

RECORD NUMBER: 16-1164

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**United States Court of Appeals**  
*for the*  
**Fourth Circuit**

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N.P., a minor, by his parent and next friends, S.P. and C.P., et al.,

*Plaintiffs/Appellees,*

– v. –

KEVIN M. MAXWELL, (officially as) Superintendent, Prince  
George’s County Public Schools, et al.,

*Defendants/Appellants.*

ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND AT GREENBELT

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**BRIEF OF AMICUS CURIAE COUNCIL OF PARENT  
ATTORNEYS AND ADVOCATES IN SUPPORT OF  
APPELLEES AND AFFIRMANCE**

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No. 16-1164 Caption: *N.P., a minor by his parents and next friends, S.P. and C.P.; C.P. and S.P.v. Kevin Maxwell, Prince George's County Board of Education*

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Council of Parent Attorneys and Advocates who is Amicus Curiae, makes the following disclosure:

1. Amicus is not a publicly held corporation or other publicly held entity;
2. Amicus has no parent corporations;
3. Amicus does not have 10% or more of stock owned by a corporation.

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**TABLE OF CONTENTS**

Corporate Disclosure Statement.....i

Interests of the Amicus.....1

Summary of Argument.....2

Argument.....3

    I. Congress Passed the IDEA to Ensure an Appropriate Education for All  
    Children with Disabilities .....3

        A. An Appropriate Evaluation Provides the Foundation for  
        Individualized Programming under the IDEA.....11

        B. The IEP is the IDEA’s “Education Delivery System” Providing  
        Notice to Parents of the Program and School Recommended For  
        Their Child.....13

    II. The ALJ relies on a misapplication *Rowley* to support a complete lack  
    specific inquiry into the merits of the school district’s decisions. ....14

        A. *Rowley* .....14

        B. N.P. was denied FAPE.....19

    III. Conclusion.....23

Certificate of Compliance.....24

Certificate of Service.....25

## TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

### Federal Cases

<i>Ashland Sch. Dist. v. Parents of Student R.J.</i> , 588 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2009) .....	18
<i>Bd. of Educ. v. Diamond</i> , 808 F.2d 987 (3d Cir. 1986) .....	8
<i>Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley</i> , 458 U.S. 176 (1982) .....	<i>passim</i>
<i>Burlington v. Dep't of Educ.</i> , 736 F.2d 773 (1st Cir. 1984) .....	18
<i>Cty. Sch. Bd. v. Z.P.</i> , 399 F.3d 298 (4th Cir. 2005) .....	19, 20
<i>D.S. v. Bayonne Bd. of Educ.</i> , 602 F.3d 553 (3d Cir. 2010) .....	21, 22
<i>Hall v. Vance Cty. Bd. of Educ.</i> , 774 F.2d 629 (4th Cir. 1985) .....	8, 9
<i>Hous. Indep. Sch. Dist. v. VP</i> , 582 F.3d 576 (5th Cir. 2009) .....	20, 21
<i>Lessard v. Wilton-Lyndeborough Coop. Sch. Dist.</i> , 518 F.3d 18 (1st Cir. 2008) ..	15
<i>Lillbask v. Conn. Dep't of Educ.</i> , 397 F.3d 77 (2d Cir. 2005) .....	18
<i>M.H. v. N.Y. City Dep't of Educ.</i> , 685 F.3d 217 (2d Cir. 2012) .....	16, 18
<i>Mr. I. v. Me. Sch. Admin. Dist. No. 55</i> , 480 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2007) .....	13
<i>O.S. v. Fairfax Cty. Sch. Bd.</i> , 804 F.3d 354 (4th Cir. 2015) .....	9
<i>Oberti v. Bd. of Educ.</i> , 995 F.2d 1204 (3d Cir. 1993) .....	17
<i>Polk v. Cent. Susquehanna Intermediate Unit 16</i> , 853 F.2d 171 (3d Cir. 1988) .....	8
<i>R.E. v. N.Y. City Dep't of Educ.</i> , 694 F.3d 167 (2d Cir. 2012) .....	17
<i>Ridgewood Bd. of Educ. v. N.E. for M.E.</i> , 172 F.3d 238 (3d Cir. 1999) .	7, 8, 17-18
<i>Sch. Comm. of Burlington v. Dep't of Educ.</i> , 471 U.S. 359 (1985) .....	13
<i>Walczak v. Fla. Union Free Sch. Dist.</i> , 142 F.3d 119 (2d Cir. 1998) .....	11

