ABSTRACT: This case study describes the unconventional warfare techniques that were used by Allied special operations forces during their campaign against German and Italian occupiers of Yugoslavia from 1943 to 1945. The Yugoslavia campaign was destined to be the first in a series of 20th Century unconventional warfare campaigns, culminating in the campaign conducted by US and UK covert and special operators that deposed the Taliban regime in Afghanistan in 2001. The persuasion, negotiations and precise military actions that enabled success in Afghanistan were the result of an evolution of modern special operations forces that began with the formation and employment of special operations forces in Yugoslavia during World War II.

Keywords: Yugoslavia, Partisan Activities, Strategic Intelligence, Unconventional Warfare.

Introduction

From September 1943 to January 1944, the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) conducted a partisan supply operation to Yugoslavia that paints a picture of the value of unconventional warfare in defeating an occupying force. During this five-month period, the OSS delivered supplies from Cairo, Egypt, and Bari, Italy to partisan forces under the leadership of Josip Broz Tito within occupied Yugoslavia. The cost of the operation to the OSS was approximately $35,000 yet yielded results of significant greater magnitude and saved countless allied lives.[1]

The return on investment for this operation and the strategic impact it had upon the war is a key component of unconventional warfare and special operations. Using this money, the OSS estimated that the partisans were able to raise and arm a guerilla force of at least 30,000 that forced the German army to divert four divisions from their winter offensive whose sole mission was to attack the supply lines of the guerilla force. It is estimated that this operation caused the German army to react with a force normally deployed to attack three American divisions and would have cost the United States approximately $171,000,000 and an untold number of casualties. While this was happening, the Allies were also building a level of trust and respect

between themselves and the partisans as well as Tito himself that went beyond the military and into the political realm.[2]

It is impossible to discuss the OSS, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), and even United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) without first mentioning General William J. Donovan, the father of the OSS, which later became the Central Intelligence Group (CIG) and finally the CIA. As of May 29, 2016, the CIA states on their website that USSOCOM operations in Afghanistan, Iraq, and other locations across the globe can trace their design back to Donovan, a fact quietly acknowledged by the USSOCOM patch which is modeled after the unofficial patch worn by the original OSS operators.[3]

Prior to World War II (WWII), the US Intelligence community was a disjointed collection of agencies that rarely collaborated with each other and only provided information to their parent organization. A community with this sort of structure was sure to fail in a time of war, and with that prospect becoming a growing reality in the late 1930's, President Roosevelt made several attempts to centralize the intelligence collection operations of the United States. After several years of frustration, he appointed Donovan as the Coordinator of Information (COI) on July 11, 1941. The Office of the Coordinator of Information

> …constituted the nation's first peacetime, non-departmental intelligence organization. President Roosevelt authorized it to collect and analyze all information and data, which may bear upon national security: to correlate such information and data, and to make such information and data available to the President and to such departments and officials of the Government as the President may determine; and to carry out, when requested by the President, such supplementary activities as may facilitate the securing of information important for national security not now available to the Government.[4]

By 1941, Donovan was already a legend in many circles. He had instant credibility with the military, having earned the Congressional Medal of Honor in World War I when as a battalion commander he valiantly charged German lines. A law graduate of Columbia University, he was a deputy assistant to the Attorney General in the Coolidge Administration.[5] Most importantly, he had the passion and vision, and the necessary dislike of bureaucracy that allowed him to quickly create a flexible and effective organization that was key to allied victory in the war. He understood the value of strategic intelligence, a theme which revealed itself multiple times in this research project.

It is an interesting piece of history that Donovan did not originally set out to create an organization that conducted clandestine operations and this mission set fell to him when other organizations gave these missions up. While Donovan was a legend, he and his new organization were not warmly received by agencies such as the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and intelligence agencies within the war department who were jealous of the amount of resources given to Donovan and obviously feared losing the power they had accumulated.

During the build-up of the COI in 1941, Donovan inherited several organizations and missions that were shed by their parent organization. One of these was espionage, as the Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI) and the War Departments' Military Intelligence Division, the G2, were uncomfortable with the mission during peacetime. As someone who took pride in accomplishing many different things, Donovan was happy to accept these mission sets from ONI and G2 and successfully managed to gain access to the Presidential unvouchered funds. The ability to spend these funds as well as the authority granted to the OSS to engage in espionage directly facilitated the later creation of the CIA's Directorate of Operations.[6]

Shortly after America's entry into the war and with a growing budget and staff, the President moved control of the COI from the White House to the newly created Joint Chiefs of Staff. This was a realignment that was supported by Donovan as it provided him with military support and resources. With the move and a reduction in staff, as half of his permanent staff was sent to the Office of War Information to manage the Foreign Information Service (FIS), came a name change and on June 13th, 1942, the COI became the Office of Strategic Services.[7] The change in title is an important one as it supported Donovan's belief in the value of strategic intelligence and is an important theme that emerged in this research.

