



## Session CLE 106 | Voting Rights and Election 2024 -- the Good, the Bad and the Ugly

Friday, November 8, 2024

9:00 AM – 10:15 AM

Description: In the last few election cycles, Asian Americans, Native Hawaiians and Pacific Islanders have moved from marginalized voters to the margin of victory both nationally and in many state races. We are the nation's fastest growing racial group and have made significant strides in achieving fuller participation by expanding language access at the polls, mobilizing new voters, and forming effective coalitions in shaping redistricting. But much of our growth has occurred in states where voting rights are under attack. Some states have criminalized types of voter assistance, including translation, and made it more difficult to register on-line and vote by mail. Excessive purges of voter rolls, disinformation, intimidation, threats of violence, and challenges to the integrity of elections overall have continued to grow. And litigation continues over newly drawn state and local maps. Hear from voting rights experts who have been on the front lines preparing for the 2024 election about the status of voting rights, redistricting, and electoral influence for Asian Americans, Native Hawaiians, and Pacific Islanders. Election day 2024 will have just passed and the elections may not all be called before NAPABA's convention. It is possible there will be ongoing litigation and organizing in the short term and there definitely will be work beyond this election. Learn what comes next and what you can do as an attorney or law student to protect and advance the voting rights of our communities.

### Moderator:

*Kathay Feng, Senior Counsel, Department of Justice, Civil Rights*

### Speakers:

*Christine Chen, co-Founder and Executive Director, APIA Vote*

*Sarah Chen, Senior Supervising Attorney, Voting Rights Program, Texas Civil Rights Project*

*Michael Li, Senior Counsel, Democracy Program, Brennan Center*

There are multiple sources of protection for voters, including the Voting Rights Act of 1965; the National Voter Registration Act of 1993, and the Help America Vote Act of 2002, as well as state laws.

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## Section I: Voting Rights Act

Although the Supreme Court has eviscerated the pro-active protections of Sections 4 and 5 of the Voting Rights Act, several parts of the VRA are still actively used to challenge restrictive voter laws, including Sections 2, 203, and 208.

Section 203 of the Voting Rights Act requires that jurisdictions that have large populations of limited-English speakers must provide assistance, which the Department of Justice and civil rights groups monitor for compliance. Local jurisdictions, such as Hamtramck, Michigan (Bengali); Pawtucket, Rhode Island (Spanish); and Union City, New Jersey (Spanish) have been sued for failure to provide translated assistance.

Additionally, Section 208 protects the right of voters to bring a person to assist if they have a disability or are unable to read or write. States such as Texas and Arizona have passed laws to limit assistance, and been challenged under Section 208.

### A. What is the Voting Rights Act of 1965

#### *Excerpts from National Archives*

This act was signed into law on August 6, 1965, by President Lyndon Johnson. It outlawed the discriminatory voting practices adopted in many southern states after the Civil War, including literacy tests as a prerequisite to voting.

This “act to enforce the [fifteenth amendment](#) to the Constitution” was signed into law 95 years after the amendment was ratified. In those years, African Americans in the South faced tremendous obstacles to voting, including poll taxes, literacy tests, and other bureaucratic restrictions to deny them the right to vote. They also risked harassment, intimidation, economic reprisals, and physical violence when they tried to register or vote. As a result, African-American voter registration was limited, along with political power.

In 1964, numerous peaceful demonstrations were organized by Civil Rights leaders, and the considerable violence they were met with brought renewed attention to the issue of voting rights. The murder of voting-rights activists in Mississippi and the attack by white state troopers on peaceful marchers in Selma, Alabama, gained national attention and persuaded President Johnson and Congress to initiate meaningful and effective national voting rights legislation. The combination of public revulsion to the violence and Johnson's political skills stimulated Congress to pass the voting rights bill on August 5, 1965.

The legislation, which President Johnson signed into law the next day, outlawed literacy tests and provided for the appointment of federal examiners (with the power to register qualified citizens to vote) in those jurisdictions that were “covered” according to a formula provided in the statute. In addition, Section 5 of the act required covered jurisdictions to obtain “preclearance” from either the District Court for the District of Columbia or the U.S. Attorney General for any new voting practices and procedures. Section 2, which closely followed the language of the 15th amendment, applied a nationwide prohibition of the denial or abridgment of the right to vote on account of race or color. The use of poll taxes in national elections had been abolished by the 24th amendment (1964) to the Constitution; the Voting Rights Act directed the Attorney General to challenge the use of poll taxes in state and local elections. In *Harper v. Virginia State Board of Elections*, 383 U.S. 663 (1966), the Supreme Court held Virginia's poll tax to be unconstitutional under the [14th amendment](#).

The Voting Rights Act of 1965 was the most significant statutory change in the relationship between the federal and state governments in the area of voting since the Reconstruction period following the Civil War; and it was immediately challenged in the courts. Between 1965 and 1969, the Supreme Court issued several key decisions upholding the constitutionality of Section 5 and affirming the broad range of voting practices for which preclearance was required. [See *South Carolina v. Katzenbach*, 383 U.S. 301, 327-28 (1966) and *Allen v. State Board of Elections*, 393 U.S. 544 (1969)] In 2013, the Court struck down a key provision of the act involving federal oversight of voting rules in nine states.

The Voting Rights Act had an immediate impact. By the end of 1965, a quarter of a million new Black voters had been registered, one-third by federal examiners. By the end of 1966, only four out of 13 southern states had fewer than 50 percent of African Americans registered to vote. The Voting Rights Act of 1965 was readopted and strengthened in 1970, 1975, and 1982.

## **B. Voting Rights Explained**

### *Excerpts from Brennan Center*

Regarded as the legislative crown jewel of the civil rights era, the **Voting Rights Act** was enacted as a comprehensive tool meant to undo the political hold of Jim Crow policies in the South and related discriminatory structures nationwide. Congress adopted the law to ensure that states followed the 15th Amendment's guarantee that the right to vote not be denied because of race. The law fundamentally opened political opportunities for Black and brown communities to participate in all aspects of the political system on an equal basis.

Section 5 of the law requires jurisdictions with a history of discrimination to obtain approval from the Department of Justice or a court before changing voting rules, a process known as "preclearance." Section 2 of the law allows people to sue — either on their own behalf or with the assistance of the Justice Department — to undo existing laws and procedures that would deny equal political opportunity to voters to elect their candidates of choice. However, these protections have been eroded by recent Supreme Court decisions.

### **Why was the Voting Rights Act enacted?**

A nonviolent campaign in March 1965 by voting rights marchers in Alabama culminated in a televised, **brutal attack by state police** on the Edmund Pettus Bridge. The outrage over this incident prompted immediate national action in Congress, spurred by President Lyndon Johnson.

