1. Introduction

An attractive feature of Hume’s theory of temporal experience is its simplicity. Hume characterizes an experience of time as an experience made up of successive parts. Time is simply the successive arrangement of the perceptions making up an experience. In contrast to theories in the Kantian tradition, which postulate *a priori* mental structures, Hume’s theory explains the temporality of experience simply as its successiveness. In doing so, it paves the way for an empiricist account of the origin of the concept of time: the concept originates in experiences that immediately manifest time by being themselves temporal, that is, successive.

This simplicity might seem to come at the cost of failing to explain certain complex phenomena. An *experimentum crucis* for theories of temporal experience is the contrast between the experience of the movement of a clock’s *second* hand and that of the movement of the *hour* hand. Hume’s theory seems ill-equipped to account for the difference. If, as Hume’s theory suggests, experiences of time are essentially experiences made up of successive parts, both the experience of the second hand and that of the hour hand constitute experiences of time. Intuitively, however, only the experience of the *second* hand strikes us as an experience of time.

I argue that Locke’s account of the phenomenon in question offers Hume an answer to this difficulty; in fact, as we will see, Locke’s account offers a compelling alternative to the standard accounts of the phenomenon in the contemporary literature on temporal experience. Section 1 of this paper explains Hume’s theory of temporal experience; section 2 outlines the challenge at hand; section 3 develops a Humean answer via Locke.
2. Hume’s Theory of Temporal Experience

Hume terms the entities that comprise any mental state *perceptions*. He divides perceptions into *impressions*, the lively entities we generally call ‘feelings’ or ‘experiences’, and *ideas*, the faint entities we call ‘thoughts’ (T 1.1.1.1 SBN 1). He also divides perceptions into *simple* and *complex*: the simple being perceptions that cannot be divided into parts, and the complex those that are composites of the simple (T 1.1.1.2 SBN 2). Hume explains that, as a result of a ‘*distinction of reason*’, we can recognize *aspects* of perceptions, that is, points of resemblance among perceptions (T 1.1.7.18 SBN 25). I can recognize the color green as an aspect of my perception of an apple in that it is a point in which the perception resembles other perceptions, such as perceptions of trees or lakes; spherical shape is another aspect in that it is a point in which the perception of the apple resembles perceptions such as of beach balls or marbles. Hume stresses that aspects need not be distinct and separable from one another. Greenness and sphericalness are not distinct or separable—they are not different *parts* of the perception—but are one and the same perception. Greenness is simply the resemblance the perception of the apple bears to perceptions of trees and lakes; sphericalness is simply the resemblance it bears to perceptions of beach balls and marbles.

A central tenet of Hume’s theories of space and time is that impressions are not by nature formless mental entities: they can manifest various kinds of arrangements, or, as Hume phrases it, they can be ‘disposed in certain manners’ (T 1.2.3.4 SBN 34). The visual impression of a table is made up of simple impressions of colored points arranged in a certain way—namely, a spatial way. The auditory impression of a melody is made up of simple impressions of musical notes arranged in a certain way—a successive or temporal way (T 1.2.3.10 SBN 36). Both are

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1 References to Hume’s *Treatise* (T) are to the 2007 Edition by Mary J. Norton and David Fate Norton. Parenthetical citations provide book number followed by part number, section number, paragraph number, and page numbers from the 1978 edition by L.A. Selby-Bigge and P.H. Nidditch (SBN).
complex impressions—impressions made up of parts. Neither is a mere conglomeration of parts, however. Each consists of parts and a manner of disposition of those parts.

These arrangements or ‘manners of disposition’ are aspects of impressions. Spatiality is the way in which the visual impression of a table resembles the visual impression of a tree or the tactile impression of a book. Successiveness or temporality is the way in which the auditory impression of a melody resembles the visual impression of an object in motion or the tactile impression of a series of taps on the shoulder. Spatiality and temporality cannot be distinguished or separated from other aspects of impressions: just as an apple’s color cannot be distinguished from its shape except by a ‘distinction of reason’, the temporality of a melody cannot be distinguished from its sound.

