CMBS Maturities Update

2009

Revised March 2010

REALpac
Real Property Association of Canada
Association des biens immobiliers du Canada

About REALpac

REALpac, the Real Property Association of Canada, is Canada's senior national real property association whose mission is to bring together the country's real property investment leaders to collectively influence public policy, to educate government and the public, and to ensure stable and beneficial real estate capital and property markets in Canada. REALpac members currently own in excess of CDN $150 Billion in real estate assets located in the major centres across Canada and include real estate investment trusts (REITs), publicly traded and large private companies, banks, brokerages, crown corporations, investment dealers, life companies, and pension funds. Visit REALpac at www.realpac.ca.

Released September 2009, reissued on October 1, 2009, revised and reissued on March 30, 2010

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CMBS MATURITIES UPDATE: 2009

1. INTRODUCTION

The fundamental premise behind the rise of the Commercial Mortgage Backed Security ("CMBS") market is that it does not make sense to take whole loan risk when, for an equal or greater return, one could take a position in a security designed to provide diversification. Starting in 1997, under the eye of credit rating agencies, Special Purpose Vehicles ("SPV") pooled whole loans and structured them into CMBS that were purchased by mainly Canadian institutional investors. Over time, the CMBS structure was accepted by the market as an efficient means to transfer risk and became an important source of liquidity. The drawback of the CMBS structure is that it creates risks that are difficult to hedge for both borrowers and investors. The availability of liquidity funded by CMBS conduit loans depends on the amount of demand in the secondary debt market for CMBS paper. When this demand dried up in 2008, so did an important source of liquidity, leaving the Canadian Commercial Real Estate ("CRE") market in uncharted waters.

This study extends the analysis done in the 2008 Maturity Update undertaken by the Real Property Association of Canada ("REALpac"), to provide the most comprehensive overview of the Canadian CMBS market done to date. In particular, it seeks to resolve the question of what will happen when loans with conduit debt mature and borrowers return to the traditional capital market for refinancing. The main findings of this study are that the decline in the Canadian CMBS market has created a modest funding gap with little potential to be a channel for financial instability. However, the risk of concentrated losses for some market participants cannot be ruled out.

In Section 2, the summary statistics of maturing loan balances are presented by securitization, province, property type, and originator. In Section 3, the Loan to Value ("LTV)" of the total maturing balances by year are stress tested under different assumptions regarding Net Operating Income ("NOI") growth and capitalization rate spreads. A discussion of the results and concluding remarks follow in Section 4.

2. SUMMARY STATISTICS OF MATURING LOAN BALANCES

Undertaking this research required constructing a comprehensive database containing the individual properties underlying Canadian CMBS issued between 1997 and 2007. The data was extracted directly from prospectuses found on SEDAR, CMBS.com, CTSLink and DBRS.

In total, the sample contained 3,722 loans from 55 securitizations with a total maturing balance of $16.6B (all values expressed in Canadian dollars). A summary profile of the annual maturing balances between the years 2009 and 2031 is presented in Chart 1, of the maturing balance by property type in Chart 2, and of the maturing balance by geographic location in Chart 3.

Chart 1: Aggregate Loan Balance at Maturity 2009-2031



Chart 2: Maturing Balance by Property Type



Chart 3: Maturing Balance by Province



For 2008, 2009 and 2010, the maturing balance of CMBS loans is approximately $1B per year rising in 2012 to $1.6B. The bulk of the maturity activity will take place between 2015 and 2017 peaking in 2016 at $2.9B. The geographic distribution of the total outstanding maturing balance is as follows: 46% is in Ontario, 17% in Quebec, 17% in Alberta and the remainder distributed between British Columbia, Atlantic Canada, and other Western Canadian provinces.[1] The distribution of the total maturing balance by property type is as follows: 36% is in Retail, 22% in Office, 16% in Multi-family Residential, 11% in Industrial, 5% in Hospitality, and 9% in Other.[2]

A detailed breakdown of the maturing balances for each year between 2009 and 2031 is presented in Schedules A, B, and C. The maturing balances for each year by securitization are given in Schedule A, by province in Schedule B, by property type in Schedule C. A discussion of the notable findings follows below.