The law was a more fulsome response than prior, inadequate efforts to assure that states registered citizens and allowed them to vote regardless of race. Despite multiple court orders, including from the Supreme Court, several states created rules that denied or limited opportunities to vote for Black citizens, such as **poll taxes and literacy tests**. These schemes effectively undermined or eliminated the political power of Black communities, even where they were a majority of the population.

### **What are the effects of the Voting Rights Act?**

The law has been a hugely successful shield against schemes that limit or dilute the voting power of communities with a history of being marginalized. This protection has been especially helpful in processes like **redistricting**, which has led to the election of hundreds of federal, state, and local candidates of color in states with a history of discrimination.

In the years after the Voting Rights Act's passage, the disparity in registration rates between white and black voters rates dropped from nearly 30 percentage points in the early 1960s to 8 percentage points just a decade later. Based on this success, the Voting Rights Act was reauthorized multiple times. In 2006, the reauthorization passed both chambers of Congress with wide bipartisan support, passing unanimously in the Senate.

### **How has the Supreme Court changed the Voting Rights Act?**

The Voting Rights Act has been a constant target of conservatives on the Supreme Court since its enactment. While the law has been renewed multiple times, the Court's decisions in recent years have often worked to limit its application. Of greatest concern is the 2013 case *Shelby County v. Holder*, which effectively eliminated the use of preclearance. Following the decision, states that no longer had to get federal approval of new voting rules unleashed a **wave of policies** that made it harder to vote. And **Brennan Center research** has shown that the racial gap in voter turnout has grown in jurisdictions previously covered by Section 5.

In the absence of preclearance requirements, civil rights groups have needed to rely more on litigation under Section 2 to combat discrimination in the political system, but lawsuits to undo these unfair rules are both costly and take years — during which elections continue. And in its 2021 ruling in *Brnovich v. Democratic National Committee*, the Supreme Court made it harder to bring lawsuits under Section 2.

### **What are the prospects for the Voting Rights Act's future?**

Despite declining yet another invitation to depart from precedent to erode the law further in the recent case of *Allen v. Milligan*, the Supreme Court's current majority has been quite clear in its hostility for the present means of combating discrimination in politics and protecting fair representation. However, the Court is not the final say on the matter. Congress has specific authority under the 15th Amendment to craft necessary legislation to safeguard the right to vote absent race discrimination. Accordingly, a **new law** that adequately protects the right to vote for every citizen is well in order. The record supporting such a law would press the Supreme Court to respect a new and well-grounded congressional response to a present and clear need for federal oversight of our election system.

## **C. Language Assistance**

The Voting Rights Act was amended in 1975 and again in 1982 to add provisions to require language assistance be provided to members of language minorities who met certain criteria.

### **i. The Language Minority Provisions of the Voting Rights Act**

#### ***Excerpts from Department of Justice, Civil Rights Division***

Congress enacted the language minority provisions because it found that:

[T]hrough the use of various practices and procedures, citizens of language minorities have been effectively excluded from participation in the electoral process. Among other factors, the denial of the right to vote of such minority group citizens is ordinarily directly related to the unequal educational opportunities afforded them resulting in high illiteracy and low voting participation. The Congress declares that, in order to enforce the guarantees of the fourteenth and fifteenth amendments to the

United States Constitution, it is necessary to eliminate such discrimination by prohibiting these practices, and by prescribing other remedial devices.

### **Legal Requirements**

The language minority provisions of the Voting Rights Act require that when a covered state or political subdivision provides registration or voting notices, forms, instructions, assistance, or other materials or information relating to the electoral process, including ballots, it shall provide them in the language of the applicable minority group as well as in the English language.

The requirements of the law are straightforward: all election information that is available in English must also be available in the minority language so that all citizens will have an effective opportunity to register, learn the details of the elections, and cast a free and effective ballot.

### **Covered Jurisdictions**

Covered jurisdictions are determined by the Census Bureau based upon a formula set out in the Voting Rights Act. The most recent [determinations](#) for Section 203 were made on December 8, 2021.

Covered language minorities are limited to American Indians, Asian Americans, Alaskan Natives, and Spanish-heritage citizens - the groups that Congress found to have faced barriers in the political process.

### **Section 203 Coverage Formula**

A jurisdiction is covered under Section 203 where the number of United States citizens of voting age is a single language group within the jurisdiction: Is more than 10,000, or is more than five percent of all voting age citizens, or On an Indian reservation, exceeds five percent of all reservation residents; and The illiteracy rate of the group is higher than the national illiteracy rate.

### **Guidance for Local Officials**

The Civil Rights Division offers guidance to local election officials on how to comply with language minority provisions. These guidelines are entitled "Implementation of the Provisions of the Voting Rights Act Regarding Language Minority Groups." 28 C.F.R. Part 55.

Language Minority Guidelines Online: [Updated version](#)

### ***ii. South Asian voters sue Hamtramck, Michigan for violations of the Voting Rights Act Excerpts from Asian American Legal Defense and Education Fund***

On June 3, the Asian American Legal Defense and Education Fund (AALDEF) sued the City of Hamtramck, Michigan for failing to comply with the language assistance provisions (Section 203) of the federal Voting Rights Act (VRA).

Susana Lorenzo-Giguere, Senior Staff Attorney of AALDEF's Democracy Program, said: "Asian Americans have had to overcome many barriers to exercise their right to vote, especially due to the lack of language assistance. Hamtramck must comply with all provisions of the Voting Rights Act and fully translate all voting material, including their website, and provide sufficient numbers of interpreters or bilingual poll workers at all poll sites."

The Census Bureau announced on October 13, 2011 that Hamtramck, MI was covered under Section 203 of the Voting Rights Act and required to provide Bengali language assistance to voters. The Census

Bureau's determination applies to all elections administered by Hamtramck and is final and not reviewable by any court. However, despite being covered for almost a decade, Hamtramck failed to provide fully and accurately translated ballots during the Primary and General Elections in 2020. For example, the translation of the general election sample ballot was completely nonsensical, and only the Republican party primary ballot was available to voters for most of the day. The City Clerk's election website provides no Bengali translation whatsoever, including no translated voting information regarding absentee ballots, voter registration, election dates, and other election information. In addition, the City failed to provide Bengali interpreters or a sufficient number of bilingual poll workers to assist limited English proficient (LEP) Bengali American voters.

On April 20, 2020, AALDEF sent a letter to the former Hamtramck City Clerk, August Glitschlag, detailing the numerous Section 203 violations observed and demanding that the City immediately comply with the federal requirements. Hamtramck had ample notice and opportunity to comply with federal law on behalf of its Bengali American citizens, yet failed to do so. AALDEF did not receive a response to its April 20, 2020 demand letter.

