michael (University of Central Florida)	
.....	GIV-D Thu PM, VIII-F Fri PM
Strong, Alejandro (Southern Illinois University–Carbondale)	
.....	GVIII-C Sat PM
Strong, Tracy (University of California–San Diego)	GVII-E Fri PM
Stroud, Barry (University of California–Berkeley)	
.....	V-L Thu PM, XI-C Sat PM
Stroud, Sarah (McGill University)	VII-A Fri PM
Stueber, Karsten (College of the Holy Cross)	GV-C Thu PM
Suikkanen, Jussi (University of Reading)	IX-F Sat AM
Sun, Weimin (California State University–Northridge)	GII-B Wed PM
Sundell, Timothy (University of Michigan–Ann Arbor)	III-I Thu AM
Sundstrom, Par (Umeå Universitet)	IV-E Thu PM
Sundstrom, Ronald Robles (University of San Francisco).....	GVII-F Fri PM
Superson, Anita (University of Kentucky)	IX-N Sat AM
Suppes, Patrick (Stanford University)	I-K Wed PM
Sveinsdottir, Asta (San Francisco State University)	IX-E Sat AM
Swanton, Christine (University of Auckland).....	GIX-A Sat PM
Swenson, Adam (California State University–Northridge)	VII-F Fri PM
Swift, Paul A. (Bryant University)	II-I Wed PM, GVII-J Fri PM
Switzer, Michelle (Whittier College).....	IV-G Thu PM
Symington, Paul Frederick (University of San Francisco)	VII-H Fri PM
Sáenz, Mario (Le Moyne College).....	IV-C Thu PM

T

Talbert, Matthew (West Virginia University)	III-F Thu AM
Talisse, Robert (Vanderbilt University).....	I-G Wed PM, GII-E Wed PM
Tang, Siu-Fu (Chinese University of Hong Kong)	GIV-C Thu PM
Tannenbaum, Julie (California State University–Northridge)	IX-D Sat AM
Tappenden, Jamie (University of Michigan)	VII-N Fri PM
Taylor, James (Westmont College)	VII-K Fri PM
Taylor, Paul (Temple University).....	V-K Thu PM
Teays, Wanda (Mount St. Mary's College).....	VIII-K Fri PM, GVI-A Fri PM
Tenenbaum, Sergio (University of Toronto).....	VII-A Fri PM
Tennberg, Chris (University of California–Santa Barbara).....	X-I Sat PM
Tessman, Lisa (State University of New York–Binghamton)	IX-N Sat AM

Tester, David Glenn (Oxford University).....	XI-I Sat PM
Thielke, Peter (Pomona College)	GV-A Thu PM
Thomas, Brian (University of California–Riverside)	II-H Wed PM
Thomas, Christine (Dartmouth College)	VI-B Fri AM
Thompson, Allen (Clemson University)	IX-F Sat AM
Thompson, Brad (Southern Methodist University)	VII-I Fri PM
Thompson, Evan (University of Toronto)	I-B Wed PM
Thompson, Lindsay (Johns Hopkins University).....	IV-K Thu PM
Thomson, Iain (University of New Mexico)	VI-E Fri AM
Thorbjørn Hansen, Finn (University of Aarhus).....	GII-A Wed PM
Tiboris, Michael (University of California–San Diego)	VI-C Fri AM
Tietjen, Mark A. (University of Georgia)	III-J Thu AM
Tillmanns, Maria DaVenza (University of California–San Diego)	
.....	GIV-A Thu PM
Tognazzini, Neal A. (University of California–Riverside)	X-F Sat PM
Tomhave, Alan (University of Missouri–Columbia).....	IX-J Sat AM
Tomsons, Sandra (University of Winnipeg)	XI-J Sat PM
Toner, Patrick (Wake Forest University).....	X-I Sat PM
Tong, Rosemarie (University of North Carolina–Charlotte).....	IV-K Thu PM
Tooley, Michael (University of Colorado–Boulder)	IV-D Thu PM
Traiger, Saul (Occidental College)	GVII-B Fri PM
Trianosky, Gregory (California State University–Northridge)	II-G Wed PM
Tropea, Greg (California State University–Chico)	GII-A Wed PM
Tuana, Nancy (Pennsylvania State University).....	M-1 Wed AM
Tuedio, Jim (California State University–Stanislaus)	
.....	GII-A Wed PM, GIV-A Thu PM
Tuozzo, Thomas (University of Kansas)	XI-H Sat PM
Turanski, Sonia (Eastern Maine Community College).....	GVII-J Fri PM
Turner, Dale (Dartmouth College).....	IX-M Sat AM
Tweedale, Martin (University of Alberta).....	V-H Thu PM
Tye, Michael (University of Texas–Austin).....	III-C Thu AM

U

Ulatowski, Joe (Weber State University).....	GIV-I Thu PM
Ulatowski, Joseph (University of Utah)	V-I Thu PM
Uliana, Regina L. (Independent Scholar).....	GIV-A Thu PM
Uzgalis, William (Oregon State University).....	V-J Thu PM

V

Vakarelov, Orlin (University of Arizona).....	III-H Thu AM
Vallentyne, Peter (University of Missouri–Columbia).....	XI-G Sat PM
Van Camp, Julie C. (California State University–Long Beach)...	VII-H Fri PM

Van Cleve, James (University of Southern California)	VIII-C Fri PM
Van Hollebeke, Mark (Seattle University)	GII-E Wed PM
Van Norden, Bryan W. (Vassar College)	V-A Thu PM
Van Roojen, Mark (University of Nebraska–Lincoln)	I-I Wed PM
Van Woudenberg, René (University of Notre Dame)	V-F Thu PM
Vance, Chad (University of Colorado–Boulder).....	GX-A Sat PM
Vargas, Manuel (University of San Francisco).....	III-B Thu AM
Veillet, Benedicte (University of Maryland–College Park).....	IV-E Thu PM
Vessel, Jean-Paul (New Mexico State University)	II-K Wed PM
Vilhauer, Benjamin (William Paterson University).....	IX-G Sat AM
Vineberg, Susan (Wayne State University).....	VII-F Fri PM
Viney, Donald (Pittsburg State University).....	GI-F Wed PM
Vision, Gerald (Temple University)	III-K Thu AM
Vitz, Rico (University of North Florida)	II-G Wed PM
Vogel, Jonathan (Amherst College)	VIII-C Fri PM
Vollmer, S.H. (University of Alabama–Birmingham).....	VII-J Fri PM
Vranas, Peter B.M. (University of Wisconsin–Madison).....	II-J Wed PM

W

Walker, Lee (California State University–Chico)	GI-B Wed PM
Wall, Edmund (East Carolina University)	III-F Thu AM
Wallis, Charles (California State University–Long Beach).....	VII-G Fri PM
Walsh, Denis (University of Toronto)	VII-L Fri PM
Wang, Robin (Loyola Marymount University) ...	II-J Wed PM, GII-B Wed PM
Ward, Andrew C. (University of Minnesota–Division of Health Policy and Management)	VI-K Fri AM
Ward, John (University of Utah)	II-K Wed PM
Warenski, Lisa (Union College).....	VIII-E Fri PM
Warren, Mary Anne (Independent Scholar)	I-L Wed PM
Warren, Tonya (San Diego State University)	GVII-J Fri PM
Warriner, Jennifer (University of Utah).....	X-D Sat PM
Watson, Lori (University of San Diego).....	I-G Wed PM, GV-A Thu PM
Watson, Stephen (University of Notre Dame).....	GIX-H Sat PM
Waugh, Joanne (University of South Florida)	GI-D Wed PM, IV-H Thu PM
Wautischer, Helmut (Sonoma State University)	I-J Wed PM, GVII-C Fri PM
Way, Jonathan (University of California–Santa Barbara).....	I-I Wed PM
Wayne, Andrew (University of Guelph).....	I-F Wed PM
Weber, Todd (Monterey Peninsula College)	V-I Thu PM
Weinberg, Rivka (Scripps College)	II-D Wed PM
Weiner, Matthew (University of Vermont)	II-A Wed PM

Wellman, Christopher Heath (Washington University in St. Louis)	VII-C Fri PM
Weslake, Bradley (University of Rochester)	X-J Sat PM
West, Henry (Macalester College)	IX-D Sat AM
Westbrook, Nathan (University of California–Riverside)	IV-E Thu PM
Westerstahl, Dag (Goteborg University)	IV-M Thu PM
Wethington, W.B. (Biola University)	GIV-E Thu PM
Wettstein, Howard (University of California–Riverside)	III-A Thu AM
Wheeler, Michael (University of Stirling)	I-B Wed PM, IX-L Sat AM
White, Roger (Massachusetts Institute of Technology)	IX-H Sat AM
Wieland, Nellie (California State University–Long Beach)	IX-I Sat AM
Wilcox, Shelley (San Francisco State University/Temple University)	IV-G Thu PM
Williams, Meredith (Johns Hopkins University)	I-D Wed PM
Willer, Malte (University of Texas–Austin)	III-H Thu AM
Williams, Christopher (University of Nevada–Reno)	GIII-A Thu PM
Williams, Michael (Johns Hopkins University)	VII-B Fri PM, IX-K Sat AM
Wilson, Donald (Kansas State University)	VI-I Fri AM
Wilson, Mark (University of Pittsburgh)	XI-C Sat PM
Winfree, Jason (California State University–Stanislaus)	GIX-I Sat PM
Wisnewski, J. Jeremy (Hartwick College)	GIV-H Thu PM, GVII-H Fri PM, X-H Sat PM
Wolf, Susan (University of North Carolina–Chapel Hill)	VI-K Fri AM
Wolfsdorf, David (Temple University)	IV-A Thu PM
Wong, David (Duke University)	III-M Thu AM
Wong, Kevin (Biola University)	GIV-E Thu PM
Wong, Wai-ying (Lingnan University)	GIV-C Thu PM
Woodruff, Martha (Middlebury College)	III-E Thu AM, GIV-G Thu PM
Woods, Cathal (Virginia Wesleyan College)	XI-H Sat PM
Woods, John (Princeton University)	GII-C Wed PM
Woods, John (University of Minnesota–Twin Cities)	VIII-H Fri PM
Woods, Mark (University of San Diego)	IV-G Thu PM, GIX-D Sat PM
Wrathall, Mark (University of California–Riverside)	X-B Sat PM
Wray, K. Brad (State University of New York–Oswego)	VII-J Fri PM
Wright, Cory (University of California–San Diego)	I-F Wed PM
Wright, Darryl (Harvey Mudd College)	IV-I Thu PM, GIX-A Sat PM
Wright, Jennifer (University of Wyoming)	GVII-G Fri PM
Wright, Sarah A. (University of Georgia)	II-G Wed PM
Wyatt, Nicole (University of Calgary)	V-I Thu PM
Wykstra, Stephen (Calvin College)	IX-H Sat AM
Wüthrich, Christian (University of California–San Diego)	VII-J Fri PM

X

Xiao, Yang (Kenyon College) III-M Thu AM

Y

Yaffe, Gideon (University of Southern California) VI-C Fri AM

Yamada, Masahiro (Claremont Graduate University) XI-I Sat PM

Yang, Xiaomei (Southern Connecticut State University) GII-B Wed PM

Yates, Melissa (Northwestern University) I-G Wed PM

Young, Charles (Claremont Graduate University) II-F Wed PM

Yount, David J. (Mesa Community College) I-H Wed PM

Youpa, Andrew (Southern Illinois University–Carbondale) IV-I Thu PM

Yuan, Lijun (Texas State University–San Marcos)
..... II-F Wed PM, GVII-A Fri PM

Z

Zack, Naomi (University of Oregon) GIX-F Sat PM

Zahavi, Dan (University of Copenhagen) II-B Wed PM

Zalta, Edward N. (Stanford University) III-I Thu AM, VII-N Fri PM

Zimmerman, Aaron (University of California–Santa Barbara) I-I Wed PM

Zinkin, Melissa (State University of New York–Binghamton) ... GV-A Thu PM

Zipursky, Benjamin (Fordham University) X-K Sat PM

Zuckert, Rachel (Northwestern University) GVII-D Fri PM

Zwolinski, Matt (University of San Diego) VIII-I Fri PM

GRADUATE STUDENT TRAVEL STIPEND WINNERS

Joseph Quinton Adams (Georgia State University)
“The Inconsistency of Morally Required Diminishment”
IX-G Saturday, 9:00 a.m.-Noon

Yuval Avnur (New York University)
“Hawthorne on the Deeply Contingent A Priori”
IX-C Saturday, 9:00 a.m.-Noon

Nathan Ballantyne (University of Arizona)
“Variability and Skepticism”
I-J Wednesday, 1:00-4:00 p.m.

John T. Bengson (University of Texas–Austin)
“Is Intuition a Form of Perception?”
VI-J Friday, 9:00 a.m.-Noon

Josh Blander (University of California–Los Angeles)
“Duns Scotus on Formal Distinction, Identity, and Material Constitution”
V-H Thursday, 4:00-6:00 p.m.

Ayca Boylu (University of Virginia)
“*Republic V*: What Our Cognitive Powers Cannot Be”
I-H Wednesday, 1:00-4:00 p.m.

Danielle Bromwich (University of Toronto)
“Belief and Motivation”
I-I Wednesday, 1:00-4:00 p.m.

Fabrizio Cariani (University of California–Berkeley)
“Disjunctive Obligations and Implicature”

III-I Thursday, 1:00-4:00 p.m.

Roger Clarke (University of British Columbia)
“How to Manipulate an Incompatibilistically Free Agent”

X-F Saturday, 1:00-4:00 p.m.

Lisa Damm (University of California–San Diego)
“The Metaphysics of Love”

VII-G Friday, 1:00-4:00 p.m.

Nicholas Diehl (University of California–Davis)
“Imagining De Re and the Symmetry Thesis of Narration”

I-E Wednesday, 1:00-4:00 p.m.

Andreas Elpidorou (Boston University)
“Chasing (Away) the Trace of Dogma: Reconsidering the Role of Presence Through Husserl’s Inner Time-Consciousness and Derrida’s Speech and Phenomena”

VIII-F Friday, 4:00-6:00 p.m.

Brian Fiala (University of Arizona)
“Materialism and the Psychology of Explanation”

VII-I Friday, 1:00-4:00 p.m.

Christopher Evan Franklin (University of California–Riverside)
“Truth at a World for Modal Propositions”

III-K Thursday, 9:00 a.m.-Noon

Stan Husi (Rice University)
“Desire Accounts of Value: Actual Versus Informed”

IV-I Thursday, 1:00-4:00 p.m.

David Jehle (Cornell University)

“Epistemic Closure and Bayesian Evidentialism”

IX-H Saturday, 9:00 a.m.-Noon

Daniel M. Johnson (Baylor University)

“Can Moore’s Proof Rationally Persuade without Transmitting Warrant?”

I-J Wednesday, 1:00-4:00 p.m.

Charlie Kurth (University of California–San Diego)

“A Deflationary Account of the Unity of Color”

II-E Wednesday, 4:00-6:00 p.m.

Jonathan Matheson (University of Rochester)

“Fragile Events and the Causal Relation”

IX-E Saturday, 9:00 a.m.-Noon

David Palmer (University of Texas–Austin)

“Pereboom on the Frankfurt Cases”

X-F Saturday, 1:00-4:00 p.m.

Mark Timothy Phelan (University of North Carolina–Chapel Hill)

“Dirty Cheap Contextualism”

III-I Thursday, 9:00 a.m.-Noon

Mark Ralkowski (University of New Mexico)

“How Heidegger Should Have Read Plato”

IV-F Thursday, 1:00-4:00 p.m.

Aaron Rizzieri (Arizona State University)

“Timothy Williamson on Knowledge and Evidence: A Critique”

X-G Saturday, 1:00-4:00 p.m.

William Dylan Sabo (University of North Carolina–Chapel Hill)

“Concept Acquisition without Representation”

IV-E Thursday, 1:00-4:00 p.m.

Jeffrey Alan Snapper (Northern Illinois University)

“God, Evil, and Closure”

VII-K Friday, 1:00-4:00 p.m.

David Glenn Tester (Oxford University)

“A Neglected Role for Descriptive Premises in Normative Inquiry”

XI-I Saturday, 4:00-6:00 p.m.

Alan Tomhave (University of Missouri–Columbia)

“Does a Monopoly on Force a State Make? Is it Necessary?”

IX-J Saturday, 9:00 a.m.-Noon

Benedicte Veillet (University of Maryland–College Park)

“Concept Acquisition and Partial Conceptualism”

IV-E Thursday, 1:00-4:00 p.m.

Jonathan Way (University of California–Santa Barbara)

“Defending the Wide-Scope Account of Instrumental Reason”

I-I Wednesday, 1:00-4:00 p.m.

Malte Willer (University of Texas–Austin)

“Visual Perceptions: A Plea for Simple Contents”

III-H Thursday, 9:00 a.m.-Noon

GROUP SESSIONS

A

American Association of Philosophy Teachers, *Wednesday, March 19, 6:30-8:30 p.m.*

American Society for Aesthetics, *Thursday, March 20, 6:30-8:30 p.m.*

American Society for Philosophy, Counseling, and Psychotherapy, Session 1, *Wednesday, March 19, 6:30-9:30 p.m.*

American Society for Philosophy, Counseling, and Psychotherapy, Session 2, *Thursday, March 20, 6:30-9:30 p.m.*

Association for Chinese Philosophers in America, Session 1, *Wednesday, March 19, 6:30-9:30 p.m.*

Association for Chinese Philosophers in America, Session 2, *Friday, March 21, 8:00-11:00 p.m.*

Association for Informal Logic and Critical Thinking, Session 1, *Friday, March 21, 8:00-10:00 p.m.*

Association for Informal Logic and Critical Thinking, Session 2, *Saturday, March 22, 6:30-8:30 p.m.*

Ayn Rand Society, *Saturday, March 22, 6:30-9:30 p.m.*

C

Concerned Philosophers for Peace, *Wednesday, March 19, 6:30-8:30 p.m.*

H

Hume Society, *Friday, March 21, 8:00-11:00 p.m.*

I

International Hobbes Association, Session 1, *Thursday, March 20, 6:30-9:30 p.m.*

International Hobbes Association, Session 2, *Saturday, March 22, 6:30-9:30 p.m.*

International Society for Chinese Philosophy and Association of Chinese Philosophers in America, *Thursday, March 20, 6:30-9:30 p.m.*

International Society for Comparative Studies of Chinese and Western Philosophy, *Saturday, March 22, 6:30-9:30 p.m.*

International Society for Environmental Ethics, Session 1, *Thursday, March 20, 6:30-8:30 p.m.*

International Society for Environmental Ethics, Session 2, *Saturday, March 22, 6:30-9:30 p.m.*

J

Josiah Royce Society, *Wednesday, March 19, 6:30-8:30 p.m.*

K

Karl Jaspers Society, Session 1, *Friday, March 21, 8:00-11:00 p.m.*

Karl Jaspers Society, Session 2, *Saturday, March 22, 6:30-9:30 p.m.*

N

North American Kant Society, Session 1, *Thursday, March 20, 8:30-10:30 p.m.*

North American Kant Society, Session 2, *Friday, March 21, 8:00-11:00 p.m.*

North American Nietzsche Society, *Friday, March 21, 8:00-11:00 p.m.*

North American Society for Social Philosophy and the Society for Philosophy and Public Affairs, *Friday, March 21, 8:00-11:00 p.m.*

North American Spinoza Society, *Thursday, March 20, 6:30-9:30 p.m.*

North American Wittgenstein Society, *Wednesday, March 19, 6:30-9:30 p.m.*

P

Philosophy of Religion Group, *Thursday, March 20, 6:30-9:30 p.m.*

Philosophy of Time Society, *Thursday, March 20, 6:30-9:30 p.m.*

R

Radical Philosophy Association, Session 1, *Friday, March 21, 8:00-10:00 p.m.*

Radical Philosophy Association, Session 2, *Saturday, March 22, 6:30-9:30 p.m.*

S

Society for Analytical Feminism, *Wednesday, March 19, 6:30-8:30 p.m.*

Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy, *Thursday, March 20, 6:30-9:30 p.m.*

Society for Arab, Persian, and Islamic Philosophy, *Saturday, March 22, 6:30-9:30 p.m.*

Society for Asian and Comparative Philosophy, Session 1, *Wednesday, March 19, 6:30-8:30 p.m.*

Society for Asian and Comparative Philosophy, Session 2, *Friday, March 21, 8:00-10:00 p.m.*

Society for Empirical Ethics, *Friday, March 21, 8:00-11:00 p.m.*

Society for German Idealism, Session 1, *Wednesday, March 19, 6:30-9:30 p.m.*

Society for German Idealism, Session 2, *Thursday, March 20, 8:30-10:30 p.m.*

Society for Lesbian and Gay Philosophy and the APA Committee on the Status of Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and Transgendered People in the Profession, *Thursday, March 20, 6:30-8:30 p.m.*

Society for Phenomenology and Analytic Philosophy, *Thursday, March 20, 6:30-8:30 p.m.*

Society for Philosophy and Public Affairs, *Saturday, March 22, 6:30-8:30 p.m.*

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- Society for Philosophy in the Contemporary World, Session 1, *Thursday, March 20, 6:30-9:30 p.m.*
- Society for Philosophy in the Contemporary World, Session 2, *Friday, March 21, 8:00-11:00 p.m.*
- Society for Skeptical Studies, *Thursday, March 20, 6:30-8:30 p.m.*
- Society for Student Philosophers, Session 1, *Thursday, March 20, 6:30-8:30 p.m.*
- Society for Student Philosophers, Session 2, *Saturday, March 22, 8:30-10:30 p.m.*
- Society for Women in Philosophy, *Saturday, March 22, 6:30-8:30 p.m.*
- Society for the Advancement of American Philosophy, Graduate Student Section, *Saturday, March 22, 6:30-8:30 p.m.*
- Society for the Advancement of American Philosophy, *Wednesday, March 19, 6:30-9:30 p.m.*
- Society for the Philosophic Study of the Contemporary Visual Arts, *Friday, March 21, 8:00-11:00 p.m.*
- Society for the Philosophical Study of Marxism, *Saturday, March 22, 8:30-10:30 p.m.*
- Society for the Philosophy of History, Session 1, *Wednesday, March 19, 6:30-9:30 p.m.*
- Society for the Philosophy of History, Session 2, *Thursday, March 20, 8:30-10:30 p.m.*
- Society for the Philosophy of History, Session 3, *Saturday, March 22, 6:30-9:30 p.m.*
- Society for the Study of Philosophy and the Martial Arts, *Friday, March 21, 8:00-11:00 p.m.*
- Society for the Study of Process Philosophy, *Wednesday, March 19, 6:30-8:30 p.m.*
- Society of Christian Philosophers, *Saturday, March 22, 6:30-8:30 p.m.*
- Society of Indian Philosophy and Religion, *Wednesday, March 19, 6:30-9:30 p.m.*

W

- Western Phenomenology Conference, *Saturday, March 22, 6:30-9:30 p.m.*
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SPECIAL SESSIONS SPONSORED BY APA COMMITTEES

WEDNESDAY, MARCH 19

Pedagogical Developments in Philosophy and Computers (I-K)

Sponsored by the APA Committee on Philosophy and Computers

1:00-4:00 p.m.

Persons, Human Organisms, and Bioethics (I-L)

Sponsored by the APA Committee on Philosophy and Medicine

1:00-4:00 p.m.

THURSDAY, MARCH 20

So You Want to Apply for a Job at a Community College? (III-L)

Sponsored by the APA Committee on Philosophy in Two-Year Colleges

9:00 a.m.-Noon

Author-Meets-Critics: David Wong, *Natural Moralities: A Defense of Pluralistic Relativism* (III-M)

Sponsored by the APA Committee on the Status of Asian and Asian-American Philosophers and Philosophies

9:00 a.m.-Noon

Writing Philosophy for Youth and Teens (IV-J)

Sponsored by the APA Committee on Pre-College Instruction in Philosophy

1:00-4:00 p.m.

Strategizing Changes in the Culture and Ideology of Philosophy (IV-K)

Sponsored by the APA Committee on the Status of Women

1:00-4:00 p.m.

Aesthetics and Race (V-K)

Sponsored by the APA Committee on Black Philosophers

4:00-6:00 p.m.

FRIDAY, MARCH 21**The Influence of American Philosophy in Scandinavia (VI-L)**

Sponsored by the APA Committee on International Cooperation

9:00 a.m.-Noon

The Promise and Perils of Teaching Philosophy Online at Two Year Schools (VI-M)

Sponsored by the APA Committee on Philosophy in Two-Year Colleges

9:00 a.m.-Noon

Prometheus Prize Lecture (VII-L)

Sponsored by the APA Committee on Lectures, Publications and Research

1:00-3:00 p.m.

Teaching Philosophy Through Science Fiction (VII-M)

Sponsored by the APA Committee on the Teaching of Philosophy

1:00-4:00 p.m.

Barwise Prize Lecture (VIII-L)

Sponsored by the APA Committee on Philosophy and Computers

4:00-6:00 p.m.

SATURDAY, MARCH 22**Pyrrhonism in Latin America (IX-K)**

Sponsored by the APA Committee on Hispanics

9:00 a.m.-Noon

Artificial Intelligence: East to West (IX-L)

Sponsored by the APA Committee on International Cooperation

9:00 a.m.-Noon

Author-Meets-Readers: Dale Turner, *This Is Not a Peace Pipe: Towards a Critical Indigenous Philosophy* (IX-M)

Sponsored by the APA Committee on the Status of American Indians in Philosophy

9:00 a.m.-Noon

Feminist Perspectives on Vice (IX-N)

Sponsored by the APA Committee on the Status of Women, the Society for Analytic Feminism and the Association for Feminist Ethics and Social Theory

9:00 a.m.-Noon

The Work of Jeffrie G. Murphy (X-K)

Sponsored by the APA Committee on Philosophy and Law

1:00-4:00 p.m.

Author-Meets-Readers: Lorraine Mayer, *Cries from a Metis Heart* (XI-J)

Sponsored by the APA Committee on the Status of American Indians in Philosophy

4:00-6:00 p.m.

