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Keynote Address

**The Third Sector, Human Security, and Anti-Terrorism
in Comparative Perspective**

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Fellow members of ISTR, President Deguchi, Professor Butcher de Rivas, Professor Onyx, members of the Board, distinguished guests, and ladies and gentlemen:

I am honored to appear before you today, invited to deliver the keynote address for this seventh biannual international conference of the International Society for Third Sector Research. Let me express the gratitude of all of us gathered here to Princess Maha Chakri Sirindhorn, who will grace this meeting with her presence tomorrow. The Princess and her family have played a signal role in supporting civil society, social development and the protection of human security in Thailand, and we are delighted to be here in Thailand as the Thai people celebrate the sixtieth anniversary of the King's ascension to the throne.

Let me also express all of our gratitude to the Center for Philanthropy and Civil Society at the National Institute of Development and Administration (NIDA), and to the Thai host executive committee headed by Professor Juree Vichit-Vadakan of NIDA, and the Thai host advisory committee, for their commitment and hard work in bringing this conference to fruition. Our Thai hosts have welcomed us to their beautiful country with great warmth and open arms, in the spirit of *raum jai*.

We are all grateful as well to the superb and hardworking staff of ISTR, particularly Margery Daniels, to the Conference Academic Committee co-chaired by Professors Jacqueline Butcher and Jenny Onyx, to the many reviewers of proposals for panels and papers for the conference, and everyone else who has already done such a superb job to make this important event a success.

We are honored and delighted to be meeting in Thailand, a nation with a long history of altruism, public service, and an active role for civil society, philanthropy and the nonprofit sector. Many of us have visited Thailand before; I had the extraordinary privilege of living here in Thailand and in Bangkok for three years during the 1990s, when I worked here for the Ford Foundation. In meeting here we honor the Thai third sector and civil society, whose contributions to Thailand will be reflected in many of our discussions over the next several days, and whose features reflect many of the issues we

shall address. The extraordinary diversity of the Thai nonprofit sector - the strength of voluntarism and social commitment - a focus on human security and social justice - deep roots in religion and culture – a range of activities from service provision to partnership to advocacy: all of these characterize the Thai third sector and civil society. And never were those features and others more clear, both in Thailand and elsewhere in this region, than in the sector's response to the devastating tsunami that hit this country and others in late 2004.

At the same time, as our Thai hosts have made clear, a number of the issues we will be discussing are also mirrored in the development of the Thai third sector and civil society. These include issues of resource mobilization for civil society, the promise of and issues confronted by social entrepreneurship, changing relationships with donors, and others. In coming here to discuss civil society and human security over the next several days, we salute the exceptional role of the third sector and civil society here in our host country, Thailand.

Considering Human Security

The topic of my talk here today is "The Third Sector, Human Security, and Anti-Terrorism in Comparative Perspective." And the topic for our conference is "civil society and human security."

Several of those terms are familiar to all of us - particularly the third sector, and civil society. In our field, there are still debates over the meaning of the third sector and civil society, but I shall not dwell on those discussions today because, quite frankly, we might never get beyond those definitional dialogues in the time I have available.

But "human security" is a newer term, and one that has been used with greater frequency over the past decade or so. What do we mean by human security?

The term has a long history, going back at least to the founding of the United Nations in 1945. But in its more modern form the use of "human security" in debates over civil society, participation, and sustainable development took a giant step forward when it became the focus of the U.N. Human Development Report in 1994. In that now famous use of the term "human security," the Human Development Report focused on the struggle to achieve "freedom from fear and freedom from want." The 1994 Report defined human security as "safety from chronic threats such as hunger, disease and repression," and "protection from sudden and hurtful disruptions in the patterns of daily life - whether in jobs, in homes, or in communities."