AALDEF's complaint alleges that Rahima Begum, one of the Bengali-speaking plaintiffs, could not participate in the electoral process equally with other citizens because of the City's failure to comply with Section 203 of the VRA. Instead, she had to rely on her English-speaking bilingual children to assist her with the voting process. Ms. Begum would have been able to effectively exercise her right to vote, and independently cast a fully-informed ballot, if Hamtramck and its City Clerk had complied with their obligations under Section 203.

On behalf of the organizational plaintiff, Detroit Action Executive Director Branden Snyder said, "Section 203 is vitally important for the LEP Asian American community in Hamtramck, Michigan. The City has prevented qualified voters from receiving the assistance that they are guaranteed under federal law."

AALDEF's complaint seeks to enjoin the City of Hamtramck and the City Clerk from failing to provide translated Bengali language voting materials and assistance, and requiring that the City ensure that LEP Bangladeshi Americans are able to participate effectively in all phases of the electoral process, in full compliance with Section 203.

Salvatore Prescott Porter & Porter is pro bono counsel in this lawsuit. "Ensuring that all citizens have not only the right, but also the practical ability, to exercise their voting franchise helps our nation more fully realize the promise of our democratic system," said law firm partner Sarah Prescott. "Our firm is proud to serve as co-counsel with the Asian American Legal Defense and Education Fund on this important and timely issue."

In 2013, AALDEF sued the Board of Elections in the City of New York for failing to provide Bengali ballots in Queens County, New York, which is the only other county in the country covered for Bengali language assistance under Section 203 of the VRA. The [Board of Elections settled the case](#) in 2014.

Jerry Vattamala, Director of AALDEF's Democracy Program, said: "AALDEF will always fight to ensure that all provisions of the Voting Rights Act are fully complied with. The federal requirements of the VRA are not voluntary, but mandatory – and no state or city is free to discard the requirements that so many fought and died for."

The complaint can be downloaded [here](#). AALDEF's April 20, 2020 letter to the Hamtramck City Clerk can be downloaded [here](#). AALDEF's Section 203 Fact Sheet can be downloaded [here](#). The consent decree can be downloaded [here](#)

#### **D. Election Laws at State Level**

NCSL and the U.S. Election Assistance Commission created one-page election policy profiles for each state. [New Profiles Offer Bird's-Eye Views of Each State's Election Laws](#) outlines each state's policies and offers a glimpse of where that state stands nationally on particular policies: state information, voter registration policies, voting policies, and "other."

You can also find more detailed [NCSL Election Resources](#) page that get into the nitty-gritty on each policy topic.

## **Section II: National Voter Registration Act of 1993**

### ***Excerpts from Department of Justice, Civil Rights Division***

In the lead up to the 2024 elections, a large number of states engaged in removing large numbers of people from the voter registration lists. In some cases, people who were eligible were removed. In other cases, the states did not follow the procedures laid out in federal laws such as the National Voter Registration Act to notify people, or refrain from removal during the 90 days immediately before an Election Day. The [pdf of the Statute can be found here](#).

Congress enacted the [National Voter Registration Act of 1993](#) (also known as the "NVRA" and the "Motor Voter Act"), to enhance voting opportunities for every American. The Act has made it easier for all Americans to register to vote and to maintain their registration.

The NVRA allows the Department of Justice to bring civil actions in federal court to enforce its requirements. The Act also gives the responsibility to the Federal Election Commission (FEC) to provide States with guidance on the Act, to develop a national mail voter registration form, and to compile reports on the effectiveness of the Act. An amendment in the Help America Vote Act of 2002 transferred the FEC's responsibilities under the Act to the Election Assistance Commission.

### **A. Provisions of the National Voter Registration Act**

The Act requires states to provide the opportunity to apply to register to vote for federal elections and sets up steps that must be followed to maintain a voter registration list.

#### **i. Section 5: Voter registration at state motor vehicle agency offices**

Section 5 of the Act requires states to provide individuals with the opportunity to register to vote at the same time that they apply for a driver's license or seek to renew a driver's license, and requires the State to forward the completed application to the appropriate state or local election official.

#### **ii. Section 7: Voter registration through state public assistance offices**

Section 7 of the Act requires states to offer voter registration opportunities at all offices that provide public assistance and all offices that provide state-funded programs primarily engaged in providing services to persons with disabilities. Each applicant for any of these services, renewal of services, or address changes must be provided with a voter registration form or a declination form as well as assistance in completing the form and forwarding the completed application to the appropriate state or local election official.

#### **ii. Section 6: Voting by mail**

Section 6 of the Act provides that citizens can register to vote by mail using mail-in-forms developed by each state and the Election Assistance Commission.

#### **iii. Section 8: Protections against purging voter lists**

Section 8 of the Act also creates requirements for how States maintain voter registration lists for federal elections. The Act deems as timely those valid voter registration applications by eligible applicants submitted to designated state and local officials, or postmarked if submitted by mail, at least 30 days before a federal election. The Act also requires notification of all applicants of whether their voter registration applications were accepted or rejected. The Act requires States to keep voter registration lists accurate and current, such as identifying persons who have become ineligible due to having died or moved outside the jurisdiction. At the same time, the Act requires list maintenance programs to incorporate specific safeguards, e.g., that they be uniform, non-discriminatory, in compliance with the Voting Rights Act, and not be undertaken within 90 days of a federal election.

The removal of voters for non-voting or for having moved can only be done after meeting certain requirements provided in the Act. The Act allows for removal of voters from registration lists when they have been convicted of a disqualifying crime or adjudged mentally incapacitated, where such removals are allowed by state law. The NVRA also provides additional safeguards under which registered voters would be able to vote notwithstanding a change in address in certain circumstances. For example, voters who move within a district or a precinct will retain the right to vote even if they have not re-registered at their new address. The NVRA became effective in most states on January 1, 1995.

The Act applies to 44 states and the District of Columbia. Section 4(b) of the Act provided that states were exempt from the Act if, as of August 1, 1994, they had no voter registration requirements or had election-day registration at polling places. These six states are Idaho, Minnesota, New Hampshire, North Dakota, Wisconsin, and Wyoming. In addition, the Act granted additional time to Arkansas, Vermont, and Virginia to comply because they needed to change their constitutions in order to comply with the Act and maintain a unitary registration system for federal and state elections.

## **B. Enforcement of the NVRA**

After the NVRA became effective, several states failed to take the steps necessary to comply with the law; several of them also challenged the constitutionality of the Act. Beginning within a month of the Act's effective date, the Department responded by filing a series of lawsuits requiring these states to comply with the Act's procedures as well as defending its constitutionality.

