The Phenomenology of Sensory Affect (IV-G)

Murat Aydede, University of British Columbia

A lot of qualitatively very different sensations can be pleasant or unpleasant. The Felt-Quality Views that conceive of sensory affect as having an introspectively available common phenomenology or qualitative character face the “heterogeneity problem” of specifying what that qualitative common phenomenology is. In contrast, according to the Attitudinal Views, what is common to all pleasant or unpleasant sensations is that they are all “wanted” or “unwanted” in a certain sort of way. The commonality is explained not on the basis of phenomenology but by a common mental, usually some sort of conative, attitude toward the sensation. Here I criticize both views and offer an alternative framework that combines what is right in both while avoiding their unintuitive commitments. The result is the reductive adverbial sensory modification view of pleasure and displeasure.

A User’s Guide to Epistemic Modals (III-I)

Michael Barkasi, Rice University

Two accounts have been proposed for the effect of epistemic modals on illocutionary acts: possible world accounts on which they are used to make assertions about some space of possible worlds, and expressivist accounts on which they note the attitude of the speaker towards some proposition. It is assumed that these are competing accounts, and that one of the two proposed effects is had by all uses of epistemic modals. I argue that epistemic modals can have either effect and that the effect you get depends on the perlocutionary intentions of the speaker. Reasonably sophisticated speakers tacitly use this fact to modulate the moves they make in discourse, a bit like one might use prosody or changes in syntactic structure. The argument itself goes through two examples from Pride and Prejudice where ascribing different perlocutionary intentions to the speaker rules out different readings of the epistemic modal while motivating others.

What If Conscious Experience Entails Change? (VII-H)

Gary Bartlett, Central Washington University

Consider the following argument:

(1) No conscious experience has a functional role which must be occupied by a process.

Therefore,

(2) Functionalism about conscious experience entails that conscious experiences need not be realized by processes.

But
(3) Conscious experiences must be realized by processes.

Therefore,

(4) Functionalism about conscious experience is false.

I think both (1) and (3) are true, though I cannot defend (3) here. (Note, however, that U. T. Place and J. J. C. Smart held that experiences are brain processes. That aspect of their view got lost in the scrutiny of type identity.) I defend (1) (and thus (2)) by showing that nothing in the functional role of a conscious experience prevents its being realized by an unchanging state. And while functionalists may be tempted to simply stipulate that the states which realize experiences must be processes, such a stipulation is inconsistent with functionalism.

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Malice and the Ridiculous as Self-Ignorance: A Dialectical Argument in Philebus 47d-50e (IV-H)

Rebecca Bensen-Cain, Oklahoma State University

I examine how the theme of self-ignorance emerges through the characterization of Protarchus, who thinks of himself as moderate and aware of his limitations in contrast to Philebus. The discrepancies between Protarchus’s self-image and his conduct are conveyed through his attitude toward Philebus and in Socrates’s dialectical argument on malice and comedy. I assess the argument and claim that it is implicitly directed at Protarchus and his lack of self-knowledge.

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How to Modify Lewisian Social Conventions to Account for Difference, Dissent, and Evolution (VII-G)

Sarah Braasch, San Francisco State University

In David Lewis’s seminal work, Convention, he gives a game-theoretic account of social conventions. Lewisian conventions have a problem. They don’t allow for difference or dissent or evolution. This is because, the way that Lewis defines conventions, thereby imbuing them with normative character, no one wants anyone to deviate, neither myself nor anyone else. Anyone who deviates or persuades others to deviate is trying to break the convention. It is possible to modify Lewisian conventions to capture the way in which we generally intuit that social conventions evolve over time, and to allow for dissent within a population. The modified, and decidedly non-normative, definition only requires that minimum threshold levels of or more members of the population conform and expect conformity to one convention or another, but not the entire population.

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Walter Burley on Mental Language (V-I)

Nathaniel Bulthuis, Cornell University

Over the last forty years, scholars of late medieval philosophy have rightly devoted a great deal of time and attention to the theories of mental language developed by nominalist philosophers in the fourteenth century. But it has been little recognized in the scholarship that principled theories of mental language were also developed by some realist contemporaries of those nominalists. In my paper, I highlight the main features of the theory of mental language developed by one of these
realists: Walter Burley, a contemporary of William Ockham. While the motivations for this theory, its role within Burley's larger account of language and mind, and the details of the theory itself are quite different from anything we find articulated by fourteenth-century nominalists, what we discover is that that theory is, like its nominalist counterparts, highly sophisticated, providing Burley with a powerful tool in his analyses of language and cognition.

Re-Cognizing Perception and Cognition (VII-H)
Daniel Burnston
University of California–San Diego
Philosophical and cognitive science approaches to cognitive architecture standardly analyze the relationship between perception and cognition along the lines of what I call the internal effect view, on which the presence of a cognitive state modifies the computations performed by a perceptual process, and thereby shapes the content of its output. I argue that, given the most reasonable view of what differentiates perception and cognition, the internal effect view is deeply mistaken. I suggest an alternative, external effect view of the relationship that I argue better captures the diverse roles of cognition in shaping perceptual activity, without falling prey to the problems with the internal effect view. I conclude by discussing some ways in which the external effect view provides a corrective for current investigations into cognitive architecture.

A Frankfurt Example to End All Frankfurt Examples (IV-L)
James Cain
Oklahoma State University
Frankfurt examples are said to provide counterexamples to the Principle of Alternate Possibilities (PAP), which holds that “a person is morally responsible for what he has done only if he could have done otherwise.” More importantly, Frankfurt examples are thought to provide counterexamples to a weakened form of PAP that restricts consideration to those actions for which we are fundamentally responsible: “With respect to the basic loci of moral responsibility, a person is responsible for what she has done only if she could have done otherwise.” Contrary to the view that Frankfurt examples can be constructed which undermine this principle, I will argue that Frankfurt examples can be constructed that undermine the arguments of those who use Frankfurt examples to attack the weakened form of PAP.

Not the Optimistic Type (II-E)
Ben Caplan
Ohio State University
Chris Tillman
University of Manitoba
Recent work by Peter Hanks and Scott Soames aims to defend views of propositions that are more optimistic than the traditional view that propositions are abstract, Platonic, sui generis entities. Hanks and Soames are optimistic in the sense that they think it’s not just a brute fact that propositions have alethic properties, such as being truth-apt, having truth-conditions, and having the particular truth-conditions that they do. They are also naturalistic in the sense that they think speakers’ or thinkers’ activities explain why propositions have the alethic properties that they do. In this paper, we present optimistic naturalistic views due to Hanks and Soames and critically evaluate the explanations they offer for propositions’ alethic properties.
An Ethical Analysis of the Emancipation Proclamation (IV-F)

Thomas L. Carson, Loyola University Chicago

The Emancipation Proclamation was seemingly half-hearted. Lincoln didn’t issue it until September 1862. It didn’t apply to the border states or Tennessee, and it permitted the Confederate states to keep slavery if they rejoined the Union in 100 days. Given that American slavery was so unjust and so grossly violated the rights and dignity of millions of human beings, it seems reasonable to claim that Lincoln should have declared the emancipation of all American slaves at the beginning of the Civil War. He shouldn’t have waited, he shouldn’t have exempted so much territory from his order, and he shouldn’t have given the Confederacy the option to rejoin the Union with the institution of slavery intact. Despite their seeming plausibility, these criticisms should be rejected because it would have been both futile and counterproductive if Lincoln had done this.

Akratic Action Under the Guise of the Good (IV-J)

Eugene Chislenko, University of California–Berkeley

I defend a strong version of the view that we act “under the guise of the good,” on which all intentional action requires belief that one ought to perform the action. My focus is on akratic action, or intentional action that one believes one ought not perform. I use a criticism of Davidson’s view of akrasia to raise the possibility of appealing to conflicting beliefs: a belief that one ought to do something, and a belief that one ought not. I then answer concerns that this appeal is insufficiently explanatory, attributes too much contradiction, attributes mistakes about one’s own beliefs, and leaves out an essential asymmetry in action against one’s “better” judgment. On the contrary, appealing to conflicting beliefs reduces one problem to another, helps explain why akratic action is puzzling, attributes a small but plausible amount of error in self-attribution, and leaves room for various forms of asymmetry.

The Way of Actuality (VII-L)

Sam Cowling, Denison University

In this paper, I defend an indexical analysis of the abstract-concrete distinction within the framework of modal realism. This analysis holds the abstract-concrete distinction to be conceptually inseparable from the distinction between the actual and the merely possible, which is assumed to be indexical in nature. The resulting view contributes to the case for modal realism by demonstrating how its distinctive resources provide a reductive analysis of the abstract-concrete distinction. This indexical analysis also provides a solution to a skeptical problem regarding our concreteness, which parallels the skeptical problem that motivates indexicalism about actuality.

Sex, Vagueness, and the Olympics (V-L)

Helen Daly, Colorado College

Scott Soames (2012) argued that the use of vagueness in the law provides evidence for one theoretical approach to vagueness over another. The winning approach is that vagueness is a feature of words; the losing approach is that vagueness is epistemic. I extend Soames’s idea by giving broader evidence to support an additional argument: I contend that Soames-type evidence is
also found outside of the law and that the arguments available on the basis of that broader evidence are not only descriptive but also normative. My central piece of new evidence is the International Olympic Committee’s 2012 ruling regarding eligibility for competition in women’s events. The ruling demonstrates that vagueness is managed in practice by further specifying what is meant, not by studying what our words already meant. In addition, it shows that thinking of vagueness as epistemic prevents some kinds of moral reasoning.

**Descartes on Innateness and Triggering Causation (VII-K)**

*Raffaella De Rosa, Rutgers University*

Descartes endorses the two *prima facie* inconsistent claims that sensory ideas are innate (Claim A) and caused in us by bodies (Claim B). Most scholars believe that Claims A and B are consistent because Descartes’s view on innateness and his understanding of bodily states as *occasional* or *triggering* causes leaves room for bodies to play a causal role in the production of sensations. I argue that the notion of triggering causation does *not* solve the theoretical problems it is introduced to solve, and it generates additional ones. I propose a new solution. My proposal relies on a different understanding of Descartes’s views on innateness in light of the distinction between the psychological question of the mechanisms by which we acquire ideas and the metaphysical question of how the content of these ideas is determined.

