



Web-Applications under attack

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Agenda

- Introduction
- The threats
- Security testing
- Prevention
- Summary




Who is cirosec

- A small company focused on IT Security
 - Founded 2002 by a team that has been working together in IT Security for over 13 years
 - Primarily consulting
 - Audits, penetration tests, risk analysis, training, projects
 - Product resale in niches
 - Innovative topics instead of firewalls
- Our main asset is knowledge and experience
 - Known experts, speakers and authors



Books published by cirosec employees

- Klein:
Buffer Overflows und Format-String-Schwachstellen
dpunkt Verlag
- Strobel: Firewalls
dpunkt Verlag
- Klein: Linux Sicherheit
dpunkt Verlag
- Gundel: Firewalls im
Unternehmenseinsatz
dpunkt Verlag
- Middendorf, Singer:
Java Programmierhandbuch
und Referenz, dpunkt Verlag





Recent publications


- Most frequently iX and ct, but also Computerzeitung, Computerwoche, IT-Sicherheit, Informationweek ...
- Past articles in iX e.g.
 - Data Loss Prevention
 - WAFs, application scanners
 - Many conference reviews
 - Security Information Management
 - Measures and metrics in IT security
 - Source code analysis
 - Memory analysis in Incident Response




speaking engagements

- At more than 20 conferences / events in the last 12 months
 - currently at HITB
- Lecturers at different universities in our area
- cirosec's own conference "IT-Defense"


Abstract structure of the problem



Attacking the web server



Attacking databases



Your view

The image shows a screenshot of the QUELLE.de website in a Mozilla Firefox browser. The browser's address bar contains the URL: `https://www.quelle.de/EUR/Q_ViewRegistration-View;sid=N3aAFa0GDroAL-51UYIsAc5OU4HhvwJ`. A blue callout box labeled "URL" points to this address bar. Another blue callout box labeled "Session ID" points to the "sid=" parameter in the URL. The website header features the QUELLE logo and a search bar. A navigation menu includes categories like "Home", "Aktuelles", "Mode für SIE", "Mode für IHN", "Baby, Kind & Spielen", "Technik & Multimedia", "Haus & Garten", "Freizeit, Sport & Reisen", "Schmuck & Uhren", and "Blumen & Geschenke". A "Meine Quelle" sidebar on the left lists user preferences and account options. The main content area is titled "Meine QUELLE - Anmeldung" and contains a registration form. A blue callout box labeled "Login form" points to the "Benutzername" and "Passwort" fields at the top right. Another blue callout box labeled "Form for address data" points to the "Kundendaten" section of the registration form, which includes fields for "Titel", "Vorname", "Name", "Strasse", "Haus-Nr.", "PLZ", "Ort", "Geburtsdatum", and "Staatsangehörigkeit". A "Hilfe zur Anmeldung" section is visible at the bottom right.

URL

Session ID

Login form

Form for address data

... and the attacker's view

Parameter manipulation possible?

The image shows a screenshot of the QUELLE.de website's registration page. The browser window title is "quelle.de - Mozilla Firefox" and the address bar shows the URL "https://www.quelle.de/EUR/Q_ViewRegistration-View;sid=N3aAFa0GDrOAL-51UW5ac5OU4HhvwJ". The page features the QUELLE logo, a search bar, and a navigation menu. The main content area is a registration form titled "Meine QUELLE - Anmelden". The form includes fields for "Frau*" and "Herr*", "Titel", "Vorname:*", "Name:*", "Strasse:*", "Haus-Nr.:", "PLZ:*", "Ort:*", "Geburtsdatum (TT.MM.JJ):*", and "Staatsangehörigkeit:". There are also callouts for "Mein Warenkorb" and "Meine Quelle | Mein Konto | Meine Post".

Forceful Browsing?

Brute force?

SQL Injection? (Bypass Login)

Hidden Manipulation?


Buffer overflows?

Cross Site Scripting


example: SQL Injection

**1; update set price = 1
where artikel like %notebook**

select info from
products where
id = 1;
update set price
= 1 where artikel
like %notebook







Shopping
application



**Prices beeing
changed**

Internal
database



cirosec







Some more examples

- CSRF
 - Start illegal transactions
- Weaknesses in the session management
 - Manipulation of session IDs
 - Session Fixation
 - Privilege escalation, access to other people's data
- Logical bugs in the application
 - Download of arbitrary files
 - Negative money transfers
- New challenges because of AJAX
- And many more



What is AJAX?