Since 1994 the concept of "human security" has been taken up in many contexts. It is important that we address human security here in Bangkok, for distinguished leaders and activists from across Asia have played key roles in furthering our understanding of human security and its meanings. Six years after the Human Development Report brought "human security" to the forefront of thinking about development, Professor Amartya Sen addressed the idea of "human security" in a now well-known speech in

Tokyo. He paid tribute to Prime Minister Obuchi Keizo of Japan, who in 1998, at the International Dialogue on Building Asia's Tomorrows, addressed the idea of "human security" and said: "It is my deepest belief that human beings should be able to lead lives of creativity, without having their survival threatened or their dignity impaired." Prime Minister Obuchi went on to define human security as "the keyword to comprehensively seizing all the menaces that threaten the survival, daily life, and dignity of human beings and to strengthen the efforts to confront these threats."

 In his own discussion of human security, Professor Sen focused on these three core issues: the menaces that threaten the *survival, daily life and dignity of human beings*. He reaffirmed in ringing terms that civil society has a crucial role to play in addressing the menaces that threaten human security, that threaten that survival, daily life, and dignity of human beings. And recent events have made it even more starkly clear that the third sector is crucial to the world's efforts to enhance human security. One need only look at the response to the tsunami in Asia and Hurricane Katrina in my country, the role of NGOs in Darfur and throughout the world, and events in all regions of the globe to understand the importance of the role that the third sector plays in survival, a key element of human security.

The third sector also plays a crucial role in the second aspect of human security the Prime Minister Obuchi and Professor Sen addressed, the menaces to daily life. For Professor Sen, a key menace to daily life was the problem of economic, ecological and other downturns, and the need to ensure what he called not only "growth with equity," but also "downturns with security." Addressing downturns with security, for Professor Sen, requires not only "social and economic provisions" but also "political participation." Professor Sen elaborates: "This requires the establishment and efficient working of democracies with regular elections and the tolerance of opposition, but also the cultivation of a culture of open public discussion. Democratic participation can directly enhance security through supporting human dignity ... but ... also help[s] in securing the continuation of daily lives (despite downturns) and even the security of survival (through the prevention of famines)."

 Here too, in the menaces that affect daily lives as well as the menaces that affect survival, there can be no doubt of the central role of the third sector. From disaster relief and service provision to advocacy, partnership, and experimentation and innovation with new ideas for development, the third sector is crucial to realizing this vision of human security. And for those who embrace Amartya Sen's vision of human security as necessarily including democratic and political participation, the third sector has played a crucial role in advocating and solidifying political and democratic participation in countries throughout the world.

For Professor Sen, following on Prime Minister Obuchi, the third prong of human security was human dignity. And here Professor Sen was also clear. For him, addressing the menaces that threaten human dignity as an aspect of human security means defining and advocating for development that, in Professor Sen's words, "is not only about the growth of GNP per head, but also about the expansion of human freedom and dignity."

In this arena of human security, "the expansion of human freedom and dignity," the third sector is also playing an irreplaceable role worldwide.

There have been other definitions of human security over the years. For example, the Commission on Human Security in 2003 called the objective of human security "to protect the vital core of all human lives in ways that enhance human freedoms and human fulfillment," focusing on building institutions that protect and strengthen human security, and on empowering people to act for themselves to defend and strengthen their security. The concept of human security has been addressed by Secretary General Kofi Annan in the Millennium Report in 2000, by the World Bank, by a number of other scholars, and, not least, by a number of national governments as well. And some nations, Canada, Japan and Norway among them, have now made the concept of human security a central focus of their foreign policies.

The Third Sector's Role in Strengthening Human Security

In each of these contexts and many others, the role of the third sector and civil society in defending and strengthening human security is recognized in multilateral statements, in commission reports, in the work of scholars, and in the policies of governments, even where the exact term "human security" may not itself be used.

ISTR and its members, meetings and journal have contributed actively to our understanding of the third sector's role in human security at the local, regional, national and international levels. In fact, it is not going too far to note that the relationship between human security and civil society has been explained most clearly by many of the scholars and policy analysts who have gathered around the International Society for Third Sector Research.

ISTR members and collaborators have spoken and written actively and with passion about the role of the third sector in strengthening diverse and tolerant societies; in combating inequity, violence, racism and other social evils; in sustaining and advancing democratic and participatory processes; in reforming failed or inadequate governance and improving governance processes; in serving the poor and others, individuals and groups, whose lives are marked by human insecurity, whether those are our fellow people living in Thailand and elsewhere in Southeast Asia, or in Africa, or Latin America, or anywhere on the globe.

