Carnap on Modality (II-C)
M. J. Cresswell, Victoria University of Wellington
In two works in 1946 and 1947 Rudolf Carnap developed a semantics for S5 modal logic which depends on the claim that [necessary]A is true iff A is L-true (i.e., valid). In this paper I look at what motivated him to develop a modal logic, and then discuss the role of meaning postulates in his semantics. An important concern will be to consider how Carnap’s logic fares in the light of Quine’s criticisms. I will argue that the use of meaning postulates, together with Carnap’s views about analytcity, enables the 1946 semantics to provide an alternative, and arguably superior, answer to Quine than the answer Carnap provided in terms of individual concepts.

The Puzzle of Porphyry’s Rational Animals: A New Interpretation of On Abstinence from Animal Food (VI-A)
G. Fay Edwards, Washington University in St. Louis
In Book 3 of his pioneering treatise On Abstinence from Animal Food, Porphyry is traditionally taken to present one of his central reasons for vegetarianism: namely, that animals are rational, and that it is therefore unjust to kill them for food. Endorsed by the majority of scholars to have written on Porphyry, I call this the “consensus interpretation” of On Abstinence. Elsewhere in Porphyry’s corpus, however, there is no sign of this position, and, in fact, in some of his other works, Porphyry affirms that animals are irrational. In this paper, I argue that the discrepancy should be resolved by rejecting the consensus interpretation of On Abstinence in favor of a new, dialectical reading of Book 3. According to this new reading, Porphyry himself is committed only to the view that the Stoics must admit that animals are rational, given their conception of rationality, and that proof of animal irrationality commits the Stoics to vegetarianism given their conception of justice. Furthermore, though Porphyry does believe it is unjust to kill non-human animals for food, this has nothing at all to do with their status as rational beings.

The Unfinished Revolution in Cognitive Neuroscience (VII-A)
Carrie Figdor, University of Iowa
The revolution of cognitive neuroscience is the unprecedented access we now have to explaining the mind mechanistically by observing the brain operating in situ. This methodological revolution has been accompanied by the idea that the brain is not a machine restricted to the push-pull operations accepted by historical mechanists. I argue that this conceptual revolution is critically incomplete: what remains to be accepted is the idea that the kinds of complex operations that can figure in mechanistic explanations of the mind, literally and non-regressively, include those considered mental. There are no a priori restrictions on what can explain what within the mechanistic framework.
Skepticism about Naturalizing Practical Normativity (IV-C)

William J. FitzPatrick, University of Rochester

Even if we allow for the naturalization of epistemic normativity and of a limited form of instrumental normativity, there are reasons to be skeptical about the prospects for any more general naturalization of normativity in the practical sphere. Not everyone, of course, will be moved by these considerations, or moved sufficiently to abandon naturalizing ambitions in this domain. For many, the attractions of a thoroughgoing naturalism will outweigh any costs of the sort I will identify, and a somewhat deflationary but naturalistically construed normativity will seem preferable to a more robust but non-naturalistic one. My purpose here is not to adjudicate that dispute, but instead to develop and clarify the motivations for resisting the naturalizing of practical normativity, so that we can see more clearly what is ultimately at stake and better explain why some of us continue to hold out against the obvious pressures to embrace naturalism. I will consider practical normativity quite broadly, including goodness, rightness, and practical reasons, arguing that some naturalizing moves fail outright to capture the relevant normative facts or properties, while others have more promise but also seem to carry certain limitations and costs, failing to capture elements that at least some of us take to be important to an adequate theory of practical normativity. Obviously there are far more naturalizing moves than can be considered here, so the aim is not to establish through a process of elimination that naturalism cannot succeed. The hope is just to say enough to identify typical challenges and limitations in a way that may shed some helpful light on the debate going forward.

The Coarse-Grainedness of Grounding (IV-D)

Kathrin Koslicki, University of Alberta

After many years of enduring the drought and famine of Quinean ontology and Carnapian metontology, the notion of ground, with its distinctively philosophical flavor, finally promises to give metaphysicians something they can believe in again and around which they can rally: their very own metaphysical explanatory connection which apparently cannot be reduced to, or analyzed in terms of, other familiar idioms such as identity, modality, parthood, supervenience, realization, causation, or counterfactual dependence. Often, phenomena such as the following are cited as putative examples of grounding connections: systematic connections between entire realms of facts (mental/physical; moral/natural; etc.); truthmaking (e.g., the relation between the truth of the proposition that snow is white and snow's being white); logical cases (e.g., the connection between conjunctive facts or disjunctive facts and their constituent facts); the determinate/determinable relation (e.g., the relation between something's being maroon and its being red). I will argue in this paper that classifying all of these phenomena as exhibiting grounding connections does not achieve much in the way of illumination. There are important and fairly obvious differences between these cases which have been obscured by creating the illusion that they are all connected via the single relation or operation of grounding. The important work of giving a positive account of the nature of the connections at issue still remains to be done, even after classifying all of these phenomena as exhibiting grounding connections; and we have not made much progress in that direction by applying a single label to what are evidently quite distinct phenomena. In fact, by treating a collection of phenomena which is in fact heterogeneous as though it were homogeneous, we have, if anything, taken a dialectical step backward.
Doing Ontology and Doing Justice: Meta-Metaphysical Lessons from Feminist Philosophy (III-B)

