NGOization of Civil Society as Unintended Consequence?
Premises on the Thai Health Promotion Foundation and Its Pressures Towards NGOs in Thailand

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Abstract

‘NGOization’ of civil society refers to a shift from rather loosely organized, horizontally dispersed and broadly mobilizing collective actions to more professionalized, vertically structured, policy-outcome-oriented nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) focusing on generating issue-specific and marketable expert services or knowledge (Lang, 2013). It can also refer to the process of institutionalization, professionalization, depoliticization of movements for social changes (Choudry and Kapoor, 2013b). The NGOization causes a gradual distancing of NGOs from their social base and makes them more overwhelmed by the modern technical practices and traditional management mentalities (Smith, 1987; Reinsborough, 2004). This potentially leads to centralization of funding to larger NGOs, working approaches that break and compartmentalize the world into ‘issues’ or ‘projects’, and alternation in the NGOs’ ecosystem, which create preconceived notions of how civil society should operate and divisions of NGOs (Edwards, 2014). Eventually, the process by the combination of NGOs and the state may depoliticize the NGOs’ works, becoming merely technical matter (Ferguson, 1994; Li, 2007).

In Thailand, such a transformation has seemingly happened through the function of the Thai Health Promotion Foundation (THPF) vis-a-vis NGOs. This article argues that NGOization is an unintended consequence of THPF’s funding and operation vis-a-vis NGOs. Obtaining money from the additional two percent of excise taxes on tobacco and alcohol products, THPF emerged as a state semi-autonomous agency operating outside the formal structure of government and works to resource organizations to reach healthy public policy. THPF became the biggest fund for civil society (Chutima, 2004), providing more than 1,000 million baht to promote numerous NGOs’ projects. For THPF, funding is a mechanism to reach healthy public policy and build civil society. A form of ‘partnership’ has appeared (Rakyutidharm, 2014). It has also played a crucial role in shaping NGO strategies. NGOs funded by THPF must follow THPF’ administrative system and project advice—thereby, being professionalized, institutionalized and bureaucratized. The ‘contract regime’ created by THPF reflects a neoliberal notion, which exists in harmony with professionalization and depoliticization of NGOs (Petras and Veltmeyer, 2005; Kamat, 2004). The creation of the THPF with an intention to promote non-state forces and reduce interference in the NGO sector paradoxically results in producing more regulations, paperwork, and bureaucratic protocols for NGOs. Unfortunately, this unintentionally put pressures on NGOs resulting in NGOization of funded organizations.

Using literature-based methodology, documentary research, and informal discussion with THPF staff, this study aims to investigate the process of NGOization in Thailand through THPF-NGOs relations. It basically concerns the way in which THPF functions, interacts, and micromanages related NGOs through funding requirements. Employing a relatively new conceptual framework to critically study NGOs and their transformation and relationship with the state, it yields interesting findings to NGO research. The main area of enquiry is how the institutionalization, professionalization, bureaucratization, and depoliticization of NGOs through the operation of the THPF advances the NGOization of civil society in Thailand. Findings signify considerable implications about the transformation of Thai civil society.

Keywords: NGOization, Professionalization, Funding, Civil Society, Thailand
Introduction

It is hard to deny that a growth of nongovernmental sector is portrayed as the main mode of contemporary civil society. Chandhoke (2003) argues that when people "demanded civil society; what they got instead were NGOs" (p.9). This NGO-constructed/led civil society approach is well-understood and popularly used across sectors and fields. However, regarding NGOs as the only element of civil society is problematic as the situation of civil society is more complex than that. Feldman (1997) challenges this uncritical account of NGO-civil society equation by reasoning that NGOs and civil society can be oppositional and NGOs do not cover every civic interest belonging to civil society (see also Anheier, 2004; Holloway, 2001, 2015). What is more important is that a lot of NGOs in reality are part of the neoliberal state-devolved service delivery sector, the ‘community face of neoliberalism’ (Petras, 1997). There are growing critical accounts of NGO actions which evidence that NGOs appear to be ‘the problem’ themselves rather than solving problems (see Henderson, 2003; Blaser, Feit, and McRae, 2004; Barry-Shaw and Jay, 2012; Choudhry and Kapoor, 2013a). All too often, many NGOs place themselves and work as outliers of neoliberal ideology,\(^1\) ignoring democratic and public practices. NGOs are seen as part of an extended or shadow state functioning through contracts made with government. They have progressively become channels for and direct beneficiaries of development aid provided by national and foreign governments (Biel, 2000; Wallace, 2003). This situation makes government-NGO relationships growing and continuing; governments, in particular, turn increasingly to NGOs for support in carrying out publicly funded functions, the process which has been called ‘nonprofitization’ (see Nathan, 1996; Salamon, 2015). Expansion of the funding base for NGOs through government contracting and corporate sponsorship is counted as a mega-trend for civil society (Casey, 2016). As such, nowadays, to become a reliable partner of government, NGOs find themselves being covered with an intense pull to professionalism and “being colonized by governmental ways of doing business” (Harwood and Creighton, 2009, 19). In this respect, NGOs are influenced by inner-organizational processes and a rationalization of modern bureaucracy to maintain their organizational reproductions. The issues of the position of NGOs in relation to government and their changing behaviors thus prompt a critical account to look at NGOs.

The changes of NGOs to more professionalized organizations plus a move towards a more institutionalized and bureaucratized of NGOs have become a central attention of ‘NGOization’. Lang (2013) states that NGOization of civil society refers to a shift from rather loosely organized, horizontally dispersed and broadly mobilizing social movements to more professionalized, vertically structured NGOs (see also Lang, 1997). The professionalization of the NGO sector in a technocratic sense plus a gradual distancing of the organizations from their

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\(^1\) Neoliberalism and NGOs are often linked given the fact that the Reagan-Thatcher era is considered to be key to the beginning of the increase in official finance to and number of viable NGOs which continues today (Fowler, 2000). However, it is important to note that although NGOs are profoundly shaped by neoliberal agenda, they are not necessarily bound to it. There are NGOs which conform to neoliberal logics and there are ones which try to subvert it.
social base are emphasized as NGOization as well (see Choudry and Kapoor, 2013b). Since 1980s more movement-oriented organizations have turned to or/and been replaced by more professionalized and effective-oriented groups, developing a powerful NGOized footprint (Lang, 2013). This phenomenon leads to centralization of funding to larger NGOs, particularly those located in the capital city, and alternation in the NGOs’ ecosystem, which create preconceived notions of how civil society should operate and the divisions of NGOs (Edwards, 2014). NGOization represents a change of NGOs both in terms of organizational structure, mission, management, and activity and their interaction with other agencies and the public.

This article takes the position that civil society should not be studied independently of its material organizational and discursive forms; NGOs should be critically considered with civil society and NGOization. The change in form of NGOs is, all too often, taken for granted. This article aims to investigate the process of NGOization in Thailand notably through the funding of the Thai Health Promotion Foundation (THPF). Unlike many analyses of NGOization which look at foreign agents and influences towards the NGO sector in a particular country, the process of NGOization argued in this article are more domestic and indigenous. In particular, it is concerned with the push for NGOs to professionalize, institutionalize, and bureaucratize in order to work with the THPF and become a reliable and appropriate organization for the funder and the government. It explores conditions for the emergence of NGOization.

This article is a preliminary study of NGOization in Thailand which is based on literature-based, document research and informal discuss with THPF staff and focused on how the THPF addresses related NGOs and its implication in terms of NGOization framework. It limits itself to consider how THPF puts pressures on NGOs notably through funding; in other words, it is concerned with how the professionalization, institutionalization, and bureaucratization created by the THPF advance the NGOization of civil society in Thailand. Findings on how NGOs react and what is happening in the NGOs affected by NGOization are out of the article’s objective.

This article is divided into four parts. The first part endeavors to develop the concept of NGOization as a conceptual framework for investigating the potential consequences of THPF funding and its other mechanisms. The second part is concerned with context and background of NGOs and THPF in Thailand. The third part is turning to analyzing the pressures given by THPF which fuel professionalization, institutionalization, and bureaucratization of NGOs. Then, the last part is focused on the implication of NGOization process towards broader civil society and its critiques both in common and in Thailand.

**Conceptualizing the Process of ‘NGOization’**

The concept of NGOization has been variously used to comprehend condition of civil society (see Lang, 1997, 2000, 2013; Hearn, 1998; Alvarez, 1999; Kamat, 2004; Armstrong and Prashad, 2005; Stubbs, 2007; Smith, 2007; Jad, 2007; Yacobi, 2007; Herzog, 2008; Aksartova, 2009; Barry-Shaw and Jay, 2012; Choudry and Kapoor, 2013a; Hodžić, 2014; Chahim and Prakash, 2014; Roy, 2015; Paternotte, 2015). However, the study of NGOization can be conceptualized in two major approaches. Traditionally, the study of NGOization is interested in government-induced pulls for NGOs to transform themselves in terms of professionalization and institutionalization. In contemporary literature, NGOization is also conceptualized especially in terms of a ‘neocolonial’ and externally induced mechanism by foreign donors, Western
governments (for non-Western societies), and philanthropic foundations and is used for some to investigate a move of an organization to transcend ‘beyond NGOization’ (see Alvarez, 2009; Jacobsson and Saxonberg, 2013a). Here, the former approach is taken into account.

Lang (2013) proposes that NGOization should be understood as a ‘sensitizing concept’ which provides us a general sense of reference and guidance in approaching empirical occurrences without rigid specifications of attributes; in contrast with a definitive concept which gives prescription of what to look, a sensitizing one “merely suggest directions along which to look” (Blumer, 1954, 7). NGOization thus describes “a culturally and politically mutable tendency rather than a narrowly confined path” possessing “different iterations and be fueled by different processes in different global or local constellations” (Lang, 2013, 65).

According to Kamat (2013), two important factors are relevant for NGOization around the world: the weight of geopolitical imperatives and the nature of the state. What should be mentioned here is about the state. The way the state governs society and the history of the country suggest the extent to which NGOs can act. The society that has strong centralized, bureaucratic government without stability in politics is likely to have limited and uneven NGOization process. NGOization thus unfolds and manifests differently in different contexts and struggles (Choudry and Kapoor, 2013b, 10). Historical context and the idea and practice of NGOs in the specific society are important (Mojab, 2009) in comprehending NGOization of a particular country. There is no ‘Iron Law’ of NGOization (Alvarez, 2009).

NGOization, for Choudhry and Kapoor (2013b), refers to the institutionalization, professionalization, depoliticization and demobilization of movements for social and environmental change. In this sense, it can mean the capacity of NGOs to depoliticize practices and discourses of social changes. A more systematic account of NGOization is provided by Lang (2013). For Lang (2013), NGOization

“refers to the process by which social movements professionalize, institutionalize, and bureaucratize in vertically structured, policy-outcome-oriented organizations that focus on generating issue-specific and, to some degree, marketable expert knowledge or services” (p.63-64).

This definition highlights organizational reproductions and the cultivation of funding resources. It seems that there is no difference between large organizations and small ones when they are needed to be treated as legitimate actors by donors and government; they experience the similar pull to behave as professional organizations albeit with different capabilities to respond.

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2 This does not mean that the second approach is not important. But for the purpose of the article, the first approach is used as conceptual framework to analyze the NGOization process in Thailand.

3 Geopolitics is quite clear, for example, in some cases where western influences and national elites play pivotal roles in a surge of NGOs; NGOs strive to adapt themselves with the requirements of foreign donors and fail to meet the need of the people or their constituencies. In other cases, there are resistances against NGOization process or even rejection of NGOs as a politically viable organizational form given the historical trajectory of the activists and organized movements.