ISTR members and friends have clarified what I believe we can accept as a central maxim of the voluntary sector: that, despite problems that need to be solved, exceptions that need to be reformed or excised, and even situations where the third sector contributes to inequity or insecurity – on balance and without question, the voluntary sector is a net contributor to human security at the dawn of the twenty-first century.

That may strike you as a self-evident statement. How many of us would devote a significant portion of our professional lives to studying or working within a sector that we felt was not a net contributor to human security? I would think that many here today,

including, I hope, our distinguished guests, agree with the proposition that the voluntary sector is a net contributor to human security at the dawn of the twenty first century.

<u>The Third Sector as a Perceived Source of Human Insecurity and Uncivil Society</u>

So what is left to discuss, if we are clear that the third sector that we study and work in contributes to human security?

I would submit that there is much left to discuss. And a primary reason for that is that a number of governments and political actors around the world do not actually regard our sector - the third sector that almost all of us either study or work in or both - as a source of human security. A number of governments and political actors seem to regard the third sector as a source of *in*security, not as civil society but as encouraging *un*civil society, not as strengthening peace and human security but as either willing conduit for, or an ineffective, porous and ambivalent barrier against insecurity in its most prominent modern forms, terrorism and violence.

To be sure, there has always been mistrust of the voluntary sector by governments in many nations around the world. This mistrust, or skepticism, finds policy expression in tightened regulation, stricter governance and financial requirements, restrictions on foreign funding, limitations on endowment growth and investments, barriers to advocacy, and a host of other legal and policy requirements. But I would submit that the current suspicion, in a number of nations, goes further than the traditional mistrust or skepticism and reflects a vision of our sector as a source of insecurity and incivility that has been fueled by the reemergence of terrorism, particularly since the horrific attacks of 2001 and subsequent attacks in Bali, London, Madrid, and elsewhere.

We meet at a time when the third, voluntary or nonprofit sector – whatever term we use to describe it – is under significant pressure in many parts of the world. One source, but not the only source, of that pressure on the third sector has been terrorism, and particularly government reactions to terrorism. In the wake of terrorist events in many parts of the world, including Asia, Europe and the United States, the sector we study and work within is an arena that, in many countries, is under suspicion and investigation for the role – real or alleged – that some nonprofit or charitable organizations have played in ties to terrorism. And even where governments do not make the explicit ties between the third sector and terrorism – and most governments do make that link today – our sector is regarded as easily used by terrorism, an ineffective and porous source of finances, organization, communications, and the transfer of goods and services for terrorist purposes.

We may regard these perceptions as accurate, as partly accurate, or as wholly inaccurate. But they are there, and they have helped to create additional pressure on the third sector in many countries. The ripples of this pressure on the voluntary sector travel far indeed: this perception and this pressure contributes to an environment of enhanced regulation of the voluntary sector, and strengthened state oversight of voluntary sector activities. They contribute to a declining confidence in the sector's ability to contribute to the resolution

of social problems and the advancement of human security that is our core goal. They contribute to declining funding for the sector and, I would submit, a declining ability for the voluntary sector in some countries to obtain support for innovative programs. They contribute to an atmosphere of investigation and suspicion that envelops the sector in some countries. They contribute to a shifting of aid priorities that equates poverty with terrorism and preference anti-terrorism programs in foreign aid. They contribute to timidity within the third sector, a timidity that sometimes expresses itself in refusal to engage in important and innovative but also perhaps controversial work at a time when the sector is under pressure in a number of countries and intense pressure in a few. They contribute to an environment in which the third sector is under pressure to do more, and to do more effectively, to regulate itself.

Of course, some of these pressures on the third sector are justified. I would be the last to say that the effects of all of these ripples of pressure are negative – I would be the last to say that governmental oversight, and even the enhanced state oversight we see today in many countries, does not contain some positive elements. I would be the last to say that the voluntary sector need not improve its governance, financial standards, and programming in my country and in many other countries as well. But we must be aware of the pressures on our sector and on the effects of those pressures.