Mari Mikkola, Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin

Today's ontologists are usually not conceptual analysts; rather, their methodology is quasi-scientific. Acceptable criteria for theory choice include: being able to provide a unified (non-disjunctive), coherent, non-circular, simple, parsimonious, non-ad hoc total theory of some subject matter that purports to tell us truths in theoretically rigorous ways. These criteria make up the constitutive values of ontological inquiry and they tend to guide metaphysical theory choices. Such values can be distinguished from contextual values of a practice (cf. Helen Longino): the political and moral values embedded in the social context of an inquiry. Now, even though we may have some meta-metaphysical value commitments (e.g., relative to the existence of ordinary objects, abstracta, facts), bringing in political or moral contextual values is usually not viewed as an acceptable move when thinking about metaphysical theory choice. With this in mind, the paper asks: Might ontological injury accommodate such contextual values after all? Feminist epistemologists have successfully argued that contextual values are admissible as criteria of scientific theory choice. Our scientific theories do not aim at some bare accumulation of facts; instead, they organize facts into patterns that aim adequately to meet some explanatory needs. The phenomenon we seek to explain (at least to an extent) trades on our practical interests. And so, there is room for contextual values in scientific theory choice and justification. Might the same also be true of metaphysical theory choice? The paper undertakes to explore this issue: whether there are important meta-metaphysical feminist lessons about contextual values that pertain to our theory choices. If my exploration is successful, I hope to motivate the view that taking on board some feminist theoretical insights not only makes a difference to justifying ontological theory choices, but also may yield better ways to do so.

Distinctively Intuitive Judgments (VI-C)

Jennifer Nagel, University of Toronto

Does intuitive judgment have a special role to play in philosophy? The notion that it does is under pressure from a variety of different angles. Minimalists such as Timothy Williamson suggest that there is nothing special about intuitive responses: our responses to particular examples such as Gettier scenarios are “just applications of our ordinary capacities for judgment.” Skeptics such as Herman Cappelen maintain that our philosophers never do actually rely on intuitions, and that it is frankly misleading to use this label for philosophers’ responses to particular cases. Against skeptics and minimalists, I argue that there is something distinctive and defensible about philosophers’ reliance on intuition. My argument draws on recent work concerning the psychological contrast between intuitive and reflective judgment, and on work concerning the role of intuition in reasoning.

Archetypes without Patterns: Locke on Relations and Mixed Modes (IV-A)

Walter Ott, Virginia Tech

Powers and qualities are puzzling features in the modern period. One thing is reasonably clear: both Robert Boyle and John Locke treat powers as relations. So we have no choice but to take
seriously the ontology of relations. Pace Matthew Stuart, I shall argue that Locke treats relations and mixed modes in precisely the same way: he rejects their extra-mental reality. And by placing Locke in the context of scholastic nominalism, I argue that this rejection need not have the dire consequences commentators from Odegard to Stuart envision.

Normativity Can Be Naturalized (IV-C)
Hille Paakkunainen, Syracuse University
I argue that, contrary to recent arguments by Jonathan Dancy (2006), Derek Parfit (2011), and William FitzPatrick (2008), there is no principled obstacle to naturalizing practical normativity. Following these authors and many others, I understand the centrally important kind of practical normativity in terms of “normative reasons for action,” reasons that count in favor of actions. On this view, naturalizing normativity is a matter of providing a naturalistic account of the property of being a normative reason for action. By a “naturalistic” account of this property, I mean an account that ontologically reduces this property to other, non-normative properties of a sort whose presence in the natural world philosophers of normativity are generally ready to countenance. I explain how such an account can be given in principle, without thereby losing anything that an account of normativity should wish to keep. Normative reasons can be every bit as “robustly” normative on a naturalistic account as on a non-naturalistic one. Indeed, one of the premises that makes it possible to naturalize reasons is, at the same time, needed for explaining how reasons can be robustly normative, making demands on agents.