Kemp Smith correctly observes that a manner of disposition is not reducible to a simple impression or a mere sum thereof, but “lie[s] beyond the nature of each and all of our simple impressions” (1941, 273-4). He too quickly concludes, however, that a manner of disposition is ‘contemplated or intuited, but not sensed’—that it is ‘non-impressional’ (274). Being irreducible to simple impressions does not make manners of disposition ‘non-impressional.’ Manners of disposition are ‘impressional’—they are given in impressions—in that they are aspects of complex impressions. For Hume, impressions are not always simples or mere conglomerations of simples: they can be complexes involving parts and arrangements of those parts (Falkenstein 1997, 194-195; Garrett 1997, 53; Baxter 2008, 20). Appreciating that impressions in fact instantiate

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2 Like Kemp Smith, Johnson and Bardon consider it to be problematic that, according to Hume’s theory, none of the simple impressions making up a succession of impressions involves an impression of time (Johnson 1989, 217; Bardon 2007, 56). However, if the impression of time is by its very nature an impression made up of parts, then the expectation that an impression of time should be discoverable in a simple impression is mistaken in the first place. Kemp Smith regards Hume as a mental atomist who inconsistently posits ‘manners of disposition’ that cannot be given in the mental atoms: “[Hume] held to the assumption, so little questioned in his day, of what Gibson has entitled the ‘composition theory’; the theory, namely, that it is in simples, to the exclusion of any supplementary factors, relational or other, that compounds consist. Hume holds to this theory, even in the very act of recognizing that there are in addition to the simples two ‘manners’ or ‘orders’, each unique in its kind, and each a feature not to be found in any of the simples so ordered” (1941, 279). It is questionable, however, that we should we regard Hume as a mental atomist of the sort described. Rather, the very fact that Hume allows simple perceptions to be ‘disposed
manners of disposition, and that successiveness or temporality is one such manner of
disposition, is crucial for understanding how, consistently with Hume’s content empiricism, the
idea of time is based on impressions that directly acquaint us with time.⁴

Hume characterizes succession by difference: for two or more impressions to be
successive, they must not be qualitatively identical or ‘unchangeable’ but must be different (T
1.2.3.8-11 SBN 35-37). His grounds for this tenet are empirical.⁵ There are no experiences or
impressions of successions made up of exactly resembling members. What seem to be such
experiences – the impression of a whole note or a note that lasts for several beats, for instance –
are always experiences of qualitatively identical objects against a background of other differences, so
that the objects of such experiences are still constituted by change.

Hume argues that any impression of time is identical to a series of successively disposed
impressions. He observes that an impression of time always involves a series of successive
impressions: in the absence of a successive series, as when we are asleep or occupied with a
single thought, we have no impression of time (T 1.2.3.7 SBN 35). He adds that when we do have
an impression of time, like the impression of a melody, the impression of time is not anything
over and above the successive sounds of the notes: the sounds do not generate an additional
impression separable from them that could be called an impression of time, but rather, the
sounds themselves are the impression of time (T 1.2.3.10 SBN 36-37). Finally, he states that a
series of successive impressions is in and of itself sufficient for an impression of time: an

in various manners’ is evidence that he was not a mental atomist – at least not the kind of atomist that sees
compounds as consisting in simples “to the exclusion of any supplementary factors”.

⁴ On a rough approximation, Hume’s content empiricism is the principle that ideas can represent only objects or
features that are first given in impressions. Many scholars have thought that the ideas of space and time are
inconsistent with Hume’s content empiricism (Kemp Smith 1941, 273-4; Hendel 1963, 409; Mijuskovic 1977, 387;
Waxman 1994, 116; Frasca-Spada 1998, 75; Allison 2008, 51). Once we appreciate that for Hume space and time (as
manners of disposition) are in fact given in impressions, however, the inconsistency disappears.

⁵ Hume seems to draw this tenet from Locke. Locke held that ideas ‘constantly change and shift’ and that we never
have ‘one unvaried single idea in the mind, without any other, for any considerable time’. Any ‘unvaried single idea’
that extends over time is always accompanied by other changing ideas (II.XIV.13). If we were ever to have an
unvaried single idea without any other, such an idea would not convey a sense of time passing (II.XIV.4). Falkenstein
(2017) criticizes Hume on this point.
impression of time ‘can plainly be nothing but different impressions disposed in a certain manner, that is, succeeding each other’ (T 1.2.3.10 SBN 37; my emphasis). Thus, any impression of time—any temporal experience—consists essentially of impressions disposed successively. By analogy, any impression of space consists essentially of impressions disposed spatially. Henceforth, I refer to this thesis as the ‘identity thesis.’

3. Counterevidence

A phenomenon at the crux of many debates on temporal experience is that of the difference between watching the movement of a clock’s second hand and watching that of the hour hand. Assume both hands move continuously. The experience of watching the hour hand, like that of watching the second hand, is comprised of successive feelings of various locations of the hand. Clearly, however, the experience of the second hand involves a distinct feeling (be it of succession, change, or motion) that the experience of the hour hand does not involve.