### Federal Statutes

20 U.S.C. § 1400(c)(1) (2006) .....	1
20 U.S.C. § 1400(d)(1)(A) (2006) .....	4, 13
20 U.S.C. § 1400(d)(1)(A) (2012) .....	13
20 U.S.C. § 1401(8) (2012) .....	6
20 U.S.C. § 1412(2)(A) (2012) .....	4
20 U.S.C. § 1414 (2012) .....	11
20 U.S.C. § 1414(d) (2012) .....	9, 10

20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(1)(A) (2012) ..... 10  
 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(1)(A)(IV) (2012) ..... 12  
 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(1)(B) (2012) ..... 11  
 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(4)(A)(i) (2012) ..... 10  
 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(C) (2012) ..... 18

**Regulations**

34 C.F.R. § 300.39 ..... 14  
 34 C.F.R. § 300.345-300.350 ..... 10  
 34 C.F.R. § 300.347 ..... 10  
 34 C.F.R. § 300.552(b) ..... 10

**Rules**

Fed. R. App. P. 29(5) ..... 1

**Other Authorities**

71 Fed. Reg. 46,665 (Aug. 14, 2006).....14  
 121 Cong.Rec. 19482-19483 (1975) ..... 5  
 121 Cong.Rec. 19504 (1975) ..... 5  
 121 Cong.Rec. 19505(1975) ..... 5  
 121 Cong.Rec. 23704 (1975) ..... 5  
 121 Cong.Rec. 25538 (1975) ..... 5  
 121 Cong.Rec. 25540 (1975).....5  
 121 Cong.Rec. 37025 (1975) ..... 5  
 121 Cong.Rec. 37030 (1975) ..... 5  
 121 Cong.Rec. 37412 (1975).....5  
 121 Cong.Rec. 37413 (1975) ..... 5  
 121 Cong.Rec. 37418-37419 (1975) ..... 5  
 121 Cong.Rec. 37419-37420 (1975) ..... 5

## INTERESTS OF THE AMICUS

Council of Parent Attorneys and Advocates (COPAA) is an independent, nationwide nonprofit organization of attorneys, advocates, and parents in forty-three states (including Maryland, Virginia, West Virginia, North Carolina) and the District of Columbia who are routinely involved in special education due process hearings throughout the country. COPAA's primary goal is to secure appropriate educational services for children with disabilities, echoing a Congressional finding that "[i]mproving educational results for children with disabilities is an essential element of our national policy of ensuring equality of opportunity, full participation, independent living, and economic self-sufficiency for individuals with disabilities." 20 U.S.C. § 1400(c)(1) (2006) . Children with disabilities are among the most vulnerable in our society and COPAA is particularly concerned with assuring a free appropriate public education in the least restrictive environment, as the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA or Act) requires.<sup>1</sup> COPAA's interest in this case is its deep commitment to all children with disabilities to obtain needed special education services. The bedrock of the IDEA is that appropriate special education services are determined based on

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<sup>1</sup> Pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 29(5), *Amicus* certifies that (1) counsel for amicus authored the brief in whole with comments from COPAA members; and (2) no other person contributed money that was intended to fund the preparation or submission of the brief. FRAP 29(5).

individual consideration of a disabled child's needs, through the development of an Individualized Education Program (IEP).

Both parties have consented to this filing.

### **SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT**

The IDEA mandates that courts make independent determinations as to whether a school district has complied with the Act based upon the evidence in the record. A child's IEP must provide meaningful benefit, and be gauged to the Student's potential. The IEP proposed by the school district must confer meaningful non-trivial educational benefit on the student. In this case, the parent provided sound evaluation results. Ignoring this expert advice, the school district proposed a continuation of the same program where N.P. failed to make progress. Further, the school district failed to appreciate the nature of N.P.'s dual exceptionalities: a gifted student and a student with a learning disability. For the reasons stated below and in appellees' brief, COPAA respectfully requests that this Court uphold the Order of the district court.

### **FACTUAL BACKGROUND**

*Amicus* adopts fully by reference herein the Statement of the Case in the Brief for Plaintiff-Appellee N.P., at 1-12.