**Towards a Phenomenology of Whiteness (IV-F)**

*Nathan Eckstrand, Duquesne University*

In the last couple of years, a renaissance of studies on the role of whiteness has occurred as more and more academics are beginning to recognize the importance of theorizing what it means to be white as part of the larger project of undermining the systemic racism plaguing our society. I argue that an important part of this task is to complement the work of people like Franz Fanon and Linda Martin Alcoff—known for their phenomenologies of race—by conducting a phenomenology of whiteness. While this process has already begun through the work of people like Sara Ahmed and Peggy McIntosh, one area that has yet to receive proper attention is the place of the white body. The purpose of this paper is to continue the phenomenological study of whiteness by relocating its focus to the place of the white body.

In the vein of phenomenologists like Heidegger and Fanon, this study will examine the white body in its average everydayness while taking specific care to understand the structures and schemas that perpetuate anti-black whiteness. The white body will be examined as a phenomenon constructed by the motions of whiteness rather than as an object in the world, and will be looked at through the manifold connections it has to the phenomena of racial embodiment (as discussed by thinkers like Alcoff, George Yancy, and Judith Butler). Borrowing from Sara Ahmed’s claim that whiteness is an orientation, I will examine how the white body helps enable the orientation that whiteness promotes.

I intend to show that the white body functions as an ensurer of continuity by identifying non-white bodies as interruptions and thus dangerous. I will identify a structure within whiteness that sees it at times acting as habitual and exclusive of that which is non-white, yet at other times sees it as
agential and occlusive of itself. The agential side of whiteness is in turns both malignant in regards

to non-whites and autoimmune in regards to itself; that is, there is a malevolency to whiteness

inasmuch as it strives for control and oppression of what is non-white, and there is an

autoimmunity that acts when one tries to point out the malevolency of whiteness which keeps

whiteness from being recognized as such. I conclude the paper with some ideas for possible tactics

for resisting the pernicious effects of whiteness.

[1] I am here thinking of Fanon’s *Black Skins, White Masks* and Alcoff’s “Toward a Phenomenology of

Racial Embodiment.”

[2] See Ahmed’s "A Phenomenology of Whiteness" and McIntosh’s "White Privilege."

The Strategies of Biopower and Normalization Present in the Controversial

Administration of the HPV Vaccine to Adolescents: A Foucaultian Analysis

(VII-I)

*Kimberly Engels, Marquette University*

This paper is a Foucaultian analysis of the mechanisms of biopower and normalization that have
developed regarding the administration of the HPV vaccine to adolescents. The first part of this
paper is an introduction into the history and controversy of administering the HPV vaccine to
adolescents. The second part of this paper will be an introduction to Foucault’s concepts of
biopower and normalization, including his analysis of the early administration of the smallpox
vaccine. The last section of this paper will utilize a Foucaultian framework to elucidate the
mechanisms of biopower and normalization present in the debate.

Are Bald-Faced Lies Deceptive After All? (V-J)

*Don T. Fallis, University of Arizona*

According to the traditional philosophical definition, you lie if and only if you say something that
you believe to be false and you intend to deceive someone into believing what you say. However,
philosophers have recently noted the existence of **bald-faced lies**, lies which are not intended to
deceive anyone into believing what is said. As a result, many philosophers have removed deception
from their definitions of lying. According to Jennifer Lackey, this is “an unhappy divorce” because it
precludes an obvious explanation of the *prima facie* wrongness of lying. Moreover, Lackey claims
that there is a sense of deception in which all lies are deceptive. In this paper, I argue that bald-
faced lies are not deceptive on any plausible notion of deception. In addition, I suggest that
divorcing deception from lying is not as unhappy a result as Lackey suggests.

When and How Affective Reactions Impact Judgments about Free Will and

Determinism: A Meta-Analysis (III-H)

*Adam Feltz, Michigan Technological University*

*Florian Cova, University of Geneva*

“Experimental philosophers” have recently studied laypeople’s intuitions about free will, moral
responsibility, and determinism. The results of these investigations have been somewhat
conflicting. Sometimes the folk seem to have compatibilist intuitions, and sometimes they appear to have incompatibilist intuitions. To resolve this apparent contradiction, theorists have proposed that people’s judgments about free will and moral responsibility can be influenced by negative affective reactions (Nichols and Knobe, 2007). In this paper, we survey the results of thirty published and unpublished studies and submit them to a meta-analysis in order to find out the extent to which purported negative affective reactions influence judgments about the freedom and moral responsibility of agents living in deterministic universe. We conclude that negative affective reactions do have some impact on judgments about free will and moral responsibility, but that this effect is not large enough to play the theoretical role theorists attributed it.

Is a Transcendental Construction Possible? (III-J)
Andrew Forcehimes, Vanderbilt University
Constructivists of the Kantian stripe favor transcendental arguments. My goal in this paper is to show that thoroughgoing (a term to be specified) versions of meta-ethical constructivism are incompatible with this argumentative form. Using Korsgaard’s account as an example, I argue that if the defining feature of thoroughgoing constructivists views holds that the procedure confers truth-functionality on moral claims, one of the early premises will be a conditional, and one of the later claims, which relies on the truth-functionality of this conditional, will need to confer truth-functionality on the initial conditional. This makes these arguments relevantly different than typical transcendental arguments, and yields unacceptable results.

Bratman on Identity over Time and Identification at a Time (III-K)
Christopher E. Franklin, Marymount University
According to reductionists about agency, an agent’s bringing something about is reducible to states and events (such as desires and beliefs) involving the agent bringing something about. Many have worried that reductionism cannot accommodate robust forms of agency, such as self-governance. One common reductionist answer to this worry (which I call “identification reductionism”) contends that self-governing agents are identified with certain states and events, and so these states and events causing a decision counts as the agent’s causing the decision. In this paper I discuss Michael Bratman’s well-known identification reductionist theory and his general strategy of grounding an agent’s identification at a time in the agent’s identity over time. I develop two constraints that an adequate identification reductionist theory must satisfy, argue that Bratman’s theory cannot satisfy both, and that his general strategy for grounding an agent’s identification at time in the agent’s identity over time is without merit.

Preservationism Destroyed (V-K)
Matthew J. Frise, University of Rochester
According to preservationism, if S formed a justified belief that P at T1 and retains in memory a belief that P until T1+n, then S’s belief that P is prima facie justified (via memory) at T1+n. Preservationism is a received view in the epistemology of memory literature, endorsed by Robert Audi, Tyler Burge, Alvin Goldman, and many others. In this paper I present three objections to it: (1) preservationism has difficulty correctly accounting for the epistemic significance of memorial
experience, (2) preservationism implausibly implies that certain evidence defeats in some but not all relevantly similar cases of forgotten evidence, and (3) preservationism inadequately explains the epistemic significance of a failed attempt to recall a proposition stored in memory. In light of these objections we should reject preservationism.

Kripke’s Puzzle about Belief Resolved (III-M)
Nicholas Georgalis, East Carolina University
Kripke has exposed a very deep problem in the orthodox view of belief and content, one that goes to its very core. Tinkering with the orthodox view will not solve it. I propose a resolution to the puzzle by abandoning the orthodox views of belief and content, accommodating belief-tokens and their specific contents, as distinct from propositions or propositional contents, and recognizing that belief-tokens map many-one to sentences that correctly express them. The difference between belief-tokens and the sentences that express them is with respect to the contents themselves. While it is generally acknowledged that contents of indexical beliefs map many-one to sentences that express them (e.g., “I am hungry”), I argue that this is true in general of belief-tokens, not just indexical ones. Space limits my discussion here to the Paderewski Case.

Truth Gaps and Impossible Worlds (VII-L)
Cameron Gibbs, University of Massachusetts Amherst
Possible worlds are a powerful vehicle for philosophical analyses; however, their limitations have motivated some philosophers to posit impossible worlds in addition to the possible ones. Two such motivations for impossible worlds are allowing for counterpossibles without trivial truth values and distinguishing necessarily co-instantiated propositions and properties. According to the standard theory, impossible worlds are inconsistent, violating the law of non-contradiction. But this is not the only theory of impossible worlds. I will formulate an alternative theory of impossible worlds, according to which the worlds are consistent yet incomplete, violating the law of excluded middle. This theory has gone undeveloped due to an assumption that it is inadequate at performing the philosophical analyses that inconsistent worlds theory performs. I will argue, however, that the alternative theory is adequate for counterpossible semantics, and distinguishing necessarily co-instantiated propositions and properties.

Permissivism without Grounding (VII-J)
Jonah Goldwater, University of South Florida
Metaphysics has often concerned itself with existence questions. But many argue such questions are trivially answered in the affirmative (Fine 2009, Hofweber 2009, Schaffer 2009); Schaffer thus recommends permissivism about existence. But if existence is trivial, what is the metaphysician to do? Enter grounding: metaphysics is not about what there is, but about what grounds what. Because metaphysics is (now) in the business of discerning structure—how fundamental entities ground derivative entities—a permissive ontology is rendered unproblematic. Critics, however, have rejected grounding as a basis for metaphysical inquiry (Hofweber 2009, Wilson unpublished). Even if these criticisms are sound, I contend, a return to existence questions is neither required nor
desirable. Instead, I argue that a permissivist meta-ontology is best in any case—even if the grounding program fails.

A Defense of Five-Dimensionalism (VI-G)
Andrew Graham, University of Missouri–Kansas City
In virtue of what is it true of Socrates that he could have been foolish, given that he is not? This paper defends an answer to that question. The view defended is five-dimensionalism. In rough terms, it consists of the following two claims. First, objects are extended in a modal dimension (in addition to the spatial and temporal ones), and their persistence through this dimension (their trans-world identity) is a matter of their having distinct parts, or modal stages, located in different possible worlds. Second, the members of any arbitrary collection of modal stages from different worlds compose a modally extended object. The argument in favor of five-dimensionalism is a version of the argument from vagueness, which has previously been used in support of unrestricted composition and four-dimensionalism. The metaphysics of five-dimensionalism provides the resources needed to help us avoid the possibility of vague existence.