This phenomenon is commonly considered proof that, as William James put it, “a succession of feelings, in and of itself, is not a feeling of succession” (1890, 628). In fact, for over a century, James’ expression has been almost axiomatic in the literature on temporal experience. It

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6 Hume’s phrase “impression of time” has been thought to be inconsistent with his claim that we have no impression of time distinct and separable from a succession of impressions (Hendel 1963, 412; Johnson 1989, 210-1). However, there is only an inconsistency if we interpret ‘impression of time’ to refer to a simple impression. If we interpret it to refer to a complex impression whose parts are ordered successively, the impression of time is in fact indistinguishable from a succession of impressions (Falkenstein 2013, 112; Fogelin 1985, 34).

7 On the basis of this theory of temporal experience, Hume proceeds to explain how the mind forms ideas of time—including the abstract idea or concept of time—by copying impressions of time. The view that the idea of time originates in successive perceptions was shared by many seventeenth- and eighteenth-century philosophers, including Locke, Malebranche, and Berkeley. Hume explicitly acknowledged Locke’s influence on his theory (T 1.2.3.7 SBN 35). However, Hume departed from Locke in arguing that the idea of time always represents time as succession. For Locke, the ideas of duration and time once acquired could be applied to any objects whatsoever, successive or not (II.XIV.24-25, II.XV.11). In contrast, Hume argued that the idea of time “can never in any propriety or exactness be applied to [a non-succession]” (T 1.2.3.11 SBN 37). Not only is it impossible for time to be experienced apart from succession—it is also impossible for it to be “conceived without our conceiving any succession of objects” (T 1.2.3.9 SBN 36). Because for Hume time is identical to succession (both in our impressions and ideas of it), he uses the terms ‘time’, ‘duration’, and ‘succession’ interchangeably. This usage sets him apart from philosophers like Descartes, Locke, Spinoza, and Leibniz, who understood ‘duration’ as a mode or attribute of objects (even unchanging, succession-less objects), and ‘time’ as the measurement of this mode or attribute by its division into equal periods, as marked by regularly repeating motions such as those of a pendulum, the moon, or the earth. Hume, in contrast, denies that we can have any notion of duration as an attribute of succession-less objects, nor, consequently, an idea of the measurement of such an attribute. Experience provides only one temporal notion: succession. ‘Time’ and ‘duration’ can only correctly denote succession.
is taken to be evident that, since both the experience of the second hand and that of the hour hand consist of successive feelings, the successiveness of the feelings cannot be what explains the feeling of succession that obtains only when watching the second hand. Something more than a succession of feelings is necessary for a feeling of succession.8

If James’ distinction is correct, Hume’s theory of temporal experience is essentially misguided. James’ distinction directly opposes Hume’s identity thesis, which states that the referents of these inverted phrases are one and the same. Insofar as the clock hands constitute evidence for James’ distinction, then, they constitute counterevidence for Hume’s theory.

I will argue that Hume has a way out of this difficulty in Locke’s analysis of the experience of motion.9 First, I want to suggest that, in fact, Locke’s analysis offers a promising alternative to some of the standard accounts of the phenomenon in the contemporary literature. The account James himself championed appeals to a Kantian ‘unity of consciousness’: unlike the successive feelings of the hour hand, the successive feelings of the second hand are unified or experienced together (1890, 608-610, 628-629). The notion that unity of consciousness is what is at stake in these cases takes such deep root in the philosophical tradition that it is commonly appealed to as uncontroversial;10 indeed, it is the starting point for the retentionalist approach to temporal experience.11 While a proper criticism of this line of explanation is beyond the scope of