Those states involved in the first round of cases included California, Illinois, Michigan, Mississippi, Pennsylvania, New York, South Carolina, Vermont, and Virginia. The Department's litigation addressed each state's refusal, often on constitutional grounds, to implement provisions of the Act. As a result of these cases and actions filed by private individuals, the Act's constitutionality was established and states were ordered to comply with the Act's requirements.

Since that time, the United States has continued to bring [litigation](#) to ensure compliance with all facets of the Act.

## **C. Arizona AANHPI for Equity Coalition Fights Arizona's Anti-Voter Law**

Represented by Asian Americans Advancing Justice – AAJC and working in coalition with other voters of color, AZ AANHPI sued Arizona over two anti-voter laws passed by the state's legislature. On September 8, 2022, a federal court temporarily blocked Arizona's HB 2243 from going into effect prior to the midterm federal elections. The law would have required county recorders to cancel a voter's registration

if they receive information that a voter is not qualified to vote or if the county officials have a “reason to believe” that a voter is not a U.S. citizen. The plaintiffs in the case allege that H.B. 2243 violated:

- The First and 14th Amendments by burdening the right to vote,
- The Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment by treating voters differently depending on which type of form they use to register,
- The Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment by discriminating against national origin,
- The Due Process Clause of the 14th Amendment by failing to provide voters a notice and opportunity to contest or cure lack of citizenship information or misinformation,
- The 14th and 15th Amendment by discriminating on the basis of race,
- The Materiality Provision of the Civil Rights Act because birthplace is not material “to whether a registrant is qualified to vote,” and
- The National Voter Registration Act by failing to comply with federally mandated registration procedures.

On February 29, 2024, a federal judge in an amended order held that provisions in HB 2243 that could have been used to purge U.S. citizens from voter rolls were unlawful.

The complaint can be downloaded [here](#). The temporary injunction can be downloaded [here](#). The amended order can be downloaded [here](#).

## **Section III: Help America Vote Act (HAVA) of 2002**

HAVA was passed in the wake of the 2000 elections where irregularities in election machinery and ballots (remember hanging chads?) came under public scrutiny. Jurisdictions across the country that received federal dollars to upgrade their voting systems had to adopt systems that would be accessible to people with disabilities and language assistance needs. In some jurisdictions, such as Los Angeles County, the monies were eventually used to create voting systems that could accommodate over 18+ languages. Some jurisdictions have still not complied with HAVA requirements to have accessible voting machinery.

### **A. Background on the Help America Vote Act**

*Excerpts from Department of Justice, Civil Rights Division*

On October 29, 2002, President Bush signed the "Help America Vote Act of 2002," (HAVA), Pub. L. No. 107-252, 116 Stat. 1666 (2002) into law. The HAVA is codified at 52 U.S.C. 20901 to 21145. After the House of Representatives, on December 12, 2001, and the Senate on April 11, 2002, passed differing versions of H.R. 3295, joint conferees were named to reconcile the differences and adopted a conference report on October 8, 2002, which was then passed by the House and Senate without amendment.

The goals of The Help America Vote Act of 2002 are:

1. Creating a new federal agency to serve as a clearinghouse for election administration information;
2. Providing funds to states to improve election administration and replace outdated voting systems; and
3. Creating minimum standards for states to follow in several key areas of election administration.

### **B. Department of Justice Activities**

The United States has enforced HAVA through both litigation and by informing jurisdictions of the Department's views on the Act's requirements.

The Department of Justice has released a guide to improving accessibility of polling places for disabled voters. [ADA Checklist for Polling Places](#)

### **C. Other Federal Agencies Activities**

- Department of Health and Human Services Activities: [Department of Health and Human Services](#)
- Election Assistance Commission Activities: [Election Assistance Commission](#)
- National Institute of Standards and Technology Activities: [National Institute of Standards and Technology](#)

## Section IV: Redistricting

In recent years, redistricting has received heightened public attention, as frustrations mount over a system of drawing districts that is overly politicized and highly secretive. The Voting Rights Act's Section 2 is still actively used to challenge redistricting plans that dilute minority population's ability to elect candidates of their choice. While most cases have reached a conclusion, redistricting cases have been known to stretch through the decade, including ongoing cases in Texas, North Carolina and Florida.

### A. Background on Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act

#### *Excerpts from the Department of Justice*

Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 prohibits voting practices or procedures that discriminate on the basis of race, color, or membership in one of the language minority groups identified in Section 4(f)(2) of the Act. Most of the cases arising under Section 2 since its enactment involved challenges to at-large election schemes, but the section's prohibition against discrimination in voting applies nationwide to any voting standard, practice, or procedure that results in the denial or abridgement of the right of any citizen to vote on account of race, color, or membership in a language minority group. Section 2 is permanent and has no expiration date as do certain other provisions of the Voting Rights Act.

### B. OCA Greater Houston Redistricting Lawsuit

In November 2021, OCA Greater Houston joined with a coalition of civil rights groups including Fair Maps, Common Cause Texas and the ACLU to file a federal lawsuit in the case, Fair Maps Texas Action Committee v. Abbott. The lawsuit challenged the Texas state legislative and Congressional district plans as unconstitutional racial gerrymanders violating both the Voting Rights Act and the U.S. Constitution. The suit details an inadequate redistricting process which lacked transparency, leading to discriminatory voting maps harming voters of color. Explaining the need for the lawsuit, Common Cause Texas stated:

The Texas redistricting plan falls short in several areas – failing to create coalition districts and cracking voters of color in different districts to dilute their voting power. Furthermore, the redistricting process was inequitably conducted, with an overall lack of transparency regarding public hearings and limited opportunity for meaningful public input.

The complaint can be downloaded [here](#).

### C. Additional Research on State of Redistricting

- Report on Redistricting in Texas:  
[https://www.txcivilrights.org/\\_files/ugd/aab911\\_c285d6b647d84991b89352f49595841b.pdf](https://www.txcivilrights.org/_files/ugd/aab911_c285d6b647d84991b89352f49595841b.pdf)
- 50-state Community Redistricting Report Card: [https://www.commoncause.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/CommunityRedistrictingReportCard\\_Digital\\_REV3.pdf](https://www.commoncause.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/CommunityRedistrictingReportCard_Digital_REV3.pdf)

## Section V: Impact of Mis/Disinformation

Mis- and disinformation campaigns are eroding the integrity of our elections and undermining trust within AAPI communities. By distorting voter perceptions and sowing doubt about the electoral process, these false narratives create a climate of fear and disenfranchisement. As a result, it becomes increasingly challenging for our communities to exercise their rights and engage fully in the democratic process – who already face unique challenges such as language accessibility, the learning curve of understanding the U.S. political system, targeted disinformation campaigns towards them, and disinformation campaigns about them. Tackling this issue is essential to ensuring a fair and equitable electoral system that accurately represents the diverse voices of all citizens.