ABSTRACTS OF COLLOQUIUM AND SYMPOSIUM PAPERS

THE INCONSISTENCY OF MORALLY REQUIRED DIMINISHMENT (IX-G)

JOSEPH ADAMS, GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY

I argue that Hampton's retributivism in *Forgiveness and Mercy* is flawed. I show that her theory is inconsistent with its Kantian commitments. I explore and tentatively reject a friendly amendment to Hampton's argument. A guilty criminal sends a false lowering message about the relative worth of the victim. This lowering message is evidence that needs nullification. Criminals deserve punishment because we have a duty to reassert the victim's true, equal worth through the defeat of punishment. Punishment accomplishes defeat by diminishing the criminal. Diminishment is the experience of receiving a lowering message which reveals a lower than expected level of human worth. Hampton commits to a Kantian theory of worth. Diminishment is possible only with a non-Kantian theory. Thus, if we link punishment to diminishment, then Hampton's retributivism demands an experience that her retributivism takes to be impossible.

RESTORATIVE JUSTICE, RETRIBUTIVE JUSTICE, AND THE SOUTH AFRICAN TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSION (IX-G)

LUCY ALLAIS, UNIVERSITY OF THE WITWATERSRAND

There are three standard views on the moral justification of the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC). One view is that it was morally wrong because it was an unjustifiable compromise with justice. Those who see it as morally justified see it either as an acceptable compromise with justice, or as giving expression to a different kind of justice from retributive justice, called "restorative" justice. In this paper I question both of the approaches used to morally justify the TRC, but do not accept that it was morally unjustified. I examine the extent to which the TRC really gave expression to restorative justice and argue that this is limited. Then I suggest that there is a way of seeing the TRC as giving expression to the moral grounds underlying retributive justice. Finally, I question the extent to which restorative justice is a distinct kind of justice from retributive justice.

*IGNORANCE IS NOT ENOUGH: WHY THE IGNORANCE HYPOTHESIS FAILS TO UNDERMINE THE CONCEIVABILITY AND KNOWLEDGE ARGUMENTS (VII-F)**TORIN ALTER, UNIVERSITY OF ALABAMA*

Daniel Stoljar's (2006) ignorance hypothesis says that we are ignorant of a type of nonexperiential, experience-relevant truth: a truth that is not about experience but is an essential part of a set of truths that entail experiential truths. He defends both the hypothesis and the following conditional thesis (CT): the ignorance hypothesis, if true, undermines the conceivability and knowledge arguments (CA & KA). I argue that his argument for CT draws the wrong conclusion from one of his central analogies. And against CT, I argue that the ignorance hypothesis does not threaten the core epistemic claim of CA & KA, that there are experiential truths that cannot be deduced from truths about structure and dynamics. Stoljar rejects a version of that argument but, I argue, his objections depend on implausibly identifying non-structural/dynamic properties with intrinsic properties.

*TOWARD A NEW CRITERION OF IDENTITY FOR PROPERTIES (V-H)**PAUL AUDI, UNIVERSITY OF NEBRASKA-OMAHA*

Questions about the identity and difference of properties crop up in nearly every branch of philosophy. Is being red being disposed to reflect certain wavelengths of light? Is being good maximizing pleasure? Is being in pain being in a certain neural state? Here I make a negative point and a positive one, taking off from an example of necessarily coextensive, non-causal properties. First, I use the example to show why properties cannot be individuated either by necessary coextension or on the basis of their causal roles. Second, I use it to motivate an identity condition for properties given in terms of grounding, the non-causal relation of determination I take to be expressed by the phrase "in virtue of." I close by saying briefly how this new criterion re-situates us with respect to the mind-body problem.

*HAWTHORNE ON THE DEEPLY CONTINGENT A PRIORI (IX-C)**YUVAL AVNUR, NEW YORK UNIVERSITY*

According to most contemporary philosophers there can be no deeply contingent a priori knowledge. Call that view "the orthodoxy." Hawthorne (2002) attempts to undermine the orthodoxy by first giving an objection to an argument for the orthodoxy, and then appealing to our intuitions about three cases in which it is tempting to say that the subject has deeply contingent a priori knowledge. He notes that our intuitions about those cases are shifty, and claims that the same shiftiness occurs in cases of a posteriori knowledge. So he concludes that there is nothing especially problematic about deeply contingent a priori knowledge. In reply, I offer an argument in favor of the orthodoxy which (a) is not susceptible to Hawthorne's first objection, (b) is consistent with the shiftiness that Hawthorne describes, and (c) presents a problem only for deeply contingent a priori knowledge, not for ordinary a posteriori knowledge.

LIFE-ADJUSTMENT AND LIFE-IMPROVEMENT (IX-F)

H.E. BABER, UNIVERSITY OF SAN DIEGO

Preferentists hold that preference-satisfaction alone contributes to well-being. If preferentism is true it seems to follow that *ceteris paribus* modifying a person's preferences to be satisfied by what is on offer should be as good as improving the circumstances of her life to satisfy her preferences. Critics suggest that no subjective account of well-being, whether preferentist or hedonist, can explain our intuitions in these cases: unless we recognize that some states of affairs are objectively more conducive to well-being than others we cannot account for our conviction that life-adjustment is not the moral equivalent of life-improvement. Can we accommodate this conviction without signing onto an objective account of well-being? I argue that we can, if we grant that the satisfaction of (actual and possible) preferences at non-actual possible worlds contributes to well-being.

THE REALITY OF POSSIBLE WORLDS (VIII-H)

ALLAN BÄCK, KUTZTOWN UNIVERSITY

Some, like Spinoza, Frege, Quine, and perhaps Plotinus, don't care for modalities in any real sense. For them talking about mere contingencies as possible worlds only reflects our ignorance. Others see possible worlds as inevitable, either in recognizing them as real objects or at any rate in our postulating them for doing theory. Today pluralism reigns: Kripke and his camp rule over the modal domain, while others just disparage or ignore it. Here though I want to argue—none too originally but perhaps persuasively—that the logical modalities are embedded in the very conception of a formal language. I then offer a simple way to think of the modalities and of possible beings, and even of impossible beings and absurd ones without losing that robust sense of reality.

HOW PHILOSOPHY CAN INFORM THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY FOR WORKPLACE ACCOMMODATIONS – AN ESSAY IN APPLIED PHILOSOPHY (VI-K)

PAUL BAKER, CENTER FOR ADVANCED COMMUNICATIONS POLICY—GEORGIA INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY, AND ANDREW C. WARD, UNIVERSITY OF MINNESOTA—DIVISION OF HEALTH POLICY AND MANAGEMENT

In the opening chapter of *Dependent Rational Animals*, Alasdair MacIntyre laments that from “Plato to Moore and since there are usually...only passing references to human vulnerabilities and affliction and to the connection between them and our dependence on others.” To redress this lacuna, we apply a variety of philosophic concepts to the issue of workplace accommodations for people with disabilities. To set the context for our discussion, we begin by recalling Isaiah Berlin's distinction between negative freedom and positive freedom. While Berlin's distinction is useful, it fails to capture the ethically salient issues in proposals to shift from engineered, one-of-a-kind workplace accommodations to universally designed environments that create systemic changes in the workplace. We argue in this paper that a new concept of freedom emerges from an

examination of such issues, and that attempts to craft fair and just policies for workplace accommodation benefit from careful conceptual analyses.

PEGS, BOARDS, AND RELATIVISTIC PERDURANCE (IV-H)

YURI BALASHOV, UNIVERSITY OF GEORGIA

In an earlier work I developed an argument favoring one view of persistence (viz., perdurance) over its rivals, based on considerations of the relativity of three-dimensional spatial shapes of physical objects in Minkowski spacetime. The argument has since come under criticism (in the works of Theodore Sider, Kristi Miller, Ian Gibson, Oliver Pooley, and Thomas Sattig). I attempt to respond to these criticisms.

VARIABILITY AND SKEPTICISM (I-J)

NATHAN BALLANTYNE, UNIVERSITY OF ARIZONA

Certain sorts of belief—those having to do with topics like politics, morality, religion and philosophy—vary with accidental features of historical and cultural background. If you had grown up there rather than here, you'd believe otherwise. Is this sort of variability a reason for skepticism? That's the main question discussed in this paper. I sketch two promising variability arguments for skepticism.

A PROBLEM WITH KIM'S QUALIA-EPIPHENOMENALISM (X-J)

JARED G. BATES, HANOVER COLLEGE

Kim's (2005) qualia-epiphenomenalism arises out a commitment to two more general theses. One is that in order for a property to have physical effects, it must itself be physical or physically reducible (Conditional Reductionism). The other is that qualia are irreducible to physical properties (Property Dualism). It follows that qualia are causally inert, that is, they never rank among the causes of our behavior or any other physical happenings. I will argue here that Kim's qualia-epiphenomenalism is in serious trouble. Specifically, I will argue that his Conditional Reductionism is at odds with his Property Dualism, and this conflict plays itself out in causal relations between qualia and cognitive states. I will conclude by pointing to some considerations that favor rejecting property dualism in favor of a thoroughly reductionist physicalism about the mind.

PRUDENT INQUIRY AND NON-EVIDENTIAL CONSIDERATIONS (VII-F)

JAMES BEDNAR, VANDERBILT UNIVERSITY

I argue against the view that non-evidential considerations such as error-costs and the cost of inquiry determine what counts as sufficient evidence for belief. I advance an alternate account according to which these non-evidential considerations determine the manner and the extent to which it is prudent to inquire.

IS INTUITION A FORM OF PERCEPTION? (VI-J)

JOHN T. BENGSON, UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS–AUSTIN

The view that intuition is a form of perception is typically derided as an instance of mysterianism. While it is surely true that some versions of the view render intuition no less mysterious than crystal ball gazing, I believe that perceptual models of intuition enjoy substantial *prima facie* motivation, and that it remains possible to develop a sophisticated perceptual model which avoids familiar objections (e.g., causation). Exploiting recent work in the philosophy of perception, ontology of mind, and epistemology of the *a priori*, I defend one such model.”

ARISTOTLE AND THE “VIRTUES OF WILL POWER” (III-E)

NOELL BIRONDO, POMONA COLLEGE

Beginning in at least the 1970s, and presumably under the influence of the later Wittgenstein, certain advocates of Aristotle’s ethics have insisted that a proper validation of the virtues of character must proceed from within, or be internal to, the particular evaluative outlook fostered by a cultivation of the virtues themselves. The most influential advocate of this line of thinking has presumably been John McDowell, although Rosalind Hursthouse, in her recent book *On Virtue Ethics*, also explicitly embraces it. In this paper I consider the suggestion that a distinction between “the substantive virtues” and “the virtues of will power” might ultimately undermine thinking about Aristotle’s ethics in the way endorsed by McDowell and Hursthouse. That would be to reanimate an interpretation of Aristotle’s ethics that McDowell has called a “historical monstrosity.”

DUNS SCOTUS ON FORMAL DISTINCTION, IDENTITY, AND MATERIAL CONSTITUTION (V-H)

JOSH BLANDER, UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA–LOS ANGELES

In this paper, I situate the work of John Duns Scotus in debates about the Problem of Material Constitution (PMC). In doing so, I examine the very different accounts of identity of Peter Geach and David Wiggins. I develop the claim that Scotus’s alternative account of identity and difference, especially his formal distinction, forges a middle way between the strict or absolute identity of David Wiggins and the “relative identity” of Peter Geach. Scotus’s preferred solution does not abandon an account of identity that includes the standard, formal properties of identity; however, it also leaves room for a genuine sort of identity that nonetheless falls short of strict identity, thus accommodating the intuitions that drive alternative accounts such as Geach’s.

PSYCHOLOGICAL EXPLANATION WITHOUT MENTAL QUASATION (X-J)

THOMAS BONTLY, UNIVERSITY OF CONNECTICUT

A great deal of work in recent philosophy of mind is driven by worries about the causal efficacy (or causal relevance) of mental properties and semantic properties in particular. The worry, in brief, is that mental states

or events might be causes without it being true that they cause anything in virtue of their specifically mental properties—i.e., without being causes *qua* mental. This worry breeds further worries: about the status of psychological explanation and, most fundamentally, about the reality of mental properties. This paper argues that such further worries are baseless. Psychological explanation is here argued to be a type of teleological explanation in which mental properties contribute to explaining an action's function, not its occurrence. Mental properties can therefore be explanatorily relevant and thus earn their keep even if they don't do any causal work. Several objections are discussed.

THE ETHICAL BASIS OF A MARKET FOR CARBON (IV-G)

IDIL BORAN, YORK UNIVERSITY

The idea of a “carbon market” is at the heart of current policy debates on the issue of combating climate change. A widely-discussed method of trading emissions is cap-and-trade, which consists in setting a cap for total greenhouse gas emissions and providing allowances, which can be traded between sources to keep overall emissions level in line with the cap. The aim of this paper is to respond to worries that this market-based method of controlling emissions may be a compromise on ethics for the sake of efficiency. The paper argues that carbon trading is supported by an ethical principle, in light of which is proposed a formulation of the ethics of carbon trading that combines both efficiency and fairness. The proposed formulation provides a valuable basis for businesses to understand their corporate responsibilities on the issue of climate change.

ARISTOTLE ON IDENTITY AND PERSISTENCE (III-E)

JOHN FRANCIS BOWIN, UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA–SANTA CRUZ

In *Physics* 4.11, Aristotle refers to a sophistical puzzle in which “being Coriscus-in-the-Lyceum is different from being Coriscus-in-the-market-place.” Following Sarah Broadie, I take this puzzle to threaten the persistence through time of changing entities. Aristotle's answer to the puzzle is that the changing thing “is the same in respect of that, by [means of] being which at any time it is [what it is], ... but in definition it is different.” What this means, I argue, is that while the accidental unities Coriscus-in-the-Lyceum and Coriscus-in-the-market-place are different in definition, they are not different without qualification. That is, Coriscus may be described as either a persisting substrate of change (*viz.*, as a substance as defined in *Categories* 5 and *Posterior Analytics* 1.22) or as one or more accidental unities like Coriscus-in-the-Lyceum and Coriscus-in-the-market-place. Described as the former, Coriscus persists, but described as the latter, he does not.

REPUBLIC V: WHAT OUR COGNITIVE POWERS CANNOT BE (I-H)

AYCA BOYLU, UNIVERSITY OF VIRGINIA

The lengthy argument at the end of Book V of Plato's *Republic* (476c-479e) is the only place to turn to see whether Plato was in fact committed to the Two-World View (TW, the view that objects of episteme and the objects of doxa are exclusively different). All the interpretations of this argument (TWA) agree on the fact that Plato is an advocate of TW except the interpretation put forward by Gail Fine. On her interpretation, the objects of episteme are true propositions and the objects of doxa are true propositions and false propositions just as in orthodox contemporary epistemology. There have been various criticisms of her interpretation of TWA, yet her interpretation of the crux of TWA (what I shall call the "Powers Argument") has not received close examination. In this paper, I argue that Fine's interpretation needs to be rejected given the textual evidence we have.

PERSPECTIVAL PROPERTIES AND THE PERCEPTUAL PRIORITY OF DEPTH (III-H)

ROBERT E. BRISCOE, LOYOLA UNIVERSITY NEW ORLEANS

Integral to Alva Noe's "enactive" account of visual perception is the claim that in order to perceive an object's 3D shape it is necessary both to see its perspectival shape (P-shape), i.e., the shape of the patch projected by the object on the frontal plane, and to understand how its P-shape would undergo transformation as a function of possible bodily movements. In this paper, I argue that phenomenological and experimental studies provide compelling evidence that our first, conscious visual awareness of the world is perceptually organized in terms of visible surfaces arrayed in depth. Indeed, they show that our ability perceptually to individuate discrete P-shapes on the frontal plane is psychologically dependent on our ability to see the 3D organization of the visual scene beyond the frontal plane. But, if this is right, then P-shapes cannot play the perceptually basic role conferred on them by the enactive account.

COMPATRIOT PRIORITY, HEALTH IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES, AND OUR GLOBAL RESPONSIBILITIES (III-G)

GILLIAN BROCK, UNIVERSITY OF AUCKLAND

How should we weigh up the responsibilities we have to compatriots and non-compatriots? So far discussion of obligations to compatriots and non-compatriots has been conducted at a fairly abstract level, and lacks specificity with respect to what exactly our obligations to compatriots or non-compatriots are in a particular domain. By examining particular issues we get a richer sense of what is possible and what might be involved. This kind of analysis can then in turn better inform our theoretical views. I discuss issues related to our responsibilities for health care, both at home and abroad. Using the ideas developed with respect to responsibilities concerning health care I go on in the final section to a more general discussion of what this implies about how we should weigh up responsibilities to compatriots and non-compatriots.

*BELIEF AND MOTIVATION (I-I)**DANIELLE BROMWICH, UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO*

Cognitivist motivational internalism (CMI) is the thesis that, roughly, if one believes that “It is right to ?,” then one will be motivated to ?. This thesis—which captures the practical nature of morality—is in tension with a Humean constraint on belief: belief cannot motivate action without the assistance of desire. When defending CMI, it is tempting to argue that, while most beliefs satisfy the Humean constraint, moral beliefs do not. However, succumbing to this temptation places one under a burden to justify what is motivationally exceptional about moral beliefs. In this paper, I offer a way of defending CMI, which does not require accepting that there is anything motivationally unusual about moral beliefs. I argue that no belief satisfies the Humean constraint: all beliefs are capable of motivating at least one action without the assistance of desire.

*THE DUCK’S LEG: DESCARTES’ DISTINCTION OF REASON (VII-H)**DEBORAH J. BROWN, UNIVERSITY OF QUEENSLAND*

Descartes’ distinction of reason *ratiocinatae* holds between inseparable extremes—between a substance and its attributes or between attributes of the same substance. It has been interpreted either as a distinction in thought alone, which implies no metaphysical compositionality in the thing conceived, or as a distinction in number and in *re* between inseparable metaphysical components of one and the same thing. I argue that neither of these interpretations fits with Descartes’ texts or with the Scholastic background to his use of this terminology, and propose a third according to which there is a foundation in *re* for the distinction of reason but one that does not rely on a numerical distinction between substances and their attributes or attributes of the same substance.

*DECOMPOUNDED COMPLEXITY IN LOCKE’S ABSTRACT IDEAS (II-F)**D. KENNETH BROWN, CALIFORNIA POLYTECHNIC STATE UNIVERSITY*

Though Locke asserts the complexity of “decomposed” abstract ideas, a straightforward understanding of decomposition seems strongly to imply the reduction of complexity such that some decomposed ideas are simple. However, Locke also holds that mental activity cannot produce its own simple ideas. Thus, critics have argued that Locke must relax his commitments that simple ideas are only passively received while complex ideas are coextensive with ideas produced by mental activity. Yet, an account of how decomposition could necessarily produce a complex idea is readily available to Locke. The mental activity involved in decomposition can be analyzed into “reflective simple ideas,” ideas of mental operations that are necessary elements of complex ideas. On this strictly compositionalist interpretation, any product of decomposition would necessarily be complex, consisting of whatever survives the decomposing and the reflective simples that comprise the ideas of the mental operations involved in decomposing.

LANGUAGE, THOUGHT, LOGIC, AND EXISTENCE (IX-I)

RICHARD BROWN, CITY UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK–LAGUARDIA COLLEGE

As is well known, we can prove that everything that exists necessarily exists in S5. Perhaps as well known is Kripke's two-part solution. First we forbid axioms with free variables and second we forbid the use of singular terms. One way to do the latter is via Nominal Description Theory (NDT): a name N is semantically equivalent to the description that mentions the name, e.g., "the-bearer-of-'N'." But how do we reconcile NDT with the thesis of rigid designation? I argue that we need to distinguish a semantic theory that aims to give an account of thoughts (P-semantics) from one that aims to give an account of English sentence types (L-semantics). I then introduce frigidity as the claim that there are no L-semantic singular terms. The causal theory of reference is a P-semantic theory and together with NDT we can then formulate L-semantic descriptions that capture singular thoughts without singular terms.

THE ONTOLOGY OF ACTION AND DIVINE AGENCY (VII-K)

ANDREI A. BUCKAREFF, MARIST COLLEGE

I assume that if the God of Judeo-Christian-Islamic theism exists, then God is an agent who has performed intentional actions. I argue that if God is such an agent, then God cannot exist outside of time. This is because of how action-tokens relate to event-tokens. Specifically, every action-token is identical to an event-token. And every event-token is such that it can be indexed to some moment(s) of time. I call this the "action-event identity thesis," or "AE," for short. If AE is correct, then God acts in time. I argue that we have some good reasons to accept AE and, thus, reject the possibility of atemporal agency. So the conception of God as a timelessly eternal agent is untenable.

HUME'S CAUSAL RECONSTRUCTION OF THE PERCEPTUAL RELATIVITY ARGUMENT IN TREATISE 1.4.4 (II-F)

ANNEMARIE BUTLER, IOWA STATE UNIVERSITY

In *Treatise* 1.4.4, "Of the modern philosophy," on behalf of modern philosophers, Hume presented a causal version of a perceptual relativity argument for the primary-secondary qualities distinction. Some commentators have complained that this was contrived: Hume's predecessors appealed solely to contrary qualities arguments or other conceptual arguments. I argue that Hume had to formulate the argument differently from his predecessors for two reasons. First, the putative conclusion was not supposed to be an epistemological point, but rather a matter of fact that the causes of the impressions of secondary qualities do not resemble their impressions. Second, the argument had to abide by his discoveries about causal reasoning—and by doing so, he was able to expose the bad causal reasoning. Hume went on to criticize the primary-secondary qualities distinction; but even though he rejected the conclusion, he tried to present an argument aimed at making the distinction.

*LOCALITY AND NECESSITY (X-I)**BEN CAPLAN, OHIO STATE UNIVERSITY AND DAVID SANSON, OHIO STATE UNIVERSITY*

In a pair of papers, Guy Rohrbaugh and Louis deRosset argue that tables have their material origins essentially. Unlike familiar arguments for this conclusion, which start from general modal principles, Rohrbaugh and deRosset's new route starts from particular worldly phenomena: hunks, tables, and the actual causal-historical paths leading from the former to the latter. We are sympathetic both to the conclusion and to Rohrbaugh and deRosset's new route to it. But we don't think their new route is entirely successful. We spell out a requirement that their new route relies on and argue that their attempt to ground it fails. We conclude by suggesting that essential dependencies create problems for their new route.

*CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTION, EMERGENCY CONTRACEPTION, AND PUBLIC POLICY (VI-K)**ROBERT F. CARD, STATE UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK-OSWEGO*

Many defenders of medical professionals' rights to conscientious objection (CO) regarding emergency contraception (EC) draw an analogy to CO status in the military. Such professionals object to EC since it has the possibility of harming zygotic life, yet I argue that this analogy cannot be used to support their case. If we accept this analogy and utilize jurisprudence to frame the associated public policy, those who refuse to dispense EC would not have their objection honored. Legal precedent holds that one must consistently object to all forms of the relevant activity. In the case at hand, then, these professionals must also oppose breastfeeding and the rhythm method since it is possible that these may act to prevent pregnancy after fertilization. These results are absurd, and reveal that such objectors do not offer a jurisprudentially consistent objection to harming zygotic life. Additionally, there are good reasons to reject the analogy itself.

*DISJUNCTIVE OBLIGATIONS AND IMPLICATURE (III-I)**FABRIZIO CARIANI, UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA-BERKELEY*

A classic counter-example by Ross (1941) put pressure on the principle of Inheritance,

$$A| = B \Rightarrow (a \text{ is required to do } A) | = (a \text{ is required to do } B)$$

Ross pointed out that (1), but not (2), seems true:

(1) You are required to clean the kitchen.

(2) You are required to clean the kitchen or play soccer.

Defenders of deontic logics in which (1) holds propose Gricean approaches based on Grice's maxim of Quantity. After articulating a precise version of the Gricean strategy, I argue that, while it may explain some phenomena, it does not get to the heart of Ross's puzzle. Implicatures derived through the maxim of Quantity are suppressed in certain embeddings and in some non-assertive speech acts. The intuitions involved in Ross's puzzle are preserved also in these types of contexts; I conclude on this basis that the Gricean approach is unsatisfactory.

*SELF VISITATION AND TRAVELER TIME (IV-H)**JOHN W. CARROLL, NORTH CAROLINA STATE UNIVERSITY*

The self-visitation paradox asks how a time traveler can travel back in time to visit his younger self without thereby having contradictory properties. One answer to the paradox holds that the properties should be relativized to the personal time or proper time of the time traveler. This answer is shown to fail for three different reasons.

*HOW TO MANIPULATE AN INCOMPATIBILISTICALLY FREE AGENT (X-F)**ROGER CLARKE, UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA*

Cases of manipulation usually feature in the debate on moral responsibility as problems for the compatibilist. To the extent that libertarians are seen to have a problem with cases of manipulation, discussion of the problem usually centers on Frankfurt cases. These are cases where libertarian criteria counterintuitively absolve the protagonist of responsibility for his actions. I offer another type of case, making the opposite sort of problem: libertarian criteria counterintuitively hold my protagonist responsible for her actions. The two types of cases together pose a dilemma for the libertarian. The most promising criticism of Frankfurt cases works by making simple acts (like choosing, deciding, etc., as opposed to complex acts like voting, driving, walking, etc.) the focus of moral responsibility, but the most promising libertarian treatment of my new cases requires focusing on complex acts instead.

*STATE DOMINATION AND THE PROBLEM OF INDETERMINACY (IX-J)**VICTORIA COSTA, FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY*

Christopher McMahon has recently argued that Philip Pettit's account of state domination suffers from a serious indeterminacy in cases in which there is reasonable disagreement concerning which public policies track the common interests of citizens. McMahon claims that in those cases any decision resulting from democratic procedures will be licensed and should count as non-dominating. This would make Pettit's theory largely useless as guide to policy. This paper examines Pettit's response to this criticism, and then argues that Pettit's account does not suffer from the particular indeterminacy that McMahon has in mind. However, it does involve an indeterminacy of another, and deeper, kind.

*MULTIPLE REALIZATION IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE (I-F)**MARK B. COUCH, SETON HALL UNIVERSITY*

Arguments for multiple realization depend on the idea that the same kind of function is realized by different kinds of structures. It is important to such arguments that we know that the kinds appealed to have been individuated properly. In the philosophical literature, though, claims about how to individuate kinds are frequently decided on intuitive grounds. This paper criticizes this way of approaching kinds by considering how practicing researchers think about the matter. I will consider several examples from

physiology in which the practice of researchers conflicts with Putnam and Fodor's standard account of the issues.

