NAVIGATING THE ROAD LESS TRAVELED: WHAT YOU REALLY NEED TO KNOW TO SUCCESSFULLY PRACTICE DOMESTIC RELATIONS LAW

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Galt House Hotel
Louisville, Kentucky
A NOTE CONCERNING THE PROGRAM MATERIALS

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THE PRESENTERS

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JUDGE PATRICIA WALKER FITZGERALD has served as a Family Court Judge since her appointment by Governor Brereton Jones to Jefferson Circuit Court in 1995. She has twice served as Chief Judge of the Jefferson Circuit Court, Family Division. Judge FitzGerald has worked with agencies in Washington, D.C. and Florida to establish family courts in those regions. She served two terms as a member of the Board of Trustees of the National Council of Juvenile and Family Court Judges and is a member of the Kentucky Judicial Education Academy Board. Judge FitzGerald is a graduate of the University of Kentucky and the Brandeis School of Law at the University of Louisville. She is the recipient of the Louisville Bar Association’s 2012 Judge of the Year Award.
I. RECENT APPELLATE OPINIONS OF PRACTICAL IMPORTANCE TO FAMILY LAW PRACTITIONERS

A. Corns v. Corns, 343 S.W.3d 622 (Ky. App. 2011)

Overview: By their agreement incorporated into the decree, parents of one child have joint custody with no designation of a primary residential custodian. An issue arose concerning a health care decision for the child. At a motion hour, the court authorized the mother to schedule the procedure and allowed the father to obtain a second opinion, adding that if the second opinion stated that the procedure was contraindicated, a hearing would be scheduled. After obtaining the contrary second opinion, the father filed a pro se motion asking the court to have a hearing on the mother’s ‘lying’ to have the child’s tonsils removed. The mother filed a response stating that the father’s motion did not state an appropriate claim for relief but agreed with her interpretation of the essence of his motion and stated that she and the father could no longer share joint custody. The mother’s response stated that the father’s motion was statutorily deficient to seek a modification of custody but affirmatively stated that pursuant to the statute, a modification of custody should be granted. The mother’s response concluded by stating that “it should be readily apparent from the various pleadings filed by [father] that joint decision making in this case is impossible.”

At the motion docket call of the case, the court stated that the matter was on “for basically a change in custody.” The mother’s lawyer reasserted that the father’s motion was deficient but stated that the mother’s response “filled in the gaps” left by the father’s deficient motion. The court scheduled a hearing.

At the hearing, the mother was represented by counsel and the father was pro se. The court announced the hearing as one on the father’s motion to change custody joined by the mother with her response. The mother’s counsel affirmed the accuracy of the court’s statement. Following an evidentiary hearing, the trial court awarded the mother custody of the child “with the authority and legal right to make all decisions that come with that title . . . .” The father obtained counsel and, following an unsuccessful motion to alter and amend, filed an appeal.

Relevant Holding(s): The Court of Appeals reversed and remanded the trial court holding that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to modify child custody.

The father’s motion sought only to address a medical decision concerning the child. The mother’s effort to reconstitute and join the father’s motion
as a motion to modify custody through her verified response did not confer subject matter jurisdiction on the trial court to deal with the matter as a motion to modify custody. The mother’s verified response was not a cross motion and could not cure the deficiencies in the father’s motion which was never intended as a motion to modify custody.

**Discussion Points:** The father’s due process rights to a fair hearing were denied because the mother’s counsel filed a statutorily deficient motion that the trial court permitted to be heard.

The mother’s verified response was statutorily deficient as an affirmative motion to modify custody because it did not allege ‘adequate cause’ to establish grounds for a change in custody – *West v. West*, 664 S.W.2d 948 (Ky. App. 1984); it was not supported by a proper affidavit – KRS 403.350; and, the father was not provided proper notice that the court intended to conduct a hearing on custody modification – *Murphy v. Murphy*, 272 S.W.3d 864 (Ky. App. 2008).