8 For a discussion of James’ expression and its role in the contemporary literature on temporal experience, see Hoerl (2013).
9 A different proposal on Hume’s potential response to James’ challenge is Falkenstein’s (2017). Falkenstein interprets Hume to hold the view that ‘only one part of time ever exists and this part is unextended’ (2017, 48). On his reading of Hume, both the experience of the second hand and that of the hour hand consist in perceptions coming in and out of existence. What distinguishes one from the other is that the former involves “a more effortless, rapid or precognitive form of perceiving that something has moved” (50). While I do not have the space to properly address Falkenstein’s interpretation, I would challenge his suggestion that for Hume ‘only one part of time ever exists.’ Hume’s characterization of time as the manner in which perceptions are disposed requires that the perceptions that constitute time all exist.
10 See, e.g., Bardon 2007, 56; Dainton 2011, 389; Yaffe 2011, 399.
11 Since the late nineteenth century, a standard approach to temporal experience is to characterize it as a unified present experience, the constituents of which are simultaneous, but which nonetheless has temporal depth. James expressed this notion by describing the ‘specious present’ as ‘a saddle-back, with a certain breadth of its own’ (1890, 609, 630); Brentano by stating that present sensations have a “proteraesthesia” or ‘original association’ to immediately preceding sensations (1988, 79, 90); and Husserl by proposing that every moment of experience is “retentional” in that it retains immediately preceding moments (1928, 50-51).
this paper, it is not difficult to see why Humeans, at the very least, would be motivated to look for an alternative. Hume rejects any “real bond” between perceptions (T 1.4.6.16 SBN 259). The only bonds between perceptions that he acknowledges are resemblance, contiguity, and causation, and these bonds amount simply to ways in which ideas—not impressions—are generally associated (T 1.1.4.1 SBN 10-11).

A second standard account appeals to temporal limits to experience. On this account, experience has limited duration; for an experience to comprise any two events, the two events cannot be separated by a longer stretch of time than the finite stretch of time of experience. This finite stretch of time is commonly called the ‘specious present.’ Accordingly, the experience of the hour hand does not constitute an experience of succession because changes in the hour hand are separated by a duration longer than that of the specious present; thus, instead of an experience of the changes, we have only an experience of the hand at one location and a memory of it at another. In contrast, because changes in the second hand are separated by a duration shorter than that of the specious present, they fall within the temporal bounds of an experience and thus constitute an experience of change or succession.12

This line of explanation might seem harmonious with Hume’s theory of temporal experience. Strictly speaking, the specious-present account is inconsistent with Hume’s identity thesis in that it maintains that some successions of experiences (namely, those that exceed the specious present) are not experiences of succession. Nevertheless, one might argue that Hume’s theory can be reconciled to it with only some minor amendments. Specifically, one might distinguish Hume’s identity thesis into two prongs: (1) that every impression of succession is a succession of impressions and (2) that every succession of impressions is an impression of

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12 Many versions of the specious-present account (e.g. James’ version) postulate mental unity in addition to temporal limits. Since there are also versions of it do not appeal to mental unity, however, I here treat the specious-present account as distinct from the mental-unity account (see, e.g. Broad 1923, 352; Russell 1927, 205; Hoerl 2013, 387-388; Dainton 2017(a), 114-115).
succession. Hume need only abandon the second of these prongs to reconcile his theory to James’ distinction by way of the specious-present proposal.\(^\text{13}\) Notwithstanding its appeal, however, the notion of the specious present is not without difficulties—these include the question of what sort of empirical evidence the notion admits of, as well as the question of how experiences occupying different specious presents combine to form continuous streams of experiences (see Dainton 2017(b)).

Locke’s account of the clock-hands phenomenon has received little attention.\(^\text{14}\) Yet, it offers a compelling alternative to the standard contemporary accounts. In particular, Locke’s account seems to presuppose less by way of metaphysical or transcendental laws; it postulates neither a unity of consciousness nor a specious present to experience. In this respect, it is the kind of minimalist explanation that Hume would be inclined to endorse.

\(^\text{13}\) A possible complication is that for Hume durations are always successions (as per the first prong of the identity thesis) and, moreover, successions always involve change. Thus, for two impressions to be separated by any duration, they must be separated by a succession of different impressions. It might be thought that the changes in the hour hand are not separated by a succession of different impressions; hence, the duration between one change in the hour hand and the next is always the same as that between one change in the second hand and the next—namely, no duration. This complication can be addressed by arguing that for Hume objects like the hour hand are always experienced against a changing background (see previous section and note 7); in this way, changes in the hour hand would in fact be separated by a succession of different impressions. It can then be argued, using the specious-present approach, that this succession exceeds the bounds of the specious present, and hence we do not experience the hour hand changing.