THE METAPHYSICS OF LOVE (VII-G)

LISA DAMM, UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA—SAN DIEGO

In this paper, I attempt to answer the question, "What is the metaphysical object romantic love?" by assuming a psychological reductionist should endorse view of identity and arguing for the normative view of love that I believe a psychological reductionist should endorse. I explain why Derek Parfit argues that relation *R* is the relation that matters in cases where survival is at stake and there is a conflict between *R* and identity. Similarly, I consider hypothetical cases where love is in question and I argue that relation *R* is what matters and that as *R* branches love should also branch. Specifically, I construct a concept based on relation *R* called quasi-love and I argue that these objections are only pragmatic worries which fail to derail my normative claim about when love should be sustained.

ON A PUTATIVE MORAL DUTY TO PARTICIPATE IN BIOMEDICAL RESEARCH (III-G)

INMACULADA DE MELO-MARTIN, CORNELL UNIVERSITY

Because of the important benefits that biomedical research offers to humans, some have argued that people have a moral obligation to participate in research. Although the defense of such a putative moral duty has raised controversy, few scholars, on either side of the debate, have attended to the social context in which research takes place and where such an obligation will be discharged. The purpose of this paper is thus to bring attention to the social context in which a putative duty to participate in research obtains. I will focus on several institutional aspects of the research enterprise: compensation for injury related-research; access to biomedical research products; and practices affecting the scientific and social value of biomedical research. By reflecting on the social context in which a presumed duty to participate in research will obtain, this paper shows that decontextualized discussions of this putative moral obligation are problematic.

IMAGINING DE RE AND THE SYMMETRY THESIS OF NARRATION (I-E)

NICHOLAS DIEHL, UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA—DAVIS

One of the central issues in the study of narratives is the question of the symmetry of narration across different media; is narration in film or graphic novels structurally like narration in literature, or is there some fundamental difference apart from media constraints? In this paper I defend one piece of the symmetry thesis; I argue, contra Berys Gaut, that narration across media is symmetrical with respect to the existence of overarching fictional narrators. Regardless of the medium in which a narrative is presented, we are prescribed to imagine a fictional narrator for a narrative work if and only if we are prescribed to imagine de re of the text of that work that it represents a fictional work. I first defend the

biconditional claim; then I offer examples from film and comic books to show that my claim is not merely trivially satisfied.

MILL'S MISLEADING MORAL MATHEMATICS (III-F)

BEN EGGLESTON, UNIVERSITY OF KANSAS AND DALE MILLER, OLD DOMINION UNIVERSITY

The debate over whether Mill is better read as an act or a rule utilitarian began in the 1950s and has continued ever since. We shall argue that in certain passages in which Mill initially appears to be endorsing the act-utilitarian moral theory, he is really doing something quite different. Insofar as he is endorsing any particular view at all, it is not act utilitarianism—nor is it even a moral theory. Instead, it is a view about how to assess individual actions that informs, but does not translate without modification into, Mill's rule-utilitarian moral theory.

CHASING (AWAY) THE TRACE OF DOGMA: RECONSIDERING THE ROLE OF PRESENCE, THROUGH HUSSERL'S INNER TIME-CONSCIOUSNESS AND DERRIDA'S SPEECH AND PHENOMENA (VIII-F)

ANDREAS ELPIDOROU, BOSTON UNIVERSITY

The current paper is divided into three main parts: first, I provide a description of the Husserlian account of time-consciousness in which the fundamental role of absence is explicated. The second part is devoted to an exposition of the Derridean reading of Husserl's theory of temporality. In this section, I first articulate the reasons why Derrida considers presence to be derivative from absence, and, second, I illustrate how this, according to Derrida, leads to the conclusion that Husserl's phenomenological project undermines itself. Finally, the paper argues against the sustainability of Derrida's position and, in turn, establishes the conclusion that presence is always interwoven with absence.

REFUTING SKEPTICISM WITH HEIDEGGER AND SEARLE (IV-F)

CHAD A. ENGELLAND, JOHN CARROLL UNIVERSITY

Both Heidegger and Searle develop a "transcendental" approach to refute skepticism. They argue that metaphysical realism, independent of any theory about what is real, is the necessary presupposition for every theory. The theory of skepticism, then, is transcendently refuted by its own realist presupposition. Searle misreads Heidegger as an anti-realist, but in fact Heidegger emphasizes an essential condition for realism, access; realism is not just about the independence of things but about our access to them as independent. According to Searle's own terms, Heidegger is resolutely realist. Within this fundamental agreement, the two thinkers nonetheless differ regarding the character of the presupposition: Searle takes it to be a condition for statements and Heidegger for being human. Both refute skepticism by calling attention to its realist presupposition even though they differ in the end regarding the presupposition's significance.

*THE INEFFABILITY OF VISUAL EXPERIENCE (VI-J)**EMILY ESCH, COLLEGE OF SAINT BENEDICT/SAINT JOHN'S UNIVERSITY*

There are certain things we can't know unless we've had the right kind of experience. If I've never tasted pineapple, for example, no amount of description is going to provide me with knowledge of what pineapple tastes like. Unlike cases in which I lack knowledge because there is a problem with my justification, the reason that I can't know what it's like to taste pineapple unless I've tasted it is that I can't entertain the appropriate belief about the taste of pineapple. Beliefs about what experiences are like cannot be communicated through language alone; in other words, these beliefs are partly ineffable. In this paper I try to locate the source of the ineffability of our visual experiences by closely examining three of their phenomenological features. I distinguish between a weak and strong notion of ineffability and argue that visual experiences are ineffable in the stronger sense.

*WHAT IS LYING? (VI-I)**DON FALLIS, UNIVERSITY OF ARIZONA*

In order to lie, you have to say something that you believe to be false. But lying is not simply saying what you believe to be false. Philosophers have made several suggestions for what the additional condition might be. For example, it has been suggested that the liar has to intend to deceive (Augustine 395, Bok 1978, Mahon 2006), that she has to believe that she will deceive (Chisholm and Feehan 1977), or that she has to warrant the truth of what she says (Carson 2006). In this paper, I argue that none of the existing definitions of lying identify a necessary condition on lying. I claim that lying is saying what you believe to be false when you believe that the following norm of conversation is in effect: "Do not say what you believe to be false" (Grice 1989, 27). And I argue that this definition handles all of the counter-examples to the existing definitions.

*MATERIALISM AND THE PSYCHOLOGY OF EXPLANATION (VII-I)**BRIAN FIALA, UNIVERSITY OF ARIZONA*

Here I sketch a strategy for rendering the explanatory gap consistent with materialism about phenomenal consciousness. Whereas many extant materialist strategies emphasize the unique characteristics of our concepts of phenomenal consciousness, my proposed strategy will focus on the unique cognitive profile of explanation. The goal is to account for the explanatory gap as a by-product of the relatively less mysterious psychological features of explanation, thus de-mystifying the gap. First, I argue that good explanations are normally accompanied by a characteristic phenomenology: the *aha!* feeling. Second, I argue that the *aha!* feeling is doubly dissociable from good explanation. Third, I suggest that the explanatory gap may be a case of a good explanation in the absence of the *aha!* feeling. Finally, I consider prospects for pursuing the strategy further.

SAVING TIME: HOW ATTENTION EXPLAINS THE UTILITY OF SUPPOSEDLY SUPERFLUOUS REPRESENTATIONS (III-H)

JASON FORD, UNIVERSITY OF MINNESOTA–DULUTH

I contend that Alva Noë's Enactive Approach to Perception fails to give an adequate account of the periphery of attention. Noë claims that our peripheral experience is not produced by the brain's representation of peripheral items, but rather by our master of sensorimotor skills and contingencies. I offer a two-pronged assault on this account of the periphery of attention. The first challenge comes from Mack and Rock's work on inattentional blindness, and provides robust empirical evidence for the semantic processing (and hence representation) of some wholly unattended stimuli. The second challenge draws on LaBerge's theory of attention to provide a substantial advantage to peripheral representations, saving time whenever we shift the focus of our attention to something which had been in the periphery, allowing us to respond to that thing more quickly than would be possible if Noë's account of perception were correct.

TRUTH AT A WORLD FOR MODAL PROPOSITIONS (III-K)

CHRISTOPHER EVAN FRANKLIN, UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA–RIVERSIDE

Existentialism maintains that individual essences and singular propositions are ontologically dependent upon the individuals they involve. However, such a position runs into immediate problems since it is incompatible with the usual analysis of possibility in terms of truth in a possible world. Existentialists respond to this problem by distinguishing two senses in which a proposition can be true with respect to a world: true in a world and true at a world. In this paper I will explore some of the implications this distinction has for modal metaphysics. Specifically, I will be concerned with providing truth conditions for modal propositions that respect the existentialist's ontology.

KANT AND THE PRINCIPLE OF INSTRUMENTAL RATIONALITY: IS THERE MORE THAN ONE CATEGORICAL IMPERATIVE? (X-H)

TAMRA FREI, MICHIGAN STATE UNIVERSITY

There is little of Immanuel Kant's moral theory that is not heavily contested. Still one point that supporters as well as critics of Kant have tended to agree on is the following. Although Kant identifies different versions of the Categorical Imperative, he is committed to there only being one categorical command of practical reason. I argue that this interpretation of is false. A close reading of *The Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals* reveals that there is another non-moral categorical demand of practical rationality, namely, The Hypothetical Imperative. This imperative adjures us to take what we know to be the necessary and available means to our ends or else give up those ends. Moreover, I argue that because The Hypothetical Imperative is the fundamental principle of all means-ends reasoning, including reasons of prudence, the traditional Kantian way of distinguishing moral from prudential obligations fails.

THE INDIVIDUAL VARIABILITY PROBLEM (II-E)

DIMITRIA ELECTRA GATZIA, SYRACUSE UNIVERSITY

In this paper, I argue that the individual variability problem, i.e., the widespread intrasubjective and intersubjective color variations among normal subjects (subjects who do not have any color deficiencies), threatens both physicalism and subjectivism about color.

HISTORICISM, INFORMALISM, AND THE CONSTITUTIVE–EMPIRICAL DISTINCTION (IX-C)

NATHANIEL GOLDBERG, OHIO UNIVERSITY

Michael Friedman has recently added a new chapter to Rudolf Carnap and W.V. Quine's debate concerning analyticity. Friedman does so by offering a replacement for Carnap's conception of analyticity—Friedman's own "constitutive apriority"—that combines Carnap's conception with insights from Thomas Kuhn's informal, historical approach to science. Moreover, Friedman contends that Kuhnian informalism immunizes his conception of constitutive apriority against Quine's "well-known and widely accepted attack" on Carnap's conception of analyticity. In this paper I show that, unbeknownst to him, Friedman's conception is immune to this attack in virtue of his appeal to historicism itself. This is fortunate, since, as I explain, Friedman's appeal to informalism is problematic.

REID AND CONDILLAC ON SENSATION AND PERCEPTION: A THOUGHT EXPERIMENT ON SENSORY DEPRIVATION (V-F)

GIOVANNI GRANDI, AUBURN UNIVERSITY

In order to illustrate the difference between sensation and perception, Reid imagines a blind man that by "some strange distemper" has lost all his notions of external objects, but has retained the power of sensation and reasoning. Reid argues that since sensations do not resemble external objects, the blind man could not possibly infer from them any notion of primary qualities. Condillac proposed a similar thought experiment in the *Treatise on Sensations*. I argue that Condillac can reach a conclusion opposite to that of Reid only by assuming that some particular collections of sensations do indeed resemble the qualities of external objects. Reid considered a similar case in a manuscript, but he noticed that such complex collections sensations do not resemble the qualities of external objects.

THE VALUE OF FEELING-CENTERED, FIRST PERSONAL PHENOMENOLOGICAL EXPERIENCES IN KANT'S PRACTICAL PHILOSOPHY (X-H)

JEANINE GRENBERG, ST. OLAF COLLEGE

How can Kantians, after affirmation of the limits of experience in the *Critique of Pure Reason*, hope to engage legitimately in the pursuit of knowing ourselves as free? Whereas Kant interpreters like Allison, Korsgaard, and Ameriks have avoided attributing to Kant appeal to actual experiences of freedom/obligation to initiate practical reflection, Kant himself takes what can only be described as experiences of obligation and freedom both as

a common starting point for explicitly practical reflection, and as proof of already completed philosophical reflections. But what warrant does he have for doing so when he has already argued we cannot have experience of intelligible ideas like this? Ultimately, Kant succeeds in identifying a first personal, feeling-centered phenomenological experience of oneself as an agent that is distinct enough from empirical experience of objects so as to warrant appealing to it as the ground of practical thinking without violating the limits of experience.

COUNTERFACTUAL REASONING IN FRANKFURT CASES (X-F)

CHARLES HERMES, UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS–ARLINGTON

Kadri Vihvelin has claimed that prior sign Frankfurt cases are logically defective. While there is a simple argument that appears to ground many commentators' insistence that Jones could not have done otherwise in Frankfurt cases the argument suffers from two potential defects. First, the argument is in the form of a hypothetical syllogism. Yet, this is an invalid inference for counterfactuals. Second, in one of the premises the event depicted in the consequent occurs prior to the event depicted in the antecedent. Many theorists believe that this is sufficient for making the counterfactual a backtracking counterfactual and believe that all backtracking counterfactuals are false in standard contexts. I demonstrate that the first problem can easily be rectified. Further, the second problem develops only by misapplying the notion of a "backtracking counterfactual."

FOLK PSYCHOLOGICAL AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL ACCOUNTS OF SOCIAL PERCEPTION (VI-J)

MITCHELL HERSCHBACH, UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA–SAN DIEGO

Theory theory and simulation theory share the assumption that mental states are unobservable, and that mental state attribution requires an extra psychological step beyond perception. Recently phenomenological and conceptual arguments have been made against theory theory and simulation theory as accounts of everyday social perception. Here I evaluate objections to theory theory offered by Dan Zahavi (2005), and objection to simulation theory offered by Shaun Gallagher (2005, 2007). I argue that their phenomenological claims are more narrowly focused than they appear, and do not rule out theory theory or simulation theory as accounts of social perception, particularly as descriptions of the subpersonal processes underlying social perception.

AGENT-RELATIVE TELEOLOGY AND THE DOING/ALLOWING DISTINCTION (II-D)

AVRAM HILLER, WAKE FOREST UNIVERSITY

Recently, a number of philosophers, including Michael Smith, Amartya Sen, and Douglas Portmore, have argued that consequentialism is consistent with the supposition that agents are required to maximize agent-relative rather than agent-neutral value. This view, agent-relative teleology (ART), is

distinctive because it combines (1) a teleological principle of right action according to which an agent ought to perform the action which maximizes good, and (2) an acceptance of commonsense judgments about constraints and options that seem to fit more comfortably within a deontological framework. However, no advocate of ART has supplied anything close to a normative “theory of the agent-relative good,” and I argue that it is doubtful that ART can supply one while also maintaining the kind of doing/allowing distinction needed to countenance commonsense moral judgments.

A DEFENSE OF EXCLUSIVE PUBLIC REASON (I-G)

CHRISTIE HARTLEY, GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY, AND LORI WATSON, UNIVERSITY OF SAN DIEGO

While political liberalism’s account of public reason was intended to show how a just society in which citizens are deeply divided over religious and philosophical beliefs is possible, many have argued that the demands of public reason are too burdensome for religiously-oriented citizens. For many commentators, the question as to how far political liberalism can accommodate religious citizens’ authentic participation in democratic deliberation is seen as turning on whether political liberalism adopts an inclusive or exclusive account of public reason. We argue for an exclusive account of public reason on matters of constitutional essentials and basic justice. We claim that commonly cited reasons for inclusive accounts of public reason are not consistent with the basic tenets of political liberalism and that political liberals have good reason to prefer an exclusive account of public reason when matters of basic justice and constitutional essentials are at stake.

WHAT’S BAD ABOUT BAD FAITH? (VI-I)

ALLAN HAZLETT, FORDHAM UNIVERSITY, AND SIMON FELDMAN, CONNECTICUT COLLEGE

We discuss the concept of authenticity (and its opposite, inauthenticity or “bad faith”), and argue against a common assumption: that bad faith is bad, but distinct from lying. We examine several conceptions of bad faith that make this assumption, and argue, in each case, that the supposed badness of bad faith is not motivated. We then propose an alternative critique of bad faith, on moral grounds.

BELIEF, ALIENATION AND INTENTION (IX-D)

DAVID HUNTER, RYERSON UNIVERSITY

Some philosophers hold that the idea of an unendorsed belief is as incoherent as the idea of an unendorsed intention. Aside from over-intellectualizing belief, this view obscures the interesting relations between endorsed belief and intention. In section 1, I argue that deep similarities between belief and desire make it likely that just as there are unendorsed desires so there can be unendorsed beliefs. In section 2, I describe what an unendorsed belief would be and, in section 3, I discuss some examples. I conclude by suggesting that an endorsed belief is like an intention and that

this reveals one important sense in which, in Anscombe's phrase, belief is essentially practical and not merely contemplative.

DESIRE ACCOUNTS OF VALUE: ACTUAL VERSUS INFORMED (IV-I)

STAN HUSI, RICE UNIVERSITY

My paper challenges the widespread conviction that the informed version of desire satisfaction accounts (IDA) of value or well-being presents an improvement over the actual version (ADA). My comparative assessment proceeds by introducing three prominent objections against ADA, and arguing that IDA fails to do better with respect to those objections. They are first that ADA is too inclusive; that, secondly, ADA opens up an implausible solution of achieving a perfect life by eliminating ambitious desires; thirdly, that ADA disallows desiring the bad. The reason why IDA is no better than ADA is that IDA cannot guarantee generating informed versions that would remove those problems. Given the vast variability in agents and desire sets, it is unlikely that adding information would generate the required kind of informed version for each agent. In the final section I address the possibility that further information might actually undermine an agent's most precious desires.

EMPATHY AND INSTINCT: A CHALLENGE TO PHILOSOPHICAL CONCEPTIONS OF FOLK PSYCHOLOGY (I-I)

ANNE JACOBSON, UNIVERSITY OF HOUSTON

The central thesis argued herein is that some empathetic actions may be instinctive; that is, an account of instinctive empathetic actions is compatible but with the development of cognitive neuroscience. Recent philosophy has neglected "instinct" as a topic. Cognitive neuroscience, however, contains the foundations for an account, which we will employ. We will also use empathetic actions to raise some general questions about the adequacy of recent philosophy's understanding of action. In doing so, we will put our discussion in the context of a question being raised by some neuroscientists; namely, How does the brain give rise to the mind and its psychology, to the extent that it does? This question reflects a dilemma for researchers that requires a reexamination of fundamental theoretical tools. The resolution of the dilemma and the account of instinctive action place in doubt the universal applicability of belief-desire psychology to action explanations.

EPISTEMIC CLOSURE AND BAYESIAN EVIDENTIALISM (IX-H)

DAVID JEHL, CORNELL UNIVERSITY

The purpose of this paper is to bring out a tension between knowledge closure and a certain brand of evidentialism about knowledge. I argue that closure and my version of (Bayesian) evidentialism about knowledge cannot be held simultaneously. So we face a choice: reject closure or reject evidentialism. Since my evidentialism is so modest, I say we should reject closure.

*CAN MOORE'S PROOF RATIONALLY PERSUADE WITHOUT TRANSMITTING WARRANT?
(I-J)*

DANIEL M. JOHNSON, BAYLOR UNIVERSITY

There has been a recent renewal of interest in G.E. Moore's proof of an external world. I begin my discussion of the proof by tracing the current debate, from Crispin Wright to Jim Pryor and Martin Davies, concluding with the most recent contribution by Ram Neta. Taking a hint from Neta, I argue that even if Moore's proof cannot justify its conclusion (transmit warrant from premises to conclusion), it is nevertheless capable of rationally persuading a doubter. To make this point, I argue that Neta's account of the means by which Moore's proof persuades is mistaken and offer my own diagnosis. I conclude by arguing that, in light of this diagnosis, the proof's persuasiveness can be rational if skeptical doubt is irrational.

*REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES, THE PARENTAL LOVE OBJECTION, AND MORAL
DEVELOPMENT (II-I)*

WILLIAM P. KABASENCHE, WASHINGTON STATE UNIVERSITY

In a number of reports, the President's Council on Bioethics has discussed an objection to certain uses of reproductive and genetic technologies that appeals to the kind of love parents ought to show their children. The concern is that parents who exercise selective control over the kinds of children they will welcome are acting in a manner contrary to the kind of unconditional love that most people intuitively recognize as being a vital part of good parenting. I elaborate on and defend this objection to some uses of these technologies. In particular, I aim to show that the practice of engaging with this technology is in tension with the kind of trajectory of character formation we generally want parents to undergo. I discuss character formation in terms of virtues and emotion-dispositions relevant to loving and being properly related to one's children.

ON THE SUPPOSED ADVANTAGE OF INDIVIDUALISM ABOUT OVERDETERMINATION (IX-E)

CHRISTOPHER KANE, TULANE UNIVERSITY OF NEW ORLEANS

In this paper I will discuss cases of overdetermination, and then respond to the threat that they pose to the counterfactual analysis of causation. I will begin by briefly outlining the counterfactual analysis of causation I defend. I will then describe the structure of a case of overdetermination, and introduce an example to give a focus to the discussion. I will then lay out two possible positions, distinguished by Jonathan Schaffer in his (2003), that one might take toward cases of overdetermination, individualism and collectivism. The counterfactual analysis is committed to collectivism, but Schaffer argues that individualism is the more plausible position. I will defend the counterfactual analysis by refuting Schaffer's case for the superiority of individualism.

*CONTEXT, COMPOSITIONALITY, AND METAPHOR (IX-I)**HANNA KIM, WASHINGTON AND JEFFERSON COLLEGE*

The central point of this paper is to show that recently developed semantic resources, which aim to reconcile compositionality with the context-sensitivity of natural language, can be used to yield a compositional account of metaphor. If the newly developed resources can indeed be extended in this way, as I argue that they can, what this amounts to is either a powerful consideration against adopting the resources of theorists who seek to explain all context-sensitivity semantically, or a powerful consideration against those who believe metaphor to be merely a matter of language use.

*PRACTICAL REASON, COMMENSURABILITY, AND POLITICAL LEGITIMACY (I-G)**CHRISTOPHER STEWART KING, UNIVERSITY OF TENNESSEE*

Political liberalism asserts two kinds of principles of political justification. One of these is procedural (i.e., fairness) and the other is substantive. Substantive justifications are plural since they derive from the numerous reasonable, comprehensive moral doctrines typical of a democratic society. It has been thought that political justification understood in this way is incoherent. This is because justification would depend on two kinds of normative principles without suggesting how they are compatible with each other. By developing an idea of constructivist practical reason, I show how the principle of fairness (as a political value) may be constructed from the non-political values represented by various reasonable doctrines—hence, how it is not incompatible with them.

*SUPERVENIENCE: FROM SYNCHRONIC TO DIACHRONIC (I-F)**JAMES C. KLAGGE, VIRGINIA TECH*

Philosophers concerned with the supervenience of one kind of property on another kind of property have generally assumed that if supervenience holds across possible worlds at a time (synchronic), then it also holds through time (diachronic). In this paper I examine cases that seem to violate diachronic supervenience. These cases involve either changing ascriptive judgments, or else conceptual change over time. I reject a counterargument that tries to embed diachronic judgments within strong synchronic supervenience. Reflection on issues of diachronic supervenience show that there is a rather thin basis for ontological supervenience, after all.

*THE APRIORI IN CHESS (X-J)**BERNARD W. KOBES, ARIZONA STATE UNIVERSITY*

I show how perceptual and apriori elements of chess knowledge may be cleanly distinguished. Examples suggest that apriori elements may be either demonstrative (i.e., implicitly proof-based) or inductive, and may be socially distributed. The examples illuminate liberalized neo-rationalist accounts of apriori warrant, such as that of Tyler Burge. A further example suggests a complication, however, for Burge's treatment of computer-enabled apriori warrant.

*ON HAVING NO REASON: DOGMATISM AND BAYESIAN CONFIRMATION (IX-H)**PETER KUNG, POMONA COLLEGE*

Recently in epistemology a number of authors have mounted Bayesian objections to dogmatism. These objections depend on a Bayesian principle of evidential confirmation: Evidence E confirms hypothesis H just in case $\Pr(H|E) > \Pr(H)$. I argue using Keynes' distinction between risk and uncertainty that the Bayesian principle fails to accommodate the intuitive notion of having no reason to believe. Consider as an example an unfamiliar card game: at first, since you're unfamiliar with the game, you assign credences based on the indifference principle. Later you learn the how the game works and discover that the odds dictate you assign the very same credences. Examples like this show that that if you initially have no reason to believe H, then intuitively E can give you reason to believe H even though $\Pr(H|E) \leq \Pr(H)$. I show that without the principle, the objections to dogmatism fail.

*A DEFLATIONARY ACCOUNT OF THE UNITY OF COLOR (II-E)**CHARLIE KURTH, UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA–SAN DIEGO*

Ordinary visual experience and psychophysical experimentation supports the claim that colors have certain structural properties—e.g., red is more similar to orange than it is to green; blues are opposed to yellows. On what is perhaps the dominant view, these “unity relations” are taken to be, in some way, essential to colors. The constraint that results is substantial: The requirement that any viable account of what colors are must entail that they have the unity relations essentially. But this dominant view of the unity relations, and thus the resulting the unity constraint, is seriously mistaken. I argue that there is no way to substantiate the influential claim that the unity relations are essential to the colors. Rather, they must be understood in a more deflationary manner. The result is a very different conception of the role of the unity constraint in debates about color and color ontology.

*A RATHER DELIBERATE MISUNDERSTANDING: ON NIETZSCHE'S RESENTMENT OF PYRRHO (III-J)**S. PIERRE LAMARCHE, UTAH VALLEY STATE COLLEGE*

In this paper, I identify some of the main affinities between Pyrrho and Pyrrhonian scepticism and Nietzsche's thought. I then identify the two main criticisms that Nietzsche makes of Pyrrho, namely, that his thinking betrays weakness and decadence, and that he is a “fanatic” for his own unbelief in the importance of all things. I argue that both criticisms are weak and forced, and themselves, arguably, betray a resentment of the Pyrrhonian way of life, or agoge, on Nietzsche's part. As such, I finish the paper by suggesting that such resentment could be rooted in the fact that Pyrrho's therapy—his sceptical way of life—may have allowed him to elude the decadence and sickness of his culture, something which Nietzsche's own thinking and practice of life was unsuccessful at accomplishing.