B. **Anderson v. Johnson**, 350 S.W.3d 453 (Ky. 2011)

**Overview:** The parties divorced in 2002 with one minor child. In 2007, by the parties’ agreement, the court entered an order awarding joint custody with equal timesharing. In 2009, the mother filed a motion to modify the timesharing arrangement so that she could move to Paducah, KY with the child. The father objected and the trial court conducted an extensive hearing. The trial court made no findings of fact and no conclusions of law and found that it was not in the child’s best interests to move to Paducah and denied the motion. The mother appealed asking that the case be remanded for specific findings of fact. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court relying on Burnett v. Burnett, 516 S.W.2d 330 (Ky. 1974), holding that findings of fact are not necessary when a trial court denies a motion. The Supreme Court accepted review.

**Relevant Holding(s):** The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals decision and remanded the matter to the trial court holding that the trial court’s failure to make findings of fact supporting the conclusion of law reached was in clear violation of the command in CR 52.01 that ‘in all actions tried upon the facts without a jury or with an advisory jury, the court shall find the facts specifically and state separately its conclusions of law thereon and render an appropriate judgment.’

**Discussion Points:** The opinion provides an interesting discussion of the tension between the language in CR 52.01 and the language in CR 52.04 that provides that a ‘final judgment shall not be reversed because of the failure of a trial court to make a finding of fact on an issue essential to the judgment unless such failure is brought to the attention of the trial court by a written request for a finding on that issue or by a motion pursuant to CR 52.02.

In the case, the Appellant had not made a written request pursuant to CR 52.02 for the trial court to make findings of fact.
The opinion acknowledges that CR 52 places a burden both on the trial court and on the litigant but states that the broader burden is on the trial court whose has the express duty to make necessary findings of fact and conclusions of law.

The opinion’s rationale is that the trial court must make findings of fact and not deal with the matter in a perfunctory manner, but, if the trial court misses some critical finding(s), the burden is on the litigant to ‘assist’ the court in its good faith efforts to comply with the rule. When a trial court makes no findings of fact, a litigant will not be prohibited from asking an appellate court to require the trial court to do its job as required in CR 52.01.

C. McGregor v. McGregor, 334 S.W.3d 113 (Ky. App. 2011)

Overview: The parties were married nineteen years prior to the commencement of the divorce. Two children were born of the marriage. Following trial, the court entered findings of fact, conclusions of law and judgment that, among other matters, imputed income to the wife in excess of her then recent earnings. The trial court applied the imputed income both in its child support and maintenance calculations. The trial court ordered equal shared parenting time on an alternating week basis and deviated from the child support guidelines based upon that shared parenting schedule.

Relevant Holding(s): As a matter of first impression, the Court of Appeals held that it is implicit in the statute that a trial court may impute income to a voluntarily unemployed or underemployed spouse to determine both the spouse’s entitlement to and the amount and duration of a maintenance award.

The Court reiterated that a relatively equal division of parenting time may constitute valid grounds for deviating from the child support guidelines, citing Plattner v. Plattner, 228 S.W.3d 577 (Ky. App. 2007).

The Court reiterated that KRS 403.212 does not require a trial court to determine that a parent is voluntarily unemployed or underemployed with the intent to avoid or reduce child support to impute income to that parent. It is sufficient for the court to find simply that the parent is voluntarily unemployed or underemployed.

The Court engaged in a thoughtful discussion the trial court’s discretion in assigning responsibility for the payment of debt. Reiterating the holding in Neidlinger v. Neidlinger, 52 S.W.3d 513 (Ky. 2001), the Court affirmed the trial court’s assignment of debt to the wife where the evidence was clear that she incurred the debt and did not produce evidence justifying its incurrence for marital purposes.

Discussion Points: As a practical matter, a number of trial courts have imputed income to a spouse seeking maintenance when argument has been made in defense of that claim that the spouse is voluntarily
unemployed or underemployed. This opinion now provides a holding by the Court of Appeals, as a matter of first impression that sustains that position.

This opinion again provides a clear iteration of the simple notion that with relatively equal shared parenting, most courts will deviate from the child support guidelines. Trial court judgments that adjudicate these deviations continue to beg the question regarding how parents sharing time will meet the day to day expenses incurred in raising their children. Litigants receiving substantially deviated child support often find themselves in the untenable position of having to manage paying the same primary costs of raising their children as parents pay that receive un-deviated child support.

This opinion again dispels the frequent misunderstanding regarding imputation of income for child support purposes. Stated simply, a trial court does not have to determine that a party intended to deny their children support to impute income when that parent is voluntarily unemployed or underemployed.