\(^\text{14}\) Discussions of Locke’s account include Odegard (1978), Yaffe (2011), and Benovsky (2012). Odegard argues that Locke is committed to the notion of the specious present (141-142). While I cannot properly address his argument here, however, it is worth noting that Odegard gives no textual evidence of the commitment, but, for reasons that can be questioned, takes the commitment to be implicit in Locke’s references to ‘experiences of succession.’ Yaffe claims that Locke rejects “our capacity to get the idea of succession from the sensory perception of motion” (392); he also attributes to Locke the view that “our sensory ideas are not capable of representing succession” (398). I believe both these claims are lacking in textual evidence. In the passage that Yaffe cites in support of the first claim (II.XIV.6), what Locke denies is that motion (as opposed to succession more generally) is the ultimate source of our idea of succession; Locke explicitly states that “motion produces...an idea of succession”, only it does not do so qua motion but in virtue of being a kind of succession. In support of the second claim, Yaffe refers to Locke’s view that the speed of the succession of our perceptions has certain bounds, which he interprets to mean that for Locke sensation is ‘halting’ in that it consists of static snapshots. This interpretation can be questioned (for an alternative interpretation, see below); indeed, Locke states that “in the impressions made upon any of our senses, we can but to a certain degree perceive any succession; which, if exceeding quick, the sense of Succession is lost” (II.XIV.184); the very contrast Locke depicts between cases in which we do sense succession and cases in which we do not implies a capacity for the sensation of succession. My interpretation of Locke in this paper has more affinities with Benovsky’s reading. I follow Benovsky in holding that for Locke an experience of motion (as in the case of a second hand) is essentially an experience the parts of which are “appropriately linked”, where the appropriate link is temporal proximity or contiguity (98-99, 104). However, while Benovsky interprets this link as a condition for an experience of succession, I interpret it as a condition for an experience of motion. As I note below, Locke clearly states that an experience can be an experience of succession even when its parts are not thus linked.
4. Locke on the experience of motion

Locke, like Hume, takes the idea of time to derive from the succession of perceptions in a mind. In advancing this view, Locke considers and rejects the possibility that the idea of time derives instead from “our observation of motion by our senses” (II.XIV.183).\(^{15}\) Locke argues against this possibility by examining the nature of our experience of motion. He characterizes the experience of motion as the experience of a “constant succession” (II.XIV.7; my emphasis). The experience of motion always involves successive perceptions; more specifically, it involves perceptions that succeed one another constantly. Locke further observes that those successions of perceptions that are not experiences of motion still convey the idea of time. He concludes that succession, not motion, is the ultimate source of that idea. Motion occasions the idea of time only in virtue of being one kind of succession.

Locke supports his characterization of the experience of motion by discussing two kinds of examples: (1) cases in which one has no successive perceptions and (2) cases in which one has no constantly successive perceptions. An example of (1) is the experience of an object moving rapidly along a circular path—so rapidly that we see a static circle rather than a moving object (II.XIV.8). Another example is a cannon bullet passing through the opposite walls of a room (II.XIV.10).\(^{16}\) The reason we do not experience motion in these cases, Locke claims, is that the motion in the external world is too fast to register successive perceptions in the mind.

As an example of (2), Locke discusses the experience of being “becalmed at sea, out of sight of land, in a fair day”—so ‘becalmed’ that the sea, the sun, and the ship appear at rest. In addition, he discusses none other than the experience of “the hands of clocks, and shadows of sun-dials” (II.XIV.11). In these cases, the motion in the external world is “so slow, as not to

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\(^{15}\) The target of Locke’s argument is the Aristotelian view that time is the measurement of motion.

\(^{16}\) Each of these examples is relevant for Locke’s argument in that each concerns an object that fails to produce successive perceptions. The examples are different in other ways, however. A perplexing feature of the circular-motion example is that, in addition to seeing a static object in place of a moving object, we see an object that does not exist (namely, a circle). For a discussion of the history of the example, see Larivier and Lennon (2002).
supply a constant train of fresh ideas to the senses” (II.XIV.11; my emphasis). While the object does register qualitatively different successive perceptions, the different perceptions are not continuous, but take place “a good while one after another” (II.XIV.7). Locke’s analysis here draws on his view that perceptions in the mind are always changing. Even when our sensations are not changing, the ideas ‘of our own thoughts’ are. Locke stipulates that the experience of a slowly moving object is one where the changing ideas of our own thoughts “come into our minds, between those offered to our senses by the moving body” (II.XIV.11; my emphasis). In other words, while the object registers qualitatively different successive perceptions, the different perceptions are interrupted by other non-sensory perceptions. It is only when the different perceptions succeed one another constantly—that is, without interruption—that an experience of motion obtains.