RECOLLECTION IN PLATO'S MENO: METHOD, MYTH, OR NECESSARY HYPOTHESIS?
(III-J)

ELAINE LANDRY, UNIVERSITY OF CALGARY

I argue that recollection, in Plato's *Meno*, should not be taken as a method, and, if it is taken as a myth, it should not be taken as a mere myth. I show that recollection ought to be taken as a necessary hypothesis for learning. I then argue that the only methods demonstrated are the elenchus and the hypothetical method. I show that the hypothetical method cannot be taken as part of the elenchus, but this does not mean that the elenchus is abandoned. Rather, I argue that the elenchus is being supplemented by the hypothetical method. Beyond supplementing the elenchus with the hypothetical method, the limits of the latter are also made clear. Thus, by considering how the slave-boy situation fits in with structural aspects of the dialogue, I conclude that Plato, in the *Meno*, is well aware of both the benefits and the limits of the hypothetical method.

THE GENESIS OF EMILIE DU CHÂTELET'S COSMOLOGICAL ARGUMENT (VII-L)

MARCY LASCANO, CALIFORNIA STATE UNIVERSITY—LONG BEACH

In this paper I argue that, contrary to many commentators, the cosmological argument in Emilie du Châtelet's *Institutions de physique* is not a mere retelling of Leibniz. I argue her argument is also Lockean, as are her related arguments regarding God's attributes. I show that du Châtelet begins with Locke's argument and shores up its weaknesses using Leibniz's PSR. I demonstrate where she follows Locke, what Leibnizian elements she brings in, and how this enables her to avoid the mistakes commonly attributed to Locke's argument. I argue that while du Châtelet accepts *Ex Nihilo Nihil Fit*, she rejects Locke's stronger causal principle. I also show how she utilizes the PSR to demonstrate the attributes of God. Here I examine her arguments for the immutability and the singularity of God, and show that these arguments succeed where Locke's fail.

FUNDAMENTAL LAWS AND PROPERTIES (X-I)

NOA LATHAM, UNIVERSITY OF CALGARY

This paper argues that there is no significant metaphysical distinction between the view that fundamental laws of nature are metaphysically necessary and the view that they are metaphysically contingent but have a lesser nomic or natural necessity. I offer two ways of illustrating this on the assumption that fundamental properties are purely relational, or role properties. One involves consideration of the law that the electron/proton mass ratio is 1:1836; the other involves the artificial laws of a world conforming to Conway's Game of Life. Then I argue that this conclusion also holds if fundamental properties have intrinsic natures, and offer a reason for thinking they must indeed do so. My view effectively treats laws and role properties as a package which can be presented in a way that gives all the causal/explanatory work to laws, all the work to role properties, or divides the labor among laws and role properties.

*FROM REALIZER FUNCTIONALISM TO NONREDUCTIVE PHYSICALISM (X-J)**JEELOO LIU, CALIFORNIA STATE UNIVERSITY—FULLERTON*

It has been noted in recent literature that functionalism can be separated into two varieties: one that emphasizes the role state, the other that emphasizes the realizer state. The former is called “role functionalism,” while the latter has been called “realizer functionalism” or “filler functionalism.” The separation between role functionalism and realizer functionalism is important because it mars the distinction traditionally made between functionalism and the identity theory. However, the distinction has not been made clear. In this paper, I begin with an analysis of role and realizer functionalism by tracing back to their origins. I shall then advocate token realizer functionalism as the correct model for the mind-brain relation. Finally, I will explain how token realizer functionalism supports nonreductive physicalism. I will be focusing on Jaegwon Kim’s reductionism, not only because he is unquestionably the leader of the reductionist camp, but also because his view closely resembles realizer functionalism.

*THE PROBLEMS OF JUDGMENT AND THE CATEGORIES: HEIDEGGER’S THINKING ABOUT TRANSCENDENTAL LOGIC (IV-F)**LESLIE MACAVOY, EAST TENNESSEE STATE UNIVERSITY*

In this paper, I offer a critical reconstruction of Heidegger’s reading of transcendental logic, based on his writings in the *Frühe Schriften*. I argue that one of Heidegger’s primary interests is the problem of the categories and that he ultimately does not find a solution in neo-Kantianism because it lacks an account of subjectivity that is adequate to address the issues of judgment raised by this problem. Finally, I suggest that in the end Heidegger may have realized that a notion of meaning developed in relation to a theory of intentional subjectivity might promise more for resolving the problem of the categories than the notion of judgment.

*HOPE, FANTASY, AND MOTIVATION (IX-D)**ADRIENNE MARTIN, UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA*

The standard foil for recent theories of hope is the belief-desire analysis advocated by Hobbes, Day, Downie, and others. According to this analysis, to hope for *S* is no more and no less than to desire *S* while believing *S* is possible but not certain. Opponents of the belief-desire analysis argue that it fails to capture one or another distinctive feature (or function) of hope. Here, I focus on the role of imagination in hope and discuss its implications for hope’s relation to practical commitment or end-setting. I argue that fantasizing—an imaginative activity with narrative structure and egoistic function—is a paradigmatic feature of hope. In attending to the role of fantasizing, we see that the hope for *S* neither always moves us forward in pursuit of *S* (contra Victoria McGeer and others), nor always draws on the motivational force of previous commitments to *S* (contra Cheshire Calhoun).

THE POSSIBILITY REQUIREMENT IN PLATO'S REPUBLIC (I-H)

MASON MARSHALL, VANDERBILT UNIVERSITY

Myles Burnyeat has maintained that for Socrates and his interlocutors in the *Republic*, the effort they put into describing their hypothetical aristocratic city will have been “idle daydreaming, mere wish-fulfillment” unless they show that this city is possible. Burnyeat’s argument, though, is not conclusive, and appealing to a certain pair of passages in the dialogue—one in Book V and another in Book IX—other commentators (such as Julia Annas) have denied that possibility ends up being a significant concern in the *Republic*. To the contrary, I argue that throughout the dialogue—and not just before the Book V passage, as it might seem—Socrates and his interlocutors adhere to the possibility requirement: they proceed as if a city is best only if it is possible. This feature of the *Republic* makes their argument for the bestness of the aristocratic city far harder to defend than it might otherwise be.

FRAGILE EVENTS AND THE CAUSAL RELATION (IX-E)

JONATHAN MATHESON, UNIVERSITY OF ROCHESTER

In this paper I defend the claim that maximally-fragile-events are the proper relata of the causal relation. In other words, the things that are causes and effects are maximally-fragile-events alone. Call this thesis the Fragility Thesis (FT). It is standard, though not uncontroversial, to take events as the relata of the causal relation; but it is highly contested that maximally-fragile-events alone play this role. In this paper I show how a counterfactual account of causation coupled with FT can provide a simple conceptual account that avoids the problems that have faced other counterfactual accounts of causation, as well as suggest that the consequences of adopting such an account are not as outrageous as they may seem.

TYE, INTROSPECTION, AND PHANTOM LIMBS (VII-I)

KEVIN MCCAIN, UNIVERSITY OF ROCHESTER

Michael Tye’s representationalism is a prominent physicalist account of phenomenal consciousness. An integral part of Tye’s theory is his explanation of the role that introspection plays in our awareness of the phenomenal character of mental states. Tye claims that through introspection we are “directly aware” of external qualities and because of this direct awareness of external qualities we are aware of the phenomenal character of our experiences. In this paper I argue that phantom limb pains pose a significant problem for Tye’s theory because there are no external qualities to be directly aware of when one has a phantom limb pain, and, hence, on Tye’s account one can have no awareness of the phenomenal character of a phantom limb pain. In addition to exposing this problem, I explore the strengths and weaknesses of four potential solutions that Tye may adopt in response to this problem.

*THE INADEQUACY OF LEWIS'S RESPONSE TO THE HUMPHREY OBJECTION (VIII-H)**MICHAEL WILLIAM MCGLONE, UNIVERSITY AT BUFFALO—STATE UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK*

In this paper I consider Saul Kripke's well-known Humphrey objection to David Lewis's views on de re modality and Lewis's response to that objection. I show that Lewis's response is fundamentally flawed.

*FILIAL DUTIES OF CARE (III-G)**JOSEPH R. MILLUM, NATIONAL INSTITUTES OF HEALTH*

Many grown children provide care for their elderly parents. Some, however, do not. Where someone is indifferent to their parents' welfare, does he/she still have a filial duty to care for them? In this paper, I assess the extent of filial duties through a critique of the four justifications given for them—friendship, debt, gratitude, and special goods. I concentrate on the last two. The gratitude account is the only one that can justify a duty of care even for people who are not interested in their parents' well-being. I argue, contrary to A. John Simmons, that parents are owed gratitude just for fulfilling their parental duties. Special goods accounts are a new addition to the literature. I argue that they must derive any force they have from general duties to benefit others, but that these duties will not normally require that children, in particular, should benefit their parents, in particular.

*SKEPTICISM AND OBJECTIVE CONTEXTS: A CRITIQUE OF DEROSE (I-J)**GIOVANNI MION, UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI*

In the paper, I contrast my contextualist account of skepticism with Keith DeRose's account. I agree with DeRose's claim that when the skeptic and her opponent meet in the same context, their claims are truth-value-less. But I agree with him on the basis of different conception of context sensitivity. According to DeRose, the content of context sensitive expressions in general, and of "knowledge" in particular, is personally indicated. Instead, for me, the content of context sensitive expressions in general, and of "knowledge" in particular, is objectively determined by the topic of the conversation and the environment in which the conversation takes place. Since "knowledge" is context relative (and, therefore, there are no invariant epistemological constraints underlying the shifting standards of everyday justification), the question whether in general we have knowledge of the external world is ill-formed. Therefore, the conversation between the skeptic and her opponent lacks a genuine conversational topic.

*MORAL HISTORY, RACIAL RUMORS, AND RATIONAL RECONSTRUCTION (II-H)**ROBERT D. MURRAY, RYERSON UNIVERSITY*

Anthony K. Appiah argues that insofar as positions in the philosophy of race cannot be rationally reconstructed they ought to be given up. But because of our moral history the perspectives and narratives of racial groups are at cross-purposes. That means that attempts at rational reconstruction will exemplify the racial issues they are meant to address. Accordingly, racial perspectives and narratives have to be disentangled to facilitate

rational reconstruction. I want to briefly illustrate the significance of the social sciences to this end by appeal to racial rumors-racial stereotypes and conspiracy theories. Racial rumors are a fitting subject in this context because their content is quite objectionable to the out-group, but racial rumors can also be understood in terms of their causes and functions, which provide a type of understanding across perspectives at cross-purposes. To this end, the social sciences can help disentangle moral history and facilitate reconstruction.

RRPLICATION WITHOUT REPLICATORS: REDISCOVERING AN UNFASHIONABLE MODEL OF SELECTION (VIII-G)

BENCE NANAY, SYRACUSE UNIVERSITY

According to an influential view of selection, it consists of repeated cycles of replication and interaction. It has been argued that this view is wrong: replication is not necessary for evolution by natural selection. I analyze the seven most influential arguments for this claim and point out that although they are valid, if we modify the notion of replication, they lose their force. According to this new concept of replication it is not entities (replicators), but properties that replicate.

RIGHTS THEORIES, UTILITARIANISM, AND THE KILLING OF CIVILIANS (VII-K)

STEPHEN L. NATHANSON, NORTHEASTERN UNIVERSITY

While it is common for people to say that terrorism is always wrong because it intentionally kills civilians, many philosophical views concede that intentionally killing civilians can sometimes be morally right. Anyone who wants to show that terrorism is always wrong must establish that killing civilians intentionally is always wrong. According to a widespread view, held by both friends and foes of utilitarianism, utilitarianism cannot justify an absolute ban on attacking civilians. If such a ban is to be justified, it will have to rely on a rights-based or other deontological theory. In this paper, I challenge the conventional wisdom by showing that rights-based approaches have no special advantage for defenders of absolute noncombatant immunity. Whatever problems a utilitarian may have justifying absolute noncombatant immunity, rights theories are beset by at least equally powerful obstacles to justifying the view that intentionally killing civilians in war is always wrong.

CAN NARRATIVE PROVIDE AN ACCOUNT OF SUBJECTIVITY? (VII-G)

JOSEPH NEISSER, SAM HOUSTON STATE UNIVERSITY

Consciousness is subjective in the sense that it is always “first-person” or “for-me.” The subjective point of view is experienced “from-the-inside” of consciousness. But just whose point of view is this? One contemporary proposal is that the first-person point of view is the point of view of a narrative self. I argue that the narrative model does not apply to subjectivity, and that the narrative self should be distinguished from the “I” of the first-person perspective. Roughly, narratives always employ the first-person pronoun

“I” to identify some person, but the distinctive features of subjectivity are marked by a different, non-identifying use of the pronoun “I.” Identification free self-reference is the criterial mark of the first-person perspective, but the narrative model does not meet this criterion. Therefore, narrative lacks the resources to account for subjectivity.

CRITICAL PERFORMANCE: MEDITATIONS ON A LARK (I-E)

JONATHAN A. NEUFELD, VANDERBILT UNIVERSITY

What could it mean to criticize a musical work in performance? A recent violin performance sympathetically presents what I take to be a politically regressive work. What were the performer’s options? Daniel Barenboim gives one answer. He claims that to perform is to “live a piece.” The notion of “living the work” is closely bound to a persistent presupposition made both by philosophers and musicians that there is an obligation to perform a work in its best possible light. Roger Scruton’s account of the “life in tones” allows us, perhaps in spite of itself, a deeper understanding of what’s at stake in living the work. I argue that the language of “life” easily slips into an uncritical view where the ideal performer speaks in one voice with the work and that a commitment to perform entails neither univocity between performer and work nor the performer’s affirmation of the work.

APPORTIONING EXPLANATORY RESPONSIBILITY (V-G)

ROBERT NORTHCOTT, UNIVERSITY OF MISSOURI–SAINT LOUIS

Sober (1988) and Sober et al (1992) are two of the leading discussions of how to apportion causal responsibility, in other words, of what it means to say (and how to measure) that one cause of something is more important than another. Drawing from this and other influential recent work in causation and causal explanation, in this paper I present a formal definition of causal strength. I use it to criticize one distinction made in the Sober papers, but also then to explore a separate issue emphasized in Sober et al (1992). In particular, it turns out that the explanandum-dependence of explanatory (as opposed to merely causal) responsibility requires a significant elaboration of existing notions of causal strength. I develop definitions of explanatory responsibility that take account of this explanandum-dependence, covering both the deterministic and probabilistic cases.

AN UNLIKELY PEDIGREE: HUSSERLIAN INFLUENCES ON RYLE’S CONCERN WITH CATEGORY MISTAKES (VIII-F)

JOHN KURTH O’CONNOR, FORDHAM UNIVERSITY

Gilbert Ryle, not Edmund Husserl, is the thinker whose name first comes to mind in connection with the phrase “category mistakes.” Indeed, Ryle is deservedly well-known for his concern to diagnose category mistakes at the heart of traditional philosophical problems and for his systematic attempt to avoid such mistakes in his own work. Nonetheless, as I will argue, a) Husserl deserves to be known for precisely these concerns as well, and b) this similarity is no accident. In the first part I argue that Ryle’s writings on

phenomenology reveal a consistent interpretation that points to Husserl's influence on Ryle, specifically on questions of method and the importance of logical grammar. Then, in the second part, I explain how Husserlian phenomenology is a systematic attempt to avoid historically pervasive category mistakes at the root of logic and epistemology. Husserl, not Ryle, is the 20th century's original philosopher of the category mistake.

ARISTOTLE ON PATHOS: FROM QUALITATIVE CHANGE TO EMOTION (III-E)

MARJOLEIN OELE, UNIVERSITY OF SAN FRANCISCO

Within the context of renewed interest in the concept of the emotions, this paper investigates the origin of the concept of emotion (pathos) in Aristotle. Usually, "pathos" is translated as feeling or emotion, and its significance is generally restricted to that of Aristotle's psychology. However, I demonstrate that Aristotle's understanding of pathos draws heavily upon his conception of pathos as qualitative change—as discussed, for example, in *Categories* 8. By drawing connections between pathos as emotion and pathos as qualitative change, I explore the original distinctions that guide Aristotle's discussion of pathos as emotion in his *Nicomachean Ethics*. Moreover, I show that Aristotle ultimately moves beyond his own rigid distinction between dispositions (including virtues and vices) and emotions. I argue that the emotions have far greater ethical significance for Aristotle than is usually granted, since dispositions such as virtue and vice can ultimately not be radically separated from our emotions.

SUPERVENIENCE, DEFLATIONISM, AND THE SUCCESS ARGUMENT (III-K)

ONYOUNG OH, CITY UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK—GRADUATE CENTER

Recently, a compatibilist solution to the conflict between deflationism about truth and the success argument has been proposed by Nic Damnjanovic. The crux of the conflict between deflationism and the success argument is that while a correspondence theorist argues that truth plays a serious causal-explanatory role in a success explanation, a deflationist thinks that truth is causally impotent: its role is purely logical. According to Damnjanovic, however, there is no genuine conflict between deflationism and the success argument. The standard (Horwich-style) response to the success argument, says Damnjanovic, can be interpreted as supporting a supervenience account of truth. But then, the causal-explanatoriness of truth can be defended by Jackson and Pettit's distinction between causal efficacy and causal relevance. I will raise two objections to Damnjanovic: first, he fails to provide a supervenience account of truth; and second, deflationism, by its nature, is not compatible with the supervenience account of truth.

THE IRONY OF THE DOUBLE IMPULSE (IX-D)

THOMAS M. OLSHEWSKY, UNIVERSITY OF KENTUCKY

Hume's ultimate irony lies in the role he requires for sympathy in the move from direct passions to indirect through the effects of the double impulse of impressions and ideas. This role must be presupposed in order

to understand the double impulse as the basis for other-regarding indirect passions; yet, sympathy is itself an other-regarding passion, and cannot be held to account for itself. That Hume may have seen this problem himself in his treatment of the double impulse in *Treatise*, Book II, is suggested in the changes he made in his account of the passions in the *Dissertation*. When we couple this irony with the problems involved in attempting to make a “feeling theory” serve as a base for moral motivation, we find Hume’s ultimate irony lies in his intended moral theory being reduced to an aesthetic one.

*REFLECTIVE JUDGMENT’S PRINCIPLE OF NATURE’S PURPOSIVENESS AND ITS
“SUBJECTIVE” AND “MERELY SUBJECTIVE” APPLICATIONS (X-H)*

LARA OSTARIC, *ST. MICHAEL’S COLLEGE*

In Kant literature, the principle of taste and the logical principle of nature’s purposiveness are considered as (1) two distinct principles, (2) as the former being subordinated to the latter, and (3) as the latter being subordinated to the former. In this paper, I give reasons why I find these positions unsatisfying and argue that the principle of taste and the logical principle of nature’s purposiveness are particular applications of the more general principle of nature’s purposiveness, namely, a “merely subjective” and “subjective” respectively. I also show that a unifying a priori principle that applies to both aesthetic and teleological judgments is demanded by Kant’s systematic aims according to which the principle of taste and the principle of logical purposiveness stand in a complementary as opposed to a merely accidental relation to one another.

THE PROBLEM OF THE SPECKLED HEN AND ACQUAINTANCE (X-G)

MICHAEL PACE, *CHAPMAN UNIVERSITY*

The problem of the speckled hen originated in the early twentieth century as an objection to classical foundationalists. Such theorists typically thought that acquaintance with an experiential property sufficed for infallible justification about that property. However, if one sees a hen with, for example, twelve speckles, one is arguably acquainted with the property of being twelve-speckled, despite the fact that most people do not have infallible justification for believing that they are having an experience as of a twelve-speckled hen. Ernest Sosa has recently pressed a version of the problem against neo-classical foundationalists who appeal to the relation of acquaintance to ground empirical justification, and several philosophers have recently attempted to defend the theory against Sosa’s arguments. In this paper, I argue that these recent attempts are unsuccessful.

PEREBOOM ON THE FRANKFURT CASES (X-F)

DAVID PALMER, *UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS–AUSTIN*

Frankfurt cases are thought experiments, pioneered by Harry Frankfurt (1969), designed to undermine the principle of alternative possibilities (PAP), the principle that a person is morally responsible for what he has

done only if he could have done otherwise. PAP adherents typically appeal to what's often called the "dilemma defense" to argue that the Frankfurt cases don't undermine PAP. Derk Pereboom (2001; 2005) has recently proposed a Frankfurt case, "Tax Evasion," which he believes avoids the dilemma defense. In this paper, I argue that his case still falls prey to this difficulty, leaving it unproblematic for PAP defenders.

TORTURE, NECESSITY, AND MORAL INTEGRITY (VII-K)

STEVEN PATTERSON, MARYGROVE COLLEGE

A great many Americans accept the notion that torture may be engaged in under circumstances such as those we face with respect to the "war on terror." Against such an enemy, with the only apparent alternatives being the doing of wrong in response and perishing, it would seem that the restrictions on doing wrong are temporarily lifted or at least that culpability for doing wrong is reduced. This is the animating idea behind what has come to be known as the "lesser evil" defense of interrogational torture. The moral version of the "lesser evil" defense turns crucially on the idea of necessity, on the notion that torture is morally justified under the circumstances. In this paper I argue that this sort of argument has some critical flaws, among them overreliance on strained hypotheticals (like the omnipresent "ticking bomb" case), arbitrariness, and an unacceptable minimization of the importance of moral integrity.

UNDERSTANDING TRUMPING (IX-E)

L.A. PAUL, UNIVERSITY OF ARIZONA

Cases of causal preemption have received extensive discussion, and, while philosophers differ on how serious the problems are or how to handle them in an analysis, their structure and interpretation is well understood. Not so for a new sort of case, recently introduced by Jonathan Schaffer, which he calls trumping preemption. I dispute Schaffer's interpretation of trumping and argue that the examples have been misunderstood.

SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN THE CLASSROOM: EXPLORING THE LIMITS OF FREE SPEECH (VI-K)

THOMAS W. PEARD, BAKER UNIVERSITY

Courts have found college instructors liable for hostile environment sexual harassment in the classroom even where the conduct at issue is principally, if not solely, the instructor's speech. This paper focuses on the moral issue of whether prohibition under Title IX of sexually harassing speech by an instructor in a college classroom unduly interferes with the liberty of the instructor to engage in such speech. This liberty issue raises the classical philosophical question of the moral limits of social coercion. In addressing the liberty issue, I state and apply an analytical framework derived from Joel Feinberg's work *The Moral Limits of the Criminal Law*. On the basis of this analysis, I conclude that Title IX does not constitute an immoral restriction of the instructor's liberty in such cases.

*THE REAL FLAWS IN THE STEM CELL RESEARCH ENHANCEMENT ACT (II-I)**YVETTE PEARSON, OLD DOMINION UNIVERSITY*

Though the present state of the assisted reproductive technology (ART) industry in the United States suggests it would be foolhardy to oppose federal funding for human embryonic stem cell research (hESCR), the most recent effort to expand federal funding for hESCR—the Stem Cell Research Enhancement Act of 2007—was deeply flawed and ought to have been vetoed, albeit for reasons other than those offered by the Bush administration and other opponents of hESCR. Instead of a critical assessment of the text of the bill, both proponents of SCREA and President Bush relied on their stock arguments for or against hESCR. This paper exposes serious problems with SCREA and recommends more careful scrutiny by proponents of future legislation aimed at increasing federal support for hESCR.

*MUNDANE OR INCREDIBLE!? (V-G)**GORDON L. PETTIT, WESTERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY*

This paper explores the difference between something being merely extremely improbable but believable and something being literally incredible—unbelievably improbable. In the former case, a rational person would not expect a special explanation for the occurrence, but in the latter, she does. John Leslie and Peter van Inwagen have proposed principles that can be used to distinguish when a particularly improbable event may reasonably attributed to mere chance and when the rational person should expect a more robust explanation. I show the weaknesses of their principles and propose a revised principle that is more suited for the task.

*DIRTY CHEAP CONTEXTUALISM (III-I)**MARK TIMOTHY PHELAN, UNIVERSITY OF NORTH CAROLINA—CHAPEL HILL*

Contextualists argue that the semantics of knowledge ascriptions are context sensitive. A recent challenge to this position concerns the manner in which it is to be implemented. Just what is it about knowledge ascriptions that makes them semantically context sensitive? I examine Peter Ludlow's recent answer to this question. I discuss a problem for Ludlow's position, and offer an emendation of the position that avoids the problem and better fits the evidence.

*COREFERENCE AND TRANSITIVITY (III-I)**ANGEL PINILLOS, ARIZONA STATE UNIVERSITY*

Sometimes two representations designate the same thing “de jure.” This happens with “Mark Twain” and “he” in a sincere use of “Mark Twain is taller than Samuel Clemens, but he is not as handsome.” Other times, coreference is “de facto,” as with the pair “Mark Twain” and “Samuel Clemens.” One goal of this paper is to give an analysis of de jure coreference and highlight its importance. The second goal is to show that de jure coreference is not a transitive relation (even when understood as a discourse-internal notion).

If I am right, then the phenomenon probably resists explanation in terms of traditional linguistic tools. I end by indicating how the notion should be understood.

SIMILARITY & ACQUAINTANCE: A DILEMMA (X-G)

TED POSTON, UNIVERSITY OF SOUTH ALABAMA

There is an interesting and instructive problem with Richard Fumerton's acquaintance theory of noninferential justification. Fumerton's explicit account requires acquaintance with the truth-maker of one's belief and yet he admits that one can have noninferential justification when one is not acquainted with the truth-maker of one's belief but instead acquainted with a very similar truth-maker. On the face of it this problem calls for clarification. However, there are skeptical issues lurking in the background. This paper explores these issues by developing a dilemma for an acquaintance theory.

SLEEPING BEAUTY, CONDITIONALIZATION, AND KNOWLEDGE DE PRAESENTI (VII-F)

JOEL PUST, UNIVERSITY OF DELAWARE

The two most plausible answers to the Sleeping Beauty problem are 1/2 and 1/3. Lewis (2001), who defends 1/2, and Elga (2000), who defends 1/3, agree that Beauty should conditionalize on her new knowledge when she is told, on Monday afternoon, that it is Monday. In this paper, I demonstrate that a number of accounts of temporally indexical belief imply that it is impossible for Beauty to conditionalize on Monday afternoon. If such conditionalization is impossible, Elga's argument for 1/3 fails and the defender of 1/2 is absolved of any need to endorse the extremely counterintuitive claim which Lewis thought himself forced to accept by his defense of 1/2.