4 Although there is no Iron Law of NGOization, it is possible to see common characteristics of the phenomenon.
Social movements in this definition refer to any collective endeavor to change the social structure which occasionally utilize extraconstitutional methods (Minkoff, 1997). It is not confined to mean just an organized movement which protests on streets. However, in order to achieve success in terms of policy advocacy, many social movements need to be professionalized (Zald and McCarthy, 1987). Organized social movements are not equated with NGOs. Mainstream account of the NGO-social movement dichotomy suggests NGOs as more conformist/reformist and social movements as radicalist (Choudry and Kapoor, 2013b). Rothschild and Whitt (1986) distinctively point out differences between the two ideal organizational types: collectivist-democratic and bureaucratic; and, to put it in NGOization language, NGOs show more institutional and professional properties featuring an inward orientation.

Adapting Rothschild and Whitt’s different properties of organization, NGOization signifies:
- a move from the collective to individuals in terms of authority in which hierarchy functions at least through virtue of incumbency in office and/or expertise;
- an increase of formalization of written charters and legal frameworks;
- a centralization of control through standardized rules and supervision as well as the selection of homogeneous personnel;
- an instrumental, role-based, and segmental relations idealized by a notion of impersonality;
- an implementation of competency-based system and specialization tendency in recruitment and advancement;
- a dominant moment of material incentives such as salaries, rather than normative and solidarity-based ones;
- a move from horizontal stratification to more hierarchical one; and
- a secure division of labour driven by specialization in which technical expertise is exclusively embraced (Rothschild and Whitt, 1986; Lang, 2013).

NGOization, hence, means an organizational shift from social movement properties towards NGO properties. Specifically, NGOization for NGOs, which is the main focus of this article, denotes the intensifying of their specific properties, quantitatively and qualitatively. In other words, NGOization drives NGOs to have stronger commitments to the properties.

This article argues in line with and develops from Lang’s work that three major developments should be looked at as signals for the beginning of NGOization. They are professionalization, institutionalization, and bureaucratization. Separately considering each of these developments and then examining the effects they have on NGOs is the framework used here to study NGOization. However, these developments are not mutually exclusive. For instance, professionalization drives more institutionalization while institutionalization serves as a supportive base for professionalization. Ultimately, NGOization will intensify these developments as well. Along this process, depoliticization of NGO work always happens, sometime not clearly. It can drive NGOization and be driven by it. NGOization being process is dialectical, interactive, and iterative (see Figure 1).

5 These properties is not strict in reality. It is hard for an organization to appear in the pure type. In particular, NGOization as process means that an organization can possess properties of both organizational types. Civil society thus has multifaceted organizations which are not limited to NGOs.
Figure 1. The Process of NGOization of Civil Society

To analyze NGOization, according to Choudry and Kapoor (2013b), is to “examine ways in which funding and other material support can orient organizations to prioritize institutional survival and maintenance at the expense of mobilization, and account for how NGO/movement actions may be shaped by material incentives” (p.5). They continue that donor funding from government, often expressed as sub-contracting relationships or foundations, is a source of pull to NGOization; “funding criteria and reporting guidelines place a heavy burden of expectation on organizations” which some of them may neither ready to do management work nor fit into criteria, guidelines and goals set by funders (Choudry and Kapoor, 2013b, 17). Likewise, Walker and McCarthy (2010) found that incentives form ‘outside patrons’ are inclined to “encourage routinization and professionalization” (p.319; see also Stone, 1996; O’Regan and Oster, 2002; Guo, 2007). Decrease of autonomy and flexibility, displacement of goals and vendorism, bureaucratization and accountability conflicts are also agreeably noted as potential implications of government funding towards NGOs (see Salamon, 1995; Froelich, 1999; Rosenthal, 1996; Smith and Lipsky, 1993; Stone, Hager and Griffin, 2001; Frumkin, 2002; Suárez, 2011). The critical factors for NGOization are donors’ capacities to control through fundings and expectations; repeatedly, “the donors expected to encounter an upwardly mobile, fully service-oriented, professional environment exhibiting all the regalia of a trustworthy business enterprise” (Lang, 2013, 84). Aksartova (2009) points out that NGOs are constrained by ‘quantifiable indicators’ of success created by donors as a part of result measurement and public presentation of the donors themselves. These indicators are, for example, “NGO establishes, people trained, photocopying machines distributed, websites created, Internet accounts used, project conducted, reports issued, etc.” (Aksartova, 2009, 168) and the pressure for these quantifying achievements is stronger in case of public donors as a state agency with bureaucratic power. Project-by-project funding compels NGOs to transform their organization by adopting...
certain forms of professional practices, functions and priorities (Choudry and Kapoor, 2013b). Moreover, it is noted that increase and/or continuity in funding produces greater NGOization for NGOs (Lang, 2013).

This article concurs with these arguments and claims that inducements form outside patrons or funders significantly generate professionalization, institutionalization, and bureaucratization which, in turn, fuel NGOization process. However, there is a recognition of a degree of agency played by NGOs themselves to the process though it is not the emphasis of this article. Essentially, NGOization is about responses to environment pressures and the “processes of material complicity with capital” (Choudhry and Kapoor, 2013, 14). When material or organizational form of civil society meets capital or money, NGOization is a consequence, commonly unintended. More specifically, in order to capture NGOization, this article mainly looks at funding requirements and other subtle signs of THPF as principle inducements for NGOization.

**Professionalization**

An intensifying push towards greater professionalization of civil society is commonly seen across the world (see SustainAbility, 2003). Professionalization is a common strategy that invites more technocratic control of the organization and expertise to deal with uncertainty (Anheier, 2014). For Weber (1947), professionalization is an aspect of rationalization of modern society. Professionalization indicates the ‘authority of institutionalized expertise’ over the authority of other claims which makes NGOs gaining an insider position at negotiation tables and in institutional decision making settings—thereby promising a higher rate of policy advocacy success (Lang, 2013; see also Clemens, 2006). With the authority of institutionalized expertise, NGOs will speak the same language as knowledge producers, governments and funders, and be reorganized to meet the need of them.

Nonprofit professionals or nongovernment experts are claimed to help NGOs being better recognized in the public and institutional settings (SustainAbility, 2003; Zwingel, 2005). Besides, some argue that being professionalized improves coordination and legitimacy of the organization while mitigates external criticism (Clemens, 1997; Caniglia and Carmin, 2005). It creates a kind of legitimacy for NGOs which is needed for getting funding. Accordingly, professionalized NGOs learn to apply modern management knowledge and practices such as division of labour with full-time salaried employee base, system of command and control through hierarchical structure, performance-based management, and so on. NGO workers in the age of professionalization are closer to company officer with little creativity and ideals whereas the office should “resemble a business office but be bit more modest” (Kordonskii, 2003 cited in Aksartova, 2009, 185). Professionalization, therefore, requires NGOs to adapt to institutional norms and structures, a certain policy field’s language, and terms of trade (Lang, 2013). Evetts (2007) concludes that professionalization is intended to boost ‘professionals’ own occupational self-interests in terms of their salary, status, and power, as well as the monopoly protection of an occupational jurisdiction. [It is] a process largely initiated and controlled by the practitioners themselves through their professional institutions and associations in order to promote and protect their own interests” (p.752).
Choudry and Kapoor (2013b) point out three major characteristics of the professionalized NGO worker system. First, professionalization prompts the centrality of paid staff; day-to-day world and longer-term agendas and activities are directly carried out by the staff. Second, this staff is not movement activists but people who have received professional training in higher education which is largely technical and draws from traditional management literature. Professionalization is likely to favor people with professional and management skills and expertise but not the people who have the spirit of an activist (Hopgood, 2006). This aims to make NGOs more efficient and accountable, emphasizing organization governance over radical politics and social movements. Third, professional staff is likely to represent the organization in public as ‘spokespeople’ at institutional and partnership settings rather than support the base to develop leadership skills and represent the movement. In this context, social change has become “highly specialized profession best left to experiences strategists, negotiators and policy wonks, NGOism is the conceit that paid staff will be enough to save the world” (Reinsborough, 2004, 194). Consequently, ideals of social development in this process rests in the hand of a small number of paid staff.

**Institutionalization**

The crucial issues for NGOs in the new contracting setting appears to be the urge for greater formalization and its impact on organizational structures, missions, roles, and autonomy (Macmillan, 2010, 5). The aforementioned professionalization is connected with institutional influence. Professionalization is not the only pull for an organization to NGOize; institutionalization plays a major part as well. In a general basis, institutionalization refers to the process and development or changing of rules and procedures that affect individual interactions over time; more specifically, it is a process in which societies and organizations are ‘made’ and ‘modified’ by regulating societal behavior (Keman, 2007, 453).

In NGOization context, institutionalization can happen in three circumstances (Lang, 2013). First, when there is a need to build durable institutions, NGOs are institutionalized so that the organizations are stabilized and recognized. This is about resources and inner-organizational building to secure the organization’s survival (Kriesi, 1996; Campbell, 2005) by developing consistent norms, functions, and routines, having a charter, and establishing managerial bodies that are not solely relied on certain individuals. The institutionalization process contributes to the intention of a system’s stability. Minkoff and Powell (2006) assert that organization survival rests extensively on ‘conformity to institutional conventions’ (p.596; see also Minkoff and McCarthy, 2005). Therefore, being an organization, to be institutionalized can mean that many of its practical rules are advanced into institutionalized behavior which endures, in a certain degree, stable over time; “practices become shared rules that in turn are formalized in supra-individual terms” (Keman, 2007, 454).

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6 To this point, Light (2000) suggests that NGOs is pressured by public sector reforms to transform itself in a way that the public sector experiences and prove itself to the funder. Modern management literature and New Public Management as underlying knowledge mechanism of the reform suggest a move to professionalization of organization and result-based performance; productivity, recruitment, administration, resource development, technology, and accountability are key words for the transformation. For Denhardt and Denhardt (2009), NGOs have been challenged to maintain balance between operating like a business and pursuing public and social interests like a public agency.
In addition, such organizational buildings bolster NGOs to socialize with government. Take (1999) shows that the higher the degree of organization of NGOs, the higher the cooperation they have with government and other organizations. This links to the second circumstance which are situations that NGOs have opportunity to participate in institutional settings of government. This opportunity significantly comes from the idea of ‘new governance’ which requires government to engage stakeholders and people in policy activities (see Rhodes, 1997; Salamon, 2002; Osborne, 2010); NGOs are increasingly invited and expected to join and play multiple roles in nationally and internationally institutional settings (See Harris and Rochester, 2001; Lewis and Kanji, 2009; Turner, Hulme and McCourt, 2015). NGOs institutionalized in this sense obtain higher popularity, become institutionally visible to and recognized by the authorities and funders, and ameliorate their legitimacy to advocate policies and interests and defend their claims.

Third, institutionalization happens when movement actors gain insider states and access career tracks in government agencies. Although they has become government insiders, such actors retain sharing movement objectives and advocate the movement agendas—thereby institutionalizing the agenda in the inner orbits of decision making (Lang, 2013). A ‘femocrat’, an activist-turned-government officer advocating women's issues, is an example of institutional insider for gender politics (see Gouws, 1996; Chappell, 2002). The institutional insider in many cases is proved to be a successful factor for pushing social agenda of the movement (Skrentny, 2003; Banazak, 2010). These three institutionalizations are not mutually exclusive; they benefit each other to advance the common purpose which is to advance organization’s or movement’s goals. This article is mainly focused on the first aspect as a precondition for engaging in contract with THPF.

**Bureaucratization**

According to Hibou (2015), it is too naive to merely comprehend contemporary bureaucracy as a hierarchical apparatus proper to the state; bureaucracy should be seen as a set of norms, rules, procedures and formalities which comprises not only the state administration, but also the business and the nongovernmental sector and indeed the whole of society. Actually, the proliferation of formalities, the invasion of our everyday lives by norms, procedures, rules, operations of coding and categorization, has arguably emerged from the private sector. Formalities as a form of bureaucratization happening nowadays is a neoliberal one as they are relied on the reference to the market. However, they are also embodied by the spread of manuals, kits, and guidelines in every sector. Therefore, the concept of bureaucracy is arguably not confined to only government affairs; instead, it is a form of administration found in organizations pursuing a wide variety of goals (Abercrombie, Hill, and Turner, 2006, 37). In the sociology of organization perspective, bureaucracy is “not a type of government, but a system of administration carried out on a continuous basis by trained professionals according to prescribed rules” (Beetham, 1996, 3). Bureaucracy thus appears in every type of modern organization.