Schedule A shows that the bulk of CMBS loan issuance was done in 2005, 2006, and 2007 by the Special Purpose Vehicles (SPV) of Merrill Lynch, Royal Bank of Canada, TD Bank, and CIBC World Markets. During

[1] Other Western Canada provinces consist of Saskatchewan, Manitoba, Yukon, Nunavut, and the Northwest Territories. Atlantic Canada consists of Nova Scotia, New Brunswick, Prince Edward Island, Newfoundland, and Labrador.
[2] The category "Other" consists of Self Storage, Mobile Home Communities, Retirement Homes, land, Parking etc.

these three years, MLFA, REALT, Schooner Trust, and CIBC securitized 24 pools of assets that have an outstanding balance at maturity of $8.5B, which is approximately 61% of the total outstanding balance of all CMBS debt. The five year debt issued between 2005 and 2007 comes due between 2010 and 2013 and the 10 year debt between 2015 and 2017.

Schedule B shows that the geographic distribution of the maturing balances is heavily weighted in Ontario. To put this weighting in context, Table 1 (below) shows the percentage of maturing balance by province compared with each province's contribution to total Gross Domestic Product ("GDP") and population.[3] While the allocation is clearly over weighted towards Ontario, the overall geographic diversification of the properties is reasonable.

Table 1: Geographic Distribution of Maturity Balance, GDP and Population

	British Columbia	Alberta	Prairies	Ontario	Quebec	Maritimes
% Total Mat Balance	8%	17%	4%	46%	17%	7%
% GDP	12%	18%	8%	37%	19%	6%
% Population	13%	11%	7%	39%	23%	7%

From Schedule C, it is notable that the combined size of the categories Hospitality and Other represent 14% of the outstanding balance at maturity as these assets may be considered second tier and may be in outlying markets. Anecdotally, conduit lenders were lending at higher LTV's than traditional portfolio lenders on these properties making it possible that borrowers will be required to put up additional equity to obtain new financing.

3. STRESS TEST OF MATURING CMBS BALANCES

Going forward, refinancing will be challenging for properties with LTV's exceeding 60% unless conditions in the CRE market improve in the form of either falling cap rates and/or a relaxation of current underwriting standards.[4] To get a handle on the size of the potential problem, stress tests estimating the LTV of maturing loans were conducted. The purpose of the stress tests is to simulate the LTV of maturing loans under adverse assumptions about NOI growth and future Cap Rate levels.[5] A step-by-step description of the methodology used to conduct the analysis, and Table 6 containing results, follows:

[3] By province Population and GDP statistics were obtained from the Statistics Canada homepage (www.statcan.gc.ca), August 2009.
[4] It is unlikely properties with LTVs exceeding 65% at maturity will be able to refinance without either putting up equity or substantially strengthening covenants.
[5] Using the underwritten appraised value found in the CMBS prospectuses and historic Cap Rate data provided by CBRE. It should be noted that these simulations provide an estimate of the magnitude under various scenarios of the potential refinancing problem but are not forecasts or expected outcomes.

- The **NOI at origination** of each property is estimated by multiplying the underwritten appraised value by the cap rate specific to the property type and province of the property.
- The **NOI at maturity** is estimated assuming annual NOI growth of -1%, 0%, 1% and 2% for the term of the loan.
- The **property value at maturity** is estimated by dividing the estimated NOI at maturity by the 2009 Q1 cap rate plus a spread of 0%, .5%, 1%, 1.5% and 2%.
- The **estimated LTV at maturity** is obtained by dividing the outstanding balance at maturity by the estimated property value at maturity.

As can be seen in Table 2 below, the main concern is for loans maturing in 2017, which are mostly 10 year loans secured in 2007.

Table 2.