Belief and the Normativity of Mental Content (III-M)
Derek Green, Northwestern University
Many think it plausible that the intentional contents of the mind are essentially prescriptively normative. Some think that is plausible in that the fact that a subject grasps a content implies non-hypothetical rules for belief. For example, one who grasps “red” ought not believe that obsidian is red when in normal conditions. A few critics offer a very intuitive objection: even if there are non-hypothetical obligations for belief, it simply does not follow that the facts about the contents the subject grasps are essentially prescriptively normative.

I argue that the objection fails. Content and belief are intertwined in a way that makes content facts oblige believers to judge in certain ways. Since mental contents are partially constituted by the fact that they are the contents of judgment, they by essence entail the subject’s enjoinment by some rules for belief. If such rules exist, mental content facts are essentially prescriptively normative.

Intention, Permissibility, and Morally Good Action (IV-J)
John Hacker-Wright, University of Guelph
In this paper I argue, against Judith Jarvis Thomson and Tim Scanlon, that an agent’s intentions can make a difference to the permissibility of an action. I claim that there are principles of moral assessment for individual actions that have a role in determining permissibility. These principles complement the rules of our moral code, which typically qualify types of actions as permissible or impermissible irrespectively of the agent’s intentions. Such principles of action assessment include the Doctrine of Double Effect. According to the view I advocate here, it is not sufficient to qualify an action as permissible that the action be permitted under a rule that is a component of our moral code or even an idealized version of it; that is because the agent’s intentions can make an action that our moral code generally permits into an action that is impermissibly bad.
What Makes It Ockham’s Razor?: The Pessimistic Consequence of Ockham’s Theological Metaontology (V-I)
Eric W. Hagedorn, St. Norbert College
It is not obvious why the Razor should be especially associated with Ockham; appeals to the virtue of theoretical simplicity can be found in many other philosophers. In fact, it is quite strange that the Principle of Parsimony ever came to be connected with Ockham in the first place, given that he believes that God can and often does not abide by the principle, creating unnecessary complexity even when more parsimonious arrangements are available. Keeping in mind the fact that Ockham believes the Razor gives false guidance about the nature of reality, I argue, will help us better understand his philosophical method and metaontology (areas of his thought that, I believe, have been often misunderstood by scholars), and will show him to be much more pessimistic about ontological theorizing than has been widely recognized.

Kant on the Blind Justice of Aesthetic Verdicts (VI-I)
Susan Hahn, Wesleyan University
There is something quite paradoxical about Kant’s notion of aesthetic normativity, involving autonomy and persuasive force. If, for the sake of autonomy, we should tolerate no one else’s opinion, how can others’ judgments possess a binding force a priori? I argue two distinct methods are needed to reconcile Kant’s aesthetic theory with normative practice. To capture the sense in which judgments of taste are universally valid a priori, the first method is a nonempirical one that distinguishes between form/content. To capture the autonomy requirement, the second method reframes the traditional form/content distinction in terms of a force/content distinction. It focuses not on the what (empty content) of aesthetic judgments, but on how the act of judging is enacted. Using a juridical model suggested by Kant’s affinity for jurisprudence, I contextualize the act of judging to a social context, linked to supporting reactive attitudes that are liable to normative assessment.

Free Acts and Counterfactuals of Libertarian Freedom: Why the Rollback Argument (Conditionally) Fails (III-H)
Robert J. Hartman, Saint Louis University
Many philosophers agree that, if human beings have agent-causal powers, they act freely when they exercise those powers. However, Peter van Inwagen has recently challenged that common opinion with a thought experiment that has come to be known as The Rollback Argument. I will argue that if there are true counterfactuals of libertarian freedom (as the Molinist suggests), then van Inwagen’s thought experiment fails to elicit the impression that he supposes it does. While Molinism is usually attractive for its theological utility, my paper highlights its philosophical utility for what may be a less chancy version of free action.
A Plague on Both Your Houses: Situationism, Virtue Ethics, and the Importance of Self-Control and Perseverance Traits in Moral Psychology (II-J)

Matthew C. Haug, College of William & Mary

Drawing on research in developmental and personality psychology that has been largely overlooked by philosophers, I defend a view in moral psychology that is intermediate between traditional virtue ethics and situationism. Situationists are correct that many cases of immoral behavior could not have been avoided by adopting a program of conscious, deliberate self-improvement employed in the immediate context of the relevant behavior. However, this is compatible with stable, global personality traits being causes of our behavior. In particular, I argue that there is good empirical evidence that traits related to self-control and perseverance influence behavior. Parties on both sides of the debate have overlooked these traits and the developmental processes that determine them. By turning our attention from the proximal processes that cause behavior to the distal, developmental processes that shape individuals’ capacities for self-control and perseverance, we can see that these capacities can be improved by interventions, some of which rely on conscious reflection and learning, as virtue ethicists have claimed. However, this reorientation also reveals that many traditional virtue ethicists overemphasize the role that cognitive traits and processes (intelligence, practical reason, deliberation) play in ensuring that individuals’ behavior accords with their reflectively endorsed beliefs. Recent research on both short-term self-control and long-term perseverance suggests that the most important factors for this task are largely “noncognitive” and independent of general intelligence and reasoning abilities.

Does Aristotle’s Vicious Person Wish to Be Otherwise? (V-M)

Erica Holberg, Utah State University

In Book VII, Aristotle claims that the vicious person chooses pleasure unqualified as his good and feels no regrets in pursuing this aim. But in Book IX, Aristotle states that the vicious person is “in flight from himself”; he wishes he had different pleasures and is filled with regret. I argue that Aristotle’s account of how we become vicious, which relies upon his conception of merely apparent pleasures, commits Aristotle to the claim that the vicious person need not feel regret and need not suffer from internal inconsistencies. Aristotle’s use of merely apparent pleasures reveals that a fundamental assumption within his moral psychology is the strong interdependence of desire, perception, pleasure, and judgment; this interdependence allows for the vicious person to not be in conflict with himself.

Philosophical Definitions: The Grounding View (VII-J)

Joachim Horvath, University of Cologne

What kind of claim do philosophers aim for when they put forward a definition of knowledge, free will, or action? According to the standard biconditional view, they aim for a necessary biconditional that states individually necessary and jointly sufficient conditions. However, the biconditional view is untenable because many necessary biconditionals are completely unacceptable as definitions. Simply adding further constraints to the biconditional view does not yield a more satisfactory result. Thus, an alternative account of philosophical definitions is called for. But the main extant
alternative, the identity view, falls prey to some of the same problems. Therefore, I suggest the grounding view as a more promising alternative. The basic idea is that a philosophical definition of X amounts to the claim that the property of being X is fully grounded in the more fundamental properties Y1, ..., Yn.

**Everettian Quantum Mechanics and the Principal Principle (IV-M)**

*Chris Howard, University of Arizona*

It’s often objected that the Everettian interpretation can’t make sense of probability. One popular strategy for resisting this objection—a strategy that’s been pursued in the recent work of David Wallace and David Papineau—aims to show that knowledge of the mod-squared amplitudes, in a way identical to that of Lewisian chances, constrains rational credence in accordance with the Principal Principle (PP). Supposing this strategy is successful, its advocates will have shown that the mod-squared amplitudes play precisely the role of Lewisian chances in rational deliberation, and thus deserve to be called “probabilities.” Against its proponents, I argue that this strategy is bound to fail. Specifically, I claim that knowledgeable Everettian agents fail to satisfy PP’s admissibility condition, and thus that it will never be rational, in any given chancy situation, for the credences of such agents to be constrained by the mod-squared amplitudes, in accordance with PP.

**Assessing Nonstandard Emotions: Nostalgia’s Formal Object and the Limits of Fittingness (VI-K)**

*Scott Howard, Harvard University*

It is widely held that each emotion type has a “formal object”: the dangerous, for example, is the formal object of fear. An emotion’s formal object is supposed to be the standard of correctness or fittingness for episodes of that emotion type. This paper poses a surprisingly neglected question: How are we supposed to select an emotion’s formal object when it is not obvious? I call this the selection question and explore it using the case study of nostalgia, an emotion with a contestable formal object. Although I argue that we can establish a formal object for nostalgia, I suggest that the usefulness of fittingness evaluations is reduced in rough proportion to the amount of argument required to select the formal object in the first place. Emotional fittingness may therefore have a less important place in the assessment of nonstandard emotions than it is commonly assumed.

**Levinasian Responsibility and Liberal Politics: Rethinking Freedom and Rights (VII-I)**

*Cheryl Hughes, Wabash College*

Levinas suggests that the liberal state is the form of politics most responsive to the demands of justice, but his description of fundamental ethical responsibility challenges particular assumptions underlying the classic liberal political tradition. This paper offers a Levinasian reformulation of freedom as invested with responsibility and a revised view of rights as beginning with the rights of the other person. The end of political society and government would still be the Lockean preservation of individual property (understood as life, liberty, and estate), but with priority given
to the rights and needs of the other and political institutions that would mediate the infinite responsibility of the one for all others.

**Rights and Capabilities: Tom Regan and Martha Nussbaum on Animals (IV-I)**

*Ramona Cristina Ilea, Pacific University Oregon*

Though many contrast Tom Regan’s rights theory to Peter Singer’s utilitarianism, none compare it to Martha Nussbaum’s capabilities approach, which is gaining popularity among philosophers, economists, and legal scholars. While Nussbaum’s and Regan’s theories appear to be very different, in this paper I will argue that the capabilities approach is an appropriate extension of Regan’s rights view into the legal arena. Regan’s work provides us with a comprehensive, rigorous philosophical account of animals’ entitlements, establishing long-term goals for their protection. On the other hand, Nussbaum’s capabilities approach aims to provide an account of basic legal entitlements. Fusing the two approaches leads to a powerful theory that is both philosophically rigorous and helpful to those who want to advocate for meaningful and realistic public policies.