Interestingly, Hibou (2015) systematically illustrates fundamentals of formalities in bureaucracy:

“criteria are necessary to apprehend risks and assess insecurity; quantified objectives and procedures are set up to reduce and even eliminate them, formalized and quantified
principles of assessment are meant to judge the effectiveness of the actions carried out, and norms are defined to designate “good” and “bad” practices. One might also mention—and this will be my last example—the expansion of what has been popularized by David Graeber as “bullshit jobs” [Graeber, 2013 - cited but the author] (even if I personally would not say that there are bullshit jobs as such, but rather jobs that have an increasing component of “bullshit tasks” in them). A feeling of malaise and futility arises when work is invaded by “extras,” which often form (or are perceived to form) a major part of working time, and take people away from the heart of their jobs, forcing them to undertake administrative tasks, follow rules, respect procedures, focus on security issues or the quality of the tasks completed, and to an even greater extent to ascertain and demonstrate that this has indeed been done, by filling forms, ticking boxes, giving feedback on the actions that have been carried out, quantifying the activity, assessing the time used to perform a particular task, organizing checks, audits, and evaluations, and so on. In other words, what we are witnessing is the penetration of the world of work by managerial techniques and their quantitative methods, but also by administrative techniques and an ever more extreme formalism” (p.viii).

Zald and McCarthy (1987) once pointed out the trend in which a social movement membership base have been progressively taken over by paid functionaries, full-time employees, and philanthropic foundations and government; this trend was called as the ‘bureaucratization of social discontent’ (Zald and McCarthy, 1987, p.340). Bureaucratization is the phenomenon that directly links to “the fact that these formalities stem from a process of rationalization and professionalization, from the desire for calculability and predictability, from the quest for neutrality, objectivity, and impersonality—all of them characteristics of bureaucracy as Max Weber had analyzed it” (Hibou, 2015, viii). Bureaucratization process, like professionalization and institutionalization, commences with ‘environmental pressures’ (Meyer and Brown, 1977). Privatization of public services and ideas of new governance have made NGOs and social movements being a frontline receiver of government contract. When NGOs and government are in contact, NGOs tend to develop bureaucratic structures, being pushed by their surrounding to bureaucratize their businesses. Funders expect NGOs to build formal accountability chains while government demands ‘detailed bookkeeping of financial transactions and internal monitoring of the “dos” and “don’ts” related to tax-exempt status’ for keeping their charity, nongovernmental status (Lang, 2013, 75). Keeping paper records, documentations, working according to prescribed rules, and accountability in combination with pressures to promote predictability,

7 Nevertheless, bureaucratization is not something totally external to an organization as it unfolds through the very same players who are its target and who, consciously or not, play an essential role in this process. Bureaucratization is not something from above but from the precess what Hibou (2015) calls ‘bureaucratic participation’ constructed through power relations.
functional hierarchies, and monitoring in NGOs’ works obviously reflect a drive for hierarchy and impersonality, keys characteristic of bureaucracy (see Beetham, 1996).  

For NGOs in particular, bureaucratization increases strategic effectiveness by giving technical expertise and coordination at the expense of public mobilization (Jenkins, 1983). Fundamental element of bureaucracy suggests that full-time, professional officials are responsible for the everyday affairs of the organization. Actually, NGO organizational properties discussed at the beginning of the article originally represent by Rothschild and Whitt (1986) as an ideal type of bureaucratic organization. In this sense, intensifying such properties can mean bureaucratization.

**Backgrounds**

**NGOs and Civil Society in Thailand**

According to the National Economic and Social Development Board (2010), there were 70,792 non-profit organizations in Thailand in 2010. Many types of Thai NGOs which operate in many social fields are recorded (see SRI, 2003; Pongsapich and Kataleeradabhan, 1997; Janya, 2007). In legislative terms, the Constitution is the foremost law that allows the erection of NGOs (Cheecharoen and Udornpim, 1999). However, the Civil and Commercial Code and the National Culture Act are the major laws (see Table 1). NGOs are divided into two types according to the laws: foundation (*mulanithi*) and association (*samakom*).

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8 Weberian bureaucracy possess four ideally major features: “hierarchy (each official has a clear defined competence within a hierarchical division of labour and, is answerable for its performance to a superior); continuity (the office constitutes a full-time salaried occupation, with a career structure that offers the projects of regular advancement); impersonality (the work is conducted according to prescribed rules, without arbitrariness or favoritism, and a written record is kept of each transaction); expertise (officials are selected according to merit, are trained for their function, and control access to the knowledge stored in the files)” (Beetham, 1996, 9). Some of these attributes arguably have the same meaning as institutionalization and professionalization.

9 It is important to note that, as a developing country without a viable and good system of statistical record on nonprofit institutions, Thailand also has numerous unregistered NGOs which significantly constitute the NGO sector and civil society along the history. Two important reasons should be mentioned on why many NGOs do not register with the state and retain the status of ‘unregistered’. First, given majority of Thai NGOs is advocacy and grassroots organizations with any political or advocacy objectives, it is not easy for them to meet the requirement of the government: a certain amount of endowment fund for a foundation, a large membership for an association, and non-political objective. As long as they can function and financially survive, they do not need to register (Salamon and Anheier, 1994). Second, registering with the government is seen as allying with the state which contradict to the ideology and characteristic of ‘anti-bureaucracy’ of NGOs. Some argue that when NGOs become registered, NGOs will not able to criticize the state as they should do (see Rakutidharm, 2014b). Thus, what shows up on official records as formally constituted NGOs potentially is ‘safe’ organizations which obscuring the real diversity of NGO universe (Salamon and Anheier, 1994, 8).
Table 1. NGOs (foundation and association) and other people organizations registration in Thailand

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Major Registrar</th>
<th>Major Law</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Foundation</td>
<td>-Ministry of Interior</td>
<td>-Civil and Commercial Code, 1925 and revised 1992 (section 110-136)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-The National Cultural Commission, Ministry of Education</td>
<td>-National Cultural Act, 1942 and 1943</td>
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<tr>
<td>Association</td>
<td>-Department of Police</td>
<td>-Civil and Commercial Code, 1925 and revised 1992 (section 78-109)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>-The National Cultural Commission, Ministry of Education</td>
<td>-National Cultural Act, 1942 and 1943</td>
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<tr>
<td>Association/Foundation</td>
<td>-Department of Provincial Administration</td>
<td>-Ministerial Decree of Ministry of Interior about Foundations Registration and Establishment, 1954</td>
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<td>-Order of Ministry of Interior No.92/2519 (1976) about Appointing Investigative Committee on Associations’ Behavior.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Trade Association</td>
<td>-Department of Internal Trade, Ministry of Commerce</td>
<td>-Commercial Association Act, 1966</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cremation Association</td>
<td>-Department of Public Welfare</td>
<td>-Cremation Welfare Act, 1974</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labour Union</td>
<td>-Department of Labour Protection and Welfare, Ministry of Labour (previously in Ministry of Interior )</td>
<td>-Labour Relations Act, 1975</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-Labour Protect Act, 1998</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Adapted and revised from SRI (2003, 53).

Although the nonprofit contribution to gross domestic product (GDP) is quite low in Thailand compared to other countries (see Salamon, 2010), it does not mean that the nonprofit or nongovernmental sector in Thailand does not exist and are not vibrant. The numbers only shows the economic dimension of the sector in which Thai nongovernmental sector is weak. Historically, after the 1980s, Thailand has witnessed a considerable rise in scope of work and in number of NGOs (see SRI, 2003). Thai NGOs have arguably emerged out of political and social reasons rather than the economic one. Compared to those of the West, few Thai NGOs do literally and solely provide public service and many play a relatively greater role in development and politics. The emergence of NGOs was perceived in Thai society as one attributed to democracy. NGOs had become a secondary political institution (Ghosh, 2009) and an agent of democratization.

It can be argued that the first wave of NGOization in Thailand had begun from the 1980s onwards. Thailand adopted more liberal policies towards society and the NGO sector which, in turn, allowed NGOs to rapidly grow (see SRI, 2003). The democratization moment also brought

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10 It is important to note that NGO facts and statistics in Thailand are underdeveloped. Therefore, it is difficult to exactly see and measure the scale and the scope of the Thai NGO sector.
about the creation of domestic organized civil society having NGOs as the prominent component. It was the beginning of modern civil society in Thailand (Baker and Phongpaichit, 2014). This phenomenon was consistent with an increasing foreign funding towards development project in Thailand (Quinn, 1997; Declore, 2003). The funded NGO boom began in the 1980s and 1990s which coincided with the opening of the market in the country to neoliberalism. Most large-funded NGOs were financed and patronized by development aid agencies, which most of the agencies were, in turn, funded by Western governments and international organizations. Roy (2014b) notes this similar situation in India and points out that these agencies, though they might not be the very same agencies, were part of the same loose, political configuration which supervised the neoliberal project.

This was the time that international and foreign bodies had a considerable role in shaping Thai NGOs; knowledges, institutions, and policies had been imported, which most of them were heedlessly done, to Thai society. Ottaway and Carothers (2000) note that, during the 1990s, donors “embraced civil society development as a necessary part of democracy promotion and launched hundreds, even thousands, of projects under that rubric” (p.293). In particular, Thai NGOs were pulled to welcome a Western style of civil society and NGO working system featured by professionalized office and employer culture. As Aksartova (2009) observed that Russian NGOs have satisfactorily “physical surroundings afforded by Western grants, which include well-appointed office space in a nice location equipped with computers, faxes, photocopiers, and so on” (p.164), Thai NGOs through foreign grants, too, had developed an office and its facilities which are respectable, Western look ones.

NGOs and the Thai government used to have antagonistic relationship until a few decades ago. However, as the government has gained more political stability, it has begun to see NGOs as a complement while many NGOs have increasingly been participating in the public policies. Many studies show that, compared to the Western societies where government normally is the second source of NGOs’ income (see Salamon, 2012; Kendall, 2003), Thailand has relatively less proportion of public subsidy on nonprofit institutions (see Salamon el at., 2012; NESDB, 2010). A Western NGO-like organization has more reliance upon public sources (Kendall, 2003, 24). However, it does not mean that Thai NGOs have not depended more on the public sector, given after the fall of foreign funds since the 1990s and most of Thai NGOs are not membership-based organizations (Thabchumpon, 2011).

Parks (2008) observes that, during the 1990s, NGOs in Asian countries have experienced fluctuations and decreases in foreign funding. Without alternative funding source, most NGOs were forced to alter there activities and goals to suit donor priorities and to acquire future funding. In Thailand, external funding had declined in the mid-1990s as a result of progress of domestic economic and political development that in turn necessarily decreased the perceived need of foreign donors (Chutima, 2004; Parks, 2008; Thabchumpon, 2011; CIVICUS, 2015). This brought about the shrinking of donor funding for NGOs (Chutima, 2004; Shigetomi, 2004). However, Thailand managed to survive the funding crisis as it successfully established alternative viable domestic sources of funding. New types of state organizations and charitable foundations emerged as important new sources of funding. Several NGOs began to domestically fundraise, though it was not easy. In this transition, Khunkanakornsakul (1999) studied 82 Bangkok-based develop NGOs in 1998 and found that 69.4 percent got support from foreign
donors, just 17.1 percent relied solely on them whereas 35.4 percent obtained funding from both foreign and Thai donors. The shift from foreign to domestic funding has taken less than two decades; Thailand relatively well-adapted compared to neighbor nations (Parks, 2008). This marked the second wave of NGOization in Thailand.

