The purpose of this paper is to outline what states expect when federal support is provided for response to a radioactive materials incident, specifically one involving a commercial power reactor. Other types of incidents are no less important but would not likely elicit a full federal response. Rather, the most probable support would be from regional RAP teams. Therefore, since the most visible and most immediately available form of significant federal support for power reactor incidents is the Federal Radiological Monitoring and Assessment Center (FRMAC), expectations are oriented toward it and the federal functions it represents, and toward the Department of Energy (DOE).

The "federal family" is a relative newcomer to power reactor accident response. There have been three Federal Field Exercises to date, all good learning experiences but still with mixed results. And there are thirty-five plus states having offsite responsibilities that are potential requestors of federal support. Federal play in state exercises, so far, has been minimal to nonexistent. Even granting that the federal response establishment has more personnel, more overall expertise and considerably more equipment than any single state can hope to bring to bear on a problem, they should not respond to that problem cold. With that in mind, the first expectation is that the DOE should establish liaison with each of the states/jurisdictions having offsite responsibilities to identify needs, both state peculiar and federal peculiar for that state: people requirements, FRMAC location(s), equipment requirements and integration, e.g., phone system, detection/analytical capability integration, operational procedures, and overall logistics support needed locally by the federal organization. In sum, we expect the federal support organization to plan for a response to each site in advance of the need for that response.

Recognizing that state response organizations vary widely in structure and in ability to staff positions, we expect the federal establishment to determine who their state counterparts are and what individual state needs are regarding liaison. While the FRMAC organizational chart shows state liaison to the FRMAC Director and to both the Monitoring and Analysis and Evaluation and Assessment Groups, co-location may not always be possible. Likely there are additional liaison requirements that don’t appear on organizational charts; states will need to know that kind of information. Given short staffs, the federal response group may have to provide the liaison to the state; only prior planning with each state will determine that need.
Liaison efforts, whether state to federal or vice versa, will be governed by procedures. States would expect federal responders to have some familiarity with state procedures; states, on the other hand, will need to know what federal procedures they should be familiar with in order to effect a smooth operating relationship. Standardizing certain procedures, for example emergency worker dose limits, mapping and use of the Global Positioning System, would provide for a smoother, more effective integration of response activities.

Information exchange among participants plays a major role in the conduct of any response; in fact, open communication is critical to its success. Therefore, states should expect that there will be no data censorship, including raw data. It's perfectly understandable that raw information should have quality assurance checks run on it before public release, but no information should be considered proprietary, including ARAC dose projection information and AMS flyover material. This coordination expectation recognizes that considerable federal technical expertise but stipulates that the state, particularly the radiation control program, should be privy to information, in advance, that would drive any protective action recommendations. In addition, state input should be sought before any federal recommendations go anywhere else.

In conjunction with the information expectation, the FRMAC, as it advertises, must be responsive to state needs. FRMAC's principal purpose, from a federal standpoint, may be to characterize plume deposition, but there will be other needs that are labor and equipment intensive. States will need information on deposition but they may also need assistance in monitoring evacuees, collecting environmental samples, and verifying the lack of contamination in areas outside the plume footprint. The FRMAC should be prepared to respond to requests for that kind of assistance.

All state expectations really point to the federal response organization establishing a good working relationship with each state having offsite responsibilities in the event of a commercial power reactor accident. This means making contact in advance of a need for federal support, determining the requirements for each state, both from the state and federal viewpoint, and perhaps most important, the representation of all FRMAC organizations in every exercise play.

Adopted: February 23, 1995
Original signed by Charles M. Hardin, Executive Director