### A. What is Disinformation and the Impact on APIA communities?

*Excerpts from Common Cause report, Stormwatch: Protecting Voters from Disinformation in the 2024 Election*

Disinformation is false rhetoric used to mislead. In elections, it's used to dampen turnout among some voters, mobilize others based on lies, or call into question the results if an opponent wins in an attempt to either overturn the election or benefit from the chaos. Disinformation can alter voter participation, potentially causing voters to miss their opportunity to vote if they are confused about the voting process (the time, place and manner of the election) or choose to stay home ("self-suppress") due to worries about intimidation, violence or other consequences. Election disinformation also alters public perceptions about elections and their trustworthiness, thereby impacting legislation and democratic norms in the long-run.

[I]t must also be noted that the disinformation problem is exacerbated for non-English audiences. Social media platforms dedicate fewer resources to providing accurate information, fact checks, and moderation for non-English languages. As a result, we often see English-language narratives translated for new audiences – with the same viral result but no fact-checking or moderation at all. Disinformers also aim at specific cultural currents to appeal to the communities they are targeting, and work these complex issues into their content.

### B. Who Voters Trust for Election Information in 2024

*Excerpts from Bipartisan Policy Center (2024)*

A record number of voters will head to the polls this year, with more than 50 countries comprising half the planet's population due to hold national elections in 2024. This coincides with the wide and growing availability of sophisticated AI technology that will supercharge misinformation and cyberthreats.

To limit the spread of inaccurate or deceptive election information, we must understand how Americans get their information to begin with and how they feel about it. To answer these questions, [the Bipartisan Policy Center](#), [the States United Democracy Center](#), and [the Integrity Institute](#) joined together to administer a national survey exploring Americans' election information habits.

We show how Americans consume, share, and assess election news in a crucial election year, uncovering new learnings after a [similar survey](#) was conducted by BPC in advance of the 2022 midterm election.

This poll was conducted by Morning Consult on behalf of BPC between December 13- 15, 2023 among a sample of 2,203 adults.<sup>1</sup>

**Most Americans have confidence in the 2024 presidential election. They are more confident that votes in their community and state will be counted accurately than votes across the country.**

A majority of respondents (69%) are confident their votes will be counted accurately in the 2024 election. This includes majorities of Republicans (60% very or somewhat confident), Independents (59%), and Democrats (85%).


Across all groups, Americans are most confident about an accurate count of votes in their community (74%). Just 64% are confident in an accurate count across the country.

This difference is most pronounced among Republicans. Only 50% of Republicans express confidence that votes will be counted accurately at the national level compared with 66% at the local level—a gap of 16 percentage points.

The confidence gap between local and national counting is an opportunity for voter education about how the counting and certification process works at all levels of our election system. While election officials may be doing a good job building confidence in their community, this gap shows the need for national and state media outlets, candidates, and political elites to help voters understand the robust processes and security measures that are present in every state.


### **Confidence in 2024 vote counting highest at community level**

Respondents were asked how confident they are that their votes would be counted accurately at each of the below levels.



## Confidence in 2024 vote counting highest at community level

Respondents were asked how confident they are that their votes would be counted accurately at each of the below levels.



● Very confident ● Somewhat confident ● Don't know/no opinion ● Not too confident ● Not at all confident

## When asked about election-related concerns, Americans point to misleading election information, violence after Election Day, and attempts to overturn election results.

We asked respondents how concerned they were about various issues around the 2024 election. Their top three concerns were inaccurate or misleading information about elections, violence or civil unrest after Election Day, and attempts to overturn the results of a fair election.

Inaccurate or misleading election information was named as a concern by 72% of respondents. This concern is most common among Republicans (75% very or somewhat concerned), and slightly less common among Democrats (72%).


Violence or civil unrest after the election was listed as a concern by 67% of respondents. The highest concern is among Democrats (73% very or somewhat concerned), but violence and unrest are a concern for solid majorities of Republicans (62%) and Independents (63%).

Finally, a majority of respondents (65%) are very or somewhat concerned that there will be an attempt to overturn the results of a fair election. While majorities of Republicans (60%) and Independents (61%) are very or somewhat concerned, the highest figure is among Democrats (72%).

As election officials, media, and civil society prepare communication plans ahead of the election, they can help mitigate voters' concerns by highlighting authoritative information sources early; educating voters about how election officials and local leaders including law enforcement work together to keep elections safe; and explaining the procedures in place to make sure votes are counted and certified.


## What adults are concerned about regarding the 2024 presidential election

Respondents were asked "How concerned are you, if at all, about the following when it comes to the 2024 presidential election?"  
This chart shows the percent who answered "Very Concerned" or "Somewhat Concerned."



## Both Democrats and Republicans concerned about inaccurate election information

Respondents were asked "How concerned are you, if at all, about the following when it comes to the 2024 presidential election?"  
This chart shows the percent who answered "Very Concerned" or "Somewhat Concerned" by party affiliation.



## Americans learn about elections primarily through television and social media.


We asked U.S. adults what sources (e.g., television, social media, and search engines) and what people or groups (e.g., news media professionals, candidates, and election officials) they look to for information about elections.

When it comes to sources of information, Americans most often learn about elections from television and social media. A plurality (43%) of adults look to national television, followed by social media (36%) and local or regional television (34%).

When it comes to the individuals or groups that they learn from on those channels, adults look most often to news media professionals, commentators, and candidates.

### U.S. adults look to television, social media for election information

We asked what **sources** and what **people or groups** adults look to to learn about elections. Respondents could choose three in each category.



*This data reveals five key findings about Americans' election information preferences.*


#### **(1) Election officials face an uphill battle breaking into a crowded media environment.**

Just 18% of Americans state that they would look to their local or county election administrators for information about elections. This puts election officials fifth behind news media professionals, commentators, candidates, and fact checking organizations. This is a notable decline from BPC's [2022 survey](#) in which state and local election officials were voters' top ranked choice for certain election information, alongside search engines.

Election officials are the best authoritative source for election information, but their low visibility underscores the need for news media, commentators, and candidates to elevate factual election information to meet voters where they are.

### 2022 Survey: U.S. voters' election information sources, by type of information

Respondents were asked where they would look for information on how to register and vote, how elections are run, and who wins an election. They were asked to select up to three options.



### (2) Americans are less likely to select AI-enabled chatbots as a source of election information than any other source.