**The Contradictions of Callicles (IV-H)**

*Tushar Irani, Wesleyan University*

Callicles’s great speech at 482c-486d in Plato’s *Gorgias* falls naturally into two parts. During the first part, from 482c-484c, he argues vigorously against the dictates of conventional morality and develops an account of natural justice according to which the strong and superior few in society rule over and get more than the weak and inferior many. In the second part, from 484c-486d, he issues a scathing indictment of philosophy, which he ridicules as a frivolous and corrupting activity that leaves a man inexperienced in human affairs and incapable of succeeding in the world of democratic politics. One of the longstanding problems in interpreting Callicles’s position here is that the two parts of his speech seem to be in tension with each other: to succeed in politics in the way he recommends, Callicles must affirm the egalitarian values of the masses that he despises. In this paper, I explain this conflict in Callicles’s position by connecting it with the larger conflict that runs throughout the *Gorgias* between the life of rhetoric and the life of philosophy. I argue that the tension in his position is best understood, not in terms of a theoretical conflict, but as a conflict between his private and public personas that is characteristic of the life of rhetoric. When interpreted in this way, we can see why Socrates cannot accept the life that Callicles advocates, for the life of philosophy as he understands it contains no such conflict. What the choice between the lives of rhetoric and philosophy ultimately comes down to on this interpretation is a choice between two opposing views on how one should stand in relation to others and how speech or argument may enable such relations. The conflict here between Callicles and Socrates rests on their different approaches to politics.
Public Reason’s Failure to Provide Reasons to Overcome Oppression (V-H)

Gary A. Jaeger, Vanderbilt University

Rawlsians argue the oppressed can overcome oppression through public reason. In order to participate in public reason, one must be rational enough to (1) construct one’s own reasons by deliberating from a coherent set of preferences and (2) offer those reasons in terms of publicly shared values. Because they are committed to avoiding paternalism, Rawlsians simply assume the oppressed are rational and so fail to see the ways that oppression renders individuals irrational and obscures their own best interests. This paper argues that public reason does little to help the oppressed construct their reasons to overcome oppression (ROOs) because it either assumes they are rational enough not to have reasons to overcome the most intractable types of oppression, or it demands they meet rational standards that inhibit deliberation about oppression. The only way to account for ROOs is to see them not as constructed, but as existing independently of deliberation.

Remembering and Knowing (V-K)

Steven James, University of Texas–Austin

Opposition to the knowledge condition on remembering (i.e., the thesis that when a subject remembers that \( p \) she knows that \( p \)) is often motivated by the claim that knowing is subject to more stringent epistemic demands than is remembering. Evidence for this generally comes in the form of putative cases of remembering without knowing (cf. Bernecker 2010). I argue that the most plausible putative counterexample cases rely on a shift in the criteria used to evaluate whether a given state is an instance of remembering and whether it is an instance of knowing. This diagnosis advances the discussion beyond appeals to intuition and so should be of interest to both advocates and opponents of the knowledge condition.

Un-Naturalizing Phenomenology: Making a Case for Transcendental Phenomenology in the 21st Century (IV-F)

John Janes, Marquette University

Husserlian phenomenology has been touted as a potentially useful tool in the cognitive sciences’ investigation of consciousness. This has given rise to a debate concerning the possibility of naturalizing phenomenology. I argue that this debate has been settled, and that it harbors a more fundamental debate that has yet to be settled: where the cognitive sciences contend that consciousness is merely natural, phenomenology contends that it is also transcendental. I argue that while a naturalized phenomenology has a future in the cognitive sciences, phenomenology as a transcendental science of consciousness has a future only if this debate is carried out and only if it is concluded that consciousness is also transcendental. Toward these ends, I offer an argument designed to engage and to convince the naturalist/cognitive scientist that consciousness is transcendental and that transcendental phenomenology also has an important role to play in the contemporary investigation of consciousness.
Poetry and Metaphysics in Republic X ( )
Sarah Jansen, Carleton College

Republic X commentators distinguish between Socrates’s metaphysical devaluation of poetry and his ethical or psychological devaluation of poetry; poetry is metaphysically inferior (because it copies appearances) and ethically inferior (because it corrupts the soul). Indeed, the assumption that Republic Book X attacks the poets on metaphysical grounds—because they propagate “images of images” of Forms, which are “far removed from truth”—is widespread. In this paper, I challenge both the nature and scope of Book X’s metaphysical devaluation of poetry. I contend that Republic X targets a pejorative “art of imitation” (μιμητική). This “art of imitation” copies inaccurate images, which are (unlike sensible particulars) “metaphysically cut off” from the Forms. I shall begin by making some preliminary remarks about Socrates’s definition of the imitator, whence emerges a key interpretive question—namely, how do mimetic images corrupt the soul? Next, I raise problems for the dominant interpretive strategy, according to which images are inherently deceptive (and hence potentially corruptive) in virtue of being related to sensibles in the same way that sensibles are related to Forms. I argue that a certain class of images (namely, imitative appearances) is inherently deceptive, because—unlike likenesses—it is metaphysically cut off from the Forms. In support of my interpretation, I marshal textual evidence that Plato makes an important distinction between two classes of images—namely, likenesses of likenesses of the Forms and misleading appearances of sensibles. Whereas psychologically beneficial poetry copies likenesses of likenesses of the Forms, psychologically harmful poetry copies misleading appearances of sensibles. I conclude by emphasizing that the success of Plato’s critique does not ultimately rely on the success of the theory of the Forms. Rather, it relies on the distinction between accurate and inaccurate images, which can be sustained in a non-Platonic ontology.

Failing to Count (V-L)
Casey Johnson, University of Connecticut

This paper offers resources to extant theories on subordinating silencing. The most important of these resources is the idea of a locution counting as a particular illocution. I propose, in this paper, an account of illocutionary silencing that draws some inspiration from Searle, as well as the more typically sited Austin. To this I add a Counterfactual Counting test—a diagnostic that can be used to help distinguish problematic silencing, that results from subordination, from more benign forms. With these resources in hand, a wider variety of cases can be accounted for than previously considered. Further, the new view can avoid objections raised against the Austinian view.

An Absurd Accumulation: Aristotle’s Metaphysics 1076b11-33 (IV-H)
Emily Katz, Michigan State University

Aristotle spends much of Metaphysics M.2 critiquing the view that mathematical objects are separate substances. This critique has been taken as evidence of his inability or unwillingness to understand and to treat fairly others’ views. The scholarly assessment of the opening argument in the M.2 series targeting separate mathematical objects certainly supports this last point. Yet while this argument has been dismissed as a flawed, halfhearted attempt to make certain platonists appear ridiculous, it is in fact very serious. I show that the argument turns on a claim about the
relative priority of various kinds of mathematical objects, and that it makes a strong case for a point that is central to Aristotle's broader critique of platonism: that if we posit distinct substances in order to explain the properties of sensible objects, we become committed to an embarrassingly prodigious ontology.

Paraphrase, Semantics, and Ontology (II-F)
John A. Keller, Niagara University
Paraphrase is ubiquitous in philosophy, especially in discussions about ontological commitment. But are typical paraphrases anything more than wishful thinking? They are seldom accompanied by evidence that would convince, say, a linguist that the paraphrase and the paraphrased sentence have the same meaning. Indeed, from the perspective of linguistics, typical paraphrases are nothing more than bad jokes. For this reason, many philosophers have become deeply suspicious about paraphrase. I argue in this paper that this worry is misguided—that the kind of meaning that successful paraphrases must preserve is not the domain of the generally recognized experts about meaning. The way that paraphrase has been used in Quinean meta-ontology, and philosophical inquiry more generally, corresponds, at least roughly, to the way it should be used.

The Metaphysics of Propositional Constituency (VI-H)
Lorraine Keller, Niagara University
Structured Propositionalism, the most widely held theory of propositions, is the view that the fundamental bearers of truth and falsity, objects of the attitudes, and sentential semantic values have both constituents and structure. Though Structured Propositionalism promises to solve many semantic problems, the metaphysical presuppositions of this view have been inadequately explored. In particular, the friends of structured propositions have been frustratingly evasive about what the relation of constituency is. In this paper, I argue that the most promising way of providing a metaphysics of propositional constituency faces very serious difficulties. The problems that plague the attempt to make sense of the relation of propositional constituency constitute a significant objection to Structured Propositionalism.

The Lack of Belief: Unbelief versus Disregard (IV-K)
Brian Kim, Ohio State University
A subject’s lack of belief in the truth or falsity of a proposition can be interpreted as an attitude of unbelief or disregard. I argue that this distinction plays an important role in articulating the principles governing the rational change of belief. I then extend these lessons to address some problems with David Lewis’s theory of knowledge.

The Vagueness Argument against Abstract Artifacts (VI-J)
Daniel Z. Korman, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign
Words, languages, symphonies, fictional characters, games, and recipes are plausibly abstract artifacts—entities that have no spatial location and that are deliberately brought into existence as a result of creative acts. Many accept that composition is unrestricted: for every plurality of material
objects, there is a material object that is the sum of those objects. These two views may seem entirely unrelated. I will argue that the most influential argument against restricted composition—the vagueness argument—doubles as an argument that there can be no abstract artifacts. There is no way to resist the vagueness argument against abstract artifacts that does not also undermine the vagueness argument against restricted composition.

**Whether-Conditionals (III-I)**  
*Theodore Korzukhin, Cornell University*

In this paper I look at indicative nested whether-conditionals:

(1) If I pass the exam, I will pass whether I pray or not.

The behavior of “if” in (1) is to be contrasted with what I will call normal cases:

(2) If Mary is at home or at work, then if she is not at home, she is at work.

I will argue that no currently available semantics for indicative conditionals can explain both what I will call the normal behavior of “if” in (2) and what I will call the deviant behavior of “if” in (1). We need a theory that predicts normal of behavior of “if” most of the time, but sometimes allows for deviance. While no currently available theory makes the right predictions, one theory comes close—Heim’s rendition of Stalnaker’s semantics (Heim 1992). I will show how to fix up Heim’s view to get the right results for all cases. In sum, the paper argues for a particular development of Stalnaker’s semantics, and shows that whether-conditionals cannot be dealt with on other approaches.