Projected Average Loan To Value of Maturing Balances by Year 2009 - 2019

2010	-1% NOI	% NOI	1% NOI	2% NOI
Cap Rates Constant	47%	43%	40%	37%
Cap Rates up .5%	50%	46%	42%	39%
Cap Rates up 1%	52%	48%	45%	41%
Cap Rates up 1.5%	55%	51%	47%	43%
Cap Rates up 2%	57%	53%	49%	46%

2011	-1% NOI	% NOI	1% NOI	2% NOI
Cap Rates Constant	46%	42%	39%	36%
Cap Rates up .5%	48%	45%	41%	38%
Cap Rates up 1%	51%	47%	44%	40%
Cap Rates up 1.5%	54%	50%	46%	43%
Cap Rates up 2%	57%	52%	48%	45%

2012	-1% NOI	% NOI	1% NOI	2% NOI
Cap Rates Constant	47%	44%	41%	38%
Cap Rates up .5%	50%	46%	43%	40%
Cap Rates up 1%	53%	49%	45%	42%
Cap Rates up 1.5%	56%	51%	48%	44%
Cap Rates up 2%	58%	54%	50%	46%

2013	-1% NOI	% NOI	1% NOI	2% NOI
Cap Rates Constant	48%	43%	40%	36%
Cap Rates up .5%	50%	46%	42%	38%
Cap Rates up 1%	53%	48%	44%	40%
Cap Rates up 1.5%	56%	51%	46%	42%
Cap Rates up 2%	59%	53%	49%	44%

2014	-1% NOI	% NOI	1% NOI	2% NOI
Cap Rates Constant	55%	50%	45%	41%
Cap Rates up .5%	58%	53%	48%	44%
Cap Rates up 1%	61%	56%	51%	46%
Cap Rates up 1.5%	64%	58%	53%	49%
Cap Rates up 2%	67%	61%	56%	51%

2015	-1% NOI	% NOI	1% NOI	2% NOI
Cap Rates Constant	53%	48%	44%	40%
Cap Rates up .5%	56%	51%	47%	42%
Cap Rates up 1%	59%	54%	49%	45%
Cap Rates up 1.5%	62%	57%	52%	47%
Cap Rates up 2%	65%	59%	54%	49%

2016	-1% NOI	% NOI	1% NOI	2% NOI
Cap Rates Constant	65%	65%	54%	49%
Cap Rates up .5%	69%	69%	57%	52%
Cap Rates up 1%	73%	73%	60%	54%
Cap Rates up 1.5%	77%	77%	63%	57%
Cap Rates up 2%	81%	81%	66%	60%

2017	-1% NOI	% NOI	1% NOI	2% NOI
Cap Rates Constant	67%	60%	55%	50%
Cap Rates up .5%	71%	64%	58%	52%
Cap Rates up 1%	75%	67%	61%	55%
Cap Rates up 1.5%	78%	71%	64%	58%
Cap Rates up 2%	82%	74%	67%	61%

2018	-1% NOI	% NOI	1% NOI	2% NOI
Cap Rates Constant	55%	49%	43%	38%
Cap Rates up .5%	58%	51%	46%	41%
Cap Rates up 1%	61%	54%	48%	43%
Cap Rates up 1.5%	64%	57%	50%	45%
Cap Rates up 2%	67%	59%	53%	47%

2019	-1% NOI	% NOI	1% NOI	2% NOI
Cap Rates Constant	54%	42%	33%	26%
Cap Rates up .5%	57%	45%	35%	28%
Cap Rates up 1%	60%	50%	37%	29%
Cap Rates up 1.5%	63%	50%	39%	31%
Cap Rates up 2%	66%	52%	41%	32%

Next, three simulations were realized in order to create a watch list of potentially problematic loans. First, as a best case, the conservative assumptions of zero NOI growth from origination and that cap rates will remain constant at 2009 levels were used. Under that scenario the simulated average LTV at maturity for each year does not exceed 60%. For the medium case, cap rates were assumed to rise 1% over the 2009 levels. Under that scenario, the average simulated LTV would break 60% only in the years 2011, 2012, 2016, and 2017. Finally, as a worst case, cap rates were assumed to rise 2% over the 2009 levels. Under that scenario the average simulated LTV remains reasonably low. The fact that these loans in aggregate are robust, after such a severe shock, is a strong indication that refinancing will not be a significant issue.