As the OSS grew and matured under Donovan's leadership, the organization developed two directorates that would play key roles in partisan activities in Yugoslavia during WWII, the evolution of Special Operations Forces (SOF) in the United States, and the future creation of the CIA's authority to combine intelligence and clandestine operations within the same organization.[8] This relationship is reflected in Figure 1.

OSS ORGANIZATION (WASHINGTON) November 1944

Figure 1. https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/intelligencehistory/oss/OSSChart_t.jpg/image.jpg

The Special Operations branch, working closely with the British Special Operations Executive (SOE) was responsible for the partisan activities studied in this research.

Purpose

The purpose of this research is to describe themes and patterns discovered during a case study of unconventional operations in German occupied Yugoslavia during WWII. In the case study we identify factors that contributed to the success of strategic operations conducted by Allied nations. We also determined how these operations formed the architecture for the CIA and are currently used in Special Operations doctrine. Based on the findings, recommendations for planners of subsequent and future unconventional warfare campaigns are made.

While the North Africa Campaign was where Allied special operations forces conducted their initial activities against Axis powers, it was the Yugoslavia campaign that first embodied the factors that have since been identified as characterizing special operations and include:

- the careful selection process and mission specific training for special operations personnel

- the requirement for regionally, culturally and linguistically proficient special operations personnel

- the requirement to gain access to a denied area occupied by hostile forces

- the need to communicate over very long distances to a remote support base

- the requirement to operate in high-risk, austere, harsh environments without extensive support

- the necessity to address the ambiguous local situation, develop solutions, and working closely with indigenous authorities in order to solve the strategic problem

- has readily identifiable phases that constitute the characteristics of US unconventional warfare campaigns: preparation, initial contact, infiltration, organization, build-up, employment, and transition.[9]

As a key case, the Allied unconventional warfare campaign in Yugoslavia during WWII provides a basis for research into subsequent and future unconventional warfare campaigns. Through a deeper understanding of past successful operations, researchers and practitioners can develop plans for future operations. While some literature does exist on this subject, it is not an in-depth study, though such documents may exist at the classified level.

The specific research question under study is: What covert actions and special operations activities were instrumental in facilitating the strategic success of the Allied unconventional warfare campaign in German-occupied Yugoslavia during World War II?

Literature Review

War came again to Yugoslavia in 1941 when the country found itself positioned in between Axis armies. In the occupied areas of the Balkan peninsula. The Italians had recently moved forces into Greece from Albania and Hitler feared that the Allies would look to Yugoslavia as a base of operations to launch counterattacks into Greece. Should this happen, Hitler's forces would be separated from his Italian allies and would face another front. The Allies and Axis had both been pushing for Yugoslavia to pledge loyalty to one side, but the country was divided. The Serbian leaders who controlled the government favored the Allies while the King and his supporters feared the Germans and attempted to stay neutral for as long as possible.[10]

Distrust grew when Hitler learned of Yugoslavian overtures to the Allies and the Yugoslavian government learned of a German plan to overthrow the Yugoslavian government.[11] Hitler became increasingly worried about losing Yugoslavia to the Allied forces and presented the Yugoslavian government with an ultimatum; either pledge loyalty to Germany or risk a German invasion. On March 25, 1941, the Yugoslavian government agreed to join the Axis. However, the very next day, the Yugoslavian army, who supported the Allies, overthrew the government and seized control, resulting in an invasion by Germany.[12]

Although the German invasion was conducted by the Wehrmacht, the regular Army and not the SS who initially served in a supporting role, the campaign into Yugoslavia was particularly brutal. Poorly trained and ill equipped, the Yugoslavian army fell to the vastly

superior German forces within ten days. What followed was an occupation that at war's end resulted in 1.75 million dead, or 11 percent of the population and pitted Yugoslavian ethnic groups against one another.[13]

The devastation inflicted upon Yugoslavia can be be traced to two root causes, memories of German losses to Serbia in World War I, and Hitler's campaign of ethnic cleansing against Jews. The hatred towards Serbia is well illustrated by an order given to the Wehrmacht soldiers by Lieutenant General Franz Boehme, the Commanding General in Serbia. He told his men:

> Your objective is to be achieved in a land where, in 1914, streams of German blood flowed because of the treachery of the Serbs, men and women. You are the avengers of those dead. A deterring example must be established for all of Serbia, one that will have the heaviest impact on the entire population. Anyone who carries out his duty in a lenient manner will be called to account, regardless of rank or position, and tried by a military court.[14]

With these orders began a reign of terror waged against military and governmental objectives, but also specifically targeted civilian populations. The Wehrmacht soon filled the prisoner of war camps they established with male Serbian Jews and requested permission to move prisoners to Romania or Germany, but the request was denied. The Wehrmacht felt that they were left with only two options, release the prisoners or kill them. They chose the latter and began shooting all of the male Jewish prisoners. This quickly escalated to include Serbian Jewish women and children who were either starved to death or shot. The German forces in Yugoslavia soon received mobile gas vans in which prisoners were put into and then driven through towns as the occupants were poisoned to death. 35,000 Serbian Jews met their fate this way and it quickly spread a climate of fear across the Balkans.[15]

The fear fuelled an insurgency that grew more resolute in response to the ongoing German atrocities. Orders went out from commanders to German troops that they should incarcerate every male between the ages of 15 to 50, that they were to consider anyone approaching them from the direction of partisan controlled territory to be the enemy and should be arrested, and that lack of absolute proof that an individual is not a partisan member should not prevent a German soldier from executing the individual if they suspected that they were.[16] The landscape was ripe for an insurgency that allowed the Allies, specifically the OSS, to support partisan activities.