Actually, prior to the 2000s most of government subsidy for NGOs was little (see SRI, 2003). Even though some governmental agencies did set up funds to aid NGOs, they covered just a particular sector. Two important funds were the ‘Rural Development Fund’ (RDF) and the ‘Urban Community Development Fund’ (UCDO). The closer relationship between the state and NGOs in terms of funding began in the very late of 1990s as the government, by borrowing loans from the World Bank and other institutions (Bunyaratanasunthon, 2000), instigated the ‘Social Investment Fund’ (SIF) to assist NGOs for responding and restoring the economic crisis (Shigetomi, 2006; Pongsapich, 2000). SIF was the first occasion that the government channeled funds directly to NGOs (Pongsapich, 1999). It is mainly managed by NGOs (Shigetomi, 2006). Then, after the public hearings for the eighth National Development Plan which demanded a national finance institution to help local organizations (Department of Rural Development Coordination, 1997), the ‘Community Organization Development Institution’ (CODI) was established in 1998 by merging the RDF and the UCDO. However, CODI began to operate completely in late 2001. The financial support for NGOs and other people’s organizations became more institutionalized (Shigetomi, 2006).

Nowadays, few Thai NGOs get funding from foreign donors; the majority of NGO funding comes from domestic source and governmental agencies (SRI, 2003; Shigetomi, 2004; Parks, 2008; Rakuytidharm, 2014a; 2014b), notably THPF. THPF, as a quasi-autonomous state agency operating outside the formal structure of government, recently provides more than 1,000 million baht to promote numerous projects of organized civil society per year — thereby, becoming one of the most important and the biggest fund for civil society at the time (Chutima, 2004). The establishment of THPF arguably marks the beginning of the third wave of NGOization in Thailand which is the concern of the article. The third wave, unlike the first wave, is driven by domestic forces and more subtle; and unlike the second wave as it more comes from new kind of government agencies not the traditional central government. In the second wave of NGOization, NGOs were basically cautious and opposed the state in terms of funding. In the third wave, however, funding comes more from quasi-autonomous governmental agencies which there are more collaborative environments between the state and NGOs. However, the third wave does not totally displace but overlay the second one as they share common features that are different from the first wave such as the increasing significant of domestic donors and the changing nature of state-NGO relations (see Table 2). It seems that Thai NGO sector tried to move beyond NGOization coming from the external pressures. However, after the establishment of the THPF, the process of NGOization has continued and intensified the influence to NGOs. This NGOization is different from before as it comes from a domestic patron which is the THPF. Nevertheless, many heritage form foreign donors and western government are left and taken as a way of life for some Thai NGOs.
Thai Health Promotion Foundation (THPF)

In the health sector, there are three major organizations and local government agencies who share major funding roles for promotion and prevention services in Thailand; THPF is the most innovative one that is relatively designed to finance population-wide promotion and prevention activities (Watabe et al., 2016; see Appendix 1). Established in 2001, THPF claims itself as the first organization of its kind in Asia and, through collaborating with all sectors of the society, it serves as an ‘innovative enabler’ or a ‘catalyst’ to enhance health promotion and a healthy society and environment for all people in Thailand (Buasai, Kanchanachitra and Siwaraksa, 2007; Sopitarchasak, Adulyanon and Lorthong, 2015). In effect, THPF provides financial and technical support and ongoing monitoring and evaluation to anyone who shares THPF’s visions, both governmental and nongovernmental. It also owns resource centers that assist civil societies in applying, utilizing and accounting for its funds efficiently and appropriately (Watabe et al., 2016). Ultimately, THPF is interested in facilitating sustainability by promoting structural change.

According to Health Promotion Foundation Act, B.E.2544 (2001), THPF has the status of a state agency which is not a government agency or a state enterprise under the law on budgetary procedures, and the income of THPF is not required to be remitted as income of the state. In principle, THPF resembles a quasi-autonomous non-governmental organization (quango) operating outside the formal structure of government. The law regulates revenue for THPF to be directly transferred from the additional two percent of excise taxes on tobacco and alcohol products and pooled in an independent public fund governed by the Prime (Deputy Prime) Minister. Currently, THPF has annual revenue about US$120 million. Even though the funding seems to be large sometimes, it is relatively small (about 7.3 percent) compared with the financial expenses of other state agencies in the health sector in Thailand (see Sopitarchasak,
Adulyanon and Lorthong, 2015; Watabe et al., 2016). This unusual financial mechanism is believed to provide a regular and sustainable budget for THPF.

This is a kind of ‘earmarked tax’ assigned for special purposes; as it is not part of general consolidated revenue, the main advantage of earmarking tobacco and alcohol tax revenues for tobacco and alcohol control or health promotion is that they can be expected to ensure a continuous, regular source of funding for programs which is not subject to annual budgetary review (WHO, 2016; see also Buchanan, 1963; Athanassakos, 1990; McCleary, 1991). Recently, World Health Organization (2016) regards THPF as one of the most effectively innovative financial mechanism for health promotion of the world; and compared to other countries where earmarked tax is applied, THPF is relatively and highly autonomous as it is not solely supervised by the Minister of Health but independent board of 21 members under the supervision of the Prime Minister.

THPF has the fiscal cycle of project grants normally vary from a month to three years. Its budget trend shows an astonishing grow to secure the population-wide activities, from 47 million US$ in 2001 to 128 million US$ in 2011 (Galbally et al., 2012). In 2014, THPF spent about 137.3 million US$ (4,874.8 million Bath) which more than half of it (51 percent) is used to fund non-governmental agencies (THPF, 2015a). As shown in Table 3, nongovernmental agencies have mostly been counted as the major beneficiary of THPF funding.

Table 3. Proportions of the annual THPF fundings separated by types of agencies (%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Nongovernmental agencies (NGOs, foundations, associations, communities, academic institutes, etc.)</th>
<th>Governmental agencies</th>
<th>Other agencies (business, professional associations, etc.)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002*</td>
<td>56.8</td>
<td>39.1</td>
<td>4.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003**</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007****</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>65.74</td>
<td>17.74</td>
<td>16.52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>25****</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
In terms of management, THPF is managed by two governing bodies: the Board of Governance and the Evaluation Board (see Appendix 2). The former board, chaired by the Prime Minister, with the Minister of Public Health and experts in which more than half of it come form the public sector, supervises the organization’s governance and works, political development, budget allocation, and regulation enactment. The latter board, in contrast, which consists of seven independent experts appointed by the Cabinet, works to evaluate the overall performance of THPF and to assess and resolve conflicts of interest pointed out by the Board of Governance.

At the beginning of every year, THPF publicly publishes its annual report to show its development, performance, budget, management and so on. The report also consists of the study of evaluation committee in terms of performance assessment and accounting (see THPF, 2015a). It seems that THPF tries to make itself as much transparent as it can. However, although THPF is regulated by law and strict internal policies about conflicts of interests (Carroll, Wood and Tantivess, 2007; THPF, 2015a), there are complaints about this fund as problematic in terms of transparency (Watabe et al., 2016). For instance, THPF is criticized as obtaining an amount of budget without requiring annual negotiation with the Ministry of Finance and approval by the Parliament. Additionally, THPF has undergone continuous pressures from politicians to influence this fund for their political tools. By dividing the roles of providers and purchasers, THPF, compared to other health agencies, can employ tools for strategic purchasing to chose service providers more flexibly and allow them to give targeted prevention services more efficiently; the role of THPF is relatively “catalytic and leverages innovative ideas with flexible funding to a wide range of multi-sectoral networks” (Watabe et al., 2016, 7).

THPF always strategically operates under ten-year goals and master plans created annually (see Appendix 3). According to Sopitarchasak, Adulyanon and Lorthong (2015), THPF carries 15 master plans which are mostly “proactively and strategically executed through its partners” (p. 64; see also THPF, 2015b).11 These strategic plans are divided into three major categories: issue-

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11 This excepts the open grants program which invites proposals for funding from all kinds of organizations which need support for their initiatives.
based, areas/settings-based, and system-based (See Table 4). As shown in Table 4, it is evident that some topics are not directly related to health issue, provided health is defined traditionally.\textsuperscript{12} Health approach of THPF expands the notion of health and health promotion in Thailand. Health becomes ubiquitous and represents power/expertise; THPF arguably govern society in the name of health promotion. Indeed, this approach towards health comes from one of the most significant milestones of global health promotion, the Ottawa Charter for Health Promotion (1986), which calls for a paradigm shift in treating public health issues by stressing the crucial role of non-health sectors and socio-ecological approach to public health (WHO, 2009). It works by following the notion of ‘social determinants of health’ which requires a multi-sectoral approach of operation (see Galbally et al., 2012). THPF adopted the approach since its establishment to promote healthy public policy and building civil society.

Table 4. 15 strategic master plans of THPF

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Master Plan</th>
<th>Approach</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Tobacco control plan</td>
<td>Issue-based approach</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Alcohol and substance abuse control plan</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Road safety and disaster management plan</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Health risk control plan</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Physical activity promotional plan</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Healthy food promotion plan</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Healthy media system and spiritual health pathway promotion plan</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Health promotion plan for vulnerable populations</td>
<td>Area/Settings-based approach</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Health child, youth and family promotion plan</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Healthy community strengthening plan</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. Health promotion in organizations plan</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12. Health promotion in health service system plan</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13. Health promotion innovation and open grant plan</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14. Health promotion mechanism development plan</td>
<td>System-based approach</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15. Health literacy promotion plan</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Sopitarchasak, Adulyanon and Lorthong (2015, 64).

In practice, THPF has two approaches towards funding: proactive and passive. Passive grants or ‘open grants’ are a channel for anyone to submit a proposal for funding. This means that THPF only reacts by reviewing and considering the proposal. Generally, THPF runs three rounds of open grants a year and might grant an amount to partners who, in turn, grant and manage grants, as they are potentially closer to the community or the target group. Open grant budget is normally limited at the maximum of 100,000 baht.

\textsuperscript{12} The most controversial scheme provided by THPF is about the media system. THPF has funded a relatively high amount of grants to media organizations which seem for many as totally irrelevant to the health issue. To this point, THPF reasons that it treats the role of media as a contributor (or not) to the promotion of the social determinants of health. It is necessary for THPF to contribute to the promotion of a healthy media project which, in turn, improves the capacity of journalists to report on health promoting policy issues. Contributing to the development of quality media by supporting the policy advocacy on the establishment of Thai Public Broadcasting Service is crucial as well. THPF also involves in increasing children’s television programs, creating a content rating system for television and cinema, and building local media (Galbally et al., 2010; Sopitarchasak, Adulyanon and Lorthong, 2015).
In contrast, proactive grants, also known as ‘partnership model’ for funding, which accounts for the majority of the total THPF grant budget, are a strategy that directly encourages other organizations to perform the activity. THPF is in the business of working with partners to create projects mutually, rather than merely reacting to proposals. There are four key stages in the THPF partnership model: proposal development, technical review, project approval, and supervision, monitoring and evaluation (Galbally et al., 2012; see also Appendix 4). In principle, THPF brings together a group of potential partners for the initial creative design phase and to develop a program. Subsequently, this group suggests about who is best to implement the program and why. This means that THPF needs to strategically think about what to promote and who will be the potential partner of the project. This implies that THPF does not simply operate with different partners, but rather strategically identifies gaps and potential partners. Therefore, it is sensible for THPF to consider itself more than a funder but an enabler.

According to the 2011 THPF bylaw on regulation and method related to budget allocation for project and activity funding, applicants must first state what and how the proposed activity is related to THPF’s missions and objections. Then, the proposal will be in the review process which is divided into two important stages: academic review by a number of expert depend on the amount of required budget, and consideration and decision-making. The bylaw also states that grantees must submit reports of performance and finance to THPF at least once a year. In order for making contract with THPF, applicants must be a legal person.

Figure 2. THPF’s strategies: ‘the triangle that moves the mountain’

![Diagram](source: adapted from Wasi (2000, 3))

At the core of how THPF operates is the tri-power strategy model, also known as the ‘triangle that moves the mountain’ (Wasi, 2000; Figure 2), which is essentially initiated and echoed by Prawes Wasi, a prominent thinker of Thai civil society and a respectful and advisory person of the THPF. Each of THPF’s plans is developed based on the model. The model includes the creation of knowledge and evidence through research, social mobilization and policy advocacy; academic institutions, social movements and organized civil society, and
governmental agencies are, respectively, crucial proponents of the model.\textsuperscript{13} Notably, THPF’s strategy relatively emphasizes knowledge management in order to advance the technical capacity of health promotion professionals (Buasai, Kanchanachitra and Siwaraksa, 2007). The pull to professionalism is obvious in THPF’s vision.