NATURAL RIGHTNESS (IV-I)

JASON RAIBLEY, CALIFORNIA STATE UNIVERSITY-LONG BEACH

This paper presents and explains a version of subjectivist ethical naturalism. I propose that non-instrumental goodness is constituted by the property of being what we would be disposed, under ideal conditions, to value for its own sake. I link this proposal with a view of the nature of moral rightness on which the choiceworthiness of an action consists in the degree to which that action promotes and protects our non-instrumental values. I construe both of these theses as synthetic statements of property identity. I explain how the thesis about rightness suggests pluralism at the normative level. I relate my views to previous work done by David Lewis, Peter Railton, and Richard Boyd on the metaphysics and semantics of goodness and rightness, indicating my debts, as well as my view's advantages.

HOW HEIDEGGER SHOULD HAVE READ PLATO (IV-F)

MARK RALKOWSKI, UNIVERSITY OF NEW MEXICO

I argue that Heidegger's interpretation of Plato is flawed for two reasons. First, if one does not assume, as Heidegger does, that Plato was a doctrinal philosopher, it is not obvious that Plato was the founder of ontotheology and subjectivism. Second, if Heidegger had fully appreciated Plato's political pessimism, he could have discovered a useful anticipation of his own later critique of technology in Plato's protracted critique of Periclean Athens. In order to make this last point, I show that Plato's representation of Socrates can be understood as an inversion of Thucydides' representation of Alcibiades, who embodies Periclean-Athenian individualism and imperialism better than anyone or anything else. Finally, I argue that this is no trivial matter: had Heidegger recognized this feature of Plato's thought, and appropriated it rather than his unabashedly Promethean reading of the *Republic*, he might have avoided his naïve and disastrous political decisions in 1933.

KNOWLEDGE NEVER MAKES A MISTAKE: THE INCOMPATIBILITY OF FALSE BELIEF AND KNOWLEDGE IN PLATO'S THAETETUS (V-J)

NAOMI RESHOTKO, UNIVERSITY OF DENVER

By assuming that everything is either known or not-known, Plato finds false belief to be incompatible with both knowledge and ignorance in the middle section of the *Theaetetus*. While this might appear to be an impossible view to maintain, I argue that it is actually a reprise of a thesis that is familiar to us from the Euthydemus: "knowledge never makes a mistake" (280a7). Furthermore, Plato's assumption that knowledge is all or nothing is justified when we heed his claim that he is, in the false belief section of the dialogue, looking for knowledge within the content of our own minds ("that activity of the soul when it is busy by itself" [187a4-6]). It is common for many philosophers to assume that the content of our minds is completely accessible to us and thus the easiest thing to know and known completely. If Plato can show that knowing the contents of one's own mind is incompatible with false belief—and therefore impossible, the thesis that we know what is beyond our own minds is also on unstable ground. I argue that Plato's strategy in the wax block is to explore the possibility that we have a relationship other than that of knowing or not-knowing our own conceptions. In fact, the wax block succeeds in accounting for one kind of heterodoxy, but only when both the perception and the imprint are treated as not known. Thus, only those who have a relationship other than knowledge with the content of their own minds can entertain false beliefs. Of course, everyone has false beliefs, so everyone has a relationship other than knowledge with the contents or their own minds.

PROTECTING THE ENVIRONMENT FROM THE LAW? WHY HUMPHREY'S IRREVERSIBILITY DEFENSE OF DIRECT ACTION FAILS (IV-G)

WALTER J. RIKER, VANDERBILT UNIVERSITY

Is environmental “non-democratic” direct action against legitimate democratic laws morally justified? Forms of environmental direct action include crop damage and tree-sitting. This is one kind of response to (what appears to be) an extreme instance of an otherwise fairly common sort of moral dilemma faced by citizens in modern pluralist democracies: what should a citizen do when her sincere moral convictions seem to require her to break legitimate democratic laws? Civil disobedience, direct action, and revolutionary activity are three distinct possibilities. I describe the features of morality and law that open the door to justified forms of political resistance. I then discuss and ultimately reject Mathew Humphrey’s (2006) “irreversibility” justification of environmental direct action. First, Humphrey’s irreversibility justification contains a fatal flaw. This is sufficient to refute Humphrey’s view. Second, and more generally, direct action fails to respond to the law’s demand for recognition and respect.

TIMOTHY WILLIAMSON ON KNOWLEDGE AND EVIDENCE: A CRITIQUE (X-G)

AARON RIZZIERI, ARIZONA STATE UNIVERSITY

Timothy Williamson has argued that a person *S*’s total evidence is constituted solely by propositions that *S* knows. This theory of evidence entails that a false belief can not be a part of *S*’s evidence base for a conclusion. I argue by counterexample that this thesis ($E=K$ for now) forces an implausible separation between what it means to be justified and rational, and what it means to base one’s beliefs on the evidence. Furthermore, I argue that $E=K$ entails the implausible result that there are cases in which a well-evidenced belief can not itself serve as evidence for a further conclusion, and the result that there can be rational and justified inferred beliefs that have no evidence for them whatsoever.

AN EXPRESSIVE MODEL OF THE SELF (VII-G)

ANTHONY RUDD, ST. OLAF COLLEGE

This paper sketches an alternative to both neo-Lockean theories of personal identity, which reduce the self to a bundle of particular states, and neo-Cartesian theories, which reduce it to a characterless “bare locus” capable of supporting any states whatsoever. A genuine alternative to both these views needs to see the self as internally related to its particular states, neither reducible to them, nor comprehensible apart from them. A person’s feelings (as Wittgenstein stressed) find expression in his/her bodily behavior. But as we come to know someone, we come to see how those particular feelings are themselves expressive of longer-term dispositions. I argue that we should see those in turn as expressive of the self—the substance whose dispositions they all are—and that this enables us to defend the common-sense view of the person as a distinct individual character, which neither Cartesian nor Lockean accounts can do.

*STAGE THEORY AND PROPER NAMES (IV-H)**PABLO RYCHTER, LOGOS BARCELONA*

Stage theory is a view about how ordinary objects (artefacts, animals, persons, etc.) are located in time. According to the view, ordinary objects are instantaneous—they exist at only one instant. In the current debate on persistence, stage theory is defended by T. Sider and K. Hawley. In this paper I focus on the under-discussed issue of what stage theorists should say about the semantics of ordinary proper names, like “London” or “G.W. Bush.” I will consider the sketchy remarks that stage theorists actually make about this issue, present some problems they face, and finally offer what I take to be the best view available for them.

*CONCEPT ACQUISITION WITHOUT REPRESENTATION (IV-E)**WILLIAM DYLAN SABO, UNIVERSITY OF NORTH CAROLINA—CHAPEL HILL*

Contemporary debates in concept acquisition presuppose that cognizers can only acquire concepts on the basis of concepts they already have, and thus requires that they have at least some innate concepts. I argue that this presupposition, which I call the Conceptual Mediation Thesis, should be rejected. I argue that distinguishing between indicating states and representing states of cognizers provides the basis for an alternative account of concept acquisition. On this account, concepts are acquired via indicating states of perceptual systems. This alternative shows how concepts can be acquired without using representations, and so how a cognizer with no concepts to begin with could go on to acquire some.

*THE POND, THE ENVELOPE, AND THE VINTAGE SEDAN: TAKING GLOBAL POVERTY SERIOUSLY (III-F)**WALTER E. SCHALLER, TEXAS TECH UNIVERSITY*

I argue that, contrary to Peter Singer and Peter Unger, we cannot determine our obligations with respect to global poverty by appeal to analogies like (Shallow) Pond (or Vintage Sedan). Although intuitively very compelling, such analogies are misleading. In Pond, it is possible to rescue the Drowning Child, whereas it is not possible to rescue everyone on the verge of death from starvation or disease. Global poverty is more like a modified Pond case where there is an endless stream of endangered toddlers. Just as we would be justified in allowing some to fall into the pond in order to build a fence around the pond, thereby saving a greater number, so, with respect to global poverty, we are justified in spending our money on long-range goods (medical research, education), even if we thereby allow children to die whom we could have rescued. But this undermines the Pond Analogy.

*HEIDEGGER’S CRITIQUE OF HUSSERL’S SPECIES THEORY OF MEANING (II-B)**JOSEPH K. SCHEAR, CALIFORNIA POLYTECHNIC STATE UNIVERSITY*

In his *Logical Investigations*, Husserl endorsed a form of platonism about propositional meanings, against the various forms of psychologism circulating at the turn of the 20th century. A platonist about meaning holds

that propositions are entities that exist prior to and independently of the acts and processes of thinking subjects. In his *Being and Time* period, Heidegger mercilessly attacked Husserl's platonism about meaning. The aim of the paper is to assess one key prong of this attack. I argue that Husserl's theory of meaning emerges from Heidegger's criticism unscathed. However, I conclude by offering an interpretive hypothesis about how one might read the failed objection in a more charitable light; that is, as marking Heidegger's existential phenomenology as an extension of, rather than a departure from, the anti-psychologistic agenda of the original Husserlian "breakthrough to phenomenology."

PERCEPTUAL CONTENT, REPRESENTATIONS, AND RELATIONS (VIII-J)

SUSANNA SCHELLENBERG, AUSTRALIAN NATIONAL UNIVERSITY

I defend a way of thinking of perception as both representational and relational. I argue that an intentionalist view on which perception represents objects is compatible with a relationalist view on which perception is a matter of standing in an awareness relation to objects, if the content of experience is understood in terms of potentially gappy content schemas. By acknowledging that perception is both relational and representational, the problems of pure relational and pure intentionalist accounts can be avoided. In contrast to pure relationalism, the view I defend can explain how veridical and hallucinatory experiences may be phenomenologically indistinguishable. Both experiences share a content schema that grounds the phenomenal character of the experience. But in contrast to pure intentionalism, the view I defend can account for the particularity of perception. In the case of a hallucinatory experience, the content schema is gappy. In the case of a veridical experience, the gap is filled by an object or an object-dependent mode of presentation of an object. Traditionally, there are two fundamentally different ways of thinking about perception. According to relationalism, perception is essentially a matter of standing in an awareness or an acquaintance relation to objects. According to intentionalism, perception is essentially a matter of representing objects. Relationalism can easily account for the particularity of perception, while intentionalism can easily account for how a perception and a hallucination can be phenomenologically indistinguishable. But two desiderata of any theory of perception should be to account for the particularity of perception and to explain the possibility of phenomenological indistinguishability. I argue that thinking of the content of experience in terms of potentially gappy content schemas allows for a straightforward way to account for both desiderata.

IT TAKES TWO: SEXUAL STRATEGIES AND GAME THEORY (VIII-G)

ARMIN SCHULZ, UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN-MADISON

Buss's Sexual Strategies Theory is one of the major evolutionary psychological research programs, but, as this paper seeks to show, it has unstable theoretical foundations. Since mate choice is a cooperative decision, the prediction of evolved sexual strategies requires careful analysis

of the entire evolutionary game the two sexes have played; instead of this, however, Buss concentrates almost exclusively on what is adaptive for the two sexes individually. This disconnect between Buss's methodology and the nature of his subject is shown to not yet be sufficiently appreciated in the literature, and to be unfortunate also for obscuring further tests and predictions of the theory.

REVENGE AND EXPRESSION (III-K)

LIONEL S. SHAPIRO, UNIVERSITY OF CONNECTICUT

There is a standard objection against accounts that purport to explain how the presence of a Liar sentence doesn't preclude a language *L* from expressing the notion of truth in *L*. According to this objection, such accounts avoid one paradox only to succumb to another of the same kind. Even if a language can contain its own truth-predicate, we can identify another intelligible notion it can't express on pain of immediate contradiction via Liar-like reasoning. My paper seeks to undermine this "revenge" objection by bringing to light a key assumption on which it rests—an assumption about what is involved in any language's "expressing a notion." What makes matters delicate is that this assumption is easily mistaken for various language-specific claims. I argue that such look-alikes, while true, are irrelevant. Only the original assumption can underwrite an effective charge of revenge, and that assumption is unwarranted and self-undermining.

THE AGENT RELATIVITY OF DIRECTED REASONS (II-D)

KENNETH E. SHOCKLEY, UNIVERSITY AT BUFFALO

Directed reasons are reasons that rely for their normative significance on the authority one individual has with respect to another. Acts such as promising seem to generate such reasons. These reasons seem paradigmatically agent relative: they do not hold for all agents. This paper provides a defense of the claim that the form of agent relativism seemingly required by directed reasons is innocuous, and poses no general problem for a practice dependent account of directed reasons, and, therefore, for consequentialism. While the position I present does not constitute a complete teleological account of value, it points toward a way of integrating directed reasons into a practice-based account of value. The position presented also remains consistent with the so called Compelling Idea that often motivates consequentialism: it is always permissible for an agent to do what will lead to the outcome that is best.

LEGITIMACY AS AFFIRMATION (IX-J)

EDWARD H.K. SONG, LOUISIANA STATE UNIVERSITY

In the political and social sciences, the idea of legitimacy focuses on the attitudes of acceptance or affirmation that citizens might express toward their state. In contrast, most liberal political theorists typically advance accounts that see legitimacy as a matter of justice. A state is legitimate only when it is just, and they worry that such attitudinal accounts ignore

important normative questions concerning the exercise of state power. In this paper, I attempt to defend a Rawlsian account of legitimacy as affirmation that points out the normative import of citizens' actual attitudes toward their states, and highlights a shortcoming of these typical liberal accounts of legitimacy. Such an account of legitimacy as affirmation offers novel ways of negotiating traditional debates about legitimacy and political obligation between Kantians and Lockeanes, and illuminates an arena of concern that has been ignored by the vast majority of contemporary liberal political theorists.

THE WORLD OUGHT TO BE OTHERWISE: THEODOR ADORNO'S THEORY OF AESTHETIC AUTONOMY AND A NEW CATEGORICAL IMPERATIVE (I-E)

MURRAY W. SKEES, UNIVERSITY OF NORTH FLORIDA

This paper shows the fundamental ethical aspect to Adorno's understanding of aesthetic autonomy. This fact is crucial to Adorno's claim regarding the autonomy of art and its subsequent social importance. I argue that, for Adorno, autonomous art develops a new categorical imperative. Adorno's aesthetic theory gives art ethical import. The implication is that art, unconsciously and unintentionally, is politically and ethically one of the few remaining authentic modes of existence. Art is the refuge of freedom in a world in which subjectivity itself is no longer a viable mode of existence for individual human agents. Moreover, Adorno's understanding of a law immanent to art, whose obedience results in free activity, is not given its truly radical implication without understanding it in terms of Kantian morality.

LOCAL AND GLOBAL RELATIVITY PRINCIPLES (VII-J)

BRADFORD SKOW, UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS-AMHERST

This paper discusses the relationship between a global version of the principle of relativity and a local version of the principle. I argue that the global principle entails the local one. I discuss a counterexample to this entailment and explain why it fails. I conclude with some remarks about the relationship between locality and relativity principles.

IS HOMEOSTASIS TOO MUCH TO ASK OF NATURAL KINDS? (I-F)

MATTHEW SLATER, UNIVERSITY OF IDAHO

The Homeostatic Property Cluster account of natural kinds offers an appealing improvement to traditional essentialist and cluster accounts. I offer two worries about the notion of causal homeostasis and its role in higher taxa natural kinds. But it may be possible to leave these problems behind by focusing on what the mechanisms in proffered cases achieve (rather than the mechanisms themselves).

*GOD, EVIL, AND CLOSURE (VII-K)**JEFFREY ALAN SNAPPER, NORTHERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY*

Is theistic belief reasonable in the face of evil? Evidential atheists say that it is not, arguing that our inability to detect God-justifying goods for many evils undermines the reasonability of theistic belief. I do four things here. (1) I briefly present the skeptical theist's response to the evidential argument from evil. (2) I then provide the following agnostic rejoinder: the skeptical theist's principle governing reasonable belief undercuts not only the reasonability of atheism, but also that of theism. (3) In exploring the agnostic rejoinder I show that its Closure principle must employ dynamic epistemic operators to preserve validity. Finally, (4) I show that the agnostic rejoinder fails both because dynamic epistemic operators do not close under known entailment and because skepticism about inferences from inscrutable to gratuitous evil does not entail skepticism about inferences from non-basic evidence for God's existence to the nonexistence of gratuitous evil.

*WHAT'S THE MATTER WITH PRICE GOUGING? (VIII-I)**JEREMY SNYDER, SIMON FRASER UNIVERSITY*

When prices for basic commodities increase in the event of a natural or man-made disaster, these price increases are often condemned as "price gouging" or "profiteering." But it is not clear what kind of moral wrong is charged by these terms. In this paper I offer an account of the moral wrongness of what is commonly referred to as price gouging. In order for the price increase to count as an instance of morally wrongful price gouging, the increase must be on a "necessary good," beyond what can be justified by higher risks or costs, and create an "unrefusable offer" for the customer. While this definition of price gouging strays somewhat from common use of "price gouging," it is a virtue of my account that it avoids some of the vague uses of the term.

*WHAT IS IT TO BE PORNOGRAPHIC? (V-I)**JORN SONDERHOLM, GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY*

In a recent paper, Michael C. Rea considers the question of what pornography is. First, he examines a number of existing definitions of pornography and after having rejected them all, he goes on to present his own preferred definition. Rea is of the opinion that pornography has essential features, and what he proposes is a "real" definition of pornography. This paper is a contribution to the ongoing debate about what pornography is. The first part of the paper (sections two to four) is negative in nature. The ambition is here to establish a counterexample to Rea's definition of pornography. The second part of the paper (sections five and six) is more positive in spirit. A suggestion is made about what is a necessary condition for something to be an instance of pornography, and the suggestion is thereafter defended against an objection found in the literature.

*EPISTEMIC TWO-DIMENSIONALISM AND THE EPISTEMIC ARGUMENT (IX-C)**JEFF SPEAKS, UNIVERSITY OF NOTRE DAME*

One of Kripke's fundamental objections to descriptivism was that it misclassifies certain sentences involving names as expressing a priori rather than a posteriori propositions. Few now defend descriptivism in the form criticized by Kripke; but many endorse two-dimensionalism as a kind of successor theory. Contemporary two-dimensionalists often explicitly disavow the idea that names are typically synonymous with associated descriptions, and so are not open to the epistemic argument as formulated by Kripke. However, two-dimensionalists share with descriptivists the idea that the epistemic status of sentences involving names is closely linked to the rules which fix the reference of the name; and, for this reason, Kripke's epistemic argument can be generalized in a way which does threaten many of the most promising versions of two-dimensionalism.

*INDEXICAL KNOWLEDGE AND PHENOMENAL KNOWLEDGE (VII-I)**CARA SPENCER, HOWARD UNIVERSITY*

A popular account of phenomenal knowledge likens it to indexical knowledge, i.e., knowledge about oneself typically expressed with sentences containing indexicals or demonstratives. The current popularity of an account of this sort owes in part to its promise of resolving some longstanding puzzles about phenomenal knowledge. One such puzzle arises from the compelling arguments that we can have full objective knowledge of the world while lacking some phenomenal knowledge. I argue that the widespread optimism about the indexical account on this score is unwarranted.

*THE GREATNESS OF VIRTUE AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR ACTION (IX-F)**REBECCA LYNN STANGL, UNIVERSITY OF VIRGINIA*

Almost all classical forms of virtue theory claim that virtue is the greatest of goods. Thomas Hurka has recently argued that this thesis is wrong. Far from being the greatest of goods, virtue is always a lesser good than such "basic" goods as pleasure, knowledge, and achievement. If virtue were the greatest of goods, Hurka argues, we would be committed to implausible conclusions about how to act. In this paper, I argue that Hurka has failed to demonstrate this last claim. Given a proper understanding of what a virtue ethicist might mean when she says that virtue is the greatest of goods, none of the supposedly objectionable action-guidance follows.

*EPISTEMIC QUESTIONS ABOUT THE ONTOLOGY OF MUSIC (VII-H)**ROBERT A. STECKER, CENTRAL MICHIGAN UNIVERSITY*

How should we adjudicate between different views about musical ontology? The answer seems obvious. An ontological claim must be backed up by an argument, and we know how to evaluate arguments. Unfortunately, even where deductive arguments are on offer, there is often as much disagreement about premises as about the conclusions. Further, quite a

bit of the argumentation for ontological theses is not strictly deductive. It often resembles argument to the best explanation. More specifically, much argumentation looks like this: desiderata are presented; various views are rejected for failing to meet the desiderata; one view is then defended as the one that best meets them. So we need some way to evaluate claims that such-and-such is a desideratum (d) for an adequate ontology of music as well as a “best-meets-d” claims that are put forward to defend a favored alternative.

EXPRESSIVISM IS SUBJECTIVIST AFTER ALL (IX-F)

JUSSI SUIKKANEN, UNIVERSITY OF READING

Jackson and Pettit argue that expressivism in metaethics collapses into subjectivism. A sincere utterer of a moral claim must believe that she has the relevant attitudes to be expressed. That belief, according to Jackson and Pettit, provides the truth-conditions of the utterance. Thus, the expressivist cannot deny that moral claims have subjectivist truth-conditions. This argument seems to fail as stated. I try to show that expressivism does have subjectivist repercussions in a way that avoids the problems of the Jackson-Pettit argument.

THE MISSING SHADE OF BLUE AND THE PROSPECTS OF CONCEPT EMPIRICISM (IV-E)

PAR SUNDSTROM, UMEÅ UNIVERSITET

According to Hume, all our thought materials are derived from experience. Hume himself draws attention to a kind of case that may appear to be a counter-example to his view: if a person has experienced all colors except bright blue, it seems possible that she could supply herself with an idea of this shade and thereby think something that she had never experienced. In this paper, I distinguish a variety of concept empiricist views, and three different attitudes one may take to Hume’s case visavi one concept empiricist thesis or other. One may hold (i) that the case is a fatal counter-example to the view; (ii) that the case is a non-fatal counter-example to the view; or (iii) that the case is not a counter-example to the view. I propose that there are concept empiricist views, which appear to be live options, and for which (iii) is the right attitude.

CATEGORIES, PREDICATION AND METAPHYSICS IN AQUINAS (VII-H)

PAUL FREDERICK SYMINGTON, UNIVERSITY OF SAN FRANCISCO

In this paper, Aquinas’s two-fold consideration of the categories is examined. Such a consideration provides a key motivation for his frequent use of the structure of predication to explicate metaphysical concepts and distinctions. A fundamental aspect of Aquinas’s metaphysics is justifying the very possibility and providing guidelines for establishing real distinctions—such as those among the ten Aristotelian categories of being—based on fundamental modes of predication. The insight of the paper lies in its identifying Aquinas’s understanding of the isomorphic relationship that exists between the dual aspects of categories as rationes and modes of

being and the predicate-copula structure of predication. The predicate itself expresses the ratio of that which is signified by the predicate, and the copula, in conjunction with the predicate, expresses the way in which that which is expressed by the predicate exists in the subject. This identification and justification of the isomorphism between predication and reality provides Aquinas a way of legitimately undertaking a derivation of the categories from modes of predication, which he presents briefly in his *Commentary on the Metaphysics* and his *Commentary on the Physics*.

DOES VALUE PLURALISM ENTAIL LIBERALISM? (I-G)

ROBERT TALISSE, VANDERBILT UNIVERSITY

Isaiah Berlin repeatedly attempted to derive liberalism from value pluralism. It is generally agreed that Berlin's arguments fail; however, neo-Berlinians have taken up the project of securing the entailment. This paper begins with an account of why the Berlinian project seems attractive to contemporary theorists. I then examine Berlin's argument. With this background in place, I criticize William Galston's recent attempts to rescue the Berlinian project.

A NEGLECTED ROLE FOR DESCRIPTIVE PREMISES IN NORMATIVE INQUIRY (XI-I)

DAVID GLENN TESTER, OXFORD UNIVERSITY

A prominent concern of the last several years has been the relevance of descriptive, empirical data for normative, philosophical inquiry. The aim of this article is to suggest that empirical findings falling within a specified class are relevant in a particular way that has received insufficient attention. Specifically, descriptive premises need not constitute evidence for any normative principle. Rather, such premises may undermine the evidential import of particular judgments that were themselves previously taken to constitute evidence for that principle. In this way, descriptive premises can alter the base of evidence used to evaluate philosophical theories, even if they do not themselves constitute evidence for those theories. I do not claim that this suggestion is novel. However, I argue that sufficient appreciation of it allows us to move towards a resolution of some contemporary concerns as to the proper role of empirical data in normative inquiry.

MISGIVINGS ABOUT THE NOMINALIST CONCEPTION OF RACIAL IDENTITY (II-H)

BRIAN THOMAS, UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA—RIVERSIDE

Among Anglo-American philosophers studying race, so-called dynamic nominalism has become the dominant way to conceive of racial identity, and social identity in general. This view originates in its philosophical guise in Ian Hacking's work with recent development done by Anthony Appiah. Appiah in particular offers a sophisticated and interesting account of racial identity. I argue that the view is mistaken in certain interesting ways as an account of racial identity. More specifically, I argue that it in fact is not an account of racial identity, that is, it fails to tell us what is constitutive of racial identity and that it in fact tells us what is causally necessary for racial

identity. I argue this point by considering several cases and I argue that these cases show that there is much work to be done in understanding racial identity as a kind of identity.

DOES KIERKEGAARD HAVE A POINT OF VIEW? (III-J)

MARK A. TIETJEN, UNIVERSITY OF GEORGIA

In this paper I contest the thesis by Joakim Garff that Kierkegaard's writings contain several competing and conflicting claims regarding the final point of view of the authorship. This thesis entails the denial of any confidence regarding Kierkegaard's larger authorial intentions. I argue that the various "points of view" present in Kierkegaard's writings do not conflict or undermine one another, but instead they are compatible perspectives that require individual treatment and analysis in light of their peculiar placement within the larger authorship. Following this, I propose an alternative reading of Kierkegaard's authorship motivated by the conception of neighbor love he develops in *Works of Love*. I also suggest that the general aim of Kierkegaard's authorship is the edification of his reader, the evocation of ethical and religious character.