The Domain of Sensory Privilege (IV-A)
Robert Pasnau, University of Colorado–Boulder
There is a familiar, albeit puzzling doctrine, going back to antiquity, that the senses, within their proper domain, cannot be in error. If the doctrine is to have any chance of success—or even be roughly correct—it is obvious that this domain must be specified with considerable care. The most notorious way of doing so is to treat the objects of sensation as inner ideas or sense data. In the present paper, however, I will consider how, for most of the history of philosophy, it has been supposed that one or another external domain of sensible qualities could serve as the privileged objects of sensation.

Genuine Wanting and Animal Desires in Plato's Gorgias
Casey Perin, University of California–Irvine
In the Gorgias (466B–468E), Socrates draws a distinction between genuinely wanting something and merely thinking that it is best for one. The puzzling implication is that we can fail to genuinely want those things we think are best for us and do precisely because we think they are best for us. Here I sketch an account of genuine wanting as Socrates characterizes it in the Gorgias. On this account genuine wanting (or, as it is sometimes called, “Socratic wanting”) is a distinctively human form of motivation that Plato in the Gorgias contrasts with mere animal desires. These are the desires celebrated by Callicles and whose presence in our psychology makes self-control a human virtue.
Locke’s Qualities Revisited (IV-A)
Samuel C. Rickless, University of California–San Diego
No scholarly consensus exists regarding the proper interpretation of the ground(s) of Locke’s distinction between primary and secondary qualities in Book 2 Chapter 8 of An Essay Concerning Human Understanding. As Jacovides (2007) points out, Locke says six things about qualities that might be understood to be criteria that fix the nature of the distinction: that the primary qualities are original (in some sense), but the secondary ones derivative; that the ideas of primary qualities resemble primary qualities, whereas the ideas of secondary qualities do not resemble secondary qualities; that secondary qualities are powers, but that (at least some) primary qualities are not powers; that primary qualities are, whereas secondary qualities are not, inseparable from bodies; that primary qualities are, whereas secondary qualities are not, in bodies considered in themselves; and that primary qualities are, while secondary qualities are not, real. In Rickless (1997), I defended an interpretation according to which the last of these six distinctions is the foundation of Locke’s primary/secondary quality distinction. Here, I return to this reading, in part to clarify it and in part to explain why it is superior to more recent competing interpretations, including the one put forward in Stuart (2003; 2013).

Welfare and Rational Fit (I-B)
Connie S. Rosati, University of Arizona
We commonly talk about what is good for someone or something. But the expression “good for” has a variety of meanings depending on the context of use. When we say, “X is good for Y,” we may express the proposition that X stands in an instrumental relation to Y, that doing X will keep Y in the condition standard users would want Y to be in, that X is good from the point of view of Y, or that X contributes to what is variously called Y’s welfare, well-being, self-interest, flourishing, or personal good. My interest herein will lie with “good for” in this latter, welfarist sense, and my aim will be to present and defend a view about the nature of this type of good-for value. I begin by discussing the basic structure of welfarist good-for. I then consider alternative views about how to understand this structure, assessing their relative merits. According to the view that I favor—what I shall call a “rational fit” theory of welfare—good for is a reason-giving relation of fit between a welfare object and a welfare subject, where a welfare subject is a valuable being.

Between Voluntarism and Ascriptivism: A Response to Charlotte Witt’s Notion of the Social Individual (III-B)
Natalie Stoljar, McGill University
Charlotte Witt employs the notion of “social individual” in her recent argument for gender essentialism. For Witt, social individuals are essentially social position occupiers. Moreover, social individuals inhabit many different social positions: those of woman, teacher, parent, citizen, and so forth. Witt argues that gender performs the function of unifying these social roles and hence is “unessential” to social individuals. Social individuals have different persistence conditions from persons: whereas gender may be essential to social individuals, it does follow on Witt’s account that gender is necessary to personhood. Moreover, the norms that apply to social individuals are different from those that apply to persons. Witt claims that a social individual is responsive to and
evaluable under norms derived from social conventions and institutions. However, she argues that a person chooses for herself whether to adopt or reject the norms associated with the various social roles she inhabits. Thus, Witt’s argument employs a distinction between identities that are ascribed to individuals from a third-person perspective and those that an individual endorses from a first-person perspective. Let us call these two positions ascriptivism and voluntarism. I argue that this distinction cannot be maintained either ontologically or normatively. Gendered and racialized identities often correspond to a complex intersection of third-person and first-person components and the norms that individuals take to apply to themselves from a first-person perspective are often partly constituted by what is ascribed to them from a third-person perspective.