This opinion reinforces the notion that there is no presumption that debt incurred during the marriage is marital debt and the imperative that a litigant seeking to have debt assigned as marital must produce proof of the purpose for which that debt was incurred.

D. Howard v. Howard, 336 S.W.3d 433 (Ky. 2011)

Overview: The Supreme Court accepted discretionary review to resolve whether a trial court could enforce through contempt an obligation under a decree to pay a debt when the husband/obligor had bankrupted the debt post-decree and the wife had failed to commence adversary proceedings in the federal proceeding.

The husband received a Chapter 7 Bankruptcy discharge post-decree which discharged the husband’s obligation to pay a debt to a bank relating to a motor vehicle. The parties settlement agreement did not provide hold harmless language in favor of the wife and the wife did not initiate adversary proceedings in the bankruptcy proceeding contesting the discharge of the obligation.

Relevant Holding(s): The Supreme Court held that a non-support related divorce debt, to or for the benefit of a former spouse or child is excepted from discharge and the former spouse is not required to participate in adversary proceedings in the bankruptcy proceeding contesting the discharge of the obligation.

Despite federal statutory language specifying a debt to a present or former spouse as an exception to discharge, the broad definition of debt in the federal statutes encompasses divorce decree obligations by former spouse to third parties even if the bankrupt's direct obligation to third party had been discharged.
The parties’ settlement agreement obligated the husband to pay a debt to a bank on a repossessed vehicle. The wife was an obligor on the debt to the bank. The settlement agreement did not have a hold harmless clause running from the husband to the wife relative to this debt.

In agreeing with the Court of Appeals that the trial court did not abuse its discretion, the Court held that KRS 403.220 only requires a trial court to consider the parties’ financial resources before making a decision regarding attorney’s fees but does not require the trial court to make specific findings of fact, citing Hollingsworth v. Hollingsworth, 798 S.W.2d 145 (Ky. App. 1990).

Discussion Points: The opinion provides a clear holding that protects former spouses when the other former spouse discharges in bankruptcy a non-support related debt. The Court determined that the parties’ settlement agreement created two distinct obligations relating to the debt. First, the husband had an obligation to the bank to make payments, and, second, he had an obligation to the wife to pay the debt even in the absence of hold harmless language. While his discharge alleviated the first obligation, the Court held that it did not alleviate the inherent obligation to make the payments for the benefit of the wife.

E. Carpenter v. Schlomann, 336 S.W.3d 129 (Ky. App. 2011)

Overview: Husband sought EPO against wife. Trial court conducted parts of hearings over three dates. At first hearing, husband gave sworn testimony. Wife was never sworn but gave a brief statement of her version of the events and then allowed husband to question wife. At the second hearing, following the Cabinet’s investigation, the court gave custody to the Cabinet but did not address the EPO. Three weeks later, the parties appeared for the third hearing during which the court acknowledged that it failed to address the EPO during the second hearing and had, therefore, extended the EPO. During that third hearing, the court granted the DVO and stated that there were strong allegations made against the wife in a companion case that the court had found accurate. The court never articulated the nature of those allegations on the record or in the issued DVO.

Relevant Holding(s): The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court holding that a full hearing is required when a trial court reviews an EPO to determine whether to issue a DVO and that requirement is not met when testimony is not given or when testimony is cut short. The Court cited its decision in Wright v. Wright, 181 S.W.3d 49 (Ky. App. 2005) holding that because of the extraordinary impact of EPOs and DVOs on the lives of those involved, trial courts are required to provide full hearings to the parties.

The Court also reiterated that a trial court cannot rely on extrajudicial evidence, not part of the record, in forming its decision, citing Lynch v. Lynch, 737 S.W.2d 184 (Ky. App. 1987).
Discussion Points: The opinion has a practical application to the often congested and pro se filled domestic violence dockets of trial courts. The Court expressed its understanding that trial dockets are inundated with domestic violence claims and the temptation to expedite these hearing processes. There may be a tendency by practitioners to develop proof in these cases in a less defined manner than in circuit court actions often because the hearings are statutorily mandated in an expedited manner and out of deference to the time management tension that exists because of the tremendous volume of these cases on dockets. The opinion demands the same level of integrity be given these hearings as any other proceeding.