DOES A MONOPOLY ON FORCE A STATE MAKE? IS IT NECESSARY? (IX-J)

ALAN TOMHAVE, UNIVERSITY OF MISSOURI—COLUMBIA

I argue that requiring a state to have a monopoly on force could entail that Canada is not a state. To avoid this result we must clarify how we understand the notion of having a monopoly on force. In clarifying this important concept, I explicate two aspects: first, a weak, negative aspect that requires that no one else be monopolizing the use of force for a given area, and second, a stronger, positive requirement, that a state have the ability, contingent on the abilities and dispositions of others, to enforce the state's will regarding the use of force.

MANY MONISMS? (X-I)

PATRICK TONER, WAKE FOREST UNIVERSITY

In a series of recent papers, Jonathan Schaffer has argued in favor of a doctrine he calls priority monism: the view that the one whole—the cosmos—is prior to its parts. He distinguishes this doctrine from existence monism, which is the view that exactly one concrete object exists. In this paper, I argue that there is no distinction to be drawn between these two monisms. They stand or fall together.

CONCEPT ACQUISITION AND PARTIAL CONCEPTUALISM (IV-E)

BENEDICTE VEILLET, UNIVERSITY OF MARYLAND—COLLEGE PARK

Concept acquisition seems to change experiential content: the avid bird watcher no longer sees the beach as filled with birds but sees it rather as filled with robins and sparrows. I argue that this fact provides *prima facie* support for an account of experiential content I call partial conceptualism. The overall argument is this: (1) there are two accounts of the changes in

experiential content, the constituent account and the causal account. (2) The causal account cannot account for all changes in experiential content—it must be supplemented by the constituent account. (3) The constituent account is (a) incompatible with nonconceptualism and (b) incompatible with conceptualism (c) but compatible with the third possible account of experiential content: partial conceptualism. I conclude that (4) changes in experiential content support partial conceptualism.

SUPEREROGATION FOR UTILITARIANISM (II-K)

JEAN-PAUL VESSEL, NEW MEXICO STATE UNIVERSITY

Many believe that traditional consequentialist moral theories are incapable of incorporating the allegedly important phenomenon of supererogation. After surveying the “ties at the top,” “satisficing,” and “egoistic-adjustment” strategies to avoid the supererogation objection, I argue that a recent formulation of utilitarianism incorporating the self-other asymmetry exhibits interesting supererogatory properties. I then incorporate this asymmetry into a version of egoistically-adjusted act utilitarianism, arguing that such a view exhibits very rich supererogatory properties, properties that should assuage the theoretical worries of a vast number of supererogation critics.

FREE WILL AND REASONABLE DOUBT (IX-G)

BENJAMIN VILHAUER, WILLIAM PATERSON UNIVERSITY

In cases where the purpose of attributing free will to someone is to retributively justify seriously harming him, justice requires us to hold that the reasons for believing that he had free will are not strong enough if it is possible to reasonably doubt that he had free will. If we think the free will debate is philosophically valuable, we must acknowledge that it is possible to reasonably doubt that anyone ever has free will, and we must therefore hold that the reasons for believing in free will are not strong enough in such cases if we are just.

DOXASTIC VIRTUES AS MORAL VIRTUES IN HUME'S EPISTEMOLOGY (II-G)

RICO VITZ, UNIVERSITY OF NORTH FLORIDA

It is common for philosophers interested in epistemology, in general, and the ethics of belief, in particular, to ask whether doxastic virtues (i.e., virtues concerning belief formation) are moral virtues. Some answer affirmatively; others, negatively. What is Hume's answer? Even his most thorough, careful, and charitable commentators have failed to explicate it directly, clearly, and in detail. In this paper, I attempt to remedy this failure and, in so doing, to rectify an oversight that impedes Hume from having his rightful place in contemporary discussions concerning virtue epistemology and the ethics of belief.

THE DALTONIAN ATOM: DEFINING A THEORETICAL TERM (VII-J)

S.H. VOLLMER, UNIVERSITY OF ALABAMA—BIRMINGHAM

In the view of most philosophers and scientists, Daltonian atomism has clear explanatory power: it explains why the elements exist in multiple proportions in the compounds they form. However, most chemists were originally strongly opposed to it, and various accounts have been given as to why. Paul Needham recently offered a new reason: it has no explanatory power. I argue, against Needham, that although Daltonian atomism may explain nothing about the nature of chemical combination, it can explain certain constraints on the elements from which compounds are formed. It does so in roughly the same way that the fact a house is made of bricks can explain certain constraints on the units from which it is constructed. In closing, I suggest what the relationship between the Daltonian atom and the abstract atom of quantum theory is, and the implications this has for explaining change in terms of what is unchanging.

NEW FOUNDATIONS FOR IMPERATIVE LOGIC II: PURE IMPERATIVE INFERENCE (II-J)

PETER B.M. VRANAS, UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN—MADISON

Imperatives cannot be true, but they can be obeyed or binding. “Surrender!” is obeyed if you surrender and is binding if you have a reason to surrender. A pure declarative argument—whose premises and conclusion are declaratives—is valid exactly if, necessarily, its conclusion is true if the conjunction of its premises is true; similarly I suggest, a pure imperative argument—whose premises and conclusion are imperatives—is obedience-valid (alternatively: bindingness-valid) exactly if, necessarily, its conclusion is obeyed (alternatively: binding) if the conjunction of its premises is. I argue that there are two kinds of bindingness, and that a vacillation between two corresponding variants of bindingness-validity largely explains conflicting intuitions concerning the validity of some pure imperative arguments. I prove that for each of those two variants of bindingness-validity there is an equivalent variant of obedience-validity.

PROBLEMS WITH HOOKER’S RULE CONSEQUENTIALISM (III-F)

EDMUND WALL, EAST CAROLINA UNIVERSITY

Brad Hooker has offered a version of rule consequentialism (which appeals to an ideal moral code) that he maintains is free from the usual objections. According to his formulation in *Ideal Code, Real World* (p.32), “An act is wrong if and only if it is forbidden by the code of rules whose internalization by the overwhelming majority of everyone everywhere in each new generation [note omitted] has a maximum expected value in terms of well-being (with some priority for the worst off).” In response to criticism, Hooker later amends his ideal rule-consequentialist approach and adopts an incrementalist or piece-meal rule-consequentialist approach. I offer some new objections that I believe apply to both approaches.

DEFENDING THE WIDE-SCOPE ACCOUNT OF INSTRUMENTAL REASON (I-I)

JONATHAN WAY, UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA–SANTA BARBARA

Many writers on practical reason accept a “wide-scope” account of the instrumental principle. On this account the requirement to intend the necessary means to one’s ends should be understood as the claim that you ought (if you intend the end, to intend the means), rather than the claim that if you intend the end, you ought to intend the means. The chief advantage of the wide-scope account is supposed to be that it avoids the implausible normative implications of the simple account. However a number of writers have argued that the wide-scope’s advantage here is merely apparent. These writers claim that there are ways of deriving implausible claims about what we have reason to do from the wide-scope account. In this paper I consider one version of this objection and argue that it rests on an overly simple account of the conditions under which reasons transmit from ends to means.

HEARING THE “VOICE OF COMPETENCE” (IX-I)

NELLIE WIELAND, CALIFORNIA STATE UNIVERSITY–LONG BEACH

Linguists studying syntactic reality need a means of describing the correctness conditions of a language on the basis of evidence. However, it’s not altogether obvious where this evidence should come from. Despite Chomsky’s claim that we should study language in the way we would study any “bodily organ,” the principal source of evidence in Linguistics is the intuitions of linguists themselves. In this paper, I argue that—despite their widespread acceptance and popularity—using linguists’ intuitions in developing linguistic theory (i) poses practical problems that vary with one’s conception of language itself, and, more importantly, (ii) collapses descriptive and normative linguistics.

IS CIVIC ENVIRONMENTALISM A SATISFACTORY URBAN ENVIRONMENTAL ETHIC? (IV-G)

SHELLEY L. WILCOX, SAN FRANCISCO STATE UNIVERSITY/TEMPLE UNIVERSITY

Few environmental philosophers have considered the urban environment to be a proper subject of moral inquiry. Most environmental ethicists have ignored non-natural environments, and the few who do acknowledge cities typically portray them as a primary source of environmental evils. Recently, however, some philosophers have begun to criticize the anti-urban trend in environmental ethics as myopic and racist, and to urge environmental ethicists to develop new normative theories capable of guiding our responses to urban environmental problems. This paper evaluates civic environmentalism, the main theory on offer in the nascent field of urban environmental ethics. Civic environmentalism draws upon civic republican citizenship theory to develop an account of our urban environmental obligations. I raise two concerns about this view as formulated by its best known proponents, Andrew Light and Richard Dagger, and suggest several directions for a more satisfactory urban environmental ethic.

VISUAL PERCEPTIONS: A PLEA FOR SIMPLE CONTENTS (III-H)

MALTE WILLER, UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS–AUSTIN

It has recently been argued that the contents of visual perceptions are complex, representing the objects of experience as subject-independent and as perspectively connected to the subject who undergoes the experience. This position is maintained to be motivated by the phenomenal contrast between visual perceptions and sensations. I argue that this phenomenal contrast can be very well explained by a view which denies that visual perceptions represent subject-independence and perspectival connectedness, and that such a simple view is in fact even more attractive than the recently suggested alternative position.

TRUTH AND DECEPTION IN KANTIAN ETHICS (VI-I)

DONALD WILSON, KANSAS STATE UNIVERSITY

Questions about the morality of lying tend to be decided in a distinctive way early in discussions of Kant's view on the basis of readings of the false promising example in the *Groundwork*. The standard deception-as-interference model that emerges typically yields a very general and strong presumption against deception associated with a narrow and rigorous model subject to a range of problems. I suggest here that there is room for an alternative account based on Kant's discussion of self-deception in the *Metaphysics of Morals*. I argue that we make the concern with ensuring our capacity of inner freedom seen in the case of self-deception the model for deception in general. I claim that doing so yields a subtle and integrated account encompassing norms of truthfulness that promises the kind of resources we need if we are to be able to make headway with hard cases where deception may seem permissible.

THE ARGUMENT FROM UNDERCONSIDERATION (VII-J)

K. BRAD WRAY, STATE UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK–OSWEGO

I examine Lipton's criticism of the anti-realist's argument from underconsideration. I argue that Lipton misunderstands the nature of the reliability that anti-realists assume scientists have. As far as the anti-realist is concerned, scientists are reliable in their judgments of relative empirical adequacy, breadth of scope, consistency, etc. Their reliability does not extend to choosing the theory that best describes reality at the level of unobservables. Indeed, there is no way a scientist could ground her claim to having such reliability.

THE PROPER STRUCTURE OF THE EPISTEMIC VIRTUES (II-G)

SARAH A. WRIGHT, UNIVERSITY OF GEORGIA

If we take a virtue approach to epistemology, what form should the epistemic virtues take? In this paper I argue, contrary to many, that the proper structure of the epistemic virtues should follow the tradition of internalism in epistemology. I motivate this version of virtue epistemology first by considering thought experiments like that of the new evil demon and

by showing how versions of externalist virtue theory, though constructed to accommodate our intuitions in such cases, cannot fully do so. I further argue that only an internalist virtue epistemology will provide epistemic virtues which appropriately mirror the structure of the classical moral virtues. Finally I argue that only an internalist version of virtue epistemology can appropriately explain why the epistemic virtues are valuable in themselves, and have more than only instrumental value.

CONVENTIONS FOR ILLOCUTIONARY SILENCING (V-I)

NICOLE WYATT, UNIVERSITY OF CALGARY

Catherine MacKinnon famously argues in favor of anti-pornography legislation on the grounds that pornography itself violates the right to free speech: "The free speech of men silences the free speech of women. It is the same social goal, just other people." Rae Langton and Jennifer Hornsby have defended MacKinnon's claim that pornography silences women in a series of papers focused on the notion of uptake, arguing that pornography prevents women from securing uptake for their attempted illocutionary acts, particularly attempts to refuse sex, and that this failure to secure uptake results in an inability to perform the illocutionary acts in question. In this paper I briefly outline the problems with this analysis from the point of view of speech act theory and present an alternative analysis of the way in which pornography could silence women, one which focuses on competing and overriding conventions.

CORNEA, CLOSURE, AND CONTEXTUALISM: OF FLAT PLANETS, PAINTED DONKEYS, AND THE BY/ON DISTINCTION (IX-H)

STEPHEN WYKSTRA, CALVIN COLLEGE

Closure principles have a probabilistic kin: the Consequence Condition. In epistemology and atheology, both play key roles. In epistemology, issues about closure figure crucially in debates about skepticism and contextualism. In atheology, the Consequence Condition figures importantly in debates about "Skeptical Theism." I argue that in both contexts, closure and kind are prey to a common confusion. To dispel it requires attending to Carnap's distinction between two senses of "confirm," and extending it into what I call "the By/On Distinction." I begin with Jim Stone's recent counterexample to CORNEA, as deployed by S. Wykstra against Rowe's pioneering arguments from evil. Stone's argument, I argue, equivocates between Carnap's two senses of confirm. I then argue that Carnap's distinction, suitably extended, dissolves what is most paradoxical in skeptical scenarios that haunt recent contextualist debates.

IS THE ONE OF PARMENIDES' FIRST HYPOTHESIS BEST INTERPRETED AS THE FORM OF THE GOOD? (I-H)

DAVID J. YOUNT, MESA COMMUNITY COLLEGE

Very few commentators have enthusiastically argued that the One of the First Hypothesis (Parmenides 137c-142b) and Plato's Form of the Good

(e.g., *Republic VI* and *VII*) are (interpretively) identical. None of them have, however, showed that this view might be true if we look at each of the First Hypothesis' characteristics if a One is (e.g., it cannot be many, has no shape, cannot be in time, etc.) and compare them with what Plato claims about the Form of the Good. After responding briefly to several objections to my view, I make these comparisons and argue for an affirmative answer to the title's question.

SPINOZA'S THEORIES OF VALUE (IV-I)

ANDREW YOUPA, *SOUTHERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY-CARBONDALE*

The standard reading of the *Ethics* holds that Spinoza subscribes to a desire-satisfaction theory of value. That a desire-satisfaction theory does some work in the *Ethics* is, it seems, undeniable. However, my aim in this paper is to show that this reading is not quite correct. I say it is not "quite" correct because a desire-satisfaction theory of value is true of someone who is unfree, but it is not true of someone who is free. On the reading I defend, the foundation of what is truly valuable in Spinoza's view is the perfection of a person's essence, not the satisfaction of a person's desires.

THE ETHICS OF PRICE GOUGING (VIII-I)

MATT ZWOLINSKI, *UNIVERSITY OF SAN DIEGO*

Price gouging occurs when sellers of a good sharply raise their prices in the wake of an emergency beyond the level needed to cover increased costs. Most people think that price gouging is immoral, and most states have laws rendering the practice a criminal offense. But the alleged wrongness of price gouging has been seriously under-theorized. This paper will explore two possible arguments against the moral permissibility of price gouging, ultimately rejecting both as misguided. It will then go on to make the positive argument that price gouging is, at least in many cases, morally permissible. This argument will be based upon the mutually beneficial nature of price gouging, the allocative efficiency of a free price system, and finally on Hayek's work regarding the signaling function of prices. I conclude that even calls for businesses to voluntarily refrain from price gouging are misguided.

APA PLACEMENT SERVICE INFORMATION

Lindsay Palkovitz will be the Coordinator for the APA Placement Service at the 2008 Pacific Division Meeting. Questions concerning the Service should be directed to Lindsay at The American Philosophical Association, University of Delaware, 31 Amstel Avenue, Newark, DE 19716. She can also be reached by telephone at (302) 831-4298, fax: (302) 831-8690, or email: lindspal@udel.edu.

APA PLACEMENT SERVICE GENERAL HOURS OF OPERATION:

Wednesday, March 19: Placement Information, 10:00 a.m. – 8:00 p.m.,

Thursday, March 20: Placement Information, 8:30 a.m. – 8:00 p.m.,
Placement Interviewing, 8:00 a.m. – 6:00 p.m.,

Friday, March 21: Placement Information, 8:30 a.m. – 5:00 p.m.,
Placement Interviewing, TBA

Saturday, March 22: Placement Information, 8:30 a.m. – 1:00 p.m.,
Placement Interviewing, 8:30 a.m. – 5:00 p.m.,

APA PLACEMENT SERVICE LOCATIONS

The Placement Services will be located in the International Ballroom Foyer of the Pasadena Hilton and in Cordova in the Pasadena Sheraton as outlined below. For your convenience, maps of the hotel appear at the back of this issue.

JOB CANDIDATES – INTERNATIONAL BALLROOM FOYER

1. Candidate Numbers will be assigned at the Placement Desk.
 2. The location of a Job Interview will be available from the Placement staff, or posted on the bulletin board at the information desk.
 3. Additional “Request for Interview” forms will be available at the Placement Desk.
 4. APA Membership Applications will be available at the APA Meeting Registration Desk.
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5. Information and instructions for using the Service will be available at the Placement desk (also see following pages), and posted on the information bulletin board.
6. The mailboxes for Job Candidates will be located at the Placement Desk.
7. A complete set of Job Postings will be available at the Placement Desk.
8. A message for the APA Placement Ombudsperson can be left at the Placement Desk.

INTERVIEWERS

1. **Interviewers check in here**—as soon as possible upon arrival.
2. Payments for **On-Site Interviewing Departments** will be received here.
3. Space will be provided here for interviewers to check their files.
4. “Request for Interview” forms received from job candidates that have been reviewed by interviewers **should be returned** here.
5. A list of interviewing table assignments will be posted on the Placement Information Bulletin Board.

INTERVIEWING AREA

1. APA Interviewing Tables will be located here.
2. In the event that additional space for interviewing is needed, we will post the additional location on the Placement Information Bulletin Board.

INFORMATION AND INSTRUCTIONS FOR JOB CANDIDATES

REQUIREMENTS FOR USING THE PLACEMENT SERVICE

1. You **must be an APA member** in order to use the Service. Placement is a benefit of membership for candidates, and there is no additional charge to use this service. Membership applications are available on the APA web site (www.apaonline.org) or by contacting the APA National Office (302) 831-1112, or at the Membership/Registration desk at the Meeting.
 2. You **MUST REGISTER** for the **MEETING** in order to use the Service.
 - If you **register in advance** for the meeting and indicate that you will be a candidate (an advance registration form is located at the back of this issue), a candidate number will be assigned in the National Office and will appear on the back of your badge. You **must** pick up your badge from the APA Registration staff prior to using the Placement service.
 - If you register on-site for the meeting, present your badge to the Placement Staff, who will be available to assign you a candidate number in the “Placement Service” line.
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WHAT TO BRING WITH YOU

1. Your copies of recent issues of *Jobs For Philosophers*.
2. Several copies of your curriculum vitae. If you run out of CVs at the meeting, the hotel has a copy center located in the Business Center.

HOW TO USE THE PLACEMENT SERVICE

After you have picked up your registration materials from the APA Registration staff, you are ready to use the Service. If you do not yet have a candidate number on the back of your badge, please go to the job candidates' area to receive one.

JOB CANDIDATES' AREA

Here you will find a file folder (mailbox) with your candidate number on it. All communications addressed to you during the meeting will be placed there. Your folder contains:

1. "Request for Interview" forms. Additional forms will be available from the Placement staff. **Be sure that your Placement Number appears at the top of all forms.**
2. A "Locator" form for you to list your name and hotel address. Please do not remove this form from your folder. This is used only in the event that we need to contact you during the meeting.

JOB POSTINGS

New jobs (not having appeared in the *Jobs for Philosophers*) will be posted on a bulletin board in the Placement Service Area. You should check this board regularly for new postings. Each ad should contain instructions on how to apply.

INSTITUTIONS THAT HAVE CHECKED IN WITH PLACEMENT

The names of institutions that have registered to use the Service will be posted on the bulletin board (updated regularly) in *alphabetical order*. Each listing will indicate the following:

1. If the listing institution has checked in with Placement.
2. If the institution is accepting interview requests at the meeting.
3. The relevant *JFP* for the institution's opening(s).
4. Where the institution plans on interviewing (Table with number assignment).
5. Miscellaneous notes deemed appropriate by the Placement staff or the institution.

SUBMITTING AN INTERVIEW REQUEST FORM

Complete the *top* portion of the "Request for Interview" form and attach a copy of your CV. **Be sure that your candidate number appears at the top of all forms.** After you have completed the necessary information,

place your request form and CV in the box marked *Requests for Interviews* which will be prominently displayed on the Placement Service Desk. Your "Request" will be forwarded to the institution by a staff member.

INTERVIEWS

After your "Request" has been reviewed by a representative from the institution, the form will be returned to your file folder with the institution's response appearing on the *bottom* of the form. Check your file folder often so that you can be certain to receive your messages promptly.

By Noon on March 22, all "Requests" submitted by you should have been returned to your file folder, and you should remove them at that time. Occasionally, an institution may retain applications to review at a later date. If you applied for a job that had been posted and the institution did not check in with the Service during the meeting, it is suggested that you contact the institution by mail.

INTERVIEWING LOCATIONS

Some departments will be conducting interviews at tables. Each institution using a table for interviewing will be assigned a table number. The table numbers assigned to institutions will be posted on the bulletin board in the Placement Service Area.

ADVICE FOR JOB APPLICANTS

The APA Committee on Career Opportunities offers the following advice for job applicants: The schedule for those seeking jobs and those Departments offering positions is difficult for all concerned. From the point of view of Departments, any publication date for *Jobs for Philosophers* is a compromise between the competing demands imposed by the need to get funding for positions, so the later the better, and by the need to have time to process applications, so the sooner the better. From the point of view of job applicants, there are also competing demands: the sooner it is published, the more time to apply, but the later it is published, the more opportunities will be available. There is no easy solution to this problem, but you can ease your difficulties somewhat by being prepared when the *JFP* is published. You should have your curriculum vitae ready to put in an envelope, a generic draft of a letter of application ready to be fine-tuned for particular job opportunities, and the rest of your file ready for mailing. This means talking to those who are to write letters of recommendation long before the *JFP* is due to arrive, preparing material about your teaching capacities, and selecting a writing sample for those Departments that request it. Applications should be complete, as well as clearly organized. It is to your advantage to send in your application as soon as possible after an ad appears.

INFORMATION AND INSTRUCTIONS FOR INTERVIEWERS

REQUIREMENTS FOR USING THE PLACEMENT SERVICE

1. It is expected that **all individual interviewers will register for the meeting** either by using the registration form found in the back of this issue or by stopping at the APA Registration Desk to register on-site prior to using the Placement Service.
2. All **Departments (not individuals)** planning to interview at the meeting should complete the Placement Service advance registration form found on our web site, www.apaonline.org/apa/divisions/pacific or at the end of this section.

Upon receipt of an advance registration form additional information pertaining to the Placement Service will be sent to the attention of the contact person listed on the form. In the event that we send Placement forms either via email or mail, please be sure to complete these and return them to our office **at your earliest opportunity**. Not doing so may cause your materials to arrive after the Staff has already left the office to travel to the meeting. In this case, we **must** have you fill out the forms again on site. If time does not allow sending them to us, please bring them with you and turn them in at the Placement Desk.

CHECKING IN WITH THE SERVICE

Before you begin to interview candidates, please check in with the Placement Staff. We will need to know that you have arrived on site for candidates inquiring about your institution. Additional information will be requested from you (or confirmed if your department pre-registered) at this time as well.

Some institutions accept interview requests at the meeting; some of these job notices may have appeared in *Jobs for Philosophers* while others are unpublished positions. A new, unpublished position will be assigned an AD# and posted on the bulletin board in the Placement Service area. If you are bringing such a job notice with you to the meeting, please provide the Placement Staff with **four** copies of the notice for the position you are advertising. Such a position announcement should be typed on *one side only* in a good size and easy to read font, and be as brief as possible. Only positions that have **not** appeared in *Jobs for Philosophers* will be posted. If you would like a position that has been posted at this meeting to appear on our website immediately following the meeting, or in the issue of *Jobs for Philosophers*, you need to submit this ad immediately, following the close of the meeting via our website, www.apa.udel.edu/apa/publications/jfp/advertise.asp. If you need assistance with this, contact the APA National Office.

Some institutions interview by prearrangement after placing an advertisement in *Jobs for Philosophers* and then contacting candidates prior to the meeting. When you arrange an interview with candidates, please inform them that they **must be APA Members in order to use the Service and they must register for the meeting in order to use the Service**.

If you plan to conduct job interviews anywhere other than at the interviewing tables/suites we have provided, please let us know your plans because candidates often come to us to ask questions about the location/time (etc.) of their interviews, and we need to have complete, up-to-date information in order to help them (and you).

Departments using a **Suite** for interviewing will need to complete an interview schedule form at the time they check in with the Service. Doing so enables the Service to notify the candidates you wish to interview of your interviewing location. **Be assured that only those candidates listed on your interview schedule will be told the location of your hotel room, unless you have directed us to give this information to all candidates who ask.** Departments interviewing at tables **DO NOT** need to complete this form.

N.B.: If you are conducting interviews in a hotel room, please be aware of the following policy statement adopted by the APA Board of Officers at its November 2004 meeting:

“Departments should not conduct Job Interviews in non-suite hotel rooms. Candidates who are subject to such interviews can appeal to the APA and are guaranteed anonymity.” (Originally published in *Proceedings and Addresses of The American Philosophical Association*, Vol. 78, No. 5, pp. 23, 119.)

APA INTERVIEWING TABLES

The Placement Service provides numbered tables for interviewing purposes; you will receive your table number assignment when you check in. These table number assignments will also be posted on the Placement Service Bulletin Board. Should additional space for interviewing tables be necessary, this location will be posted as well.

INSTITUTION FILE FOLDER (MAILBOX)

There will be a file folder bearing the name of your institution located in the Candidates' Area. Requests for interviews from candidates will be placed in this file folder.

REVIEWING INTERVIEW REQUESTS

When a candidate requests an interview with your institution, you should receive her/his curriculum vitae attached to a “Request for Interview” form. The bottom of this form is to be completed by you and returned to Placement staff. If an interview is granted, space is provided on this form to list the time, date, and location of the interview. If you are *unable to interview a candidate*, space for this response is also provided on the form. Any request you receive in an envelope contains confidential material and should be destroyed rather than returned to the candidate. As a matter of professional courtesy, *all requests should receive a response*. When a candidate receives a “Request” form back without a response, he or she is likely to assume that the material *has not been reviewed* and might return this to you via our service or contact your institution by mail.