**Temporal Passage and Events in Progress (II-I)**  
*Nick Kroll, Franklin and Marshall College*

I offer a novel account of temporal passage. According to this account, time passes in virtue of there being events in progress. I argue that such an account of temporal passage can explain the direction of time, the dynamic character of temporal passage, and the rate of temporal passage. I also defend this account of time over the standard B-theory view that time doesn’t pass and the standard A-theory view that times passes in virtue of there being events that move from being future to being present to being past.

**Locating Gunky Water and Wine (VI-G)**  
*Matthew Leonard, University of Southern California*

Can material objects be weakly located at regions of spacetime and yet fail to be exactly located anywhere? In this paper, I discuss one such case which answers affirmatively: the case of blending gunky water and gunky wine, in gunky space. I show that the case is interesting and complicated, and has consequences for some ideas found in papers by Daniel Nolan and Josh Parsons.
A Defense of Intentional Self-Deception (V-J)
Jason Lopez, Wisconsin University

Many hold, along with Alfred Mele, that those who believe that self-deception is an intentional act must resolve two difficult paradoxes. This is accepted by both those who support and those who oppose the intentionalist picture. Here, I will break this trend and accept the result of one of the puzzles: the process of intentional self-deception must undermine itself. Interestingly, taking on this position does not make self-deception paradoxical; a self-deceiver is free to continue to try to trick him- or herself even though it is impossible to do so. Thinking of self-deception in this way situates it in normal mental activities like the process of deciding which of two contradictory desires to act on and the procedures of belief maintenance and acceptance.

Radical Interpretation and the Problem of Asymmetry (VII-G)
Greg Lynch, Fordham University

Davidson holds that thinkers cannot employ sets of concepts that differ radically, but he affirms that local conceptual divergences are possible and commonplace. He defends the former claim by arguing that (a) a speaker must mean whatever a fully informed radical interpreter would take her to mean, and (b) radical interpreters must employ a "Principle of Correspondence" whereby they read their own concepts into those they interpret. However, these considerations appear to rule out the possibility of there existing any conceptual divergences between thinkers, not just radical ones. To avoid this difficulty, Davidson must restrict the applicability of the Principle of Correspondence to instances of "symmetrical" interpretation (i.e., cases where the speaker does not employ concepts alien to the interpreter). However, Davidson cannot draw a principled distinction between cases of symmetrical and asymmetrical interpretation without tacitly assuming that (a) is false.

Utilitarianism, Intuitions, Rationality, and Neuroscience (II-J)
Patricia A. Marino, University of Waterloo
Rosalind Abdool, University of Waterloo

In a provocative 2005 paper, “Ethics and Intuitions,” Peter Singer argues against the use of intuitions in moral reasoning on grounds that recent research in neuroscience shows they are best explained as unjustified manifestations of evolutionary pressures or cultural preferences. He infers from this increased support for utilitarianism, because utilitarianism has a rational, non-intuitive, foundation, while rival deontological views and methods such as reflective equilibrium do not. Engaging with some secondary literature, we argue that Singer’s mode of justification itself relies on intuitions in deeper ways than critics have suggested, and we consider and reject the strongest Singerian argument for the claims about rationality. We draw out two implications: first, that they undermine Singer’s attempts to interpret the empirical results as support for utilitarianism, and second, that Singer’s own methodology, coherently and consistently applied, would support a Ross-style pluralism rather than utilitarianism.
A New Account of Scientific Models and Approximations (IV-M)
Ian McKay, Cornell University

Here I will offer a new account of scientific models. I will argue that a model is made of three defining features: representational mediums, targets, and interpretation instructions. I will show that this account can be used to accommodate the heterogeneity of models in the sciences. Further, it can be used to understand the very general, but typically problematic case for accounts of models: that of “bad” models, including those discarded throughout the history of science. I will also note an important distinction between model application and model testing—the former being the use of models for prediction, and the latter the use of models for theory or hypothesis verification. I will claim that isomorphism between models and the world is not required, and that models are not by nature “false.” I will finish by relating models to the nature of approximations in general.

Virtue and Self-Mastery in Plato’s Laws (V-M)
Susan Sauvé Meyer, University of Pennsylvania

In the figure of the divine puppets in Laws 644-5, the Athenian portrays virtue as a kind of self-mastery (the victory of the golden cord against the iron cords’ opposing pulls). Such a picture of psychological conflict sits oddly with the Athenian’s endorsement, elsewhere in Laws, of the conception of virtue as a harmony (sumphônia) between a person’s rational and non-rational impulses. Against those who would seek to defuse this apparent inconsistency by denying that victory of the golden cord in the puppets passage involves psychological conflict, I argue instead that there are two models of virtue deployed in the Laws: the conflict model invoked in the puppets passage (which the Athenian’s interlocutors endorse), and the harmony model endorsed by the Athenian. The Athenian pursues a deliberate dialectical strategy of appealing to his interlocutors’ rather than his own conception of virtue.

The Rawls–Harsanyi Dispute: A Moral Point of View (V-H)
Michael Moehler, Virginia Tech

The Rawls–Harsanyi dispute has had a significant impact on political philosophy during the second half of the last century. Central to this dispute is the question of whether the core modeling device of Rawls’s theory of justice, the original position, justifies Rawls’s principles of justice, as Rawls argues, or whether it justifies the average utility principle, as Harsanyi suggests. Many commentators agree with Harsanyi and consider this dispute to be primarily about the correct application of normative decision theory to Rawls’s original position. In this article, I argue that, if adequately conceived, the Rawls-Harsanyi dispute is not primarily a dispute about the correct application of normative decision theory to Rawls’s original position. Instead, Rawls and Harsanyi aim to model different moral ideals, and this difference in their moral assumptions leads them to significantly different conclusions about justice. There is no winner in the Rawls–Harsanyi dispute. Instead, the dispute merely clarifies the moral ideals and their formal representations that need to be assumed in order to justify either Rawls’s contractualist principles of justice or the average utility principle. Thus understood, the Rawls–Harsanyi dispute offers a promising starting point for future research that can deepen and enrich our understanding of the demands of justice.
A New Puzzle about Doubt, Belief, and Confidence (III-L)
Andrew Y. Moon, Dalhousie University
In this paper, I introduce a new puzzle about the relationship between three psychological states: doubt, belief, and confidence. The puzzle takes the form of three propositions that seem plausible but are jointly inconsistent. In section 1, I lay out the puzzle. In section 2, I lay out four ways of responding to the puzzle, including my own preferred way.

“I’m a Real Boy!“: Predication and Fictional Characters (VI-J)
Cathleen Muller, Marist College
One proposal for understanding the predicates used to describe musical works, defended by Nicholas Wolterstorff and David Davies, is that the predicates that describe the score and the performance are analogical (i.e., they pick out two different but closely related properties). One might think that this analysis could be extended to the predication of fictional characters, since they cannot be real, actual, and concrete and have the same properties that real people have. However, I argue that analogical predication will not work for fictional characters because there is no property available to be the “different but closely related property” of fictional characters. I then turn to the one sort of fiction for which I think our predication of properties to characters is plausibly understood as analogical: theater and film. I conclude by defending a pretense-based view of fiction, arguing that it better makes sense of predication.

Travel Bans, Asset Freezes, and Other Targeted Preventions of Terrorist Acts at the Interface of War and Peace (IV-I)
Hadassa Noorda, University of Amsterdam
This paper examines preventive constraints on suspected terrorists that can lead to de facto imprisonment and develops a framework for setting appropriate limits on their future use. Preventive constraints are often seen as a permissible alternative to imprisonment. Still, preventive de facto imprisonments imperil the freedom of the target in two ways. Firstly, in some instances these constraints can so thoroughly constrain an individual’s functioning that they lead to de facto imprisonment. Secondly, the preventive nature of these kinds of targeted constraints affects the autonomy of the targeted person by precluding her from taking steps to defeat the prediction that she will blow up a plane or finance terrorism and make the “right” moral choice. Seeing that preventive constraints can infringe on leading a free and autonomous life, this paper argues that some of these constraints require the same protection as their counterpart that puts persons under lock and key.

Molinism and the Ersatz Thin Red Line (III-H)
Dan Padgett, Baylor University
Molinists hold that God foreknows what free creatures will do because he knows which counterfactuals of creaturely freedom (CCFs) are true. CCFs are counterfactual conditionals of the form “were S in circumstances C, S would freely do A.” Greg Restall has argued that Molinists should not hold a branching view of time because branching time entails that CCFs are providentially
useless. I argue that Restall is wrong: nothing about branching time per se poses a problem for the Molinist. After rehearsing Restall’s arguments, I argue for a modification of the tense logic semantics that underly Restall’s argument. I then offer a Molinist-friendly metaphysic for branching time and show that branching time poses no new threat to Molinism.

If Justice Really Matters, It’s Not Just a Matter of Degree: The Significance of Gyges’ Ring in Republic 2 (V-M)

Tyler Paytas, Washington University in St. Louis

In Republic 2, Glaucon argues that anyone in possession of Gyges’ invisibility ring would perform unjust acts, and moreover, anyone who would refrain from injustice in such circumstances would be judged foolish. Glaucon seemingly takes this as evidence that we value justice only for its consequences. However, Terence Irwin (1999) claims that the Gyges’ argument could not support this conclusion because endorsing acts of injustice in some circumstances is compatible with valuing justice for its own sake. I argue contra Irwin that Glaucon’s argument, if sound, would indeed show that we attribute mere instrumental value to justice. I claim that Glaucon presents the argument under two plausible background assumptions: (1) that justice requires taking the interests of others as placing limits on self-interested pursuits; and (2) that no one who values justice for its own sake could coherently endorse disregarding the interests of others for the sake of personal gain.