## ARGUMENT

### **I. Congress Passed the IDEA to Ensure an Appropriate Education for All Children with Disabilities**

In the 1970s, Congress held hearings investigating the quality of educational instruction provided to children with disabilities. These hearings established that public school districts throughout the county had wholly excluded millions of children with a multitude of disabilities or placed those children in programs where they received no educational benefit. *Education for All Handicapped Children, 1973-74: Hearings on S.6 Before the Subcommittee on the Handicapped of the Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973-74)*. At that time, statistics showed that "only 55 percent of the school-aged handicapped children and 22 percent of the pre-school-aged handicapped children [were] receiving special educational services." Senator Randolph, *Hearings on S. 6 before the Subcommittee on the Handicapped of the Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., 1 (1975)*. Parents and educators discussed the widespread failure of states to provide the extent of supportive services necessary to meet the needs of children with varying degrees and forms of disabilities. Statistics compiled for Congress by the Office of Education at that time revealed that children of all ages and with a range of handicapping conditions were affected. For example, pupils excluded or receiving inappropriate education included 82% of "emotionally disturbed" children; 82%



of “hard-of-hearing” children; 67% of “deaf-blind” and “other multi-handicapped” children; and 88% of those classified “learning disabled.” *Senate Report, S. Rep. No. 168, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 5-8 (1975)* reprinted in 1976 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News, 1425, 1429-32; *House Report, H.R. Rep. No. 332, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975)*, at 11- 12.

In light of the gross disparities Congress found regarding the access to educational programming for students with disabilities, Congress enacted Public Law 94-142, the Education for All Handicapped Children Act in 1975, which through various amendments has become the IDEA. The IDEA requires that state and local public education agencies enact policies and procedures to ensure that all students with disabilities receive a “free appropriate public education that emphasizes special education and related services designed to meet their unique needs and prepare them for further education, employment, and independent living.” 20 U.S.C. § 1400(d)(1)(A).

In enacting these acts, Congress did not merely require access. Congress mandated that children with disabilities receive a free appropriate public education. While the IDEA itself fails to provide a substantive standard giving content to the term “appropriate,” the statute itself says it will provide a “full educational opportunity to all handicapped children.” *Id.* § 1412(2)(A) (2012). This goal is repeated throughout the legislative history. The Senate Report says that the Act

"guarantee[s] that handicapped children are provided equal educational opportunity." *S.Rep.No.94-168*, at. 9 (1975), reprinted in 1975 U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News, at 1433. Numerous drafters of the legislation echoed the same. *See* 121 Cong.Rec. 19482-19483 (1975) (remarks of Sen. Randolph); *id.*, at 19504 (Sen. Humphrey); *id.*, at 19505 (Sen Beall); *id.*, at 23704 (Rep. Brademas); *id.*, at 25538 (Rep. Cornell); *id.*, at 25540 (Rep. Grassley); *id.*, at 37025 (Rep. Perkins); *id.*, at \*214 37030 (Rep. Mink); *id.*, at 37412 (Sen. Taft); *id.*, at 37413 (Sen. Williams); *id.*, at 37418-37419 (Sen. Cranston); *id.*, at 37419-37420 (Sen. Beall). The legislative history thus directly supports the conclusion that the Act intends to give handicapped children an educational opportunity commensurate with that given other children.

In the seminal case of *Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley* the Court said, "Congress did not impose upon the States any greater substantive educational standard than would be necessary to make such access meaningful." 458 U.S. 176, 192 (1982). Defining "appropriate" as "meaningful" does not advance the argument. The Act details as specifically as possible the kind of specialized education each handicapped child must receive. The basic floor of opportunity is instead intended to eliminate the effects of the handicap, at least to the extent that the child will be given an equal opportunity to learn if that is reasonably possible.

The term "free appropriate public education" is a defined term in the IDEA as:

- ...special education and related services that--
- (A) have been provided at public expense, under public supervision and direction, and without charge;
  - (B) meet the standards of the State educational agency;
  - (C) include appropriate preschool, elementary, or secondary school education in the State involved; and
  - (D) are in conformity with the individualized education program required under section 1414(d) of this title.

20 U.S.C. § 1401 (8).

While this definition has been called "cryptic," *Rowley*, 458 U.S., at 188, the test of free appropriate public education is whether the student is likely to receive educational benefit. As the *Rowley* majority held:

Implicit in the congressional purpose of providing access to a "free appropriate public education" is the requirement that the education to which access is provided be sufficient to confer some educational benefit upon the handicapped child. It would do little good for Congress to spend millions of dollars in providing access to a public education only to have the handicapped child receive no benefit from that education. The statutory definition of "free appropriate public education," in addition to requiring that States provide each child with "specially designed instruction," expressly requires the provision of "such . . . supportive services . . . as may be required to assist a handicapped child to benefit from special education." § 1401(17) (emphasis added). We therefore conclude that the "basic floor of opportunity" provided by the Act consists of access to specialized instruction and related services which are individually designed to provide educational benefit to the handicapped child.