Buasai (1997) observes that the establishment of THPF reflects the necessity for re-orienting existing health promotion infrastructures toward a greater capacity for social mobilization. Since its establishment, THPF has made numerous achievements (see Galbally et al., 2012; Sopitarchasak, Adulyanon and Lorthong, 2015). THPF promotes the reduction in alcohol consumption and smoking rate, increase road safety and accident prevention, promote well-being environment in organizations, and so on. It also supports the establishment of many innovative social and health policy. THPF is a strong advocate of health and social promoting policy. Not only direct advocacy and funding NGOs, when necessary, THPF establishes new organizations to mobilize and run campaigns (Galbally et al., 2012). Expanding networks of partners have become tools for advocacy of THPF. However, most people know THPF through its social marketing. THPF has employed sponsorship with health promoting messages as a key social marketing method. These massages are mostly about anti-alcohol and anti-smoking.

THPF likes to claim that its achievements cannot be attributed only to the organization, but are to be acknowledged as collective contributions by its partners and collaborating organizations over the country (Adulyanon, 2012). Notably, THPF’s investment on health promotion seems to provide high return to the public (Hanvoravongchai et al., 2014). THPF is considered as “the most important and the most instructive health promotion initiative in the region” (Moodie et al., 2000, 256). It is admired by international society as a successful viable innovative financial mechanism of promoting healthy public policy. As a member of the International Network of Health Promotion Foundations (INHPF), THPF has been invited to support the development of health promotion mechanisms in other countries. Recently, Thailand’s campaign for tobacco control funded by THPF is regarded as one of the most remarkable and successful stories in global health by the Center for Global Development in the project ‘Millions Saved’ (Glassman and Temin, 2016).

\textbf{Discussion}

\textbf{Professionalization, Grants and Contract Regime}

Some note that NGO-led processes of social actions are inherently imperialist and colonial (Rajagopal, 2003; Williams, 2010). Professionalization of knowledge employed by NGOs is largely draw from Western sources and assumptions which are, in turn, arguably underpinned by imperialist and colonial assumptions (Smith, 1999; Choudry and Kapoor, 2013b).\textsuperscript{14} In the case of development assistance from international organizations and Western countries, it is obvious that

\textsuperscript{13} It is noted that no private and business corporations are directly emphasized in the model. This may imply an anti-market and anti-capitalism worldview of the model.

\textsuperscript{14} Smith (1999) avers that the West has imposed five assumptions developed from liberal scholarship: legal/formal frameworks, textual/document orientation, views about science as the means for evaluation, rules and criteria for practice from business world, and selection of speakers and experts. These five attributes can be seen as approaches to formal NGO development.
the rules and knowledge for NGO practices mostly originate from the West. In developing countries like Thailand, Western model of NGOs has been forged during the years of structural adjustment and development aid either in the name of democratization or development. This model maintains even though direct links from the West are perished. Such knowledge is inherently applied in the domestic organization such as THPF.

Professionalized knowledge and managerialism suggest NGOs to fragment and compartmentalize the world into ‘issues’ and ‘projects’ (Choudry and Kapoor, 2013b), which, ultimately, makes Thai NGOs ‘projectized, log-framed and compliant’ (CIVICUS, 2015) under the newly-emerged ‘contract/granting culture’. A kind of ‘depoliticization’ of issue thus happens which NGOs’ works become merely technical matter (Ferguson, 1994; Li, 2007).

In the case of THPF, contract-based grants or grant-aid contracts are the instruments to fund NGOs. Grants as a tools of government in the new governance paradigm reflect a turn to indirect tools for public action (Salamon, 2002). According to Beam and Conlan (2002), grants, conceptually, are payments from a donor government (the grantor) to a recipient organization or an individual (the grantee) aiming to stimulate or support some sort of service or activity of the recipient. The supported activity can be either a new or ongoing one. Through grants, the grantor may involve the provision of service whereas the grantee generates actual performance; responsibility for the activity is shared by the two parties. Grants come as many forms; the most common one is cash payments.

Arguably, grants are relatively better suited the NGOs as they do not require the grantee to obligated to give a particular product to the donor government as in the case of contracts and they do not ask the grantee to pay back to the grantor as in the case of loans. If the task is not accomplished, there are most likely no legal ramifications assuming the grantee has broken no other laws. Although grants are essentially non-coercive as they encourage a particular action rather than restrict it (Beam and Conlan, 2002), it can be coercive considering many restrictions attached to the grant requirements. These requirements are regulations detailing the administrative processes and criteria for the grantor and the grantee.

Unlike traditional philanthropic grants, THPF provides project-based grants which is the contract-based funding for fixed or known periods of particular projects in the delivery of service or products without legal liability for damage for failure to operate. These grants are renewable depended on the performance, impact, and plausibility of the project. THPF grants require application or proposal to describe detailed plans, the rationale, objectives and beneficiaries of the project, scheduled operations, the way to measure the impact and performance, the budget for operation, and so on. Proposals go to expert review screening. After receipt of funds, grantees are asked to maintain financial records and submit them to financial audits and undergo file performance or/and annual reports.

In the case that the grantee cannot reach expected tasks of the project or fail to manage the project, THPF will, in effect, consult with the grantee to solve the issue. THPF will take a lead in damage assessment. If the grantee is responsible, THPF will only abolish the project and then order the grantee to return the remaining money. Although there is no legal punishment for failure, THPF grating is a kind of legal contract which two parties need to sign to activate it. If corruption or any illegal activities are evidenced related to the project, the grantee must return all the grants obtained since the commencement of the project to THPF plus an amount of interest.
However, although there are some details that make grants different from contracts (see Salamon, 2002; Beam and Conlan, 2002; Kelman, 2002), both of them share a common concern; they create ‘contracting regime’. This contracting regime\textsuperscript{15} refers to the partnership configuration that on the one side has government being a funder and on the other side has NGOs being recipient; public and private agencies are thus involved in a mutually dependent yet not equal relationship (Smith and Lipsky, 1993). Smith (2010) underlies that such contracting profoundly changes the internal management and the political behavior of NGOs, particularly by transforming the organization to a more professionalized, corporate style management, notably featuring by professional staff composition.

As THPF provides more than 1,000 million baht (about US$ 28 million) to promote numerous projects of NGOs, the increasing of support and grants form THPF to NGOs ultimately causes the beginning of ‘contract regime’ in NGO’s ecosystem. THPF claims itself being more than a ‘sponsor’ which facilitates and supports to build partnership and calls their grantees as ‘partners’ (Galbally et al., 2012; Rakyutidharm, 2014a). For THPF, ‘partnership model’ replaces the pure market purchaser-provider contracts as it collectively designs the activity with partners, not just doing contracting/tendering. However, the relationship between THPF and NGOs is still asymmetric and essentially a ‘contract regime’ though being a governance version of it. As the controller of funding decisions, THPF sets the terms of the relationship\textsuperscript{16} and its funding decisions are indeed selective depended on THPF yearly plan and framework. Criticism for not allowing all interested parties to compete for the right to develop and implement a project is regularly seen though the process of the selection of grantee, in principle, is written in all THPF annual reports. Moreover, ones excluded from the partners’ pool, especially those who do not receive the grants, often censured THPF for being a ‘club’ whose inner circle, those who know THPF’s board and staff, is at advantages for funding (Galbally et al., 2012).\textsuperscript{17} Nonetheless, THPF claims that a wide rang of new partners appears every year and the proportion of newly potential partners have continually increased (see THPF, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015a).

There is also a chance that organizations with more resources and technical knowledge are at advantages in the application process. Being familiar with technical matter for proposing the

\textsuperscript{15} Contract regime used here is not equal with purchase-of-service contracts. The word ‘regime’ is deliberately used to address a set of stable relationships which go beyond simple common practice and display the way the world works (Smith and Lipsky, 1993).

\textsuperscript{16} Actually, the relationship between donors and NGOs is dynamic and complex (Parks, 2008). Hilhorst (2003) interestingly reasons that this power relationship is relied on a dynamic and multi-layered history of interactions between donor and NGOs which are influenced by political and ideological differences, competition between organizations and disagreements over the notion of ‘partnership’. Therefore, THPF, in practice, has changed course of political and management towards NGOs over time; so there are many approaches and styles of interventions on how it can and want to impose on NGOs as grantees. Besides, different NGOs are different in scale and scope; a more professional and big NGO would have the room to specifically deal with funding agencies and issues. Network of relationship between NGO workers and funders is an important factor that defines the relationship as well (Shigetomi, 2006). In short, the donor-NGO relations could be seen in terms of ‘bargaining’ and ‘negotiation’, sometimes marked by coercion (Hulme and Edwards, 1997).

\textsuperscript{17} The funding bias coming from the personal relationship between NGO worker or referee and THPF is mentioned by many NGO workers (see Rakyutidharm, 2014a, 2014b).
project and people working in THPF, in a certain degree, bring a promising funding contract. This is the same situation happened in a market competitive tendering process in which large consulting companies are frequently excellent at winning competitive tenders because they have favorably sophisticated tender writing infrastructure in place. NGOs that pursue THPF funding contract must adapt themselves and practice to write the project proposal. Instead of working with the beneficiaries, NGOs are potentially compelled to focus more on technical matters and be familiarized with THPF system of language and regulation. This is particularly important given the capacity of project evaluation of the partners. In effect, ones who are part of the initial project design team must have knowledge and experience of appropriate evaluation methods for the proposed project so that the proactive partnership model can give maximum outcomes. Grantees are asked to specify their evaluation approaches and methods from the outset in order to adjust and improve the project as well as to earn lessons and to assess the possibility of scaling up the project (Galgally et al., 2012).

THPF, intentionally or not, transforms an organization of NGOs, helping to create ‘socializing rituals’ of NGO work. Aksartova (2009) reasons that such rituals unique to civil society assistance which socialize recipients into the donor-recipient relationship and the donor worldview which are venues where the recipients grasp rules of appropriate professional conduct and learn to become familiar with the donor vocabulary. NGOs are likely to be pushed by the nature of work contracted with THPF to replace local workers with professionalized experts. Although the THPF does not permit any project aiming for acquiring materials and/or facilities and establishing an office, NGOs’ works, in effect, become more about organizational and/or material reproduction in order to indicate that the money is well spent through an actively professionalized operation which then increases a chance to get funding in the future and less about public engagement and social movement which are difficult to measure the impact. The ‘Organization-First approach’ which treats organizational success as priority one has become NGO approach to work which ties NGOs “almost exclusively to program expansion and implementation, so funding priorities often determine organizational focus” (Harwood and Creighton, 2009, 4). NGOs have to “demonstrate managerial and technical capabilities to administer, monitor and account for project funding” (Choudry and Kapoor, 2013b, 9). NGOs are at risk of having stray from their intended missions to attract and keep funding (Anheier, 2014). Given organizational reproduction being the core of NGOs’ mission, much time and energy are dedicated to a series of attempts which have been blueprinted off the civil society charts of the THPF. The THPF, as a result, potentially makes NGOs too obsessed with manufacturing measurable ‘results’ especially in quantitative terms, forsaking qualitative ones.

In effect, anyone who used to obtain grants from THPF and would like to apply for another grants need to have a good history of performance. The project proposed has to clearly state how it is expanded and developed from the previous project(s) and what is the rationale to develop the project. More importantly, the proposal must illustrate expected impacts that will benefit more than those of the previous one(s). In the case of proactive funding scheme in which THPF is the one that sets the agendas before funding, NGOs are potentially doing nothing more than writing the proposal to fit such agendas. Although there is an involvement of potential partners to develop the programs together (see Appendix 4), it is likely to happen in the large budget projects and the one who are included in the team tend to be powerful NGOs that have
networking potential and professionalized resources. These requirements direct NGOs to obsess with organization reproduction and THPF demands; the logic of success has become NGOs’ determining factor which make NGOs staying in a structurally bad position to admit failure. Although failure does not have legal consequences, but it ruins the possibility to get a new grant and a capacity to compete with other NGOs who have successful performance in the report. To gain more budget, success story is needed to legitimize the proposal. In effect, failure denotes negative meaning. For donor, failure is not rewarded; for NGOs especially the ones in surviving mode, failure is not accepted. Grants given by THPF are structured as performance-based; NGOs will only get paid when they meet certain performance aims.