Russellians Can Get Donkeys and Bishops Just Right (VII-F)

Caleb Perl, University of Southern California

I defend Russellian orthodoxy about definite descriptions by showing that it can ground an attractive account of donkey anaphora. I argue that we should recognize a free-choice interpretation of “a,” in the way that we recognize a free-choice interpretation of “any.” If we allow that “a” has that interpretation, the Russellian is well-placed to explain the problematic sentences. Moreover, there are several facts that such a Russellian can explain better than competing theories—including facts about unresolvable anaphora and the interaction of adverbs of quantification with donkey sentences. The project thus provides a partial defense of traditional assumptions about formal semantics against the dynamic alternative.

Epistemic Evaluation, Disagreement, and the Total Evidence View (IV-K)

Timothy Perrine, Indiana University–Bloomington

Regulative epistemology is the task of describing and stating the epistemic norms that human cognizers ought to follow. Although much of twentieth epistemology was concerned to describe the epistemic practices and states of human cognizers, regulative epistemology has taken front stage recently in the epistemology of disagreement. In this paper, I distinguish between two kinds of epistemic norms, what I call “first-person” and “third-person” norms. I argue that Kelly’s Total Evidence View is most plausibly seen as offering us a third-person norm, not a first-person one.
Non-Peer Disagreement (IV-K)

*Maura Priest, University of California–Irvine*

Literature in the epistemology of disagreement has focused on peer disagreement: disagreement between those with shared evidence and equal cognitive abilities. Additional literature considers the ideal response of non-experts that disagree with experts. But there remains an unexplored perspective. How should epistemic superiors respond when disagreeing with inferiors? *Prima facie*, it may seem an uninteresting question. After all, if I claim $p$ and find out that: (1) you claim not-$p$, and (2) you have access to less evidence, it seems that 2 nullifies the impact of 1. I can account for our disagreement by your evidence paucity and remain steadfast in my belief. The case is similar with cognitive inferiors. Maybe I am an expert on the subject, and you are a novice. Perhaps you are just plain stupid. In either case, it seems I have little reason to alter my belief. My aim in this paper is to show that these *prima facie* intuitions are often mistaken, or at least, misleading. When we distinguish between two types of inferiors, competents and incompetents, we see that disagreement from the former can give superiors reason to reevaluate belief. I consider three dominance models of non-peer relations: strict superiority, weak cognitive superiority, and weak evidential superiority. I show that in all three cases, epistemic superiors have reason to lower belief credence in response to inferior disagreement. However, inferior disagreement is not always cause for epistemic reevaluation. Disagreements with incompetent inferiors is nuanced. In some instances, these disagreements ought to bolster the superior’s justification. Reversely, *agreements* with inferiors can defeat justification if epistemic inferiors track falsity. But sometimes inferiors track neither truth nor falsity. In these cases, an inferior’s disagreement is epistemically uninformative.

Aristotle on Degrees and Heroic Virtue (I-D)

*Douglass Reed, University of Virginia*

In this paper I investigate two neglected issues regarding Aristotle’s ethical landscape in his *Nicomachean Ethics*. The first is whether Aristotle believes that there are degrees of true human virtue. The second is how Aristotle conceives of what, in Book VII, he calls “heroic virtue.” As I argue, these two issues are related because Aristotle conceives of heroic virtue as virtue to the highest degree. In order to prove this I begin by considering and rejecting problems with ascribing to Aristotle the view that virtue can differ by degrees. As it turns out, in order to definitively determine this question, we must understand Aristotle’s conception of heroic virtue. Accordingly, in the final part of the paper I argue that Aristotle understands heroic virtue as human virtue to the highest degree. After dispatching with alternative interpretations, I explain how this reading of heroic virtue is sustainable given the doctrine of the mean. I end the paper by considering how Aristotle thinks those with heroic virtue might differ from those with non-heroic virtue. With all of this accomplished, we will achieve two important insights into Aristotle’s ethics. First, we will better understand Aristotle’s heroic virtue, the state that he identifies as the most perfect human condition. Second, in the course of defending my reading of heroic virtue, we will come to better understand his conception of virtue by rejecting the standard interpretation and seeing that Aristotle does not maintain that all virtuous agents are perfectly virtuous.
Oaxacan Transborder Communities and the Political Philosophy of Immigration (IV-I)

Amy Reed-Sandoval, University of Washington

I argue that members of Oaxacan Indigenous “transborder communities” of Mexico and the United States are entitled to a freedom of movement right between these two countries. First, I explore the vital role that migration across the U.S.-Mexico border plays in maintaining Oaxacan transborder societal culture. Second, I explore the implications of Will Kymlicka’s views on collective rights for this phenomenon. On the one hand, Kymlicka’s argument that just states must protect the societal cultures of minority groups within their territory would seem to support such a right for Oaxacan “transmigrants.” On the other, his categorical distinction between “national minorities” and “voluntary migrants” cannot, as it stands, capture the lived experiences of Oaxacan transborder communities and similar transnational groups. However, I argue that there is a reasonable extension of Kymlicka’s view that can, indeed, account for the phenomenon of Oaxacan transborder communities by allowing for this freedom of movement right.

Object Constructivism and Unconstructed Objects (VI-J)

Justin Remhof, Santa Clara University

The object constructivist thesis that all objects are socially constructed, typically associated with William James and Nelson Goodman, is thought to be absurd. Many objects are socially constructed, such as nickels, books, and tables, but constructivists make the much stronger claim that seemingly natural objects, such as stars, are also constructed. This position has come under attack. Paul Boghossian and Israel Scheffler independently argue that object constructivism presupposes the existence of at least some unconstructed objects, so the thesis is false. This paper does not attempt to convince those who are firmly against constructivism, but rather begins to develop a constructivist position that can respond to the worry. The constructivist will claim that on her position whatever exists apart from us cannot be an object.

Persistence, Thought, and Personhood (III-K)

Nicholas Rimell, University of Virginia

Perdurantists say that ordinary objects persist by perduring. Typically, the perdurantist also endorses two other views: a reductive view of tense, and a view of property ascription according to which I have properties at times in virtue of my temporal parts’ having those properties. These commitments saddle the perdurantist with difficult challenges. First, the perdurantist must give a plausible account of tensed thought. Second, she must respond to the Too Many Thinkers argument.

The perdurantist responds to each of these challenges. But the conjunction of her responses, I argue, entails that perdurantism is false. I begin by presenting these responses, and I explain why perdurantists are (and should be) compelled to adopt them. I then explain why these responses are jointly inconsistent with perdurantism. I conclude that, if the perdurantist wishes to retain her view, she must find a different way of meeting at least one of the above-mentioned challenges.
Against Radical Credal Imprecision (V-J)

Susanna Rinard, University of Missouri–Kansas City

A number of Bayesians claim that, if one has no evidence relevant to a proposition $P$, then one’s doxastic attitude toward $P$ should be represented by the interval $[0, 1]$. I argue that this is inconsistent with plausible claims about comparative levels of confidence. A discussion of some alternatives leads to the conjecture that there is an in-principle limitation on formal representations of belief: they cannot be both fully accurate and maximally specific.

Phenomenal Blending and the Palette Problem (IV-G)

Luke Roelofs, University of Toronto

I discuss the apparent discrepancy between the qualitative diversity of consciousness and the relative qualitative homogeneity of the brain’s basic constituents, a discrepancy raised as a problem for identity theorists by Maxwell and Lockwood (as one element of the “grain problem”), and more recently as a problem for panpsychists (under the heading of “the palette problem”). The challenge posed by this discrepancy is to explain how a relatively homogenous “palette” of basic qualities could give rise to the bewildering diversity of qualities we, and presumably other creatures, experience.

I argue that this challenge can be met, though it requires taking controversial stands on a number of phenomenological questions, and accepting an eventual theory most elements of which are in a certain sense unimaginable, though not for that reason inconceivable.

Affinity and Systematicity in the First Critique (VI-I)

Michael Rohlf, The Catholic University of America

This paper proposes a novel solution to a puzzle about the relationship between Kant’s notion of affinity in the Transcendental Deduction and the principles of systematicity that he ascribes to reason in the Appendix to the Dialectic. The puzzle is that these appear to conflict with one another. Kant argues in the Deduction that the affinity of all appearances is guaranteed by the way our understanding constructs appearances according to the categories. So it is unclear why we also need reason’s principles of systematicity to search for affinity among appearances. My solution involves distinguishing two kinds of affinity, which are both necessary but only jointly sufficient for experience, and only one of which is secured by our understanding according to the Deduction. The other kind of affinity, which reason searches for according to the Dialectic, must be supplied by nature itself in order for experience to be possible for us.

Frankfurt, Personhood, and the Objectivity of Value (IV-L)

Anthony J. Rudd, St. Olaf College

This paper is a critical examination of Harry Frankfurt’s account of personhood and its relation to our loves and cares. I shall argue that Frankfurt’s rejection of moral—or, more broadly, evaluative—realism ultimately undermines his own account of personhood in terms of the capacity for higher-order volition.
The Invariance Criterion for Logical Pluralism (VI-H)

Tomoya Sato, University of California–San Diego

A characterization of logical constants has been of great importance in philosophy of logic. The boundary between logically valid and invalid arguments varies according to a demarcation between logical and extra-logical terms. Alfred Tarski, Gila Sher, and others proposed an invariance criterion that covers classical logic. In the present paper, I argue that the invariance criterion can be extended to a criterion of intuitionistic logic, which is taken as a genuine logic by the Beall-Restall type of logical pluralism. I show that logical constants of intuitionistic logic can also be characterized in terms of invariance.

Blocking the Strengthened Case for Knowledge from Falsehood (V-K)

Ian P. Schnee, Western Kentucky University

A growing number of authors defend putative examples of knowledge from falsehood (KFF), inferential knowledge based on false premises. I first argue that there is no KFF because subjects’ knowledge in the proffered examples is actually based on ersatz (substitute) true premises; I call this the Ersatz Solution to KFF. Fitelson (2010), however, provided a more challenging template of knowledge from falsehood in which the knowledge is counterfactually dependent on the falsehood (which Fitelson calls KFF*) and claimed that a version of KFF* avoids a key element that I employ in the Ersatz Solution. If correct, that claim would significantly strengthen the case for knowledge from falsehood. My second argument counters Fitelson’s move: I argue for the conditional claim that if the Ersatz Solution works for KFF then it also works for KFF*. If my argument here is successful, it significantly advances the case against knowledge from falsehood.