Put simply and to summarize, the third sector is now considered, by many governments, to be a source of human insecurity as much, if not more, than a contributor to human security, a breeding ground for uncivil society rather than the proud emblem of civil society. In the view of many governments – and I submit that in my country, the United States, as well as in parts of Latin America, Africa, Asia, Europe and the Middle East these sentiments have been growing since 2001 – in the view of many governments the third sector is a conduit for the values and financing of terrorism and other forms of political, religious or ethnic strife. The ripples from that worldview now affect the third sector every day and in dozens of countries around the world.

The Third Sector and Human Insecurity: State Responses

If nonprofits are viewed as a direct conduit of insecurity, or as a porous and ineffective barrier against it, then the state's responses have been clear – not only in my country but in a number of other countries around the world. Let me catalogue some of those responses, bearing in mind that not all state actions have been taken in all countries.

Governments that believe that the third sector is a source of human insecurity may respond with heightened and over overbroad regulation of the nonprofit sector, regulation that imposes broad new requirements on the sector that are largely untargeted against particular offending organizations. Governments may impose financial, governance, reporting or other restrictions unrelated to threats of insecurity or terrorism.

Governments may, using terrorism as a pretext, engage in extra-legal persecution of the nonprofit sector. Governments may, again using terrorism as a pretext or reason, fail to

combat bureaucratic practices in its relations with the third sector, reducing its effectiveness and allowing corruption to fester.

Just in the last five years, we have seen various forms of anti-terrorism regulation affecting the third sector, or threatening to affect the third sector, or anti-terrorism being utilized as a rationale to control the third sector in a number of countries. The contexts vary dramatically, of course, but anti-terrorism is an issue for the third sector in nations ranging from India, China, Canada, the United Kingdom, Pakistan, Australia, Cambodia, Zimbabwe, Central Asia, the Netherlands and elsewhere throughout Asia, Africa, and Latin America.

These responses take many forms:

Prevention of terrorism laws and regulations in India and elsewhere in South Asia that directly affect the nonprofit sector, for example. Restrictions on gatherings and associational activities in China. Limitations on funding in the United States and new certification requirements for funders and nonprofits alike. Inclusion of charities in new anti-terrorism legislation in Britain. New methods to close or suspend charities linked to terrorism in Canada. The use of anti-terrorism and rhetoric to crack down on the charitable sector in Zimbabwe, Uzbekistan, and elsewhere. The list could go on. And sometimes these moves may be considerably less formal, more along the lines of what Jude Howell has called the "intangible creation of climates of opinion or shifting attitudes" toward the voluntary sector.

The notion that the third sector is a source of human insecurity rather than a net contributor to human security is not, of course, the only factor underlying some of those state policies I have listed. In a number of countries, the idea that our sector is a source of insecurity, even a conduit of terrorism, may not even be the primary factor mentioned by government officials in moves to tighten control over the sector. Other factors can play a major role in pressure on the third sector: the rapidly growing role of diasporas in social development, and the attention that brings from the state; major issues of accountability and transparency in the voluntary sector; the growing role of political and religious giving; and a number of other factors as well.

Sometimes the state may not even itself believe in its rhetoric of insecurity, but may be using insecurity and one of its most prominent modern forms, terrorism, as a coldly calculated and fear-inducing lever to strengthen control over the voluntary sector. But these measures are occurring in a sufficient number of countries, activated by a sufficient range of governments, to spur us to examine this phenomenon and how we should approach it even where the state's hardening policies toward the third sector in a number of countries may, I acknowledge, come from a range of sources and reasons.

The Third Sector and Human Insecurity: The Third Sector's Responses

Not only the state but also the third sector itself responds to the sense that the sector is linked to, or ineffective in the battle against, terrorism. And in some countries where the

sector is strong, the sector's has still responded to these pressures with a dual timidity – timidity in the face of state action, and timidity in the face of the need to be responsible for our own accountability and legitimacy.