F. J.A.S. v. Bushelman, 342 S.W.3d 850 (Ky. 2011)

Overview: Wife conceived a child with paramour during extra-marital affair. Wife continued to maintain a sexual relationship with husband throughout the period of the affair. Within two weeks of the birth of the child, wife and paramour arranged DNA testing that confirmed that paramour was father. Wife ended relationship with paramour and confessed affair to husband. Paramour brought paternity action to establish his paternity. Family court determined that marital relationship between wife and husband had ceased such that child of wife and paramour was born out of wedlock. Wife/mother sought a writ of prohibition to bar trial court from proceeding with paternity action. The Court of Appeals denied the petition for a writ and the wife/mother appealed.

Relevant Holding(s): The Court held that the paramour was a putative father who had requisite standing to bring the paternity action to determine paternity of the child conceived when the mother was married, overruling J.N.R. v. O’Reilly, 264 S.W.3d 587 (Ky. 2011).

The Court held that the paternity statute that provides that the husband of a married woman is presumed to be the father of her child born while married or within ten months after the end of their marital relationship is not a bar to a claim that a man other than the husband may be the actual father. The statute simply defines the burden on the challenging litigant to overcome the presumption of paternity. KRS 406.011.

Discussion Points: Judge Bushelman, the trial judge, conducted an evidentiary hearing to determine whether the court had subject matter jurisdiction. The trial court focused on whether evidence established that the marital relationship between the wife and husband ceased ten months prior to the birth of the child. The trial judge determined that the marital relationship ceased when the wife broke the monogamous marital bond and began the secret affair. The trial judge essentially adopted the rationale of Justice Abramson’s opinion in J.N.R. that the marital relationship is a reference to a traditional monogamous relationship defined by love, fidelity and trust and not simply a reference to sexual intercourse.
G.  **Woodson v. Woodson**, 338 S.W.3d 261 (Ky. 2011)

**Overview:** Former husband sought to modify prior maintenance award. Trial court denied the motion determining that the prior award was a lump sum award and incapable of modification based upon **Dame v. Dame**, 628 S.W.2d 625 (Ky. 1982).

The parties’ settlement agreement, incorporated into the decree, provided that the former husband pay the former wife $338 per month for five years as maintenance. The trial court appropriately denied the motion stating that it had no jurisdiction to modify the prior award based upon Dame. The court of Appeals affirmed the trial court although in an opinion highly critical of the Dame rationale. The Supreme Court accepted review.

**Relevant Holding(s):** The Supreme Court unanimously overruled Dame and reversed and remanded the matter to the trial court.

**Discussion Points:** The opinion reverses thirty years of Dame’s application to the issue of maintenance in domestic relations practice. **Dame,** decided ten years after implementation of the Uniform Marriage and Dissolution Act, was predicated on the notion that a maintenance award capable of lump sum calculation at any point is maintenance in gross and not subject to the modification provisions of KRS 403.250. The practical problem with Dame is that it ignored the realities of financial changes that can occur in the lives of litigants post decree. The rationale for Dame at the time was that a closed end award should remain closed to finalize distasteful litigation. While not minimizing the need for finality in domestic relations litigation, the Court stated that the burden in KRS 403.250 is sufficiently strict to insure stability and finality in litigation.


**Overview:** Husband and wife were married for twenty-nine years at time of entry of decree. Wife was not represented by counsel. Parties first created a handwritten settlement agreement signed by both parties and witnessed by a notary. That agreement contained a provision stating that wife would receive “half of Teamster Retirement at the twenty year service rate. Cannot be collected until Teamster pension is collected.” And, the agreement contained another provision regarding the pension stating that “value will be divided into half at the time the Divorce is final. Lewis will continue to invest the half for Phyllis. If Phyllis draws her half out early all expenses will be paid by her. Phyllis is responsible for taxes on her half.” Wife had not seen any documentation concerning the plan. Husband took handwritten agreement to his counsel who created a formal agreement based upon the handwritten agreement. The new agreement contained language not found in the handwritten agreement. Both parties signed the new agreement and same was incorporated into a decree.

Husband knew at time his counsel drafted new agreement that by its language, wife would draw nothing from his pension when he retired. And, when husband retired, he tendered a QDRO relative to the pension
to which the wife objected. The trial court found that husband intentionally introduced an ambiguity into the settlement agreement and construed the agreement against the husband. The trial court construed the agreement as requiring that wife participate in husband’s pension as of the date of his retirement. The husband appealed.