It is normal for the grantor like THPF to want to ensure that money would be spent effectively and efficiently. The funding ultimately becomes showing-impact job. However, THPF itself falls victim to the culture of success. As an autonomous state agency which obtains a certain amount of money through the special channel, THPF is not popular with many bureaucratic organizations and the central government and thus pushed to corroborate success stories which in turn serve as legitimacy for the existence of THPF. This situation puts NGOs the next in line for creating success. Therefore, NGOs are compelled to succeed otherwise their fund will perished.

Moreover, when NGO works become more professionalized and technical, people without ‘matched’ expertise will be slightly excluded and fade away from the working circle of the organization, leaving professional staff to do the organizational routine job and distancing from volunteer and the public. The development of the contract regime puts NGOs in danger of embracing too wholeheartedly the language of the business world; NGOs have become all busy devising their mission statements and business plans, and concentrating more on their outcomes and throughput (Bates and Pitkeathley, 1996, 91-92). Unsurprisingly, NGOs that receive grants from THPF will be decisively focused on assessment and strategic planning. They have become what Roy (2014b) calls the ‘indicator species’. When they think and work, impact and measurement of the activities come as one of the first concern.

Hence, NGOs may experience the contract regime as a benefit as a threat which compromises its autonomy; yet it does also give chances to keep funding for expansion and growth (Jones, 1996). Flexibility is necessary to funding relationship (Gutch, 1991). All in all, the effect of grants and contracting regime generated by THPF is consistent with the analysis of DiMaggio and Powell (1991) on ‘institutional isomorphism’ which suggests that organizations in a certain field (THPF network in this case) are subject to powerful isomorphic dispositions which then drive organizations to become more similar. NGOs under contracts with THPF highly adopt similar internal practices in order to compete effectively for the contracts (in the future). THPF and NGOs develop norms, practices and other shared professional standards guiding their conducts. It is important to note that NGOs with specific cultures or histories are able to resist the isomorphic pressures, especially if the THPF grants/contracts are relatively small part of their
overall revenue. Nonetheless, THPF has become the sole funder and the source of income for many NGOs in reality.\textsuperscript{18}

**Institutionalization and Bureaucratization**

To be fair, one critical characteristic of NGOs being an organization is that they have to be organized, i.e., institutionalized to some extent (Salamon and Anheier, 1992). Although some NGOs by nature are formally not incorporated or do not have an organization’s charter, they must have other signs of institutional reality such as rules of procedures, regular meetings, and membership which differentiate NGOs from ad hoc or temporal gatherings (Anheier, 2014). This is important for being an organization because it create the identity of the organization by drawing meaningful organization boundaries. Institutionalization requires more of this characteristic.

Generally, THPF requires anyone who pursues the grants to be, to some extent, organized or incorporated as the contract-based funding is a legal activity. In Thailand, only registered NGOs are regards as official NGOs qualified for legal transactions with other organizations (Shigetomi, 2002). Although there is no specific law related to NGO accreditation status, to gain official foundation (mulanithi) and association (samakom) status and become a legal person, one has to register either with the Ministry of Interior or the National Cultural Commission, Ministry of Education or both in according to the Civil and Commercial Code and the National Culture Act (see Table 1). Such foundation and association are regarded as NGO or nonprofit organization in general definition.\textsuperscript{19}

According to the Article 78 of the Civil and Commercial Code, the term ‘association’ refers to a group established for the purpose of any continuous communal activities that are not for profit. An association’s activities must benefit the community and its income and profits must not benefit individual members. In the Article 110 of the same law addresses that the term ‘foundation’ refers to a fund set aside for particular charitable purposes in the fields of religion, the arts, science, literature, education, or any other area where the public benefits. No personal profits are permitted.

Cheecharoen and Udornpim (1999) reveal that the registration procedure for association and foundation takes longer and is much more bureaucratic in comparison to companies or legal-

\textsuperscript{18} This information is given by informal discussion with THPF staff and some CEOs of THPF-funded NGOs and supported by the experience of the author in the NGO sector in Thailand for the last decade. There is no official statistical data regarding this issue. However, it is not sensible to deny that Thai NGOs are not dependent on THPF funding.

\textsuperscript{19} It is hard to totally classify associations or foundations into certain categories (Cheecharoen and Udornpim, 1999). Foundations and associations are mostly the same in terms of registration and tax exemption. The difference between them is about the way they operate. Unlike foundations which are limited to public benefit missions, associations can work for mutual benefits as well as public benefit mission. The rules also differ as to political involvement of associations and foundations; associations are allowed to engage in political activities while foundation’s registration application has to clearly write ‘no politics involved’ with the exception of ones that are established for the purpose of promoting democracy under a constitutional monarchy. Besides, associations are likely to be member-based and their committees tend to be somehow elected by the member. There is an annual member meeting in every association which is regarded as a checking mechanism of the organization. Foundations, in contrast, are more inward and close system run by professional employers and employees.
person partnerships; “[m]any offices are involved, the required paperwork is voluminous, and the process has more steps than necessary to ensure legal compliance” (p.337).

For ones that do not want to involve in such a time-consuming process of registration, they can pursue a less formal version of being incorporated. The less formal versions of the applicant are ‘working groups’, ‘projects’, ‘unit’, and ‘forum’ as a groups of person that has no legal personality. According to law, a group of person in this context is established by at least two people to perform non-profit distributing activity, notably registered with the Revenue Department. In other words, it can be seen as a foundation without a legal person status.

Moreover, the pull to institutionalization by registering with the government creates an obsession in money and materials. One important of the registration requirement is a certain amount of endowment fund especially for a foundation. Gaining more budget means increasing stability. Actually, as long as they can function and financially survive, they do not need to register (Salamon and Anheier, 1994). However, the reality is that NGOs cannot financially survive by themselves. Receive more funding intensifies this issue.

In an application for granting, THPF writes that the project proposal must carried by a credible and reliable group of people, agency, organization, and community relating to the area of proposed project. These applicants have to be endorsed by credible individual who has no involvement and interested in any payment form the applicants. In reality, no one would like to accountable for informal groups without institutionalized manner. Institutionalization increases stability and credibility of the group and makes the person feel, to some extent, secure to endorse.

Furthermore, THPF’s advocates and experts are likely to support NGOs to get involve with the government. To gain credibility, institutionalized form of the organization is significant to make other listen. Prawas Wasi repeatedly speaks about the ‘tri-power strategies’ which actively encourage NGOs to work with government and sometimes gain insider status of the government. Lobbying seems to be a favorite tactic that the THPF and its sympathizers use and encourage the related NGOs to employ. This tri-power strategies lead to a certain version of civil society in Thailand which will be discussed later.

Moreover, the initiation of the state to promote non-state forces may eventually cause the rise of total amount of regulations, paperwork, and bureaucrat-like employers (Graeber, 2015). The more the state intends to reduce its interference in the NGO sector actually results in producing more regulations and more bureaucrat-like people in the NGO community. This apparent paradox can be observed so regularly in the way THPF treats related NGOs. Many NGOs potentially turned to be isomorphic with THPF. THPF which emerged as a newly-kind state agency arguably reflects the neoliberal ideology supporting non-state mechanism. However,

20 These terms are frequently said to label NGOs without ‘legal person’ status in Thailand (Salamon and Anheier, 1994).

21 The underlying assumption is that the more the state liberalizes the policy towards NGOs, the more NGOs become under the state regulation. State has changed from using hard control via controlled laws to soft control via subsidy and contract. Governance reforms intended to reduce governmental interference in economy and society and to promote non-hierarchical means of governing, paradoxically, cause an ultimate rise of more regulations, more paperworks, and more bureaucrat-minded officers. This is called by Grabber (2015) as ‘the Iron Law of Liberalism’.
it is still function within the framework of public organization bounded to hierarchies, principles, prescribed rules and regulations, namely bureaucracy.

According to the way THPF is administrated by two governing bodies, it can be argued that, albeit being non-bureaucracy, the Board of Governance is significantly influenced by bureaucratic and the state power as the proportion and direction of the member is favored by the public sector side. Chaired by the Prime Minister with the help of the Minister of Public Health implies that the state and bureaucracy still ultimately hold the decision-making power over the organization. In addition, the Evaluation Board’s works reflect logic of performance-based capitalist market emphasizing expertise, competition, accountability and performance. Focusing on outcomes and social impacts, THPF’ performance is monitored and evaluated at three levels: plan and program, master plan, and organizational. Consequently, this creates “dos” and “don’ts” of the organization by monitoring and evaluating the organization’s performances which will become new criteria for future operations. Although its autonomous status would free it from the rigid and complex structures of a bureaucratic system, bureaucracy-as-professional-administration is still function well in a quango. It appears that these protocols and working standards are being imposed over the grantee who has a lower position and direct interaction with THPF. It is possible to suspect that funded NGOs are inclined to be more hierarchical given the isomorphic pressures put by THPF.

In practice, funded NGOs are asked to keep every detail of financial records and submit them with proved audit reports by a professional auditor. These reports are normally done at least twice during the funding agreement, at the middle and at the end of the project. This creates difficulties for less professionalized and institutionalized NGOs in particular when they spend money and launch activities. Professionalized or big NGOs are likely to have an in-house audit section or alike which performs the finance-related tasks; small NGOs have less systematic finance department, if any, and need to hire external people to perform the task. NGOs are obliged to act according to numerous laws and regulations. These laws are written in legal language and needed to be interpreted into common language; NGOs workers are compelled to learn and familiarize themselves with prescribed rules. One important rule for THPF grantees is that grantees must not involve in any commercial and advertising activities related to tobacco and alcohol for the last year before getting funding from THPF and must not take any support from tobacco and alcohol industries during the the funding period with THPF. THPF even has regulations for grantee to use its logo and state the message in any products and activities so that the public will know that the activities are funded by THPF. If grantees break the rule, THPF has an authority to abolish the contract and the grantees have to return all the money with 15 percent interest per year. In some cases, such grantees must also compensate an amount of money to THPF as a punishment. The protocol applies to other cases of contract abolishment by THPF as the grantor as well.

During the contract, funded NGOs need to report their progress, along with the financial report, several times as addressed in the contract agreement. The amount of information to report increases by the time of the project. The first time might need not to report as much as the final time. Generally, funded NGOs are asked to report the activities, their outcomes and participants as well as self-evaluation of the activities. The tasks of monitoring and assessment consist of a lot of varied indicators and criteria. Funded NGOs must fill pages of assessment forms which
require knowledge and experience, in a certain degree, to effectively finish them. For the final report, they are also required to specify and analyze their target groups and areas, strategies, publicity, publications, participation with other organizations, and so on. These self-assessment is both quantitative and qualitative and more advanced requiring technical knowledge and expertise. The final report must be written in a standard book format with cover, acknowledgment, executive summary, table of contents, preface, body texts, summary, bibliographies, appendixes and other visual materials (if any).

Specifying a ‘target group’, in particular, is usually defined for the period needed to implement the ‘project’; ‘targeting’ is “limited by the time frame of the project” (Jad, 2007, 185). Besides, this ‘target group’ is selective; the selection of ‘target group’ defines the prioritization of the unit of development of particular NGOs. As a result, some groups will benefit form the NGOs while others are necessarily left out. This standard of prioritization, for Hearn (1998), causes a fragmented process of development without equity; consequently, NGOs should not be seen as mere neutral humanitarians but political actors that “should be honest in presenting themselves and being understood in that light” (p.99). This temporality of the constituency and, then, the project carried out by professionals hired by the organizations to do the ‘job’ rather than driven by voluntarism (Jad, 2007), therefore, creates unsustainable development works; the question arises: what will happen to the ‘target group’ after the end of the project? This depoliticizes NGO works and NGOs themselves making them becoming a technical matter and conformed organism, respectively. With minuscule but numerous funding requirements, NGOs funded by THPF are likely to spend so many working time for dealing with writing project reports and other documentation, which are perceived as ‘extra’ of the working mission.