Each candidate is assigned a numbered file folder to facilitate prompt communication between interviewers and candidates. Materials that you wish to transmit to a registered candidate should be handed in to the Placement Service staff, and will be delivered to the candidate by our staff.

APA STATEMENT ON PLACEMENT PRACTICES

The APA Committee on the Status and Future of the Profession reminds you of its Statement on Placement Practices: The APA discourages the nomination by graduate departments of job seekers for positions in philosophy, and the submission of their dossiers in response to announcements of positions, without their knowledge or interest. This may seriously mislead those who are conducting searches, and may have unfortunate consequences both for them and for genuinely interested applicants. Graduate departments using a nomination procedure or submitting dossiers on behalf of job seekers should either attest explicitly that the candidate wishes to be considered for the positions in question, or (preferably) ensure that the job seekers themselves submit personal letters of application for these positions. Departments conducting searches are encouraged to recommend or require explicitly (in their position announcements) that each candidate, to be assessed of full consideration, should submit a personal letter of application for and interest in the announced position.

A Placement Ombudsperson will be available at the meeting. Please see the Placement Service Staff if you would like to contact the Ombudsperson.

PAPER SUBMISSION GUIDELINES

Online Paper Submissions: Papers may be submitted either electronically or in hard copy by mail. For electronic submissions, follow the instructions on the APA web site. For hard copy submissions, mail to: Lindsay Palkovitz, ATTN: [Eastern, Pacific, or Central] Division Papers, The American Philosophical Association, University of Delaware, 31 Amstel Avenue, Newark, DE 19716, (302) 831-4298. Papers in any area are welcome. All papers are blind reviewed. Author's name, institution, or references pertaining to the identity of the author should be omitted from the paper, abstract, notes, and bibliography. Submitted papers are not returned to authors. Papers not accepted by one Division may be re-submitted for consideration to another Division. In submitting papers, authors warrant that those papers are entirely their own work or the joint work of the authors identified in the cover letter, and that, where appropriate, acknowledgement of the contributions of others has been made.

Graduate Student Travel Stipends and Awards: Papers to be considered for Graduate Student Travel Stipends/Awards must meet the criteria specified by each Division. For more information, visit the following address: www.apa.udel.edu/apa/divisions/stipends.

GUIDELINES FOR ALL THREE DIVISIONS

(*Guidelines 6, 7, 9, and 10 only apply to authors who are submitting papers in hard copy.)

1. Authors must be members in good standing of the APA.
 2. 1 copy of the paper.
 3. 1 copy of the abstract.
 4. Colloquium papers are limited to 3,000 words.
 5. Abstracts for colloquium papers are limited to 150 words.
 - *6. Title or cover page, which must include: a) title; b) word counts for all papers and abstracts; c) author's contact information; d) the Division the paper is to be submitted for.
 - *7. Papers must be typed on one side of page, double spaced, 1-inch margins on all sides, all pages numbered, 10-12 pt. font.
 8. No more than one submission by the same author for the same Division will be considered.
 - *9. Indicate name of Division on outside lower left side of the envelope containing the paper.
 - *10. Include a self-addressed stamped envelope to the National Office if you wish the receipt of your paper to be acknowledged.
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11. Any paper which is under consideration for publication elsewhere will be considered, provided that it will not appear in print until after the Divisional meeting is held. If this is the case, indicate when and where the paper is expected to be published.
12. Papers are not accepted by e-mail.
13. Authors are advised to provide accurate email addresses as part of their contact information because they may be contacted by email, sometimes under urgent circumstances. Authors who expect to relocate between the date of submission and the date of the meeting should arrange for email forwarding, or else provide both current and new email addresses with their contact information.

EASTERN DIVISION:

Meeting is held December 27-30.

Selections are announced in May or June.

Papers accepted by either the Central Division or the Pacific Division may not be presented at any subsequent meeting of the Eastern Division.

Papers exceeding 3,000 words will not be considered as colloquium papers.

Submissions for consideration as symposium papers must not exceed a length of 5,000 words. Abstracts for symposium papers must not exceed a length of 300 words. Authors should be aware that only a few papers are selected for presentation as symposium papers. If authors wish to have a shortened version of their paper considered as a colloquium paper, they should submit the appropriately shortened version, along with a shortened abstract, simultaneously with the submission of the symposium paper.

Any paper submitted without an abstract will not be considered. Any paper whose abstract is deemed unacceptable by the Program Committee will not be accepted. No revised abstract submitted after the paper's acceptance will be published in the *Proceedings and Addresses of The American Philosophical Association* without the approval of the Program Committee.

PACIFIC DIVISION:

Meeting is usually held at the end of March, but starting in 2009 will move to April.

Selections are announced in January.

A paper that has been on the Main Program at a past APA meeting (any division), or will be on the Main Program at a future Central or Eastern Division meeting, cannot be presented as a Main Program colloquium/symposium paper at the Pacific Division meeting.

Submissions for consideration as colloquium papers must not exceed 3,000 words.

Submissions for consideration as symposium papers must not exceed a length of 5,000 words. Abstracts for symposium papers must not exceed a length of 300 words. Authors should be aware that only a few papers are selected for presentation as symposium papers. If authors wish to have a shortened version of their paper considered as a colloquium paper, they should submit the appropriately shortened version, along with a shortened abstract, simultaneously with the submission of the symposium paper. (This will be considered a single submission.)

CENTRAL DIVISION:

Meeting has usually been held at the end of April, but starting in 2009 will be held in February.

Selections are announced in January, or before when possible.

Papers exceeding 3,000 words will not be considered as colloquium papers.

Submissions for consideration as symposium papers must not exceed a length of 5,000 words. Abstracts for symposium papers must not exceed a length of 300 words. Authors should be aware that only a few papers are selected for presentation as symposium papers. If authors wish to have a shortened version of their paper considered as a colloquium paper, they should submit the appropriately shortened version, along with a shortened abstract, simultaneously with the submission of the symposium paper.

The Central Division will not include a paper on its meeting program if that paper has already been presented or is scheduled for presentation on the Main Program of another APA Divisional meeting.

MINUTES OF 2007 PACIFIC DIVISION EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE MEETING

BOARD ROOM, ST. FRANCIS HOTEL, SAN FRANCISCO

THURSDAY, APRIL 5, 2007

Present: Joan MacGregor (Chair), Janet Levin, Sharon Lloyd, Calvin Normore, Fred Schueler, Anita Silvers, Nick Smith, Allen Wood

Guests: Dom Lopes, Mark Wrathall

CALL TO ORDER: The meeting was called to order at 8:00 a.m.

APPROVAL OF AGENDA: Secretary Silvers requested the addition of a new item to the previously distributed agenda. An APA member had just brought a complaint to the Pacific Division Executive Committee regarding discrimination on the basis of sex by an institution on the Pacific Coast that was using APA facilities. The question was not to address the complaint directly, as doing so involved an investigatory process inappropriate for a divisional Executive Committee, but rather to determine how the Executive Committee could be properly responsive to members raising issues of this sort, and then to respond properly. The Executive Committee agreed to address this matter as the first action item on the agenda.

APPROVAL OF MINUTES OF MARCH 22, 2006: The Minutes were approved as printed.

REPORT OF SECRETARY-TREASURER: The Secretary-Treasurer made a brief report on the financial state of the Division.

DISCRIMINATORY HIRING PRACTICE AND JFP: An APA member asked the Executive Committee to address what he believes to be a discriminatory practice by a Pacific Coast institution advertising its position in the APA's *JFP*. He was offered the position but also asked as a pre-employment condition to sign a statement agreeing not to engage in certain practices. Although these were not practices he engaged in, he believed the previously undisclosed pre-employment condition violated APA anti-discrimination policy.

Executive Committee discussion focused on the APA requirement regarding publication of potentially discriminatory pre-employment conditions. While institutions with religious affiliations may decide that they will hire only members who accept their faith, this condition must be published so that people who don't meet the condition will not waste time and resources applying. The Executive Committee decided that there was reason to exercise its ability to place items on the agenda of the APA Board of Officers. The Executive Committee thereupon requested that

the APA Board of Officers consider whether to refer the complaint to its investigatory committee, the APA Committee on Defense of Professional Rights, to determine whether the APA policy on advertising in *JFP* had been violated. (See the Board of Officers' 2007 Meeting Minutes in the forthcoming May 2008 *Proceedings* for the outcome of the referral.)

APPOINTMENTS TO 2008 PROGRAM COMMITTEE: The Executive Committee discussed fields that needed to be covered by new appointments to the Program Committee. Proposals for members to be appointed were made. 2008 Program Committee Chair Wrathall will contact candidates and come back to the Executive Committee for more recommendations if the necessary coverage of fields is not achieved.

2009 PROGRAM COMMITTEE CHAIR: The Executive Committee decided to invite Paul Hurley to chair the 2009 program committee.

APPOINTMENT OF NOMINATING COMMITTEE: The proposed revision of the Pacific Division bylaws at the upcoming business meeting provides for the divisional nominating committee to be elected. To identify candidates for this election, however, calls for one last appointed nominating committee to select candidates for the first election to the nominating committee. To reflect the proposed revisions in the bylaws as closely as possible, the Executive Committee adopted the idea that the division's immediate past president chair the nominating committee. Calvin Normore will chair the 2007-08 nominating committee. Robert Pasnau and James van Cleve will be the committee's members. They will nominate candidates of the number and kind designated in the revised bylaws.

REPORT OF 2007 PROGRAM CHAIR: 2007 Program Committee Chair Fred Schueler gave the Executive Committee some comparative statistics about the 2008 and 2007 programs. 457 papers were submitted for the 2007 program, compared to 386 for 2006. The rate of acceptance remained steady, but the standard for accepting colloquium and symposium papers went up by half a grade. The number of colloquium papers accepted therefore went up, but the number of accepted symposium papers went down. Thirty-six graduate students had their papers accepted. The number of invited sessions was the same as the previous year.

Program Committee Chair Schueler worried that, if the number of submissions continued to rise according to the trend line from 2006 to 2007, no hotel would have sufficient meeting rooms to house the meeting. Silvers assured the Executive Committee that the number of submissions always rises precipitously when the meeting is in San Francisco, and drops the next year when the meeting is elsewhere. Nevertheless, she said, finding hotels with enough meeting space that are willing to provide the space at no charge in return for a sleeping room guarantee is increasingly difficult.

PIKSI SUPPORT REQUEST: The Executive Committee responded positively to the APA Board of Officers' request that the Division contribute \$3,250 to support the Philosophy in an Inclusive Key Summer Institute for Undergraduates at Penn State.

MEETING SITES for 2009: The 2008 meeting is in Pasadena, and the division will return to San Francisco for the 2010 meeting. A site in the Northwest for the 2009 meeting is needed. The Executive Committee decided to invite proposals from hotels in Seattle and Vancouver. In regard to the prospect of meeting in Vancouver, special attention will be paid to border crossing issues that might impede some members' ability to attend the meeting.

BUSINESS MEETING AGENDA: The Executive Committee approved the agenda for the upcoming business meeting. The Secretary Treasurer reported on conversations with the Chair of the Division's Ad Hoc Committee on Bylaw Revision about approaches to present and act on the Committee's recommendation. It was agreed that President Normore, who would chair the business meeting, initially would call on the Chair of the Bylaw Revision Committee to present the issues, and that the proposed revisions needed no second as they were being made by a committee. The proposal would be moved and acted on in sections (the sections delineated by its authors).

ADJOURNMENT: Having completed the agenda, the Executive Committee adjourned the meeting at 10:50 a.m.

Respectfully submitted,

Anita Silvers

Secretary-Treasurer

MINUTES OF 2007 PACIFIC DIVISION BUSINESS MEETING

THURSDAY, MARCH 5, 2007, NOON

ITALIAN ROOM, ST. FRANCIS HOTEL, SAN FRANCISCO, CA

CALL TO ORDER: President Calvin Normore called the meeting to order at 12:06 p.m.

APPROVAL OF AGENDA: The agenda was approved.

APPROVAL OF MINUTES: The minutes of March 22, 2006, were approved without correction.

ANNOUNCEMENTS: Names of APA members who had passed away since the last meeting were read. A moment of silence was observed.

REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-TREASURER: The Secretary-Treasurer distributed the APA audit report, which includes details of the three divisions' financial activity, and stated that the report also would be published in the May '07 *Proceedings*.

REPORT OF THE PACIFIC DIVISION EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE: Executive Committee Chair Joan MacGregor reported on the recent meeting of the Executive Committee (see Executive Committee Minutes in the January '08 *Proceedings*).

REPORT FROM THE APA BOARD OF OFFICERS: The APA Executive Director reported on the actions of the APA Board of Officers. Secretary-Treasurer Silvers mentioned that the Board minutes would be available in the forthcoming May '07 *Proceedings*. She invited everyone to a reception later that afternoon to welcome the new APA Executive Director.

REPORT OF THE PACIFIC DIVISION NOMINATING COMMITTEE: Nominating Committee Chair Steven Reynolds reported that the Committee nominated Nancy Cartwright for Vice President and Stewart Cohen for Member at Large of the Executive Committee.

ELECTION OF NEW OFFICERS: A motion to elect these officers passed.

APA BY-LAW REVISIONS: Proposed "house-keeping" revisions to the APA by-laws were discussed, prior to being sent to mail ballot.

PACIFIC DIVISION BY-LAW REVISIONS: Paul Menzel moved the adoption of the amendments to the By-laws of the Division on behalf of the Ad Hoc Committee on By-law Amendments for Nomination and Election Procedures, which he chaired. The proposed amendments were printed in the January 2007 issue of the APA *Proceedings*. He asked for, and received, consent of the body to substitute the words "...the proposed amendments

are presented for discussion” for the last four words of section 6-b [old section 5-b], “...a vote is taken.”

Menzel explained the proposed amendments as having essentially three parts: sections 1-3 on the Nominating Committee, the work of the Nominating Committee, and the terms of office for all positions; section 4 on the elections themselves; and section 6 on procedures for amending the by-laws. (a) The Nominating Committee would be largely elected, comprised of the immediate past president of the division plus four members elected for two-year terms. It would nominate two candidates each for vice-president, for at-large Executive Committee positions, for representative to the National Board of Officers, and for open positions on the Nominating Committee, and one or more candidates for secretary-treasurer. Nominations would be published in the same issue of *Proceedings* that contains the Pacific Division program, with any nominations by petition of five members due seven days before the beginning of the division meeting. Term limits would be set for all offices. (b) Elections would be by mail ballot mailed within 30 days of the annual business meeting. (c) Proposed by-law amendments would have to originate in the same ways as prescribed in the current by-laws but would be voted on in a mail ballot mailed within 30 days of the annual business meeting at which they were discussed. Two-thirds of the votes cast would be required for passage.

Menzel noted that most of the changes recommended for the Pacific Division have parallels in an existing by-law of the Central or Eastern Divisions.

The body agreed to take the proposed amendments *ad seriatum*, discussing and voting separately on each part.

REVISIONS OF SECTION 1 (OFFICERS) AND 2 (DUTIES OF EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE), AND ADDITION OF SECTION 3 (DUTIES OF NOMINATING COMMITTEE): Chair Normore led the body through discussion of sections 1 through 3. Differences of opinion surfaced over the provision that almost all of the elections must be contested. No attempt to alter this provision passed. However, the two-thirds vote needed to pass amendments to the by-laws was not achieved. Sections 1 (Officers) and 2 (Duties of the Executive Committee) of the by-laws were not amended, nor was a new section on “Duties of the Nominating Committee” adopted.

REVISION OF SECTION 4 - OLD SECTION 3. (ELECTIONS): The proposed amendments to section 3 achieved the necessary two-thirds vote, and the section was amended.

REVISION OF SECTION 6 - OLD SECTION 5. (AMENDMENTS): The proposed amendments to section 5 achieved the necessary two-thirds vote, and the section was amended.

ADJOURNMENT: The meeting adjourned at 1:05 p.m.

Respectfully submitted,

Anita Silvers

Secretary-Treasurer

2008 CANDIDATES FOR OFFICE

FOR VICE PRESIDENT:

Michael Bratman

Terence Parsons

Michael Tooley

FOR REPRESENTATIVE TO THE BOARD OF OFFICERS:

Heather Battaly

Andrews Reath

FOR EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE MEMBER:

Brad Armendt

Ned Markosian

PROPOSED PACIFIC DIVISION BY-LAW AMENDMENTS

The following petition to amend the Pacific Division By-Laws has been received. What follows here is (a) a proposed “primary” amendment; (b) a proposed “supplementary” amendment; (c) the list of signers of the petition; and (d) an explanation of the amendments. This proposal will be placed on the agenda of the annual business meeting and then will go out to mail ballot.

BY-LAWS OF THE PACIFIC DIVISION, THE AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL ASSOCIATION

PROPOSED PRIMARY AMENDMENTS SUBMITTED NOVEMBER 2007

(additions denoted by bold, deletions by strike-through)

1. Officers

a. The officers of the Division shall be a president, a vice-president, a secretary-treasurer, and Pacific Division representative to the National Board of Officers. The terms of office of the president and vice-president shall be one year. Each year the presidency shall be assumed without further election by the vice-president of the year preceding, and a new vice-president shall be elected. The terms of office of the secretary-treasurer and of the representative to the Board of Officers shall be three years. All officers assume office on July 1 following their election. All terms end on the appropriate June 30.

b. There shall be an executive committee consisting of nine members, as follows: (a) the officers of the Division, *ex officio*, (b) the immediate past president of the Division, (c) three members elected at large, for three-year staggered terms, and (d) the chair of the program committee, *ex officio* (see 2c). The chair of the executive committee shall be chosen by the Committee from among the members elected at large. All members of the Executive Committee must be members of the Association, affiliated with the Pacific Division. A majority of its members shall constitute a quorum of the executive committee.

c. There shall be a nominating committee of five to nominate officers for the Division. The committee shall consist of the immediate past president, who shall act as chair, and four other members, two of whom shall be elected each year for two-year terms.

d. The terms of president and vice-president shall be one year; no one may serve more than one term in these offices. The terms

of the at-large executive committee members shall be three years, and those of the elected nominating committee members shall be two years; elected members may serve two consecutive terms on either of these committees, after which they are not eligible for re-election to that committee for a period equivalent to one term. The representative to the national Board of Officers may serve up to two three-year terms. The secretary-treasurer may serve up to three consecutive three-year terms.

2. Duties of the Executive Committee

a. Arrangements for the regular annual Pacific meeting of the Association shall be the responsibility of the executive committee.

b. The agenda of the annual business meeting to be held during the regular Pacific meeting of the Association shall be the responsibility of the executive committee.

c. The executive committee shall establish such committees as it deems necessary to aid it in efficiently attending to the business of the division, retaining in every case full responsibility for the action of such committees. Among these committees shall be: ~~(1)~~ a program committee of three or more members, serving staggered three-year terms, the chair to serve *ex officio* on the executive committee. The program committee shall be responsible for the program of the annual Divisional meeting. ~~(2) A nominating committee of three members. The nominating committee shall be responsible for making nominations to all offices of the Division. At the discretion of the executive committee, the secretary-treasurer may~~ **shall** serve *ex officio* on **any** committees appointed by the executive committee.

d. The executive committee shall fill vacancies to any office of the Division in cases in which the elected officer leaves office before the completion of his or her term.

3. Duties of the Nominating Committee

a. **The nominating committee shall nominate a slate of candidates for election to consist of: one or more names for the office of vice-president, two names for a member of the executive committee, and in appropriate years, one or more names for the office of secretary-treasurer and two names for the office of representative to the national Board of Officers. It shall also nominate two candidates for each of two positions on the next year's nominating committee; each nominee shall be a candidate for a specific position on the committee.**

b. **The nominating committee is free to consult with any officer of the Division in order to assist it in fulfilling these responsibilities.**

c. **The Nominating Committee shall publish its report in the issue of the APA *Proceedings* that contains the program of the Pacific Division annual meeting (normally the January issue). Before the name of a nominee is published, the individual nominated shall**

have expressed to the Nominating Committee explicit written consent to stand for election.

d. Upon publication of the report of the Nominating Committee, members of the Pacific Division may by petition make additional nominations for the next year's Nominating Committee, for officers, and for members of the Executive Committee. Such petitions must be signed by five members of the Association affiliated with the Pacific Division, must bear the written consent of the nominee, and must be received by the Nominating Committee no later than seven days before the start of the annual divisional meeting.

e. The Nominating Committee will make the final slate of candidates available in print at the beginning of the divisional meeting, for discussion at the annual business meeting.

43. Elections

a. Nominations made by the nominating committee for all elections to office in the Division shall be published in the issue of the *APA Proceedings* that contains the program of the Pacific Division annual meeting (normally the January issue).

b. Any five members of the Division can submit nominations for offices of the Division after the nominations of the nominating committee have been published, up until seven days before the start of the annual divisional meeting. Such nominations shall bear the signatures of the five members and the consent, in writing, of the nominee.

c. (a) and (b) specify the sole methods of nomination.

d. All elections to office shall be by mail ballot to all members of the Association who are certified by the executive director as affiliated with the Pacific Division, mailed within 30 days after the end of the annual meeting by the secretary-treasurer. Ballots shall be counted six weeks after they are sent out. When there are two candidates for a single office, election will be by majority of those voting. When there are more than two persons nominated for a single office, voting shall be the method of transferable vote described in the section on preferential voting in Section 44 of *Robert's Rules of Order, Newly Revised*.

54. Meetings

a. A quorum for the annual business meeting shall consist of those who attend the meeting.

b. Resolutions which purport to represent the sense of the Pacific Division on matters of public policy may be voted on only by mail ballot authorized by the annual business meeting. Such mail ballots will include relevant minutes of the meeting and a summary of the arguments presented.

c. In the business meeting, questions of order shall be covered by Robert's Rules of Order.

65. Amendments

a. Amendments or additions to these by-laws may be proposed only by the executive committee, by the national Board of Officers, or by a petition signed by at least twenty members of the Association with voting affiliations with the Pacific Division.

b. Proposals to amend or add to these by-laws must be announced to the members of the Association who have voting affiliations with the Pacific division at least two weeks prior to the meeting at which the proposed amendments are presented for discussion.

c. Any proposed amendment of or addition to these by-laws must be presented for discussion at a regular business meeting and shall then be submitted by mail ballot to all members of the Association who are certified by the executive director as affiliated with the Pacific Division, with passage dependent upon acceptance by two-thirds of those casting votes.

PROPOSED SUPPLEMENTARY AMENDMENT SUBMITTED NOVEMBER 2007

(additions denoted by bold, deletions by strike-through)

If and only if the primary amendments proposed to the by-laws and submitted November 2007 pass, the new Section 3, sub-section a, shall be amended as follows:

3. Duties of the Nominating Committee

a. The nominating committee shall nominate a slate of candidates for election to consist of: **two** ~~one or more~~ names for the office of vice-president, two names for a member of the executive committee, and in appropriate years, one or more names for the office of secretary-treasurer and two names for the office of representative to the national Board of Officers. It shall also nominate two candidates for each of two positions on the next year's nominating committee; each nominee shall be a candidate for a specific position on the committee.

(*****

We, the undersigned Pacific Division APA members, propose that the By-Laws of the Pacific Division be amended to revise the nominating committee, its selection, and its duties, per the attached specific amendment language. The amendments are segregated into a two-part sequence: first (the "primary amendments"), to revise the nominating committee, the selection of its members, and many of its duties, and second (the "supplementary amendment"), to stipulate that the nominating committee shall nominate

two candidates for the office of vice-president (instead of “one or more”). The second amendment is phrased so that, if passed, it would take effect only if the first amendment passes.

Name	Institution	Date
Rita Manning	San Jose State University	22 Oct 07
Naomi Zack	University of Oregon	22 Oct 07
Christina Bellon	California State University–Sacramento	22 Oct 07
Marcia Homiak	Occidental College	22 Oct 07
Anatole Anton	San Francisco State University	22 Oct 07
Andrew Light	University of Washington–Seattle	23 Oct 07
Keith Cooper	Pacific Lutheran University	24 Oct 07
Sharyn Clough	Oregon State University	24 Oct 07
Alison Wylie	University of Washington–Seattle	24 Oct 07
Patricia Hanna	University of Utah	24 Oct 07
Erin McKenna	Pacific Lutheran University	30 Oct 07
Paul Menzel	Pacific Lutheran University	30 Oct 07
Laurie Shrage	California State University–Pomona	30 Oct 07
Ann Garry	California State University–Los Angeles	30 Oct 07
Bernard Linsky	University of Alberta	31 Oct 07
Ronald Sundstrom	University of San Francisco	31 Oct 07
Elizabeth Potter	Mills College	31 Oct 07
Andrea Woody	University of Washington–Seattle	31 Oct 07
Sandra Harding	University of California–Los Angeles	31 Oct 07
Robert Pasnau	University of Colorado	1 Nov 07
Scott Pratt	University of Oregon	1 Nov 07
John Lysaker	University of Oregon	1 Nov 07
Adam Arola	University of Oregon	1 Nov 07
Mark Johnson	University of Oregon	1 Nov 07
Michael Tooley	University of Colorado–Boulder	1 Nov 07
Graham Oddie	University of Colorado–Boulder	1 Nov 07
Carol Cleland	University of Colorado–Boulder	1 Nov 07
Claudia Mills	University of Colorado–Boulder	1 Nov 07
Wesley Morrison	University of Colorado–Boulder	1 Nov 07

DESCRIPTION AND JUSTIFICATION OF PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE BY-LAWS OF THE PACIFIC DIVISION OF THE AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL ASSOCIATION

(amendments submitted November 2007)

Background

On April 5, 2007, at the Pacific Division's annual business meeting, amendments to the by-laws that were proposed by the Ad Hoc Committee on By-law Amendments for Nomination and Election Procedures were passed. Those amendments require that nominations for all offices now be published in the January issue of *Proceedings of the APA*, that nominations by petition (as distinct from those from the nominating committee) be submitted by a minimum of seven days before the annual division meeting, that election of officers occur by mail ballot instead of at the annual business meeting, and that proposed amendments to the by-laws, though presented at the annual business meeting for discussion, be voted on by mail ballot.