458 U.S., at 200-201.

Importantly, in footnote 23, the Court sets forth independence and self-sufficiency as the goals of the free appropriate public education:

This view is supported by the congressional intention, frequently expressed in the legislative history, that handicapped children be enabled to achieve a reasonable degree of self-sufficiency. After referring to statistics showing that many handicapped children were excluded from public education, the Senate Report states:

"The long range implications of these statistics are that public agencies and taxpayers will spend billions of dollars over the lifetimes of these individuals to maintain such persons as dependents and in a minimally acceptable lifestyle. With proper education services, many would be able to become productive citizens, contributing to society instead of being forced to remain burdens. Others, through such services, would increase their independence, thus reducing their dependence on society."

The desire to provide handicapped children with an attainable degree of personal independence obviously anticipated that state educational programs would confer educational benefits upon such children.

458 U.S., at 201 [citations omitted].

The *Rowley* Court's apparent minimal substantive requirements of a free appropriate public education have been, over time, explained by other courts. For example, in *Ridgewood Bd. of Educ. v. N.E. .*, 172 F.3d 238 (3d Cir. 1999), the Third Circuit reviewed the development as follows:

IDEA leaves to the courts the task of interpreting "free appropriate public education." *See Rowley*, 458 U.S. at 188-89. The Supreme Court began this task in .... *Rowley*, 6, holding that while an IEP need not maximize the potential of a disabled student, it must provide "meaningful" access to education, *id.* at 192, and confer "some educational benefit" upon the child for whom it is designed. In determining the quantum of educational benefit necessary to satisfy

IDEA, the Court explicitly rejected a bright-line rule. Noting that children of different abilities are capable of greatly different achievements, the Court instead adopted an approach that requires a court to consider the potential of the disabled student before it. *See also Hall v. Vance Cty. Bd. of Educ.*, 774 F.2d 629, 635 (4th Cir. 1985) (*Rowley* holds that "no single substantive standard can describe how much educational benefit is sufficient to satisfy [the IDEA]").

We first interpreted the phrase "free appropriate public education" in *Board of Education v. Diamond*, 808 F.2d 987 (3d Cir. 1986), when we rejected the notion that the provision of any educational benefit satisfies IDEA, holding that IDEA "clearly imposes a higher standard." *Id.* at 991. Examining the quantum of benefit necessary for an IEP to satisfy IDEA, we held in *Polk v. Cent. Susquehanna Intermediate Unit 16*, 853 F.2d 171 (3d Cir. 1988) that IDEA "calls for more than a trivial educational benefit" and requires a satisfactory IEP to provide "significant learning." *id.*, at 182, and confer "meaningful benefit." *Id.*, at 184. We also rejected the notion that what was "appropriate" could be reduced to a single standard, *id.*, holding the benefit "must be gauged in relation to the child's potential." *Id.*, at 185. When students display considerable intellectual potential, IDEA requires "a great deal more than a negligible [benefit]." *Id.*, at 182.

*Ridgewood Bd. of Educ.*, 172 F.3d at 247 (some citations omitted).

The five-member majority explained:

The determination of when handicapped children are receiving sufficient educational benefits to satisfy the requirements of the Act presents a more difficult problem. The Act requires participating States to educate a wide spectrum of handicapped children, from the marginally hearing-impaired to the profoundly retarded and palsied. It is clear that the benefits obtainable by children at one end of the spectrum will differ dramatically from those obtainable by children at the other end, with infinite variations in between.

458 U.S. at 202. Thus, there was no "one test for determining the adequacy of educational benefits conferred upon all children covered by the Act." *Id.*

This Court recently held in *O.S. v. Fairfax Cty. Sch. Bd.*, 804 F.3d 354 (4th Cir. 2015):

We note that we have never held "some" educational benefit means only "some minimal academic advancement, no matter how trivial." *Hall v. Vance Cty. Bd. of Educ.*, 774 F.2d 629, 636 (4th Cir. 1985). Rather, we have used the word "meaningful" to describe what a FAPE requires, even before the 2004 amendments. *G. ex rel. R.G. v. Fort Bragg Dependent Schs.*, 343 F.3d 295, 306 (4th Cir. 2003). But in doing so, we have cited *Rowley's* "educational benefit" requirement. *Id.* at 303. Using "meaningful," as the Court also did in *Rowley*, was simply another way to characterize the requirement that an IEP must provide a child with more than minimal, trivial progress.

*Id.*, at 359.