Resistance forces were divided between two separate armies; one under the control of General Draza Mihailovich, a Chetnik and regular army officer who refused the order to surrender to the Germans and Josip Broz Tito, a Croat and dedicated communist.[17] It was Tito's forces that the allies eventually provided the majority of support to and it is his forces that are normally associated with the term partisans. And while both leaders would engage Axis forces, they also had vastly different views of what a post-war Yugoslavia would look like.

The partisans totalled about 300,000 from a total population of 16 million.[18] OSS support of the partisans began in 1943 and consisted of forty officers and enlisted men that operated 15 different cells based with partisan army corps or division headquarters.[19] While small in number, the impact of these unconventional warriors was strategic in nature. The OSS provided the partisans with military and medical supplies, engaged in psychological warfare against the occupying forces, and helped return allied forces to friendly territory. In a memorandum to Joint Chiefs of Staff written in March 1945, Donovan stated that the OSS was responsible for returning to safety over 800 American and British airmen shot down over Yugoslavia. This small force constructed several emergency landing strips for aircraft that were bringing in

supplies and returning with evacuated airmen and OSS officers working with partisan forces routinely directed bombing attacks in support of partisan activities. Special demolitions were infiltrated into Yugoslavia, and the OSS officers provided the partisans with the training on how to effectively use them.[20] It was an extremely effective operation and is a clear blueprint for current US Special Operations doctrine which embeds small numbers of specially trained forces with much larger forces and provides them with equipment, training, and specialized or unique skills.

Hybrid warfare is not a new concept; it is just a relatively new term to describe a very old concept. In the United States, credit for the term and definition of hybrid warfare is attributed to Frank Hoffman, who in 2007 wrote the monograph *Conflict in the 21st Century: The Rise of Hybrid Wars,* while working at the Potomac Institute for Policy Studies. In this seminal piece, Hoffman defines hybrid warfare as incorporating "…a range of different modes of warfare, including conventional capabilities, irregular tactics and formations, terrorist acts including indiscriminate violence and coercion, and criminal disorder".[21]

Hoffman's definition of hybrid warfare is most often used when describing the Second Lebanon War with Israel in 2006. During that conflict, the Israeli army was built, trained, and equipped to fight low and high intensity conflicts. What they encountered with Hezbollah fell in-between these levels and the Israelis were not ready to counter that type of threat. Unbeknownst to Israel, Hezbollah had changed their training and tactics leading up to the war in 2006 and specifically focused on training their soldiers to operate individually and in small groups, or cells using "…guerrilla warfare tactics (e.g., ambushes, attack and withdraw) – a combination that is the essence of hybrid warfare".[22] Alongside these tactics, Hezbollah had also accumulated enough rockets that they were able to sustain long term rocket attacks into Israel.

They also possessed conventional intelligence equipment that allowed them to collect and jam Israeli communications. The end result was that when the ceasefire went into effect on August 14th, Hezbollah had achieved a strategic victory by showing Israel, and the rest of the world, that they were an effective military force that could engage a professional military, Israel, and not only survive but was capable of sustaining long term and continuous attacks into Israel.[23]

Hybrid warfare, and by extension unconventional warfare (UW), has been around for ages. The United States Department of Defense defines UW as "Activities conducted to enable a resistance movement or insurgency to coerce, disrupt, or overthrow a government or occupying power by operating through or with an underground, auxiliary, and guerrilla force in a denied area".[24] The term irregular warfare (IW) is often used, incorrectly, as a synonym for UW. IW is:

A violent struggle among state and non-state actors for legitimacy and influence over the relevant populations. IW favors indirect and asymmetric approaches, though it may employ the full range of military and other capabilities, in order to erode an adversary's power, influence, and will.[25]

UW is thus one tool of many used to wage IW.

Applying these definitions to history, it can be seen that hybrid warfare is not a new concept. In the American Revolutionary War, George Washington's army normally conducted conventional type battles but in the South Carolina campaign, his forces employed some UW tactics. The tactics employed by the North Vietnamese Army and Vietcong blended conventional and unconventional warfare in support of an effective IW struggle.[26] And the recent invasion of Crimea by Russia saw a combination of conventional attacks, unconventional warfare from Russian Spetsnaz as well as a powerful information warfare campaign designed to destabilize the Ukrainian government and mitigate world outrage and bolster support for the

campaign within Russia.[27] Hybrid warfare is used because it works and its' success has been validated over centuries. As the current research will show, it was a significant factor in partisan activity within Yugoslavia during World War II.