- **A**synchronous **J**avaScript and **X**ML
- HTTP-requests within HTML-pages without page reload
- Since 2005, similar technology existing since 1998 (Outlook Web Access/IE4)
- Used in many well known web sites:
 - Google Suggest
 - Google Maps
 - Flickr
 - Del.icio.us
 - ...






Classic model of web applications






AJAX model



- Transfer of logic to the client side




Classical web process flow





AJAX process flow





Old threats

- ...remain the same
- AJAX requests are normal HTTP requests
- Known attacks like SQL-Injection, XSS or File-Inclusion are still relevant




New threats because of AJAX

- Server side
 - Attack surface increased because of more parameters
 - Input validation?
 - Unauthorized / unauthenticated use of AJAX functions
- Client side
 - More logic on the client side
 - Vulnerabilities in client side code




Vulnerable authentication






Vulnerable authentication





SAP based web applications





SAP HTTP Services

- More than 150 services in a raw server
 - Web GUI, SOAP, etc.
- Enumeration and audit with Webinspect
 - Custom policy created by cirosec

example: SAP-Info over HTTP

<http://172.16.0.106:8001/sap/public/info?icm=1>

```
- <RFC<BR>  <RFCPROTO>011</RFCPROTO><BR>  <RFCCHARTYP>4103</RFCCHARTYP><BR>  <RFCINTTYP>LIT</RFCINTTYP><BR>  <RFCFLOTYP>IE3</RFCFLOTYP><BR>  <RFCDEST>sapn4s_N4S_01</RFCDEST><BR>  <RFCHOST>sapn4s</RFCHOST><BR>  <RFCSYSID>N4S</RFCSYSID><BR>  <RFCDATABS>N4S</RFCDATABS><BR>  <RFCDBHOST>sapn4s</RFCDBHOST><BR>  <RFCDBSYS>ADABAS D</RFCDBSYS><BR>  <RFSAPRL>700</RFSAPRL><BR>  <RFCMACH>390</RFCMACH><BR>  <RFCOPSYS>Linux</RFCOPSYS><BR>  <RFCTZONE>3600</RFCTZONE><BR>  <RFCDAYST /><BR>  <RFCIPADDR>172.16.0.106</RFCIPADDR><BR>  <RFCKERNRL>700</RFCKERNRL><BR>  <RFCHOST2>sapn4s</RFCHOST2><BR>  <RFC<BR>  <RFCRESV /><BR>  <RFCIPV6ADDR>172.16.0.106</RFCIPV6ADDR>
```

Database
(SAP Max DB)

SAP Version

OS Version

Internal IP-Address



WebInspect SAP Policy

http://172.16.0.106:8001/sap/bc/gui/sap/its/webgui

SSO logon not possible; logon tickets not activated on the server

Choose "Logon" to continue A dialog box appears in which you enter your user name and password

No switch to HTTPS occurred, so it is not secure to send a

System: N4S
Client *: 001
Users: Via Popup
Password: Via Popup
Language: English

Accessibility

[Change logon & password](#)

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Access to SAP GUI

Default-Accounts

Bad / missing password



Security for web applications

New threats can not be mitigated with old technology

Fight the root cause

- secure programming
- secure architecture
- regular security testing

Prevent exploitation

- new technologies and products



1. Fight the root cause



Coding guidelines for secure development

- Need awareness and support
 - Hacker trainings have proven to be successful here
- Should be developed together with the developers
- Source code analysis tools can help to constantly remind people of the guidelines



Secure coding is not a full solution

- Limited influence due to foreign code
 - Libraries, platforms, frameworks, backends
- People make mistakes
 - Doing input validation right is not as simple as it seems



2. Testing security



Application audits / pentests

- During development
 - Security testing tools integrated in the development environment
- During QA
 - Security as part of quality
 - Security testing while testing anyway
- Before going into production
 - By security experts

- The earlier the cheaper



Different approaches

- From the outside
 - With tools like Webinspect and manual work
- Looking inside the code
 - Source code analysis tools and manual work
- Combination of both

- Tools are important even if more time is spent doing manual checks



Automated black box tests

- Checking for the existence of
 - Standard (sub) directories
 - Backup or config files
- Checking the reaction to input
 - `<script>` being output
 - Error messages to special character input
 - Internal server error
 - ODBC Error
- And much more



3. Prevent exploitation



WAFs

- Gateways in front of the web server farm
- can validate input where applications do not
- Can track session state
- And much more



Summary

- Web application security is and remains an important issue
- Security testing needs to be done earlier in the lifecycle
- The right tools make things easier
- Awareness and trainings must not be left out