Just 2% of Americans said they would look to AI-enabled chatbots as a source of election information, ranking below any other information source (including “Don’t know/no opinion”).

This makes clear that Americans are yet to see generative AI tools as legitimate information sources, alleviating some concerns that unreliable generative AI interfaces, prone to hallucinations, will significantly impact voters’ access to trustworthy election information this year.


While adults may not seek out information on AI-enabled chatbots, they may not always know when they’re interfacing with one, particularly as campaigns explore ways to integrate generative AI into operations for the first time. Additionally, AI-powered misinformation and targeted digital persuasion campaigns remain a big concern.

### (3) Google, Facebook, and YouTube are the most sought out online platforms for election news and information.

44% of adults stated that they would look to Google for election news and information, followed by Facebook (31%) and YouTube (29%). Nearly a quarter of adults (23%) said they would not use online platforms for election news and information.


### U.S. adults look to Google, YouTube, Facebook for election news

Respondents were asked "Which online platforms would you be most likely to look to for election news and information?" and could select up to three options.



### 48% of adults 65+ report they would not use online platforms for election information

Respondents were asked "Which online platforms would you be most likely to look to for election news and information?" and could select up to three options. Chart shows top five most frequently selected options across all adults.




#### (4) Americans consume election information passively.

Americans' top three sources of election information are passive: Americans are more likely to learn about elections while scrolling social media or watching a news channel than proactively searching for election information.

Additionally, a plurality (41%) of adults said the primary way they engage with election content on online platforms is through browsing or reading posts. Only a small subset engages through active forms of engagement, such as commenting (16%), sharing content (10%), or creating and posting their own content (6%).

#### How adults engage with political content online

Respondents were asked to select up to three primary ways they engage with content related to elections on online platforms.



#### *(5) Credibility and reliability of a source is the most important factor when seeking out information about elections.*

In an era marked by widespread mis- and dis-information, Americans' appetite for authoritative election information is strong. Adults of all political affiliations rank credibility and reliability as the most important factor when seeking information about elections.

### **C. The Myth of Voter Fraud**

#### *Excerpts from Brennan Center for Democracy*

It is important to protect the integrity of our elections. But we must be careful not to undermine free and fair access to the ballot in the name of preventing phantom voter fraud.

Politicians at all levels of government have repeatedly, and falsely, claimed the 2016, 2018, and 2020 elections were marred by large numbers of people voting illegally. However, [extensive research](#) reveals that fraud is very rare, voter impersonation is virtually nonexistent, and many instances of alleged fraud are, in fact, mistakes by voters or administrators. The same is true for [mail ballots](#), which are secure and essential to holding a safe election amid the coronavirus pandemic.

Non-citizens are not permitted to vote in state and federal elections. It's a federal crime for noncitizens to register or vote in federal elections, and it's a crime under every state's laws. So it should come as no surprise that every legitimate study ever done on the question shows that voting by noncitizens in state and federal elections is [vanishingly rare](#).

The Brennan Center's seminal report [\*\*\*The Truth About Voter Fraud\*\*\*](#) conclusively demonstrated that most allegations of fraud turn out to be baseless and that most of the few remaining allegations reveal irregularities and other forms of election misconduct. Numerous [\*\*other studies\*\*](#), including one commissioned by the Trump administration, have reached the same conclusion.

Voter fraud is unacceptable, but we must find solutions that address actual problems instead of imposing policies that make it harder for millions of eligible Americans to participate in our democracy.

#### **D. Noncitizens Are Not Voting in Federal or State Elections — Here's Why**

*Excerpts from Brennan Center for Justice (2024)*

*States have multiple systems in place to deter noncitizen voting. Those who violate the law face prison time and deportation.*

Imagine you're an undocumented person living in the United States. You've come to this country seeking a better life for you and your family. Or maybe your parents brought you here seeking the same when you were a child. You spend your life living in very real fear that you might be noticed by the government and be deported — perhaps to a country you've never known. There's an election coming up, the outcome of which will surely impact your life. But you know you can't vote because you're not a citizen. Would you risk everything — your freedom, your life in the United States, your ability to be near your family — just to cast a single ballot?

Of course you wouldn't. It's a [\*\*federal crime\*\*](#) for noncitizens to vote in federal elections. It's also a crime under every state's laws. In fact, under federal law, you could face up to [\*\*five years in prison\*\*](#) simply for registering to vote. It's also a deportable offense for noncitizens to register or vote. And sure, people make bad decisions and commit crimes all the time. But this one is different: by committing the crime, you create a government record of your having committed it. In fact, it's the creation of the government record — the registration form or the ballot cast — that *is* the crime. So, you've not only exposed yourself to prison time and deportation, you've put yourself on the government's radar, and you've handed the government the evidence it needs to put you in prison or deport you. All so you could cast one vote. Who would do such a thing?

The answer is: just about no one. Every legitimate study ever done on the question shows that voting by noncitizens in state and federal elections is vanishingly rare. That includes the Brennan Center's [\*\*own study\*\*](#) of 42 jurisdictions in the 2016 general election. We found that election officials in those places, who oversaw the tabulation of 23.5 million votes, referred only an estimated 30 incidents of suspected noncitizen voting for further investigation or prosecution. In other words, even suspected — not proven — noncitizen votes accounted for just 0.0001 percent of the votes cast. But you don't have to take our word for it: the Cato Institute will also tell you, "[\*\*Noncitizens don't illegally vote in detectable numbers.\*\*](#)"

Maybe you're thinking that there are a bunch of noncitizens voting and getting away with it. Again, consider the fact that in order to commit these crimes you create a government record of having committed them. Indeed, anyone can look up your voter history on public voter files. And election officials conduct regular maintenance of these voter lists — in fact, they're required to by [\*\*federal law\*\*](#). Moreover, these are crimes that U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services officers are instructed to look into during the naturalization process. So, if you ever try to become a citizen, you'll be caught.

It should come as no surprise then that in the extremely rare instances when a noncitizen does cast a ballot, it's usually an accident. Sadly, **there have been times** when noncitizens are misled by mistaken officials into thinking that they're eligible — and they can face serious consequences even as a result of a mistake.

## **E. Debunking the "Non-Citizen Voting" Narrative**

### ***Excerpts from America's Voice Resource Guide (2024)***

Far too many politicians, pundits, and online commentators with massive audiences are peddling bigoted conspiracies about a plot by elites to use non-white immigrants to undermine our democracy with masses of fraudulent votes and dilute the voting power of "real" Americans. This conspiracy is a version of **replacement theory** – a lie rooted in white nationalism and antisemitism that has inspired multiple deadly terrorist attacks in recent years.