I propose that Locke’s account of the experience of motion can be Hume’s response to James’ challenge. The difference between the experience of the second hand and that of the hour hand is that the different perceptions of the second hand succeed one another constantly, while those of the hour hand do so with interruptions; only the former comprise an experience of motion. A striking feature of Locke’s account is that, unlike most other explanations of the phenomenon, it does not introduce a distinction between successions of perceptions and

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17 Locke’s term ‘idea’ is roughly equivalent to Hume’s ‘perception,’ albeit many scholars think Lockean ideas are intentional objects, whereas the same is not obviously true of Humean perceptions. In any case, Lockean ideas are entities responsible not only for thought but for sensation as well.

18 Much of Locke’s discussion of the experience of motion concerns the relationship between perceptions in the mind and external objects. Locke claims that external objects can succeed one another at faster or slower speeds than perceptions succeed one another in the mind. His statement that “there seem to be certain bounds to the quickness and slowness of the succession of those ideas one to another in our minds” concerns the speed of our perceptions relative to the speed of external objects (II.XIV.184-185). Objects that succeed one another at a speed above a certain limit will not register successive perceptions (as the examples of (1) show), while objects that succeed one another at a speed below a certain limit will not register constantly successive perceptions (as per the examples of (2)). Incidentally, Locke’s talk of ‘bounds’ might evoke the notion of the specious present; however, Locke’s ‘bounds’ are limits to the speed of perceptions, not to the duration of an experience. This dimension of Locke’s discussion does not concern us here. What is crucial is that for Locke the experience of motion requires constantly successive perceptions. This characterization of the experience of motion is independent of his more metaphysically-fraught claims on the relative speeds of perceptions and external objects.
perceptions of succession. Locke states clearly that the experience of a slowly moving object is still an experience of succession—albeit of *interrupted* succession (II.XIV.12). In this way, Locke’s account affords Hume a way to maintain the identity thesis against the alleged counterevidence: what is at stake in the phenomenon of the clock hands is not the experience of succession, but the experience of motion. The phenomenon proves that a succession of feelings is not always a feeling of *motion*, but not that it is not always a feeling of *succession*.19

5. Conclusion

I have argued that Hume’s theory of temporal experience, when supplemented with Locke’s account of the experience of motion, can in fact account for the phenomenological difference between the experience of the movements of a clock’s second hand and that of the movements of the hour hand. Locke’s proposal is that the difference consists in the constancy or continuity of the perceptions of changes in the second hand; in virtue of this constancy, the experience of the second hand is an experience of motion. If, as this analysis suggests, the difference is the experience of motion, *not* the experience of succession, the clock-hands phenomenon does not ultimately support James’ popular distinction.

Earlier in this paper I discussed the example of listening to a musical melody to illustrate Hume’s view that time is the successive arrangement of perceptions. The experience of the melody is an experience of time because it is made up of successive parts. Time is an aspect of the experience, namely, its successiveness. Locke’s analysis clarifies an important circumstance in this example: experiences like that of a melody can manifest not only time, but motion as well; they do so when they are made up of *constantly* successive parts. In other words, time and

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19 It might seem that, in fact, Hume explicitly endorses Locke’s account. In the course of presenting his theory of temporal experience, Hume refers to the example of circular motion and cites Locke’s view that “perceptions have certain bounds … beyond which no influence of external objects on the senses is ever able to hasten or retard our thought” (T 1.2.3.7 SBN 35). As Larivier and Lennon have argued, however, Hume mentions Locke in this passage not in order to explain the experience of motion, but in order to corroborate his thesis that time is made up of temporal minima (Larivier and Lennon 2002, 515, 520). It is thus not obvious (at least not on the basis of this passage) that Hume endorses Locke’s view. My proposal is only that he *could* endorse it.
motion are two distinct aspects of the experience. It seems to me that discussions of experiences like that of a melody or of watching a second hand often fail to disambiguate on which of these two aspects is in question, that is, on whether the experience is being discussed as an experience of time or of motion.\textsuperscript{20} Once we appreciate that the two are distinct, it becomes clear that what is missing in the experience of the hour hand is the experience of motion, not the experience of time.

Works Cited


\textsuperscript{20} Broad, for instance, fails to distinguish between experiences of motion and experiences of change (i.e. succession) in his discussion of the clock-hands phenomenon. He discusses the experience of the second hand as an experience of something “moving or changing” (1923, 351). My point here is that the experience of the second hand is an experience of something changing insofar as it is successive, and an experience of something moving insofar as it changes \textit{continuously}. The fact that the experience of the hour hand is not an experience of motion (because it does not change continuously) does not entail that it is not an experience of change.


Hoerl, Christoph. 2013. “‘A Succession of Feelings, in and of Itself, is Not a Feeling of Succession’”. Mind 122 (486): 373-417.