Drilling deeper into the data and looking only at the loans whose simulated LTV exceed 65% at maturity yields some interesting facts. Of the 366 loans on the best-case watch list, 68% were issued by U.S. conduit lenders. Of these loans, 40% had terms of five years or less. It is notable that there were no properties on the watchlist with simulated LTV exceeding 100% under current cap rates. Borrowers with loans on the watch list have time to seek alternative financing and the defeasance space promises to be active. Table 2 summarizes the findings of this analysis.

Table 3.

Year	Total Maturing Balance	Simulated LTV (2009 Cap Rates)	Simulated LTV (2009 CR + 1%)	Simulated LTV (2009 CR + 2%)	Watchlist Loans (2009 Cap Rates)	Watchlist Loans (2009 CR + 1%)	Watchlist Loans (2009 CR + 2%)
2010	$ 1,188,326,739	49%	55%	61%	$ 110,693,419	$ 212,691,346	$ 405,776,208
2011	$ 1,037,789,228	53%	59%	66%	$ 195,613,169	$ 327,175,494	$ 409,270,958
2012	$ 1,631,234,808	49%	55%	61%	$ 152,247,927	$ 280,381,643	$ 366,826,126
2013	$ 1,066,953,685	46%	52%	57%	$ 41,706,662	$ 179,543,349	$ 402,061,790
2014	$ 1,201,885,858	45%	51%	56%	$ 97,788,007	$ 217,420,944	$ 387,712,326
2015	$ 2,127,305,350	49%	54%	60%	$ 105,634,304	$ 469,010,331	$ 942,450,473
2016	$ 2,866,717,607	55%	61%	68%	$ 589,697,954	$ 1,605,506,822	$ 1,917,486,628
2017	$ 1,726,204,301	58%	65%	72%	$ 608,898,842	$ 867,806,168	$ 996,480,182

4. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUDING REMARKS

The liquidity provided by the CMBS benefited borrowers who enjoyed lower spreads, higher LTV ratios and the availability of non-recourse debt. Traditional portfolio lenders suffered as their margins fell and they were forced to compete on underwriting standards.

There is currently no evidence to support that maturity default in the Canadian CMBS market poses a systemic risk requiring government intervention. Refinancing risk is most concentrated in loans originated in 2006 and 2007 by U.S. conduit lenders. Provided that capitalization rates do not rise across the board by more than 1%, the risk is manageable and can easily be absorbed by opportunistic funds and more aggressive lenders. The implications for the Canadian capital market going forward is that until these loans work their way through the system there will be little pressure for spreads to fall or for underwritten LTV's to increase. Even then, the effect of the problem loans should be small relative to the overall commercial mortgage market.

It will take a while for investors to regain their appetite for these securities. Investors will also likely take a "wait and see" approach to see how the first iteration of the CMBS experiment fares before committing further capital to this structure. While they are waiting, and until the capital market normalizes, the risk-adjusted returns for selectively taking on whole loan risk will be high as lenders will be able to be more selective than in past years.