In this circuit, the standard remains the same as it has been for decades: a school provides a FAPE so long as a child receives some educational benefit, meaning a benefit that is more than minimal or trivial, from special instruction and services. *Id.*, at 360. Thus, under Fourth Circuit law, a child's IEP must provide meaningful benefit, and be gauged to the student's potential. The IEP proposed by the school district must confer meaningful non-trivial educational benefit on the student.

The overriding requirement in making educational placement decisions is that the program of special education and related services contained in the child's

IEP forms the basis for placement decisions, 20 U.S.C. §1414(d). The IDEA requires the relevant public education authority to prepare and review at least annually an “individualized education program” for each child with a disability. 20 U.S.C. §1414(d)(4)(A)(i). The IEP is the primary vehicle for ensuring that a disabled child’s educational program is individually tailored based on the child’s unique abilities and needs. *See* 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d); 34 C.F.R. §§ 300.345-300.350. A child’s IEP describes, among other elements, the child’s present levels of educational performance, measurable annual goals for addressing the child’s educational needs that result from the child’s disability and the individualized instruction and services that will be provided to help the child. 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(1)(A); 34 C.F.R. §300.347.

The bedrock of the IDEA is that appropriate special education services are determined based on individual consideration of a disabled child’s needs, through the development of an IEP. Placement decisions need to be “based on” the child’s IEP. *See, e.g.* 34 C.F.R. § 300.552(b). And the child’s IEP needs to be based on sound evaluation and must be reasonably calculated to provide meaningful, non-trivial educational benefit. That means that the method of teaching used must be one specifically designed to benefit the individual student in question. Where there is strong expert opinion, based on sound evaluation, that one method of instruction provides educational benefit for the child in question and no evaluation-based

evidence than another method of instruction provides meaningful, non-trivial educational benefit for the child in question, the school district is not at liberty to select the unsupported method and then hide behind the canard that methodology is within the sole discretion of the school.<sup>2</sup>

**A. An Appropriate Evaluation Provides the Foundation for Individualized Programming under the IDEA**

To provide FAPE in compliance with the IDEA, a school district receiving federal funds must evaluate a student to determine whether he has “unique educational needs” requiring the provision of special education. 20 U.S.C. § 1414 *see also Rowley*, 458 U.S. at 176, 193-94, 205-06 (IDEA’s procedures designed to result in personalized educational programs for children with disabilities). When evaluating what a child’s programming should be, IEP teams are required to identify a student’s areas of deficit and to develop a program that addresses the child’s unique educational needs. 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(1)(B). Further, when considering what programming is necessary “to meet the unique needs” of the student, *id.*, the team must keep in mind that the “term ‘unique educational needs’ [should be] be broadly construed to include the handicapped child’s academic, social, health, emotional, communicative, physical and vocational needs.” *Walczak v. Fla. Union Free Sch. Dist.*, 142 F.3d 119, 130 (2d Cir. 1998). With this

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<sup>2</sup> However, methodologies may be included in an IEP if “specific instructional methods are necessary for the child to receive a free, appropriate public education.” 71 Fed. Reg. 46, 665 (Aug. 14, 2006).



information in hand, the team must then create a plan, consisting of a statement of the “special education and related services and supplementary aids and services” the student must receive in order to “advance appropriately toward attaining the annual goals” and “make progress.” 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(1)(A)(IV).

In this case, the parent provided sound evaluation results indicating that ignoring this expert advice, the school district proposed a continuation of the same program where N.P. failed to make progress and failed to appreciate the nature of this dual exceptionalities: a gifted student and a student with a learning disability. Brief of Plaintiff-Appellee, at 21-26.

The Council for Exceptional Children (CEC) estimates that there are approximately 3 million academically gifted children in grades K–12 in the United States. There is a subset in this population—those students who evidence the potential for high achievement in areas such as specific academics, general intellectual ability, creativity, leadership, and/or visual, spatial or performing arts, but who also have an educational disability that makes some aspect of achievement in school difficult. CEC estimates that there are approximately 360,000 students in this category nationwide (<http://www.cec.sped.org/Special-Ed-Topics/Specialty-Areas/Gifted>). These students are considered to be “twice-exceptional”. It is important to note that there is great variability within the population and their concomitant exceptionalities often mask each other. The one common

characteristic of this group, however, is that they simultaneously possess attributes of giftedness as well as an area of disability, which could include issues of general learning, or physical, sensory, attention, social/emotional, or behavioral functioning.