The nonprofit sector has, in some cases, engaged in self-censorship, or failed to defend nonprofits caught up in overbroad government action. In a number of countries, for example, the broader third sector has stood by as Muslim charities were targeted and shuttered. In the absence of necessary facts about the relationship between these charities and terrorism, I am certainly not saying that it is the job of the voluntary sector to defend all nonprofits that come under suspicion. But when governments use tactics that threaten the third sector more generally, that are not specifically targeted at actual wrongdoers, and the voluntary sector does not respond, we must be concerned about such timidity. We must be, in my view, particularly concerned when some of the most powerful institutions in the nonprofit sector – such as large American foundations – fail to respond effectively to government actions that chill and threaten innovation in the third sector and that appear to go beyond what is necessary to fight against the threat of terrorism.

The U.S. Example

As I detail this criticism, let me discuss some developments in my own country. We are gathered from dozens of countries, and normally I would not focus on one. But in this critique it is perhaps most appropriate for me, as an American, to criticize certain developments and policies in my own country rather than to criticize the actions and policies of others.

My government's offensive against several Muslim charities was pursued with a vigor that convinced many in the American nonprofit sector that the government's actions were based on solid evidence. Perhaps it was. But in the heat of the environment after the horrendous and murderous attacks of September 2001, the remainder of the American nonprofit sector generally did not consider it an option to criticize the breadth of government tactics in the investigation and closure of Muslim charities that admittedly distributed funds in the Muslim world and, admittedly, in some cases to terrorist organizations and the families of suicide bombers.

Some, however, tried to indicate problems with the breadth and potential implications of government's approach. Key Muslim community organizations warned that the government's actions contributed to an anti-Muslim backlash. But outside the Muslim community, there were few dissenting voices.

One of the few was the director of an umbrella association of nonprofits in Ohio, in the American industrial midwest. This nonprofit leader stepped forward in 2002 to warn of the quote "implications of the unprecedented effort by federal agencies, working in concert, to shut down significant charities, seize their records and assets, and force the organizations to suspend operations until their innocence can be proven."

But those voices were solitary ones. Most of the nonprofit sector in my country hoped for a kind of unspoken bargain with the government: government criminal enforcement would be limited to Muslim charities that had funneled donations to some combination of terrorist and charitable activities abroad, and those organizations would be considered guilty until proven innocent. Meanwhile, in the other side of this unspoken bargain, the rest of the American nonprofit sector seemed to hope that the broader sector would remain unaffected.

The director of the Ohio nonprofit association challenged that unspoken bargain. "Will any organization be subject to the same treatment if the government claims links to terrorism? How broadly will terrorism be defined .... ? What about eco-terrorism, or domestic disruptions such as the protests organized against global trade and financial institutions? If a major U.S. philanthropic institution is discovered to have made a grant to an organization that the government claims is linked to terrorism, will it be subject to the same 'seize and shut-down' treatment?"

Of course, governmental efforts did not end with three or four Muslim charities. Some provisions of the Patriot Act, adopted in late 2001, were clearly applicable to the American nonprofit sector, for example. But, truth be told, none of this really disturbed the American nonprofit and philanthropic sector – neither the investigations, indictments and broad statements about registered Muslim charities, nor the possibility that the new Patriot Act could be applied vigorously against the nonprofit sector well beyond a handful of Muslim charities. It was only when the government took steps that might directly threaten the autonomy of the sector that an important portion of American philanthropy and nonprofits were stirred to a response.

That step was the release of the *Anti-Terrorist Financing Guidelines: Voluntary Best Practices for U.S.-based Charities, by the U.S. Treasury Department* in late 2002. The Guidelines provided a broad and detailed range of new provisions for charitable and philanthropic organizations to use in their overseas giving, including the collection of considerably more information about grantees than is sometimes available, the vetting of grantees, review of financial operations, and other requirements in quite detailed terms. The effects on southern NGOs, for example, were potentially significant indeed.

In the words of our colleague Barnett Baron, whom many of you know, the 2002 Treasury Guidelines carried the danger of "setting potentially unachievable due diligence requirements for international grant-making, [and] subjecting international grant-makers to high but largely undefined levels of legal risk, [which] could have the effect of reducing the already low level of legitimate international grant making."