Recently, there has been a reinvigoration of a **long-debunked myth** about non-citizen voting in federal and state elections. *Non-citizens cannot vote in federal or state elections, and strict penalties for violating the law could jeopardize the individual's ability to remain in the United States.* This issue has been **deeply researched** as the claim is not new, and while there have been a few individual cases, even the most **vocal proponents** of the myth have failed to turn up any significant evidence of a problem.

These nativist voices have also been reinvigorating a disinformation narrative that the U.S. Census Bureau, when counting all persons, is counting undocumented immigrants, thus somehow "robbing" the representation of "real" Americans. This conspiratorial disinformation falls apart at a glance, but for those prone to believe the white nationalist great replacement theory, it adds another layer to the plot afoot.

These nativist lies are advancing a dual-pronged assault on our democracy. The lies sow distrust in the democratic process. But they also create the pretext of voter suppression tactics or designed undercounts in the census to strip representation away under the guise of protecting democratic representation for "real" Americans.

Below is a short resource guide to provide the facts and bust the harmful myths about "non-citizen voting," the U.S. Census, and white nationalist great replacement theory:

- Federal law already bars non-citizens from voting in federal elections, which has been the case for three decades. While the right has been **advancing claims** that "non-citizen voting" represents a threat to election integrity, including promoting legislation aimed at preventing non-citizens from casting a ballot, this is creating an issue where **none exists**. Non-citizen voting is already illegal under **federal law** and is not a common occurrence, as a variety of noted outlets and experts have stated.
- There is zero evidence of any plot of non-citizen votes to influence elections despite numerous and massive investigations, including by those leading the accusation. "There's no evidence such voting has ever happened on any significant scale," **Axios** reported. "**Multiple nationwide studies** have uncovered only a handful of incidents of non-citizens voting," the Brennan Center **stated**. "**Election officials agree** that there is no serious problem of non-citizen voting in our elections," likely due to the severe penalties that non-voters can face, including fines, prison time, and even

deportation. Even the **proponents** that peddle the myth of non-citizen voting have been **unable** to find any evidence despite their repeated claims.

- Yes, perpetuating the debunked myth of non-citizen voting can be a coded reference to the white nationalist replacement theory. The idea of noncitizen voting has been widely disproven, and promoting the myth at this point only contributes to the bigoted conspiracy that there is a group inside the United States that threatens our democracy.
- Proof of citizenship requirements are onerous and unnecessary, amounting to voter suppression. The **federal courts** have rejected proof of citizenship requirements, citing them as unnecessary potential barriers to the ballot. **Extensive research** has also shown that many United States citizens would be prevented from accessing the franchise.
- The claim that including undocumented immigrants in the U.S. Census “devalues your vote by devaluing your congressional representation” is simply false. The U.S. Census is not part of a nefarious plot to erase the votes of “real Americans.” The constitutionally mandated count of all people in the U.S., far from disempowering “real Americans,” **ensures that everyone is counted so that all communities get their full federal resources**. The more accurate a census count, the better communities’ needs can be met. Besides ensuring that Congressional seats are mostly equally distributed, the Census also helps determine where an estimated **\$2.8 trillion** in federal dollars a year will be spent. Nativists’ anti-immigrant obsession is further highlighted by the fact that they don’t have complaints about other non-voters also counted by the Census – children, prisoners, and millions of permanent residents eligible to become U.S. citizens. In short, there are plenty of people who are counted and who also can’t vote, yet opponents of immigration are not fearmongering based on them.

## Section VI: The Growing AAPI Electorate

### *Excerpts from APIA Vote*

#### **A. Overview of AAPI population and electorate**

Asian Americans, Native Hawaiians, and Pacific Islanders (AAPI) are among the fastest-growing racial demographic cohorts in the United States. With over **24 million individuals** (including mixed-race) spread across the nation, this burgeoning population has emerged as the nation's fastest-growing voter bloc. The unprecedented turnout rates witnessed in the 2020 presidential election and 2022 midterm elections underscore the increasing political influence of AAPI voters, often surpassing the margin of victory in key battleground areas.

Additionally, AAPIs are the fastest-growing electorate in the nation, and our impact is already being seen across the country. In the 2020 Presidential Election, nearly 60% of AAPIs, equivalent to 5.4 million AAPIs, turned out to vote, a historic high. This turnout was a 10% increase from 2016 - larger than any other ethnic group.

This increase was so large that AAPI voters surpassed the margin of victory in six battleground states including Pennsylvania and Arizona, and came close in several others like Texas and Michigan. This was propelled by never before seen investment, visibility, and engagement in our communities. In fact, 21% of AAPI voters in 2020 were first time voters, even larger in some battleground states, in comparison to 12% of the general population.

#### **A GROWING ELECTORATE**

##### *Presidential Battleground States*

State	AAPI First Time Voters (2020)
Arizona	<b>22.03%</b>
Florida	<b>18.10%</b>
Georgia	<b>26.43%</b>
Michigan	<b>20.31%</b>
Nevada	<b>25.38%</b>
North Carolina	<b>24.75%</b>
Pennsylvania	<b>23.53%</b>
Wisconsin	<b>17.33%</b>

##### *Other States*

State	AAPI First Time Voters (2020)
California	<b>19.70%</b>
Illinois	<b>16.67%</b>
Massachusetts	<b>19.39%</b>
Minnesota	<b>16.15%</b>
New York	<b>20.43%</b>
Ohio	<b>23.19%</b>
Oregon	<b>17.67%</b>
Texas	<b>24.75%</b>
Utah	<b>13.48%</b>
Virginia	<b>17.11%</b>
Washington	<b>15.04%</b>



In 2024, we project 5.9 million AAPIs to head to the polls if AAPI turnout matches 2020. It could reach even 6.3 million if AAPI turnout matches white turnout in 2020. AAPIs will be undeniably influential in this upcoming election.