Theoretical Framework

Much debate exists as to whether or not an actual theory for Special Operations exists. Harry Yarger, a Senior Fellow at the Joint Special Operations University states "The lack of such theory is odd given the public's fascination with special operators, the U.S. Congress' legislative support, policy maker's penchant for their use, and the number of popular movies and books" seen in in recent years.[28] He presents a number of premises that provide the reader with a rather detailed list of necessary considerations in viewing special operations forces and their employment and reviews some of the criteria that have come out of USSOCOM in recent years. He ultimately declares that this piece contains nothing new in terms of the theory and he recognizes the absence of an overarching theory and promotes academic study of the field.[29]

Still, a number of studies providing insight into the types of operations, circumstances, and unique environments of these operations can be seen in contemporary works. McRaven (1996) provides detailed case studies on historical special operations missions beginning in World War II and ending in 1976 with the Israeli Raid on Entebbe and provides analysis on the elements that contribute to the success of special operations. The framework and principles presented appear to be reminiscent of the planning considerations presented in most military officer development courses over the last 30 years. While it provides an effective checklist for planning and assessing special operations activities and is popular, it falls short of establishing an actual theory for the study of special operations. Spulak (2007) widens analysis and expands the discussion to include various characteristics, capabilities, strategic impact, and doctrinal

elements in publication since the formation of USSOCOM in 1987. He argues the need for

special operations theory and suggests it can be:

> …stated concisely: special operations are missions to accomplish strategic objectives
>
> where the use of conventional forces would create unacceptable risks due to
>
> Clausewitzian friction. Overcoming these risks requires special operations forces that
>
> directly address the ultimate sources of friction through qualities that are the result of the
>
> distribution of the attributes of SOF personnel[30].

Though frequently referenced it has not been recognized as the authoritative theory on special

operations.

Standing in contrast to most works on SOF Theory, Marsh, Kenny, and Joslin (2015)

argue that there is "…a strong case for scientific rigor and theorizing the study of special

operations" but that the field is better served by not limiting the study by developing "…single,

overarching metatheory of special operations" that would inhibit wider observation and fail to

recognize the various phenomena that are present in each case.[31] Instead they propose a wider

view of the field of research possibilities applied to individual phenomena. It is with this

particular view that we chose our theoretical approach.

In the absence of a singular established theory and a lack of certainty as to what the

material would yield, the grounded theory approach developed by Glaser and Strauss (1967)

seemed to be a logical technique to approach the inquiry. It is suitable for exploratory studies and

differs from standard framework approaches where data analysis ends in description and simple

interpretation. In depth analysis and a more exploratory approach results in a richer narrative and

though potentially incremental, seeks to develop theory.[32]

Methodology

The Grounded theory method was selected as the most appropriate approach for this study. The ability to use a more inductive style to generate theoretical ideas from the archived data while continuing to expand the collection of material was needed to insure the necessary depth of the study. The progressive movement from the descriptive coding process, towards a more theoretical analysis of OSS operations, resulted in an understanding of activities where a hypothesis did not previously exist. The discussion below outlines the collection effort, applied methodology, and development of the narrative.

National archive materials consisted of staff papers, correspondence, area studies, mission reports, and asset profiles. The material studied was primarily from the "Wild Bill" Donovan collection during World War II. The data was collected by three researchers over a period of three days. The collection took the form of original documents in both paper and microfiche. An example of data collected is shown in Figure 2. The complete holding was assessed with a focus on OSS operations and supporting efforts in the former Yugoslavia. The wide variety of collected materials and sources led researchers to select a two tier approach in identifying emerging themes. The first was the use of constant comparative analysis process described by Strauss & Corbin (1990) and was used to identify and shape emerging themes; the second was a peer analysis and debriefing to identify inconstancies.

In order to conduct the requisite synthesis, information was first taken from the collected materials, categorized, and continuously related to the body of archival data to identify emergent themes.[33] The overall concept involved the organization of data, discovery of relationships, and development of a coherent study using open, axial, and select coding steps. The initial assessment began using the public website for National Archives where the researchers briefly

reviewed thousands of abstracts and began to form impressions of the collection. Upon arrival at

the National Archives in College Park, Maryland, the investigators analyzed hundreds of

documents that contained references to operations in Yugoslavia

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diplomatic inability of denying officially the authenticity of these "messages."
The result is a complete confusion or misinformation in America, where not only
the public but even many Government officials, taking the UP dispatches from
London for granted, are not aware of the real relationship between the Yugoslav
Government, The British Intelligence Service and Mihailovich.

Our information about Yugoslavia, and the Balkans in general, being
second-hand, that is, either British or Russian, we are not only behind the
events, but we can never be sure - take the example of British information alone -
how much the British withhold from us, or why the British sometimes release
certain information months later. A typical instance of deliberately delayed
information is the existence of the Partisans, of whom the British have known
for a year and a half, but began to give them publicity over the BBC only last
winter. If we had our own men on the spot in Yugoslavia, we would be able not
only to obtain first-hand, up-to-date information, but to check it with the
British and Russian information and thus see through the British and Russian
games in their manipulations of the news.