Although not explicitly stated, IDEA supports the identification of twice-exceptional students. IDEA includes 15 different areas in which a student can be found eligible as a result of his or her disability, including learning disabilities, emotional disturbance, autism, and other health impairments. *Mr. I. v. Me. Sch. Admin. Dist. No. 55*, 480 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2007).

**B. The IEP is the IDEA's "Education Delivery System" Providing Notice to Parents of the Program and School Recommended For Their Child**

The express purpose of the IDEA is to "ensure that all children with disabilities have available to them a FAPE that emphasizes special education and related services designed to meet their unique needs. . . ." 20 U.S.C. § 1400(d)(1)(A); *see Sch. Comm. of Burlington v. Dep't of Educ.*, F, 367 (1985). A FAPE is provided to a child with disabilities through the development of an IEP, which is both a "comprehensive statement of the educational needs of a handicapped child and the specially designed instruction and related services to be employed to meet those needs." *Sch. Comm. of Burlington*, 471 U.S. at 367. An

IEP must be reasonably calculated to enable the child to receive educational benefits. *Rowley* 458 U.S. at 187-88, 203.

**II. The ALJ relies on a misapplication of *Rowley* to support a complete lack of specific inquiry into the merits of the school district's decisions.**

The ALJ's decision dismisses the fact that the school district failed to deal with the various assessments making clear that N.P. required a specific type of programming or methodology in order to be able to make meaningful progress commensurate with his abilities. This finding is incomplete and is undermined by the federal implementing regulations and case law.

**A. *Rowley***

First, the ALJ relies on a misapplication *Rowley* to support a complete lack of specific inquiry into the merits of the school district's decisions.<sup>3</sup> The *Rowley* court, in fact, said,

We do not attempt today to establish any one test for determining the adequacy of educational benefits conferred upon all children covered by the Act. Because in this case we are presented with a handicapped child who is receiving substantial specialized instruction and related services, and who is performing above average in the regular classrooms of a public school system, we confine our analysis to that situation.

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<sup>3</sup> The ALJ relies upon "appropriate educational benefit" and extrapolates that standard to mean that "appropriate" education does not mean that a student is able to maximize his potential or to receive optimal services. The ALJ provided no analysis of the failures of the Appellants to address N.P. unique educational needs.

458 U.S. at 202. The *Rowley* decision was limited to its facts by the Court itself. As such, the ALJ's refusal to examine the school district's decision-making is legal error which specifically requires an inquiry into the content, methodology or delivery of instruction a student might need in order to make progress. 34 C.F.R. § 300.39(a-b).

Notwithstanding this self-limiting language, the *Rowley* Court went on to provide strong advice to courts.

In assuring that the requirements of the Act have been met, courts must be careful to avoid imposing their view of preferable educational methods upon the States. The primary responsibility for formulating the education to be accorded a handicapped child, and for choosing the educational method most suitable to the child's needs, was left by the Act to state and local educational agencies in cooperation with the parents or guardian of the child. The Act expressly charges States with the responsibility of "acquiring and disseminating to teachers and administrators of programs for handicapped children significant information derived from educational research, demonstration, and similar projects, and [of] adopting, where appropriate, promising educational practices and materials." § 1413(a)(3). In the face of such a clear statutory directive, it seems highly unlikely that Congress intended courts to overturn a State's choice of appropriate educational theories in a proceeding conducted pursuant to §1415 (e)(2).

We previously have cautioned that courts lack the "specialized knowledge and experience" necessary to resolve "persistent and difficult questions of educational policy." We think that Congress shared that view when it passed the Act. As already demonstrated, Congress' intention was not that the Act displace the primacy of States in the field of education, but that States receive funds to assist them in extending educational systems to the handicapped. Therefore, once a court determines that the requirements of the Act have been met, questions of methodology are for resolution by the States.

458 U.S. at 207-08 [internal citation omitted]. This last phrase has been widely relied on to exclude any discussion of methodology. See, e.g. *Lessard v. Wilton-Lyndeborough Coop. Sch. Dist.*, 518 F.3d 18, 29 (1st Cir. 2008) (literacy program for child with intellectual disability), *M.H. v. N.Y. City Dep't of Educ.*, 685 F.3d 217, 240 (2d Cir. 2012) (instructional method for child with autism). Relying on this language, school districts across the country have rejected, at IEP Team meetings, parents' requests for a particular educational methodology. In doing so, districts have ignored in this analysis. However, by its express terms, the Court only sought to preclude the courts from making methodological determinations. Nothing in the *Rowley* language can be read to suggest that IEP Teams should be foreclosed from discussing content, methodology or delivery of instruction.