SCHEDULE A

Loan Balance at Maturity by Securitization 2009 - 2031

Securitization	Number of properties	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2026	2030	2031	Total
Merrill Lynch Financial Assets																
MLFA Series 1998 Canada - 1	4	$ 2,528,220														$ 2,528,220
MLFA Series 1998 Canada - 2	33	$ 118,093,716														$ 118,093,716
MLFA Series 2000 Canada - 3	37	$ 50,621,932	$ 118,986,252													$ 169,608,184
MLFA Series 2000 Canada - 4	55		$ 190,001,121	$ 6,190,546				$ 3,958,617								$ 200,150,284
MLFA Series 2001 Canada - 6	24			$ 126,836,352					$ 6,715,570							$ 133,551,921
MLFA Series 2002 Canada - 7	39	$ 6,697,519	$ 3,697,474	$ 22,915,272	$ 143,501,796		$ 2,033,728									$ 178,845,789
MLFA Series 2002 Canada - 8	52	$ 2,099,087			$ 199,223,513	$ 1,747,909			$ 2,162,954	$ 1,352,161						$ 206,585,623
MLFA Series 2003 Canada - 9	4	$ 6,564,681	$ 2,358,702													$ 8,923,384
MLFA Series 2003 Canada - 10	55		$ 13,579,616	$ 10,141,704	$ 75,807,096	$ 190,729,650	$ 13,184,354	$ 4,327,490	$ 4,088,805							$ 311,858,716
MLFA Series 2003 Canada - 11	6	$ 20,478,628														$ 20,478,628
MLFA Series 2004 Canada - 12	57	$ 62,082,708	$ 10,211,642	$ 2,042,214		$ 196,133,215	$ 166,880,455									$ 437,350,234
MLFA Series 2004 Canada - 14	51	$ 148,809,171					$ 207,285,563	$ 38,191,063	$ 8,325,249							$ 402,611,046
MLFA Series 2005 Canada - 15	58	$ 42,723,963	$ 49,077,018			$ 14,495,808	$ 153,151,710	$ 99,207,291								$ 358,655,791
MLFA Series 2005 Canada - 16	48		$ 70,411,562				$ 57,643,747	$ 233,788,514								$ 361,843,823
MLFA Series 2005 Canada - 17	50		$ 47,836,436		$ 48,797,736		$ 12,194,125	$ 262,064,711	$ 30,297,724							$ 401,190,732
MLFA Series 2006 Canada - 18	82		$ 53,373,658	$ 31,407,583	$ 47,889,387			$ 166,856,006	$ 167,228,607	$ 4,232,115						$ 470,987,355
MLFA Series 2006 Canada - 19	75		$ 974,711	$ 99,774,747		$ 21,532,455		$ 55,638,655	$ 298,202,186							$ 476,122,754
MLFA Series 2006 Canada - 20	66			$ 94,714,841	$ 12,770,301	$ 10,039,755		$ 1,278,850	$ 375,946,962							$ 494,750,709
MLFA Series 2007 Canada - 21	41			$ 14,214,200	$ 29,068,571			$ 1,421,252	$ 214,661,664	$ 43,140,232	$ 7,980,947					$ 310,486,865
MLFA Series 2007 Canada - 22	66		$ 1,524,175		$ 130,690,294	$ 4,881,880			$ 51,630,739	$ 185,121,701						$ 373,848,789
MLFA Series 2007 Canada - 23	51				$ 109,717,040		$ 6,220,990			$ 250,824,899						$ 366,762,928
N-45 First Issuer Corporation																
N-45 Series 1999 - 1	2	$ 12,766,997														$ 12,766,997
N-45 Series 2002 - 1	12			$ 67,823,261	$ 33,846,780	$ 22,621,547										$ 124,291,588
N-45 Series 2003 - 1	29	$ 9,269,354	$ 29,092,196	$ 26,399,890	$ 88,634,683	$ 71,372,046	$ 9,467,414									$ 234,235,583
Real Estate Liquidity Trust																
REALT 2004 - 1	73	$ 100,478,503	$ 10,615,088	$ 2,433,137		$ 44,751,890	$ 147,806,715									$ 306,085,334