It is essential that, before the invasion of the Balkans, we establish
our own intelligence and liaison with the guerrillas in Yugoslavia (and Greece).
There is no excuse for the greatest power in the world to have no such service
in the Balkans. If the British and the Russians can do it, we can do it too,
equally well or even better, especially now that all of North Africa is in Anglo-
American hands. We have the technical means - planes and submarines - for
smuggling our intelligence men into Yugoslavia. We have human material, and
better than the British: the British liaison men are former British business
men, diplomats or intelligence men, who lived in Yugoslavia, speak Serbo-
Croatian with an accent, and have no feeling of the people or the soil; we
have men who, while Americans, speak Serbo-Croatian like natives and under-
stand the background of the Yugoslav people, with all its emotions, reactions
and idiosyncrasies. Finally, we as a nation enjoy more trust among the Yugoslav
people - and for that matter throughout the Balkans - than the British do. One
of the three escaped Serbian Partisans, whom I met in London about a month ago,
told me frankly the people "back home" had more confidence in the Americans
than in the British. Coming from a Partisan, this is characteristic - because
some time last fall the Partisans executed the British liaison officer Atterton,
who had been sent to contact Mihailovich. In short, we have everything neces-
sary to establish intelligence and liaison in Yugoslavia before the invasion:
technical means, human material better than the British, and something the
British don't have - the confidence of the people.

I believe we should hurry to establish this service, because the
British, playing a lone hand, are already ahead of us in their race to get
the credit for eventual political successes in Yugoslavia. For instance,
last March the British Ambassador in Moscow began to negotiate the Partisan-
Mihailovich issue with the Soviets, without the British Government's informing
either us or even the Yugoslav Government. Ever since last March various British
Foreign Office spokesmen have assured me confidentially that the best policy
would be to collaborate both with Mihailovich and the Partisans in their res-
pective zones - but the same Foreign Office lets the State Department back and
support Mihailovich alone. In his letter to the then Premier Yovanovich of last
May, Eden among other things urged the Yugoslav Government to persuade Mihailovich
to agree to British liaison with the Partisans - and Colonel Bailey is working
on this scheme. The British Government, to my knowledge, has refrained from

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Authority NND 974345

Figure 2. Message from Cairo Desk.

The body of archival material in this collection was reviewed in its entirety and copies of

all documents were distributed to each of the members. These were reread in detail in order to

identify and label relevant phrases, concepts, words, and activities. Special attention was paid to

the frequency, emphasis, and unique nature of content. Materials pertaining to the development

of mission concepts, coordination with host nation forces, mission planning, execution, and support were reviewed and cataloged for analysis. Initial patterns and relationships of data were identified through the use of Nvivo software. The results of this process, researcher coding notes with key words, terms, and activities were tracked in Excel for ease of viewing, identification of overarching themes, and quick reference to cataloged documents. When material revealed no added ideas or outliers, collection was stopped and the existing content was further developed. The final review of data was completed when a rich description of events was reached and the analysis reached the point of saturation.

The researchers continued by naming the principal categories and identified the primary themes for development. Relationships to other categories were established, and detail added to thicken the narrative. This method of analysis supports our method of study. As previously mentioned, coding is only one part of the data review process. The idea of theoretical sensitivity in Strauss and Corbin considers issues such as individual experiences and determining research biases.[34] Understanding personal perspectives and their impact on data analysis is important. The impact of researcher perspective in the analysis of data shapes the selection of materials and grouping of data. The researchers' perspective is present through the various steps in developing the narrative. It contributes to the identification of emergent themes in data, naming convergence, and developing a coherent storyline. This is an integral part of the coding process. It is this measure that allows researchers to move beyond the linear analysis of groupings and was essential to the next steps in understanding the data. This was a natural transition to the next step of our analysis.

The second tier of analysis was the researchers' review of the archival materials. The purpose of the review was to detect discrepancies in the findings, identify potential themes not

previously revealed in the review of data, and determine if further sampling was needed. Researchers, having extensive experience in the Special Operations and intelligence community, conducted an interrater review to assess thematic content in the materials. Researchers reviewed the findings and agreed on consistency of the results. The continued analysis and identification of relationships served to form the level of importance placed upon these activities.

Results

In order to identify the emerging themes a wide range of initial materials was examined. Early analysis identified categories that were general but provided some context and helped to identify the importance of the various types of activities that were deemed important to success in theater. Initial impressions were that most material focused on the need for a US presence in the Yugoslav region, potential training requirements, and considerations of how those activities might best serve US interests. Much of the information is not attributed to individuals but rather staff sections responsible for activities in the theater of operations. These exchanges were written in direct language with frank assessments and no concern for attribution. As analysis progressed, new themes and relationships were identified. The initial review of content is discussed below and followed by themes that emerged in analysis.