Only now, when threatened by what was arguable overbroad and vague government action, was the philanthropic community bestirred to act, complaining about the breadth of the government's so-called "voluntary" prescriptions. A band of major charities and foundations active overseas, angered and anxious at the sweep of the Treasury's new guidelines and fearful that "voluntary best practices" would be treated as law even though

they had not been adopted by Congress or formally adopted by a government agency, proposed a new approach: what it called the *Principles of International Charity*.

They prefaced their new Principles by noting that "after consideration of both the effectiveness of existing procedures and the implications of strict compliance with the Guidelines, charitable organizations concluded that that Guidelines are impractical given the realities of international charitable work and unlikely to achieve their goal of reducing the flow of funds to terrorist organizations, but very likely to discourage international charitable activities by U.S. organizations." The nonprofits asked the government to withdraw the onerous and ineffective Treasury Department Guidelines and to substitute the new *Principles of International Charity* drawn up by the nonprofit and philanthropic sector.

Those Principles emphasized compliance with American law but also that charitable organizations and foundations are not agents of the U.S. government. They emphasized that charities are responsible for ensuring, to the best of their ability, that charitable funds do not go toward terrorist organizations, and that there are key baseline steps that can be taken to help in reaching that goal – but also that there are a diverse range of ways to accomplish that goal, and that different methods of safeguarding and protection will work for different kinds of organizations that have different types of risk. And the charitable organizations concluded, "each charitable organization must safeguard its relationship with the communities it serves in order to deliver effective programs. This relationship is founded on local understanding and acceptance of the independence of the charitable organization. If this foundation is shaken, the organization's ability to be of assistance and the safety of those delivering assistance is at serious risk."

In response to the charitable and philanthropic sector's concern, and because of the unworkability of the earlier, hastily drafted Guidelines, the Treasury revised its Guidelines on overseas giving in December 2005. The "revised" *Anti-Terrorist Financing Guidelines: Voluntary Best Practices for U.S.-Based Charities* did make some improvements, particularly in reducing some of the onerous and unworkable due diligence burdens on American organizations providing charitable funds overseas. But three basic issues remained that were of continuing and deep concern to the nonprofit sector.

First, in the words of the concerned charities and foundations, "the revised Guidelines contain provisions that [continue to] suggest that charitable organizations are agents of the government," and that assumption and suggestion could lead both to declining effectiveness and to severe harm to American aid personnel working overseas. Second, the revised Guidelines seem to require nonprofits funding overseas to collect even more data than the original 2002 Guidelines would have required. And third, the nonprofit community remained deeply concerned that these so-called "voluntary best practices" were in fact stealth law, adopted without consideration by Congress or formal rulemaking by an agency. In the words of the concerned charities and foundation Working Group, "we are concerned that the revised Guidelines will evolve into de facto legal

requirements through incorporation into other federal programs, despite the inclusion of the word "voluntary" in the title."

When directly confronted with government action that would impinge on the ability of American nonprofits and foundations to undertake overseas giving and perhaps endanger their programs, the American nonprofit and philanthropic sector began to resist aspects of the new government regulation of the nonprofit sector based in anti-terrorism. A battle of sorts has been joined between the government and the philanthropic sector over overseas giving, and neither side is giving in: The Treasury has not withdrawn the new, revised Guidelines on overseas giving, and the nonprofit community continues to insist that its Principles of International Charity should be substituted for the government's revised Guidelines. But this only occurred when the sector saw itself as directly threatened.

In recent months the fallacy of assuming that government actions would be directed solely against a few Muslim charities, and that the remainder of the nonprofit sector would be left alone, has been further challenged by the emergence of new evidence indicating that my government has, in fact, targeted a much broader swathe of the American nonprofit sector for surveillance and observation. It is now clear that literally hundreds or even thousands of American nonprofits have had events observed, telephone calls sorted, or financial transactions examined by government agencies. Again, with apologies for speaking here primarily about my own country because I feel it is perhaps most appropriate for me to criticize my own government's actions, it is now clear that in my country the government continues to view the nonprofit sector as a source of insecurity well beyond the initial prosecutions of a few Muslim charities for channeling funds to terrorism.