REALT 2005 - 1	69	$ 80,127,204	$ 19,671,782		$ 8,443,390	$ 2,226,090	$ 26,612,546	$ 130,381,571								$ 267,462,582
REALT 2005 - 2	95	$ 8,211,258	$ 117,676,720					$ 355,529,446								$ 481,417,425
REALT 2006 - 1	81		$ 35,893,202	$ 42,893,805			$ 21,724,891	$ 94,920,928	$ 70,940,581				$ 11,409,317	$ 12,608,951		$ 290,391,674
REALT 2006 - 2	67			$ 37,310,052		$ 3,797,464	$ 1,192,216	$ 33,651,543	$ 189,031,069	$ 19,163,878	$ 4,532,704		$ 21,841,614			$ 310,520,540
REALT 2006 - 3	58			$ 61,510,804		$ 7,905,519	$ 11,768,699	$ 8,392,205	$ 204,077,095		$ 14,970,078		$ 1,852,542		$ 14,797,770	$ 325,274,712
REALT 2007 - 1	76				$ 32,017,051	$ 21,954,805			$ 45,713,176	$ 300,554,603	$ 2,956,634					$ 403,196,269
REALT 2007 - 2	48				$ 49,180,240					$ 247,896,366		$ 9,117,120				$ 306,193,726
Solar Schooner Trust																
Solar Trust 2001 - 1	38		$ 57,991,087	$ 86,857,518												$ 144,848,605
Solar Trust 2002 - 1	56			$ 15,510,815	$ 164,687,839											$ 180,198,654
Solar Trust 2003 - 1	59		$ 18,921,370	$ 867,478	$ 147,165,983	$ 122,542,673										$ 289,497,504
Schooner Trust Series 2004 CCF1	55				$ 19,685,614	$ 259,422,330										$ 279,107,944
Schooner Trust Series 2004 CCF2	58	$ 6,966,549		$ 40,824,183		$ 2,547,996	$ 228,124,589									$ 278,463,317
Schooner Trust Series 2005 - 3	94	$ 9,313,402	$ 5,283,198		$ 3,752,483		$ 94,880,738	$ 180,893,205								$ 294,123,026
Schooner Trust Series 2005 - 4	76		$ 99,382,249		$ 3,774,851		$ 2,959,599	$ 323,571,879								$ 429,688,578
Schooner Trust Series 2006 - 5	91		$ 7,480,427	$ 13,370,255	$ 1,955,655		$ 14,801,653	$ 121,190,818	$ 210,344,032							$ 369,142,840
Schooner Trust Series 2006 - 6	98			$ 30,297,421		$ 5,441,991		$ 2,431,954	$ 239,602,378							$ 277,773,744
Schooner Trust Series 2007 - 7	72		$ 9,783,380	$ 38,773,533	$ 23,919,228				$ 73,930,486	$ 192,239,713						$ 338,646,340
Schooner Trust Series 2007 - 8	68				$ 20,180,144		$ 21,516,029			$ 385,221,331						$ 426,917,504
Claret Trust/Claregold																
Claregold Trust 2007 - 2	69			$ 23,565,885	$ 97,873,728	$ 1,040,827		$ 9,609,352	$ 149,706,632	$ 96,457,303						$ 378,253,727
Claret Trust 2006 - 1	84	$ 103,401,473	$ 56,433,755	$ 32,831,621	$ 31,944,988	$ 23,782,901										$ 248,394,737
Column Canada Issuer Corp.																
Column 2006 WEM	1								$ 524,111,700							$ 524,111,700
Column CL 2002 - 1	34	$ 13,798,073		$ 94,527,493	$ 68,604,960		$ 2,436,098									$ 179,366,624
Falcon Trust																
Falcon 2002 SMU - 1	39	$ 51,990,601			$ 38,101,457											$ 90,092,058
Falcon 2003 - 1	45		$ 122,716,880			$ 37,984,935										$ 160,701,815
Mansfield Trust																
Mansfield Trust - 1	49	$ 40,418,203	$ 35,353,038	$ 13,754,618												$ 89,525,859
Total	2650	$ 897,441,244	$ 1,188,326,739	$ 1,037,789,228	$ 1,631,234,808	$ 1,066,953,685	$ 1,201,885,858	$ 2,127,305,350	$ 2,866,717,607	$ 1,726,204,301	$ 30,440,363	$ 9,117,120	$ 35,103,473	$ 12,608,951	$ 14,797,770	$ 13,845,926,497