## WHERE AAPIS CAN MAKE A DIFFERENCE IN PRESIDENTIAL RACES



State	Margin of victory in 2020 Presidential Election	Number of AAPIs Who Voted in 2020	2020 AAPI First Time Voters	Predicted 2024 CVAP
Arizona	10,457 (D)	74,164	22.03%	175,260
Georgia	11,779 (D)	142,418	26.43%	272,395
Michigan	154,188 (D)	109,688	20.31%	211,603
Nevada	33,596 (D)	74,983	25.38%	205,990
North Carolina	74,483 (R)	89,605	24.75%	198,835
Pennsylvania	80,555 (D)	144,131	23.53%	292,266
Texas	631,221 (R)	444,700	17.33%	904,275
Wisconsin	20,682 (D)	49,264	17.33%	45,801

Source: Cook Political Report (August 2023), Census, and TargetSmart

To address the rapid growth and impact of AAPI communities, [state-specific AAPI voter demographic fact sheets](#) are regularly updated every two years. These comprehensive resources offer essential insights into AAPI population metrics and voter engagement indicators tailored to all 50 states and the District of Columbia. [T]hese AAPI voter demographic state fact sheets provide invaluable insights, including:

- Number and growth of eligible AAPI voters
- Number and growth of AAPI population
- Vote share of the total electorate
- Counties with the highest AAPI populations
- Largest AA and NHPI ethnicities
- Languages other than English spoken at home
- Voter engagement levels
- Social economic challenges

## B. AAPI Population Growth Across Key States

The AAPI community has witnessed remarkable population growth between 2012-2022, especially in states where the AAPI voting bloc holds significant influence with a vote share of 4% or higher. Notable examples include:

- Nevada (45.1% AAPI population growth, 11.97% AAPI vote share)
- California (20.9% growth, 17.34% vote share)
- Washington (50.3% growth, 10.44% vote share)
- Hawaii (3.7% growth, 66.98% vote share)
- New Jersey (24.3% growth, 9.05% vote share)
- Illinois (27.8% growth, 5.53% vote share)

- New York (22.9% growth, 8.35% vote share)
- Virginia (34.7% growth, 7.12% vote share)
- Texas (62.3% growth, 5.44% vote share)

### **Geographic Concentration Across Top Counties**

While the AAPI population is spread nationwide, certain counties have emerged as hubs with significantly higher AAPI concentrations. These include:

- Los Angeles County (15%) and Santa Clara County (39.2%) in California
- Honolulu County in Hawaii (48.2%)
- Clark County in Nevada (10.7%)
- Middlesex County in New Jersey (25%)
- King County in Washington (19.8%)
- Queens County in New York (26.1%)
- Fairfax County in Virginia (20.3%)
- Harris County in Texas (7.1%)

### **Language and Assimilation Challenges**

A considerable portion of the AAPI population is foreign-born, with many states reporting over 50% of AAPI residents speaking languages other than English at home. Limited English proficiency is also a notable challenge, impacting access to opportunities and services.

### **Socioeconomic Disparities**

Poverty and lack of health insurance coverage are persistent issues for some segments of the AAPI community. Certain states have higher rates of AAPI poverty and uninsured residents, highlighting the need for targeted support and resources.

### **National AAPI Population Statistics (2022):**

- Total AAPI Population: 24,823,527
- Total Eligible AAPI Voters: 13,468,896
- Total AAPI Foreign-Born Non-Citizens: 3,497,682
- Total AAPI Foreign-Born Citizens: 4,781,589
- Total AAPI Native-Born Citizens: 15,841,713


These insights shed light on the dynamic growth of the AAPI community across states with substantial voting power, as well as the geographic concentration in specific counties, underscoring the increasing influence of this diverse population segment. Here is an example of the [state-specific AAPI voter demographic fact sheets](#).

## 2024 AAPI Voter Demographics | GEORGIA

**328,471**  
ELIGIBLE AAPI VOTERS\*

**42.3%**  
AAPI VOTER ELIGIBILITY  
GROWTH (2012-2022)

**4.16%**  
AAPI SHARE OF  
ELECTORATE IN GEORGIA



**151,565**  
FOREIGN BORN  
NONCITIZENS

**181,530**  
FOREIGN BORN  
CITIZENS

**238,132**  
NATIVE BORN  
CITIZENS

\* Includes multi-racial population

### COUNTIES WITH HIGHEST AAPI POPULATIONS

	AAPI Share of County Pop	Size of AAPI Population	AAPI Eligible Voter Share of County	Number of AAPI Eligible Voters
Gwinnett County	12.8%	122,482	20.7%	65,695
Fulton County	7.6%	80,882	10.5%	38,387
DeKalb County	6.2%	47,549	8.9%	21,275
Cobb County	5.6%	42,946	8%	22,134
Forsyth County	16.6%	42,032	25.9%	14,553

### LARGEST ASIAN AMERICAN ETHNIC GROUPS IN GEORGIA

Asian Indian (177,310)	Chinese, except Taiwanese (80,468)	Korean (73,280)	Vietnamese (72,518)	Filipino (51,636)	Japanese (23,741)
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### LARGEST NHPI ETHNIC GROUPS IN GEORGIA

Native Hawaiian (7,556)	Chamorro (3,659)	Samoan (2,276)
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#PowerInNumbers

**APIAVOTE**  **AAPI DATA**  
DATA. NARRATIVE. ACTION.

## 2024 AAPI Voter Demographics | GEORGIA

### AAPI CITIZEN VOTING AGE POPULATION (CVAP)

**36.8%**

Voters aged 50+

**24.9%**

Voters aged 18-29

### VOTER ENGAGEMENT (National Level Data)

- Voter contact falls short for AAPIs. In the 2022 Asian American Voter Survey (AAVS), 56% of Asian Americans had no or uncertain contact from the Democrats. 66% reported the same from the Republicans.
- Of contacted Asian American registered voters, 44% reported outreach from Democrats, 35% from Republicans, 39% from community groups. Comparatively, in 2016, 48% reported Democratic outreach, 16% from the Republicans.
- 37% of registered Asian Americans did not identify with either party, signaling need and opportunity for voter education via outreach.

### IMPORTANCE OF LANGUAGE ACCESS

Per the 2022 AAVS, of Asian Americans speaking non-English languages at home, 11% reported language barriers to voting and 42% stated voting assistance in their language would be utilized. (National level data).

**64.5%** of Asian American adults in GA speak a language other than English at home.

**33.9%** of Asian American adults in GA are **Limited English Proficient** (speak English less than "Very well")

**Vietnamese** (56,572)   **Chinese** (54,776)   **Korean** (46,592)   **Hindi** (32,636)   **Gujarati** (22,225)

**Other Eastern Malayo-Polynesian languages** (1,017)   **Samoan** (304)   **Chamorro** (257)

#### TOP 5 ASIAN LANGUAGES SPOKEN IN GA

#### TOP NHPI LANGUAGES WITH 100+ ESTIMATED SPEAKERS IN GA

### SOCIOECONOMIC CHALLENGES IN GEORGIA



About 9.4% Asian Americans and 15% NHPIs in Georgia live in poverty.



About 9.2% Asian Americans and 16% NHPIs in Georgia lack health insurance.



About 10.5% Asian Americans and 14.5% NHPIs in Georgia lack broadband access.

#PowerInNumbers

**APIAVOTE**  AAPI DATA  
DATA - HARMONY - ACTION