Pseudonyms and Superheroes (III-M)

David Schwarz, Independent Scholar

This paper addresses Saul’s simple sentence examples of apparent substitution failure for co-referiring name-pairs such as “Superman” and “Clark Kent.” It is noted that current proposals to semantically differentiate the two names face Saul’s Enlightenment and Aspect problems, while her alternative of rejecting substitution failure violates linguistic intuitions. To offer a new approach to semantic differentiation the paper considers pseudonyms, observing that to adopt or bestow such names is to place conditions on their reference that effectively provide them with Forbesian hidden indexicals. The argument is then that taking “Superman” and “Clark Kent” as pseudonyms allows a Forbesian analysis of Saul’s sentences that avoids the problems she raises for Forbes’s own account. The paper concludes that Saul’s examples and their Forbesian analysis tell us little about the semantics of proper names generally, since they depend on the special case of pseudonyms.

Attention and Cognitive Control in Affective Perception for Embodied Appraisals (IV-G)

William P. Seeley, Bates College

Embodied appraisal theories like Prinz (2004) treat emotions as direct, noncognitive embodied responses to biologically and behaviorally salient aspects of the environment that are under
environmental control. Prinz defines cognitive states and processes, in contrast, as mental states and processes that are under organismic control. Organismic control is, in turn, defined relative to top-down neurophysiological processes that originate in prefrontal cortex and are associated with executive control of behavior. Recent research in affective neuroscience demonstrates that emotional responsiveness to emotion laden facial expressions is dependent upon the availability of endogenously controlled attentional resources in ordinary perceptual contexts. The deployment of endogenously controlled attention resources is a canonical example of a top-down neurophysiological process originating in prefrontal cortex that is associated with executive control. Therefore, the evidence from affective neuroscience suggests that affective perception is rarely direct and unmediated but rather, by Prinz’s own definition, under organismic control.

How to Be an Ethical Expressivist (III-J)
Alex Silk, University of Birmingham
Expressivism promises an illuminating account of the nature of normative judgment. But worries about the details of expressivist semantics have led many to doubt whether expressivism’s putative advantages can be secured. I argue that insights from ordering semantics and decision theory can help us eliminate expressivism’s semantic stumbling block. By systematically interpreting the orderings that figure in analyses of normative terms in terms of the basic practical attitude of conditional weak preference, the expressivist can explain the semantic properties of normative sentences in terms of the logical properties of that attitude. Expressivism’s problems with capturing the logical relations among normative sentences can be reduced to the familiar, more tractable problem of explaining certain coherence constraints on preferences.

The Constitution of Action (II-H)
Kenneth Silver, University of Southern California
Though “the problem of action” is often considered to be a matter of understanding what distinguishes an action (e.g., arm-raising) from a mere bodily movement (e.g., a reflex), I begin by purely considering the metaphysical relationship between them. Though movements and the actions related to them seem to both be events, I claim that the movement constitutes the action just as we often say that the lump constitutes the statue. I apply the recent literature on material constitution to action theory in order to show how movements and actions seem to conform to the trademarks of the constitution relation. What’s more, both the causal theory of action and a prominent view of material constitution seem to either easily conform to or even suggest the thesis that actions are constituted. To conclude, I gesture towards problems for which having this kind of theory of the metaphysics of action may be helpful.

What Is a Theory of Persistence? (VI-G)
Bradford Skow, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
The way debates about theories of persistence are usually framed is confused. Clearing things up sheds light on (1) questions about the relationship between theories of persistence and theories of time (like presentism and the “block universe” theory), and (2) questions about how exactly the endurance theory of persistence should be understood.
The Explanatory Power of High-Level Perceptual Content (II-D)

Chris Smith, Wake Forest University

Representationalists in the philosophy of perception hold that perceptual experience has representational content. One of the chief debates among representationalists is over whether experience has “high-level” content in addition to “low-level” content. In the case of visual experience, low-level contents are properties like shape, size, and color, while high-level contents would include kind properties (like being a duck), semantic properties (like being a word that means duck), and causal properties. All representationalists accept that experience represents low-level properties. “Conservatives” hold that those are all the properties experience represents, while “liberals” hold that experience also represents some high-level properties. Obviously, liberalism can come in many different forms, depending on exactly which high-level properties are held to be represented. In this paper I defend the thesis that experience represents kind properties, like duckhood. My argument for this thesis is an inference to the best explanation (IBE) with aspect-switching and seeing-as as the explananda: the best explanation of what’s going on when we alternate between seeing the duck-rabbit as a duck and seeing it as a rabbit is that we alternate between visually representing it as a duck and visually representing it as a rabbit—more generally, seeing as F = visually representing as F. I criticize three conservative strategies for explaining seeing-as and thereby resisting the IBE argument for liberalism. The first, the “attention/etc.” strategy, tries to explain aspect-switching by appealing to differences in attention, imagination, and emotion accompanying vision. The second, the “conceptual” strategy, appeals to the application of concepts in conjunction with vision. The third, the “gestalt” strategy, appeals to visual representation of overall gestalts of low-level properties like shape, color, and texture. I argue that each of these strategies is explanatorily inferior to liberalism.

Rationality and Desire in Fiction (VI-K)

Shannon Spaulding, Oklahoma State University

Gregory Currie, Tyler Doggett, and Andy Egan argue that the best explanation of our affective responses to fiction involves imaginative desires, or i-desires. Accounts that do not invoke i-desires imply that consumers of fiction have conflicting desires with respect to the fiction. Thus, Currie, Doggett, and Egan maintain, these accounts imply that consumers of fiction are irrational. I consider whether there are rationality constraints on desires. I argue that it is quite difficult to articulate general principles of rationality for desires, and even according to the most plausible of these possible principles, conflicting desires about fictions are not irrational.

Unnecessary Existents (VII-L)

Joshua Spencer, University of Wisconsin–Milwaukee

Timothy Williamson has argued for the radical conclusion that everything necessarily exists. In this paper, I assume that the conclusion of Williamson’s argument is more incredible than the denial of his premises. Under the assumption that Williamson is mistaken, I argue for the claim that there are some structured propositions which have constituents that might not have existed. If those constituents had not existed, then the propositions would have had an unfilled role; they would have been gappy. This gappy propositions view allows for a plausible response to Williamson’s
argument. Additionally, a slight variant of the gappy propositions view allows for plausible defense of Linguistic Ersatzism from the problem of contingent non-existents (also known as the problem of aliens).

Newcombian Nuances: An Interventionist Take (IV-M)
Reuben Stern, University of Wisconsin–Madison
Most causal decision theorists believe it is obvious that subjects should two-box when confronted with Newcomb’s Problem. In this paper, I argue that matters are not so obvious. In particular, I argue that the causal decision theorist’s recommendation should depend on how we spell out the remarkable success of the predictor. If the predictor’s success is reducibly stochastic, then there are scenarios in which the causal decision theorist should recommend two-boxing. But if the predictor’s success is perfect or irreducibly stochastic, then the causal decision theorist should recommend one-boxing. I additionally argue that these conclusions undermine one of the most powerful arguments for evidential decision theory: the argument that the evidential decision theorist is richer in the long run because she is a one-boxer. If my argument is correct, the one-boxer is richer than the two-boxer only in those circumstances in which the causal decision theorist should recommend one-boxing.

Status of Psychê in Plato’s Phaedo (VII-H)
Sophia A. Stone, Purdue University
Socrates needs coherent accounts of soul and form for his proofs on the immortality of the soul. The accounts have interpretive as well as logical problems: whether the proofs succeed or fail is not the concern here. Instead, I’m interested in the status of psychê. I analyze the textual peculiarities when Socrates talks about mathematical entities: three, the threes, three-ness, and the equals themselves—what is the status of the mathematicalss? The answer is not obvious. In the paper I argue that Socrates in the final proof is committed to a third entity, implied but not stated in the previous arguments. The soul moves in and out of a changing reality while maintaining the ability to grasp knowledge and acquire virtue. This role for soul is possible only because it is an intermediary.

Against the Necessity of Monism (VII-J)
Shruta Swarup, Cornell University
Contra Jonathan Schaffer, I argue that Priority Monism is not metaphysically necessary. We can accept its necessity only on pain of denying an extremely plausible principle to the effect that otherwise intrinsically indiscernible entities must have the same metaphysical status. My conclusion has significant implications for the debate between monists and pluralists. Schaffer’s much-discussed “argument from gunk” for Monism depends on the principle that whichever priority doctrine holds, holds necessarily. But if Monism doesn’t hold necessarily, a monist can hardly endorse this principle. Monists will have to give up the argument from gunk.
Omissions and the Frankfurt Cases: A Challenge (IV-L)

*Philip Swenson, University of California–Riverside*

The Principle of Alternative Possibilities (PAP) tells us that an agent is morally responsible for an action only if he could have done otherwise. Frankfurt-style cases (FSCs) call PAP into question because they appear to be cases in which an agent is morally responsible for an action despite the fact that he could not have done otherwise. In this essay I will argue that, despite initial appearances, we have good reason to deny that the agents in FSCs are morally responsible. As a result, we also have good reason to deny that FSCs are counterexamples to PAP. My strategy will be to begin with cases in which it is clear that an agent is not morally responsible for his behavior (or lack thereof) and argue that our judgment concerning responsibility in these cases ought to be the same as our judgment in the Frankfurt-style cases.

Social Conventions and Associative Duties (VII-G)

*Erin Taylor, Cornell University*

Associative duties are moral duties that people have in virtue of some socially recognized relationship like that of family, co-worker, or compatriot. Although they constitute the core of our moral lives, a unified account has been elusive. I argue, first, that associative duties are “mediated” by social convention. As such, they will abide by two key constraints. The “Regularity Constraint” says that associative duties will not normally depend on features of your situation that are overly unusual. The “Accessibility Constraint” says that associative duties will not normally depend on features of your situation that are inaccessible to typical participants. Second, I argue that the Regularity and Accessibility Constraints have important implications for a general theory of associative duties. I sketch a general account of associative duties that respects these implications.