SCHEDULE B

			Maturing Loan Balance by Province 2009 - 2031														
Province	Number of properties	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2026	2030	2031	Total
Alberta	349	$ 106,553,521	$ 189,495,675	$ 122,287,467	$ 195,032,942	$ 156,923,101	$ 71,315,661	$ 157,266,301	$ 1,017,376,133	$ 309,472,659			$ 5,704,658			$ 2,331,428,120
British Columbia	185	$ 71,265,027	$ 70,508,119	$ 110,418,910	$ 156,127,036	$ 71,817,238	$ 100,828,225	$ 143,358,773	$ 196,022,371	$ 196,511,909			$ 29,398,814		$ 14,797,770	$ 1,161,054,193
Maritimes	250	$ 88,493,225	$ 89,539,146	$ 40,768,865	$ 68,884,747	$ 43,448,064	$ 145,661,003	$ 206,918,318	$ 152,481,247	$ 68,306,650	$ 19,502,782					$ 924,004,048
Ontario	1323	$ 476,279,740	$ 568,141,134	$ 503,280,357	$ 674,389,258	$ 589,435,862	$ 707,463,821	$ 1,003,485,478	$ 1,029,389,147	$ 814,507,512	$ 2,956,634	$ 9,117,120		$ 12,608,951		$ 6,391,055,015
Other Western	116	$ 15,855,030	$ 96,142,888	$ 34,949,392	$ 50,719,974	$ 28,995,067	$ 19,832,110	$ 116,798,041	$ 146,193,589	$ 106,410,136						$ 615,896,227
Quebec	427	$ 126,227,704	$ 174,499,776	$ 226,084,237	$ 480,571,871	$ 176,334,353	$ 156,785,037	$ 499,478,438	$ 325,255,119	$ 230,995,436	$ 7,980,947					$ 2,404,212,918
Missing	3	$ 12,766,997			$ 5,508,979											$ 18,275,976
Total	2653	$ 897,441,244	$ 1,188,326,739	$ 1,037,789,228	$ 1,631,234,808	$ 1,066,953,685	$ 1,201,885,858	$ 2,127,305,350	$ 2,866,717,607	$ 1,726,204,301	$ 30,440,363	$ 9,117,120	$ 35,103,473	$ 12,608,951	$ 14,797,770	$ 13,845,926,497

SCHEDULE C

			Maturing Loan Balance by Property Type 2009 - 2031														
Property Type	Number of properties	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2026	2030	2031	Total
Hospitality	115	$ 14,598,009	$ 89,910,468	$ 110,364,544	$ 32,530,925	$ 58,621,731	$ 89,369,823	$ 98,305,382	$ 45,829,925	$ 79,098,625			$ 35,103,473	$ 12,608,951	$ 14,797,770	$ 681,139,626
Industrial	510	$ 128,737,384	$ 164,819,586	$ 140,502,907	$ 171,854,148	$ 70,042,430	$ 116,221,707	$ 199,713,107	$ 360,872,982	$ 128,144,457						$ 1,480,908,707
Missing	85	$ 51,990,601	$ 122,716,880		$ 43,610,436	$ 37,984,935										$ 256,302,852
Office	418	$ 134,021,257	$ 158,058,990	$ 287,937,670	$ 324,391,619	$ 242,645,755	$ 258,027,857	$ 397,232,325	$ 656,766,917	$ 571,934,543	$ 2,956,634					$ 3,033,973,567
Other	294	$ 120,301,170	$ 56,487,828	$ 49,297,550	$ 151,402,803	$ 44,515,310	$ 92,664,207	$ 201,422,051	$ 179,875,743	$ 297,221,380	$ 14,970,078					$ 1,208,158,120
Multifamily	443	$ 182,977,668	$ 156,656,158	$ 59,837,886	$ 400,208,244	$ 139,127,272	$ 134,381,001	$ 461,890,412	$ 450,305,728	$ 215,893,698	$ 7,980,947					$ 2,209,259,014
Retail	788	$ 264,815,155	$ 439,676,830	$ 389,848,671	$ 507,236,634	$ 474,016,252	$ 511,221,263	$ 768,742,072	$ 1,173,066,312	$ 433,911,598	$ 4,532,704	$ 9,117,120				$ 4,976,184,610
Total	2653	$ 897,441,244	$ 1,188,326,739	$ 1,037,789,228	$ 1,631,234,808	$ 1,066,953,685	$ 1,201,885,858	$ 2,127,305,350	$ 2,866,717,607	$ 1,726,204,301	$ 30,440,363	$ 9,117,120	$ 35,103,473	$ 12,608,951	$ 14,797,770	$ 13,845,926,497



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