Implications Towards Civil Society

What can NGOs gain from the NGOization? According to Lang (2013), the returns are both material and symbolic. By material returns, NGOs will get a better legal status which in turn makes them easier to access fundings and to influence policy. By symbolic returns, it makes NGOs getting closer to the donors or governments—thereby, normalizing the relationship they have with governing agencies and donors. This, however, has drawbacks. When a relationship is strongly formed, there is always an exclusion of some parties and perspectives which show less organized interests causing a kind of client or insider relationships between selected NGOs and government (Alvarey, 1999; Lang, 1997, 2000). In summary, NGOization serves as a conduit for internal/organizational reproduction and external legitimacy for gaining funding (Lang, 2013).

Moreover, the process of NGOization signifies considerable implications about the transformation of civil society. First, it is a specific condition that means NGOs do operate in the 21st century or the late modern civil society influenced by neoliberal ideologies and policies. For some, it is a product of neoliberal globalization which composes of the thrive of issue-specific NGOs and the centrality of civil society in which such NGOs are a major component (Stubbs, 2007; Yacobi, 2007; Sheppard et al., 2009). It also refers to a development in the organizational formation of civil society vis-a-vis the government. NGOs become more stable which able to “support moral claim-making with fact-driven claims” (Lang, 2013, 86).

According to SustainAbility (2003), the 21st century NGOs are more insiders as a part of the system which would be changed. They are focused more on solutions delivered through
market which is contradicted to the previous generation of NGOs that spotlighted problems considered as symptoms of market failure. They also invest heavily in networks and see government and corporate fundings as investments, not guilt; they then actively persuade supporters that they are good investor and professional. In addition, they do not solely follow charity sector rules but adapt strategy and business management for their work.

Phenomena like professionalism and bureaucratisation feature modernity. Bureaucratization in particular is considered as one of the main figures of neoliberalism (Hibou, 2015). Promoting NGOs is seen as the policy and practice of strengthening civil society and good governance which are counted as intrinsic pillars of neoliberal policy (Petras and Veltmeyer, 2001, 2005; Kamat, 2004). Funding NGOs, for donors, is then a strategy to democratize a society with ‘civil society’ (Petras and Veltmeyer, 2001, 2005; Veltmeyer, 2007). THPF uses funding as a mechanism to promote civil society too. Therefore, professionalization and the other developments function well for neoliberal regimes. Many point out that NGO operations are inclined to welcome capitalism rather than seeking to transform it (Greenfield, 2001; Petras and Veltmeyer, 2001; McNally, 2002; Choudry and Kapoor, 2013b). Funding, in fact, is a market mechanism that is the act of providing financial resources. NGOized organizations have become part of the ‘nonprofit industry complex’ (INCITE, 2007) modeled after capitalist structures. NGOization, ultimately, to put it in Petras and Veltmeyer’s words (2005), serves to keep the existing power structure intact whereas promoting a degree of change and development. In short, the process of NGOization, especially professionalization, is driven by the neoliberal policy context in which NGOs work (Kamat, 2004).

The second implication is that the state-NGO relationships is developing into greater ‘collaborative’. It can be argued that this relationship is totally not the achievement of NGOs but the capacity of THPF in drawing NGOs to function with government agencies while NGOs are able to retain their own missions (Rakyutidharm, 2014a). NGOized organizations better meet the need of states and donors that seek reliable and competent partners. NGOs realize that public advocacy strategies involving protests, direct opposition and so on are not welcome by government donor. Collaborative environment derives from transformed working approach of NGOs to be a more creative but tamed civil society. In this sense, NGOization happens in an arena of governance. NGOization represents a precondition for NGOs to engage in modern governance arrangement.

Conceptually, one of considerable changes in the new governance is the selection of instruments to reach a governance purpose by the state. Instead of depending on a traditional ‘command and control’, the state utilizes more ‘softer’ or indirect instruments such as co-operative arrangements with non-state actors, and ‘co-production’ in particular (see Ostrom, 1996; Pestoff, 2006, 2009, 2012; Brandsen and Pestoff, 2006; Pestoff, Brandsen and Verschuere, 2012; Poocharoen and Ting, 2015). In this sense, the state has shifted from being a direct ‘doer’ to ‘regulator’ of private provision—thereby, becoming a ‘regulatory state’ (see Majone, 1997; Schneider, 2002; Crawford, 2006; King, 2007; Levi-Faur, 2013), which increasingly expands the use of rule making, monitoring and administrative techniques. For Power (1994, 1999), such desire to enhance the capability of the state to oversee non-state actors, there is an ‘audit explosion’, i.e., the increasing of state strategies for creating and managing networks and
partnerships through setting up all kinds of arrangements for auditing and regulating other organizations.

Actually, THPF itself is a product of new governance logic as the state is, to some extent, hollowed out through networks and contracts (Milward and Provan, 2000; Rhodes, 2012) and having some missions devolved to other agencies—thereby, becoming an enabler rather than a doer. The state through THPF mostly act ‘steering’ while non-state actors, markets and civil society, do the ‘rowing’ (Osborne and Gaebler, 1992; Denhardt and Denhardt, 2003; Braithwaite, 2000; Jordana and Levi-Faur, 2004). THPF’s operations as a newly type of state agency “no longer center on managing people and programs but on organizing resources, often belonging to others, to produce public value” within the web of multiorganizational, multigovernmental, and multisectoral relationships that increasingly characterize modern governance (Goldsmith and Eggers, 2004, 8). It can be argued that THPF and its relationship with funded NGOs are a consequence of an audit explosion in Thailand.

Further, among an rocket increase of collaboration between governments and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), a question arises; what makes NGOs legitimate actors in late modern civil society and public affair? In fact, some point out various sources of legitimacy in which NGOs can claim (see Thrandardottir, 2012; Beetham, 2013; Lang, 2013). This article argues that it is the process of NGOization which significantly makes NGO a legitimate and reliable partner for governments.

Third, it signifies the growth of ‘institutionalized advocacy’ (Lang, 2013), making NGOs better access to institutional contexts and being competent and reliable experts in governance arrangement. Nonetheless, it diverts NGOs from their constituencies and public movement activities. Hence, although this help NGOs to reach their advocacy goals, it has drawbacks. Here, it is considerably important to note that the argument of this paper does not reject the positive impacts NGOization creates, yet it contends for a more transitory, less palpable consequence which has implications for civil society in Thailand.

**NGOization and Its Critiques**

In principle, NGOization is heavily criticized as making NGOs engage less in public advocacy which is arguably a significant democratic attribute of NGOs as legitimate civil society. Kamat (2013) states that “NGOization stalls and obstructs processes of authentic democratization” (p.ix) and reminds us that NGOs and NGOization are not the same thing. Professionalization, institutionalization, and bureaucratization compel NGOs to minimize, if not, ignore inputs from externally vibrant constituencies and larger publics—thereby ‘losing their roots’ (Hulme and Edwards, 1997). As a result, they disincentivize NGOs to build resource links with their publics which go beyond donations. Such diminishing of the mobilization feature of social change created by NGOs is notes by Bayat (2004) as an establishing factor of a new form of clientelism. The ‘true beneficiaries’ to this seemingly ‘participatory turn’ of NGOization which allows NGOs to participate in institutional settings are NGOs, not the people (Davis, 2006).

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22 One may argue that NGO constituency is not really defined by a NGO itself; what actually constitutes the constituency potentially “come[s] to be defined as one’s donor community rather than as those affected by an NGO’s action” (Lang, 2013, 86).
However, there is a situation that constituencies do not count on professionalized organization to promote their interest (Jenkins and Eckert, 1986). NGOized organizations are considered elitist, upscale, and uncommitted to the real lives of people (see Henderson, 2003). Engaging less with the public, they have contributed to their demobilization and been seen as legitimate proxy public of the government and donors—thereby being ‘their’ civil society, but not the ‘public’ one. Besides, some argue that a real social change cannot happen through NGOized organization funded by foreign or governmental bodies; ‘the revolution will not be funded’ (INCITE, 2007). Lang (2013) concludes that NGOization has shaped that advocacy repertoire of civil society actors, which, in turn, helps create professional civic entrepreneurial class through donor-defined mandates and, perhaps, establish a depoliticized and well-trained professionalized class of citizens.

This professional civic entrepreneurial class or ‘nonprofit professionals’, on the one hand, might well administrate their organizations and positively engage with government. On the other hand, it sometimes prompts “the establishment of an elite of activists rather than the fostering of horizontal ties, norms of reciprocity and civiness” (Jacobsson and Saxonberg, 2013b, 7). The expansion of the NGOs by fostering top-down, centralized, bureaucratic, corporate NGOs rather than grassroots, bottom-up processes potentially harms the building of a functioning civil society (Henderson, 2002; cf. Fagan, 2005).

Many times, NGOs working with ideologies shared by THPF are criticized as ‘elite’ NGOs (Phatharathananunth, 2006). They become an elite proxy between people and other agencies. They are accused of representing the deals and interests of THPF in the policy process and development work in order to ensure the continuation of funding and their very own survival. This arguably make advocacy activity without publics; through institutionalized context, they claim themselves as ‘naturalized’ representatives of beneficiaries they advocate. A shift from activism to advocacy produces images of experts who ‘speaking for’ instead of ‘engaging with’ resulting in a more expert-oriented and donor-friendly communication style, i.e., a language and an idiom of donor-specific expert culture (Lang, 2013). NGOization makes NGOs learn to speak a particular linguistic repertoire for acquiring funds and status (Aksartova, 2009).

In Thailand, many certain catchwords are commonly seen in NGO’s linguistic system such as ‘partnership’, civil society’, ‘effectiveness’, ‘efficiency’, ‘modules’ and so on. These words somehow have become the standard of grant applications. In particular, ‘partnership’ is strongly encouraged as the golden word and strategy of the THPF to reach its goal and build civil society (see Galbally et al., 2012). Here, civil society, derived from Prawes Wasi, is used to refer to the partnership between civil society actors and government agencies (see Phatharathananunth, 2006; Rakyutidharm, 2011); the state is intensively included to be an important element of civil society in this context. Consequently, NGOs and the state have, to some extent, become ‘partnership’ as THPF referred to grantees as ‘partners’ or ‘owner of the issues’ while positioned itself as ‘supporter’ (Rakyutidharm, 2014a). The idea of ‘network’ or ‘alliance’ is popularly used to explain the relationship between NGOs and THPF. Arguably, it is the first time that NGOs were drawn to fully operate with the state with their own missions.

Nevertheless, it is not clear that how the constituents and recipients engage in this partnership approach as goal formulation, program building, and decision-making are principally the business of the THPF. Selected potential NGOs are occasionally invited to discuss the project
and further fine tune the project proposal (Galbally et al., 2012). These is also no obvious commitment for NGOs to publicly report feedback from their primary constituents, if any, in the funding agreement. This might create a kind of partnership that lacks of beneficiaries engagement and NGOs that being self-referential, developing priorities and strategies internally without reference to peoples they claim to represent or advocate or community where they work.