Foreclosing discussion of content, methodology or delivery of instruction at IEP Team meetings runs afoul of the Court's view of the role of the parents at IEP Team meetings. It made it clear that their participation is critical:

It seems to us no exaggeration to say that Congress placed every bit as much emphasis upon compliance with procedures giving parents and guardians a large measure of participation at every stage of the administrative process ... as it did upon the measurement of the resulting IEP against a substantive standard. We think that the congressional emphasis upon *full participation* of concerned parties throughout the development of the IEP ... demonstrates the legislative conviction that adequate compliance with the procedures prescribed would in most cases assure much if not all of what Congress wished in the way of substantive content in an IEP.

*Rowley* at 205-206 [emphasis added]. Indeed the *Rowley* court clearly stated that educational methodology should be determined at IEP Team meetings:

The primary responsibility for formulating the education to be accorded a handicapped child, and for choosing the educational method *most suitable* to the child's needs, was left by the Act to state and local educational agencies *in cooperation with the parents or guardians* of the child.

*Id.* at 207 [emphasis added].

This means that at the IEP Team meeting the goals and objectives are to be established for the student. Once those goals have been developed, the IEP Team is to select the possible method to achieve those goals. The parents are to be full participants, with the other IEP Team members, in discussing and deciding what that educational method should be. Moreover, since this is an IEP Team decision, it is subject to review at an impartial hearing. The role of the court is then to review the administrative determination to see if it was made in accordance with the law. In other words, it is not the job of the court to determine the relative merits of alternative educational methodologies. But, it is the job of the court to see whether the methodology selected would provide meaningful, non-trivial educational benefit to the child. Where there is strong expert endorsement of one methodology, which is rejected without any evaluative basis by the school district, it is incumbent upon the court to reject the methodological determination of the district. *R.E. v. N.Y. City Dep't of Educ.*, 694 F.3d 167 (2d Cir. 2012).

In addition, school districts must ensure that the IEP is appropriate for the student. *Id.* The warning to courts not to second guess a school district's choice of educational methodology does not mean that the court should ignore its obligation to enforce the *Oberti v. Bd. of Educ.*, 995 F.2d 1204, 1214 (3d Cir. 1993). Moreover, there is nothing to prohibit including an instructional method on *Ridgewood Bd. of Educ.*, 172 F.3d 238 (IEPs included Orton-Gillingham and Wilson reading methods). Thus, if a student is capable of making progress in two different methodologies, courts have long held that the determination of which methodology should be used is an issue to be left to the states, and the local educational agencies. However, where the evidence demonstrates that a specific methodology is critical in order to enable a student to make meaningful, non-trivial education progress, the issue is no longer one of methodology, but one of whether a FAPE is provided.

Second, as a general matter, the Act mandates that courts make independent determinations as to whether a school district has complied with the Act based upon the evidence in the record. *M.H.*, 685 F.3d 217; *Lillbask v. Conn. Dep't of Educ.*, 397 F.3d 77, 83 n.3 (2d Cir. 2005); *See also*, 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(C); *Ashland Sch. Dist. v. Parents of Student R.J.*, 588 F.3d 1004, 1009 (9th Cir. 2009); *Burlington v. Dep't of Educ.*, 736 F.2d 773, 791-92 (1st Cir. 1984), *aff'd sub nom. Sch. Comm. of Burlington v. Dep't of Educ.*, 471 U.S. 359.

In this case there was not the type of specific inquiry into the factual underpinnings of N.P.'s disability and needs to require an affirmance of the ALJ's decision.

Indeed, the ALJ's decision is neither well-reasoned nor based on the record on this issue. The parent came forward with compelling evidence that N.P.'s progress in reading, writing and math was less than trivial, demonstrating that N.P. actually lost skills during the years in question. *See Appellee's Brief* at 26-32.

**B. N.P. was denied FAPE**

This Court has reviewed the denial of *Cty. Sch. Bd. v. Z.P.*, 399 F.3d 298 (4th Cir. 2005), the hearing officer determined that the IEP for a child classified with autism failed to provide a FAPE because the child required one-to-one instruction in order to make academic progress. However, the school recommended by the IEP did not have sufficient one-to-one instruction, and the IEP did not provide for a full-time aide for the child. Citing *Rowley*, the Fourth Circuit stated that:

at all levels of an IDEA proceeding, the opinions of the professional educators are entitled to respect.... The respect and deference that must be accorded to those professional opinions, however, does not give a district court license to ignore... that the findings of the *administrative proceeding* must be given due weight.