Other changes proposed by the Ad Hoc Committee concerning the nominating committee, its duties, and the terms and term limits of the offices for which it makes nominations narrowly failed to pass at the April 5, 2007, business meeting. It is these changes, with slight alteration, that are now being proposed again. For these proposed amendments, given the amendments that were adopted in April 2007, adoption will need to be by vote on a mail ballot in April 2008, after the proposed amendments are discussed at the March 2008 annual business meeting.

Basic Description

The amendments now proposed are in two segments: (1) The "primary amendments," which are quite detailed and which focus on the nominating committee's membership and selection, officers' terms and term limits, and the duties of the nominating committee. (2) A one-word "supplementary amendment" then addresses one specific matter: the number of candidates for division vice-president that the nominating committee is required to nominate. Here it is proposed that the "one or more" nominees language used in the primary amendments be altered to a mandatory "two."

Detailed Description of the Primary Amendments

In the proposed primary set of amendments, a key element is the nominating committee. The composition of the committee is addressed in a new section, 1-c. The committee, were it to be revised per this proposal, would become much more like the nominating committee in the Eastern and Central divisions currently: comprised of five persons, four of whom would be elected and one of whom (the immediate past president of the division) would serve *ex officio* and as the committee's chair.

The length and limits for the terms of all offices and positions are addressed in a new section 1-d. Most terms and term limits are kept as stipulated in the current by-laws, but it is proposed that the Secretary-Treasurer also be governed by term limit. Unlike most of the other officers and committee

members, however, this office would not be limited to two consecutive terms, but to three consecutive terms.

The work and selection of the nominating committee are detailed in a new section 3 (with the current by-law sections 3, 4, and 5 then becoming sections 4, 5, and 6 respectively). Sub-section **a** of the new section 3 stipulates that the nominating committee nominate one or more persons for Vice-President. It also stipulates that the committee nominate two persons for each at-large position on the executive committee and for the representative to the national Board of Officers, and that the committee nominate one or more person(s) to be Secretary-Treasurer.

Sub-sections **b**, **c**, **d**, and **e** of the new section 3 treat other aspects of the nomination process. The current manner of nomination by petition is continued, and timelines and publication requirements are clarified.

Justification of the Primary Amendments

The changes involved in these amendments are significant. They would position the Pacific Division much closer to the Central and Eastern divisions in its approach to organizational governance, making office holding more the outcome of election than simply nomination and moving the division more in the direction of expressly democratic governance.

Election of four of the five members of the nominating committee instead of having the executive committee appoint a three-member committee reflects this basic shift toward more explicit democracy. Four elected positions (along with a fifth member not immediately elected, the immediate past President) will also allow the committee to be more representative of the division geographically and in type of institution.

Term limits would become explicit and similar to the other divisions, generally two terms. The term limit proposed for secretary-treasurer is longer, however. This office is different than others. For a President and Executive Committee to best execute the work of the division, continuity in the Secretary-Treasurer's office has distinct advantages. On the other hand, however, only rarely has a Secretary-Treasurer served more than nine years in either of the other divisions. The proposed limit of three elected three-year terms has the merit of combining considerable continuity with opportunity for choice by the division's membership.

One of the most important changes included in these amendments is the requirement to nominate two candidates for the executive committee and the representative to the national Board of Officers. This would make the Pacific division similar to the current Eastern and Central divisions. Competitive candidacy, as compared to more honorific election by default because only one candidate is nominated, is appropriate because the positions being filled are *governing* positions. Officers lead the organization, and their interest in and positions on various issues facing the APA as an organization are fully germane to their selection.

It is proposed, however, that the nomination of "one or more persons" be allowed for the position of secretary-treasurer. This reflects the belief

that the secretary-treasurer carries out more administrative work for the division and its executive committee than any of the other offices do. The proposal on this score is similar but not identical to the Central division, where “one” (though not “one or more”) nominee is stipulated, and it is unlike the Eastern division where the Secretary-Treasurer is not elected but appointed by the Executive Committee. Although there are advantages in both of the other divisions’ models, the proposed amendment for the Pacific division follows more the Central than the Eastern Division model in having the Secretary-Treasurer elected. It is also proposed, however, that while the nominating committee should have the option of submitting more than one nominee, it should have the option of nominating only one.

Justification of the Supplementary Amendment

The “supplementary amendment” changes the requirement for the nominating committee to nominate one or more candidates for vice president to a requirement that it nominate two. Both the Eastern and the Central divisions elect their vice president (who, as in the Pacific Division, becomes the president in the following year). The current bylaws of the Pacific Division do not preclude an election between more than one candidate, nor would the by-laws as amended by the previous “primary” amendments being proposed at this time. They implicitly discourage it, however, inasmuch as the default option is effectively the appointment of a vice president by the nominating committee’s nomination of only one candidate. In fact, the Pacific Division has never held an election for the vice presidency between two or more candidates.

Although no one could complain about the actual candidates selected by this procedure—the list of past Pacific APA presidents is as distinguished as one could wish—the process itself is unfortunate. The motivation behind the proposed change to the bylaws in the one-word supplementary amendment is that both the symbolic and real importance of the APA presidency would be better served by a democratic election between multiple candidates. The change in language ensures such an election by requiring the nominating committee to propose two candidates, which would then trigger a general election by mail ballot. Once an election becomes the norm, it is the hope that other members would be encouraged to nominate further candidates, yielding the sort of fully open, democratic process that the other divisions enjoy every year.

The election of a president is an opportunity for reflection on the intellectual and professional values of our community. Simply to be nominated is an honor, and there can be no embarrassment in losing such an election, in view of the lofty competition for the position. To win such an election is to know not just that one is favored by the deliberations of a committee, but that one has the highest possible standing in the minds of one’s peers at large for the role of leading the governance of the organization. The proposed bylaw change would therefore have all the usual advantages of democracy, making the offices of vice-president and president a public expression of the membership’s vision of the profession.

CALL FOR PROPOSALS FOR MINI-CONFERENCES

CALL FOR PROPOSALS FOR MINI-CONFERENCES HELD IN CONJUNCTION WITH THE ANNUAL MEETING OF THE AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL ASSOCIATION, PACIFIC DIVISION

The Pacific Division Executive Committee invites APA members to organize small conferences in conjunction with the annual meetings in 2009 in Vancouver and 2010 in San Francisco. The APA Pacific Division will provide a venue and can also provide some support for such conferences.*

The purpose of this new program is to give members opportunities for collective exploration of important philosophical topics in more depth than is offered by the usual meeting schedule.

Members are invited to submit proposals. Proposals received by March 1, 2008**, will be considered by the Pacific Division Executive Committee at its meeting in March 2008. The proposal should describe the topic of the conference and explain its timeliness and importance, and its potential audience; identify prospective speakers; and specify what support will be needed to hold the conference, and what contribution (in addition to meeting space) the Pacific Division is asked to make. Conference organizing committees should include at least one member of the Pacific Division.

Please contact Secretary-Treasurer Anita Silvers (asilvers@sfsu.edu) if you would like more information. Proposals should be sent by email and should be submitted by March 1, 2008, to be considered by the Executive Committee at its March 2008 meeting.

*Up to \$5,000 can be made available to defray direct expenses of the mini-conference.

**Proposals received after this date will be considered by the Executive Committee at the next possible opportunity.

LIST OF ADVERTISERS AND BOOK EXHIBITORS

AYN RAND INSTITUTE (A-226-227)

BANCROFT PRESS (A-250)

CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY PRESS (A-223)

CONTINUUM BOOKS

DUKE UNIVERSITY PRESS (A-224)

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OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS (A-214-215)

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HOTEL RESERVATION FORM, CENTRAL

RECEPTION TABLE REQUEST FORM, CENTRAL

APA REGISTRATION POLICY

It is the policy of the APA that all persons attending sessions, including those who are participating as speakers, commentators, or session chairs, are required to register for each meeting they attend. In addition, we have always recommended that all participants wear their APA badges during session hours to identify themselves as registered participants. In an effort better to enforce this policy we have begun a system of checking meeting attendees, randomly and anyone whom we suspect might not be registered, for proof of registration. If you are asked to provide proof of registration and are unable to do so, you will be asked to register immediately in order to enable you to attend sessions. Registration fees help subsidize every divisional meeting. Without that income we will be unable to ensure the quality and excellence of our meetings which you have come to expect. We thank you for your continued cooperation.

PASADENA ATTRACTIONS

The Norton Simon Museum features seven centuries of European art from the Renaissance to the 20th century, including works by van Gogh, Picasso, Rembrandt, and Fragonard. The museum also features an extensive collection of South Asian sculpture and a sculpture garden with works of Rodin. Open Wednesday - Monday, noon-6 p.m. and Friday, noon-9 p.m. (626) 449-6840. www.nortonsimon.org (take the free Arts Shuttle to the Simon)

Huntington Library, Art Collection, and Gardens, 1151 Oxford Road, San Marino. The Huntington is an oasis of art and culture set amidst 150 acres of gardens. The Library features works from British and American history and literature, including an original Gutenberg Bible and Chaucer's Canterbury Tales. Three galleries showcase 18th- and 19th-century British and French masterpieces, including the "Blue Boy" and "Pinkie." Fifteen gardens feature 14,000 species of plants. Open: Tuesday - Friday, noon-4:30 p.m.; Saturday - Sunday, 10:30 a.m.-4:30 p.m. (626) 405-2100. www.huntington.org

Pacific Asia Museum, 46 North Los Robles Avenue (one and a half blocks from the Hilton). Housed in the historic Grace Nicholson mansion, the museum is dedicated to the preservation, promotion, and understanding of the arts and culture of Asia and the Pacific. Listed on the National Register of Historic Places. Eclectic collection and great gift shop with Asian antiques. Open: Wednesday - Sunday, 10 a.m.-5 p.m. Friday, 10 a.m.-8 p.m. (626) 449-2742. www.pacificasiamuseum.org

Pasadena Museum of California Art, 490 East Union Street (two blocks from the Hilton). The only museum in Southern California devoted exclusively to California art, architecture, and design. Wednesday - Sunday, 10 a.m.-5 p.m., Friday, 10 a.m.-8 p.m. (626) 568-3665. www.pmcaonline.org

The Gamble House, 4 Westmoreland Place. Built in 1908 during the American Arts and Crafts movement, this masterpiece is the best preserved example of work from internationally recognized architects Charles and Henry Greene. The home was built for David and Mary Gamble of Procter & Gamble and is listed on the National Register of Historic Places. Docent Tours: Thursday - Sunday, noon-3 p.m. (626) 793-3334 <http://gamblehouse.org>

Comics Restaurant & Ice House, 24 N. Mentor Avenue (626) 577-1894. The famous comedy club at which many world class performers got their start, and where they still perform.

The Knightsbridge Theatre, 5 South Raymond Avenue. This intimate theatre offers live year-round presentations ranging from William

Shakespeare's "A Midsummer Night's Dream" to Neil Simon's "The Female Odd Couple." (626) 440-0821 www.knightsbridgetheatre.com

Santa Anita Park Thoroughbred Racing. Wed. - Sun.; \$5 admission; \$4 parking. Santa Anita Park, 285 W. Huntington Dr., Arcadia. (626) 574-RACE or www.santaanita.com

Pasadena Civic Center (one block away, opposite Paseo Colorado). *Buddy: The Buddy Holly Story* will be playing while we are in Pasadena. For tickets, (213) 365-3500 or www.theaterleague.com

Pasadena Playhouse (just a few blocks from the hotel). *Dirty Blonde*, with Claudia Shearer recreating her Broadway roles as Mae West and the admiring Mae West fan Jo, will be playing while we are in Pasadena. 39 S. El Molino Ave. Box Office: (626) 356-7529 www.pasadenaplayhouse.org

Pasadena Jazz Institute. Concerts by the world's finest jazz musicians. (626) 398-3344 Concerts are held at Travis Auditorium, 180 N. Oakland Ave.

BEYOND PASADENA

Disneyland and Disney's California Adventure. 1313 S. Harbor Blvd., Anaheim. Drive Time: 1 hour. (714) 956-MICKEY www.disneyland.com

The Getty Center. 1200 Getty Center Drive, L.A. Drive Time: 40 minutes. (310) 440-7300 www.getty.edu.

Heritage Square. 3800 Homer St., L.A., Drive Time: 10 minutes. Eight Victorian buildings in a park setting. (213) 763-DINO www.nhm.org

Los Angeles County Museum of Art. 5905 Wilshire Blvd. Drive Time: 40 minutes. (323) 857-6000 www.lacma.org

Los Angeles Zoo. 5333 Zoo Drive, L.A., Drive Time: 20 minutes. (323) 644-6400 www.lazoo.org

Museum of Contemporary Art. 250 S. Grand Ave., L.A. (213) 626-6222 www.moca.org

Southwest Museum. 234 Museum Drive, L.A. Drive Time: 10 minutes. Oldest museum in L.A. Nationally acclaimed collection of Native American art and artifacts. (323) 221-2164 www.southwestmuseum.org

Universal Studios Hollywood. 100 Universal City Plaza, Universal City. Drive Time: 20 minutes. (800) 864-8377 www.universalstudioshollywood.com

PASADENA RESTAURANT LIST

Reservations are very strongly recommended for Friday and Saturday nights, especially if you want to dine around 8:00 p.m. on Friday, after the Presidential Address and reception.

Many Pasadena restaurants offer outdoor as well as indoor dining.

Area codes are 626 unless otherwise stated; distances are from the Hilton (168 S. Los Robles). The immediate area (three or four block walk) includes many of the standard, reliable restaurant chains: California Pizza Kitchen, McCormick & Schmick's Seafood (nice outdoor dining), Cheesecake Factory, Louise's (Italian), Gaucho Grill, Soup Plantation, Tony Roma's, etc. McCormick & Schmick's Seafood Restaurant (\$\$) is at 1111 N. Los Robles, takes reservations (405-0064), and has very pleasant indoor and patio dining with a large menu.

Paseo Colorado, 280 E. Colorado Blvd., is a large mall on Colorado behind the Sheraton and is extremely convenient to the hotels. Restaurants are inexpensive to moderate. These include:

Border Grill (\$\$) (844-7700) Mexican, offshoot of the well-known Santa Monica restaurant of Mary Sue Milliken and Susan Feniger.

P.F. Chang's China Bistro (\$) (356-9760)

Café Med (\$\$) (844-7700)

Yardhouse Restaurant (\$\$) (577-9273)

California Crisp (\$) (396-9992)

Rubio's Baja Grill (\$) (535-9383)

Delmonico's Seafood Grill (\$\$\$) (844-7700)

The Bodega Wine Bar (\$) (793-4300) has light food as well and is recommended.

Other restaurants near the hotels (within 3/4 mile):

California School of Culinary Arts Bistro (\$\$) (open Mon. to Fri., seating 11:30-1:30, 5:30, 8:00), (405-1561) .3 miles

California School of Culinary Arts Café (\$) 561 E. Green St. (Mon. to Fri, open 7:00 a.m.-8:30 p.m.), (683-7319) A less expensive version (see above) .3 miles

Gelson's Supermarket, 280 E. Colorado (actually at the corner of Green St. and Marengo Ave. (535-0190) Nearest grocery and deli to the hotels with a good deli and places to sit. This upscale market has an extensive assortment of ready to eat delicacies, great for a picnic lunch, to take back to the hotel for breakfast or dinner, or to sustain you on your homeward flight at the corner of the Paseo Colorado mall. Less than .4 miles.

King Taco #21 (\$) 45 N. Arroyo Pkway (792-0405) Inexpensive and good Mexican food. .7 miles

Mario's (\$\$\$) 39 S. Molina Ave. Where they sing while you dine. (796-1977)

Sitar Exotic Indian Cuisine (\$\$), 618 E. Colorado Blvd. (449-5954) Indian. .4 miles

Maison Akira (\$\$\$), 713 East Green St., Pasadena, (796-9501) French with Japanese accent. High end, but generally worth it. .4 miles

Yahaira's (\$\$) 698 E. Colorado Blvd. in the Theater District. (844-3254) Serves lighter Mexican fare with an emphasis on fresh ingredients. (Its parent restaurant El Portal is right next door, serving more traditional fare.)

El Portal (\$\$) 695 E. Green (795-8553) Regional dishes from the moles of Oaxaca to the seafood of Vera Cruz.

Sushi of Naples (\$\$) 735 Green St. east of El Molino in the Theater district. (578-1123) Good sushi and other Japanese food, with no Italian influence whatsoever.

Old Town is centered at the intersection of Colorado and Fair Oaks. Shuttles leave every 15 minutes, but it's easily walkable in about 15 minutes. Walk west down Colorado Blvd. or Green St.

A'Float Sushi (\$) 87 E. Colorado (792-9779) Sushi on boats, not great but fun.

Akbar Cuisine of India (\$), Try the Coco Lamb. Food not as incendiary as menu suggests, so no need to be timid. 44 N. Fair Oaks Ave. (577-9916)

All India Café (\$) 39 S. Fair Oaks Ave. (440-0309) Indian, probably the best of the four on this list (but see also the Tibet/Nepal House). Good seafood, dishes from Bombay and beyond.

Azeen (\$\$) 110 E. Union (683-3310) Good Afghan food, moderately priced.

Boba World (\$) 24 W. Colorado (585-5885) Asian fusion, inexpensive and filling, child friendly.

Cafe Atlantic (\$\$) 53 E. Union St. (296-7350) Xiomara's more reasonable sister restaurant: excellent Cuban.

Café Santorini, One Colorado (64 W. Union. St., in the alley) (564-4200) Mediterranean cuisine.

Chiara, 43 E. Colorado just east of Fair Oaks in Old Town. (564-8696) Has several good Brazilian dishes along with its more pedestrian Italian offerings.

Chandra (\$\$) 400 S. Arroyo Pkwy (577-6599) Thai. Saladang's competitor. People differ about which is better.

Il Fornaio (\$\$) One Colorado (24 W. Union. St., in the alley) (449-0052) one of the better Italian chains.

Kuala Lumpur (\$\$) 69 W. Green (577-5175) good Malaysian Restaurant, mostly from southern Malaysia and Indonesia. Try the curry or wonton laksa, the yam-curry noodles, the tamarind noodles, and any seafood dish. Ying Yang noodles sooth an overheated palate—they're not on the menu, but you can ask for this subtle dish.

Melting Pot (\$\$\$) 88 West Colorado (792-1941) fondues and hot pots.

Neomezze (\$\$) 20 E. Colorado (793-3010), small plates with a Mediterranean flair, décor with a N.Y. influence. Outdoor seating.

Patakan Union (\$\$) 43 E. Union St. (449-4418) Thai.

Ruby's Diner (\$) 45 S. Fair Oaks Avenue (796-7829) Chicken fried steak and meatloaf dinners, old fashion fountain drinks.

Sushi Roku, One Colorado (33 Miller Alley) (683-3000) One of a chain but with a good reputation.

Tre Venezia (\$\$) 119 Green St. (795-4455) Italian. Try the unusual pastas, veal bollito misto, fish in agrodolce, and seductive desserts. Comfortable dining room. .9 miles

Raymond Street in Old Town (see above), wrapping around Holly St., north of Colorado has some of the best restaurants in Pasadena:

Cafe Bisou (\$\$) 91 N. Raymond (792-9923) Cal-French crowd pleaser.

Chado Tea Room, 79 N. Raymond (431-2832) Very impressive tea list.

Nonya's (\$\$\$) 61 Raymond St. (583-8617) Modern Maylay/South Chinese fusion. Recommended by Pasadena denizens. Specialty cocktails.

Yujean Kang's (\$\$\$) 67 N. Raymond Ave. (585-0855) Nouvelle Chinese, possibly one of the best and most interesting Chinese restaurants in the L.A. area. Recommended by philosophers near and far.

Tibet/Nepal House (\$\$) 36 E. Holly St. (585-9955) Nepali, nice goat curry, excellent vegetarian dishes, drink Himalyan Blue beer or buttered tea. They say the Dali Lama eats here.

Xiomara (\$\$\$) 67 N. Raymond Ave. (796-2520) Nuevo Latino Cuban, with killer mojitos.

Beer in Old Town (see above):

Gordon Biersch, One Colorado (41 Hugus Alley) (449-0052) Great beer, not food.

Yard House (\$) 330 E. Colorado Blvd. (577-9273) For draft beer of many varieties, food unknown.

Odd and Odder in Old Town (see above):

Twin Palms (\$\$\$) 101 W. Green St. (577-2567) Tent dining (taste by Kevin Costner).

Buca di Beppo (\$\$) 80 W. Green St. (792-7272) Old style American Italian, bizarre restaurant with larger servings, but somehow charming despite the genre.

Honey Baby's Tea Cakes (\$) 10 E. Holly St. (585-9127) Homemade goodies for lunch or tea.

Near Old Town:

Arroyo Chophouse (\$\$\$) 536 South Arroyo Pky. (577-7463) Steak. .8 miles

Parkway Grill (\$\$\$) 510 S. Arroyo Pky (795-1001) Wonderful California Cuisine, don't be put off by the stodgy looking decor. Recommended by Cal Tech faculty. .8 miles

Saladang (\$\$) 363 S. Fair Oaks Ave. (793-8123) Thai, companion restaurant of Saladang Song. Excellent Thai food with modern approach. Try catfish in red wine sauce, pad kee mow, prik king, and thai toast. Curry dishes are great. But can be crowded. .7 miles

Saladang Song (\$\$) 383 S. S. Fair Oaks Ave. (793-5200) Thai, companion restaurant of Saladang. Quieter and slightly less expensive than Saldang. .7 miles

Lake Street Area is about a fifteen minute walk east. If you are watching your budget, you'll find more eating places to suit you on this walk along Colorado Blvd., or Green St. than in Old Town:

Bistro 45 (\$\$\$) 45 S. Mentor Ave. (795-2478) French in an amazing 1930s Art Deco Building. Lovely small plates. Strong recommendations from many quarters; often found in the "top 10 in S. California; top 100 in nation" kinds of lists. .9 miles

Celestino (\$\$) 141 S. Lake Ave. (795-4006) Good California Italian

Cobbler Factory (\$) 33 N. Catalina Ave. (795-1005) Dinky place famous for cobblers. .9 miles

Europane, 950 E. Colorado Blvd. (577-1828) Lake has great sandwiches, as well as quiche and other lunch fare. Be forewarned, however, that it's hard to escape without picking up a little something for dessert as well. Great bakery including excellent pastries, and sandwiches (open 7a.m.-5:30 p.m., except Sun., closes 2:30), cash only. .9 miles

Halie (\$\$\$) 1030 E. Green (440-7067) Cal-French-Asian Fusion. Very good chef, interesting decor. .8 miles from Hilton.

Madre's (\$\$\$) 897 Granite Ave (744-0900) Latin restaurant belonging to Jennifer Lopez; a fine restaurant called "Mom's" .9 miles

Peet's (\$) 605 S. Lake (795-7413) Starbucks is ubiquitous, but some might well prefer Peets. 1.0 miles

Pie N' Burger (\$) 913 E. California Blvd. (795-1123) Inexpensive and good pies and burgers. 1.1 miles

Radhikas Cuisine of India (\$\$) 140 Shopper's Lane (744-0994) Indian (some prefer this to Meezban). .8 miles

Smitty's Grill (\$\$\$) 110 S. Lake Ave (793-9999) Elegant (nice corn bread), owned by the same people who own Parkway Grill. .7 miles

Wolfe Burgers, 46 N. Lake (792-7292), Terrific burgers, many options. .8 miles

Zankou (\$) 1296 E. Colorado Blvd. (405-1502) Some people modestly consider Zankou (also in L.A. and Glendale) as having the best roast chicken in L.A. 1.2 miles

Somewhat further away (drive or take a taxi):

Cameron's Seafood Market (\$\$) 1978 E. Colorado (793-3474) Lots of seating with very good variety. 1.8 miles

Casa Bianca (\$) 1650 Colorado Blvd., Los Angeles, ((323) 256-9617) Great eggplant/garlic pizza. 1.6 miles

Raymond Restaurant (\$\$\$) 1250 S. Fair Oaks Ave. (441-3136), California food in a beautiful garden. 1.8 miles

Further afield: There is great Asian food available in the nearby communities of Monterey Park and San Gabriel, about 15 minutes' drive from the hotel. There are a number of good restaurants near the intersection of Garfield and Main St. in Alhambra. The Gold Line connecting Pasadena with Downtown L.A. stops right in the heart of Chinatown. Of course, those willing to venture further into L.A. will be able to find anything under the sun.

Babita Mexicuisse (\$\$) 1823 S. San Gabriel Blvd. in San Gabriel is a good 20 minute drive, but it serves top notch Yucatan-style cuisine in an intimate setting.

Shiro (\$\$\$) 1505 Mission St., South Pasadena (799-4774) Japanese/French fusion cuisine, often rated as one of the top restaurants in the L.A. area. Accessible by the Gold Line. Very good value for money.

Pho 79 (\$) No frills Vietnamese chain that serves satisfying soup and noodles, with restaurants in Chinatown (727 N. Broadway), Alhambra (29 S. Garfield Ave.), and San Gabriel (535 W. Valley Blvd.).

Señor Fish (\$) 618 Mission St., South Pasadena (403-0145) This improbably named chain offers top-notch Baja-style tacos and burritos at unbeatable prices. There are branches on Mission street in South Pasadena (accessible by the Gold Line) and on Main Street in Alhambra.

Empress Pavillion (\$\$) 988 N. Hill St. (213-617-9898) and Ocean Seafood, (\$\$) 750 N. Hill St., (213-687-3088) are two solid Cantonese places in Chinatown.


MPV Seafood Restaurant (\$\$) 1412 S. Garfield Ave., Alhambra (289-3018), Chinese, currently the restaurant most commonly used by the CSULA Philosophy Dept. to entertain guests. 4.7 miles.

Ocean Star Seafood (\$\$) 145 North Atlantic Blvd., Monterey Park (818-308-2128), one of the most popular Dim Sum houses in L.A. Regular offerings can be amazing (with service that can vary). 5.6 miles.

Tung Lai Shun (\$\$) 140 W. Valley Blvd., No. 118C, San Gabriel (288-6588). Islamic Chinese food. Be adventurous! Be sure to try the sesame bread! 6.0 miles.

HOTEL DIAGRAMS





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Erin C. Shepherd, Publications Coordinator

October 8, 2007