This partnership style of civil society potentially causes negative consequences. Frequently, the state mechanisms echoed with the prominent idea of ‘partnership’ unintentionally weaken civil society; civil society becomes part of the state whilst strengthens the state’s position towards civil society (Phatharathananunth, 2006; Jumnianpol, 2001). This partnership approach also invites governmental agencies to engage in a vast range of activities formerly carried out independently by NGOs, augmenting the state’s control over society as the state, in effect, is the first among equals. Additionally, since the state has become the key source of funding, it influences, neutralizes, de-politicizes, and manipulates the activities of partnership (Phatharathananunth, 2006, 10), demanding in return a disciplined partnership. A form of ‘state corporatism’ consequently happens, instead of civil partnership and is arguably criticized for building ‘manufactured civil society’ (Peci, Figale and Sobral, 2011; Hodgson, 2004). There is a high possibility that other organizations, which are not selected by the state, are exclude to access to policy debates and thereby effectively politically silenced as observed elsewhere by Alvarez (1999). The scenario is particularly true in rural areas in Thailand. Many state-manufactured NGOs in Thailand have been “a tool for the government to co-opt and control civil society” (Crispin, 2000, 21). Ultimately, this partnership approach plays a part in making Thai state to be not consistently pushed back by civil society but managed to discover methods to marginalize or co-opt NGOs.23

Funded by THPF is seen as threat for the autonomy of NGOs as civil society actors. There are concerns towards advocacy role of NGOs towards the state and government as THPF is legally an autonomous state agency.24 Indeed, the donor-NGO relation is a political matter and heavily influences the being and transformation of NGOs. Unfortunately, many NGO workers only see the relationship of donor-NGOs in terms of technic which can be managed, notably through lobbying and negotiating. It seems that they do not see political aspects related to asymmetric power relations of their interactions with THPF (Rakyutidharm, 2014b). In addition, NGO workers tend to view ‘receiving government fundings’ as ‘a kind of utilizing public resources’ in which NGOs are legitimate to do that; NGOs think that grants that come from people’s tax are spent by them for people/public interests as they claim to represent a specific constituency. There is also a historical context that NGOs obtaining funding from foreign agencies were accused as brainwashed, ill-intentioned ‘third-hand’ or ‘foreign-infiltrated’ NGOs

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23 Even so, co-optation of civil society is necessarily not the product of cooperation between the state and NGOs (see Phatharathananunth, 2006). In effect, NGOs can keep their autonomy when contracted with the state depend on many factors as the donor-NGOs relations is complicated.

24 Traditionally, NGOs did not totally welcomed governmental fund as many of them rejected the assistances because they were skeptical about true motive of the state (Delcore, 2003). The government tends to provide grants to non-political NGOs which potentially decreased the advocacy role of NGOs. Nonetheless, this was not the end of Thai civil society as there were many cases that proved although NGO received fund from the government, they still protested against the government (see Parks, 2008; Rakyutidharm, 2014b).
(Sattayanurak, 2006). Getting more funding from the government is believed by some NGOs as a way to delete such an image of funded NGOs. Moreover, for some, THPF being an quango is spotted as a non-bureaucratic agency which is, in turn, not the central government. THPF is supposed to have an autonomy from the state and reaching funding from THPF is not totally equal with obtain money form the government. This seems correct but reflecting a narrow worldview of NGOs about the state and state power. THPF is inherently bureaucratic in many sense.

Some NGOs might experience the partnership model or the proactive approach of funding in which THPF is the one that begins to offer funding to NGOs and then invites NGOs to consider the plan or project set by THPF. This case tends to let NGOs think that they are not the applicant in the first place; hence, they have advantages over THPF as they are experts in need. It seems that NGOs in this situation of pre-contract with THPF might not experience process of NGOization. Nonetheless, regardless of who asks who first for funding, to acquire the material and funding support, NGOs are ultimately compelled to NGOized, notably according to funding requirements. And during the contract, NGOs are transformed, consciously or not, to be consistent with THPF’s priorities.

Heavily focusing on donor and funding requirements is a great threat to NGOs’ ability as effective intermediaries and a part of vibrant civil society (Edwards, 2014). NGOs have become disciplined organizations run within parameters and frameworks set by the donor (Choudry and Kapoor, 2013b). THPF has played a crucial role in shaping NGO strategies. In specific, funding requirements of THPF significantly cause the imposition of institutional blueprint of civil society molded by the THPF. NGOs which got money from THPF must follow THPF’ administrative system and project advice. Even though THPF claims that it invites NGOs to share opinion, collaborate in planning, joint activities, and support each other to reach mutual goal, the agenda-setting of the issues still normally begin by the THPF and the inner orbit of THPF experts. In the process of contract, NGOs are expected to act and think following the ways the THPF designs for. This situation is called by Evans (2004) as ‘institutional monocropping’. A heterogenous and variety of civil society is replaced by the limited pattern of NGOs.

Finally, the aforementioned discussions raise the emergence of accountability issues. NGO-constituency relations is one of the major issue related to NGOization process. As NGOs have grown increasingly Frankenstein-like into ‘a large, complex, top-down, technically oriented bureaucracy guided by government and donors’ which is less accountable to and supportive of its base (Jellinek, 2003; Davis, 2006), the scale and complexity of operations have also multiplied quite dramatically, making the task of management and accountability as challenging as leading
a major business corporation (LeRoux and Feeney, 2015). Mitlin (2001) reports how, on the one hand, NGOs “preempt community level capacity-building as they take over decision-making and negotiating roles”, whereas, on the other hand, they are restrained by “the difficulties of managing donor finance, with its emphasis on short term project funds, on financial accountabilities and on tangible outputs” (p.164). The power of decision-making in NGOized organizations is customarily depended on the particularly qualified director of the board in which the success is not based on an ability to mobilize local people but the “ability to fund-raise, be convincing, presentable and able to deliver the well-written reports that donors require” (Jad, 2007, 184). Kamat (2003) challenges NGOs in terms of accountability that “[t]heir dependence on external funding and compliance with funding agency targets raise doubts about whether their accountability lies with the people or with funding agencies” (para. 9). To this point, stated Roy (2014b), NGOs, in the long run, are accountable to their funders, not to the people they work among which ultimately turns confrontation to negotiation and depoliticizes resistance from below; NGOs become a well-manner, reasonable, salaried, nine-to-five job.

Conclusion—Unintended Consequence?

NGOization is a process that intensifies NGO organizational properties which significantly affects the way NGOs think and act. This article argues that NGOization of civil society investigated here is an unintended consequence of THPF’s funding and operation vis-a-vis NGOs. For THPF, funding is a mechanism to reach healthy public policy and build civil society. Unfortunately, this unintentionally put heavy pressures on NGOs resulting in NGOization of funded organizations. However, the process of NGOization is neither good nor bad as it has benefits and drawbacks. To professionalize, institutionalize, and bureaucratize are sensible for stabilizing the organization. Nonetheless, these processes riskily ignore democratic characteristics of NGOs, distancing NGOs from the public. In Smith’s language (1987), this process “uses knowledge to restructure collective non-capitalist forms of organization into hierarchical strata, detaching them from the movements they originate in and connecting them to the relations of ruling” (p.216-217). NGOized organizations frequently build and “become enmeshed and invested in maintaining webs of power and bureaucracy” instead of focusing on creating movement for social change (Choudry and Kapoor, 2013b, 15).

For Kamat (2013), NGOization process is an always unfinished and unstable project. NGOization in Thailand has happened through the history. The NGOization through THPF funding represents an unusual NGOization process; unlike many cases that foreign powers

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25 However, to be fair, legitimacy of NGOs comes from technocratic as well. Beetham (2013) interestingly reasons that the proper source of authority of NGOs is a combination of democratically based and technocratic. The democratic proponent can be seen in NGO ability to perform as a representative of different constituencies, members and advocates whose voices and interested are marginalized. The representation of marginalized social groups is linked to a larger notion of civil society in democratic polity. This legitimacy is of great value but hard to validate conclusively and relies on how NGOs relate themselves to the relevant constituency. According to Atkinson and Scurrah (2009), there is a difference between ‘speaking as the poor, with the poor, for the poor, or about the poor’ (p.207). In addition, expertise and experience in a certain field is also the source of NGOs’ authority. This technocratic legitimacy means that NGOs operate with their knowledge, information and analyses. It is important to note that democratic and technocratic sources of NGO legitimacy are not mutually exclusive or oppositional. NGOs are often asked to work with democratic ‘authority’ based on technical expertise for their achievements (Beetham, 2013, 277).
involve, this NGOization is principally domestic and indigenous. Many NGOs has no other alternatives just THPF funding. And in survival mode, it is very challenging for NGOs who receive grants from THPF to maintain their autonomy and to resist, or perhaps move beyond, NGOization process.

This paper argues that THPF puts intense pressures notably through funding on related NGOs, driving them to professionalize, institutionalize, bureaucratize to be a reliable applicant or partner of THPF. This, in turn, depoliticizes NGO working approach, breaking and compartmentalizing the social world into technical ‘issues’ or ‘projects’. THPF operations and its funding requirements create a kind NGOization of civil society in Thailand.
References


Health Promotion Foundation Act, B.E. 2544 (2001)


Thai Health Promotion Foundation (THPF) (2010). *ThaiHealth Annual Report 2009*. Bangkok: Thai Health Promotion Foundation. [in Thai]


**Website**


Appendix 1
Promotion and Prevention Financing and Service Stakeholders in Thai Health Systems

Abbreviations
THPF = Thai Health Promotion Foundation
PPA = prevention and promotion area-base payment
PPE = prevention and promotion express-based payment
PBF = performance-based financing
NHSO = National Health Security Office
UC = the Universal Coverage scheme
CUPs = contracting units for primary care
PCUs = primary care units
PHC = primary health care
Tambon = a local governmental unit in Thailand which is below district (amphoe) and province (changwat)
Appendix 2

THPF’s Board Structure

Appendix 3
THPF’s Structure of a Plan and Its Mechanisms

Executive Board

→

Plan Administrative Committee

→

Program Steering Committee/Program Manager

→

Plan (1-15)

→

Director / Secretary

Contract with allies to implement each program

Project Package

→

Project

Source: adapted from Galbally et al. (2012, 137)
Appendix 4
The Four Stages in the THPF ‘Partnership Model’ or Active Funding Scheme

Stage One: Proposal Development
- Organize a consultative meeting with experts on a specific issue to formulate project ideas and to identify strategic interventions/activities; during this meeting, experts also recommend potential partners with competencies to implement the project.
- A THPF technical officer together with an expert (or sometimes an identified interested partner) drafts a project proposal based on what was discussed during the consultative meeting.
- Potential partners discuss the project and further fine tune the project proposal.
- The project proposal must be consistent with the criteria THPF has set out for different types of projects, namely, development, operations, research or sponsorship.

Stage Two: Technical Review
- Reviewers must not have any direct relation with the project.
- The number of people on the technical review panel depends on the project size, ranging from one person for projects less than 200,000 baht (US$6,378) to seven people for projects more than 5 million baht (US$159,440).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Project size (baht)</th>
<th>Number of people on the technical review panel</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>&gt; 20 million</td>
<td>7 persons (3 persons must be members of Executive Committee); the reviewing process should be a face-to-face meeting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10-20 million</td>
<td>7 persons; the reviewing process should be a face-to-face meeting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5-10 million</td>
<td>7 persons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-5 million</td>
<td>5 persons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>200,000-1 million</td>
<td>3 persons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&lt;200,000</td>
<td>1 person</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Stage Three: Project Approval

- Once a proposal has been revised as required, according to advice from the technical review panel, a technical officer will submit the project for approval by a THPF CEO, the respective Plan Administrative Committee or the Executive Board, depending on the project’s size:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Project size (baht)</th>
<th>Authority</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>&gt;50 million</td>
<td>1) Endorsed by the Plan Administrative Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2) Approved by the Executive Board</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20-50 million</td>
<td>Plan Administrative Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&lt;20 million</td>
<td>THPF CEO</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- All board members and members of the Plan Administrative Committee considering a project proposal must sign a form declaring whether they have a conflict of interest, and anyone who does must leave the meeting room while the other members vote on the proposal.

Stage Four: Supervision, Monitoring and Evaluation

- THPF conducts a financial audit for every project and a project audit when the disbursement is more than 500,000 baht. The Board appoints an internal audit sub-committee which also reviews operational compliance and certifies financial audits and other reporting to the Board.
- Each of office is responsible for internal supervision and quarterly monitoring, and each grantee is also responsible for supervision and monitoring activities in their own programs and projects.
- All projects receiving grants of more than 20 million baht (US$637,755) must have an external independent evaluation.