The preliminary examination of documents provided a wide array of themes that included discussions on the geographic area, political undertones, various operations and support initiatives, and considerations force preparation. Many documents discussed the lack of US situational awareness in Yugoslav region. There were several documents expressing concern that all information was coming to US planners second hand and that it was potentially misleading, delayed, or even edited to benefit other Allied nations. Both British and Soviet Liaisons were on the ground shaping the environment and connecting to either the remanence of former

government forces under Mihailovich and an assortment of emerging partisan and resistance factions with varied political agendas.[35]

Though the initial argument to establish a liaison presence in Yugoslavia was for the purpose of unfiltered situational awareness, there were also concerns about Allied post-war positioning, conflicting political ideologies,[36] and the need to prepare for an invasion by expeditionary forces.[37] This descriptive higher level examination shaped the first impression.

Strategic Requirements

The salient properties contained within the body of data continued to reference the various capabilities and attributes of the force needed to satisfy strategic requirements. Continued reviews of the material identified reoccurring dimensions and formed relationships to mission requirements and unique force capabilities. Gradually the characteristics and variations in data were identified and it became possible to map relationships between identified requirements. These remained largely consistent and were present in documents involving the initial formation of forces, training, operations, and debriefings.

Themes or categories identified in the previous step could take two very different paths. One could consider phases or factors in the initiative. These would include "planning, recruitment, training, and the operations." In an initial memo from the Cairo Desk, Lieutenant Colonel Walter Booth identified and submitted a proposed outline for study to this effect.[38] The other is to seek a more abstract view of the data to conceptualize on what requirements were most significant to the success of OSS operations in Yugoslavia. In identifying the requirements most significant to OSS success, the major storyline or core category has been named. It encompasses the related subcategories that serve to support to the storyline. These include a

focus on strategic intelligence, communication, cultural knowledge and preparation for operations within the Yugoslav environment.

Strategic Intelligence

Reference to strategic intelligence requirements goes far beyond simple situational awareness and alieving political concerns. Supporting themes within the body of data reference support for sabotage, targeting by Allied air forces, and preparation for large scale invasion by conventional ground forces. It recognizes the importance of large intelligence networks that include the local population and partisan forces working within the area. Early training and persistent intelligence requirements focus on the collection of intelligence, securing documents, and processing prisoners of war with a significant focus on who, when, what, and where.[39] It highlights the significant importance and details and the use of illustrations in gathering intelligence and stablishing large networks are shown as essential; they are useful in observing road networks, trains, and to reach a point of intelligence saturation.[40] Support for invasion by conventional forces included local area assessment that identified not only enemy strength but the disposition of local manpower available to fight in support of allied effort.[41]

Operators and local assets were also included in plans to receive, maneuver with, and pass conventional forces on to other intelligence operatives as the battle moves beyond their geographic knowledge.[42] Some thought was given to determining the status of the indigenous population's political leanings and their willingness to support US interests beyond conflict with Axis forces.[43]

Communication

Significant focus was placed on communications training for both infiltrating operatives and indigenous assets. The ability of operatives to broadcast intelligence reports reoccurs as an

important theme. Even where it is not specifically named in content, the importance of dependable communications methods is readily apparent in the data. In addition to training proposals, planning documents, and operations reports, it is laced in numerous routine exchanges. Reports generated in May of 1945 provide some insights into the methods, patterns, complexities, and networks. These are highlighted in a collection of debriefings on Operations Sophie, Pittsburgh, Marina, Partridge, and Graves.

Discussion of communication training plans recognized the accomplishments of other similar missions in Western Europe. The successes of Jedburgh, Essex, and other field operations were considerations in training development.[44] It was recognized that operations must master all methods of wire and radio methods. They should also be proficient in surveillance methods. These would include the use of electronics, imagery, and microfilm in communication.[45]

Networks and signal plans for deep operations are established in a way that a centralized hub terminates and captures the entire body of reports. Though initially focused on intelligence collection and directing sabotage operation, attention to more conventional maneuver, logistics, and personnel recovery activities is frequently present in the material. Consideration for future requirements is reflected in building the communications network. The system is designed to transition from rear to forward echelons to accommodate the movement and transition of assets to maneuvering conventional forces. It is recognized that operations are dependent on the cooperation of all service branches and is a combined effort. "Intelligence, special operations, counter-espionage, and psychological warfare" are seen as connected efforts that rely on effective communications efforts.[46]

The dispersion and isolation of cells operating in the region require the need for effective communications methods for infiltration of added resources, resupply, and personnel recovery.

Tight communication windows required precise and timely exchanges. Security concerns in reports outlined a number of challenges to making successful communications. Proximity to German installations, monitoring, and mobile detection finding equipment were constant concerns. Dependability and the cumbersome nature of communications gear also served to narrow the broadcast window. Often equipment was exchanged for other allied operating systems and makeshift antenna methods were developed to enhance capabilities.[47]

While skilled operators in more permissive environments might hit all scheduled windows, others were shown to miss up to 30 consecutive days of contacts. This made directing operations and scheduling supply drops unpredictable. Still, positive contacts led to a wide variety of successful quick infiltrations by air or submarine, resupply operations, and personnel recovery missions which saved hundreds of downed American Air Force personnel.[48]

Cultural Knowledge

Cultural Knowledge and preparation for the operating environment is presented as a major focus within staff papers. The need for individuals capable of blending into the local population was extremely important. Language capability, knowledge of the area of operation, and the ability to establish relationships and networks is a common subject in the collection. Additionally, it was noted that a special type of candidate was required for OSS operation whose characteristics included "…integrity, intelligence, courage and good physical condition."[49] The desired profile was reliable and experienced operators that understood how to conduct successful communications, intelligence, reconnaissance, and sabotage missions. It was understood that recruitment abroad was required to identify the personnel necessary to round out teams and assessment and recruitment of the indigenous population was an ongoing effort.