The Flexibility of Epistemic Modals: Creating, Not Solving, Problems for Fallibilists (III-L)

*Allison Thornton, Baylor University*

*Chris Tweedt, Baylor University*

There is a certain tension between fallibilism and the standard account of epistemic modals. Charity Anderson (2013) tries to relieve this tension by arguing that epistemic modals are “intra-subjectively flexible.” That is, epistemic modals range over varying subsets of a subject’s knowledge depending on the subject’s context. This flexibility is compatible with the standard account of epistemic modals, and it enables fallibilist claims to come out true, so her account resolves the initial tension—or so it seems. We disagree. We will first argue that Anderson’s account does not resolve this tension, then we will give another problem for Anderson’s account. That is, we will argue that the intra-subjective flexibility of epistemic modals not only does not solve the problem it was set out to solve, but it also creates another problem for fallibilists.
The Structure of Propositions and Cross-linguistic Syntactic Variability (VI-H)

Vasileios Tsompanidis, Institut Jean Nicod–École Normale Superiéure

In Jeffrey King’s theory of propositions, the structure of a proposition mirrors the syntactic structure of natural language sentences that express it. I provide cases where this claim individuates propositions too finely across languages. Crucially, the fact King presents as his paradigmatic proposition expressed by the sentence “Dara swims” will not correspond to any proposition believed by a monolingual Greek speaker. This is due to the obligatory article required by Greek syntax in front of proper names. At this point King has two options: he can either try to streamline the syntax of Greek and English, or he can insist that English speakers can express simple structured propositions that are inexpressible in Greek. The former option entails that King has to give up his neo-Russelian framework, while the latter is an ad hoc move that makes his account arbitrary or trivial. I conclude that the mirroring claim is untenable.

Climate Change and the Epistemic Exploitation of Women (V-L)

Rebecca Tuvel, Vanderbilt University

Using the example of the trend to mainstream gender, this paper flags the worry that efforts to include women’s voices in climate change risk instrumentalizing women for their knowledge, specifically knowledge acquired through oppression. I call this particular species of instrumentalization epistemic exploitation. I conclude by gesturing at a two-step process by which organizations seeking women’s knowledge can avoid the problem of epistemic exploitation. First, organizations must recognize that women’s ecological knowledge is a product of oppression. Second, organizations must try to combat women’s oppression in line with women’s wills to the extent of the organization’s capacities. If an organization fails to meet these two requirements, we are faced with the problem of epistemic exploitation.

Henry of Ghent and Godfrey of Fontaines on *Sine Qua Non* Causes and Causation (V-I)

Simona Vucu, University of Toronto

Henry of Ghent, a master of theology at the University of Paris in the late thirteenth century, claimed that impediments can intervene in causal interactions, even when the active and passive cause are in adequate proximity for an effect to be produced. According to his view about when impediments intervene, what removes these impediments is a *sine qua non* cause or something without which the effect would not have been produced. Henry’s view about *sine qua non* causes met with harsh criticism especially from Godfrey of Fontaines, master of theology at Paris at the same time as Henry. Godfrey denies that impediments can affect the production of an effect; instead they intervene before the active and passive causes are in proximity. He also argues that Henry’s view has unwelcome consequences for how one identifies the causal role of the entities involved in a causal interaction.
Justice and Political Authority in Left-Libertarianism (V-H)

Fabian Wendt, University of Hamburg

Peter Vallentyne has argued that left-libertarians can judge redistributive states to be just even if they lack political authority. Against Vallentyne, I argue that states without political authority have to be judged unjust from a left-libertarian perspective. One argument for this is that states without political authority will infringe upon people’s left-libertarian enforcement rights. But admittedly, left-libertarians can claim that a state that all-in-all promotes justice in the interest of all rights-holders can nonetheless be judged just. But in a second argument, I argue that even states that successfully promote justice have to be judged unjust, from a left-libertarian perspective, as long as they do not have political authority. This is so because institutions can be intrinsically unjust, independently from what they achieve or do. The institution of slavery, for example, is intrinsically unjust because slave-owners claim to have liberties and powers they actually do not have (morally speaking). In the same way, states without political authority claim to have certain liberties and powers they do not have. Such states are intrinsically unjust for that reason. Though states without political authority might be able to all-in-all promote justice, it is thus hard to see how they could be just.

Two Arguments Against Teleological Accounts of Practical Reason (IV-J)

Stephen White, Northwestern University

The teleological conception of practical reason roughly holds that our reasons for performing an action depend on our reasons for preferring the outcome of that action to the outcomes of the alternatives we have available to us. My aim in this paper is to argue that we should reject the teleological conception. To do this I develop two separate strands of argument. The first extends an argument suggested by T. M. Scanlon, which is based on some cases of complex practical reasoning that are seemingly at odds with the teleological conception. The second is a new argument designed to show that, if we accept the teleological conception of reasons, we will not be able to correctly characterize or explain certain basic and intuitive instances of rational failure.

A Problem with Thinning (III-I)

Malte Willer, University of Chicago

I discuss a problem for the classical variably strict analysis of indicative conditionals. The problem is based on the observation, highlighted by Sobel sequences, that indicative conditionals resist thinning: a contingent indicative conditional does not retain its truth-value if one strengthens its antecedent with an arbitrary bit of information. I argue that, given minimal assumptions about the semantics and pragmatics of indicative conditionals, a variably strict analysis of indicative conditionals is empirically inadequate: it fails to account for the observation that indicative Sobel sequences are not only consistent but also assertible. I then show how a semantic analysis of indicative conditionals as strict over a dynamically evolving domain avoids the problem. The paper thus exploits data about thinning to argue for a certain semantic approach to conditionals, but unlike previous discussions does not appeal to considerations about order-sensitivity to motivate a dynamic analysis.
Sensitive Knowledge as Natural Knowledge (VII-K)
Aaron Wilson, University of Miami
In the following, I argue that (1) Locke considers (what he calls) sensitive knowledge to be a genuine form of knowledge, but that (2) he considers it to be a fundamentally different kind of knowledge from what he calls intuitive and demonstrative knowledge, in that the epistemic criteria for sensitive knowledge are very different from the epistemic criteria for intuitive or for demonstrative knowledge. This is not generally recognized in the literature on Locke. Finally, (3) I argue that sensitive knowledge, in Locke, is a kind of natural knowledge: knowledge that we have, not by the exercise of reason or of the intellect, but by the reliability of certain natural capacities that produce such knowledge (e.g., the senses).

Reviving Concurrentism About Death (III-K)
Aaron Wolf, Syracuse University
Epicurus claimed that we are worse off because of death neither before it happens nor after, and I believe he was right about that. But he went wrong in supposing on that basis that death is no harm at all, because he neglected a third possibility. Death may be bad for its victim just when it arrives. I think this maligned alternative is the most plausible view about the time during which our deaths are bad for us. Call it concurrentism. My aim here is to argue that concurrentism should be brushed aside no longer. The argument has two key premises: (a) we are worse off due to harms when the relevant events are occurring, and (b) that one must exist at time t to be worse off at t. I think that if (a) and (b) are true, concurrentism emerges as an especially natural theory of the deprivation of death.

Retributivism in Hobbes’s Theory of Punishment (VII-K)
Arthur Yates, School of Law, University of California–Berkeley
The tradition views Hobbes as providing a utilitarian justification for the practice of punishment. Specifically, the tradition views Hobbes as rejecting retribution and advancing deterrence and/or correction as providing the justification for punishment. The author of this paper argues that Hobbes neither rejects retribution in punishment nor justifies punishment on utilitarian grounds. The principles of deterrence and correction provide constraints on punishment, but such principles do not, for Hobbes, provide its justification. Hobbes’s theory of punishment is best understood as providing a retributivist justification for the practice of punishment: that persons ought to be righted of the injustices done to them. The author of this paper connects the righting of injustice to the re-establishment of the juridical equality that is the product of the social contract that establishes mutual accountability to the laws of nature.

Spinoza’s Symptomatic Theory of Emotions (VI-K)
Andrew D. Youpa, Southern Illinois University–Carbondale
Michael Della Rocca argues for a reading of Spinoza according to which emotions are propositional representations and nothing but propositional representations. On his nothing-but-representation reading, an emotion can be true or false, justified or unjustified, and, according to this reading,
emotions do not have any qualitative features because they allegedly do not have any non-representational features.

In this paper I defend an alternative interpretation of Spinoza’s theory of emotions. I argue that emotions are representations but they are not propositional representations. First, I show that an emotion is a representation in the sense that it is a sign of the state of an individual’s power, and an emotion serves as a sign in the way that a symptom represents that of which it is symptomatic. Second, I show that emotions are symptomatic signs in virtue of their qualitative character.

**Synthesis in Kant and Hegel (VI-I)**

*Rocio Zambrana, University of Oregon*

Hegel is known as a thinker of becoming, given his emphasis on contradiction. Revisionists have curbed the ontotheological conclusions of Hegel’s idealism by emphasizing contradiction. I argue that the key to a revisionist reading is Hegel’s treatment of synthesis. Kant defines synthesis as “the act of putting different representations together . . . and comprehending their manifoldness in one cognition.” Hegel understands synthesis as gathering, and gathering as what makes possible determinacy. However, Hegel conceives of determinacy as actual determination within Geist, rivaling Kant’s single epistemic subject and suggesting that synthesis is the work of practices of rendering intelligible.

**The (Anti-)Real(ist) Mill (III-J)**

*Peter Zuk, Rice University*

In the opening pages of *Utilitarianism*, John Stuart Mill writes that “the question concerning the summum bonum, or, what is the same thing, concerning the foundation of morality, has been accounted the main problem in speculative thought.”¹ Many of us engaged in contemporary moral philosophy will no doubt agree. Our discipline has come a long way since Mill’s time, but this great question is still with us. The purpose of this paper is to examine some aspects of Mill’s work that suggest that his answer to the question is an anti-realist one, making it markedly different than the one that has traditionally been ascribed to him.