Relevant Holding(s): The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court and held that it would be unconscionable and violate public policy to enforce the language of a contract when a party intentionally introduces an ambiguity into the contract. The Court affirmed that the trial court appropriately determined the intent of the parties where an ambiguity exists which cannot be resolved on the face of the contract. The opinion affirms the application of the rule of contra proferentem, the contract interpretation maxim that ambiguities will be resolved against the drafter of the contract.

Discussion Points: The opinion has myriad practical applications in today’s domestic relations practice, particularly when one litigant is pro se while the other has counsel and when many settlement agreements are first drafted by the parties without legal formalities and are then taken to one party’s lawyer to be “formalized.”

II. MANAGING RELATIONSHIPS WITH CLIENTS, ADVERSE COUNSEL, AND THE COURT

The American Bar Association Section of Family Law Civility Standards is a template for competent practice by members of the domestic relations bar.

A. Clients

1. Treat the client with respect.

2. Try to keep the client on an even emotional keel and avoid characterizing the actions of the other party, opposing lawyers, and judicial officials in emotional terms.

3. Be aware of counseling resources and be prepared to refer the client to counseling where appropriate.

4. Where a client has an exaggerated or unrealistic view of his or her options in any given situation, explain matters as carefully as possible in order to assist the client to realistically assess the situation.

5. Respond promptly to client requests for advice or information.

6. Consider the availability and appropriateness of forms of alternative dispute resolution.
7. Where a client wishes to pursue a claim or motion for purely hostile or vindictive purposes, explain to the client the reasons why the client should not do so.

8. Do not assist a client in pursuing a claim for primary custody or visitation where the purpose of the claim is to obtain bargaining leverage in order to achieve a purely economic objective.

9. Avoid any communication to client about the judge, the other lawyer, or the other party that will contribute to disrespect for the legal process.

10. Encourage clients to comply with all court orders.

B. Opposing Counsel

1. Be honest in all communications with opposing counsel. Do not intentionally misrepresent any factual or legal argument.

2. Be respectful and courteous in all oral and written communications with the opposing side.

3. Do not engage in conduct, oral or written, that promotes animosity and rancor between the parties or their counsel.

4. Use a demeanor and conduct during a deposition or other out-of-court meeting that would be no less appropriate than it would be in the courtroom.

5. Do not engage in harassing or obstructive behavior.

6. Honor reasonable requests for routine extensions of time, unless a client’s position will be adversely or materially affected.

7. Confer in good faith with opposing counsel on scheduling matters.

8. Do not utilize the manner of service of pleadings or discovery requests to disadvantage opposing counsel.

C. The Court

1. Act with complete honesty; show respect for the court by proper demeanor; and act and speak civilly to the judge, court staff and adversaries.

2. Avoid frivolous litigation and non-essential pleading in litigation.

3. Explore settlement possibilities at the earliest reasonable date, and seek agreement on procedural and discovery matters.
4. Avoid delays not dictated by a competent and justified presentation of a client’s claims or defenses.

5. Strive to protect the dignity and independence of the judiciary, particularly from unjust criticism and attack.

III. RESOURCES


A. On the website of the American Academy of Matrimonial Lawyers, the following materials can be purchased for a nominal fee:

Publications:

1. Bounds of Advocacy

   A standard of conduct providing clear, specific guidance in areas most important to matrimonial lawyers. The preeminent work that all attorneys must master for admittance to the Academy.


   This outstanding explanation of the divorce process will give you invaluable tips on handling your divorce.

3. Focus on Forever

   According to the National Center for Health, half of first-time marriages fail. This discouraging statistic is fueling a national discourse on marriage. Focus on Forever, an hour-long DVD sponsored by the American Academy of Matrimonial Lawyers, explores new research and strategies that can help couples create satisfying, successful marriages.

4. Making Marriage Last

   A great resource from the Academy. Patterned in the style of “Stepping Back from Anger,” this sixteen-page booklet is provocative and easy to understand. Learn from those that make a living off of failed marriages on what it takes to keep a marriage intact and healthy. Resources and suggested reading list included.