A number of reports profiled the recruitment and capabilities of partisan fighters. On occasion it was an extension of intelligence assessments that might prove useful in post war Yugoslavia. In other write-ups it appeared more of an evaluation for recruitment or retention. The reports provided such details as age, place of birth, unique skills, and any military experience the individual might have. Added information occasionally referenced marital status, political leanings, fighting ability, personal dispositions. Notes on religious preference were sometimes included.

Nothing was left unnoticed. Continued assessments of the requisite skills needed by US and partisan forces were explicitly outlined. They serve to support and confirm the themes identified in our research. Specific recommendations for training include intelligence, communications, and an ability to not only operate but thrive in the environment. Training evolved to meet emerging requirements and executed in conditions that are similar to the area of operations or when required in Yugoslavia. Reviews of the numerous OSS reports reinforced the importance of the subcategories identified above. When using these categories to review the mission reports on operations Geisha, Flotsam, Fungus, Altmark, Relator, and Redwood, one sees that the operational details are easily organized into parallel groups.[50]

Discussion

This research explored the factors that contributed to the success of the unconventional warfare campaign conducted by the OSS, and evaluated those observed factors while examining modern special operations, to include modern SOF doctrine. This section analyzes those observations and presents refined themes as a framework for future unconventional warriors to consider when designing operational concepts.

Given the nascent character of special operations during WWII, the OSS had limited doctrinal guidance for managing the unique missions that it was expected to conduct. As it was, the overall imperative to defeat the Germans, and specifically to conduct a successful economy of force operation in the Balkans, required the OSS as well as its allied partners to set the conditions in the Balkans by managing operations of every mission effectively regardless of the separate agenda of the resistance unit involved, the characteristics of the operational area, or the composition of OSS unit that conducted it. The goal in Yugoslavia was to effectively pester and distract the German war machine and set the conditions for eventual Allied victory in the Yugoslav theater of operations and thus support overall Allied victory against the Germans.

The greater part of existing academic examination looks at OSS history, to include its beginnings, operations and leadership. There has been a much more limited academic consideration of the organization in the context of operational doctrine. In the context of the OSS's campaign in Yugoslavia, the operations were clearly within the definition of unconventional warfare, which US DOD Joint Publication 3-05 defines as:

> …operations and activities that are conducted to enable a resistance movement or insurgency to coerce, disrupt, or overthrow a government or occupying power by operating through or with an underground, auxiliary, and guerrilla force in a denied area[51].

While unconventional warfare has emerged as a core activity of special operations forces (particularly US forces), WWII presented the first significant opportunity for the design and execution of an unconventional warfare campaign at the theater level. Unconventional warfare has continued to evolve since WWII, with many state and non-state actors using these techniques to pursue different and corresponding state and non-state purposes. This proliferation of

techniques beyond the conventional warfare practices of the 20th century has become what is termed '4th Generation Warfare,' which is characterized by conflicts somewhere on the continuum between peace and full conflict/total war. This innovation in warfare was identified and discussed in 1989, when Lind, et. al, evaluated the future of warfare in the context of identified trends, such as the use of mission orders, a reduction of the use of centralized logistics, an emphasis on maneuver, and fourth as "…the goal of collapsing the enemy internally rather than physically destroying him."[52] The OSS experience in Yugoslavia provides examples that demonstrate all these trends. Additionally, the OSS operational records provide a unique and timely opportunity to examine unconventional warfare techniques, as the security classification of more modern conflicts (such as in Afghanistan) currently precludes access to that information.

The ongoing conflicts and 'frozen conflicts' in South Ossetia, the Donbass, Kosovo and Nagorno-Karabakh are examples of the ambiguous operating environment where either nation-states or non-state actors have employed these techniques. While these cases are examples of where 4th generation warfare techniques were used during a preliminary, unconventional warfare phase prior to limited conventional conflict, the potential exists that experienced forces could use 4th generation warfare techniques to achieve their goals while managing the conflict at a level just below what would normally devolve into open warfare. The OSS experience in Yugoslavia provides pertinent examples, though sometimes rudimentary, of how effective an unconventional warfare campaign can be, as well as the challenges to success that are likely to be in place in future conflict situations.