Nor does the required deference to the opinions of the professional educators somehow relieve the hearing officer or the district court of



the obligation to determine as a factual matter whether a given IEP is appropriate. That is, the fact-finder is not required to conclude that an IEP is appropriate simply because a teacher or other professional testifies that the IEP is appropriate. The parents presented evidence (outlined above) tending to show that, because of the nature and severity of Z.P.'s problems, the IEP would not provide Z.P. with a educational benefit....To conclude that the hearing officer erred simply because he did not accept the testimony of the School Board's witnesses, an argument that the School Board comes very close to making, would render meaningless the due process rights guaranteed to parents by the IDEA.

To the extent that the district court concluded that the hearing officer's findings were not entitled to deference because the decision was premised on the hearing officer's preference for the ABA methodology used by the Faison School over the TEACCH methodology used at Twin Hickory, we again disagree. Neither a state administrative hearing officer nor a reviewing court may reject an otherwise appropriate IEP because of dissatisfaction with the educational methodology proposed in the IEP... As we have explained above, the hearing officer concluded that the School Board's IEP was not appropriate and did not provide Z.P. with a FAPE because Z.P.'s problems were so severe that they would have precluded him from accessing the curriculum that would have been provided at Twin Hickory. If the School Board's IEP were appropriate, then it would have been impermissible for the hearing officer to reject it simply because he thought the Faison program would be better for Z.P. But that is not what the hearing officer did. The hearing officer concluded, as a factual matter, that the School Board's IEP was not appropriate for Z.P., but that the Faison program was appropriate. Thus, the hearing officer did not impermissibly impose on the School Board what he believed was a better method for teaching Z.P.

*Id.* at 307-09.

In *Hous. Indep. Sch. Dist. v. VP*., 582 F.3d 576 (5th Cir. 2009), the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's affirmance of a hearing officer's decision that

the school district failed to offer a hearing-impaired student a FAPE because the student's IEPs were not specific enough with regard to her auditory-processing or audiological deficiencies. The student's IEPs lacked strategies to assist with sequencing, gap detection and noise desensitization, strategies that the parents' expert testified the student required. *Id.* at 585. The Fifth Circuit specifically stated:

In light of [the expert's] testimony, we find no clear error with the district court's finding that noise desensitization, sequencing training, and gap-detection work were necessary to address V.P.'s specific auditory-processing problems. Further, there was evidence to support that they were not offered merely as a means of maximizing her potential or making her more competitive with the other members of her class. Based on the valid fact-finding concerning what was necessary to address her auditory needs, and applying our de novo review, we accept that her IEP was insufficiently individualized.

*Id.*

District courts are tasked to determine whether the evidence demonstrated that the educational method chosen by the school district enabled the child in question to learn. *Rowley*, 458 U.S. at 206-07. By way of example, if a school decides to use the one reading program to instruct its students with learning disabilities and the evidence demonstrates that the child in question can progress academically using that method, a parent cannot argue that the school should use another instead. On the other hand, if the student, because of the nature of his or her disability, is unable to make progress using the school's preferred program the parent has every right to assert, and a court has every right to determine, that

the use of that program does not provide FAPE for the individual child.

The Third Circuit has taken a similar view. In *D.S. v. Bayonne Bd. of Educ.*, an ALJ found that “based on the scoring results from evaluations and assessments and the weight of testimony from teachers and medical experts,” a student’s IEP failed to incorporate the recommendations necessary to address his needs. 602 F.3d 553, 556 (3d Cir. 2010), “The absence of these recommendations, or any alternatives reasonably calculated to confer an educational benefit to D.S., led the ALJ to find the IEP inappropriate.” *Id.* The district court reversed. *Id.* While the Third Circuit agreed “with the District Court that the IEP did incorporate certain instructional techniques that were consistent with [the parents’] consultants’ recommendations,” it disagreed “with the District Court that the presence of these generalized instructions in the IEP contradicts the ALJ’s ultimate factual conclusions -- which a reviewing court is obliged to consider prima facie correct -- that (1) in order for D.S.’s ninth grade IEP to be reasonably calculated to enable D.S. to receive a meaningful educational benefit, it needed to incorporate the specific remedial techniques and provisions for accommodations that the teachers and evaluators who worked with him had proposed, and (2) the IEP failed to incorporate these specific remedial techniques and provisions for accommodations.” *Id.*

### III. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above and in appellees' brief, COPAA respectfully requests that this Court uphold the Order of the district court.

Date: June 21, 2016

Respectfully submitted,

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