5. Model Family Law Arbitration Act

   The Model Act is based upon the Revised Uniform Arbitration Act with the recommended Rules and Forms based largely upon American Arbitration Association commercial arbitration rules. Unlike the RUAA, the Model Act permits judicial appeals of substantive issues of law and modification of child custody, child support and spousal support to the extent those issues are modifiable under state law. The Model Act also provides for de novo judicial review of child custody and child support arbitration awards.
6. **Model Parenting Plan**

The newest release from the Academy is designed to protect children whose parents separate or do not share the same home. The Parenting Plan helps lawyers and parents structure a personalized plan of parenting responsibilities to protect children caught in the separating and divorcing process. The Plan consists of printed copy and a Word document on CD.

7. **Stepping Back From Anger**

This title aptly describes the succinct information of this twelve-page booklet. Includes the “Children’s Bill of Rights,” resources and suggested reading list. A companion video is available in the AAML store.

8. **The Voices of Children**

Extremely powerful and thought provoking fifteen-minute videotape. Round table discussion with various aged children describing their emotional turmoil due to child custody disputes. Companion video to Stepping Back from Anger booklet.

9. **What Should We Tell the Children: A Parents’ Guide for Talking about Separation and Divorce**

This booklet was designed to help parents think about and accomplish a difficult task: what to say to their children when parents are separating. The primary goal is to make discussions with children about separation a bit easier for parents and more helpful and meaningful for their children. A larger, very important goal is to increase children's and adolescents' ability to deal successfully with the stress and disruption of their parents' separation.

10. **Child Custody Evaluation Standards**

Every jurisdiction in the United States has established legal standards for the determination of child custody; few states have rules or laws which govern how child custody evaluations are conducted. In large urban areas where mental health professionals are plentiful, these evaluations are typically completed by licensed psychologists who have stated competencies in child development and custody evaluation. However, this committee recognized the fact that in the rest of the country, where mental health professionals are scarce and economic resources limited, these evaluations may sometimes be conducted by professionals (which may include attorneys) without training in custody evaluations and court appointed lay persons functioning as Guardians ad Litem and under the mantel of various ADR methodologies. It was the intent of the committee that these Standards would aid pro-
professionals in understanding the necessary training, skill and experience required in conducting custody evaluations. It was also the intent of the committee that the various courts would utilize these Standards in their selection of custody evaluators.

11. **Representing Children**

The American Academy of Matrimonial Lawyers has promulgated these revised Standards for Attorneys for Children in custody and visitation proceedings in order to update the Standards that it first released in 1994, and after considering the additional standards separately approved by the American Bar Association and then the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws.

It is hoped that these Standards will: (1) assist judges in specifying the tasks and responsibilities of the counsel they appoint in custody and visitation cases and (2) help counsel to provide children with more effective representation in cases involving their vital interests. Designed as a resource, this publication is not intended to be a substitute for existing state law.

B. From the website of the Association of Family and Conciliation Courts, http://www.afccnet.org/resourcecenter/resourcesforfamilies/categoryid/1, the following materials:

1. Web resources.

2. Parenting plan information.

3. Pamphlets for parents.
   a. FAQs Parents As about Separation, Divorce and Child Custody.
   b. FAQs Separating and Divorcing Parents Ask about Legal Matters.
e. Is Mediation for Us?
g. Parents Are Forever.
h. Preparing for Your Custody Evaluation.
i. Understanding the Parenting Coordination Process.
j. When Parents Relocate: Moving away and Long-Distance Parenting.
k. A Guide for Stepparents

C. http://www.afccnet.org/ResourceCenter/ResourcesforProfessionals lists the following resources for professionals:

1. Reports and resources.
   a. AzAFCC 2011 Summit Project: Parenting Communication Resources in High-Conflict Cases (PDF)
   b. Comprehensive Service Model for the Resolution of Parenting Issues (PDF), ADR Subcommittee of the Florida Family Court Steering Committee
   c. How Best to Find Out What a Child Really Needs and Wants (PDF), Hon. Peter Boshier, Principal Family Court Judge of New Zealand
   e. Planning Mediation Programs – A Deskbook for Common Pleas Judges (PDF), Ohio State University College of Law (2000)

2. Innovations Books appendices.
   a. Innovations for Self-Represented Litigants, Edited by Bonnie Rose Hough and Pamela Cardullo Ortiz.
b. Innovations in Court Services, *Edited by Cori K. Erickson*.


D. Websites Useful for Domestic Relations Lawyers