Joint Publication 3-05 provides an outline of requirements for Special Operations Forces. It closely parallels the same requirements identified in the study of the OSS in Yugoslavia. It is as if the considerations were lifted from the classified documents and placed into today's guiding

documents. JP 3-05 states that "SOF partners design, plan, and oversee execution of special operations in support of national strategic objectives".[53] In order to accomplish the objective, Special Operations Forces must consider "…strategic, physical, and political and/or diplomatic risk; operational techniques; modes of employment; and dependence on intelligence and indigenous assets."[54] All of this requires a high level of planning and intelligence with detailed knowledge of the area of operations, the culture, people, and languages used. This combined with demanding training and rehearsals is critical to mission success.[55] Added definition and requirements for the ideal personnel suggest a demanding evaluation process where more experienced candidates are selected for advanced specialized training and "…regional, cultural, and linguistic specialties."[56] Great emphasis is placed on planning and the need for a "…robust communications architecture."[57] This remains an important element for successful operations. It serves as the intelligence and logistical life-line for both SOF operators and the supported indigenous forces.

A more clearly defined process of addressing the strategic problem exists in today's joint doctrine. Under the Joint Operating Concept (JOC) for Irregular Warfare (IW) joint force commanders (JFC) must conduct strategic planning that that clearly translates "national strategic guidance and direction into a strategic concept for achieving a set of military and non-military conditions necessary to achieve strategic success" before an IW campaign can be designed.[58] Considerations for establishing military conditions includes ways in which the application of a wider selection of instruments of power can be brought to bear and the initiation of a successful campaign can be conducted. It may include major combat operations (MCO), indirectly using IW, or some hybrid of the two.[59]

Elements within the scripted vignette provide essential lines of operation as part of successful Irregular warfare campaign to bolster or erode a government's powerbase. The detailed example provides essential elements which are largely in-line with the study's findings. The vignette details the focus of these efforts which show that a high level of importance is place upon the use of Special Operations forces in concert with indigenous peoples, the necessity of training host nation forces in intelligence and communication, a focus on actionable intelligence provided to the supported population, all of which is tailored to meet a strategic end.[60]

Conclusions

One cannot use the terms unconventional, irregular, asymmetric, or hybrid warfare interchangeably. The terms may run parallel and yet it is possible that the activities of one could be nested within conduct of another. These activities differ from conventional or traditional means of conducting warfare. Yet the use of conventional force may too be part of a hybrid operation that encompasses the wide application of instruments of power and less recognized means of warfare. Thus hybrid warfare is a more overarching term. Considering the evolutions and revolutions occurring United States' Military capabilities since WWII, it seems that identifying commonality between covert actions and special operations activities in the former Yugoslav Republic during the second World War and SOF operations today, might be difficult.

Still, when looking at the thematic development of key elements that facilitated the strategic success of the Allied unconventional warfare campaign in German-occupied Yugoslavia during WWII, there is an obvious similarity to important considerations in today's SOF operations. Many of the OSS operations executed in a time of full scale military operations were conducted in the same manner as they would be in today's less defined and graduated scale of conflict. This is displayed in contemporary Joint Publication's and Operating Concepts where

significant importance is place upon strategic considerations, the importance of strategic intelligence, communication, and the cultural knowledge or considerations.

Within the framework of US special operations doctrine, successful unconventional warfare campaigns demonstrate the need to establish relationships early in the effort when at some point, a national decision is made to take action and begin an unconventional warfare campaign. There is a need to establish and maintain relationships with whatever organization is to be supported. While relationships are always important, so much of the soft power that must be generated by the unconventional warfare force relies on relationships to be effective.

These relationships include countering friendly, enemy and neutral competitors, who will be in place in the area of operations as well as the area of influence. Actors on the battlefield, to include any friendly, enemy and neutral players, will pursue their own agenda at the expense of the overall friendly effort. An internal assessment of American intelligence capabilities in 1943 indicated that both the British and the Russians were much more capable of understanding the situation on the ground in guerilla-controlled Yugoslavia because of their in-place liaisons forward with the resistance. The Americans relied on secondary information and their ability to act and respond suffered accordingly. While the impact was in the realm of public affairs in regards to the British, the comparatively more effective Russians were well on their way to ideological victory.[61]

Moreover, opponents' political and ideological efforts, to include those of current allies who may become opponents in the future, must be identified early and countered. The OSS's entry into the Yugoslav campaign was after both the British and Soviets had initiated operations and moved unconventional forces into the sanctuaries held by the partisan resistance. This created a situation where it found itself behind in the effort to provide information to counter

communist doctrine being provided by forward deployed Soviet political officers who were embedded with partisan forces. In fact, the OSS was never able to successfully counter the move toward communism and the Soviet bloc, and the end of the war found the victorious communist partisans within the grasp of the Soviets; at least for a while.[62]

The OSS found that the relationship with the partisans was fluid and required constant and consistent management. Partisans were typically focused on the end-state of a communist country after a victory over the Germans. However, the OSS learned the hard way that relationships must extend beyond the tactical imperative and focus on the overall objectives: the resistance must be coached and occasionally led with the end state in mind. Thus, OSS leaders, who would find themselves dealing with a tactical dilemma, would on occasion take expedient measures to satisfy an immediate goal rather than postpone an immediate success in deference to an operational or strategic win.

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