These developments have had other unfortunate consequences as well. In particular, American foundations have been deeply concerned about potential investigations of their grant making by the executive or legislative branches, and several have responded by shifting responsibility to their grantees, through new and broadly worded grant letters, not to engage in any activity that might be considered redolent of bigotry or encouraging terrorism or violence.

The federal government tried to impose a new certification requirement on the thousands of charitable organizations that receive funding through a federal employees' giving program, the Combined Federal Campaign, in which nonprofits would be required to certify that no employee or others with whom the nonprofit had any ties appeared on any of the government's chaotic and confusing terrorist watch lists. After widespread protest, that requirement was rescinded.

I mention these to indicate the ripples that arise when one government appears to view our sector – beyond a few individual organizations – as a source of insecurity rather than a builder of security, a source of incivility rather than a key building block of civil society. These ripples affect many other countries besides my own, as I have indicated, and occur in multiple forms.

The Duties of the Third Sector

These are complex and difficult matters for the third sector in any country; I only use my country as an example. Many other scholars and commentators have written about these issues in other countries, and I commend their superb work to you. Many of those scholars and commentators are affiliated with ISTR, and some of them are here at our conference today. Blake Bromley, Alan Fowler (whom I think for discussions on this theme, discussions directly reflected in this address), Jude Howell, Rajesh Tandon, Lia Versteegh and others have written or spoken cogently and eloquently on these issues. And a number of papers address these issues directly or indirectly at this conference, including by examining the complex links between civil society and human security.

The road is difficult for the nonprofit sector when particular elements of the sector are regarded by the state as sources of insecurity. On the one hand, our commitment to human security requires, in the words of the 1994 Human Development Report, a focus on the struggle to achieve "freedom from fear and freedom from want," and that most certainly includes opposition to terrorism. If, as Amartya Sen regards human security, it includes a commitment and action toward "the expansion of human freedom and dignity," that is clearly incompatible with terrorist acts. And so we support measured and reasoned state action to confront this threat to human security. And we support enhanced measures within our sector – through self-regulation and other means – to address directly the perception that the third sector is a source of insecurity and incivility and a nesting ground for inappropriate practices. Far better that the sector itself seek urgently and effectively to address some of these issues than that we cede the ground to governments.

At the same time, the third sector must, where possible, point out instances where state policy, even when well-intentioned, seems likely to chill the innovative spirit, effectiveness and functioning of the voluntary sector. Where possible the third sector seeks to shine a spotlight on instances of persecution of the third sector, and to defend the sector against attacks from government, or from nongovernmental extremists of various kinds. I recognize that in many countries undertaking those roles is difficult, and in those cases third sector organizations continue to exercise the necessary caution in working within environments that we all know can be very complex and sometimes dangerous.

The Duties of Scholars

Finally, we must reassert the value of measured, knowledgeable, comparative and even multilateral approaches to dealing with situations in which elements of civil society actually do contribute to human insecurity, to an uncivil society. Those situations do exist, as we all know, and we must be forthright in recognizing those links where they are shown and firmly opposing third sector involvement in human insecurity, whether through terrorism or in other forms.

But resolving these issues on the basis of hastily drafted new state policies based on emotional and political appeals within the confines of political contention in individual

countries, such as my own, rarely represents the most well-informed solutions to the problem of voluntary sector organizations that contribute to human insecurity through, for example, the financing of terrorism. We have a difficult role to play in these debates, for as scholars, researchers and policy analysts of the third sector we must call for and contribute measured analysis, knowledgeable viewpoints.

But our role goes further than seeking to build an environment for measured and knowledgeable policy analysis and policymaking on these difficult issues of civil society and human security. The scholars who gather under the ISTR banner can play a role that goes beyond the crucial task of encouraging measured and knowledgeable policymaking. For we are perhaps uniquely positioned to envision a broader world, a sense of options and possibilities that are drawn from comparative analysis of civil society and human security.

In few countries around the world today has the resurgence of state concern and control over the nonprofit sector been tempered or measured by any understanding of what other nations are doing. In my own country, for example, our policymakers have utterly ignored examining lessons from other nations on these issues – lessons that may indicate that more measured, even limited means may have a greater effect in delinking the organizations that appear to actively support terrorism from those activities. We have failed to explore, for example, the alternative approaches underway here in some countries in Asia, or in Canada, where legislative measures to halt third sector links to terrorism have been criticized but, I must now, are indeed more carefully crafted and targeted than in my country.

I think we would all agree the most of our governments are not oriented toward understanding the benefits that come from comparative analysis – and in many of our countries that may be a huge understatement. Even where states have access to this comparative understanding, they may still not use it effectively in determining policy. But the state must be aware that there are other options, even nuanced and carefully drafted options, and we are among the few that can provide those comparative options. So we must help where we can, and we should not underestimate the light that can be shone by pointing out comparative examples where a better job may be done with fewer and more well target interventions.

In an era of terrorism, of growing religious, political and ethnic insecurity, our comparative approach is more than scholarly. With an urgency perhaps never before experienced by the third sector, it is important that those who rule the third sector begin to be aware that there are other paths, policy choices in other countries that reflect the same goals for the state – security and, yes, often control – but can be accomplished through means that are considerably less onerous and considerably more nuanced and sophisticated.

Some of us would go even further. For those, like me, who believe that unilateral approaches to the questions of human security are often less effective than multilateral approaches, our work can point out the very existence of multilateral means to address

issues of human security that our students, colleagues and policymakers may be woefully unaware. How many colleagues and policymakers know, for example, that there is a detailed multilateral approach to halting terrorist financing – the key problem in the link between the third sector and terrorism – undertaken by the United Nations and by the Financial Action Task Force, a group of dozens of countries and organizations working on these problems? The need for measured and knowledgeable analysis leads us toward comparative approaches, and for some of us that even leads us toward multilateral approaches to these pressing issues.

So what does this mean for our duties as scholars, as researchers and policy analysts of the voluntary sector? Our work must be unrelenting, critically analyzing both the successes as well as the substantial shortcomings of third sector organizations and of the state in its regulatory engagement with the voluntary sector. That unstinting search for the truth of what occurs in the voluntary sector may be our only salvation from states that now live in fear, and cope with that fear by extending their reach and reasserting their power.

Only by an unstinting search for the truth of what occurs in our sector and its meaning can we seek truly to understand the relationship between the third sector and human security. And only then can we be believed if we stand for the principle that, on balance and with exceptions that must be dealt with, the voluntary sector around the world is a net contributor to human security, not to human insecurity, to the strengthening of civil society rather than the strengthening of the forces of incivility among us.

Scholars and researchers such as those gathered in the ISTR community have an important role to play in the unstinting search for the truth about the voluntary sector – we are among the few who seek real data, defensible propositions and conclusions, rather than beginning with and defending already held biases about the sector without the benefit of critical, measured and knowledgeable analysis. And the scholars gathered here are among the few who particularly value comparison in understanding the third sector and government policies toward it, a perspective that is particularly valuable at a time of increasing state suspicion of, and actions against, the voluntary sector in a number of countries.

The topics we will discuss over the next several days reflect this unstinting search for truth in an era of heightened suspicion of the voluntary sector. The dimensions of voluntarism; the specifics of state regulation of the voluntary sector; strengthening civil society legitimacy and accountability; the role of gender, religion and ethnicity; the role of civil society in natural disasters; social enterprise; the role of civil society in conflict resolution; civil society and fundamentalism; problems of advocacy; limitations on funding and resource mobilization – all these are intimately related to the new position of the voluntary sector and the problem of human security.

I wish you well in all these discussions. I hope that we can emerge from this meeting and over the next several years with a deeper understanding of the role that the third sector plays in advancing human security and what can and should be done, both by

governments and by the voluntary sector itself, when third sector organizations are linked to human insecurity. That is a difficult task, but the scholars gathered through ISTR are, I think, perhaps uniquely qualified to undertake it.

Thank you very much.

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